HISTORY
OF
TRANSYLVANIA

Nagyszőlős Mts.

Máramaros Mts.

O b c s i n e k

Borsa Pass

Radna Mts.

Radna Pass

C y b l e s

OS REGION

Nagy-Szamos

Borgó Mts.

NASZÓD REGION

Beszterce

BESZTERCE RÉGION

Kelemen Mts.

B e s z t e r c e M t s.

S t î n i ş o a r ă

nos Hills

Maros

Csíkó

Tölgyes Pass

MEZŐSÉG

Görgény

GYERGYÓ

Görgény

Gyergyó Mts.

Békás Pass

T a r k ő

A MEZŐSÉG

Mts.

Gyimes Pass

RESZTES-MEZŐ

ÁNYOS-ZÉK

S

MAROSSZÉK

SÓVIDÉK

FELCSÍK

Tatros

Küküllő

Kis-Küküllő

U D V A R H E L Y S Z É K

H a r g i t a

CSÍK

Csík Mts.

K ü k ü l l ő   H i l l s

Nagy-Küküllő

S Z É K E L Y F Ö L D

ALCSÍK

Homoród

KASZONSZÉK

Nemere

Ojtoz Pass

Hortobágy

BARDÓC-SZÉK

KÉZDISZÉK

ÁSZFÖLD

(KIRÁLYFÖLD)

P e r s á n y   M t s.

MIKLÓSVÁR-SZÉK

Barót Mts.

Baro

Bodok Mts.

SEPSISZÉK

Ő L D

SZEBEN BASIN

Sebes

Homoród

FOGARASFÖLD

HÁROMSZÉK

Bereck (Háromszéki) Mts.

Szeben Mts.

Olt

Vöröstorony Pass

Fogaras Mts.

Feketeügy

ORBAISZÉK

Bodza Pass

B A R C A S Á G

HÉTFALU

Brassó

Királykő

Mts.

Csukás

Tatár Pass

Törcsvár Pass

B u c s e c s

Tömös Pass

C o z i a

Căpăţîna

Olt

Argeş

Ialomiţa

Bâsca

History
of Transylvania

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By

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Contents

Preface to the English Edition

According to current usage, the geographical name "Transylvania" refers to the Romanian province lying west and north of the Carpathians and bordering on Hungary. Originally, only the territory between the Carpathians and the Bihar Mountains constituted historic Transylvania, which in mediaeval times used to be an organic part of the Hungarian state. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the so-called Partium (the areas lying west and north of the mediaeval Transylvania), and even the Banat, belonged to the Principality of Transylvania, then under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. (Before 1526 these regions belonged to different administrative units of the Kingdom of Hungary.) Historic Transylvania was a Habsburg principality from the late seventeenth century until 1867, except for a brief interval from 1848 until 1849 when it was reunited with Hungary. From 1867 until 1918 Transylvania belonged to Hungary, with both being included in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The modern definition of Transylvania was formulated after 1920 to include areas outside historic Transylvania. This new Transylvania was split into two by the so-called Second Vienna Award (30 August, 1940), which gave the northern and eastern parts back to Hungary. Then, in late 1944, these same areas were given back to Romania and this arrangement was sanctioned by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.

From the previous paragraph it must already be apparent that the history of Transylvania right up until the twentieth century, has been characterized by a series of annexations predominantly determined by considerations of power politics. In Transylvania, Romanians, Hungarians and Saxons have been living side by side for centuries, together with other, smaller, ethnic groups. Ever since the nationality issue came to the fore, ethnic factors have played an increasingly important part in the changes. Since the early eighteenth century, Romanians have constituted the greater part of Transylvania's population. By the end of that century the idea of uniting all Romanian-populated regions had already achieved a prominent place in the thinking of the intelligentsia, and in the nineteenth century incorporated into the concept of a unitary Romanian nation-state. At the same time, the Hungarian population of Transylvania was bound to Hungary in numerous ways, politically as well as culturally, and wanted Transylvania's reunion with Hungary. The third major nationality in Transylvania, the

Saxons, wished to secure their own autonomy under any prevailing régime. Transylvania was twice united with Romania: once in 1920, and then again in 1947. On both occasions the ethnic majority principle formed the basis of the decision and the Hungarian minority was not consulted in the matter. As a result, areas predominantly populated by Hungarians were also handed over to Romania. This fact became a source of friction, since there existed neither bilateral nor multilateral agreements to settle the minorities' problems in any acceptable form, and at a time when the practice of forced assimilation was continuing.

As a result, Transylvanian history has long been subject to dispute not only among politicians, but also among scholars. The truth of this assertion was indicated by the reception given to *Erdély története* (A History of Transylvania), the three-volume work published in cooperation with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' Institute of History in 1986. Although the authors attempted to avoid the pitfalls of a nationalist approach, to write the history of Transylvania with the greatest possible objectivity, and to apply the criteria indispensable to a scholarly work, Romanian politicians, together with certain historians, accused them of having nationalist prejudices, of advocating territorial revision and even of falsifying history. We rejected these accusations, but welcomed those critical comments which, while appreciating the concept, methodology, and novel approach of the work, called attention to its unevenness and to the omissions and mistakes it contained. With these criticisms in mind, we decided to publish an abridged version in English to help inform and orientate the foreign reader.

Sadly, not all the original authors and editors could participate in this work. The deaths of András Mócsy and Zsolt Trócsányi were a great loss. To revise the sections written by them, we had to call on Gábor Vékony and Ambrus Miskolczy: the resulting chapters should be seen as the joint work of the authors of both the original and the abridged version. István Bóna took over the editorial work of András Mócsy. László Makkai died shortly after the completion of the abridged manuscript.

The criticism and the arguments put forward confirmed the authors and the editors in their earlier conviction that writing a history of Transylvania is a task which touches on the fundamental questions of scholarly research, and places a great responsibility on historians both in the eyes of their colleagues and of the public. We all share the belief that in the interest of learning about our past we have to consider facts which need to be presented, analyzed, and interpreted with respect to circumstances prevailing at the time. Our authors and editors reject the traditional argument of nationalist romanticism, which invokes so-called "historic rights" to support a political ideology or a national identity, and all those reductionist explanations which attempt to derive historical processes form a single factor — i.e. ethnicity. They are unable to accept the finalist approach of certain historians, who attempt to project the ethnic and state structures of the twentieth century into the past. Although our authors assign great significance to the independence movements and the efforts to form nation-states, they do not regard them as the sole driving forces of history. They are convinced that, partly independently of the ethnic composition and partly embedded in it, economic and social conditions were crucial right up until the formation of

the modern nation-states, and continued to be relevant even later on. Last, but not least, historical experience taught our authors that co-operation between the various nations is in the interests of each nation. They believe that only the observation of collective and individual human rights and mutual respect for the language, the culture and the history of each nation can form the basis for such co-operation.

In writing a history of Transylvania, the authors addressed themselves to the economic, social, political and cultural history of all three major nationalities, knowing full well that in the current state of research a certain disproportion was unavoidable. The authors were careful to base their work on the analysis of facts and to avoid value judgments as much as possible — realizing that there is always a great temptation simply to replace old values with new ones when one writes a history of such controversial subject. For this reason, they paid much attention to the economic, social, and cultural trends of the "long period", trying to fit it into the framework of the region's history.

We have listed in the annotated bibliography the works written by historians of other nations, calling attention to views that are at variance with our own. We take the opportunity to express our hope that the time will come when historians will discuss their differences according to the norms of scholarly research and that their work will serve not only scholarship itself, but also better understanding between nations.

With regard to the period after 1918, we had to content ourselves with a brief summary of events up to 1945, since there are neither reliable source documents, nor sufficient research work to facilitate an authoritative appraisal of the last decades. We hope that within a few years there will be enough material available to permit the writing of respectable and scholarly works.

Transylvania is a special part of Europe, where different nationalities, religions and cultures meet — sometimes competing, but mostly co-operating with each other. The events of the last years prove that such co-operation between the various ethnic groups of Transylvania is in the interests of the whole of Europe.

BÉLA KOPECZI

TRANSYLVANIA IN PREHISTORIC AND ANCIENT TIMES

I. Prehistory and Antiquity

1. The Prehistory of Dacia

From the Beginnings to the End of the Stone Age

The variable pre- and protohistory of the Transylvanian Basin, ringed by high mountains, can in no way be separated from the history of the neighbouring areas. The valleys of the Szamos, Maros and Olt rivers have always been a favourite route of traders and populations in search of a new homeland. Groups casting an eye on the mineral wealth of this area were not deterred by the seemingly impenetrable mountain ranges, while what appear to be insignificant hills often acted as borderlines.

As a consequence of the geographic features of Transylvania and frequent immigrations, few periods have been characterized by a cultural and ethnic unity.

Even though the first human groups had probably colonized this area by the Lower Paleolithic, the first certain races of human settlement in Transylvania date to the Middle Paleolithic. At the beginning of the last glaciation, archaic Homo sapiens groups settled the caves of the Middle Maros region. Some of these sites show strong affinities with the slightly earlier or contemporaneous cave dwellings in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula. Their flakestone tools were manufactured exclusively from quartzite. It is noteworthy that while a group of the so-called Charentean culture that occupied an open-air site in Hungary specialized in the exploitation of young cave bears, wild horse was the main quarry of another community of this culture in the Hátszeg area somewhat later.

The Charentean industry was distributed not only in the Hátszeg but also over the entire southern Carpathian Range as shown by the sites of Pestera in the Törcsvár Pass and Baia de Fier in the southern Carpathians.

At the close of the Middle Paleolithic, groups manufacturing bifacial tools retouched over their entire surface made their appearance in Transylvania. These groups are generally linked to the Szeletien technocomplex in a wider sense. There is no evidence of development from earlier, local industries and thus the presence of bifacially worked points in the Late Charentean can be traced to Szeletien influence.

Only the developed phase of the Aurignacian industry appeared in the second cold stage of the last glaciation. The Aurignacian groups replacing the cave bear hunters of the Würm 1/2 interstadial have been identified only from seasonal cave campsites. Interestingly enough, it is precisely the

short-lived innovation of the Aurignacians, the projectile point carved from bone, which is lacking from the known tool kits, with the only notable exception being the Late Aurignacian point from Baia de Fier. Worked points of bear hunters have been reported from Csoklovina. The neuro-cranium found on that site suggests that these hunters can be assigned to the proto-Nordic anthropomorphic group (Předmost race).

Beginning with the Würm 2/3 period, the mammoth and reindeer hunters of the eastern Gravettien seem to have bypassed the area encompassed by the eastern Carpathians. Only two sites in the source region of the Dîmbovița suggest that these plains hunters had seasonal cave settlements. The tools recovered from Szitabodza too lie on the boundary of Transylvania.

After the retreat of the icesheet from the Carpathians the Transylvanian Basin was again slowly populated. Epigravettien–Tardenoisien sites are only known in southeastern Transylvania, along the upper reaches of the Bodza River. In addition to a variety of tiny blades, points, blade scrapers and small lunate scraper flints these sites have also yielded the characteristic trapezoidal tools of the Tardenoisian culture. At the same time the proto-Europid Romanello–Azilien groups of the southwestern Carpathians and the Iron Gates region domesticated the dog and may also have tried their hand at the cultivation of wheat and at pig breeding.

This process came to a halt with the arrival of the Körös–Starčevo population, an immigrant group from the southern Balkans. They had learned the cultivation of wheat and barley and adopted an animal husbandry based on sheep and goats from Anatolian newcomers in their original homeland. However, the domestication of millet and of cattle may perhaps be regarded as their own innovation.

Their sites all lie beside watercourses and occasionally on low river terraces. They built timber-framed houses with wattling subsequently daubed with clay. In addition to ground level houses, semi-subterranean huts have also been uncovered. Their dead were laid to rest within the village. Whereas the Epi-Paleolithic archaic Homo sapiens population buried their dead in an extended, supine position, the predominantly proto-Mediterranean Körös-Starčevo population interred their dead in a contracted position, without grave goods.

The finds recovered from the Körös settlements reflect an increased dependence on food production, but with a wide range of variation between individual sites. The ratio of hunted and domestic animals is roughly equal on some sites, while on others, domestic animals outnumber hunted species sixfold. Stockbreeding based on cattle appears to have been predominant compared to the previously domesticated sheep and goats. While pig breeding was of importance on some sites, other sites are devoid of any evidence of pigs.

A similarly wide range of variation has been noted in the ratio of cultivated and gathered cereals. The quernstones found on a number of Transylvanian sites must undoubtedly have been used for grinding seeds, but not necessarily cereal grains. The lithic assemblages from these sites rarely feature the short blades that could have functioned as inserts in a sickle. The Körös-Starčevo population nonetheless lived in food-producing communities even if hunting and gathering were not always secondary activities. At

4

the same time, some groups appeared to have specialized in the processing of minerals, which would explain traces of human settlement in caves that had been uninhabited since the Late Pleistocene.

The Körös-Starčevo population penetrated Transylvania from the Banat. Their earliest settlements have been reported from Kolozsvár. Some groups, however, migrated as far as eastern Hungary. These groups then intermixed with the local Epi-Paleolithic population which is why burials of both Alpine and archaic Homo sapiens type individuals were found at Bácstorok. In accordance with the general practice of that period, the graves were found inside and between the houses of the settlement.

Around 5000 B.C., new groups from this population came to Transylvania, advancing slowly along the Maros River. Certain aspects of their material culture have also been observed in the southern part of the Great Hungarian Plain. One of their earliest settlements is that uncovered at Szászhermány. The assemblages from this site include coarse vessels of chaff-tempered clay and fine red-slipped bowls, some of which are painted with the white spots of the preceding period. Pottery painting in general, as on the Great Hungarian Plain, was rare in Transylvania. The only other exception is the site of Lécfalu, where polychrome painting also occurred. The early finds share numerous affinities with assemblages from the eastern Balkans, while the final settlement phase has been correlated with the final phase of the Körös–Starčevo sequence.

After a brief transitional period, the arrival of new populations from all directions at the onset of the Middle Neolithic brought an end to the uniformity characterizing the Early Neolithic. Groups of the Vinča–Tordos culture advanced along the middle reaches of the Maros and settled the area between the southern Carpathians and the Érchegység (Ore Mountains), with some groups migrating as far east as the Fogaras Mountains. Southeastern Transylvania was occupied by Linear Pottery groups from Moldavia who penetrated as far as the Mezőség in the northwest. Sporadic traces of the Szakálhát group — distributed over the southeast of the Great Hungarian Plain — have been identified along the Szamos River, whilst further to the north we find groups making painted pottery related to that made in the northeastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain.

The ethnic character of the Middle Neolithic defined the course of Transylvanian prehistory for a long time, until the close of the Copper Age. The population of the Vinča–Tordos culture, one of the most thoroughly investigated archaeological cultures of this period, after a time abandoned the majority of their settlements. The settlement of these peoples in the Érchegység region from the central areas of the Balkan Peninsula is hardly a coincidence: copper artifacts made their appearance at a fairly early date in this region and the gold deposits of nearby Zalatna were among the earliest to be exploited.

The pictographic tablets brought to light at Alsótatárlaka in 1961 which bear a striking resemblance to similar clay tablets from proto-Elamite and proto-Sumerian contexts must be mentioned here. The possibility of direct contact between the two regions, however, is rather problematic since apart from the geographical distance the finds are separated by a gap of about a thousand years from their Mesopotamian counterparts. Early linear-geo-

metric writing systems tend, in any case, independently to resemble each other. At the same time, the Alsótatárlaka tablets, which are undeniably composed of some sort of writing, have permitted the positive identification of some of the marks (previously suspected to be writing) incised on various clay items of the Vinča–Tordos culture. It would appear that an attempt to introduce writing was, thus, made around 4000 B.C. in the Maros region which is in itself a remarkable achievement. We can at the same time also assume that a proto-state formation based on some sort of simple central ceremonial centre developed in this region. Such a political formation in turn could hardly have come about had some groups not begun to exploit the mineral resources of the region and become dependent on the grain and cattle raised by other groups.

Fig. 1. Terracotta tablets from Alsótatárlaka

The attempts in Transylvania at creating a production economy based on the central redistribution of surplus failed over the long run. The process was interrupted by new population movements. In Moldavia, the areas formerly settled by Linear Pottery population groups practising a primitive agriculture and animal husbandry (with the ratio of hunted animals as high as 50 per cent) were occupied by groups of the Boian culture from eastern Muntenia whose economy was based on cattle and sheep breeding. Some groups even penetrated the Middle Maros region from the Olt Valley. Their large pots and bowls ornamented with excised triangles and incised bundles of lines make an appearance among the settlement finds of the Vinča–Tordos group.

The real break, however, was caused by the migration of the Szamos Painted Pottery population from northern Transylvania along the Maros River. Their vessels, ornamented with red and occasionally black painted motifs against a white or orange background, crop up from time to time among the finds from the upper layers of Vinča–Tordos settlements, suggesting a partial mingling of the local population and the newcomers. However, few traces of this integration survived in the later archaeological record and therefore it would appear that the greater part of the Vinča–Tordos population abandoned its settlements and withdrew along the Maros.

6

The Copper Age

Thus, for a short period at the turn of the Middle and Late Neolithic, the greater part of Transylvania was occupied by the same population. Only the highlands of southeast Transylvania were still controlled by peoples of the Boian culture. The communities of the Petreşti culture long occupied the territory of southern, and partly central, Transylvania. Their control of ore mines enabled them to establish contact with groups in faraway regions such as Muntenia and Dobrudja and almost certainly with communities in more southerly areas. Their vessels are fired so that they ring in an almost metallic way. They are ornamented with elaborate black, red and brown painted meander and spiral patterns. The technical execution of these bowls, shouldered vessels and cylindrical fruitstands testify to a flourishing metallurgy that is corroborated by a wide variety of copper finds. The various articles fashioned from sheet gold and their imitations which reached distant areas in Bulgaria and Greece to the south, and the Kassa Basin to the north bear witness to the intensive exploitation of gold deposits.

The Petreşti sequence lasted until the end of the Copper Age but only in the areas formerly occupied by the Vinča–Tordos population. The painted pottery groups of the Kis-Szamos region were replaced by horse breeding proto-Europid peoples from the Pontic steppeland who entered Transylvania through the eastern Carpathians. They occupied the settlements of the painted pottery groups and, in marked contrast to the earlier Neolithic practice, buried their dead in larger cemeteries separate from the settlements as, for example, at Marosdécse. Their dead were laid to rest on their back with the feet drawn up slightly. Various grave goods such as large Pontic stone knives, knobbed stone maceheads and simple cups were found next to the bodies in the graves. The custom of depositing lumps of red paint, ochre, beside the deceased can also be traced to the east.

Roughly at the same time as the arrival of these new groups, the population of the Cucuteni–Tripolye–Erősd culture settled in the former Boian territory. These successive waves of migration in the eastern half of the Carpathian Basin resulted in continuous population changes. Due to the local population's intermingling with the newcomers, their lifeways and their material culture underwent various developments.

The Tiszapolgár culture which evolved as a result of this process settled the Tisza region, northern Transylvania and the Banat, with some groups from the Banat advancing as far as southern Transylvania and the Middle Maros region. The villages of simple huts inhabited by the Tiszapolgár groups — whose economy was based on large-scale animal husbandry and cultivation — and the settlements of the Cucuteni–Tripolye–Erősd population encircled the settlement area of the Petreşti culture, whose population continued its existence in peace even in these troubled times — perhaps because the former populations were dependent on the products of their metallurgy.

The Cucuteni–Tripolye–Erősd population learned the art of pottery painting from its new neighbour, the Petreşti culture. The Erősd–Tyiszkhegy settlement, whose layer sequence is over four metres thick, yielded an abundance of bichrome and polychrome pottery that was painted with motifs in

black, white and red prior to firing. The settlement consisted of houses, with walls made of upright posts connected with a twig wattling subsequently thickly daubed with clay on both sides. Their internal furnishings featured rimmed hearths plastered with clay. The occupants of the Erősd settlement were agriculturalists who cultivated einkorn wheat. Their livestock was dominated by cattle, although, at the same time, the greater part of the meat consumed came from hunting. Most of their tools and implements were carved or polished from stone and bone (axes and antler hoes), while copper was reserved for awls and various ornaments. The small clay statuettes and clay stamp seals used for body painting preserve the memory of elaborate rites and rituals, as well as of a tribal organization.

The Cucuteni–Tripolye population penetrated as far as the Upper Maros region in the north where they became neighbours of the Tiszapolgár peoples. The settlement territory of the latter was subsequently occupied by groups of the Bodrogkeresztúr culture, who occasionally also occupied former Tiszapolgár villages. Transylvania marked the periphery of their distribution. Their presence in this area can hardly be explained otherwise than that they were attracted by the rich ore deposits of this region, since conditions for intensive agriculture and large-scale animal husbandry were undeniably more favourable in the Banat and on the Great Hungarian Plain. It is characteristic that, viewed from Transylvania, the proportions of copper artifacts increases dramatically towards the heartland of their settlement territory. The shaft-holed axes, adzes and so-called hammer-axes reached the Great Hungarian Plain from these Transylvanian copper mines. The graves of the Tisza region have also yielded an abundance of small gold ornaments. It is not accidental, then, that similar gold items rarely occur in Transylvania itself — the only well documented specimen was recovered from Marosvásárhely where a site of the Bodrogkeresztúr culture has been identified.

The Bodrogkeresztúr find assemblages from Transylvania are practically identical to those from the Great Hungarian Plain. The deceased were laid on their side with their feet drawn up and were equipped with two-handled vessels — so-called milk jugs —, flowerpot shaped vessels and a variety of cups. Their settlements probably consisted of ground level houses. One Bodrogkeresztúr site lying in the Cucuteni–Tripolye territory featured a small house with a floor constructed of wooden planks that was subsequently plastered with clay.

At roughly the same time as the Bodrogkeresztúr population moved into the Háromszék Basin, the beginning of an integration process seems to have taken place in Transylvania. Assemblages reflecting the mingling of Bodrogkeresztúr, Petreşti and Cucuteni–Tripolye traits can be observed on the eastern periphery of the Mezőség, whilst the finds from the Middle Maros region reflect the integration of Bodrogkeresztúr and Petreşti groups. The end of this process saw the emergence of a material culture that can be considered the heritage of the southwestern Transylvanian and Oltenian populations.

A few groups from these mixed Transylvanian populations migrated as far as the Great Hungarian Plain, whilst other groups — probably advancing along the Szamos River — penetrated the sub-Carpathian region and eastern Slovakia.

The population of the Băile Herculane–Cheile Turzi group often settled in caves. These agriculturalists and stockbreeders, whose ranks also included ore miners and traders, did not settle in these barren and remote caves of their own free will, but because pastoralists from the eastern steppe had begun to graze their herds on the pastures of Wallachia and Moldavia at this time. These pastoralists stormed into this area through the Carpathians and disrupted local communities. The local population managed to work out some sort of *modus vivendi* with the first wave of newcomers, however, successive waves forced them to flee from their mountain homes.

This event marks, not for the first time, the start of a new chapter in the history of Transylvania (and, also, of east-central Europe). These eastern newcomers and the local population assimilated in the Lower Danube region, where they were soon joined by southern Balkanic and perhaps also Anatolian groups. The emerging new population, the Černavoda III culture, penetrated as far as the Maros region. Their livestock keeping was based on sheep, goat, pig and horse, as well as cattle. The cattle bones are generally dominated by the remains of old male individuals reflecting a high number of oxen which, in turn, suggests plough agriculture and the use of wooden or perhaps antler hoes and shares.

This incipient development soon came to an abrupt end. Around 2000 B.C., new population movements again led to changes in Transylvania with the arrival of Kolozskorpád–Coțofeni groups, pastoralists from Macedonia and the Balkans in the southwestern Carpathians. The settlements are to be found everywhere both in the uplands and on floodplains. They often settled in mountain caves as well. They cremated their dead — the first instance of this in Transylvania — although inhumation burials, often sprinkled with ochre, also occur, especially in the burial mounds from the early period. They may have adopted this custom from their eastern neighbours. Conversely, this practice may have been part of the cultural tradition of this eastern European population. Their frequently found settlements are located in environments favouring the semi-nomadic lifeways of this pastoralist group.

Even though these pastoralists and the Černavoda III population came from roughly similar backgrounds, their pottery shows marked differences. Scoops with high-drawn handles, globular cups, urns and askoi were at first decorated with simple incised lines and hatched bands (matching ornamental motifs and a few corresponding vessel forms have also been uncovered in Černavoda III contexts), which were later combined with lentil-shaped ornaments. Short dashes filled with lime also appear in this period, mostly on Transylvania sites.

Pastoralist tribes from the trans-Carpathian territory migrated into southeast Transylvania during the Coțofeni II–Kolozskorpád period. The population groups of the Foltești III–Zăbala culture penetrated as far as the Middle Maros region from the Háromszék Basin and the Brassó area. Little is known about their settlements. Their dead were laid to rest on their side with the feet drawn up in simple pit graves or in stone cists over which a burial mound was erected. Coțofeni elements can occasionally be singled out among their finds suggesting scattered local mingling of the two populations.

The Bronze Age

Around the middle of the Early Bronze Age the Folteşti III–Zăbala groups were ousted by newcomers to southeast Transylvania (and Wallachia): the Glina III–Schneckenberg population. The new arrivals founded their villages on hilltops and elevations. Their livestock was dominated by sheep, and their antler hoes and shares suggest a primitive plough cultivation.

The clay wagon model from Kucsuláta perhaps reflects experimentation with animal traction. The abundance of curved stone knives and polished stone axes contrasts sharply with the scarcity of copper implements, mostly awls and chisels, with the occasional adze, axe or dagger. Household pottery is invariably tempered with sand and crushed shells. The one and two-handled mugs as well as the small handled cups are carefully polished. Their dead were laid to rest in a contracted position within a stone cist and were only rarely accompanied by their worldly possessions.

Whilst the Olt region was settled by the Glina III–Schneckenberg population, the rest of Transylvania was still controlled by Coţofeni groups. In this later phase of their existence the former lentil-shaped ornaments are gradually replaced by deeply incised and stroked decoration in short multiple designs. The excavations at the site of Kelnek uncovered bipartite houses with walls erected around a framework of wooden posts interconnected with wattling and subsequently daubed with clay. Hearths and ovens were found inside the houses. These features are probably the result of changes in style of life. It would appear that a direct link can be traced between their sedentary way of life and the fact that the settlements of the Cîlnic population are concentrated in the Érchegység region. So-called eastern copper axes, whose antecedents go back to the Cernavoda III period, abound in this area. The manufacture of this weapon type, widely distributed throughout eastern and central Europe, was obviously not restricted to the Cîlnic territory. Nevertheless, it cannot be mere coincidence that an imposing hoard of over forty axes, dating to a somewhat earlier period, came to light in this area at Bányabükk.

The turn of the Early and Middle Bronze Age saw the arrival of Moldavian groups in the Háromszék Basin in eastern Transylvania: population groups of the Ciomortan culture who were related to Monteoru and Costişa groups. The settlement at Csíkcsomortány–Várdomb was fortified with a ditch. A few of their two-handled jugs, globular bowls and cups were deposited beside their dead who were also buried in a contracted position.

They did not enjoy life for long in their few fortified settlements. They were unable to check the advance of newer groups of the Monteoru culture and were forced to migrate to more westerly parts of Transylvania. The characteristic ornamental motif of their pottery, triangles of parallel lines filled with punctates later reappears on the widemouthed cups of the Wietenberg culture.

The earliest Wietenberg finds were brought to light in the north (outside Transylvania). The early assemblages and finds from this area share numerous similarities with the Early Bronze Age Ottomány culture of the Tisza region, with influences from the Ciomortan and Tei cultures only discern-

ible at a later date. In contrast to its neighbours in and beyond the Carpathian Basin who practised inhumation, the Ottomány population cremated its dead similarly to the other Middle Bronze Age groups of Transylvania. It would appear that at the beginning of the Middle Bronze Age, population groups from the trans-Tisza area migrated into Transylvania (finds associated with this population have been uncovered at Dés, and Bágyon beside the Aranyos), where they mingled with the Ciomortan population and, in the south, with Tei groups.

The Wietenberg population occupied the whole of Transylvania with the exception of the territory beyond the Hargita, whilst the Háromszék Basin came under the control of the Monteoru culture.

Wietenberg settlements have been identified on low river terraces, high plateaus and well-defendable elevations. Most houses were log-built, but semi-subterranean dwellings have also been uncovered. Surprisingly enough, few traces of agricultural activities have survived in the archaeological record, with hunting and animal husbandry appearing to have played a prominent role in their economy. Since they enjoyed exclusive access to the Transylvanian ore resources, the Wietenberg population probably traded gold and bronze for grain with their neighbours.

The entire range of bronze artifacts and gold ornaments then current in east–central Europe has come to light on the Wietenberg territory. At the same time, few hoards are known in spite of the fact that hoard finds practically encircle their settlement area. This phenomenon and the demonstrable presence of "acropoleis" suggest a strong military aristocracy. In addition to eastern type and disc-butted bronze axes their weapons also include the sort of daggers wielded by the Mycenaean Archaeans. Warfare with long daggers was unusual in east–central Europe at that time; and, in contrast to neighbouring areas, there is hardly any evidence for horse riding in Transylvania.

Since the Wietenberg culture shares a number of other links with the Mycenaean civilization, it is not entirely impossible that the local Transylvanian population was ruled by a group of warriors from the south during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries B.C. This military aristocracy increased its wealth through the intensive exploitation of ores and the trade of metal artifacts manufactured from these ores. The products of this metallurgy are, as a general rule, distributed outside the Wietenberg territory and it would appear that their traders could easily fall victim to strangers bent on seizing their riches. The hoard of gold axes, discs and other ornaments discovered at Cófalva in the Monteoru territory, the hoard of gold swords and daggers found at Perșinari in Muntenia, which at the time was occupied by the Tei population, as well as several other hoards on the fringes of the Wietenberg territory were probably concealed for such reasons.

The prosperity brought by gold left its imprints on every aspect of life. The womenfolk, freed from the burdens of agricultural work, busied themselves with homecrafts of which, sadly, only the lavishly ornamented earthenware vessels have survived. The globular jars and one-handled cups were covered with incisions and channelling so arranged as to produce flamboyant spiralform and meander patterns. Askoi, vases with multiple mouths

and wagon models were manufactured for elaborate rites and rituals. Richly ornamented sacred hearths were placed inside cult buildings similar to the one uncovered on the eponymous site of Wietenberg near Segesvár.

At the close of the fourteenth century B.C., central European pastoral tribes invaded the Carpathian Basin. The migrations triggered by this invasion shook the very foundations of the prosperous society built by these Transylvanian smiths, traders and warriors. The familiar roads on which they transported their goods were now roamed by hitherto unknown peoples. Groups of refugees poured into Transylvania and the locals had no choice but to conceal their valuables.

The "Tumulus" groups advancing along the Maros Valley in the wake of these displaced and fleeing groups occupied southern Transylvania. Their heritage has also been uncovered in the Szeben area, in the Mezőség and beyond the Hargita. Together with the former inhabitants of the Great Hungarian Plain, they penetrated southwest Transylvania as well. One part of the Wietenberg population fled to the mountains (their cave settlements date back to this period), but the majority withdrew northwards. Together with the Gyulavarsánd population they attempted a last stand in the Szamos Valley, the Máramaros and the sub-Carpathian region against the advance of the Tumulus culture and its allies (the Felsőszőcs group) from the south and the west.

The lack of consolidated circumstances and broader regional unity made Transylvania the easy prey of yet newer waves of pastoralists from the eastern steppes in the early phase of the Late Bronze Age. This new population movement is not reflected in hidden hoards since the local population had hardly anything left worth concealing. Their new overlords, the population of the Noua culture, who poured into Transylvania through the Carpathian passes, also extended their rule to the Middle Szamos region in the north and the Érchegység in the west.

Very few settlements of this cattle and sheep breeding people have yet been investigated. The few Moldavian sites that have been excavated featured light wooden dwellings suggesting that their Transylvanian houses must have had similar constructions. They buried their dead in a contracted position with their feet drawn up although in some cases cremation appears to have been the practice. Their two-handled cups and vessels ornamented with simple raised bands appear to have been adopted from the assimilated Monteoru groups. The three-edged bone arrowheads, the bone cheekpieces from horse harnesses, the knot-headed and roll-top pins, as well as the curved sickle-knives find parallels far to the east among the artifacts of the Sabatinovka population who lived between the Dniester and the Dnieper rivers. This proto-Europid population — which included Alpine and Mediterranean anthropological groups in Transylvania — probably spoke an Old Iranian tongue and thus the arrival of the Noua population marks the first appearance of Iranians in the Carpathian Basin.

Sometime at the beginning of the first millennium B.C. the inhabitants of Transylvania and the Szamos–Tisza region were again compelled to conceal their accumulated riches. The greater part of the Noua population fled eastward so as to escape the fate of being reduced from master to servant overnight.

12

The newcomers, population groups of the Gáva culture, gradually occupied the Küküllő and the Olt valleys, the Mezőség and the Szamos region. Their settlements include fortified sites; their houses are mostly log-built oval or rectangular semi-subterranean huts with central plastered fireplaces. They raised cattle but could also boast of considerable horse herds. In spite of the high number of bronze sickles, agriculture appears to have played a less prominent role in their economy and the better part of their meat was procured through hunting.

Following their settlement, bronze metallurgy again began to flourish in the Érchegység region. Practically all known tools, implements, weapons and ornament types were manufactured from bronze. These axes, sickles, swords, spears, belts, pins and cauldrons were, to all appearances, buried in uncounted quantities as shown by the hoards discovered at Ispánlak, Felsőmarosújvár, Nagysink and Marosfelfalu.

The Gáva population — who cremated their dead and laid their ashes to rest in urns — and other allied groups gradually extended their sway over larger territories at the close of the Late Bronze Age. Their settlements and cemeteries have also been identified outside Transylvania, in the Banat and the trans-Tisza territory, as well as in Galicia and Bessarabia to the east of the Carpathians. Some groups even penetrated as far as the Dnieper region.

The area south of the Carpathians, Wallachia and northern Bulgaria was also settled by a population which, judging from its material culture, may have spoken a tongue related to the one used by the Gáva groups. This area roughly coincides with the territory later inhabited by the Dacians, the Getae and the Mysoi.

There is little evidence for major migrations that would have led to population changes in this extensive area during the period that elapsed between the close of the Late Bronze Age and the first mention of its peoples in classical sources. This favours an identification of the Gáva culture and allied groups with the ancestors of the Dacians, the Getae and the Mysoi. Their origins are clear. The emergence of a population sharing the same language or speaking related tongues at the close of the Late Bronze Age was the result of the gradual mingling of remaining local Middle Bronze Age groups with the conquering Tumulus population.

The Iron Age and the First Historical Nations

The peaceful existence of the Transylvanian miners and traders came to an abrupt end at the close of the Late Bronze Age. Asian equestrian groups swarmed into the Carpathian Basin and the Danube region and caused considerable upheaval in the quiet life of the agrarian communities. The newcomers — a mixture of various population groups who also often warred among themselves — resettled entire villages and turned extensive areas into wasteland. After the subsidence of these successive waves of people, various communities, often quite small, with mixed ethnic components appear along the Danube. Population changes can be noted in the areas set-

tled by the Gáva culture and related groups, with most of the Late Bronze Age population of Transylvania probably migrating to the trans-Carpathian region. Their abandoned villages were occupied by the newcomers and other groups from the Lower Danube and, to a lesser extent, from southern Transdanubia.

Finds of the Basarabi culture make their first appearance in the Middle Maros region, whence this population spread out to occupy the whole of the Transylvanian Basin. Their settlements, in contrast to those in Wallachia, are often fortified and inhabited for longer periods of time. Light surface buildings were scattered among their wattle and daub houses. Their economy was predominantly based on animal husbandry. Most of the Basarabi population appears to have earned a living by metallurgy. It is striking that a number of assemblages unearthed on the fringes of their settlement territory contained artifacts that were unknown or very rare in Transylvania, but which were made up of bronze objects used among their neighbours.

This period witnessed a flourishing iron metallurgy. Not only are weapons, tools and implements as well as parts of horse harness manufactured from iron, but also personal jewellery and costume ornaments, in ever-increasing proportions. The newcomers gradually discarded their old bronze goods and, for example, began to cast cheekpieces of iron instead of bronze which, at the same time, resemble the old ones down to the tiniest details. Their weapons — swords and *akinakes* — often resemble the Late Bronze Age swords with open-ringed hilts. Single-edged curved daggers with T-shaped hilts, similar in form to the weapons wielded by the neighbouring Balta Verde group have also come to light.

Little is known about their gold metallurgy but there is evidence suggesting that a number of gold items from the Carpathian region were fashioned in this area: the early finds from Mihályfalva, for example, include armrings and winged beads with analogies to be found in the Dalj (Croatia) and Michałkowo (Poland) hoards. Gold items occur but sporadically in later periods, again suggesting that these craftsmen traded their products.

A uniform burial rite can be observed over all Transylvania at this time. The dead were interred in a supine position with the head oriented west or east. In addition to their personal ornaments, their weapons and everyday tools were also laid in the grave. The vessels deposited in the graves contained beef whilst most of the cups probably held some sort of drink. The fact that only three vessel types — urns, one-handled cups and bowls with inverted rims — were placed in the grave pit reflects a rather strict burial rite. Even though evidence for horse burials with a mound erected over the grave is known from the early phase immediately succeeding the Late Bronze Age, the vessels deposited in these graves foreshadowed the practice of later times. At the time when wheel-turned pottery became widespread in the Lower Danube region and in the Great Hungarian Plain, only vessels reflecting an earlier style were laid in the Transylvanian graves.

This Early Iron Age population with its strict rites was undoubtedly related to the Scythians of eastern Europe. Herodotus, who wrote his *Histories* in the late fifth century B.C. and who drew exhaustively from Hecateus' late sixth century works, states that the Maros spilled into the Danube "from

the country of the Agathyrsi".[1] In another passage, however, he mentions that the Agathyrsi were neighbours of the Neuri,[2] who dwelt in the Bug region near the source of the Tyras (Dniester) River.[3] Obviously, these scattered bits of information can be related not only to Transylvania, but to the entire eastern half of the Carpathian Basin or to the Carpathian Basin in general.

At the close of the sixth century B.C., Darius conducted his European campaign against the Scythians with the Agathyrsi also turning against them. This can be interpreted as some sort of potential Persian–Agathyrsian alliance. Set against this background, the recovery of one of Darius' inscriptions from Transylvania, namely from Szamosújvár, is indeed noteworthy.

According to Herodotus (or rather Hecataeus), the Agathyrsi "live in luxury and wear gold on their persons. They have their women in common."[4] This latter remark can perhaps be taken to suggest group marriage or, what is more likely, polyandry. In any case, the evidence from the cemeteries dated to the later, Csombord period can hardly be reconciled with Hecataeus' description, and thus his data probably reflect earlier conditions.

Around 500 B.C., the Agathyrsi of Transylvania occupied further territories and their characteristic artifacts reached the eastern areas of the Great Hungarian Plain. When at the beginning of the fifth century B.C. this area was occupied by groups from Wallachia and the central Balkans, they abandoned their plains settlements but continued their peaceful existence uninterrupted in Transylvania. The metalwork distributed in and beyond the Carpathians – mirrors, *akinakes*, and quivers with applied metal crosses – clearly imply that it was they who supplied the neighbouring and, often, more faraway regions with popular "Scythian" items.

They soon disappeared from the horizons of the Greek world. Herodotus mentions one of their kings, a certain Spargapithes, who lived in the mid-fifth century,[5] and the last reference to the Agathyrsi is to be found in a work written by Alexander's teacher, Aristotle, according to whom they were a law-abiding people who chant their laws.[6] In the mid-fourth century B.C., they still lived in Transylvania, but not much later – according to the testimony of the archaeological material – the Agathyrsian cemeteries abruptly ceased to be used. They abandoned their dead and moved to other areas without a trace. The reason for their sudden departure was the arrival of the Celts who appeared in the eastern Balkans at the close of the fourth century B.C. In 335, they sent a peace delegation to Alexander the Great. Their attack against the Balkans was repelled by Cassander.

Transylvania abandoned as it were by its former inhabitants, came into the possession of homeless Celtic tribes. Archaeological traces of settlement

1. HERODOTUS, IV, 48.
2. HERODOTUS, IV, 125.
3. HERODOTUS, IV, 17, 51.
4. HERODOTUS, IV, 104.
5. HERODOTUS, IV, 78.
6. ARISTOTLE, *Problemata* 19, 28.

on a larger scale only date from the beginning of the third century B.C. Prior to that, only a few isolated graves of warriors who had participated in the raids on the Balkans are known. The early Celtic-style finds which, in contrast to the majority of the Transylvanian finds labelled "La Tène", can undoubtedly be considered an inheritance from the Celts have been unearthed in the Érchegység region and the Sajó and Nagy-Szamos valleys. Of the Transylvanian inhabitants of what was later to become Dacia, only a single population group can be singled out as being of Celtic stock: the Cotini–Cotensi.[7] In his description of another group of this population inhabiting the westerly parts of the Northern Mountain Range, Tacitus writes that — to their own shame — they mine iron.[8] These scattered bits of information would suggest that the Cotini of Dacia were the descendants of the third century B.C. Celtic settlers. They formed a small, but important minority of the Transylvanian population in Celtic times.

The majority of the population groups who now settled Transylvania were Dacians from the Tisza region of the Great Hungarian Plain. They preserved various elements of their traditional culture in the face of the all-pervading Celtic "fashion" which also crop up among the uniform commodities of long-distance trade and include large pots, one-handled cups and small curved knives. The Late Iron Age cemeteries of Transylvania contained burials of this population. The burial rite is as varied as it is on the Great Hungarian Plain, ranging from inhumation burials to scattered cremation burials and urn graves.

The spread of wheel-turned pottery and a flourishing iron metallurgy specializing in the manufacture of agricultural implements and the tools used in homecrafts suggest the emergence of a separate class of craftsmen. In some cases these craftsmen can be linked to a distinct ethnic group, such as the Cotini. Finds of weapons, horse harness and war chariots as well as the presence of unarmed agrarian communities on the opposite end of the scale reflect a ruling warrior class. This social structure suggests a considerable surplus which in turn led to the necessity of introducing a means of measuring value instead of the traditional barter trade in Transylvania and in the neighbouring territories.

The so-called "eastern Celtic" and "Dacian" coins were modelled on the tetradrachms issued by Philip II and Alexander the Great. At first, the Macedonian kings circulated the originals together with their imitations. The story of minting follows the events of political history: with the appearance of Burebista on the scene the imitations of Macedonian coins were no longer minted. However, the links between Transylvania and the "Celtic *koine*" had been severed much earlier, for beginning in 150 B.C., the coins minted in Transylvania did not serve (or only very rarely served) as a measure of value beyond the Carpathians, for instance, on the Great Hungarian Plain.

7. Ptolemy, III, 8. 3; ILS 8965.
8. Tacitus, *Germania* 43.

2. The Dacian Kingdom

The Dacian People

The exact dating of the first reports concerning the Dacians is a matter of considerable controversy. No less controversial is the question of their authenticity. The usefulness of the available evidence is restricted by the fact that it is only some extracts of more detailed accounts that have come down to us, and these extracts, in discussing a given people, often present as contemporaneous events which, in fact, occurred historical periods apart. The other difficulty stems from the fact that two different names were used for the Dacians. Greek and Roman writers employed various ethnonyms for the tribes inhabiting the eastern half of the Balkan Peninsula, the Lower Danube and Transylvania. The territory to the south of the Balkan Mountains — which was bordered by Macedonia in the east — was occupied by the Thracians, a population which had come into contact with Greek culture at a relatively early date, whilst the Getae settled the area to the north of the Balkan Mountains, and the Lower Danube region. Greek sources invariably refer to the Dacians of Transylvania as Getae, an ethnonym which Roman historians often arbitrarily translated as "Dacii" even when the people in question actually were Getae. Consequently, the scattered bits of information relating the participation of Dacians in the wars fought by Rome against various Thracian, Getic and Celtic tribes on the northern frontiers of Macedonia during the second and first centuries B.C. must be treated with extreme caution.

The archaeological record contributes little towards the clarification of this problem. An assortment of population groups which — one might call them "Getae" in the south, "Bastarnae" in the east, and "Celts" in the Carpathian Basin — lived on the territory of Burebista's later Dacian kingdom, which stretched from the Dniester to the Danube and from the Balkan Mountains to the northern Carpathians. In Transylvania the traditions of Celtic iron metallurgy survived uninterrupted even though other aspects of material culture underwent significant changes. Coarse hand-made vessels dominate the pottery inventory, and the potters manufacturing wheel-turned wares were not the descendants of Celtic masters, but newcomers from the Balkans and the Lower Danube. The imposing remains from the first century B.C. and later Dacian monumental architecture uncovered at Kosztezsd, Blidaru, Újvárhely and elsewhere reflect formative influences from the Greek cities of Pontus, rather than a survival of Celtic traditions. Stone walls, whose outer and inner faces were built of squared blocks of hewn limestone that were held together by wooden ties, were still current at the time of the decline of the Dacian Kingdom; in fact, the majority of the buildings constructed using this technique were, apparently, erected at this time. Neither do the relics of Dacian silverwork — which are so obviously items manufactured on the fringes of the classical world that their counterparts are to be found on the Iberian Peninsula — predate the time of Burebista. The silver vessels from Szörcse and Csíkszentkirály were, the works of Greek craftsmen active in Roman times, whilst the masked fibulae and the mul-

tipally twisted armrings were fashioned by "barbarian" goldsmiths who drew their inspiration from Greek art. Since in the area bordered by the Ruszka, Szörény and Kudzsir mountains (the Szászváros Mountains), and in the Maros Valley these finds occur together with hand-made pottery whose origins can be traced to Moldavia and the Lower Danube region, it would appear that Dacian culture was secondary and that its emergence can be linked to Burebista's efforts at creating a state.

During the course of the first century B.C., a number of hillforts sprang up over the territory that was bordered by impenetrable mountains to the south, but which maintained vital links with the Danube through the waterways of the Maros, Jil and Olt whose heartland lay in the valley of the Városvíz that flowed into the Maros. The number of open-air — unfortified — settlements increased spectacularly during the second and first centuries B.C., suggesting major transformations in the fabric of Dacian society. However, the exact nature of these transformations is less easily defined. Technological progress was undoubtedly stimulated by strong Celtic influences from northern Transylvania. The widespread use of iron tools and implements, the adoption of the potter's wheel as well as the introduction of a series of other innovations, and the emergence of these hillforts can likewise be traced to influences from the Celtic *oppidum* culture. The use of currency and the appearance of local mints indicate that silver began to function as an economic adjunct in the case of various commodities, as well as a practical and measurable means of wealth accumulation. But, as in the case of the Danubian Celts, this by no means implies that money became widespread as a universal standard value. Nor did it lead to the emergence of a market economy. The Dacian economy appears to have remained on a preponderantly subsistence level, to the extent that even the pots and pans used in individual households were made individually or, at most, within the local community. There is no evidence whatsoever that pottery was manufactured as a market commodity. In this respect, the economy of the Dacian Kingdom lagged far behind that of the Danubian Celts.

The Reign of Burebista

What remains to be explained then are the internal reasons underlying the erection of hillforts — reflecting a clearly differentiated social structure —, the accumulation of wealth — mainly in the form of silver — and the obvious and sudden growth of Dacian power. The often laconic data on Dacian social structure describe two distinct, almost caste-like layers: the *tarabostes* or "cap-wearers", and the commoners or "long-haired" people. Later depictions indeed show that members of the Dacian nobility wore felt caps. The separation of a small elite minority from a subjugated majority offers a plausible explanation for the duality of the Dacian archaeological heritage, a unique phenomenon among the other Late Iron Age cultures in the Lower Danube region. Greek import pottery, Greek mirrors, a high standard of local silverworking and carefully executed wheel-turned wares ornamented with painted patterns from the Dacian hillforts are in sharp contrast to the

humble and coarse handmade pottery and poor quality iron artifacts which maintain Early Iron Age traditions in the open settlements.

That one tribe or a smaller group of tribes conquered extensive territories within a relatively short period of time, and either subdued and exploited the local population — one not necessarily related to it linguistically — or forced it into an uneasy alliance is by no means an unusual phenomenon in these centuries. Before the Dacians gained control in the Lower and Middle Danube region, Roman Macedonia was first harassed by the Celtic Scordisci from the north and later, from the beginning of the first century B.C., by the Dardanians of southern Serbia and Macedonia. At the time when the Scordisci are designated as the archenemies of Rome in the Balkans, the Dardanians either pass without comment or are lumped together with other Thracian tribes as the allies of the Scordisci in their wars against Rome. The power of the Scordisci was broken around the turn of the second and first centuries B.C., and they are rarely mentioned among the Balkanic enemies of Rome thereafter. At the same time, increasingly more is written about the Dardanians and various other Thracian tribes who accompanied them to the battlefields and who had previously only been "grudgingly" listed among the allies of the Scordisci. The political history of the Carpathian Basin during the last few centuries B.C. was characterized by the reign of a tribe or a smaller group of tribes. The northern and western areas of the Carpathian Basin were, at the close of the second century B.C., controlled by a Celtic tribal alliance led by the Boii. The Sava Valley was dominated by the Scordisci who until the beginning of the first century B.C. were the overlords of the Pannon tribes living between the Drava and the Sava. The hegemony of the Scordisci in this area was probably broken after the crushing defeats inflicted on them by Rome. The independence of the Pannon tribes in the 60s is suggested by the fact that when Mithridates, king of the Pontus region, set out to attack Italy via the Balkan Peninsula and the Alps, it was the Pannons and not the Scordisci who were said to control the area.

In the mid-first century B.C., the peoples of the Carpathian Basin and the Balkans found themselves confronted by the Dacian king, Burebista, who had embarked on a series of swift and unexpected campaigns. Our sources offer little conclusive evidence as to whether Burebista had actually been the first significant ruler to unite the Dacian tribes, or whether he was following up on the achievements of his predecessors. His reign is correlated with major events of Roman history: the arrival of Burebista's right-hand man and chief counsellor to the Dacian court is synchronized with Sulla's ascension to power (82 B.C.), while Burebista's murder is set alongside Caesar's assassination (44 B.C.). These ill-constructed parallels serve only to enable us to date Burebista's reign before the mid-first century B.C. According to Strabo — our most important source — Burebista carried out his major conquests within a matter of a few years. An inscription found in Dionysopolis[9] (Balchik, Bulgaria) dating to around 48 B.C. flatly states that Burebista was "the first and greatest of all the kings of Thracia". The same inscription mentions a Getan ruler to whose father the town of Dionysopolis

9. G. Mihailov, *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae*. I. (2nd edition, Sofia 1970). No. 13 = Dobó, *Inscriptiones ...* 837.

sent a delegation. The delegation was received by the Getan king in Arge-
dava. Owing to the fragmentary state of the inscription it is not entirely
clear whether this king of Argedava was Burebista's father, or whether
Argedava itself may perhaps be identified with Arcidava (Varadia) on the
eastern fringes of the Banat. If so, the king receiving the Greek delegation
may plausibly be identified with Burebista's father. This possibility is, how-
ever, somewhat contradicted by the fact that in the first half of his reign,
every sign suggests that Burebista did not have any influence over the Greek
towns of the Pontic littoral. In the audacious plans drawn up in the 60s by
Mithridates, king of the Pontus region, the Dacians are ignored — they ap-
pear neither as potential allies nor as foes — suggesting that Dacian rule
did not at that time extend to the Lower Danube or to the Black Sea littoral.
Consequently, Burebista's conquests can be assigned to a brief period in the
50s of the first century B.C. During the first, and longer, half of his region,
Burebista was undoubtedly preoccupied with the unification of the Dacian
tribes and with the creation and consolidation of the Dacian Kingdom. His
chief counsellor and aide in this protracted and undoubtedly bloody proc-
ess was Decaineus, the high priest, who was invested with "an almost royal
power".

The chronological order of Burebista's conquests is uncertain because
our sources mention little more than the fact itself. Burebista extended Dacian
rule in three directions. He broke through to the southeast as far as the
Pontic littoral and vanquished the Greek towns lying on the seacoast be-
tween the Danube delta and the Balkan Mountains. Before he could achieve
this, the Getan tribes inhabiting the Lower Danube region had to be sub-
jected in parallel with crushing the power of the Bastarnae occupying the
territory to the north of the Getae beyond the Carpathians. This population
of Celtic or Germanic stock had by the second century B.C. frequently put
their troops at the disposal of the Macedonian kings and appeared time and
time again as mercenaries serving various powers. After Burebista's death
they were either the allies of, or mercenaries in the service of, the Dacians in
the wars against Rome.

The other thrust, deemed dangerous in Roman eyes, was directed against
Macedonia. Burebista crossed the Danube, and after ravaging the better
part of the Balkan Peninsula he came to the Roman province of Macedonia
and the Dalmatian coast, also in Roman hands. In Julius Caesar's last years,
the removal of the Dacian threat was high on the agenda of Roman foreign
policy. However, the only established result of these Balkanic conquests
was that the Scordisci fought alongside the Dacians in Burebista's later wars,
and that the Dacians had gained a lasting foothold to the south of the Dan-
ube, in the northern part of present-day Serbia.

The third direction of Dacian expansion affected their western neigh-
bours, the Celts. The Boian tribal confederacy embraced, in the first half of
the first century B.C., the Celtic tribes of western Transylvania. Burebista
first probably tried to break the hegemony of these tribes, the Taurisci and
the Anartii, and then found himself facing the Celtic (Boian) tribal confed-
eracy controlling the northern areas of the Carpathian Basin. The conflict
was sparked off by the Dacian advance towards the settlement territory of
the Boii that lay in Transdanubia and western Slovakia. Burebista's victory

over the Celts led to the dissolution not only of the Boian tribal confederacy, but also to the settlement of Dacians in what is today southern Slovakia. Besides the widespread distribution of the characteristic hand-made Dacian pottery, this fact is also reflected in the marked "Dacianization" of Celtic personal names during the second century A.D. in southern Slovakia.

The changes in the balance of power in the Middle and Lower Danube region caused consternation in Rome if for no other reason than that a hitherto unknown population — furthermore one living far beyond the Roman sphere of influence — had with alarming swiftness grown into a major political force in Illyricum (the Dalmatian coastline) and Macedonia. The necessity of breaking Dacian power was justifiably a major point in Julius Caesar's political programme. He planned an expedition against them that was to have been launched from Macedonia and would have taken place by 44 or 43 B.C. had his assassination not thwarted these plans. Around the same time, Burebista too became the victim of political murder. This conspiracy (or rather revolt, in our sources) appears to have reflected the interests of a particularist group (or groups) of the Dacian nobility: the Dacian tribes could have been united only after the elimination of their independent tribal leaders. Obviously, the possibility that Roman foreign policy also had a role in Burebista's death cannot be entirely ruled out. Some of Burebista's successors are known to have made contact with Octavian and Anthony.

The Transition Period

At the height of his power, Burebista would have been able to mobilize an army of 200,000 men, while not much later Dacian military power is estimated at one-fifth this number. Burebista's kingdom broke up into four, and later, five principalities. In the heartland, Decaineus managed to maintain his control over Burebista's own tribe for some time. His successor, Comosicus, probably in his person united the final form of royal and high priestly power. The list of kings recording the names of the kings from Burebista to Decebal obviously relates to this central territory, to the kingdom controlling southwestern Transylvania, whilst the other Dacian and Getan kings mentioned in various Augustan sources probably ruled over tribes of the Lower Danubian Getae. The list of kings poses problems of its own. Cotiso of the Dacians, mentioned by several sources as controlling the mountainous Iron Gate section of the Danube, is omitted from the list naming Burebista, Decaineus and Comosicus. Since the list contains other misspellings too, Comosicus can perhaps be identified with Cotiso.

Of Burebista's fragmented kingdom only the intra-Carpathian Transylvanian principality can be regarded as strictly speaking Dacian, since the other kingdoms ruled over Getan tribes. One of their kings, a certain Dicomes, is said to have established contact with Anthony at the time of the civil war which raged after Caesar's death and to have offered his help before Actium. At the same time, Cotiso made overtures to Octavian and, if Anthony's accusations are to be believed, Octavian even toyed with the

idea of establishing family relations. Other Getan and Dacian kings, by navigating skilfully between the squabbling Roman parties, also hoped to achieve material and financial gains with promises of alliance. These extraordinarily far-reaching diplomatic ties, unusual among the barbarian peoples of this period, can be explained by the fact that each king of Burebista's fragmented domain regarded himself as Burebista's political heir and tried to enlist powerful allies to further his political ambitions. Under these circumstances, the Dacian threat retained its priority in Roman public opinion even after Julius Caesar's death. Octavian, as Caesar's heir, declared war on the Dacians as the executor of Caesar's political legacy, in spite of the fact that the timeliness and possibilities of Rome's actually going to war had practically passed. Even the Iapodic war fought between 35–33 B.C. was, ostensibly, launched as a preliminary to the campaign against the Dacians, though its real objective was the occupation of the hinterland of the Adriatic coastland connecting Italy with the Balkans. One undisputable result of this campaign was the capture of Siscia (Sisak, Yugoslavia) in the Sava Valley, a victory Octavian hailed as providing Rome with a highly advantageous starting point and a base for military operations against the Dacians.

The Dacian war, of course, never took place. For one thing, the years that followed saw the decisive phase of the struggle for autocratic power in Rome; for another, the Dacian threat was by that time not so great as to be a prime concern of Roman foreign policy. Rome was satisfied to have Cotiso's control broken south of the Danube. This happened in 29 B.C., not long after Octavian's victory at Actium. M. Licinius Crassus scored a major victory against Cotiso in the first phase of a protracted Balkan war. Cotiso, however, retained his power over the left bank of the Danube, and probably remained in power for some time in the heartland of Burebista's former kingdom.

The conquest of the territories that were to become Noricum and Pannonia to the south of the Danube, and the organization of a Moesian army subordinated to Macedonia again led to hostilities between the Roman Empire and the Dacians. In the last phase of this large-scale operation, Rome took the first steps towards ensuring its influence on the left bank of the Danube. During the war that eventually led to the conquest of Pannonia (10 B.C.), the Dacians crossed the Danube. The Romans repelled this attack and Augustus sent a punitive expedition against them which "forced the Dacians to acknowledge the supremacy of the Romans".[10] This campaign was probably directed by M. Vinicius, of whom we know that in the course of one of his campaigns he first defeated the army of the Bastarnae, and later forced Dacians and Celts into an "alliance".[11] Lentulus's expedition, which drove the Dacians, "a people inaccessible" in their mountainous lands, to the north of the Danube and established a Roman guardpost on that side of the river, was perhaps synchronous with this campaign. One of our sources comments on this event to the effect that "Dacia, although not wholly vanquished,

10. Res gestae Divi Augusti (Monumentum Ancyranum) 30. = Dobó, *Inscriptiones* ... 769.
11. Dobó, *Inscriptiones* ... 769a.

22

was kept at arm's length".[12] Only a few details of some later Roman campaigns in the area are known: a Roman army sailed up the Tisza and the Maros and approached the Dacians; and there must be some factual background to the remark in a poetic work that the Dacian tribe of the Appuli — probably the inhabitants of the region around Apulum (Gyulafehérvár) — could easily reach the Black Sea. This casual remark is the only indication of the fact that after Burebista's death the Dacians might have tried to establish contact with the Lower Danube region. The shortest route between Apulum and the Black Sea lies by way of the Olt Valley. It cannot be mere chance that Augustus, who did not attach much importance to the military occupation of the Danubian frontier, established one of the earliest Danubian legionary camps not far from the mouth of the Olt (Oescus=Gigen, Bulgaria). The other early Augustan legionary fortress on the Danube (Carnuntum=Deutschaltenburg, Austria) was founded on territory neighbouring Rome's other Danubian foe, the Germanic kingdom of Maroboduus. This would suggest that in spite of the disintegration and territorial losses of the Dacian Kingdom after Burebista's death, it nonetheless remained an almost inaccessible political formation of superior organization.

In this barely stabilized situation the Romans probably breathed a sigh of relief when two tribes of the equestrian Sarmatian people began their gradual westward migration along the Lower Danube. The Jazyges and the Roxolani advancing behind them were sandwiched not only between the Getae and the Dacians, but also between the Roman Empire and the Dacians, and eventually formed a buffer zone between the Dacians and Pannonia. The Sarmatian migration — which was welcomed and even in some cases supported by Rome — could have been the occasion of the series of large and small Dacian incursions, which could well have included joint Dacian–Sarmatian action. In order to ease the tensions north of the Danube, the Romans had worked out a settlement policy under Augustus. A large number of Getae (Dacians?) were settled in Moesia in order to provide a homeland for the Sarmatians. The disturbances stirred up by these events subsided but gradually. Even in the final years of Tiberius's reign the Dacians and the Sarmatians frequently raided Moesia. Afterwards, however, there followed long decades of peace which, according to the afore-mentioned Dacian list of kings, roughly coincided with Coryllus's forty year long reign.

Coryllus occurs nowhere else in our sources, and is probably a misspelling of Scorilo, a highly popular Dacian name. A typical anecdote about a Dacian king called Scorilo has come down to us. To discourage his people from taking sides in Rome's domestic quarrels, he pitted two dogs against each other; when he then threw a wolf in front of the dogs, both dogs immediately turned on the wolf.[13] This kind of caution must have been a hallmark of Coryllus–Scorilo's long reign, and the anecdote about the dogs was especially apt at the time of the first real crisis in the history of the Roman Empire (68–69 A.D.), when the Danubian frontier was left unprotected by the legions who marched off to participate in the civil war. The Sarmatians exploited this situation successfully on several occasions, inflicting fatal

12. FLORUS, *Epitome* II, 28 (= IV, 12).
13. FRONTINUS, *Strategemata* I, 10, 4.

blows on a number of Roman armies and governors. Scorilo's cautionary parable can, in fact, be linked to a specific event. During the crisis of 68–69 (probably during the winter of 69–70), the Dacians crossed the Moesian section of the Danube and occupied a couple of frontier camps. If the parable about the bickering dogs can indeed be attributed to the Dacian king mistakenly called Coryllus, it seems probable that the Danubian frontier was attacked by an independent Dacian group from Wallachia, making Coryllus-Scorilo's admonition to his own people necessary.

Tacitus described the Dacians as an "ever unreliable nation" in connection with this attack.[14] Though this opinion reflects the experiences of later Dacian–Roman conflicts as well, the Dacians had always been accorded special attention since Burebista. It proved infinitely more difficult to steer them into a relationship conveniently called an "alliance", but which practically meant an incorporation into the dependent *clientale* system. When, at the close of Augustus's reign, the Dacians are described as not being as dangerous as they had formerly been and as being on the verge of recognizing Roman overlordship, this can be taken to reflect the more peaceful conditions of the Scorilo period. It would nonetheless appear that the Dacian-Roman alliance *(foedus)* rested on very shaky grounds indeed. The Dacian Kingdom differed in several respects from the Germanic and Sarmatian client kingdoms lying along the Danubian frontier which had entered into alliance with the Roman Empire. It enjoyed a singularly favourable geographic position in that the heartland of the kingdom was cut off from the Danube by an impenetrable mountain chain. A Roman attack from the west through the Temes or Maros valleys, or from the east through the Zsil or Olt Valley would have definitely involved long deployment of the troops with a considerable detour, as well as the penetration of well defended mountain passes. The Dacians were undoubtedly at a tactical advantage in no less a place than in the most important section of the empire's Danubian frontier, where the Danube cuts the southern Carpathians in a series of steep, narrow gorges. So that the Roman ships might be towed, a cliff road had to be hewn into the rockface. This amazing feat of ancient technology was completed towards the end of Tiberius's reign. It cannot be mere coincidence that a more peaceful phase of Dacian-Roman relations commenced at this time. Rome certainly would not have shirked even considerable financial sacrifice to make shipping safe through concessions to the Dacians.

The Kingdom of Decebal

Beside its obvious geographic advantage, Roman foreign policy also had to consider the high level of organization of the Dacian Kingdom and the strength of the central power. The hillfort of "royal" Sarmizegethusa on the western slopes of the Kudzsir Alps was surrounded by a chain of similarly fortified hilltop settlements which made the royal seat almost inaccessible and defended it against the outlying territories of the kingdom. These forts,

14. Tacitus, *Historiae* III, 46, 2.

Map 1. Transylvania at the time of the Dacian Kingdom
1. Dacian hillfort; 2. Roman military camp; 3. Roman town

covering areas of several hectares and fortified by ditches, thick walls and
also often with watchtowers, could not only house an impressive number
of armed men, but also served as the kingdom's industrial centres and stores,
and, naturally, its treasuries and sanctuaries. That the royal power could
mobilize an enormous labour force is reflected by the thick walls faced with
regularly cut limestone blocks reinforced by wooden crossbeams, as well as
the paved courts, roads, stone staircases and water channels hewn from
large blocks of stone all of which also served to underscore royal power.
The impression made by "monarchic representations" of this kind on the
commoners living under far more primitive conditions should not be under-
estimated; the enormous social gulf dividing the "cap-wearers" from the
"long-haired" Dacians undoubtedly required these royal accoutrements.

This centralized power was also strengthened by a religion whose cult
places have been identified near the hillforts by recent Romanian research.
The round sanctuaries framed by regularly placed stone slabs and the quad-
rangular ones with four rows of columns were most probably the scenes of
cults interwoven with astrological beliefs. These cults are said to have been
introduced by the Thracian Zalmoxis (or in other sources Zamolxis) who
was supposed to have been a disciple of Pythagoras. The teachings of this
mythical Zalmoxis — who was later admitted to the ranks of the gods —

25

included exhortations to an ascetic way of life. This belief system of Thraco-Getan origin probably was spread among the Dacians by Decaineus who came to the Dacian Kingdom at Burebista's invitation. Burebista had probably perceived the possibilities inherent in this belief system and used it in the development of central power. The practice of the cult was a privilege, and the belief system was a jealously guarded priestly secret. The high priest mediated between the supernatural and the king. It could well be that priestly privileges included the art of healing. Greek medical texts mention a large variety of Dacian medicinal herbs together with their Dacian names, reflecting the high level of the medical and botanical knowledge of the Dacians.

The excavations conducted on Dacian forts have brought to light a number of Roman imports in addition to the local implements and artifacts. Some of these belong to the group of luxury items that can be found among the personal possessions of the barbarian nobility in all parts of Europe. What is conspicuous, however, is that the Roman imports found in this area include not only items that enhanced the luxury of the tribal aristocracy, but also good quality iron implements which undoubtedly contributed to the high level of the crafts practised in the forts. It is also highly probable that Greek and Roman specialists were sought out and employed to direct the fortification work of the Dacian hillforts. A number of ashlars, and especially the stone blocks from the sanctuaries, bear Greek letter signs which were probably mason's marks facilitating the joining of pre-carved architectural elements, whilst another group of these signs is associated with the calendrical function of the sanctuaries. A huge truncated conical vessel — perhaps serving a cultic function — bears stamps with Latin lettering identical to those on Roman stamped tiles in every detail. One of these stamps reads DECEBALVS, the other PER SCORILO.

Romanian scholars generally translate these two stamps as "Decebal, Scorillo's son". The difficulty of this translation and interpretation lies in the fact that the two names were impressed by two different stamps (even though both occur on the same vessel), as if one name were that of the customer (the one who ordered the vessel), and the other that of the potter. The link with King Decebal is plausible, but even so, the lack of the title *rex* ("king") is highly conspicuous. Assuming that the translation "Decebal, Scorilo's son" is correct, one is led to conclude that Decebal was King Scorilo's son. However, the Dacian king list records another ruler between father and son: King Diurpaneus, who charted the political course which, despite the brief grandeur of Decebal's reign, eventually led to the downfall of the Dacian Kingdom.

As we have seen, Scorilo basically accepted the alliance system created by Rome along the European frontier of the empire. He may have been favourably disposed towards this system because Tiberius granted him an exceptionally high annual *stipendium* after building the cliff road along the Danube. According to a later historian, Jordanes, King Diurpaneus launched an attack against the empire after the Dacians "in the reign of the Emperor Domitian ... for fear of his avarice, broke the truce they had long observed under other emperors".[15] It could be that Domitian had indeed planned to

15. JORDANES, *Getica* 76.

reduce the exceptionally high *stipendium*, but it is hardly plausible that he would have done so in a politically unfavourable climate when the Danubian Germanic tribes were making preparations for war. It is more likely that the Dacians timed their unexpected and surprise attack — causing serious losses to the empire — in concert with the tensions on the Germanic front.

The Dacians attacked at the latest in the winter of 85–86 and as so often before, they probably poured over the frozen Danube. The surprise attack claimed the life of Oppius Sabinus, the governor of Moesia. The seriousness of the situation is shown by the fact that Domitian himself hastened to Moesia where he devoted several months to the organization of an effective counter-attack. The direction of the counter-offensive was entrusted to Cornelius Fuscus, the praetorian prefect, who crossed the Danube and advanced successfully on Dacian soil. At this critical moment Diurpaneus gave up his throne to Decebal, who began his reign with a glorious victory over Fuscus's army. Fuscus fell in battle and his defeat was so disastrous that his army was declared lost. Only a third Roman army commander, Tettius Julianus, managed to secure a decisive victory in 88, in the Battle of Tapae, a pass en route to the royal seat.

Owing to the fragmentary nature of the sources, it is difficult to single out the new elements in Dacian–Roman relations introduced by the treaty that was shortly concluded and by the new alliance. Historiography with an anti-Domitian bias has considered this peace treaty as a victory for Decebal, since he was granted not only a high *stipendium*, but was also supplied with skilled craftsmen and engineers from Rome on whose knowledge he could rely in matters "pertaining to both peace and war". At the same time, following the victory, but still prior to the peace treaty, it was possible to dispatch Roman troops safely to the Germanic front over the Great Hungarian Plain, "through the kingdom of Decebal".[16] Decebal himself repeatedly suggested a peace treaty even before his defeat at Tapae.

Decebal did not exploit the Romans' plight in the ensuing years when Domitian was forced to wage a long Germanic–Sarmatian war in Pannonia. It would appear that he had achieved his aim with the high *stipendium* granted him by the peace treaty and the Roman artisans placed at his disposal. He did not attend the peace negotiations of 88, but was represented by an envoy called Diegis (perhaps his brother), and it was the latter who received the diadem — symbolizing his confirmation as a client king — from the hands of Domitian.

The clarification of the building periods of the Dacian forts awaits further research. It is possible that the erection of stone walls and watchtowers around the hilltop settlements can in part be attributed to Decebal who asked the specialists sent to him to supervise these and similar operations. The stamp bearing the name of Decebal was probably made by a Roman military engineer, since it is an exact copy of the stamps used in Roman military brick making. The tiles used in the forts similarly suggest the activity of Roman artisans.

Decebal significantly enlarged his kingdom's territory during the decade of his client relationship with Rome. These expansions were tolerated

16. Dobó, *Inscriptiones* ... 502 = 774a.

by Rome as long as they remained within the framework of the alliance system and did not endanger treaties concluded with other kings' and would not foreseeably lead to the collapse of the carefully established and precarious *clientale* network. Decebal's expansion can be reconstructed from Ptolemy's descriptions, for in his geographic handbook — written well after the conquest of Dacia — the boundaries of Dacia do not correspond to the frontiers of the Roman province. Nor does he mention which legions were stationed in Dacia, even though he never failed to note this detail in his descriptions of other provinces. Sarmizegethusa is still described as "royal", suggesting that it cannot have been the Roman *colonia* founded at Várhely, but only the royal seat near Újvárhely. The frontiers of Decebal's Dacia were marked by the Tisza River to the west, by the Carpathians to the north and by the Dniester River to the east. He had subdued this vast territory, which was inhabited not only by Dacians, but also by Celts, Sarmatians and other population groups, step by step and not without the occasional war. Ptolemy also lists the populations that came under Decebal's rule — unfortunately, in a manner that does not allow their precise geographic localization. The northernmost among these peoples we know from other sources as well: the Celtic Anartii and Taurisci, members of the former Boian tribal confederacy inhabiting northern Transylvania, and the Costoboci who lived beyond the Carpathians and spoke Dacian. The other ethnonyms Ptolemy mentions do not occur elsewhere; however, they include a conspicuously high number of ethnic names derived from place names (Predavenses, Ratakenses, Kaukoenses, Buridavenses, etc.). Since these peoples are allocated a central position on Ptolemy's map the assumption may perhaps be risked that Decebal settled his Dacians on territories that were administered from a specific centre, and thereby disrupting the traditional tribal framework. For the other striking feature of Ptolemy's record is that the only previously known Dacian tribe, the Appuli, does not occur even in the form "Apulenses", i.e. derived from the place name Apulum.

3. The Roman Province of Dacia

Conquest and Organization of the Province

By the second half of the first century A.D., the continental European frontier of the Roman Empire had been established at the Rhine and Danube rivers. The linear military defence along the river banks had become final. These waterway frontiers not only separated the empire clearly from its neighbours, but the rivers also checked potential enemies and acted as a barrier to minor raids. At the same time, these waterways offered a convenient means of communication and acted as a means of transporting various trade commodities and supplies, as well as building materials between the chain of camps and forts built at fords and at suitable strategic points. The various peoples living on the fringes of the imperial frontier were drawn or forced into alliance with the empire. However, one strong military power

28

on the other side of the frontier could not be fitted into this system. Consequently, the peace concluded between the empire and Decebal in 89 — though in fact adhered to by both sides for quite some time — was not regarded as final by Rome on the experiences of the previous 150 years. The Dacian state, a strong political, economic and military power, became a constant source of tension.

The internal and external political situation of the Roman Empire did not permit any kind of action against the Dacians for some two decades. In 89, Antonius Saturninus rebelled in Germania and a Suebian–Sarmatian war was raging on the Pannonian frontier (89-92). The execution of dissident senators, beginning in 93, and the acute political crisis led to the murder of Domitian in 96. Following Nerva's brief reign, Trajan soon began making preparations for a Dacian war. The emperor took far more comprehensive measures than ever before to ensure his victory. He assembled a vast military force: the legions, auxiliary troops and other military units stationed along the Middle and the Lower Danube numbered some 200,000 men. Most took part in the battles of the military campaign that began in 102.

The army began its march after three years of preparation. Only fragments of the contemporary accounts of this campaign have survived. The precise chronology of events can best be reconstructed from the historical narrative written by Dion Cassius in the third century, from the 200 metres long spiral band of reliefs on the memorial column erected in Rome after the final victory, and from the results of archaeological investigations. The army was commanded by the emperor and his close friend and colleague, Licinius Sura. The troops were concentrated in Moesia Superior, around the legionary camp of Viminacium. The main objective was undoubtedly the storming of Decebal's seat at Sarmizegethusa Regia which was surrounded by a chain of forts and which could be approached from several directions.

The main thrusts of the military advance were determined by the Danube fords that were defended by the fleet. The largest deployment of troops began from Lederata. These troops then marched towards the Hátszeg Mountains through the eastern Banat where a military base was established. A few surviving fragments from the emperor's campaign journal suggest that he also advanced along this route towards the Dacian heartland. The other attack route was initiated from Drobeta, whilst still other units crossed the Danube at Dierna.

The Romans scored a decisive victory at the very beginning of their campaign and the Dacians sued for peace. However, Decebal did not appear in person at the peace negotiations and fighting was resumed. The Roman troops advanced along the northern frontiers of Moesia Inferior from the Danube to the southern Carpathians. When the Szászváros Mountains were encircled, Decebal was forced to surrender and the harsh terms of the armistice, in practice, signalled the end of the Dacian Kingdom. The Dacians were compelled to surrender their weapons, their siege engines, and their military engineers — as well as to extradite all Roman refugees. Their forts, and fortresses were pulled down, and the territory occupied by the Roman troops was formally annexed to the empire. The Dacians became the subjects of Rome. The occupied western part of the Dacian Kingdom was incorporated into Moesia Superior, whilst the eastern areas were absorbed

into Moesia Inferior. After the war, a stone bridge designed by Trajan's engineer, Apollodorus, was constructed at Drobeta making communication possible and insuring continuous supply at all times.

Decebal, nevertheless, made a last attempt to reorganize his army and resist. He occupied some territories and established contacts with a few neighbouring peoples. He captured a high-ranking Roman officer, Longinus, and tried first to blackmail the emperor, and then later to have him poisoned. These events left Rome with no alternatives and the empire commenced preparations for a final showdown. The second Dacian war broke out in 105. The aim was to capture the central areas of the Dacian Kingdom: Trajan led his troops towards Sarmizegethusa Regia. By 106 the Romans had captured and destroyed the Dacian forts and strongholds. Before the last fortress fell, the defenders poisoned themselves. Decebal fled and committed suicide in order to avoid capture. His head was cut off and brought before Trajan at his military headquarters by a soldier called Claudius Maximus.

Following the triumph in Rome, Decebal's head was exhibited on the Gemonia steps. Plays were held in the circus to celebrate the death of this despised enemy, while coins bearing the legend DACIA CAPTA were struck. The former Dacian heartland was now occupied by the Roman army.

The Dacian wars marked the first conscious decision of the empire to send a Roman army across the European frontier of the *Imperium* — marked by major waterways — with the express aim of protecting this frontier through conquest, the annihilation of the enemy, and the incorporation of the enemy territory into the empire — though at times it seemed as if Rome was of two minds about the annexation and retention of the Dacian territories.

The organization of the province began at a fast pace during the term of office of the first governor, Terentius Scaurianus between 106 and 110. Coins bearing the legend DACIA AUGUSTI PROVINCIA were struck in 112. Scaurianus took the necessary measures to transform the conquered territory into a province. He took a population census and then ordered a survey of the area. The first and most important task was the clear demarcation of the frontiers of the new province and the organization of its defence. In the European provinces of the empire, the legions and the auxiliary troops were generally stationed along the river frontiers of the Rhine and the Danube. In areas where this did not prove possible, as in the southern parts of Germania and Raetia, an arrow-straight defensive line with earthworks and ditches was created, even across open hilly countryside. However, the rough terrain of Dacia did not favour either kind of defence system. It took Rome about ten years to build a chain of strong, military forts. The military camps standing on the boundaries of the province served at the same time to mark the frontiers of the empire.

The core of the military defence of the new province was at first formed by two legions and their auxiliary troops. The *legio IIII Flavia* was stationed in Bersovia until 118–119. The other legion was the *legio XIII Gemina* whose camp was established in the centre of Transylvania, at Apulum.

In addition to the legions, a high number of auxiliary troops — cavalry and infantry troops totalling 500 men and cavalry units numbering 1000

men — were stationed in the province. The province was permanently garrisoned with troops by the 120s. The all-important road network was constructed in parallel with the forts. The building of roads by the military began at roughly the same time as the organization of the province since supply lines were essential and of strategic importance, especially in a province which thrust so deeply into hostile territory.

Trajan settled the veterans of the legions who had fought in the Dacian wars in Colonia Dacica, the first settlement in the province. In order to populate the territory which had emptied as a result of the wars, Trajan settled large populations in Dacia. These settlements were symbolized by children playing in the lap of a female figure personifying the province of Dacia on coins struck to commemorate the constitutional foundation of the province.

At the beginning of Dacia's existence, in 107–108, a war broke out on the western frontier of the province.[17] All that is known of this war is that the governor of Lower Pannonia, who later became the emperor Hadrian, fought against the Sarmatian Jazyges — who were settled in the Danube-Tisza interfluve and had previously been allies of Rome in its war against the Dacians. The unrest among the Sarmatians was, in part, caused by the fact that the territory (the eastern part of the Banat) that had been wrested from them by Decebal had not been returned to them by Trajan, in spite of their repeated demands.[18] At the same time, the Jazyges living in the Transdanube–Tisza region, were now bordered by the Roman Empire not only on the west and south, but also on the east as a consequence of the newly-founded province, a circumstance which, understandably, became a source of tension.

Rome's problems in this region appeared to have been resolved after these wars, and the safety of the new province appeared to be secure as well. This period of respite proved to be very fleeting, however. When Trajan died in 117, the first real showdown between Rome and its neighbours took place. The Jazyges and the Roxolani attacked the two Moesias. The situation was aggravated by the death of Quadratus Bassus, Dacia's excellent and experienced governor. The outbreak of hostilities was caused by the reduction of the annual *stipendium* paid by Rome to the Roxolani and by the above-mentioned territorial demands of the Jazyges, as well as by the fact that the newly created province acted as a barrier between these two related peoples. The emperor hastened to Moesia and also visited Dacia en route. At Drobeta, he had the superstructure of the bridge removed "for Hadrian was afraid that it might also make it easy for the barbarians, once they had neutralized the fortifications at the bridges, to cross into Moesia".[19] After assuring the Sarmatians that they would again receive their previous *stipendium*, the emperor soon came to an agreement with the Roxolani also. A rather unusual method was chosen for dealing with the Jazyges. An experienced soldier, Q. Marcius Turbo of the equestrian order was appointed governor of Pannonia Inferior and Dacia. Thus, he was able to crush Jazygian resistance from both directions.

17. *SHA*, vita Hadriani 3, 9.
18. Dion Cassius, LXVII, 10, 3–4.
19. Dion Cassius, LXVIII, 13, 6.

The Sarmatian wars in 116–118 clearly showed that Dacia played but a minor role in the defence of the provinces lying to the south of the Danube River and in staving off possible attacks. Though Rome had eliminated a major source of danger with the overthrow of Decebal, a former buffer zone which had checked the Sarmatian tribes was also eliminated in the process. The danger of a unified Dacian power had indeed disappeared, but the growing strength of the Sarmatians threatened not only the Danubian frontier of the empire, but also sections of the Dacian frontier in Oltenia and the Temesköz. The equestrian battle tactics employed by the Sarmatians were less of a threat in the mountainous parts of Transylvania, but an alliance with the "free Dacian" Celtic and Germanic tribes on the northern fringes of Dacia was able to bring concentrated attacks along the entire Lower Danubian *limes* section and the frontiers of Dacia. Consequently, the defence of the frontier of the empire — now augmented by Dacia — called for a larger garrison than the shorter Danubian *limes* section prior to the conquest had. Thus at the beginning of his reign Hadrian, whose ideas on imperial strategy were basically defensive in nature, contemplated the possibility of relinquishing Dacia.[20]

This possibility must in any case be considered as having been realistic in view of the military situation. It was not alien too Hadrian to relinquish conquests secured by his predecessors in the course of costly expeditions. For example, he did withdraw the Roman troops from the territories beyond the Euphrates and the Tigris. But, in the end, he abandoned this idea and reorganized the defence of the province. The *legio IIII Flavia* was withdrawn to its earlier base beyond the Danube, to Singidunum. Hadrian anticipated a potential Jazygian attack and he hoped to strengthen the Danubian *limes* with this measure. The military role that fell to Dacia was — besides the defence of its own territory — participation in the battles to ward off an enemy attack. Incapable of independent military manoeuvres, on numerous occasions the Dacian army could be successfully deployed only together with troops from other provinces.

The Roman Empire was determined to establish in the European border provinces a defensive line which would clearly demarcate the imperial frontier for the peoples of the Barbaricum, and which would, at the same time, offer a relatively easy and rapid means of overland and water communication between the chain of forts built along this frontier. What remain to be researched are Rome's interests in retaining —along with the shorter Danubian frontier which corresponded better to the traditional ideas of defence — a province the control of which posed considerable difficulties. Why did Rome decide, after some hesitation, to maintain a province whose defence called for a larger and certainly more costly army than the defence of its other provinces? Having failed to immediately withdraw its troops from this territory after the Dacian wars, Rome could have done so later only at the cost of considerable prestige. The gold resources of Transylvania undoubtedly influenced the decision to retain the province.

20. EUTROPIUS, *Breviarium* ... VIII, 6, 2.

Map 2. Dacia between 106 and 261

1. Boundary of the empire; 2. Boundary of the province; 3. Road; 4. Camp of auxiliary troops; 5. Legionary camp; 6. Settlement with municipal rights

Organization and Administration

The organization that began under Marcius Turbo and probably lasted well into the term of office of the next governor, Julius Severus (120–126) affected the frontiers and the garrison of Dacia, as well as the neighbouring territories of the Barbaricum: the Temeskoz, Oltenia and Wallachia. The troops of the Lower Moesian army stationed in Wallachia were withdrawn at the latest by this time; this, in effect, meant the abandonment of a territory that had been occupied during the course of the Dacian wars. A province called Dacia Inferior (Lower Dacia) was carved out from the Dacian territory beyond the Olt River. No legions were stationed in this province. It was governed by a procurator of the equestrian order. The province enjoyed a certain measure of independence in its internal administration. Its boundaries were marked by the Danube to the south and by the other Dacian province, Dacia Superior, to the northwest. The eastern boundary is uncertain: it either lay along the chain of forts on the Olt River or along the so-called *Limes Transalutanus*, a fortified line lying some twenty-five to thirty-five kilometres farther on and roughly parallel with the Olt.

Prior to its division, the central territory of Dacia was called Dacia Superior (Upper Dacia); it comprised the heartland of Transylvania and the eastern Banat up as far as the Eastern Carpathians. Following the transfer of the *legio IIII Flavia,* only one legion remained in Dacia, the *legio XIII Gemina* stationed in Apulum. The governor of the province, who at the same time acted as the legion commander, also resided here.

Simultaneously with the reorganization of 118 or some years later (but definitely before 124), a new province was created in the northern part of the province, in northern Transylvania, under the name of Dacia Porolissensis. The province received its name from the military fort at Porolissum. There was no legion stationed here either and, thus similarly to Dacia Inferior, the province was governed by a *procurator* of the equestrian order. The governor of Dacia Superior was entrusted with supervising military matters in the other two provinces as well. The formerly united province of Dacia was, in this way, divided into three distinct parts.

There were about eighty forts in Dacia. Unfortunately, very little is known about the date of their construction or the sequence in which they were built owing to the lack of archaeological investigation on these sites. It is possible that some of these forts only operated for short periods of time. The large number of forts can also be attributed to the fact that there were few military camps of the size usual elsewhere. Also, a number of smaller forts were constructed along the *limes* section on the Olt and the *Limes Transalutanus.* Several of these forts could be garrisoned by a single military unit. In 164, the garrison troops stationed in fifteen Dacian forts were drawn from three equestrian and twelve infantry units. Disregarding the legionary detachments, these troops numbered about 11,500 soldiers. Together with the legion, the armed forces in Dacia can be estimated at about 45,000–50,000 men.

The earliest, earth-and-timber period of these forts has been observed on fifteen of the fort sites. These forts were later partially or totally rebuilt with stone walls and defence works. This work began by the time of Hadrian,

while the reconstructions continued under Antoninus Pius. Conversely, a number of forts were only built at the beginning of the third century.

According to a milestone erected in 109–110 in Ajtony, the construction of the main military roads began immediately after the occupation of the province and finished with its reorganization in 118. The routes can be reconstructed from the *Tabula Peutingeriana*. This rough map of the road network connecting the settlements — mostly forts — and of the distances between them was drawn in the mid-third century. The *Tabula* begins its description with the roads from the two Danubian bridges at Lederata and Drobeta connecting Dacia with the empire, and those from Dierna which led to Apulum, and thence to the northern frontier. The roads linked these strategically important fords with the capital of the province and with the northern frontier. The roads of eastern Dacia are not marked on the map, the reason being that this territory had been evacuated by the army by the middle of the third century. The map, drawn at a later date, does not depict the abandoned forts in that area.

The road connecting Dacia with Pannonia Inferior led through the Barbaricum, and is also well known: it branched off from the Tibiscum–Apulum road at the confluence of the Sztrigy River and then turned westwards into the valley of the Maros River. It also led beyond the Dacian frontier. The road followed the Maros Valley until its confluence and then entered Pannonia Inferior through the Danube–Tisza interfluve. Its course along the valley of the Maros is not known. The stamped tiles and building remains uncovered at Bulcs, in the environs of Arad, at Nagyszentmiklós and at Németcsanád definitely suggest that this road was under military control. Fill from it has been found along a fifty kilometres long section in the Danube–Tisza interfluve. This road enabled rapid communication between Pannonia and Dacia. The tomb statue of a sailor from Micia and the inscription erected by the shipping society active in Apulum[21] indicates that there was shipping on the Maros River. The safety of the section of road that passed through Jazygian territory had to be ensured at all cost, which is why it was placed under military protection.

The interpretation of the finds that have been unearthed on either side of this road also has a bearing on the definition of the status of the Temesköz. It has been suggested that the road leading through the Maros Valley should be considered an imperial frontier — a section of the *limes* — in spite of the fact that no camps have yet been identified next to it and that the western boundary of this territory, the line of the Tisza River, is similarly unfortified. The presence of a Sarmatian–Jazygian population as well as the lack of fortifications and Roman finds definitely suggest that the area lying to the east and south of the Tisza–Maros line cannot have belonged to Dacia in terms of administration.

The peaceful decades following the reorganization in 118 created favourable conditions for subsequent development in Dacia. For over two decades there were no major wars in or beyond the province. The Dacian threat is mentioned in general terms only during the reign of Antoninus Pius. These Dacians lived beyond the northern and eastern frontiers of the province

21. Collegium nautarum: *CIL* III, 1209.

and also included groups of Carpi and Costoboci, as well as free Dacians *(daci liberi)* who had either been unwilling to surrender or who had fled from their homeland because of the wars. The details of this war are not known, but the war threat appears to have been insignificant at this time. According to a brief remark in the biography of Antoninus Pius[22] the emperor "crushed the Germans and the Dacians and many other tribes and also the Jews, who were in revolt". The Dacian war can be dated by the appearance of the epithet *Dacicus* among the honorary titles taken by the emperor in 157. Indeed, the governors of Dacia Superior and Porolissensis were all first-rate soldiers (Statius Priscus and Macrinius Vindex). The armed forces of the two provinces proved unable to prevent the attack and Mauritanians troops had to be called in from Africa. Even though actual battles can only be assumed in Dacia Superior, the enemy movements were the first signs of unrest and a portent of the long war along the entire section of the Danubian frontier.

Economy and Trade

The economic importance of the central European frontier provinces of the *imperium* was negligible. Neither were their exports of much consequence. At the same time, the upkeep of the garrison troops consumed considerable funds. The mineral wealth of Transylvania undoubtedly enhanced the importance of Dacia for Rome. Aside from stone quarries as well as iron and salt mines, what really attracted the Romans were the gold deposits. Even though an exceptionally abundant source material has survived concerning these gold mines, next to nothing is known about their exploitation in Dacian times (the Dacians apparently preferred silver jewellery, at least this is what is suggested by presently-known finds), or about the yield of these mines in Roman times. The fame of the Transylvanian gold mines was spread by the wax tablets that came to light at Verespatak in 1786, in 1790, and on several other occasions during the course of the nineteenth century. These tablets comprise, in fact, various economic writings, contracts of purchase and sale, and accounts from between 131 and 167.

The exploitation of the Transylvanian gold mines *(aurariae Dacicae)* appears to have begun shortly after the organization of the province. The focus of mining activity lay in the Érchegység where the miners lived in small villages next to the larger settlements of Ampelum and Alburnus Maior.

The mine territory *(territorium metalli)* was considered imperial property and the settlements here were not granted urban autonomy (it is uncertain whether Ampelum ever received the status of *municipium*). The administrative organization and the gold mines were directed by the mine procurators *(procurator aurarium)* who were generally freedmen of the emperor. Mining was well under way by Hadrian's reign as indicated by a wax tablet dated to 131. The staff of the administrative organs of the mines *(vilici, tabularii, dispensatores)* to whom the administration and professional control

22. *SHA*, vita Pii 5, 4.

of the mines were entrusted were mostly imperial slaves and freedmen. The *librarii*, who were clerks in the office of the *procurator*, were occasionally chosen from among the soldiers of the *legio XIII Gemina*. They were not the only soldiers who were active in the territory of the mines. The protection of the regions that lay near the frontier against external attacks and bandit raids was the task of the *numerus Maurorum Hispanorum,* soldiers who had been recruited from North Africa.

The wax tablets and the other inscriptions from this area contain a wealth of information about the population living in the mining territories. The mines were worked by Illyrians from Dalmatia as well as by Pirustae, Sardeates and Buridustae. The Illyrian names from the mining territories account for the greater part (64 per cent) of the Illyrian names in Dacia. It would appear that there was a constant shortage of miners in spite of repeated recruiting. The high wages paid to these miners also suggest that the labour force was insufficient. The text from one wax tablet clearly shows that the population of this area had declined by the sixties of the second century. On 9 February, 167, the officials of the Jupiter Cernenus *collegium* of Apulum dissolved the organization because only seventeen of the original fifty-four members remained in Alburnus.

Little is known about the economy of Dacia aside from mining. Handicrafts appear to have been self-supplying, as in the other provinces. The implements and tools necessary for agricultural work and mining were manufactured from iron ore extracted from local mines. The handicraft best preserved in the archaeological record is that of the potters since ceramics were used in every household. So far, however, very few workshops and pottery kilns have been excavated. Neither can traces of a local, uniform pottery style distributed over the entire province be detected. Influences from the area to the south of the Danube have been noted in the vessel forms and the surface finish of pottery from southern Dacia. In contrast, the pottery from the north shows influences from Noricum and Pannonia (as reflected, for example, in three-footed bowls). However, one specific vessel type with a characteristic ornamentation can be distinguished in northern Transylvania. The exact distribution of this pottery ware is not precisely known. These large hemispherical bowls were decorated with stamped patterns. The grey and pink bowls manufactured in Porolissum reveal influences from southern Pannonian workshops. The figural relief ornamentation of terra sigillata wares can be recognized in the stylized geometric patterns that were stamped on the vessels.

Overland and water routes favoured the development of long-distance trade, while the many soldiers stationed in the province guaranteed a secure market with substantial purchasing power. At the same time the high proportion of oriental settlers ensured links with the major trade arteries of the Roman world operated by Syrians. A number of merchants are known from the inscriptions. Little is known about their actual business for they left hardly a trace of their activities in the archaeological record. They probably traded in perishable commodities such as foodstuffs and textiles which have not survived. The main export commodities of the province were salt, iron and, obviously, gold; some of the wild beasts (such as bear and wolf) used in circus games were perhaps also caught in and exported from Dacia.

The Long War and Recovery in the Severan Age

The northwest to southeast migration of the Gothic tribes, beginning in the middle of the second century, initially caused unrest among the peoples living beyond the frontiers of the empire in the northern half of the Carpathian Basin, and then led to a bitter war one and a half decades long. The Germanic tribes (Goths, Langobards and Vandals), who were on the move in search of a new homeland, threatened the settlement territory and the hitherto peaceful existence of the border populations. The path of their flight was blocked by the Roman Empire which forced them into a dependent, client relationship, but which at the same time also proved to be a wealthy neighbour.

The safety of the region was undermined by the fact that in 162, Emperor Marcus Aurelius withdrew a number of troops from the European frontier provinces — including Dacia — for deployment in the Parthian war that had broken out in the previous year. However, the skilful policy charted by the governors of these provinces postponed for some time the outbreak of hostilities in this region. The first armed conflicts in Dacia can be roughly dated to after 167 on the evidence of the coin hoard from Tibód — the latest coin from which was minted in that year — and the latest date on a series of wax tablets (29 May, 167). These wax tablets had been carefully concealed by their owners probably on their receiving news of the war; they were never able to retrieve them. Simultaneously with the onset of armed conflict, a number of administrative and military changes came into force. Unfortunately, the exact sequence of these changes within the brief three year period cannot be reconstructed from the sparse information contained in the sources. These measures were probably adopted in the face of the crisis brought on by the war so that it is hardly probable that the best solution was found already by the first years of the war. In the second half of 167, the *legio V Macedonica* which had returned from the eastern campaign to Troesmis in Dobrudja, was transferred to northern Dacia, to the military camp of Potaissa, perhaps in anticipation of an attack against Transylvania. The administrative subdivision of Dacia was also modified, with the three parts of the province becoming more strongly linked to each other between 167 and 170. They were placed under the leadership of a single governor whose official title became *"legatus Augusti pro praetore Daciarum trium"* (governor of the three Dacias). The names of the provinces also changed: Superior became Apulensis and Inferior was hereafter called Malvensis (probably after a settlement that has not yet been identified). These changes follow the well-known pattern established by naming Dacia Porolissensis: the provinces were named after a major settlement or town. The legionary fortress of Potaissa was linked to Dacia Apulensis.

Military activity culminated between 167 and 170. Dacia's situation was especially critical because its long frontiers had to be protected from three sides. The high military command in Rome appointed capable and experienced soldiers as governors and procurators in the Danubian provinces; some of them, such as M. Claudius Fronto, who in 167 had been the governor of Moesia Superior, fell in battle. The defence of the western frontier of

Dacia and Moesia Superior was eventually pulled together under one command in order to check the Jazyges who mounted attacks through the Temesköz. In 168, Fronto was entrusted with the joint governorship of both provinces and subsequently was placed at the head of the Tres Daciae. When the army of Moesia Superior was defeated and the new Moesian governor also fell on the battlefield, the province was joined to Dacia. The concentrated Sarmatian and Germanic attacks led to a critical situation at the front: "... After waging successful battles against the Germans and the Jazyges, and while fighting valiantly for the state, he fell in battle", states the inscription on Fronto's statue erected in Trajan's forum.[23] An inscription in his honour was also erected in Sarmizegethusa.[24] The danger threatening the town is described in another inscription set up in honour of Marcus Aurelius, whose troops relieved the town when it was in grave danger.[25]

Little is known about the eastern front in Dacia. It is assumed that only minor skirmishes took place in this area since the main enemy thrust was directed towards the south. The Costoboci and the Sarmatians bypassed Dacia and plundered Moesia Inferior before advancing into Achaia. They ransacked the Eleusinian sanctuary. Finally, the governor Cornelius Clemens defeated them with the help of a Vandal group, the Asdingi *(hasdingi)* in 171 and 172.[26] This event marked a decisive turn in events. Rome now attempted to realize her aims by diplomatic means. In a somewhat similar way, "Tarbus, a neighbouring chieftain, who had come into Dacia and was demanding money and threatening to make war if he should fail to get it"[27] was also checked by Rome's allies. Certain populations were admitted into the empire who later settled in Pannonia, Moesia and Germania. This course of events reflects the ultimate wish of the belligerent barbarians to be admitted behind the frontiers of the empire. The events of the ensuing year were determined by military actions initiated by Rome. The enemy was defeated on its own territory. The Jazyges were later granted permission by Marcus Aurelius to communicate with their kindred in the east, the Roxolani, by way of Dacia under the supervision of the governor of the province.[28]

The *legio I Italica* from Moesia Inferior was also deployed in the battles on the northern frontier of Dacia. Around 180 Marcus Aurelius' son, the emperor Commodus, led his army against the peoples, primarily the Buri *(buri)*, living in this area. The campaign proved successful because "now that they were exhausted he [Commodus] made peace with them, receiving hostages and getting many captives from the Buri themselves, as well as fifteen thousand from the others, he compelled the others to take an oath that they would never dwell in nor use for pasture a forty-stade (five-mile) strip of their territory bordering Dacia. The same Sabinianus also, when twelve thousand of the neighbouring Dacians had been driven out of their own country and were on the point of aiding the others, dissuaded them

23. *CIL* VI, 1377.
24. *CIL* III, 1457.
25. *CIL* III, 7969.
26. Dion Cassius, LXXI, 12, 1.
27. Dion Cassius, LXXI, 11.
28. Dion Cassius, LXXI, 129. 1–2.

from their purpose, promising them that some land in our Dacia should be given them".[29]

At the end of the long war, Rome restored the former system of alliances on the frontiers of the empire. The appearance and settlement of various Germanic tribes along Dacia's northern front, however, cast a shadow over the province.

The one and a half decade long war and the plague following in its wake, as well as the weakness of the military defence and the slower pace of the granting of urban autonomy compared to other provinces, again caused unrest among the provincial population under Commodus's control. The emperor's biography mentions these events briefly. In the mid-180s, "the provincials in Britain, Dacia and Germany attempted to cast off his yoke".[30] The minor details are unknown but there is nothing to show that the native Dacian population participated in these movements. Similar stirrings were reported in Germania. It is possible that the Dacian legions received the epithet *"pia fidelis, pia constans"* at this time for their fidelity to Commodus. The legion stationed in Apulum erected a statue to Commodus.[31]

In 192, Commodus was murdered and in March 193, the governor, Septimius Severus, was acclaimed emperor by the Pannonian legions in Carnuntum. Together with the other Danubian provinces, the Dacian army, too, immediately recognized him as their overlord. The new emperor entrusted the governorship of Dacia to his brother. From this point, the military detachments of the Dacian army fought on the side of Septimius against the pretenders. Under the reign of Septimius Severus the fate of the Danubian provinces which had supported him from the outset took a turn for the better. The peaceful political situation also favoured economic prosperity. The reconstruction of Dacia is reflected in broad grants of urban autonomy. Severus granted autonomy to three settlements while one settlement was promoted to the rank of *colonia*. It would appear that grants of *ius Italicum* to several Dacian towns can also be dated to his reign. The *territorium* of towns that had received the *ius Italicum* were exempted from land tax.

The paucity of archaeological finds — those that do exist are, moreover, largely unpublished — does not allow a detailed reconstruction of this Severan prosperity. It is nonetheless conspicuous that this prosperity appears to have been restricted to Transylvania rather than extending to the whole of Dacia. The chief beneficiaries of this prosperity were the soldiers of the two legions and of the auxiliary troops stationed in the province. The rebuilding and enlargement of various towns following the ravages of the Marcomann wars can also be attributed to this new policy of urbanization.

Dacia suffered no enemy attacks under Septimius Severus. Following the devastation of the long war, reconstruction work in the military fortresses also began. Wherever necessary, the fortifications were rebuilt in stone. It has been suggested that the *Limes Transalutanus* was also built at this time. Armed hostilities broke out again in 212–213 in the northern part

29. DION CASSIUS, LXXII, 3. Vettius Sabinianus was governor of Dacia.
30. *SHA*, vita Commodi 13. 6–6.
31. *CIL* III. 1172.

of Transylvania when the province was attacked by the free Dacians, the Vandals and the Carpi. After the fighting, Caracalla visited the province before setting out with his army to fight in the war raging in the eastern part of the empire.

In 218, following Caracalla's murder, the free Dacians "... after ravaging Dacia and showing an eagerness for further war, now desisted when they got back the hostages that Caracalla, under the terms of the alliance, had taken from them".[32] Few inscriptions have survived from the reign of the last Severan emperor, Alexander, although soldiers, in the spirit of the emperor cult, erected inscriptions to the emperor and his mother, Julia Mammaea, as a token of their loyalty.

Settlement and Urbanization

After the Roman conquest, Dacia became imperial property and, as such, its territory was assigned to different administrative categories (military *territorium*, municipal *territorium*, imperial property). Trajan granted Dacia provincial status soon after the conquest. This region would hardly have attracted settlers if the newly conquered territory had remained under military administration, which always suggested a lack of security. The introduction of civilian administration and the management of the affairs of the population called for the founding of a civilian settlement, a town. This took place in 110–112, at the latest. The veterans of the legions that had fought in the Dacian wars were settled in Colonia Ulpia Traiana Augusta — later known as Sarmizegethusa — founded by Trajan. The native Dacian population of this area who had not fled with their brethren do not appear to have enjoyed preferential treatment over the legionary veterans at the time of the foundation. Since large tracts of arable land were scarce in the mountainous region, the resettlement of the local population somewhere else was a more pressing problem than in other colonies. This *colonia* remained the only one of its kind in the province until the reign of Hadrian. The new town adopted the name of Decebal's seat, Sarmizegethusa Regia, in spite of the fact that it lay some thirty-seven kilometres to the west of the former Dacian capital and that it had no Dacian antecedents.

The adoption of the geographic names used by the native population corresponds to general Roman practice. The survival of earlier place-names was made possible by the fact that when the Roman army conquered this territory during the course of the first Dacian war, these settlements were still inhabited; thus, their names could be passed on. That this had indeed been the case was revealed by the emperor himself. In his campaign journal of the Dacian wars, Trajan recorded the route of his advance. According to the single surviving fragment of this journal "... from here we advanced to Bersobis, and then to Aisisis".

32. Dion Cassius, LXXVIII, 27.

The survival of the place names used by the native population, however, does not necessarily imply the actual survival of earlier settlements, especially if the Roman town was founded on the site or in the immediate vicinity of an abandoned military camp, as was the normal practice in Dacia. The building of a military camp generally entailed the annihilation of whatever Dacian settlement there might have been there. The native name was retained even if the camp was sited in the broader environs of the native settlement as, for example, Aquincum and Brigetio in Pannonia, as well as Singidunum in Moesia. Sarmizegethusa Regia and Colonia Dacica in Dacia are a case in point. They demonstrate that the Roman conquerors used Dacian place names quite liberally when naming their settlements. Consequently, it is impossible to identify Dacian settlements on the basis of the Dacian names given to Roman camps and forts. Neither do these names demonstrate the continuity of the Dacian settlements.

When Hadrian organized the three Dacian provinces, he also founded two new towns for the administration of civil matters. The *municipium* of Dacia Inferior was created from the *vicus* beside the military camp of Drobeta lying on the Danube River. The reasons for choosing this particular settlement were obvious. The importance of the settlement guarding the northern bridgehead of the stone bridge increased considerably owing to a large traffic while the rapid growth of its population also called for a grant of urban autonomy. Napoca in Dacia Porolissensis was promoted to the rank of *municipium* in the northern province.

Municipal development and urbanization was extremely slow compared with other provinces. The foundation of the first *colonia* was necessitated by the introduction of civil administration, whilst the next two were brought into being following the creation of new provinces. Little is known of the circumstances and the foundation date of later towns. The *vicus* of the camp of Romula was made a *municipium* after the transfer of its troops, perhaps under the rule of Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius. The civic settlement next to the legionary fortress of Apulum (Apulum I) was granted urban rights by Marcus Aurelius. Some time later it was already being mentioned as a *colonia*, a rank granted, at the latest, under Commodus. Urbanization proceeded on a larger scale under Septimius Severus. The *canabae* of the legionary fortresses of Apulum (Apulum II) and Potaissa became *municipia* at this time. The fort *vicus* of Dierna and Tibiscum received the status of *municipium* in the third century, perhaps under the Severi, whilst Drobeta became a *colonia*. Potaissa and Apulum II were raised to the rank of *colonia* by Caracalla. The town of Malva has not yet been identified. Some scholars equate it with Romula, while according to others, its location should be sought for elsewhere. What is certain is that it became a *colonia* in 230.

There were only about eleven or twelve towns in Dacia including three or four *municipia* and eight *coloniae* (the status of Ampelum is uncertain, and the identification of Romula with Malva, as we have noted, is still moot). Moesia Superior, considerably smaller than Dacia, boasted thirteen towns, while Pannonia had about twenty to twenty-three. In contrast to other provinces where the towns of the urban network were dispersed more or less evenly over the entire province, the urban settlements of Dacia were concentrated in the western half of the province.

Civitates, which normally played a decisive role in the "civilization" of the native population were entirely lacking in this province. It would appear that the fact that municipal rights were only conferred on most of the settlements (certainly five of six of them) at a relatively late date, under Septimius Severus, was directly linked to the lack of such *civitates*. In Dacia, towns could evolve only from military settlements that grew up around the camps because there alone were communities with large enough populations to be found. In the second century A.D., however, this possible course of urban development was still blocked. The *territoria* that lay under military administration were inhabited by the families of the soldiers as well as discharged veterans, merchants and various craftsmen. The municipalization of these settlements would necessarily have called for the loss of a part of the *territoria*, i.e., for joining this land to the new town, in spite of the fact that it was needed for provisioning the military. The abolition of the military *territoria* only began under Septimius Severus, and this delay proved an obstacle to urbanization in Dacia. Owing to the great number of camps, the areas attached as military *territoria* were rather extensive. At the same time, the emergence of larger civilian settlements was hindered by the relatively late date of the conquest on the one hand, and by the smallness of the civilian population on the other. Owing to their low numbers, the towns, concentrated as they were in western Dacia, could not become disseminators of Roman culture throughout the province.

The settlement of various peoples after the conquest did not yield spectacular results while, from the 160s, a gradual emigration from the province can even be noted. Long drawn out wars and plagues decimated the population. The lack of civilian population also hindered urban development. The disastrous economic situation following the Marcomann wars and the lack of urban autonomy led to unrests and, later, to revolts. This situation, in turn, called for radical measures to ensure some sort of improvement and the repopulation of the area. The grants of *ius Italicum* were meant to remedy this situation. Sarmizegethusa, Napoca, Apulum and, perhaps, Dierna were granted the rare privilege of exemption from land tax under Septimius Severus at the latest, a measure that was designed to attract and encourage settlers from outside Dacia. These measures proved successful as the ranks of the provincial population were swelled by Syrians and other orientals. The organs of the provincial emperor's cult and the provincial assembly also sprang into life — after a long hiatus — in the Severan period. The lack of such organs for expressing civic loyalty in the preceding period is highly conspicuous. The provincial assembly was the main body uniting the towns and the *civitates* of the native population and also fulfilled another important corporate function in addition to performing the public rites of the emperor's cult. This assembly could instigate prosecutions against an unjust governor after he had finished his time in office and it could request the investigation of alleged grievances. The existence of this organization is not attested to in the pre-Severan period in Dacia, but is documented in a number of inscriptions from later times. The title of "metropolis" as definitely linked to the location of the provincial assembly, appears next to the name of Sarmizegethusa only under the reign of Alexander Severus.

The relatively late appearance of the provincial assembly can be traced back to two causes. On the one hand, the low number of second-century towns did not call for the introduction or for the zealous practice of the emperor's cult. These rites were, in any case performed regularly in the military camps and by the *augustales* in the towns. On the other hand, the government in Rome considered the local population too small; the *civitas* organization was also lacking. Under the Severi, however, the urban population increased along with the number of towns which in turn eventually necessitated a provincial assembly and the organization of the emperor's cult on a provincial level. The high priest of the imperial cult was called *coronatus*, "wreath-wearer", a word borrowed from the eastern provinces.

By the time the towns and their leading organizations were called into being under the Severi, Dacia looked back on a hundred years of existence. As it happened, it could look forward to less than three decades of peaceful development, which obviously restricted the extent and intensity of romanization in the towns and elsewhere.

Little is known about the rural settlements. It would appear that the urbanized areas also influenced the occurrence of *villa* economies. Estate centres and their buildings have mostly been excavated in the western part of the province, in Transylvania, and generally in the vicinity of towns. The main buildings are small, rarely covering more than 400 square yards or so. They are simple and unpretentious without a trace of luxury, such as mosaics, wall paintings or ornamental marble slabs in their internal furnishings, which suggests that these *villae* belonged to small- or middle-sized estates. And hardly any *villa* estates are known from the Oltenian plains even though this region was better suited to agricultural activities.

The Population: Dacians and Settlers

In his description of the population of the new province, Eutropius mentions that after the conquest "Trajan ... had transferred there infinite masses from the entire Roman world to settle the fields and cities. Dacia lost all its men in the long war of Decebal".[33] The historian's words clearly imply that the native population of Dacia suffered considerable losses during the course of the long wars and that Trajan had, in essence, to repopulate the territory. A conscious settlement policy was usually adopted for the "provincialization" of freshly conquered territories in the course of which discharged soldiers received land grants. The veterans were soon joined by their families and a number of tradesmen. If this is what had happened in the case of Dacia as well, Eutropius would not have stressed the fact so emphatically. The real reason for the settlement is fairly evident. The area had become depopulated owing to the heavy losses suffered by the native population.

The fate of the native population of any newly conquered territory depended largely on how and after what preliminaries it came into the hands of Rome. If the province had been acquired peacefully and without resist-

33. Eutropius, *Breviarium* ... VIII, 6, 2.

ance, the population suffered few losses. In Dacia, however, the situation was different. Trajan annexed the territory to the *imperium* after two bitter and protracted wars, at the end of a one and a half century long process. These struggles and the occasional Roman defeats made the Dacians a hated and much-despised enemy.[34] This impression was only aggravated by Decebal's treacherous actions after the first Dacian war. For Rome, he was the man who broke his oaths, a man to be mistrusted at all times, for he had not observed the peace treaty. His actions subsequent to the outbreak of the new war won him no more credit. He first tried to persuade Longinus, a captured commander in the Roman army, to defect to his side, and when this attempt failed "he asked that he might receive back his territory as far as the Ister and be indemnified for all the money he had spent on the war, in return for restoring Longinus". Longinus committed suicide and Trajan was then able to reject these unacceptable terms.[35] Decebal then made an abortive attempt to have Trajan murdered by assassins at his Moesian headquarters.[36]

The deeds of Decebal for centuries determined the Roman attitude towards the Dacians. Little wonder, then, that after the preliminaries to the second Dacian war "the emperor wished to exterminate them utterly". We might recall here that the physical annihilation of barbarians who dared to attack the *Imperium Romanum* in no way posed a moral problem to Rome. This sentiment, first voiced by the Emperor Augustus[37] was later put into practice. Marcus Aurelius had, for example, contemplated the extermination of the Jazyges.[38] Extermination, in the Roman sense of the word, meant not only the execution of all rebels, but also that the native population was sold off as slaves, with the men drafted into the army and sent to faraway provinces. Those Dacians who had been thrown in their lot with Decebal could expect no mercy. This bleak perspective undoubtedly influenced their last desperate act — which is also depicted on Trajan's memorial column. The Dacian ruling elite committed mass suicide. When Trajan returned to Rome "he gave spectacles on one hundred and twenty-three days, in the course of which ... ten thousand gladiators fought"[39] — most of them probably Dacian prisoners of war. According to Criton, who was a physician in the imperial court, and who participated in the wars and later wrote their history, the number of prisoners from the Dacian wars was extremely high. Trajan, however, spared the lives of only some forty men after his final, all-decisive victory. Even if these numbers are somewhat exaggerated, they nonetheless reflect one aspect of the Dacian–Roman relationship, as well as the high toll on Dacian life.

The surviving Dacian men were drafted as auxiliary troops and were sent to Britannia and the east. Their later fate is not known. There is no evidence that after their discharge they returned to their former homeland.

34. Dion Cassius, LXVII, 6.1, 6.5.
35. Dion Cassius, LXVIII, 12. 1–5.
36. Dion Cassius, LXVIII, 11.3.
37. Res gestae Divi Augusti, 3. = Dobó, *Inscriptiones ...*
38. Dion Cassius, LXXI, 16.1–2.
39. Dion Cassius, LXVIII, 15.

45

In any evaluation of the extent of the depopulation it should be borne in mind that the new province was centered on the heartland of Decebal's kingdom, the area which had suffered the greatest losses in human life, not only because of the long wars, but also because it was these people who had remained loyal to Decebal — to the point of draining the poison cup. It was the inhabitants of this region who were massacred by the Romans. It was they who were sold into slavery, and who fled to unoccupied territories in face of the Roman conquest.

The incorporation of the native population into an administrative and territorial organization *(civitas peregrina)* convenient to Rome was an essential point in the establishing of any new province. These *civitates* were at first placed under military control, although the leaders of the native population were also drafted into the administration. The administration of the *civitates* later passed into the hands of the tribal elite *(principes)* who enjoyed various privileges. The *civitas* system in part provided the institutional framework for romanization and in part formed the nucleus of later urban communities. However, in contrast with other provinces, no traces of this system can be detected in Dacia. One reason is the lack of a tribal aristocracy: this had either been eliminated by Decebal or had perished with the rest of the Dacian "nobility" during the wars. Characteristically enough, only a single tribal or ethnic name survived into the provincial period in Dacia: the *vicus Anar(torum)*, the village of the Anartii in northern Transylvania.[40] This village, however, was inhabited not by Dacians, but by Celts who had been subdued by them. Only a single *princeps* is known by name: T. Aurelius Aper, who was not a Dacian but a tribal leader from Dalmatia.[41] The small native population would, perhaps, explain why Rome considered the introduction of an administrative system designed for the dissemination of Roman civilization — the *civitates* — unnecessary for the surviving Dacians. This situation would imply that the surviving native population took no part in the urban life that eventually led to romanization. The inscriptions from the province suggest that persons with "Thraco-Dacian" names were not represented in urban bodies and institutions.

The written sources and the archaeological evidence offer an insight into the process of the settlement *ex toto orbe Romano* (from the entire Roman world), to quote Eutropius. The first group of immigrants were the legionary veterans who already enjoyed full Roman citizenship and who arrived after the founding of Sarmizegethusa. Another group can be traced back to the legions stationed in the Rhineland, western Pannonia and Moesia; their names betray an Italian ancestry. A western Pannonian or Norican origin is rarely indicated on the inscriptions. However, the distribution of characteristic proper names clearly reveal Pannonian and Norican origins. Judging by the occurrence in northern Dacia of burial rites formerly restricted to the area of Noricum and Pannonia, and by the distribution of various artifact types, the number of arrivals from those regions was fairly high.

The other group of settlers from the Middle Danubian region came to Dacia from Dalmatia. Various inscriptions clearly show that they arrived as

40. *CIL* III, 8060.
41. *CIL* III, 1322.

close-knit communities and that they were essentially resettled along tribal lines, mainly in the *territorium metalli* (ore territory). A segment of this group did not yet enjoy Roman citizenship but were *peregrini*. They settled in closed communities *(vicus Pirustarum)* in the Érchegység, and mining on a larger scale only began with their arrival. A few descendants of these Dalmatian, Norican and Pannonian settlers later became municipal leaders. Besides Roman citizens, the colonists from Pannonia and Noricum included also a number of Celts, as indicated by their names *(Bonio, Bucco, Cotu, Veponius)*.

The military, too, contributed to the ethnic heterogeneity of the province. The auxiliary troops stationed in Dacia included a number of units organized along ethnic lines. Surprisingly enough, the proportion of Thracian names is conspicuously low in spite of the many soldiers of Thracian origin and the large mass of Balkanic immigrants. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the soldiers who had been recruited from nearby areas did not settle in Dacia after their discharge but returned to their former homes.

There was a large influx of people from the oriental provinces and from the southern Balkans, the Greek-speaking territories of the empire. The Romans often deployed special units, such as Palmyrian archers, in regions with varied topography that could only be defended with difficulty. Three units of archers were stationed in Dacia. There were other Syrian troops as well, generally archers and other Commagenian units. The proportion of immigrants from the east, from Anatolia, rose perceptibly after the Marcomann wars.

The proper names which can be evaluated from the province total about three thousand. Seventy-five per cent (about two thousand) are Roman, one hundred and twenty are Illyrian, seventy are Celtic and sixty are Semitic (Syrian). Thracian–Dacian names number about sixty, that is, about two per cent of the entire onomastic material. These are mostly true Thracian names held by persons who had arrived from areas lying south of the Danube River. Since no throughgoing attempt to distinguish Dacian names from Thracian has yet been carried out — the relatedness of the two ethnic groups is still subject to debate — these names are lumped together. It is nonetheless conspicuous that expressly Dacian names *(Bitus, Butus, Decebalus, Diurpaneus, Sassa, Scorilo)* occur not in Dacia, but in other parts of the *imperium* where Dacians were taken as slaves. Names from the native population comprise about 24 per cent of the total in Noricum, where romanization began a full century earlier than in Dacia. This would suggest that Dacian participation in the romanization of Dacia was minimal.

The settlement of populations from Noricum–Pannonia and Illyria is reflected by the occurrence of tumulus graves in Dacia, mainly in Transylvania. Either a large or small mound was constructed over the ashes of the dead who were cremated on a funeral pyre. This custom was widespread in western Pannonia and in neighbouring eastern Noricum. The close ties between the two areas are reflected not only by these tumulus burials but also by characteristic Norican–Pannonian clay vessels, such as three-footed bowls, bowl-shaped lids and large straight-walled bowls deposited in these Dacian graves. A large (perhaps the largest) cemetery of these Norican–Pannonian settlers with over three hundred tumulus burials has been unearthed at Hermány. Other cemeteries have been identified at Kálbor and

Magyarigen. In addition to earthen tumuli, burial mounds encircled by a stone wall or a "parapet" have also been found. A most impressive, early burial of this type has been uncovered at Sarmizegethusa: the huge tumulus (whose diameter was twenty-one metres) erected by the Aurelius family over the burial of a twelve year old girl. The graves in the small cemetery at Csolnakos were encircled by a stone wall. Parallels to it have been noted in western Pannonia (Carnuntum, Austria).

We know little about religious belief in the Norican–Pannonian territory aside from these burial customs. The cult of *Suleviae, Epona* and *Hercules Magusanus* was probably introduced by settlers from Celtic and Germanic territories. The spread of the cult of *Silvanus* in Dacia perhaps reflects the closer relations with Pannonia. The altar dedicated to *Jupiter Depulsor* suggests the presence of settlers from Poetovio in southwestern Pannonia where a number of altars erected to the "averting" Jupiter have been found; the Dacian altar was dedicated by a person with an Illyrian name.

Little is known about the tools and implements of everyday life, or about the personal ornaments and costume of the southern and eastern, mainly Syrian immigrants. Considerably more is known, however, about their beliefs. One type of tombstone, which depicts the deceased in the midst of a funerary feast, can be traced to southern, Greek iconography. The widespread distribution of marble cult images of Danubian rider gods can likewise be traced to southern influences. Finds of this type have mostly come to light in the southern part of the province. The pottery industry of southern Dacia also shares numerous similarities with that of Moesia.

The number of altars and temples dedicated by the settlers of eastern origin to their local gods *(diis patriis)* is considerable. First among the revered deities was the supreme god of Doliche who was identified with Jupiter. Altars and cult images dedicated to this particular god have come to light all over Dacia. The Palmyrians had their own temples in Sarmizegethusa, Micia and Porolissum. The numerous eastern deities mentioned in inscriptions also testify to the diversity and heterogeneous origins of the gods venerated by the provincial population *(Jupiter Tavianus, Erusenus, Mater Troclimene, Jupiter Heliopolitanus, Azizus, Bonus Puer, Balmarcades, Nabarazes, Malagbel, Bellahamon, Benefal, Jarobolas).*

Dacia was a Latin province in the sense that the language of administration and public life was Latin and that most inscriptions were worded in this language. The use and spread of Latin was promoted by the legionaries stationed in Dacia who had been recruited from Latin territories and by western settlers insofar as they were descended from Italian immigrants and still spoke Latin. Bilingualism, that is, a higher level of romanization, can hardly be assumed among the Illyrians and the Celts in view of their early settlement. They perhaps spoke Latin, but the language had by no means become their native tongue around the first half of the second century: they had barely embarked on the romanization which awaited them in Dacia. The same is true of the *Pirustae* from Dalmatia. Other settlers had arrived from territories where the administrative language was Greek. Similarly to the native western colonists, some groups came from areas whose population had not been entirely hellenized. They still spoke their native

1. Gold jewellery finds from the Bronz Age, Somogyom

2. Scythian finds: *1.* "Bronze bell", Gernyeszeg; *2.* Bronze mirror, Makfalva

3. Dacian silver jewellery:
1. Torockószentgyörgy, the
vicinity of Nagyenyed and
Nagyvárad; 2–3. Nagykágya
Darlac and Cserbel

4. Coins from Dacia: *1.* Coin minted at the time of the foundation of the province of Dacia; *2–3.* Denarii minted at the end of the Dacian wars with personalized representations of Dacia subjugated and the Danube River; *4.* Coin minted in Viminacium during the reign of Philippus showing Dacia and the insignia of the emperor's legions

5. Wax tablets found at Verespatak

6. Gothic pottery in Transylvania: ornate dish found at Bereck; side and bottom

7. Gepid jewellery: *1*. Gold earring set with precious stones, Bánffyhunyad; *2*. Gold pendant set with precious stones, Nagyvárad; *3*. Ornate sword pommel, Transylvania; *4*. Gold bracelet, Transylvania; *5*. Gold ring, Nagyszentmiklós; *6-7*. A pair of gilt silver fibulae; *8*. Gold pearls; *9*. Gilt bronze fibula, Nagyvárad

8. Relics from early Avar graves: 1–2. A pair of stirrups from the remains of a funeral pyre, Dicső-szentmárton; 3. Gold earring, Transylvania; 4–6. Bridle-bit and a pair of stirrups, Németpereg; 7. A pair of gold earrings from the grave of a high-ranking lady, Torda

tongue (e.g., the Galatae). The Palmyrian archers and their families were numerically strong and comprised a considerable portion of the population. They had their own writing system which they sometimes employed in their Dacian inscriptions. These inscriptions are extremely important in spite of their scarcity since they are lacking in other Syrian communities in Europe. Several Greek, as well as Syrian, inscriptions have been recovered from not one, but several Dacian towns. Pottery vessels and tiles inscribed in Greek or some other oriental language are also quite common. This would suggest that both languages were spoken throughout the province. Noteworthy as well is the fact that Apulum was called *Chrysopolis*, "gold city" not in Latin, but in Greek, as well as the fact that the high priest of the emperor's cult was designated using Greek terminology.

The southern settlers came from Thrace, where the official language was Greek, and from Moesia where the official language was Latin. (The latter area was in fact bilingual, a Greek–Latin territory.) The Thracians from the south did not contribute to the dissemination of the Latin language. They were mostly soldiers who were compelled to speak Latin during their service in the army but whose original homeland was part of the Greek speaking world. They continued to use their native tongue over a long time and maintained the use of their typical names until the early Byzantine period. Consequently, these soldiers of Thracian origin, who in the early second century had only been under Roman administration for about sixty years, would not have spoken Latin as their native tongue in Dacia. If we accept the relatedness of the Thracians and the Dacians, the example of the Thracians, who stubbornly remained one of the most un-romanized population of the *imperium*, most emphatically suggests that the process of romanization was long and drawn out for the Dacians as well. The adoption of Latin by the native population cannot be documented in the province of Dacia which existed for a mere 165 years, the shortest-lived of all the provinces of the Roman Empire.

Dacia was, thus, rather heterogeneous linguistically. A linguistically uniform community never evolved. The language most suited to this role would undoubtedly have been Latin, the official language of the province. However, this was only spoken as a native tongue by the leading officials in the administration, army officers and the majority of soldiers serving first in the one, and later — after 167 — in the two legions stationed in the province. In the absence of strong Latin communities among the new settlers, there was lacking the precondition for the linguistic transformation of the native population.

The extent to which the native population could have been romanized was, thus, quite restricted and, in contrast to the native populations of other provinces, the government did not deem the romanization of the Dacians to be particularly important. What was the nature of this native population? The archaeological record definitely suggests that a few Dacian groups stayed behind in the province after the conquest. A few of their settlements and cemeteries have been unearthed and investigated. Their number is low, however, nor is the chronology of these sites secure. It is still open to debate whether these partially excavated settlements were also occupied after the

Roman conquest. Graves that can be linked to the native population have been unearthed at Orbázsa, Maroslekence, Mezőszopor, Radnót and Segesvár, although the tombstones from the latter site are inscribed with Illyrian names. The cemeteries of the native population were no longer used after the evacuation of the province. These cemeteries generally contained cremation burials where the dead were commonly cremated in one place and then their ashes were strewn into an oval pit, or deposited in an urn. These latter have usually been considered to be Dacian burials even though this rite is globally linked to the Roman population in other provinces. Burials where the deceased were cremated on the site of the burial are less frequently found. This practice has mostly been observed in tumulus graves. At the same time, these diverse funerary rites often occur within the same cemetery. Inhumation burials make their appearance in the municipal cemeteries (Apulum, Napoca) from the late second century A.D.

The settling of two free Dacian tribes in the province at the close of the second century A.D. must also be considered in the analysis of the ethnic composition of these cemeteries. Some of these burial grounds have yielded silver jewellery with parallels in the ornaments of the Carpi of Dacian culture, who lived beyond the eastern frontier of the province. Silver jewellery of this kind has come to light in the Mezőszopor cemetery.

The material culture of the surviving Dacian population is rather colourless and undifferentiated. Aside from the already mentioned settlement features and burial finds, only the pottery vessels found in the course of excavations can be studied in this respect. No inscriptions, stone sculptures, costume depictions or jewellery has survived. Their material culture is more or less restricted to pottery. However, only a few vessel types continued to be manufactured in the provincial period from the diverse pottery industry of the former pre-conquest period. These wares were handmade. Wheel-thrown Dacian vessels are rare in the imperial period. These vessels are ornamented with finger impressions or appliqué decoration imitating cords. One characteristic vessel type is the so-called Dacian cup, a shallow, thick-walled, wide mouthed cup with one or two handles. This would suggest a rather simple way of life linked to the lower strata of pre-conquest Dacian society.

The provincial Dacian pottery industry is very instructive in terms of the romanization of the native population. The handmade pottery of Pannonian potters did not survive into the third century A.D., which saw the appearance of mass-produced, wheel-thrown provincial pottery. In Dacia, however, hardly any interaction or exchange of ideas can be noted between the pottery of the native population and the pottery wares used by the new settlers. The stubborn persistence of earlier pottery forms probably reflects the resistance of the native population to romanization.

Romanization was a complicated process that took place in the conquered territory which had been transformed into a province. By the end of the process, the local population had adopted Roman customs and various elements of Roman culture. The first changes were in the material culture, which was modified and transformed by the adoption of Roman techniques

and by the influence of Roman forms and design. The life-styles of a part of the native population also underwent changes. Romanization was a more or less spontaneous process whose framework was provided by the administrative organization, the *civitates*, and which was greatly promoted by urbanization and military service in the Roman army. The tribal groupings gradually disintegrated; the long military service, participation in urban life and in trade brought great social changes. This process, which lasted for several generations, first led to bilingualism and later to a complete change in language. This cultural progress generally lasted for some four hundred years or even longer in the various provinces of the empire. Romanization was encouraged and promoted by well-defined external measures so that this gradual integration and assimilation can be easily traced in the archaeological record of the province. No similar process has been noted in Dacia.

The multi-lingualism of the people who settled in Dacia did not favour the linguistic transformation of the surviving Dacian native population. How could the groups living in the vicinity of military camps in which Syrian or Thracian troops were stationed ever hope to learn Latin? There was no *civitas* organization for the native population which might have triggered this transformation. The possible reasons for the paucity of *civitates*, so very conspicuous in Dacia, have been already dealt with at length. But since the native population did not participate in urban life, it was denied the most plausible path to romanization.

In contrast with other provinces, there is no evidence whatsoever for the drafting of the native population into linguistic units a few years or even decades after the conquest. The beliefs of the Dacians had no impact on the religious remains from the province. Nor do we know the name of a single Dacian deity. In spite of various attempts in this regard it remains to be demonstrated whether behind the ostensible dedications to some Roman god lie native divinities identified with the classical pantheon according to the patterns of *interpretatio Romana*. Inscriptions, such a characteristic feature of Roman culture and everyday life, were not made by the Dacians.

The province, as we have already noted, existed for a mere 165 years. Assimilation and a complete change of language would have been impossible in such a short time. Neither in Pannonia which bordered on Italy, nor in other provinces of the empire did the romanization of the material culture of the native population take place during the first two centuries of Roman rule. The tools and implements of everyday life as well as dress only underwent significant changes after the crises brought on by the Marcomann wars, while another 200 years elapsed before romanization can be considered complete. In Dacia, the Marcomann wars were followed by the settlement of orientals. The brief, generation-long prosperity of the province under the Severi was followed by a series of wars after which the province was abandoned and evacuated. There is nothing to show that the surviving Dacian groups were romanized. The highest stage of romanization, the change of language and the adoption of Latin as a native tongue, is not only not demonstrable in Dacia, but the historical and social evidence argues strongly against it.

Collapse and Evacuation

The 220s mark the last peaceful decade in the history of Dacia. In the same year that the emperor Alexander Severus set off for the abortive Persian campaign with detachments from the Illyrian army (231), the Gothic migration towards the Black Sea littoral form the northwest, which had previously provoked migrations in the Carpathian Basin, also came to an end. The Goths, whose path was blocked by the Black Sea, settled in the southern Ukraine and the northern Pontic littoral. However, this by no means brought peace to the empire or to Dacia. The fleeting decades of peace, in fact, mark the years when the Goths mustered their forces. From the mid-230s they wreaked their fury on the provinces of the Balkans and Dacia, bringing devastation on a scale never experienced before. The first attack against Dacia was mounted during the reign of Maximinus (235–238). In 236, the emperor took the title *Dacicus Maximus*, indicating military victory and suggesting that by this time war was raging in the vicinity of Dacia. The province was primarily attacked by the free Dacians and the Carpi who had been pushed westwards by the Goths. The hostilities continued under the reign of Gordianus III (238–244) when the Carpi stormed the *Limes Transalutanus*. Their attack is marked by a number of hoards hidden at that time in Dacia, Dobrudja and Moesia. The peril is reflected as well by a dozen or more coin hoards that were concealed during his and his successor's reigns. The Dacian provincial assembly still expressed its gratitude on an inscription dedicated to Gordianus.[42] Then in 245–247, the Carpi mounted a devastating attack on the eastern frontier and the *Limes Transalutanus* simply collapsed. Pannonian troops were also deployed to help Dacia. In spite of temporary successes, the *Limes Transalutanus* had to be abandoned. Given the lack of archaeological data, however, the exact date of its abandonment remains unknown, although it must have occurred before 248, when the internal line of defence, the *Olt-Alutanus* became the new frontier. Romula, lying along the Olt River, was surrounded with stone walls by legionary detachments from Moesia Superior and Germania.[43]

In 246–247, after the local mints of Moesia had ceased to operate, a mint was set up in Viminacium in order to ensure continuous military pay in the Lower Danubian area. This mint supplied Dacia with coins for eleven years, but the province was later granted the right to mint coins itself.

The hostilities and wars continued. Trajan Decius is honoured as "*restitutor Daciarum*" (restorer of the Dacian provinces), in an inscription from Apulum. A bronze statue of him was erected in Sarmizegethusa. In 250 he, too, took the title of *Dacicus Maximus*, which suggests repelled enemy attacks. By the middle of the third century, coin circulation had come to a halt in the military camps of eastern Transylvania, a phenomenon that probably reflects the departure of the troops stationed in these forts. The evacuation of the northeastern territories is also indicated as we have already note, by the mid-third-century *Tabula Peutingeriana*, which does not show either the

42. *CIL* III, 1454.
43. *IDR* II, 324–328.

Limes Transalutanus or the Roman roads through eastern Transylvania. The attacks of the Carpi demonstrably triggered the emigration of the population to Moesia, south of the Danube. The mother of Galerius, the future emperor, fled from Dacia during the reign of Philippus owing to repeated Carpic attacks.[44] She was hardly the only one to have hit upon this obvious solution at this early date.

Fig. 2. Altars erected to Mithras at Poetovio, western Pannonia, by the legions withdrawn from Dacia in the 260s

The attacks against Dacia are poorly reported in the sources since the area most badly affected lay in the Balkans, and not in Dacia which had, in any case, lost its strategic and military importance. In 257, Gallienus took the title *Dacicus Maximus*, which indicates some sort of action against the Carpi. This period marks the last phase of building activity in the forts of the province. The wide gates of the forts at Énlaka, Barcarozsnyó, Sebesváralja and Porolissum were walled up in order to leave as few penetrable surfaces as possible. Under Gallienus, that is before 260, the custom of erecting inscription stones was also abandoned. The disappearance of coinage in western Dacia is reflected by the fact that with the exception of Apulum,

44. Lactantius, de moribus persecutorum a. 2.; Aurelius, *Epitome de Caesaribus* 10. 16.

Map 3. The abandonment of Dacia

1. Singidunum; 2. Viminacium; 3. Ratiaria; 4. Oescus; 5. Novae; 6. Durostorum; 7. Coin hoards concealed in the middle of the third century, indicating the decay of old Dacia

the military headquarters, hardly any coins have come to light in the forts and towns. The chronic lack of money — an ongoing attendant to the crises of the middle of the third century — was aggravated by the closing of the Viminacium mint in 257–258 when it was dismantled and transported away. The conclusive wars, conducted on several frontiers for three decades, the catastrophic economic situation, the chronic shortage of money and the internal power struggles eventually led to anarchy within the *imperium*. At the close of the 250s, however, after the rockbottom depression brought on by the terrible sufferings of the earlier incursions, Gallienus devoted his energies to reorganizing the empire. He created a mobile central army from detachments drawn from the legions, and in 260, he succeeded in expelling the Alamanni, who had penetrated as far as Italy. He then consolidated and restored the Rhineland frontier.

Gallienus established his military headquarters for the defence of Italy and Illyria at Poetovio. In the 260s, the Dacian legions, the *legio V Macedonica* and the *legio XIII Gemina* were both transferred to this base under the leadership of Flavius Aper *praepositus*. The soldiers took up quarters in the town. Their presence is attested to by marble inscriptions and reliefs that have

54

come to light in the third Mithras sanctuary of the town which was rebuilt and richly furnished by them. The presence of staff officers and their administrative rank in Poetovio indicates that numerous detachments from the two legions were stationed there. This in turn suggests that these troops had been transferred from Dacia because the province had lost its strategic and military importance and because Dacia was now surrounded by hostile and belligerent barbarians. This transfer was a continuation of the former partial relinquishing of territories and a prelude to later events.

The reorganization of the Danubian provinces was facilitated by the fact that after a series of attacks, the Gothic thrust lost its strength. In 269, Emperor Claudius II inflicted a crushing defeat on the Gothic army at Naissus. The title *Gothicus* taken by the emperor marked a real military victory and became a constant epithet connected to his name. His successor, Aurelian, cleared Illyria and Thracia of the plundering barbarian hordes and defeated the Goths on their own territory before leaving for the eastern front. The Goth king, Cannabaudes, also fell in battle. The war on the Lower Danube came to an end at this point. The victories brought relief to the people of the area, but they could not save Dacia. The coins minted in 270, at the beginning of Aurelian's reign, bear the legend GENIUS ILLYRICI and PANNONIA or DACIA FELIX reflecting the importance of Illyria, and proclaiming the luck of Dacia, which had been salvaged for the *Imperium*. It is possible that the legend indeed refers to the salvation of Trajan's Dacia, but it appears more probable that it commemorates the deliverance of the provincial population, and celebrates the new province of Dacia that had been founded south of the Danube. Aurelian, who gained personal experience of the situation in the province, probably saw no reason to maintain a province plagued by constant raids, and, to boot, one with a much diminished population. The remaining garrison troops were withdrawn and the surviving population was resettled in Moesia. To keep up appearances, a new province called Dacia (later Dacia Ripensis and Dacia Mediterranea) was created between the two Moesia with Serdica (Sofia, Bulgaria) as its capital.

The final forty years of Dacian history repeatedly demonstrated what had already been apparent in Hadrian's time, namely, that the province did not play a significant role in the defence of the Balkan provinces and the central areas of the empire. The Sarmatians and the Goths had been able to plunder the two Moesias and Thracia unhindered. The long frontier section of the empire in this region could not be effectively defended even by tens of thousands of soldiers. By withdrawing the Romans from Dacia, Aurelian considerably reduced the length of the imperial frontier. What remained could then be better protected, similarly to the frontier in Germania and Raetia, in the triangle between the Rhine and Danube rivers. He strengthened the Danubian *limes* in its late first-century form. The *legio XIII Gemina* occupied the *castrum* at Ratiaria, whilst the *legio V Macedonica* returned to Oescus, its garrison of 170 years before. After shortening the frontier section, Aurelian was able to lead a segment of the Illyrian army east in the knowledge that the Balkan provinces were now secure.

The Fate of the Provincial Population after Evacuation

The surrender and evacuation of Dacia is described rather uniformly in the sources. Eutropius[45] recounts the event as follows: "On seeing that Illyricum was devastated and Moesia was in a ruinous state, he abandoned the province of Dacia which had been founded by Trajan and led away both soldiers and provincials, giving up hope that it could be retained. The Romans who were evacuated from the towns and fields of Dacia he resettled in the centre of Moesia which he named Dacia. It now divides Moesia ... and lies on the right bank of the Danube, as it had previously lain on the left". What remains to be established is whether in spite of everything, we can assume the presence of masses of Latin-speaking Roman citizens in the territory of the former province, who, after weathering the storms of the Migration period, could have become the ancestors of a neo-Latin population. Eutropius's statement could be challenged only if the late third century ethnic conditions and the historic circumstances did not confirm or downright refute this resettlement, or, if the presence of a mass of Latin-speaking people who had attained the highest level of romanization were to be demonstrated in Dacia after 271. The word "mass" is crucial in this respect, for after the disintegration of the Roman administration and provincial organization and the collapse of military defence in the Middle Danubian provinces, Roman civilization in the region was sooner (in northeastern Pannonia) or later (in western and southern Pannonia, Raetia and certain parts of Noricum) swept away by the successive invading waves of the Migration period some 130–150 years later. Surviving population groups who stayed behind in the province because they had no place to flee — emigration to the south was pointless — were either assimilated by the continuously changing newcomers or perished. They were not to become the ancestors of a neo-Latin population in spite of the fact that the situation, circumstances (a uniform population that had evolved over the course of 400 years of romanization) and geographic position were infinitely more favourable there than in a Transylvania surrounded by hostile barbarians where the restless period brought on by the incursions of the Carpi, the Goths, the Sarmatians, the Vandals and the Gepids was prolonged after the early Roman withdrawal.

When investigating possible continuity in Dacia, one must also consider what set of circumstances contributed to the survival of the provincial population in more westerly provinces and made the emergence of neo-Latin peoples possible. The ethnogenesis of the neo-Latin peoples took place some 130–150 years after the evacuation of Dacia on the territory of the former *Imperium*. At the same time, considerable divergences are noticeable in the survival of Roman culture in these territories. In the western and southern European parts of the empire, a continuity in ways of life may be observed even after the appearance and settlement of new barbarian conquerors. In contrast, the peoples occupying the Carpathian Basin, who later founded kingdoms in the west or in Africa, succeeded each other with alarming ra-

45. Eutropius, *Breviarium* ... IX, 15.

pidity and perpetuated decades of misery and insecurity. This process had begun some 130–150 years earlier in Dacia than in the other Danubian provinces.

An important point is that the evacuation of the province was a well-organized action which was carried out after Rome had managed to check for some time the raids ravaging the northern Balkans. In other words, places of refuge still existed at this time. Even if the improvement in the situation at the close of the third century was not that spectacular for the average Roman citizen, the cessation of the Gothic incursions into Moesia made the changes perceptible and showed that the empire was still capable of defending itself. The wars to the south of the Danube reduced the population there to such an extent that there was no obstacle to resettlement on a larger scale. Indeed, Eutropius links the evacuation of Dacia not so much to the vulnerability of the province, but rather to the devastations in Illyria and Moesia. However, the losses to the Illyrian population may be attributed not only to constant warfare, but also to plagues that raged throughout the province from the 250s: "Such a great plague broke out in the towns as had never been experienced before; the devastations of the barbarians appeared small in comparison so that the occupied, almost desolate towns could consider themselves luckier than the ones contaminated by the plague".[46] The loss of population was so great that Thrace — which bordered on Moesia — still required resettlement in the fourth century. It is, thus, fairly obvious that not only were there no obstacles to the evacuation of the provincial population of Dacia but that the depopulation of the Balkans practically called for a new influx of population. Rome undoubtedly congratulated itself that in the place of barbarians it could populate these territories with its own subjects.

The evacuation of Dacia was by no means an emergency measure. Why would the provincial population, especially the Latin-speaking Roman citizens, have remained in an undefended area that could expect a series of barbarian strikes that would eventually lead to occupation, and which would, in the foreseeable future, slip back into its former barbarous state? In the other provinces, escape to the south began spontaneously in the early fifth century A.D., with the decline of the empire, even though the refugees could in no way hope for effective protection by then. The Latin, Greek and perhaps Syrian-speaking Roman citizens could see no future in staying behind in the areas to the north of the Danube, especially if they could continue their earlier life-style not far from their former homes and among the infinitely more civilized and cultured conditions of the empire. Neither can it be assumed that the less romanized, fragmented Dacian population, who did not even speak Latin, would have been more attached to the former province. The contrary was to have been the case if the sources are to be believed. At the close of the second century A.D., the free Dacians requested their *receptio* into the empire: at the end of the Marcomann wars a contingent of unknown numbers and a group of 12,000 people were admitted into the *Imperium*. Now, in the face of dangerous Gothic incursions, they would have wished to remain in the province even less, but it was hardly because

46. Zosimus, I, 37.

they had become romanized in the intervening fifty to sixty years. It was more that since the second century, the peoples living beyond its frontiers saw the *Imperium* as a haven of prosperity and security, an area protected by walls and defended by a strong army, where they repeatedly requested admission. The attraction of the empire continued in spite of the anarchy and wars raging in the middle of the third century. The Marcomanni were resettled in the empire under Gallienus, while the Carpi, who had previously ravaged Dacia,[47] were resettled in 295.

A sudden decrease in the number of inscription stones erected by the civil population may be observed from the middle of the third century throughout the empire. The process of resettlement can, nonetheless, be traced using epigraphic evidence. Prior to the evacuation, the number of Latin inscriptions from the fourth century increased perceptibly in Serdica, the new capital of Dacia that lay in a Greek-speaking area. This phenomenon can certainly be linked to the Latin-speaking population evacuated from Dacia.

The written sources give uniform descriptions of the surrender of Dacia. Evacuation and resettlement to a neighbouring area could not have proved too difficult a task for the well-organized and efficient administration of the Roman Empire. Obviously, the transfer of population did not take place overnight, even if a considerable part of the civilian population had already fled earlier. It is possible that they had not all left the province, even though there is little to support this hypothesis. It is, nonetheless, obvious that the number of people who might have opted to stay behind was minimal.

The fate of a population, whether their settlements continued on or were abandoned, can be established by a look at their cemeteries. If a settlement is no longer inhabited (because its occupants perished or fled elsewhere) its cemetery also falls into disuse. The dress accessories, tools and implements of everyday life, various grave goods and coins placed in the burials give a fairly good indication of when a settlement is abandoned and when a cemetery is no longer used. If it were assumed, in spite of the contradictory testimony of the written sources, that the better part of the provincial population stayed on in Dacia after the surrender of the province, this could only be confirmed through the excavation of Roman towns and rural settlements, and the cemeteries of the military forts. Such excavations would demonstrate, beyond the shadow of a doubt, whether or not burials continued after the 270s. Apart from a few excavated sections of cemeteries too small for an analysis of this kind, only one completely excavated cemetery is known, the burial grounds at Romula which were no longer in use after the second third of the third century. The cemeteries of Napoca, Apulum, Potaissa and the military forts await investigation.

Roman coins and Christian finds, or relics interpreted as such, are often mentioned as proof that the provincial population survived. True enough, Roman coins, even if in insignificant number, were still in circulation in Dacia for some fifty years after the middle of the third century. Their number only begin to rise again from the fourth century. Coins, however, were aux-

47. AURELIUS, *Epitome de Caesaribus* 39. 43.

iliary to the economy and were, thus, also in circulation beyond the imperial frontier in the Barbaricum in various amounts depending on historical circumstances. Circulation of money in Sarmatian territory on the Great Hungarian Plain and in the Banat — areas never under Roman rule — definitely shows that this particular type of find does not confirm the survival of the descendants of the provincial population of Dacia, nor does it indicate that the Temesköz was ever a part of the empire (as a remnant of former Dacia).

The only cohesive force among the provincial population after the disintegration of the Roman administration and provincial organizations was Christianity. From the middle of the fifth century, the church played a crucial role in enabling the population to weather the crises of the fifth to seventh centuries with promises of salvation and a happier afterlife. The church hierarchy already evolved by the fourth century had begun to be integrated within the state apparatus and played a vital role. From the very moment that the state bodies showed themselves unable to fulfil their functions and incapable of organizing the defence of the centres of Roman civilization, that of the towns, the ecclesiastic communities became increasingly important. Of especial importance were the bishoprics which operated on the same principles as the territorial organizations of towns and which were bound by a sense of the universality of the Christian church. This church hierarchy gradually organized the defence of the community, and negotiated with the conquerors whenever necessary.

Since the bishoprics were only organized during the course of the fourth century throughout the *Imperium*, this factor, which could have promoted romanization, simply did not exist in a Dacia which had been evacuated in 271. Indeed, there are no traces whatsoever of the existence of bishoprics there. The majority of the finds from Dacia (fifteen in all) which have — sometimes incorrectly — been identified as Christian are of unknown provenance and their find circumstances are unclear. Thus, they are unsuitable for demonstrating the presence of ecclesiastic communities or bishoprics. At most, these finds confirm the presence of individuals who professed Christianity. These objects could have reached Transylvania either through trade conducted by the Christian (Arian) Goths who settled in this area in the fourth century, or as booty from various raids, or as a result of the collection of antiques — as in our own times. With the exception of the Berethalom assemblage, unambiguously linked to the Goths, these finds were not liturgical requisites. Similarly to the early Byzantine bronze lamps from Tápiógyörgye in the vicinity of Pest or from Luciu in Moldavia, in the Barbaricum, neither can these finds be cited as proof of the Christianity of their owners. In the same way, the hand of a bronze statue of Jupiter Dolichenus from Dacia found in the Ukraine does not suggest a Roman citizen initiated into the rites of that cult, while the bronze statue of Victoria unearthed at Akasztó, in southern Hungary, does not attest to the Roman beliefs of its barbarian owner.

Aside from written sources and archaeological evidence, place-names also offer an insight into the nature of ethnic change. The names given to settlements, mountains and rivers help to orient peoples living in a particular region. Changes according to a set pattern in place-names, which are a

part of the civilization of human groups, reflect the changes or transformations affecting the population or even its disappearance. Changes in place-names and changes of population rarely take place at the same time since local populations rarely disappear without trace. Furthermore, the partial coexistence of old and new groups involves the adoption of place-names, to some extent. Consequently, these names are preserved to some degree even after the original (eponymous) population has disappeared or has been assimilated. This process is irreversible: insofar as a given people remained in its homeland, the place-names did not disappear without trace even if new groups had settled in their midst. Changes in place-names are generally indicative of the appearance and settlement of new peoples. The survival of place-names is influenced by the nature and actual process of ethnic change, cultural heritage, and social organization. The total disappearance and change in place-names is rare over wider areas. Various sections of major rivers were always inhabited at one time or another and river names were transmitted over several millennia as in the case of the river Elbe, the Rhine, the Danube, the Tisza and the Maros rivers.

The study of place-names is especially important after the disintegration of the Roman Empire. They have proved instrumental in tracing the fate of the provincial population at a time for which other sources are practically non-existent or mute. In the parts of the empire where great masses of the Roman population stayed behind, that is, in the later neo-Latin countries, an abundance of Roman toponyms and river names may be found which were affected only by regular patterned linguistic change. In other areas where the provincial population retained only part of their former homeland which was resettled by new peoples, place-names were changed to a certain extent. Where population change came after a period of an area's depopulation — absolute or with only small remnants surviving — the change in place-names is more complete. Repeated linguistic changes involved more rapid modifications of place-names as well as the disappearance of earlier ones. In Raetia, Noricum and Pannonia, the Roman population survived into the fifth century only for some time after the disintegration of the empire. Afterwards, they disappeared so that only a small percentage of their place-names have come down to us. The names used in Roman times, however, have been preserved to the present day even in areas where the descendants of the one-time provincial population have long since disappeared. No antique place-names have been preserved in the northeastern part of Pannonia, since population change was swift and complete there. In the Drava-Sava interfluve and western Pannonia, however, in addition to the water names (Rába — *Arrabo*, Marcal — *Mursella*, Zala — *Salla*, Zöbernbach — *Sevira* – *Savaria*, Mura — *Muria*), town names have also survived: Wien — *Vindobona*, Ptuj, Pettau — *Poetovio*, Sisak (Sziszek) — *Siscia*. Szerémség (Srem) incapsulates the memory of *Sirmium*. The name *Scarbantia* (Sopron) is documented until the late sixth century A.D. The name of Savaria did not change: it may be found in the ninth century and it was used officially alongside the name Szombathely until the nineteenth century in spite of the fact that this part of Pannonia had not been settled by neo-Latin population groups in the ninth century. The initial coexistence and later assimilation, however, permitted the transmission and

use of old place-names by the new population. The survival of certain Pannonian place-names definitely shows that they were adopted by the Hungarian tribes. If the ethnogenesis of the neo-Latin speaking Romanian people had indeed even partially taken place in Trajan's Dacia or in Transylvania, the majority of Roman place-names would have survived as in other neo-Latin countries.

As it is, only the names of a few rivers have been preserved: the Szamos (the form *Samum* is known from the Roman period) and the Maros *(Marissus, Marisia)*. However, as only a section of these rivers flowed through Dacia, the survival of their name cannot be entirely attributed to the Dacian population. The survival of the river names of the Olt *(Alutus)* and the Cserna (is sometimes derived from its Slavic name *Dierna*) can be ascribed to the Romans and Byzantines who controlled the northern bank of the Danube and the narrow shoreline from counter forts for centuries after the evacuation of Dacia. In addition to a few controversial water names in the Dacian heartland, not a single place-name has survived. The extensive disappearance of Roman names, much greater by far than in the other European provinces of the *Imperium,* also confirms the evacuation and surrender of the province and is harmonic with its history, demonstrating as it does a complete and total change in population. (Present-day place-names which have an antique ring in the territory of former Dacia are artificial denominations from the more recent past.)

Historical records, archaeological evidence and place-names all demonstrate that after 270, the territory of Dacia became isolated from the Roman Empire and was, thus irrevocably lost to Roman civilization.

II. From Dacia to Transylvania. The Period of the Great Migrations (271–895)

1. The "Men of the Forest". The Goths in Transylvania (271–380)

The Decline of Dacia

The Carpic, Gothic and Gepid attacks which afflicted the Roman provinces to the north and the south of the Lower Danube are well known from the history of antiquity and had been described in the previous chapter of the history of Roman Dacia. As a result of these attacks, the position of Dacia Superior became critical. The soldiers manning the Roman frontier forts in Transylvania received their pay until the end of the joint reign of Philip I and Philip II; a few garrisons are known to have existed under Decius (249–251).

The Roman *limes* in Transylvania was the military installation of a strong, self-confident militant superpower given to taking the offensive. The *Imperium* did not close the passes — with the exception of the Vöröstorony Pass — but controlled them with a chain of advanced turrets, visible from the military forts. The Lápos Mountains in the north, the Kelemen and Görgényi Mountains and the Hargita in the east, the Bereck Alps in the south were a kind of no man's land — Transylvanian Dacia can be best likened to an enormous classical theatre whose gates and seats Rome ceded to the barbarian audience, reserving the stage for itself.

The camps, and later forts, of the auxiliary troops were established on the plateaus usually beside or near a major waterway in order to facilitate transport and communication, and were located on low hills or terraces which offered an excellent overview of the lowland encircled by the mountains and their passes. In other words, Rome merely kept an eye on the great natural protective ring which — the myth that has persisted into modern historiography notwithstanding — never, for one single moment, really protected Transylvanian Dacia.

This system had collapsed by 160–170, and could no longer be effectively held by the Roman Empire under the thrust of the barbarian attacks in the middle of the third century. The successive raids and incursions from 248 onwards ravaged and destroyed the stone-walled forts and towns of Scythia Minor, Moesia and Thracia. The military prowess of the barbarian armies clearly indicates that none of the border forts in Dacia could resist or seriously impede their onslaught. The undefensible eastern Transylvanian *limes* was relinquished in the 250s without even an attempt at its defence.

About three or four towns and the single legionary *castrum* of the province held out for some time in the western half of the province, but only along the main road leading southwards: the garrison of Micia protecting the western exit of the Maros Valley was withdrawn under Valerian (260). On the evidence of hoarded coins, the last bastion in the heartland of Transylvania, the *castrum* of Apulum, was under attack from 268 onwards, when the main road leading through Krassó–Szörény was also abandoned (the Galacs coin hoard).

Contemporary literary sources and the archaeological evidence both demonstrate that the Roman army, the soldiers' families and all other civilians whose livelihood was strongly linked to the military were evacuated from the province at the beginning of Aurelian's reign (271) at the latest. Life came to an abrupt end in the forty-eight Roman *castella* and the settlements that depended on and lived off these forts (the so-called *vici auxiliari*) which formed an arc extending from the Temes region to the Vöröstorony Pass. That this was indeed so is borne out by the *castella* themselves. Those which were not resettled and built in during the Hungarian Middle Ages (e.g. Bereck, Tihó, Kosály, Vármező, Magyarigen, and also Pozsesna on the Lower Danube) to this day offer the same desolate spectacle with their earthen ramparts and deep ditches as the *agri decumates* of Baden-Württemberg which were abandoned at roughly the same time, or the border forts of the Antonine Wall in Scotland that had been relinquished somewhat earlier. They are literally "empty" both inside and out, for they had long fallen into disuse by the time of the large-scale building activity of late Roman age.

It is probable in the case of the four *municipia* that held out the longest — Napoca, Potaissa, Apulum, and Ulpia Traiana — that the small and wretched population groups within or around their walls at first accepted Gothic overlordship. However, the traces of these groups in the archaeological records (a few burials) do not extend beyond the close of the third century A.D. At the same time, the buildings within the stone walls — some of which have survived into the Modern Age — decayed rapidly, and by the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries the *principia* (military headquarters) in Potaissa was being used as a burial ground by groups of eastern barbarians. The rural homes, the *villae*, and the farmsteads of the advocates of romanization had perished to such an extent that in the fourth century the Goths had already opened cemeteries on their sites (e.g. Palatka).

There is only one way a "romanized" population could possibly have survived: if they had resorted to active defence and had withdrawn into hastily erected hilltop forts and fortified sites, as indeed had the provincial population of some areas lying within the empire — the inhabitants of the Balkans and of southwest Pannonia, the population of the Eifel-Hunsrück hill country between the Rhine and the Mosel, and farther westwards, the population of the Ardennes. The terrain of Transylvanian Dacia was certainly extraordinarily well suited for this kind of defence. However, there are no traces of late Roman *refugia* or fortified places in Transylvania, and the lack of these contradicts the much-quoted "self-defence" theory.

Not one single late Roman or early mediaeval source mentions or knows of a "surviving" Roman population in Transylvanian Dacia: the one-time

Roman towns, settlements and forts perished without exception, not one single language or literary source retained their names into the Middle Ages. What has survived is of linguistically uncertain origin, the names of a few major waterways which the Romans themselves considered a prehistoric heritage: the names of the Temes, the Maros, the Körös, the Szamos and the Olt. The river names "Ampelus-Ompoly" and "Tierna-Cserna" are similarly a legacy of the pre-Roman era. As for the name of the Aranyos River (documented in a charter from 1075: *qui dicitur hungaricae aranas, latine autem aureus* [which in Hungarian is called 'aranas' but in Latin 'aureus']), which in Hungarian was borrowed from the Iranian, it is "derived" from the Latin *aureus* only by those who go in for vulgar etymologizing. The name given to this particular river is rather obvious in view of its abundant gold content (Hungarian *arany*), a fact borne out also by its Slavic name (Zlatna–Zalatna from *zlato*, "gold").

The complete disappearance of antique place-names from Dacia proves the complete assimilation of the surviving population fragments, especially if one remembers that, although numerous place-names in Britannia, in the Rhineland and the Upper Danube region of yore are preserved in English, Dutch and German, the Roman population that continued to live there well over two hundred years after the surrender of Dacia was likewise completely assimilated. The funerary rite of the Transylvanian "late Roman" cemetery (Baráthely I) is undoubtedly reminiscent of the so-called scattered cremation burials formerly practised in Dacia — and extensively documented in Pannonia until Probus (276–282) at the latest — but what must be recalled is that the grave goods (intact vessels, lamps, coins) characterizing genuine Roman burials do not occur in these graves. The Baráthely graves all contained expressly "barbarian" meat offerings, whilst a few burials yielded fibulae and vessel sherds burnt in accordance with the barbarian rites practiced by the population of the Marosszentanna–Cherniakhov culture. Similar burial rites have been observed in the Carpic-Gothic cemeteries of Moldavia (Dančeny, Etulija, Baltzata, Hanska-Luterija II and Oselivka). Marosszentanna–Cherniakhov type finds (vessels, combs, jewellery) have also been found from the settlements belonging to these centuries, and thus the population group using the Baráthely burial ground originated from the Barbaricum. It is, moreover, rather improbable that a closed community of "surviving Romans" could have successfully lain low near one of the most bustling main roads leading through Dacia (between Medgyes and Segesvár).

Relics of the late Roman rites and costumes characteristic of the Tetrarchy and later do not occur on the left bank of the Danube. The so-called cruciform brooches — insignia bestowed by Rome on Roman subjects — only reached the Barbaricum as booty, with sporadic finds of such fibulae among the Germanic Quadi, the Sarmatians of the Great Hungarian Plain, the Gepids of the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain (Muszka), and the Transylvanian Goths (Obrázsa, Lemhény and Vecel). These "crossbow" brooches do not confirm the presence of a Roman population in the Barbaricum, and this is doubly true of specimens that found their way into Transylvanian private collections and museums from Pannonia, Moesia and even Italy in

the course of the past century. Another absurd suggestion — and one that betrays considerable ignorance of human nature — is that the presence of Roman coins is evidence for the presence of "romanized" Roman persons. In fact, the Roman coin "circulation" of other regions of the Barbaricum such as the Great Hungarian Plain or the Polish Lowlands shows little, if any, divergence from the circulation of post–271 Roman coins in Transylvania.

The Carpic Interlude

The first really dangerous attacks against Dacia were mounted by the barbarian Carpi from what is today Moldavia. Even though the classical sources claim that after their incursion in 244–247 the emperor Philip the Arabian cleared the empire of them, the fact is that the emperor barely managed to defend the Olt *limes*, the *Limes Alutanus*. The coin hoards from Transylvania that are closed by issues minted under Philip I and Decius in 247–249 (Mezőviszolya and Mezőbánd, both lying in the region of Septér) suggest a successful attack against northeastern Dacia, though there is no record of this in our sources.

The urn burials of the cemetery recently unearthed in Septér on the northeastern fringes of the Mezőség represent an archaeological culture that is new to Transylvania, but which has been linked to the Carpi in Moldavia (Poieneşti culture). The Carpi had probably advanced into Transylvania through the Borgó Pass. The amphora-shaped urns from Bözöd and Medgyes which match the urns from Septér suggest that the Carpi penetrated as far as the Nagy-Küküllő Valley in the southwest.

The Carpic settlement should not be overestimated, and especially should not be pictured as a mass influx of population. The twenty-seven burials that have been unearthed in the only known Carpic cemetery and the largest one at Septér represent the majority of graves at that site; the grave finds are rather uniform and can be assigned to the span of a single generation, from between 250 and 290. The Carpic vessels and jewellery share numerous similarities with those of the Marosszentanna–Cherniakhov culture, and "Carpic" amphorae have also been found in "Visigothic" contexts at Sepsiszentgyörgy–Eprestető and Baráthely, whilst "Gothic"-type bowls with smoothed-in decoration, pots, one-handled cups, combs and needle cases were also frequent in the Septér graves. These links are extremely important for they indicate the earliest phase of the Gothic Marosszentanna–Cherniakhov culture in Transylvania, which has also been attested at the eponymous site of Marosszentanna.

There are no individual Carpic finds in Dacia after 290–300, but it is still uncertain whether the Carpi of Transylvania joined their brethren who were accepted into, and settled in the Roman Empire in 295, or whether they were assimilated by the Goths.

The Goths in Transylvania

The history of the Gothic migration and the Gothic wars is known down to the level of detail, and their outcome is similarly quite clear: from 271, the area to the north of the Lower Danube (and to the west of Scythia Minor = Dobrudja) became the land of the Goths called *Gutthiuda* in Gothic and *Gothia* in Latin, and the left bank of the Danube was called *ripa gothica* or "Gothic bank". After the occupation of these areas beyond the Carpathians bordering on Roman Dacia, the hitherto uniform Gothic population split into two branches. The area to the east of the Dniester was settled by the *greuthingi*, "the Goths of the steppeland", who were also known as Ostrogoths (Gothic *austro* = "bright", "sparkling", "radiant", and also "eastern"), whilst the area to the west and southwest of the Dniester was occupied by the *tervingi*, "the Goths of the forest", who were called also Visigoths (Gothic *vezu/vizu* = "valiant", "gallant"). The Gothic ethnonyms speak for themselves, for the Gothic groups who had previously inhabited the Pontic steppeland could only have acquired the name "people of the forest" after their occupation of mountainous Transylvania.

Only recently has it been suggested that Transylvanian Dacia had not belonged to the land of the Goths. Historic arguments, too, have been put forward for refuting claims that the Transylvanian Basin, called "Caucaland" in Gothic (= Hauhaland, i.e. "land of the mountains"), had ever been settled by the Goths, or that the Gothic occupation had ever been more than a fleeting, brief episode in Transylvanian history.

The fact is that not soon after their settlement a contemporary, official Roman source mentions the Goths in Transylvania: *Tervingi, pars alia Gothorum, adiuncta manu Taifalorum adversum Vandalos Gepidesque concurrant.*[1] In other words "the other Gothic groups, the men of the Forest (the *tervingi*), in alliance with the Taifali, clashed with the Vandals and the Gepids" (autumn, 291). The Visigothic tradition preserved in the *Origo Gothica*[2] clearly states the reason for these hostilities, and leaves no doubt that the warring parties clashed for the possession of the abandoned Roman province of Dacia. Fastida, the king of the Gepids who was "hemmed in by rugged mountains and dense forests",[3] first made an offer for the peaceful division of Dacia. When his offer was rejected, he decided on a frontal attack, though only after some encouragement from Rome (my foe's foe is my friend), but without success. After his defeat, Fastida retreated *ad patria*, "to his own abode"; and it must here be recalled that there is no area other than the Carpathians where the Gepids could have been "hemmed in by rugged mountains". The Vandalic allies could only have been the Hasding Vandals who, for the past 120 years, had been living in the Upper Tisza region and in the valleys of its tributaries. The Siling Vandals of Silesia could have had no active role in these faraway events. The exact place of the battle recorded in the *Origo Gothica* will probably never be known (*Aulha*, Gothic *ahwa*, "river", "wa-

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1. Panegyrici Latini III, (XI) 17. 1.
2. JORDANES, *Getica* 99.
3. JORDANES, *Getica* 98.

ter"), but Jordanes's remark that it had been fought near the *oppidum Galtis* suggests the environs of an old Roman town. The explicit purpose of this war was the division of Dacia, and it definitely took place in Dacia. Any attempt to degrade this war into an insignificant and inconsequential local skirmish somewhere near the Prut is nothing less than deliberate tampering with the substance of the literary evidence: the identity, the homeland and the aims of the actual participants.

After protecting Transylvanian Dacia from the incursions of the Eastern Germanic relatives, the Visigoths could proceed to occupy and settle the valleys of the Küküllő rivers, the Kis-Szamos and the Maros as far as Micia/ Vecel. The historical proof of their settlement is their encroachment on Sarmatia, an ally of Rome. In response to an appeal of the Sarmatians for help, Constantine the Great's son, the future emperor Constantine II intervened on their behalf and inflicted a disastrous defeat of Ariaric's Goths on 18 February, 332 on the territory of the Temes region, the present-day Banat. The defeat did not quench their thirst for battle, and a few years later (around 335) the Goths, led by their king Geberic, drove the army of Visumar, the Vandalic king, from the Maros Valley. The Goths could only have defended Dacian Gothia along the section of the Maros flowing through the Great Hungarian Plain. This is borne out by a contemporary Roman source from around 350: *Daciam* ... nunc *Taifali, Victohali et Tervingi habent*,[4] in other words, "Dacia is *now* in the possession of the Taifali, the Victofali and the Tervingi".

The Gothic army led by King Athanaric first withdrew behind the *Serrorum montes* (the south-eastern Carpathians) after the campaign led by the emperor Valens in 364 and 369, and then retreated to the Caucaland in face of the Hunnish raids. The Gothic occupation of Dacia is a fact confirmed by contemporary Roman sources, and needs no proof. The geographical literature of the fifth and sixth centuries calls Dacia "Gothia" in their review of the third and fourth century history of the region. Suffice it here to quote Orosius from the fourth century: *Dacia ubi est Gothia*[5] — "Dacia, where Gothia now lies".

The archaeological evidence of the Visigoths was first identified around 1906 on the basis of the finds from the Marosszentanna cemetery. Béla Pósta, the then professor of archaeology at Kolozsvár, played a crucial role in this identification: in the course of a study trip to Russia he had acquired first-hand personal knowledge of the finds — still unpublished at that time — from the cemeteries of Cherniakhov and Romashki excavated in the province of Kiev and had noted their surprising similarity to the Transylvanian burial grounds. He was also the first to outline the historical background of this similarity. His identifications gained international recognition and acceptance through the publications of his student István Kovács; the third and fourth century Gothic–Eastern Germanic culture is still called the Cherniakhov–Marosszentanna (Sîntana de Mureş) culture.

Like the other Germanic peoples, the Goths, too, cremated their dead in the early imperial period. This rite — which serves as an indication of their ethnic origins — survived well into the third and fourth centuries. How-

4. EUTROPIUS, *Breviarium* ... 8, 2.2.
5. OROSIUS, *Historiarum adversum paganos* ... I, 54.

Map 4. The Goths in Dacia, 270–376/380

1. Border fortifications in Dacia before the evacuation; 2. Terving–Visigoth settlements and cemeteries of the Marosszentanna culture; 3. Presumed Roman population under Gothic rule; 4. Gothic coin and jewellery hoards concealed between 376 and 380; 5. Gepids before the Hunnish supremacy; 6. Gold coins from Theodosius to Honorius, 379–424; 7. Gepid treasure hoards concealed in the 420s; 8. Gothic settlement area; 9. Gepid settlement area in the north and the east of the Great Plain

ever, as a result of cultural influences from the Mediterranean world and with the spread of Christianity, inhumation burials gained ever wider currency and there is a perceptible decline in cremation burials. The few Gothic cremation burials from Transylvania can generally be assigned to the first


Fig. 3. Bronze fibulae, buckles and bone combs from the Gothic cemetery at Marosszentanna

generation of Gothic settlers (for example, the burials in the decayed inner area of the Roman *castellum* at Sóvárad), but the practice of cremating the deceased is known from later periods, too, and has also been documented at the eponymous site of Marosszentanna.

Recent research had distinguished three successive waves of settlement on the basis of the finds in the Marosszentanna cemetery. These phases span at least three generations and give a clear indication of the period in which the occupants of the Gothic village established and used this burial ground (300–376). The first phase is characterized by an abundance of vessels into which were deposited foodstuffs for use in the netherworld; similar graves have been brought to light at Csombord, Marosújvár, Rugonfalva and Marosvásárhely in Transylvania. The second phase indicates a change of costume and jewellery (with the appearance of new fibula types, combs and buckles); the deceased were now equipped with only one or, at the most, two storage vessels; similar graves have been reported from Palatka, Mezőakna, Fehéregyháza and Kolozsvár. The third phase reflects the spread of Christianity: the burials are east-west oriented and they occasionally overlie the burials of phase one which were no longer visible. The hands of the deceased are often clasped together and the pagan custom of food offerings disappears. Similar graves have been excavated at Újős, Medgyes and Kolozsvár.

The so-called bow fibulae which fastened the garment at the shoulder or above the bosom and which continued to be worn by the Visigoths in their Hispanic home make their appearance during the second phase. This fibulae apparently evolved from the fibulae "with returned foot". The distribution of Gothic silver and bronze fibulae covered with a semicircular plate at the head and a pentagonal plate at the foot reflects the centres of Visigothic settlement in Transylvania, but also the random choice of the areas investigated (Kolozsvár, Magyar-Palatka, Vajdakamarás, Újős-Rét, Mezőakna, Marosszentanna, Marosvásárhely, Tekerőpatak, Maroslekence, between Baráthely and Ecel, and Szászhermány, the latter being a settlement). Similar fibulae mark the wealthy female burials of the Ostrogoths in the steppeland, and the fibulae of Visigothic women living beyond the Carpathians are practically indistinguishable from the Transylvanian specimens (Independenţa, Spanţov, Izvorul, Alexandru Odobescu, Tîrgşor, Leţcani, and more recently from Bîrlad and Mogoşani). That these women really were Goths is indicated by a spindle whorl unearthed at Leţcani bearing a well legible and intelligible Gothic runic inscription. Spindle whorls with incised runes have also been reported from Wallachia.

It is not only the female jewellery that is uniform. The female costume of the Marosszentanna–Cherniakhov culture features semicircular bone combs, various types of bone, silver and bronze pendants, whilst the male costume is characterized by belt and shoe buckles. Gothic pottery too, shows a uniform development, both continuing late Celtic traditions and adopting late antique techniques (such as the potter's wheel). Pottery wares practically identical in form, execution and ornamentation have been unearthed in the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Maros and the Lower Danube region. But while the pottery (and the material culture) of the Ostrogoths reflects influences and borrowings from the Graeco-Roman towns of the Pontus region, the

Visigothic wares reflect the cultural impact of the Roman provinces lying beyond the Lower Danube, especially of the handicrafts of the border towns. These influences (and Roman imports such as glass, amphorae and flagons) are more frequently documented in the lowland along the northern side of the Lower Danube than in the inland regions to the north. They are evident in the Barcaság and in the Háromszék Basin, while they hardly left a trace on the archaeological record from the Maros and the Kis-Szamos Valley. There is even less evidence of late impacts of the former (pre-Gothic) Roman provincial handicrafts, and the technological know-how of firing vessels to a bright red or yellow colour disappeared entirely.

'Ninety per cent of the archaeological finds of the Transylvanian Goths was identified, excavated and published by Hungarian and Saxon archaeologists prior to the outbreak of the First World War and shortly after the close of the Second World War. Systematic investigations came to a standstill after the excavation of some one hundred and twenty graves, while at the same time, the number of graves excavated and published from Moldavia and Wallachia rose from zero to two thousand; in other words, the ratio of Dacian to extra-Dacian burials is presently 1:20. This uneven ratio eventually clouded the vision of scholarly research and there has been a perceptible increase in the theories calling the Gothic presence in Transylvania into question in the light of the "archaeological evidence", or restricting it to the Maros region on the evidence of a few "late" cemeteries (at Marosszentanna, Marosvásárhely and Mezőakna). Other scholars link these burial grounds to Athanaric's Goths who sought refuge in Transylvania after the Hunnish assault of 376, or to Radagaisus's people (?) around 400. Following the large-scale investigations on the Romanian lowland, even the few scholars who do acknowledge a Gothic presence in Transylvania from 271 or 300 on have tried to compress their settlement territory to a small or plainly insignificant area. One delightful theory would have the Visigoths using the cemeteries of the exclusively Roman settlements of Transylvania.

In reality, the Gothic settlements of Transylvania differ but little from the settlements of the Marosszentanna–Cherniakhov territory. The one-room huts — the likes of which were not to be found even in the remotest village of the Roman Empire in the third and fourth centuries — had sunken floors and their roof was supported by two or three pairs of posts; they contained hearths or ovens only rarely. However, timber-framed houses have also been uncovered. The combs, fibulae, jewellery and vessel fragments found in these houses match the grave goods of the burials found at Bözöd-Lóc, Baráthely I, Segesvár-Szőlők, Bögöz-Vizlok, Sepsiszentgyörgy-Eprestető, Szászhermány-Goldgrube, Székelykeresztúr, Réty-Telek, and Brassó, for instance: the relatedness of the two is, thus, an archaeological truism. The number of settlement sites indicated by surface features and various finds is relatively high. These sites, along with the cemeteries, give a fairly accurate outline of the boundaries of the Visigothic settlement territory. The distribution of the presently known eighty to ninety sites nevertheless suggests a considerable compression of the inhabited and cultivated areas as compared to the Roman imperial period. Settlement traces indicative of the Gothic occupation of one-time Roman *castella, villae* and other settlements are few and far between (Micia/Vecel, and Bereck).

Fig. 4. The distribution of the plate-fibula, the most characteristic item of Gothic women's jewellery in Transylvania

1. Kolozsvár; *2.* Magyarpalatka; *3.* Vajdakamarás; *4.* Újős–Füzkút; *5.* Mezőakna; *6.* Marosszentanna; *7.* Marosvásárhely; *8.* Gyergyótekerőpatak; *9.* Maroslekence; *10.* Between Baráthely and Ecel; *11.* Szászhermány

The composition of the food offerings that were deposited in the burials and the animal bone samples found in excavated settlements, as well as the settlement patterns clearly imply that — in contrast to their Ostrogothic kinsmen — the Visigoths occupying the Lower Danubian lowland and Transylvania were agriculturists, a fact supported also by Libanius's description from 348–349.[6] The vocabulary of Ulfilas' Gothic Bible translation is well stocked with terms indicating a rather sophisticated knowledge of agriculture, with words for ploughing, sowing, reaping and harvesting, and reflecting an animal husbandry based on stalling. The archaeological evidence, the historical sources and the linguistic data refute a recently proposed hypothesis according to which the Visigoths of Transylvania and beyond were migratory herdsman or "nomadic" pastoralists. A thriving and self-supplying peasant economy is suggested by the Gothic vocabulary with words for a wide array of village handicrafts. The surviving relics of Visigothic handicrafts (including pottery) are undeniably "barbarian", even

6. LIBANIUS, *Oratio* 59. 89.

if they were visibly influenced by the neighbouring Roman civilization. But cultural impacts of this kind can be demonstrated for all peoples on the barbarian side of the *limes*. The Visigoths (as well as the other barbarians) were dependent on the empire for various luxury items such as metal and glassware, cloths and textiles, as well as certain foodstuffs like oil and wine to such an extent that when trade relations were broken off at, say, times of war, the Goths "were reduced to great hardship and distress owing to their extreme lack of the necessities of life".[7] The Goths paid for these commodities with slaves; and when the emperor Aurelian evacuated the provincial population from Dacia, it was from this sorry fate that he was hoping to save them.

Visigothic society can best be reconstructed from the relevant expressions in Ulfilas' translation of the Bible, from the *Passio S. Sabae* — the acts of the Gothic martyr, Saba — and from the information recorded by a few late classical authors, primarily by the fourth century contemporary, Ammianus Marcellinus, as well as from the Gothic names and archaeological record of that time.

Following the occupation of Dacia, the Tervingi — the people of the forest — were not divided into tribes. (By the third and fourth centuries, the word *thiuda*, Gothic for "tribe", was used for denoting the Visigothic people and their land.) The central power *(thiudanassus)* was in the fourth century wielded by a single *thiudans*, a term that corresponds to Greek *basileus*. The Visigoths were divided into clans *(kunja = phylai, pagi)* who were led by a *kindins (dux, archon)*. Extended families *(sibja)* inhabited the territorial units *(garvi)* corresponding to each *kunja*; these *sibja*, however, were linked by blood ties in exceptional cases only. Each village *(haims)* was generally inhabited by a single *sibi* suggesting that the territorial, economic and cultic units of the period was the *sibi*. The patriarchal families *(fadreins)* grouped in each village were led by a village council, in which the elders *(sinistans)* called the tune. There were also some smaller, farmstead-like settlements *(weihsa)*.

From the time of the large-scale campaigns and conquests, real power among the Visigoths passed into the hands of the military leaders and their retinue. *Reiks (basiliskos, regulus)* designated the military leader, and from the third and fourth centuries on, it occurs frequently as a part of proper names (Guntheric, Geberic, Aoric, Ariaric, Munderic, etc.) It is also to be found in the name of the greatest Visigothic leader of that century: Athanaric. The title of *iudex* borne by Athanaric is often rendered in Late Latin as "governor" (or "ruler", "confederate leader") and it is fairly obvious that in terms of his real role, his activity and authority Athanaric was a *iudex potentissimus* — a distinction that corresponds to the Gothic *thiudans*. The *reiks* owed their rule to the *maistans (optimates-megistanes)* layer, the all-powerful lords of the estates and rural manors *(gards)*, and themselves belonged to this layer. Their power was ensured by a smaller or larger military retinue of professional warriors. The free *(freis)* Visigothic people had become strongly stratified by the fourth century: besides the distinct layer of paupers, various classes of servants and slaves also made their appearance.

73   7. Ammianus Marcellinus, *Rerum gestarum*. Liber 27. 5.

The archaeological record has preserved little of the *maistans* layer: a gold bracelet, probably a symbol of power and wealth from Szászbuda, and a gold fibula set with garnets "ex Transilvania", a masterpiece of fourth-century Visigothic goldsmith's art. The social stratification of the villages, however, is more clearly reflected in the burials of the village cemeteries, for example at Marosszentanna. The graves and their grave goods reflect a social stratification comparable to that of the Gothic village described in the *Passio S. Sabae*. A community of fifty to one hundred villagers included four or five wealthier couples; it was they who, in their lifetime, must have had the main say in the village council. The majority of burials can be linked to peasant families of equal social standing *(waurstwja)*, whilst poorer graves can be associated with the paupers *(unleths)*. Few of the burials can be attributed to slaves *(skalks)*. The personal ornaments of the wife of a tribal leader standing above village society have come to light at Tekerőpatak from a buried hoard. They resemble the jewellery of the wealthier village women, the only difference being that the former were fashioned from solid silver and that a small fortune in Roman coins was also part of this hoard.

Both the written sources and the archaeological finds offer a wealth of information about the ancestral religion of the Goths. The Gothic runic inscription on one of the items of the Pietroasa treasure that had been buried on the fringes of Transylvanian Dacia even includes the words: *Gutani/ō wih hailag.*

The pre–376 Christianity of the Goths has, until recently, been judged as severely by most historians as by the Romans, who were appalled by the bizarre costumes of their pagan priests and priestesses, by their clan sanctuaries bedecked with barbarian religious symbols, their rustic cult statue carted around on wagons and by their stag-drawn sacred carts. Christian missionary endeavours were thought to have been isolated events which could boast some — at best, temporary — success only among the Visigoth's Roman prisoners and captives, the one-time Roman population that had been subjugated by the Goths, and the lowliest of the lowly among the Goths themselves. Archaeology was even more exacting in what it required by way of evidence: it would have expected Gothic graves to yield tangible relics of Christianity of the kind that have hardly ever been found even in the frontier provinces of the empire before 376. The Visigothic cemeteries have yielded no tangible evidence of this kind, nor are they likely to. At the same time, from the middle of the fourth century, we can observe a perceptible decline in the pagan food offerings and beverages deposited in a number of these cemeteries, including the one at Marosszentanna, and a visible increase of east-oriented burials (with elapsed hands). These traits are comparable to the fourth-century Christian funerary rites in the provinces.

Between 369 and 372, Athanaric tried to divert attention from the inept military leadership of the *maistans* and from the ignominious defeats suffered from the Roman army in 367 and 369 with a spate of religious persecutions. These persecutions, which gave an impressive number of Gothic martyrs to the Catholic and Gothic Arian church over the four years would hardly have made sense if the Christian congregations had indeed merely consisted of a few prisoners of war and a handful of miserable and wretched Goths.

The various — Catholic, sectarian, and Arian — Christian missions flooded Gothia following the peace treaty concluded after the Roman victory of 332. Judging by Ulfilas' Bible, the Arians appear to have had the most success in establishing a Gothic Christian church. The number of Christians among the Goths appears to have been considerable already at the time of the first persecution in 347–348, and the history of Gothic Christianity can be continuously traced up to the martyrdom of Saba (372), or up to 378, when Fritigern, a convert to Christianity, sent a Christian presbyter as an envoy to the emperor Valens. Most scholars have at long last rejected the earlier thesis that the mass conversion of the Goths took place on Roman soil and only after 382, and now concede that "the majority of Goths had already embraced Arian Christianity when they poured into the empire"[8] in 376.

In the light of the above, the few fourth to sixth century Old Christian oil lamps, and the *donarium* (votive tablet) with the inscription ZENOVIVS and a pendant bearing the monogram of Christ found at Berethalom in 1775 can no longer be cited as proof for some sort of "Roman" presence. The fourth century *donarium* from Berethalom had been manufactured somewhere in Illyricum and had belonged to the paraphernalia of a missionary priest together with the bronze vessels found alongside it. The Christian gospel was for everyone. Neither in the fourth century, nor in our own times can it be regarded as the privilege of a population of a specific language, or ethnic origin.

Collapse

After the Huns smashed Ermanaric's Ostrogothic kingdom they turned against the Visigoths. Athanaric tried to ward off the enemy onslaught along the Dniester River, and he hastily consolidated advanced defensive positions against possible surprise attacks. The Hunnish military leadership, however, bypassed these lines using a brilliant nomadic manoeuvre: they forded the river by night, and routed Athanaric's army in a surprise attack at dawn. The outcome of this battle is well known: in the autumn of 376 the better part of the Visigothic population, led by Fritigern and Alavivus, petitioned for, and was granted, admittance *(receptio)* into the empire by the overlord of the eastern part of the *Imperium*, the emperor Valens, whilst Athanaric and his retinue retreated to the *Caucalandensis locus* in Transylvania. At the end of 380, Athanaric and his followers, too, sought refuge in the Eastern Roman Empire. This marked the end of Visigothic supremacy in Transylvania and in Gothia.

The catastrophe that befell the Goths and their subsequent withdrawal is reflected in numerous hoards, including two lavish gold treasures — the two weighing over seven kilograms — hoarded by members of the Gothic ruling elite: Roman gold ingots that can be dated to between 367–375 by the Roman state stamps on them have come to light at Kraszna; the gold ingots

8. H. WOLFRAM, *Geschichte der Goten*. München 1979, 96–97.

found at Földvár can be assigned to between 376–380 on the testimony of the imperial stamps. The silver treasure from Tekerőpatak which is dated by a series of silver coins as well as by a gold solidus of Gratian from 376 has already been mentioned in passing. What is remarkable is that none of the presently known Visigothic cemeteries have yielded jewellery types of a later date than the items in this hoard. Small and large fortunes in coin-hoards were buried between 376 and 380 at Maroscsapó, Zernyest, Szamos-újvár and Várhely. These coin-hoards definitely signal a general and wide-spread catastrophe, and together with the Tekerőpatak treasure they mark the end of Visigothic cemeteries and settlements in Transylvania. The Hun-nish pressure uprooted not only the German settlers of present-day Roma-nia, but also triggered the depopulation of present-day Poland, an area that had for centuries been densely settled by various Germanic tribes. It was this depopulation which cleared the path for the large-scale Slavic migra-tions that followed the Hunnish period.

The Visigoths had plundered and destroyed the forts, towns and vil-lages of Roman Dacia. Even worse, their century-long dominion saw the decay of whatever may have survived the wars. The gold mining region was a deserted wasteland throughout the early Middle Ages. It would ap-pear that the delights and comforts of Roman civilization had held no at-traction for the Goths or, for that matter, for the Alamanni who had occu-pied the *agri decumates* between the Rhine, the Danube and the Neckar riv-ers, and western Raetia at roughly the same time. This territory, wedged in between the formerly prosperous Danubian provinces and the Rhineland, was about the size of the area of Transylvanian Dacia that had been settled by the Romans. Following the Alamannic conquest, the abandoned forts and rural settlements were gradually reclaimed by the forest; not even their names were considered worth preserving by the Germanic tribes, whose only interest in the area was the need for new pastures and new agricul-tural lands. Surviving fragments of the earlier "Roman" population were soon assimilated by the newcomers. This contemporary parallel sets the fate of Roman Dacia in its proper perspective.

The Gepids before the Hunnish Conquest (269–424)

Roman sources first mention the Gepids in their list of the barbarians who attacked Dacia in 269. Indirect proof of their arrival in the Carpathian Basin is the attack in the autumn of 270 at Aquincum, Pannonia launched by the Vandals, who had been set in motion by the Gepids. The Visigoths had occupied Roman Dacia under their very noses, and their campaign against the Dacian Goths before 291 — which had been encouraged by the emperor Maximian — turned out to be a defeat. They had no choice but to move beyond Dacia and settle on the fringes of the one-time Roman province in the northwest, primarily in the Meszes Mountains. Discoveries of their ar-chaeological evidence (inhumation graves with elements of the Cherniakhov culture, but, in contrast to Gothic graves, abundantly equipped with weap-ons) have become increasingly frequent in northeastern Hungary and north-

western Romania. This area corresponds neither to Roman Dacia nor to historical Transylvania, but rather to the northwestern fringes of the present-day Romanian "Transylvanian" lowlands. The Visigothic settlement extended only to the right bank of the Szamos River in Roman Dacia, and extended to the left bank of the river solely in the region of Kolozsvár. The one-time Roman *limes* in Dacia lay some seventy kilometres to the west, along the inner side of the Meszes Mountains; the area in between was regarded as a kind of no man's land by the Goths.

The early abode of the Gepids lay in the valleys of the Sebes-Körös, the Berettyó, the Ér, the Kraszna, the Túr and the lower Szamos rivers to the northwest of the Meszes Mountains; in other words, it did not extend to the borders of Roman Dacia and lay well beyond the boundaries of geographical Transylvania. However, archaeologists and historiographers abroad stubbornly insist on identifying the Principality of Transylvania with historic Transylvania and Roman Dacia, and locate the early Gepid kingdom in "Transylvania".

The dazzling treasures which the Gepid kings had amassed over a whole century and which were buried when the Huns penetrated the Carpathian Basin (424) at Szilágysomlyó in the foothills of the Keselyű Mountain — treasures I and II belong together, for they had come to light from the same small plot of land — can in no way be linked to the Visigoths whose settlement territory lay well over one hundred kilometres away, beyond a mountain range. It no more stands to reason to link them to some Roman or Dacian "local leader". The same holds true for a contemporary hoard of antique silver vessels found at Tóti in Bihar county. Both have come to light in early Gepidia, and together with the similar but smaller hoards from Gelénes in the Upper Tisza region and from Ormód/Brestov in the Carpathian Ukraine they signal a historical turning-point. The treasures from Szilágysomlyó and the other finds brought to light in this region — a heavy gold collar from Szilágyújlak, a gold pendant from Zilah, the grave of a Gepid warrior from around 400 likewise at Szilágysomlyó — suggest that the early centres of Gepid power should be sought somewhere in the broader environs of Szilágysomlyó, an area that was open towards the valleys of the rivers Kraszna, Ér and Berettyó, but was protected by massive mountains from the east. The early Gepid dynasty had died out in this area, and it was here that King Ardaric, elevated to power by his Hun overlords, laid the foundations of later Gepid power.

2. The Huns (376/424–455)

The fate of Gothia was sealed by the Hunnish military advance. The former Gothic population that had known and, in a sense, had reached a *modus vivendi* with a still unified *Imperium Romanum* gradually disappeared from the scene under the repeated waves of Hunnish pressure. However, it is still unclear where and how the Huns established themselves in eastern Europe following their victory of 376. They first broke into the Eastern Roman Empire in 395, by which time they were mounting their attacks from

Wallachia. In December 400, they did away with Gaina and his Goths fleeing back from the territory of the empire. The westward drive of various Hun troops caused the outbreak of the "second Hun panic": the Vandals and the Sueves hastily fled from their abodes in the Carpathian Basin, and the Visigothic army led by Alaric made its first attempt to penetrate Italy through Dalmatia (401).

The next campaign that Uldin's Lower Danubian Hunnish army waged against the Eastern Empire (the occupation of Castra Martis in 409) ended in disaster. But by the time the government in Constantinople made truce with the Huns in 412, Uldin had already captured and burnt the Roman counterforts on the left bank of the Danube from Sucidava (near the mouth of the Olt River) to Lederata (west of the Iron Gates), and had, thus, annihilated the Romans' advanced posts. In the following decades the whole of Wallachia was occupied by the Huns. No other region of Europe has yielded such an abundance of archaeological evidence for the early settlement of the Huns as this fertile lowland traversed by meandering rivers: the majority of the Hun copper sacrificial cauldrons and graves with gold diadems have come to light in this region. It was from here that King Ruga led his armies against Thracia in 422, and though Ruga and the main Hunnish army moved into the Carpathian Basin following this campaign, soon new contingents of eastern Hunnish warriors took their place. The significance of these troops is indicated by the fact that the camp *(ordu)* of the co-regent, Attila, lay somewhere in the Buzău Valley between 435–445. A number of princely graves have been discovered in this area, and a Hunnish gold buckle from Brassó can probably also be linked to this *ordu*. In summertime, a Hunnish noble probably marched into the (later) Barcaság through the Bodza Pass. (The period in question is indicated by a gold solidus of Theodosius II issued around 430 and found in this region.)

By 424–425, King Ruga and the main Hunnish forces had pitched camps on the Great Hungarian Plain to the south of the Körös rivers. It was here that they began to build their new, principal *ordu* that was visited by Priscus in 449. The settlement territory of the Gepids who had submitted to the Huns was shifted to the north of the Körös–Sebes-Körös line in the Great Hungarian Plain, and this shift apparently entailed a gradual Gepid infiltration into Transylvania as far as the Nagy-Szamos River. The land of the Huns lay to the south of this region.

Central and southern Transylvania, girded with rugged mountains and covered with dense forests, served as a highway to the east (through the Vöröstorony, Bodza and Borgó passes). It was a campsite in summer, and a hunting ground in the autumn. This period marks the nadir of human settlement in Transylvania: only in the Maros, the Sebes-Körös, the Nagy-Küküllő valleys and along the roads leading to the passes have traces of human settlement been identified, and even these are few and far between. No Hunnish finds are known from northern Transylvania.

Some sort of central residence, perhaps a temporary *ordu* (the likes of which are described by Priscus) can perhaps be postulated near Szászsebes, where a gold solidus of Theodosius II minted in 429 or 430, and twelve gold coins of Varakhran V, the Kushan–Sassanian king (420–438) have come to light. The latter had probably been part of the booty brought back by a

Hunnish warrior who had fought in central Asia in the 420s. A series of other contemporary eastern and western Roman gold coins mark the extent of Hunnish power and the main routes leading through Transylvania (Gyulafehérvár, Marosludas, and Vízakna). The distribution of gold coins extorted from the two Roman empires accurately reflects the movements of the Huns and their allies.

One of the most significant Hunnish finds from Transylvania is the gold *cicada* — a religious symbol and an insignia of rank among the Huns — from Sáromberke. It is possible that the Germanic gold fibulae inset with precious stones, ornaments comparable to the Szilágysomlyó brooches, found at Völc in the Kis-Küküllő Valley, were the jewels of a wealthy woman of the Hunnish period. The solitary grave of a nobleman buried with a gold coin of Theodosius II and an assortment of gold jewellery at Csépány near Beszterce can also be assigned to this period. Aside from these lavish finds only a handful of "commoners'" finds from the Hun period — which are nonetheless highly characteristic — are known from Transylvania. These include one-handled jugs with burnished, flattened decoration, and vessels and glass cups which are scattered across the entire Middle Danubian region that came under Hunnish occupation (Maroskarna and Marosvásárhely, from graves or from settlements). Family burial grounds with a few graves typical of the Hunnish period from the Alps to Moldavia and the Pontus region have recently been unearthed at Újős and Baráthely: the graves contained chip-carved fibulae (of the so-called Perse–Léva type) that resemble the ones worn by the Huns, the Alans and the Germanic peoples during the Hunnish period, as well as fibulae with a triangular plate above the catchplate (of the so-called Brigetio–Mártély type). Similar plate-brooches have been reported from Arad–Mikelaka lying near the outlet of the Maros from Transylvania. The Alanic fibula of Caucasian type from Gyulafehérvár–Partos is the last of this small group of Hunnish finds from Transylvania, which has been enlarged with the grave goods of Hunnish burials uncovered at Nagyvárad–Szalkaterasz near the edge of the Great Hungarian Plain south of the Sebes-Körös. (The "Hunnish" items of the Mojgrad hoard that have played a prominent role in a number of earlier theories are modern forgeries.)

Southern Transylvania turned into a desolate and empty land during the fifty years of Hunnish occupation. The areas suitable for cultivation and human settlement had shrunk catastrophically. The river valleys functioned merely as routes of communication, and the areas bordering these valleys became the hunting grounds of the Hunnish kings and nobles.

3. The Gepid Kingdom (455–567)

Contemporary reports and the history of the Goths written by the Gothic Jordanes both highlight the importance of the role played by the "innumerable forces of the Gepids" in Attila's campaigns against Gaul (451). The Gepid troops were led by "the most famous king", Ardaric, who enjoyed a special privilege among all the vassal kings: he was allowed to participate

in Attila's council (445–453). This rare privilege of the Gepids can be ascribed to the fact that they were the only Eastern Germanic people who had not fled in panic on hearing of the Hunnish advance. In his campaigns against the towns of both Roman empires, Attila relied heavily on the mass of Gepid foot warriors. Their new king, Ardaric, who had been designated by the Huns, wielded the same measure of power over his own people as Attila over the Hunnish nobles and the common peoples of his empire. This kind of power was granted to Ardaric and a few other vassal kings by Attila and his Huns; and Ardaric, an astute and cunning man by nature, used this power for the benefit of his own people. No other area in the Carpathian Basin has yielded as many gold grave *oboli* as the settlement territory of the Gepids. Their Hunnish overlords supplied them with "home-minted" solidi of Theodosius II when the flow of eastern Roman gold dried up after the death of the emperor. When Attila died in 453, the Gepids were the best equipped and wealthiest of the Germanic tribes, and had the richest military aristocracy. It was "the Gepids raging with the sword" and "Ardaric's sword" that led the coalition of the Danubian peoples to victory in the Battle of the Nedao River fought against Attila's son and successor, Ellak (455).

After their victory, "the Gepids occupied by force all of the Hunnish settlements and held sway over the borders of all of Dacia. Being valiant men, they asked only for a friendly alliance, peace and an annual subsidy from the [Eastern] Roman Empire".[9] This contemporary report that has survived probably on the basis of Priscus's description strongly suggests that after their victory the Gepids annexed the Hunnish territory on the left bank of the Danube to their own settlement territory, which thus became multiplied in size. The boundaries of their kingdom in the first half of the sixth century can be reconstructed from a description by Cassiodorus, who drew his information from a Byzantine source. According to him, the Gepids lived to the west of Scythia Minor: the Danube bordered their land in the south, the Olt in the southeast, the Alpine mountain chain (i.e. the eastern and northern Carpathians) in the east and the north, and the Tisza in the west.[10] Right after 550, Jordanes remarked that the "present" country of the Gepids lay right across from Moesia on the far bank of the Danube, in a land formerly called Dacia and later Gothia, which was "now" called Gepidia and which was bordered by the Danube in the south.[11]

The most significant war waged by the Gepids dates to the period between the above-quoted two descriptions of the location and size of Dacia. The war happened after the work of Cassiodorus was finished, and before Jordanes has finished his *Getica*, the Gepids had lost their newly-won territories. It must be noted here in passing that the Eastern Empire never acknowledged the Gepid conquest. Jordanes, who lived in the territory of the Eastern Empire only alluded to these events in passing. The war that broke out in 539 was launched by the Gepids who had concluded an alliance with Theudepert, the Frankish king, against Byzantium. They routed the east Roman army led by General Calluc, and occupied the Danubian zone of

9. JORDANES, *Getica* 264.
10. JORDANES, *Getica* 33.
11. JORDANES, *Getica* 74.

Moesia Prima and Dacia Ripensis between Singidunum (Belgrad) and the region opposite the mouth of the Olt River. This area remained under Gepid control until the close of 551. The twelve year-long Gepid control of the Lower Danubian border can, in retrospect, be said to have shaped the later history of Europe: they opened the frontiers of the Eastern Empire to the permanent intrusions and attacks of various Slavic groups — and in 550, of the Kutrigurs. The romanized population of Dacia evacuated to the Lower Danubian region by Emperor Aurelian in 270 now fled to the inner regions of the Balkan Peninsula to avoid "slavery" under Gepid rule, and to escape recurrent Slavic–Kutriguric attacks. They took with them the memory of their Trajanic origins and their "Dacian" heritage, as well as their Latin dialects. And though Justinian I ordered the Gepids to evacuate the east Roman territory after the victory of his Langobard allies in 551, and again closed the Lower Danubian border, he could not resurrect its former inhabitants to populate the towns. After 552, only small forts were erected on the site of the former *castella*, counter forts and towns on both banks of the Lower Danube. For three decades, these were manned by soldiers of semi- or entirely barbarian descent, until the Avar and Slavic campaigns swept even these small forts away.

The Gepid finds from the Age of Migrations — the fifth and sixth century — are exceptionally well documented. In fact, the very first Gepid grave find, jewels from the burial of a noblewoman, came to light in Transylvania at Kisselyk, in the year 1856. József Hampel recognized as early as 1880 on the basis of a grave find from Nagyvárad that these and similar jewellery from the Carpathian Basin were ornamented in the "Merovingian style". By the end of the century he could confidently assert — on the basis of the finds rapidly growing in number and of his profound knowledge of historical sources — that the graves and burial grounds yielding comparable finds to the east of the Tisza could be regarded as an evidence of the Gepids. In his publication of the first Gepid cemetery to be expertly excavated at Mezőbánd in 1906–1907, István Kovács proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the cemetery should be assigned to the Gepids of the Age of Migrations (1913). And although the conceptual confusion pervading archaeological research after the First World War did not spare Gepid archaeology either, investigations and excavations have continued in the area that had formerly been Gepidia, but which now lies in three different countries: Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Although research in Transylvania was carried out between 1951–1956 within the framework of a "Slavic-Antes Programme", the 1960s brought a more professional approach. The claim that the settlements and cemeteries of the period in question do indeed belong to the Gepids has not been seriously challenged by any well-trained Hungarian, Yugoslavian or Romanian archaeologist to this day. It is, however, an infinitely more difficult task to reconcile their views with those of western scholars of the "Merovingian period", for there are quite a number of western historians and archaeologists who are loath to admit the very existence of the Gepids. The few who do, tend to associate with the Gepids only the simple commoners' finds. The contemporary Gothic and Langobard chronicles describing the Gepids as an abomination alas still influence scholarly attitudes, and it is still as fashionable to generously ascribe to the Goths

Map 5. The Gepids in Transylvania and in the Eastern Great Plain, 445/455–567

1. Settlement, grave, cemetery; 2. King's grave, hoard; 3. Gold coins paid as tribute by Byzantium from the time of Theodosius II (the 440s) until the death of Justinian I (565); 4. Coin hoard; 5. Gepidia up to cca 455; 6. Gepid settlement area between 474 and 567

their lavish treasures, their royal burials resplendent with dazzling jewellery, and their military victories as to denigrate the people themselves. These attitudes occasionally influenced local research on Gepidia. One virulent example is the claim, borne out by no historical source, that the royal burials of Apahida and the Szamosfalva treasure should be linked to an Ostrogothic elite who possessed Transylvania until 474 or 490. And yet, the historic victory of the Gepids over the Huns and their firm alliance — with the exception of the above-mentioned twelve years — with the Eastern Roman Empire provides a more than adequate explanation for the extraordinary wealth of the Gepid kings and nobles.

The distribution of the solidi issued under Theodosius II, Marcian and Valentinian III — gold coins that were lovingly deposited in the burials of Gepid nobles by their relatives so that they would be able to pay for their entrance to the netherworld — clearly shows that at the time of the Hun overlordship, Gepidia lay to the east of the Bodrog–Tisza line, to the north of the Körös–Sebes-Körös line, and north of the source area of the Nagy-Szamos in the east. International research generally tries to fit the solitary lavish burials from the Partium and northern Transylvania (e.g. Érmihály-falva) into the chronological framework of "Merovingian civilization" established on the basis of coin finds. The almost *nouveau riche* fashion worn by Gepid noblewomen, the dress ornamented with huge silver fibulae worn in pairs on each shoulder, the cast silver belt clasps, golden earrings and armrings, and an array of glittering beads evolved at around this time. Graves comparable to the noblewomen's burials uncovered in northeastern Hungary have also come to light in the Partium (at Érdengeleng and Gencs), and a veritable noblemen's cemetery was set up at Nagyvárad at this time.

Since the weapons, male and female dress and various other products of the Gepid material culture of the Hun period are known from various cemeteries of Hungary and the Partium (Ártánd I–II, Érmihályfalva, etc.) it is relatively easy to trace the settlement of Transylvania after the end of its Hun occupation. The first settlers obviously arrived still wearing the earrings, fibulae and other ornaments manufactured in their former homeland. Their grave *oboli* were still picked from among the late issues of Theodosius II which reached the Hun Empire in enormous quantities, or the late issues of Valentinian III but they were soon supplanted by the solidi of Leo I and Zeno. The distribution of these coins is concordant with the early Gepid grave finds that have come to light as far south as the valleys of southern Transylvania (Segesvár, Székelyudvarhely, Brassó, Szelindek, and the Hátszeg area). The majority of these finds come from small, family burial grounds established in the vicinity of newly founded manors or farmsteads, since larger villages had not yet been formed. Most of these early finds have been reported from Kolozsvár and its environs, suggesting the emergence of a major Gepid centre in that area.

Gepid Kings in Transylvania

A chain of smaller settlements inhabited by high-ranking military retinues and their families evolved around the ruins of Napoca (Magyarvalkó, Kardosfalva, Szamosfalva, Apahida, etc.). It cannot be mere chance that the Gepid kings chose the site of the one-time Roman towns as their residence: the walls of Napoca, although crumbling, were still standing, and perhaps it was still possible to make a mouldering public building or so habitable to some degree. The same process of semi-restoration can be observed in the case of the abandoned fort of Castra Regina (Regensburg), which was used by the Alamanni, and later by the Bavarian princes. That the royal family in Transylvania enjoyed an even higher standing is reflected by the fact that they buried their dead in secret on the terrace of the Kis-Szamos, far from their residence, near the present-day village of Apahida. The first royal burial came to light, and was plundered, in 1889; even so, most of the grave finds were rescued. The bilingual (Hungarian and German) publication of these finds that appeared not much later practically contains all that can be, and is, known about this assemblage. Most important among these finds is a late antique–early Byzantine onion-headed gold crossbow fibula that is somewhat larger, more ornate and more delicately wrought than the brooch found in the grave of Childeric (d. 482), the Frankish king at Tournai, suggesting that this particular Gepid king had been held in higher esteem by the Romans than the other barbarian kings of that period. The magnificent silver jugs of the Apahida treasure were presents from Constantinople. The other grave goods were in part regalia (symbols of power and rank), and in part personalia (personal ornaments and jewellery). The solid gold arm-ring with thickened terminals had been a symbol of rank among Germanic royal families since the third and fourth centuries. The six gold pendants attached to a boar's head had perhaps ornamented a diadem-like crown fashioned from gold brocade. The king's belt was fastened with a large gold buckle inset with colourful garnets, and his insignia of rank included a gold-mounted glass or wooden cup. The religion of the deceased king laid to rest amidst his treasures is revealed by his gold finger-ring ornamented with crosses, and his name is preserved on another finger-ring bearing a Latin inscription, OMHARIVS, as well as on a signet ring with a Greek monogram that can be read as (AUD-)OMARIUΣ. The letter ꝶ of the Latin inscription could be read as *ri*, giving the ending *harius* which corresponds to Old Germanic **harjaz* and Gothic *harjis* (nominative and genitive) meaning "army". "*Aud(om)harjis*" can perhaps be translated as "army's salvation". If the ligature is read as "ir", we get the Gothic word *hairus* meaning "sword". *Om*, however, defies interpretation in either case. In any case, on the evidence of other contemporary and related names, this compound name with its associations of combat and weaponry had undoubtedly been borne by a Gepid king.

Some of the jewellery from the second royal grave at Apahida — for instance, a cloisonné buckle identical to the one in the first royal burial, the gold-mounted glass goblet and wooden cup — which was discovered and brought to light from a plundered grave in 1968 some five hundred metres away from the first assemblage — is on a par with the items of the first

burial. The other lavish finds, which include gold mounts that had decorated the sword and its sheath, gold purse-lid inset with garnets, and sumptuous saddle and harness ornaments deposited together in a wooden casket, are items not found in the first burial. On the other hand, the insignia and personalia are missing from this second assemblage. Perhaps they were lost when the grave was discovered. Only a gold buckle that matches the former two, but is considerably heavier and more decorated, is known from the third Apahida find discovered in 1978.

The three royal grave finds are complemented by yet another buried gold treasure that came to light in 1963 at Szamosfalva. It contained mostly female jewellery (an ornate breast pendant suspended from a braided chain, belt buckles, beads and rings) with a few male ornaments such as a gold finger-ring and a massive gold collar.

The jewellery from Apahida and Szamosfalva can be confidently set beside the most splendid Germanic royal ornaments of the Hunnish period which have been left to us as mementos of the fabulous wealth of that era. There is every reason to regard them to be the grave goods and jewellery of the fifth-century Gepid kings, the Ardaricings. The *regia* of Napoca and the neighbouring manors and farmsteads of the royal retinue were abruptly abandoned at the beginning of the sixth century, an event which signals a particularly violent political change. The hoarding of the Szamosfalva treasure can be linked to the ascension of Elemund; the hoard of family heirlooms had probably been buried, never to be found again, by a fleeing Ardaricing.

The Gepids at the Time of the Merovingian Civilization

At the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries, a new "civilization" made its appearance in the western and central regions of Europe from the Atlantic to Transylvania. Its cradle was northern Gaul, the area long occupied by the Franks, or, to be more precise, Austrasia, the "southern country" of the Rhine, Maas, Mosel and Maine valleys. The rise of the Merovingian dynasty not only brought the consolidation of political power, but also revived the economic prosperity of the one-time Roman towns. The countryside saw the emergence of estates — and of villages and manors scattered over these estates — whose subsequent development was to lead to the birth of feudalism. Row grave cemeteries whose burials and grave goods have preserved the fashion, the weapons and other aspects of the material culture of that period, as well as certain tokens of the existing social order, grew up around these rural settlements, which had very little or nothing in common with the Roman villages of yore. To the east of the Frankish–Alamannic territory, in Thuringia, in present-day Bohemia, in Austria, Pannonia, the Tisza region and also in Transylvania we find the so-called "eastern Merovingian or eastern row grave culture" which can definitely be linked to the Germanic peoples living in these areas. No traces of this culture have yet been identified beyond the Carpathian Basin, either to the east or to the south. The distribution of this culture marked the frontiers of

contemporary Europe. And though the adjective "Merovingian" cannot, strictly speaking, be applied to the regions beyond Thuringia and Upper Austria — since the Merovingian dynasty never controlled this part of the world — the term "eastern Merovingian" can, nevertheless, be used to mean that the peoples inhabiting this region, first and foremost the Gepids and the Langobards, had entered into political and dynastic alliances with the Merovingians in the first half of the sixth century (the former is exemplified by the Gepids at the time of their campaigns against Byzantium in 539, the latter by the Langobardic kings). These relations frequently determined the course of history in this region.

The faraway Gepids appear to have been more receptive to Byzantine influences than to direct or indirect cultural impacts from the Merovingian world, and on the testimony of their jewellery, they also had contact with the Crimean Goths and with Scandinavia. After their second occupation of Sirmia in 536, their country was made up of three distinct units bound by loose ties. The Tisza region was receptive to influences from the west and the north, Sirmia was open towards the south and towards Italy, whilst Transylvania — for a while — was receptive to impacts from the east. When these eastern contacts were abruptly severed after the onset of the Slavic migration, Transylvania was soon transformed into a self-supporting province within the Gepid Kingdom.

The fact that several permanent settlements are known from this period reflects economic and political stability. The fifth and sixth century Gepid settlements had no antecedents; traces of Gothic, Roman or prehistoric occupation have only been identified at major economic or strategic sites. The majority of the newly-founded settlements were villages or farmsteads that were established by the incoming Gepid rural population which earned its livelihood with agriculture and stockbreeding.

The most intensively investigated Gepid settlement lies at Malomfalva–Podej, where thirty-four huts with sunken floors, and gabled roofs supported by one, two or three pairs of upright posts have been uncovered. Like the houses of other contemporary Germanic peoples, these huts contained no hearths or ovens. Looms have been identified in some of the huts, whilst others have yielded various tools and implements, lost combs, knives, cheap fibulae, and an abundance of pottery shred characteristic of the period in which these huts were built and occupied. All objects are characteristic products of Gepid iron and bronze metallurgy, or of Gepid bone carving, whilst the pottery testifies to the continuous use of the potter's wheel. Their parallels run into the thousands in the Gepid settlements and cemeteries of the Tisza region. There are no demonstrable "local" influences peculiar to this region and unknown elsewhere in Gepidia. The rural population, engaged in crop raising and cattle breeding, had no notable outside contacts. The Malomfalva settlement was inhabited by the Gepids between 500–567. The houses of the last period were utterly destroyed by the invading Avars. A few years or decades later, the site of the devastated Gepid village was already being used by the new Avar settlers.

Houses, and smaller and larger villages comparable to the Malomfalva settlement have been uncovered at several other sites in Transylvania (Csapó-szentgyörgy, Kutyfalva, Mezőszopor, Vajdaszentivány, Betlenszentmiklós,

Segesvár–Szőlők, and Kézdipolyán–Kőhát). Similar villages have been uncovered outside Transylvania as well: in Bihar, where houses have been found with bone carving workshops; in Csanád and Pécska in the Maros Valley; and in Szentlászlóvára and Ó-Palánk in the Lower Danube region. The sunken Gepid huts in the inner area of what had once been Apulum, that is, within the Gyulafehérvár citadel, have yielded spouted vessels, characteristic specimens of Gepid pottery, which date the period securely. Spouted vessels and other ceramic wares decorated with stamped or smoothed-in patterns have also been uncovered at settlements established on higher elevations, for example at Kisselyk–Várhely and Kisgalambfalva–Galath-tető. These settlements also featured timber-framed houses besides the huts with sunken floors. However, there is no indication that these hilltop settlements were fortified with earthen ramparts — some archaeologists have simply mistaken the prehistoric or medieval rampart for Gepid fortifications. Settlements in all of Gepidia were unfortified.

The extent of Gepid settlement in Transylvania is best reflected by the graves and by finds indicating cemetery sites. As elsewhere in Gepidia, these can be linked to two basic settlement types: to villages, and manors with their farmsteads. By the sixth century, the noblemen's mansions disappeared throughout Transylvania; it is only at Nagyvárad (lying outside of Transylvania proper) that their continuous existence can be noted. Unfortunately, the family graveyard at Nagyvárad had not been excavated by trained archaeologists, and quite a lot of the finds that came to light from about the ten graves in the course of several decades never got as far as the museum collections. The available finds, however, offer convincing proof that — whether these items had belonged to males or females — the graves contained the burials of some of the most distinguished people in the whole of Gepidia. The grave finds included Christian relics as well as genuine Frankish jewellery. Comparably splendid finds from the years after 536 are only known from Sirmia, which is hardly surprising, since around the middle of the century King Kunimund moved the Gepid royal court to the still thriving antique town of Sirmium. The heir apparent, as well as the bishop of the Gepid Arian church, also resided there.

Graves indicative of manors and farmsteads have been identified mostly in the Kis-Szamos and the Maros valleys (Magyarkapus, Nagyiklód, Mezőceked, Marosvásárhely, and Maroscsapó) and in the Kis-Küküllő Valley (Betlenszentmiklós). The burial rite is rather uniform and evidently Christian, with west to east oriented coffin burials. The grave goods, too, show surprising uniformity: Gepid-type fibulae, double-edged combs, arrowheads — often an entire quiverful —, bronze and iron buckles current in that period, pottery with stamped or smoothed-in patterns, and the occasional undecorated pot, all of them, without exception, Gepid wheel-turned wares. The quantity of pottery recovered from a given cemetery varied according to the religious beliefs of the community: some abounded in vessels, others hardly contained any.

Few village cemeteries are known from Transylvania. The cemetery of the Malomfalva settlement was plundered by grave robbers after the settlement had perished. The few grave goods that were not considered worth taking — fibulae, beads, combs, weapons, and so on — are so characteristi-

cally Gepid that were the site of the cemetery unknown, it could be confidently located as being in the neighbourhood of Szentes in Hungary. Village cemeteries have also been uncovered at Beszterce and at Galacfalva.

The largest and most circumspectly excavated Gepid cemetery in Transylvania is the burial ground at Mezőbánd. In contrast to Malomfalva, the deceased were provided with a wide array of vessels which, however, did not contain any pagan food offerings. This unique blend of Christian and pagan burial rites can also be observed elsewhere among the half-pagan, half-Christian Gepids. Like the cemeteries at Marosnagylak and Baráthely III, the Mezőbánd cemetery is one of the few burial grounds that continued to be used even after the Avar conquest, and the few excavated graves at Marosveresmart suggest that this cemetery can also be classed among them.

The grave finds of known provenance and the number of sites with one or two graves come to about forty. The two "most Gepid" pieces of jewellery found in Transylvania, two bird-headed buckles, also originate from such "solitary" burials at Szamosjenő and Maroscsapó–Csürrét. Buckles of this sort had been the personal ornaments or "insignia" of high-ranking, wealthy women throughout sixth-century Gepidia.

Though the relics of the "Merovingian culture" of Transylvania are known from several sites and cemeteries — for this epoch can be considered one of the better-investigated periods of the early medieval history of Transylva-

Fig. 5. The settlement areas of Gepidia in the sixth century are indicated by the distribution of the most characteristic item of Gepid jewellery, the buckle decorated with an eagle's head

nia — their interpretation still poses numerous problems. What is certain is that this civilization is, by and large, identical with that of the Gepid population of the Tisza region and of Sirmia, as well as with the culture of the Pannonian Langobards, and the Bavarians of the Upper Danube region. It is a culture securely dated by the Byzantine gold *oboli* deposited in the burials uncovered in the Tisza region and in Sirmia, as well as by other Byzantine metal objects placed in these graves. The gold coins of Justin I and Justinian I deposited as grave *oboli* are useful for dating the Gepid settlement, even if only a few of them were found in the actual sixth century graves.

The political history of this period was not devoid of upheavals. The ascension of Elemund or of his father has already been alluded to. In the 540s, this dynasty was overthrown by Thorisind. A great many villages (and their cemeteries) perished throughout Gepidia in the chaos following this coup. Signs of earlier unrest can also be noted in Transylvania. The single "internal" coin hoard of Gepidia was buried in the Nagy-Küküllő Valley between Kisselyk and Mikeszásza soon after the close of Justin I's reign. The hoard contained some fifty to eighty or one hundred coins that had been amassed from the 440s, but it did not contain any coins that flowed into Gepidia during the Justinianic boom. Still, the possibility that the hoard had been buried at the time of Thorisind's putsch cannot be ruled out.

In spite of numerous similarities, sixth century Gepid society in Transylvania was but a pale reflection of that in the Great Hungarian Plain and, especially, of that in Sirmia. There are hardly any finds indicative of a nobility, or of a royal or princely retinue, and this, in the light of the diametrically opposite testimony of the fifth century, can hardly be written off as due to some shortcoming of archaeological investigation. The southward movement of the Gepid nobles and military leaders in the sixth century is a historically documented fact. The few who chose to stay behind with their families had belonged to the ranks of the village warriors, and their number does not appear to have been particularly high. The majority of sixth-century Transylvanian Gepids were tolerably well-off or poor freemen, who were reduced to servitude and were burdened with a series of obligations — a state of affairs that roughly corresponds to early feudal conditions. The grave of a smith uncovered at Mezőbánd who was buried together with his tools and his helmet forged of iron plates can probably be ranked among the more highly positioned and wealthier members of his community.

It was in the Gepid period that the chain of villages engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry began to stretch from the middle reaches of the Szamos, through the Maros and Küküllő valleys, down to the Feketeügy River. The size and extent of the cultivated and inhabited area — though it fell short of what it had been in the Visigothic period — was again growing as compared to the absolute nadir of the Hunnish era.

Throughout the years of Gepidia's existence, the Gepids of Transylvania carefully closed and guarded the mountain passes into their land, and were spared the incursions of both the Slavs and the Avars. Thanks to their geographic isolation, the Gepids of Transylvania suffered relatively little in the course of the Avar campaigns against Gepidia in 567. Only twenty-five of the thirty cemeteries that can be confidently dated to the sixth century fell into disuse after 567, and their settlements had probably also been destroyed.

Any objective survey of the remaining four or five cemeteries belonging to various remote little villages that were still in use after 567 immediately reveals that they continued Gepid traditions both in terms of material culture and outlook. There is also the possibility that the Avars had resettled fleeing Bavarians, Alamani and Franks among the surviving Gepids. A few late sixth century and seventh century weapons, belt mounts and reliquaries fashioned in a distinctively western style definitely support this possibility. Similarly resettled population groups were to be found in other parts of the Avar Empire as well, and the policy is in itself expressly "steppean". Consequently, the archaeological theory according to which the few Gepid cemeteries that were still used after the Avar conquest in Transylvania contain elements of an independent civilization or that there existed an archaeological "group" whose population "intermixed with the autochthonous population" ("Bánd culture") lacks convincing proof. According to this theory, the "local Romans" are represented by a few Byzantine buckles and an array of cheap trinkets the likes of which were current all over the empire and which also made their way beyond Byzantium.

What is an undisputable fact is that after the 670s, the Gepids left no traces in the archaeological record of Transylvania.

4. The Avar Period (567–827)

The archaeological legacy of the one-time Avar Empire that extended over eight present-day countries in the Middle Danube region includes over two thousand sites with tens of thousands of burials — some of the completely excavated cemeteries contained several hundred or even over one thousand graves — as well as hundreds of house remains from Avar villages. Supra-national co-operation among archaeologists is admirable even if there is often a lack of consensus on minor details of chronology and ethnic attribution. Co-operation of this sort, however, is sadly lacking in the case of the eastern part of the Avar Empire. Only thirteen graves of the Avar cemetery at Marosgombás in Transylvania — the first burial ground to be excavated by an expert — could be uncovered in the year preceding the outbreak of the First World War (Márton Roska, 1913). (By that time, the number of excavated and published Avar graves was already in the thousands in Hungary.) Roska was never to publish his findings. The same fate befell the excavation conducted at Tövis by Sándor Ferenczi in 1938, on the eve of the Second World War: its only result was about fifty, still unpublished burials. Since then, Avar graves have at most been investigated as an unwanted "by-product" of excavations conducted on sites thought to belong to another period, or in the course of unavoidable rescue excavations on a few other sites.

It is not difficult to account for why archaeological research on this period was neglected and later, was outright discouraged. The twelve sites that have also yielded horse burials — five of which are described as "solitary" horse burials the likes of which are unknown outside modern Transylvania proper — and which are listed as Avar finds in a recent summary are

interpreted as the evidence of a gossamer "mounted nomadic" layer that ruled over the "autochtonous Roman" or, as other scholars would have it Slavic, population. It has been claimed that the archaeological finds in the Transylvanian Basin which can be associated with the Avars (finds which have been labelled as belonging to the "Mureş group" or "Gîmbaş group") must be dated to after the internal upheavals and transformations within the Avar Empire, that is, to after 670. In the same vein, the distribution of the Avar finds is restricted to an area not exceeding roughly forty by fifty kilometres in size. These theories would have small Avar groups or communities living out their lives in some sort of splendid isolation until the fall of the Avar Empire, after which their fate is shrouded in mystery. Accordingly, the period until 670 is filled out by these theories with "surviving" groups of the above-mentioned Bánd-type Gepids and of the "romanized" population. Scarce and sporadic though they be, this interpretation of the Avar finds in Transylvania is not only contrary to the historical evidence, but is also inconsistent with the archaeological evidence that has come to light for that period.

Interestingly enough, Transylvania played a crucial role in the European history of the Avars well before this population of inner and central Asian origin overran the Carpathian Basin. After their conquest of the windy steppes to the north of the Black Sea littoral, the Avars who had by that time concluded an alliance with Justinian I, arrived to the Lower Danube region in 562 where their *kagan*, Baian, "pitched his tents in great numbers over the wide plains".[12] It is from this area that they asked to be admitted into the empire. Though the emperor refused to allow them to enter, he whetted their appetite with the possibility of seizing from the Gepids Pannonia Secunda — a territory which would have made an excellent settlement territory for the Avars. Baian, however, sensed that it would be futile to even attempt to penetrate into the fertile lowland through the narrow passes of the massive southern Carpathians, or along the Iron Gates. The young, energetic *kagan*, therefore, decided on a bold and bizarre course of action. Leaving their camp behind, he and his horsemen skirted the eastern slopes of the Carpathian massif in search of a pass. However, they could find no route through which a people of migratory herdsmen and their cattle could cross the 1,500–2,000 metre high mountains covered with dense forests several hundred kilometres wide on either side. The few passes they might perhaps have tried were heavily guarded by the Gepids. Winding their way along the mountains, they finally reached the eastern fringes of the Merovingian Empire *(Galliae)* where Sigebert I, King of Austrasia, checked their advance. The Avars were forced to turn back in 563. And since the new emperor of Byzantium, Justin II who ascended the throne at the end of 565, made no new promises and also stopped their supply of gold, the Avars made an abortive attempt to cross the Danube (winter of 565–566). It was at this point that Baian decided to try his luck again, and to try to penetrate into the fertile lowland beyond the Carpathians along the already tested, longer route.

12. CORIPPUS, In laudem Iustini III.

This time, his efforts were crowned with success. He defeated the Frankish army and even captured Sigebert himself, who was, however, set free in the hope of his acting as mediator in a desirable alliance. The alliance in question was to be forged with the Pannonian Langobards which, given the particular political constellation, did not appear to be an overly difficult task. For the queen of the Langobards, the wife of King Alboin, was none other than Sigebert's sister. This temporary alliance was as much desired by the Langobards as by the Avars, pursued as they were by the wrath of their Turkic overlords. For in the Langobardic–Gepid war that had broken out in the previous year, Justin II supported Kunimund, the king of the Gepids and this Byzantine–Gepid league posed a threat to the very existence of the Langobards. It was thus that the Avar–Langobardic alliance (in which King Alboin undertook to surrender the lands of the Gepids to the Avars) was concluded by the two panic-stricken parties at the beginning of the year 567.

The Avar cavalry that was escorted by the Langobards into the Carpathian Basin through the Moravian Gates and was then shown the way to the Great Hungarian Plain from the Danube Bend inflicted a devastating defeat on the Gepids. The contemporary Byzantine chroniclers were fully aware of the fact that "the state of the Gepids had been crushed by Baian"[13] — and not by the Langobards, as their chroniclers were later fond of boasting. After the first unsuccessful attack on Sirmium in the autumn of 567, Baian occupied the Gepid territories on the left bank of the Danube. The first Avar warriors penetrated Transylvania from the west, along the Maros, and they finally cleared the way into the Olt Valley through the Vöröstorony Pass for their kindred who, for the past five years, had been patiently waiting on the other side of the mountains. The Avars devastated the country far and wide, and the majority of the Transylvanian Gepids probably perished at this time. This is not as far-fetched a statement as it might first seem: it only appears to be nonsense to modern, twentieth-century man who can only think in terms of countries with millions of inhabitants. The ruling élite of the nations of that age rarely exceeded a few tens of thousands, and their populations rarely exceeded a few hundred thousand souls — which made the countries of that period very fragile indeed. At the close of the seventh century, the Geographer of Ravenna was pretty certain — for he mentions the fact twice — that the territory of one-time "Datia prima et secunda" or the older (magna) "Datia" which was also called "Gepidia ... is now populated by the Uns, also known as Avars".[14]

Transylvania — but not the eastern parts of the Great Hungarian Plain, and the Temes region — practically lost its importance after the Avar conquest in 567–568, especially once the Langobards also ceded Pannonia to their formidable allies in the spring of 568. The pyre finds (burnt horse harness, cheek bits, a pair of stirrups and a spearhead that were thrown onto the funeral pyre and later buried at a shallow depth) of inner Asian type which mark the earliest Avar occupation of the Carpathian Basin have only

13. MENANDER PROTECTOR, *Excerpta* ... 27–28, 195–198, 456–458.
14. *Ravennatis anonymi Cosmographia* ... I, 11.; IV, 14.

been found at the lowland exit of the Maros-Aranka (Németszentpéter), and in the Kis-Küküllő Valley (Dicsőszentmárton). These stirrups can be classed among the oldest in Europe, similarly to their counterparts from Hungary. A number of early Avar guardposts can be assumed on the Transylvanian side of the passes, especially in southern Transylvania, a fact suggested by a gold coin find of Khosrau I (531–579), the Persian king, which had obviously made its way to Brassó together with the Avars, as well as by the gold coins of Justin II (565–572) and of Mauritius Tiberius (582–602) found in the Sebes and Olt valleys. These Byzantine coins had in part been used as grave oboli by the Avars; the majority of these coins probably originates from looted graves whose find circumstances have not been adequately recorded. One proof for this is a solidus of Justin II found in a plundered burial of the small Avar cemetery at Ispánlaka which is still unpublished, as are the other Avar graves that were uncovered there in 1970, and which contained also horse burials with gold or gilded grave goods. That an Avar centre had existed somewhere near the confluence of the Aranyos, Maros and Küküllő rivers already before 600 is suggested by a splendid pair of gold earrings with a large gold bead pendant in a burial that was found at Torda; only fifteen similar pairs of comparable size and workmanship can be quoted from the entire Carpathian Basin.

The Avar commoners who occupied the windy plains and gently rolling hills of the Carpathian Basin could hardly have found the smallish Transylvanian Basin hemmed in by mountains of dark woodland attractive. After the close of the first great wars against Byzantium (601–602), when the Avars finally realized that they had no choice but to make the Carpathian Basin their permanent home, traces of a new Avar centre in Transylvania have also been identified. The Szentendre and Deszk type gold earrings with pyramidal pendants "from Transylvania" — the exact findspot is not known — suggest the appearance of nobles around and after 600. One centre can be located to Gyulafehérvár, where silver harness ornaments and a contemporaneous Byzantine buckle have come to light. Equally important are the press moulds from the Küküllő valleys (Erzsébetváros and Korond) that had belonged to Avar goldsmiths and which definitely prove that ornate belt and harness mounts testifying to the rank of their owner were manufactured locally in Transylvania. Equestrian Avar groups who had buried their dead together with their horses settled in Nagyenyed and in the former Gepid village of Mezőbánd where the Avar community interred its dead at the edge of the Gepid cemetery. Their burial rites and their costumes match those of the Pannonian Avars and the Avars of the Great Hungarian Plain down to the smallest detail. Aside from the above-mentioned sites, pre-630 Avar settlements are indicated by finds of Avar-type handmade pottery (Malomfalva, Marosnagylak, and Csapószentgyörgy). However, not even the faintest traces of an early Avar habitation have been detected in the Szamos Valley. Obviously, this does not apply to the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, the Ér Valley, the Maros–Aranka triangle and the Temes region, areas that had been integrated into the Avar settlement territory at an early date and which yielded some highly informative assemblages. Example of these are the horse burials and the grave group from Érmihályfalva; the burial of a goldsmith together with his horse from Fönlak;

the warrior and horse burial from Németszentpéter into which were placed a helmet, a coat of mail, and a sword as well as a gold coin of Heraclius minted before 625; and in the south, the burials of women wearing silver earrings with large globular pendants from Oravicabánya and the early Avar burials from Orsova.

The defeat suffered at the siege of Constantinople in 626, and the ill-fated Italian expedition in 628 led to a prolonged crisis in the Avar Empire beginning with 630. In the west and the southwest, a number of Slavic tribes shook off the Avar rule and gained their independence by fighting, whilst in the east their former Bulgarian ally turned against them and founded a new steppean empire. The internal strifes did not spare Transylvania either, and the events of between 630–638 can be traced in the archaeological record. The Mezőbánd cemetery fell into disuse and almost all graves — including the Avar burials — were plundered. The only large hoard of gold coins from the Avar period (Korond–Firtosvár) which contained at least 237 solidi, the last of which was minted in 625 in Byzantium and which gives the approximate date of the catastrophe, was hidden during these troubled times. Finally, there are those burials which came to light only in Transylvania within the Avar Empire, graves which yielded lance and spear-heads with pierced blade of a form traceable to the Pontic steppeland, and graves of eastern Slavic women easily identified by their Slavic costume who had been the wives or relatives of the warriors alluded to above. Eastern Avar and other, allied Turkic elements had probably fled beyond the mountains to Avaria when the new Bulgarian Kaganate was organized in 635 (Marosgombás and Tövis).

Only a handful of seventh-century Avar settlements are known from Transylvania (Szászsebes, Malomfalva–Borsóföld, Radnót–Csapószent-györgy and Lapos, Segesvár–Szőlők, and Bözöd). The huts with sunken floors and their stone ovens hardly differ from the houses in the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain (Bihar), or the large Avar settlements elsewhere in Hungary, nor are there substantial differences between the wheel-thrown and handmade pottery found in the fill of various settlements.

During the reign of Constantine IV, a little before the arrival to the Danube region of the Bulgarians, who had been pressed westwards by the emergence and expansion of the Kazar Empire, the territory of the Avar Empire was flooded by eastern population groups. Among the new arrivals were Onogur–Bulgarians (Wangars), but mostly they were various Turkic groups — including some Kazars — with whom the Avars shared a common ancestry, and who had been uprooted from their former abodes. In the north and the northwest the boundaries of the Avar settlement territory, as well as the political boundaries, shifted to beyond their former line. In the heartland of the empire, a number of settlements fell into disuse, and new ones, along with new cemeteries, were founded by the incoming population. From these it is evident that the new burial rite, the horse harnesses, the weapons and the styles of dress had no links whatsoever to the types current in the early Avar period. This new period is marked by grave finds dated with gold coins of Constans II and Constantine IV in the Temes region. No similar coins, however, have been reported from Transylvania.

Still, the newcomers to the Avar Empire did, eventually, make their way to Transylvania, brandishing their novel weapon, the sabre, and wearing a new type of stirrup for their flat-soled boots; the horses had distinctive bits and *phalerae*, and pendant-ornamented harnesses (Oláhgorbó, Székelykeresztúr, Felenyed, Marosnagylak, and Csákó, where houses featuring a stone oven have also been uncovered). The cemetery at Tövis was used by the newcomers and they also started a new cemetery at Aranyosgyéres. On the testimony of a gold finger-ring, one of their leaders, a prince, established his residence and was buried at Gyulafehérvár. All in all, not much is known about this transitional period of about a quarter century. There are only indirect references to it in the Byzantine and Frankish sources or none at all. It is only recently that its real significance has been recognized. In fact, the archaeological evidence of this period reflects the emergence of a new artistic style: a skilful blend of the traditions of earlier and later population groups, a style that has aptly been termed "griffin-tendril" style after the motifs most frequently occurring on the cast bronze buckles and belt ornaments. It was at this time that permanent villages were established; under internal and external pressures, the peoples of the Avar Empire had turned to crop raising and animal husbandry, with semi-migratory pastoralism being the exception, rather than the rule. The majority of the known large Avar period cemeteries (about seventy to eighty per cent) contained the dead of four to five generations: village cemeteries with over one thousand burials are by no means exceptional. This clearly reflects a change to a more stable way of life from the close of the seventh century onwards.

The presence of similar late seventh-century and eighth-century cemeteries in Transylvania is proven by horse burials described as "solitary graves" (Hari, Muzsnaháza, and Magyarlapád), as well as by griffin-tendril ornamented belt mounts, carved bone needle cases, and other contemporaneous ornaments such as earrings with star-shaped or lunular pendants (Tövis, Aranyosgyéres, Lesnyek, and Szentgyörgyválya). Equally scanty is the evidence from the eastern Temes region (Temesvár–Módosi Bridge), from the eastern fringes of the Körös–Maros interfluve (Székudvar) and from the Ér Valley. A settlement with huts featuring sunken floors and stone ovens, as well as timber-framed above-ground houses has been uncovered at Gyulafehérvár–Stadion. The occupants of this settlement were mostly engaged in cattle raising; their vessels were partly handmade and partly wheel-turned, and bronze earrings with star-shaped or lunular pendants were also found. Late Avar huts with sunken floor and containing a stone oven have also been reported from Bihar. Unfortunately, only the mere existence of these settlements and cemeteries is known, but even these slender facts verify an important point, namely that in the eighth century — but only then! — the Avars withdrew to the Maros Valley and to the surrounding fertile lowland. In other words, at a time when the Avar settlement territory was expanding throughout the Avar Empire, it drew back in Transylvania, and, judging by the numerous horse and weapon burials, became increasingly military in nature. The reason underlying this withdrawal is to be sought in the westward expansion of the Slavs. Even so, the dominant element in Transylvania remained Avar. This is confirmed by the Slavic cemetery with urn burials unearthed at Baráthely II, where Avar horse

Map 6. The population of Transylvania and the Eastern Great Plain between 567 and 895

1. Early Avar relics, 567–675; 2. Byzantine gold coins in the early Avar period from Justin II to Constantine III, 565–641; 3. Gepid remains from the Avar period, 567–630/675; 4. Late Avar cemeteries and settlements, 675–826; 5. Slav settlements; 6. Slav urn graves and cemeteries for cremated remains; 7. Cemeteries of the Slavic population belonging to the Szilágynagyfalu type; 8. The same, with late Avar belt ornaments; 9. Settlements of the Slavic population belonging to the Szilágynagyfalu type; 10. Archaeological indications of Bulgarian occupiers, from 826; 11. Avar settlement area; 12. Slav settlement area; 13. Enclosed Bulgarian settlement area

burial and inhumation burials containing Avars laid to rest in an Avar costume and according to Avar rites have also come to light. This cemetery and a few other comparable sites (including settlements) proved the earliest clues to why the Küküllő River is known by two names. The theory — which remains controversial — is that Turkic *kükäläγ* (Hungarian *kökényes*, "blackthorn thicket") was transmitted into Hungarian and then into Saxon-German *(Kokel)* from Avar, through Bulgarian. It was probably simultaneously that Slavic *trnava* (also meaning "blackthorn thicket") made its appearance, and was transmitted from Slavic into Romanian by the earliest Romanian settlers (Tîrnava).

As far as can be judged from the few eighth-century Avar finds, neither the rites nor the material culture of the Avars had any specifically "Transylvanian" elements: the cast belt mounts, *phalerae*, the jewellery, the weapons, and the horse harnesses could equally well have been found at any of the sites within the Avar Empire. In other words, the Transylvanian Avars kept pace with the overall internal development of Avar culture. Unfortunately, many details of this development are still unclear owing to the paucity of finds and accurate observations.

5. The Slavs up to the Hungarian Conquest (600–895)

The intensive Slavic migration that was to produce permanent changes in the ethnic and linguistic map of eastern Europe began in the sixth century. The earliest traces of the Slavic tribes' advance north of the Carpathians, to the region of the river Elbe to the Bohemian Basin, and even as far as the Maine-Weser riverhead are in the form of archaeological finds; no written sources deal with these events. Their presence and incursions in the Lower Danube region, however, are reported in the Byzantine sources from the reign of Justin I onwards. Slavic raids became increasingly frequent under Justinian I, and a number of Slavic groups gained a foothold on the area south of the Danube. For the time being, the Carpathian Basin, surrounded as it was by the Carpathian massif densely forested on both slopes, was spared a Slavic invasion; as long as Gepidia existed, the few passes leading into Transylvania remained heavily guarded. There is no evidence in the Gepid settlements and cemeteries of contact with the Slavic world before 568, nor can one discover Gepid influences on the Slavic finds outside the Carpathians in the period before 568.

The collapse of Gepidia opened up new possibilities to the Slavs. The overlordship of the Avars extended to the distant eastern steppeland; it was not until 635 that the Carpathians came to mark a frontier. Nevertheless, there are no signs of Slavic settlement in Transylvania until around 600, for even after 582, the main target of the Slavic incursions — which often had Avar support — was the Balkan Peninsula to the south of the Danube. The Slavs themselves had left behind vast regions of forest, and the dense Transylvanian woodland could hardly have held much attraction

for them. The situation changed drastically when the Byzantine troops at last managed to drive the Avars from the areas south of the Danube, and again closed the river frontier (601–602). From this point on, the slow Slavic migration temporarily came to a standstill, and those groups which had not yet secured a foothold had to look for a new home.

The Slavs are first documented in the archaeological record just outside Transylvania when they reached the outer foothills of the Carpathians at the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries. Their small villages of thatch-roofed huts with sunken floors form a sweeping arc (Kodyn–Suceava–Botoșana–Bucharest) from Bukovina to the valley of the Dîmbovița River, which is still known by its Old Slavic name. These lowly huts with stone ovens yielded the same sort of poor quality finds as have been uncovered in their former homeland between the Dniester and the Dnieper: simple hand-made pots and round clay baking platters identified as being of the early Slavic Prague–Penkovka and Prague–Korčak culture. The pagan Slavs cremated their dead and placed their ashes in urns or in small pits. The largest urn cemetery of the early Slavic world (which still awaits publication) has come to light at Monteoru, at the southeastern projection of the Carpathians, and indicates a mass settlement of Slavs in this region. The appearance and presence of the Slavs is clearly proven by their cremation burials, a funerary rite that had been abandoned by other contemporary populations much earlier.

The earliest archaeologically attested traces of Slavic settlement in Transylvania make their appearance early in the second half of the seventh century in the Gepid villages and Avar cemeteries of the Avar period. These relics include distinctive masked fibulae cast from so-called "white metal" (Maros-gombás, Vecel, and Székelyhíd), "Romano-Byzantine" iron and bronze fibulae from the outer Carpathians (Baráthely and Malomfalva), Byzantine lock-rings and stylish pendants in the shape of stars and grape clusters braided into the hair, and inspired by Byzantine types (Marosgombás, Marosnagylak, and Marosveresmart). However, these finds prove nothing more than that the Gepids and Avars took Slavic wives. At the same time, the above-described fibulae were also scattered beyond the Avar–Gepid settlement territory, and have also been found on purely Slavic sites (Fiatfalva, Kézdi-polyán and Várhely), which suggests that the Slavs whose daughters had married Gepids or Avars had, by that time, arrived in the Carpathian Basin. One Slavic bride even took her clay baking platter to Mezőbánd.

The Slavs who penetrated Transylvania through the eastern passes (Békás, Tölgyes and Ojtoz) settled the valleys and basins, and repopulated the eastern and southeastern Transylvanian fringes that had been empty and desolate for centuries. Many of the names given by the incoming Slavic population to the rivers and the new settlements have survived to the present day (Černavoda, Kvasena, Bystra/Bystrica and Lekenica are examples of such river names; of the settlement names, Černaton and Pol'an are still in use). That the Carpathian–Lower Danubian region had, by the seventh century, become the land of the Slavs is even recorded by a faraway Armenian geographer, Pseudo-Movses Khorenatzi: "On the arctic (i.e. the northern) bank

of the Danube lies the country of Dacia, which is inhabited by the Slavs, twenty-five clans."[15]

Although the majority of the finds unearthed during the quarter century after 1950 has only been published in part, these still constitute an impressive and practically unmatched material. The earliest Slavic villages dating to the beginning of the seventh century have been identified in the Háromszék Basin (Kézdipolyán–Kőhát, Felsőcsernáton–Róbert-tag, and Sepsiszentgyörgy-Bedeháza). From here, the Slavs soon moved into the Barcaság (Brassó–Magura) and the Olt Valley in the Fogaras region (Alsókomána). By the middle of the seventh century, the string of Slavic settlements extended — via the Gyergyó and the Hargita mountains — to the upper Kükükllő region, from where a chain of villages has been reported (Bözöd, showing Avar influences, Székelyszállás, Fiatfalva, and Székelykeresztúr). The occupants of these settlements consisting of a considerable number of huts with sunken floors (often twenty to thirty) used the Prague-type handmade pots characterizing the earliest Slavic settlements. A mould carved from stone brought to light from a hut at Székelykeresztúr–Fenyőalja is comparable to the moulds from Slavic settlements beyond the Carpathians, and suggests the arrival of new settlers. Whether these new groups arrived through the Vöröstorony Pass and migrated upwards, or whether they wound their way downwards along the Olt Valley is unknown, but it is a fact that from the middle of the seventh century, their settlements can be found at Kiscsűr near Nagyszeben (whose name can be traced to Slavic *Cibin*), and at Vízakna. New settlements make their appearance in the early Slavic settlement territory of Transylvania during the eighth century (Földvár), and the renewal of some earlier villages can also be noted (Kézdipolyán, Siménfalva-Cserealja, and Szászhermány). The Slavic expansion continued toward the centre of the basin (Segesvár–Szőlők, Székelykeresztúr–Melegpatak, Nagymedesér–Borsóföld, Ocfalva, Székelyszenterzsébet–Szénásvölgy) and also extended to the Upper Tisza region, and the Szamos and Lápos valleys.

Archaeological research was at first baffled by the relative poverty of early Slavic material culture. These early Slavs had lived in unpretentious, simple gabled-roofed huts with sunken floors rarely supported by any kind of post, which were small, smoke-filled, extremely dark and rather uncomfortable. They do not appear to have even used hand-driven potter's wheels. Their graves are, if possible, even poorer than their settlements. The most reasonable explanation for this apparent poverty is that — in spite of their seemingly central geographical position — the Transylvanian Slavs lived in isolation, on the fringes of the Slavic world, cut off from those neighbouring civilizations — Byzantium, Italy and the Merovingian Empire — in whose proximity or on whose territory their brethren showed a faster pace of development. It is conspicuous that not even the faintest echoes of Gepid craftsmanship can be felt in the Transylvanian Slavs' material culture. Their knowledge of agriculture and animal husbandry, however, was in no way inferior to that of their kinsmen, and their smiths appear to have been better masters of their craft than, for example, their potters (as shown by a ploughshare

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15. *Géographie de Moïse de Corena d'après Ptolémée.* Ed. P. ARSENE SUKRY, Venise 1881. "Europa" X, 16.

and a turnable millstone from Siménfalva, and a ploughshare or counter from Sepsiszentgyörgy). The efficiency of their crop raising techniques is evidenced by the fact that some of their villages were occupied for centuries, a number of them growing to a size of thirty or forty huts.

The Slavic settlers of Transylvania cremated their dead, as had their ancestors before them. The earliest urn graves have, quite fortuitously, been uncovered on the northern fringes and in the northern parts of Transylvania (Piskolt, Nádasdaróc, Beszterce, and Doboka), whereas the cemeteries of the early Slavic settlements in southeastern Transylvania remain unknown for the time being for lack of archaeological research in that area. Slavic urn burials and cemeteries make their appearance in the Küküllő Valley from the middle of the seventh century (Oláhtordos, Nagyekemező, and Magyarpéterfalva) and soon extend into the Olt and Sebes valleys, too (Vízakna, Nagyszeben-Szenterzsébet, and Mihályfalva); the first burials at the latter site can be dated to after 670 on the testimony of an Avar–Byzantine bronze buckle.

Only a few traces of Avar–Slavic coexistence have been found, the most important among these being the urn cemetery uncovered at Baráthely II. One sure sign of peaceful coexistence on this site is the occurrence of eighth-century Avar jewellery (the likes of which have been brought to light from Avar inhumation burials) in Slavic urns, as well as the presence of wheel-turned pottery. However, most of the cemeteries are even poorer in finds than the settlements: the majority of the urns contain only a few iron knives, an iron strike-a-light, or some beads. The archaic Slavic custom of sacrificing the deceased's widow appears to have been preserved and practised in a few communities (e.g. Vízakna).

The Slavic urn cemetery at Medgyes–Galgenberg which, from the 1960s, had turned the attention of archaeologists to the Slavic presence in Transylvania had been only established in the ninth century. Under the influence of settlers from Bulgaria, some permanent, if modest, changes seem to have taken place in the material culture of the Slavic settlements that survived into the ninth century (Kézdipolyán–Kőhát, Székelykeresztúr–Melegpatak, Fenyőalja, Siménfalva–Cserealja, and Sztrigyszentgyörgy). Changes of this sort are the use of the heavy, hand-driven potter's wheel in pottery manufacture, the appearance of potters' marks on the base of various vessels, as well as the use of ornamental motifs in pottery decoration. This type of decoration followed directly from the technique of using the potter's wheel, and is reminiscent of the ceramic wares produced by the Danubian Bulgarians.

Parallel to these developments, the emergence of certain patterns, such as regular grave rows, can be noted in the cemeteries at Medgyes and other ninth and tenth century burial grounds (Mihályfalva, Oláhfalva, Baráthely II, the urn burials of Csongva, as well as the large, but still unpublished urn cemeteries excavated at Berve and Gyulafehérvár). More than likely, this is a reflection of the Bulgarian military control in these areas. The Slavs who settled around the Bulgarian centres of power were reduced to servitude: it was they who cleared the forests and worked in the salt mines, and their heavy burden of services was ruthlessly exacted.

100

The People of the Szilágynagyfalu Kurgans

The first reliable traces of Slavic presence in the Carpathian Basin were uncovered between 1878-1880.[16] These excavations were conducted at Szilágynagyfalu, where six of the forty-three *tumuli* were investigated. The excavation of a further three burial mounds at the same site in 1958 has contributed greatly to a better understanding of the observations made in the last century. In 1957-58, six *tumuli* of a similar group of burial mounds were investigated at Szamosfalva, which is now part of Kolozsvár, close to where another mound had been excavated at the beginning of the twentieth century (Apahida). All these excavations furnished proof of the presence in northwestern Transylvania of an independent and distinct Slavic population group.

These large, often three to six metre high *tumuli* had been erected over quadrangular or rectangular funerary buildings constructed of wooden beams; a few smaller mounds contained similarly constructed burial chambers of the size of a large coffin. Only in the case of one mound is there no mention of any kind of wooden structure in the excavation report. These *tumuli*, or *kurgans*, apparently served as communal burial grounds, with the number of deposited vessels in each ranging from three to twenty-two. Some of these vessels served as burial urns, while others, together with the wooden buckets bound with iron bands, were storage jars. The ashes of the deceased were in some cases strewn over a clay plastered surface or over a woven mat, but all burials were provided with food, generally pig meat — a foodstuff alien to the Avar diet.

Well-datable Avar silver and bronze belt mounts were unearthed in some of the mounds both at Szilágynagyfalu and at Szamosfalva. These finds, and the horse burials uncovered at the eponymous site, suggest that the people of these *kurgans* had arrived at a time when the Avar Empire still existed. On the testimony of the Avar ornamental belts, this population can, with some confidence, be identified as the Avars' free Slavic allies who had settled in areas that had been desolate and empty since the decline of Gepidia, and even before that. The jewellery is similar to that found in other, less conscientiously excavated graves (e.g. Mojgrád); the vessels decorated with bundles of wavy lines are closely matched by finds from various settlements (e.g. Nagyiklód, Csomafája, Szilágynagyfalu, Kisnyíres, Bihar, Érszakácsi, Lázári; one of the huts with sunken floors of the latter site also yielded an iron ploughshare). These finds from the Transylvanian Szilágy region are closely allied to assemblages from the settlements (Karcs, Karos and Anarcs) and burial mounds (Királyhelmec and Tarpa) of the Bodrog and the Upper Tisza region.

The origins and the original homeland of this population group requires further study. The custom of erecting a mound over the ashes of the deceased, the distinctive pottery wares and some of the jewellery types point to an origin beyond the Carpathians. In any case, it is clear that this heritage can be linked to an incoming "eastern" Slavic population, where "eastern"

16. By F. Rómer, K. Tompa and J. Hampel professors of the Budapest university and F. Pulszky director-general of the Hungarian National Museum.

merely indicates their tribal and political origins, for the Slavic language was still uniform in the eighth century.

From the middle of the ninth century, the population groups occupying the Kis-Szamos Valley moved to the northwestern side of the Meszes Mountains to escape the hostile Bulgarians who had arrived in the Maros Valley. They maintained but loose contact with the Maros Valley once it came under Bulgarian control, and some of the finds from Szilágynagyfalu itself suggest that Slavic groups fleeing from the Bulgarian advance had also settled in the neighbouring villages. The archaeological evidence indicates that the Szilágynagyfalu type Slavic population in the Szamos–Kraszna valleys lived to see the Hungarian Conquest, and survived well into the Conquest period, though their settlement territory became restricted to the hills and forest clearings. Their memory is preserved by a number of Slavic river names and place-names that were transmitted into Hungarian and, later, into Romanian. It would appear that this Slavic population, which inhabited the areas that would later become Szatmár and Kraszna counties, was gradually absorbed by the conquering Hungarian tribes and had no significant influence on the settlement patterns of the Hungarians in Transylvania: the early Hungarian settlement territory lay to the south of the Szilágynagyfalu Slavic population. Nor are there any indications that these Slavic communities had evolved a form of political organization that went beyond the tribal society, or that they had built forts.

6. Southern Transylvania under Bulgar Rule (827-895)

The internal strifes that erupted throughout Avaria in the aftermath of Charlemagne's campaign in 791 probably decimated the Avars of Transylvania, too. The civil wars of 795 saw the death of the *kagan*, the overlord of the Avar heartland, as well as of the *jugurrus (juγrus)*, the commander of northern and eastern Avaria. Since the Franks did not venture beyond the Tisza in their campaigns, eastern Avaria would have stood a chance of survival had not an even more dangerous enemy arisen in the person of Krum, the khan of all the Bulgarians, in 802–803. And while most western historians, ever under the spell of the Carolingian Empire, refuse to recognize that the Avar Empire had, in fact, been crushed by the Bulgarian army, most Hungarian and Bulgarian scholars are inclined to believe that eastern Avaria was incorporated into the Bulgarian Empire already in 804. This latter theory is contradicted by the fact that the Carolingian annals mention that between 818 and 824, some Slavic groups — the Timočani who had inhabited the Timok Valley, and the renegade *(predannici)* Abodriti — fled to "Dacia" north of the Danube to escape the wrath of their former Bulgarian overlords.[17] Since the Franks readily supported these Slavic groups and showed no inclination whatsoever to waive their patronage, in 827 the Bulgarians

17. *Annales regni Francorum,* ad A. 818; ibid. ad A. 819; ibid. ad A. 824.

mounted a general attack against the outposts of the Frankish Empire in the Drava–Sava interfluve. In the course of successive campaigns, they drove out the Franks and occupied the territory of the present-day Sirmia and eastern Slavonia. An inscription of Khan Omurtag (814–831) mentions a Bulgarian *tarkhan* who had drowned in the waters of the Tisza. This event and the Bulgarian name of an earth-and-timber fortress at Csongrád/Černi-grad in the Middle Tisza region suggests that the Bulgarians had indeed occupied some territories prior to the peace treaty of 832. A contemporary mid-ninth century source — the Bavarian Geographer — lists the eastern Abodriti *(Osterabtrezi)* of Dacia among the subject peoples of the Bulgarian Empire,[18] whilst the entries for the years 863 and 883 in contemporary western annals explicitly state that the armies of Bulgaria, in alliance with the Eastern Frankish Empire, had attacked Moravia, which lay on the western bank of the Garam River. In a description by the Persian Djaihani from around 870, the Bulgarians *(w.n.n.d.r)* and the Moravians *(m.r.da)* lived a ten day journey apart.[19] Transylvania is only mentioned in the final years of the Bulgarian occupations in contemporary records: in 892, an embassy sent by Arnulf, the king of the eastern Franks, requested that Laodimir (Vladimir), the Bulgarian khan, "should forbid the sale of salt to the Moravians".[20] This is the only indication that the Bulgarians had seized some of the salt mines in southern Transylvania (at Vízakna, Marosújvár, and Kisakna), and that they traded salt to other lands. Though the Hungarian chroniclers make no mention of the Bulgarian occupation of Transylvania and have preserved the memory of Bulgarian overlordship only in the Tisza region, the fact that salt was mined and traded leaves no doubt that a considerable part of the Maros Valley had indeed come under Bulgarian control.[21]

The Bulgarian occupation of Transylvania is amply documented in the archaeological evidence. The inhumation burials brought to light on the left bank of the Maros near Alsótatárlaka, opposite Maroskarna, contained a series of vessels whose form, material and decoration was unlike any other earlier or contemporaneous Transylvanian pottery, but which is practically indistinguishable from the Bulgarian pottery of the time. Inhumation burials with "Maroskarna-type" vessels, beads, knives and pagan food offerings have been uncovered in Gyulafehérvár and its environs (Kudzsir, Partos, Oláhgorbó, Szászsebes, and Sebesány). A pair of earrings was found in one of the Oláhgorbó burials. Inhumation burials have also been found near Marosújvár and Kisakna; some contained Maroskarna-type pottery (Magyar-szentbenedek), some a series of female jewellery resembling the earrings from Oláhgorbó, which are of a type that has no known antecedents in Transylvania (found at Csombord). Bulgarian archaeologists soon proved that the only parallels to the jewellery from Csombord and Oláhgorbó are the similar ornaments from ninth and tenth century cemeteries in Bulgaria. In other words, they can be considered the evidence of Bulgarian settlers.

18. Geographus Bavarus, *Descriptio pagorum Slavonum* 2.
19. Djaihani = Gardizi. = Gombos, *Catalogus* ... III. 1006.
20. *Annales Fuldenses*, ad A. 892.
21. Meditations based on later place-names, for instance, Slankamen, dating from the 11–12th century, as regards never existing salt mines are untenable hypotheses.

Since at the time of these finds similar earrings and pendants had been published only in reports of excavations of Moravian cemeteries, the Hungarian archaeologists of Transylvania who had excavated and published the Csombord cemetery were convinced that they had stumbled on a historical curiosity: the graves of Moravian settlers in Transylvania engaged in salt mining and salt trading. As far as Csombord was concerned, this view was accepted by Romanian and Saxon scholars, too, who had been misled by a pair of simple iron spurs from Alsótatárlaka which they considered a sure indication of Moravian presence in the ninth century. Whereas the fact is that Carolingian spurs, and their imitations, were rather widespread in the eastern border zone of the Carolingian Eastern Frankish Empire during the eighth to tenth centuries — an impressive number of similar spurs has been found in Dalmatia for example — and they were also current in the Danubian Bulgarian Empire, as well as among the tenth-century Hungarians.

Recent excavations of the Roman Apulum in Gyulafehérvár have brought to light the remains of a ninth-century settlement (overlying partly the third-century Roman destruction layer and partly the sixth-century Gepid settlement) which featured a number of huts with sunken floors containing pottery shreds with smoothed-in decoration resembling the Marosakna vessels. The cemetery of the settlement was identified to the west of the one-time Roman *castrum* in Zalatna street; it contained inhumation burials with Maroskarna-type vessels, as well as a few Slavic–Bulgarian urn graves, characteristic amphora-shaped flasks and pots bearing potter's marks. The explanation for their presence is obvious. There is reliable evidence that antique Singidunum had been called "White castle" *(Belegrad)* by the Bulgarians already in the ninth century after its white coloured Romano-Byzantine stone-walls. This name was also applicable to Apulum. The Bulgarian name of Belegrad was, in the tenth century, translated into Hungarian by the Hungarian settlers, and since it became the residence of the second most important leader, the *gyula,* the Hungarians called it Gyulafehérvár, "the white castle of the *gyula*". This name has survived to the present day in spite of the fact that in 1003, King Stephen broke the power of the mighty *gyulas*. The Saxon settlers of the twelfth century translated the Hungarian name into German (Weyssenpurg), whilst the name used by the Transylvanian Slavs (Bellegrad) was transmitted into the Romanian (Bǎlgrad).[22]

The cemeteries of the Maroskarna–Csombord population differ significantly from the contemporaneous Slavic urn graves, from the Avar inhumation burials of the preceding epoch, as well as from the tenth-century Hungarian graves. They are unique even in comparison to other Bulgarian cemeteries, for the latter were biritual by the ninth and tenth centuries, and reflected a mixture of Bulgarian–Turkic (Proto-Bulgarian) inhumation burials — in which the dead were laid to rest with their costume, rich food offerings and, often, their horse — and of the cremation graves of the Slavic

22. Recent Romanian historiography rejects the fact of Bulgarian rule in Transylvania, nor does it acknowledge it even in Wallachia. Romanian archaeology calls these Bulgarian finds remnants of the "Dridu culture", a name reminding us of a Neolithic culture.

population. The small cemeteries unearthed at Maroskarna, Csombord and other Transylvanian sites resemble the Proto-Bulgarian burial grounds of Bulgaria. Considering the empire-building policy pursued by the Bulgarian khans, it is not in the least surprising that they should have sent Bulgar-Turkic warriors, rather than Bulgar-Slavs, to rule over the alien Slavic population of Transylvania.

These small ruling strata of warriors lived a rather secluded life in Transylvania. The surrounding, subjugated Slavic population had little influ-

105   *Fig. 6.* Danubian Bulgar silver earrings from the Csombord-cemetery

ence on their material culture, their settlements and their cemeteries. The yellow flask of Lower Danubian type found at Marosnagylak, the northernmost Bulgarian settlement, suggests that they probably received their supplies from the mother country, to where the bulk of the mined salt was transported.

The main road to Transylvania from Bulgaria protected on both banks of the Danube by brick and stone forts led through the Olt Valley along the old Roman military road. A few Roman forts were restored in order to ensure its safety, and the Bulgarians' secure hold over southern Transylvania was ensured by the fort of Apulum–Belegrad. Another road that passed through the Bodza Pass from Constantia on the Danube was similarly protected by earth-and-timber fortresses which were later rebuilt in brick (Bucharest, Ploești–Bucov and Slon–Prahova). Yet a third road wound its way from the Danube Bend in the Dobrudja to the brick fortress at Focșani, and from there (through the Ojtoz Pass) to the Transylvanian Slavs, who had settled in the Olt Valley and in the Cernavoda region, as confirmed by a Bulgar–Turkic vessel of Maroskarna-type found at Kézdipolyán.

Bulgarian finds have also been found along the Danube at Orsova, in the Temes region, and up as far as Szentes along the Tisza, which makes Csongrád the northernmost outpost of Bulgarian occupation.

The small group of Bulgarian conquerors and the single Bulgarian fortification in Transylvania at Belegrad on the right (northern) bank of the Maros proved unable to withstand the onslaught of the Hungarians in 895. Their houses and settlements were set aflame, and Transylvanian Hungarian tradition had not even preserved the memory of their rule. The people known to us from the Csombord cemetery apparently surrendered, and continued to live on in the area for some time into the tenth century.

TRANSYLVANIA IN THE MEDIAEVAL HUNGARIAN KINGDOM

I. The Hungarian–Slav Period (895–1172)

The Magyars or Hungarians belonging to the Ugric branch of the Finno-Ugric family of languages first appeared in the written sources of European history in connection with a remarkable event. The kagan of the mighty Khazar Empire sent his envoy to the Byzantine emperor Theophilus asking him to build a fortification on the left bank of the Don River, the far side of which then marked the border with "Turkia". Indeed, in 833–834, Petronas Spatarios and his task force built Sharkel (white fortress), thus successfully sealing the Khazar–Hungarian border. The reason for building Sharkel anew from baked bricks was that sometime in the course of the decade following 813, the earlier, original "White Fortress" on the site of today's Tzimlianskoe gorodishche, built of white stone not far away on the right side of the Don, had been sacked and destroyed by the Hungarians and some accompanying Khazar insurgents, the Kabars.

While the Hungarian tribes living in the Don area still accepted the nominal suzerainty of the Khazars at the time of Prince Levedi, other Hungarian tribes and their Turkic allies appeared in the Lower Danube region, "sixty days' march" from Sharkel. Byzantine sources of around 838 refer to them as *Turkoi, Hunnoi,* and even *Ungroi.* The latter name comes from the application of the folk name *Onogur* to the Hungarians. This word was originally used to describe the Turkic Bulgar peoples and is still preserved in the European languages of today (Ungar, Hongrois, Hungarian, Venger, etc.). It was from the territory denoted by the compound Turkic–Old Hungarian word of "Etelköz" (*Atelküzü* = between rivers; Constantine Porphyrogennetus gives its precise location as the area enclosed by the Seret, Prut, Dniester, Bug and Dnieper rivers,[1] that the "enemy called Ungri"[2] crossed the Carpathians in 862 to launch the first of their attacks on Carolingian Pannonia. It was in this manner that the Hungarians first visited their future homeland. According to Arabic-Persian sources from around 870, the Hungarians *(m.dž.gh.r)*, with their "plentiful plough-lands" and an army of 20,000 horsemen, were then ruled by a prince and a deputy military commander

1. *DAI* 38 = *FBHH* 45.
2. Annales Bertiniani ad A. 862. GOMBOS, *Catalogus* ... I, 111.

(*k.nde* = *kende/kündü*; and *dž.la* = *gyula*). Since during the campaign against Venia (Vienna) in 881 the "rebellious" (= *Kabar*) troop of Khazars that had defected to the Hungarians still operated as a separate unit (Ungari and Cowari), their strength was probably not included in the 20,000 horsemen mentioned above.

The term "Hungarian Conquest" designated the series of events in the course of which the Hungarian tribes, yielding to pressure to leave the Etelköz, sought refuge in the Carpathian Basin. The pressure came from the Bulgars who felt threatened by the alliance concluded in 894 in the Lower Danube region between Niketas Skleros, the envoy of the Byzantine emperor Leo the Wise, and the two leaders of the Hungarians, Árpád and Ku(r)san. The Byzantines ferried a strong Hungarian army across the Danube, led by Árpád's son Levente (Liunti[ka], using Greek phonetics). This army inflicted such a serious defeat on the Bulgar khan, Simeon I, that he was forced to seek refuge in his most secure strongholds (first in Mundraga = Mádara, then in Dristra = Silistra). In his desperation, Simeon allied himself with the Turkic Pechenegs, who had earlier pushed the Hungarians westwards (893). The latter thus found themselves caught between two fires. The Conquest was the consequence of this double attack.

1. The Hungarian Conquest

Today, any historian or archaeologist writing on the Hungarians' conquest of the Carpathian Basin, especially that of Transylvania and the lands lying east of the Tisza River, has to make a decision on whether or not to use the most extensive and detailed "source", the *Gesta Hungarorum* (The Deeds of the Hungarians), written by an author calling himself Magister P. *(P. dictus magister)*, or to use the name by which he is better known, Anonymus. If he does, the historian will find himself entangled in the contradiction which has been troubling historiography — both in Hungary and abroad — for over 200 years. The *Gesta* was originally written in the early thirteenth century. The sole surviving copy, a fourteenth-century codex, was discovered in the mid-eighteenth century, and was taken as gospel practically from the moment of its first publication in 1746. Today, however, in the light of other extant written sources as well as of archaeological finds and observations, there is not doubt that the historical and geographical "facts" recorded in the *Gesta* must be treated with a great many reservations. The first step to a more critical approach was taken at the end of the nineteenth century, when the new scientific method of textual criticism was applied to historical sources. Since then it has been repeatedly pointed out that the content of the *Gesta* reflects the geographic and ethnographic character of Hungary of around 1200, as well as the political organization and aspirations of that time. For this period, the *Gesta* is an excellent source — but it is this early thirteenth-century world that it projected three hundred years back into the ancient past. The genre of the *Gesta* is the epic tale, a kind of narrative history which flourished after 1200. As such, the *Gesta* may, perhaps, serve as an authentic source for historians of literature, but not for historians.

Historical textual criticism of the *Gesta,* however, has not been consistent. It has often been the case that, for the sake of supporting a new theory, persons and events mentioned in the *Gesta* are singled out and declared to reflect authentic clan traditions of the tribes conquering the country. For this reason, in present-day Hungarian historiography there are two, largely irreconcilable, Anonymus interpretations. According to one view, it is possible that in respect of folk names, of personal names and of place-names having to do with occupations, the author of the Gesta conveys something of the tribe traditions dating from the age of the Hungarian Conquest. Historians holding the opposite view, while they subscribe to what Anonymus says on the origin of place-names is applicable from the tenth century onwards, doubt very much that what he wrote reflected authentic late ninth- and early tenth-century historical and clan traditions. On matter of clan traditions, they consider what is said in the *Gesta* as applicable at best to conditions from the early eleventh century on.

Anonymus deliberately emphasizes that the property rights of the "conquering" nobility (it is here that the expression "*de genere* families" first appears) are just as secure and permanent as those of the House of Árpád. According to Anonymus, these noble warriors fought relentlessly for ten years (!) shedding their blood for every square foot of land and all their privileges were granted by Árpád himself.

The truth is, however, that apart from Árpád and some other commanders who lived and were active in diverse periods of the tenth century, the author of the *Gesta* has not the foggiest notion of the true events or characters of the time of the Conquest, nor of the contemporary sources, save for some misinterpreted statements by the early tenth-century chronicler Regino. He knew none of the names of the actual opponents of the Hungarians (such as Svatopluk I and II, Moimir II, the Frankish emperor Arnulf of Carinthia, the count of Pannonia Braslav, the Bulgar khan, Simeon and the Bavarian duke, Liutpold). He is ignorant of the decisive battle at Pozsony, and has no idea of the possible or actual foci of local defence, that is of Černigrad/ Csongrád, Mosaburg, Belgrade by the Danube as well as Belgrad in Transylvania. With the exception of the Bulgarians, he is not familiar with any of the peoples who opposed the Hungarians (such as the Moravians, Slovenes, Carinthians, Franks and Bavarians). On the other hand, Anonymus creates two peoples (the Bisseni and the Picenati) out of the one eastern enemy, the Pechenegs. He is left with no alternative but to invent enemies and opponents, so that his no less fictitious Hungarian heroes might have the opportunity to triumph over them. Without much hesitation he devises the names of warriors and chiefs such as the Bulgar Laborcy, the Cuman Turzol, the Bohemian Zobur, the Vlach Gelou and the Bulgar Glad from the names of rivers (Laborc), hills (Tarcal and Zobor — the latter comes from the Slavonic *Sobor* = "church mountain", after which the early eleventh-century Benedictine monastery of Zobor was named), and villages (Glad, Gyalu and Marót). The main antagonists, the Bulgar Salan and the Khazar Ménmarót, are his own inventions. The supposed enemies — the Bohemians who in fact were still living in the Bohemian Basin at the time of the Conquest, the Cumans (Kipčaq or Polovci), who only appeared in Europe in the second half of the eleventh century (1055), and the Vlachs, who came to the

Carpathian Basin even later, in the thirteenth century — all reflect the circumstances of Hungary during the early thirteenth century. The majority of his conquering heroes are none other than the ancestors of wealthy early thirteenth-century landowners, whose lineage could be traced to the privileged class of the new state apparatuses of the eleventh century.

Until this time, Anonymus's view has prevailed in all historical accounts of the Hungarian Conquest of Transylvania, irrespective of the nationality of the author. Coming through the "Verecke Pass", the conquerors came to the Tisza Valley and attempted the invasion of Transylvania along the Szamos and Maros rivers. They immediately encountered a dangerous enemy in the person of the "Bulgar-hearted" Khazar Ménmarót, lord of the fortresses of Szatmár and Bihar. Unable to defeat him, the Hungarians forged an alliance with him. From his fortress by the Szamos River "some Vlach" *(quidam Blacus)* "leader" *(dux)* called Gelou organized the resistance of the local inhabitants (Blasii and Sclaui). In any case, no one has ever spoken more contemptuously of these two peoples throughout their history than Anonymus, the very same Anonymus who is extolled to the skies by modern Romanian researchers. They usually fail, however, to quote this half of his sentence: *"uiliores homines essent tocius mundi"* (they are the biggest rascals in the whole world).

Neither Slavic nor Romanian scholars, as representatives of the nations living with the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin today, have applied the methods of textual criticism to the writings of Anonymus. If anything, they have even regressed a step in this century. When Anonymus pronounces in the *Gesta* on late ninth and early tenth-century matters, he is credited with the authenticity of a war reporter or war diarist. His "objectivity" being the royal notary of Hungary is never questioned. Today's Romanian and Saxon historiographers regard the persons and exploits of "Gelu" (Gyalu), Ménmarót (Marót), and Glad (Galad), fictitious characters whose names were derived from village names distorted both by Anonymus and his transcriber, as evidences of the "patriotic" war of the Romanian people and describe their supposed dominions as "feudal Romanian voivodates". There is no hope of bridging the gap between these views and reaching a compromise, as long as state and national interests dominate historiography.

The real history of the Hungarians during the ninth to the eleventh centuries has been reliably recorded by Near Eastern and Spanish Arab, Persian, Italian-, German-, and Franco-Latin, and Byzantine–Greek sources. None of these sources mention the persons and events described by Anonymus, or, if they do, they date them to a period other than the time of the Hungarian Conquest. The history of the Conquest, as presented by Anonymus, is also at variance with the relevant section of the *Gesta Hungarorum* of the age of St. Ladislas. This chronicle, the oldest one known from Hungary, based its account on the lost *Old Gesta* set down in the 1060s.

Contemporary sources provide only a sketchy picture of the Hungarian Conquest. At present, there is no proof of that the Hungarians (and their allies, the Kabars) once in ally with the Carolingians, once with the Moravians were operating from within the Carpathian Basin during their early campaigns against Moravia and Pannonia (862, 881, 892, 894). The situation changed dramatically in the course of the last in the series of campaigns

against Pannonia (894), which coincided with the death of Svatopluk I in late autumn of the same year, and with an other campaign that the Hungarians, allied with Byzantium, had launched against Simeon I and Bulgaria. For this reason the Pechenegs, who had allied with the Bulgars, launched an all-out attack on the eastern territories of the Hungarians at the end of 894 and by early 895, and the Bulgars, who had quickly made a truce with Byzantium, routed the Hungarian forces under Levente's command, which were plundering Bulgarian territory south of the Lower Danube. The Pechenegs' attack against their home territories effectively prevented Levente's forces from retreating to their former homeland. The Hungarian army was therefore obliged to retreat to Transylvania through the Southern Carpathians. There, it met up with the bulk of the Hungarian tribes who were fleeing the Pechenegs, and were pouring through every accessible pass in the Eastern Carpathians. The part of the Hungarian army that had attacked Pannonia at the end of 894 likewise found itself prevented from returning to the eastern steppes. By the end of 895, thus, all the Hungarian forces of any account had moved into the Carpathian Basin, and had taken over the lands up to the Danube and Garam rivers, and had put an end to Bulgarian domination in the southern zone.

There was no further military action in the Carpathian Basin in the following few years (896 to the summer of 900). This, in effect, marked the first phase of the Hungarian Conquest and settlement. Until the turn of the century, the government of Carolingian Pannonia was firmly in the hands of the appointed Slavic count, Braslav. The Hungarians enjoyed amicable relations with the Moravians, who lived on the other side of the Garam River.

The second phase of the Conquest began with the military alliance between the emperor Arnulf of Carinthia, and the Hungarians. By early 898, after having passed through Pannonia with Arnulf's permission, a smaller Hungarian army carried out an aggressive reconnaissance mission against the cities of Friaul and Marche, both hostile to the emperor. In the summer of 899 the Hungarians launched a massive campaign into northern Italy against Arnulf's adversary, King Berengar I. With their splendid victory at the Brenta River, on 24 September, 899 they burst onto the stage of European history and in the next thirty-three years did not loose a single major battle. Concurrently with the Hungarians' Italian campaign, civil war erupted in Moravia between the sons of Svatopluk (898–899); and Arnulf intervened on the side of Svatopluk II. Very likely, the Hungarians helped him in this venture as well. Arnulf's unexpected death on 8 December, 899 sparked off the next major turn of events. The Hungarians felt that the treaties they had made with both Arnulf and his ally, Svatopluk II, no longer bound them. Since neither the Carolingians (the government of Louis IV, the Child) nor the Moimirides renewed their alliances with the Hungarians, the latter took advantage of Moravia's near exhaustion from the ongoing civil war. In 900, in a single offensive launched against the country, they seized those of its territories lying between the Garam and Morva rivers. Simultaneously, the Hungarian army returning from Italy occupied Pannonia without encountering any significant resistance. By the summer of 900, therefore, the second phase of the Hungarian Conquest was completed; and by autumn of the same year, the Bavarians had completed building Ernsburg in anticipa-

tion of Hungarian attacks. According to entries in the *Annals of Fulda*, when the Hungarians, after advancing as far as the Enns River on both sides of the Danube, turned back, they returned to Pannonia as to their "own" *(ad sua)* land.

The Hungarian destruction of the military strength of Moimir II's Moravia in 902 was meant to secure the outward defences of the newly-occupied Carpathian Basin. Then came the decisive victory over the attacking Bavarian forces at the former stronghold of Count Braslav (Brezalauspurc = Pressburg) on 4–5 July, 907. After this, there could be no doubt as to who were the masters of the new country.

The Hungarian raids on the west of between 862 and 955 have also been studied by German, French and Italian historians. Irrespective of how they evaluate their net effects, none of these accounts deny the military organization and success of the campaigns; any more than one can help but acknowledge the mastery of the no less bloody and devastating raids of the Viking-Normans. The light cavalry of the Hungarians scored victories over the armies of Italy, Bavaria, Thuringia, Franconia, Saxony and Burgundy. They took, looted and sent up in flames one Italian and western European town after the other. All the way to Denmark, to Bremen, to the English Channel, to the Atlantic Ocean at Aquitaine, to Andalusia in Spain and to Otranto in Italy the population rued the Hungarian visitations, and by the late 960s, so did Constantinople and Thessaloniki. Against the background of their real-life battles and campaigns, they are reduced to batrachmyomachian fightings in the fantasy world of Anonymus against such fictitious characters as Laborcy, Zobur, Gelou and Glad. The warriors who, in real life, had sacked Beneventum, Narbonne and Bremen — to mention but a few cities — according to Anonymus's *Gesta* has stand utterly at a loss at the sight of the fancy-bred Bihar castle of "Menumorout" (spelled thus, as if the name would lose its Hungarian origin when the Old Hungarian spelling is used: Ménmarót = Moravian stallion). It is likely that the same army which for fifty years terrorized the nations of Europe across the Alps and the Pyrenees, the Rhine and the Seine, the Danube and the Ebro, would — as the historians following Anonymus would have it — shrink from the Meszes Gate, from crossing the Maros and the Vág, or from the local strong men of county-sized territories?

2. Transylvania and the Eastern Great Hungarian Plain in the Century Following the Hungarian Conquest (895–1003)

The Hungarian *Old Gesta* written in the 1060s gives an account that is in agreement with what the various contemporary sources, too, suggest as the only viable route for the Conquest. By this account, for three months the hounded peopled of disturbed Hungarian habitations fled in disarray through all the traversable passes of the Eastern Carpathians, crossing forests and snow-capped mountains *(Alpes)* to the safety of Transylvania *(in*

Erdelw), with the "eagles" *(bessi)* (in Old Hungarian *besēk* = Pechenegs) at their backs all the while. The Hungarians were finally "able to rest here, and their surviving herds also managed to recover".[3] There can be no doubt of the authenticity of the story preserved by the family tradition of the House of Árpád which claims that the previous leader, Duke Álmos, Árpád's father, was killed in Transylvania, "since he was not to enter Pannonia".[4] It was probably the defeat suffered at the hands of the Pechenegs that called for this ritual human sacrifice in the Khazar manner. Transylvania was the only place that the Hungarian army routed in Bulgaria could retreat, since the pass south of the Lower Danube running parallel to the rivers was guarded by the strong Bulgar fortresses of Vidin and Belgrade. Furthermore, since no Bulgar army was stationed in the Carpathian Basin at the time of the Conquest, the Hungarians had no significant Bulgar forces to fight off for possession of the land. Between the fateful years of 894 and 899, these distant outposts of the Bulgars were unlikely to have had more than the regular 50–300 men guarding the fortified places, so that in Transylvania, the Bulgar presence left not even a memory.

The concluding sentence of the chapter of the Old Gesta dealing with the Conquest makes the claim that in Transylvania the Hungarians had "built seven earthen castles *(septem castra terrea)* to protect their wives and livestock, and stayed there for some times". That the added comment "that is why the Germans call this country Simburg *(Siebenbürgen*, the "Seven Castles") until the present day"[5] is an insertion from later centuries, is obvious as the fact that the entire passage dealing with the "seven earthen castles" could not have been written before the construction of the first castles of Transylvania, that is, before the eleventh century. These supposed earthen castles are not likely to have been built for the protection of seven salt mines promptly seized by the seven tribes or chiefs either, as has been maintained. For one thing, initially, people barely had to mine for salt, since literally "mountains" of salt were to be found on the surface in several places. In the early days, people probably continued to exploit the salt mines of the Bulgars in the Maros region. On the other hand, the conquering Hungarians simply did not have a population large enough to need all large salt mines of what was later in Mediaeval Transylvania.

Wooded ninth-century Transylvania could not possibly have fed all the people and livestock of the Hungarian tribes for even a few months. For this reason, the majority of the Hungarians were forced to move on into the Great Hungarian Plain by 895. True, in one place Constantine Porphyrogennetos describes "the whole habitation area of Turkia" as the region whose greatest river is the Tisza (Títza), and which incorporates the Temes (Timésis), Tutis (Bega?), Maros (Morésis), and Körös (Krísos) rivers, with the Danube (Istros) marking the "eastern" border with Bulgaria.[6] The contradiction is usually dismissed by arguing that in this passage, the emperor was only speaking of the "land" of the Hungarian chief who had personally

3. *SRH* I, 28.
4. *SRH* I, 28.
5. *SRH* I, 286.
6. *DAI* 40 = *FBHH* 48.

Map 7. Transylvania and the Eastern Great Plain at the time of the Hungarian Conquest and the establishment of the Hungarian state

1. Tenth century cemeteries and finds of Hungarian warriors; 2. Tenth–eleventh century cemeteries and finds of Hungarian commoners; 3. Forts of Hungarian *ispáns*; 4. Carolingian, Viking and Byzantine swords; 5. Settlements bearing the names of Hungarian tribes of the Conquest; 6. Residences and landed estates of Hungarian ruling princes and other leaders in the tenth century; 7. Place-names of the tribal name type; 8. Slav villages still in existence during the tenth and eleventh centuries as revealed by archaeological investigation; 9. Bulgarian hillforts from the beginning of the tenth century; 10. Hungarian border defences against the Bulgarians in the tenth century; 11. Early salt mines

visited Byzantium after 952. This explanation, while worth considering, is unlikely to be correct. The collection of the emperor's works was completed in 952, before the said visit, and it is common knowledge that it contained no information coming directly from the chief. The description of "Little Turkia" was derived from the reports of one of his envoys, the cleric Gabriel, written between 897 and 900, and incorporated into the emperor's far from consistent account, in which facts from various times are blurred. Thus, this work actually recorded the situation prior to 900. Aventinus, the sixteen-century Bavarian humanist who used documents which are now lost, has done the same, calling the Hungarians' pre-900 country "Dacia" on several occasions, and even distinguishing between the Dacia that was to the east and the one that lay to the west of the Tisza River. Elsewhere in his work, the emperor Constantine himself informs us accurately about the Hungarians' land as it was in his own lifetime: "Pannonia, which once belonged to the Langobards, is now the land of the Turks".[7] To the west it borders on "Frangia" (Franconia).[8] "The Turks live on Moravian land north of the Danube (= the south-west region of modern Slovakia), and on this side live between the Danube and the Sava".[9] Even in the later passages of the above-cited contradictory description of "little Turkia", the Franks are described as western neighbours and the Croats as its southern neighbours.[10]

What follows from all this is that, after having conquered "Dacia", the majority of the Hungarians promptly left Transylvania. It can also be safely assumed that the Hungarian population of Transylvania further decreased after 900.

The eastern parts of the Great Hungarian Plain and of the Temes region, which now belong to Romania, do not readily lend themselves to comparisons with tenth-century Transylvania, while displaying striking similarities with the Tisza region of Hungary. The conquering Hungarians did not find significant Slavic populations here. The more populous Slavic communities lived at the edge of the mountains and on the wooded slopes, but on the plains (for instance along the middle section of the Berettyó River and along the lower reaches of the Fehér-Körös) they had only small dispersed settlements. Hungarian cemeteries of various sizes from the period of the Conquest, almost invariably rich in finds, have been discovered in abundance in the area stretching from the Nyírség and Érmellék through Bihar, Zaránd, Arad and Temes to Örsvár (Orsova) on the Lower Danube, and overlying these Conquest-period finds, the *milites* burials of the time of Grand Duke Géza towards the end of the century. The old Hungarian place-names, above all the ones preserving the names of the conquering tribes, also prove that the region was occupied mostly by Hungarians.

In addition, conquering tribes' names, of probably Kabar origin, tribal names — Varsány and Tárkány, and Berény, meaning "Alan", a member of an Iranian people — are preserved in the names of villages even in the eastern Great Hungarian Plain. Seven of the eight names of tribes conquer-

7. *DAI* 27 = *FBHH* 38.
8. *DAI* 13 = *FBHH* 37.
9. *DAI* 42 = *FBHH* 50.
10. *DAI* 40 = *FBHH* 48.

ing the country, together with Tárkány, Varsány and Berény, regularly turn up as place-names on the plains of Bihar and Zaránd (all in all twenty-five villages). The exception is the tribal name Kürt, which is not to be found either in the eastern Great Hungarian Plain or in Transylvania. Although the Mongol invasion of 1241 had wiped out hundreds of villages in the Maros–Temes–Lower-Danube region (in certain places 30 to 70 per cent of all villages), and although by the end of the seventeenth century almost the entire Hungarian population had been eradicated in this area, about four to six place-names, tribal in origin, have survived in the flat areas of each county. In order of frequency of occurrence, these names are Kér, Jenő, Tarján, Nyék, Megyer, Gyarmat, Keszi, as well as Tárkány and Varsány.

The habitat near Biharvár of a tenth-century Hungarian commander, *Salard dux* — who in 924 had fought in northern Italy and had burned down Pavia — is called Szalárd, while the fortress Zarándvár received its name directly from Prince Zerind, the son of Árpád's son Tevel. The origins of both of the above-mentioned fortifications probably go back to the tenth century as it was at that time that places were simply named after personal names. This, in the case of Biharvár, has been demonstrated long ago by archaeologists. There are also some villages around Biharvár which in the tenth century had serviced regional centres and which were named after the crafts practised by their inhabitants — blacksmiths: Kovácsi, armourers: Csatár; carpenters: Ácsi; ploughmen: Szántó; hunters: Vadász. These names are all representatives of the type that turn up in eleventh-century documents as the names of permanent settlements.

The situation was fundamentally 'different in Transylvania. There are no villages with Hungarian tribal names in the territories of Belső-Szolnok, Torda, Küküllő, Fehér and Hunyad counties. There is one Jenő and one Kér in Doboka, one Keszi in Kolozs county. The single Berény in north Hunyad is not of much consequence. The reason behind this marked deficiency has long been a puzzle: the number of place-names with a tribal origin in Transylvania falls short even of the low number of excavated Hungarian archaeological sites, and falls way short of the considerable number of waterways and other topographical features with names originating in Hungarian. What is clear is that in 942, the Hungarians were led by "seven emirs" or chieftains, as we have learned from a historical work only recently published, written by Ibn Hayan, a Spanish Moor. Even the actual names of some of the seven chiefs can be gleaned from this document which was based on a Hungarian source. Around 950, Constantine Porphyrogennetos, using a reputable Hungarian source, still lists the seven tribes *(geneai)* of the "Turks" correctly and accurately. The fourth of these is the compound name *Kürtgyarmat*.[11] These tribal names are authentic, since the names of the same eight tribes, found in varying forms from region to region, are preserved in the names of exactly 300, mostly still existing villages, in all those areas of the Carpathian Basin that were inhabited at one time or another by the Hungarians. While the frequency of their occurrence varies between twenty-three and fifty-eight, there are roughly all homogeneously dispersed over the territory of historic Hungary. The author of the *Old Gesta*, on the other

hand, either no longer had any knowledge of the tribes or did not consider them worth mentioning. No reference is made to the tribes, tribal organizations or their remnants either in the legislation of Stephen I, nor in his *Admonitiones.* At the same time, tribal names (Varsány and Berény included) appear as the names of permanent settlements in the same distribution as today in eleventh-century charters (from 1001, 1002, 1009, 1061, 1075 and 1086). Therefore, the tribes — whatever is meant by the term — must still have existed at the beginning of the tenth century, although by the end of the tenth century their enforced disbandment had been completed. This is true even if tribal place-names continued to be given conceivably as late as the eleventh century. Such a systematic destruction of earlier formations could have taken place at the latest under the rule of Grand Duke Géza who is remembered, both by western contemporaries and in Hungarian tradition, as a strong ruler with blood on his hands — most of those tribal chieftains who thwarted him in his determination to control and subjugate the tribes. The forcible disbandment of the Hungarian, Kabar and other allied tribes meant the end of tribal system. "Duke Géza built up a *regnum* embracing the whole country,"[12] remarked a German contemporary. The dispersed tribal population was kept under control by the new army *(militia, iobagiones).* Grand Duke Géza created this army by significant expansion of his military escort, and guaranteed its success by its strategically-governed deployment — for example, in the triangle defined by Esztergom, Óbuda and Székesfehérvár.

The above-outlined events of the last quarter of the tenth century did not affect the greater part of Transylvania — the only exception seems to have been the region around Kis-Szamos River. However, the dearth of tribal place-names in Transylvania in general does show that this part of the country followed its own distinct political path from the last third of the tenth century onwards.

This distinct direction had no perceptible preliminaries. There are known village names in Transylvania which seem to match the name of one of the commanders leading the Hungarian raids (Maros-Bogát, Bugat *rex* being one of the leaders of the Hungarian army which penetrated as far as Verona in 923). But the four Transylvanian occurrences of the altogether twenty-five "Bogát" villages in the Carpathian Basin are so scattered — from the Kis-Szamos River across the valleys of the Aranyos and Maros rivers right up to the bend of the Olt River — that they could hardly have corresponded to the habitats of a Transylvanian nobleman in the tenth century. Besides, this name of Slavic origin was evidently still in use in the eleventh century. It would be warranted to link one or the other Transylvanian villages going by the name of "Bogát" to the tenth-century commander only if some other archaeological, etymological or written information confirmed the participation of Transylvanian Hungarians in the Italian campaigns. Up to this point, however, evidence for relations between Transylvania and contemporary Europe come only from a single coin, a silver piece of the Bavarian duke Berthold found in Torda county in 1735. But since the coin was not

12. B. Querfurtensis, Vita Sancti Adalberti Pragensis. Gombos, *Catalogus* ... III, 4912, 2297.

pierced following the Hungarian custom for the purpose of sewing it on the clothing, there is no indication of whether or not it might have come from the grave of a raiding Hungarian warrior. It must have passed into Hungarian hands sometime *before* the duke's victory by the Traun (943) and somehow found its way into Transylvania.

There are, on the other hand, two Transylvanian place-names which suggest that this part of the country was under the rule of the Hungarian grand dukes until the middle of the tenth century. Jutotcha's (Jutas) son Falítchsi/ Falís (Fajsz),[13] who was grand duke of the Hungarians around 950 according to Constantine Porphyrogennetos, disappeared after the defeat at Augsburg in 955, and his unusual name was never to be assumed by anyone else from the House of Árpád. Obviously, neither of these two anomalies was a coincidence. Fajsz's name appears as a place-name in only five instances over the whole of the Hungarian-speaking region. One of these five "Fajsz" villages is, however, located in the immediate vicinity of what was later to be Küküllővár, that is, on strategically important territory. Taksony (Toxun) — formerly and mistakenly, read as "Caxun" — the erstwhile village near Asszonynépe by the Küküllő and Maros rivers received its, once again, unusual, name from Grand Duke Géza's father, Taksony (or "Taxin", in the works of Constantine Porphyrogennetos).[14] Until about 970, the direct rule of the Hungarian dukes over the Transylvanian frontiers can be verified by these two rare place-names marking the princes' habitats and estates.

The Hungarian population then living under the rule of the leaders of the Hungarian tribal alliance consisted of the descendants of the generation who had stayed behind in Transylvania at the time of the Conquest. During the tenth century, this population inhabited the valleys of the Kis-Szamos and Aranyos rivers and the united Küküllő–Maros river valleys, that is, the regions formerly inhabited by the Avars, and just before the Conquest, in part by the Bulgars. Only through archaeological research would it be possible to estimate the significance and size of this population. After the last third of the tenth century, the marches, known as the *gyepű*, ran along the inner rim of the Transylvanian Basin, as evidenced by archaeological excavations and place-names. It was the same in other parts of the country with Zala, Vas, Sopron, Moson, Borsova and Ung counties.

The Byzantine Orientation and its Supporters

The alliance drawn up in 894 between the Byzantine emperor and the Hungarian leaders, Árpád and Ku(r)san, proved enduring on both sides. It continued even when, around 897 or 898, the Byzantine authorities failed to persuade the "archons" of the Turks (that is the Hungarians) to undertake a military intervention against the Pechenegs. In the words of Emperor Leo the Wise, "now" (before 921) the Turks are "neither our neighbours nor our enemies". Rather they appeared as friends, or, as the emperor put it, as

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13. *DAI* 40. = *FBHH* 49.
14. *DAI* 40.

"subjects".[15] Rumours of a Russian–Pecheneg–Hungarian alliance began circulating around 924 or 925. At that time, this alliance would have been directed specifically against the arch-enemies of Byzantium, the Bulgars. However, by the time this campaign actually started almost a decade later, substantial changes had already taken place. The Hungarians' defeat at Merseburg in 933 and non-payment of German taxes which followed it turned the attention of the hawkish Hungarian leaders towards new — and more wealthy — prey. In April 934, the Hungarians, in alliance with the Pechenegs, did in fact launch their first attacks across the Danube against the Bulgars but then they unexpectedly attacked the empire for the first time, as all the Byzantine sources point out. They advanced as far as Constantinople and only turned back when a huge ransom was offered. This event was a watershed in Bulgar–Pecheneg relations as well: the Pechenegs went on to end Bulgar rule in Wallachia about this time by sacking the Bulgar frontier strongholds that had secured the passes of the Southern Carpathians. Around 948, the land of the Pechenegs "extended from the Lower Danube to across from the fortress of Dristra (Silistra)",[16] at which point the Pecheneg province of Jazikapan lay only a half day's march from Bulgaria.[17] The Pecheneg–Hungarian alliance turned out to be a lasting one: the two peoples did not fight one another for the rest of the tenth century.

In April 943, the Hungarians turned against Byzantium again. The campaign ended with the signing of a five-year peace treaty. The Byzantines must have paid the Hungarians handsomely for these years of peace. In 948, the third-highest ranking "archon" of Turkia, the "horka" (karkha), arrived in Byzantium to renew the just-expired treaty. He was Bultchu, son of Kal(i), and he was accompanied by Termatchu (Tormás), son of Tevel(i), a great-grandson of Árpád. The treaty was extended and Constantine Porphyrogennetos VII had raised Bultchu from the christening basin himself, and sent him home as a *"patrikios"* and the "master of a great fortune". "Not much later Gyula (Gülasz), another Turkic prince, also came to the imperial city, converted to Christianity and received the same benefits and honours."[18] However, this visit could only have taken place after 952, since it was not mentioned in Constantine Porphyrogennetos's work completed that year; on the other hand, it must have happened before 955, since Ioannes Skylitzes already mentions Bultchu's (Bulosudis's) death already in 955. Skylitzes goes on to say in the same place: "He (that is Gyula) took along with him a monk by the name of Hierotheus, a man renowned for his piety, whom Theophylactus (patriarch of Constantinople between 2 February, 933 and 27 February, 956) had anointed as the bishop of Turkia and who, upon his arrival, drew many away from their barbarous ways to Christianity. As for Gyula, he kept the faith, never again himself raiding the land of the Romans, and not forgetting about captured Christians. He paid their ransom, cared for them and freed them." A twelfth-century Greek polemical treatise — which has survived only in the form of a fifteenth-century Rus-

15. Tactics 18, 76 = *FBHH* 23.
16. *DAI* 42 = *FBHH* 41.
17. *DAI* 37 = *FBHH* 41.
18. Ioannes Skylitzes Synopsis 5. = *FBHH* 85–86.

sian manuscript — repeats, and fills out, this momentous report. The essence of the addition runs as follows: "And the Greek high-priests had still not been able to plant their feet firmly on their land (on the land of the Paeons or Magers = Hungarians) or to teach them the words of the Scriptures, when one of the two princes (*knaza* = the *harka* and the *gyula*), whose name was Stephen, died in the holy Christian faith and having had pleased the Almighty with many good deeds, entered the Kingdom of Heaven in peace." We also learn that no holy books had been written in the Paeons' (= Pannons') own language, and that "the heretic Latins from Rome ... bringing along their books and writings"[19] exploited this situation. Since the Latin mission only began in the autumn of 972, the above-mentioned must have occurred some time earlier.

In order to understand the above text, we must first recall that there were three leaders in the Hungarian tribal hierarchy: the *kende* (the chief duke) and the *gyula* (the military commander); the third was known as the *harka* (perhaps he was the chief justice). While the titles of *kende* and *harka* later disappeared into oblivion, *gyula* became a proper name after the middle of the eleventh century, and subsequent chroniclers projected it back into the past as such. Arab sources describing the Hungarians before the time of the Conquest, however, were aware of the fact that the *dž.la* or *jila* (*gylas*) was not a name but a rank, and so was Constantine Porphyrogennetos, who learned about the second leadership rank in Turkia from his Hungarian visitors.

But to get back to the story: the Hungarian attacks on Byzantium were renewed in April 959, and the Hungarians once again reached the gates of Constantinople under the leadership of a commander called Apor (Opour), whose memory and erstwhile habitat is what is probably preserved in the name of a now vanished village near Mindszent by the Tisza River. The Hungarian army plundered Thrace and Macedonia in 961, and after raiding the environs of Constantinople and Thessaloniki in 968, returned home with a large number of captives. Two years later, in 970, the Hungarian raids came to a definite end following the defeat of the allied Hungarian–Russian–Bulgar army at Arcadiupolis.

The evidence that helps in the location of the base for these campaigns against Byzantium is quite spectacular. During the joint reign of Romanus I and his sons, Byzantine coins suddenly came pouring into Hungary. While only fifteen early tenth-century coins and one golden *solidus* have been found, there is a marked increase after 934: twenty-two coins, five of which are gold. The peak can be dated to a relatively short period: the rules of Constantine VII and Romanus II (948–959) — twenty-eight coins, of which twenty-four are gold! —, and it perfectly matches the events we have been describing. The archaeological finds show a small decline for the period between 963 and 970 (sixteen coins, eight of which are golden *solidi*), but this is misleading, since it was precisely in 965 that the astonished Ibrahim Ybn Yakûb noted that the "Turk" merchants of Hungary were paying with

19. Facsimile in G. Fehér, A nagyszentmiklósi kincs-rejtély megfejtésének útja. (The Way to Solving the Nagyszentmiklós Treasure-Mystery.) *Archeológiai Értesítő* 1950, 45. (Based on an old edition, Moscow.)

gold coins at the market in Prague. The year 970, however, marks the last year for these coins.

Not counting the single *solidus* found in Sirmium, all these Byzantine coins, mostly gold pieces dating from the period between 934–969/970, have come to light in the Tisza region and east of the Tisza from Tokaj down to Orsova. More specifically, the authenticated graves containing golden coins (eleven sites) have all been found in the area stretching from the Berettyó and Körös rivers down to the Temes region by the Lower Danube. The distribution area of these Byzantine coins is precisely the same as the area from where Byzantine "lion-buckles" — five of the six occurrences —, gold and silver earrings, and a sword have been recovered. The latter was unearthed at Kunágota together with some Byzantine silver coins — hardly a coincidence. With the exception of Sirmia, tenth-century Byzantine gold and silver pieces and jewellery have not been found in the Carpathian Basin on the right side of the Danube. That absolutely none have been found in Transylvania is all the more striking considering that antique coins have been collected there regularly since the sixteenth century, and that in the last few decades all Byzantine coins from public and private collections have been published, and the search for such pieces has continued with social support — all with the aim of demonstrating continuous Byzantine presence within the "autochthonous Romanian" population.

It must, therefore, have been those Hungarian warriors residing in the Tisza region, the area between the Berettyó and Körös rivers and the Lower Danube, who participated in the campaigns against Byzantium. This, of course, is not to say that the ransom Byzantium paid for non-aggression and the presents given to the *horka* and the grand duke did not find their way to other centres, though no traces of their having done so have been uncovered. All the finds have come from warrior graves in the Tisza region. Since the soldiers brought the booty back here with them, the prisoners freed by the *gyula* between 959 and 969 must also have been taken to this same area.

All these details add up to the following: the land of the "patrikios and gyula" Stephanos was probably located east of the Tisza, between the Körös and Maros rivers. It is probably the name of his headquarters that is preserved in the name of the town of Gyula (previously Julamonostora). Since Bishop Hierotheus did his missionary work among the people in the *gyula*'s land, his permanent residence (assuming he had one) must also have been at the *gyula*'s court.[20]

20. It is hard to imagine that his seat would have been in Sirmium (Szávaszent-demeter/Sremska Mitrovica), which counted as the border territory of Bulgaria, where, on the other side of the Sava in Sermon (Mačvanska Mitrovica), by this time, a Bulgarian–Serbian bishop was active, whose cathedral, built on the ruins of an early Christian basilica, is well known from the middle of the tenth century (D. MINIĆ, Le site d'habitation médiéval de Mačvanska Mitrovica. Sirmium XI. Beograd 1980; cf. with the text written about early mediaeval cemeteries: Sirmium XII, Beograd 1980). This latter Sirmion/Sermon came under Byzantinian rule in 1018, and is not identical with the Hungarian Szerémség, as historical literature thinks. Also, a diocese is unimaginable at the far away Gyula-fehérvár, which, before 950 could not have been the seat of the *gyula*s.

In 970, for the first time in 300 years, the Byzantine emperor Ioannes Tzimisces reached the Lower Danube with the Byzantine army in pursuit of the allied Russian–Pecheneg–Bulgar forces. In 971, he set up a Byzantine *thema* with Dorostolon (Silistra) at its centre. This event may have been behind the *gyula* Stephanos's unexpected removal east to Transylvania. Since the defeated Pechenegs of Wallachia had temporarily disappeared from the historical stage in the tenth century, the *gyula*, in southern Transylvania in effect became Byzantium's neighbour in the Lower Danube region. In the Hungarian *Old Gesta*, the event is given the usual epic aura. While on a hunting trip *"in Erdeel"*, the great and mighty commander, Gyula *(Gula dux magnus et potens)* is supposed to have discovered the fort of Alba *(Civitatem Albam)* that had been built in ancient times by the Romans. There is a seed of truth in the hunter-legend, insofar as the *gyula*s had, indeed, not resided in the Roman town for some time following the Conquest and only moved there from Hungary at a later date. Hierotheus could not very well have been alive by then, so it is more likely that the *gyula* was accompanied by his successors,[21] if indeed the bishop had a successor. The twelfth-century polemical writing, however, vaguely supports this possibility. In any case, the Byzantine presence on Transylvania's borders was soon a thing of the past. The Bulgars had had a bad year in 971, so much so that they had been pushed back into Macedonia. Their envoys appeared in the court of Otto I in Quedlinburg in 973 together with Grand Duke Géza's Hungarian delegation in the hope of securing some western support. But the Bulgars soon recovered, probably with Géza's help. In 976, they succeeded in ousting the Byzantines from the Lower Danube region for another quarter of a century. It is not very likely that the pious Stephanos lived long enough to see these events, although his putative death much earlier, in 956, is not supported by documents. But in the 970s at the latest, the aged *gyula*, a contemporary of Prince Fajsz and Taksony, was succeeded by the "second" *gyula*, who was a contemporary of Géza's. His daughter, Sharolt, became Grand Duke Géza's wife and, later, the mother of Vajk (afterwards King Stephen I).

The marriage of Grand Duke Géza and Sharolt was undoubtedly politically motivated. It was the *gyula* who needed this marriage in order to find favour with the prince. Although Sharolt, born east of the Tisza River in the second half of the 950s, must have been christened by Hierotheos on instructions from her pious grandfather, she was still given a Kabar/Khazar-type Turkic name: Sharaldy = White weasel, or Sharylty = Whiteness. Her name was later translated into Slavonic form as Bele-knegini, which has the same meaning: White princess/lady. [Her supposed sister "Caroldu" is

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21. Inscription "Antonios bishop governor *(proedros)* of Turkia" on a lead stamp of unknown origin, dated to the 11th century and "Theophylaktos bishop *(episkopos)* of the Turks" on a similar one: *FBHH* 253. — It is not likely that these refer to Hungarians, they should be considered rather as alluding to high priests of the Turks near Vardar.

124

again, an invention of Anonymus's or rather, one of his misreadings.)[22] In the same way that he created a Bulgar commander called Shalan from the Hungarian name, Calan (Calan → Chalan → Shalan), he similarly, contrived the version "Carold" from the name Sharolt/d (Sharolt/d ←Charold→ Carold). Since the name Sharolt, spelled with an "Sh", was familiar from other sources, "Caroldu" became the "sister" for lack of a better alternative.]

The actual marriage ceremony took place in the 970s. If Vajk–Stephen really was born in 977 — the latest research indicated that he was definitely born after 975 — then his birth came at a time when the *gyula* was in serious trouble. It was exactly in 976 when the Bulgars cut off his direct links with Byzantium. Sharolt had been taken to Esztergom from Transylvania, as evidenced by the name of the village of Sarold, formerly her estate near Segesvár by the Nagy-Küküllő River. (The villages featuring "Décse" in their names, for instance Marosdécse, the salt port at Torda, and the village of Magyardécse located in the salt mining region of the Szamos River, may all have belonged to Stephen's father Géza, but they are more likely to have been named after King Géza I.[23] The original form of Géza was Gyécse.) There is not much more that we know about the rule of the *gyula*, Sharolt's father, although this much is certain: he tried to maintain his court in Fehérvár in a princely fashion. The court chapel, rotunda, was probably built during his rule, and the *"gyepű"* in the Küküllő Valley was pushed further east, beyond Segesvár.

Sharolt's brother — who must have been younger than Sharolt, since when his two sons, Boja and Bonyha, died a violent death at the time of the second plot against King Peter in 1046, they were both still in the prime of life — probably took over the rank of the "third" *gyula* of Transylvania at the beginning of the 980s, as the author of the *Old Gesta* could still vividly recall. His contemporary, the extraordinarily energetic Byzantine emperor, Basil II — later known as *Bulgaroctonus* = "Bulgar Slayer" — began his forty-year-long incessant and, in the end, successful fight to restore the Byzantine Empire to its former glory shortly afterwards, in 985. He launched his European campaigns with an attack on Bulgaria.

The "third" *gyula*, therefore, had good reason to bank on direct Byzantine support once more without even having to fear the retaliation of the House of Árpád. For in the 990s, it was the *gyula's* sister, Sharolt, rather than the aging Grand Duke Géza, who ruled the whole country: *"totum regnum manu tenuit"*.[24] Géza's death, Stephen's elevation to the throne and the crushing defeat, in 997, of the pretender to the throne, Koppány, all

22. The written Hungarian sources from the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries spell the *s* (*ś*), *cs* (*c*) and *k* sounds, sometimes the *h*, too with an *ch*. Cf. Chimon = Simon, Choma = Soma, Chanad = Csanád, Chatar = Csatár, Chemey = kemej, Chemen = Kemény, Chupa = Kupa. (K. FEHÉRTÓI, Árpádkori kis személynévtár /Personal Names of the Árpád Period/, Budapest 1983.) Charold as the "wife of Doboka" was also mentioned in the history of Transylvania.

23. On his coins: Geuca, on his charter: Geisa, according to the Byzantine script on the Crown: Geovitza(s), which has to be pronounced as Gieitcha–Gievitcha; the harder Décse–Devicse version developed from this.

24. GOMBOS, *Catalogus* ... III, 2203–2204.

spelt trouble for the younger brother, whom the Slavs, for some obscure reason, nicknamed "Prokuj", meaning "the son of Prok". (*Prok* — "remainder", "successor" or possibly "descendant".) The quarter of Koppány's drawn and quartered body sent to Transylvania must have gone to the *gyula* in Fehérvár, which can be interpreted in many ways, except as a gesture of friendship.

The *gyula*'s unexpected and rapid fall was initiated by Basil II's attack on Bulgaria in 1001. By the end of 1002, the emperor had occupied Vidin and restored the Byzantine *thema* Thrace south of the Lower Danube. Stephen could not afford to wait for the emperor to offer help to the power-hungry *gyula*, who was in any case already far too much under the influence of his Greek priests.

The *Annals of Hildesheim* and *Altaich* note briefly in 1003 that "King Stephen led an army against King Gyula, a maternal uncle of his, and took him together with his wife and two sons into captivity, forcibly converting his whole country *(regnum)* to the Christian faith".[25] The sources make no mention of there having been armed resistance or a clash of some sort, let alone a "Romanian–Hungarian war", and the aftermath of the action certainly suggests nothing of the sort.

With this, the unbalanced "separate history" of Transylvania, covering a quarter of century came to an end. Stephen unprudently did not hold the prince in captivity who had assumed the role of a king. He escaped from Esztergom some years later and changed sides to join the Polish king Boleslav I the Mighty (992–1025). Stephen generously allowed his wife to follow him freely, without requiring a ransom. The best evidence how deeply the *(senior)* Lord "Prokuj" deplored his lost "kingdom" was that he had the face to take arms against Stephen and his country. Thus, Stephen felt obliged to expel him from the border fortress which was entrusted to him by King Boleslav. All these happened *before* 1018, when Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg, who related the late reports of Prokuj, died. The former prince must have finished his life somewhere on Polish soil. Boja and Bonyha, his sons, remained faithful to István and their people.

The action which was over-estimated by both the Hungarian and the Romanian historiography, i.e., the defeat of "Leader" Ajtony, took place after the organization of Transylvania was established when the royal transport of salt on the Maros River to the Tisza River had become already regular. The exact date of this event, possibly ranging from 1003 to 1028, has been extremely contested up to the present.

It is unlikely to ever be determined down to the year. At the time of Géza's rule and at the beginning of Stephen's reign, all aspects of life in the Maros–Temes region followed the pattern being set in Hungary (see the cemeteries of the conquering Hungarian warriors and, later, the swords and the burial places of Géza's *militia*). Graves from the second half of Stephen's rule, containing royal coins, have come to light from Hodony all the way down to Mehádia.

The incident itself had left no written trace in the contemporary historical sources. Of the close to ten written sources, only the greater Legend of

25. Gombos, *Catalogus* ... I, 141, 139 and I, 92, 205.

Saint Gerald *(Legenda maior S. Gherardi)* and Anonymus' Gesta mention anything, the two accounts providing two radically different versions. The legend had it that Prince Achtum/Ohtum was baptized in Vidin according to the Greek rite. (His name originated from the Turkish word *Altun*, meaning "gold", and through regular patterned linguistic change, took the Hungarian form "Ajtony" in the same way as "Falis" was transformed into "Fajsz".) Later, on Greek (read: Byzantine) instruction (authority), he founded a monastery at Marosvár, dedicated to Saint John the Baptist, and invited Greek monks as well as an abbot to settle there. This event could only have taken place after 1002, for by the end of 1002, Basil II had taken Vidin from the Bulgars and extended the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire up to the Lower Danube region, that is, to the borders of Ajtony's domain.

Ajtony's personal habits, in spite of his flirtation with Byzantium, remained that of a heathen as he took "seven wives". Though this precise number sounds suspiciously like a folk-tale element in the legend, there can be no doubt that he had more than one wife. After Ajtony's defeat, one of these wives was given to *comes* Csanád, another to *comes* Becs. (On this, the two reports confirm one another, and the information is undoubtedly authentic.) Vast herds of horses and cattle grazed on Ajtony's land "not counting those which were put up by the herdsmen in stables".[26] (Only a few years ago, this later information was still regarded as one of the later added elements of the legend, on a par with the descriptions of Ajtony's manors and mansions. Today, however, there is growing archaeological evidence indicating that the practice of stabling animals was known in the Hungary of the tenth and eleventh centuries.)

Ajtony probably had a sizeable army of the same type as Géza's *militia,* and was a man of overwhelming self-confidence. Originally this choleric, wealthy and braggart lord was probably the governor of the then recently built Marosvár *(urbs Morisena)* who underestimated the balance of power, and switched his loyalty to his mighty southern neighbour. He succeeded in subjugating the heathen Hungarians living around Békésvár and as far as the Körös River, and made himself lord of the Temes region. With this, he began to pose a threat to communications between the royal seat and the recently acquired Transylvanian territories. Ajtony's unbridled covetousness — he was insolent enough to raid the royal salt consignments —, his heathen practices and, above all, his flirtation with Byzantium infuriated King Stephen.

To vanquish the rebel, King Stephen sent his kinsman, Doboka's son, Csanád (Chanad, Sunad), and — according to the "Csanád Saga", an insertion of dubious historic value in the Gerald Legend — the *gyula*, who happened to be in the royal court at the time. A tradition that does appear to be based on fact, on the other hand, places the battle between the armies of Csanád and Ajtony at the spot where Csanád raised a monastery dedicated to Saint George the Martyr in commemoration of the event. The place was later named *Oroszlános* after the sculptured lions that decorated its gates (*oroszlán* means "lion"). Later on, Bishop Gerald found shelter for the Greek monks of Marosvár in the same monastery (called Wruzlanmunustura in

26. Vita S. Gerhardi 10 = Gombos, *Catalogus* ... III, 2424.

1247). Everything else (Ajtony's death included) remains obscure. Descendants of Ajtony, bearing his name, continued to hold estates in the counties of Csanád, Krassó and Kolozs until the fifteenth century. King Stephen was not one to take revenge, and spared Ajtony's family in the same way as he had spared Koppány's. (The principles are outlined in King Stephen's laws, II. 2.)

The campaign against Ajtony — which, in fact, was more of a police action — cannot be dated to the establishment of the See of Maros, since that, together with the founding of the See of Bihar, was a part of the royal ecclesiastical policy of 1030. The jurisdiction of the Bishopric of Kalocsa had been extended previously to include the Temes region. The campaign must have taken place a good many years before 1015 or 1018 since in one or the other of these two years, more likely in the latter, King Stephen I fought alongside Basil II, destroying Bulgaria, and taking part in the first or second occupation of Cesaria, the "Imperial City" = Ohrid.

While the ancient Gerald Legend written in Csanádvár had nothing to say about Ajtony's ancestry, Anonymus seems to know, and keeps repeating almost in the manner of an epithet, that Ajtony was the descendant of a "Cuman" commander called Glad who had lived at the time of the Conquest. While in the Gerald Legend it was Ajtony whose name was linked to Vidin, in Anonymus's *Gesta* it was Glad who had connections with the town. In keeping with his usual style, Anonymus added that extra authoritative touch, and made Glad a native of Vidin. Glad/Galad, probably a Turkish name, belonged to an actual person who lived in the tenth or the eleventh century. His memory is preserved in villages in the Temes region which bear the name Gilád/Galád. (These were some of the villages whose name Anonymus "borrowed" — a tried and true method he adopted — when he was creating "enemies" for the conquering Hungarians.) By the early thirteenth century it was not, of course, known that the conquering Hungarians never assumed the name of anyone they found living in the conquered area. Therefore, we have no proof, other than Anonymus's narrative, that Glad might have been Ajtony's great-great-grandfather from 120 years before. The possibility, however, that he was Ajtony's father or grandfather, cannot be excluded. It is also worth mentioning, however, that Oswald de Lasko, Franciscan friar, referring to unknown documents, claimed that Ajtony (Atthon) had been a native of the Nyírség. He could not have been lord over either a Kabar or a Hungarian tribal land, nor over an independent "Romanian voivodate". Anonymus explicitly referred to Glad as a "Cuman", and spoke only of Cumans, Bulgars and Vlachs who had helped Glad from outside. That the latter were none other than Anonymus's contemporaries, people of the Asenid Bulgar-Romanian Empire (Asen's contemporary Latin title was: *Rex Bulgarorum et Blachorum*) established in 1186 with Cuman help, perhaps does not even need to be proved.

In the past few years it had become "fashionable" to connect the gold hoard unearthed at Nagyszentmiklós with the Hungarians of the *gyula* or of Ajtony (or even Glad's Romanians) obviously on the inspiration, among other things, of the proximity of Csanádvár and Nagyszentmiklós. The vessels of Avar princes made in the seventh and eighth centuries, however, cannot be linked to persons and events living centuries later. Ever since

128

very nearly identical parallels to the runes subsequently scratched on these vessels were found in Szarvas on an eight-century Avar bone needle case, even the burying of the vessels cannot be dated to after the fall of the Avar Empire.

The Conquering Hungarians in Transylvania

Identifying the artifacts of the Hungarians after their arrival in the Carpathian Basin has become a routine task for archaeologists. With the help of the tenth century western coins found in a grave in 1834, archaeologists had already succeeded in tying customs such as burying a warrior with his horse and other peculiarities of clothing and arms to the conquering Hungarians. Similar finds rapidly grew in number after archaeology first developed into a movement and then into a science. By around the turn of the century (1896, 1907) publications of these finds filled huge volumes. In the past few decades, however, a new look at the excavations and research done in this century has led to the conclusion that the few hundred warriors found buried with their horse and arms and the graves of their female relatives do not fairly represent the entire Hungarian population of the tenth century. Even by the most generous estimates, these finds only reflect the middle strata of the population, about 20,000–30,000 people from one generation. The survival of the Hungarian language and nation was insured by the common people, likewise oriental in origin, who left behind less spectacular remains. It has also become apparent that though the armed strata, the equestrian "heathens" and their oriental metal craft, rich in pagan imagery, had disappeared from the scene by the early eleventh century, or rather, were transformed into a new Christian ruling class and art, the villages and cemeteries of the common people survived the shock of Hungary's joining the brotherhood of Christian states. From the late tenth or early eleventh century onwards, folk culture absorbed the local Slavic elements and, after being enriched by the symbols of Christianity, it became a culture of many peoples, the "archaeological" culture of the Árpáds' new state. For this reason after the eleventh century, it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between Slavic and Hungarian villages and/or cemeteries in Transylvania, too, using archaeological methods. With the consolidation of the state and of the Roman Catholic church, these supra-national attire and rites lost their colour and became impoverished, though in essence they survived among the common people obliged to bury their dead around the Catholic churches up to the great catastrophe of the Mongol invasion of 1241–1242.

Thanks to archaeological excavations, this is all borne out today by evidence from several thousand archaeological sites and burials. The cemeteries of the military middle strata with symbolic or actual horse burials are known from 550 sites located all over the plains and the hilly regions of the Carpathian Basin. The culture of the common people is evidenced in more than 2,000 sites which include cemeteries of early villages holding from 600 to 900 to 1,300 graves each. In the same way as the Old Hungarian place-names, these finds are, with the odd exception, archaeologically totally un-

Fig. 7. Grave of a sabre-bearing Hungarian warrior from the time of the Conquest, with the remains of a stuffed horse on his left; and the plundered grave of a warrior of the same period with a horse-hide on his left. The former Zápolya Street, Kolozsvár

related to the villages and the artifacts of any people who had lived here previously.

To this day, the most spectacular finds have been those of the military middle strata. Their chief distinguishing feature is a characteristic equally absent from the customs of the Avars living here earlier and the equestrian

peoples who arrived in the plains of eastern Europe after the Hungarians. This custom is the partial (symbolic) horse burial. After the horse of the dead man had been butchered and eaten at the burial feast, the horseskin, together with the skull and the forelegs, was placed inside the grave, either rolled up, spread out, or occasionally even stuffed with straw. This practical custom derived from the Finno-Ugric belief that the soul of a horse — like the soul of a man — resides inside the skull. Therefore, the horse's afterlife could be assured by the burial only of its skull. Sometime only the harness or the saddle was placed inside the grave, or not even that in the case of some families and/or groups. In these latter cases, it may be assumed on the basis of oriental historical ethnographic parallels, that the skull, the harness, or perhaps the stuffed horse itself, was hung over the grave after the burial feast which was held at a later time in the same way as the spear of the deceased was often used to mark the owner's grave. Therefore, a lack of horse-bones and harness equipment (e.g. in Maroskarna) only indicates that a particular community had different traditions and burial customs. It certainly by no means indicates that these people were not Hungarians.

The Hungarian burial grounds of the tenth and the eleventh centuries are, in general, characterized by shallow graves, even in the case of corpses buried in splendid costumes. The unprecedented shallowness of the Hungarian graves indicated that they saw the peace of their dead secure throughout the land. These graves are, therefore, reflections both on a stable regime and on the character of a people who liked to make life as easy as possible. The same phenomenon is evidenced in the "partial" horse burials. In line with an ancient oriental tradition, the Hungarians liked to establish their burial grounds on hillsides and elevations. On the plains they preferred the sites of prehistoric settlements and tumuli (Óbesenyő–Bukova).

In the small cemeteries of the military middle strata, men and women were buried in one or two rows in a strictly predetermined order, even though some peculiar variations existed. Sometimes even women were buried together with their horses (Bihar, Kolozsvár, Temesvár). This arrangement of graves within the cemetery has, in the past, been explained on the basis of kinship or clan relationship. Today, however, there are serious biological arguments against that view. It is becoming more and more apparent that here we are witness to the military order of the tenth century. The details of this order are yet to be clarified in the course of archaeological excavations currently being carried out. The "standard equipment" found in the graves faithfully reflects the military order. (The inverted commas are only necessary to indicate that this equipment was never really "mass produced". Rather, these objects were the products of many hundreds of independent blacksmiths and goldsmiths.) In spite of the varied workshops, all the harness equipment found in the graves such as the pear-shaped stirrups with circular bases and the bridle-bits are extremely characteristic of tenth-century Hungarian craftsmanship. Naturally, they vary in size and while some are made of simple wrought iron, others are also decorated with gold or silver inlay (Kolozsvár, Muszka, Perjámos). The decoration of the harness equipment is, again, characteristic of ninth- and tenth-century "steppe" nomads, although in their detail and combination of elements they

are uniquely Hungarian. The harness equipment found in women's graves can serve as an example: the reins and the breechings decorated with gold-plated silver and bronze rosette mounts have been found from sixty-five to seventy sites spread over the whole of the Hungarian territories (Bihar, Sikló, Muszka).

Since the internal order of the cemeteries of the warring middle strata shows a marked stratification, it is far from certain that the deceased could take all their worldly possessions with themselves into the beyond. The number of arrows placed in the iron mounted quivers varied from one to eight, clearly indicating that the deceased also were not equal beyond the grave. It does not really matter whether this was meant to reflect the viewpoint of the other worldly or of the worldly hierarchy. Similarly, if the close-combat weapon of the Hungarians, the long sabre with a curved hilt is examined, it is found that this weapon was only placed in about twelve per cent of the graves of warriors buried with their horses. When all the graves of these middle strata are taken into account, the figure is reduced to five per cent. The exclusiveness exists in spite of the fact that the sabre was far from being a rare weapon. Practically every mounted soldier possessed one. Naturally, these sabres, also display great variability, coming with or without guards, in simple wooden or leather sheaths or in sheaths decorated with bronze, silver or gold mountings. One can no more picture a Hungarian warrior without a sabre than assume that archers went to war with only from one to eight arrows in their capacious quivers. While it was the sabre which was best accommodated to the Hungarian style of fighting in the early days, there is authentic evidence that the first conquering Hungarians already possessed some "western" weapons. These weapons include Norman–Viking double-edged swords (Gyulafehérvár) and Byzantine ones (Sepsiszentgyörgy). The two different types of close-combat weapons uncovered from graves of the conquering Hungarians, therefore, cannot be described in terms of conquerors' weapons versus the weapons of the defenders (Arad–Csálya and Déva).

They carried rhomboid or "swallow-tail" shaped arrow-heads in ingeniously constructed iron-mounted quivers. These arrow-heads were of a type and size which, again, had previously been unknown in the Carpathian Basin (found at Kolozsvár and Déva in Transylvania). The bows — the products of many many years of work —, and especially the bow-quivers, were very rarely placed in the grave. If such bows are found, the bone nocks of these reflex-bows, with their peculiar shape, stand out. The battle-axe and the spear-head featured less often in the Hungarian burial rituals (spear-heads have been found at Sepsiszentgyörgy–Eprestető in Transylvania).

The metal — bronze and silver — hairrings, buttons and the lyre-shaped bronze (Temesvár, Pécska, Maroskarna, Kolozsvár) or iron belt-buckles are ubiquitous characteristics of Hungarian men's garb at that time. Naturally, every warrior had a leather belt and a sabretache. The distinctive bronze and silver-mounted ornamental belts decorated with oriental leaf-patterns were indicators of a specific rank (Sajtény and Kolozsvár), in the same way as were the ingeniously shaped and mounted rings set with precious stones and, above all, the metal sabretache plates. The commanders and distinguished warriors from the western campaigns often had silver coins sewn

Fig. 8. Grave finds of a Hungarian woman from the time of the Conquest buried in ornate costume, Marosgombás

to their garments by way of decoration (Sikló, Orsova). These coins have proven to be of help in dating the burials up to the middle of the tenth century. According to a misconception that even has advocates in Hungary, the conquerors came to the Carpathian Basin without their women. If

so, they would have forgotten their own language within a few decades. It is true that women's graves account for only about 30 to 40 per cent of all the graves in military cemeteries — this is what makes them military! In the civil cemeteries, however, this asymmetry is often reversed.

There are metal finds that help in the reconstruction of women's clothing such as buttons, circular or rhomboid adornments trimming the neck of the shirt or caftan, as well as mounted pendants of various sizes (Marosgombás). Mounted boots, caps and, of course, jewellery have frequently been found. Long oriental earrings decorated with pearl pendants first appeared in the Carpathian Basin with the Hungarians. They also brought along Byzantine earrings from the Black Sea region which has pendants resembling bunches of grapes. (These silver earrings come in solid and hollow versions and were also copied in bronze.) Still, the most important items are the lamellar disk-pendants, either beaten or engraved as well as the wide (often engraved) bracelets. After the Conquest the women began to wear western jewellery as well, including earrings and ornamental broaches with enamel inlay. Some of these objects found their way to the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain (Szalacs, Detta) and Transylvania (Gyulafehérvár) either as part of the booty from raids or as goods purchased for money.

While the metal finds and the burial customs of the puritanical men of the middle strata are only rarely seen in the cemeteries of the common people, the garments worn by women of the middle strata often resemble and display similarities with the clothing of common women. The gold and silver versions of the common women's bracelets, twisted torques and finger-rings bent from a single thick metal rod or bunched wire again represent a thoroughly new type of jewellery in the Carpathian Basin of the tenth century. Such pieces often occur in the graves of the wealthier women. These women often wore a double-branched pendant for trimming the neck of their garments which was copied in several bronze versions by the common women up until the middle of the eleventh century. Clothing decorated with small bronze buttons and bronze pendants to be braided in the hair were quite popular. The bronze and silver bracelets of unknown origin decorated with opposing animals' heads came to the Carpathian Basin only after the Conquest (Torda, Biharfélegyháza, Pécska, Temesvár). These bracelets were equally popular with women from both social groups. The only female jewellery worn exclusively by the common women were the simple bracelets and finger-rings of bunched wire, plain hair rings, crescent-shaped pendants of some religious significance and various glass necklaces, by this time sometimes of local origin.

The Hungarian archaeological culture appeared in Transylvania and the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, simultaneously in both the valleys and on the plains as everywhere else in the country. In spite of this fact, even Hungarian researchers have subscribed to the view that the settlement of the Hungarian conquerors in Transylvania had been less substantial. It was, however, later research in the area that was spotty, not Hungarian settlement. In the first place, archaeological research commenced half a century later in Transylvania than in the rest of Hungary: the first graves of the Hungarian conquerors in Transylvania were only found in 1895 at Marosgombás. The last systematic excavations of tenth-century Hungarian

sites, on the other hand, were carried out in 1911, at Zápolya Street in Kolozsvár and it was only possible to publish the results in 1942. Between the two world wars, only one grave of a single Hungarian conqueror horseman was reported (Székelyderzs). After the Second World War, graves of the military middle strata were unearthed on many occasions, almost invariably as the "by-products" of excavations designed to look for something else. These sites were expertly excavated by conscientious archaeologists, but none of these cemeteries have ever been published (for example, those at Déva, Piski and Pata Street in Kolozsvár, as well as a number of cemeteries in Gyulafehérvár, and those at Köröstarján, Sajtény, Sikló, Arad-Csálya and Csóka-erdő in Temesvár). A few graves were published (Maroskarna B. cemetery, Hodony, Szalacs and Gálospetri), only because no horse-bones were found and hence the graves were thought to be those of non-Hungarian warriors. Compared with the results from excavations in Hungary and in southern Slovakia where admirable work is being done in research on the military middle strata, the number of Transylvanian finds falls steadily behind. This situation creates a great deal of confusion, since keeping such finds secret leads either to the underrating or overrating of their importance. The excavations themselves, however, can very seldom be kept secret. In this way, it leaked out that in the seat of the *gyulas*, Gyulafehérvár, important cemeteries of both the middle strata and common people have been found in numbers that are comparable only to the cemeteries of the Árpád dynasty in Székesfehérvár. In addition, it was learned that there had been a significant Hungarian military centre in the Carpathian Basin in Kolozsvár at the time of the Conquest.

Horse burials of "lone" warriors — a phenomenon known only among the elite — or of "groups" of just two or three graves have been found dating to the beginning of the tenth century in the Székelyföld — region inhabited by Székely — (Kézdivásárhely, Eresztevény, Sepsiszentgyörgy, Csíkzsögöd, Köpec and Székelyderzs). These men must have been members of the military contingent settled along the inward edge of the southeastern Transylvanian passes to protect the borders against the Pechenegs and the Bulgars. It is the lack of such a force in this area that would be surprising, since significant military outposts of this same type have lately been found even on the outer ring of the northeastern Carpathians (Przemyśl in southeastern Poland). Nor is it surprising, then, that around the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries, the Bulgars completely rebuilt the fortifications in Slon on the southern slopes of the Carpathians, placed precisely opposite to this southeastern Transylvanian border guard unit. These fortifications had originally been built from bricks to keep under surveillance the southern exit of the Bodza Pass, but only a few decades later they were rebuilt from stone. They provide tangible evidence of the appearance of a new, offensive power in the region against whom the Bulgars needed to set up a permanent defence system. What is surprising, however, is the trapezoid-shape stone fortress found at Slon-Prahova with towers on two corners and fortified with a peculiar gate tower, a unique construction north of the Lower Danube region. The technology of its construction — carved stonework and the use of mortar — links this fortress directly to the great Bulgar centres at Pliska, Preslav, Madara and Silistra/Dristra. The fortifications in

Slon on the southern slopes of the Carpathians must have served only defensive purposes. These advanced positions were given up, first by the repeatedly defeated Bulgars, and later, also by the Hungarians.

The only partially excavated and almost wholly published Hungarian "military" cemetery (consisting of only twelve graves, including those brought to light in 1941–1942) in the interior of Transylvania is located in Kolozsvár's former Zápolya Street (known today as Dostoievski Street, and also called Vishinski Street in some of the earlier literature). Its importance can only be compared to that of the most remarkable cemeteries of similar type in Hungary at Kenézlő, Bezdéd, Eperjeske and Karos. That the cemetery contained everything with the exception of sabretache plates probably stems from the fact that the graves had been robbed sometime during the Middle Ages, and also that the cemetery has not been completely excavated.

The fact that the graves of Hungarian warriors have turned up in the valley of the Kis-Szamos in no way enhances Anonymus's credibility as a "war reporter". The strategic importance of the location speaks for itself. The relatively small cemetery in Zápolya Street serves as proof neither for the continued existence of "Roman" Napoca into the tenth century, nor for the existence of Hungarian Kolozsvár from the tenth century onwards, since the cemetery lies 1,275 metres to the east of the, by then, decayed ruins of the Roman city. Nothing could have justified this distance if the people buried in the graves had indeed lived inside the walls of the Roman city, and especially not if they had resided inside what was to be called the *Óvár* (Old Castle), where, incidently, no sign of habitation between the ninth and the eleventh centuries has been found. In places where people did settle in what was still standing of the Roman cities, for instance in Apulum at Gyulafehérvár, they did not hesitate to bury their dead within the city walls, inside the destroyed Bulgar settlement. The cemeteries outside the antique walls are a continuation of the Bulgar cemetery, or lie east, not far from the fortress.

The recent discovery of another cemetery located much closer to Napoca alters none of the above conclusions. About thirty graves, almost all with grave goods, were unearthed during the course of excavations at a second- and third-century Roman cemetery between the Györgyfalvi Street and Pata Street. Precisely how many graves contained horse bones is not known. There may have been five or six, several of which contained sabres and a few of which were equipped with mounted belts. Almost all the men's graves contained arrow-heads, while a dozen more held the bone nocks from reflex bows. Hair-discs, bracelets, rings, some made of gold and silver, and "Saltovo-type" vessels were found in the women's graves. In other words, these finds are similar to those uncovered in Zápolya Street. The cemetery lies at a distance of about 600 metres to the southwest of the one in Zápolya Street, and therefore must have been a separate burial ground. There was a third cemetery from the same period at roughly the same distance to the northwest (Farkas Street), marked only by a single grave of a woman whose garment had been mounted with small metal buttons along the neck and who was wearing a pair of silver earrings with pendants resembling bunches of grapes. On the basis of these three early cemeteries in Kolozsvár, it may

be assumed that some military settlement(s) from the time of the Conquest was located along the region of the Malompatak and Budai Nagy Antal Street (formerly Honvéd Street).

The horse burial of a Hungarian warrior, demolished in the eleventh century by builders, has been found inside the fortress in Gyulafehérvár. No particulars are known of the graves from the middle warrior strata reported found outside the walls (Zalatnai Street), except that they contained horse bones, ornamental belts, quivers, hair-discs and pendants, and silver earrings with pendants resembling bunches of grapes. The details of the military cemeteries of the middle warrior strata unearthed during the course of both earlier (at Marosgombás and Magyarlapád), which frequently contained horse bones, and more recent excavations (at Maroskarna B. cemetery) are comparatively well known. A similar, partially excavated and published cemetery from the Maros region in Déva has also been reported, and there has been news of unpublished horse burials from Maroskarna and Piski.

Except for the ford on the Szamos River at Kolozsvár, all the military cemeteries from the period of the Conquest have been unearthed in the Maros Valley. The cemeteries of the military posts appear along both sides of that section of the river which runs towards the open territory of the Great Hungarian Plain, along the valleys of the Maros and Aranka rivers (Ópálos, Fönlak, Németszentpéter, Arad–Csálya, Nagyszentmiklós, Perjámos, Magyarpécska and Sajtény). Only one military settlement has been found in the valley of the Sebes-Körös at Krajnikfalva and none in the region of the gate of Meszes.

The cemeteries of the eastern Great Hungarian Plain belonged to the central bulk of tenth-century Hungarian settlements. The totally military cemetery of Biharvár was one of these, the only cemetery in the region that has been partially excavated and published still early in this century. Another central burial place was the military cemetery in nearby Köröstarján, also including a number of horse burials, and the cemetery of Ártánd within the territory of today's Hungary. The Ér region was inhabited by representatives of the middle strata (Gálospetri and Szalacs), as was the vicinity of the presumed early habitat of the *gyula*s, south of the present-day town of Gyula (Gyulavarsánd, Muszka and Sikló). In the Temes region, there is a long chain of fine military cemeteries of this middle strata, and cemeteries of their chiefs (Nagyősz, Vizesd, Nagyteremia, Nagykomlós, Hodony, Temesvár–Csóka-erdő and Detta all the way down to Orsova). At Orsova on the Lower Danube, there was a military outpost from the period of the Conquest surprisingly rich in Hungarian finds, which have been dated with the help of western and Byzantine coins. In the last third of the tenth century, the military settlements of the Ér region and the Sebes-Körös region likely served as border-guard posts against the Transylvanian "land" of the *gyula*s, while the forces of the Temes region were at the disposal of Ajtony in the eleventh century.

The smallish tenth-century cemeteries of the distinctly oriental commoners of Hungarian stock have been found almost exclusively in the valleys of the Maros River (Maroscsapó, Marosnagylak and Gyulafehérvár — at least two cemeteries — Magyarlapád, Alvinc–Borberek and Maroskarna). Even

the few exceptions are in the neighbourhood of the Maros region (Torda, Zeykfalva and Kelnek). Only some of the more important cemeteries from the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, the Temesköz and the Lower Danube region are worth mentioning: those at Nagykároly, Hegyközkovácsi, Nagyvárad, Gyulavarsánd, Pécska, Hidasliget, Temesliget and Mehádia. As in most places within the country, Hungarian settlements and their cemeteries in Transylvania, too, only rarely survived the internal struggles, turmoil and resettlements that accompanied the founding of the Hungarian state. There is evidence of a tenth-century period in the late (Medgyes-type) urn-cemeteries of the Slavs in Transylvania as well as in the Bulgar cemetery of Csombord and in the burial grounds shared by Bulgars, Slavs and Hungarians in Gyulafehérvár. In the southern parts of the Temes region, some tenth-century archaeological material has been found in the cemeteries of a few Bulgar-Slav settlements (Ómoldova, Felsőlupkó–Gornya).

3. Transylvania in the Early Kingdom of Hungary (1003–1172)

Igfon erdő (Egyfan = "holy woods") was the name given to the Bihar Mountains in Old Hungarian. The country lying over the mountains was called "Across the woods" (*Erdeelvv* in the eleventh century *Old Gesta*) looking from the direction of the plain along the Duna–Tisza rivers; much the same as the land over the *Havas* ("Alpes" = the snow-capped Carpathians) was called *Havaselve* (today: Wallachia). In the pre-1190 sources from the Árpád period, the former was referred to as *Ultrasilvana (Ultra Silvas)* in the Italian–Roman Latin dialect, while in the Latin dialect used in Germany the name *Transilvana* appeared sometime between 1190 and 1250, with the two forms being used concurrently. The use of the form *"Transsilvania"* is only confirmed after 1461. The thousand year old Hungarian name of *Erdély* is spelt *Ardeal* in Romanian. It was first written down in this form in 1444 in a Romanian charter worded in Slavic, and the same spelling is still used today.

Compared to the rest of Hungary, very few charters have survived from the Árpádian period in Transylvania. The Chapter of Gyulafehérvár, together with its archives and registers, was destroyed, first by the Mongols in 1241, and then by the Saxons of Vízakna in 1277. The Mongol invasion brought a similar fate to the documents of the nearby See of Csanád, to the archives of the See of Várad — with the exception of a register containing some early thirteenth-century data — and to the archives of the Abbey of Kolozsmonostor. As a consequence of the widespread devastation, only a few official documents, mostly royal charters, have survived as records of Transylvania's early history, and these certainly do not go back to the earliest days (Gyulafehérvár: 1111; Csanád: 1111 and 1163; Belső-Szolnok: 1134 and 1166; Arad and Aradvár: 1156 and 1177; Dobokavár: 1164; Krasznavár: 1093 and 1164; Tordavár: 1075 and 1177; Kolozsvár, Küküllővár and Krassóvár: 1177; Zaránd: 1203 and 1214; Hunyadvár: 1265 and 1276). Only four charters refer back to the eleventh century. To this day, the testimony of the

much earlier chronicles and legends is generally ignored and the archaeological data are re-interpreted in a determined effort to present these late references as primary, contemporaneous sources, especially when the reference is to the political institutions of the Kingdom of Hungary in Transylvania. This approach fails to take cognizance of the fact that the arrival of the Saxons and the Romanians, as well as the resettlement of the Székelys are also documented only in charters dated several decades after the events themselves. The unfortunate practice of deducing the history and economic history of eleventh-century Transylvania from development trends obtaining throughout all of Hungary at the time as well as these late Transylvanian charters has only added to the chaos. It has resulted in a hopeless confusion of the territorially organized counties (*comitatus civitatis, mega,* later also known as the "noble counties") with the border counties (*marchia, comitati confiniorum),* and the early units of government (centred around the royal castles (*civitates, comitati castrorum,* the "royal counties"), quite ignoring the fact that in some places, the first of these really did develop quite late. The extent of the confusion is well illustrated by the circumstance that the existence of *comitati* centred around the royal castles, for example, is generally denied on the grounds that they lack the data and criteria characteristic of the territorially organized counties. And yet, these castles are still there for everyone to see, and have been excavated and dated on the evidence of the finds and occasionally, even of coins. People were continuously buried in the cemeteries of these castles since the time of King Stephen I and King Peter (Ó-Tordavár, Ó-Kolozsvár, Ó-Hunyadvár and Ó-Aradvár). Under these circumstances, therefore, toponymy checked against etymology and archaeology plays a much larger role in the reconstruction of the real history of this region than of the rest of the Carpathian Basin.

There are many problems that cannot be resolved by archaeology. Archaeology can determine, however, whether or not a region was inhabited at any given time starting from the Neolithic, and can confirm with some degree of certainty whether or not the settlement was a lasting one. Archaeology also provides information on the type of population which lived in the region — its "culture" — on the degree of its social differentiation and, when it comes to historical times, on the form of government. Archaeology can establish, with a high degree of certainty, whether castles and fortifications existed in the period in question and if so, what type they were when they were built and rebuilt as well as when they were destroyed or deserted. With the help of the coins minted yearly or every other year, under the kings of the House of Árpád and used by the people as oboli, archaeologists can date the eleventh- and twelfth-century cemeteries within a decade or so. They are also able to identify long-perished villages using the evidence of charters and regional place-names surviving only in local history. In short, archaeology provides source material that today cannot be overlooked. Unfortunately, however, the one-sidedly researched archaeological evidence from the region is even less adequate for shedding light on the economic history of this age than of the early stages of the Age of Migrations.

Map 8. Settlements in Transylvania and in the Eastern Great Plain between 1003 and 1172

1. The fort of the *murchio/comes*; 2. The seat of the *dux*; 3. Princely *curtis*; 4. Bishopric; 5. Abbey; 6. Salt mine operating in the eleventh–twelfth centuries; 7. Hillforts and border hillforts from the last third of the eleventh century to the middle of the twelfth century; 8. Besenyő (B), Kölpény (K), Talmács (T), village names indicating border-guard settlements; 9. Hungarian village churches and church-yards in the eleventh–twelfth centuries; 10. Villages referred to in documents up to the 1170s; 11. Early clan landed properties in the eleventh–twelfth centuries; 12. Slav Daróc and Ardó place-names; 13. Coins issued by Stephen I, Peter, Samuel and Andrew I; 14. Coins issued by Béla I, Solomon, Géza I and Ladislas I; 15. Coins issued by Coloman, Stephen II and Béla II; 16. Coins issued by Géza II, Stephen II, and Béla III; 17. Coin hoard from the age of Peter; 18. Coin hoards from the age of Ladislas I; 19. Coin hoard from the age of Béla II; 20. Coin hoards from the age of Béla III; 21. Border-guard cemeteries from the time of Géza II; 22. Border-guard villages from the time of Géza II; 23. Border *ispánság*s (counties) in the eleventh–twelfth centuries, Borsova features here as a basis for comparison

The Eastern Part of the Great Hungarian Plain up to the Last Third of the Twelfth Century

Just as in the tenth century, it is necessary to distinguish in this period as well between the history of the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain (the eastern part of the region laying east of the Tisza and the Temes region) and the history of Transylvania. Biharvár and Csanádvár, the two centres of this area played such major roles in Hungarian history that they rate in importance right after the two royal seats of Esztergom and Székesfehérvár, and sometimes even precede them.

From the second half of the 1020s, King Stephen I created a principality *(ducatus)* in the vast region of Bihar under the rule of his only surviving son, Prince Imre (Heinricus, Emericus). The establishment of the Diocese of Bihar in an area previously belonging to the Diocese of Eger, in 1030, and the concurrent founding of the See of Maros on territories formerly part of the Diocese of Kalocsa show the growing importance attached to the region. Prince Imre died in an accident in the Berettyó Valley on 2 September, 1031 while hunting wild boars. A monastery was founded on the probable scene of the accident at the end of the eleventh century (Hegyközszentimre).

Gerald (Gerhardt) of Venice, the great missionary saint of the Hungarian church was appointed bishop of Csanád in 1030 *(Annales Posoniensis)*, although for a long time his bishopric would still be known as the Diocese of Maros *(Moresenae aecclesia)*. After the death of King Stephen I, the bishop became the living conscience of the Christian kingdom. Even the atrocities committed by King Samuel Aba in Csanádvár in 1044 failed to intimidate him and he refused to place the crown on the king's head in the cathedral on 22 April, Easter Sunday. It was in Csanádvár that people opposing Peter's second reign gathered in 1046 and, with Gerald's support, set out from here to ask the heir to the throne, Prince András of the House of Árpád, to return to Hungary. Gerald founded the episcopal Cathedral of Saint George (the burial place of Ladislas IV since 1290) using the 1000 silver marks donated by King Stephen I and subsequently supervised its construction. King Stephen I had also given gold and silver worth 500 marks to Gerald to erect the Monastery of the Blessed Virgin Mary, where Gerald later wrote the first of his theological works completed in Hungary, the *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum* (Deliberation on the Hymn of the Three Boys). He suffered martyrdom on 24 September, 1046, and by 1053 his body had been taken to Csanádvár to be buried in the Monastery of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The large piece of stone that had been the instrument of his martyrdom was placed on his sarcophagus. His remains were "elevated" on papal instruction in the presence of King Ladislas I and Prince Lampert on 25 July, 1088. Thus, the first Hungarian bishop-martyr was canonized at Csanádvár.

Biharvár had a stormier history. King Andrew I revived the principality between 1048 and 1050, initially putting Prince Béla, his younger brother and heir to the throne, in charge, and giving him the right to mint his own money. In 1060, Béla used the principality's military force to overthrow the rule of King Andrew and his son, Solomon. Nevertheless, after the death of King Béla I, King Solomon was forced to hand over the principality to Béla's

son, Géza (called "Magnus dux" on the principality's coins between 1064 and 1074). During these decades, Biharvár was practically the second capital of Hungary. It was hardly a coincidence, then, that such eminent personalities headed the Diocese of Bihar as the — presumably Italian — Baduil (Budli/Buldi, Budlu), who suffered martyrdom together with Bishop Gerald in 1046, or Baduil's successor and the future bishop of Eger, Leodvin of Lorraine (Namur) (mentioned before 1061 as *Lieduinus episcopus Bichariensis* between 1064 and 1074). Several princely mansion-houses were built in the area. It was from Bihar that Géza and Ladislas organized the revolt against King Solomon in 1073, and from here that Ladislas set out to get forcing help, while Géza's "Bihar army" was defeated on 26 February, 1074. Then, the same army, led by Prince Ladislas, thoroughly redeemed its honour at Mogyoród less than two weeks later on 14 March, 1074. After Géza I assumed power, Prince Ladislas became *dux* (1075–1077).

When Béla I seized power in the autumn of 1060, or when the pagans rose in revolt in Székesfehérvár in 1061, the remains of King Stephen I were "raised" (*Translatio S. Stephani regis*, 11 October) and hidden under a huge stone slab in Székesfehérvár. It was at that time that his mummified right arm and hand were taken to Bihar. The thief hid them in a small wooden monastery until the third year after the second *translatio* occasioned by King Stephen I's canonization on 20 August, 1083, when the incident came to light (1086). King Saint Ladislas I and Prince Álmos ordered the building of a monastery for the Holy Dexter (*Sanctissima Dextera*, in Old Hungarian: *Szent Jobb*) on the spot. It was there that Hungary's national relic was kept until 1433. Although King Coloman stripped the monastery of the lands and privileges transferred to it by Prince Álmos, including the salt tax of Szalacs, the lands were returned by Géza II. Later, considerable compensation was given to the monastery when it was made a *locus credibilis*, with authority to handle legal business. Since almost all the estates of the abbey (also known later as Berettyómonostor) lay within the territory of modern Hungary (except, for example, Síri near Világosvár), no conclusions about the economy of Transylvania and the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain can be drawn from a survey of the sixteen different crafts professed by members of the roughly 90 households which rendered service to the abbey.

After founding Várad, Ladislas I first established a collegiate chapter in the newly built fortress and then moved the See of Bihar within the castle wall as well. His nephew and successor to the throne, Coloman, became the first bishop of Várad (between 1093 and 1095). Coloman's younger brother, Álmos, earlier (1091–1095) king of Croatia which had been conquered by Ladislas I, became the last *dux* of Bihar (1095–1106), although without the right to mint his own coins. It was Álmos who founded the Benedictine Monastery of Meszes in Transylvania around 1106. Following his pilgrimage to Jerusalem, he founded the Abbey of Dömös (1108), donating about a hundred estates to it. They included several villages in the region between the Fehér-Körös and the Fekete-Körös rivers and along the Maros River. The transference of King Ladislas I's remains from Somogyvár to Várad perhaps also took place during Álmos's reign (1098?). It was to have enormous consequences when, a few decades later, the town was to become the second most important religious and cultural centre of the mediaeval King-

142

dom of Hungary, second only to Székesfehérvár. After the canonization of Ladislas I in Várad (1192), the area surrounding his grave became the burial place of kings and queens. (Among the first who found a resting place here were Andrew II [temporarily], Queen Beatrix of Luxemburg, Queen Mary of Anjou, and the king and emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg.) King Stephen II founded Hungary's first Premonstrant abbey on the northern bank of the Sebeskörös on the Promontorium of Várad, inviting monks from Prémontré in the same decade as the order was established (1119). With authority over all the Premonstrant monasteries in Hungary, it was at this abbey that King Stephen II was buried in 1131. Since the first miracles around the tomb of Ladislas took place during Stephen's reign, it is entirely possible that the latter's remains were later taken to the Cathedral of Várad. During the reign of Stephen II, there was a war of sorts on the southern borders. The Byzantine emperor, Ioannes II Comnenus crossed the Danube at Haramvár and chased a Hungarian army as far as the Krassó River. Otherwise these odd hostilities were confined to the destruction of each other's fortresses and the carrying off of the building material (1127–1129).[27]

The plains outside Aradvár gained notoriety in connection with the general assembly of 1031. It was here that sixty-eight noblemen supporting Coloman were massacred by the followers of Álmos on orders from Helene, queen of Béla II. The confiscated wealth of the victims was later used to build the Abbey of Saint Martin on the spot by way of expiation. The building has already been completed by the reign of Stephen III, since people were buried around it in those years. The imposing ruins we see today are those of the rebuilt church consecrated in 1224. Its properties, donated by Béla III and registered in 1177, included besides villages in the counties of Arad, Zaránd, Bihar and Temes, some Transylvanian estates: a piece of land in Torda county (whence the boats of the abbey stationed at Arad started out with their consignments of salt), and the previously mentioned village of Asszonynépe, to which we shall have occasion to return.

The history of the period came to a close with an attack by the Byzantines. Emperor Manuel I Comnenus marched to the Lower Danube in the autumn of 1150, and sent an army to the "land of Timises" (the Temes region). The army was led by Boris, a pretender to the Hungarian throne. The invaders, after plundering the wealthy market towns, fled in disgrace at the approach of the army of King Géza II, as we learn from the confirming reports of Ioannes Cinnamus,[28] as well as Abu Hamid al-Garnati, from Granada who happened to be in Hungary at the time.

To complete the history of the period, the Cistercian Abbey of Egres, founded by Béla III on the left bank of the Maros River in 1179 must surely be mentioned. This was the second Cistercian abbey established in Hungary after the one built at Cikádor in 1142. Built by French friars from Pontigny in the French style, it was to be the mother house of the Cistercian abbey to be built in Kerc in Transylvania in 1202. Queen Jolanta of Capet-Courtenay was buried in the Monastery of Egres in 1233 as was King Andrew II in 1235.

27. I. CINNAMUS, Epitome I. = *FBHH* 196–198; Chronica Hungarorum 156 = *SRH* I, 441–442.

28. I. CINNAMUS, Epitome II. = *FBHH* 208–209.

Transylvania after 1003 until the Last Quarter of the Twelfth Century

Although the *Annals of Hildesheim* and *Altaich* leave no doubt about the enforced conversions that took place among the mostly pagan population of the region immediately after the *gyula* and his family were taken to Pannonia in 1003, there is also some earlier evidence on the organization of political power. Fortresses built with earth-and-timber ramparts were raised on this strip of land as soon as it was annexed to the kingdom. The work was carried out under the command of people such as *comes (ispán)* Doboka (said to be related to the king) and the father of Csanád, the future *comes* of Marosvár. At the time of the Pecheneg attack on Transylvania (an event which has been emphasized in all three legends of Saint Stephen and which took place sometime between 1015 and 1030), the village folk were herded within the walls of the castles until the Transylvanian army, commanded by the *tribunus* of Fehérvár, put the pillaging enemy to flight. The population who "fled to safety within the walls" could not have been very numerous, although the walls were already standing and, according to the *Legenda minor*, the castle of Fehérvár withstood the enemy attack.

It was in these years that the system of royal castles introduced by Stephen I were being built over the whole country. By the end of Stephen's rule, they numbered nearly forty. Alba civitas (Gyulafehérvár), the most important of them in Transylvania, was protected by the stone walls left by the Romans. Like Székesfehérvár, its sister castle in Pannonia, it was called "white" not only because of its walls but also to mark its position as the first among equals. The city that for a considerable time was only referred to as "Alba Ultrasilvana" or "Alba Transilvana" was called "(civitas) Alba Iule" in the Transylvanian sources. It was only later that the humanists' predilection for classical languages caused it to be changed to "Alba Julia" (the first documented occurrence of the term is in 1496).

Following practice current all over Hungary, the rest of the royal castles were named either after their first *ispán*, that is the official appointed by the king, who was responsible for administering the region and for the people belonging to the castle (e.g. Dobuka/Doboka, Turda/Torda, Colus/Kolozs, Hunod/Hunyad, Bihor/Bihar and Urod/Arad), or the river flowing by them (e.g. Küküllővár, Krasznavár, Marosvár later called Csanádvár, Temesvár and Krassóvár). The direct adoption of personal names in nominative as place-names is a peculiarity of the Hungarian language. Whenever it occurs, we can be sure that we are dealing with Hungarian nomenclature, even in instances where the Hungarian origin of the name is doubtful or not verifiable (such as the presumably Slavic Bihar, Doboka, Kolozs and Szatmár). For example, the names given to the salt mines belonging to these castles had the Slavic word *akna* (pit) affixed to the names of the ruling *ispán*s, and exemplify this use of personal names. (For Kolozsakna, Torda-akna, Désakna, read: Kolozs's *akna*, Torda's *akna* and Dés's *akna*).

The early Transylvanian counties were all, without exception, border counties *(marchiae, comitati confiniorum)*, each headed by an *ispán*. The castles serving as the *ispáns'* seats of government were all built in the inner

. Relics from Late Avar graves: *1.* Bronze belt fasteners, Zilah; *2–12.* Bronze belt ornaments, uckles, belt fasteners and earrings, Aranyosgyéres

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11. Silver treasure from the eleventh century: earrings ornamented with filigree work, fragment of pendant, silver pearls, Királyföld

10. Relics from graves of Hungarian men from the time of the Conquest: *1*. Stirrup and a part of its underside, inlaid with silver; *2*. Sabretache pendant; *3, 6–7*. Silver belt ornaments; *4*. Stirrup; *5*. Silver horse accoutrement

12. Spandrel relief showing Christ in glory, Gyulafehérvár, first cathedral, around 1100

13. Spandrel relief showing Christ in glory between two apostles, Gyulafehérvár cathedral, around 1210

1. Gold fibula set with precious stones belonging to a high-ranking Transylvanian Gothic lady

2. Gold pendant with boar's head from the Apahida I grave of a Gepid king

3. *1*. Chalice from the Calvinist church at Vízakna, Szeben county. Gilt silver, engraved and decorated with enamelled plates. Italian work, fourteenth century (?); 2–3. Enamelled plates from the base of the chalice depicting Saint George and Saint Barbara

4. Miniature depicting the ▶ Battle of Posada (9–12 November, 1330) from the *Képes Krónika* (Illustrated Chronicle), around 1358

INRI

western half of the counties, for example Dobokavár, Kolozsvár, Tordavár and Gyulafehérvár, as well as Hunyadvár located at the point of entry to the Hátszeg Basin. The situation is somewhat different only in the case of the "easternmost" castle, Küküllővár. For a long period, the ill-defined marches marked the eastern, southeastern and southern boundaries of the early border counties. Approaching the Carpathians, regarded as the natural, theoretical border, the frontiers became increasingly blurred, until they disappeared in precisely the same manner as they did in the case of the other border counties of the early Árpád period (Zala in the west, Borsova, Zemplén, Újvár and Gömör in the north). The elongated (in the case of Fehér county, undetermined) shape of the border counties stretching across the uninhabited or sparsely populated woodlands up to the peaks of the mountains *a priori* exclude the possibility that they could ever have had any earlier precedents, in the form of a voivodate or a kenezate. With the exception of Gyulafehérvár, no precedents can be verified for the *ispán's* castles either. The composition of these counties was essentially similar to that of Szolnok county which was created for the overland transport of Transylvanian salt consignments. The county of "Külső" (Outer)-Szolnok had been established along the Tisza River during the reign of Stephen I between 1018 and 1038. It was named after the *comes* Zounuk/Zounok/Zonuk/Zonok (pronounced like the Hungarian word *szónok*, meaning orator) who lost his life in the pagan revolt of 1046. His old Hungarian name has nothing to do with the Slavic word "*sol*" meaning "salt", and used to mean "salt" in the Hungarian language of the Ugric Age. The present form, Szolnok developed in the Late Middle Ages. This county extended across the region east of the Tisza ("Közép" [Central] Szolnok) along the salt road of Szalacs (magna via Zoloch, which definitely existed previous to 1067) to include Désvár and Désakna in northern Transylvania under the name of "Belső" (Inner)-Szolnok either at the time of King Béla I or King Géza I. It is entirely possible that the later county name derives from Zounuk, who in 1073 was one of Prince Géza's chief advisors.

Some Hungarian historians claim that the county system in Hungary was organized over the two-thirds appropriated from the lands of the conquering ancient clans. As far as the Transylvanian border counties were concerned, this is highly unlikely. Although the Gyula–Zsombor clan may have been present (though, more likely, it was not) in Doboka county the inhabitants were simply descendants of the clans of the *gyula*s. The *gyula*, who only moved to Transylvania in the last third of the tenth century, cannot be regarded as a descendant of the Transylvanian conquerors. Also, the family of the "*gyula*" (Queen Mother Sharolt, Boja and Bonyha) remained loyal to the end to Stephen I, therefore, their estates were not confiscated.

It can be verified, however, that, in addition to the lands of the royal castles appropriated from the *gyula's* lands, the queen's estates had already come into being during the reign of Stephen I. The Hungarian word *asszony* originating in the Alan-Osset language means "lady, princess, queen" in Old Hungarian. The name of the village of Asszonynépe (Lady's people) in Fehér county is the first occurrence, both in type and in time, of composite names containing the word *asszony* (1177: "Ascen nepe"). In or around 1030, Queen Gizella (Kesla), "with the consent of King Stephen", donated to the

Abbey of Bakonybél the nearby village of Lopath (Magyar-Lapád), situated along the same little stream, together with the now vanished Transylvanian village of Abony (Obon), according to the oldest charter making reference to "across the snow-capped mountains", that is Transylvania.

Although most of the first *ispáns* in Transylvania are known to us by name, precious little is known about the people they ruled. We have no information for this period about the landed families *(seniores)* of independent means *(facultas)* posing as rivals to the *ispáns*, with only two possible exceptions, the Kalán and Kajan families in Hunyad county. On the evidence of identical place-names in the region east of the Tisza River, however, their ancestors, came to the Strigy and Maros valleys at the time of the *gyulas*. The Zsombor-clan (as the Zsombor-villages indicate their early estates on the northern rim of the county of Doboka in the Almás Valley) played only a periferical role or was forced to do so in the eleventh century.

Once the region was integrated into the Kingdom of Hungary, there is no reason to assume that the social structure in Transylvania was any different from that mentioned in Stephen I's law books and *Admonitiones*. The castles, the swords and the spurs testify to the life-styles of the *ispáns (comites)*, always described as the strongest supporters of the state, and of the soldiers *(milites)* who defended the castles. The latter were armed bondsmen *(iobagiones)* who lived in permanent residences *(domus, edificia)*. Their origins must mostly have been Transylvanian: they were probably the descendants of former border guards *(speculatores)* and the military escort of the *gyulas*. There is no indication that Stephen I ever moved significant forces from Hungary into the region. The majority of those living inside the walls of the castles *(cives)* belonged to the social group of freemen *(liberi)* who also included the just emancipated, previously partially-free population *(liberti)*. These are the people who were buried in the cemeteries of the castles with their jewellery and silver coins. Graves totally lacking in grave goods in the castle cemeteries tell of servant burials *(servi, mancipii)*. As anywhere in Hungary, the common people and poor freemen *(vulgares aut pauperes)* in Transylvania, lived in villages *(villae)*, houses *(mansi)*, and semi-subterranean huts *(mansinculae)*. Evidence from the cemeteries shows that the population of these villages were also divided along family lines. Unlike the servants who came with the slave trade, these people almost certainly arrived at the time of the Conquest. In Transylvania, too, the villages were led by a village chief *(villicus)*. Nowhere in the sources can we find any mention of organizations based on kinship or synthetic clans.

There is little sign of change in these social divisions in either the charters of the middle third of the century or the so-called *Third Law-book of Ladislas* compiled around 1077. There were poor people *(ewnek = inek)* both among the freemen and the semi-free servants, who nevertheless were financially and legally in a far better position than the slaves. Considerable changes seem to have taken place, on the other hand, judging by late eleventh century legislation and charters dated from the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries including references to Transylvania. In short, there is no reason to believe that this region differed in its development from the rest of Hungary. The nobility *(nobiles, optimates, proceres)* and the military *(milites)* became the new ruling class. Members of the latter may even, by then, be described as knights. The population of the castles *(cives, castrenses)*

naturally consisted of freemen *(liberi)*, but by then they had split demon-strably into two groups: the professional soldiers *(castellani, cives castrensis)* and the bondsmen *(iobagiones castri)* of earlier times. As their contemporary Latin name indicates *(ministri, ministeriales* = people on duty), the latter were well on the way towards being swallowed up by the great new class of the common people *(plebs, plebeia)*. The trend to growing differentiation is re-flected in the various new designations for the free inhabitants of the castles *(civiles, castrenses castri, populi castri, curtes-udvornici)*. These free and par-tially free people were employed in service but nevertheless were still well above the great strata of slave-servants *(servi, ancillae)*.

The Diocese of Transylvania was most probably established very early on, possibly in 1009, following the personal intervention of the papal legate, Azo, and concurrently with the founding of the dioceses of Pécs, Győr and Eger. Its seat was established in Gyulafehérvár, where the Byzantine rite had yet to be completely suppressed. It is for this reason possible that the first episcopal church dedicated to Saint Michael (one which within dec-ades would prove too small) was completed before 1009. The process of Christian conversion could hardly have encountered any serious opposi-tion from the population. Its successes are soon evident from the cemeteries of the counties administered from the castles, although primarily only those with larger populations. It was only later that the Transylvanian bishops began to exert any real power over the counties of Kraszna, Szatmár and Ugocsa, which were sparsely populated, mostly by Slavs. The first bishop of Transylvania known to us by name was called Franco, according to a charter dated from 1075. Franco participated actively in the political life of the country. In Hungarian and foreign sources of between 1071 and 1081, he is referred to as *"episcopus Bellegrad(i)ensis"*, using Gyulafehérvár's Slavic name. The title of "bishop of Transylvania" *(Ultra silvanus)* was first used only in connection with his next known successor, Simon. Simon's succes-sors, however, were all explicitly referred to as *"ultrasilvani"* (Baran 1138, Valter 1156, and Vilcina/Vulcina 1166). The change of title probably re-flected the marked growth in the territory of the diocese during the twelfth century. By this period, the areas of the early deaneries set up in the first years of King Coloman's reign coincided with the areas of the counties that had since emerged. Probably Coloman was the one who founded the Chap-ter of Gyulafehérvár.

Not many major political and military events took place in Transylvania in this period. The only evidence of the opposition to the reign of King Peter in the region is the hoard of silver coins hidden sometime between 1041 and 1046 in Lámkerék (between Sebes and Gyulafehérvár).

The army of the Pecheneg tribe Jula[29] led by *Dux* Osul, easily penetrated the marches from Moldavia when it raided Transylvania in 1068. The army

29. The description of the event can be found in the Chronica Hungarorum 102 *(SRH* I, 367), where Osul was sent by "Gyule dux Cunorum" the late Hungarian personification of the Pecheneg Gula/Jula tribe, who settled west from the Dniester, not far from Turkia. By this time the Hungarian *gyula*, a name of rank, became an everyday personal name; cf. in the 1075 Charter of Garamszent-benedek: *Iula comes palatinus.* Therefore, with the leadership of Osul, a hostile Pecheneg army attacked Hungary and Transylvania. The story of "Alba Iulia", the Pecheneg lord of Gyulafehérvár is an entire fabrication.

reached Biharvár after burning down Ó-Kolozsvár. Returning to Transylvania through the valley of the Nyírség, the Szamos region and along the Lapos-Ilosva Valley, they hoped to escape with their booty through the Borgó Pass. The armies of the king and the prince gathered at Dobokavár — first mentioned in an eleventh-century chronicle in connection with this event — and cut off the enemy at the confluence of the Sajó and Beszterce rivers. The Pechenegs fled to a hill but were completely wiped out by King Solomon and his army in a daring frontal attack.

The hill where the battle took place was named after the battle cry of the Hungarians, "Kyrie eleis", from which the modern Hungarian place-name "Kerlés" derives. In Romanian, "Kerlés" was transformed into "Chiraleș", although it entered Hungarian poetry in the form of "Cserhalom" as the result of one of Bonfini's mistakes ("Cherhelem"). The memory of the battle itself was merged into the *St. Ladislas Legend* after going through substantial changes. As the commander of the Hungarians, King Solomon was replaced by Prince (and even King) Ladislas, and it was he who was described as having rescued the daughter of the bishop of Várad from the hands of the "Cuman" enemy.

These are very grave anachronisms, indeed, considering that the See of Bihar was only moved to Várad a quarter of a century later and that the Cumans (Kipčak Turks) were still living east of the Dnieper in 1068, and so on. The mention in the legend of "the bishop's daughter", however, indicates that the legend must have been created very soon after the death of Ladislas I, since in the book of his laws King Coloman prohibited the marriage of bishops once and for all. After Ladislas I was canonized in 1192, this story — constructed of ancient eastern elements —, lived on along with his church legend. It became the most popular theme depicted in several episodes on cathedral frescoes (Nagyvárad) and, following Sigismund's reign, in village churches, too. Neither is it a coincidence that it is the village churches of the Székelyföld that most of these frescoes have been preserved.

According to the passage which relates the event in the eleventh-century *Old Gesta* it was a scout *(speculator)* from "Újvár" (de Novo Castro) who informed the Hungarian army stationed at Dobokavár about the escape route of the Pechenegs. It is possible, therefore, that the construction of "Újvár" (Marosújvár), the fortress securing the salt mines and the salt roads in the vicinity of "Újakna", had been completed by 1068. There was a great need for it because, according to the charter of the Abbey of Garamszentbenedek, which had been given the right to collect salt taxes on the Aranyos River (Aranas in 1075), the *castrum quod dicitur Turda* ("the castle which is called Torda") (this is the first occasion that the fortress is mentioned) to the west of the already-working salt mine of Tordaakna could not protect the mine against enemy attacks coming from the Maros River. Nevertheless, everything seems to support the theory that the outer ring of fortresses protecting the Transylvanian Basin was built as a response to the incursion of 1068 because the defence system, based on the marches and the uninhabited strips of land along them, had proved ineffective against the light cavalry of the eastern invaders. It is not known exactly how many fortresses were involved. It would be as irresponsible to try and deduce a figure from later evidence as from the sheer existence of the earthworks surveyed with-

out excavations. Only one thing is certain, namely, that in the last third of the eleventh century the populated area protected by fortresses grew substantially.

The new ring of fortresses was put to the test in the spring of 1091. The first real attack of the Cumans, led by Krul's son Kapoltch, probably came through the Ojtoz Pass. Again, passing through Ó-Tordavár, Ó-Kolozsvár and Doboka they reached Várad, Bihar and, after crossing even the Tisza River, they came to the Temes region where they finally encountered the army of Ladislas I. Ladislas had already recognized the failure of the border fortresses and had initiated the in-depth redistribution of his defences. He moved mounted archers from Bihar as well as from the western, southwestern and southern border counties behind the outer ring of fortresses (Second Statute of Ladislaus 17.1.: *custodes confiniorum qui vulgo ewrii vocantur* [border guards who are commonly called ewrii = *őrök*]). Archers were moved in smaller numbers to the Sajó region, and in more significant numbers to the area south of the Maros River, along the Sebes River and the region of Nagy-Küküllő. These early border-guard settlers of Ladislas I would become the creators, the most devoted disciples and propagators of the Saint Ladislas cult. The future Székely administrative units, branches and clans were to be named after their habitats (Sebes, Orbó and Kézd, later prefixed with the word Szász meaning Saxon), in the same way as their earlier Transylvanian settlements (Telegd and Medgyes) had been. They built wooden and stone churches in their villages and had begun to bury their dead around these churches by the time of Coloman.

The names of most of their villages and settlements survived even after they were transferred to the east. Their early seats and lands were later recalled as "*deserta*", deserted (1224) only because they had to evacuate them for the immigrant Saxon colonists.

Hungarians and Slavs

German place-names have verified the presence of early Hungarian border-guard settlements since the twelfth century. According to István Kniezsa's now-classic research: "The Saxon place-names from northeastern and southern Transylvania yield very good evidence in the region. For in the northeast, along the Sajó River which flows into the Nagy-Szamos not far from Bethlen, as well as in the area to the west, the German place-names of the Saxon population, with only one or two exceptions, all derive from the Hungarian" (e.g. Sárvár–Schueret–Şirioara; Kendtelek–Kindeln–Chintelecu; Vermes–Warmesch–Vermeş; Kékes–Kikesch–Chiochiş; Somkerék–Simkrugen–Şintereag, with the third version being Romanian). "Similarly, there is a remarkably large number of Saxon place-names, both in the area between the two Küküllős and in the Királyföld between the Nagy-Küküllő–Maros line and the Olt River which also came originally from the Hungarian. These place-names convincingly prove that when the Saxons settled in the area they found permanent Hungarian settlements already in place. Since it is known that the Saxons moved to their present habitat area in the mid-

dle of the twelfth century, the Hungarian settlements must be placed earlier, at least to the beginning of the twelfth century or perhaps to the second half of the eleventh century. (E.g. Örményes–Irmesch–Ormeniș; Holdvilág–Halwelagen–Hoghilag; Ludas–Lodges/Ludesch–Ludoș; Vessződ–Wassied–Vesăud; Medgyes–Mediasch–Mediaș; Baromlak–Wurmloch–Vorumloc; Sárpatak–Scharpendorf–Șarpotok; Kézd–Keisd–Chizdu; Egerbegy–Arbegen–Agârbiciu; Bürkös–Bürkesch–Birgiș; Kövesd–Kabisch–Coveș; Homoród–Hamruden–Homorod; Halmágy–Halmagen–Halmeag; Árpás–Arpasch–Arpașu and Talmács–Talmesch–Tălmaciu.) "In the Barcaság, ... unlike the Saxon regions mentioned so far, not a single Saxon place-name derived from the Hungarian can be found ... no Hungarian population to speak of could have lived here prior to the arrival of the Saxons ... It also follows from this reasoning that the Székely people could not have settled in the area known today as the counties of Csík and Háromszék before the middle of the twelfth century."[30]

Already Kniezsa discovered significant eleventh- and twelfth-century surviving Slavic population groups in the region stretching from the Latorca River across the valleys of Túr–Kraszna to Beszterce. This finding can be complemented with results from later studies which show that the large majority of such eastern Slavic place-names from the Árpád period as "Ardó" (forest guard/forester) and "Daróc" (trapper/forest hunter) originated in this area. The results also demonstrate that the Szilágyság, the Máramaros and the Beszterce regions were once one huge woodland area where it was possible to find Slavic servants of the king holding the above names as personal names even as late as the thirteenth century. Igalja (Igyalja), the first village with a Hungarian name, appears in Doboka (northwest of the Királyföld of Beszterce and east of the Sajó Valley) in a charter from the time of Béla III. This village later assumed the name of the Church of Saint Andrew which was already standing at the time of this first mention. Even a hundred years later, however, the estate consisted mostly of woods, bushes, groves and meadows.

The most important evidence for the continuing presence of the Slavic population in Transylvania has been provided by the names of the smaller rivers and streams. Of all the tributaries of the united Szamos, the Krasna, Túr, Túróc, Pisterna, Lekence, Kapnik, Debrek and Debreke (Melsed = Mélyséd, in Arpadian Hungarian) rivers have Slavic names, as do the Lozád, Lóna, Gorbó on the left side of the Kis-Szamos, and the Tiha, Ilošva, Ilva, Salva, Rebra, Besterce and Lekence on both sides of the Nagy-Szamos. There are fewer rivers with Slavic names along the Maros River: the Kalodva, Orbó and Lekence. Of the rivers flowing into the Aranyos, only the Túr and the Torockó have Slavic names. On the other hand, there are more such rivers in Hunyad, and these include the Lešnek, Striğ, Dobra, Černa and Bistra. The parallel Slavic name of Tirnava for the Küküllős has already been mentioned in the chapter on the Avar–Bulgar period. The left-side tributaries of the Felső-Olt also have Slavic names, including Toplica, Kis-

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30. I. Kniezsa, Magyarország népei a XI-dik században. (The Peoples of Hungary in the Eleventh Century.) In: *Szent István Emlékkönyv.* (Saint Stephen Memorial Volume.) II. Budapest 1938, 389, 447.

Besterce, Černavoda, Káson, Kovásna, and Debrenpatak, as do the streams of the Černa and Gerebenc in the region of the Olt bend and its tributaries, the Cibin, the Černavoda and Cód in Szeben. Most of the tributaries in the upper region of the Temes River have Slavic names such as Gladna, Bistra, Černa and Lankó.

There is an equally large, or perhaps even larger, number of streams and small rivers with Hungarian names in Transylvania, such as Szilágy, Egregy, Almás, Lápos, Berekszó, Hagymás, Nádas, Ludas, Kapus, Füzes, Fejérd, Gyékényes, Mélyes, Hodos, Sajó and Fenes — all of which flow into the Szamos River; and the following tributaries of the Maros River: Tekerő, Békány, Köves, Kígyós, Ezenes, Magyaros = Mogyorós, Görgény, Nyárád, Egregy (the Hungarian name given to the Černa), Farkad, Gyógy = Diód, the other Gyógy, Aranyos, with the Monyoróspataka and Sóspataka brooks flowing into it; Komlód, Ludas, Sebes, and the Küküllős with Székes, Székás, Buzgósár, Segesd, Csergőd, Fenes, Körtvélyes, Szilas, Egres, Hagymás, and Sóséd/Sóspatak flowing into them. Of the tributaries of the Olt River, Fekete-ügy (Hungarian name for the Černavoda), Vargyas, the two Homoróds, Kozd (1206: Cwezfey), Kökönyes, Kormos, Sáros, Sebes, Árpás, Hortobágy, another Sebes and Feketevíz all have Hungarian names. Into the Slavic-named Krasna flow the Slavic Zolina and Sereden as well as the Hungarian Előpatak, Bikagyür, Egres, and Székpataka. The same Slavic-Hungarian dual nomenclature is found around the headwaters of the Körös rivers. The Slavic Bistra/Besterce and Derna and the Hungarian Almás, Gyümölcsénes, Gyepes, Ér and Jónás flow into the Hungarian Berettyó. At the river-head of the Sebes-Körös there is the Slavic (?) Kalota, but right after it the Hungarian Sebes, Méhséd, Hegyes, Kutas, Nyárér, Köleser follow each other. In the Middle Ages the tributaries of the Fekete-Körös had only Hungarian names: Belényes, Fenes, Solymos, Hollód, Hodos, Gyepes. A big tributary of the Temes is the Hungarian Sebes.

Apart from the ancient names of the Maros, Körös, Szamos, Olt, Ompoly and Berzava rivers (all of which came into the Romanian language after going through Slavic or Old Hungarian transmutations) only the three river names of suspected Turkic origin in the upper region of the Olt River, the Barót, Barca and the Brassó, should be mentioned. With that, all Transylvanian rivers worth the name have been accounted for.

Only one conclusion may be drawn from these river names, which usually prove much more lasting than other kinds of geographical names. Transylvania must have been inhabited by two different peoples up until the end of the twelfth century, the widely scattered Slavs who arrived earlier and the Hungarians who have been continuously present in the region since the tenth century. The Slavs lived almost everywhere in Transylvania, although after the Hungarian Conquest larger groups of Slavic settlements were only in the Kraszna region, between the Szamos, Nagy-Szamos and Upper Tisza rivers, in the Háromszék Basin, in the area between the Sztrigy and the Szeben rivers, and in Krassó-Szörény. There was also a smaller Slav population in the Aranyos region. By the twelfth century, these larger Slavic blocks became further diluted. In those times the Slavs and Hungarians lived mixed almost over the whole of Transylvania. The Slavic and Hungarian names of 143 rivers were adopted in still recognizable forms by the

German-speaking population except for the smallest streams and without exception by the Romanian speaking people of Transylvania. Not even a mountain stream with Romanian name could be found in the whole of Transylvania up until the fifteenth century.

The question of place-names is only mentioned briefly here since Slavic place-names had also been adopted by the Hungarians, the Germans (Rudna, Bistritz, etc.) and the Romanians, the last mostly from the first two. The significance of the Slavic place-names, and consequently of Transylvania's autochthonous Slavic population, must not, however, be overestimated. Of the 1119 Transylvanian place-names known from various charters before 1400, only 104 are Slavic in origin, that is, less than ten per cent. There are some place-names in central Transylvania, around the confluence of the Maros and Küküllő rivers, which have definitely been borrowed from the Slavic language, such as the two Gerends, Dombó, Dombró and Gambuc. In these names, the Hungarian kept the nasal vowels that later disappeared from the Slavic language.

In reality, Hungarian place-names dominate the whole of Transylvania. In practice these place-names include nouns in the nominative case referring to a tribe, a people, a person or a trade, and from the twelfth century onward, the patron saint of a church. This way of denominating places is unknown in Slavic, German and Romanian. The following Slavic names for occupations appear everywhere over the entire Carpathian Basin: Bocsár = cup-bearer; Csatár = armourer; Hari = cook; Igric = entertainer. Similarly, the Hungarian nomenclature derived from certain trades of the so-called service-villages is not unique to Transylvania, either. Such names include Szántó = ploughman, Kovácsi = blacksmith, Fazekas = potter, Ebes = master of hounds, Solymos = falconer and Szőlős = wine-grower.

Politics in the Twelfth Century

In 1105, King Coloman created the title of *ban* for the supervision of the *ispán*s governing in newly-conquered Croatia. It is customary to place the origins of Transylvania's government as a discrete territory and the emergence of the title of *"vajda" (voivoda)* in the same period. For various reasons, however, both the Hungarian and the Romanian historiographers have tried to push the roots of its government as an "independent" territory centuries further back. Romanian scholars regard the title of voivode as the direct continuation, or perhaps the revival, of the voivodeship *(voievodatul)* of Gyalu, the supposed ninth-century *dux "blacus"* of Anonymus. Anonymus wrote down the name in the form "Gelou/Golou/Geleou" in the thirteenth century, although today's Romanian historiographers prefer the form "Gelu" used by Anonymus's fourteenth-century transcriber in the chapter titles *(tituli)*. "Golou" can only be read as "Gyalu", which is a Hungarian name of Turkic origin (cf. the name of the village of Kun-Gyalu in the county of Szolnok, for example). His supposed castle mentioned by Anonymus obviously cannot be anything else but the *curtis pontificalis*, the summer residence of the Transylvanian bishops built next to a Roman *castrum* in Gyalu, referred to as "Golou" in a charter dated 1246. This is where Anonymus got

the name of the castle, and connected it with the title *"gyula"* (Geula), interpreted as a proper name. The only historically accurate piece of information to be gleaned from this part of his account is that the fortified mansion-house of the Transylvanian bishops in Gyalu was, in fact, standing by around 1200.

Hungarian scholars have looked for the origins of Transylvania's separate government in various places: in the power of the *gyulas*; in the mysterious "Zoltán of Erdőelve" (whom Stephen I supposedly appointed as governor of Transylvania after the victory over the *gyula*); in the person of the "tribune" mentioned in the eleventh-century *Minor Legend of St. Stephen;* and in other *"principes"* which turn up in eleventh-century sources. But, in fact, it was only in 1526 that the chronicler known as the Anonymus Carthusian first called "the Gyula" a voivode. The vague fourteenth-century chronicle mentioned above calls Zoltán of Erdőelve the "forefather" *("proavus")* of Stephen, which is clearly nonsense. The word *"princeps"*, simply meaning "lord, or aristocrat", was used in connection with every prominent person in the eleventh century: the *comes* Zonok/Szolnok, after whom his county was named, was also referred to as *"princeps"*. The title *"Mercurius princeps Ultra silvanus"* featuring in the often-quoted charter dating from 1111 is unlikely to have referred to a voivode, since only a few years previously — 1097 — the same person had been referred to as *"comes Bellegrat(a)e"*.

The voivodes sent to Transylvania as appointed royal functionaries represented the central power rather than some form of self-government. They only appeared after 1199, but then their presence here seems to have been continuous. By 1206, the office was rotated among five persons. The designation *voievoda-voyvoda* became permanently established beside the title *comes Albe Transilvane,* the latter being eventually dropped. The word voivode in the language of the Transylvanian Slavs and their relatives, had the meaning of "seignior", "military commander" and "war lord". Referring to the Hungarian tribal chiefs, Constantine Porphyrogennetos used the same word, obviously as a result of having relied on Slavic interpreters. For the Transylvanian Slavs, this word precisely fitted their notion of the *gyulas'* power, and later of the *comes'* rank and office. It was hardly a coincidence that the *comes* of Doboka was referred to as the *Voiouoda comes de Doboka* in 1214. In any case, Gallus still bore the title *comes Albensis Ultrasilvanus* in 1177, with the charge or function of voivode appearing only later on.

This being so, it could not possibly have been the responsibility of the voivode to avert the biggest foreign attack on Transylvania that century. Continuing the hostilities that had taken place earlier in the Temesköz, Manuel I launched a retaliatory campaign against King Stephen III from the direction of the Lower Danube region and the Black Sea. The attack in 1166 was directed explicitly against Transylvania. Leon Vatatzes's army, consisting mostly of Vlachs from the Balkan Mountains, probably invaded the "land of the Huns" via the Ojtoz Pass from the direction of the *Euxinus* (Black) Sea, where "he massacred everyone and trampled on everything that came his way without mercy".[31] The carnage was immense and a great number of prisoners were taken. The report specifically mentions the horses

31. N. Choniates, Epitome 16. = *FBHH* 238, 295.

seized by the enemy, thus providing the first evidence of the Transylvanian horse breeding that would become so famous later. The other Byzantine retaliatory campaign was initiated from Vidin under the leadership of Ioannes Dukas. He raided the "land of the Huns" passing through some "difficult, uninhabitable terrain", which must refer either to the valleys of the Cserna and Bisztra rivers through the Vaskapu (Iron Gate) of Hunyad or to the area along the valley of the Zsil River. He pillaged a number of larger villages and took rich booty, or at least that is what contemporary Byzantine chroniclers claimed.[32]

Economy and Population

Information concerning the economic history, geography and population of Transylvania has been preserved in documents from the last third of the eleventh century. While the passage in the *Legenda Maior* of Saint Gerald describing Saint Stephen's boats transporting salt on the Maros seems authentic (cf. the story of Ajtony mentioned earlier), it was in 1075 that the salt tax *(tributum salinarum)* from a place near the *castrum* of Torda *"ultra silvam"*, called Aranas in Hungarian, was mentioned in an authenticated charter for the first time. The occasion was King Géza I's waiving of half this salt tax in favour of the Abbey of Saint Benedict, situated by the Garam River. Shortly afterwards, we have reports of salt as a real form of endowment.

King Béla II's authenticated charter from around 1131, confirmed King Ladislas I's salt endowment of 1092 awarded to the Abbey of Saint Maurice in Bakonybél, which had been challenged during the reign of King Stephen II. Ladislas assigned twenty-four households *(mansiones)* to the Abbey, which were obliged to deliver 600 salt cubes (the number was later scratched out and "corrected" to 6,000) to the brothers four times a year *(qui quattuor vicibus per annum sol deferrent scilicet, sexcentos lapides fratribus)*.[34] There is little doubt about the salt coming from Transylvania, as can be seen from King Béla II's charter of 1138, which will be discussed later. At first reading, however, it is not clear whether the twenty-four heads of families listed by name were salt miners or only people who transported the salt, since their places of residence are not listed in the charter. The names of villages are also missing in that twelfth-century charter forged for the benefit of the Bakonybél abbey and dated to 1086, into which Ladislas's original deed of 1092 was inserted after the duties were generously increased. Still, it is more informative, insofar as it mentions a salt mine *(salifodio)*, salt mining and three boats for transporting salt *(navibus)* in connection with the same twenty-four names. These names had come into Béla II's authentic charter of 1131 from Ladislas's lost charter of 1092. It is, therefore, precisely the late forgery which bears witness to Transylvania's salt revenues.[33]

32. I. Cinnamus, Epitome 26. = *FBHH* 238–239 and 337.
33. P. Sörös, A bakonybéli apátság története. (The History of the Bakonybél Abbey.) In: *A pannonhalmi Szt .Benedek-rend története.* (The History of the Pannonhalma Order of Saint Benedict.) VIII. Budapest 1903, 271–272.

The members of the twenty-four households listed in the deed of 1092 in principle could have resided anywhere. However, their Transylvanian origin is supported by the very fact that the villages they lived in are not mentioned in the deed. In the same way, the villages of the surely Transylvanian salt transporters are not specified in the deed of 1138, either. This peculiarity, while still needing further research, indicates that the miners and transporters of salt in early Transylvania were registered under the names of the heads of families and not by the names of their home villages.

The twenty-four names copied from the charter of 1092 support the Transylvanian origin of the salt transporters. It is in this charter that the word *Scicul/Scichul*, which is the oldest form of the designation "Székely" (in Anonymus's *Gesta*: *Sicul*; in charters from 1213 and 1222: *Sicul*; in the Regestrum of Várad from 1217: *Scecul*) first appears and demonstrates the fact that those scholars of Turkic languages who earlier had tried to derive "Székely" from the word *šikil (recte: šilik)* or *eškil/ešekel* were mistaken. Christian names — we find Paulus, Martinus and Michael — are still rare. There were many more unambiguous Hungarian servant names (San = Csány; Nesinc = Nesincs; Nanasca = Nánász/a/; Sacan = Csákány; Zakan/Zachan = Zákány; Bela; and Kasudi = Kásádi; Cuna = Csúnya; Keta = Kötő; Rescadi = Részedi). The Finno-Ugric suffix *-di* can also be found at the end of Slavic or other names (Zagordi, Bedladi), while the charter contains examples of purely Slavic names as well (Boguta and Walen). The remainder of the names, apart from a nickname (Negus), are hard to interpret (Lawa, Cunei, Zaut, Desce and Gnenu).

It was again King Béla II who, in a charter of 3 September, 1138,[34] listed all those properties that in 1108 his father, Prince Álmos, had donated to the Abbey of Dömös and confirmed the ecclesiastics in their rights. Twenty-five transporters of salt were listed from the "salt village" of Sahtu/Sajti by the Maros River. Twice a year they were obliged to ferry the salt on the Maros from Transylvania to the market of Szombathely (forum Sumbuth) in the county of Arad. The salt transporters of Sajti had single-component Hungarian names, such as Aianduk = Ajándék, Bise = Bicse or Bese, Buken = Bökény, Forcos = Farkas, Halaldi = Haláldi, Kewereg = Kevereg, Maradek = Maradék, Niundi =Nyundi, Numarek = Nyomorék, Silev = Süllő, Sima = Sima, Wendeg = Vendég, Wosos = Vasas even their Christian names are Hungarian-sounding: Iwanus, Pedur, Michal, Niclous.

The 24,000 salt cubes — the number in the copy of 1329 was probably a later "correction" — transported to the Abbey of Dömös by the people of Sajti (*allatores salis* = salt carriers) were carved out by members of those thirty Transylvanian households — *In Ultrasilvanis partibus sunt mansiones que sal dare debent* (In the Transylvanian Parts there are mansions which are obliged to give salt) — whose residence was so unclear in the 1138 copy of the same document. About three-fifths of the salt miners had single-component Hungarian names: Wosas = Vasas, Besedi = Beszédi, Fuglidi = Fogolydi, Both = Bot, Vtos = Utas, Cima = Sima, Kosu = Kos, Halis = Hálás/Halász,

34. D. Szabó, A dömösi prépostság adománylevele. (The Deed of the Abbey of Dömös.) *Magyar Nyelv* (Hungarian Language), 1936, 203ff.

Map 9. Hungarian settlements in the eastern third of the Carpathian Basin at the time of the Hungarian Conquest and the Árpád dynasty where earthen cauldrons and pots with ribbed necks have been found

Himudi = Himdi, Satadi = Csatádi (?), Sounik = Szónok, Orsci = Orrszi, Emis = Emes, Vza = Uza, Eulegen = Ólegyen, Ellu = Elő/Élő, Wendi = Véndi. The remainder of the names were either Slavic — Kinis, Senin, Sokol, Lesin, Ginon and Viuscij (the Slavic Christian Wasil belongs to this group) — or Christian: Martin, Simeon and Isaac. The origins of the names Vir and Ogsan are unknown, or rather, uncertain. The deeds of 1092 and 1138 provide the first chance to catch a glimpse of Transylvania's early ethnic composition. It is also worth noting that the forgeries and the transcriptions executed in the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries point to the dynamic growth of salt mining.

According to the deed of 1138, the people from the "Transylvanian areas" assigned to the Abbey of Dömös were obliged to pay dues to the abbey in the form of the skins of twenty martens and one bear as well as one bison horn and one hundred leather belts. Unfortunately, names are not mentioned in the deed.

The perambulation of Asszonynépe, the estate donated to Abbey of Saint Maurice at Arad by King Béla II after 1131, were recorded in 1177.[35] This is the oldest available information on Transylvanian village names. All the place-names specified are Hungarian: Feketefee = Feketefeje/fő; Hegesholm[ir]u = Hegyeshalom; Sossed = Sós-séd; Husee Berke = Huseje/Huso/Husi berke; Ret = Rét; Sciluas = Szilvás; Thow = Tó; Feqet kopua = Fekete kapuja; Fequet = Fekete, later called Fugad/Fügöd. Similarly, nearby villages also bore the names of Hungarian or Turkic persons: Bodon; Lapad; Heren; Tordosi de Vyuuar = Tordos of Újvár; and Suqman = S/Szukman, the later Szokmánd. The word "Caxun" occurs in this document, appearing as the name of a grove, probably the result of misspelling the name Taxun/Taksony (only a stroke from the letter C is missing). The name "Parpurcum" (= Harpurtum) was also misspelled; in 1317, it was written as Haperton. The village is today known as Háporton. The Transylvanian Hungarian word "háportyán" roughly means "rush mat (basket) weaver".

At the same time the boundaries of the Torda estates of the Abbey of Arad was also registered in Hungarian: the Aranyos (Oronos) River, Fyzeskuth = Füzeskút, Monoros River, Sos River. The boundary description of the estate of the Cistercian Abbey of Kerc, donated between 1202 and 1208, and taken out of the territories of the Fogaras Vlachs (terra exempta de Blaccis) from 1223 is also of great importance. In this, except the names of the Olt (Alt) and the Kerc (Kerch) — which is of unknown origin — rivers, only early Hungarian (Hungarian–Slav) boundary names are mentioned: the marshy Égerpatak (Egvverpotac), the Nogebik (Nagybükk) and the Árpás River. These, probably, are remains from the times before the reign of Béla III and Géza II.

35. I. Borsa, III. Béla 1177. évi könyvalakú privilégiuma az aradi káptalan számára (The 1177 Charter of Béla III for the Abbey of Arad). Levéltári Közlemények, 1962, 216.

Archaeological Evidence from the Times
of the Establishment of the State

With the exception of Gyulafehérvár and perhaps Biharvár, little is known about tenth-century settlements either in the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain or in Transylvania; in the eleventh century, however, life continued in castles and other places of habitation whose names are preserved in place-names that are still in use to this day.

The most spectacular monuments of the new era are the fortifications, those large-scale defensive earth-and-timber castles which around 1200 Anonymus saw as the unrivalled foci of all power. He claimed that some of these had already been in existence when the Hungarians arrived and took them by force (i.e. Szatmárvár, Biharvár, Alpárvár and Gyaluvár) while others he explicitly says were built by the conquering Hungarian commanders (i.e. Szabolcsvár and Csongrádvár). Of course, today it is clear that the problem with Anonymus is that he let his story run away with him; his sense for the essence of the matter, however, was quite keen. Fortresses were, indeed, indispensable to the "modern" state in his time. Several tenth- and eleventh-century Hungarian fortresses had, in fact, antecedents. Some had been prehistoric (Bronze or Iron Age) earthworks of various sizes, usually placed at geographically and strategically important points, while a few others had been built upon the crumbling walls of Roman towns. The Hungarians, however, only rarely resorted to the rebuilding or the taking over of fortresses from potentates immediately preceding them in the region (Bresalauspurc = Pozsonyvár; Mosapurc = Zalavár, but only at the end of the eleventh century; of Belgrad = Gyulafehérvár, and the Bulgar earthwork of Černigrad = Csongrád). Of all these fortresses, Anonymus only mentioned the last one and even that as a newly-built Hungarian fortress. The Arpadian castles of Alpárvár, Zemplénvár and Titelvár were all built directly on prehistoric foundations during the course of the eleventh century or even later. Not one was standing as a fortification in the ninth century, even though these were the supposed centres of Anonymus's local potentates. Modern excavations have demonstrated that the earth-and-timber fortresses of Szabolcsvár, Abaújvár, Patavár, Ó-Aradvár, Ó-Kolozsvár (Kolozsmonostor), Ó-Tordavár (Várfalva), Dobokavár, Sajósárvár and others were built without antecedents either at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries, or in the course of the eleventh century.

A few decades ago even Hungarian historians could not imagine that the "nomadic" or "semi-nomadic" Hungarians were capable of building fortresses. The fortress-castles that served as the centres of local government by *ispáns* from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, while mentioned in the written sources, were archaeologically unexplored, so that nothing was known of their size or structure. In this way, the old historical school brought up on Anonymus nonchalantly "attributed" to the local inhabitants these supposedly insignificant fortifications.

By now, historians in general have accepted the view that no state organization could be maintained without castles, and especially not in the Middle Ages. Thus, a modern — costly and exhausting — "fight" for these

158

castles has begun. Outside Hungary's present borders, and depending on the country, searches have been initiated for Anonymus's Slavic, Vlach, Bulgar or "Roman" (Frank) fortresses, respectively. The current upswing in these excavations is due, in no small measure, precisely to a "state archaeology" of sorts. This prejudice has also brought about distortions in scientific methods, since the point of departure in dating the various layers is usually not archaeological stratigraphic evidence, but rather Anonymus's "facts", to which the finds are adjusted. The excavations at Dobokavár, Kolozsmonostor and Gyaluvár in Transylvania, and at Ó-Aradvár by the Maros were inspired by Anonymus's Vlach commanders, Gelu and Glad, respectively. Unfortunately, this same approach has also borne other fruit, namely, that the results from these excavations have not been published. For not only did these (and several other) excavations fail to produce a single find from the ninth century, but hardly any tenth-century material came to light either. The construction of the castles can be placed at the time of the establishing of the Hungarian state while the fifteenth- to seventeenth-century episcopal castle still standing in Gyalu was built directly on a layer of third-century Roman ruins, and not even on the territory of the Roman *castellum*.

The origins of the early Hungarian fort-building techniques are not clear. It is only in certain structural aspects that the Hungarian castles bear any resemblance to the tenth to thirteenth century earth-and-timber fortresses of central and eastern Europe. In size and function, they are thoroughly different. As to their purpose and role, they probably followed the Khazar model but this still remains to be verified by future study. Sunk panels and timbers were embedded in the high and extended ramparts comprising these fortresses. Hontvár, Sopronvár, Mosonvár, Abaújvár, Borsodvár, and Szabolcsvár are their representatives in present-day Hungary. Having once dried out, however, they became rather inflammable and burned down very quickly in sieges or even by accident. Because the ramparts turned red after such fires, these fortresses are often (and mistakenly) called "burned" or "sherd" forts. When people rebuilt them, they had to increase the height of the rampart out of structural considerations and sometimes this happened even twice in the lifetime of some of these fortifications. Nevertheless, it did not save them from the Mongols, who successfully sacked them in Russia, Poland and Hungary. It was mostly at that time that these fortifications were finally deserted for good. Only those fortresses did not burn easily where stone walls had been raised to replace the wooden ones (e.g. Dobokavár and Biharvár). In any case, by the thirteenth century this type of fortification was considered out of date on all counts.

Of the forty to fifty early castles, only a few (Sopronvár/Scarabantia, Győrvár/Arrabona, the Slavic-named Visegrád and Gyulafehérvár/Apulum) had Roman antecedents, and only the first two were constructed on Roman wall ruins. From this point of view, Gyulafehérvár is quite unique in the Carpathian Basin. According to the oldest military maps (1687 and 1711), its 474 metres by 474 metres layout preserved the regular square shape of the Roman legionary fortresses, with towers at two of its corners, on the axis of the Roman highway *(cardo)* and gates and gate-towers on both ends built on Roman foundations. The survival of some parts of the

walls, recognized as Roman already in 1574, was probably due, in addition to the excellent workmanship, to the fact that the Roman town, built under the mountain on a plateau that spread along the right-hand side of the Maros River, lost its importance after the Roman gold and iron mines in the Érchegység were closed, and remained ignored until the conquest of the Danubian Bulgars. Of the other Roman forts of similar size and shape in Dacia (Ulpia Traiana, Potaissa, Napoca and Porolissum), three failed to become the location of future settlements. These sites remained deserted, in spite of the fact that the walls of Potaissa outside Új-Torda, together with one of its large, gate-towers decorated with reliefs, stood intact until modern times. During the Middle Ages, it was not even known that the city had formerly been Roman. The German inhabitants of Ó-Torda called it the "Saxoniaburg" (Fortress of Saxonia). It was the humanist Bonfini who first identified the city as Roman, but wrongly as "Salinum" (Salt City). In Kolozsvár, only parts of the northern and western walls of Napoca seem to have been made later use of. With the exception of the *decumanus*, the track of the highway running parallel with the Szamos River, the mediaeval town layout owes nothing to that of the Roman city.

The earliest finds reflecting the settlement of the Hungarians in the castle-forts and villages of Transylvania from the time of the Conquest are grooved rim vessels of eastern — Saltovo — origin and type found at Dobokavár, Gyulafehérvár, Ó-Kolozsvár, Betlenszentmiklós, Malomfalva and Alvinc; the early earthen cauldrons at Csanádvár, Biharvár and Vártelek respectively; and the metal finds from the time of the last "phase" of the Conquest. The earliest finds uncovered within the castles and in the new cemeteries surrounding them all reflect the Hungarian rites and style of dressing implanted in the tenth century. The earliest burials reflect no definite Christian traits, except for the burial of the dead facing east. The hair rings, finger-rings, torques, bracelets, two-piece pendants and the buttons exhibited no or very few changes in fashion among these people, who have often been linked to their conquering forefathers through the specifically oriental Hungarian surgical method of true and false trepanation against various diseases.

Modern scholarship assigns the late tenth and eleventh century cemeteries to a half-pagan half-Christian population, although this is only true in connection with the nature of the cemeteries. The *Legenda maior* of Saint Gerald reveals that priests were sent out to consecrate the existing cemeteries of all the communities that contributed to the building of churches — after 1030, statute II/1 of King Stephen obliged every ten villages to build one church — and this, temporarily, permitted the Christian to bury their dead on the old sites. This is the reason that the "pagan" cemeteries of the commoners are found to have been in use throughout the country even after the founding of the Christian state (e.g. Déva and Várfalva, both until the time of Ladislas I).

A significant change occurs after the eleventh century in that the graves become easy to date when the custom of placing an obolus in the dead man's spread to Transylvania and the Temes region. In this way, coins of Stephen I and other Hungarian kings up to the end of the twelfth century, the time of Béla III, have been uncovered, in just the same way as anywhere

else in the lands of the House of Árpád. From the twelfth century on as the clothing became somewhat simpler it also became more uniform. Beside hair and finger-rings, metal veil pins appear in women's fashion (Gyulafehérvár, Kolozsvár, Csittfalva, Marosvásárhely).

As in other parts of the country, the *miles,* the new armed strata based largely on western models and derived largely from the former military escort, emerged in Transylvania, the eastern Great Hungarian Plain and in the Temes region in the early phase of the establishing of the new state, during the sixty-six years that Grand Duke Géza and King Stephen I reigned. Double-edged "Carolingian" swords have been found in the graves (Déva) and the fortresses (Dés, Doboka, Nagyernye, Biharvár, etc.) of this period in no smaller proportions than elsewhere. After the eleventh century, bronze and iron spurs came into common use, reflecting the spread of the new "knightly" way of fighting. It is in this period that pottery, one of the most important artifact of daily life became uniform in the land of the House of Árpád. So much so, that in the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, there was no appreciable difference between the pottery of, for example, the Fehérvár in Transylvania and the Fehérvár in Transdanubia. Saltovo type vessels turned on potter's wheels and decorated with close-set horizontal grooves running in spirals predominated in both places. This technique had been carried in by the Hungarians from the east. Local pottery traditions rooted in the pre-Conquest era and still evident in the tenth century were either overwhelmed by the new style, or vanished. Present-day archaeologists trying to demonstrate the survival of these traditions in Transylvania have succeeded in coining terms such as Dridu culture or Csüged/Ciugud ceramics, but have yet to come up with the finds to which the terms are supposed to apply.

The Emergence of Castles

The Bulgar Belgrad–Fehérvár lying on the right side of the northwestern section of the Maros River was occupied by the Hungarians at the time of the Conquest. The grave of a Hungarian warrior buried with his horse inside the fortification, as well as other similar graves around it, verify this. The castle suddenly gained importance when, in the last third of the tenth century, the first Transylvanian *gyula* established his seat inside its walls. On the evidence of the mortar mixed with brick-dust, a Byzantine plaster technique, the earliest Christian church, a rotunda, must have been built during the time of the *gyulas*. There is no evidence of burials around the church in this early period. The commoners were buried in the "pagan" cemetery northwest of the castle up to the end of the tenth century. The Fehérvár of the *gyulas*, most probably was not a very crowded town, because in its northwestern district, once the site of the Bulgar settlement, there still existed a tenth century "pagan" cemetery inside the walls.

The Fehérvár of the *gyulas* grew further in importance after King Stephen put an end to his uncle's rule of the province in 1003. Its walls of white stone were restored at the beginning of the eleventh century, so that they did not

require further reconstruction until the Mongol invasion. Not long ago, the remains of the first single-nave episcopal church were discovered. It had been built on the site of the old "pagan" cemetery across from the present cathedral during the reign of Stephen: at the time, its length of 19 to 20 meters would have been considered quite substantial. After the middle of the eleventh century the area east of the church from around the *Monetaria* (Mint) to the walls, became densely built up, with houses even lining the road leading to the castle. The fact that the number of cemeteries around the castle had risen to three by the middle of the eleventh century was obviously related to the increase in the population living around it. The most important of the three was the new cemetery lying to the northwest on top of an old Roman burial ground, one that was used from the time of Andrew I to that of Ladislas I. It was Ladislas I and Coloman who initiated the building of the new, thirty-eight metre long, triple-nave episcopal church at the end of the century. The present cathedral stands on the foundations of that building. The old church of the time of Saint Stephen had been demolished at the time the new one was being built. The earliest example of Transylvanian Romanesque sculpture, a Maiestas Domini relief on the semi-circular tympanum of the Ladislasean–Colomanean cathedral, has survived as an inside tympanum on the southern entrance of the present, early thirteenth century cathedral together with a few impressive capitals. The date and the Hungarian origin of the low relief is revealed by the figure of Christ sitting with his arms raised on a throne decorated with animals' heads. The composition follows the depiction of seated kings on the royal seals of Ladislas and Coloman. Inhabitants of the castle were obliged to bury their dead in the cemetery around the new cathedral from the twelfth century onward, even when that meant that the graves lay within the grounds of the old church! Other churches and cemeteries were built around the castle in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Archaeological evidence suggests that the large fortification complex known as Dobokavár came into existence at the beginning of the eleventh century at the earliest and during the course of the eleventh century gradually developed into a great *ispán*'s castle. Repeated destruction and siege necessitated its renovation and enlargement on several occasions (during the reign of Stephen, before 1030, and then in 1068 [?], and again in 1091). Stone walls replaced the earth-and-timber elements by the beginning of thirteenth century. One of its churches was already standing by the first half of the eleventh century while the other was completed during the reign of Ladislas I. Both were rebuilt several times and had cemeteries around them. A church was also erected in the Váralja *(suburbium)* in the twelfth century.

There is still no archaeological proof that Désvár existed in the eleventh century, although the fragment of a western sword suggests that Dés and the surrounding area was occupied in the eleventh century. The early fortress and cemetery have yet to be found. Due to later reconstruction, only modest remnants from Küküllővár are known on the left bank of the Kis-Küküllő. The earth-and-timber fortification has quite an ordinary structure with a double moat outside and stone pavement inside, similar to that found in Ó-Tordavár and Sajósárvár. An eleventh- or twelfth-century vessel re-

covered in the area of the fortress has been published. On 4 April, 1241 the castle was destroyed by the Mongols.

Much more instructive are the remaining three of Transylvania's "Seven Castles". All three are classic examples of the castle-to-city evolution peculiar to eastern Europe in that the fortifications built in the early years of the consolidation of the Hungarian state were in different locations from the mediaeval towns which, for various economic reasons, grew up in their vicinity, some nearer, some farther away from the castle itself, towns which only subsequently inherited the names of the castle nearby.

Ó-Tordavár was built on a flat plateau above today's village of Várfalva. In size, shape and structure it is a typical early eleventh century *ispán*'s castle. It has not been excavated inside, but the walls have been transected in several places. The cemetery in the *suburbium* used by the inhabitants of the castle at the turn of the tenth and the eleventh centuries, was excavated in 1912 and its finds published. The oldest sections of the cemetery still exhibit characteristics of commoners' burials, while younger parts reflect the burial rites of the castle's Christian population between the times of Stephen I and Ladislas I. The cemetery was discontinued during the reign of Ladislas and the population, was obliged to bury their dead around the new church after the castle was abandoned in the thirteenth century, as village dwellers. This new church was built below the castle during the rule of Ladislas I and is still used today by the Unitarian community. The town of Ó-Torda was known to be the town of the salt miners who worked in the area of Tordaakna. Here, the earliest cemeteries were opened around the churches. (The eleventh- or twelfth-century cemetery of Tündérhegy in Torda had belonged to the neighbouring village of Szentmiklós.) The northeastern neighbours of Torda are well known since 1176: the villages of Szind (Scinth) and Koppány (Coppan).

The original Hunyadvár, was built on a promontory called Saint Peter Hill at the confluence of the Cserna and Zalasd rivers, 300 metres from the late mediaeval castle of Vajdahunyad erected on rocks. The castle which was partly ruined during its history has been recently excavated. It was 200 by 70 metres, oval, and a village belonged to it which was built below the hill. The cemetery below the castle, on the northern side of the road leading to Rákod, once used by its inhabitants, was partially excavated and published in the 1910s. People were buried here from the time of Stephen I until the end of the eleventh century. No later cemeteries from the area are known at present.

Coluswar – *castrum Clus* – was built 2100 metres to the west of the Roman city and stood until 1241. It was originally established as an *ispán*'s castle in this geographically ideal location: on a hill surrounded by branches of the Szamos River near to a ford and a cross-roads. The finds – for example, coin of Stephen I and pendants from the late Conquest period – show that the earliest earth-and-timber fortification was built at the very beginning of the eleventh century. The walls and houses containing the coins of Solomon were burnt down at the time of the Pecheneg (Uz?) attack in 1068, and a higher rampart was subsequently constructed. The size and the structure of the earthwork corresponds to that of the castles built for the *ispáns*; it is more than unlikely that it was just for the protection of some mansion

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12th to 13th cent.

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
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
Fig. 10. Tenth to thirteenth century churches at Gyulafehérvár

1. The round church (rotunda) from the last third of the tenth century; 2. The first bishop's church, built cca 1009; 3. The episcopal cathedral of Ladislas I and Coloman; 4. Today's cathedral built at the time of Andrew II

house or a legendary early monastery. The (unpublished) cemetery outside the fortress is the earliest. The cemetery inside the fortress suggests that there had been a small church, built perhaps after the middle of the eleventh century. The first Benedictine monastery in Transylvania, founded by Ladislas I and dedicated to the Blessed Virgin Mary, was built inside the castle before the end of the eleventh century. The population of the castle was buried around it until the end of the twelfth century (cf. Gyulafehérvár). This triple-nave monastery church was destroyed or perhaps pulled down around 1190. With the stones of the monastery, a rotunda which had six apsis, was built around 1200 to meet religious needs temporarily. This rotunda, partially demolished, was incorporated as a chapel within the new monastery at the time of its construction in the thirteenth century. This Ó-Kolozsvár fell to the Mongols with the last of its defenders. After the second half of the thirteenth century, the site is only referred to as *Colusmonustora* (Monastery of Kolos, 1263). A rectangular stone wall was built around the monastery in the second half of the thirteenth century.

There is no sign of anyone having lived over the ruins of Roman Napoca in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Evidence from several excavations shows that by that time, a new surface layer had already formed on top of the ancient rubble inside the Roman city. The first evidence of life there in the Middle Ages is a twelfth-century cemetery around a village church dug into the Roman period rubble in today's Szabadság Square. The late thirteenth-century Óvár (Old Castle) was the earliest town centre located in the northwestern quarter of the old *castellum*, although not exactly following the line of the ancient walls. From the beginning, however, fourteenth-century Kolozsvár extended beyond the walls of the old Roman *castellum* which could not, therefore, have played a part in the development of the city. The

◄ Fig. 9. Hillforts in Transylvania from the time of the establishment of the Hungarian state

1. Ó-Kolozsvár and its rotunda from the end of the twelfth century; 2. Ó-Tordavár; 3. Ó-Hunyadvár; 4. Biharvár; 5. Dobokavár; 6. Küküllővár, border hillfort from the end of the eleventh century; 7. Sajósárvár

earliest finds so far, (vessels, etc.) come from the area of Óvár and the town centre, and date back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The Meszes Gate was guarded by Krasznavár (1093: *Krasson civitas*). The large semi-circle formed by the outer belt of Transylvanian castles was brought into being after the 1068 Pecheneg incursion. In the north, at the confluence of the two branches of the Szamos, it begins with the red ramparts and the eleventh- to twelfth-century graves of Kozárvár. To the north-east is the earth-and-timber fortress of Sárvár, with its valuable finds of jewellery in the eleventh- to twelfth-century cemetery on the left bank of the Sajó River. The Maros Valley was blocked by a small, now nameless, earth-and-timber fortification near Malomfalva on the right side of the river. An eleventh-century western sword and Hungarian pendants have been uncovered from the site, together with fragments of vessels mostly from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. The sizeable earth-and-timber *"kapuvár"* (gate fortress) of (Hévíz-)Ugra was built to protect the important river ford on the Olt in the southeast at the end of the eleventh century or at the very beginning of the twelfth, at latest. A significant village community adjoined the fortress. The builder of Ugravár was probably the nobleman from Bihar who formed a part of King Coloman's escort in 1094 and who also founded Ugramonostor in Bihar. The fortress has been accurately dated on the basis of the excavated goods (cauldrons, vessels, hair-rings and coins). Around 1200, a smaller stone castle was erected on the same spot. The bridge-head furthest east on the Olt River came into existence in the twelfth century at the latest, its name, Földvár (Earthwork), revealing the type of its construction. The earth-and-timber castle discovered underneath the present fortification of Fogaras on the left bank of the Olt River could not have been built before the twelfth century, in contrast with the earth-and-timber fortress of Orlát on a flat hill top by the river ford of Cibin–Černavoda (Black Water) in the south, which has been very accurately dated by fragments of vessels and clay cauldrons from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Its original name may have been Cibinvár. Orlát (meaning "under the castle") was the name of the village that grew around a nearby thirteenth-century stone castle, Salgóvár. Finally, the earth-and-timber fortress of Szentlászlóvára near Ómoldova on the Lower Danube was also one of the early border castles as evidenced by clay sherds, and probably was built by Saint Ladislas. After the Mongol invasion, it was rebuilt in stone.

The castles of princes and *ispáns* in the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain can be linked to the history of Transylvania in the sense that they were all built along waterways leading out of Transylvania. Evidence from the tenth-century cemetery of the mighty fortress of Biharvár (1075: *civitas Bichor*) built along the stream Kösmő shows that it was erected in the early Hungarian period. Not counting the Leányvár (Maiden Castle), a small, squat earthwork from the Bronze Age extending beyond the later castle, the mediaeval fortification had no antecedent. Only prehistoric sherds have come to light from the earthwork rampart. The possibility of this very large and, in terms of its structure, characteristically Hungarian castle being erected by the scattered and sparse Slavic population of the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain can be safely dismissed. The earth-and-timber castle was twice renewed after two successive destructions (in 1068, and in

1091). Its walls were built higher, and, sometime in the twelfth century, were replaced by stone walls. Despite its thick stone walls, the fortification had lost its military significance even before the Mongol invasion. The commoners of the castle lived within the walls in rough semi-subterranean huts with earthen ovens inside, and buried their dead in the large burial grounds around the church south of the fortress from Andrew I until the time of Andrew II. The parochial, later episcopal, church is only known from descriptions. Dated with the help of a Saint Stephen coin, it is to have been an early construction; only later were people buried around it. At the present time, the importance of Biharvár is more clearly demonstrated by the densely distributed tenth- and eleventh-century villages and cemeteries in the area than by the finds of the poorly-excavated central castle site, most of which are, at any rate, unpublished.

On the southern bank of the Sebes-Körös, twelve kilometres south of Bihar, only Hungarian villages and commoners' cemeteries have been found from the tenth and eleventh centuries. Although these sites were found within the area of Nagyvárad, they cannot be linked directly to the present town. The circular, earth-and-timber castle of (Nagy-)Várad was built only in 1091–1093 (1093: *Váradynum de Byhor*) by Ladislas I around the monastery also founded by him and soon rebuilt into the triple-nave episcopal cathedral of the Virgin Mary. The castle, built on the island between the main and the side branches of the Sebes-Körös did not have an antecedent. The earliest archaeological finds from this rich site date to the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

At present, no particulars are known about the castle of Szatmárvár, built on the northern side of the Szamos River overlooking the Szamos region. On the other hand, Marosvár on the southern side of the Maros River, the "seat" of the rebel Ajtony in the eleventh century, had been definitely a centre by the tenth century. Its importance may chiefly be seen in the rich tenth-century graves and cemeteries found in the vicinity. The outline of the earliest earth-and-timber fortification, later renamed Csanádvár, is just barely recognizable on Luigi Marsigli's map produced around 1696. The castle was blown up and demolished in 1699. At the time it was built, a branch of the Maros River still flowed by the fortress to the south. The steeples of the Saint George Cathedral stood here as late as the end of the seventeenth century. The Benedictine Monastery of the Blessed Virgin, founded by Bishop Gerald and rebuilt in the thirteenth century, also stood on the northern periphery of the castle. It was renovated a second time in Gothic style in 1361. This monastery was also called the Abbey of Saint Gerald after the martyr was buried here. The precise geographical information given in the *Legenda Maior* of Saint Gerald indicates that the Monastery of Saint John the Baptist once stood in the vicinity as well. It vanished without a trace in 1241, and its precise location is not known today. The small church with its three apsides, not "seven" — an apse is not to be confused with a buttress —, which stood near the ruins of the cathedral at the end of the seventeenth century has been identified by Romanian and Hungarian archaeologists as the Byzantine church of Ajtony (or perhaps even Hierotheus). In fact, it was a typical sixteenth–seventeenth century Orthodox church. The present cathedral of Németcsanád was built on the spot where the church

of the Monastery of the Blessed Virgin once stood. Renovated in 1741, the church was torn down completely in 1868. It was at this time that the original eleventh-century stone sarcophagus of Saint Gerald was discovered lying along the nave of the church. The latest, small test excavations have revealed a tenth- or eleventh-century settlement immediately above a sixth-century Gepid settlement. The original Aradvár (Urod/Orod) on the northern side of the Maros River was situated on an island surrounded by old branches of the same river, and has been better excavated. By now historians have established that this castle was located near Öthalom–Glogovác, twelve kilometres east of Arad. The evidence unequivocally shows that this is an earth-and-timber *ispán*'s castle typical in the early eleventh century. It was rebuilt once and its height increased. People were buried around its as yet unexcavated church from the time of King Peter until the middle of the twelfth century, after which the cemetery around the chapter's huge Monastery of Saint Martin was used. A charter from 1177 mentions people living in houses inside the castle walls. Ó-Aradvár was completely destroyed during the Mongol invasion.

Only the location of Temesvár is known, but it must have been built in the tenth century, considering the presence of the Hungarian military cemeteries and the name of the castle. Only the eleventh-century graves of its inhabitants are known. The little researched fortification near Zimándújfalu known simply as Földvár (Earthwork) from the Árpád period was also built in the tenth century. Its extremely rich cemetery was in use from the tenth century to the time of Ladislas I, when the castle was probably deserted. For this reason it never received a new name. The future *ispán*'s castle, Zarándvár was, as its name suggests, probably founded in the tenth century by a prince. Only a very small part of it has survived, and even less has survived of the recently demolished Örs(ova)vár (Orsova).

The Early Roman Catholic Church

Although Saint Stephen's statutes ordered the building of a specified number of churches (*Decem villę ęcclesiam edificent* — that every ten villages build a church) all the eleventh-century churches known to us from their remains are in or around castles, the seats of local government by the *ispáns*. However, there is also Statute I. 7 of Ladislas I in 1092 to consider, which ordered the restoration of churches destroyed or burned down during the civil war (meaning the pagan revolts) and Statute I. 8, which demanded that the bishops renovate those churches which were crumbling because of age. A considerable number of churches must, therefore have existed earlier. Nevertheless, the situation changed fundamentally during the reign of King Coloman. What hitherto had been recommended, now became obligatory, especially when it came to burial around churches. From the turn of the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, new parish churches and cathedrals were built one after the other (at Biharvár, Várad, Ó-Aradvár, Dobokavár, Gyulafehérvár). Even more importantly from the viewpoint of the Catholic church village churches with semicircular or rectangular sanctuaries sprang

up like mushrooms. Research into these churches and the cemeteries around them had been very much neglected in Transylvania. Still, the available information, mostly from graves dated with the help of twelfth-century coins, allows the construction of a coherent picture. Early village churches and their remains have survived over practically the whole of Transylvania: at Mojgrad, the remains of the twelfth-century church from a village of unknown name near Almaszeg, at Csitfalva, at Szentábrahám, at Sztrigyszentgyörgy, at Fogaras, and at Illyéd in Krassó. Those named after a patron saint (Saint James, Saint Nicholas, Saint Andrew, Saint Abraham, Saint George and the Saint-king, meaning Saint Stephen), are from the twelfth century. This has been demonstrated by the excavation of villages even where (e.g. at Mezőszopor–Saint James), the churches themselves have not yet been found. Elsewhere, only the cemeteries around churches and the associated grave goods have come to light, for instance at Sigeth = Máramarossziget, Nagybánya = Asszonypataka, Váralmás, Jakabfalva, Györgyfalva, Marosvásárhely, Marosszentkirály, Konop, Sajósárvár, Székelyudvarhely, Fogaras, Piski, and near Segesvár; at the last site dated by the coins of Stephen II and III.

Early Arpadian Villages, Houses and Other Architectural Monuments

The study of Árpád-period settlements and houses is still at an early stage in Transylvania, too. In southeastern Transylvania several, formerly Slavic, villages continued on into the Árpád period, like Sepsiszentgyörgy–Kulakert, the late houses on Siménfalva-Cserealja, the upper layer in Kézdipolyán, the middle layer of the Domonkos mansion in Alsócsernáton, the major part of the huts in Székelyszenterzsébet–Szénásföld, Réty–Suvadástető and Segesvár–Szőlők (the latter might be the same as the decayed village of Sharold). There was very little difference between the crude huts of the late Slavic and the early Hungarian period: both were semi-subterranean. The Hungarians of the Árpád period seem to have preferred ovens carved into the earth (e.g. Székelykeresztúr–Gyárfáskert and Alsócsernáton–Domonkos mansion) to those of stone (e.g. Vermes, Malomfalva, Mezőerked and Betlenszentmiklós), and used frying balls, rather than frying platters. Early Hungarian settlements may be suspected where Hungarian metal objects such as arrow-heads, bridle-bits, sabre fragments, harness equipment, eleventh- and twelfth-century spurs, Hungarian coins (e.g. Csákó, Marosgombás, Maroslekence and Baráthely II village), or typical Hungarian earthen and metal cauldrons have been found. The houses themselves were the usual gable roofed huts such as the common people of the Árpád monarchy lived in everywhere (Székelykeresztúr–Gyárfás-kert, Nagymedesér, Vermes, Betlenszentmiklós, Csapószentgyörgy, Mezőerked, Malomfalva, Ó-Kolozsvár, Biharvár and Ó-Aradvár). After the eleventh century, however, the huts occasionally had above-ground walls supported by timbering (Székelykeresztúr and Malomfalva). The same development is evidenced with the introduction of four to six posts in roof constructions (Csicsókeresztúr,

Fig. 11. The princely palace of Belényesszentmiklós, eleventh–twelfth centuries

1. The palace of princes Béla and Géza; 2. The palace reconstructed by Prince Álmos, and subsequent additions

Malomfalva and Csíkszentkirály). The family cooking cauldrons brought to the region from the east European "Saltovo culture" were important utensils in Hungarian commoner households. These vessels were used over open fires in the villages and also acted as cooking cauldrons for herdsmen. The use of these cauldrons was widespread in all those parts of the Carpathian Basin where Hungarians lived. They were completely absent from the predominantly Slavic areas.

Cauldron sherds have also been found in Transylvania in great numbers. After comparing these to the earthen cauldrons of the Pechenegs in Moldavia and also to those of the Danubian Bulgars in Dobrudja and in the Lower Danube region, the latest Romanian and Saxon research, taking the view that the Danubian Bulgars were also Pechenegs, has attributed all such finds to the "Pechenegs". Using these earthen cauldrons as evidence, they hope to demonstrate a massive Pecheneg, and recently even a "Roman", presence in Transylvania. There never was any large-scale Pecheneg immigration to the Carpathian Basin, however, and especially not to Transylvania, where there are only six or eight relatively recent (eleventh- and twelfth-century) villages containing the name "Besenyő" (Pecheneg), all located in eastern and southern Transylvania. The remaining 95 or so 103 villages with similar names are found over the non-Transylvanian parts of the Árpád kingdom. On the other hand, the shape and the ornamentation of the cauldrons in the Carpathian Basin significantly differ from those of Moldavia regarded as their prototype and most of them were produced earlier. The suggestion that these cauldrons were copied from local, or even Roman bronze vessels, is untenable. The cauldrons were uncovered from houses and layers dated with the help of tenth- and eleventh-century Hungarian metal finds, or were found together with the wheel-turned Hungarian Saltovo-type clay vessels at Biharvár, Várad, Ó-Kolozsvár, Ó-Tordavár, Ó-Aradvár, Gyulafehérvár, Dobokavár, Maroslekence, Csapószentgyörgy and Malomfalva. Cauldrons made from the eleventh century on may be dated

with the help of Hungarian coins, as were settlements and adjoining cemeteries containing oboli. Some cauldrons have been dated as tenth- or eleventh-century on the basis of their early wavy-lined ornamentation (Ó-Kolozsvár, Belényesszentmiklós, Segesvár–Szőlők and Bulcs–Kápolna). The numerous sites on the plains of Arad county where cauldrons have been found mark the locations of Hungarian villages destroyed during the Mongol invasion. On the whole, these roughly 180 sites where such cauldrons have come to light so far in Transylvania and the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain have yielded important evidence on Hungarian settlements during the Árpád period. They constitute an integral part of the 600 similar sites presently known over the entire area once occupied by Hungarians.

Hidden treasure finds shed important light on the study of eleventh-century settlements and their economy in addition to providing clues to the more major events which took place in this era. The silver bends from the Darufalva–Jurkovci type necklace were buried during the Pecheneg attack that occurred either before 1030 or sometime during the reign of Peter (1038–1044). This eastern type of jewellery is usually found accompanied by coins from the 1030, which makes dating easy. The magnificant treasure of silver jewellery also of eastern origin and found in the area subsequently known as the Királyföld was more likely to have been buried the Uz-Pecheneg incursion of 1068. The Byzantine bronze coins collected since the tenth century found in Alsócsernáton in Háromszék county had been hidden by the Slavic owner in a house burned down by the enemy. The silver jewellery sheds light on the relationship between Transylvania and the eastern Slavic world. The four coin hoards consisting of Ladislas I's coins clearly mark the line of attack of the first Cuman raid led by Kapoltch in 1091 across Transylvania all the way to Biharvár (the finds were at Torda, Magyarfráta, Doboka-váralja and Biharszentandrás). They also show that occasionally, large fortunes — 120–170 silver coins — were accumulated.

The discovery of the eleventh-century princely *curtis* and the accompanying chapel near Belényesszentmiklós was the result of the most recent research. This sizeable palace, probably built during the rule of Béla I and Géza I as *duces*, is closely related to the royal mansion situated by the Danube River near Dömös. The palace was damaged in the Cuman attack of 1091, and probably was rebuilt while Prince Álmos was *dux*. It was at that time that its church was enlarged. Its subsequent history and architectural development in the thirteenth century was associated with the gentilitial Borsa family.

Other new and professional excavations have verified that Transylvania's central-lobed churches (at Székelyudvarhely–Jesus Chapel, Kézdiszentlélek–Perkő) previously thought, because of the uniqueness of their groundplan, to have been built in the tenth or eleventh century — a view held mostly by Hungarian art historians and architects — are, in fact, late Árpád-time buildings in archaic style. Other buildings of this sort are the four-lobed Orthodox church in Guraszáda, which both archaeological and documentary (a charter from 1292) evidence indicate to have been built around 1300; the rotunda of Ó-Kolozsvár with six internal lobes built around the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (there were twelfth-century capitals and paired-columns with reliefs preserved in its foundation); and the rotunda

of Illyéd in Krassó, lately held to be ninth- or tenth-century by Romanian researchers, but surrounded by twelfth- and thirteenth-century graves.

Research attuned to the romantic had disregarded the less specular of the truly early edifices. The small rotunda at Algyógy with its semi-circular sanctuary was built using Roman bricks and, judging from its size, structure and formal characteristics (matching similar buildings in Veszprém, Sárospatak, Ducó and Gyulafehérvár), was definitely built in this period, that is in the eleventh or twelfth century. This circular church, assigned an unjustifiably late date and its significance overlooked, is probably the oldest preserved church edifice in both historic and present-day Transylvania.

The First Frontier Guard Deployments to the East

At the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in most places it was the outer ring of border forts that marked the limits of the frontier-guard villages that were the settlements of the light archer cavalry *(sagittarii)*. Some of these villages, however, may have belonged to the advance Pecheneg guards. One such village, named Talmács, is located by the Transylvanian exit to the Vöröstorony Pass. The name referred to the Talmat/Talmač tribe of the Pechenegs who lived east of the Dnieper, and who enlisted as guards *(talmatzoi)* with the army of the Byzantine emperor sometime in the second half of the tenth century. The (uncertain) date of their enlistment with the Byzantines cannot be taken to indicate the time of their appearance in Hungary. All the villages named Talmács, and Kölpény (after *kulpingoi*: another Pecheneg tribal name) have their origins in the time when the latter tribe joined the Byzantines, that is in the second half of the eleventh century. The greater part of these "Pecheneg" village names are scattered across Hungary's inner territory, and their presence underlines the historically verified arrival en mass of the Pechenegs in several waves during the eleventh century. Their settlement and dispersion does not contradict their deployment as frontier and advanced guards, a role documented in several early Hungarian historical accounts, and demonstrated by the exceptionally advanced positions of their frontier settlements in Transylvania. The villages named "Besenyő" located between the Maros and Olt rivers as well as Talmács in Szeben and Mezőkölpény in Marosszék, fit perfectly into the structure of the eleventh-century border defence system. As to the question of the Pechenegs' religion in the twelfth century, the contemporary German name for the village of Besenyő in Beszterce, Heidendorf (Pagan village), leaves no doubt abut their still being pagan.

Of extraordinary significance for our understanding of Transylvania's settlement history are the eleventh- and twelfth-century stone and wood churches recently discovered beneath twelfth- and thirteenth-century Saxon churches in southern Transylvania, as well as the cemeteries around them. No less important are the early Romanesque churches of the Hungarian border guard villages and their cemeteries used until the times of Géza II and Stephen III (Szászsebes, Szászkézd, Medgyes, Szászfehéregyháza, Kelnek, Nádpatak, Szászorbó and Homoróddaróc). These names also show

that by this time, the Catholic church had generally extended its influence over the valleys of the Sebes, the Nagy-Küküllő and the Homoród rivers while to the south it held a way up to the Olt River (Fogaras). Concurrently with the settlement of Saxons along the country's borders after the middle of the twelfth century, the population of the Hungarian frontier-guard village, the border guards of the eleventh century, were relocated in the territory of the present-day Székelyföld, most notably in the Háromszék Basin. Some villages disappeared completely. On the southern banks of the Nagy-Küküllő, for instance, not far from Medgyes and just outside the old Paratéj, the later Baráthely, the life of a twelfth-century village dated with the help of coins and noted for the many cauldrons found there was interrupted for ever: its inhabitants had obviously been obliged to move on.

The two large cemeteries opened up just outside Zabola and Petőfalva in the eastern part of the Székelyföld have provided evidence for the Hungarian arrival of the border guards in the area in the twelfth century. Both cemeteries were probably placed around wooden churches during the reign of Géza II. (That such churches existed is evident from the report of Otto of Freising in 1147.) Amply documented by oboli, these cemeteries continued to be used during the times of Stephen III and Béla III in Petőfalva until the Mongol invasion. The burial rites and the attire of the dead are typical of the Hungarians of the Árpád period. Their privileged status is revealed by the valuable grave goods. The women often wore small, medium or large hair-rings made of silver or electrum, as well as various embellished silver rings on their fingers; the men's occupation was reflected in the iron mounted quivers and iron and bone arrow-heads, while the occasional offering of cattle, lamb and (primarily) horse-meat testified to the frailty of their Christian faith. Relationships with the local Slavic population have left no visible traces. The people of Zabola and Petőfalva belonged to the class of well-to-do free Hungarians, which accurately describes the legal and economic position of the newly resettled frontier guards. The appearance of the new settlers north of the Zabola region Kézdiszék (Alsócsernáton) at the end of the twelfth century is also shown by the east-facing graves and the associated grave goods.

New settlements emerged at the same time as these cemeteries. A house with its floor sunk below ground and a round earthen oven was found in the garden of the Apor manor house in Karatna (today part of Torja). It was accompanied by a circular open-air baking oven carved into the ground nearby. The settlement has been reliably dated by the sherds of cauldrons, characteristic arrow-heads similar to those found in Zabola, and twelfth-century fragments of vessels with potter-marks. The Zabola-type arrow-heads and twelfth-century spurs of the settlement-finds at Karatna characterize and accurately date the top settlement level with a circular oven dug into the earth, cauldrons, arrow-heads and spurs at Alsócsernáton–Domonkoskert which, as shown by coins found above a Slavic settlement level destroyed in 1068. Sepsiszentgyörgy–Bedeháza (cauldrons and spur), and Eprestető (cauldrons, arrow-head, and hoe blade), Angyalos (arrow-head), and Réty (cauldron and spur) in the northeastern Székelyföld are also of the twelfth century. After the end of the twelfth century, the early frontier guard

settlements appeared north of this territory of what later was to be called

Csíkszék: at Gyergyószentmiklós–Lázárkastély (cauldrons), and especially within the area of Csíkszentkirály, where a semi-subterranean house, but with roof posts at the four corners, was dated with the help of twelfth-century vessels, cauldrons and the coins of Isaac II Angelus. The latest excavations and finds, thus, prove the fact that the frontier guards were moved eastwards in the twelfth century. They did not, on the other hand, confirm the earlier supposition based on wrongly-dated arrow-heads that these settlements were associated with tenth- and eleventh-century Hungarians or even Pechenegs previously living in the area.

Conclusions Drawn from the Study of Hungarian and Slavic Settlements up to the Great Changes of the Late Twelfth Century

Fortuitous and irregular as the archaeological studies of the past century have been, they have yielded some irrefutable facts concerning settlements in the region.

The eastern rim of the Great Hungarian Plain from the Ér region to the Lower Danube, together with the adjoining valleys, differed at most from the neighbouring western plains in that the centres of Hungarian settlement and early state administration were situated precisely along this rim, from Szatmárvár through Biharvár, Várad, Zarándvár, Aradvár, Temesvár to Krassóvár and Orsovavár. Even denser and richer early Hungarian settlement may be anticipated here than in the central and southern parts of the region east of the Tisza. In the light of the archaeological study of these settlements, it seems quite logical that the eleventh-century centres of political opposition to the power of the early Hungarian state as represented by Esztergom and Székesfehérvár formed around Marosvár/Csanádvár and Biharvár.

The situation was different in Transylvania proper. The study of the graves of the military middle strata suggests that the western half of the Mezőség, the larger basins (i.e. Háromszék Basin) and both sides of the Maros Valley were occupied only for strategic reasons during the Conquest. When the Pecheneg–Bulgar threat ended in the middle of the tenth century, the early expansive defence system disappeared — to be changed to permanent occupation, in fact settling down in the western half of the Transylvanian Basin with a marchland round it. The first permanent Hungarian settlements formed around the salt mines along the Maros and Aranyos rivers, with Gyulafehérvár being their political-military centre. Apart from Gyulafehérvár and some smaller villages in the Maros and Küküllő river valleys, it would be hard to predict the location of significant settlements elsewhere during the second half of the last third of the tenth century without carrying out excavations in the area.

After 1003, the valley of the Maros River continued to be the principal highway and the main artery of state administration in the eleventh century. The campaign against Ajtony was partly prompted by the insolence of the lord of Marosvár in taxing the boats carrying King Stephen I's salt con-

signments on the Maros. This river remained the main transportation route for the Transylvanian salt being sent primarily to Arad and Szeged, and later to Szeged only, until the end of the sixteenth century. The archaeological study of Transylvania's settlements suggests that the overland transport of salt was only organized around the middle of the eleventh century: starting from Désvár and built not long before in the northwest Transylvania, the route led through the Gate of Meszes (already known and used at the time of the establishing of the Hungarian state — Vártelek) to Szolnok by the Tisza River. The salt route was given the telling name of *királyuta* — "The King's Highway" *(via regis)*. Judging by the lack of archaeological evidence, the rough terrain in the valley of the united Szamos from Dés to Asszonypataka/Nagybánya did not play a significant role in the Hungarians' settlement or in linking the two parts of the country until the end of the eleventh century.

Naturally, the absence of archaeological finds and all traces of human habitation also excludes the possibility of northern and northeastern Transylvania having been densely populated in the Árpád period. The possibility that these areas were populated by people other than Hungarians or Slavs is even less likely. Máramaros and the northeastern part of the Szilágy region were described in twelfth- and thirteenth-century documents as vast royal forests. The supposed "autochthonous" Romanian population of Máramaros — in hiding from the time of Trajan until the coming of Dragoş in the fourteenth century[36] —, mentioned by the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Moldavian chroniclers Miron Costin and Dimitrie Cantemir, left behind no traces whatsoever.

Although the Sebes-Körös–Királyhágó ("The King's Pass")–Kis-Szamos route had been known since the Conquest, practically up until the end of the Árpád period it had less significance for the settlement history of Transylvania than the main communication artery, the Maros Valley, as is borne out by the uneven distribution of earthen cauldrons.

The strategic defence of Transylvania to the last third of the eleventh century was secured by Dobokavár in the north, Küküllővár in the east, and Hunyadvár in the south. The Hungarian settlements around these castles tended to be compact, and cover larger areas, and this was true of the settlements around Ó-Kolozsvár and Ó-Tordavár as well. Gyulafehérvár maintained its central role all the time. It is something of a triumph for archaeologists that the regions that were identified as centres of Slavic settlement before the Conquest largely coincide with the areas that linguists studying Slavic place-names have indicated as probable areas of the Transylvanian Slavic population's survival until the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

From about the last decades of the eleventh century, the central areas were defended by frontier guard communities moved from other regions of Hungary to the southern parts of Transylvania later inhabited by the Saxons. These communities were settled around and within smaller earth-and-timber forts. During the reign of Ladislas I and Coloman, the formation of a parish church system is evidenced within the whole area occupied

175   36. *DAI* 37 = *FBHH* 41.

to that time. Roman Catholic churches surrounded by cemeteries were established in previously uninhabited regions and former woodlands, especially in the Küküllő valleys. The castles of the *ispáns* were everywhere the centres of Christianity. For example, two, later repeatedly rebuilt, early stone churches are known within the territory of Dobokavár.

In the middle third of the twelfth century, at the time of the first Saxon immigration, the late eleventh century frontier-guard settlements were gradually moved into what was later to be called the Székelyföld. Today, there is archaeological evidence that verifies the existence of these settlements and cemeteries of the frontier guard communities. The frontier guards were Hungarians, cleaving to old Hungarian traditions which were already a little outdated in the rapidly developing new country. Their standing in society is shown in their clothing, which displays a wealth verging on that of the nobles.

The archaeological evidencies on the Hungarians' habitations in Transylvania are confirmed by the most recent research on Transylvanian dialects.

The Hungarian dialect spoken in the Szatmár, Kraszna, Közép-Szolnok, eastern Bihar, and western Kolozs (Kalotaszeg) regions is related to the dialect of the Tiszántúl and the Upper Tisza region. The archaeological study of settlements shows that the habitation areas of the Hungarians spread across this region, most of which lies outside Transylvania proper, from the west, that is from the Tisza region at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries.

There are at least three separate major dialects among the Székelys. Its most ancient and sporadic remnants can be observed in the Belső-Szolnok, northern Kolozs, eastern Fejér and western Küküllő regions. People living in these areas seem to be the descendants of the early, eleventh-century frontier guards in the marches, while people in the western part of the later Udvarhelyszék certainly had their origins in Bihar. The three major dialects found in the Székelyföld display striking similarities with the dialects of other former border regions of the country. The dialect around Marosszék is similar to that spoken in the Pozsony region (in today's Slovakia) and in the Moson region, and to that of the Őrvidék (Burgenland). The dialect of Udvarhelyszék is similar to the one spoken in southern Baranya (Ormánság). The Székely communities, therefore, must have formed through the relocation of various *őrség*s (guards) to the east during the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Today it is impossible to say which was the largest, the eponymous, group. The autochthonous population throughout the whole of the Székelyföld had been Slavic.

The Hungarian dialect of the Transylvanian Basin is distinctly Transylvanian, different from all other Hungarian dialects. The only explanation for this is that this dialect has this roots in the Hungarians who settled here in the late-ninth century, of the time of the Conquest. Its early core, like the graves of the conquerors and the oldest earthworks, can be found in the area stretching from Dobokavár through Kolozsvár, Tordavár, Küküllővár and Déva to Hunyadvár. From here it extended in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to the eastern half of the Mezőség and the headwaters of the Fehér- and the Fekete-Körös in the west. This area roughly corresponds to the archaic dialect of the folk songs found in the Mezőség, in Enyed and in

Marosludas, the fourth independent archaic dialect of Transylvania, the one defined by Bartók. All this demonstrates that a significant group of the Hungarians have been continuously present in the western half of the Transylvanian Basin since 895. This group differs from the main body of the Hungarians — including even the Székelys who were settled in their present location at a later date — in that their unique geographic isolation has resulted in their preserving ethnic characteristics more archaic than those found in any other Hungarian region.

II. The Emergence of the Estates (1172–1526)

1. The Three People of Transylvania (1172–1241)

The Formation of the Székely and Saxon Settlements

According to chronicles going back to the thirteenth century, the Székely nation, living in a closed community on the southeastern border of Transylvania, descended from the Huns who had found shelter in Transylvania after the death of Attila. This, however, cannot be proved; neither can the assumption that they are identical with a Turk people who migrated into the Carpathian Basin in about 670. Such an assumption, despite some archaeological evidence, is not verifiable linguistically. The Székelys, or at least their eponymous core, are most likely to have descended from a tribe referred to as "kabars" by the Byzantine emperor, Constantine Porphyrogennetos, the "rebels" who rose against their Khazar overlords and joined the Hungarian tribes before the conquest of the Carpathian Basin. In about 950 they were still bilingual, speaking both their own Turk tongue and the Hungarians' Finno-Ugric language. Their name is generally derived from the name of the Bulgarian–Turk tribe "Eskil", although this is much disputed.

However, the Székelys' origin is likely to be Turkic. The runic alphabet which the Székelys used in the Middle Age had initially been employed to set down Turkic texts; of its thirty-seven characters, twenty-one were Old Turkic, three Hellenic and three Gelgolitic. Four of the last two types of characters represent phonemes which do not occur in Turkic, but can be found in Finno-Ugric Hungarian. The Székelys, for as far back as we have data concerning their language (including geographical names), have always spoken Hungarian, and their local dialect contains no more Turkic loan words than the vernacular Hungarian. Thus, even if their language had originally been Turkic, they very early on assimilated completely into the Hungarians. This could hardly have happened in their present area of habitation, on the southeast border of the territory where Hungarian was spoken.

The Székelys preserved one element of their Turkic tribal organization even in modern times. The Székely people was divided into six tribes, with four branches within each. Each branch was governed by a number of leading families which had the hereditary right to put forward judges (*judices*) and military leaders (*capitanei*) for the clan, and these offices were rotated annually among them in a specific order. This structure may have survived

from the time of the Conquest, or may have been formed as a pattern of military organization during the period when the frontier zone was established. Be that as it may, it clearly existed by the time the Székelys moved to their present location, since each one of the six clans is found by name in every Székely community in whatever part of the country it settled later on. Some members of every one of the six tribes must, therefore, have been involved in each resettlement. The land on which they settled was in every case considered to be the common property of the Székely people as a whole. Each new community was reorganized along the pattern of four branches for each of the six tribes; in cases where the new settlement was a branch short, the number was rounded out to four with a "new" branch. The office-holders' share of the common tribal land was a multiple of that of an ordinary person, and this, as well as the other benefits they received, made for considerable differentiation in wealth among the Székelys, too. The feudal system of personal subordination, however, could not evolve, since every Székely was a free man, with the right to possess an equitable share of the common land and the duty to personal military service. Together with the tribal-military structure, the Székelys preserved the longest, the transhumant way of life of the Hungarian herdsmen, seasonally rotating their use of highland and lowland pastures for optimal grazing. In the early days, they presented horses to the king by way of taxes, and even when they gradually took to agriculture, the Székelys paid their tax in cattle. This means that they remained primarily stockbreeders. In the king's army, the Székelys served as the light cavalry vanguard.

The uniquely structured Székely communities and the Székely way of life would never have survived within the framework of the royal counties where the commoners were assigned to various duties around the castles and only a certain proportion of them were called on to perform military service. Along with the military settlements bearing Hungarian tribal names, there are also settlements called Székely throughout all of historical Hungary, in Transdanubia as well as along the northwestern borders. From this we can conclude that the resettlement of the first Székely (Kabar?) warriors must have started at the turn of the tenth and eleventh century.

The deanery established for the Székelys which is first referred to in the sources as being in Transylvania was named after a settlement in Bihar county, and it even had a district called Erdőhát (Forest Hill) after the hilly region near the village of Telegd. The Transylvanian Saxon name of Hortobágy for a river can be found at only one other place in Hungary outside the Székelys' early Transylvanian habitat, and that is in Bihar county. The river-name of Homoród which was given to two streams in the Deanery of Telegd also has its parallel in Bihar. Bihar county was completely surrounded by Hungarian settlements in the course of the tenth century, which explains why the Székelys were thoroughly magyarized by the eleventh century, and spoke only Hungarian by the time they moved to Transylvania, although they kept their runic alphabet.

Toponomy also provides information about the area the Székelys first inhabited in Transylvania, about the time of their movement further eastwards to their present homeland, and about the route they took. It was around 1190 that King Géza II established a provostship in the valley of the

Hortobágy River for the first German-speakers (*Flandrenses* or *Theutonici*) settled in Transylvania. This provostship was first under the authority of the bishop of Transylvania, but was later transferred to the archbishop of Esztergom. Its territory, called "Altland" both then and later, consisted of three judicial and administrative districts called *szék*s that is seats — the Szebenszék, Újegyházasszék and Nagysinkszék seats. The records refer to the Altland as *desertum*, meaning, however, not a desert, but something abandoned, the land left by the Székelys of Telegd who moved on to a former royal domain — of which only its name, Udvarhely (Place of the Court) survived. This is primary proof that the Székelys had already been in the Hortobágy Valley before the arrival of the Germans, and also in the valleys of the rivers Sebes and Szád to the west, and in the Sáros Valley to the east, and had passed on some of their place-names before they moved on. After the departure of the Telegd Székelys and still in the twelfth century, the Székely community of the Sebes Valley (near today's Szászsebes) moved east of the Olt River bend to the territory afterwards called Sepsiszék, this name being a variant of Sebesi, that is of the name of their former home. Later Székelys from Orba in the Szerdahely district followed their example and migrated to the southeastern marches of Transylvania into the district afterwards Orbaiszék.

The move must have taken place before 1224, for in 1224, King Andrew II joined the seats of Szászváros, Szászsebes, Szerdahely and Kőhalom to the three seats of Altland, decreeing that the Székely communities, from "Város" (Szászváros) to Barót in Sepsiszék beyond the Olt bends become one nation (*unus sit populus*).[1] He provided, furthermore, that the separate districts should unite under the sole authority of the *ispán*, or *comes*, of Szeben, who was appointed by the king and was independent of the voivode of Transylvania. The first known *ispán* of Szeben appeared, by the way, in 1210 as the leader of the Saxons, Székelys, Pechenegs, and Romanians in a war against Bulgaria. The Székely's own separate *ispán* must have been appointed in about 1230, at about the time the settlers leaving the areas that had been allocated to the Germans were finally installed in Sepsiszék and Orbaiszék. For some time, however, there were some Székelys living north of the German settlements on the southern bank of the Nagyküküllő, who gave up their lands to the Germans only later. Nevertheless, the basis of the autonomy these German settlers were to enjoy already existed in 1224. The other six seats joined to the "province" of Szeben (later Szebenszék) were awarded the liberties of Szeben collectively. This meant that here the villages and seats had the authority to elect their own judges and priests, and that the population as a whole was subordinate to no private landowner. It was the king who appointed their administrative and military leader, the *ispán* of Szeben, who in these years was invariably a member of the Hungarian aristocracy. The autonomous seats were obliged to pay a considerable amount of money in taxes, and to supply 500 armoured soldiers to the king.

This free peasant status, so different from the form of social organization in the counties, as it involved no obligation of rendering services even to

1. E. JAKAB, *Oklevéltár Kolozsvár története első kötetéhez.* (Archives to Volume I of the History of Kolozsvár.) Buda 1870, 9.

elected officials, was not one that the German settlers had brought with them from their homeland near Luxemburg. In fact, the weight of their seigneurial burdens had been as much of a reason for their emigration as the over-population of that area. They won the liberties of Szeben in Transylvania. Similar settlement programmes for foreign "guests" *(hospites)* who shared in the privileges of personal freedom and self-government were started in other parts of Transylvania as well: immigrants arrived in the northern part of the province around Radna and Beszterce, and in some villages of the Maros Valley in the district of Szászrégen, probably about the same time as those who settled in Szeben. Because they all shared in the Saxon-type privileges, all German immigrants were referred to as "Saxons" *(Saxones)* by the royal chancellery and by the Hungarian population, though they had not come from Saxony. The liberties of Szeben thus became the "Saxon liberties", and they applied only to those who settled on the royal domains transferred to them and called — despite the fact that the territories were geographically remote from each other — the *Királyföld*, German: Königsboden (Land of the King), and the *Szászföld* (Land of the Saxons). Those Germans who established their new homes on ecclesiastical or other nonroyal land found themselves under the authority of their feudal lords. However, the freedom of the royal settlers, too, was in constant danger, from factors both external and internal to the system. In 1224, King Andrew II promised that he would not give grants of land to any lord in any of the seven seats which shared in the liberties of Szeben. Nevertheless, irreversible cases of his having done so had occurred before. For instance, Gosselin, the royal chaplin and one of the Walloon immigrants who had come with the Germans, owned an estate called Kisdisznód in Szebenszék. In 1223, one year before the ban on private ownership in the region, he gave the land, together with its church, to the Abbey of Kerc, probably because he himself wished to live in the royal court. The village could not revert to being under Saxon authority until a hundred years later, and even then only because the abbey was joined to Szebenszék.

The German immigrants were led by operators who held the title of *Gräve* in German (*geréb* in Hungarian). Villages were often named after the *geréb* who established them. This is how Szeben, the Saxon centre, had initially acquired the name *Villa Hermanni*, and later, when it was a town, came to be called *Hermannstadt*. The *gerébs* laid claim to hereditary prerogatives (e.g. a bigger share of the land, milling and inkeeping rights), which gave them almost seignorial powers. It was to curtail this development that the commoners had the king declare in the charter of 1224 that "the people have the right to elect whomever they deem fit" for their magistrates.[2] On the other hand, the *gerébs* tried to safeguard their independence by obtaining land grants from the king in areas to which the liberties of Szeben did not apply, and where they were able to exercise the rights of landowners over the population, even over the settlers of German descent. Some of them ended up moving out of Szebenszék, and ceding their villages to the Saxon communities.

181   2. Ibid.

While the Saxons succeeded in preventing the *gerebs* from accumulating land within the seats, they failed in their efforts to unite all the Saxon seats under the ecclesiastical authority of the Altland, the provost of Szeben coming under the immediate authority of the archbishops of Esztergom, although that status involved significant material advantages when it came to the payment of tithes, for example. The priests belonging to the Archdiocese of Esztergom were allowed to keep two-thirds of the tithes collected for their own purposes, whereas the share of all the others was only a quarter. Time and again the priests of the other Saxon deaneries and chapters tried to wrest for themselves, too, the advantages which their Szeben colleagues enjoyed. This led to constant discord with their superiors, the bishops of Transylvania. The Saxon *gerebs* supported their priests in this struggle, and when the bishop of Transylvania had Alárd, the defiant *gereb* of Vízakna executed in 1277, Saxon soldiers led by Alárd's son Gyán, ransacked Gyula-fehérvár, and set the cathedral on fire, with the members of the bishop's chapter and many Hungarians citizens who had fled there for safety inside. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, Vízakna had finally been placed under the authority of the Provostship of Szeben, which also shared in the profits from the settlement's important salt-time. However, the dispute over tithes continued, and the bishops of Transylvania excommunicated the disobedient Saxon priests on several occasions.

Before the 1224 charter securing the rights of the German settlers, there was an event which was to have a lasting effect on the history of the region: in 1211, the Teutonic knights who had been expelled from the Holy Land settled in the Barcaság. The area was then deserted, because the king had resettled the Pecheneg frontier-guard community which had given the originally Turkic names of Barca, Brassó, Tömös, Zajzon and Tatrang to the rivers of the area. The Pechenegs' new home was probably near the castle of Talmács — named after one of their tribes —, where, according to records from 1224, they shared the use of the neighbouring forests with Saxons and Romanians. The knights were not under the authority of the voivodes, but enjoyed autonomy. They had the right to build wooden castles, and to settle people on their land who became exempt from paying tithes and had the right to hold fairs. This, however, did not satisfy the knights. They started building stone castles and spread their influence beyond the mountains. The last straw came when the knights insisted that they were subject to no authority but the pope's. King Andrew II would not tolerate this, and expelled them in 1225. Their German settlements, however, stayed on, and formed an independent Saxon district headed by a royal *ispán* who had his seat at Brassó.

The consolidation of both the Székely and Saxon settlements took place only in the second half of the thirteenth century. Székelys living near Medgyes moved to the Marosszék (west of the Seat of Udvarhely), which belonged to the Deanery of Telegd. Some of those living near Szászkézd moved to establish Seat of Aranyos near Torda in 1288; others settled north of Seat of Sepsi and Seat of Orba of Kézdiszék. The above three later united as the district of Háromszék (Three Seats), although as far as church organization was concerned, the seats of Orba and Kézd formed a separate deanery, the Deanery of Kézd. Sepsiszék was the only one of the Székely seats to remain

part of the Deanery of Gyulafehérvár. Finally, the inhabitants of the Seat of Udvarhely gave up their home and chose to live in the seats of Csík and Gyergyó, although they stayed within the jurisdiction of the Telegd deanery. The two Saxon communities which took the place of the Medgyes and Szászkézd Székelys remained under the authority of the Székely *ispán* until 1402. Ecclesiastically, however, they belonged to the Gyulafehérvár deanery, as did the eighth Saxon seat, Segesvár, which had grown up by the beginning of the fourteenth century. In the northeast, Beszterce — together with Radna and the "royal" district — obtained the liberties of Szeben only in 1366. The villages, however, south of Beszterce, which were administered by the Teke, Régen and Kerlés deaneries, now came under the authority of Hungarian and Saxon landlords. Thus the geographical distribution of the Székely and Saxon population took its final form.

The Peregrine Romanian Homeland

The settlement of the Saxons and resettlement of the Székelys to the east was only an intermediate stage, not the final form, of frontier defence, which needed constant reorganization due to the changing nature of the external threats to the country. After the series of raids by nomadic peoples from the east, the most dangerous foe was Byzantium. In 1166, Emperor Manuel I led the first sudden surprise attack against Transylvania and his soldiers ravaged the area, taking many prisoners and a rich booty. According to a contemporary chronicler, "His great army consisted of, among many others, a great host of Vlachs, who are allegedly descendants of former settlers from Italy".[3] The Slavonic word "Vlach" borrowed originally from the German, was used by the Byzantines to describe the people in their empire who spoke a neo-Latin language and called themselves "Rumin".

The above is the first authentic historical source which speaks of the presence of Romanians in Transylvania. This was the first time they appeared north of the Danube River. In 1164, Manuel's rival, Andronikos, who had been imprisoned but escaped, was captured by Vlachs on the Galician border, that is, somewhere on the Moldavian side of the eastern Carpathians. It follows that Romanians must already have been living on the southern and eastern outer slopes of the Carpathians before 1200.

Linguistic evidence also suggests a similar conclusion. This derives from Bulgarian rule in the area between the Danube and the Southern Carpathians after 600: the Slavonic loan words in Romanian are of Bulgarian-Slavonic origin. Their phonetic features, however, suggest that intensive Bulgarian-Romanian ties were formed only after 900. Therefore, the phonetic change from *a* to *o* (e.g. *bab* to the Romanian *bob*) took place in the ninth century; and the disappearance of the weak vowel *i* (e.g. *timinica* to the Romanian *temniţă*) is conjecturally placed at about 900. Place-names of Romanian origin can be found only around today's Sofia and in the area to the west and south of it, indicating that linguistic relations developed only in those Byzan-

3. *FBHH* 238–239.

tine territories which were occupied by the Bulgarian tsar Simeon who held Sofia and expanded his control as far as Thessaly. There are no signs of interaction in Old Bulgaria on the right bank of the Danube.

Further linguistic evidence points even further, as both main dialects of the Romanian language, the Daco-Romanian and the Megleno-Romanian, contain words which have either been borrowed from the Albanian or have originated from a Balkanic proto-language shared with the Albanians. (This Balkan proto-language may have had different dialects and may have been influenced by several *satem* type languages which fused during the period when the area was under Roman rule.) The Romanian dialects also have grammatical features identical to some in Albanian. The only place where the Romanian's ancestors could have had contact with the Albanians, however, was the central part of the Balkan Peninsula, for the Albanians have always lived there. The region where the Macedo-Romanians live, or rather, where they used to live, since the majority of them moved to present-day Romania earlier this century, cannot have been the Romanian people's original homeland. For in the area concerned, that is, in the region south of Skoplje and Sofia, the vernacular was Greek during the generations of Roman rule, and the Romanian-speaking population could not, thus, have picked up its language there. They must have moved there from the north, probably after 600, fleeing from the Slavic tribes who were invading the Balkan Peninsula. Several tenth to twelfth century Byzantine sources provide data on the Macedonian and Thessalian Romanians.

That the Romanian people were spread over such a large area and appeared in Transylvania at a relatively late date can only be attributed to the fact that they led a transhumant way of life. Words which can be found both in the Albanian language and in the northern and southern Romanian dialects provide linguistic evidence to support this view. The obvious peculiarity of these words is that most of them, directly or indirectly, relate to pastoral life in the mountains. On the other hand, terms associated with land cultivation are clearly missing except for the words *mazăre* (pea), *păstaie* (pea-pod), *grunz* (clod of earth) and *grapă* (hoe), which indicates that the women must have cultivated the land using rude hoes, whereas the men tended the herds away from home. In Romanian, the technical terms of tillage, farming implements and cultivated crops are of Latin, Slavonic or Hungarian origin.

The vocabulary for the natural environment in Albanian, Macedo-Romanian and Daco-Romanian graphically depicts a mountainous area, particularly the region above 1200 metres, where primeval coniferous forests covered the slopes. It was in an environment of this kind that the Albanians and Romanians lived together before the Romanian dialects developed, as evidenced by words common in the Albanian and the Romanian dialects such as, for instance: *brad* (pine tree), *bunget* (dense forest), *copac* (tree), *curpen* (vine), *druete* (tree stump), *ghionoaie* (woodpecker), *mal* (slope), *măgura* (hill), *năpîrcă* (viper), *pîrău* (stream), *spînz* (hellebore), and *viezure* (badger). To judge from the directions the peoples later took and the areas of their final settlement, the original common habitat must have been a mountainous area near Skoplje, a region rich in alpine pastures. This pastoral population had, at one time, lived as one people with a romanized population which

184

had fled from towns and villages north of the Albanian–Romanian area, and had settled south of it. This is proven by the Romanians' adoption of Macedonian place-names, for example Bitolja > Bitulea, Veria, Seres, Elasson > Lâsun, Kastoria > Kostur, Saloniki > Sârun or Florina > Flârin. The close links that existed between the town-dwellers and the nomadic groups among the Macedo-Romanians are proven by a statement by the leader of the 1066 Romanian uprising against the Byzantine government, who lived in the urban centre of Larissa: he was not able to get in touch with his men, because in the summer they and their families were all in the mountains of Bulgaria (today's Macedonia).

The above statement is, in fact, the first known mention of the practice of transhumance, that is summer-winter rotational grazing, among the Romanians. Since the shepherds moved to the mountains with their families in the summer, and to the valleys and the seacost in the winter, Byzantine sources call them "nomads". Real nomadism, however, involves the shepherds' constantly moving their herds to new pastures, and taking their families with them. Although Romanian herdsmen did not, as a rule, follow this pattern, occasionally some of them had to seek new areas because of repeated attacks by other tribes, or poor pastures. In the Balkans, there were some Romanian shepherds even in the twentieth century who led a genuinely nomadic way of life and had no permanent habitat. Migration spread the pastoral, undoubtedly Romanian-speaking culture, whose language was from the Pindus to the northern Carpathians, leaving permanent traces on the languages of several other peoples.

From the sixty-six words in Albanian, Macedo-Romanian and Daco-Romanian (according to some dubious etymologies, a few more) which originate from the proto-language in the Balkan Peninsula, thirty have passed into Balkanic languages (Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian), including twenty-eight which have found their way into Hungarian and Ukrainian as well. Surprisingly, a further thirteen of them can be identified only in the Hungarian and the Ukrainian which means either that they never were adopted into the other languages of the Balkans, or that they have died out. Finally, thirteen of these words are still used by Polish, Slovakian and Moravian shepherds today. That these "peregrinating" words were originally in the vocabulary of peregrine shepherds is proved by their meaning. Out of those which reached the Balkanic languages together with Hungarian and Ukrainian, twenty-one are fundamentally connected to pastoral life, and the others are also related to it. (Some examples are: *bačin* (cheese-making shepherd), *balegă* (manure), *barz* (grey animal colour), *bască* (wool), *brîu* (belt), *căciulă* (sheepskin hat), *căputâ* (shepherd's socks), *cătun* (shepherd's shelter), *fluier* (flute), *gard* (manure-heap), *gâlbează* (flatworm), *mînz* (foal), *murg* (dun animal colour), *rînză* (rennet), *sarbăd* (sour-milk), *sterp* (barren), *strungă* (sheepfold), *șuț* (hornless), *țap* (billy-goat), *țarc* (pinfold), *vatră* (fireplace), *vătui* (lamb), and *zgardă* (dog-collar). The pastoral vocabulary of Daco-Romanian, and of all the other languages it influenced, became richer after the separation from the Albanians, and concerned with dairy farming particularly. Some such words have survived in Macedo-Romanian too, like *strâgheată* (soft cheese), *urdă* (sweet cottage cheese), *zară* (buttermilk), *zâr* (whey), and *cîrlig* (shepherd's crook), but they also spread to other Balkan peoples,

as well as to the Hungarians, Ukrainians, and to some extent even to the Poles, Slovaks, and Moravians. Besides these, only the Daco-Romanian has preserved the words *brînză* (cottage cheese), *bordei* (shepherd's hut), *butuc* or *butură* (tree stump), *căpușă* (tick), *cață* (shepherd's crook), and *cîrlan* (lamb). It was from the Daco-Romanian that these terms have passed into the Balkan languages, and into Hungarian and Ukrainian, and to some extent into Slovak, Polish and Moravian.

During the centuries when the Romanian pastoral communities were peregrinating across the alpine pastures of the Balkans and the Carpathians, their vocabulary was naturally enriched by other languages. For example, from the Slavic they borrowed *stînă* (cheese making hut), *smîntînă* (sour-cream), *colibă* (hut), *jintiță* (sweet whey); from the Hungarian *sălaș* (shepherd's shelter), *lăcaș* (lodgings), *răvaș* (accounting), and *tărcat* (dappled). It is striking, however, that of those Romanian words for animal husbandry which came from the Latin, only a few can be found in other languages, such as *păcurar* (shepherd), *staur* (stable), *turmă* (herd), *curastră* (yoghurt), probably because they did not belong specifically to Romanian pastoral culture, but were general terms of animal husbandry known to all nations.

It is apparent from the vocabulary listed above that the Romanian were a pastoral community engaged primarily in raising small animals, particularly sheep, but they could not do without horses while migrating. Besides the making of cheese and cottage-cheese, weaving wool and breeding horses not only enabled them to be self-sufficient but also played an important part in the economic life of the whole Balkan-Carpathian region. In the Middle Ages, and even in early modern times, one of the most important staple foods in this huge area was preserved salted cottage cheese. Hand-woven woollens were sought after in both rural and town markets; and Romanian horses, apart from being considered very good, carried the greater part of the freight traffic in the Balkan peninsula. The documents mention two categories among the Romanian shepherds attached to Serbian monasteries by royal decree in the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries: the *vojniks* or soldiers, and the *kjelators* who performed carrier socage-service. (The word *kjelator* is of Latin origin but derives directly from the Romanian *calator* which means traveller; the phrase *Vlachoi hoditai* used in a Byzantine source in 976 is probably a calque).

It would be a mistake, however, to regard the Romanians as solely a transhumant or even mainly a nomadic people — a mistake that has been made by a great many writers, from early medieval Byzantine chroniclers to modern Hungarian and even Romanian historians. The mountain shepherds who specialized in dairy farming had to rely on the town market where they could sell their surplus produce; they also needed to buy cereals either in the town markets or in the villages. However, in difficult times they had to cultivate the land themselves, within the limits of the geographical potential of the mountains. This is how the technical terms of tillage, which are of Latin origin, have survived in both the northern and southern dialects of Romanian, *grîu* (wheat), *orz* (barley), *secară* (rye), *meiu* (millet), *ara* (to plough), *semăna* (to sow), *treera* (to thresh), *făină* (flour), and *pîine* (bread). In peaceful times the majority of the nomadic pastoral communities chose to stay in the same area for longer periods, changed over to farm-

ing and established permanent villages. This is proved by hundreds of place-names in the northern Romanian dialect, or by place-names that refer to a Romanian population (Vlasi, etc.) in the enormous area stretching between Sarajevo and Sofia from west to east, and between Niš and Skoplje from north to south, although the Romanians had left that region by the end of the Middle Ages, or had assimilated into the Serbian and Bulgarian environment. While in Transylvania, the former Roman province of Dacia, there were no Roman town names preserved in the language of the inhabitants before the Hungarian Conquest, in the northern, romanized areas of the Balkan Peninsula the Roman names of towns and rivers adopted by the Slavonic population — for example: Ratiaria became Arčar, Naissus Niš, Scupi Skoplje, Serdica Srjedec, and Almus changed to Lom, Oescus to Iskăr, and Augusta to Ogosta, and so on — imply that at the time of the Slavonic invasion only part of the romanized town-dwelling population had fled to the south, while the rest stayed on and assimilated into the Slavonic community only later. However, according to the above-mentioned evidence of mediaeval Romanian place-names, the inhabitants of the neighbouring Romanian villages and pastoral communities maintained their language until their fourteenth-sixteenth century migration to the north, or until their local assimilation, and increasingly combined their pastoral way of life with agriculture. The Romanian shepherds connected with the Bulgarians enriched their vocabulary with Slavonic words for agriculture sometime after 900, when the speakers of the northern and southern Romanian dialects were still living together. This is apparent in the fact that both dialects contain Bulgarian loan-words showing the same phonetic changes, for example, *bob* (bean), *brazda* (furrow), *coaja* (bark), *coasă* (scythe), *cociasă* (dry stalk), *cucian* (peduncle), *grădină* (garden), *livadă* (orchard), *lopată* (shovel), *plug* (plough), *snop* (sheaf), *stog* (rick), and so on.

All in all, the Albanian loan-words of the northern Romanian dialect and the Bulgarian loan-words of the southern Romanian dialect lead to the conclusion that the evolution of the Vlach–Romanian language and people took place over a relatively large area in the course of migrating in different directions, and sometimes returning to previous places of habitation. This, if there is a continuity of the Roman province and, later, the Romanians, it cannot be regarded as attaching to some area, but to the people themselves, among whom were the descendants of the Roman and the romanized population moved from Dacia to the southern banks of the Danube in 271, and pushed further to the south by the Slavs after 600. The Romanian population, dispersed in various directions by the Bulgarians after 900, reassembled in different places at different times as the changing political circumstances allowed. Between 900 and 1000, the Romanians must have been in every part of the Bulgarian Empire which spread from the southern Carpathians to Thessaly, including the region between the Carpathians and the Lower Danube, an area with a sizeable Bulgarian–Slavonic population at the time. Their presence in this area is shown by the names of such rivers as Zsil–Jil, Jijia, Ialomiţa, Dîmboviţa, and by the name Vlaska region, near the lower section of the Argeş River. This latter epithet implies the existence of a sporadic Romanian community in a Slavonic environment. It must have been here that the northern Romanian dialect picked up the Bulgarian-Sla-

vonic technical terms of agriculture which are unknown to the southern dialect, such as: *ogor* (fallow land), *sâdi* (to plant), *ovâz* (oat), *pleavâ* (chaff, husks), and *rarițã* (hand plough), as well as *brãzdar* (ploughshare), *grindei* (plough beam), *cormanã* (mouldboard), *plaz* (sole of a plough).

In 1014, the Byzantine expansion reached the Danube, and put an end to the independent existence of the Bulgarian state for the next two hundred years. The Bulgarian–Slavonic population was left isolated in the Lower Danubian plain. Hemmed in from the north by the Romanian pastoral communities living on the slopes of the Carpathians, and by the Cumans invading the area from the south, this Bulgarian–Slavonic population gradually became romanized. The same thing happened to the Slavonic community living north of the Danube, on the territory of what later became Moldavia. The former Bulgarian region between the Lower Danube and the Carpathians fell under Cuman rule, and was thereafter referred to as *Cumania* in the historical sources.

Between 1014 and 1185, the entire Romanian population of the Balkans lived within the Byzantine Empire, and, as mentioned above, was part of the Byzantine army. But they often rebelled against the Byzantine authorities because of the heavy taxes. In 1094, the Cumans making forays into the empire were guided through the Balkan Mountains by Romanians. By that time the Romanian Christian church, whose language had originally been Latin, had already adopted the Bulgarian's Slavonic liturgy. They belonged to the Archdiocese of Ohrid, and in the eleventh century a separate diocese was established for them in Vranje in the Morava Valley. In 1185, the Bulgarian malcontents rose against Byzantine oppression led by two Romanians, Peter and Asen. With Cuman help, the area broke away from Byzantium, and the Asenid, or Second Bulgarian Empire — also called the Bulgarian–Vlach Empire — was founded. It eventually fell to the Turks at the end of the fourteenth century. The Romanian element ceased to play a role in this empire from the mid-thirteenth century on.

From the end of the twelfth century, large Romanian communities had been moving to the politically ascendant Serbia, only to disappear from there as well or to become assimilated into the local populations. By the fifteenth century, only the Macedo-Romanians and the secessionist Megleno-Romanians remained in the centre of the Balkans. A fragmentary Romanian population who spoke the northern dialect migrated to Istria and the majority of the Romanian people was concentrated north of the Danube.

After such a varied history, we cannot localize the ancient Romanian homeland to a small area, to the Niš–Skoplje–Sofia triangle, for instance, as some historians have previously believed possible. The Romanian linguist, Sextil Pușcariu, declared long ago: "Nothing prevents us from believing that during the early evolutionary period of our language, a relatively sparse population living over an extensive area was able to pass on linguistic innovations through primitive channels across great distances". It was in the same spirit that Alexandru Nicolescu made the following highly apt observation: "The Romanians moved about both to the north and south of the Danube with characteristic versatility ... and therefore the Romanian nation did not have a single 'cradle' or 'ancient homeland', but several, stretching over a vast area had lying far from one another ... Through the repeated

188

merging and dispersing of their communities throughout the Carpathian-Danubian and Danubian-Balkan regions, the Romanians achieved a 'mobile continuity'."[4] The story of Transylvania's Romanians can be understood only in the light of this "mobile continuity".

Romanians in Transylvania and Cumania until the Mongol Invasion

Some fifty years after the Romanians *(Vlachoi)* in the army of the emperor Manuel I had raided and looted Transylvania in 1166 a whole series of charters dated to the first decades of the thirteenth century make reference to Romanians living peacefully under Hungarian authority in the southern Carpathians. They must have had some sort of autonomy. At least this is what is implied by a charter of 1202 issued by King Andrew II, in which he granted the narrow strip of land running up to the mountains between the Olt, Kerc and Árpás rivers to the Cistercian monastery established in Kerc near the Olt River. This piece of land must have belonged to the Romanian community, for the charter removed it from their authority.[5] According to a 1223 charter issued to confirm the grant, the transfer of the property was carried out by Benedek, the voivode of Transylvania who held this office between 1202 and 1209. The approximate date of the next event referred to in connection with the Romanians in 1210. The document itself was written in 1250, and describes how Joachim, *ispán* of Szeben, led Saxon, Romanian, Székely and Pecheneg soldiers *(associatist sibi Saxonibus, Olacis, Siculis et Bissenis)* to aid the Bulgarian tsar Boril against the rebellious town of Vidin. Romanians shared a forest with the Pechenegs near — probably south of — an area settled by Saxons, for the use of which the Saxons, too, received a grant in 1224 *(silvam Blacorum et Bissenorum cum aquis usus communes exercendo* — to use in common the forest of the Vlachs and the Pechenegs together with the waters). Historians have long held the earliest source of information about Romanians in Transylvania to be King Andrew II's diploma of 1222, in which the king granted the Teutonic knights who had settled in the Barcaság various privileges, among them duty-free passage through lands owned by Székelys or Romanians *(cum transierint per terram Siculorum aut per terram Blacorum).* Although it has been discovered that the knights, after being expelled from the Barcaság, forged the document in Rome in 1231 in order to regain the land, there is no reason to doubt that at that time the Barcaság indeed bordered on a region inhabited by Székelys in the east, and on the area between the Olt River and the southern Carpathians inhabited by the Vlach Romanian population in the west.

The word *terra* in the text cited above did not mean "country", or even a political administrative unit, as is often claimed by certain Romanian histo-

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4. A. NICOLESCU, Romania antiqua, Romania nova et la continuité "mobile" du Roumain. *Quaderni di Filologia Romanza* ... Bologna, 6, 1987, 21–24. The above Puşcariu citation can also be found there.

5. *Documenta historiam Valachorum in Hungaria illustrantia.* Eds A. FEKETE NAGY and L. MAKKAI, Budapest 1941, 9.

Map 10. Better-known Romanian place-names in Transylvania before 1400

Legend

- ○ Slav place-name adopted by Romanians from Hungarian
- ◒ Slav place-name adopted by Romanians from Hungarian, retaining a 10th-century nasal
- ● Slav place-name directly adopted by Romanians
- ◉ Parallel naming of place by Hungarians and Romanians
- —·— Mediaeval southern and eastern borders of Transylvania

riographers. In some cases it simply meant "region" or "land", even the piece of land belonging to a village, as we can read in hundreds of documents. In other cases it referred to a larger area including several administrative units, as in the vernacular — though not official — names Székelyföld (land of the Székelys) or Szászföld (Saxonland) both of which consisted of a number of seats. Finally, *terra Blacorum* could not have been the "successor state" to the domain of the "Gelu dux" invented by Anonymus, since he had placed Gelu's lands in the region of the Szamos River, whereas the *terra Blacorum* lay in the valley of the Olt.

The vicinity of the Barcaság mentioned in the forged charter of 1231 suggests that the *terra Blacorum* of the early thirteenth-century documents was located between the Olt River and the peaks of the southern Carpathians or even further to the south. If we assume that the forest shared by the Romanians and the Pechenegs in 1224, lay south of Szeben, as many historians believe, then the "land of the Romanians" must have spread along the right bank of the Olt to the area where Talmács castle guarded the entry to the Vöröstorony Pass; since Talmács bears the name of a Pecheneg tribe, the forest in question must also have been here.

Like the German–Walloon settlers previously, the Romanians arriving in the Olt region also settled in an already inhabited area. Nineteen settlements were recorded along the Olt River at various times in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Starting from the west, on the northern bank were Talmács (1265), Szakadát (1306), Földvár (1322), Fogaras (1291), Halmágy (1211), Galt (on the site of today's Ugra 1211), Miklósvár (1211), Hídvég (1332); on the southern bank Kolun (1332), Árpás (in 1223, the name of a river, in 1390, the name of a village), Szombathely (1291), Betlen, Sárkány, Debren (where Páró is today), Venice, Kormospatak (today's Komána), Héviz and Doboka (all 1235).

The name Talmács as mentioned above, is of Pecheneg origin; Galt comes from the Walloon–French *noiale galt* (walnut forest); Venice from the Italian Venezia; Kolun from the German Köln meaning "colony". All these names were given by the foreign settlers; the rest of the village names are Hungarian. The names of 1235 were recorded in a papal tithe-roll, and indicate that they were Catholic settlements. There are no village names of Romanian origin among them, nor any suggesting a Greek–Orthodox population; the Romanian forms of all these village names derive from the above-listed names.

The first document to mention a permanent Romanian settlement, *Kerch Olacharum* (Oláhkerc) date from 1332. Although the name had already appeared in a document in 1252, that text made only a general reference to the area inhabited by Romanians near Kerc *(terra Olacorum de Kyrch)*. Placenames of undoubtedly Romanian origin in this region are Kucsulata and Mundra, both south of the Olt, which were recorded in 1372 and 1401. There is documentary evidence that in the fifteenth century about a dozen Romanian villages came into existence in the hills further south of the Olt. These fairly new settlements were obviously established by the Romanian voivodes of Wallachia, as they, from 1366 on wards, often enjoyed fiefdom over this piece of land along the Olt, with Fogaras as an already developed centre. In 1372 the voivode Vlaicu called the Fogaras area *nova plantatio* (new settlement) when he gave grants of land to his Wallachian boyars, who appar-

ently brought along with them Romanian peasant settlers as well as Gipsy slaves. Thus the Romanian population, which had certainly been present in the area from the beginning of the thirteenth century, established permanent settlements only after a considerable time. Nor is it yet clear when they came to supplant some of the communities previously inhabiting the Olt Valley.

It is the name *terra Blacorum* that indicates the origin of the Romanian pastoral communities that settled in the Fogaras area, for the Romanian name of the later Wallachia has always been *Ţara Românească* (Romanian Land). By the twelfth century, the Romanian population had absorbed most of the Slavonic peoples living in this region. The territory where Romanian was spoken spread to the steppes north of the Danube, an area inhabited by Cumans. (Several dozen rivers in the area have Cuman names.) These were people that the ancestors of the Romanian shepherds of the southern Carpathians moving their herds to winter pastures by the Danube had already come in regular contact with. It is not unlikely that the Romanians who took part in the campaign of Emperor Manuel against Transylvania in 1166 had been recruited into the Byzantine army in this region. This deduction is supported by archaeological evidence: approximately 2700 Byzantine bronze coins minted between 1081 and 1185 have been discovered in twelve treasure finds and thirty-three sporadic finds at forty-five locations. Far fewer Byzantine coin finds minted after 1185 have been found: only 322 known items. The reason for this is clearly the previously-mentioned uprising against Byzantium, in which Bulgarians and Romanians joined forces under Romanian leadership.

The Bulgarian–Vlach Asenid Empire continued the fight which Byzantium had started against Hungary for the possession of Belgrade on the Danube and of Barancs. Although they sometimes made peace, and even formed an alliance — as in the cases of the Hungarian involvement in the Vidin uprising of 1210 — a clash over who should rule Cumania was inevitable. Since the 1166 Byzantine attack, Transylvania had been particularly vulnerable. Presumably it was in the last few decades of the twelfth century that the Kingdom of Hungary succeeded in persuading the Romanian shepherds grazing their flocks on the alpine pastures of the southern Carpathians but based at the lower reaches of the Argeş River to undertake frontier guard duties. To win their support, the king handed over to them the area between the Olt and the mountains which was already settled by Hungarian and Saxon communities. There is but one good answer to the question of why the establishment of permanent Romanian settlements in this area took place at such a late date, and that has been given by the Romanian historian, Petre P. Panaitescu: "In Transylvania the northern and western slopes of the mountains do not have good pastures. No southern shepherd would dream of driving his herds to a country so poor in grazing land".[6] The transhumant Romanian communities which returned to the Danube annually established their first permanent settlements near the Argeş River in the twelfth century; only later did they settle in the region around Fogaras.

The political affiliation of Cumania was finally decided when, after the Teutonic knights had been expelled from the Barcaság, Prince Béla, the heir

6. P. P. PANAITESCU, *Introducere la istoria culturii româneşti*, Bucharest 1969, 146.

to the crown, took over the government of Transylvania in 1226. The chieftains of the western Cuman tribes of the Lower Danube, in constant fear of a Mongol invasion and who had, indeed, been heavily defeated by the Mongols near the Kalka River in 1223, took to the teachings of Hungarian Dominican missionaries to such an extent that they not only converted to Christianity in 1227, but also accepted the authority of the king of Hungary over their country and people. A Cuman diocese belonging to the Archdiocese of Esztergom was established in the southern part of today's Moldavia with Milkó as its centre. The conversion did not extend to the Romanian population of Cumania who were Orthodox Christians, had already adopted the Slavonic liturgy of the Bulgarian church, and were under the immediate authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. They probably had their own ecclesiastical organization belonging to the Greek Orthodox Diocese of Vicina, the diocese established in the Danube Delta at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

In 1234, Prince Béla received a papal order that the bishop of Cumania appoint a Roman Catholic bishop to care for the Romanians of Cumania living under the king's rule *(populi sui Walaci vocantur)*, because they were receiving the Sacraments from some pseudo-bishops of the Greek rite *(a quibusdam pseudoepiscopis Grecorum ritum tenentibus)* and were even impelling those Hungarians and Germans who had moved into their area to do so. This was the first attempt to unite the Romanians ecclesiastically, but in actual fact, nothing came of it. However, the data relating to the attempt prove that by that time, a significant part, or perhaps even the majority, of the population of Cumania was Romanian.

Integrating the newly-gained territories into the Kingdom of Hungary was primarily a political issue for Prince Béla; religion played only a secondary role. Cumania had previously belonged to Bulgaria and the new Bulgarian–Vlach Empire also laid claim to it. In anticipation of the likely Bulgarian attack, Prince Béla organized the western marches of Cumania into a military frontier zone as far as the Olt River. Patterned on the Croatian and Slavonian provinces, the area named the Banate of Szörény, was to be governed by an official of the Crown, the ban. The first man appointed ban of Szörény was the incumbent voivode of Transylvania, Pósa *de genere* Csák. He was replaced in 1223 by Lukács, the former master of the king's cupbearers, and returned to his previous office of voivode of Transylvania. In 1228, Prince Béla made an attempt to seize the castle of Vidin, a bridgehead on the south bank of the Danube, from the Bulgarians. The Banate of Szörény, however, survived, and the memory of the Hungarian settlers has been preserved in the names not only of several villages, but also of rivers (e.g. Amaradia from the Hungarian Homoród) and counties (e.g. Mehedinți from the Hungarian Miháld). Corlard, the Walloon *gereb* of Talmács, was granted the hunting area of Lovista in the valley of the Lator River. In 1238, Béla, who had by then already been crowned King Béla IV, asked the pope to send a bishop to minister to the Hungarian and Saxon inhabitants of the Banate of Szörény. Only those parts of Cumania which were east of the Olt River continued to be governed by Cumanian chieftains, but even they ruled as royal commissioners from 1233 on, when Prince Béla took the title king of Cumania *(rex Cumaniae)*.

Map 11. Hungarian settlements in Transylvania in the middle of the thirteenth century, on the basis of place-names

The Mongol Invasion and its Consequences

The process of Cumania's integration into the Kingdom of Hungary was brutally interrupted by the Mongol, or Tatar, invasion, which brought devastation to the whole of eastern Europe. In 1239, the eastern Cuman tribes fled to Hungary to escape the Mongols, and were accommodated between the Danube and Tisza rivers by King Béla IV. Their nomadic way of life, however, clashed with that of the settled Hungarian population, so they moved down to the Balkans in the spring of 1241, when the Mongols reached the Hungarian border.

194

The Mongol army poured into Transylvania along three routes. Entering through the Borg Pass, Kadan and his forces took the German mining town of Radna, sacked Beszterce, and marched on Kolozsvár, where, slaughtered "an innumerable multitude of Hungarians".[7] Having massacred as many of the population of northern Transylvania as were unable to escape into the highland, and having burnt down the villages, they passed through the Gate of Meszes and joined the main body of the army led by Batu Khan, which had come through the Verecke Pass. Chieftain Budjek arrived in Transylvania through the Ojtoz Pass, and clashed with the army of Voivode Pósa in a battle near the Barcaság, in which Pósa and most of his men fell. The Mongol army proceeded along the Olt Valley without encountering resistance, devastated Küküllővár and Gyulafehérvár, and then left Transylvania along the Maros River. In the meanwhile, the third army, the troops of Burundai, having wrought unspeakable carnage in Cumania, descended on Szeben through the Vöröstorony Pass and laid waste the town and the surrounding area.

King Béla IV hastily rallied his troops, but they were not familiar with Mongol warfare, and the Hungarians suffered a major defeat from the main Mongol army near Muhi on the Sajó River. The king had to flee; first to Transdanubia, and later, when the Mongols crossed the frozen Danube in the winter, to the island of Trau in Dalmatia. When in the spring of 1242 upon receiving news of the death of the khan of all Mongols the invaders withdrew, they took thousands of prisoners with them — leaving behind a country of charred ruins and unburied corpses. Only a handful of castles in Transdanubia had been able to resist and still remained. Of the accounts, the most detailed is the one dealing with the devastation of Transylvania, for the memorists, Canon Rogerius of Várad, had escaped from Mongol captivity and had made his way up the Maros Valley all the way to Kolozsvár.

The primary effect of the Mongol devastation was demographic. Hungarian and Saxon immigration to Cumania and the Banate of Szörény petered out, and Romanians started to migrate to Transylvania from the more exposed Lower Danube region to escape further Mongol attacks. The Cumans were scattered by the Mongol invasion: most of them became subjects (kipchak) of the Golden Horde established along the northern shore of the Black Sea. Of the rest, some settled in the Great Hungarian Plain, others in the Balkans. From that time on, the subjects of the king of Hungary in Cumania were Romanians who had assimilated what was left of the Slavs and the Cumans.

Romanian Kenézes and Voivodes

King Béla IV entrusted the Romanian battle-hardened nomadic equestrian people with the reorganizing of the provinces beyond the southern and eastern Carpathians. The first task was to restore the defensive potential of the

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7. Gy. Györffy, *Az Árpádkori Magyarország történeti földrajza.* (Historical Geography of Hungary during the Árpád Era.) III. Budapest 1987, 356.

Banate of Szörény: the keneziate or *kenézség (keneziatus)* was the organization structure adopted. The term derived from the Hungarian form of the word *kniaz*, originally meaning "ruler" in the Slavonic but used at this time to describe the leaders of Slavic villages in Transylvania. In Doboka county, for example, where, in the thirteenth century, no Romanians were yet living, in a document of 1214 *villani kenesii et omnes alii de provincia Doboka*[8] are mentioned. The keneziate was a hereditary office: it involved the leadership of one or more settlements and the collection of the royal taxes, and involved certain privileges — for example the local administration of justice, a share in the tax income, and milling rights.

A role, analogous to that of the *kenéz* was played by the leader of the German settlers, the *soltész* — called "Schultheiss" in Upper Hungary and *geréb* in Transylvania. There is every indication that in the Banate of Szörény and in Cumania, the institution of the keneziate was introduced by King Béla IV after the Mongol invasion. No evidence has survived concerning the previous organizational structure of the Romanian population of the area. In those Romanian communities living in the Balkans, particularly in mediaeval Serbia, the office of *kneaz*, the equivalent of the *kenéz*, was occasionally to be found, but the Romanians within the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary used only the term *chinez* taken from the Hungarian. The greatest authority on the Romanian history of this period, Silviu Dragomir, also sees it in this light: "*Kenéz*es or village leaders are known amongst the Transylvanian Romanians from the fourteenth century on. However, this particular institution is the product of the Hungarian feudal system, and has very little in common with what we find amongst the Vlachs living in the Balkan Peninsula. Had the Daco-Romanians borrowed the word from the Slavonic language during their frequent contacts with the Slavs, it would have become an integral part of the Romanian language. But this is not the case. The word has remained alien ...".[9] Alien in one sense only, namely, that the institution was not a product of the internal development of Romanian society, but was an organizational form typical in Hungary. It was Hungarian in the same way as the office of voivode — *voievodat* in its Romanian form, was also essentially Hungarian. A voivodate incorporated, and its voivode was responsible for several keneziates. Here, the title of voivode, originally reserved for the voivode of Transylvania was used for a much lower office. There are also other examples of such devaluation of titles in the Hungary of the Middle Ages. For instance, the title of *comes* originally borne by the *ispán*s who headed each royal county, was already being used by the *geréb*s in the thirteenth century, and by patricians in the fourteenth century; in modern times, an *ispán* was simply the administrative head of an estate.

The earliest mention of the keneziates is in a charter of 1247 issued by King Béla IV, who had induced the Knights of St. John to help defend the country from the Mongols by granting them the "region of Szörény" with

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8. Ibid. II, 66.
9. S. Dragomir, *Vlahii din nordul Peninsulei Balcanice în evul mediu.* Bucharest 1959, 117.

the adjoining mountains as far as the Olt. The area included the keneziates of János and Farkas, who, judging by their names, could easily have been Hungarians. However, the king expressly denied the knights authority over "the keneziate of Voivode Litovoi, which is left to the Romanians". Béla granted the knights half the revenue of these lands, but kept the other half, and also maintained his right to the income from the Hátszeg area which formed part of Litovoi's land. The knights were also granted the territory of Cumania beyond the Olt, except for the land of the Romanians' voivode, Sânislau, which the king left to the Romanians "on terms similar to those for Litovoi's land". The Romanian voivodes were obliged to support the knights with military equipment. Later data have revealed that only the *kenézes* and voivodes were obliged to perform military service; the Romanian commoners only paid taxes. The Romanians in the Banate of Szörény and in Cumania as in the whole Kingdom of Hungary paid their tax to the king in livestock — of which the king was bound to surrender a tenth to the archbishop of Esztergom, according to documents dating from 1250 and 1252. A late thirteenth-century document reveals that this tax was the so-called "fiftieth" *(quinquagesima):* one fertile ewe and one barren one for every hundred sheep, which was collected and handed over by the *kenézes,* who themselves gave thick woollen blankets and cheese. By the fourteenth century, the Transylvanian *kenézes* paid the fiftieth in cash — which means there was already a market for Romanian dairy products. Incidentally, those Romanians who were the subjects of the Serbian kings in the Middle Ages also paid their taxes in the form of a fiftieth of their flocks, and this remained the practice in the Kingdom of Hungary as well. However, Romanians everywhere were exempt from paying church tithes, since they did not belong to the Roman Catholic church.

Besides the security considerations that loomed large after the Mongol invasions, there was also another reason for King Béla IV's choosing to settle Romanian frontier communities in the Banate of Szörény on the inner slopes of the southern Carpathians. The area namely, that was situated around the new castles in the mountains was hardly suitable for tillage, whereas it stood to offer a good living to shepherd communities. This is how Romanian keneziates came into being near the castle of Hátszeg on the upper reaches of the Sztrigy River. The first evidence for this is from 1263 when a Hungarian landowner was granted the former Slavic village of Fenes and the surrounding area, "except for the keneziates of Dragun and Kodoch".[10] The Slavs must have fled during the Mongol attacks, and Dragun and Kodoch probably used the prerogatives that went with the title of *kenéz* to settle their people there, and were under the authority of the above-mentioned voivode Litovoi. After the Mongol invasion, new royal castles were built also along the upper reaches of the Temes and Karas rivers, which were later joined to the Banate of Szörény. Of these, the earliest known was Krassófő (1247), but the royal castles of Zsidó, Miháld, Sebes and Illyéd, which are mentioned in sources dated between 1320 and 1333 must also

10. Gy. Györffy, Adatok a románok XIII. századi történetéhez és a román állam keletkezéséhez. (Data on the History of Romanians in the Thirteenth Century and the Origin of the Romanian State.) *Sz* 1964, 7.

have been built around the same time. Although these castles had Hungarian names, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they were the centres of autonomous Romanian districts. Most of the records of this region were destroyed by the subsequent Turkish occupation. Thus, there is but one indirect evidence of Romanian settlement here, a deed dated 1350, in which Juga's son Lupchyn, or, as he was also called, Voivode János, successfully claimed the land which King Béla IV had granted to one of his unnamed ancestors in the Sebes district.[11]

We have no information about the local government of the Romanian voivodates and keneziates in the thirteenth century, and so we can only deduce how it may have functioned from fourteenth century evidence. The condition for obtaining the title of *kenéz*, according to a document from the Hátszeg region of 1360, was bringing settlers into an area. In a lawsuit, a *kenéz* family regained the prerogatives that went with the title of *kenéz (ius keneziatum)* over two villages by proving that the villages had been newly established by their ancestors. The ruling — made by a group of jurors elected by the Romanians themselves: twelve *kenézes*, six priests and six Romanian commoners *(Olachi populani)* — was brought in at a meeting *(congregatio generalis)* where "all the *kenézes* and men of other status of the district of Hátszeg" *(universitas)* gathered under the presidency of the royal captain of Hátszeg castle. In the middle of the fourteenth century, voivodes were elected similarly by the Romanian *universitas* in the keneziates of Máramaros and Bereg north of Transylvania. In 1364, Queen Elizabeth issued a decree in which she prohibited the *ispán* of Bereg from employing his own officials to administer the affairs of the Romanian population: they were to elect collectively *(de communi voluntate)* to head their communities a Romanian voivode *(woyvodam Wolacum)*, a man whom they find suitable and trustworthy as indeed the Romanians living in Máramaros and other parts of our country freely do... this voivode should administer justice in all matters arising among them, and should faithfully deliver the incomes due from the Romanians to us and the *ispán*".

As long as the Romanians in the Kingdom of Hungary lived in settlements which were directly subject to the king or his appointed officials, they enjoyed the privilege of having their own elected voivodes or groups of jurors elected by the people of each keneziate, administer their internal affairs according to their own legal customs *(ius valachicum)* and the only tax they paid was the fiftieth of their flocks. The change came when first King Ladislas IV between 1272 and 1290, and later other kings, allowed lay and clerical landowners to settle Romanians on their lands and to collect the fiftieth tax from them. Initially, there were certain attempts made to forestall this development. In 1293, King Andrew III ruled that Romanians who had been settled without royal permission should be returned, even forcibly, to the royal estate of Székes. (In the area between the two Székes rivers, both flowing into the Maros, there were thirty-four villages at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Five have since disappeared, but the rest still exist.) When, however, in the course of the great social transformations of the late thirteenth century, the majority of Hungarian royal estates

11. Ibid. 12.

were donated by the Crown to various landowners, the region of Székes and the Romanians settled there, also came under seignorial authority. It was at this time that Romanian self-government began to disintegrate. In 1291, King Andrew III called a Transylvanian assembly in Gyulafehérvár, for the nobility, the Saxons, the Székelys and the Romanians were all *universis nobilibus, Saxonibus, Syculis et Olachis* as autonomous self-governing communities. This assembly was the last of its kind. After this, it was only the courts of the keneziates and voivodates in the privileged Romanian districts which met, each separately to conduct its own affairs. By contrast with the Saxons and Székelys, no united self-government of Romanians evolved perhaps because the *kenezes* and voivodes did not represent any striving after Romanian autonomy.

2. Nobles and Serfs in Transylvania (1241–1360)

The Disintegration of the Royal Counties

The royal county as a form of social organization started to decline in Hungary at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By that time neither the royal court nor the *ispáns* were satisfied with the primitive goods produced in the villages surrounding the castles, as higher-quality articles were already available, both foreign import and goods made by the French and German settlers in the towns. Their acquisition, however, required money. The cultivation of land by slaves, who yielded the lord their dues in agricultural produce but no cash, was clearly obsolete. Free peasant settlers supplying tax payments in money were encouraged on both secular and clerical estates. The families holding the highest offices of the realm wanted to emulate the Western European landowning nobility and possess their own demesnes instead of having only the poor returns from land worked by slaves and the income received as officials of the royal counties. At the other end of the scale, the commoners — some of them slaves on the royal, noble or church estates, others, though theoretically free, tied to the land by perpetual servitude — longed for the privileges of the settlers newly arrived from the West. Better farming methods — the horse-drawn plough, the field rotation system, the quadrupling of the yield of cereal crops instead of the doubling of it — as well as the growing number of markets all confirmed the general feeling that the time had come for change. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, there were peasant movements in the western parts of the country even against manual services which in Hungary were called the *robot*.

By the late twelfth century, only a quarter of the royal revenue was coming from the payments in kind made by the royal counties. The rest was in the form of money: the taxes paid by the foreign settlers, the *hospites*, and the profits on the minting of coins, and on the royal monopoly over the mining of salt and precious metals. This being so, the king could afford to

grant these lands along with the labour force living on it to aristocratic families eager to have their own estates. These donations of the royal counties were highly prejudicial to the interests of various social groups living there, for after the relative freedom of being under direct royal authority, they now faced subordination to some private landowner. The solution was to adopt the western European model of late feudalism, a system in which peasants had the right to move freely, cultivated the land of their lord independently, and paid him his dues in money or in kind. In most of Hungary, this change-over took place in the course of the thirteenth century. In 1298, a royal decree ruled that peasants living under the authority of a feudal lord were to be free to move. The word *jobbágy*, the Hungarian equivalent of *iobagiones*, the term once used to designate the group of armed retainers who had entered their lord's service of their own free will — was applied to these peasants to emphasize their freeman status. Recognition of the title to nobility of the small landowners (the former *serviens* class) and of the officials of the royal counties came even before that, in 1267. Previously, nobility had been granted only to the high-ranking officials of the king, who, from then on, enjoyed the title of "barons". At the same time, royal county as an administrative form gave way to the institution of the noble county. In the noble counties, the *ispán*, who was appointed by the king, administered justice jointly with judges called *szolgabírós* elected by the nobility. Later the *ispán*s of the counties were given the title *főispán*.

In Transylvania the noble county and the rights of the nobility evolved only later and along different lines. This is due to the fact that the royal counties, the administrative units centred around the royal castles, disintegrated at a slower pace in Transylvania. Things were still in a state of flux in the second half of the thirteenth century, and thus the *iobagiones* of yore, the soldiering small landowner and royal official class, received titles of nobility only at a later stage. But the main impediment to more rapid change was the oppressive authority of the voivodes. From the beginning of the thirteenth century, the *ispán* of Gyulafehérvár (who had the title voivode of Transylvania) appointed the *ispán*s of the other five Transylvanian counties — Doboka, Kolozs, Torda, Küküllő and Hunyad — from among his personal supporters. Between 1263 and 1441, the voivode of Transylvania was also the *ispán* of Szolnok county which then spread from northern Transylvania to the Tisza River, and thus the voivode was the chief administrator, chief justice and military leader of all of Transylvania, except for the Székely, Saxon and Romanian autonomous territories. The voivode's income derived from the estates around the castles reserved for his benefit; the king's taxes, tolls and mining revenues, however, were collected by royal officials. Although the voivodes were eager to obtain grants of land from the king, they hardly ever became big landowners in Transylvania, since the kings changed their voivodes often, and always appointed them from aristocratic families outside Transylvania.

The first voivode to obtain estates in Transylvania was Gyula Kán from Transdanubia at the beginning of the thirteenth century. He was granted a few villages, but lost them after he left office, and it was only in 1268 that one of his descendants who was also voivode was able to recover a part of his estate. Before that, at the very end of the twelfth century, the ancestors

14. Monastery of a clan at Harina, around 1200

15. Church built at Guraszáda for Romanian settlers, around 1300

16. Cistercian church and cloister at Kerc, first half of the thirteenth century

17. The sanctuary of the Saint Bartholomew church in Brassó, built by masons from Kerc, middle of the thirteenth century

18. The south aisle of the third cathedral in Gyulafehérvár, first third of the thirteenth century

19. Greek Orthodox Romanian church built from Roman ruins at Demsus, middle of the thirteenth century

20. Greek Orthodox Romanian church at Zeykfalva, second half of the thirteenth century

21. The hall choir of the Lutheran church at Szászsebes, second half of the fourteenth century

2. An outstanding example of mediaeval European sculpture, the statue of Saint George by Márton and György Kolozsvári, 1373, Prague

Prospect dess Rothen Turn Passes in die Österreich: und Türck: Walach.

Alt Fluss

Nro 1. Der Rothe Thurn. 2 Die Schantz um selbigen. 3. Der Weeg von Talmas 4. Das alte Talmascher Schloss. 5. Der Eingang in den so genannten neu öffneten Carolinischen Weeg.

23. Latorvár, at the Vöröstorony Pass, one of the mediaeval border-fortifications in Transylvania, fourteenth century (the cannon tower dates from the seventeenth century). In the background is the fourteenth-century fort of Talmács. Pen-and-ink drawing and watercolour, around 1735

of the Was family had been given grants of land. A bigger, but uninhabited area near the upper reaches of the Maros River was granted to Mihály Kácsik of northern Hungary during his term as voivode (1209–1212), and to his brother, Ban Simon. However, because of the latter's rebellion, in 1228 the king confiscated the estate and gave it to Dénes Losonci Tomaj. Tomaj, later voivode himself, established what was to become the wealthiest landowning family in Transylvania, and which broke into three branches in 1319 forming the Losonci, Bánffy and Dezsőfi clans. Smaragd Zsámboki, who was voivode for only a brief period (1206–1207), was able to obtain only a few villages in Hunyad county, which were later inherited by a poorer branch of his family, the Barcsais, who settled in Transylvania. A member of the Kökényes-Radnót family was granted the sizeable domain of Teke near the Tomaj estates before 1228, but his family had died out by the end of the century. In the first half of the thirteenth century, the Becse-Gergely family, who were likewise not of local origin, had an estate in the north, near the Nagy-Szamos River; their descendants, the Transylvanian Bethlen, Apafi and Somkereki families, had a major part in the area's history right up to modern times.

Quite distinct from these big continuous latifundia consisting of several villages peripheral located at the foot of the mountains were those discontinuous estates of two to ten villages lying on both sides of the Kis-Szamos and in the Mezőség which were owned by different families of the same clan. At the end of the twelfth century, it became a nation-wide custom for these clans to call themselves the descendants *(de genere)* of their first known ancestor, someone regarded as one of the original conquerors. Five such clans are known in Transylvania from early thirteenth-century sources. Anonymus mentions the Zsombor clan — along with their village, Esküllő — as the descendants of tenth-century conquerors; later, too, they were landowners in Doboka county. The other family he speaks of is the Agmánd clan of Belső-Szolnok county. In the early thirteenth-century Doomsday Book of Várad, we find the names of members of the Kalocsa (later called Szil, then Tyukod) clan who owned lands in the counties of Kolozs and Torda, together with those of a clan named "Mikola" after its first known ancestor. A similar pattern of discontinuous landowning is revealed by documents concerning the Borsa clan who were patrons of the monastery at Almás in the first half of the thirteenth century, and later acquired land in Bihar county. The five clans listed above, who lived in the four northern Transylvanian counties, held lands outside Transylvania only in neighbouring Bihar county, and even there only from the second half of the thirteenth century. They can, therefore, be regarded as "first settlers", that is, as Transylvanian landowners continuously from the time of the Hungarian Conquest. From all five clans there descended a number of families, most of which survived to the present day, and it was these families that produced the core of Transylvania's Hungarian nobility.

In the second half of the thirteenth century, social changes not only speeded up, but involved more and more of Transylvanian society. The old castles (Dés, Doboka, Kolozsvár, Torda, Gyulafehérvár, Küküllővár and perhaps even Hunyad) were sacked by the Mongols. Although King Béla IV supplemented their surviving population with new elements and reorgan-

ized their administration, they lost their military significance. The role of defence was taken over by new castles built in the mountains on the initiative of the king, and their captains were responsible for the administration of the area. The office of *ispán* in each county was usually linked to the captainship of such a new castle. To the old centres — Dés, Kolozsvár, Gyulafehérvár and Torda — the king brought settlers *(hospites)* engaged in both agriculture and trade. They were to have an exclusively economic role, and were granted the privilege of electing their own judges, and the right to hold markets and to engage in toll-free trade; they also enjoyed tax concessions. The burghers of Transylvania's Hungarian towns were mixture of the Hungarian and German *hospites* population which had intermarried with the original people of the castles who had gained rights similar to theirs. In the thirteenth century, the king granted Gyulafehérvár and Kolozsvár to the bishop of Transylvania. While the latter became a royal free town in 1316, Gyulafehérvár remained in the hands of the bishops, a state of affairs which hindered its civic development in many respects. The castle of Doboka was presented to a branch of the Kökényes-Radnót clan which had come to Transylvania from another part of the country shortly before. The castle itself lost its importance; the surrounding settlement declined into a village, and functioned as the seignorial centre of the Dobokai family's lands. Küküllővár and Hunyadvár, because of their more favourable location, continued to play a military role, although later, they, too, were alienated by the king, who disposed of them in the form of a royal grant. The villages which had been administered from the castles fell into the hands of landlords one after the other, and eventually the royal estates were confined to the mountainous regions around the new castles — which was, nevertheless, still a huge area.

The interior of the Transylvanian Basin and even some areas of the mountainous region were, thus, transferred into the possession of the local nobility and of families recently moved to the area. The Kendi family, who had their estate along the Küküllő and later played an important role in Transylvania, had sprung from the Transdanubian Szalók clan. The Thoroczkai branch of the Ákos clan, who were likewise not of Transylvanian descent, had their estates in Torda county, while the Illyei and Folti branches owned land in Hunyad county, on the northern bank of the Maros River. Near these estates, on the left bank of the Maros, grants of land were received by the Transdanubian Hermány clan, which later broke up into several families of small landowners. In the fourteenth century, the Lackfi *de genere* Hermány family rose to become one of the highest-ranking families of the country. Six of the Lackfis': father, sons and grandsons, held the position of either voivode of Transylvania or of *ispán* of the Székelys *(comes Siculorum)* between 1328 and 1376, and as such had major roles in determining the fate of Transylvania. Of the old families, the Losonci Bánffys were the most prosperous, as they were granted the seigniories of Csicsó and Lápos, mountainous areas comprising most of the northern part of Belső-Szolnok county, by King Ladislas IV and King Andrew III. The Csák clan hailing from Transdanubia obtained the domain of Bonchida; however, in the fourteenth century, this estate, too, passed to the Bánffys, who were granted the domains of Sebesvár in Kolozs county and of Újvár in Küküllő county at about the

same time. Thus the family came to rank among the most illustrious of Transylvania's aristocracy, and although they suffered setbacks both in influence and wealth during the fifteenth century, they continued to play a significant part in the life of Transylvania until recent time.

Anarchy and Consolidation

The spread of private landownership in the second half of the thirteenth century, had political causes. To satisfy the ambitions of his restless son István, in 1257 King Béla IV divided the country, just as his father had done. The eastern part of Hungary including Transylvania passed to István, who besides holding the title of junior king, also called himself duke of Transylvania, maintaining his own court and conducting an independent foreign policy. He did a great deal to normalize life and to secure the defences of Transylvania after the devastation wreaked by the Mongols, and he rewarded those noblemen who supported him with generous grants of land. However, the rivalry which grew up between father and son soon had the country rent by internal strife. The troops of the king forced István to take refuge in the castle of Feketehalom in the Barcaság, but he broke out, and won the support of enough of the besieging army to scatter his father's troops. István followed them to Pest, then, in the spring of 1265, won a major victory over Béla, forcing the king to acquiesce in István's possession of half of the country. This was the situation until Béla's death in 1270. The truce between father and son was a tense one, and both of them made every effort to strengthen their own party. The only way this could be done was to woo the aristocracy, who had already huge tracts of land, with further grants.

István, who reigned as Stephen V, died suddenly after only two years on the throne, and was succeeded by his son, Ladislas IV, who was still a minor. The great landowning families lost no time taking advantage of the situation: relying on troops recruited from their estates, and treating the royal lands, which they were supposed to govern as *ispáns*, as their own, they turned their territories into *de facto* autonomous princedoms. The first to refuse obedience openly was the Romanian voivode Litovoi who had governed the Banate of Szörény since it was abandoned by the Knights of St. John in 1260. When in 1272 he fell fighting the royal troops sent to bring him into line, Bárbat, his brother and successor, decided to try loyalty to the king and for a while paid the royal taxes. In the next few years, the king lost the Banate of Szörény, and, more significantly, Cumania. The Romanian voivodes became independent, and Hungary broke up into princedoms, ruled for their own benefit by men who ostensibly governed in the name of the Crown. King Ladislas IV proved unable to regain his authority, and was eventually assassinated in 1290.

His successor, King Andrew III, inherited what was tantamount to anarchy, and was unable to restore order. His brief reign was further burdened by the need to fend off pretenders supported from abroad. Shortly after his accession to the throne he made a royal progress throughout the country, including Transylvania, in an attempt to contain the spirit of insubordina-

tion. The weakening of the central government left ample opportunity for the abuse of power, however, and not even the king's appearance helped. After he had left Transylvania, in 1294, the voivode Loránd *de genere* Borsa, who together with this brothers, held a significant part of eastern Hungary, attacked the bishop of Várad with his troops, and even turned on the king's army which had been sent to stop him. After some desperate fighting the king's troops defeated the voivode's army, but his successor, László Kán, who was appointed in 1297, did not prove to be any more loyal. While the king was busy dealing with the rebellious flaring up all over the country, the voivode laid hands on the Transylvanian royal revenues, added the titles of *comes Saxonum* and *comes Siculorum*, to his voivodeship and his office as *ispán* of Szolnok, and appropriated the revenues of the mining towns. In other words, he treated Transylvania as his personal property. Between 1307 and 1309, he did not allow the vacant office of bishop to be filled until the chapter elected his candidate. In the castles he appointed his supporters as captains, and if someone was reluctant to enter his service, that person lost his land to the Crown.

Similar trends won out in other parts of the country as well and by 1301, when King Andrew III died, Hungary was in the hands of a dozen great landowning families, who ruled their territories independently. Hungary was on the brink of degenerating into a country of petty provinces. The struggle for the throne, which went on for several years, was also conducive to the development of the oligarchy. The Árpád dynasty had died out with Andrew III, and a fierce struggle for power ensued among the relatives of the female line. The pope supported Charles Robert of Sicily, a member of the French Anjou dynasty, who was, however, initially unable to gain the sympathy of the whole of the aristocracy. The majority first invited Wenceslas of Bohemia, and later, after he had turned down the offer, Otto of Bavaria. Voivode László Kán lured the new king to Transylvania reputedly with the promise of his daughter in marriage. But when Otto arrived, he had him taken prisoner and sent back to Bavaria. In 1308, László Kán recognized Charles Robert as king, but refused to send him the royal crown which was in his possession.

Public recognition, however, of the legitimacy of Charles' reign was conditional on his being crowned with the crown of Saint Stephen. Voivode László, however, did not even attend the Diet which elected Charles Robert king, but stayed in his mountain stronghold with the crown and awaited developments. The papal legate, Cardinal Gentile, started negotiations with him, and when these proved fruitless, the pope excommunicated him on the grounds of his daughter's marriage to the Orthodox king of Serbia, Uroš II. This finally achieved the desired effect. The voivode handed back the coronation regalia the following year, and even promised to return his illegally acquired royal privileges and properties. Though Charles Robert was able to make a royal progress through Transylvania already in 1310, for over a decade he had to fight one battle after the other in the attempt to curtail the power that overmighty lords throughout the country had usurped. During this time, Voivode László continued to rule Transylvania: he did not allow royal garrisons into his castles, and even managed to prevent his successor, Miklós Pok, who was appointed in 1315, from actually taking

over the voivodeship. Only after Voivode László's death in 1316 were the king's troops able to recover Transylvania from his sons in a battle near Déva. In 1318, the new voivode, Dózsa Debreceni had to fight the rebellious Borsas and their ally, the Transylvanian Mojs's son, Mojs. Even his successor, Tamás Szécsényi *de genere* Kácsik, who assumed office in 1320, had to deal with the sons of László Kán: in 1321, he finally succeeded in occupying their last stronghold, the castle of Csicsó.

Voivode Tamás pacified the still rebellious Transylvanians with an iron hand. He forced the followers of László Kán and a number of other turbulent nobles to accept his authority, and finally turned on the Saxons. In the course of their endless dispute with the bishops, the Saxons had devastated Gyulafehérvár again in 1308, and, when the title of *ispán* of the Saxons *(comes Saxonum)* remained tied to the voivodeship even after Voivode László's death, they rose, led by Henning, *geréb* of Péterfalva, against the new voivode. It was only with the help of Cuman forces brought in from the Great Hungarian Plain that the rebellion was put down in 1324. Tamás Szécsényi, though obedient to the king, was as jealous of his power in Transylvania as his predecessor, Voivode László, had been. The bishop of Transylvania had cause enough to complain bitterly of the voivode's aggressiveness and insatiable greed, of his constant attempts to appropriate church lands for himself and his supporters.

Charles Robert's victory in Transylvania had serious consequences for the rebellious aristocracy. Great families who had settled in Transylvania either at the time of the Conquest or just a little later lost their properties, and although later the king pardoned most of them (for example, the Zsombor and Borsa clans, and the Was family), the leadership of Transylvania passed to Charles Robert's loyal adherents. Tamás Szécsényi held the title of voivode until the king's death (1342), and was generously rewarded for his services from the confiscated wealth of the rebels. In 1319 he was granted the enormous seigniory of Sáromberke which lay between Beszterce and the Maros River, and then in 1324 the lands belonging to Salgó castle in Szeben county. Like Voivode László, Tamás Szécsényi also married a Piast princess (Anne of Auschwitz), and with the interest of his family always at heart, he took his nephews with him to Transylvania. For one of them, Simon, who was to found the Kentelki Radó family, he acquired the seigniory of Nagysajó and the lucrative office of *ispán* of the Székelys'. Another nephew, Péter Cseh, won — thanks to the position of his uncle — the hand of the Talmácsi heiress, a daughter of a fabulously wealthy Saxon *geréb* family, and with her, extensive properties. It was this alliance that gave rise to the Vingarti Geréb family, two members of which held Transylvania's highest offices in the fifteenth century: the bishop's and the voivode's. Other members of the Kácsik clan, to which the Szécsényis belonged, also married into Transylvanian Saxon families. A descendant of Simon — the *ispán* of the Székelys — acquired the estate of Kentelek, from which the Kentelki Radó family had taken its name. János, son of Péter Cseh, followed the example of his father and married a daughter of Mihály Kelneki, an immensely rich Saxon *geréb*, who married six of his seven daughters to Hungarian noblemen. The Hungarian Barcsais, who were small landowners, made their fortune by marrying into the Alvincis, another Saxon *geréb* family, and inherit-

ing part of their property when the family's male line died out. Naturally, the marrying of Hungarians into great Saxon families was not a one-way process: for example, the Brassóis, a Saxon *geréb* family, acquired the properties of a discontinued branch of the Zsombor clan by marriage.

The Noble Counties and the Nobility

In Transylvania, as already noted, the development of the noble counties followed the overall Hungarian trend, but the changeover had a slower pace. While in the rest of Hungary the noble counties were starting to take over the role of the royal counties by the time of the Mongol invasion, in Transylvania the thirteenth-century charters make frequent mention of the *iobagiones castri* of Belső-Szolnok, Doboka, Kolozs, Torda and Gyulafehér-vár. Perhaps because in Transylvania the major social change took place during critical years of political instability, their assimilation into the nobility was not as uniform as had been that of their peers further west. This social stratum which in Transylvania retained its status as a dependent of the Crown until quite late, was, to all intents, and purposes, swept away by the tide of events. Nearly every charter which mentions them does so in connection with the sale of their lands. The buyers were often descendants of the "conqueror" tribes (for instance, members of the Gerendi, Kecseti, or Szentmártoni families) or other nobles of uncertain origin, and sometimes ecclesiastics. It is not known what the fate of the impoverished soldiering small landowners and royal officials may have been thereafter; some of them perhaps salvaged enough of their property to be able to lead the life the nobility. It is impossible to prove with absolute certainty that any noble family in mediaeval Transylvania had descended from the *iobagiones castri*. The majority of them, however, must have entered the service of some wealthier noblemen, or found a living in the royal castles newly built in the mountains.

Thus, the mediaeval nobility of Belső-Szolnok, Doboka, Kolozs and Torda counties in the Mezőség consisted mainly of families from the conqueror tribes, and was largely homogeneous. The differences between them were ones of financial status: the estates of the more prolific families were more often subdivided, and there were villages where several noble families lived and tilled their land themselves. But even less fruitful families were unlikely to own more than ten villages. Only the wealthiest could claim twenty to thirty villages, but these lands were not contiguous, being broken up by other families' estates. The great latifundia incorporating twenty to fifty villages on a continuous tract of land developed on the edges of these small and medium-size estates.

Although the dietal act of 1290 which specified the system of noble counties, manorial court jurisdiction and the tax-free status and military service liability of nobles and "of Saxons of Transylvania possessing, like the nobility, freehold estates"[12] applied to the whole country, the emancipation of

12. *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen.* I. Hermannstadt 1892, 175.

the Transylvanian nobility came relatively late compared to other parts of Hungary. The Transylvanian nobles were still paying taxes to the voivode at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and were exempted from this obligation by Charles Robert only in 1324, in appreciation of their services in crushing the Saxon rebellion. It was in 1342 that they acquired full seignorial authority, that is won from the voivode the right of jurisdiction over the inhabitants of their lands, and were confirmed in this privilege by the king only in 1365. It was therefore all the more significant that the king remitted to the Transylvanian nobles in return for military service rendered the eighteen denarius tax — the *lucrum camerae* introduced by Charles Robert on each villain holding — in other words, he allowed the nobles to keep the tax themselves. Thus, the serfs of Transylvania paid tax to their lords only, except for the Romanian serfs, who continued to pay the fiftieth to the king.

The nobility's attempts to achieve autonomy for the counties were less successful. Although at the beginning of the fourteenth century, county courts with the nobles' judges *(szolgabírós — iudices nobilium)*, the symbols of autonomy, appeared in Transylvania as everywhere in the country, and certain counties even held independent general assemblies, by the middle of the century, the voivodes had succeeded in their efforts at centralization. From then on, it was not the individual counties which held meetings presided over by their *ispáns*; rather, the voivode called joint assemblies of the seven Transylvanian counties, which usually took place in Torda. It was at these assemblies that they collectively elected the nobles' judges for the counties: two for each county (not four, as in other parts of the country). Thus, the voivodes governed the Transylvanian counties as though they comprised a single county, which greatly hindered the development of local self-government. This way, although the Transylvanian nobles as individuals acquired those rights which distinguished the nobility from the commoners all over the country, as a group, as a social state, they were unable to set their collective will against the voivodes'.

The development of the nobility's political weight was hindered also by the institution of *familiaritas*, a peculiarity of the Hungarian feudal system which started to spread together with the formation of great estates. The poorer freemen began to enter voluntarily the service of the aristocrats, mostly as members of their military retinue or as managers of the seigniories. These people were admitted into the household of the lord (thence the term *familiares*), who undertook to support them and to provide them with legal protection, while the *familiares* swore an oath of allegiance. (However, the lord had nothing to do with his *familiares*'s estates, since according to Hungarian law, land could be granted only by the king.) In Transylvania the voivode usually appointed his depute, the vice-voivode, from among *familiares* of his who had come from outside Transylvania; the vice-voivode was also the *ispán* of Fehér county and presided over the voivode's court. This voivode also chose the *ispán* of each county from the ranks of his *familiares*, who, in their turn, chose their deputies, the *alispáns*, from among their own supporters. In all the other parts of Hungary, *ispáns* were appointed by the king from among the most distinguished families. Since the office of the *ispán* was lucrative and involved considerable prestige, even members of the wealthier Transylvanian families were keen to fill it; and thus, a large

207

proportion of the landed nobility entered into a relationship of *familiaritas* with the voivode, which compounded the voivode's power considerably. It was for this reason that not even the wealthiest aristocratic families were able to compete with the authority of the voivode, although the voivodes usually came from families outside Transylvania, and had no estates there to speak of.

The motor of the social change that led to the formation of the nobility was the defence policy deliberately pursued by the kings. They supported not only the developing noble estate, but also the Székely, Saxon and Romanian communities, always favouring those who were most suited to undertake the country's defence. There was the aura of the crusaders about the figure of the Hungarian soldier: "soldier" and "nobleman" became identical terms, and the nobility's way of life besides its enormous economic and political advantages had also a moral attraction for the Székely, Saxon and Romanian communities. The change in these societies must be understood in terms of this attraction.

Székelys and Saxons among the Nobility

The Székely social order was, even in its original form, closest to the nobility's way of life, as the two major features which characterized Székely society, personal freedom and the obligation to undertake personal military service, were also typical of the nobility. For this reason, as early as the fourteenth century, Székelys were looked upon as noblemen even outside the borders of their own land. In 1346, a certain Pál Sényői had to prove only that he was Székely to be allowed to live as a freeman anywhere in the country. Within the Székelyföld, however, the ancient custom of holding all land in common and the legal equality which existed proved obstacles to individual prosperity. The major advantages available to the nobility of the counties that is, the unlimited acquisition of land and dominion over the serf population of their estates, could not develop in the Székely society. The more enterprising Székelys, therefore, had always tried to make their fortune by entering the personal service of the king, and, in recognition of their services they also received grants of land in the disintegrating royal counties. Since they were bent on keeping their share of the communal land in the Székelyföld, they tried to obtain grants close by, but on the territory of the counties. It was mostly the estates of the old royal counties which were wedged into the Székely territories that passed into the hands of this new nobility of Székely origin. In 1252, the king gave the Szék estate, which lay on the border of the Barcaság and Háromszék, to the Székely ancestor of the Nemes, Mikó and Kálnoki aristocratic families. These families wanted to play the noble landowner even in villages whose inhabitants enjoyed Székely rights and liberties and fought fierce battles with the Székelys of Seps in an effort to bring them to heel. But in the end, the disputed area remained within the borders of the Székelyföld. It was likewise in the thirteenth century that the king presented the castle of Bálványos with its Hungarian and Slavonic villages (the latter well on the way to assimilation) to

the ancestor of the Székely Kézdi and Apor families. The owners settled Hungarian and Russian serfs on this territory, and succeeded in bringing it under county authority. However, their claim on the region of Kászon was successfully parried by the Székelys in 1324. Near the Székelyföld, on the eastern borders of Fehér, Küküllő, Torda, Kolozs and Doboka counties, a whole group of families called "Székely" acquired land, both through royal grants, and through marriage into the county nobility. In virtue of having kept their share of the common land in the Székelyföld, these landowners played a role in the Székely community, and in the public affairs of the counties as well. The members of the same family often functioned simultaneously as a county's *szolgabírós* and as officials of the Székely community.

Lack of economic wherewithal prevented the majority of the Székelys from performing military service in the up-to-date armoured cavalry squadrons. Their branch of service was the light cavalry. In the parts of Hungary, further to the west, this type of soldier was disappearing, for the modern European warfare of the time called for armoured cavalry. As a result, after the Mongol invasion the Hungarian kings demanded a certain number of soldiers with good-quality armour from those social groups obliged originally to render military service. This necessarily led to a process in which those who had been ousted from effective military service were reduced to serfdom, since their role was restricted to providing only material backing for those of their fellows who actually did the fighting. This was the fate of the Cuman and Jazyg peoples who had been settled between the Danube and the Tisza in the thirteenth century. Though originally all bound to render personal military service, after a short period, they were able to provide the king only with 600 soldiers. The ensuing social differentiation marked the end of the Cuman and Jazyg communities as societies of co-equals. Eventually, the soldiering class forced the commoners to serve them as serfs. The border regions of Transylvania, on the other hand, were, throughout the Middle Ages, under constant attack from enemies (Mongols, Lithuanians, Romanians and later the Turks) whose military might, like that of the Székelys, was based on light cavalry units; in battles with these enemies, the Székelys' ancient equipment and methods of warfare was eminently suitable. Since the simpler kind of equipment required in the light cavalry was accessible even to those of modest means, every Székely continued to possess the right and duty of personal military service, and consequently, also personal liberty.

Saxon society too, experienced a crisis no less grave than the Székely, but developed in an entirely different direction. Unlike the Székelys, the Saxons had never rendered personal military service, but were obliged to supply a certain number of troops. Therefore, the social advantages associated with being a soldier had always affected only a minor group of the whole community, primarily the *geréb*s. The *geréb*, who was judge, administrative officer and military leader in one person, held his office on a hereditary basis. The office was linked to the land owned, and could be sold or pledged. But the *geréb* was also bound to respect the interests of the community, was subject to Saxon law and had to pay his share of the taxes. Thus, if he really wanted to stand out from among his fellows, a *geréb* had to seek opportunities in the counties, as did his Székely counterparts. They acquired lands on

Map 12. The sub-division of the diocese of Transylvania at the beginning of the fourteenth century

the edge of the Királyföld and populated them with mostly German set-
tlers, who, however, were not treated as co-equal free members of the Saxon
community, but as serfs. The "Saxon" serf class, thus, evolved outside the
Királyföld in the second half of the thirteenth century.

The *gerébs'* title to the villages they held within the counties was one of
noble right; in fact, many of them were even formally raised to the rank of
nobility by the kings (the first known *geréb* to be ennobled was the Walloon
Johannes Latinus of Voldorf in 1206). But public opinion regarded them as
nobles independently of such formed recognition, distinguishing them, how-
ever, from nobles with full rights (1358: *nobiles et alii comites*). The main
reason for this distinction was that the *gerébs* — and here again their posi-
tion was analogous to that of the prominent Székelys — did not give up
their lands in the Szászföld, and used the power and authority deriving
from their estates in the counties to strengthen their leading role in the life
of the Saxon communities. The history of the Saxons in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries is one of the *geréb* families' continuing to consolidate
their dominance and exclusive authority. They filled all the offices of the
autonomous Saxon communities, it was they who represented Saxon mili-
tary power and dominated Saxon economic life, and their aristocratic-mili-
tary way of life, an attempt to imitate the Hungarian nobility's life style,
effected the entire community. Intermarriage between Hungarian noble and
Saxon *geréb* families became more and more common. Like the Hungarian
nobility, they took for their family name the name of their estate, preferring
the name of an estate owned by noble right in the counties over their lands
in the Szászföld. It is sometimes only the German Christian names and the
adjective *"geréb"* which reveals the Saxon origin of a noble family. Many of
them held county offices; in the fifteenth century, a member of the Vízaknai
Geréb family even became the vice-voivode of Transylvania, and later *ispán*
of the Székelys. Through·them, the noble society of Transylvania was en-
riched by valuable new elements, men with good leadership skills, but this
did not change its character: the nobles who were of foreign origin were
much smaller in number than the Hungarian nobles, and for all practical
purposes, assimilated with the Hungarians.

Within the Saxon communities, *gerébs* in leading positions could be found
even at the end of the fifteenth century, but their numbers gradually dimin-
ished. For in the meantime, Saxon society had started to develop in an en-
tirely different direction, one in which the *gerébs* did not wish to share. Partly
in response to the pressure of the Saxon middle class, which jealously
guarded the Saxon traditions of equality before the law and the oneness of
the people, and partly voluntarily, they gave up their share of the land to
the *communitas*, renounced their titles, and moved to the counties where
they could live as noblemen. In the fourteenth century, already, administra-
tion and the courts in the Saxon seats came to be headed by chief justices
appointed by the king, the *királybírós*.

Ecclesiastical Organization and Education

In the Middle Ages, the nobility of the counties, the Székelys and the Saxons belonged to the Roman Catholic church, the majority of them to the Diocese of Transylvania. The exceptions were the inhabitants in the area of the earliest Saxon settlement, Altland, which from 1192 on, formed the Provostship of Szeben and was under the direct authority of the archbishop of Esztergom. The rest of the territories inhabited by Saxons, both those forming free communities and those living under landlords, formed separate deaneries and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. The structure of the See of Transylvania more or less coincided with the royal counties, except for the Deanery of Ózd along the upper reaches of the Maros. There may, however, have been a royal county of Ózd at one time, which disappeared during the expansion of the Székely territories and/or was amalgamated with the counties of Kolozs and Torda. Those parts of the Szászföld, which did not belong to the Provostship of Szeben, as well as the Székely Sepsiszék, stayed within the Deanery of Gyulafehérvár. A separate archdeaconry of Kézd was set up for the Székely areas of Kézd and Orba, and the Deanery of Telegd for the Székelys of Udvarhely.

The bishops of Transylvania were initially of foreign origin (French, German and Italian). Later, an increasing number of them came from within the country; there was only one though, who was of Transylvanian origin. They were mostly from aristocratic families, sometimes from burgher families, but they were all graduates of foreign universities. Some of them had previously been engaged as royal notaries; for example, Adorján at the end of the twelfth century, who had organized the working of the royal chancellery and his successor, Pál who, in 1181, had drafted the decree making written records compulsory at the chancellery. In this period, the Transylvanian bishops' annual income from tithes was 2,000 silver marks, which ranked them fourth among Hungary's fourteen bishops. Their being versed in the Scriptures proved to be compatible with a determined insistence on their exclusive right to tithes and to the income from their estates, and this even led to armed clashes with the voivode, the Saxons and the abbot of Kolozsmonostor in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth century.

The monastic orders were mainly represented in Transylvania by the Benedictine Abbey of Kolozsmonostor established by King Ladislas I towards the end of the eleventh century. After 1231, it became one of the credible places. In the province of Transylvania, the Chapter of Gyulafehérvár had the same right. Their archives were burnt during the Mongol invasion; the first known document issued in Kolozsmonostor is from 1288, whereas the incomplete records of Gyulafehérvár start with the year 1278. A Benedictine monastery was founded by Duke Álmos near the Transylvanian exit of the Meszes Gate in 1120, but this disappeared without trace from documents after 1288. Monasteries were also built to house family crypts: in Almás for the Borsa clan in the thirteenth century; in Harina, probably for the Kácsik clan, and in Gyerőmonostor for the Mikola clan. They were all basilica-type buildings with a nave and two aisles, and semicircular clerestories. Only the one at Harina has preserved its original form

to the present day. The Cistercian monastery of Kerc already mentioned was built in 1202; its late Romanesque–early Gothic style, reproduced by its builders in later years, was a major influence on Hungarian and Saxon church architecture in Transylvania. The monastery itself was deserted in the thirteenth century, and today only its ruins remain.

The mendicant orders had a much more significant impact on Transylvania, though not as much on architecture as on public thinking. As early as the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Dominicans of Transylvania started their campaign to convert the Cumans, whose first bishop was to be a Hungarian Dominican. In the thirteenth century, they established altogether five monasteries in Gyulafehérvár and in the Saxon towns, and also had convents at the same locations. It was in the fourteenth century that the Franciscans became popular in Transylvania with the Hungarian, Székely and Saxon communities particularly because of their sermons preached in the vernacular. In a Franciscan collection of Latin sermons assembled around 1310, there are brief summaries in Hungarians, the so-called *"gyulafehérvári glosszák"* (Gyulafehérvár Glosses). The most flourishing period for the Franciscans in Transylvania was the fifteenth century.

The town and village priests received their education in parish and chapter schools in the towns. However, village schools were also founded relatively early; the first record of such a school is from 1332, and concerns the school-building *(domus scolaris)* of Zsuk, a village in Kolozs county. In the fifteenth century records, we find schoolmasters mentioned in several villages. To study at foreign universities was, of course, beyond the means of most Transylvanians, but even so their number was quite significant: by 1520, 2,060 students identified as "Transylvanian" had enrolled at universities abroad. In the twelfth century, most of them had attended the University of Paris; from the thirteenth century on, they were likely to have gone to Bologna and Padua, and from the mid-fourteenth century, to Prague, Cracow and Vienna. The majority of them were noblemen or burghers from towns or boroughs, but some of them came from the villages.

Both structurally and stylistically, parish church buildings were different from the episcopal and monastic churches. Before the middle of the thirteenth century, village churches were built with just the single nave and no aisles, the chancel separated from the nave with a Romanesque transverse arch, and ending in a semicircular apse. Archaeological evidence dates the earliest of these churches, at Malomfalva, to the eleventh century. Transylvanians continued to build their churches in this style for three hundred years, and the square apse replaced the semicircular one only in the middle of the thirteenth century. In the Székelyföld, however, all the churches except for one are in the latter, older style. The Saxon population, in both their autonomous districts and in the seignorial villages, built themselves basilicas with a nave and two aisles, a style typical of German colonization in the east. In most Hungarian and Saxon churches, the preeminent position of the leading part of society is reflected in the galleries they had built for themselves.

Romanian Landowners and Serfs within, and beyond the Carpathians

After the Cumans had moved out of Cumania, an area lying south and east of the Carpathians, the king of Hungary as we have seen, entrusted the country to the voivodes of the Romanian population living there, officials appointed in the same way as the voivode of Transylvania. However, the constantly recurring Mongol attacks made it impossible to consolidate this system of government, except in Wallachia, on a narrow strip of land at the foot of the mountains, where a few such voivodes were able to exercise their authority. Moldavia, on the other hand, was still politically a no man's land and scarcely populated even at the beginning of the fourteenth century. It was finally cleared of the Mongols only in 1352 by the troops of Endre Lackfi, the *ispán* of the Székelys.

Taking advantage of the political turmoil in Hungary at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the voivodes of Wallachia followed the example of the Hungarian oligarchy, and made a joint attempt at independence of the central power. In 1330 King Charles Robert was unable to command the obedience of Basarab, the voivode of Wallachia *(terra Transalpina)* — by that time, the name "Cumania" had been forgotten. The campaign the king conducted against the voivode not only failed, but very nearly cost him his own life. From then on, the voivodes of Wallachia were, in effect, independent rulers, and the kings of Hungary had to content with their oath of fealty, which left them extensive political freedom. The Romanian voivode of Moldavia, Bogdan I also rebelled against the king of Hungary in 1359, and here, too, the king settled for suzerainty instead of effecting rule over Moldavia.

The continued Mongol threat prompted real migrations to Transylvania of the peoples living beyond the Carpathians. Fourteenth-century documents present a picture of lively activity in eastern Hungary: in regions so far unmentioned in the documents or presented as uninhabited, a whole series of villages appeared, some only to disappear shortly afterwards, and make room for new ones in their place or in their neighbourhood. This was undoubtedly the time of the immigration and settlement of the Romanians, who were arriving in Transylvania in great numbers. In 1292, as we have seen, the lord of Illye in Hunyad county was granted royal permission to settle Romanians. In 1350, his descendants jointly inherited "Romanian settlements" *(possessiones olacales)* of unknown number which were not yet listed; by 1468, in the same seigniory fifty Romanian villages were already recorded by name. The Rékási family, who came from Wallachia in 1359, was granted the district of Ikus in Krassó county in 1365. At that time, the district had five villages; by 1404, however, thirteen were recorded, though only one was of the original five. Ikus had thirty-six villages in 1510, but only two of the above-mentioned thirteen were among them, the other eleven having disappeared and thirty-four having come into existence in the century intervening. Thus the final settlement of the Romanians took place over a lengthy period of times and generally speaking continued until the end of the Middle Ages, as proved by numerous examples of changed village names.

Until the middle of the fourteenth century, the Romanian immigration only affected the as yet uninhabited mountains and their immediate proximity. It was only later that the compact settlements of the Hungarians and Saxons in the centre of the Transylvanian Basin were broken up by interspersed Romanian communities. Some of the transhumant Romanians who came down from the mountains to the Mezőség stayed there and settled on the edge of the Hungarian and Saxon villages. This is how the great number of "twin" villages bearing the forenames "Magyar-" (Hungarian-), "Szász-" (Saxon-) or "Oláh-" (Vlach-) came into being. The Romanian villages were administered by their founders, the *kenézes*, who were serfs of the Hungarian, Saxon or Romanian landowners, and ranked as village judges. The social stratification leading to nobility or to serfdom took place also among the Romanian population of eastern Hungary, Transylvania included, but the development differed from the pattern of other ethnic or social groups in many respects.

The Romanian voivodes and *kenézes* whose social and legal status was relatively similar to that of the Saxon *gerébs* went through the same process of social advancement as the latter to reach nobility. The similarity, however, stopped there, and did not extend to the mass of the Romanian population. In recognition of their military services, the kings granted some voivodes and *kenézes* possession of those Romanian villages which they had established, and administered, but their obligation to pay dues for the office held, and to render personal military service remained. The legal status of the landowning *kenézes* was regulated by King Louis I in 1366. He declared landowning *kenézes* whose possession was confirmed by royal charter to be of equal standing to the nobility when they acted as witnesses in a court of law. This, however, did not mean "real" nobility for the *kenézes*, that is exemption from royal taxes for themselves of for those living on their estates. On the other hand, this was the first step towards the *kenézes'* distinction from the common Romanians *(communis Olachus)* who had, so far, been equal to them before the law though they had had administrative jurisdiction (but not the authority of the landowners). They were also distinguished from that class of *kenézes* who had not been confirmed in their property by a royal deed *(communis kenezus)*. Members of this later *kenéz* group were pronounced the legal equals of those judges *(villici)* of the Hungarian and Saxon villages who were villains themselves but who nevertheless enjoyed some tax advantages. Such distinctions had been already in effect in the Romanian keneziates: for example, at the Hátszeg assembly of 1360 already mentioned, besides the twelve *kenézes* and six priests, there were six Romanian commoners *(Olachi populani)*, three of whom were referred to as "serfs" *(iobagiones)* of the *kenézes*. Nevertheless, they all sat together in the court, like *Kenéz* Basarab Longus and his serf, Mihul (like every commoner at the time, he is mentioned by first name only).

A voivode or *kenéz* who rose to the seminoble status was described in charters and deeds as "noble voivode" *(nobilis vaivoda)* or "noble *kenéz*" *(nobilis kenezius)*, and his social status corresponded exactly to that of the Hungarian "conditional" noble *(conditionarius)*, whose nobility was "conditional" on his rendering specified services. The bishops of Transylvania and Várad rewarded the Romanian voivodes who served in their private ar-

Legend

● Monastery

■ Masonry church

● Wooden church

▲ Church of undetermined material

□ Priest mentioned in diploma

0   10   20   30   40   50 km

Hadadgyörtelek 1450
● ●Bósháza
Szilágyerked 1450
Szilágygörcsön
● Kucsó 145
Keresztelek ▲
1470
Paptelek● 1450
1450

▲ Dank 1435

□ Venter 1349

Fele
15th cen

Pojény 1554
▲ Kocsub 1551
Körössebes 1538 ▲ ▲ ■ Kiskoh 1554
▲
Szegyesd 1503

Kopsa 14th cent.

■ Ribice 14th cent.
Nagyvajas 1418
■ 14th
Krístyor cent.   Zalatna 15th cent
Guraszáda 13th cent.
□ Papfalva 1468

Rakovica 1439
□ □ Papalmás □   ▲ Lonka 1498
1511–1512 Vajdahunyad   ■ Alsóváros
14th cent. Szlop   ■ Sztrigysze
Szentandrás   Zeykfalva 13th cent.
Demsus 1360 ■   Tustya 1360
1360 Pesteny ■   Nalácv
Nagyosztró   ■ Dals
Glimboka ▲ 1360   ■ Barbátvíz 1411
1493 Klopotiva Malomvíz
1360 13th cent.

Map 13. Orthodox Romanian churches up to the middle of the sixteenth century

vélyes
cent.

Ruszpolyána1516
(Havasmező)●
ulafalva 14th cent.
● Rozávlya 1516   Ruszkova
□ Konyha 14th cent.   1516

Szentgyörgy 1450 ● ● Major 1450
Naszod 1450 ●

plostor
n cent.

ics
430

Szentpeter ▲ Faragó 1451
lahfráta ● 1415
402 ●
   ▲ Mezőpagocsa 1539
apus ●   ● Mezőgerebenes 1447
ytelke ● Ikland 1539
1539 ● Lekence 1539

● Szélkút 1500

mies by granting them "ecclesiastic nobility", which was similar to conditional nobility. This meant that they enjoyed the land which they had originally only administered as if it had been their private property, and disposed over its free Romanian population as over serfs. However, the right of ownership still belonged to the king or to the bishop. As for their legal status, the Romanian nobles remained under the judicial authority of the royal or episcopal castellan. The heirs of the seminoble Romanian voivodes who were vassals of bishops continued in this state until the beginning of modern times when the Reformation put an end to great church estates. The noble voivodes and noble *kenézes* who held estates on royal land, however, continued to rise socially and sooner or later reached unconditional, that is "real" or "national" nobility: in respect of their rights and duties they were an integral part of the Hungarian nobility.

The prime difference between the nobles of Székely and Saxon origin and the Romanian nobles was that while the former were granted estates in the counties, that is outside the Saxon and Székely territories, the Romanian voivodes and *kenézes* were granted landlord's rights over the land which they had earlier been administering. The inevitable consequence was that the common Romanians lost their personal freedom and became the serfs of the noble voivodes and *kenézes*. The Romanian population, after a few sporadic attempts at resistance, reconciled themselves to their fate. The king had no interest in defending the personal liberties of the common Romanians who performed no military service against voivodes and *kenézes* who were soldiers. Thus, by the end of the Middle Ages, the great masses of the Romanian population were the serfs either of Hungarian or Saxon nobles, or of Romanians risen from their own ranks. This explains why no separate Romanian "Estate" could evolve: the serfs, whatever their language, possessed no political rights, while the nobility, again regardless of origins, formed a single social Estate, a single "Nation".

The social advancement of the privileged Romanians proved to be the most rapid outside Transylvania proper, in Máramaros for the simple reason that in the fourteenth century Hungary faced the greatest threat from the still aggressive Mongols along its northeastern border. The Romanian voivodes and *kenézes* of Máramaros and Bereg took part in the campaigns of King Charles Robert and Louis I, first against the Mongols, later against the Lithuanians, then finally against Bogdan, the rebel Romanian voivode of Moldavia, and by the middle of the century, more and more of them were being ennobled. One voivode and *kenéz* family after the other was granted "real" nobility: the Barcánfalvis in 1326, the Bedőházis in 1336, the Bilkeis in 1339 and the Ilosvais in 1341. Real nobility exempted them from all taxes and specified services, and obliged them only to perform personal military service.

In 1365, the voivodes Balk and Drag who had been driven out of Moldavia by Bogdan moved to Máramaros with their brothers, prompting quite a migration. In the following years, the so far uninhabited northern mountains of Transylvania were speedily populated by the Romanian commoners they brought with them; one of the brothers even led Romanian settlers to Poland. Drag's descendants, the Drágffys, acquired large seigniories of more than a hundred villages in the Máramaros, Ugocsa, Szatmár, Belső-

Szolnok and Közép-Szolnok counties as early as the fourteenth century, and became the first aristocrats of Romanian origin in Hungary to play a role in national politics. The voivodes of Máramaros became the royal *ispáns* of Máramaros county, and it was at their instigation that the Romanian nobles of this county formed their own system of self-government in approximately 1380 on same pattern of the other noble counties, electing nobles, judges and jurors from among themselves to assist the work of the king's appointee, the *ispán*.

A similar but less rapid process started in another strategically important part of Hungary: in Temes and Krassó, the two counties of the Banate of Szörény which lay on the Transylvanian side of the Carpathians. There was a sudden increase in the Romanian population here, too, in the fourteenth century. There are data to prove that large numbers of people arrived from outside Hungary's borders. In 1334 a certain Voivode Bogdan was granted land in Temes county, and he brought so many people with him to his new estates there that the move took nine months to complete, and the king even sent one of the highest dignitaries of the land, the archbishop of Kalocsa, to assist him with the arrangements. In 1359, six members of another distinguished Romanian family from Wallachia settled in Temes "leaving all their properties in Wallachia behind". First they received thirteen villages, and six years later a further five estates which formed the already mentioned district of Ikus. Their descendants were the Rékási and Dobozi Dánfi families, later of noble rank.

Between 1365 and 1369, King Louis I used this area as a bridgehead during his campaigns against Wallachia and Bulgaria, in which the most he could achieve was to get purely formal oaths of allegiance from the rulers of those countries. For this campaign he wished to gain the support of the *kenézes* of Temes and Krassó counties, and tried to ensure their loyalty by converting them to the Roman Catholic faith. A royal decree of 1428 which has survived only in the form of a nineteenth century copy mentions a putative decree of Louis I according to which only Roman Catholic noblemen and *kenézes* would be granted land in the Sebes district of Temes county. Independently of whether the document is genuine or a forgery, in reality there is evidence for only one authentic case of conversion, from 1366, when Sorban, one of the *kenézes* of the castle of Világos in Arad county was converted to the Catholic faith and received the name István in baptism. However, he never succeeded in obtaining full noble rights. Members of the Mutnoki *kenéz* family, which was demonstrably of local origin, were first described as nobles in 1376, probably because they were one of the few Catholic families. This is indicated by the fact that in 1394 a member of their family was the canon of the Gyulafehérvár chapter. It was at approximately the same time that the ancestors of the Temeseli Dési *kenéz* family in Temes county acquired nobility. However, the majority of the *kenézes* in the Romanian districts of Temes and Krassó counties lacked royal confirmation even of their *kenéz* status around 1379.

Conversion to Roman Catholicism was so infrequent in the fourteenth century that it prompted Alverna, the Franciscan vicar of Bosnia, to complain in 1379: "There are some stupid and indifferent people who disapprove of and abuse the recently-begun holy work of His Majesty the King of

219

Hungary ... that is, the conversion and baptism of the Slavs and Romanians living in the country". Resistance came not only from where it was natural, from the Romanians, but from the Catholic Hungarian landowners, whose interest lay in keeping the Romanian settlers on their estates by providing them with a priest of their own religion. This practice was so widespread that even landowners who were churchmen followed it; in fact, the Catholic bishop of Várad is the first on record to have given permission, in 1349, to a Romanian voivode named Peter to keep a tax-exempted Romanian priest (*presbyterum Olachalem*) in his village of Felventer. From the end of the fourteenth century, the Hungarian noblemen themselves had wooden churches built for their Romanian serfs and kept Romanian priests for them in the Mezőség.

In such circumstances, it is not surprising that in 1391 the voivodes Balk and Drag, who were also the *ispán*s of Szatmár and Máramaros counties, approached the patriarch of Constantinople and subsequently obtained the right for the prior of the Monastery of Körtvélyes, which was their foundation, to ordain and oversee the Romanian priests and to consecrate the Orthodox churches on their estates in Máramaros, Szatmár, Ugocsa, Belső- and Közép-Szolnok counties. Their descendants, the Drágffys only turned Catholic in the fifteenth century — one of them even held the office of voivode of Transylvania — but they continued to be patrons of the Greek Orthodox Monastery of Körtvélyes. The Monastery of Priszlop in Hunyad county established at the end of the fourteenth century enjoyed the same right of ordaining Greek Orthodox priests as Körtvélyes in the north, except that it was not under the immediate authority of the patriarch of Constantinople, but of the archbishop of Wallachia.

The most zealous and devoted of the Greek Orthodox faithful were the "noble *kenézes*" of the Romanian districts of Hátszeg, Vajdahunyad and Déva. They had yet to rise to noble rank in the fourteenth century, but they had stone churches built and had themselves and their families depicted as the founders on frescos which had Slavonic inscriptions. Besides the names of the founding *kenéz* and the priest, the name of the painter, Teophil, can be read on the 1313 fresco of the church in Sztrigyszentgyörgy; the church itself, judging by its semi-circular clerestories, must have been built in the thirteenth century. Here, too, as in the whole of the region, the priests came from *kenéz* families. There are other thirteenth century Greek Orthodox churches in Zeykfalva and Malomvíz. The contemporary church of Demsus, built in the Byzantine style and centrally planned, has a centred tower in place of the cupola, which copies the Catholic church towers built in Transylvania in the first half of the thirteenth century. Apart from the church in Demsus, written sources mention four other Romanian churches in 1360; of these the only one still standing is that in Osztró. The Osztró church and another one in Lesnyek, also built by a *kenéz*, has elements linking it to fourteenth century Transylvanian Gothic architecture. The Greek Orthodox churches of Kristyor, Ribice and Lupsa on the mountain estates of the Catholic bishop of Várad and Transylvania were also built in the Gothic style in the fourteenth century. The church in Guraszáda, an early Byzantine stone building, was the only one built not by a *kenéz* but by a Hungarian landowner who had settled there after 1293 for his Romanian serfs. It is surpris-

ing, on the other hand, that no mediaeval Greek Orthodox stone church has survived in Máramaros and Bereg both of which had early Romanian settlements, or in the Fogaras region, or, indeed, in the Romanian districts of Temes and Krassó counties. There is not as much as a mention of stone churches here, only of wooden churches, whose present condition gives no real clue as to their origin form.

3. The Three Nations of Transylvania (1360–1526)

The Transylvanian Concept of Nation

The Age of Estates was a distinct phase in the development of European feudalism, and is characterized by a shift in power: the absolute authority of the sovereign — and of his immediate entourage — was replaced by the corporate participation of certain privileged groups in legislation and in government. These groupings, as well as the bodies representing them, were called Estates. In most countries, the Estates convened at the national assemblies were the aristocracy, the nobility and the city burghers. In some countries, as in England, prelates, the "Lords Spiritual", formed a separate Estate; while in others, as in Hungary, they formed one Estate along with the aristocracy. The evolution of the Estates in Hungary started at the end of the thirteenth century with separate meetings of the aristocracy (the so-called barons) and the nobility at the Diet. However, development suffered a setback of about a century and a half during the decades of particularism bordering on anarchy, and the subsequent heavy-handed rule of the Anjou kings, who relied exclusively on the barons. The first Diet to claim legislative power met in 1439, with representatives of the barons, the nobility and the royal free towns. Just a few years earlier, in 1437, the leaders of the Three Nations *(nationes)* of Transylvania — the nobility, the Székelys and the Saxons — had called their "Assembly of the Province". Although the decisions made at this forum did not have the force of law — legally binding rulings could only be brought by the full Hungarian Diet of which the Transylvanians were also part — they did become statutes regulating conditions specific to Transylvania. These assemblies were nevertheless genuine assemblies of Estates, although of Estates that were entirely different politically from the Estates comprising the Hungarian Diet. This is why they were called "Nations".

In the Hungary of the early fifteenth century, the word "nation" *(natio)* generally meant "the nobility". By then, the ethnic sense of the word had faded, and it came to be primarily a social and political concepts denoting the set of all people with political rights. The change in the meaning of the term was greatest in Transylvania, where only individuals owning land either privately or communally could be members of a "Nation". Serfs — whether Hungarian, Saxon or Romanian — were excluded. They had no privileges and were under the authority of the landowners.

The Nation formed by Transylvania's nobility was the one that corresponded most closely to what was meant by "nation" in the rest of Hungary, and included all those free landowners who were obliged to do personal military service and owned their land outright, and not communally. Ethnic origin was irrelevant here: in the nobility Saxon landowners were to be found alongside Hungarians and a considerable number of Romanians, as we have seen, also rose into this grouping. The "hungarianization" of the Saxon and Romanian nobles occurred not as a matter of principle — the Hungarian nobility had always had non-Hungarian speaking members — but through compliance with the majority, with no coercion to adopt the Hungarian language. The way of life of the nobility was peculiarly Hungarian, and assimilation to it came about naturally. The "nation" comprising Transylvania's nobility was the "Hungarian nation". How far the Transylvanian nation concept was from being an ethnic category is best illustrated by the Székely Nation, the *communitas* of all those enjoying Székely rights and liberties. By the time Transylvania's Estates had taken form, the Székelys had long ceased to be a separate ethnic unit; in fact, they were commonly regarded as the most Hungarian of all Hungarians. Only the Saxon Nation still carried the implication of a separate ethnic group, but even it did not apply to the whole of Transylvania's German population, since the burghers of towns living outside the Szászföld in the counties were not included in the *"natio Saxonica"*, nor were the Saxon serfs. There was no Romanian Nation; its development had been forestalled, as we have seen: the rising of the voivodes and *kenéze*s above their fellows had put an end to the freedom of the Romanian commonality. The Romanian nobles became members of the Nation formed by the nobility, that is, the "Hungarian nation", and those Romanians who were reduced to serfdom lost their claim to their Romanian status and the rights it had involved in earlier times.

The co-operation among the three estates of "nations" — Hungarian, Székely and Saxon — was initially restricted to the maintenance and possible extension of their privileges, and to local self-government. The idea of joint political action did not even arise. There is no sign of there having been some sense of specifically Transylvanian identity among the nobility, the Székelys and the Saxons in the fourteenth century. Transylvania at the time was still a purely geographical concept, and although it was regarded as a somewhat independent region within the Kingdom of Hungary this stemmed not so much from some form of Transylvanian local patriotism, but from the voivode's exceptional authority.

As the chief justice, governor and military commander of the Transylvanian counties, the voivode exercised a degree of influence which unavoidably affected the Székely and Saxon territories as well, although formally they were governed by *ispán*s independent of the voivode. In fact, the Székelys and Saxons insisted on having their own *ispán*s, as they feared that if they fell under the same jurisdiction and administration as the nobility, their own system of law and order would be superseded. However, the kings, whose interest was to create a unified government in this far-away province, usually ensured concordance between the high officials of Transylvania by appointing the *ispán* of the Székelys from among men close to, or related to, the voivode.

The first institutional contacts between the nobility, the Székelys and the Saxons were established through the voivode. Questions of land owner-ship, administration or military service affecting all three parties regularly arose, and needed joint action. It was to settle these matters that the king personally called a meeting of the whole of the province (*generalis congregatio*) at the end of the thirteenth century. Here, as we have seen, the Romanians were still represented. In the first decade of the fourteenth century, Voivode László Kán called such meetings of his own authority; between 1322 and 1414, the voivodes acting for the king, annually convened these assemblies on the meadow of Keresztes near Torda, on the estate of the Knights of St. John. Often only the nobles came, who were joined by the Székelys and the Saxons if the matters so required. For the Romanian *kenézes* of the royal districts, the vice-voivodes called separate juridical meetings. The assem-blies, near Torda, helped the leaders of the nobility, the Székelys and the Saxons to recognize their joint interests.

This series of assemblies broke off after 1414, and the political unrest of the ensuring years suspended relations between the three nations. The male line of the Anjou dynasty died out with King Louis I in 1382, which led to severe internal struggle over the succession. The oligarchy, which Charles Robert and Louis I had managed to keep under control, again gained ascend-ancy, and the struggle among the barons unsettled the whole country. The new king, Sigismund of Luxemburg, who emerged victorious from the civil war, recognized that he had to share power with the strengthened aristoc-racy. The high dignitaries of the realm were mainly concerned with main-taining their share of central power; they had no time to carry out all their official duties in person, but left them to their *familiaries*. The king tried to remedy this situation by appointing two people to each of the most impor-tant posts, but to little effect. In Transylvania, Sigismund appointed his close confidant, an eminent Polish soldier formerly in Louis I's service, Stibor Stiborici, to be voivode between 1395 and 1401 and then again between 1409 and 1414. Stiborici did at times appear in person to discharge his du-ties as voivode. His successors, however, Miklós Csáky and his son, László, voivodes in 1415–1426 and 1427–1437 respectively, did not as much as visit Transylvania for those more than two decades, but left the task of govern-ing Transylvania to their vice-voivode, Loránd Váraskeszi Lépes. The lat-ter, together with his brother, György, the bishop of Transylvania, success-fully furthered their family's interests, but was unable to keep a firm hand on the province, partly because as vice-voivode, he did not have the requi-site authority. Government was in great disorder, yet these were the years that Transylvania was going through one of the most critical periods of its history, and was crying out for righteous and protective rule.

Turkish Threat and Peasant War

A threat comparable only to the great Mongol invasion now menaced Hun-gary from the south. The Ottoman host, having conquered the peoples of the Balkans in less than fifty years, was, by the end of the fourteenth cen-tury, attacking the marches of Hungary. King Louis I had been obliged to

repel one of their attacks as early as 1375. Later Mircea, the voivode of Wallachia and a vassal of the king of Hungary, put up a heroic fight to ward off another Turkish attack, but was forced to flee to Transylvania and to request the support of King Sigismund. In 1395 he returned to Wallachia with Hungarian troops, but was defeated again; one of the Hungarian commanders, István Losonci, also fell. King Sigismund's crusade against the Ottoman Turks, which united western knights and heroic fighters from the Balkans under Hungarian leadership, ended in defeat at Nicopolis in 1396.

Not long afterwards Wallachia, Transylvania's advance bastion, fell to the Turks and Mircea became a taxpaying vassal of the Porte. However, King Sigismund, who had the welfare of his Wallachian liege men at heart, on several occasions sent Hungarian troops to help restore voivodes who had been driven out by the Turks. But the task became increasingly difficult: there were always Romanian pretenders willing to lead Turkish troops against these voivodes as soon as the Hungarian armies were withdrawn. In this way Wallachia became a battlefield, and the Turks, usually supported by their own voivodes, made raids into Transylvania more and more frequently.

It was in this situation that in 1419 King Sigismund first recognized the legislative competence of the Transylvanian Nations. On his initiative, it was declared that in case of an Ottoman attack, every third nobleman and every tenth serf would take up arms in support of the Székelys and the Saxons, who, living on the border, stood to bear the brunt of any offensive. The wisdom of this was demonstrated in 1420 when, without such assistance, Voivode Miklós Csáky tried vainly to check a Turkish attack near Hátszeg; the attacking troops subsequently devastated Hunyad county and Szászváros, taking a large number of prisoners. In 1421 an Ottoman army appeared outside Brassó, and smashed the Saxon and Székely troops. In 1432 Turkish and Romanian forces from the neighbouring voivodates broke into the area, and except for the recently rebuilt castles of Brassó and Szeben which were able to withstand the siege, the Szászföld and even the Székelyföld suffered major damage.

The increasing defence burden fell primarily on the serfs. The Romanian serfs paid tax on their flocks to the king only; since they belonged to the Greek Orthodox church, they paid no tithes. However, when urban development induced large numbers of Hungarian and Saxon serfs to leave their lords to seek their fortunes in the towns, the landowners settled Romanians on the plots left vacant. At the request of the bishop of Transylvania, the king agreed that the Romanians who settled on so-called "Christian lands", abandoned by Roman Catholic serfs, should pay the tithes due on their holdings. This measure made for a great deal of dissatisfaction among the Romanian serfs, who had been used to the much lighter tax known as the fiftieth.

But the circumstances of the Hungarian and Saxon serfs were also deteriorating. The changeover to a money economy, growing material demands from the nobility, and the Ottoman threat — all placed new financial burdens on them. The landowners began to insist again on the payment of the new tax introduction in 1351: the ninth — i.e. the second "tenth" of the serfs' produce — which had fallen into disuse. This tax was collected, how-

ever, without relieving the serfs of those taxes which they had been paying hitherto. The rent on the land was raised, extraordinary taxes were imposed, and, most onerous of all, the landowners took every opportunity to hinder the movement of the serfs. The performance of personal military service also constituted an unusual and grave burden for the peasantry, who had not been called on to bear arms for centuries. The serfs became restive throughout Transylvania, and in several places refused to pay the church tithes. Bishop György Lépes resorted to a double-edged weapon in an attempt to resolve the situation: he excommunicated those villages which refused' to pay their tithes, declaring that the only way they could obtain redress was to pay the church taxes owing in a newly-issued currency whose unit value was ten times that of the old. In the meantime, priests who had studied in Bohemia were passing on to the peasantry the radical Taborite ideas of the Hussite rebellion — which turned it against the church even more. In the spring of 1437, the Transylvanian serfs, led by Antal Budai Nagy of the lower nobility, rose against their ecclesiastical and temporal landlords.

The rebels consciously called themselves the *"universitas"*, "the universality of the Hungarian and Romanian inhabitants of Transylvania" and "men of free status"[13] — deliberately describing themselves in terms usually applied only to the nobility to proclaim the egalitarian Hussite social programme. They also followed the example of the Hussites when they established a redoubt in a Transylvanian "Tabor" (camp) on the extensive plateau of Mount Bábolna near Alparét in Doboka county. From this camp their captains sent four legates to Voivode László Csáky who had hurried to Transylvania on hearing the news of the rebellion. They asked that their grievances be remedied: that the abuses over tithe payments stop, that the sentence of excommunication be lifted, and that the serfs' right to free movement be generally recognized.

The voivode first had the envoys mutilated, then killed. With his troops he then attacked the peasants, but lost the subsequent battle, in which he himself disappeared. The nobility felt forced to negotiate, and, in an agreement made in front of the Convent of Kolozsmonostor on 6 July, 1437, promised to remedy the peasants' grievances. The bishop reduced the tithes by half, and eased the terms of payment for the sums outstanding. The landowners compromised: ten denaria were to be paid in rent as opposed to one and a half gold florins. They agreed on one day's socage per year per holding and promised to abandon the collection of the ninth. Also renounced was the so-called *akó* (approximately twelve gallons), a tax previously levied and paid in kind. All this amounted to the abolition of all seignorial taxes in the form of both services and produce. The fact that the landowners settled for a moderate money rent was a great achievement for the peasants, with implications for the future. Finally, the serfs' right to move freely was guaranteed. The most significant condition of the proposed agreement was to have been the recognition of the serfs' right to call an annual armed assembly on Mount Bábolna, where alleged abuses of authority by the landowners were to be discussed and, if necessary, punished.

13. L. DEMÉNY, *Parasztfelkelés Erdélyben 1437–1438.* (Popular Uprising in Transylvania.) Budapest 1987, 129.

Such an unprecedented affront to its self-esteem and interests was intolerable to the nobility, and in a short time the struggle broke out again. However, the peasants continued their resistance, and one manor house after another was put to the torch. Neither side showed any mercy. To relieve the nobles in their desperate plight, in mid-September the vice-voivode called the leaders of the other two Nations to a general assembly at Kápolna. This was the first time that the Transylvanian Estates assembled without royal authorization or without waiting for the appointment of a new voivode. They agreed to join forces in "brotherly union" against all internal and external threats to the province, and promised to support one another against all aggressors except the king. For some time yet, however, this mutual assistance pact existed on paper only. A few days after the Kápolna assembly, there was another bloody confrontation with the peasants, and the nobles were again obliged to negotiate. On 6 October, in the village of Dellőapáti in Doboka county, the two sides agreed to send their delegates to the king to ask his arbitration. But King Sigismund was gravely ill and died on 9 December; his successor, the Austrian prince Albert of Habsburg, had not yet arrived in the country. Thus a royal decision was delayed.

In the meantime the peasants won the support of the citizens of Kolozsvár, thereby acquiring a strong fortified military base from which they continued their skirmishes against villages supporting the nobles. Eventually, in December, with the help of extra troops from other parts of Hungary, the nobility won a major victory near Kolozsmonostor led by the newly-appointed voivode, Dezső Losonci Bánffy, who was closely affected since his estates lay next to Bábolna. Antal Budai Nagy was killed in battle. At the beginning of 1438, the final stronghold, Kolozsvár, also fell. On 2 February, the representatives of the Three Nations met, and after solemn renewal of their union, the reckoning with the peasants took place: their leaders were tortured and then executed, and the rest of those captured were blinded and mutilated. Kolozsvár paid for its participation by losing its municipal liberties, and did not regain them until several years later. There was, of course, no further talk of the contractual rights which the serfs had won previously.

The Hunyadis

Although the Transylvanian Estates eventually managed to crush a badly-armed and gullible peasantry, they lacked the strength to withstand the Turkish onslaught. In 1438, Turkish, Romanian and Serbian troops broke into Transylvania through the Iron Gates, in Hunyad county. The Turkish attackers were accompanied by Vlad Dracul, voivode of Wallachia, formerly King Sigismund's vassal and a Knight of the Order of the Dragon, to which the cream of the Hungarian aristocracy then belonged. It was to Voivode Vlad's troops that the town of Szászsebes surrendered; most of its inhabitants were taken prisoner. The invading armies then turned on Szeben. When the town managed to withstand an eight day siege, they ransacked Gyulafehérvár and Küküllővár. After almost two months of devastation, the enemy left through the Barcaság, taking with him much booty and thousands of captives.

226

After the sudden death of Albert, the newly-crowned Wladislas I, who was already king of Poland, made the struggle against the Ottomans his principal concern. In 1440, the first year of his reign as king of Hungary, he decided to reorganize the country's defence system completely, and to centralize the government of the southern border region, which had hitherto been in the hands of several royal officials. For this enormous task he appointed Miklós Újlaki, ban of Macsó, and his old companion-in-arms, János Hunyadi, ban of Szörény, as *ispáns* of Temes and voivodes of Transylvania, at the same time allowing them to retain their former titles. The defence of the western half of the long border region became the responsibility of Újlaki, while the defence of the eastern half was entrusted to Hunyadi.

At long last, the fate of Transylvania was entrusted to the right hands. Hunyadi himself was a Transylvanian, and the affairs of the province were therefore nearer to him than to his predecessors, who had all come from other parts of Hungary and whose estates were similarly distant. Hunyadi, an outstanding figure of fifteenth-century European history, started life in modest social circumstances, but enjoyed a prodigious career. His father, who was probably from a Wallachian boyar family, had served as a knight in Sigismund's court and in 1409 had been granted the castle and seigniory of Hunyad for his services. The young Hunyadi, whom contemporaries regarded as Sigismund's illegitimate son, first served as a soldier under Hungarian barons, then at the courts of George Branković, the Serbian despot and the duke of Milan, and finally as a knight at the Hungarian royal court. It was King Albert who had appointed him to head the Banate of Szörény, which was under constant attack from the Ottoman Turks. Wladislas I entrusted Hunyadi, his closest advisor and bravest soldier, with the command of the campaigns against the Turks. Hunyadi's successes were amply rewarded by the king; as a result of the 1444 peace negotiations with the Turks, he acquired Branković's vast Hungarian estates. He came to own property on a scale unprecedented in Hungarian history, and never matched since. At the time of his death, his estates covered five and a half million acres of land, a quarter of which was in Transylvania. The revenues from this enormous property and the military and political power of his countless retinue Hunyadi (unlike most of his contemporaries) used not for personal aggrandizement, but in the common interest: for years he personally met the greater part of the expenses of the wars with the Turks.

In 1442 Hunyadi defended Transylvania against a Turkish attack led by Mezid bey. Although he lost the first battle near Szentimre, where Bishop György Lépes fell, help brought by Miklós Újlaki enabled Hunyadi to divert the Ottoman army from its siege of Szeben and in a pitched battle to destroy it completely. In the same year, he put the troops of Sehabedin beylerbey of Rumelia to rout in Wallachia near the Ialomiţa River. In 1443 he himself launched an offensive and won a series of victories; only harsh weather forced him to turn back from the Balkan Mountains. Despite the fact that a subsequent campaign launched by Wladislas in violation of a peace treaty with the Turks ended in disaster, and the king himself was killed in the Battle of Varna (1444), the Hungarian frontiers were saved from immediate threat for some time.

King Wladislaw I was succeeded by the child Ladislas V; during his minority, János Hunyadi, the celebrated hero of all Christendom and the idol of the Hungarian lesser nobility, was elected governor of Hungary. He intended to use his increased power to eliminate the Turkish threat once and for all. Hunyadi's third Balkan campaign failed, however, owing to the hostility between him and Branković, and because of the irresolution of the Romanian voivodes. He was heavily defeated at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in Serbia in 1448.

Although Hunyadi was unable to realise his long-term plans, he continued to maintain Hungary's defence successfully. Sultan Mohammed II, after occupying Constantinople, launched a campaign against Hungary, and in 1456 laid siege to Nándorfehérvár. Hunyadi's troops scattered the besieging army with the help of peasant crusaders recruited by Giovanni di Capestrano, a Franciscan friar who was later canonized. (It is in commemoration of this battle that church bells ring at noon each day.) This great victory halted for decades the Turkish advance towards Hungary. But at the height of his glory, Hunyadi fell victim to the plague, which broke out in his camp after the battle. His body was laid to rest at Gyulafehérvár. Hunyadi's death triggered a fierce power struggle between his sons and his opponents who had been enviously watching the success of the one-time governor. The elder of the two, László Hunyadi, was beheaded by royal command. When, however, the throne became vacant within the year, under military pressure from the lesser nobility and the family's numerous retainers, Mátyás, the second son, was elected king in 1458.

In Transylvania, King Matthias was received with mistrust, and the alliance of the Three Nations that was again solemnly declared at the 1459 assembly displayed the character of a united front against the king. This show of defiance, though, was aimed not at Matthias, who was not much more than a child, but at his maternal uncle, Mihály Szilágyi, who was notorious for his vehement and aggressive nature and who was governing the country on behalf of his nephew. In violation of Saxon autonomy, Szilágyi granted himself the district of Beszterce, together with the hereditary title of count bestowed on János Hunyadi by Ladislas V when he resigned as governor in 1452. Szilágyi disregarded the privileges that his predecessor had been so careful to guarantee the citizens of Beszterce, and began to treat them as ordinary serfs. It was this that led Beszterce to revolt in 1458. Matthias, fearing an outbreak of disorder in Transylvania, stripped his uncle of his power, taking the government into his own hands. In 1465 he restored the liberties of Beszterce. However, the atmosphere of hostility towards him did not ease. The burdens of his expensive campaigns and his strictness towards an aristocracy unaccustomed to a firm hand led to opposition movements throughout the country.

The Transylvanian nobility found it particularly irksome that Matthias replaced the *lucrum camarae* tax, from which they had been exempted by Louis I, with a newly-introduced tax which he then imposed on them, too. In 1467, Benedek Farnasi Veres, a descendant of one of the conqueror tribes of Transylvania, organized a military uprising against the king, persuading the voivode of Transylvania, János Szentgyörgyi, to join in. High-ranking Saxons and Székelys also took part in the sedition. However, Matthias

quickly intervened and took the disorganized rebels by surprise; the voivode was the first to beg his monarch for mercy, and many of those who had masterminded the rebellion fled abroad. The wrath that subsequently descended upon the Transylvanian nobility was comparable only to the land confiscations ordered by Charles Robert after Voivode László's fall. Transylvanian families of many centuries' standing — such as the Farnasi Veres, Suki, Iklódi, Kecseti, Drági, Bogáti, Losonci Bánffy, Somkeréki Erdélyi, Dobokai, Illyei and Folti families — became homeless overnight. The king distributed their estates among his relatives and proven supporters, with the lion's share going to the new voivodes, János Dengelegi Pongrác and Miklós Csupor, as well as to János Nádasdi Ungor. Had these families, due to a peculiar misfortune, not all died out within a few decades, Transylvania would have witnessed the rise of a new aristocracy. What in fact happened was that some of these windfall seigniories were soon divided up amongst the female descendants; others the king gave back to their original owners whom he pardoned after his initial anger had passed.

The net result was that great estates practically ceased to exist in Transylvania. It was not only the nobles who were punished, but also the Székely and Saxon rebels: the mayor of Szeben paid with his head. Thus the political significance of the Transylvanian Estates greatly diminished, while the king gradually increased the authority of the voivode, who, from the beginning of the 1460s, regularly held the post of the *ispán* of the Székelys as well. This authority was counterbalanced only by the autonomy of the Saxons, which the king deliberately strengthened. In the same year, soon after the rebellion, Matthias went to war with Ştefan, voivode of Moldavia, who had been one of its instigators. Although the king was injured in a clash and withdrew his troops, the voivode thought it unwise to persist in his enmity; instead he swore allegiance.

King Matthias managed to organize effective defence for Transylvania against Turkish attacks. In this he was assisted by the same Ştefan, the most distinguished of Moldavia's voivodes (1457–1504) and later justly dubbed "the Great", since with Hungarian military support he won a number of victories over the Turks. Matthias also supported the courageous but ruthless Vlad, another voivode of Wallachia (1456–1462, 1476) and the son of Vlad Dracul. This second Vlad was called "The Impaler" (Ţepeş) by his enemies since this was the way in which he executed captured Turks and those boyars who sympathized with them. He had frequent political and commercial conflicts with the Transylvanian Saxons, and had several of them murdered also. Because of this the Saxons published alarming pamphlets that spread his notoriety throughout Europe, thus laying the foundations of the "Dracula" stories of later times.

During the reign of Matthias, the Turks launched only one serious attack against Transylvania, in 1479. Voivode István Báthory, however, headed off the main body of their army at Kenyérmező in Hunyad county. Here, on 13 October, the bloodiest battle ever fought with the Turks in Transylvania took place. Due to the well-timed arrival and intervention of Pál Kinizsi, the *ispán* of Temes, who was famous for his victories over the Turks, the enemy suffered a major defeat, and for the next decade gave Transylvania a wide berth. Defence against the Turks also became more systematic: be-

tween 1387 and 1438 walls with projecting towers were built around the Saxon towns, while the villages in southern Transylvania turned their churches into fortified shelters, thus creating the peculiarly Transylvanian Gothic church-fortress.

The Turkish threat meant that the military services of the *kenézes* in the royal counties of the southern marches were increasingly in demand. This development was not without its effect. A long list of Romanian *kenézes* in Temes, Krassó and Hunyad counties were raised to noble rank, and by the end of the fifteenth century they had become members of the national nobility. It is no coincidence that the mass ennoblement of the *kenézes* is linked particularly with the name of János Hunyadi: having been brought up in its midst, he well understood this stratum's desire to rise. The first Transylvanian voivode to hold both the voivodeship and the post of *ispán* of the Székelys, Hunyadi naturally had a great many Hungarian *familiares*; but many Romanian *kenézes* also joined his retinue, and it is understandable that it was these expressly personal followers of the powerful governor who primarily enjoyed his favours. The later brilliant careers of several Romanian *kenéz* families started in Hunyadi's service; for example, those of the Nádasdi Ungor, the Malomvizi Kenderesi, the Kendeffy and the Csulai families of Hunyad county, and the Csornai, Bizerei, Mutnoki, Temeseli Dési and Macskási families in Szörény county. In the fifteenth century in Hunyad county along the number of new Romanian noble families descended from the *kenézes* of the royal district of Hátszeg — the Bajesdi, Barbátvizi, Bári, Brettyei, Csolnokosi, Farkadini, Fejérvizi, Galaci, Karulyosdi, Kernyesti, Klopotivai, Lindzsinai, Livádi, Macesdi, Oncsokfalvi, Osztrói, Pesténi, Ponori, Puji, Riusori, Szacsali, Szentpéterfalvi, Szilvási, Totesdi, Vádi, Várhelyi and Zejkányi families — was nothing short of the number of Hungarian petty nobles in any county. Some of these *kenéz* families acquired large estates with several villages — for example, the Szállaspataki family and the Muzsinas of Demsus. Hunyadi's mother probably came from the latter family. Titles of nobility and lands were granted also to the voivodes of Sebesvár in Kolozs county, to the ancestors of the Meregjói Botos, Kalotai Vajda, Csicsei Vajda and Danki Vajda families, and to the Lupsai Kendes in Fehér county. The legal status of the Romanian ruling elements in the Fogaras region in the second half of the fourteenth century and at the beginning of the fifteenth, was regulated still by the voivodes of Wallachia, who at that time held the area as a feudal grant from the king of Hungary. Here, therefore, the social stratum equivalent to the *kenézes* was described by the originally Bulgar term "boyar" which was used for the nobility of Wallachia. The boyars of Fogaras were rewarded for their services with approximately the same level of nobility as the *noble kenézes* of the other royal counties, except that their services were greater. However, several families from among them rose to the ranks of the real nobility, as, for example, the Majláth family which played such an important role from the sixteenth century on.

Naturally, the Romanian nobles not only acquired the titles of the Hungarian nobility, but also adopted their entire legal system, administrative framework, institutions and way of life. In Máramaros, as we have seen, a county system evolved which corresponded exactly to the Hungarian, and in the second half of the fifteenth century, the *kenéz* law-court of the

Temesköz districts developed into a typical county law-court, and the *kraynik*, the official who prepared and administered the sentences, gradually took on the role of a *szolgabíró*. A similar process occurred in the Hátszeg area. In the fourteenth century it was still the royal captain who convened the assembly of the *kenézes* and his authority dominated the agenda. By the first half of the fifteenth century, however, the *kenézes* collectively passed judgement or issued charters without his authorization — that is, they practised self-government similar to that of the nobles. In time, however, since Hunyad county had an established Hungarian nobility and, therefore, a noble law-court, the Romanian nobles adapted themselves to the existing framework, and the *kenézes'* law-court ceased to exist.

Not all the ennobled Romanian *kenézes* converted to Catholicism. In Máramaros a considerable number stayed Greek Orthodox. In Hátszeg, churches were still built in the Transylvanian Gothic style in the fifteenth century, but they were Greek Orthodox churches decorated with Byzantine ornaments and religious inscriptions in Slavonic, and their priests were from *kenéz* families.

In the second half of the fifteenth century, the kings raised Romanians to confidential posts and high public offices with no objection from the Hungarian nobles although they, by then, had a strong sense of national identity. The highly responsible post of ban of Szörény was held by Mihály Csornai between 1447 and 1454, by István and Mihály Mutnoki between 1467 and 1469, and by Péter Macskási at the end of the fifteenth century. János Malomvizi Kenderesi, Mihály Pestényi, and later Péter Temeseli Dési were *ispán*s of Máramaros and Bereg counties. János Nádasdi Ungor, whose father had taught János Hunyadi the art of warfare, was one of King Matthias' favourites: through his wife, who was from the Lendvai Bánffys, he was related to the oldest aristocratic families of the country; and because of his talents as a talented military commander, he acquired huge grants of land. The career of the Hátszegi Csulais is also typical. Of the seven sons of the ennobled small landowning *kenéz* Vlad Csulai, five reached high public office: László Ficsor became ban of Jajca, later of Szörény; Miklós Kende became ban of Sabać, György Móré ban of Szörény and Nándorfehérvár, János Báncsa captain of Bálványos, and Fülöp Móré bishop of Pécs. Their wives came from Hungarian aristocratic families such as the Bethlen, Haranglábi and Dóczi families.

The Towns and the Saxon Autonomy

Urban development played an essential role in the evolution of the Age of the Estates in feudal Europe, since it was by relying on the towns that the monarchs were able to counterbalance the political influence of the aristocracy. In Transylvania, in addition to other peculiarities, it was especially notable that urban development took place mainly within the political framework of the Saxon Nation and under its effective protection. The successful economic policy of the Anjou kings, the boom in mining and the cattle trade in Hungary, the introduction of a stable gold currency, and increased trade

with neighbouring countries also stimulated the development of the Transylvanian towns. The fruits of this were primarily enjoyed by Saxon villages which grew into craft and trade centres, that is, into towns. The three big Saxon centres, Szeben, Brassó and Beszterce, were far ahead of the Hungarian towns (Dés, Torda and Gyulafehérvár), the Székely centres (Marosvásárhely, Udvarhely, Sepsiszentgyörgy, etc.), and even of other Saxon towns such as Szászsebes, Medgyes, Segesvár, and Szászváros primarily because they dominated the passes leading to the Romanian voivodates. Some of the smaller Székely towns also lay near the border, but the Székelys' military way of life inhibited the early rise of a professional merchant stratum in society; by the time mercantile development started among them, the leading role of the Saxons was assured.

Only Kolozsvár, with its mixed Hungarian–German population, was able to compete with them. Since it lay on the crossroads of commercial routes from the rest of Hungary to Transylvania, Kolozsvár controlled their traffic; and its originally German inhabitants, leading at first a noble–peasant way of life, played an important part in the evolution of Transylvania's urban burgher economy and society. Already in the second half of the fourteenth century, the trades and crafts flourishing in Kolozsvár, combined with the attractions of civic freedom, lured the Hungarian serf population of the surrounding area to move into the town. German craftsmen from the Szászföld and from the German states also settled in the town, although in much smaller numbers. They became the leaders of the guild-based craftsmen — which meant that those involved in foreign trade now demanded their part in the administration of the town alongside the proprietor-trader patricians. This rising social group had no ambition to acquire land and was consciously German, a quality which the old civic aristocracy, with its noble-military aspirations, lacked. Thus established, German particularism undermined the earlier ethnic understanding: the new burghers, with the support of the king, began to oust the old elite families from power (1405) and the struggle for leadership in Kolozsvár turned into a conflict between Hungarians and Saxons. Temporarily the Saxons dominated the scene; however, by 1458 the Hungarians, who already outnumbered them, achieved, with the support of the central government, that the offices of judge and councillors be shared equally. From then on, although the contract guaranteeing this arrangement was conscientiously adhered to by both parties for centuries, natural increase favoured the Hungarians: the Saxons gradually diminished in number, and by the beginning of early modern times the majority of Kolozsvár's population was Hungarian.

By the fifteenth century Dés, Torda and Gyulafehérvár were already entirely Hungarian towns. Their German population must have been very small even initially, and when Hungarian peasants from the neighbouring areas started to pour into the towns at the end of the fourteenth century, the German townsmen were absorbed by the Hungarian majority. A similar fate was in store for the German populations of the Hungarian mining towns of Szék, Kolozs, Abrudbánya, Zalatna, Offenbánya, Torockó, and for the Hungarian populations of Saxon towns. For example, in Szászsebes only one street, called "Székely", has preserved the memory of the Hungarians who once lived there. The hungarianization of the towns was promoted by

the considerable growth of trade and craft activities in the Hungarian villages: in fifteenth century registers, a considerable number of serf families appear under names denoting various handicrafts. This indicates that the serfs who moved into towns already had their basic craft skills. Thus, besides the German citizens, there were also large groups of Hungarians in the late mediaeval towns of Transylvania. Romanians, however, did not play a role in the development of Transylvanian towns.

One of the major incentives for the growth of Transylvanian towns was the lively trade with the two Romanian voivodates. Although the Hungarian royal authority became weaker in the territories beyond the Carpathians, it still exerted considerable influence. Under royal protection, the two Romanian voivodates, which were rich in raw materials, opened up to Transylvanian merchants. In the late Middle Ages, the voivodates were still at an early stage of their development and were still suffering from organizational difficulties — for example the first church was not built in Wallachia until the beginning of the fourteenth century —, and the population badly needed the Transylvanian merchants to exchange Romanian products for western goods. King Louis I's economic policy, which aimed to re-establish the old Eastern trade routes leading through the country (Eastern trade had been bypassing Hungary for several hundred years), also fostered Saxon trade. In 1369 the king granted Brassó a staple right which obliged Polish and German merchants on their way to Wallachia to sell their most sought-after merchandise, broadcloth, to the tradesmen of Brassó: the latter were now able to resell the goods in Wallachia. In the same way, foreign merchants were obliged to trade on the Brassó market the merchandise, agricultural produce or livestock which they had bought in Wallachia. In 1378 Szeben received the same rights over the international trade route passing through the town; Beszterce had already gained control over the Polish route through Moldavia in 1368.

Initially, however, this lively commercial traffic took up not Saxon, but western European products, particularly textile goods, since the Saxons had scarcely developed any market-oriented craft activities by the fourteenth century. Saxon merchants did not have a very active role in actual exporting, but, relying on their staple rights, sold the acquired goods in their town markets to Balkan merchants and bought up their merchandise in return. This is not surprising, as this was common practice even for Viennese merchants in the Middle Ages: their staple right ensured that their transactions also were carried out locally. Saxon tradesmen seldom went east, except perhaps to the Romanian voivodates in order to arrange some important or delicate business; on rare occasions did they venture any further. They preferred to go to western, particularly to German cities, especially after King Louis exempted them from the staple right of Buda. They took produce from Wallachia and Moldavia, and brought back cloth and spices. Of their two usual routes the first went through Kassa to Bohemia and Poland, and finally to Danzig; the other through Buda, and from there, either to Vienna–Regensburg–Basel or to Zara and Venice.

Saxon handicrafts started to take advantage of the great economic boom only fairly late. Guilds appeared throughout Transylvania in the mid-fourteenth century. King Louis first abolished them, and then, at the request of

the Saxons, he re-established the guilds in 1376 and issued new regulations for their operation. The large number of guilds at the time (nineteen guilds comprising twenty-five types of activity) is quite misleading. It certainly does not add up to a large quantity of goods produced, for there is no indication of quantity control in contemporary regulations. Limits on the quantity each guild member could produce appeared in charters of incorporation only later, when the guilds started to be market- and even export-oriented. This change took place in the fifteenth century, and thereafter the products of Transylvanian tradesmen and craftsmen also found their way to the east. Trades and crafts developed at such a pace that we can find guilds with over a hundred members even in villages. The range of merchandise exported to the Romanian voivodates became wider and wider, as is indicated by fifteenth-century customs regulations listing ready-made clothes, pots and pans, knives, weapons, semi-finished metal articles, spices, jewellery, parchment, paper, carts and even dried fruit and confectionery. However, the type of goods imported from the voivodates remained unchanged: produce, not so much agricultural produce as the products of animal husbandry: livestock, hide, wax, honey and, less frequently, cereals.

The new patricians of the Saxon towns who had risen to a leading role through commerce were, like the *gerebs*, a narrow social stratum consisting of a few families only, and they clung to their power no less jealously. Their authority was challenged by burghers involved in the trades and crafts at the end of the fifteenth century, but not with much success. The result of the movement was the establishment of the so-called "Body of a Hundred" (*Hundertmannschaft*, 1495), which had already been operating in towns in the rest of Hungary and in Kolozsvár. Although this institution also represented the guilds, its members were appointed by the city council consisting of patricians only, and thus the guilds remained in a rather dependent position. The Saxon commonality of the towns felt increasingly oppressed, and rose against the town leadership in 1511 in Segesvár, and in 1513 in Szeben. Disgruntled peasants murdered the mayor of Segesvár in 1520. However, neither the urban lower middle class nor the village peasantry were able to break the authority of the new elite; after a temporary advancement of the lesser nobility, the upper strata of society again gained the upper hand and with it, royal support throughout the country. As the fate of the serfs and the common Székelys took a turn for the worse, so did the political and economic dependence of the common Saxon citizens on the patricians grow.

The new Saxon social order was built on the primacy of the towns. The Saxon peasantry not only suffered from the oppressive power of the patrician community leaders, but also experienced the economic pressure that the towns put on the villages. Even the lower classes of the towns were ahead of the peasantry. The centres of the autonomous districts systematically hindered the development of the other settlements under their authority, and above all maintained their exclusive right to hold fairs and markets. Brassó foiled Földvár's attempts to hold their own weekly market in 1378, Nagysink prevented Szentágota from the same in 1379, and Segesvár obstructed Henndorf in 1428. Later, town guilds also extended their power to village guilds by granting town guild masters supervisory rights over village handicrafts.

The Saxon notion of equality before the law could not, thus, manifest itself reality. But the Saxon peasant was still in an incomparably better position than his counterpart in the noble counties or the poor Székely commoner. This was due particularly to the fact that Saxon society had become gradually demilitarized after the *gerébs* had moved into the counties, and thus the danger of developing the noble-serf social duality disappeared.

The shift from the noble-peasant pattern to the burgher-peasant one was accompanied by the evolution of Saxon ethnic self-consciousness. The Saxon middle class displayed the same exclusive and enthusiastic ethnic bias as the Hungarian nobility of the late Middle Ages. The first practical manifestation of the new attitude was the exclusion of alien elements from Saxon towns and guilds. The first known measure of this kind was taken by the Council of Szeben in 1474: they ruled that the Dominican monastery which had been built in the suburb would be allowed to move within the walls only if the majority of the monks were German. This continuously strengthening self-awareness of the Saxon middle class and the rising German ethnic consciousness of the whole of Saxon society was encouraged and almost institutionalized by the kings who, from the beginning of the fifteenth century, granted more and more Saxon seats the right to freely elect their own chief justices. The process was completed by King Matthias. In 1469 he granted all the seats this right, and in 1486, joined all the Saxon seats and the districts of Beszterce and Brassó in the Saxon University *(universitas Saxonum)*, entrusting its leadership to the *ispán* of the Saxons — who, in fact, was the elected mayor of Szeben — in his new capacity as count of the Saxons *(comes Saxonum)*.

The Székely Fight for Freedom and György Székely's Peasant War

During the reign of King Matthias, Transylvania enjoyed the return of the prosperity which had characterised the Anjou period. After the 1467 rebellion, the king selected his voivodes carefully. From 1470, the number of deeds issued by the voivodes in connection with Transylvanian matters increased perceptibly, which indicates that they could no longer regard their office as a mere title or source of income, but had to attend to their duties in person. Under the kings of the House of Jagiello, Wladislas II and Louis II, however, the development of the feudal state was accompanied by party struggles causing serious disturbances in the whole country. The oft-repeated Turkish attacks, the rivalry between various aristocratic cliques — in which the lesser nobility sometimes had only a subordinate role, but sometimes took part as an independent force —, and finally György (Dózsa) Székely's peasant war, were all signs of disintegration. In 1493 Transylvania suffered two Turkish attacks which mainly affected Saxon areas, and its internal peace was disturbed by Saxon and Székely movements.

The defeat of the peasant war of 1437 suppressed the peasants' open struggle for a long time to come. The centre of social unrest was transferred from the counties to the Székelyföld. With the advent of a money economy

and the related mercenary army system, the traditional way of life of the free Székely peasantry came to a point of crisis. Since their urban development was rather slow, free Székely peasants had no option to being drawn into feudal dependence — unlike their Saxon counterparts, who produced for the market —, and the demand for up-to-date and permanent fighting units made it impossible for every Székely to do military service. The growing disparity of wealth excluded more and more people from actually exercising their Székely liberties. The land once held in common by the community had gradually became divided into smaller and smaller units, and thus the majority of the prolific Székely families became dwarf-holders. In order to secure their living, vast numbers of them entered the service of their more prosperous fellow Székelys.

The leaders of Székely society who owned land both in the Székelyföld and in the counties would have liked to see their lands in the Székelyföld worked by underlings as completely dependent as the serfs on their estates in the counties. To this end, the landowners attempted to change the voluntary contractual relationship existing in the Székelyföld into a form of feudal tenure, and impose their economic and judicial authority on the free Székelys working on their estates. These violations of civil rights occurred with increasing frequency, and led to revolts by the mid-fifteenth century: the commoners attacked their superiors and tried to regain their freedom by force of arms. Since Székelys who were reduced to serfdom no longer rendered military service, the central authorities intervened in the interest of maintaining an adequate supplę of potential soldiers. János Hunyadi introduced measures supporting the Székely commoners against their notables first as governor in 1446 and then as voivode of Transylvania in 1453. His son, King Matthias, continued to make similar efforts. In 1466 the king instructed the voivode of Transylvania who was also *ispán* of the Székelys to call an assembly in Zabola for the Transylvanian nobles and the elders of the Székelys in order that on the basis of their testimony, the Székelys' liberties were written down. By the ruling issued at this meeting, common Székelys were not to be forced into servitude; what work the commoners did for the notables was to be done voluntarily. The Székely commonality, for their part, tried to make use of the Zabola assembly in influencing public administration and justice: it was declared that two-thirds of the jurors in the law-courts of the Székely seats should be elected from among them. However, the captains of the seats — or to use the term current by then, the *hadnagy*s (lieutenants) — and the justices continued to be elected according to ancient Székely custom from among the wealthy families. The central power — initially only in a supervisory role — was now represented by a new office holder appointed by the *ispán* of the Székelys. He was called the *királybíró* or *Königsrichter (iudex regius)*.

However, the settlement of 1466 did not prove to be stable: the theoretical freedom of the common Székelys did not yet provide them with the material means to undertake military service. By then, the majority of them had not the means even to take part in the light cavalry, and so, in 1473, the king issued a new decree in which the existing social stratification was formally recognized. Those Székelys who were able to supply at least three mounted mercenaries or armed retainers belonged to the high-ranking

236

primores; those who performed mounted military service in person formed the class of *lófő* or *primipilus* class; and the majority, the free commoners of *pixidarii* fought as foot-soldiers. This last measure legally reduced to servitude those who were unable to finance themselves even as foot-soldiers. As for the differentiation of the *lófő* group from the commoners, this had the result that office holders and jurors were thereafter chosen only from the two upper strata, while the lowest, the *pixidarii*, was soon completely excluded from public life.

The Székely crisis entered a new stage with acts of violence by the *primores* and the *primipili* against the commoner. In the background were events that were affecting all of Hungary: at the beginning of the sixteenth century, diets were held with increasing frequency, and they were attended by large numbers of the lower nobility who carried arms and intervened or appeared to intervene in the county's affairs. The waves of this movement reached Transylvania also, and encouraged the rebellious soldiering Székely commoners to take an even more determined stand against those of higher status among them. In 1505 they held their assembly in Udvarhely and in 1506 at Agyagfalva without royal summons or the participation of a royal representative. The Diet's meetings which occurred at the same time on the field of Rákos, were no match for it in sabre-rattling and high-sounding rhetoric during debates. Rigorous judgement was passed on those who had violated the Székely liberties, and the equality of all Székelys was reiterated — this time, of course, only for the commoners.

Székely self-consciousness had reached a height previously unknown. From the thirteenth century, the Székelys had been regarded as the descendants of Attila the Hun's people who had found shelter in Transylvania when the Hunnish Empire disintegrated. This tradition became more and more widespread, and by the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it had gained political significance. Their sense of having descended from the legendary Huns not only filled common Székelys with pride and the conviction that it was they who had best preserved the *szittya* (Scythian) military virtues of the Hun-Hungarian kindred people, but also provided the ideology they needed to back the privileges they demanded as their due. The Hungarian lesser nobility also admired the *szittya* ancestors, and were encouraged to do so by the ancient chronicles which were then appearing in various adaptations — one of these, the first book printed in Hungary, had been widely read since 1473 — which presented the Hungarians and the Huns as the same people. This romantic adulation of the Huns, which was the strongest element of the Hungarian nobility's self-awareness towards the end of the Middle Ages, placed the Székelys in the centre of interest, and readily accepted their claim to priority.

The sense of outraged self-esteem among the Székelys was near the boiling point when in 1506 the king ordered that according to the ancient Székely custom called *ökörsütés*, that is the branding the oxen for the king's use, the tax in oxen be collected on the occasion of his son's birth. The soldiering Székely commoners, who regarded themselves as nobles, were outraged by this attempt at taxation; the nobility had not paid taxes in Hungary for generations. The tax on their cattle also imposed a heavy financial burden on the impoverished Székely commoners, and this combined with their hurt

237

pride, led them to revolt. Pál Tomori, captain of Fogaras, was sent out to restore order, but he lost the battle and fled to his castle, himself injured; the uprising was suppressed only after the involvement of further royal troops. Since the Saxons of Szeben participated in the crushing of the Székely rebellion, the Székelys launched an attack on them the following year under the leadership of György Makfalvi Dózsa. He is often identified with György Székely, who acquired eternal fame as the commander of the 1514 Hungarian peasant war.

These rearguard fights for Székely liberties, however, did not last long. In 1510, the king was pressed by the nobles to appoint the twenty-four year old János Szapolyai, the nobility's much admired candidate for the throne, voivode of Transylvania. This powerful magnate, the patron, in actual fact the exploiter of the nobility on the national political scene, was as much of a tyrant to Transylvania as his predecessors. The Székelys soon learnt the enormous difference between political slogans and real life. The common Székelys who rose against the arbitrary measures of the *ispán* of the Székelys were routed by Szapolyai himself in 1519. In order to bring them to their senses, he also confiscated the rebels' properties for the royal treasury, although by law the "Székely inheritance" was not be transferred to the king even in case of treason but was to devolve on the relatives. Szapolyai's measures meant a new turning point in Székely history. Thereafter, the central power consciously aimed at restricting Székely privileges, a policy which forced the soldiering Székely commoners to constant resistance for centuries to come.

The Székely commoners, unlike the peasants, fought for the recognition of their noble rights, rather than against their noble oppressors. Thus György Székely (Dózsa), who came from the marches of the Lower Danube to lead the 1514 anti-feudal uprising of the peasantry originally assembled to go on a crusade, was an exception. To the best of our knowledge, no other Székely soldier, apart from his brother, joined the peasants. Although the waves of the peasant war which started in the Great Hungarian Plain reached Transylvania also, they did not affect the Székelyföld, but primarily the storm centres of 1437. Here noble manor houses again went up in flames, and two boroughs, Dés and Torda, joined the uprising. The peasant troops coming from the Great Hungarian Plain also roused the mining area of Abrudbánya, Zalatna and Torockó. The voivode, however, guarded feudal interests well. His men suppressed the movement everywhere, and Szapolyai himself set out with his troops for the south, on the information that Dózsa was leading the main army of the peasants into Transylvania. On the way, he called an assembly of the Three Nations to meet at Déva on 18 June; it was there that he learned that Dózsa turned towards Temesvár. Therefore he also moved his troops in that direction.

In the meantime, Dózsa's deputy, Friar Lőrinc, who was occupying Várad, started a deflecting manoeuvre against Kolozsvár to engage the nobility's forces. The town council of Kolozsvár did not intend to jeopardize their position again as they had in Antal Budai Nagy's time, but did not dare to resist the rebels either. The town's mayor, János Kalmár, devised an intermediate solution: the officers of the peasant army were allowed to enter the town fortifications, but the troops had to set up camp on the open fields

outside the walls. It was there that Lénárd Barlabássy, the vice-voivode, attacked them, but was defeated. Meanwhile, however, the town's guards, on Kalmár's orders, assassinated the peasant officers within the town. Friar Lőrinc, who had been left outside, thus lost his rear guard, and had to lead his troops out of Transylvania. By that time, the peasant war was already approaching its tragic end elsewhere. The outcome affected the fate of Transylvania only indirectly.

Gothic and Renaissance Culture in Transylvania

The early elements of Gothic architecture showing considerable French influence were spread throughout Transylvania by the masons from the cathedral in Gyulafehérvár and the abbey in Kerc built in the first half of the thirteenth century. Following the example of these two centres, rose windows, recessed portals with lance arches and polygonal chancels appeared in refurbished or newly-built Hungarian and Saxon churches in the second half of the thirteenth century.

Gothic architecture reached its peak due to the requirements of the highly popular mendicant orders, who claimed that the church should serve as a unified space for preaching. First they built churches with a single nave, and from the second half of the fifteenth century buildings in which the nave, the two aisles and the chancel were all of the same height. This meant that instead of using cross vaulting, they had to introduce net vaulting, which embraced the entire inner space of the church without, however, breaking the soaring Gothic arches: the ceiling is not oppressive, but suggests infinity by seeming to float boundless in the air. The mendicant orders settled in the towns, thus their influence on parish churches was also considerable. In fact, some parish churches were the finest examples of mature Gothic architecture. In the middle of the fourteenth century, when Transylvania experienced the first big wave of urban development the material possibilities and artistic demands brought Gothic art to its full glory.

The nave of the church in Szeben is already of this high Gothic style, though the lower vaulting in the aisles had preserved the basilica tradition. In other places, though, the aisles were raised to the height of the nave, as in the mountain church of Segesvár or the church at Szászsebes. The latter is particularly noteworthy for its rich typically high Gothic sculptural ornaments. The Anjou coat of arms there, the statues of kings, and the generally high standard of three-dimensional work suggest the influence, if not the direct influence, of the royal court. In Transylvania the most outstanding architectural achievement of mature Gothic art is the parish church of Saint Michael in Kolozsvár, which was originally started as a basilica with a nave and two lower aisles, but towards the end of the fourteenth century the plans were altered, and it was completed with the nave and aisles of equal height. Its style was heavily influenced by the cathedral in Kassa, which disseminated the values of a flourishing south German architecture. With its impressive spaciousness, excellent vaulting and richly ornamentation, as well as its harmonious exterior with the former northwest spire pointing

239

to the sky, the church of Saint Michael in Kolozsvár is a worthy symbol of Kolozsvár, this real centre of Transylvania's economic and intellectual life, and of the most fertile soil for Hungarian-Saxon co-existence.

While ecclesiastic architecture in Kolozsvár followed German patterns, painting and sculpture, which also served religious functions, looked towards Italy. This cannot be attributed only to the Anjou kings' close ties with Italy, but also to the fact that the Hungarian artists of Kolozsvár — unlike their peers in the Szászföld — were drawn to the dynamism of Florence and Siena, to late Gothic and early Renaissance art which had abandoned rigid Byzantine forms, and depicted the world in a more vivid, naturalistic and above all, more emotional, way. Research in art history gives reason to suppose that around Miklós Kolozsvári, the only painter of the period known by name, at least four painters formed a (probably Hungarian) school of painting. Their works show individually identifiable characteristics and can be found in Magyarfenes, Almakerék, Marosszentanna and Barcaszentpéter. The frescos of the first two churches are usually attributed to Miklós Kolozsvári, whereas the fresco in Marosszentanna, which shows a Mongoloid-faced Madonna holding an oriental-looking baby Jesus dressed in local clothes, is thought to be the work of another highly talented master. Miklós Kolozsvári's gifted sons, Márton and György, created a whole series of statues which are part of the European tradition of early Renaissance art, such as the Saint George statue in Prague, the statues of Hungary's canonized kings in Várad which were destroyed in the seventeenth century, and a former, now lost version of the Saint Ladislas Herm presently to be found in Győr. Art historians used to suppose the direct influence of Italian masters on these works; however, recent opinion assigns their features to the internal strengthening and self-realization of eastern-central European art which also absorbed Italian influences.

This period — judging also by the roughly simultaneous establishment of a number of eastern-central European universities — was indeed an era of cultural prosperity, a prosperity based on political and economic stabilization. It was an era when Hungary was not on the periphery of Europe, but within the immediate reach of Venice and the south German regions which were already developing an early capitalist economy. This general prosperity attained its peak at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and brought Kolozsvár's leading role in Transylvanian art to fruition. Tamás Kolozsvári painted the most beautiful Hungarian triptych of the century for Garamszentbenedek in 1427: its pictures, which depict the Calvary and the miracles of Saint Nicholas and provide abundant illustration of the material culture of the time, combine the best traditions of the Italian *trecento* and Burgundian–Dutch Gothic in a new light. As, however, the Transylvania of the time was a culture of many colours it is not surprising that in the immediate vicinity of western-inspired "modern" works of art one can find a whole range of churches in the Székelyföld with old-fashioned frescos showing oriental, Byzantine stylistic features. These frescos, embodying the frontier-guard mentality of the Székelys, represent the legend of Saint Ladislas' struggle with the pagans in naive, strongly local colours. According to some art historians, these frescos combine the miraculous deeds of the Holy Knight with motifs from heroic epics of eastern

24. Detail of a pietà of the Lutheran church at Nagyszeben, around 1400

25. The interior of the nave of the Saint Michael church at Kolozsvár, 1430s

26. Fresco by János Rozsnyai in the sanctuary of the Lutheran church at Nagyszeben, 1445 ▶

27. View of Vajdahunyad castle from the southwest, fifteenth century

28. View of Vajdahunyad castle from the southeast. Pen-and-ink drawing and watercolour, 1735

29. Cover-plate of János Hunyadi's tomb at Gyulafehérvár, last third of the fifteenth century

Side section of János Hunyadi's sarcophagus, last third of the fifteenth century

31. Bronze baptismal font at Segesvár, 1440

32. The Lutheran church (fourteenth–sixteenth centuries) and the town hall (beginning of the sixteenth century) at Nagyszeben (Photograph by Emil Fischer, around 1900)

33. Romanian church frescoes: 1. St. Stephen, St. Ladislas and St. Imre, Kristyor; 2. Vladislav and An
church founders, Ribice; 3. Bâlea, his wife Vişe and his son Ştefan, church founders, Kristyor (15th ce

nomadic peoples. The frescos of Bögöz and Gelence, depict opposite to the legend of Saint Ladislas events in the life of Saint Margaret of Antioch, and the Last Judgement. The legend of Saint Margaret presented in a Byzantine style later re-appeared in frescos in other Székely churches — undated in Maksa, Csíkszentmihály, Erdőfüle, Bibarcfalva, Homoródszentmárton, and Sepsibesenyő; from the end of the fifteenth century in Sepsikilyén — with such frequency that for some time they were believed to be copies of a fresco in Várad. Today, art historians tend to think that these off-repeated elements served as the illustration of a wide spread oral tradition.

The most significant example of Saxon art is the so-called Black Church in Brassó which started to be built at the end of the fourteenth century and was completed in the fifteenth century. It bears certain similarities to the cathedral in Kassa, of a style transmitted by Kolozsvár, but modified according to local taste. It is a huge and impressive building with an air of authority. Eighty-nine metres long, it is one of the largest Gothic churches not only in Transylvania, but also in whole eastern-central Europe. The ornamentation of the church is late Gothic, and of a date contemporary with the spread of the triptych in Transylvania which started from the Szászföld and influenced the Székelyföld as well. Of the 1,981 fourteenth to sixteenth-century triptyches surviving in Hungary, 324 were painted in Transylvania, including the one in Csíkmenaság from 1543, the latest known to date. Some of the most beautiful were painted for the churches of Segesvár, Medgyes and Szászsebes; it was under their influence that Gothic fresco painting revived in the middle of the fifteenth century. Outstanding examples of this are the fresco of the Calvary painted by János Rozsnyai of Szeben in 1445, and another representation of the same theme in the southwestern chapel of the parish church in Kolozsvár.

Secular architecture and painting did not produce significant works of art in Transylvania until the fifteenth century. The castles of the great landowners, of which five were commissioned by the Losonci Bánffys or granted to them by the king, were rather gloomy, plain buildings. By the middle of the fifteenth century, however, the Gothic-ornamented castle of Vajdahunyad was already standing, the walls of which King Matthias made decorate with elegant Renaissance court scenes — according to some, the frescos depicted the Raven-legend of the Hunyadi family. The first Gothic burghers' houses, among them King Matthias's birthplace in Kolozsvár, were built in Transylvanian towns also in this period.

During the fifteenth century, Saxon, and later the Székely churches of Csík, were fortified against possible Turkish attacks, which gave Transylvanian architecture a distinctive appearance unique in the whole of Hungary. Particularly picturesque are the ones which had their chancel raised by one or two storeys. These were equipped with ambulatories, loopholes, and holes through which tar could be poured on the enemy. Thus the chancel, rising high above the roof, appears to be a second tower opposite the real one built with the same features. Of 230 Saxon churches between the Maros, Kis-Küküllő, Olt and Homoród rivers, thirty are like this. The northernmost one is in Szászbogács and than Bolkács, Buzd, Nagydisznód, Mártonhegy, Nagysink, Szászfehéregyháza, Magyarkapus, Berethalom and Ecel encircle the area where these peculiar buildings can be found. Almost all of

them were surrounded also by a separate wall with bastions. In the majority of cases, however, the church itself did not undergo alteration, but was surrounded by a fortification which had store rooms on the inside with ambulatories and loopholes above. It was some time later, when Turkish attacks were expected from the direction of Moldavia also, that the fortification of Székely churches in the Csík district began as well, for example in Csíkkarcfalva and Csíkrákos, in typically local styles.

The end of the fifteenth century was again a period when churches of the mendicant orders and parish churches of smaller towns were built. The hall-like churches of Torda, Dés and Kolozsvár (Farkas Street) show characteristics similar to the churches of Debrecen, Nyírbátor and Szeged: they all represent a late Gothic style specific to eastern Hungary. We find late Gothic motifs side by side with the ornamentation of the Tuscan Renaissance in the earliest painted ceilings: the one in Gogánváralja, which was started in 1503, and the slightly later one in Székelydálya. The high art of the Italian and southern German Renaissance is represented in the Lázói Chapel in Gyulafehérvár and in the door of the vestry in the parish church of Kolozsvár commissioned by the vicar, Johan Klein. In these works, Transylvanian art stepped into the Renaissance, which really started to flourish only in the sixteenth century.

The most important achievement of fifteenth century Transylvanian culture was, however, the spread of the vernacular. In this, the leading role was taken by the Saxons, who had maintained continuous links with their motherland and with the German intellectuals who already corresponded in their native tongue. Nevertheless, the Saxon patricians and civic office holders usually learnt Hungarian also besides Latin, as is indicated by a fourteenth-century Latin-Hungarian word list from Beszterce. The earliest extant document in the Hungarian language from Transylvania is the will of a nobleman, János Ródi Cseh of Kolozs county, written in his own hand in 1507. It was also he who drafted the first document issued by a county in Hungarian in 1508. By this time, religious texts were often translated from Latin into Hungarian for nuns of the mendicant orders and for their associates. The traditions, however, of religious literature written in the vernacular in Hungary go back to the Hussites. The first translations of the Bible into Hungarian were made in the 1430s by Hussite priests who had been driven from Hungary to Moldavia. Stories from the Bible and legends of the saints translated into Hungarian by literate members of the mendicant orders have survived in the so-called Teleki, Székelyudvarhelyi and Lázár codices.

The Romanians who lived in Hungary were ahead of the voivodates across to the Carpathians in starting to use their mother tongue in writing already in the sixteenth century. The first Romanian manuscripts, translations of Orthodox Slavonic texts, were written in the Körtvélyes monastery in Máramaros. It has an interesting history. At the end of the fifteenth century, the Ruthenian bishop of Munkács made an attempt to draw the monastery under his authority. The Romanian nobles of Máramaros, who opposed this plan, turned for help to Bertalan Drágffy, the voivode of Transylvania at the time. Although Drágffy's family had previously converted to Catholicism, he was, nevertheless, the monastery's patron. He put an end

to the dispute by placing it under the auspices of the Roman Catholic bishop of Transylvania. Although no formal union was ever declared between the two churches, the Greek Orthodox monks of Körtvélyes had to yield to the Roman Catholics on major dogmatic issues. For instance, the Psalter translated into Romanian at Körtvélyes — the *Psaltirea Şcheiană* — contains the Catholic formula according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father but also from the Son *(Filioque)*. The Hungarian Catholic church's use of the vernacular in Transylvania thus affected the Romanians also, and promoted the development of Romanian-language religious literature.

PART THREE

THE PRINCIPALITY
OF TRANSYLVANIA

I. The Emergence of the Principality and its First Crises (1526–1606)

1. From the Kingdom of Hungary to the Principality of Transylvania

Transylvania and the Disintegration of the Mediaeval Hungarian State

On 29 August, 1526, Hungary suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Empire. King Louis II fell in battle at Mohács and the victorious Suleiman I captured and then sacked the capital Buda. A power vacuum came into being in Hungary, which two men undertook to fill. One of them was Ferdinand of Habsburg, archduke of Austria, the brother-in-law of Louis II and brother of Emperor Charles V, whose claim to the throne was based on a dynastic agreement concluded in 1515. It was he who symbolized the assistance that Hungary hoped to get from the Holy Roman Empire against the Turks.

The other candidate was János Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania since 1510. He was not the scion of a ruling family: the favour of King Matthias had enabled his father to join the ranks of the great landowners of the country. During the long period, however, when Wladislas II vainly kept hoping for an heir, the elder Szapolyai raised his eldest son as a possible contender for the Hungarian throne. In 1526, the greater part of the magnates and the whole of the nobility supported his candidacy. The masses, up till then always disappointed in the issues of foreign help, saw in him the saviour of the country.

On 10 November 1526, Szapolyai had himself elected king by the Diet in Székesfehérvár, and his coronation took place the next day. The new king, John I, attempted to set the Hungarian state on its feet again. He ruled with a strong hand, but the bankruptcy of his foreign policy soon made his indisputable domestic policy achievements count for nothing. He aspired to make an accord with the Habsburgs, to whom he offered an alliance against the Turks. Ferdinand, however, who had been king of Bohemia since October 1526, and who had been pronounced king of Hungary in Pozsony by a handful of supporters in December of that year, was, naturally, unwilling to negotiate with his rival, in spite of the fact that his brother, Charles V, had just that summer been forced into a new war by a European coalition led by the French. This coalition on the other hand would have admitted John I but, with the Turks at his back, he did not want war.

The unexpected successes of the imperial mercenary troops in Italy caused a decisive turn in events. In the summer of 1527 they occupied Rome, and forced Pope Clement VII, the French king Francis I's chief ally, to conclude

peace. Ferdinand's hands were freed, and, since he was afraid that Hungary weak as it was, would, out of necessity, come to an agreement with the sultan, and that Austria and Bohemia would thus be put at risk, he himself began to conquer it.

In July 1527, German mercenary troops crossed the Hungarian border. Winning one victory after another, they were joined by more and more Hungarian lords who had been vacillating in fear of war on two fronts. The German troops, in their first push, occupied Buda and then in September, defeated John's forces near Tokaj. King John fled to his former province, Transylvania, but that winter the inhabitants of even this apparently secure base for operations, turned against him. Georg Reicherstorffer, Ferdinand's skilful and unscrupulous agent, had instigated revolts against John first in Brassó and later in the other Transylvanian Saxon towns. Meanwhile Péter Perényi, whom John had appointed to succeed him as voivode of Transylvania, not only deserted the king but also handed the Holy Crown over to the Habsburgs. This was used to crown Ferdinand I king of Hungary on 3 November, 1527.

John's remaining supporters held out stubbornly in Transylvania. István Tomori, for example, defended the fortress of Fogaras until July 1528. But in the meantime their king had suffered another defeat (on 8 March, 1528) at Szina, near Kassa. After this King John, with a small entourage, fled to Poland.

During the period of the military operations, the Turks had repeatedly offered an alliance to John, and after Ferdinand's coronation, the Turks stepped up their attacks along the country's southern border. All this led John to conclude that Suleiman I would not stand idly by while the most powerful dynasty in Europe came to power in neighbouring Hungary, and his recent experiences certainly indicated that, of his two foes, the Turks were the stronger.

Given his Christian conscience and the legacy of hatred which sprang from a century of warfare against the Ottomans, it must have been difficult for John to arrive at the decision he did. It was probably the Transylvanian revolt of late 1527 which finally made up his mind, and in this way, the territory, albeit indirectly, had a decisive influence on Hungarian politics for centuries to come. For in late 1527, John I sent an envoy, his Polish adherent Hieronymus Łaski, to Constantinople to ask the Turks for support.

The sultan's response was unusually prompt. After just a few weeks of intense negotiation, he signed a treaty of alliance with King John, even promising that he would "never abandon him whatever his need".[1]

In the meantime Hungary had been bitterly disappointed in Habsburg rule. The new government lacked money and was incapable of any effective action. Charles V, who was fighting the French for Naples, was unable to extend assistance. On receiving news that the Turks were preparing for war, John returned to Hungary, a move which was all the more necessary

1. L. SZALAY, *Adalékok a magyar nemzet történetéhez a XVI. században.* (Data on the History of the Hungarian Nation in the 16th Century.) Pest 1857, 124.

in view of the threat that the Turks might seize the country for themselves. By the spring of 1529 the whole of the Great Hungarian Plain was again under John's rule. The Turkish advance launched that same year pressed on as far as Vienna, and although the Turks were then forced to retreat, the fighting which dragged on until the end of the year left the Great Hungarian Plain and the eastern part of Transylvania — including Buda — in John's possession.

The following years brought more war and unrest. Turks repeatedly attacked the Habsburg armies in Hungary, and, in 1532, renewed their march on Vienna. In late August however, the Turkish advance was halted at Kőszeg. The opposing forces were similar in strength and the front line established in 1529 shifted only slightly when King John succeeded in taking control of the eastern part of Upper Hungary. As a result, just three years after the Battle of Mohács, Hungary was divided into two.

Transylvania was situated in the eastern part of the divided country and lay far from Vienna, but this did not mean that it would automatically side with John, in spite of the fact that Ferdinand's rule proved no more effective in that territory than in other parts of Hungary. In the Saxon towns Reicherstorffer's men unleashed a reign of terror, even going so far as to threaten the Habsburg loyalist count of the Saxons, Markus Pemflinger. Péter Perényi, whom Ferdinand had allowed to remain voivode, was not able to come to terms either with the Saxons or with the Hungarian nobility. Ferdinand was prepared to send in troops but only if Transylvania would finance them—this kind of help was declined.

Meanwhile, John and his supporters had successfully cut Transylvania off from the rest of the country. On orders from the Turks, Petru Rareş, voivode of Moldavia, invaded the Székelyföld and, in June 1529, he defeated Bálint Török's pro-Ferdinand forces at Földvár, near Brassó. Further resistance to John was broken in a series of small campaigns by, his governor in Transylvania, István Báthory of Somlyó. The Transylvanian Saxons held out the longest in support of the Habsburgs, but in the summer of 1530 Brassó opened its gates to the beleaguering Hungarian, Romanian and Turkish troops. In January 1531, Segesvár surrendered, and in early 1532 István Majláth the last Transylvanian magnate to side with the Habsburgs, also went over to John. Szeben, the last Saxon stronghold was already under attack when some unexpected events interrupted John's series of victories.

At Christmas 1530, during an urgently summoned Diet in Buda, John had Aloise (Lodovico) Gritti nominated governor of Hungary. The bastard son of the doge of Venice, Andrea Gritti was a banker who had become a confident of Ibrahim, the Turkish grand vizier. For John, Gritti represented an opportunity to secure the Turks' support, to straighten out the economy, and to share with another the burden of what amounted to a political crisis.

But Gritti had greater ambitions than anyone could have conceived. He wished to be the sole ruler of Hungary, first with the support of the sultan and later by playing Vienna off against Constantinople. After several years of manoeuvring in Buda and Constantinople, Gritti took a decisive step in the spring of 1534. Approaching from Transylvania he crossed the border

near Brassó and not long afterwards instigated the murder of John's most popular and most powerful supporter, Imre Czibak, bishop of Várad.

The nobility of Transylvania and the county of Bihar took up arms. Czibak's nephew, Ferenc Patócsy, and Gotthárd Kun, the commander of King John's Transylvanian armies, led the campaign. A huge army drove Gritti into the town of Medgyes. He called on Petru Rareş for help, but the latter, by a complete change of front, joined the besiegers. On 28 September the citizens of Medgyes opened their gates to the attacking force, and then massacred the governor and his Turkish encourage.

At the beginning of the conflict, King John faced a difficult decision. If he abandoned Gritti, the sultan might retaliate, but if he helped him out, his own subjects would most certainly turn against him. After some hesitation John decided on the first course of action and, following the drama at Medgyes, he made preparations for the storm which was to be expected from Constantinople. In the summer of 1535, John even sent envoys to Charles V offering his abdication, but the danger soon passed. The sultan ordered an investigation into the death of his courtier but, as Gritti's patron, Grand Vizier Ibrahim, was falling from favour — he was executed in March 1536 — the whole matter soon blew over.

As a result King John was able to withdraw his offer to abdicate, the more so as the emperor was unwilling to accept his main condition for such a step — the supplying of the major Hungarian castles with adequate garrisons.

The Gritti affair ended with no effect on politics as a whole, and in Transylvania the struggle between the two parties began again. In late 1535 and early 1536, Ferdinand's followers attempted to relieve Szeben, which was still under siege, but without success. On 1 March, 1536 the town surrendered to John. For the time being, the civil war in Transylvania had come to an end.

The events concerning Gritti had, however, one important consequence. John's close follower, a friar of the Order of St. Paul named Juraj Utješenović, or Friar George, who up till then had been an obscure figure, emerged into eminence. He received the see of the assassinated bishop of Várad and the office of treasurer that Gritti had held. At the beginning of 1538, it was this man (also known as Martinuzzi, a name mistakenly later attributed to him) who was to help John put an end to what was, by then, eleven years of internal strife in Hungary, and after the death of the king Friar George became the most prominent figure in the country's politics.

At the time of the friar's rise John had already lost most of his extensive family holdings, and as royal possessions had only Buda, Solymos and Lippa. Tax collection proved difficult in time of war — and both rulers had only half a country from which to collect. The most valuable mines and revenues were in the hands of Ferdinand. In John's part of the country, the predominance of the great aristocrats, which had weakened the state long before the Battle of Mohács, now grew anew. Men like Bálint Török or Péter Perényi wielded much greater power in their respective areas than did the king. As for the situation on the opposing side, a bitter report from Ferdinand I's Hungarian counsellors says: "The rogues, who are legion, escape punish-

ment by joining the enemy, and escape the enemy by rejoining us (...), and with this always provide new reasons for war and turmoil in the land (...)".[2]

These were indeed times of changing loyalties, prompted by material considerations rather than principles. Political unreliability, however, was not uncommon in a situation, where neither party could cure the country's grievous ills, nor even offer any hope for a remedy.

Transylvania did not achieve political significance in the part of the country with uncertain borders and chronic internal and external problems which came under King John's rule. There was no unity among the Three Nations. The Székelys always liked to rebel against authority of any kind; the Saxons, although defeated, continued to incline towards the Habsburgs; and the nobility of Transylvania, though bearing the brunt of the struggles with the Saxons, was unable to acquire much weight in the politics of the region. Among the Hungarians, István Majláth was the only landowner of any real note and, accordingly, the only individual to wield power of any magnitude.

Towards the Formation of the Transylvanian State

In the year 1536, King John won a series of minor victories. Besides taking Szeben he managed to recapture the strategically important city of Kassa. The following year, Ferdinand I's army launched a counter-offensive. In Upper Hungary it also achieved successes but down by the banks of the Drava River, the nearly forty thousand strong army led by Hans Katzianer lost the most important battle on Hungarian soil since Mohács — not against the main Turkish forces but against a detachment of beys stationed along the border. There was to be no other battle of similar significance until the engagement at Mezőkeresztes in 1596.

King John had long expressed his willingness to negotiate, and Ferdinand now also realized that the "Hungarian question" could not be solved by military means. The two parties began serious talks in late 1537. On the side of the Habsburgs the emperor's representative was Johann Wese, archbishop of Lund. John appointed as chief negotiator Friar George, known until then primarily for his economic expertise but who now proved to be equally skilled as a diplomat.

The peace treaty was signed in Várad on 24 February, 1538. Both rulers were allowed to retain their title of king of Hungary along with the territories which they then held. At the same time John agreed to the provision that after his death his part of the country would recognize Ferdinand as its king, and if in the meantime John should have an heir, his old family estates would be declared a "duchy" to be ruled by the latter.

Both parties were aware of the fact that the sultan would not be happy with such an accord. The peace was therefore concluded in secret, and Charles V charged with defending Hungary if necessary. But when the sultan launched a campaign into Europe in the autumn of 1538, John I called

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2. L. Bardossy, *Magyar politika a mohácsi vész után.* (Hungarian Politics after the Defeat of Mohács.) Budapest 1944, 120.

on Charles in vain. The emperor was willing to fight the Turks only on the Mediterranean Sea, and Ferdinand I belatedly sent only a few thousand mercenaries. As it turned out, Suleiman marched only against Moldavia, but John had to face up to the fact that the Treaty of Várad was a dead letter. In consequence he tried to back out of its stipulations.

Friar George assisted King John all through the following intricate political manoeuvrings, and did everything he could to prevent the Hungarian lords from taking the secret oath as specified by the treaty. As a result he attracted both criticism and attention. The king, meanwhile, sought and found a wife, one of the daughters of the Polish king, Sigismund I. John's marriage to Isabella, on 2 March, 1539, was clearly a political move. The future heir would provide, the pretext for breaking the Treaty of Várad, and open the way to continuing the pro-Turkish policy — the inevitable necessity of which the past years had repeatedly indicated.

At this point Transylvania came into play again. Following the fateful events of 1538, the local lords, led by King John's two voivodes, István Majláth and Imre Balassa, started plotting. Not much is known about the aims of the "conspiracy", but it appears that the intention was to detach Transylvania from the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, thereby saving it from the growing threat of war with the Turks. The more eminent landowners of the province supported the movement. It was not easy, however, to break with the centuries-old tradition of the unity of the whole country's ruling class and, moreover, the foreign powers who were approached in connection with the matter — everyone from the sultan to the Moravian Estates — did not take the offer too seriously. The venture collapsed immediately, John's armies appeared in the province. Almost all its participants asked for, and received, clemency; only Majláth chose instead to take refuge in the strong hold of Fogaras.

But John I was ill when he arrived in Transylvania. His wife gave birth to a son on 7 July and soon after this eagerly awaited news reached him, the king's condition worsened. He took to his bed and, on 22 July, died in Szászsebes. Friar George was left with a difficult task: to prevent — in the name of a baby only a couple of weeks old — the dismemberment of that part of the country which had belonged to the late king. A wave of desertions immediately began, with the Treaty of Várad providing the justification. John's most powerful followers submitted to Ferdinand one after the other — among them Péter Perényi, the eminent diplomat Ferenc Frangepán, archbishop of Kalocsa; and Voivode István Majláth.

Friar George hurried to Buda to have the infant elected king by a hastily-summoned Diet. (Throughout his life this child held the title of "John II, King Elect of Hungary".) Then, just after the election, with a remaining handful of supporters led by the young king's guardian Péter Petrovics and Bálint Török, Friar George successfully defended Buda against a siege by Ferdinand's armies in the autumn of 1540. Furthermore, he sent Chancellor Werbőczy to Constantinople to request assistance.

Suleiman I graciously promised support. No sooner had Werbőczy left with the good news, however, than Ferdinand's envoy, Hieronymus Łaski, who had changed sides since his mission on behalf of John I, came to pay his respects at the Sublime Porte. His mission was to inform the sultan

of the Treaty of Várad. Vienna calculated that if it could turn the sultan against his protégé, the Szapolyai party would be forced to submit to Ferdinand, and as a result, troublesome, pro-Turkish Hungary would cease to exist.

In order to leave nothing to chance, Wilhelm Roggendorff's German army and Péter Perényi's Hungarian troops again laid siege to Buda, which then in May 1541 was in the hands of the Szapolyai party. A few days of bloody skirmishes left both sides exhausted. Soon Suleiman arrived with his full army. The ominous advance was not accidental: the sultan wished to settle accounts with the untrustworthy Hungarians. The defenders of Buda had good reason to be fearful: the town was in no state to withstand another — and this time Turkish — siege.

On 29 August, to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the Battle of Mohács, the sultan summoned the Hungarian lords to his camp to pay their respects. While the reception was taking place, the janissaries, who had ostensibly gone to see the sights of Buda, occupied the Hungarian capital. Friar George and Péter Petrovics were at the same time informed that King John's son could rule over the territory east of the Tisza River, including Transylvania, on payment to the Porte of an annual tribute of 10,000 gold florins. Buda remained under Turkish occupation.

This event marked the beginning of another bleak chapter in the history of Hungary: the country was trisected into three parts, with its heartland concerted into a mere province of the Ottoman Empire. But at the same time, it represented a milestone on the way to the development of the Transylvanian state.

The intentions of the Turkish conquerors were demonstrated in 1541 and it was then also clear that the Habsburgs would not protect Hungary. Evidently, the basic situation which had determined the course of Hungarian politics since 1529 was unchanged: the eastern part of the country belonged to the Turkish sphere of influence and those who lived there had to get accustomed to this fact.

Listening to Queen Isabella's reproofs, enduring the malice of the Hungarian lords who blamed him for the loss of Buda, Friar George set about reorganizing the government. He had at his disposal the territory lying east of Kassa and the Tisza River. In the seigniories of the Diocese Várad, his power was complete, and in Transylvania the Turks had cleared the friar's way by removing his staunchest enemy István Majláth, who, on grounds of treason, had been taken to Constantinople as a prisoner for life. On 20 January, 1542, at an assembly held in Marosvásárhely, the Three Nations recognized Friar George as governor of Transylvania, then in late March, at a meeting in Torda they invited Queen Isabella and her son, the king, to move to Transylvania.

With Buda in Turkish hands, the Szapolyai part of the country lacked any real centre. Lippa, the last of the great Szapolyai seigniories, was too near to the Turks to allow the court, which had retreated there in the autumn of 1541, to remain in residence for long. Isabella's stronghold was now Transylvania. As the Diocese of Transylvania had just fallen vacant, the queen was able to take up residence in the bishop's palace at Gyula-

fehérvár; Friar George had the vast church holdings assigned to the treasury, and no new Transylvanian bishop was appointed.

General bitterness prevented the new administration from working effectively. Although on 18 October, 1541 a Diet was held in Debrecen at which the lords of Transylvania and the Tiszántúl counties swore allegiance to the Szapolyai dynasty, Ferdinand was planning a campaign to capture Buda from the Turks and for once he received the support of the Holy Roman Empire. Hoping for success, on 29 December, 1541, in the fortress of Gyalu, the friar concluded an agreement with Ferdinand's envoys that Hungary was to be united and ruled by the Habsburgs under the terms of the Treaty of Várad which they had broken not so long before.

The imperial army's campaign in Hungary, however, soon petered out — in the summer of 1542. While Charles V was again busy with one of his many French wars, the Turks proceeded, in 1543–1544, to capture one Hungarian castle after another. Under this pressure Ferdinand I decided not to continue a struggle which had become hopeless. On 10 November, 1545, his envoys signed an armistice with the Turks in Adrianople. Hungary was again left to its fate.

After the disappointment of 1542, on 20 December of the same year Friar George called a new Diet at Torda where he forced the Transylvanian lords to swear allegiance to him. The "Union of the Three Nations" was renewed, and the Gyula Accord of 1541 declared null and void, despite Saxon protests. In early 1543, 10,000 florins, the first tribute in the whole history of Transylvania, arrived in Constantinople. At the August 1544 Transylvanian Diet, the representatives of the Tiszántúl counties, and other counties along the Tisza, sat as full members, alongside the Transylvanians.

Friar George had reached the high point of his career. As Transylvania's governor, he had acquired most of the seigniories and castles of the voivodes of Déva and Görgény. He had also taken possession of all estates belonging to the See of Csanád, as well as the fortunes of a few wealthy families that had died out.

His power was not without its limits, however. There were still areas of the Szapolyai part of the country which were in the hands of other lords. North-west of the Tisza, the area around Kassa was ruled by Captain Lénárt Czeczey, and the triangle between the Tisza and Maros rivers by the *comes* of Temes, Péter Petrovics. In addition, there were still quite a number of powerful landowning magnates in the Szapolyai areas outside Transylvania: the Patócsys in Békés, János Török in Debrecen and the Drágffy and Perényi families in the region from Máramaros to Kraszna. Further on, in Zemplén, Borsod and Abaúj counties, there were the Balassas, Losoncis, Bebeks, and the Homonnai Drugeths.

What proved to be decisive, however, was the fact that law and tradition demanded that the queen direct the affairs of state. Friar George nevertheless retained his office of treasurer, governed Transylvania as "royal lieutenant", and finally created a new office for himself — that of chief justice. Accordingly, he controlled finance, public administration, and the judiciary. Other high-level royal offices, for example, those of the palatine, the lord chief justice, and the chancellor, remained unfilled. No new voivode

was appointed, and the daily conduct of affairs fell to a vice-voivode from the lesser nobility, László Mikola.

Isabella had disliked the coarse-natured and frugal friar-bishop from the start. Inexperienced and at times capricious, the dowager queen for the time being nevertheless had to submit to the purposeful monk, although at times she even toyed with the idea of abdicating and leaving the country, along with her son.

Isabella did have her allies, however, in the traditional Szapolyai supporters led by their distant relative, Péter Petrovics. They were drawn to the queen not only by dynastic links and a fear of losing power, but also by their disdain for the socially-inferior friar. Yet even they had to realize that Friar George was successful in implementing a policy which suited their interests — in spite of the queen herself if need be. They could do nothing but acquiesce in his control.

The rivalry between the queen and the friar-bishop constituted a permanent threat. Hungarian society, from aristocrat to burgher and from lesser noble to the thinking peasant, wanted first and foremost to see the country united. People acknowledged the arguments for the alliance with the Turks and yet were ready to see the continuation of Szapolyai rule which was linked inseparably to it as a purely family affair. They put continual pressure on Friar George, as leader of the eastern part of the country, to achieve this reunification by giving up the support of the queen and the king elect. He regarded the reunification as a sacred aim but did not believe it to be possible. Thus, the friar-bishop held on to power, but was not really able to win acceptance either for himself or for his policies.

Collapse and Revival

The political upheavals of the late 1540s increasingly upset the delicate balance of power that had come into existence under the rule of the Szapolyais. The process actually began in early 1546 when the Turks began to demand two southern fortresses — Becse and Becskerek — in order to secure their line of communication between Belgrade and Szeged, which town they had captured in 1543. The year 1547 brought more trouble. On 31 March the French king and sworn enemy of the Habsburgs, Francis I, died. On 24 April, Charles V's armies won a decisive victory at Mühlberg against the rebellious Protestant princes, and on 19 June an armistice between the Habsburgs and the sultan was established in a peace treaty signed in Constantinople.

The pro-Turkish policy initiated by John I had up to now achieved its primary aim: the protection of eastern Hungary, which had been left to itself, under Turkish conquest, but without relinquishing of its independence. But the affair of the two castles in the south indicated that, in the longer run, the Turks wanted to continue their expansion as before. In addition, the Peace of Constantinople ended the Habsburgs' passive but stubborn resistance which had until then restricted the Porte's freedom of action in the Carpathian Basin. Clearly related to all this was the fact that

Suleiman I had not been willing to include Isabella and her country in the treaty.

The court at Gyulafehérvár dispatched a despairing message to Charles V: "No peace is possible with an enemy who seeks not only to subjugate Us, but who also plots against Our life... hitherto contenting himself with tributes, he is now demanding more and more of Our castles and seeking ever more occasion to undo Us".[3] Ferdinand I's Hungarian advisers also asked the emperor not to sanction the peace, their only purpose in serving the Habsburgs being to oust the Turks from Hungary.

Charles V, however, refused to believe that the death of Francis I and the victory at Mühlberg had solved the problems of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Peace of Constantinople accordingly came into effect.

Isabella and Friar George used the general anxiety for renewed manoeuvring. In the spring of 1548 the queen again began to negotiate with Ferdinand about her own possible departure. For his part the friar decided to break the vicious circle that had determined Hungarian politics for a quarter of a century, and offered Transylvania to Ferdinand I.

It took the king over a year to send troops to the defence of his new province. Having achieved his most important goal, however, in September 1549, Friar George signed a third accord, in Nyírbátor, to unite the two parts of Hungary. Isabella and her son were to receive the duchies of Opole and Ratiborz in Silesia. Ferdinand appointed Friar George voivode of Transylvania, enabling the latter to retain the power he had held in the territory up until then.

On hearing news of this deal (which had been concluded without her knowledge or consent), Isabella showed her true colours. There was no further talk of her going away or abdicating. Resolved to hold to the power of the dynasty at any price, she immediately denounced her "unfaithful" royal lieutenant to the sultan. Later, in the summer of 1550, Isabella denied Friar George entry into Gyulafehérvár, while Péter Petrovics advanced from the Temesköz along the Maros Valley into Transylvania. On this the friar quickly gathered his troops and laid siege to Gyulafehérvár, taking it after six weeks. He now turned against the Turkish and Romanian troops, who in the meantime were pouring into Transylvania from the voivodates of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Diet, held under arms, met at Torda on 29 October, and in the general uproar the friar was able to win over its members. In the following weeks, János Török forced Casim, the pasha of Buda, to retreat and János Kendi defeated the Wallachians. Friar George himself drove Ilie, the voivode of Moldavia, back beyond the Carpathians. By the onset of winter the country was once more at peace.

Amidst conspicuous weeping, Isabella was reconciled with her royal lieutenant on 30 November, but in May 1551, Transylvania was again under arms. Isabella feared for her rights and those of her son, while Petrovics, and his companions (along with Ferenc Patócsy, a magnate in Békés), were anxious about their estates, which since 1541–1543 bordered on Turkish territory. The majority of the Transylvanian politicians however stood by Friar George in his efforts to unite the country. He was now convinced, more than ever, that Isabella had to be removed from Hungary.

3. *EOE* I, 307.

Legend

International boundaries

Boundaries of counties and districts

The internal boundaries of the country partitioned into three

In 1545

Regions of uncertain loyalty
and extension in 1545

In 1571, after the Peace of Adrianople (1567)
and Speyer (1570)

In 1606

In 1645

In 1664, after the Peace of Vasvár

The seven counties of Transylvania

The Székely sees

The Saxon sees

Autonomous manor

Partium (Parts of Hungary in the
Transylvanian Principality)

Parts of the country under Habsburg rule

Turkish-occupied territory up to 1545
and its expansion

Between 1545 and 1571

Between 1571 and 1606

Between 1606 and 1645

Up to 1664

City

Smaller town, agricultural market town with fortress

Smaller town, agricultural market town

Fortress

Village

✗ 1660   Place of battle

◯ 1552   Place of siege

Catholic diocese

Protestant diocese
(Calvinist, Lutheran, Unitarian)

Orthodox diocese

Késmárk SÁROS Kisszeben
Poprád   Lőcse   Sáros   Kapi
Szepesvár   Eperjes
Igló   Olaszi   Sóvár   ZEMPLÉN   Var
Dobsina   SZEPES Gölnicbánya
Murány   Szomolnok
Csetnek
Rozsnyó   Jászó   Kassa   Gálsza
GÖMÖR   Torna   Nagyida   Ter
Szárdvára 1528   Szina   Füzér
Derencsény   Szendrő   ABAÚ   Gönc   Ujhely
Rimaszombat   Rudabánya   Rozs   Patak   ZEMP
Rimaszécs   Boldogkő   Liszka   Tolcsva
Gede   Szászó   Tálya   Szerencs
Ajnácskő   Dédes   Miskolc   Tarcal   Rakamat
Dédes   Diósgyőr   Tokaj   1631
Onod
Sirok   Eger   Oo   Nyíregyháza
1552   O   Nag
Nána   Mezőkeresztes   Csege   A   Böszörmény
1596 ✗
Poroszló   Újváros
Heves   Nádudvar
JÁSZSÁG   Abád   Szoboszló
Szolnok 1552   Szel
KÜLSŐ   Balaszentmiklós   B   Köro
Kengyel   KUNSÁG   Bajon   Szalont
Varsány   Túrkeve   HEVES   1636
SZOLNOK   Túra   Kölesb
Gyoma   Szalonta
Csongrád   Békés   Gyula
Szentes   1566
Donáttornya   Szeg
Kaszaperek   Zarán
Hódvásárhely   Torony   Simánd   Világosvár
Szeged   Makófalva   Arad
Nagylak   Zádorlak
Kanizsa   Csanád   Macsalaka
Perjámos   1551
Horogszeg   Sárád
Kokend   Pápd   Temesvár
1514
Aracs   Basahida   1552
Becse   Ujpécs
Ittebő   Csák
TORONTÁL
Bocskereke   Mezősomlyó
BÁCS   Baka   Köves
Titel   KEVE
Erdősomlyó
SZERÉM   Illye
Pancsal   Dombró   Haram
Zimony   Keve
Belgrád
Szendrő
Galamb
SERBIA

POLAND

MOLDAVIA

0   50   100 km

Verecke
Szolyva
Szentmiklós
Munkács
R E G   Dolha
Bereg
Beregszász   Huszt
M Á R A M
Nagyszőllős   Nyaláb vár
UGOCSA   Técső   Hosszúmező   Rahómező
Visk   Sziget
Németi   Rónaszék
1564   Aranyosmedgyes
Szatmár   Szinyér   Sagatag   Visó
Erdőd   Nagybánya   Felsőbánya
Beltek
Tasnád   Kővár   Lápos
KÖZÉP 1562   Csehi   Gorozló   BESZTERCE   Radna
gitta   SZOLNOK   1601   Szamos
Somlyó   Zilah   Naszód   VIDÉKE
BELSŐ SZOLNOK   Csicsó
D O B O K   Kápolna   Kecseg Bethlen
1437   Rés   Beszterce   DOBOKA
Alparét   Dés
Bálványosvár
Szamosújvár
1357
K O L O   Hama
Gorbó   Szék   BESZTERCE
Almás Doboka   Buza Teke   TORDA   GYERGYÓ-
Hunyad   Bonchida   Bátos   Vécs   Görgény
Gyalu   Kolozsvár   Szászrégen   Gyergyószentmiklós
1600   Felek   Kolozs   SZÉK   SZÉK
Szászfenes   Torda   CSÍK-
Jára   TORDA   Maros-   Madefalva
TORDA   Aranyosgyéres   vásárhely   Makfalva   Csíkrákos
ARANYOS   1575   Kerelő   Csíksomlyó
Torockó   SZÉK   Kerelőszentpál   MAROS-   UDVARHELY-   Csíkszereda
TORDA   1600   Felvinc   Dicsőszentmárton   Udvarhely   SZÉK
Ofenbánya   Nagyenyed   KÜKÜLLŐ   SZÉK   KÁSZONSZÉK
Abrudbánya   Győr   Balázsfalva   Nagyszeben   SZÉK
D   Kecskevár   Kükülővár   SEGESVÁR   Segesvár   Bardóc
Körösbánya   MEDGYES   Oláhos   Ilyvánvásvár
Zalatna   Medgyes   SZÉK   Köhalom   Torjavására
1479   Nagyselyk   Mühlvár   SEPSI   KÉZDI
Alvinc   Gyulafehérvár   KÖHALOMSZÉK   Apát   ORBAI-
KENYÉRMEZŐ   Vingárt   SZÁSZSEBES   SZERDAHELY   FEHÉR   NAGYSINK-   FEHÉR   Sepsiszentgyörgy   Zabola
Déva   SZÁSZVÁROS-   Szászsebes   SZÉK   Vízakna   ÚJEGYHÁZ   SZÉK   Nagysink   Komána   Földvár   SZÉK   SZÉK
Vecel   SZÉK   Sábel   SZÉK   Fogaras   BRASSÓ
Szászváros   Szentberk   Sellenberk   FEHÉR   Porumbák   FOGARASFÖLD Feketehalom   VIDÉKE   FEHÉR
Hunyad   Tálmács   Törcsvár   Brassó
Hátszeg   SZEBENSZÉK   Vöröstorony   Rozsnyó   Törcsvár
Kolcvár   D   Törcsvár

C H I A

W A L L A

Szörényvár

In the meantime, European politics had taken another turn. At the Imperial Diet of Augsburg in 1550, Ferdinand I for the first time came into serious conflict with his brother, Charles V over the eagerly awaited help for Hungary which never arrived. With all hope of German help now gone, however, Ferdinand tried to postpone the implementation of the Nyírbátor Accord. On the other hand, his Hungarian subjects, who were burning to see their country unified, were virtually forcing him to comply with it.

In the end, in the summer of 1551, Ferdinand sent Giovanni Battista Castaldo, his "military governor", and Tamás Nádasdy, the lord chief justice of the Hungarian Kingdom, into Transylvania with an army of between six thousand and seven thousand men. This was, as one observer ironically remarked, "too small for an army and too large for an embassy".[4] By the time the troops reached Gyulafehérvár, Friar George had again forced Isabella to surrender. In despair she abdicated on 19 June, renouncing her own rights and those of her son. On 26 July, the Diet, meeting in Kolozsvár, recognized Ferdinand I as the country's sole ruler. Amidst pomp and ceremony, the Holy Crown that had been in the hands of the Szapolyais since 1532 was taken to Pozsony.

The sultan, on learning of the troop movements in Transylvania, ordered the governor-general of Rumelia, Mehmed Sokollu to attack. At the beginning of August, the pasha was already in the Temesköz, and despite Friar George's message that yearly tribute to the sultan had been remitted, the Turks captured Becse, Becskerek, Csanád, and Lippa. The successes mollified Sokollu, although he could not take Temesvár, and he was willing to give credence to the friar's assertions that only Petrovics had been a traitor, and that royal garrisons had been sent only to Petrovics's castles.

Ultimately the political manoeuvring begun in 1549 ended badly. Although Isabella was expelled, the country united, and even a war with the Turks provoked in the hope that they would be defeated, the most important tasks, to involve the Holy Roman Empire, had not been carried out. As Charles V refused all help, Friar George had to abandon his original plan, of war against the Turks, but this proved increasingly difficult. Under pressure from Ferdinand and public opinion, he led an army to recapture Lippa. (In this the friar received assistance from Giovanni Battista Castaldo and Tamás Nádasdy, as well as from the mercenary commander Sforza Pallavicini.) The Turks were forced to surrender the castle but Friar George took care that the enemy garrison withdrew unharmed.

In the meantime, Friar George had been made a cardinal, but Ferdinand I continued to distrust him. Accordingly, the king was more than ready to lend an ear to the groundless accusation made by Castaldo and his men that the friar was preparing treachery. In the early hours of 17 December, 1551, Sforza Pallavicini, acting on orders from the king, had Friar George murdered in his castle in Alvinc. In just a few weeks Castaldo, and the newly appointed voivode, András Báthory, took control of Transylvania.

The Habsburgs, meanwhile, were tied down by another uprising of the German Protestant princes, and by the French attack which was launched

4. Ascanio Centorio Degli Hortensi, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania*. Vinegia 1564 — Budapest 1940, 68.

to support this. The sultan immediately proved that although he was unable to win a decisive victory, he was nevertheless the strongest in Hungary. During their 1552 campaign, the Turks captured a number of border castles, including Veszprém, Szolnok, Lippa, Temesvár, Karánsebes, and Lugos. The Turkish advance claimed the greatest amount of land from the former Szapolyai territories, and, this done, Suleiman sent word to the Transylvanians to recall Isabella and her son, on pain of being wiped from the face of the earth. Castaldo and Báthory were unable to prevent the Transylvanian politicians from opening direct negotiations with the Turks. Péter Haller, the mayor of Szeben and earlier a totally reliable Habsburg loyalist, assumed the role of envoy. These events showed that Friar George had made a mistake in allowing the Habsburgs to enter Transylvania. But by having the friar murdered, Ferdinand I, as he must have realized, had solved absolutely nothing.

In the autumn of the same year, 1552, while the underpaid mercenary army in Transylvania was pillaging local villages and towns instead of fighting the Turks, Castaldo, aware of his impotence, had himself recalled. Báthory resigned as voivode, and in the summer of 1553, the nobility beyond the Tisza organized an uprising to bring Isabella back. Péter Petrovics immediately hurried to the assistance of the rebels.

The voivodes of Transylvania appointed by Ferdinand, István Dobó who had gained fame in the defence of Eger in the battles of 1552, and the Transylvanian magnate Ferenc Kendi, were faced with the task of suppressing the revolt. Fortunately, the sultan was engaged in a war with Persia and therefore forbade the pasha of Buda to support the insurgents. The uprising collapsed, but in 1554 Suleiman I presented the towns of Lugos and Karánsebes to Petrovics who in the meantime had escaped to Poland. Envoys from the Porte were again sent to Transylvania to demand the return of the Szapolyais. All Ferdinand I could do was to pay himself, in early 1555, the tribute due to the Constantinople treasury. His envoys, however, were obliged to return with the news that the sultan would only be appeased if Isabella were given back her country.

On Turkish instructions, Moldavia and Wallachia prepared for war, and, under Petrovics's leadership, the Tiszántúl rose in revolt once again. On 23 December, 1555 the Transylvanian Diet, meeting at Marosvásárhely, sent word to Ferdinand I: "We were happy to be ruled by a Christian prince and to be connected to the Holy Roman Emperor, but God did not wish this to last for long... Accordingly we ask your Majesty for one of two things: either to assist us so that we can resist Suleiman, or to be so kind as to absolve us from our oath."[5]

They did not really expect an answer. At the Diet held in Torda at the end of January 1556, Menyhárt Balassa, commander of the Transylvanian armies, decided that a message should be sent to Queen Isabella, who was residing at that time in Poland, saying that she was expected back. Petrovics and his army advanced into the country from Karánsebes and on 12 March, the Diet, now meeting in Szászsebes, swore an oath of allegiance to "the son of King John".

5. EOE I, 475.

On 14 June, 1556, Ferdinand I stated in a letter to the sultan that he would return Transylvania to the Szapolyais. He was too late: in May Ali Khadim, pasha of Buda, attacked Szigetvár, thus drawing the royal troops from Transylvania into Transdanubia. One after another the royal castles in Transylvania opened their gates to the armies of Petrovics and Balassa. Isabella and her son entered Kolozsvár with much pomp and ceremony on 22 October although Voivode István Dobó defended Szamosújvár until November 1556, when he was finally obliged to surrender. Várad opened its gates in April 1557, and Gömör, Abaúj and Zemplén counties also went over to the Szapolyais. In the eastern part of the country only the castles of Gyula, Világos, and Jenő remained loyal to the Habsburgs, but later, in 1566, these fell to the Turks.

By the summer of 1557 Isabella's rule again extended all the way to Kassa and the Szepesség. A bloody warning was given to waverers: on 31 August, 1558 the queen had Ferenc Bebek, Ferenc Kendi, and Sándor Kendi assassinated in Gyulafehérvár on charges of treason. But just over a year later, on 15 November, 1559, she died; the nineteen-year-old John II, king elect of Hungary, was left to rule Transylvania. Meanwhile, Ferdinand I had signed another armistice with the Turks, but was willing to negotiate with the Szapolyai party only in the matter of recovering the throne from them. A solution to the stalemate seemed possible when Menyhárt Balassa took sides with the Habsburgs in 1561, bringing with him the nobility of the Tiszántúl. An army sent to win them back suffered a serious defeat at Hadad on 4 March, 1562. The Székelys now rose in revolt, and although they were scattered by Ferdinand's troops, the territory of Szapolyai Hungary was truncated. From the Tiszántúl only Bihar and Máramaros remained in King John's hands.

The repeated counter-attacks of the following years yielded significant results only in the winter of 1564–1565, with the capture of Szatmár and Nagybánya. But, in the spring of 1565, the two towns were retaken by Lazarus Schwendi, an army commander of the new Habsburg king, Maximilian I. Because of these successes, John II now concluded an accord (the Peace of Szatmár) with the young Maximilian, in which he renounced the royal title in return for recognition of his rule in Transylvania. The Turks, however, now made haste to assist their protégé. On 29 June, 1566, John II, with an entourage of representatives from the Three Nations, paid his respects, to Suleiman, who had arrived at Zimony with an army. The sultan assured him of his support, and the Turkish troops then proceeded to attack Szigetvár, the capture of which would open the way to the occupation of the whole of Transdanubia. But while the siege was going on, Suleiman died. Pertev pasha, his second in command, captured Gyula, Jenő, and Világos, and with this the Habsburg enclave in the southern Tiszántúl was lost to the Ottomans. Not much later on 17 February, 1568, Maximilian concluded peace with the Turks at Adrianople. In this latest peace with the Turks Maximilian also dealt with the "other" Hungary.

Now that accord which István Báthory of Somlyó had spent years in reaching even suffering imprisonment for his pains, was signed by the new favourite of King John, Gáspár Bekes. It happened at Speyer on 16 August, 1570. In the Accord of Speyer Szapolyai agreed to renounce the title of king

of Hungary in favour of the title "Johannes, *Transylvaniae et Partium Regni Hungariae Princeps*". That meant that he regarded himself and was regarded by his adversary as the ruler of the former province of the kingdom, Transylvania, together with "the parts of the Hungarian Kingdom". The latter were some eastern countries later called "Partium" (or "Részek") which became an integral part of the Principality of Transylvania. He also agreed that, should he die without an heir, his principality, as part of the Hungarian Crown — would revert to the Hungarian king. Maximilian soon ratified the accord, but just a few days later, on 14 March, 1571, John II died. He left his people no heir, only an unclear legal situation.

The Diet which had met at Gyulafehérvár on 8 September, 1567 in the wake of the Turkish successes had sworn "by the Almighty Father that ... should it be God's unalterable will to call our gracious lord from among us with no heir having been born to him, we shall elect a Prince by joint design and not out of partiality."[6] With God's will done, the Transylvanian Estates were now faced with the choice of abiding by their oath or accepting the agreement signed in Speyer. Finally they decided on the first possibility and on 25 May, 1571, "without further dispute" elected István Báthory of Somlyó, to be their ruler.

Báthory was born in 1533, the son of the Transylvanian voivode at the time, whose name was also István Báthory. The young Báthory had been a page at the Viennese court and had seen something of the world. He returned to Transylvania in the mid-1550s. When Isabella came home in 1556, it was Báthory who welcomed her on behalf of the Estates. His first important assignment had come in 1559 when the queen appointed him captain of Várad, in other words, ruler of the militarily important county of Bihar. At that time Báthory was already the greatest landowner in the Szapolyai part of the country.

Báthory's election in 1571 was not without risks and he himself was aware of then. He therefore renounced the high-sounding titles of the two Szapolyais, contenting himself with the style once used by the appointed royal officials governing Transylvania, "voivode" and even took a secret oath of allegiance to Maximilian, thereby recognizing that Transylvania belonged to Hungary. At the same time the Porte also upheld its right to nominate a successor to the Szapolyais, although the ahdname brought by the courier Amhat to the Gyulafehérvár Diet had been made out to Báthory in advance: "Voivode of Transylvania, István Báthory! ... Transylvania has long been under my protection, ... and the country is my own as are the others in my possession... Therefore, out of my power, in accordance with your fealty to me I make Transylvania over to you."[7]

Transylvania consequently had to continue to balance between the two great powers. At first Vienna presented the bigger problem, because although Maximilian, learning from his father's failures, was unwilling to interfere openly in Transylvanian affairs, he permitted his officers in Upper Hungary actively to support Gáspár Bekes in the latter's efforts to become voivode.

6. *EOE* II, 335.
7. *EOE* II, 459.

Bekes's first attempt at this was unsuccessful and he was forced to flee Transylvania in 1573. Then, in the summer of 1575, with an army recruited in Upper Hungary, he made a second bid to take over the country. Although the Székelys rose in revolt behind Báthory's lines, the voivode nevertheless won the decisive battle at Kerelőszentpál on 8 July, 1575. Bekes escaped, but five of the lords who supported him were hanged on the battlefield. Another seven (together with three dozen Székely leaders) were later executed on orders from Báthory.

The fame of this victory was so great that when the briefly ruling king of Poland Henry of Valois returned to his homeland to become Henry III of France, on 15 December, 1575 the Polish nobility elected Báthory to be their new ruler. His rival was the Emperor Maximilian himself, but impending conflict was suddenly averted by the latter's death on 12 October, 1576. Maximilian had shown caution in his dealings with Báthory, but his successor, Rudolph went out of his way to avoid challenging the ruler of a large and powerful Poland for possession of Transylvania and a handful of counties appended to it.

While the threat from the West therefore diminished, pressure from the Turks gradually increased. Although in 1572 Selim II recognized the Báthory family's right of succession, this did not prevent him from threatening to recognize Gáspár Bekes as the rightful ruler. No sooner had Murad III, his successor, come to the throne than he raised Transylvania's tribute from 10,000 to 15,000 gold florins annually. Furthermore, the "presents" to be given to Turkish dignitaries were increased, while a pretender to the throne of Transylvania was kept in reserve at Constantinople. (This man was a Transylvanian nobleman named Pál Márkházi, and it was clear that the Turks were employing the same method towards Transylvania as they used to keep in check Moldavia and Wallachia.)

Báthory, however, whose family estates lay in the Partium, was familiar with the dual pressures involved in living in close proximity to the Turks. Back in 1567 he had warned a confidant of Ferdinand that "the Turks will not tolerate just anyone as ruler of Transylvania. His Majesty fares better if there is a go-between in the province, who can render service in such a way that with the passage of time ... Transylvania might become joined to Hungary." He had no illusions. This statement also comes from Báthory: "The army of the Turkish emperor does not pick strawberries into other people's baskets."[8] Thus, Báthory paid the increased tribute and gave "presents" to the Turkish authorities, forebode the soldiers in his border castles to provoke the Turkish detachments, and harassed the Moldavian voivodes fleeing from the Turks. In short, he did everything possible to keep the peace.

The question now arose as to whether Báthory's taking the Cracow throne had affected Transylvania's position as far as the Turks were concerned. The second half of the sixteenth century was Poland's golden age, when grain exports to the West made the country rich and strong. The traditional weakness of its political system had hitherto prevented Poland from be-

8. E. VERESS, *Báthory István erdélyi fejedelem és lengyel király levelezése.* (Correspondence of István Báthory Transylvanian Prince and Polish King.) I. Kolozsvár 1944, No. 69.

coming a leading eastern European power, but Báthory had came from a country where central power had been able to overcome the particular interests of the Estates.

István Báthory, who became King Stephen — unusually in those days — continued to consider himself a Hungarian in his new realm. His Polish subjects were justly vexed with the king when he let slip the remark in 1577 that God had created him not for the Poles but for the Hungarians. As a result of his Hungarian concerns King Stephen was constantly preoccupied by the Turkish question. The situation in Europe was not the best, even now. Following their spectacular defeat at Lepanto on 7 October, 1571 the Turks had been recovering their strength. Venice, abandoned by its allies, was forced to make peace with the sultan in 1573. With the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre on 24 August, 1572, France was again involved with its Huguenot wars. The Holy Roman Empire however, was unable to take advantage of France's vulnerability since, because of Catholic–Protestant rivalry and opposition to the imperial power, the Habsburgs enjoyed real authority only in their Hereditary Provinces and in the Lands of the Bohemian Crown.

The idea of crushing the Turks seemed to persist only at the papal court. Báthory, however, was at first impeded from moving in that direction by the fact that Pope Gregory XIII had supported Maximilian in the struggle for the Polish throne. Only in 1577, the year after Maximilian's death, were relations established between King Stephen and the papacy. The papal nuncio Laureo arrived at Báthory's court with a plan for an anti-Turkish league and was followed, in 1579, by the nuncio Caligari, who came with a similar suggestion. But nothing came of either of these proposals. Then in 1581, and again in 1582, King Stephen himself suggested that the Christians of eastern Europe should unite to march against the Turks.

The prospective allies however — Venice and Philip II's Spain — were incapable of even the most rudimentary co-operation. Báthory now came up with a new idea: in the spring of 1584 he asked the Holy See to help him in the conquest of Russia, after which the Russians, and even the peoples of the Caucasus, could be launched against the Turks. The Jesuit Antonio Possevino took the proposal to Rome, but is was rejected by the Papal Curia. As the dauphin had just died and the throne of the "Most Christian King" was set to pass to the Protestant Bourbon, Henry, king of Navarre, the pope had no time to waste on eastern Europe. But Báthory persisted: in the summer of 1586 he sent his nephew, Cardinal András Báthory to Rome, but in vain. The support promised by Sixtus V (25,000 ducats a year) was so ridiculously low that negotiations were broken off. On 12 December that same year King Stephen died in Gródno. His elaborate plans had come to nothing.

There was hardly a ruler of note in Europe during the previous 150 years who had not considered leagues or thought about crusades against the Turks. In real life however Stephen Báthory remained wary of the Turks both as mere voivode of Transylvania and as king of Poland. He did everything to keep the peace, even executing Cossacks who had pillaged Turkish territory, and beheading two Moldavian voivodes, Ioan Potcoavă, and Iancu Sasul, who driven out by the sultan were preparing to return home. King

Stephen had good reason for all this: the Polish Estates were determined to preserve the existing peace with the Porte, and had made him promise to do this in his coronation oath, the *Pacta Conventa*. The Poles feared the power of the sultan, as well as the enmity of the powers surrounding them — Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburgs.

To ignore the will of the Estates was beyond the power of even such a determined king as Stephen. His early popularity evaporated just when he attempted to strengthen royal power. His secretary and confidant, Jan Zamoyski, who came from the middle nobility and who was later to become his all-powerful chancellor, was widely hated. The Zborowski brothers, who were earlier Stephen's main supporters, organized a revolt against him, but when Báthory had them executed for treason, which was the practice in Transylvania, the whole country protested vehemently.

Poland's neighbours also contributed to the wrecking of Báthory's most important plans. Danzig refused to take the obligatory oath of allegiance and the war fought in 1576–1577 to break its opposition brought rather questionable results. Between 1579 and 1581 the king conducted three successful campaigns against Tzar Ivan IV, but was unable to break his power permanently. Perhaps this interlude contributed to Báthory's thinking on the interrelation of the Russian and the Turkish questions, and to the fact that his anti-Turkish plans gained a degree of popularity among the Lithuanian nobility, although unfortunately too late.

No doubt, King Stephen was preoccupied with driving the Turks from Europe. Yet his political experience taught him that to force such an undertaking would be hopeless not only militarily but also from the foreign and domestic policy points of view. For this reason he set out to create the necessary preconditions for it, and only his untimely death prevented him proceeding further. Although in Poland Stephen Báthory was mourned as one of the country's greatest kings, he had hardly succeeded in furthering the affairs of Hungary.

Transylvania had undoubtedly sensitized Stephen Báthory to the Turkish question, and the problems of the little country were continually with him during his ten years as king of Poland. Nevertheless he left the day-to-day business of government "back home" first to his brother, Kristóf, and then, after the latter's death in 1581, to Kristóf's son, Zsigmond, bestowing on these two lieutenants the title of voivode. Stephen himself took the title of prince of Transylvania, naturally, retaining the right to make the important decisions himself. He established a separate Transylvanian chancellery in Cracow, and through this supervised and directed the activities of his voivodes.

Transylvania's foreign policy was conducted entirely by Báthory. Maximilian and later Emperor Rudolph wanted to force him to adhere to the Speyer Accord, but he for his part demanded the return of the territories lost between 1564 and 1567. Neither side wished to become involved in war, but it was not until 1585 that an agreement was negotiated. (As a result of this, the extremely lucrative Nagybánya gold mine reverted to the prince.)

In the meantime, Báthory, a sovereign ruler as a result of his gaining the Polish throne, revived the idea — current during the time of the Szapolyais — that Hungary could be united from the east. When it seemed that Em-

peror Rudolph was terminally ill, Stephen repeatedly alluded during nego-
tiations with the nuncio Caligari to the idea that if the Turkish consented,
Hungary would elect him as her king. Stephen certainly did have his sup-
porters in Hungary, and in contemporary correspondence, there are a few
references to this possibility. But nothing was done to realize the plan. Nev-
ertheless, Báthory's successors on the throne of Transylvania in the century
to come, were all under the influence of his plans and achievements.

2. Economy, Society and Culture in the New State

The New State

István Báthory died just sixty years after the Battle of Mohács. In those sixty
years, Hungary had been partitioned into three, with the central territory
annexed by the Turkish Empire, and the western and northern parts ruled
by "Hungarian" kings from the House of Habsburg. The "identification" of
the eastern territories, however, was more complex. John I had been "king
of Hungary", Isabella "queen of Hungary", and their son, John II, was
electus, rex Hungariae, or "king elect of Hungary" all his short life. The title
of *princeps*, or prince, did not exist until it was first applied to John in the
Speyer Accord of 1570, and the term "Transylvania" as the name determin-
ing the part of the country under Szapolyai rule was used only unofficially,
simply to distinguish between the two "Hungarys" at this time. Sure enough,
the Habsburgs refused to recognize the Szapolyais' royal title, firstly on
account of their own election to the Hungarian throne, and later on account
of the Várad, Gyula, and Nyírbátor accords. Poland, France and Turkey, on
the other hand, did recognize the Szapolyais, and the other European pow-
ers oscillated between these two positions, depending on their relationship
with the Habsburgs at any given moment. The Hungarian people solved
the problem of having two rulers by not only adding *"Transylvaniae"* to the
title of one, but also by leaving the precise sense of Isabella's title unde-
fined: *"regina"* meant both a queen reigning in her own right, and queen
consort. For his part, John II was spoken of as the "son of King John".

The Speyer Accord had been intended to resolve the constitutional mud-
dle by creating the title "prince of Transylvania". John II, or John Sigismund
(this often used name was fixed on him originally by pro-Habsburg histori-
ans) died soon after the agreement, and with him the only dynasty with a
legitimate claim to the titles of "king of Hungary", as well as "prince of
Transylvania". When he was elected to rule Transylvania, István Báthory
relied on the old Hungarian legal system and chose the title of "voivode"
which was formerly held by provincial governors. But while earlier voivodes
were appointed to the office, Báthory had been elected as ruler by the Diet.
Báthory, however, wished to protect the relative independence of his state
and could not, of course, hide behind such a dubious title for long. What he

264

could not do as a "simple magnate" or as a ruler of doubtful legitimacy — that is, take the title "prince of Transylvania" — he was able to do when he became king of Poland. In addition he was able to make this title hereditary, and to get it internationally recognized.

The difficulty experienced by the country and its rulers in finding legitimate titles for themselves was matched by the difficulty of establishing a new machinery of government. Before 1526, when the Kingdom of Hungary held a Diet, the nobles of the mother country either attended in person or were represented by county delegates. From Transylvania, on the other hand, went the jointly elected delegates of the counties, with the Saxons sending their own. (There is no data concerning the participation of the Székelys at the Diets.) The province's internal affairs were managed at joint meetings of the Three Nations.

Under John I this system continued unchanged. The first Diet in Hungary in which the Transylvanians, including the Székelys, participated on equal terms, that is, personally and not just through representatives, were called by Friar George on 18 October, 1541 in Debrecen. After this the counties of the mother country and the Transylvanians again held their separate assemblies until 1544. Then, in August, a Diet of the Three Nations was called at Torda, with the participation of a fourth party enjoying full rights — the deputies of the Tiszántúl counties and other counties along the Tisza River. From then on, the role of the Diet was appropriated in the eastern kingdom, the later principality, by the former provincial assembly of Transylvania enlarged with representatives from the Partium.

The other legal successor of the earlier Hungarian Diet continued unchanged in Habsburg Hungary and was to become an effective interest organization for the Estates by the early part of the sixteenth century. No taxes could be imposed, or laws passed, without its consent. Indeed, this Diet also went on to exercise a certain degree of control over the royal administration. The Transylvanian Diet, too, performed these functions, at least in theory. In practice, however, its importance decreased more and more. Although the Transylvanian diets met quite frequently, up to four or five times a year, their composition altered. After 1545, the number of participants from the Partium and the Transylvanian counties, the Székely and Saxon seats, and individual towns constantly varied. Much more important politically than these delegates to the Diet were the leading figures in the prince's government — his advisers and chief officials —, and a slightly larger group of eminent lords, the Regalists *(regalisták)* whom the ruler invited personally to attend the Diet. The Regalists included, naturally enough, a number of big landowners, but the primary requirement for being chosen for this honour was popularity with the ruler.

The custom of convening the Diet at the request of the Estates was discontinued in Transylvania after 1556. Now only the ruler could call a Diet. It was he who determined the agenda, and his proposals were for the most part accepted without modification. The Estates made proposals concerning local affairs only, and the outcome of these was always uncertain.

Foreign and military affairs now came under the ruler's authority, as did financial matters, with the sole exception of the imposition of taxes and

even this right was nominal. The former "liberties" of the Estates lived on, but to a lesser degree and purely in matters of local administration.

Only in exceptional cases did the Diet oppose the ruler's will, as for example when the conflict between Isabella and Friar George raised the question of who had the right to govern, or when "Voivode" Báthory, threatened by the Bekes movement, was asked to honour the promises he had made when elected — although without result.

Nevertheless, the strengthening of the central power did not entail the modernization of the state administration. The state apparatus, which John I had organized in Buda on the exact lines of the pre-1526 model, disintegrated in the upheavals of the period 1540-1541. Even the small bureau of assistants to the Transylvanian voivode which Szapolyai had tried to update before 1526 had ceased to exist.

In the midst of the chaos, Friar George established a unique chancellery responsible for everything relating to government, from financial affairs to diplomacy and military matters and from bestowing of estates to the administration of justice. This office soon proved ineffective, and Friar George attempted in his last years to reorganize it by establishing a so-called "small chancellery" *(cancellaria minor)* for judicial matters. Its head, the *prothonotarius,* was still only the deputy of the chief justice (Friar George himself) at the time of the friar's ascendancy. After 1556, the *prothonotarius* became the first judge of the country; later, however, two men shared this post.

In 1556 Mihály Csáky was appointed as the first chancellor to head the "greater chancellery", and remained in this post until 1571. A separate treasurer was designated to supervise financial matters in conjunction with the chief tax collector and the chief tithe lessor. The ruler also appointed the leaders of the army (the most important posts were those of the captains of Várad, Déva, Kővár and Huszt), as well as the *főispáns* (comes supremi) of the counties and the Székely officials. Only the Saxons were able to preserve their right of self-government, to a greater or lesser extent.

In spite of this pronounced centralization, the state administration remained quite archaic, primitive by comparison even with mediaeval Hungary where much more clearly defined and efficient institutions had operated. The leading officials, with the exception of the chancellor, were little more than clerks and even the chancellor and his subordinates were unable to exercise anything like the amount of power required for up-to-date government. Their task was to implement the ruler's decisions and not to formulate them. Most conspicuous in this respect was István Báthory's administration. Though exceptionally able men headed his Gyulafehérvár chancellery (Ferenc Forgách, Imre Sulyok and Farkas Kovacsóczy), the king entrusted Márton Berzeviczy who directed his "Transylvanian Chancellery" in Cracow, with the handling of the country's most important affairs.

Transylvania's main dignitaries were automatically members of the Royal Council, later the Prince's Council. This council had been modernized before 1526, with its members being partially elected by the Diet, and partially chosen from specially trained secretaries from the royal court. In this way the royal power had been balanced both by the Diet and by professionals. John I, however, returned to the old, less defined council made up of

chief dignitaries and aristocrats. In 1542, the Three Nations wished to create an elected twenty-two member council to restrain Queen Isabella (and especially Friar George). However, this resolution was never implemented, although it was passed repeatedly. Isabella and later John II chose their advisers at will and eliminating thereby any possible supervision by the Estates.

If we look at these persons who may be termed the country's leaders at this time, we cannot help but be struck by how much they had changed. In John I's time, the key role was played by aristocrats attempting to strengthen their local power. During the rule of Friar George, the number of local power groups began to decline and after the 1560s these groups disappeared completely — partly because many (like Menyhárt Balassa or the Perényi family) became disloyal and partly because, strangely and without apparent cause, the greatest families (for example the Drágffys or the Jaksicss) died out. The great lords of Transylvania proper (like the Kendis or Majláths) were left with only smaller estates. In addition, these traditional leaders were constantly obliged to share power with "foreign" (i.e. non-Transylvanian, and sometimes even non-Hungarian) courtiers — first with John I's close advisers and later with their descendants (for example Antal Verancsics from Dalmatia, or Orbán Batthyány from Transdanubia). When these advisers and the great lords died, their place was taken by "new men": Mihály Csáky, a petty noble, rose to the office of chancellor; Tamás Varkocs from Silesia became captain of Várad. Then there were the Poles, Stanisław Niezowski and Stanisław Ligęza, who arrived in Isabella's retinue and the Italian Giorgio Blandrata, the Queen's personal physician. The list could be continued.

During Báthory's rule the situation changed only to the extent that several former graduates of Padua were to be found among the most important courtiers, and especially in the chancelleries. Among them was Márton Berzeviczy, head of the Transylvanian Chancellery at Cracow who had been born in Upper Hungary. Others were Berzeviczy's two deputies (Farkas Kovacsóczy from Slavonia, and Pál Gyulay, a peasant raised to nobility). Yet another was the aristocrat Ferenc Forgách who had fled Hungary and who first became bishop of Várad and then chancellor at Gyulafehérvár (to be followed in this office by Kovacsóczy).

The development of Hungarian society before Mohács had clearly been leading to a strengthening of the Estates' role. After 1526 this process came to a halt in the eastern part of the country, where with the establishment of the Principality of Transylvania, the ruler's power became dominant once again. This was indicated not only in the machinery of power, and in the decrease in the number of those participating in power, but also by the ever-growing manifestation of despotism on the part of the ruler himself.

During the reign of Matthias Hunyadi or his immediate successors, the execution of members of the political elite had been quite rare, and later the Estates compelled the kings to adhere to this tradition in Habsburg-ruled Hungary. By contrast, Queen Isabella, as we have seen, simply exterminated those aristocrats she considered to be dangerous, with the Diet pronouncing the death sentence on them afterwards. Báthory also had execu-

tions carried out after the Battle of Kerelőszentpál, without bothering to consult the Estates at all — the semblance of legality being given by the *prothonotarius* who pronounced the verdict.

The fact that the ruler possessed so much power was due in part to the court's growing financial means. Friar George had laid down the foundations for this primarily by increasing the size of the treasury's land holdings. By the second half of the sixteenth century the prince's estates comprised 700 villages, or fifteen to twenty per cent of the country's territory. The largest seigniories were Gyulafehérvár, Déva, Várad, Gyalu, Fogaras, Kővár, Görgény, Kolozsmonostor, Szamosújvár, Jenő, Lugos, Karánsebes, Székelytámad, Székelybánja, Zalatna, Huszt, and Törcsvár. To this were later added the enormous estates of the Báthorys. It is impossible to estimate the monetary income from all these, but it is certain that through them the prince exercised direct control over a large part of the country. With such enormous lands to draw on, it was easy to put the treasury's affairs in good order.

Besides the takings from these immense estates, the income of the Transylvanian treasury consisted of roughly regular revenues, that is of sums made up by the taxes levied on the serf households called *porta*s, by those levied on the Saxons in two forms, by those of the Székelys and the towns, further by the returns of the salt mines, and of the tolls and duties, of the gold exchange and the leasing of the titles. It can be estimated that the regular yearly revenues in the last third of the sixteenth century were as follows:

24,000 *porta*s in Transylvania proper	60,000 florins
17,000 *porta*s in the Partium	40,000 florins
The Saxons on St. Martin's Day	8,500 florins
The Saxons as special tax	25,000 florins
The Székelys	25,000 florins
The Towns	15,000 florins
The salt mines	30,000 florins
The tolls and duties	15,000 florins
The gold exchange	5,000 florins
The tithe lease	15,000 florins

Together with the income from the treasury lands and the prince's private estates, the total yearly income of the Transylvanian treasury was as much as 300,000 gold florins. Even with the heavy devaluation of money in the sixteenth century this is a vast sum if one considers that before 1526 the royal income was a mere 200,000 gold florins annually from the whole country.

Clearly, the prince now had ample resources to support his increasingly expensive army. In spite of this military expenditure rose only moderately. But while the small number of princely bodyguards — some one thousand to two thousand men — could be regarded as an up-to-date mercenary unit, the strengthening and maintenance of the border castles often necessitated the collection of additional taxes. The 300,000 florins income covered the tribute due to the Turks (initially 10,000, but later 15,000 florins), the

salaries of the leading dignitaries — the chancellor, the *prothonotarius*, the army commanders, and the councillors —, besides István Báthory's always modest household expenses.

Why was the power of the Estates weaker in the new Transylvania than it had been in the old Hungary?

The first reason was political. The Principality of Transylvania developed gradually — not as a result of its own strength, but rather on account of Turkish pressure. Without Turkish intervention in 1529 the part-state of the Szapolyais would never have been born; without Turkish intervention in 1541 it would not have survived, and without the campaigns of 1552–1556 it could not have been reorganized. King John, Friar George, and their successors accepted the Turkish alliance only because in their own experience eastern Hungary could not be sustained in opposition to the Turks. This forced acceptance of events masked fear and even aversion. When pressure from the Estates for unification or the political situation in Europe altered the delicate balance of the country, Transylvania was always ready to seek peace with the "other" Hungary tied to the Habsburgs, even if this meant to betray her powerful patron in Constantinople.

One should remember, of course, that the Turks, too, were hardly renowned for their sincerity. Turkish policy towards Transylvania was geared toward preventing the unification of the two Hungarys. As long as the leaders of the new Transylvanian state refrained from promoting unification, Constantinople permitted the country a large measure of independence, but any treason would always be immediately and ruthlessly punished. The Turks would then take more territories, as they did when they captured Buda in 1541, or when they overran the Temesköz in 1552. If, on the other hand, the balance of power favoured the Turks, they would offer their "good will" in exchange for new concessions. The situation in the late 1540s and that in the early 1570s differed only in that in the 1570s the sultan demanded not just the strategic border fortresses but also an increase in the amount of taxes and "presents". In addition, claimants to the throne now sought support in Constantinople. The Porte's aim was to subjugate Transylvania, as it had done with Wallachia and Moldavia, and finally to incorporate them into the Ottoman Empire.

With the Turkish–Transylvanian alliance being as insincere as it was, it is not surprising that it enjoyed virtually no support in the country — in spite of the fact that the very establishment of the new state had rested on the connection with the Porte. Determined opposition from the Estates had prompted the attempts at unification in 1540–1541 and again in 1551–1556. Both attempts failed, and resulted in minor tragedies, but there were also two positive effects. Firstly, the attempts drew the Turks' attention to the fact that the proximity of the Habsburg power meant that the eastern part of Hungary could count on help if pressure from the Porte became too great. This threatened Transylvania's dependency of Constantinople and explains why, even in the early 1570s, the Turks made no such excessive demands on Transylvania as on the neighbouring Romanian voivodates. Secondly, these repeated failures made the Estates aware that they would have to accept an alliance with Turkey whether they liked it or not. What King John

had realized years before was now accepted first by the nobility of the Partium which was directly threatened, and later by the lords of Transylvania as well.

Tension remained high among the Saxons who had strong ties with the German and Austrian domains, with the West, ties which were both economic and emotional. Although their intellectuals, from Johannes Honterus, the Reformator, to the poet Christian Schaeseus, tried hard to hold on, against a newly-born German consciousness, to the old tradition that all the peoples of Hungary belonged together, on Isabella's return in 1556, Szeben staged a genuine popular uprising against her. It claimed the life of the chief justice, Johannes Roth, who had allegedly agreed to a compromise. Only with great effort could the level-headed count of the Saxons Peter Haller, re-establish order and gain acceptance for Isabella.

The direction of development was clear but the end result by no means secure. Too much fear and coercion, and too many ulterior motives had contributed to it. Transylvania's rulers, and the Estates in whose name they exercised power, resolutely adhered to the idea of their state being part of Hungary. Their policy served the interests of Hungary as a whole and not just those of Transylvania, and this was true even during the rule of István Báthory. The new country, although heeding its Turkish masters, would constantly attempt to unite with the kingdom, right up until 1690.

The second reason for the Estates' loss of influence in Transylvanian politics was social. For over a century (since 1437) the Three Nations had grown accustomed to cooperating within the province, but the differences, and even antagonisms, between them had not diminished. Many years would have to pass before they learned to regard themselves as the leaders of an autonomous state.

Only István Majláth's — unsuccessful — uprisings between 1539 and 1541 represented an attempt to act on behalf of the whole province, the first such movement in centuries. More characteristically, following the country's unification in 1551, the Székelys, the Saxons, and the Hungarians contacted Ferdinand I separately, each paying their own taxes and raising their own standing armies. Conflict between Saxons and Hungarians arose repeatedly, irrespective of whether an emperor, a king, or a prince ruled Transylvania. The Székelys were always ready to stage an uprising, thereby arousing the enmity of the rulers and the other two Nations. The nobility of the Partium was, by the very circumstance of the region's belated annexation, not included in the legal fiction of the Three Nations partnership. Besides the fact that both the experience and the institutional framework of common political action were rudimentary, the Three Nations also had different interests. The proud nobles, the Saxons with their civic mentality, and the Székelys with their free peasant status were all pulled in different directions on account of the differing privileges they enjoyed.

There was also a third reason for the Estates' loss of power: the competing forces were weak also on their own.

The Transylvanian State and the Outside World
in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century

The new state of Transylvania evolved between 1529 and 1571. Its birth was as difficult as the establishment of its borders. The two Hungarys were for a long time interlinked like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Eventually, in 1571, the borders were marked out by the Speyer Accord. Then John II relinquished all the lands that lay inside Habsburg-controlled territories. In return he was awarded the counties of Máramaros, Kraszna, Közép-Szolnok, and Bihar to be attached to Transylvania. These were the counties known as the Partium.

Though not included in the Speyer Accord, the Banat of Lugos and Karánsebes (a part of the Temesköz) also passed to Transylvania, as did parts of the counties of Arad and Zaránd at the western foot of the Bihar Mountains (these bordered on Turkish territory).

The Principality of Transylvania thus comprised some 38,600 sq miles of territory of which Transylvania itself contributed some 22,800 sq miles. As for its population, the absence of reliable data permits only a very rough estimate to be made, and the same is true for its ethnic relations.

Table 1. The population of the Principality of Transylvania at the end of the sixteenth century

Territory	Hungarians	Saxons	Romanians	Others (Serbians, Ukrainians)	Total
Székelyföld	150,000	?	?	–	160,000
Szászföld	?	65,000	15,000	–	85,000
Counties	240,000	20,000	200,000	?	460,000
Partium	170,000	–	110,000	80,000	360,000
Total	560,000	90,000	330,000	85,000	1,065,000

By comparison, the territory of the pre-1526 Kingdom of Hungary comprised some 135,000 sq miles, and had an estimated population of over 4 million.

The Principality of Transylvania, as it had developed during the course of the sixteenth century, was small compared to the old Hungary of which it had formed a part. In addition, the new state was exposed to a number of adverse foreign influences which it had no power to control.

First among these was the slow Turkish advance which brought about a continual state of war whether openly or implicitly, because Turkish troops did not balk at pillaging territories beyond their borders, actions which the Hungarian border detachments repaid in kind. Soon there was a strip of land which was taxed by both sides. The Turks were, even at the height of their power, unable to prevent incursions and the Hungarian ruling class

quickly learned to take advantage of the pillaging ventures. It asserted not only state authority, but also seignorial rights in territories under Turkish occupation: a state of affairs that was to have serious importance later during the war of liberation. The Turks, on their part, were out to tax any land they could lay hands on — in line with the traditional tactics of wearing down their opponents.

Although Transylvania was allied to, and was a vassal of, the Porte, the double-tax zone existed also along their common border. The Turks laid claim to territories well inside Transylvania, taxing all including the westernmost villages in Hunyad county. Fifty-three per cent for instance of Bihar county's taxpayers were laid under tribute by both Transylvanian and Turkish authorities.

The constant state of war had adverse effects on the new state's commercial links. The main road which connected Transylvania with central Hungary and, eventually Vienna (the route was Kolozsvár–Debrecen or Nagyvárad–Szolnok–Vác–Pozsony–Vienna) was still much travelled after the Turks occupied the Great Hungarian Plain. Nevertheless, merchants now preferred to take a different route — from Kolozsvár to Kassa, and through the Vág Valley to Pozsony. Cracow was becoming Transylvania's second major trading partner after Vienna.

The fate of the trade route running from the lower Maros River through the Sava Valley into Dalmatia and on to Italy is not quite clear. Evidently the toll farm on it at Karánsebes was very valuable (in 1583 6,000; in 1588 1,900 florins). However, this may be due to increased trade with the Balkans. The roads leading from Beszterce, Brassó, or Szeben to the Romanian voivodates had become almost completely neglected by the middle of the sixteenth century. Beszterce's customs house, where the toll called *harmincad (tricesima)* was collected, was leased for ridiculously low sums: 200 florins in 1552, 70 florins in 1569 and 100-200 florins around 1574. While the customs house in Brassó dealt with 167,000 florins worth of goods in 1503, by 1530 the figure was a mere 33,000 florins (admittedly, Transylvania was engaged in a war at this time). Even during the second half of the sixteenth century the turnover of the Brassó customs house never exceeded 80,000 florins. With about half the commerce of Brassó, Nagyszeben's trade was also in decline.

A direct cause of the falling off of commerce was the Porte's restrictions on exports from Moldavia and Wallachia, which were obliged to supply Constantinople with food. On the other hand, an upswing in incomes from commerce at the end of the century was due to the renewed use of the Levantine trade route from the southern Ukraine to Transylvania.

Along the western borders of the Szapolyai territories, Friar George established new customs houses, and after 1556 an effective foreign trade route with toll gates came into existence. In the absence of adequate data we can only estimate (from the 929 florins income of the relatively minor Zilah customs house in 1558) that its turnover must have been quite high. Of course, the Turks and later royal Hungary also set up customs houses on their new borders. Merchants going to the West from Transylvania across the Great Plain which then belonged to the Turkish Empire encountered

two new borders within Hungary, thus they had to pay tolls at four new places.

With foreign trade on the decline, less capital was invested in Transylvania. Salt was the principality's most lucrative resource, with rich mines in Vízakna, Dés, Torda and Máramaros. In the early sixteenth century, the Fuggers had aspired to lease Transylvania's salt-mines; in the skirmishes of 1528–1529, Gritti took over this profitable business and after the latter's death John I had Bavarian merchants join in. However, after 1541 the mines became the concern of not very wealthy local businessmen.

Similar was the fate of the gold mines reopened by Gritti in the Bihar Mountains: after initial success they were left unexploited. In István Báthory's time some rather dubious Italian businessmen leased them. There is little data on iron and mercury extraction during the sixteenth century, although these were growing in importance later.

It was something more than caution which prevented western businessmen from investing in the embattled Carpathian Basin. Around 1546, for example, the Fuggers gave up even their relatively well-protected copper mines in Upper Hungary. The real reason was that the Atlantic trade, spices from the East Indies, and precious metals from South America offered faster and larger profits, something which the Fuggers, and others, were quick to realize. Aztec and Inca treasure reduced the demand for gold from European mines, and Transylvania experienced the effects of this at first hand.

At the same time, the Carpathian Basin now began to feel the effects of the "price revolution" — brought about by the influx of Spanish-American gold, an upswing in European industry, and a sudden rise in the population of western European towns. In the international division of labour the region ranked among the great deliverers of food and raw materials. Between 1520 and 1580, the price of cattle, the most important export item at the time, tripled. The price of wine quadrupled in the same period. The cost of grain, which was not exported, rose fivefold as a result of the general price increases during these years.

The distant and small state of Transylvania was only marginally affected by the general development of Europe. The Saxons alone knew modern methods of working the land, but the Székelys were just beginning to rest the soil every third year. Only at the end of the sixteenth century did interest in vegetable and fruit production increase in Transylvania accompanied by the first experiments in stabling animals and growing fodder.

Grain could not be exported because of the distance to western markets which, in addition, lay upstream along navigable rivers. Cattle from the Great Hungarian Plain had a better taste than those from Transylvania, besides being nearer to their markets. Transylvanian wine experienced competition from the newly-established Tokaj vineyards, and salt was also exported from Cracow.

Transylvania's balance of trade accordingly remained in deficit. Imported industrial goods, such as cloth, tools, weapons, or luxury items, could not be paid for even if the volume of imports were reduced. Only the gold mines brought in small sums, but with South American competition they

could never become really lucrative as continuing inflation lowered the value of gold coins. The country introduced a series of desperate price regulations during the second half of the sixteenth century, but these were insufficient to remedy the problem.

Saxon and Hungarian Towns

Hungary in the past had only a few towns and these were quite small. In the Transylvania province however, towns were relatively numerous. Besides the leading Saxon settlements Segesvár, Szászváros, and Beszterce, Kolozsvár, Dés, Torda, Marosvásárhely, and Gyulafehérvár also employed various privileges. The Partium was again more like Hungary generally: two of its urban settlements, Várad and Debrecen, were not towns by rights, and the third, Nagybánya, had mining town privileges.

As commerce with the West became more difficult, and as the other Hungarian towns — Kassa, Buda and Pest — were cut off and no longer presented any competition, the Saxon towns gained in economic importance. In addition, with the union of the Three Nations, the Saxons' self-government now became one of the cornerstones of politics as conducted by the Estates of the new state.

The leadership of the Saxons remained unambiguously in the hands of their patricians, also after the evaluation of the principality. The great merchant families, the Hallers, Rapolts, Armbrusters, Offners, and Lulays, constituted the social elite. Social discontent, as expressed in the 1556 Szeben uprising, surfaced only rarely. In the guilds Saxon craftsmen competed effectively with their Hungarian counterparts, and south-eastern Europe's first cloth manufactory was established in Brassó in the 1570s.

Even in the years of upheaval, Saxon towns continued to develop into increasingly beautiful places, with wooden houses being rapidly superseded by stately stone edifices. Saxon gold- and silversmiths created exquisite objects to satisfy demanding customers, who in these troubled times may have wished to invest their money in items which could be easily hidden or taken to safety.

The population of these towns increased only slowly, however. By the end of the sixteenth century Brassó had only 8,000–9,000 inhabitants, up from 7,000 in less than a hundred years, while Szeben had no more than 6,000 people. Other towns boasted no more than 2,000–3,000 inhabitants. One reason for the slow growth was the Saxons' traditional desire for segregation. Hungarian craftsmen and merchants were prohibited from settling in their towns, and family connections were kept up only with Germans, either in Hungary or in the Holy Roman Empire. The Saxons's original protectiveness of their privileges acquired political overtones in the years around the Battle of Mohács, when the Saxons tended to support the Habsburgs' cause. Simultaneously, they were determined to restrict the numbers of the privileged burgher population.

Slow growth was also due to the fact that, although Transylvania had a relatively dense network of towns, this was supported by only a sparsely

populated and economically undeveloped hinterland. When Transylvania broke away from the mother country, local craftsmen were quick to fill the void, but with isolation from the West came a series of economic problems. Rising prices were accompanied by a shortage of money, and the traditional Saxon markets in Moldavia and Wallachia were now scarcely accessible. The initial economic upswing ground to a halt.

New competitors appeared from the Turkish Empire. Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Romanian and Serbian merchants brought in cheap wares. Staple rights offered little defence against these goods which were produced for local use only especially since the "intruders" avoided the mandatory transportation routes. The figures listed in the previous chapter on tolls collected at Karánsebes, reflect the situation at this time.

There was also competition from the country's non-Saxon burghers. But the Hungarian towns of Dés, Torda, Marosvásárhely and Gyulafehérvár had no staple rights and no major trade routes passed through them. Of the non-Saxon towns, only Kolozsvár, which earlier had a Saxon majority but whose population was now increasingly Hungarian, got a key role in the new country's commerce. Both main roads to the West, via Kassa and via Várad, began here. The town's merchants took advantage of these roads and, in order to express their appreciation for their increasing profits, stressed their support for the Szapolyais, at the same time giving vent to anti-Saxon sentiments. In return for its support, in 1558 Queen Isabella re-awarded Kolozsvár the staple rights it had lost in 1437. The Balkan merchants, towards whom the Saxons had been so inhospitable, proved useful for Kolozsvár: the goods they brought into Transylvania by circumventing Szeben and Brassó were in great demand on the town's market. Although the Saxons repeatedly secured decrees from the Diet (in 1556, 1560, 1571, and 1591) to limit the freedom of move of Armenian, Greek, and other Balkan merchants, these remained ineffective — partly because other towns that profited from the foreigners' presence were unwilling to enforce them.

By the end of the sixteenth century, Kolozsvár's population of 9,000–10,000 exceeded that of Brassó, the largest Saxon town. Construction work was even livelier in Kolozsvár with what amounted to miniature palaces being built in quick succession. The finest of those that have partially survived is the so-called Wolphard-Kakas House. The masons of these found their models in the prince's newly erected palaces in nearby Kolozsmonostor and Gyalu. István Báthory even had Italian architects design a university building to be erected in Kolozsvár. Furniture and fittings were fashioned in the new Renaissance style, as in Saxon residences. Comfort came to acquire an importance hitherto unknown.

No other town was able to develop as spectacularly as Kolozsvár. Conditions were nowhere so favourable. Of the other two major Hungarian towns, Várad had originally been the centre of a diocese, rising to the rank of a *civitas* only in 1556. Debrecen remained a borough with only limited rights of self-government, under control of the landowner on whose property it lay.

Várad was traditionally one of the main settlements of the Tiszántúl, an important stopping place on the road from Kolozsvár to Vienna, and where from the 1540s onwards deliberate fortification works took place up until

the Fifteen Years' War. Although there are no precise data, we know that the town was considered quite wealthy, and that many burghers from Pest moved there to escape the Turks.

For Debrecen's rapid development there is no convincing explanation. At a geographically insignificant location and situated in a not very fertile area of the Great Hungarian Plain, Debrecen had 1,300 paying *portas* and an estimated population of 20,000 in the middle of the sixteenth century. It was therefore by far the largest town both in Transylvania and in the Kingdom of Hungary.

In the Great Hungarian Plain, with no royal free town anywhere near, settlements that acquired the right to hold fairs became centres for serfs working in industry or trade. These town-dwelling peasants soon realized the business opportunities afforded by cattle and wine. As the nobility shunned anything to do with trade or money, and as the royal free towns showed no interest in such lowly pursuits, the inhabitants of Debrecen, called *"cives"*, like those of most market towns boroughs, soon controlled the cattle and wine trades. Pastures surrounding the town were expanded and the herds raised on the Plain of Hortobágy elevated Debrecen to the level of an economic power. Debrecen's commercial links extended as far as Cracow, Vienna, Brünn and Breslau.

The phenomenon of serfs participating in international trade was unprecedented. In contrast, the other great export item, Polish grain, was not sent the market by serfs, but by the manors of the Polish nobility. Because of the shortage of labour in Poland, the feudal service was increased substantially, with the result that the nobility there remained in power for centuries, and social mobility was non-existent. In Hungary, on the other hand, the growing prosperity of the market towns provided the peasants with an opportunity to establish farms. Feudal landownership was negatively affected by the fact that serfs who were sinking into poverty left their holdings (sometimes the entire vicinity of a village), and these were then leased by the inhabitants of the market towns. The result was that the landowners were no longer paid feudal dues on these holdings.

With the dismemberment of Hungary in the late 1520s, the Great Hungarian Plain with its many market towns found itself on the periphery of the war zone. Then with the fall of Buda, this region disintegrated and came under different authorities. Constant battles took place along the new borders and even in times of peace incursions were common, hampering commercial activity. The practice of double taxation in the border areas meant a heavy burden for the population, and the animosity between Transylvania and the Habsburg territories had additional negative effects. For example, Debrecen, which gradually became the economic centre of the Tiszántúl, not only owed services to its landlords, but, after 1567, also paid taxes to the Principality of Transylvania (3,200 florins yearly) to Constantinople (2,000 florins yearly), and to the royal government (1,000 florins per annum).

In spite of this, the boroughs experienced no perceptible decline. In Békés county, wedged between Transylvania and the territory under Turkish rule, there were these important market towns (Gyula, Simánd, and Békés) which actually flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century. The *cives* there

276

paid their ninth in money and their *robot* was well below the one day per week decreed in 1514. Even so seignorial income there reached several thousand florins annually — primarily from the taxes put on the commerce in horses and cattle.

Although we have no specific data on the market towns of Transylvania, there is no reason to believe that they fared differently. On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to think that their prosperity, which continued until the last decade of the sixteenth century, stemmed primarily from economic reasons. The constant state of war, multiple taxation, and the growing arbitrariness of landowners desperate to save their economic position forced the serfs of villages to leave their homes. These people initially sought protection in the larger, more secure settlements, the market towns; when these became threatened as well, the wealthier left again. For example, after 1552 most of the citizens of Szeged moved to Nagyszombat, Kassa and Debrecen.

Transylvania was severely affected by the continual unrest. Many factors inhibited the development of peasant commodity production: the country was far from western markets, its pastures were poorer than those of the Great Hungarian Plain, and its wine inferior to that made in Tokaj. In addition, the dense network of Saxon towns also constituted an obstacle. The Saxons repeatedly blocked any progress toward peasant commodity production, referring to their privileges. In the early 1520s, for example, Brassó initiated litigation which lasted several years against nearby Sepsiszentgyörgy, with the result that the latter was deprived of its right to hold a market. Only settlements with exceptionally good chances were able to rise above the general level: places such as Torda and Dés situated near rich salt mines acquired market town rights. At the beginning of the principality period these were even regarded as towns, although they would not have gained this position had they not been situated on the king's — and later the prince's — estates. Another pseudo-town to become wealthy was Marosvásárhely, one of the most important market in non-Saxon Transylvania and the commercial centre of the Székely Nation.

The degradation of market towns on the Great Hungarian Plain under Turkish rule and the flight of the populace which resulted from the renewed Turkish advance meant that the Transylvanian state lost its socially and economically most promising population strata at the moment of its birth. This put an end to the development of the Hungarian towns founded on agricultural commodity productions. John I still could count on the *cives* as an important economic force: in 1529 he raised Lippa to the status of a royal free town, and in 1529 he repopulated Buda, whose German burghers had fled, with Hungarian peasants. He did the same with Kassa in 1538, and in 1530 and 1536 he re-established the serfs' right to free migration, which had been revoked in 1514. Obviously, John, in his turn, received financial and intellectual support from the *cives*. His successors, however, did not concern themselves with the affairs of this group. Debrecen remained alone in its spectacular development and the other market towns trailed a long way behind it with regard both to population size and economic weight. In 1569, Tasnád had 319 tax-paying *portas*, and Kraszna only 281, which means that their total population must have been fewer than four thousand souls.

The Serfs

A serf class in the classical, feudal sense had come into being in Transylvania by the end of the fourteenth century — later than in the other Hungarian territories. As the new state developed, the peasantry continued to divide into different groups. Earlier the *cives* of Transylvania-ruled Tiszántúl were mentioned but the rights of the free Saxon peasants and those of the arms-bearing Székelys differed from those of serfs proper. Traditionally, however, serfs were grouped into three categories; the copyholders called *telkesjobbágy* in Hungarian who were under the obligation to pay various taxes in kind or in money to the landlords; the freeholders called *szabados* who, though possessing a farming holding under seignorial authority, were exempt for the most various reasons from all or some duties to the landowners; and finally people called cotter *(zsellér)*, who either lived in the households of copyholders or managed some sort of enterprises without direct obligations to the landlord.

Among copyholders differentiation resulted from such factors as size of family, quality of land, skills, and, often, luck. In the more developed Hungarian counties the "holdings" called *telek* in Hungarian were already mostly halved by the fifteenth century, but in the villages of Transylvania undivided *telek*s were still relatively numerous as late as the mid-sixteenth century, when they constituted thirty-five per cent, for instance of the total in the seigniory of Szamosújvár, sixty-five per cent in the area around Kővár, and sixty to ninety per cent in Erdőd, in the Partium. The primary reason for this was probably the low density of population. Considering, however, that sheep and cattle breeding were important here, size of holdings cannot be regarded as adequate for categorizing the serf population. Unfortunately, there is no data on what ratio of the livestock was in the possession of serfs.

The second group, the freeholders, included those serfs who worked as the servants of the lord, some artisans and tradesmen (for example fishermen and butchers), and village leaders of various statuses. The third group also showed diversity. In most seignories these were the poor, often newly-arrived farm hands, who had no holdings. Legally, those *cives* who lived from dealing in cattle or growing wine and who had given up their holdings to do this were also *zsellér*s. However, as they were quite well-to-do, they did not really belong to this group in any but a legal sense. Neither did those clerks, called *deák* who were literate to some degree and worked for seignories or in the market towns.

The differences that existed between and within the different layers of the peasants living under seignorial authority were not necessarily differences in wealth. Actually in many places the *zsellér*s had to perform less services than other serfs, and their duties were set out in contracts. Moreover, they could gain exemption from these duties by paying a lump sum to the landlord. Since there was enough land available, there was no need to subdivide holdings until they were no longer large enough to support a family and this hindered the growth of the proportion of *zsellér*s generally. In Habsburg-ruled Hungary, 25 per cent of the serfs were *zsellér*s at this time but in Transylvania and the Partium the figure was between five per cent and twenty per cent.

The amount of taxes owed to the state varied considerably. Rating was for whole villages, with local justices determining its distribution by family. The basis for imposition was either the holding or the number of draught oxen, and in some places a direct tax to be paid to the lord was also added. Thus the amount of tax varied from area to area, although it was usually less than the one florin per head of family laid down in the law of 1514. Even the devaluation of money seems to have had no effect on this: the tax for the market town of Tasnád was 1,000 florins in 1569 and the same sum twenty years later, and the treasury income from the Kolozsmonostor seigniory was around 180 florins both in 1580 and in 1599.

Similarly diverse were the agricultural commodities which had to be handed over as payment in kind. Oats were mandatory everywhere and wheat in most places, with chicken, pigs, sheep, eggs, honey, vegetables, fruit and firewood also being required in some locations. The amounts to be handed over rose slowly as the century wore on.

More general was the payment to the landlord of the ninth, or *nona*. The Transylvanian Diet of 1549 upheld the 1514 law on the ninth, which at the time had been considered a novelty. Until the mid-sixteenth century is was collected only in the Partium, and even there it did not reach the proportion required by the law. Later on, collection became stricter: in the seigniory of Gyula the *nona* yielded 400–500 florins in 1526–1527, but thus had risen to almost 2,000 florins by 1562.

The title until the early 1540s preserved its original function of providing the church with income. Almost all types of produce were collected, from grain and fruit to wine and pigs. Later, political necessity resulted in change. In 1542 the Diocese of Gyulafehérvár fell vacant, with its income going to the treasury. Then, in 1556, the tithe of the Diocese of Várad followed suit. The practice however of leasing out the collection of the tithe, usually to the lord from whose peasant it was due, was continued also by the treasury.

A further difference in the circumstances of the peasantry in different parts of the principality resulted from the variance in the corvée *(robot)* they were forced to perform. The Transylvanian Estates traditionally maintained that the relationship between lord and serf was a private affair. They kept this to such an extent that they refused to pass a law regulating the *robot* and never referred to the law of 1514 which set the level of it at one day per week. Some estates allocated *robot* on a head of household basis, others according to the number of draught animals owned. In the second half of the century, though, the burden of *robot* increased. In the estate of Fogaras for instance, in 1508 two days of hay-making had been required annually, in addition to bringing in two cartloads of wood. In 1570 this was augmented by three days of harvesting per year. And in 1596 the serfs were complaining about having to do work around the manor as well. In 1556, when the Drágffys owned the market town of Csehi in the county of Szilágy, the serfs had only to cart supplies to the castles of Erdőd and Kővár. When György Báthory became the new lord, he demanded ploughing and harvesting, even going so far as to dispose of the manor's own ploughs. In another of Báthory's seigniories, at Béltek, which he had also inherited from the Drágffys, all demesnial work had to be done by means of *robot* and the vineyards which had earlier been cultivated by hired hands were also worked

in the same way. In addition, no limit was set for the number of days manual labour was to be performed, and each serf had to work "according to his ability" *(pro facultate)*.

By the end of the century labour "according to ability", which was effectively unlimited in duration, was common throughout Transylvania. The labour required was no longer specified in terms of the time to be spent on it, but rather in terms of the tasks to be completed. Some seigniories demanded what amounted to labour every third day, three times the level laid down in the law of 1514, and which even then had been considered excessive.

There was in the meantime another type of work which also fall to the lot of the serfs. Because of continuing wars, the borders of the new state had to be fortified, and the construction of castles — and places — required a great deal of manpower. This gave rise to a new kind of manual labour in the form of castle service. It soon became obligatory and unlimited, as was the traditional labour service.

There was a definite decline in the legal protection the serfs had enjoyed. Instead, there were now restrictions on their freedom to move, and no real maximum on the labour that could be required. That all this did not result in extensive poverty was due only to the fact that the mountainous borders were difficult to supervise, and the continuing availability of new land left the serfs with ways to protect themselves. They could run away from their lord, peasant holdings could be bought and sold with the permission of the landowner, and purchased and newly-cleared land could change hands freely. This enabled the serfs to bear not only the growing burden of socage but also the increasing state taxes called *dica*.

The uniform *dica* system changed only slowly. In 1543 the *dica* had to be paid by those serfs with wealth of three florins or more. This amount rose to six florins in 1552, when the *porta* was no longer a serf's holding but merely a unit of taxation. Draught animals constituted the basis for taxation, with six florins being the tax on a pair of oxen. The tax was usually one florin per *porta* until the 1540s, just 60 dinars in 1545, again one florin in 1550, and finally, after 1556 two florins annually.

As early as 1540, however, there were added taxes for the upkeep of the border castles, the tribute for the Turks, the construction of new castles and for military expenses in general. These amounted to a total of three florins per *porta*.

Throughout the period every eighth to sixteenth head of household was recruited for military service. Their troops were the *telekkatonaság* (military from the *telek*). István Báthory even ordered the review of them twice a year. But by the 1560s this sort of *levée en masse* was no longer required. The diets forgot about it, and even during the Fifteen Years War which began in 1593 it was not reinstituted.

Modern warfare required a well-trained standing army. For this reason a new layer of freemen arose from the ranks of the serf soldiers: these were the *darabont*s (guardsmen), who were gradually relieved of labour duties by the rulers. They constituted a cheap and readily available army which had ties neither to serfs nor to the nobility and which was therefore ready to serve only the prince.

34. The north facade of the chapel of János Lázói at Gyulafehérvár, 1512

35. Detail of John Sigismund's sarcophagus in the Gyulafehérvár cathedral, around 1571

36. Wooden belfry at Mezőcsávás, second half of the sixteenth century

37. The map of Honterus on Transylvania, 1532

RANSYLVANIAE

MOLDAVIÆ TERMINVS

SCHVK.

LI

KYSDI

ORBAI

ALTHLAND

SCHEPSI

BVRZELAND

CORINA

ORIEN

Alpes

Alpes

VALACHIÆ PARS

HAZEK.

38. Title pages of books printed in Transylvania: 1. Collection of aphorisms attributed to Aurelius Augustinus (from the printing press of Honterus). Brassó, 1539; 2. The first Hungarian translation (by Heltai) of Luther's shorter Cathecism. Kolozsvár, 1550; 3. Versechronicles by Sebestyén Tinódi. Kolozsvár, 1554; 4. Manual of Hungarian Law by István Werbőczy. Kolozsvár, 1571

39. Book cover by Pál Bánffy, with portraits of Luther and Melanchton, 1569

40. The earliest examples of Romanian printing:
1. Selections from the Bible translated into Romanian for use in the liturgy. Brassó, 1561; 2. Selections from the Bible translated into Romanian (Palia de la Orăştie) for the Calvinist Romanians in Transylvania with the coat of arms of Zsigmond Báthory. Szászváros, 1582; 3. The monogram of the first Romanian printer, Master Filip, on the Nagyszeben Gospels, 1546

41. Portrait of István Bocskai. Copper engraving, 1605–1606

After the middle of the sixteenth century the lives of serfs became increasingly difficult. Ordinary Transylvanian peasants who had never been able to link themselves into commodity production were now increasingly unable to do so. They were mere passive observers, or even victims of the tragic events that befell Hungary, and of the rise of the new state in which they lived. Throughout the period, serfs were never a political factor, not even the *cives* of the Partium.

The Romanians

Turkish conquest and the continuing wars with the Habsburgs determined the western borders of the new Transylvanian state in such a way that it incorporated all the Romanian-inhabited territories of the former Kingdom of Hungary. The process by which the Romanians gradually gave up their transhumant lifestyle in favour of agriculture, continued throughout the sixteenth century together with their sometimes changing religion and language. Assimilation was slow and devoid of violence, as a result of which it is difficult to trace the fate of the Romanians, who became serfs in the classical sense of the term.

The assimilation of Romanians that did occur was offset by the large numbers of people who migrated to the principality from Moldavia and Wallachia in the last third of the sixteenth century. With the collapse of mediaeval Hungary, these two voivodates had lost a neighbour which, although it had regarded them as client states, had counterbalanced the power of the Porte. There was incessant competition for the thrones of these two defenceless Romanian states. The Porte took advantage of their weakness and tightened the pressure on them still further, stationing permanent garrisons in Moldavia and Wallachia, and always offering the position of voivode to the candidate who offered the greatest amount of tax and who promised to be the most subservient. In Wallachia this meant for instance that there were nineteen different voivodes in sixty-four years, and only two of them died of natural causes. Along with general instability came an ever-increasing tax burden which in turn led to the massive flight of the shepherds and peasants from there.

The immigrants into Transylvania journeyed along the ancient roads on the lower slopes of the mountains. But the population of these areas had grown considerably over the past centuries. Newcomers therefore settled on the poorer pastures which earlier had been used only occasionally. A Romanian-populated belt of territory took shape from Máramaros through the Belényes Basin and the snowy peaks of Gyalu to the county of Hunyad, the Szörénység and Fogaras. As the Habsburg official, Zacharias Geizkoffler, noted in 1602: "Earlier there were only a few Romanian villages but now these are greatly multiplied, for as opposed to the desolation of the plains, the mountainous land is very much developed".[9]

9. *MR* I, 513.

The search for land and settlement took place in an organized manner: a *kenéz* or voivode would lead the group of immigrants who would come to an agreement with their new seignior as to where they would live and the services they would own. When a new village was established, both the ruler and the lord would grant a set of temporary exemptions from taxes and services, realizing that a large working population served the interests of all.

The still predominant transhumant lifestyle of the Romanians, however, did not make for prosperity and for agriculture forced by the landowners upon the newcomers who were left only poor-quality land. Moreover, the peasants from Moldavia and Wallachia were backward when it came to farming skills. As opposed to the local population which increasingly practised crop rotation, the immigrants went in only for rotational grazing. A necessary consequence of this was that Romanian peasants ranked among the poorer inhabitants of Transylvania.

Their language of course had been immaterial during the Middle Ages. Although villages had been designated as Saxon, Hungarian, or Romanian (*possessio hungaricalis, saxonicalis* or *walachicalis*), this referred not to the language used there but to the services owed and the villagers' legal status. A serf's ethnic origin was only one of the factors determining his status, and all villages were, in fact, ethnically mixed.

In one respect, however, the Romanian villages enjoyed an advantage over Hungarian or Saxon ones: since they were not Catholic, they did not have to pay the tithe. At the most Romanians who adopted the Catholic religion were forced to do so, and of course those settling on "Christian soil", as it was the custom since mediaeval times and then decreed by the Diet in 1559.

The Romanian peasants on the Fogaras estate found themselves in a different situation. There is no indication that they paid the fiftieth, perhaps because the seignior, the voivode of Wallachia, was such a long way off. They were, however, required to pay a tax in the form of "fish money" or "silver money", and here the serf was not termed as a *"colonus"*, or *"iobagio"*, but, following the terminology of Wallachia, a *"vecin"*.

The rise of Romanians into the higher ranks of society continued in mediaeval fashion. A case of elevation to noble status was that of Miklós Oláh, the most prominent sixteenth-century Romanian Transylvanian. Born in Szeben to parents who had come from Wallachia, Oláh was brought up to become a Catholic priest, and eventually got to be archbishop of Esztergom, the head of the Roman Catholic Church of Hungary. As a renowned humanist, Oláh regarded himself as a "Hungarus". His main writings dealt with the condition of Hungary, with Attila, the king of the Huns, and King Matthias; they proclaim the ideals of the Hungarian nobility.

The Decline of the Székely Community

While centuries of development had produced a feudal system in the surrounding communities, as late as the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Székelys still preserved their ancient rights. They kept their village community and *levée en masse*. They also retained their system under which landed

property reverted to the community on the death of its owner, as well as the autonomy which made all these things possible. The "*ökörsütés*" ("branding of the oxen" was, as before this time, an indirect and rarely-performed obligation which, in any event, did not compromise the Székelys' exemption from taxes since the oxen to the king were always regarded as gifts. Székely society continued to be organized into three strata.

As, however, the population increased, land became so scarce that more and more Székelys had to accept employment with the better-off families. What began as voluntary service gradually turned into servitude by the end of the fifteenth century. Several Székely officials on the other hand joined the ranks of the Hungarian nobility and acquired estates in the royal counties. The next generation would attempt to turn the Székely inheritance into feudal estates, including the lands of those who had voluntarily entered the family's service.

At first, development in this direction had practical, rather than legal, ramifications, but after the Battle of Mohács the situation changed. The Székely territories — the Székelyföld — became an important part of the Szapolyai kingdom, and continuing warfare demanded increased military service from the Székelys. At the same time, the financially-embarrassed Szapolyai administration was obliged to impose special taxes on them as early as the reign of King John I, while Friar George taxed them because of the tribute demanded by the Turks.

The otherwise bellicose Székelys watched passively as their ancient rights were curtailed, probably because of the ever-present threat of war. A 1554 law exempted the *primores* and the *lófős* from taxation, and put them on a par with the nobility in this respect. At the same time, the very poor, who were in their service, also received tax exemption. On the other hand, all foot soldiers, the *pixidarii*, who were considered freemen, were taxed, which resulted in a double burden of military and monetary obligations. On her return to power in 1556, Queen Isabella braced herself for a long and difficult struggle. As a result, the diets that met in the following years passed a series of laws on the Székelys' tax liability and mandatory military service. Taxes were sometimes imposed on the entire Székely Nation and sometimes by *porta*s. In 1557 the Diet also passed a law which decreed that a majority vote of two Nations was also legally binding on the third.

The liberty of Székely commoners was actually limited to two areas: they, too, could serve as jurors, and those who had so far avoided undertaking service could not be subordinated to a lord and remained exempt from labour. On the other hand, in 1559 it was decreed that elected military and law court officials of the Székely seats, jurors included, were to come under the supervision of the chief justice, *királybíró* appointed by the ruler.

This series of laws merely sanctioned a process that had affected Székely society in the previous half century. "Modernization", in other words, the introduction of feudalism, which was inevitable, now received a legal basis. The state got its way, and, in return, the Székely commoners retained their personal freedom.

Their double obligations, however, caused discontent among the *pixidarii*, who were ready to turn against the privileged upper strata. The fact that their position deteriorated only gradually delayed the explosion, until a spark from the outside set all aflame.

In December of 1561, Menyhárt Balassa went over to the Habsburgs. The sudden conversion was carefully prepared, and the ringleaders approached the Székelys, promising them the restoration of their "ancient liberties". Many Székelys took up arms in the spring of 1562, but by then John II had lost the Battle of Hadad and, as a result, had concluded a peace with Ferdinand I's envoys. The Székelys were not informed of the agreement, and John's troops were forced to engage them, scattering a smaller detachment near Görgény. After this the larger body stationed near the village of Holdvilág broke up. The principal leaders were impaled, and many others had their hands, noses, or ears cut off.

The Székely question was obviously a critical one and John II attempted to settle it at the Diet held in Segesvár on 20 June, 1562. First of all he ordered a series of reprisals, suspending the Székelys' court of appeal which operated in Udvarhely, and ruling that commoners could no longer serve as jurors in the law courts of the seats. He abolished the Székelys' special local military and legal offices; these duties were now taken over by the *királybíró*. The mining and sale of salt were declared a state monopoly, and the law which said that Székelys guilty of treason would have to turn their landed property over to the ruler was upheld, which meant that such property would cease to be the possession of the Székelys' community. Lastly, John II made it the sovereign's prerogative to bestow the rank of *primor* or *primipilus* on common Székelys.

Of much greater consequence, although not set down in law, was the measure by which the foot soldiers were no longer under compulsory military service. With this the Székelys lost the legal justification for the liberties they had traditionally claimed. John II also decreed in 1562 that free Székelys without means to perform military service were to be royal servant-people thus relieved of military duties and seigniorial services. Perhaps this ruling was originally intended to prevent the Székelys from sinking into serfdom. But just four years later, in 1566, the king consigned them by the hundreds to seigniors, *primores*, and *primipili*, who treated them as serfs and demanded the usual services from them.

The elimination of Székely foot soldiers as such from the military organization of Transylvania was directly compensated for by the serf army. Those who were called *darabont* and *puskás* (gunner) elsewhere were called "red *darabont*" (because of the colour of their uniforms) in Székely territory. Székelys perhaps enjoyed an advantage within this army: because of their experience and traditional skills, they made better soldiers than did other serfs.

Had it not been for these measures, the introduction of feudalism would probably have been delayed even more and this would have caused even greater instability. Ancient Székely liberties were at odds with the feudal system and posed a serious threat to the tranquillity of the state, as indicated by the repeated, and externally supported Székely revolts.

There were no illusions about the fact that rights which had been in effect for centuries could not possibly be annulled by a mere stroke of the pen. With this in mind, John II had two castles constructed in the territory to keep an eye on the perpetually discontented Székelys. The castle in

Udvarhely was named "Székelytámad" ("Székely-assault"), the one in Háromszék "Székelybánja" ("Székely-regret").

When István Báthory came to the throne the Székelys entertained hopes that their ancient liberties would be restored, especially since their leaders were also dissatisfied with having lost their offices, and resented the presence of the Hungarian nobles who had settled in the Székelyföld. In 1571, a group of Székely commoners actually staged an armed revolt but overwhelming force again compelled them to submit. When Gáspár Bekes organized his campaign in 1575 the exasperated Székelys joined in, but after the Battle of Kerelőszentpál retributions followed, finally crushing opposition for a quarter of a century.

As a results of coercion on the part of the state, the transformation of Székely society was nearly complete. Székely liberties were not forgotten, however, and these flashes of remembrance foreshadowed the disturbances that were to come.

Power and those Who Held it

The nascent Principality of Transylvania was handicapped by its isolation, it was weighed down by monetary and financial difficulties. At the same time, military expenses were multiplied. Those who assumed the leadership of the state necessarily had to face these problems.

The nobility "over there" in royal Hungary could enrich itself by joining in agricultural commodity production and by introducing demesne farming. Great estates, which at the end of the fifteenth century had been operating at a near loss, were by the late sixteenth century yielding enormous profits.

Transylvania was unable to follow this example. It could not export grain, of which it had little anyway, because of the distance to foreign markets and the consequent transportation problems. Its attempts to export wine and cattle were also unsuccessful: the country was unable to overcome its economic and geographical limitations.

The only way in Transylvania was to increase seignorial incomes at the cost of the peasantry. In his *Tripartitum* of 1514, Werbőczy had put down only the aim of the nobility to be the absolute owners of the serfs' holdings. In the Principality of Transylvania, however, in the late sixteenth century such ownership was accepted as customary law. It made the base on which manorial farming could be organized. As this spread, an increase in *robot* as described in the chapter on the peasantry had to follow. There developed the practically self-supporting demesne structure, with the peasants producing everything needed to ensure the continuity of production as well as the supplies necessary for their own livelihood. The landowner's household, too, was now provided for almost entirely by his serfs, who included for instance trained cartwrights, tanners, and tailors. The lack of money meant that grain became nearly the measure of value. Landowners tried to acquire as much of it as possible. They rarely marketed it, but instead used it as a means of payment for servants, soldiers, and officials. Landowners

285

also used wheat to buy wine for retail, and to feed everyone who worked for them, from the builders and furnishers of their castles to the hands on their farms.

Along with the introduction of manorial farming, the dues in kind were also increased. There was great competition for the lease of the tithe, the number of manorial mills grew, and the nobility's ancient right to retailing their vintage became increasingly profitable with an ever growing number of taverns on the estates. Milling and the sale of wine were the two activities that earned money for the landowner, money which was otherwise hard to come by.

Such possibilities, however, were open only to holders of larger domains, because medium and small-sized estates could not operate self-supporting economies. At the same time Transylvania proper had only very few truly large domains — Fogaras, Gyulafehérvár, Hunyad, and Kolozsmonostor — and even most of these had fallen into the hands of the treasury. Real large seigniories were in the Partium which had experienced what might be termed typically Hungarian development. The domain of Szatmár, always one of the stakes in the war of the castles, brought its lord an income of 18,000 florins in the year 1569-1570 while in the same years the estate of Kolozsmonostor, yielded just 1,800 florins. The few aristocratic families — the Báthorys, Balassas, Drágffys, and Perényis — who owned castles and seigniories in the Partium achieved absolute financial superiority over the nobles in Transylvania, and this was reflected in the positions they occupied in the new state.

The Saxons at this time were politically passive as a result of economic hardships and their pro-Habsburg bias. The Székelys were in decline, with inner strife and frequent rebellions against the government preventing them from becoming a constructive factor in politics. No new force took the place of these groups, which had fallen by the wayside, and as the market towns in the Tiszántúl became more and more isolated, their development slowed to the degree that they were unable to win political rights for themselves. On their own the Hungarian burghers of Kolozsvár could not fulfil the functions of a classical Third Estate.

Accordingly, the nobility could stabilize its economic position in the absence of any real competitor. From the very beginning of its autonomous existence, Transylvania had been an archaic feudal country, and this is what it continued to be. The nobility constituted the leadership of society, and within this class the wealthiest families, the great landowners of the Partium, enjoyed the most political power. It was one of these families, the Báthory family, that assumed rule over the principality. This relative concentration of political and economic strength also explains why the power of the ruling princes was so unusually great.

While the sharp rise of the incomes of the great domains was ensured in part by the increase in defence spending, it was accompanied by a transformation of lifestyle, tastes, and attitudes. Along with the reconstruction of the Saxon towns and Kolozsvár, Transylvania's fortresses, castles, and manor houses were transformed and embellished in "Italian mode" that is in Renaissance style. The fortress at Szamosújvár and the castle at Alvinc were strengthened and beautified by Friar George. Farkas Bethlen began recon-

struction work at Bonyha in 1543. The Kendis' beautiful castle at Marosvécs was modernized from 1555 onwards, and the Apafis' castle at Ebesfalva was also brought up to date around this time. Gábor Kornis began reconstructing Huszt around 1577, and Captain Ferenc Geszty started to rebuild Déva in the late 1570s.

Two of the most beautiful buildings from this period are the Bethlen family castle at Keresd and Benedek Keresztúri's manor house at Szentbenedek, begun in 1593. Both were far away echoes of Cinquecento Renaissance, like many places in the principality by Italian architects.

The former bishop's residence in Gyulafehérvár, which now served as the prince's palace, was continually enlarged. In Kolozsvár an Italian architect designed the building of the academy founded by István Báthory as a regular Renaissance palace with an arcaded courtyard. On the basis of Italian plans, modern Italian-style castles were constructed from the late 1540s on at Várad, and from the 1580s on at Fogaras.

A society almost completely isolated form the rest of Europe was trying to follow western Europe, if somewhat belatedly and in rather a poor way. The Christians of Transylvania firmly declined to accept either a political structure or a new culture from the Asiatic world of the Ottomans.

Culture and Reformation, Religious Tolerance

The Reformation spreading all across Europe reached Hungary as early as the 1520s, and found its first foothold among the German population of the royal free towns. At the court of King Louis II, in the entourage of Mary of Habsburg his queen, there was a circle of humanists sympathetic to Lutheran ideas. This included two personalities who were to play a leading role in Transylvanian politics: Georg Reicherstorffer and Markus Pemflinger.

Luther's teachings were introduced into Transylvania by a priest from Brassó, Johannes Honterus, who had been educated in Vienna, Cracow and Basel. An exceptionally erudite man with a methodical mind, Honterus established a printing press at Brassó in 1538–1539 (the second in Transylvania after the one at Szeben established in 1529), and used it to publish his widely popular works on theology and geography. In 1542–1543 Honterus formulated the basic tenets of the Saxon Lutheran church which was now coming into existence. The last Catholic mass in Brassó was celebrated in October 1542, and in 1543 the Gyulafehérvár Diet gave free passage to the Brassó preachers it had previously summoned on charges of heresy. In April 1544 Honterus became the pastor of Brassó, and his first actions in this capacity were to reorganize the town's school and to found a library.

Inspired by the example of the most populous Saxon town, the whole University took similar steps. In November 1545, the Saxon National Assembly, meeting at Szeben, decided that Luther's teachings as interpreted by Honterus were to be uniformly adopted. In early 1553 a synod of the Saxon clergy elected its own bishop *(superintendents)* in the person of Paul Wiener. In this way, in the 1550s the foundations of the Saxon Lutheran church were laid, and these were to endure for centuries to come. After

such splendid victory, however, came a cultural through. While the press at Brassó was at its height, the printing shop of Szeben did not publish a single book either in German or in Latin, and in the second half of the century the only major Saxon work to appear was the collection of the laws concerning the Nation's privileges. Selecting and editing work was conscientiously performed by Mathias Fronius, and Albert Huet, the count of the Saxons, secured the prince's approval for the edition. To print the law-book, the equipment of the Brassó and the Szeben presses was pooled in 1583, with the result that both got into a period of crisis.

Only a few years after the Saxons had adopted Lutheranism, the Hungarians also took to it. In Kolozsvár the ardent follower of Luther, Kaspar Helth, became the minister in 1544. In this town, the population of which was mostly Hungarian by this time, Helth began writing and preaching in Hungarian, and even used his name in the Hungarian form: Gáspár Heltai. A printing press established in 1550 also helped his work. Heltai published besides his own language books parts of a Bible translation. In 1554, Transylvania's Hungarian Lutherans established their separate church, with a former monk, Tamás, as bishop.

Tamás was not unique in his turning to the Reformation: Most of the early Lutheran preachers were former Franciscans, friars of that Order which had played a key role in the 1514 peasant uprising. In the same way that the revolt had been a movement originating in the market towns, now the Reformation, too, found its first Hungarian followers among the burghers of these settlements. The most effective early Lutheran evangelists, Mátyás Dévai Bíró, András Szkhárosi Horvát, István Benczédi Székely, János Gálszécsi, András Batizi, all Franciscan friars except the last two, worked in the much disputed territory between the Szapolyai- and the Habsburg-ruled parts of the country. They enjoyed only limited freedom of action. But what they could not achieve on their own by preaching, was accomplished by secular authority. In 1549, Péter Petrovics, the omnipotent ruler of the Temesköz, set up a Lutheran diocese, the second in all of Hungary after the Saxons'. The synods held at Torony in 1549 and 1550 were attended by the reformed ministers of Arad, Makó and Szeged, and — even before the Saxons — they elected a bishop, Máté Gönci, who also came from a market town. In the upper area of the Partium, from Ugocsa to the county of Szilágy, the Perényi and Drágffy families supported the new religion. Anna Báthory, the widow of Gáspár Drágffy, afforded protection to the Synod of Erdőd held on 20 September, 1545, at which the ministers of Szabolcs, Szatmár, Szilágy, and Ugocsa adopted the Lutheran confession and elected Demeter Tordai as bishop.

Scarcely had Lutheran teachings established themselves in Transylvania when the second, Calvinist, wave of Reformation struck the country. Calvinism gained ground rapidly in the Szapolyai-ruled territories. Towards the end of his life, Mátyás Dévai Bíró, the Debrecen minister, began to dispute several of the original Wittenberg theses, and in 1551 his successor, Márton Kálmáncsehi Sánta, was actually accused of heresy by the town council on account of his Calvinist teachings. Kálmáncsehi sought the protection of Péter Petrovics, who was now living in Munkács. With the latter's support a synod was held in December 1552 at Beregszász, where the minis-

ters of the area were the first in Hungary to adopt a Calvinist confession of faith.

The failure of the uprising staged by Petrovics in the Tiszántúl in 1553 interrupted the spread of Calvinism, but only temporarily. When the tide turned in 1556 it conquered this region with lighting speed. Kálmáncsehi became the Tiszántúl's first Calvinist bishop, with his seat in Debrecen. After the latter's early death, Péter Melius Juhász, Debrecen's chief pastor, was elected. Melius was an energetic man with a talent for political organization, a talent which he was to make abundant use of as Calvinist bishop of the Tiszántúl.

Under Melius, Debrecen became a major centre of the Reformation. In 1560 the bishop invited Gál Huszár from Transdanubia to set up the country's first Calvinist printing press. (This was the second press in this region, after the one at Várad, which had been in operation since 1550.) Melius also compiled a book on herbs, began a Bible translation, and wrote theological tracts, poems and sermons.

In 1561, when Melius was already a bishop, he set down his confession of faith based on the Calvinist creed, which later became known as the *Debrecen-egervölgyi hitvallás* (Confession of Debrecen and Egervölgy). In 1567, the Debrecen synod of ministers from the Tiszántúl adopted Melius's confession. This involved the regulation of all aspects of life, from dogma and divine worship to individual and public morality and even intimate details relating to the conduct of family life.

"Pope Peter", as he was dubbed by his adversaries, faced struggles throughout his life: against those who remained Catholics, against Luther's Hungarian and Saxon followers, and finally against the latest strand of the Reformation of his time, the Antitrinitarians led by Michael Servetus. In the end, Melius succeeded in halting, at least in the Tiszántúl, the successive waves of the Reformation going beyond Calvinist sectarianism which had swept over the area in the previous thirty years. When Melius died in 1572, there was no one of comparable calibre to take his place. Only uninspired followers remained to continue where the organizer, theologian and writer had left off. The fire that had characterized the region dimmed considerably.

Melius had protected Debrecen from the army of peasants gathered around the religious enthusiast György Karácsony, and had driven Tamás Arany and his Antitrinitarians from the town. However, in those areas which were outside his power religious dispute continued unabated. In Kolozsvár Ferenc Dávid (Franz Davidis, or Franz Hertel), who, like Heltai, was of Saxon birth, became the Hungarian Lutheran bishop in 1556. Like Melius's, Dávid's life centred around religious controversy. But his sceptical mind dove him from one crisis of faith to another. After fierce disputes with the Calvinists, he found himself doubting the truth of the position he had been advocating. He resigned his port as Lutheran bishop in 1559, only to take up the Calvinist faith, and the Hungarian burghers of Kolozsvár were quick to follow their popular minister. In 1564 the Nagyenyed synod of Transylvania's Hungarian ministers again elected Dávid as their bishop, with the result that the whole diocese now turned Calvinist.

When John II appointed Dávid to be his court chaplain, the bishop met with another challenge. The court physician, the Italian Giorgio Blandrata, was a declared Antitrinitarian. Years of dispute followed until finally, in 1568, Dávid announced that he no longer believed in Christ being one godhead with the Father. Again, the town followed him, as did his sovereign. Accordingly, the Antitrinitarians became a recognized denomination in Transylvania, and some of Europe's most daring theological thinkers — Johannes Sommer, Christian Francken, Jacobus Paleologus, and Mathias Vehe-Glirius — visited the new country.

Kolozsvár became an important intellectual centre: Heltai's press published numerous prints, including the works of its owner which made Heltai the most outstanding literary figure of his time and one of the most famous in the whole history of Hungarian literature. It also published poems by Sebestyén Tinódi Lantos, the first great poet to write in Hungarian, as well as a Hungarian translation of Werbőczy's *Tripartitum*.

By the late 1560s Transylvania presented an unusual picture as far as religion was concerned. Three Protestant denominations existed, although Catholicism did not disappear completely. Some of the Székelys of Csík and Háromszék remained Catholic, as did some of the nobles in the Partium. Most of the Romanians retained their Greek Orthodox religion.

Transylvania was unique alongside Poland in that religious persecution never really took place there. John I, while remaining a Catholic himself, always showed tolerance towards his priests who were constantly disputing various questions of dogma. Friar George, whose coarser nature prompted him to act more forcefully from time to time, made the Diet pass a law in 1545 which prohibited innovations in religion, but, this was the last measure of its kind. The Diet held at Torda in 1543 already recognized Lutheranism, forbidding only additional innovations.

Soon, however, the Calvinists appeared on the scene, followed by the Antitrinitarians. The 1568 Diet announced general freedom of religion, saying that "faith is a gift of God".[10] Only two years later, however, a law had to be passed to curb theological excesses. By this time, though, four denominations existed side by side and more or less harmoniously. Transylvania's fifth denomination, Greek Orthodoxy, was tolerated, although it was not considered as being on an equal footing with the others.

One explanation for such tolerance lies in the strong divisions within this feudal society. Lutheranism was supported by the autonomous Saxons; the nobility, faced with the dismemberment of the old Hungary and a spiritual crisis, initially followed the teachings of Luther, but then adopted Calvinism; Antitrinitarianism became the denomination of Transylvania's Hungarian burghers in Kolozsvár.

Political as well as intellectual and ethnic factors determined the choice of religion. Responding to the new political circumstances, the Transylvanian Saxons accepted the teachings that originated in Germany. The staunchly anti-Habsburg Péter Petrovics had obvious political reasons for decisively and on two occasions-supporting the Hungarian Calvinists. In search of his own and his country's identity, the ever-restless John II found in Antitrini-

10. *EOE* II, 343.

tarianism the means through which he could express both his adherence to the Christian world and the distance from it that politics forced him to maintain. As for the Székelys, some stuck to Catholicism, seeing in it a safeguard of their manifestly diminishing rights. Others accepted the successive strains of Protestantism, from Lutheranism all the way to Antitrinitarianism, with a few of them even embracing the latter's Sabbatarian offshoot. Economic decline or prosperity seems also to have influenced a particular group's acceptance or non-acceptance of the new creeds. While the stagnating Saxon towns became Lutheran but went no further, Kolozsvár, which continued to flourish economically as well as intellectually, adopted almost every branch of the Reformation.

But if the ruler's power was almost unlimited how could the Estates, and even social state which did not enjoy their rights, remain independent in matters of religion? The answer must lie in the exceptional situation of the new country.

In a state that had come into existence by accident rather than by design and whose future was uncertain, the religion of their subjects was of secondary importance for the rulers.

István Báthory's religious policies clearly reflect the relationship between the government and religion. In the 1570s, the tireless Ferenc Dávid took biblical criticism one step further, and declared that Christ was not to be worshipped. The voivode, Kristóf Báthory, had no desire to coerce Dávid, and summoned Faustus Socinus, the famous Antitrinitarian thinker, to Transylvania to convince the bishop of his error. But Socinus was unsuccessful, and finally the voivode had Dávid arrested on various charges, some of which were false. Dávid died in the fortress of Déva in November, 1579, and after this the Antitrinitarian sect disintegrated. A moderate wing, led by Blandrata, went on to become the Unitarian church. The radicals, on the other hand, formed the Sabbatarian sect: under the influence of Mathias Vehe-Glirius, a one-time follower of Dávid, they rejected the New Testament.

Meanwhile István Báthory was doing what he could to save Catholicism from extinction in Transylvania. In 1579, he forced the Transylvanian Diet to allow the Jesuits into the country. Then Báthory founded for them a school of university rank in Kolozsvár, and also permitted them to run a number of elementary schools in other locations. The Protestants were openly hostile to the initially Polish and Italian, but later also Hungarian, Jesuits. Faced with pressure from the Protestant Estates, Báthory made just one concession: he did not reorganize the Catholic church, which was already without a bishop. A new bishop of Gyulafehérvár was appointed only later, under Prince Zsigmond Báthory.

Equally effective was Báthory's interference in the conversion of Orthodox Romanians by Saxons and Hungarians, which had been going on since 1540. In 1544 Szeben's printing press had published a catechism and other works by town interpreter Filip Moldoveanul — written in Romanian and in the spirit of the Reformation. In Brassó Coresi, a Greek orthodox priest, and his followers had a series of ecclesiastic books printed in Slavonic and several in Romanian during 1558 and 1582 but few were in the spirit of the Reformation.

By the end of the 1560s, the Calvinist church of the Transylvanian Romanians had come into existence in the Hátszeg region. Báthory, however, prevented its development, not by the use of force, but by supporting the Greek Orthodox church. After many attempts he appointed a priest named Ghenadie to be the Romanian bishop in 1574: With the continuing influx of Romanians from Wallachia and Moldavia, the Orthodox church was constantly replenished, and finally the Romanian Reformation was segregated. With this the Romanians also lost their chance of gaining any of the privileges that the Estates enjoyed. Inspite of recognition of their bishops, Orthodoxy was not a fully accepted denomination.

The uninterrupted maelstrom of religious renewal and the Counter-Reformation that was now beginning both assuaged the population's thirst for knowledge and the same time stimulated it. By the end of the sixteenth century, Transylvanians had the opportunity to read tens of thousands of books printed at home and abroad. These were largely theological treatises, (with Melanchthon being the most read author), followed by the classical authors and contemporary humanists: primarily the writings of Aristotle, Erasmus, Ramus, Justus Lipsius, and Boccaccio.

But Transylvania was also producing its own literature — not only the earlier-mentioned works by Heltai, but also ones written in the newly discovered and increasingly popular fable genre. Strangely enough the Hungarian awareness is the inspiration for such works as the great epos *Ruinae Pannonicae* written by the Saxon Christian Schaeseus. Christian Pomarius to *Beszterce története* (The History of Beszterce) provides a description of the country and folk of the Saxons. A specifically Transylvanian area of writing in this period was historiography. Antal Verancsics and György Szerémi, formerly at the Szapolyai court, and the Transylvanian-born Miklós Oláh, all wrote important chronicles of Habsburg Hungary. Bishop Ferenc Forgách, who fled to Transylvania from Ferdinand's court, on his arrival in the country wrote a history of the years 1540 and 1570. Farkas Kovacsóczy, another chancellor-author, wrote the first Hungarian book on political theory. Pál Gyulay, a former tutor of Zsigmond Báthory, wrote a chronicle of István Báthory's Russian campaign of 1579–1581. Best of all was István Szamosközy's analytical and unbiased history. And then there were the "official" historians, Gian Michele Bruto, who had been called in from Italy, and his successor, János Baranyai Decsi, a teacher from Marosvásárhely.

Court historians wrote in Latin, probably with an eye on the international reading public. Nevertheless, a Hungarian-language literature was also beginning to evolve at this time. Furthermore, Hungarian became the official language of government, since after 1565 all laws were framed in this tongue.

Culturally, Transylvania did not become isolated from the West. The Reformation in the country had been started by young people from Hungary who had attended universities in western Europe. Honterus encountered Protestant thinking at German and Swiss centres of learning, as did many Saxon and Hungarian preachers of the generation which followed. Wittenberg and Basel were preferred to Catholic Vienna or Cracow. To get there, a basic education had to be acquired. Accordingly, in 1543 Honterus established the *Studium Coronense*, a school with very high standards in

Brassó. Secondary schools sprang up one after the other in Kolozsvár, Marosvásárhely, Gyulafehérvár, Nagyenyed and Székelyudvarhely — mostly with the active support of the princes.

As far as religious tolerance and the flourishing of Hungarian-language literature were concerned, the newly-formed Principality of Transylvania was unusually advanced. Its relative backwardness showed itself in other areas. One example was its belated adoption of the Renaissance mode of living. Many had remodelled their castles in the new Italian fashion as far back as the time of Friar George, but behind the modern walls people continued to live in a mediaeval manner. Of course, the more puritan atmosphere of the Reformation did not favour a lifestyle stemming from *joie de vivre*. The mediators of the latter were primarily the Catholics who came from Italy, first those at the court of Queen Isabella and later those at the court of John II. The final breakthrough was achieved by Zsigmond Báthory, a staunch Catholic. His court was full of Italian musicians, artists, and artisans. Through the musician Gianbattista Mosto and the captain of the guard Gianandrea Gromo, he was in touch with Girolamo Diruta, and even the composer Palestrina. At first, Transylvanian society regarded the court's "modern" Renaissance pomp with suspicion, and the average nobleman and simple burgher felt outright hostility. The culture of the general population remained mediaeval until the early seventeenth century. Where new concepts might have taken root, as the market towns, for example, the Renaissance clashed with the Reformation, and the struggle was clearly decided in favour of the new religion with its simplicity and rigour.

3. Transylvania in the Fifteen Years' War

The highly-centralized Transylvanian government had one major weakness: it was excessively dependent on the personal competence of the head of the state. It was the ruler's ability, or lack of it, which constituted the single most important factor when the country suffered a sudden change of fortune.

When István Báthory died in 1586, a struggle for power inevitably developed around his successor, still a minor, Zsigmond Báthory. Opposing Zsigmond was János Ghiczy, governor since 1585, who now confronted the powerful Báthory clan — the younger István Báthory, captain of Fogaras; Boldizsár Báthory, captain of Várad; and István Bocskai, the boy Zsigmond Báthory's uncle. A third faction was the chancellery, headed by Farkas Kovacsóczy. The Estates, which had been kept under control for thirty years, now took advantage of the situation to assert their power: at the Diet held in October 1588, they maintained that they would declare the sixteen-year-old prince no longer a minor on the stipulation that the Jesuits were expelled from the country. Brought up as a devout Catholic, Zsigmond Báthory resisted this demand, especially since his own confessor, the Spanish Friar Alfonso Carillo, was himself a Jesuit.

Accordingly, the Diet was dissolved — only to be convened again in December. The Báthory cousins now sided with the Estates, and the Diet was able to force the departure of the Society of Jesus. This also marked the

end of the attempt to establish a university in Kolozsvár. Embittered, the aged Ghiczy resigned his post as governor, and died shortly afterwards. The ambitious Báthory clan now reinforced its ties with the Estates, which were headed by the Kendi family. The ruler's powers were increasingly curtailed. In November 1591, the Diet compelled the prince to secure the consent of the Council before taking decisions of national importance. Later it also demanded the establishment of an army and a treasury controlled by the Estates. In the ever more intricate struggle for power Zsigmond informed Boldizsár Báthory of a possible conspiracy against the latter's life. By way of response, Boldizsár had two top chancellery officials, the erudite secretary Pál Gyulay, and János Gálfi, Zsigmond's former tutor murdered.

When the prince failed to react to the crime, Chancellor Kovacsóczy made overtures to the opposition, and even established marriage ties with the Kendis and with Boldizsár Báthory, the husband of the other Kendi daughter.

For Zsigmond one support remained — the army. The soldiers of the late King Stephen, battle-hardened in Polish campaigns, had for the last years been idling in Transylvania's border fortresses. In 1593 this army received an unexpected opportunity to influence the course of politics.

That year Hungary became involved in another war with the Turks. Surprisingly, the Christian troops were initially at an advantage. Zsigmond Báthory, educated by the Jesuits and heir to King Stephen's grand designs, sent Friar Carillo to Emperor Rudolph, to propose an alliance. In February 1594, the prince announced in Gyulafehérvár that the country would join the Holy League. A few weeks later Transylvanian troops set out for the Temesköz to attack the Turkish garrisons there.

However, the Transylvanian Estates had not forgotten the lessons they had learned in the 1550s. They realized that the coalition consisted of just the emperor, Venice, and the pope. The immediate neighbour, Poland was pursuing an expressly pro-Turkish policy. Accordingly, at the Diet held at Torda on 12 May, 1594, they refused to endorse the declaration of war. In early July, Zsigmond again convened the Diet but the Estates marched in fully armed and passed a resolution for the maintenance of peace. The war's principal supporters had already left to defend the border castles from the Turks. The prince, greatly disappointed, abdicated his throne.

This action on the part of the ruler caught the opposition off guard, and Boldizsár Báthory, Sándor Kendi, and Farkas Kovacsóczy, spent weeks negotiating for a replacement. In the meantime, the captain of Kővár, Kristóf Kereszturi, and his associates, István Bocskai, the new captain of Várad, Ferenc Geszty, captain of Déva, Gáspár Kornis, and László Gyulaffy persuaded Zsigmond Báthory to return. This he did, at the head of his army, and the Estates did not oppose him. The Diet, meeting on 20 August, 1594, had the leaders of the opposition arrested: Sándor Kendi, his brother Gábor, and three members of the council were beheaded, while Boldizsár Báthory, Farkas Kovacsóczy, and Ferenc Kendi were all murdered in prison. On 28 January, 1595 István Bocskai signed a treaty in Prague confirming Transylvania's membership of the Holy League. In return Emperor Rudolph officially recognized Zsigmond's title of prince and even designated a bride for him, in the person of Archduchess Maria Christina of Habsburg.

In the spring of 1595, the Transylvanian forces attacked the Turks, and György Borbély, captain of Karánsebes, recaptured almost every fortress along the Maros River — from Világos to Arad and from Facset to Borosjenő. In the late summer the sovereign himself led the main army into Wallachia to assist his secret ally for the past year, Mihai Viteazul. Mihai, voivode of Wallachia since 1593, was threatened by the 40,000 strong army of Grand Vizier Sinan pasha, sent to subdue the "rebellious vassal". On 23 August, Mihai succeeded in stopping the Turks at Călugăreni, but in face of superior force he was compelled to retreat. Báthory now called the Székelys to arms, inviting them to participate alongside the princely army and the troops of the Estates. The Székelys quickly seized the opportunity to secure from the prince the re-establishment of their ancient liberties. They alone comprised some 23,000 men, and with the army thus reinforced, Bocskai took Tîrgoviște in mid-October, destroying most of Sinan pasha's retreating forces near Giurgiu on 25 October.

The country had to pay dearly however for the brilliant victory. The Transylvanian nobility started to object to the liberation of the Székelys, since this deprived them of thousands of serfs. Zsigmond, although at first appearing to negotiate, rescinded his decision at the beginning of 1596. Betrayed by the prince who owed his victory to their heroism in battle, the Székelys were on the verge of revolt when István Bocskai's troops forestalled the action with extraordinary brutality, staging an event which came to be known as the "Bloody Carnival". But the fortunes of battle took a turn. The siege of Temesvár had to be abandoned in the summer of 1596, and between 23 October and 26 October the united Christian forces, which included Báthory's army, lost the Battle of Mezőkeresztes against Sultan Mohammed III. In January 1597, the prince went to the court in Prague and offered to abdicate in favour of Emperor Rudolph. Once more he was persuaded to stay on — although the series of military defeats which continued throughout the year eventually changed his mind, and Friar Carillo was sent to the imperial court to mediate over Báthory's abdication. Rudolph conceded, and in April 1598 imperial commissioners arrived in Transylvania to take over the reins of government. Bocskai had the army swear allegiance to the emperor, and, as recompensation, Báthory was given the small Silesian duchies of Oppeln and Ratibor.

The repeated military defeats and the emperor's interference in Transylvanian affairs rekindled the Estates' pro-Turkish sentiments. When Bocskai was relieved of his post as army commander he turned to Zsigmond Báthory, who then secretly returned to Transylvania in August 1598, assuring the army of his support and reinstating Bocskai as commander. The main pro-Turkish official, Chancellor István Jósika, was executed, and the imperial commissioners were sent home.

Naturally, imperial Prague did not accept the new state of affairs; the Turks, exploiting the instability, laid siege to Várad, the gateway to Transylvania. (Ironically, it was the imperial garrison that defended the castle.) The sultan refused Báthory's offer of peace, whereupon Friar Carillo turned to Poland's all-powerful chancellor, Jan Zamoyski, for support. In March 1599 Zsigmond again abdicated his throne — this time in favour of his cousin, Cardinal András Báthory, who had been living in Poland. Since Cracow

backed the new prince, Constantinople agreed to this new arrangement. Transylvania's change of sides, on the other hand, had cut Wallachia off from its Christian allies. The voivode, Mihai Viteazul, therefore decided to march against Prince András, and in this he had the support, both moral and financial, of Emperor Rudolph. In the Battle of Sellenberk, fought near Szeben on 28 October, 1599, the Transylvanian commander Gáspár Kornis was defeated by the Wallachians, who were backed by the Székelys. On 3 November the Székelys, out of hatred for the Báthorys, murdered the retreating cardinal-prince. On 1 November, Mihai Viteazul entered Gyulafehérvár; and at the end of the month, the Diet recognized him as imperial governor. He was never made a prince and it never occurred to him to connect Transylvania with Wallachia: the government of the two countries remained separate.

Although Mihai Viteazul installed Wallachian boyars in the more important offices, he did not interfere with the Transylvanian system of government by the Estates. He also sought the support of the Hungarian nobility. Transylvania's Romanians were granted no new political rights; the only change was that the Greek Orthodox church was now recognized. Mihai's rule was never secure, however. First, it was shaken by the brutality of the Székelys in their retribution for the "Bloody Carnival" of 1596. Then, Mihai's own unpaid Romanian and Serbian mercenaries began pillaging. Finally, the emperor withdrew his support when he realized that the voivode wanted to keep the province for himself.

In May 1600, Mihai Viteazul hurriedly organized a campaign against Moldavia, but although he succeeded in taking it from the pro-Polish voivode Ieremia Movilă, the booty in that poverty-stricken land was insufficient to support his army for long. In Transylvania, there seemed to be no end to the excesses. In the name of the Estates, István Csáky turned for aid to Emperor Rudolph's general, Giorgio Basta, who in September 1600, marched into the country with a strong army of mercenaries. After he defeated Mihai Viteazul on 18 September at Miriszló, Transylvania was once more a province of the Habsburg Empire. In late October the Transylvanian Estates swore allegiance to Rudolph. At the same time, Székely liberties, which Mihai had restored, were revoked, and István Bocskai was driven into exile.

With their pay almost always in arrears or not forthcoming at all, Basta's soldiers soon began pillaging Transylvania, which proved a more lucrative source of booty than war-torn royal Hungary had been. The brutal deeds of Hungarian, Walloon, Italian, Bohemian, and German mercenaries fill the diaries of contemporaries. All the while, Turkish and Tatar raiders were making incursions along the undefended frontier.

In desperation, the Transylvanian nobility again turned to Zsigmond Báthory, who arrived quickly at the head of a Polish army, and reclaimed his throne in 1601. Basta withdrew without battle, simply to reinforce his troops. In the summer of the same year he launched an offensive, assisted by Mihai Viteazul, who had been driven out of Wallachia and who hoped to regain his power with Rudolph's support. Basta defeated Báthory at Goroszló on 3 August, and after the engagement, had Mihai murdered in

his camp. Centuries later the voivode was to be remembered as a heroic figure in the struggle for Romanian unity.

The atrocities of the mercenaries began anew, and, to crown it all, Zsigmond Báthory returned to his devastated country for a fourth time: he who had earlier driven Transylvania into a war against the Turks, now faced his own subjects as an ally of the sultan and with an army that included Turkish and Tatar soldiers. By the beginning of 1602, Báthory was again the ruler of Transylvania. But seeing the effects of his "conquest" for the devastated country he became distraught, and after only a few months in power he left Transylvania for the last time. He died in Prague in 1613.

On hearing of the prince's intention to leave Transylvania, Basta marched into the country once more, defeating the troops of the Estates at Tövis and occupying the entire principality by July 1602. The mercenaries' depredations and the senseless wars with the Turks soon prompted the Transylvanian people to make a last desperate attempt to save their homeland. In April 1603 Mózes Székely rallied the Transylvanian troops and routed Basta's mercenaries with the aid of Turkish and Tatar auxiliaries. On 8 May, Székely even assumed the title of prince. But the cruelty of the Tatars surpassed even that of the mercenaries, and Radu Şerban, the new voivode of Wallachia, attacked Transylvania as an ally of the emperor. The Székelys sided with Radu. Mózes Székely fell in the Battle of Brassó on 17 July, 1603, which his supporters lost.

Basta returned with a new army, and after again plundering the entire region, withdrew his troops in early 1604. Transylvania, exhausted and humiliated, was left with no strength to act.

István Bocskai's Uprising and the Resurrection of the Transylvanian State

While Transylvania laboured under its own cross, in the territories of the kingdom the war between imperial and Turkish forces which had been going on since 1593 became deadlocked. Repeatedly, but always unsuccessfully, the Christian forces laid siege to Buda. On the other hand, in 1600 the Turks captured Kanizsa, and in doing so came menacingly close to the Austrian border.

In the county of Nógrád the emperor's soldiers still controlled the territories they had occupied at the beginning of the war. But the annual campaigns forced both sides to use increasing numbers of irregular troops, since trained men and financial resources were in ever shorter supply.

Finding itself in desperate straits, the imperial government took an unprecedented step, indicting the most powerful Hungarian landowners on false charges of treason. One of its targets was István Bocskai, who had retired to his estates in the Tiszántúl. Bocskai was accused of maintaining contact with the Transylvanian exiles who enjoyed Turkish protection, that is, with the remnants of the pro-Turkish party. A Hungarian army of haiduks, who were notorious for their cruelty, was sent against Bocskai. En route, however, they staged a mutiny, in part because of the emperor's anti-Cal-

vinist policies. Joining up with Bocskai's own troops, they routed Barbiano, the captain of Kassa, in a battle fought near Álmosd on 15 October, 1604.

On 11 November, Bocskai and the haiduks marched into Kassa itself, encountering almost no resistance. Not much later the leader of the exiles, Gábor Bethlen, handed Bocskai the ahdname in which the sultan recognized him as prince of Transylvania, and soon Turkish and Tatar reinforcements arrived on the scene. Giorgio Basta, who was now the commander of all Hungary, launched an offensive which, although initially successful, was subsequently halted by Bocskai. After this the entire Tiszántúl, with the exception of Várad, submitted to the Turkish-supported prince.

From April 1605 onwards, the roving haiduk and Tatar armies swept over almost all of royal Hungary. A group of Hungarian lords headed by István Illésházy, the man most severely affected by the estate confiscations which the treason trials entailed, sided with Bocskai. By September most of the troops were pillaging the areas along the Austrian border, between Sopron and Vienna. A laboriously-assembled imperial army led by Count Tilly counter-attacked, but could only retake Transdanubia.

In the meantime, on 20 April, 1605, the Diet, meeting at Szerencs, had elected Bocskai prince of Hungary. He went on to ask the sultan to grant him the title of king of Hungary, but by the time Grand Vizier Mohammed Lalla arrived with a splendid crown, the defeats in Transdanubia had dampened spirits. Bocskai, still mistrustful of the Turks, finally gave up the idea of the coronation. Instead, he began to take charge of Transylvania — not just nominally but also in reality.

For years the new prince had enjoyed no contact at all with the country he was now to govern. His retinue consisted of haiduk captains, Hungarian lords, and a few nobles who took his side. Transylvania was however, wary of trusting the man who had embroiled them in war, who had brutally punished the Székelys, and who had contributed to their general misery. Yet the Estates felt powerless to act and stood idly by as Bocskai occupied the Partium, and, afterwards, Lugos and Karánsebes. When in early 1605 Bocskai sent an army under László Gyulaffy into Transylvania, the Székelys left the Habsburg camp, choosing to accept Bocskai's word that he would restore their liberties. Resistance was now confined to the Saxon towns and the few troops who remained loyal to the emperor. Old but tenacious, Albert Huet count of the Saxons organized opposition but to no avail: when Bocskai himself entered Transylvania in 1605, the Saxon towns and imperial garrisons capitulated one after the other. As they laid down their arms, the Fifteen Years War came to an end in Transylvania. On 14 September the Diet, meeting at Medgyes, installed the new prince in office.

However, in the rest of Hungary, the war continued. Bocskai delegated the running of Transylvania to Zsigmond Rákóczi, aged landowner from the Partium, and set out in person to secure peace. In this he encountered opposition from some of his supporters, and the emperor attempted to have him murdered. But Bocskai persisted. The haiduk captains, who refused to stop fighting, were executed. Most of the haiduks themselves were settled on land in the devastated Tiszántúl, and were given collective liberties on the Székely model. Negotiations with the imperial court finally led to the Peace of Vienna, concluded on 23 June, 1606. The Principality of Transylva-

nia was restored, and its western border was redrawn, with Bocskai receiving the counties of Szatmár, Szabolcs, Ugocsa and Bereg and the castle of Tokaj, although admittedly only as non-hereditary donations. In the Kingdom of Hungary freedom of religion was re-established, and it was decided that henceforth only Hungarians would be nominated to the high offices of the realm.

Less than six months after the Peace of Vienna, another, no less significant, treaty was concluded, with the Turks. This was the Peace of Zsitvatorok, signed on 15 November, 1606. The borders of the Turkish occupied territory were defined according to the situation at the moment. Neither the emperor nor the sultan, drawn into another war with Persia, was able to alter the given situation.

One and a half decades of fighting had came to an end. The military balance was almost equal: the Turks had taken Kanizsa and Eger, while the Christian forces had advanced to Nógrád county and along the Maros River in Transylvania. This state of affairs was extraordinary, as contemporaries were quick to realize: for since 1521 the Turks had not waged a war with Hungary that had not resulted in their victory. Time was undermining Constantinople's colossal military machine, and lacking new conquests, the Ottoman Empire was now beginning its slow decline.

Transylvanians realized, as so often before, that the House of Habsburg would be unable to protect their distant country from the Turks, while at the same time they needed the emperor's support to neutralize the Ottoman threat. Just as in the mid-sixteenth century it had been the Hungarian ruling class that had established the new state to secure its own survival, it was again the great lords of the Tiszántúl who now came to revive a country that had almost ceased to exist. Once more the Transylvanians submitted to the Turks, belatedly and partly out of compulsion. Nevertheless, in Bocskai's time there was something new in the relationship between Transylvania and royal Hungary: the realization that the Hungarian Estates could profit from Transylvania. "As long as the Hungarian Crown is with a nation mightier than ours, with the German, ... it will be necessary and expedient to have a Hungarian prince in Transylvania, for he shall provide protection and be of use to them", wrote Bocskai in his testament.[11]

The lesson that Hungary and Transylvania had learned was a cruel one. While the devastation does not appear to have been as great as on the Great Hungarian Plain or around Buda, where whole counties were almost entirely depopulated, the military operations, the excesses, and the epidemics that followed in the wake of the campaign in Transylvania greatly reduced the population there.

What had not been destroyed in the fighting had been gravely affected by the systematic looting. The inhabitants of the smaller settlements were no more spared having to pay exorbitant sums in ransom money than those who lived in the larger towns. There is evidence that during the rampages of Basta's armies, the area around Brassó paid out some 35,000 florins. Moreover, it was rumoured that the general himself took two tons of gold

11. *Magyar történelmi szöveggyűjtemény.* (Hungarian Historical Texts.) Ed. by GY. EMBER — L. MAKKAI — T. WITTMAN. Budapest 1968, I, 372.

and silverware from Transylvania. For a country that already was short of money, the removal of its coin and precious metals threatened to precipitate economic collapse. At the same time, the huge estates formerly owned by the ruling prince had been broken up. In addition to all the destruction, the Székelys were a constant danger, not having forgotten the atrocities that had been committed against them.

Bocskai was able to resurrect Transylvania, but the country could never become what it had been before. Poorer and more vulnerable than ever, its revival was not so much due to its own strength as to the exhaustion of its two main neighbours. Should one or both of these recover sufficiently to resume hostilities against the other, the fate of the principality would once again be uncertain.

The new ruler was an outstanding military leader, and, in the last years of his life, an able diplomat and statesman. Had he lived longer, he would perhaps have speeded up the recovery of the country. But this was not to be. Only a few weeks after reaching the peak of his life, the conclusion of the Vienna and Zsitvatorok agreements, Bocskai died in Kassa, his temporary capital, on 29 December, 1606. In their unbridled grief, his haiduks murdered Chancellor Mihály Káthay, whom they suspected of having poisoned the prince. This, however, could not alter the fact that Transylvania had to choose another ruler.

II. The Golden Age of the Principality (1606–1660)

1. The Antecedents

Population

At the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, famine swept over the entire continent of Europe. Introducing a so-called "little ice age" the seventeenth century brought cold, rainy summers, with hail and repeated flooding. In the Carpathian Basin at this time the Fifteen Years' War added to the misery. In Transylvania, conditions were especially critical: cases of cannibalism were reported by horrified contemporaries.

The precise scope of the devastation is difficult to assess. In the multi-form region of the counties Belső-Szolnok and Doboka, exact data show for instance that in the lowlands Hungarian and Saxon villages had lost over 80 per cent of their people, while the Romanians living in mountainous areas lost only 45 per cent of theirs. Even allowing for the fact that part of the missing population did not die but had sought safety somewhere, the effective population loss was clearly enormous.

Other facts also indicate that people in hard-to-reach areas were less affected by the devastation than the inhabitants of settlements along the military routes. Fortified towns provided a degree of protection as well. But even such towns as Szeben and Brassó had lost as much as three quarters of their population by the time peace was concluded in 1606. Another figure concerns the tanners' guild of Beszterce: a mere 10 per cent of its masters had remained in the town.

Clearly, generalizations from any of these isolated figures would not be very reasonable. Yet, along with data on taxation, they suggest that approximately one half of the population of Transylvania was destroyed at the turn of the seventeenth century by the coincidence of natural catastrophes and war, and only some 10 per cent of the country's wealth and economy remained.

As to the process that led out of the crisis, there are a number of aspects to be considered. Owing to a lack of precise statistical sources only conjectures are possible, which suggest that by the 1650s the population recovered to approximately its late sixteenth-century level.

In the first place certain changes in public attitude give proof of demographic stabilization. From the 1620s on, for instance, the Diet took a new stand regarding deserting serfs. While at earlier Diets the primary concern had been to force serfs to return to their lords, there is hardly any mention

of such demands after 1628. Another indication of stabilization is the fact that while in the first two decades of the seventeenth century the Diet frequently relieved new settlers of paying taxes for a six-year period, after the 1620s such dispositions become increasingly rare. This shows that by the late 1620s, the domains must have been operating satisfactorily, even if their population did not reach the pre-war level. There are signs of similar developments in the towns, though it is sure that in the Saxon areas as late as the 1650s many houses were still vacant. Nevertheless they had stabilized their economy, one sign of this being that in the period of the greatest monetary devaluation, in the late 1620s, only the Saxons were able to change their worthless tax in coins into gold.

One of the reactions to the catastrophes was a sudden rise in the birth rate, as is frequently the case under such conditions. This is manifest in many interrelations, but genealogical accounts provide the hardest data. Clearly, however, such accounts are available only for the high-born. The generation of the turn of the century sired a remarkably large number of children. An example is Lázár Apor who lived in the first half of the seventeenth century. He had ten children, but only two grandchildren and three great-grandchildren; his forebears in the sixteenth century all had only two or three offspring. Another family, the Hallers, registered three children or fewer per generation until the early seventeenth century, when Pál Haller had nine children by three wives. In the Mikó family, one or two offspring were the rule before the seventeenth century, but there were four or even five for the ensuing generations. The Lázárs are perhaps the only exception, with two generations having seven children in the sixteenth century, and later Lázárs siring no more than five children at most.

Such genealogical data are of course not wholly reliable sources on numbers of births, since probably only family members reaching adulthood were entered in the family chronicles. Since, however, a certain consistency can be presupposed, genealogical tables can be taken as indicative if not of the precise number of descendants, certainly of the comparative sizes of families.

There was clearly a demographic explosion following the period of destruction. There are no available facts, as to the exact circumstances that led to this change, nor is there any circumstantial evidence with regard to a possible lowering of the marrying age, or regulations to encourage children-bearing. It is also possible that the demographic explosion was simply the result of the increased care given to children when, following the shock that accompanied the vast depopulation, the value of life rose.

A second factor which aided regeneration was the fact that after the demographic explosion, the birth rate never seriously declined, as it did in the rest of Europe in the seventeenth century.

In the domain of Gyalu, between 1640 and 1666 the proportion of boys to heads of families exceeded 1.0 in every one of these years. This means that the average family size was above 4.0. Only for the year 1638 is there a record of the number of girls, when the average family sizes was 3.8, 4.4, 3.7, and 4.3 in four different locations within the seigniory.

An even higher population growth was evident in the county of Fogaras between 1632 and 1640 when the male population increased from 0.9 to 1.4 per family in Fogaras itself, and from 1.4 to 1.6 per family in Porumbák.

Only in Komána was there a decrease from 1.6 to 1.3, but on the average the entire domain shows a population growth. The average number of male offsprings to a family head was 1.07 in 1632; 1.3 in 1637; and 1.4 in 1640. The rate of growth applying to entire families is not documented either in Fogaras county or Gyalu, nevertheless it is clear that the population was increasing and there was a tendency to have larger families both in the seigniory and the county as a whole.

It is unlikely that all parts of Transylvania or all of its social groups evidenced the demographic explosion indicated by the above statistics of the early seventeenth century. Still, this was the most significant factor in the principality's recovery.

Nevertheless the Romanian population did grow in this period, due in part to the fact that many of them moved into the villages depopulated during the war. The Romanians also tended to have larger families than the Hungarian population. This also explains the difference between the increase in the population of Fogaras county and of Gyalu: the population of the former was Romanian, of the latter, Hungarian.

The Free Election of a Prince and Gábor Báthory's Coup

The most poignant lesson to be learned from the exhausting Fifteen Years' War was that the two Great Powers with interests in Hungary were unable to outmatch each other. This realization strongly influenced Hungarian politics for many decades. One direct result, however, was that domestic affairs could be conducted without blatant foreign interference for quite some time. Its political mobility being greater than ever, Transylvania's enormous demographic and economic losses seemed recompensed at least to some degree.

Following István Bocskai's death a race began for the throne of Transylvania. Many aspirants were gathering backers, but two in particular had hopes of getting elected. One was Bálint Homonnay Drugeth, whom István Bocskai had designated to follow him in office: the other was Gábor Báthory, a relative of the Báthory princes. Initially, their chances were by and large equal: there were considerations for and against both. They were young, of noble birth, skilled soldiers and well-known personalities, and both had fought on the side of István Bocskai.

The Transylvanian Estates, however, held against them precisely those arguments on which they themselves based their claims: Homonnay's election would mean that the Estates would recognize a prince's right to designate his successor; while another Báthory posed the threat of dynastic rule. Both candidates thus endangered the Estates' right freely to elect the prince. They also held against Homonnay the fact that he enjoyed external support: Constantinople had officially recognized him as Bocskai's successor. In the end, this was the reason why most Transylvanian politicians turned against him. The Fifteen Years' War, in which they rightly felt the country had been a pawn in the hands of foreign powers, had left them with the desire to settle their own life.

With neither of the two contenders winning undivided support, the nobility of the Principality of Transylvania nominated their own candidate. He was Zsigmond Rákóczi, who by the appointment of Bocskai, had been serving as governor since 1605. His contemporaries did not consider him a particularly able statesman, nonetheless in his own way he must have been a man of considerable talent. He was among the few who had been able to take advantage of the political situation at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and rose from the nobility to the ranks of the aristocracy. On taking the office of governor of Transylvania, he had moved here from Felsővadász in the Kingdom of Hungary with his affluent wife and two barely teenage sons, and immediately turned his attention to the two Romanian voivodates of Moldavia and Wallachia and the affairs of the lands of the Exchequer. He was involved in examining the possibilities of reviving foreign trade and in taking account of the revenues available to the treasury when the news of István Bocskai's death reached him. His claim to the throne was obvious.

Objectively speaking he was at a disadvantage as compared to Homonnay and Báthory since he had no hope of external support. For the Transylvanian Estates, however, this was a deciding factor in Rákóczi's favour, making him able to stand for election as their own candidate. Rákóczi's objective advantage over his rivals was that he was personally present in Transylvania, while his opponents had to organize their support from outside the principality.

No one wanted to hurry the election, however. The Diet set the date for sometime after Bocskai's funeral, and did not count on any unexpected occurrence. Thus it was with no feigned surprise that the Estates received a letter from Archduke Matthias calling upon them to delay the election until Emperor Rudolph — in keeping with the provisions of the Peace of Vienna — notified them of his intentions.[1] Their astonishment was all the greater since no part of the 1606 peace treaty even implied that the emperor had such rights of interference. What the archduke's communication in fact made clear was that Rudolph's government did not consider the issue of Transylvania's independence settled by the 1606 Vienna agreement. This attempt at intervention set Transylvania in motion: on 12 February, 1607, the Diet elected Zsigmond Rákóczi prince of Transylvania. With this election, a *fait accompli* was created. It seemed as though the treaties of 1606 were being implemented literally, and Transylvania, again independent, had succeeded in carrying out her first self-motivated action. True, the seizure of power by Rákóczi set off an immense uproar outside the principality but none of the parties concerned raised a real objection.

It was Constantinople where the major injury was left unavenged. In fact, Mustapha agha who brought the ahdname of the sultan and the princely insignia for Homonnay, was already stationed at the border when Rákóczi was elected, but was presumably bribed by the latter. Rákóczi was afraid of serious revenge so that, in exchange for his recognition as prince of Transylvania, he offered the grand vizier, Murad pasha two fortified castles, Lippa and Jenő which had come in to the possession of Transylvania in the course

1. The edition of the letter: *EOE* V, 480.

Church founders, 1409. A fresco completely repainted in 1743 in the Greek Orthodox Romanian Church at Sztrigyszentgyörgy. Watercolour reproduction

7. A page from the breviary of Domokos Kálmáncsehi. The embellishment was executed ▶
by Franciscus de Castello Italico de Mediolano in the royal book illuminating workshop
at Buda between 1481 and 1495

8. John Sigismund in front of Suleiman at Zimony, preparing for the attack on Szigetvár in 1566. ▶
Turkish miniature, 1568

9. Virginal belonging to Katherine of Brandenburg, 1617

11. Letter patent of nobility. Granted by György Rákóczi I to István Nagybányai Csengeri Képíró, his court painter. Gyulafehérvár, 11 March, 1632

2. Letter patent of nobility of Adam Erazmus, princely secretary, 11 May, 1607

3. Ten ducat coin minted by Gábor Bethlen as a present from the prince. Enamelled in parts, in a base embellished with pearls and almandite. Minted at Nagyszeben, 1611. Obverse and reverse

14. The middle part of a tablecloth belonging to Zsuzsanna Lorántffy (seventeenth century)

of the Fifteen Years' War. The reply of the Sublime Porte was, however, surprising, Murad rejected the castles and wrote to Rákóczi to do as they wished only not to wage a war.

* * *

Royal Hungary was equally eager to prevent war. Even though before Rákóczi's election both the kingdom's politicians and the Habsburgs had supported first Homonnay then Báthory, no one was willing to launch military action. Rather they tried to pressure Transylvania through negotiations to effect Rákóczi's abdication.

Initially Zsigmond Rákóczi, along with most of the Transylvanian politicians, refused to negotiate, but finally the wish to preserve the peace impelled them treat with the Habsburgs. The threat to Transylvania's peace was being posed by the haiduks. This special military force, which had fought valiantly throughout the Fifteen Years' War, had been completely ignored after István Bocskai's death. Ever since 1606, their discontent had hovered over the country like a black cloud. And the country, though trembling at the prospect of another war, did nothing to calm them, nor to meet their demands. They were not asking for much, only for their pay, a sum of 45,000 florins. But in the penurious year of 1607, neither Transylvania nor Hungary had any cash.

The soldiers restlessness erupted in a movement organized by the haiduk general, András Nagy, in the autumn of 1607. His men even negotiated with the pasha of Buda, Ali. Until the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna were implemented, they declared, they would not lay down their arms. In December 1607 they even considered electing Bálint Homonnay as king of all Hungary. By then, though, the young aristocrat had tired of struggling for the rule of Transylvania and was doing all he could to evade the haiduks' envoys. But the haiduks would not be pacified. Having no definite goal, they were like a weapon lying on the ground, waiting to be picked up. They would serve anyone who bent down to them.

In the end, it was Gábor Báthory, who availed himself of the opportunity. In a Machiavellian spirit, he negotiated throughout the year 1607 with those considering steps to protect the country's law and order against the haiduks, and then in February 1608, he signed a pact with them. According to the accord, General András Nagy and Captain János Elek agreed to form an alliance with Gábor Báthory to help him to power as prince of Transylvania. He in turn agreed to support the Calvinist faith and to make András Nagy the second man in the principality. The haiduks' preacher, Máté Foktűi, would be rewarded with goods and chattels and would be appointed as one of the prince's counsellors. And finally: Gábor Báthory would see that the haiduks got lands to settle on in the area between Várad, Ecsed and Kálló.

Soon after the pact was concluded the stage was set for Báthory's election. The agreement was signed on 5 February, 1608 and on 7 March, Gábor Báthory became prince of Transylvania. Not a shot had been fired. Báthory had negotiated with the backing of the country's only military power, and Transylvania surrendered for fear of that power. Zsigmond Rákóczi abdicated.

In War and in Peace

Zsigmond Rákóczi displayed great political acumen when he resigned his title. To insist on his rightful office at the cost of opposing Báthory would have been a tragic mistake. It would have meant his defeat, and further devastation for Transylvania. For the alliance between Gábor Báthory and the haiduks was a clear sign that the young aristocrat was willing to risk war to attain his ambitious goal.

Rákóczi's resignation did dampen Báthory's zeal, however, as indeed did Transylvania's statesmen shortly thereafter. They were appalled to hear of his designs, to attack Moldavia and Wallachia without delay. His mind had been set on the war even before he had taken his title, though both the conditions set for his election by the Estates as well as the political course of his predecessors obliged him to aim at good relations with the two voivodates. Another clash with the neighbours right after an exhaustive war was abhorrent to everyone.

Nonetheless only a month after his installation, Báthory sent a confidant to Michael Weiss, the respected justice of Brassó and a man knowledgeable in the neighbouring principalities' affairs, to inquire about a possible way to overthrow the Wallachian voivode, Radu Şerban. The sage justice sought to dissuade him in the strongest terms. His concern was that of the circumspect Saxon unwilling to sever the profitable economic ties with the two voivodates. He was unable to change Báthory's mind, however. The prince sent secret envoys to Moldavia, to win the support of the young voivode's mother, Ieremia Movilă, a woman known for her political abilities, against Wallachia.

The Prince's Council, however, opposed the rash plan, openly voting against the prince at a meeting in May 1608. They agreed only to his negotiating a new alliance with the two countries. According to the ensuing agreement, signed on 18 July, 1608, the thirteen-year-old Constantin, voivode of Moldavia, became Transylvania's vassal and was obliged to pay a tribute of 8,000 florins a year. The Wallachian voivode, Radu Şerban, had already sworn an oath of fealty to Transylvania's envoys on 31 May.

The 1608 treaties with the Romanian principalities secured peace along the borders. At the same time they again focused attention on the problem of the haiduks. It would have been much easier to tie them down with warfare against the neighbours than to find the time, energy and money need for their settlement. Since Báthory did not fulfil the conditions of their mutual agreement, the threat of the haiduks' turning against him was imminent, when development came to his rescue. The Habsburg archdukes were determined to take political decision-making out of Rudolph's hands both because his melancholic disposition made them question his fitness for it, and because they thought it wise to make him the scapegoat for the tragedies of the turn of the century. Archduke Matthias was assigned the task of executing the plans.

In early 1608, Matthias gave up his attempts to undermine the Treaty of Vienna, and, in an attempt to win supporters against Rudolph, presented himself as committed to both the Vienna agreement and the Peace of Zsitvatorok. On 1 February, 1608 he forged an alliance with the Estates of both

Hungary and Austria. But since after the long war he could expect little armed assistance from the nobility, he, too, like Báthory a few years earlier, decided to turn to the haiduks. Proceeding shrewdly, on 27 March, 1608 he confirmed the privileges granted by István Bocskai. Three weeks later, he recruited an army of 6,000 haiduks. Báthory was left with only 3,000.

In this way the fate of the haiduks had become a matter of common concern to Matthias and Gábor Báthory. It was with the backing of the haiduks that the archduke had been able to negotiate Rudolph's abdication from the Hungarian throne and from the rule of the Austrian Hereditary Lands, and this had involved them more closely than ever in the country's affairs. Thus, Matthias' and Báthory's envoys conducted talks about the future of the haiduks, they were at the same time discussing the question of future relations between Transylvania and royal Hungary. For though Rudolph's abdication had left Matthias with high hopes of the Hungarian Crown, before he could take further steps, these two matters definitely needed to be settled.

On 20 August, 1608 two agreements were signed. The first specified that the haiduks as free men, would serve both Hungary and Transylvania, their obligations corresponding to those of the Székelys. The other pact contained the promise that Gábor Báthory would not declare Transylvania's independence from the Crown of Hungary. At the same time, the agreement recognized him as prince of Transylvania.

In the early autumn of 1608, no more than half a year after Gábor Báthory had been elected to rule the principality, there was peace in Transylvania. Shortly thereafter, the Porte also expressed its recognition of Báthory's title. A leader of the pro-Ottoman party, Gábor Bethlen, had been sent to Constantinople to secure the sultan's endorsement, and already in mid-August Báthory learned the good news. Bethlen himself arrived only in late November, and with him an embassy from the sultan. They had brought along the traditional insignia of installation: the flag, the sword, and the ornate document which secured three years of tax exemption for the principality and confirmed Gábor Báthory as prince of Transylvania.

The Estates of Transylvania were content. Even though the young ruler had procured his title by threatening the Estates with the haiduks' might, now that he was in power, he had been taught to respect Transylvania's traditional interests. Gábor Báthory commenced his rule in compliance with the wishes of the Estates.

The Prince without the Support of his People

Gábor Báthory was not the man to tolerate inaction for long. In taking over power in Transylvania, his aim had never been to serve the welfare of his subjects: he had simply been driven by the ambition to rule. And rule he did; but he was too restless to find ways of stabilizing his rule.

His advisors were men of all sorts. One group stemmed from old families who had played a role in Transylvania's history since the Szapolyais. Another consisted of members of families that had risen to leading posi-

tions under the Báthorys. A third group had come to Transylvania only during Bocskai's war of liberation. Tension between the long-established families and the newcomers had been intensified by the power struggles of the recent past. Many were related to the members of the pro-Turkish opposition persecuted in 1594. Others had taken up arms in support of Habsburg rule during the Fifteen Years' War. Some were considered followers of Voivode Mihai. The few years that had passed since the upheavals at the turn of the century had not erased the political differences. Besides that, disparity in religion divided the intimates of Báthory. Though most of the Calvinist prince's followers shared his creed, a handful of them were Catholics. When all was calm, religious differences were not of significance, but even a minor crisis was certain to rekindle animosities.

Instead of trying to smooth over the differences, however, the prince only aggravated them with his capricious grants of land. These donations seemed to be in no evident way given for merit, with the result that Báthory's liberality made him more enemies than friends. There were rumours about the prince's mistresses, and suggestions that it was the wives of the confidants who procured Báthory's benevolence for their husbands.

Nor was the prince any more adept at dealing with his burghers. They, just like the lords of castles, were obliged to play host to his extravagant gallivantings. Entirely unprepared to govern, the young ruler consumed the towns' resources instead of profiting from the burghers' wealth by some suitable form of taxation. He did not realize that though the wealth of the towns could be tapped, their continued ability to pay taxes depended on the support of their industrial and commercial interests. No better than a feudal overlord, Báthory's treatment of the towns was the next thing to extortion.

Gábor Báthory's irresponsible ways earned him more and more enemies. Only one year after his election the general mood became menacing when, disregarding the Diet's remonstrations, he started to prepare for a war against Wallachia with Moldavian support.

That war could be avoided, or at least postponed, was due only to the fact that Gábor Báthory was stopped short by a conspiracy of his leading statesmen. How long the plot had been in the making is not known; by the spring of 1610, at any rate, the conspirators had decided to have the prince murdered. The occasion was to be a journey in March. But at the last moment, the would-be assassin recoiled: although he had already entered Báthory's bedroom, he could not bring himself to stab the prince. Instead, he confessed everything. Chancellor István Kendi immediately took flight, but the count of the Székelys, Boldizsár Kornis, who had instigated the plot, was captured. As it turned out, there had been just a handful of conspirations: only a few lords and Kendi's household had known of the plot.

Contemporaries were quick to conclude that Boldizsár Kornis had been driven to seek to murder the prince because of Báthory's attentions to his wife. But the truth was that the conspiracy had been brought on by a power struggle among the various parties behind Báthory. He, however, refused to look beyond the direct threat on his life, and did not stop to examine the many reasons for discontent which had in no way been connected with the deed. The staged public execution of Boldizsár Kornis was meant to intimi-

date anyone who dared oppose him. On the other hand those who had proven faithful were promoted. The traitor Kendi was replaced as chancellor by an old favourite of the prince, János Imrefi, and Gábor Bethlen was named count of the Székelys.

The shock of the conspiracy, however, did not last long. By December, Gábor Báthory resumed his preparations for war. In fact, it seemed that his wilfulness knew no bounds. For though, according to the Saxons' privileges, a prince had no right to reside on their territory, Báthory occupied their main town, Szeben, a deed which infuriated not only the Saxons but public opinion in general. For though there was no denying the truth of Báthory's assertion that Gyulafehérvár lay in ruins and was unfit to serve as the prince's seat, the disregard of the privileges of the wealthiest Saxon town was an unpardonable affront. Nevertheless turning a deaf ear to all objections, Báthory proceeded to launch his campaign against Wallachia. He set off on the second day of Christmas, 1610, and hoped for nothing less than a splendid victory. Voivode Radu Şerban, however, informed of Báthory's approach, had escaped. The Transylvanian troops reached Tîrgovişte without meeting any armed resistance. There Gábor Báthory installed himself as prince of Wallachia, and then thought to procure the Porte's permission for the campaign.

He sent a great embassy to Constantinople, charged with convincing the Porte of an elaborate fabrication: namely, that by ousting Radu Şerban, Báthory had wished to secure Wallachia for the Porte. This was to be followed by his occupation of the Kingdom of Poland. Should the Porte approve, Báthory would ensure it by placing on the throne of Poland a king forever loyal to the Ottoman Empire. There can be no doubt that Báthory really did have ambitions to attain the Polish crown; his forebear, István Báthory's, example had been a challenge to all subsequent princes of Transylvania. Báthory's timing, too, was correct: Constantinople really had relinquished its policy of peace at all cost.

Where Báthory was mistaken, however, was in thinking that the recovering Turkish Empire would allow him to take the initiative. After ordering Báthory to return home, the Porte named Radu Mihnea the new voivode of Wallachia. Gábor Báthory had no choice: after an absence of two months, he returned to Transylvania. In an effort to save face, he left Gábor Bethlen and a small group of men in Tîrgovişte. It was Bethlen who received the new voivode and concluded an agreement with him. Only after Radu's induction, in early April, did Bethlen return to Transylvania.

2. The Reign of Gábor Bethlen

The Porte Regains its Power

At the time he was receiving the new voivode of Wallachia, in the spring of 1611, Gábor Bethlen, though one of the most influential politicians, gave little indication that he was to become the greatest prince of Transylvania. It was history itself which forced him to take the reins of government, a

claim of events which began with the Porte showing renewed interest in Transylvania.

When the Porte ordered Gábor Báthory to return to his principality it became clear that Ottoman strength was again on the rise. Though Radu Şerban asked both Vienna and Poland for aid, he was able to oust Radu Mihnea only temporarily. In Moldavia the ruling Movilă family, which had been backed by Poland, was forced to flee, to be replaced by a voivode with ties to Constantinople. The Porte's influence in the two Romanian voivodates had not been so strong for many decades.

For the moment, Transylvania was left out of these changes, though it felt the effects of the struggle between the great powers. As Gábor Báthory returned home, war followed in his wake. First two pashas from Hungary had marched against the principality while the prince was busy interfering in Wallachia. Then troops from the Kingdom of Hungary entered to interfere in the clash between Báthory and the opposition.

The two pashas remained only a short time in Transylvania before the Porte ordered them out. But Turks had entered the country, ravaging the haiduks' settlements, and they, upon learning of the Turkish advance, abandoned the war on Wallachia to defend their lands. Having ransacked the Romanian counties, they inundated Transylvania, and the neighbouring regions of royal Hungary. All the effort involved in having settled them had come to naught. Returning dispirited and unable to pay off the haiduks, Báthory decided to send them on to the wealthy Saxon town of Brassó, which was the next prize on which he had set his eyes.

In the meanwhile, Zsigmond Forgách, captain of Kassa, had come from royal Hungary to take advantage of Báthory's weakness. Though the palatine, György Thurzó, refused to sanction the undertaking, most of the lords of Upper Hungary supported Forgách, and some even joined his forces. The prince took refuge in Szeben, and it was to force him to surrender that Wallachian troops laid siege to the town. Gábor Bethlen had sent to the Porte for aid, and by early September the Turks also arrived. Thus, by early autumn 1611, Transylvania was in an uproar, with all sides at war with all the others. Devastation comparable to that at the turn of the century seemed imminent when an unexpected turn of events ensued.

With the arrival of the Turkish troops the warring parties began to regain their composure. It was almost as if the rightful lord had returned to his neglected estate. Everyone fled from the troops of the pasha of Bosnia, Omer. Both Forgách and Radu Şerban left without battle in mid-September, though the voivode could not return to Wallachia as Radu Mihnea who attached himself to the Turkish army on its march on Transylvania had reclaimed his seat in Tîrgovişte.

With the arrival of Omer and Forgách's retreat, it became evident that Transylvania was experiencing the same kind of shift in the balance of powers as Moldavia and Wallachia had a few months earlier. The Porte was again asserting its political presence in the region. To the Turks, Transylvania and the two Voivodates constituted a military zone on their onward push to the West. And they once again had the force to rebuff anyone who would stand in their way.

In light of this new realization, Brassó and the prince's opposition that had assembled there sought contacts with the Porte. They found their man

in András Ghiczy, a former haiduk captain, who was sent on behalf of Báthory as his envoy to Constantinople. The prince wished him to thank the Porte for its support against Forgách. The envoy, however, stopped off in Brassó on his way, and it was the message of the opposition organized there, that he forwarded to the Porte in November. In the name of the country's Three Nations they requested the Porte's aid in ridding Transylvania of the tyrannical prince's rule.

The leaders of the movement were certain of success. They went on to organize a veritable state within the state, incorporating the Saxon territories around the town. They minted money and were preparing for the showdown with Báthory. However, the Turks were very slow in responding, for in the autumn of 1611 decisions in Constantinople were most difficult to make. The formidable old pasha, Grand Vizier Murad, had died in August and his successor, Nasuh pasha had not yet returned from the war in Persia.

Even so, András Ghiczy was able to get a decision form the Divan, probably without Nasuh pasha's knowledge: he himself was to oust Báthory and take the title of prince of Transylvania. He was even promised military aid. In return, Ghiczy promised to hand over Lippa and Jenő and to resume annual payments of the former tax of 15,000 gold florins. On leaving, he left his brother behind as surety.

András Ghiczy arrived back in Transylvania in June, 1612. The news of his success in Constantinople had much preceded him. Thus the opposition was confirmed in its determination. Báthory, on the other hand, reacted like many of the princes of Transylvania before: at the Diet held on 26 June, 1612, he suggested that Transylvania renounce Turkish suzerainty, and join the Kingdom of Hungary. In face of the Turkish threat, he intended to resume the political see-saw that had proved fatal so often before.

The Diet quite understandably refused to approve Gábor Báthory's plan. Not only past experience spoke against it, but also the conditions of the time. What made the situation especially dangerous was the person of the new grand vizier, Nasuh, a familiar figure in Hungary, since he had been stationed here during the Fifteen Years' War. It was he who had been forced to give up the castle of Fülek, and it was known that he had never forgotten that humiliation. Nasuh had planned revenge against the Turkish negotiator of the Peace of Zsitvatorok, Ali pasha, the commander of Buda, and had relinquished the scheme only upon direct orders of the sultan. The new grand vizier was, thus, a staunch opponent of the peace in Hungary. Nothing good could be expected from him, even without an attempt to break away from Turkey. But it was impossible to guess precisely Nasuh's intentions concerning Hungary now that he had the full power of the grand vizier.

Gábor Bethlen Stops the War

Gábor Bethlen decided on a desperate move: on 12 September 1612 with fifty of his trusted men went into Turkish exile. His once confidential relationship with Gábor Báthory having greatly deteriorated by then, his departure resembled a flight. In the past Bethlen had been indispensable to Báthory, probably because of his ties with Constantinople and his knowl-

edge of Turkish ways. Especially since Bethlen had won the Porte's approval for Báthory's princely title, Báthory had held him in high esteem. But now that Báthory's intention was to renounce Turkish suzerainty, Bethlen had become downright undesirable. The prince considered the level-headed Bethlen a nuisance, and unfairly suspected him of complicity with the Saxons, and it was alleged in fact, that he contemplated having Bethlen assassinated.

But Bethlen fled not just because he feared for life, nor that he was envious of Ghiczy's success, though indeed he might well have been. For Ghiczy, in securing the Porte's order for his own election, had been proceeding along a line that Bethlen had planned out originally. The idea that Turkish troops could usher in an aspiring prince came to him back in 1603, when the country was suffering Habsburg occupation and he had wanted to bring in a ruler appointed in Constantinople.

At that time, Bethlen had won István Bocskai for the task. But Ghiczy was no Bocskai, and Bethlen felt compelled to take measures against him. Having served three rulers and even endured prison for one, Bethlen had worked his way up the ladder to power. He could rightly consider himself more suitable than any other candidate for the title of prince of Transylvania as he set about the nerve-racking task of acquiring it.

In the principality, in the meanwhile, an alliance with the Habsburg king seemed increasingly imminent. For an open battle on 15 October, 1612, Báthory had overthrown the opposition forces centred in Brassó. Mayor Justice Weiss was killed, as were a great number of his men. Those who survived, along with András Ghiczy, withdrew to safety behind the walls. The victory brought renewed strength to Báthory. At the Diet in November, he proscribed all leaders of the opposition, whether at home or abroad, including Gábor Bethlen. Then he secured the election of commissioners to be sent to negotiate the Habsburg alliance. At the insistence of the Estates, however, he also named envoys to be sent to the Porte.

The commissioners sent to Vienna were the first to set to work, conducting talks there and then in Pozsony, where the Diet was meeting. In April 1613, an agreement was signed in Pozsony declaring Turkish suzerainty over Transylvania invalid; but Báthory did not want a confrontation with the Porte. The envoys he had sent to Constantinople arrived at the Porte on 22 May, but were unable to put in Báthory's case. Grand Vizier Nasuh even refused to accept their gifts, for only a few weeks earlier, the Divan had made the decision to replace Báthory as prince of Transylvania by Gábor Bethlen.

Some time earlier in the autumn of 1612, one of the commanders of the Turkish occupied territories, the pasha of Kanizsa, Skender, had put Bethlen in touch with Grand Vizier Nasuh, as after leaving Transylvania, Bethlen paid his respects to the leading officers of Turkish-occupied Hungary. He had been to Temesvár and to Buda, and had spent the winter in Belgrade, because he knew that the commanders of the territories around the principality met there regularly with the top officials coming from Constantinople. Here was an opportunity for Bethlen to meet influential Turkish personages. He had previously written to György Thurzó, in the Kingdom of Hungary from the court of the pasha in Buda.

In the early spring of 1613, Gábor Bethlen continued on to Adrianople where both the grand vizier and the sultan were staying at the time. It was here that Skender pasha had become Bethlen's most active supporter for many years to come, and recommended him to Nasuh. The outcome of this meeting was Bethlen's nomination as prince by the Divan in March 1613. At the end of April he was given the symbols of rule. A number of Turkish military commanders and both Romanian voivodes were ordered to accompany Bethlen in his march on Transylvania.

The future prince left Constantinople in August, along with troops commanded by Skender pasha. They reached Transylvania in early October. In early September other Turkish troops had arrived along with Voivode Mihnea from Wallachia, as had an advance guard of Tatars. Three weeks later Ghirei Khan brought in the main Tatar army, and on 3 October the pasha of Buda, Ali, reached the outskirts of Gyulafehérvár. Some 80,000 troops had gathered to win Transylvania for Gábor Bethlen. There were probably more Turks and Tatars in the principality than at any time before. The outcome of the contest was evident.

Yet Bethlen did not wish to circumvent the necessary formalities, a consideration which only emphasized Transylvania's vulnerability. For it was Skender pasha who called the Diet, something no Turk had ever done before. But the threat of war made refusal to appear impossible. The Diet was given five days to complete the election; they proved sufficient. On 23 October, 1613 Gábor Bethlen was already prince of Transylvania. In their fear they elected him freely, as a sarcastic contemporary penman put it.[2]

On the day after Skender's orders, the Diet had Gábor Báthory dismissed with an eloquent letter of farewell. The Estates enumerated their grievances, his sly escape from the Turkish armies, and his intention of breaking with the Porte; finally they pointed to the danger looming large over the country. But Báthory had retreated to Várad by then, and it is uncertain whether he actually ever received the letter. He was assassinated four days after the election; contemporaries had it that the assailants had been haiduks instructed by Ghiczy.

On learning of Báthory's death, the Turkish troops withdrew. Plundering, pillaging, and taking thousands of prisoners as slaves, they marched out of the country. They left behind woeful devastation and the certainty that Transylvania was again under the suzerainty of the Porte.

The Professional Prince

While Gábor Báthory had ruled with extravagance and capricious irresponsibility, Gábor Bethlen's government was a time of order and purpose. Báthory, handsome and charming, won over even his enemies when they came into personal contact with him, but he could not command lasting

2. Nagy Szabó Ferenc memoriáléja. (The Recollections of Ferenc Nagy Szabó.) *ETA* I, 115.

loyalty. In contrast, Bethlen, stocky, battle-scarred and ungainly as he was, inspired more enduring sentiments. Those close to him, however, felt respect, rather than friendship, and his enemies despised him. But Bethlen was not the man to bother about the feelings of others and he never sought emotional contact. It was for this reason that he was able to work well with everyone. There is no evidence of the prince's ever having been subjective in the awarding of offices.

Gábor Bethlen's forebears had become involved in Transylvanian politics in support of Queen Isabella. His father was a member of the Prince's Council under Zsigmond Báthory. At thirteen young Bethlen, already an orphan, went to live in Zsigmond Báthory's court at Gyulafehérvár. Nothing is known of his education or the influences that shaped him. Nevertheless, Bethlen's deeds until he came to rule the principality shed light on two very characteristic and special elements of his disposition. The first of them became manifest in the course of the Fifteen Years' War, when Bethlen was fighting on the side of Mózes Székely and always excelled just in the task that needed to be done. If it was necessary he conducted diplomatic negotiations, if required commanded soldiers. He had a sense for dealing with people, whether on a personal basis or through a well-worded appeal to the masses. Bethlen had the ability to grasp events, to see through the intricacies of a human relationship or a military situation. This diverse expertise remained the most striking talent throughout his life.

The other outstanding quality was Bethlen's unbounded objectiveness. Not as if he would have made plans realistic by today's standards. He was just as prone to ignore the realities of a situation as any of his contemporaries. And facts were certainly not his main concern especially in matters of diplomacy. His objectiveness consisted in his ability to ignore everything that was incidental to the accomplishment of his projects. Bethlen took the measures required to achieve his goal, and pursued them without any scruples.

This objectiveness was a life-long characteristic, but was perhaps most evident in the way he went about getting elected to the principality. Bethlen did not organize a party in Transylvania, he did not bother about the king or about royal Hungary, not even about public opinion at home. He turned to Constantinople, knowing that it was there that Transylvania's fate was decided. And subsequently, Bethlen had no second thoughts. There is no evidence of any regret expressed over the devastation the troops paving his way had caused, or for the enforced elections. Bethlen accepted unemotionally the implacable reality that Transylvania was — for the time being — under the undisputable power of the Turkish Empire.

But in spite of Bethlen's rational and consistent pro-Turkish stance, the relationship between the Porte and the prince was not harmonious. In return for the confirmation of this title Constantinople demanded from Bethlen the surrender of Lippa and Jenő. What his predecessors had repeatedly promised to the Turks, he was now to deliver. Zsigmond Rákóczi's offer to deliver the two castles had been expressly turned down, Gábor Báthory had not been asked to relinquish them. Bethlen was pressed to give the strongholds over lest they be taken by force. In September 1613, news came that Skender pasha had pitched his tent on the border. After having put Bethlen on the throne, he was going to recapture Lippa and Jenő.

The pasha's demand placed Bethlen in a bad predicament. With the liberation of Jenő and Lippa from the Turks, during the Fifteen Years' War, large areas had fallen again to Transylvania, inhabited by thousands of Hungarians who payed taxes to Szolnok, Gyula and Temesvár. Their fate also was now at stake. And never had a ruler surrendered castles to the Turks without resistance. At the same time, Bethlen knew that it would be disastrous to provoke Skender's attack. He could not afford a war with the Porte.

Amidst this crisis the prince began a series of manoeuvres that included year-long negotiations and appeals to all his acquaintances at Constantinople. By the end Bethlen won a partial victory: he could keep one of the fortresses. Lippa was chosen to be handed over, since it was closer to the border, and therefore meant a smaller loss in population. Even so Bethlen himself had to take Lippa, fighting against his own soldiers there, before the Turks marched in. In the end, he was able to resettle these men at Vaja, and gave them haiduks' privileges.

With the fall of Lippa, Transylvania had reached the lowest point of its history. It was at the complete mercy of the Porte. Had Gábor Bethlen died then, he would have been remembered as one of the most sinister figures of Hungarian history. In fact ruling Transylvania for another sixteen years gave him time to emerge as one of the greatest of Hungary's historical personalities.

Gábor Bethlen and his Country

Bethlen had to apply all his statesmanship when he took over Transylvania, as the forces determined to destroy the power of the prince were stronger than ever before. Both the nobility and the Saxon University opposed him, though their resistance was addressed not so much to Bethlen personally as to the legacy of his predecessor. Báthory had been a tyrannical but weak ruler whose importunity earned not only him, but also his office, the hostility of Transylvania. Thus Bethlen's position was an intricate one. Although he had delivered them from the despised ruler, the new prince was not hailed as a liberator; instead Bethlen had to bear the consequences of the acts of the incompetent man he had replaced.

Actually it would have been logical to expect a chain of repercussions: that Bethlen should try to suppress with brute force the spirit of opposition which the tyrannical Báthory had provoked. But Bethlen was no dilettante; with him Transylvania had gained a proficient sovereign.

Bethlen began to build up his power already at the Diet that was to elect him. Here he appeared in person and asked the Estates who were assembled by command of Skender pasha to revoke the proscription issued after his escape in 1612. With this said, he withdrew. This departure signalled his acknowledgement of the fact that he had no right to be present until the sentence was rescinded. Though, with an army behind him, the move was no more than a polite gesture, it was characteristic of Bethlen to make it. He wished to convey to the lords of Transylvania at the nadir of their humilia-

tion that he would not abuse his power after victory. And this was in fact what happened. After the Turkish and Tatar troops withdrew according to the agreement Bethlen had concluded with the Porte, the new prince went about winning the country with a care verging on courtesy.

First and foremost he had to settle his relations with the Saxons. They were not even willing to take the oath of allegiance and refused all obedience until they were given back the town of Szeben which Báthory had declared the official seat and residence of the prince. Bethlen tried to negotiate, but he did not try to use force. When it became apparent that the Saxons were relentless and unwilling to accept his presence even for the winter, on 17 February, 1614 the prince returned Szeben to the Saxons, and left the following day.

Later, too, he managed to avoid confrontation not only with the Saxons but also with the Estates. Bethlen devised an uncommon strategy for ruling: he organized his power not in opposition to their power, but parallel to it. He did not touch the Estates' privileges, for his aim was not to curtail these, but to shift the balance so that his power predominated over theirs. For this purpose, he did not need to interfere with their rights, but merely to use his own princely power to its maximum. Bethlen worked toward this end by taking advantage of Transylvanian society's peculiarities.

One of these was that there were no laws governing the composition or functioning of the Diet. There was not even an unwritten law on the matter. This allowed Bethlen to choose carefully the men who were to participate at the Diets. Though certain people were to attend on the strength of their elective offices, by 1615 the prince had established the practice whereby they made up only one third of the whole body. That meant that the majority consisting of the Regalists or of officials appointed by the ruler, owed the very right of attending to Bethlen and he did not have to bother with a Diet that might oppose him. Even so Bethlen limited the number of questions that were to dealt with. The only matter the Estates could bring up and decide on at will was that of the relationship of the serfs to their lords. All others, including foreign, military and financial affairs, Bethlen gradually took out of the competence of the Diet.

The other peculiarity which enabled Bethlen to expand his power was that the state's revenues were not handled by delegates of the Estates but by the prince's officials. The Diet only had the right to levy and to allocate taxes. Without questioning this right, Bethlen concentrated on increasing state revenues from sources over which the Diet had no control. By the 1620s, the 60,000 to 80,000 florins from taxes made up only 10 per cent of all state incomes. This meant that it did not much matter to the ruler how many taxes the Diet levied, or what it appropriated them for.

It is doubtful whether there was another ruler in Europe at the time who managed to realize so much of what he had set out to attain. Bethlen's means to his ends were in the first place the highly modern method of mercantilism, which required, among other things, that the balance of exports to imports be strictly regulated by the treasury. The aim was to increase exports and thus the influx of currency. Secondly, it required the creation of state monopolies to give precedence to exports of state-owned goods.

316

By taking the steps he did with regard to the Diet and the economy, Gábor Bethlen in essence eliminated all control by the Estates over the prince's power. He became a ruler independent of the Estates, without, however, touching the privileges of Transylvania's Three Nations. The other strata of society he left equally untouched.

Outdated Methods of Taxation and Modern Economic Policy

That Gábor Bethlen refrained from impinging upon social relations is well reflected in the particular methods of taxation in Transylvania. While in other countries taxes were levied according to wealth, and the sum to pay grew greatly in the seventeenth century, in Transylvania conditions in this regard remained almost unchanged. State taxes levied according to wealth were introduced only in a few towns, such as Kolozsvár. The Székelys paid irrespective of personal wealth only some extraordinary taxes; the serfs again irrespective of their wealth were taxed by tens; and the Saxons' taxes were set to equal the total tax income which it was presumed would be collected from the serfs, an amount which had nothing to do with the size of the Saxons' population or the prosperity of their economy.

All things considered, Bethlen actually made financial sacrifices in order to secure social tranquillity, for taxes levied according to wealth would certainly have brought in more money especially in the Saxon towns. As it was, Bethlen seems to have thought the sacrifice was worth making, and his subjects had no cause to complain.

A state organized upon such a basis was certainly nothing like absolutism in the West since, precisely because of the peculiar system of taxation, there never developed the kind of interdependence between the state and the bourgeoisie that was typical there. East of the river Elbe, however, there did evolve what can be called the eastern type of absolute state. Here, the rulers established a central power independent of the Estates not because of social pressure, but because of foreign threat.

It was this eastern type of absolutism that Gábor Bethlen organized in Transylvania. In fact, his was the first government of this type east of the Elbe, perhaps because he needed the freedom to act quickly and decisively in light of the country's precarious position of being constantly threatened by two Great Powers.

But Bethlen, even in the clutches of powerful enemies, did not restrict himself to a merely defensive strategy. He was aware of the fact that a great international coalition was being organized against one of his adversaries, the Habsburg imperial government. In 1610, King Henry IV of France actually set out on a campaign against Rudolph II; the clash was forestalled only by Henry's assassination. In 1611 the conflicts between the emperor and the German electors impeded the election of the future head of the empire. And in 1613, England joined the ranks of the enemies of the Habsburg emperor with the marriage between Princess Elisabeth Stuart and the elector palatine. It was under such circumstances that Gábor Bethlen made prepa-

rations to participate actively in international politics. And when in 1618 events in Bohemia really offered the opportunity to intervene against the emperor, Bethlen could decide to do so without any regard to domestic considerations.

3. Transylvania in the International Coalition against the House of Habsburg

Hungary and the Thirty Years' War

Gábor Bethlen had a decision to make on whether or not to launch a campaign against the House of Habsburg in the strictest sense of the term, for meanwhile war in the west was imminent, and the enemy to the east also experienced trouble. In 1619, the young and ambitious sultan, Osman II, marched against Poland. The war ended in victory for neither side. Nevertheless, it had become clear that Poland and the Porte had reached a state analogous to the one existing between the Porte and the Habsburgs since the turn of the century: neither side was able to get the better of the other.

A number of forces were at work to draw Bethlen into the conflict in the east. For one, his old friend, Skender pasha, was a key figure in the campaign against Poland, and he sent repeated orders for the prince to join in the war. On the other hand, Bethlen's own diplomats were begging him to take action, especially because of the uncertain outcome of the power struggle that had emerged among the various factions at the Porte. Grand Vizier Nasuh had died, and with his death, there surfaced animosities against Bethlen previously suppressed on the part of those who had considered him Nasuh's protégé. The various parties all had their own plans for Transylvania, none of which was favourable for the principality. This was the reason why the Transylvanian envoys were pressing the prince to re-establish his situation in Constantinople.

But Bethlen had no intention of getting involved on that side. Following some clever diplomatic manoeuvres, he kept postponing the day he set off for Poland, and finally arrived only when the war was over. He had avoided fighting on the side of the Turks. Nor was he concerned with the conflicts between the Turkish factions; in fact, they but served to convince Bethlen of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. And he did nothing to appease his enemies there. Instead, the prince launched negotiations in Constantinople on a campaign against Ferdinand II of Habsburg, who had succeeded to the Hungarian throne on 20 March, 1619.

With that, Bethlen had made the decision to enter into war in the west. With fine political acumen he realized that the conflict around Constantinople would be of no advantage to Transylvania. For though it was clear that the Ottoman Empire was losing strength, no one would have imagined that it would finally collapse at that time. On the other hand, like most of his contemporaries, Bethlen believed that a war against the Habsburgs could only lead to the overthrow of the dynasty in Austria.

On this side the descent into war started with the 23 May, 1618 uprising in Prague against Habsburg rule. Bethlen was quick to recognize its significance. He concluded that without hope of help from abroad Bohemia would not have embarked on so grave an undertaking. The rebels first approached England, and after it had refused support, turned to the Dutch. Here they found an ally against the common enemy, since the Dutch were eager to tie down Habsburg forces as far from their own soil as possible. The Netherlands supplied the financial resources to aid Frederick V, the elector palatine who had been elected king during the rebellion in Bohemia. And it was in the Netherlands that Frederick took refuge, when following the imperial army's victory on 8 November, 1620, he was forced to flee Prague. On Dutch soil, Frederick was safe, but his idyllic domain by the Neckar River was overrun by Habsburg mercenaries. Thus the war spread to the German Empire. It was to last until 1648, engulfing the entire continent of Europe. By the time peace was concluded in Westphalia between the Habsburg emperor Ferdinand III and his opponents, King Louis XIV of France and Queen Christina of Sweden, the exhausting struggle had already earned the designation "Thirty Years' War". It had started with the rebellion of Bohemia against the Habsburgs, but peace was forced on Ferdinand by powers far away from Prague. Imperial rule, in spite of all hopes, had not been annihilated; it was only transformed.

Gábor Bethlen as Prince of Hungary

Gábor Bethlen joined the war in August 1619 following negotiations with the rebels, as a member of the international coalition forming around Bohemia. He did not have to go far to join in the war against the foe of half of Europe. Right on his doorstep, in the Kingdom of Hungary ruled by monarchs from the House of Habsburg, the intervention of the prince of Transylvania was most welcome.

The man who called on Gábor Bethlen for help was György Rákóczi, the son of Zsigmond, the former prince of Transylvania, leader of the Protestant opposition in royal Hungary. But in fact most of the aristocracy favoured Bethlen's handling of the politics of the kingdom. They became his staunchest supporters in the hope of further increasing their already considerable power.

From Matthias II, who had been elected king of Hungary after the Fifteen Years' War, the Estates had secured full guarantees for their privileges. They had made clear their claim to conduct the internal affairs of the country and had excluded the king from interference in matters concerning relations between the landlords and their serfs. More could have been gained only by having a sovereign of their own nationally and thus being relieved from all danger from foreign interests to the country's welfare. The experiences of the past few years only confirmed the desirability of this kind of change. For after the death of Palatine György Thurzó in late 1616, they were deprived of the highest dignitary of the realm as no Diet was called to elect a new palatine. Only two years later were the Estates given this opportunity, but at the same time they were supposed to accept Archduke Ferdi-

nand as the successor of Matthias II. The Diet acquiesced in electing him king of Hungary after the election of a palatine, but the issue aroused strong opposition. The misgivings of the Estates were based on the fact that the archduke was known to have established absolute rule with the support of the Catholic church, in his Hereditary Lands. With his rule there, therefore, loomed over the lords of the Kingdom of Hungary the danger of a strong central government.

All this resulted in Gábor Bethlen's being an ideal candidate to the throne. Of their "own blood" as the Estates later put it, he would not be influenced by foreign interests, and he obviously did not have the means to establish his power independently of the Hungarian lords. The general feeling was that they could gain a national king without actually handing him the reins of government.

With the aristocrats' support, Bethlen's troops advanced quickly. On 27 August, 1619 he left Gyulafehérvár and by 21 September he was already calling the first meeting of his adherents in royal Hungary. They gathered in Kassa to discuss the spheres of influence to be assigned to Bethlen at the head of an army, and to those who had chosen to side with him. Finally, it was established that the prince had come not to attack, but to back their cause, like Jephthah that of the children of Israel. In other words, he was to be the official representative for their opposition to the king.

Support for Bethlen snowballed. The prince himself took part in the occupation of Pozsony on 14 October. Meanwhile György Széchy, one of Bethlen's young followers, has won over the mining towns. When Palatine Zsigmond Forgách called the Diet to meet on 11 November, most of royal Hungary was already in Bethlen's hands. It was at about the same time that his army, after joining up with Bohemian and Moravian troops, reached the gates of Vienna.

A siege of the imperial city, however, was not attempted. On 29 November, 1619 Bethlen withdrew his forces, causing an immense public uproar both at home and abroad. Not only had the prince forgone his promised campaign, he had also abandoned his Bohemian allies. Bethlen's excuse was the need to attend to domestic matters. In reality, he must have recognized the hopelessness of assault on Vienna, and preferred moral defeat to a military one. The move was calculated correctly. In spite of the uproar, the retreat did not tarnish Bethlen's reputation at home at all.

Gábor Bethlen's political success reached its zenith after this, when the Estates meeting at the Diet in late 1619 and early 1620, offered to elect him king of Hungary. He turned down the offer. The reason was a diploma the lords had composed, stating their conditions. It outlined the rules of operation for an ideal republic of nobles, where the king would have no rights except to call the Diet and to approve the laws enacted. In declining the election, Bethlen was refusing to meet the conditions. Even so, the Diet passed a motion declaring that the Estates of the Kingdom of Hungary had unanimously and "absolutely" handed over to Gábor Bethlen the rule and government of the country.[3]

3. The edition of the Acts of Bethlen's Diet at Pozsony: KATONA, *Historia critica* ... XXIX. The expression cited: 456.

A King Is Elected but not Crowned

The Habsburgs were officially deposed and the new king was elected at the following Diet in Besztercebánya on 25 August, 1620. It was then, after lengthy negotiations, that Bethlen finally signed the diploma. During these negotiations the delegates were officially informed that Bethlen would rule the country as a Turkish protectorate. An ambassador from the Porte read them the letter from Osman II in which the sultan vowed to defend Hungary. The Transylvanian chancellor, Simon Péchi, spoke at length about the advantage of the new system. He called on the Diet — now that royal Hungary and Transylvania were one — to settle the kingdom's affairs following the Transylvanian model. The Diet had no choice but to accept the fact that in turning away from Habsburg sovereignty they also had to renounce the hope of driving the Turks out of the country.[4]

In signing the diploma, Bethlen had made a compromise: he had accepted the limitation of his power in return for the Estates' accepting the Turkish protectorate.

But he declined any coronation, which perplexed his contemporaries and historians since they have fabricated various theories as to his motives. The explanation is probably very simple. With circumstances such as they were in 1620, a coronation in Besztercebánya would have been a poor show at best. Bethlen clearly wished to receive the Holy Crown with due pomp, after his power had been consolidated. At the time of his election, he had certainly no doubts as to the final victory.

After November 1620, however, events took an unfavourable turn. On 4 November, the pasha of Buda, Mehmed Karakas, occupied Vác. Soon after that came word that Ferdinand II's army had defeated the Bohemians in a battle on the White Mountain near Prague, and was taking a bloody revenge. The pasha's act caused distrust in the consequences of Bethlen's final triumph, while Ferdinand's reprisal foreshadowed the no less unhappy outcome of a possible defeat.

Gábor Bethlen himself carried on as if nothing had happened. He set aside the conditions and the laws in drawing up his strategy. The conditions set by the Estates did more than curtail his personal power: they also inhibited the effectiveness of the whole movement. Before long, the statesmen of Hungary had to realize that Bethlen was not the man to lead on a leash. They had needed a new king to have a state in which their privileges were unbridled but the very existence of this state depended on Bethlen's victory. And that victory was impossible with Estates enjoying unlimited freedom.

Bethlen Loses the Kingdom of Hungary

The political situation in Hungary became full of contradictions, contradictions which seemed insoluble. Bethlen's victory seemed less and less desirable, while defeat was sure to be followed by reprisals as severe as in Bohe-

4. Katona, *Historia critica* ... 470.

mia. Nevertheless, the Hungarian lords found the solution. They opened negotiations with Ferdinand II about their voluntary surrender, thereby circumventing the consequences of both victory or defeat.

While in the autumn of 1619 they had refused to accept the offer of peace from Vienna, by December 1620 they forced Bethlen into initiating negotiations. Peace talks began on 25 January, 1621 in Hainburg, Austria's easternmost town, and continued in spite of several interruptions. More and more of Bethlen's followers were for peace, and made sure the talks continued. Even Imre Thurzó, the country's most gifted young politician, especially dear to Gábor Bethlen, joined the peace party; he died of smallpox but the negotiations did not break off.

The talks were moved to Nikolsburg and were concluded there on the last day of the year 1621. In accordance with the peace, Gábor Bethlen renounced his title of king of Hungary, and agreed not to interfere in the future kingdom's affairs. In return he was granted rule over seven counties in Upper Hungary, though with certain restrictions, and was also awarded a number of great estates. For themselves, the lords attained complete amnesty from Ferdinand II.[5]

Thus, Bethlen's state was liquidated by the founders themselves. They had experimented with organizing a national kingdom and, when it could not be realized in form of a republic of Estates, they dropped the experiment. With that they escaped the fate of Bohemia. And while Protestant refugees from there flooded Europe, Hungary elected a Lutheran palatine in the person of Szaniszló Thurzó, a leading supporter of Bethlen's. When taxes were levied at the Diet of 1622, it became clear that the Hungarian lords had not fared badly financially. While Bethlen had levied a tax of twenty-eight florins per unit of taxation, Ferdinand was satisfied if they approved three. While Bethlen had obliged them to pay twenty-two of those twenty-eight florins themselves, now it was the serfs who had to come up with the three florins. The Diet of 1622 also incorporated in its laws the Royal Diploma, a measure unheard of from time immemorial under Habsburg rule in Hungary.

The short deviation in favour of Bethlen had no disadvantageous consequences, nevertheless the lords in power did not run the risk again. Gábor Bethlen launched two more campaigns to win back the kingdom, but he could not gain real support from them.

The Struggle for Hungary and Gábor Bethlen's Final Plans

Gábor Bethlen attempted to regain Royal Hungary in August 1623, although most of his councillors as well as the lords of Upper Hungary advised against the undertaking. Even György Rákóczi would meet Bethlen in his camp only after the grape harvest. Bethlen convoked the Diet for 19 November, but it voted for reconciliation. On 2 April, 1624 the prince signed the peace documents, which in essence reiterated the points set down in the Agree-

5. The edition of the peace treaties: R. Gooss, *Österreichische Staatsverträge.*

ment of Nikolsburg. Since that treaty had been signed, there had been no real changes on the domestic scene in Hungary. Thus Gábor Bethlen had been mistaken in launching a campaign against the Habsburg king in 1623.

The second time he marched into the kingdom in August of 1626, conditions were much more favourable. Bethlen had become a member of a powerful international anti-Habsburg coalition. The ambassadors to Constantinople of England, France, Holland and Venice had sounded him out on the matter already in 1625 via his envoys. Then these same powers turned to Bethlen directly, to know his intentions in case such an alliance should form. Bethlen for his part, gathered information on political conditions in the German Empire. After the death of his wife, in the spring of 1625, he sought the hand of Katherine of Hohenzollern, daughter of the elector of Brandenburg, in marriage; the wedding was held one year later. With this, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden became Bethlen's brother-in-law, and the Transylvanian prince in effect joined the Protestant Powers led by him.

In launching his 1626 campaign, Bethlen was, thus, counting on the backing of his powerful allies. But fate decreed it otherwise: it was he who was always being called upon to aid the others. For a few months even the theatre of war was removed from the empire to Hungary: Count Mansfeld, the commander of the Protestant forces, had taken refuge there, pursued by the mighty imperial general, Wallenstein. Bethlen's cause was overshadowed by the western interests of his allies. A peace agreement, concluded in December 1626, between Ferdinand II and the prince only reiterated once more the conditions of the 1621 Peace of Nikolsburg. Still, it did relieve Hungary for a time of the devastations of the Thirty Years' War.

In the interim between his last two campaigns, and before he married Katherine of Hohenzollern, Bethlen took the astonishing step of proposing marriage to one of the daughters of Ferdinand II, Cecilia Renata. To the marriage proposal he attached a political one: with the marriage, Bethlen was to become governor of Hungary. And once he had the support of the House of Habsburg and their allies, he would turn against the Turks. If they took his advice, he assured Vienna the Ottomans would be driven from Hungary within four or five years.

Bethlen's unexpected offer caused a commotion in diplomatic circles, but was politely and repeatedly declined. Only a few Hungarian magnates, were seriously attracted by the idea of a war against the Turk launched from Transylvania. In 1627 and in 1628 Archbishop Péter Pázmány and Palatine Miklós Esterházy discussed the plan with intermediaries sent by the prince. By then, of course, Bethlen had already committed himself to Katherine, but to some Hungarian politicians the idea of a war against the Porte led by Transylvania remained attractive. However, there was no attempt to implement that plan as Hungary's hopes for a war on the Ottoman Empire were in fact based on the assumption that after the great war in the western Empire came to an end, the emperor and king of Hungary would turn his armies against the enemy in the east. The war in the German Empire was not over, however. And following his third campaign, Bethlen gave up his aspirations for the throne of Hungary.

Instead, he turned to acquiring the crown of Poland. Bethlen had pondered on the idea since 1627, and to realize it he sought to strengthen his

ties with his brother-in-law, King Gustavus Adolphus. This was the time when the talented and energetic Swedish sovereign began to take a leading role in the war in the empire. But Bethlen's time was running out. Beyond conducting negotiations, he was unable to do much to realize his plans.

The prince fell ill, although he fought against it with all his might, he succumbed to his growing weakness. Hardly able to eat any more, he nevertheless travelled to Várad in October 1629 to discuss with György Rákóczi what should be done after his death. Exhausted by the return journey, he died an hour before noon on the day after his arrival, on Thursday, 25 November, 1629.

The Contest for the Kingdom and Transylvania

Gábor Bethlen had accomplished a huge task: he had restored Transylvania and its prince to the prestige they had enjoyed in the 1570s and 1580s. Like his predecessors, István Báthory and initially Zsigmond Báthory as well, Bethlen was able to play an influential part in international politics. From a "Turkish puppet" he had risen to become an ally of major powers. One of his admirers likened him to Matthias Corvinus and to István Báthory, and there can be no doubt that he was one of Transylvania's greatest rulers.

The principality, however, had never supported his efforts for the throne of Hungary. It seems that the Transylvanian Estates were not aware of the possibilities inherent in Gábor Bethlen's scheme, seeing it only as a matter of personal ambition. It never appeared to them as part of a plan to overthrow the Habsburg dynasty, the primary aim of the international alliance throughout the Thirty Years' War.

Bethlen was aware of the sentiments of his subjects; he never counted on the Transylvanians in the fight against the Habsburgs. And in the course of his wars, really nothing happened that would have affected the principality directly. At the two legislative Diets Bethlen had held in royal Hungary, nothing touching on Transylvania was discussed. Even when the seven counties of Upper Hungary came under the rule of the prince as agreed in the Peace of Nikolsburg, neither the Estates of those counties nor Bethlen did anything to establish their constitutional union with Transylvania. When the Transylvanian Diet made a half-hearted attempt to gain jurisdiction over the revenues of the seven counties, the prince decidedly rebuffed them.

Transylvanians thus measured their rulers' growing international influence by the changes taking place in external appearances at court: Bethlen gave expression to his absolute power in the splendour and pomp of his surroundings. Ostentation of this sort was expected of a sovereign in the seventeenth century, but it was not an obligation that Bethlen chafed under.

To rule was a duty bestowed upon him by the Almighty, but this did not prevent Bethlen from enjoying everything allotted to it. He took pleasure in conducting diplomatic negotiations, in writing letters and he never wearied of warfare. But most of all he enjoyed establishing a court fit for his position, as he was very much addicted to luxury. Bethlen loved dressing in bright colours, even for nightwear. He purchased jewellery worth fortunes,

and appreciated a good cuisine and specialities to eat. He sent for deep-sea fish, snails, tropical fruit, and confections. From foreign countries he often ordered masks, though whether he actually liked to dance is not sure. Bethlen had his own musicians from Germany and Italy as well as actors to provide entertainment.

All these devoured increasing sums of money. While prior to his first campaign against Ferdinand, Bethlen spent about as much as any magnate in royal Hungary, after 1624 his budget reached the proportions of European sovereigns. His revenues grew concurrently, however, and by and large he spent about as much of his total income on luxuries as contemporary rulers in the West. Bethlen desired to impress his adversaries with the splendour of his court, as they did. That way he demonstrated the country's international rank.

4. A Prince under the Force of Circumstances

Political Crisis and the Triumph of György Rákóczi I

Gábor Bethlen died childless, but he had provided a successor. In June 1626, only months after the wedding, he had Princess Katherine elected to succeed him. She had no equal in this respect in all of Europe, since there was no other woman who had been elected to rule, as Bethlen pointed out in his testament.[6] It is doubtful however, whether she on her own part ever sought this honour. What is certain is that when it came to it, Katherine had no real inclination to rule. In fact, it was as if she deliberately sought to irritate her subjects. She showed no respect for the wishes of her late husband: the very day of his death she called on Ferdinand II to resume rule over the seven counties of Upper Hungary.

If in nothing else, in this one matter Katherine and the Transylvanian Estates concurred. Neither in Transylvania nor in Upper Hungary did anyone like those counties to belong entirely either to the principality or to the kingdom. But that was where agreement between the new ruler and her subjects ended. The crisis did not erupt, however, until it became known that Katherine wished to place Transylvania under Ferdinand II's rule, with her lover, István Csáky, as intermediary.

News from György Rákóczi only added to the crisis. He had been approached by an opposition grouping on behalf of the seven counties, including two of Gábor Bethlen's favourites, István Bethlen, the Younger, and Dávid Zólyomi. Holding out the aid of the haiduks, the only effective power that favoured the counties' alliance with Transylvania, they sought to secure the rule of the principality for Rákóczi. Reluctant at first, Rákóczi finally joined the haiduks in late September 1630. He did so only after having received a message urging him to take this step from the late prince's brother, the elder István Bethlen.

6. The edition of the testament: *A fejedelem.* (The Prince.) Ed. L. Makkai, *Erdély öröksége.* (The Legacy of Transylvania.) IV.

At the time István Bethlen the Elder sent his message to Rákóczi, he was still governor to Princess Katherine, but by the time Rákóczi had reached the haiduks, Bethlen had already been elected prince. For Katherine, made weary of ruling, was forced to resign on 28 September. To complicate matters, Rákóczi did not turn back. Though Palatine Esterházy repeatedly dispatched orders for Rákóczi's return, and though the newly elected prince conveyed repeated threats against him, Rákóczi sent the young István Bethlen to enlist the aid of Muharrem pasha, the commander of Szolnok. Rákóczi himself, however, did not come beyond Várad, except to compel Prince István Bethlen to negotiate.

In late October, they came to an agreement. But since the position of both of them was precarious and the strength of their supporters at the Porte about equal, they wished to have the matter decided by the Transylvanian Diet. According to an agreement between István Bethlen and György Rákóczi, the Diet was to choose between them six weeks thence. They had judged the situation well: the Porte did not give preference to either of them. The sultan had sent two contradictory edicts, one to elect Bethlen, the other to choose Rákóczi. Katherine had to decide which edict to have read out. As she had always despised her brother-in-law it was György Rákóczi who became prince of Transylvania.

The election was held on 1 December, 1630, and the news reached Rákóczi in Várad two days later. He left for Transylvania to be instated before Christmas. Muharrem pasha of Szolnok, and the envoy of the deputy grand vizier followed him a day later, to be presented when Rákóczi took his oath of office on 24 December, 1630.

The new prince did not break relations with the haiduks until several months later when they, commanded by the young István Bethlen and Dávid Zólyomi, launched an attack against royal Hungary. Their underlying aim had been to stir Rákóczi into action in support of the seven counties of Upper Hungary. But instead of taking advantage of the initially successful fight of the haiduks, Rákóczi signed a peace with Ferdinand II on 3 April, 1631, promising never to enlist the haiduks' aid against the Kingdom of Hungary.

Good External Relations and Internal Conflicts. Economic Policy

The Estates of Transylvania greeted György Rákóczi by recalling the memory of his father. Yet Prince Zsigmond and Prince György did not have much in common. The elder Rákóczi had been inherently flexible, had communicated well with everyone, had been a man who had scaled the ladder to power by accommodating to every situation. And when the interests of his country required it, he had been wise enough to step down. In contrast, György Rákóczi had barely begun to reach for the throne when he sent a message to the palatine that he would not renounce his aspirations though it cost him his life.

This was typical of György Rákóczi I: he was stubborn, and clung stubbornly to whatever he felt was his due. He was a demanding ruler, and

during his reign he obtained through litigation more of his subjects' estates than any other Hungarian sovereign before or after. Even so, he became a great man, largely owing to the favourable circumstances of his years of rule. The country and the neighbouring territories had years of peace that they had not had for many generations.

The Thirty Years' War, which was sapping all the strength of the Austrian Habsburgs had, was most unfavourable for them just at the time of Rákóczi's election. They had no energy to deal with the affairs of Hungary. To the east, Constantinople was in turmoil from the series of the janissary revolts going on since 1622. From the 1630s on, the Turks were effectively absent from Europe for two decades.

It is indicative of the tranquillity in the area that there had been no interference by any major power in the quick succession of elections held in Transylvania in 1629 and 1630. At home, however, Rákóczi stirred up a great outcry among his subjects when, in the agreement of 1631 he also committed himself to garrisoning imperial troops in one of his family's castles at Ónod. There the soldiers were to stay until one of his sons should move permanently to royal Hungary as a subject of the king. Since both his sons were around ten years of age at the time, the disposition was obviously meant to be of long duration.

The measure affected more than just the Rákóczi family. The inhabitants of vast territories were affected by it. Ónod, situated at the mouth of the Sajó River opposite Eger, was of strategic significance. Lying at the frontier of the Turkish occupied territories, besides the estates it protected also the people of the region. The garrison of Ónod had consisted of soldiers recruited from the surrounding estates and had been protecting their own, their brothers' and their relatives' possessions against the Turkish pillagers from Eger. The population was terrified to think that their lives and lands would now depend on the goodwill of an imperial garrison of foreigners.

The commoners in the vicinity of Ónod, feeling they had been betrayed by those who ruled them, began to organize their own protection. Like the haiduks they first sought to engage a leader from among the nobility. When that failed, the peasant captains organized themselves under the leadership of Péter Császár. They sent out letters calling on the people of the villages around Ónod to join them. In late July 1631 they planned a meeting with the nobility, but the lords would not commit themselves. Thus the peasants met at Gönc in mid-August, and chose a body of peasant commanders for each county.

By then it was clear that the movement had a twofold purpose: the radical wing was voicing demands for social change; Császár and his supporters on the other hand were more anxious to find a leader from among the nobility. They sent delegates to Dávid Zólyomi, but he only referred them to the prince. In January of 1632 Péter Császár went to Gyulafehérvár. With that his fate was sealed.

Until that time, the nobility of Hungary had not paid much attention to the peasant movement. Since it took place on a Rákóczi estate it affected primarily the prince. Those in discord with him even watched the events with some degree of malicious glee. But when Császár's appeal to the prince brought about the fear that Rákóczi, instead of suppressing the movement

might support it, the politicians of the Kingdom, turned on the peasants. They took Péter Császár captive, and on 2 March, 1632 put him on trial before a summary court in Kassa. He was accused of political crimes, and after suffering terrible tortures, was executed.

Though there were then no atrocities to mention against the landowners, Császár's execution let loose the most violent passions. The nobility of Upper Hungary now made attempts to negotiate with the peasants, but the gesture came too late. Only some of the rebels laid down their arms; most of them marched on Transylvania. They never got there. István Bethlen the Younger, and Dávid Zólyomi suppressed them in a violent clash.

In theory, it might have been otherwise. The peasants were ready to fight, and, since the death of Gábor Bethlen, the two young politicians had been urging an attack on the kingdom. Now the rebels gave them a chance, although the 1630s were probably not the right time for a clash between the principality and the kingdom. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the political élite's attitudes that, quite independently of the turn of events, Bethlen and Zólyomi did not even consider assuming leadership of the peasant army.

They were held back by prejudices and not by prudence as is shown by the fact that in late 1632 Dávid Zólyomi was increasingly active trying to organize an anti-Habsburg venture. István Bethlen then was already dead, but Zólyomi boasted, that the envoys of three different rulers were negotiating in his castle at the same time. After a while, György Rákóczi had had enough: though he was indebted to Zólyomi for promoting his election, he had him arrested in the spring of 1633 and brought to trial for treason.

Along with Zólyomi, Mózes Székely was also put on trial. He had been persuaded by the followers of his late father to try for the throne of Transylvania, and sought the support of the Porte. Instead of taking steps against him there, Rákóczi waited until Székely returned home, and then had him imprisoned. He was brought to trial together with his followers. The simultaneous trials of Mózes Székely and his men, and Dávid Zólyomi were meant by Rákóczi to intimidate the opposition. Judicial proceedings of this sort were to become the sorry hallmark of his rule. There was hardly a year during the prince's reign when sentences to loss of life and property were not issued.

The group Rákóczi dealt with most severely were the Sabbatarians. This denomination, a unitarian offshoot of the Reformation, had lived without harassment in Transylvania for many decades. What social theories they had were rather nebulous, but after 1620, a few of their members had spoken out for the right to political oppositions. Mózes Székely for instance had been a leading Sabbatarian. In his time, Gábor Bethlen did not bother about them; rather he engaged Sabbatarians in diplomatic dealings with the Porte.

Rákóczi on the other hand felt a personal aversion to Sabbatarian theology, and he refused to tolerate their political contacts. Last but not least, some of the Sabbatarians had attractive estates. Rákóczi decided for persecution. But he was a stickler for appearances. First a great theological dispute was staged at Dés to stress the ideological background of the proceedings. Rákóczi initiated a series of trials only after this in July 1638.

328

Many of the accused sought refuge by joining the officially recognized denominations, but those who remained true to their faith were sentenced to loss of life and property. At the last moment, the prince graciously stayed the sentence of execution. But without exception, all were deprived of their land. One man had died in the persecutions: a goldsmith from Kolozsvár named János Torockai had been stoned by order of the law-court.

Even with the atrocities he committed against the Sabbatarians, Rákóczi was not able to eliminate opposition completely. In his later years, too, the prince liked to bring opponents to trial on charges of treason. These trials served a double purpose: they kept the opposition in line, and aggrandized the Rákóczi estates.

Rákóczi had evident reasons for amassing so much land: he changed the basis of the prince's power from that of Gábor Bethlen. Instead of state trade and mercantilism, Rákóczi sought to enlarge his personal wealth. He was almost fanatical about the need to accumulate more land, but was at a loss when it came to making intricate economic policy decisions.

At amassing estates, the prince proved extremely adept, the size of the family's property increasing manifold in the course of his reign. At the time he was elected prince, Rákóczi possessed fully or in part ten great seigniories; in his last will he disposed over thirty-two such estates. Around 1648, 27,000 serf families laboured on Rákóczi's estates in Hungary and Transylvania. Over 100,000 people lived in his countless villages and his fifty-six towns. The produce of sixty-six dairy farms and vineyards served the consumption of his family, or earned a profit from retail. The prince actually owned more serfs than all Transylvanian landowners combined.

In this way he established a peculiarly medieval style of rule unparalleled in the seventeenth century. Rákóczi was unique among his contemporary counterparts, who all benefited from a money economy. Yet he was no weaker than other rulers. Personal wealth made him no less independent of the Estates than Gábor Bethlen had been with his own kind of mercantilism.

What is more, Rákóczi's subjects were less imposed upon in certain respects: the treasury's monopolies were revoked, and György Rákóczi lowered taxes to three-quarters of what they had been.

A Victory over the Turks

György Rákóczi's power was not evident for quite some time. He seemed to be gathering wealth and influence for its own sake. When he did become involved twice in international matters, he did so only by force of circumstances.

First he was compelled to take action against the Turks when the Turkish commander of Buda, a son of the grand vizier Nasuh pasha , upset the existing relationship between Transylvania and the Porte. Personal antipathy between Hussein Nasuh and Rákóczi only added to the conflict, though primarily it was sparked by a group of malcontents around Nasuh's son who were determined to shake off the absolute control of Constantinople. Instead, they wished to govern the region around Hungary without interference from the highest officials in the central government.

The dissenters used István Bethlen the Elder to support them in the revolt against Constantinople. He had fled to Buda in 1635 to escape the treason trials. Dávid Zólyomi was his son-in-law, and his son, Péter Bethlen, had already been arrested. The former prince Bethlen had every reason to believe that Rákóczi would not pardon any member of his predecessor's family. At the same time, István Bethlen's support offered Hussein Nasuh an excellent opportunity to take action against Rákóczi.

György Rákóczi made an attempt to halt Hussein Nasuh's effort by putting the matter to the officials in Constantinople. But these left it up to the Divan in Buda to take a stand on the matter. Thus Rákóczi was left without an ally, especially since it was no secret that Buda was backing István Bethlen.

The politicians in the kingdom, including Péter Pázmány and Miklós Esterházy, all advised the prince against a war. Still, Rákóczi had no option but to prepare for battle. And luck was on his side. One night in October, 1636, his troops descended on the Turkish camp below Szalonta and routed the enemy with a ruse like something out of a folk-tale. Months later, splendidly robed corpses were still to be found in the surrounding marches, and for several years, Turks captured that night were traded throughout Hungary.

In this first military action, which György Rákóczi had undertaken against his will, he had come out victorious. Not for many decades had a Transylvanian prince defeated Turkish troops. He was hailed as a hero, even if his victory had been won not against Constantinople, but against an enemy of the central imperial administration. Respect for Rákóczi grew immensely both at home and abroad.

War with the Habsburg, and Separate Peace

Again it was not György Rákóczi I's own determination, but rather outward expectations that made him embark on his second large undertaking: it was taken for granted that he would continue his great predecessor, Gábor Bethlen's anti-Habsburg policy. All Bethlen's former allies and all his one-time enemies sought to discover Rákóczi's intentions, but he, though adopting after the victory over the Turks, a more decisive tone in his dealings with the pro-Habsburg political leaders of the kingdom, gave no indication of contemplating any action.

Thirteen years of weariness on the enemy's side and as many years of urging on the other finally drove the prince to take action. In the spring of 1643, he concluded an agreement with Queen Christina of Sweden, which automatically committed King Louis XIII of France to his support. In February 1644, Rákóczi set out against Ferdinand III, and with this, Transylvania was involved in the Thirty Years' War again.

It is unclear why Rákóczi chose this particular moment. The state of affairs in royal Hungary had offered several, much more suitable, occasions. Not that Rákóczi had ever had an active supporter in royal Hungary such as he himself had been to Gábor Bethlen. As it was, he could not claim that anyone in royal Hungary had sought his aid. Rákóczi's declared aim was to

resurrect the national kingdom, yet the most influential politicians did not stand by him. He had called upon the Hungarians to fight for the freedom of Protestant religion, but by 1644 most of the great landowners had reverted to Catholicism. In essence, the aristocrats of royal Hungary had converted to the religion of the dynasty to express the sincerity of their reconciliation with the king following the short interlude when they had sided with Bethlen upon his seeking the Hungarian kingdom. Rákóczi's rallying cry of religious freedom for Protestants was therefore unable to stir the lords of the Kingdom of Hungary because of their ties both to the Catholic church and to the king. And without their backing, the overthrow of Habsburg rule was inconceivable.

Nevertheless, Rákóczi was initially very successful, in spite of the fact that his allies in the West gave him no military aid. As with Bethlen, they had various reasons for not taking part in the actions agreed on with Rákóczi. The only help the prince received was a sum of 200,000 thalers from France, and that when the campaign was already nearing its end. Even so, Rákóczi's army was undefeated until the battle at Galgóc on 9 April. But with this, Rákóczi's luck turned. The imperial troops were winning battle after battle. Aided by peasants from the surroundings regions Rákóczi was able to hold Kassa, but he had to realize that it would be wiser to try to negotiate than to continue fighting.

His decision proved correct. Though Rákóczi was undoubtedly weaker militarily, his able diplomats, who set to work in May of 1644, eventually succeeded in negotiating a favourable peace. Extending also to matters of public concern, the Peace of Linz signed in December 1645 most importantly secured freedom of religion even for the Hungarian peasantry. Personally, Rákóczi not only gained several large estates, but was awared control of the seven counties of Upper Hungary that Princess Katherine had returned to the kingdom.

Ferdinand III made major concessions in the peace. The reason for this was that Rákóczi received indirect support from his allies: when Ferdinand learned of the approach of Swedish troops, he could only concede to the Transylvanians' demands. In June already, before the treaty was concluded Rákóczi has sent his favourite son, Zsigmond, and his chief military commander János Kemény to Moravia to join the allies. But as soon as the peace treaty received its final formulation, he immediately recalled his men from the Swedish camp.

The Allies' Mutual Indifference and Rákóczi's Final Plans

Upon the withdrawal of the troops from Moravia, the prince offered to Torstensson, the Swedish commander, who thus had to give up the siege of Brünn, the explanation that he was forced to give up the campaign on orders of the Porte. The excuse, though credible, was difficult to verify. Probably no effort was made to do so, since the anti-Habsburg allies no longer required Rákóczi's aid. From the summer of 1645 on they were winning

one victory after another. Peace negotiations were already in progress in Westphalia. Before Ferdinand III's enemies completed their plan to storm Prague, the war was over.

The fact, that no full effort was made to take Prague, shows characteristically the total indifference of the western allies as regard Habsburg rule in Bohemia. The imperial armies had suppressed Bohemian liberties at the very onset of the war, and after that they were forgotten. Ferdinand III signed the Peace of Westphalia as the loser of the war, but there was not a word in the documents about the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, just as no mention was made of Hungary either. György Rákóczi I's negotiators succeeded only in including Transylvania, as an ally of Sweden and England, among the countries listed in the Peace of Westphalia on the side of the signatories.

Western indifference towards the areas surrounding Hungary was understandable enough. In the world of politics unselfish sacrifices do not exist, and in the Thirty Years' War there had been no altruism on the part of the rulers of Transylvania either. They supported their allies only so long as their own interests allowed. Bethlen had abandoned his allies at Vienna, and Rákóczi had withdrawn his troops from Brünn.

Perhaps it was these manifold disappointments in the collaboration with Western allies which directed Rákóczi's attention to Poland. It must have seemed that there he was not on visionary grounds, since one prince of Transylvania, István Báthory, had in fact once ruled Poland. Rákóczi had supporters there in the person of the duke of Ostorog, Janusz Radziwiłł and his followers. Together they worked out a grandiose plan to make Zsigmond Rákóczi, the prince's younger son, king of Poland after the death of the ailing Wladislas IV. Transylvanian diplomacy was already at work, when the plan received an unexpected impulse.

In the summer of 1648, György Rákóczi I learned of the uprising of the Cossacks in Poland. Recognizing in them his possible allies, the prince, for once on his own initiative, contacted their leader. The Cossack hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in fond memory of István Báthory, promised support. But György Rákóczi I was never to read the warm response. He died on 11 October, 1648. It was left to his sons, György and Zsigmond, to complete what he had set out to do. He delegated the rule of the principality to the elder, György Rákóczi II. The new prince of Transylvania was taking over a country for which the past three and a half decades had been a time of perhaps its most unqualified prosperity.

5. Transylvanian Society under an Absolute Rule

The road leading from the demographic and economic recession at the time of the Fifteen Years' War to the flowering in every sphere of life and the new latitude open to Transylvanian politics in the mid-seventeenth century had actually not been long. The population regenerated relatively quickly as a direct result of three and a half decades of peace and stability. The social fabric and economy, however, were not as easily restored, and not every stratum of society was effected equally positively.

The Serfs

Even as compared to the condition of the serfs in other parts of eastern Europe in the seventeenth century, the position of the serfs in Transylvania was discouraging. On the one hand, they had had the burden of the Fifteen Years' War to bear; the other extra burden was that the country's ruler was also the country's greatest landowner.

The extensive devastation at the turn of the century had physically annihilated much of the peasantry, and those who had been spared their lives were left homeless. With this the whole structure of serfdom was upset. Since no one had a secure abode, everyone moved freely, though this freedom of movement was, in fact, the need to flee. In any case, it was a movement that the landlords were not able to prevent.

When the war was over, the country's leaders set about trying to restore the old feudal relations. The serfs, however, were most reluctant to see the *status quo ante* restored. This is indicated by the fact that great numbers of serfs continued to desert the estates until the mid-century, in spite of tax reliefs promised to those who returned, and threats of retribution against those who moved on.

The community of interests between the prince and the large landowners further aggravated the position of the peasantry seeking to shake off bondage. Instead of siding with the serfs and using their resistance to being bound anew to curb the power of the lords, the rulers concentrated their efforts on curbing the free movement of the serfs. They did not encourage even those serfs who wanted to enlist in the army or to work in the mines, though this would have fed the treasury. Anyone who sought the protection of the state was turned away, and it was prohibited even to settle on the lands of the Exchequer. In short, the princes of Transylvania did not check the power of the landlords in any way.

All through the seventeenth century, the serfs continued to exist without hope of betterment. Their attempts to break out of the restrictions that hemmed them in met with unrelenting opposition. In their relationship to the serfs the rulers and the Estates formed a united front; their determination to get the most out of the serfs bridged whatever differences they otherwise had.

The Lords

At the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the principality's ruling class was made up of the landowners of the seven Transylvanian counties and the Partium, as well as those enjoying noble privileges in the Székelyföld. Romanian boyars continued to be excluded from this class in spite of the fact that their power over their serfs had grown considerably.

There are no exact figures on the privileged classes of the Partium. We do, however, have such figures for Transylvania proper. Here, 350 to 400 families comprised the nobility. The majority of villages were divided up

among several landowners, so that 80 per cent of these families owned only a part of a village. Fifteen per cent had possession of one to three entire villages, and only a total of six families among owned seigniories extending over several entire villages, though these properties still did not come near in size to the latifundia, or really great estates. Two families, the Bánffys of Losonc and the Csákys, made up the elite. Even by the standards of royal Hungary, they held truly great estates: Bánffyhunyad and Almás, respectively. The great estates that had been in noble hands in the Middle Ages had reverted to the treasury after the Fifteen Years' War. The Transylvanian great estates that stayed in noble hands were incomparably smaller than the enormous network of seigniories of families like the Zrínyis in the Kingdom of Hungary.[7]

Including the Partium in this picture altered it only in showing the Csákys and the Bánffys to even greater advantage, for they owned estates in the Partium as well. In addition, the Báthorys of Somlyó also had estates there; the bulk of their properties, however, lay in royal Hungary. A few "new" families also had seigniories in the Partium: the Bethlens of Iktár, the Zólyomis and the Wesselényis.

No Székelys rose into the class of truly wealthy Transylvanian landowners. By the standards of the Székelyföld, however, the Lázárs, the Mikes family, and the Apors were considered affluent. All through the seventeenth century, this structure of the ruling class remained unchanged. The aristocrats grew poorer during the rule of those princes who amassed seigniories, especially the Rákóczis, but the proportions were always the same. That there was property left with the nobility even after the predatory princes had had their will was probably due to the fact that their belongings were spread out over different parts of the principality. As the nobility as a whole, grew poorer, less and less property was enough to raise above the others. That explains why the group of families considered the social elite did not change. When the Csákys left Transylvania to move the royal Hungary, the Bánffys of Losonc remained the only truly great landowners of the principality.

No modern hereditary aristocracy evolved in the principality. The social superiority of the elite families was a matter of convention. None of the rulers from the Szapolyais onwards had awarded hereditary titles. The Transylvanian nobility really was possessed of an undifferentiated unity, the *"una eademque nobilitas"*, a unity which, in royal Hungary, had become fictitious by the mid-seventeenth century.

As regards landed property and social influence the prince was unquestionably at the top of the hierarchy. Even in the late sixteenth century, there had been no family in Transylvania to approach the Báthorys in wealth, and in the seventeenth century, when the rulers came to monopolize landownership, the wealth of the entire ruling class did not come near to the immense richness of the princes. In the seventeenth century, the prince was both ruler and landlord to the majority of the serfs in Transylvania.

7. The conscription of the nobility: Zs. JAKÓ, *Adatok a dézsma fejedelemkori adminisztrációjához.* (Data about the Administration of the Tithes in the Age of the Principality.) Kolozsvár 1945.

The Székelys

The Székelys entered the seventeenth century with their privileges again intact. They were relieved of paying regular state taxes, something which was a basic right of the Székelys, but a right which had been alternately revoked and then again recognized throughout the sixteenth century. The other side of their traditional privileges, the obligation to do military service, was only partially in effect: by the seventeenth century, not every male Székely was liable to do military service. A social stratum had evolved which was considered to have serf status, the members of which, in return for various services, were not obliged to go to war. These Székely serfs paid no regular state taxes either, as a result of which in practice state regulations did not apply to them. The Székely privileged class considered it an affront if their serfs were as much as registered.

This situation as a whole, was definitely advantageous for the Székely serfs. Though in the seventeenth century they still had to pay the extraordinary taxes occasionally levied — taxes which, earlier, the entire Székely Nation had been required to pay — this was a drawback to their standing only with respect to the free Székelys. Otherwise, the Székely serfs carried a considerably smaller burden than the non-Székely serfs of Transylvania. When an extraordinary tax was levied in 1616, for example, to cover the tribute to be paid to the Porte, each ten Székely serfs paid eleven forints, while for every ten non-Székely serfs the tax was nineteen forints. Moreover, the 1616 tax had not been fully collected from the Székely serfs even by 1622. Their own officials protected them with every possible means against the state.

Under these conditions, to be a serf among the Székelys became a definitely desirable position. A census of 1614 reported that in Marosszék sixty per cent of the serfs expressedly stated that their becoming serfs was not against their will. As reasons for wanting to enter this state they listed their desire to escape the consequences of poverty, starvation, illness, and military service.[8] At a time when the Transylvanian peasantry elsewhere was compelled to take up serfdom either by threats or promised advantages, with the Székelys it was taken up. By 1622, there were an estimated 20,000 heads of families among the Székelys who were serfs, which came to about 20 per cent of the total serf population of the principality.

Nevertheless, when the rulers launched attacks on Székely privileges, the reason was not that more and more subjects were not paying regular state taxes, but that there were fewer and fewer Székelys prepared to take up arms. For in addition to the standing army of 4–5,000, the Székelys provided the roughly 10,000-strong force which could be deployed at any time and at extremely low cost.

For this reason, as a first measure, in 1619 Gábor Bethlen prohibited further free Székelys from becoming serfs, and those who had taken up serfdom after 1614 had to leave it and go back to the "privilege" of military

8. The edition of various conscriptions of the Székelys also from later times: *Székely felkelés 1595-1596*. (The 1595-1596 Székely Uprising.) Eds S. BENKŐ — L. DEMÉNY — L.K. VEKOV, Bucharest 1979.

service. When this measure failed, like many others, and the Székely militia still dwindled, Bethlen decided to attack the problem from another angle. In 1623 he obliged the Székely serfs to pay regular state taxes like all of their counterparts in the principality.

The regulation however, instead of solving the problem, initiated a new process: increasing numbers of Székelys moved away from the Székelyföld. The situation became serious enough for the Diet to take up the matter at a meeting of 1638. But there were no tools to keep the Székelys on their home-lands. Before their privileges had bound them to the Székelyföld; with these gone, the whole Székely Nation was disintegrating.

In 1636, György Rákóczi I, so as to improve the status of the Székelys, gave up the right of the treasury to the landed property of persons convicted of treason. But this did not alleviate the burden of military service. Already in 1648, a decree had to be published ordering Székelys into the army under pain of capital punishment. And though Gyorgy Rákóczi II rescinded the law before it was ever actually put into effect, the very idea of such a ruling shows how great a liability the freedom to undertake military service had become which once was one of the Székelys' jealously-guarded privileges.

György Rákóczi II attempted to impose conditions on the Székelys, rather than using force. The effects of his regulations had no time to make themselves felt, however; with the outbreak of war in 1658, they were swept away by destruction.

The Saxons

The Királyföld, a privileged territory in Transylvania that was inhabited by the Saxons, preserved its special status well into the seventeenth century. Not until the middle of the century did the absolute prince interfere in the internal affairs of the Saxon Nation.

By the end of the sixteenth century, a social structure typical of the regions east of the Elbe had become consolidated in Transylvania's towns and in their surroundings as well; the wealthiest craftsmen had joined the stratum of merchant patricians to form the urban elite: against them, the common craftsmen, though protected by their guilds, were powerless. The burghers' theoretical equality before the law was never questioned, the social distance between the leading families and the poor craftsmen however was not to be bridged. A similar superiority of the rich over the poor developed in the relations between the towns and the surrounding villages: the village judges were townsmen appointed by the towns, and the village guilds came under direct control of the town guilds.

The unquestionable power of the Saxon town senates was brought home in the matter of the levying of taxes. Since the Middle Ages, the entire Saxon community had paid one lump sum. In earlier times, the kings had specified the amount of the taxes they were to pay in each particular year, but since Transylvania had become a principality, state taxes came to a fixed amount equal to 2,000 units of taxation anywhere else in Transylvania. The amount to be contributed by any given town and community was decided

by the Saxon Nation at meetings presided over by the mayor of Szeben. This made the senate of Szeben the leading body of the entire Saxon Nation.

If development had followed the pattern typical of other regions east of the Elbe, the Saxon communities would have undergone considerable change in the course of the seventeenth century. Typically in these areas, including the Kingdom of Hungary, the burghers acquired land and took up agricultural production when the market for industrial goods deteriorated. And, as the corollary of this same process, more and more noblemen moved into the towns, while the towns, as corporations, started to acquire land.

Nothing like this happened, however, with the Transylvanian Saxons. The privileges they held as an Estate allowed them to guard their bourgeois character. The Királyföld functioned as if it were a single large town. Land here could not be held by right of nobility, and outsiders had no means of obtaining Saxon land. Feudalism was unable to penetrate Saxon society either in the abstract sense, for concretely through the intrusion into their communities of members of the landed nobility. The burghers, on their part, did not strive for land either individually or collectively. In theory, equality of rights among the Saxon towns and the Saxon villages was sustained.

Besides the common privileges, the Romanian voivodates had a decisive role in keeping up the bourgeois-style Saxon existence. This was because until the mid-seventeenth century, they did not build up self-supplying industrial economies. Thus in the relatively long period of their recuperation after the wars at the turn of the century and in the years of the political consolidation that began around 1630, the voivodates were a market for all types of industrial products manufactured by the Transylvanian Saxons. There were, of course, controversies between the voivodates and Transylvania even during these years. On such occasions, the transit roads were blocked. When the conflict blew over, however, letters came to Brassó or Szeben asking them to reopen the roads, and to send off a shipment of shingling nails. That was the product most in demand, along with everything else needed for building castles and churches. But everything imaginable was exported to the Romanian principalities, from medical instruments to boots.

Thus the Saxons were able to sustain their own internal order both because of their privileges, and the demand for their goods coming from the Voivodates. In consequence, it was a severe blow to them when, in the mid-seventeenth century, both these conditions ceased to obtain almost simultaneously, though independently of each other. With the return of peace, the principalities developed their own industry and sought to close their markets to products from Transylvania. It was at about the same time that György Rákóczi II launched his attack on Saxon privileges.

In earlier times, rather than interfering with their rights, the prince's predecessors had tried to drain the Saxons' wealth. His father, for example, had obtained large sums from them through imposing fines of various sorts. He had never encroached on Saxon privileges, but had, rather, reinforced them on three separate occasions. The younger Rákóczi did just the opposite: indifferent to the Saxons' wealth, he methodically set about eliminating them as one of the three privileged Estates of Transylvania.

The Diet of 1651 revoked the privilege whereby the Saxons were not to be summoned directly, that is without their own jurisdiction as first in-

stance, to appear before the Prince's Court. Two years later it was decreed that non-Saxons, too, could buy houses in the Saxon towns. The effects of the measures, however, were palliated from the first by other contingencies: György Rákóczi II was obliged to make concessions to the Saxons when he prepared for war against Poland, and the devastation that followed in 1658 swept away the prince's measures regarding the Saxons, along with much else.

The Romanians

In the early seventeenth century, the Romanians were still not part of Transylvania's Three Nations, though they were an integral part of society as a matter of course. This coexistence was conceived as problematic neither by the Romanians nor by the other inhabitants of the principality until the middle of the seventeenth century.

Those Romanians, who rose to the rank of nobility, were integrated into the nobility, as were the Slovaks and Croatians in the Kingdom of Hungary, or the Saxons in the Principality of Transylvania. The serfs, for their part, were similarly inconspicuous parts of Transylvanian society, in spite of the fact that most of them continued to observe their Orthodox faith, and to follow a traditional lifestyle different in many ways from that of the rest of the population.

The position of the nobility remained unchanged throughout the seventeenth century. Families of Romanian origin like the Kendeffys or the Macskásis were considered every bit as honourable as any nobles of similar affluence. One of Gábor Bethlen's diplomats, Voivode Marko, for example, a man whose name was known throughout Europe, was of Romanian birth. There were Romanian seigniorial officials who were no less aggressive and no more judicious than any Hungarian holding a similar position. Their Romanian origin made them neither better, nor worse. When, for example, in 1657 the Diet was debating whether or not to elect Ákos Barcsai prince of Transylvania, his allegedly Romanian ancestry was no more of a disadvantage than his lack of wealth or of heirs.

In the case of the serfs, the situation worked out differently. For a long time, they had been divided into two, sharply distinct strata, and the relationship of one of these strata to the rest of society changed drastically in the course of the seventeenth century. It was this change that was to lead to the altered relationship of the Romanians as a whole to the rest of Transylvanian society.

The serf group whose relationship to the rest of society remained unaltered were the Romanian copyholders (*telkesjobbágyok*). There was no more difference between the Romanian copyholders and the majority of Transylvania's agriculturalist population than there was between nobles of Romanian and any other ethnic origin. The position of the Romanian serfs was unlike that of other serfs only to the extent dictated by the peculiarities of the geographic location and organizational structure of the seigniories they lived on. Even their religion did not necessarily entail a unique pattern of

life — holidays, feast days, and so on — since from the mid-sixteenth century there had been Romanian Protestants in Transylvania. And around 1566, a Romanian Calvinist diocese had been organized as well.

The wider relationships of the second group of Romanian serfs — the transhumant shepherds — however, changed greatly. They who originally had lived in the mountains had been geographically segregated from the serfs working on holdings. Their lifestyle and that of the others did not meet. The devastation, however of the wars, and the aspirations of the landlords anxious to replenish the workforce of their estates together changed this situation many places. After the end of the war, lots left unclaimed because their owners died or disappeared attracted men who had never called a clod of earth their own; landlords lured the shepherds into the communities of settled peasants. The peculiar life-style and religious practices of the new arrivals often stirred hostility among the locals. And because it was they who were conspicuous, in the course of the seventeenth century they came to be considered as typical of all Romanians.

It is indicative of the social rating given by their peers to the stratum of transhumant shepherds that their way of life, for all its freedom from practically all obligations, was never an alternative that attracted the sons of those who worked the land. The few of them on the margins of society who took up the ways of the Romanian transhumant shepherds were rare exceptions among the huge masses of the serfs.

"Re-nomadization" of this kind is not to be confused with a pattern of behaviour that was typical of the settled serfs during wars. At times of danger, they sought safety in the mountains, taking their varied livestock with them, and caring for them there until it was safe to return home. There are records describing the return of these peasants coming down from the mountains with their beehives, chickens, ducks, pigs and cattle. It is evident that their taking to the mountains was not the adoption of the transhumant shepherd's way of life, and meant no permanent move by the vast majority of these village serfs.

The transhumant Romanian shepherd stratum, therefore, was not speaking, a force disruptive of the feudal system for the simple reason that their lifestyle was not one that cared to emulate. In spite of this incessant attempts were made to integrate them. It was as if the land-owning nobility were determined to bend these semi-free people to their will, to wedge them into the feudal society so foreign to them. The state supported the landlords fully in this. Though they achieved some degree of success, it was only small groups that they were able to integrate out of the free Romanians staunchly resisting majority.

Reconstruction

For much of the first half of the seventeenth century, Transylvania was involved in the work of reconstruction. The country's leaders were determined to restore the conditions that had prevailed before the Fifteen Years' War. Special attention was given to rebuilding Gyulafehérvár, but money

was also chanelled to renovate Kolozsvár, and the strategically important fortress of Várad. Gábor Bethlen initiated the reconstruction, but was unable to complete it. György Rákóczi I employed foreign masons to rebuild the famous Farkas Street Church in Kolozsvár. He also renovated a church in Torda that had lain in ruins for decades. He had buildings and bridges put up on the estate belonging to the salt office of Dés, and in Várad he had cleared away an entire district of the town which had burned down. Chroniclers of the reign of his son, however, György Rákóczi II, mention no further renovation, only construction.

The four decades of Gábor Bethlen and György Rákóczi I's rule were years when war damage was restored, and mark a period of considerable significance in the architecture of Transylvania. The princes themselves contributed much to this. Their more or less consistent promotion of the new architecture greatly contributed to the spread of the Renaissance style in Transylvania. Beautiful arcades and airy edifices crowned with cornices were built at their instigation. And yet, the most significant aspect of this great period of reconstruction was independent of the two rulers' activities.

This aspect, though most clearly manifest in the architecture of the period, was an emanation of a profound and comprehensive cultural change. It found reflection in architecture in that elements of the Renaissance style were to be found even in buildings put up by village masons and carpenters. This is not to say that from the seventeenth century on village houses had staircases with loggias and frescoes of mythological characters on their walls. Such costly Renaissance hallmarks remained confined to the manor houses of the wealthier landowners and the houses of the most affluent burghers in Transylvania. Nor did the new attitude introduce virginals into the parlours of peasant women, or induce the men to sit down after a good day's ploughing to compose poems on the beauty of nature.

But the essence of the Renaissance, which was to clarify the relationship between man and his environment, did reach the villages of Transylvania. It is characteristic of this period that more than anything else it transformed the structure of living space. Small nooks and corners disappeared, along with rooms at differing levels, indoor stairs and capriciously located exit doors appeared to facilitate escape. Windows were now larger and were glassed in: you could look in, and you could look out. People moved outside the confines of the houses, and into the new gardens. And as the houses were enlarged by the surrounding gardens, so the towns were enlarged with places to take a stroll in. For the first time in the history of Transylvania, townspeople were taking excursions to the surrounding countryside.

The settlements themselves changed as well, most notably in their structures. Towns no longer had narrow alleys, and canalization was introduced. At road intersections open squares with fountains or statues were now to be found and here and there a park was established. Everything became more open and more lucid.

No purely Renaissance towns were built in Transylvania, but the medieval character of the towns was transformed. Gábor Bethlen had two fountains installed in Gyulafehérvár, one in the market square, the other behind the cathedral. György Rákóczi I had the market square of Gyalu enlarged to

insure a better view from the surroundings houses. In Gyulafehérvár, on one of the bastions, he had soil brought in to plant a fruit and flower garden. As for the Saxons, buildings of the same style within the same street, in Szeben or Beszterce confirm that the city landscape was deliberately planned. Moreover, excursion sites were recorded close to major Saxon settlements as early in the mid-seventeenth century.

Following the great devastation of the villages of Transylvania, the transformation of the pattern of settlement that could be observed since the Middle Ages took a faster course. As the peasants rebuilt their living quarters after their flight, a new practice of site allocation came about. The previous method, whereby blood relations built side by side, was no longer followed. In place of the earlier "pile villages", registers from the seventeenth century tell overwhelmingly of villages with a symmetrical ground-plan, built according to a regular order, with rows of houses reflecting the affluence of their inhabitants.

The richest lived around a natural or artificial centre and the poor had their living quarters further away in regular order, in line with their decreasing means. While not characteristic of all village settlements at the time, this form established itself permanently. It seems indeed, that it was highly suitable: it has been able to survive up to the present, in spite of centuries of destruction and social change.

But this structure was only the skeleton. A given village was as different from any other as are two persons in spite of their identical bone structures. For example, in the villages in the seigniory of Fogaras, in 1637 there were anywhere of between five and sixty-seven holdings. Some of these villages contained every size of plots *(telkek)* from a whole holding to an eighth of a holding. In the villages of another seigniory, plots were generally of equal size within a single settlement, with all whole holdings in one, and all half holdings in another.

In this same period, ending in the middle of the seventeenth century, peasant homes were acquiring their new appearance. Most notably, they were no longer of a temporary character. Most peasant houses in the seventeenth century were built to last, as is indicated by the fact that seigniorial records list "abandoned houses" that had stood vacant for several years. What was new in the layout of these houses was their division into several rooms, as opposed to the earlier single living space. Attics and cellars were often added for storage.

This type of peasant house, with several rooms and levels holding cellars and lofts must have been quite common by the mid-seventeenth century. There are, however, no records of the houses of the landless cotters, of the people living off the same land as the *jobbágy*.

Nor are there any sources stating that peasants in the seventeenth century already planted flower gardens, though there is reason to assume they did. The most eloquent indication is a picture of a Romanian girl, an illustration in a book published in Nuremberg by a university student from Szeben named Johann Troester. On her head the girl is wearing a dense wreath of flowers. Troester describes how these were made from roses and other flowers, and notes that the Romanian girls wearing them looked like

the Roman maids of antiquity on their way to a festival of Flora. Roses are usually considered the flowers of the elite, but from this it seems that they were grown in the gardens of peasants as well. There is also reference to a gardener on one of the seigniories who grew violets and carnations in pots in his room.

The Value of Work

The peasant practice of gardening suggests that for these simple people, work was an end in itself; certainly, the "fruit of one's labour" was not to be measured in terms of real profit. Their clothing implies this as well. It was in the seventeenth century that Transylvanian peasants began to set aside a separate holiday attire which they decorated with rich embroidery or made of cloth woven in colourful patterns, and intricately ornamented. The making of such a Sunday best must have involved tremendous work.

Beyond gardening and making these colourful costumes, however, the peasants of Transylvania did not work as a pastime. Village entertainment in the seventeenth century was by and large, the same as it had been in the Middle Ages. They liked to dance, either in groups or in pairs. The Romanian men performed a three-beat round dance to the accompaniment of fife-music. Contemporaries have noted that the mountains shepherds played beautifully.

Work on colourful, ornate clothing and gardening for the pleasure of it among people at the lower end of the social scale, however, only served to underline the true character of their daily labour. Work was no source of pleasure to those who performed it, but a heavy burden borne for the pleasure of others. It is hardly a coincidence that this recognition was born at the very moment when the mass of society was discovering beauty for its own sake, while the other, smaller part was growing cloyed with inordinate luxury.

The man to formulate this realization in Transylvania was János Szalárdi, the custodian of the prince's archives in Gyulafehérvár. On seeing the prince of Liechtenstein's park in Moravia with all the intricacies or Renaissance landscaping, Szalárdi was appalled by the money squandered on it. But even more than by the extravagant spending he was struck by the enormous amount of work the creation of the park entailed. With the fresh eyes of an outsider he recognized that Renaissance splendour was the product of the labour of many people, a rarely noted fact.[9]

This approach, which saw the perfect workmanship behind the wonders of the park, and contemplated the hard labour it required, was quite widespread in Transylvania in the seventeenth century. Provincial poets and the verses of village preachers sang of a respect for workmanship and labour. They wrote of the indispensability to lord and peasant alike of all that work creates. Clearly, it would be an exaggeration to see in these poets the early proponents of some labour theory of value. There is no doubt, however,

9. *Szalárdi János siralmas magyar krónikája.* (The Miserable Hungarian Chronicle of János Szalárdi.) Budapest 1980, 259.

that they pondered over the amount of hard work required to generate a product. And they expressed their respect for work in a tone reserved by professional poets for the praise of their society's most valued quality, knightly virtue.

The new respect for labour was a direct consequence of the extraordinary growth in the demand for workers. Indeed, this was the major hallmark of the modern age for those who produced all that was needed for the modern lifestyle with the work of their hands.

The new demand affected the peasantry the most directly, since the seventeenth century was the time when landowners were striving to become increasingly self-sufficient. That meant that they had most of their requirements satisfied by goods produced by their serfs. How far this was so is indicated by the fact that village craftsmen were exempted from performing the regular labour service required of each inhabitant of the settlement, and instead rendered it in the form of work in line with their own craft. Furriers, carpenters and smiths laboured for their seignior on demand. Most of the trades practiced in the villages were related to construction and building, a few people were involved in the production of food. But some seigniories even had craftsmen working in trades that were usually found only in towns, for instance tailors and joiners. In some places, even the providers of luxuries — bird-catchers, gardeners, and game-keepers — did their work in lieu of other services due.

The products generated by serfs in the form of service due reached even the highest classes. Proceeding down the hierarchy from the prince's castle to the village manors, more and more of the labour employed was serf labour. Transylvanian architectural history speaks of works created by village carpenters and other serf craftsmen. Serfs also manufactured furniture and home-decorating textiles. Peasant-made carpets and homespun textiles decorated even the most elegant homes, while the most artistically executed furniture included peasant-style beds, tables and benches.

Studying memorial household furnishing obviously, it is impossible to separate the products of the town guild craftsmen from the objects made in the villages. This is due to the fact that hardly any objects survived from the seventeenth century, and information stems largely from inventories, for instance, dowry lists. Most likely, serf craftsmen created products that could compete with the best of those made by master craftsmen, and it is almost certain that goods produced by town guilds stood in the houses of the nobility. The extant records of the furnishings to be found in the homes of the nobility show remarkable similarity to the furnishings of patrician homes. And since the goods manufactured by serfs were never sold on the market, the similarity can only mean that the guilds, too, were producing everything that the taste and fashion of the time required.

Like the town craftsmen, the serf craftsmen, too, were sensitive to the new requirements. They had to manufacture more and more, and especially, they had to produce different types of wares than earlier. Though this change required that they work more, on the whole it had a positive influence on the circumstances of craftsmen in villages and towns alike. Those living on the estates had better lives, and in the towns, craftsmen's wages did not lag behind the astronomical rise in prices even in 1625.

6. Culture and Education

The Schools

In the area of education the most striking change taking place in the early seventeenth century was the considerable increase in the proportion of serfs to the total number of students. This fact was noted by contemporaries such as the outstanding teacher and authority on education around the middle of the century, János Apáczai Csere. He remarked that there were so many serf children in the schools that the offsprings of the nobility had difficulty in keeping their benches in the classes. He also noted the reason for this love of learning the serfs' desire to rise out of serfdom and poverty.[10] And so it must have been. In Transylvania, customary law, which under Bethlen was reinforced, had long insured the serfs' freedom to learn. Their landlords could not deprive them of this freedom, and studying remained a difficult, but generally attainable, means of climbing up the social ladder.

A relatively dense network of schools facilitated entry into the system. There were schools in every region of Transylvania, though their distribution was not uniform. The Saxons had the greatest number of schools: a Census in 1660 recorded 238 ministers and 224 schoolmasters serving this nationally, which meant that by and large, every congregation had its own teacher. Of the Hungarian language areas, only the Székelys had a comparable supply of teachers. The Romanian areas, however, were incomparably worse off. Though it is likely that there was teaching in some of the monasteries, there were only two actual Romanian-language schools. In 1657 Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, dowager of György Rákóczi I, founded a third such school on the estate of Fogaras.

The structure of education was transformed in two respects in the course of the seventeenth century. Firstly schooling for girls was initiated. This was an enormous step forward, since it provided the masses with an opportunity for learning totally neglected until then. Secondly, in 1622 an academy was added to the schools system, which until then had a number of colleges *(kollégiumok)* roughly the equivalent of grammar schools, as its highest-level educational institutions. Though the founding of the academy came quite late when compared with the rest of Europe, the fact that it came into existence and survived, at all was remarkable, considering that the university in Kolozsvár founded by István Báthory had operated for only a few years. The Gyulafehérvár Academy with its faculties of theology, philosophy and law, Bethlen had intended to have expanded into a university. This, however, György Rákóczi I failed to accomplish. Nevertheless, a great number of students found in the academy their opportunity for both intellectual and social advancement.

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10. J. APÁCZAI CSERE, Az iskolák igen szükséges voltáról. (On the Urgent Necessity of Schools). In: J. APÁCZAI CSERE, *Magyar logikácska, valamint egyéb írások.* (Little Hungarian Logic and Other Writings.) Ed. J. SZIGETI, Bucharest 1975, 151–152.

The Saxons also considered the establishment of an academy. At their synod in 1647 they discussed the matter, and in 1653 the Saxon University took up the question again. The fact that no Saxon Lutheran academy was founded in the seventeenth century was due to a lack of support from the prince and his government. As it was, the most talented pupils continued to study at universities abroad, so that the Saxons were the most numerous group to study at foreign universities. In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, about 4,500 Transylvanians known by name studied abroad; of these 55.5 per cent came from the five largest Saxon towns. The others hailed form a total of fifty-six localities.[11]

It was a characteristic of Hungarian education in general that many students attended foreign universities. The reason was most probably the lack of such institutions of higher learning closer home. But the fact also speaks of the need generally felt for higher education: with her medieval universities now extinguished and the partition of the country Hungary was in danger of being cut off from the mainstream of European culture and education. That it did not happen, clearly had a great deal to do with the determination to see that it would not. Oddly, not even the wars curbed the flow of students to foreign universities. In the sixteenth century, for instance, the decade between 1521 and 1530 saw most students leaving Transylvania for universities abroad, and that number was surpassed only in the decade beginning in 1630, with 304 students enrolled in universities in other countries.

The choice of the country in which to study changed at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Under the Calvinist princes, that is, from the election of István Bocskai, Transylvanians did not attend Catholic universities for several decades. Around the middle of the seventeenth century did they again start studying in Padua, which was known to have the best medical school. During the years when the Thirty Years' War was ravaging Germany, the universities of England and Holland became the preferred institutions. In this sense Transylvania actually profited from the war, since its students went to the Netherlands and England at a time when these two countries where at their intellectual zenith. A Transylvanian even contributed so to speak, to the scientific revolution in England, János Bánffyhunyadi, a reputed chemist, who taught at Gresham College in London until 1646.

The Intellectuals

A much more surprising development was that certain outstanding personalities were permeated in England with the complex system of principles which is usually denoted by the term puritanism. The novel relationship between the individual and the church was treated by them in much the same way as they handled the question of public education or taught

11. M. Szabó, *Erdélyi diákok külföldi egyetemjárása a XVI–XVII. században.* (Students from Transylvania at Foreign Universities in the 16th-17th Centuries.) *Műv. T.* II. This work gives all the figures on Transylvanian students abroad.

the new elements of metaphysics elaborated by Descartes. Pál Medgyesi, János Tolnai Dali, and János Apáczai Csere were the best known among them. Their activity — around the middle of the century — was the culmination of Hungarian puritanism. Medgyesi was primarily responsible for ecclesiastic life, Tolnai Dali was especially active in schools and Apáczai Csere primarily in the renewal of scientific life. These were followed by lesser known personalities who were active mainly in the eastern part of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Of the young people studying at universities surprisingly few remained abroad. In the almost two hundred years between the beginning of the sixteenth and the end of the seventeenth centuries only 2.4 per cent did not return. They came home often in spite of attractive job offers from foreign institutions, aware of the fact what that meant. They came to play a decisive role in the revival of education, their very person a testimony to the pivotal effect of learning. It was mostly the teachers and preachers who started on their way those young serfs who overcame all objective and emotional hurdles to take advantage of the possibility to study.

The school in Kolozsvár was unusual in that many of the teachers who taught there were physicians. One such outstanding personality was Máté Csanaki, a man who after visiting several recognized universities earned his Doctor of Medicine degree in Padua. Since the only faculty for Unitarian theology was in Poland, anyone of this creed studying at schools in the West had to take up another field. Most enrolled in the medical faculties, yet back home they often worked as teachers, or practiced both professions concurrently. Frequently professors from Poland also taught at the Unitarian schools in Kolozsvár.

Of all the teachers invited from abroad to teach in Transylvania in the first half of the seventeenth century those working in Gyulafehérvár are the best known. Martin Opitz, perhaps the most noted German poet of the time, moved there for a short period, but he disliked living in Gyulafehérvár and left. Following him, in 1629, the final year of Gábor Bethlen's rule, came three professors from the dissolved university of Herborn. Among them were the renowned encyclopaedist, Johannes Alsted, and Johannes Bisterfeld, primarily a diplomat, both of whom remained in Gyulafehérvár for the rest of their lives.

Of the Transylvanians teaching in this town, Pál Keresztúri was one whose personal magnetism and excellent teaching personality moulded the lives of generations of students. He was new in that his teaching went out to his students as individuals: it was not only how much information they managed to retain that interested him, but also why it was that certain things made an impact on them and others did not; in short, he was interested in the process of learning.

By the 1640s the other important school of Várad had risen to be a centre of learning in Transylvania. It was primarily the reform activities of Mihály Kecskeméti that earned the institute its fine reputation. This was the first school in the principality to use the books of Comenius, Ramus and William Ames, and the first to stage a play. The school attracted many outstanding teachers, among them György Mártonfalvi, who had come to Várad from a university in Holland. With him there, Várad would have offered the latest

346

in the natural sciences; but hardly had Mártonfalvi arrived when the Turkish siege of 1660 forced the school to relocate to Debrecen.

These outstanding teachers, who actually belonged to the clerical intelligentsia contributed to the growth of this stratum's social prestige in the course of the seventeenth century. Under Gábor Bethlen, the state helped this process along. For absolute rulers usually had also a state religion, and under its Calvinist rulers the Calvinist church became the state church in Transylvania. Bethlen's approach was unique in that though he had no ecclesiastics in his council, he elevated the heads of the Calvinist church into the ruling elite.

The social prestige of the ecclesiastic intellectuals grew in such measure that even the Romanian priests, who were the farthest removed in every sense of the term from the dominant Calvinist church, benefited from it. Already Gábor Bethlen had emancipated them from serfdom, and under Bethlen and his successors their status among Romanians grew even more. The number of Romanian priests increased significantly in the first half of the seventeenth century. For example, in the seigniory of Fogaras, while there were twenty-nine Romanian priests in thirty-three settlements in 1632, their number had more than doubled by 1640.[12]

Only the Saxons seem to have experienced a reverse development. The Saxon University had made itself master over the Saxon clergy, and by the middle of the century, this secular authority regulated everything from the lesson preached at the service to the clothing that the priests' families were to wear. Since the Saxon church fell outside the competence of the prince's church policies, the University automatically assumed the role of patron. But the exceptional erudition of the Saxon lay intellectuals was no less of an important factor. The mayor of Brassó, Michael Weiss, for example, had studied at better universities than any of the church leaders in his time. Why should he have looked up to them?

Michael Weiss is a good example of how difficult it is to define the category of lay intelligentsia in the seventeenth century. Certainly, the fact that a person had studied, even at a university, is not an unambiguous criterion. Nor did everyone employed in an intellectual job, belonged absolutely to it. An illustration of this is a mayor, Tamás Borsos of Vásárhely, who for many years worked abroad as a diplomat, but whose main concern throughout that time was how his estates were being managed at home.

And yet the only way of defining the set of seventeenth-century lay intellectuals is in terms of the activity they were engaged in. In the course of the century, their numbers grew significantly. First of all with the principality broadening its international relations, more and more people were needed to conduct its diplomacy. Though the country had permanent representation only in Constantinople, its envoys frequently visited the courts of other powers as well. These envoys included everyone from noble lords to letter-bearing couriers, but most of them came from the ranks of the middle nobility and the town burghers. It is likely that the government "bureaucracy" also grew, though the structure of the central government organs did not

12. D. PRODAN in *Urbariile* gives conscriptions of Romanian villages. G. MÜLLER in *Die sächsische Nationsuniversität* (*SUBB-H* 1973) gives conscriptions of Saxon settlements.

change in the course of the seventeenth century. On the other hand, there was a growing demand for intellectual work in every sphere of life, resulting in an increase in the number of trained professionals also in the government-boards of the counties, of the Székely districts and of the towns.

The lowest stratum of the lay intelligentsia employed education it had acquired mostly through a few years of local schooling in the villages, market towns, and seigniories. They were the clerks working at the courts of the higher nobility, some of them rising to the rank of bailiff. Those who managed the estates, the courtjudges *(udvarbíró)*, mostly came from the lower nobility. They can be included among the intelligentsia only with some reservation. For their level of education was generally low, and frequently they managed also some property of their own, whereas their practical knowledge was exceedingly broad. They possessed a balanced combination of theoretical and practical erudition.

Erudition

Following the catastrophe of the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Transylvania's intellectual life was the first to recover. The first book after the war appeared in 1610 in Kolozsvár; it was a didactic poem on morals written in Hungarian. The following year a Latin poetics was published in Szeben. The fast recovery did not entail continuity, however, for the lively spirit of polemics that had still characterized Transylvania at the end of the sixteenth century had disappeared, and had given way to neo-stoicism and a turning away from the vicissitudes of life to seek solace in the pleasure of thinking.

Transylvania's overall situation provides reasons enough for the change. The political failures of the turn of the century had made it clear that the country would remain wedged and torn between two great powers. Nothing could be done to change that. As for the churches, after long and futile disputes, they turned instead to their own internal affairs.

The elite representatives of this introspective culture came from the following of István Báthory of Somlyó, lord chief justice of the Kingdom of Hungary, whose court had been the last Hungarian aristocratic court of European stature. A distant relative of the Báthory princes, this exceptionally erudite aristocrat was a writer of Stoic disposition. After a youth filled with political and military success and reaching the height of his prestige, he retreated from public life. Báthory withdrew to the gloomy castle of Ecsed, where he established a court of intellectual splendour and simple externals. István Báthory's spiritual contacts included personalities such as Justus Lipsius. Though he died at the beginning of the Fifteen Years' War, even the first two Transylvanian princes to be elected after the war were under his influence: Zsigmond Rákóczi had been his friend, and Gábor Báthory has been educated at his court.

The process of intellectual regeneration in time gave rise to a more secular culture. This is reflected by figures on book publication up until 1630. Between 1611 and 1630, of the eighteen Hungarian-language publications that appeared, ten were not on theology. After that year, however, the ratio

was reversed: 62.5 per cent of the publications appearing between 1631 and 1650 treated theological matters or were intended for church use.[13] These statistics, however, give only a superficial view of the realities. In fact, the most thoroughly religious works had a temporal application, and often explicitly addressed themselves to the natural sciences. Sermons often discussed illnesses, and theological writings had introductions dealing with the mysteries of nature. Religious publications show thorough acquaintance with both the occult explanations of natural phenomena and the new discoveries in the natural sciences. Though the best educated intellectuals were within the church rather than working as scholars; they conveyed their secular knowledge even from the pulpit.

Besides the secular concerns of religious instruction, seventeenth-century Transylvanian culture was characterized also by the growth of publishing.

Most of the growing number of books were initially published by the prince's press in Gyulafehérvár. Founded by Gábor Bethlen, it came into its own during the 1630s. Possibly György Rákóczi I had cyrillic letters brought from Wallachia and from 1639 the printer of the princely family published very many Romanian-language publications. Perhaps even more distinctive was the publishing house established in Várad by Ábrahám Szenci Kertész in 1649, which contributed to the dissemination of works in the Hungarian language. Kertész had no ideological axe to grind, thus he was the person to publish the period's only Jesuit work to appear in Transylvania. He put out works by Comenius as well as statutes of the Calvinist church. The publication of the book *Approbatae Constitutiones*, a collection of legal regulations, was a major undertaking in Várad. The revised edition of the Gáspár Károlyi Bible translation was also commenced, but on account of the destruction of the city in 1660, was only completed in Kolozsvár later. From 1640 until the fall of Várad in 1660, this publisher came out with 113 works of which 70 were written in Hungarian.

This growing book production meant first of all that works on events in the distant past were outnumbered by accounts of the deeds of contemporary princes, primarily the military accomplishments of György Rákóczi I. New were also the expressedly scientific works, foremost those in linguistics: dictionaries and a book on the theory of translation by István Geleji Katona entitled *Grammatikácska* (A Little Grammar).

The new interest in linguistics captivated even the prince's family. While still heir apparent, György Rákóczi II and his brother Zsigmond participated in work on the dictionary being complied by János Erdőbényei. The number of works on linguistics, however, does not reflect the growing interest in language that existed around the 1640s. This was the first wave of Hungarian language reform, and although the problems were hotly debated in all of Hungary, the centre of activity was Transylvania. The dispute revolved around whether to use orthography based on etymology, which would be accessible only to the educated, or on phonetics, a simpler form that could be learned by anyone who spoke the language. The advocate of

13. *Régi Magyarországi Nyomtatványok.* (Old Hungarian Prints.) Ed. G. Borsa et al. Budapest 1971. *RMK* gives the facts on books and presses.

the first approach was the Calvinist bishop István Geleji Katona, and of the second, Pál Medgyesi, the court preacher of György Rákóczi I. The two were to be integrated later towards the end of the seventeenth century by Miklós Tótfalusi Kis, a printer who had studied in the Netherlands.

The question of the mother tongue also arose among the Transylvanian Romanians. Their problem however, was more complicated than that of the Hungarians. Ștefan Simion Romanian bishop of Gyulafehérvár complained that it was impossible to prepare a Bible translation suitable for every Romanian because they do not speak uniformly. Obviously he was thinking not only of those living in Transylvania but of those Romanians in different counties whose language usage showed discrepancies. These deviations in the Romanian, and in the Transylvanian principalities might have been resolved by the Eastern Orthodox church. This however retained the old Slavic use – in keeping with orthodox universality – and did not support the efforts to use the mother tongue.

Thus the use of the Romanian language in the Orthodox church which was so promising in the sixteenth century stalled from the beginning of the 1580s. After this the mother tongue became restricted to the Romanians of Protestant denomination. The first completely Romanian New Testament was published in 1648 for Romanian Protestants by the princely printer in Gyulafehérvár in Romanian literary language. A pastor named Silvestru and Ștefan Simion did a lot to develop the Romanian literary language. In Transylvania the intertwining of the Romanian mother tongue and Calvinism had peculiar consequences. In the first place a contradiction arose between local Romanian pastors and the Romanian mother tongue with respect to how certain intellectuals insisted on orthodoxy.

In the second place the mother tongue relationship evolving in Transylvania and in Wallachia became contradictory. For just in the middle of the seventeenth century the spread of mother tongue in printed form had commenced in this area. Since this remained within the confines of orthodoxy the polemics conducted with Transylvania were greatly reinforced thereby.

Among the Saxons there were no such problems. This was primarily so because since the reformation the products of German culture reached them in ever more uniformly. However a certain segregation was preserved: the German text regarded as literary was read in the schools according to the different Saxon dialects. Interest in their vernacular was demonstrated in that they sought the local precedents of their own language. They dealt with etimological problems on the basis of the sixteenth-century legend of the Get–Gothic–Transylvanian Saxon continuity.

Equally noteworthy was the growing interest in history and medicine from the late 1630s on. A book on mathematics in Hungarian appeared as well, but it stopped at simple arithmetic. The books on history and medicine discussed the concerns of the time, the former analysed the 1657 catastrophe in Poland, the latter treated the possible causes of the recurring epidemics ravaging the country.

An Open-Minded Society

The Transylvanian scholars of the seventeenth century were typically involved in everyday life. They had neither the opportunity, nor perhaps the need, to seclude themselves in the ivory tower of science, to ponder on some problem, or to conduct scientific experiments. The fact that the highly educated were in constant touch with those who looked to them for guidance had several positive effects. But since there was no opportunity for creative scientific investigation, religion remained the focus of intellectual interest in Transylvania. Scholarly disputes were always connected to problems of religion. The revolutionary epistemology of Descartes, for example, was first formulated in Hungarian by János Apáczai Csere, a theologian with a doctorate from the university of Harderwijk. His *Magyar encyclopaedia* (Hungarian Encyclopaedia), a work highly influential for the development of Hungarian science and scientific language, was published in Utrecht in 1655.

Transylvania's active intellectuals combined an interest in religion with great receptivity to new ideas. It is more difficult to say who it was that the ideas mediated by them actually reached. There is one area, however, which definitely shows that the preoccupation of the greatest thinkers of the time had filtered down to a broader segment of society. Surprisingly, the segment involved is the Sabbatarians, a religious community which, in the course of the seventeenth century, no longer had an educated elite.

Sabbatarianism, this peculiar form of Stoicism evolved in the last third of the sixteenth century, had, in the seventeenth century, spread beyond the circle of the intellectual and political elite to the uneducated and the lowly. It is difficult to assess the size of the movement at this time, since the persecutions of 1638 obviously destroyed much of the evidence. It is, in fact, the restatement and the great severity of laws against the Sabbatarians which indicate that the movement had taken root among the Transylvanian peasants, especially among the Székelys, and could not be destroyed.

The fact that the sect was immune to all persecution was probably due to its members' natural defiance in the face of aggression, to their rage against social and political oppression. At the same time, Sabbatarianism's growing strength had a great deal to do with the fact that it filled a strongly felt cultural void.

The void was due to a general lack of popular education. The official Churches had stopped playing the role of teachers of the poor, which, originally, had been a means of winning converts to their particular faith. As they became accepted and consolidated, however, they lost interest in the lowest strata of the population, for proselytizing, the old motivation, was checked on all sides by the tacit agreement among the received religions not to upset the denominational *status quo*. It is characteristic in this connection that Calvinism, the dominant religion in seventeenth century Transylvania, was from the turn of the century on, concerned with the popular education only of the Romanians whom it wanted to convert.

The Sabbatarians, on the other hand, with their neophyte zeal for converts, took popular education into the churches, providing the faithful information about day-to-day matters of general interest. They responded to the concerns of their congregation. The hymns they sang at their services conveyed with a disarming immediacy, all the teachings of creed.

The Sabbatarians' hymns were not sombre and were not preoccupied with sin and punishment, the motives of other religions. They taught that man could not follow God's will, the Laws, but that through His grace he could still find salvation. Salvation, as proclaimed in the Sabbatarian hymns, was a certainty for all the faithful. This secure knowledge gave them the peace that comes from "cheerfulness of spirit", and the carnal pressures that went with the Sabbath. One hymn even claims that the holy days must be observed for the simple purpose of man's relaxation.[14]

This anthropocentrism was familiar with the hierarchies that made the world go round, but took the Stoic tenet of the vanity of all worldly careers to the people. Many handwritten hymn books contain the originally Anabaptist verse declaring that man must adapt to the world as created by God, because the desire to lead the life of the nobility brings only sorrow and suffering.

The Sabbatarians' self-education, however, with its repudiation of everything worldly, was not an end in itself. Rather it sought to understand the secrets of Nature, and preached man's secure place in the world with the tranquility of the pantheists. The Sabbatarians believed in the stability of the laws of Nature, which not even God's unpredictable, sudden wrath would disturb. They proclaimed these immanent laws of Nature along the world concept of the Ptolemaic system. God "hung the Earth in the middle" says one of their hymns, and even argues that it is only man's imperfection that bars him from seeing that the "Heavens" revolve around the Earth. Granted that all this was contrary to the Copernican heliocentric theory, but in the seventeenth century a number of great thinkers adhered to the same view.

For those who have little access to culture, the fact that certain questions are posed is probably more important than the answers given. For one starts thinking about things constantly heard of. That was certainly true of Sabbatarians: verses dealing with the laws of Nature or arguing with the Copernican world view were set down in many handwritten hymnals. They would not have been copied repeatedly if they had not aroused interest.

These hymnals leave no doubt that the modern scientific theories spread by the intellectuals were received with utmost attention by seventeenth-century Transylvanian society.

7. The Miscarriage of Great Hopes

Connections with the Romanian Voivodates

György Rákóczi II, who took the throne in 1648, was the first ruler in Transylvania to succeed his father and to attain his title without confrontation. He had been elected by the Diet to succeed him while György Rákóczi I was still alive and consequently had no particular domestic problems. But just when he took over the government, conditions abroad were becoming extremely involved.

14. The edition of the Sabbatarian hymns: *RMK* V. Budapest 1970.

Following the Cossack uprising in Poland in 1648, there was unrest throughout eastern Europe. The Cossacks' movement thus took on a historic importance similar to that which the Bohemian uprising had for western Europe, since it sparked off a lengthy war in eastern Europe which, like the Thirty Years' War, resulted in the restructuring of relations between the various countries.

Zsigmond Rákóczi's plan to win the Polish throne failed at the very beginning of the conflagration. György Rákóczi I's death had polarized the Rákóczi party in Poland. Jan Casimir, the brother of Wladislas IV, became king. Though the strife around the Polish throne did not cease, for the time being the Rákóczi party was not a part of it.

Transylvania found a more immediate and portentous opportunity for action when it reviewed its relations with the Romanian voivodates. The opportunity came when the leaders of both principalities failed to realize the significance of the Cossacks' uprising, and took a stand against them. György Rákóczi II was able to take advantage of the ensuing chaos by installing in both countries voivodes committed to him. Gheorghe Ştefan took over the government of Moldavia, and Constantin Şerban became voivode of Wallachia. In both cases, a popular uprising supported Rákóczi's choice.

The course of events — in Moldavia in 1650 and in Wallachia five years later — was similar in the two countries. The Cossacks attacked, and the people rose in the wake of the disorder. Taking advantage of the anarchy, the aspiring rulers drove out the voivodes in power, and with the aid of Rákóczi took up voivodeship. They turned to crush the popular movements. Rákóczi personally marched on Wallachia since the uprising there threatened to spread to Transylvania; to Moldavia he only dispatched an army.

In aiding the new voivodes Rákóczi had reasons that went far beyond political ties: he realized that social stability in the voivodates was in the interest of his own principality. Frequently during times of unrest the disaffected had made their way to Transylvania, instigating rebellion there. Already in May 1619, Moldavians had incited what was tantamount to a peasant revolt. Moreover, self-proclaimed voivodes and defeated peasant leaders were constantly turning up in Transylvania. Rákóczi thought it easier to help settle social unrest in the Romanian counties than to fend off the incendiaries.

The Hopes of Politicians in the Kingdom

His intervention in the voivodates won György Rákóczi II great respect. The court at Gyulafehérvár became the centre of east European diplomacy where Polish, Turkish, Tatar, and Cossack ambassadors communicated. The expectation was that the prince would intervene in the war which had broken out in Poland in the wake of the Cossack uprising.

The politicians of the kingdom waited in the greatest anticipation. A leading group of these were looking to Rákóczi to act. The most influential aristocrats, who had not long before been indifferent or even hostile to his father's military attempts in royal Hungary were now pinning their hopes on

the younger Rákóczi. In his father's time, led by Count Miklós Esterházy, they had declined Transylvanian interference, because they had come to believe in the course of the Thirty Years' War that the Habsburgs with all their forces in the West would be able to put end to Turkish occupation. Once peace was restored in the empire, they claimed the emperor would turn his attention to the matter of Hungary.

Once the Peace of Westphalia was signed, however, it was clear that their hopes would be disappointed. No attack on the Turks was attempted. It was at this point, in 1649, that their attention turned to the Rákóczis, initially to the younger of them, Zsigmond.

Zsigmond Rákóczi was a captivating personality and a staunch realist. In the course of his father's campaign he had come to realize what the elder Rákóczi never would, namely that the slogan of freedom of religion for Protestants would no longer do as a rallying cry for the restoration of the independent Kingdom of Hungary. Setting the issue of religion aside, he established contacts with Catholic aristocrats, winning the support of Miklós Esterházy and his party which, after the palatine's death, was headed by Count Pál Pálffy, also a Catholic. When it became clear that there would be no war against the Turks, Zsigmond Rákóczi joined them in working out a plan to drive the Habsburgs out of Hungary. The political coalition that formed around him in the autumn of 1651 was, thus, one that stood above religious differences. Zsigmond Rákóczi had even been able to win some western allies to what had the seen balance of a great turning-point in seventeenth-century Hungarian politics, until expectations were dashed by the death of the young, though politically mature politician on 4 February, 1652.

It was at this point that political attention turned to György Rákóczi II at the instigation of Count Miklós Zrínyi, who took over the leadership of the party formerly headed by Pálffy in the spring of 1652. In Zrínyi, the Transylvanian prince had won the support of royal Hungary's most prominent aristocrat. No contemporary history book failed to recount the deeds of his great-grandfather, Miklós Zrínyi, who had died a hero during Suleiman's siege of the fortress of Szigetvár in 1566. Minstrels sang of his exploits, and even in the seventeenth century he remained the embodiment of the ancestors' heroic struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Thus the Miklós Zrínyi who lent support to György Rákóczi II had history on his side. And by his own deeds Zrínyi had gained great recognition by leading battles against the Ottoman forces since early youth. In the years when the Habsburg king was still believed to be about to liberate Hungary from the Turks, Zrínyi had written an epic about his great-grandfather, and had got involved in politics on Miklós Esterházy's side.

Zrínyi was the ideal political leader. It was largely due to him that by the time György Rákóczi II was contemplating involvement in Poland after the victories in the Romanian principalities, royal Hungary's population, from the leading aristocrats to the petty nobles and from the people in the market towns to perhaps even the village peasantry was waiting in anticipation for Rákóczi to act. While the prince was off on the Polish campaign, he and Zrínyi were exchanging letters on the practical aspects of Rákóczi's rule in royal Hungary. The plan was that, as in Gábor Bethlen's time, the kingdom like Transylvania, was to become a vassal of the Turkish Empire.

The Polish Campaign and the Beginning of Transylvania's Decline

György Rákóczi II began his march on Poland in January 1657, as an ally of King Charles X of Sweden. Following lengthy negotiations, they had agreed that after jointly conquering Poland, Rákóczi would become its king, with territories south of and including Warsaw.

In Transylvania, there was serious opposition to the undertaking, including the prince's mother, Zsuzsanna Lorántffy, and his wife, Zsófia Báthory. Equally apprehensive were the older members of the Prince's Council. But the younger ones, who had been appointed by Rákóczi, as well as the intellectuals in his entourage, were enthusiastic, and quoted the great Bohemian exile, Comenius, who, in a letter to one of Rákóczi's men back in 1655, had said that nothing was more certain than the fall of Poland, and with it, of the papacy.[15]

Indeed, it seemed that Rákóczi's victory was a foregone conclusion. Some two thirds of Poland's territory was in the throes of Cossack revolts and peasant uprisings. Swedish and Russian armies were ravaging the country, and in July 1656 Warsaw fell without the Polish king's only ally, Leopold I of Habsburg, having entered the war. Rákóczi was counting on a Polish defeat, and his aims were only natural for someone in the seventeenth century. He was looking to secure Transylvania's trade routes, since Poland was the principality's gate to the West.

The prince and his supporters were of the opinion Sweden's attack on Poland was only the first step to an international coalition and war against the Habsburgs. It was with this future all-out war in mind that he allied with Sweden, the power which could be expected to be the most effective against the Habsburgs when the Polish campaign was over.

But the Polish campaign proceeded contrary to all expectations. Already in 1657 it stalled, when the Sweden suddenly withdrew because of an attack from Denmark. One month later, in July, the Cossacks also withdrew from the war. By that time, the troops of Leopold I had arrived. Nevertheless, it was the Poles themselves who decisively defeated György Rákóczi II. National opposition organized against him was becoming increasingly effective. Those who had fled into the marshes or the mountains now rallied to drive out the hated intruders. The regular troops were no match for popular actions of this sort.

Rákóczi was compelled to accept a humiliating peace without having lost a single battle. He had to agree to all the conditions set by the Polish supreme command. It was when he finally set off on the journey home that it became evident that though he had been the first Transylvanian ruler since John II to have been brought up to rule, he had neither a sense of responsibility nor the requisite military know-how. On the way, he made unnecessary detour, when he learned of the approach of Tatar troops. He left his army to be captured while making his own escape. The soldiers

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15. Comenius' letter to A. Klobusiczky: *Erdély és az észak-keleti háború.* (Transylvania and the Baltic War.) Ed. S. Szilágyi, Budapest 1890–1891, I, 393.

were driven off to the Crimea; Rákóczi arrived at Ecsed to join his family in early August.

Upon his return, he vowed to sacrifice even his personal fortune if necessary to ransom his captured army. Yet he did nothing. It is believed that Rákóczi suffered a nervous breakdown, but even on recovering he did nothing to bring his soldiers home. Soon the highways and byways of Transylvania were filled women and children begging for money to pay their menfolk's ransom. The generations of absolute rule by Transylvania's princes were now taking them toll: there was no one to take decisive action in this hour of the country's desperate plight.

Turkish War in Transylvania

Meanwhile, in the Ottoman Empire, an unexpected event had happened; power had been taken over by an extraordinary strong personality. He was Mehmed Köprülü, a very old man, who started his career as an illiterate soldier of Albanian birth, and who had risen from the very lowest to the highest rank of society. He become grand vizier, taking over the Great Seal of the Empire from the hand of the infant sultan's mother on 15 September, 1656. He accepted only on condition that he would have absolute power. He took over power in the midst of inordinate chaos and after the empire had suffered severe defeats, yet in a matter of months, order was restored. He crushed the janissaries' revolts and reorganized the empire's finances. Köprülü is a good example of how a great personality can alter the course of history. Turkish historians refer to the two decades of his rule followed by that of his son both as grand viziers, as the Köprülü Renaissance.

For Transylvania, Köprülü's coming to power was an enormous blow, especially since it happened unexpectedly. In late January 1657 Köprülü had already dispatched on order to György Rákóczi II to return home from Poland. The order was not heeded, however. Nothing but news of chaos had been coming from Constantinople for decades, and the prince had grown accustomed to ignoring the orders coming from the Porte. Köprülü was the fifth grand vizier to be named to the post in 1656, and not even his well-wishers thought he would last more than a few months. But he remained in power, and was adamant that his orders be followed.

When, after repeatedly ignoring instructions, the prince returned home only after the humiliating peace, in late October 1657 Köprülü sent out a command for Rákóczi's deposition. By that time, Transylvania's politicians should have been able to assess the changes that had transpired at the Porte, but in Transylvania, Rákóczi still seemed more formidable than the grand vizier. They did not dare to press Rákóczi to resign. First, they merely handed him Köprülü's letter, only later pleading with him to consider heeding it. Rákóczi, however, made conditions, and wanted to secure the future of his estates. And the Diet negotiated with him.

The intolerable situation lasted for the rest of Rákóczi's lifetime. The prince insisted on his title without the least sense of regal responsibility for his country. And Transylvania's politicians were either not able or not brave

enough to drive him out. With foolish impotence they rather brought on themselves the revengeful deeds of the Porte.

First, Mehmed Köprülü arrived in person, at the head of the main Turkish army. After having removed Rákóczi's allies in both Romanian voivodates, he arrived at the Transylvanian border in late August 1658, and ordered the prince to appear before him. Rákóczi refused to comply. It is difficult to imagine whose help he was counting on with the Transylvanian soldiers still prisoners in the Crimea. Leopold I had been evasive when asked for support. The leaders of royal Hungary tried to gain help from the king, to no greater avail. Leopold had hardly any cause to assist Rákóczi as it was because of the prince that he had had to send his troops to Poland. Some hope perhaps could be placed on the haiduks, because with them — still before Köprülü's arrival — Rákóczi had defeated Ahmed Seide, the pasha of Buda.

In response to György Rákóczi II's refusal to yield power over Transylvania, the troops of the grand vizier flooded the country. First they captured the fortress of Jenő, then marched on and laid waste to the rest of the principality. In early September, they reached Gyulafehérvár. Street after street the capital was burnt down. The prince did not stay to witness the destruction however. He took flight in the direction of Debrecen, and the Turkish troops followed him to the Berettyó River.

Back in Transylvania, the head of the Prince's Council, Ákos Barcsai, did the only thing left to be done: he went to the camp of the grand vizier and acceded to all of Köprülü's conditions, including the capture of György Rákóczi II. On 7 October, 1658 the Diet recognized Barcsai as the new prince of Transylvania. With that, Köprülü and his entire army marched out of the country.

At last peace was restored. Instead of, urgently fulfilling the bargain with the grand vizier however, Rákóczi's and Barcsai's men jumped at each other's throats. Civil war broke out. The conflict was joined by a third party when János Kemény, the commander of the Transylvanian army, returned from captivity in the Crimea in the autumn of 1659. The politicians of the principality had no time to remake relations with the Porte.

In April 1660 the Turkish main army from Constantinople set out for Transylvania a second time. But before it arrived, on 7 June, 1660, Rákóczi died from wounds received in a battle near Szászfenes against the pasha of Buda. The Turks did not turn back, however. Ali pasha, commander of the army, took Ákos Barcsai prisoner as surety for the taxes promised to Köprülü. The prince duly sent word from the pasha's camp for the taxes to be paid, so that measures were taken to collect them. But in the meanwhile, Várad was already laid under siege.

On 14 July, 1660, the Turks set up camp on the banks of the Körös River in the vineyards and orchards around Várad. Before the siege began, Ali pasha called on the fortress to surrender. The military commanders, however, supported by the town council, decided on defence. They evacuated the town itself, and some one thousand soldiers, burghers and students withdrew to the castle.

They held out for forty-four days, repulsing repeated attacks. But after the enemy drained off the water in the moat and no more gunpowder was

left, they surrendered on 17 August, 1660. Even then they made conditions, and the impact of their valiance was such that the Turkish command agreed to their demands. The soldiers could leave the town with arms, the burghers who so desired were allowed to remain, while those who chose to leave were permitted to take with them the school's equipment and the printing press. The Turkish commander-in-chief promised not to loot or pillage lands not belonging to Várad, and to secure the reduction of Transylvania's taxes to the Porte.

The immense Turkish army looked on stupefied as only three hundred people walked out of the castle that had held out against six weeks of siege.

III. The End of Turkish Rule
in Transylvania and the Reunification
of Hungary (1660–1711)

1. Changes in Politics

Prince Mihály Apafi and the Turkish Wars of 1660–1667

In the autumn of 1660, a flood of pamphlets and diplomatic reports alerted western Europe to the most recent blow that the Ottoman Empire had struck at Christendom: György Rákóczi II had been beaten in a clash with Turkish forces, and had died of the wounds he had sustained in the battle. Várad, the most important border fortress of the principality, had fallen into Turkish hands. With Várad lost, "The road lay open to the barbarians to take Hungary, Moravia, Silesia and Poland".[1] Transylvania's tragedy rekindled the hopes of Hungary's leaders — for instance the palatine, Ferenc Wesselényi, and Miklós Zrínyi, ban of Croatia — that Christendom would finally rally to take the offensive they had been vainly urging since the Peace of Westphalia, and would at last liberate the peoples of Europe from the Turkish yoke.

Leopold I's appeal for help was heeded by the pope, by Venice and by the German electors, including Johann Philipp, elector of Mainz, and president of the League of the Rhine: the emperor could count on their support in the event of a campaign to rid Transylvania of Ottoman occupation.

After the death of György Rákóczi II, Ákos Barcsay, who was trying a policy of cooperation with the Porte, took over as prince of Transylvania. After the fall of Várad, however, the Estates lost confidence in him, and elected János Kemény, a man in his fifties, to be their prince.

János Kemény — who had served as a diplomat under Gábor Bethlen, and as a general under György Rákóczi II, and had returned from captivity among the Crimean Tatars only the year before, — called on Transylvania's population in 1661 to arm, certain that help would be forthcoming from the Christian princes of Europe. There was no time to lose, for the Tatar armies were already wreaking havoc in the Székelyföld, and Ali, pasha of Temesvár had been ordered by the grand vizier to "pacify" the Saxons. In this hour of utmost danger, a comprehensive plan of action was worked out in Vienna on the advice of the high lords of Hungary: Montecuccoli was to lead the main body of the imperial army in an attack on Esztergom, the fortress on the Danube protecting Turkish-occupied Buda, and then lay siege to Buda

1. F. Deák, *Nagyvárad elvesztése 1660-ban.* (The Loss of Nagyvárad in 1660.) Budapest 1878, 32.

itself. Miklós Zrínyi was to start the campaign in Transdanubia, laying siege to the Turkish stronghold at Kanizsa, in the hope of drawing off the Turkish forces that had descended on Transylvania.

Fortunately, however, the grand vizier Mehmed Köprülü, who had been at war with Venice since 1645 and was even at that moment on the island of Crete trying to wrest Candia from Venice, had no desire to wage war on two fronts. Accordingly, he offered the Habsburgs a deal which, it seems, they could not resist. By the terms of the secret treaty of 1661, Vienna recognized Várad to be an Ottoman possession, and promised not to aid János Kemény; in return, the Sublime Porte undertook to terminate its punitive expedition into Transylvania, and to see that a new prince was elected. It was this secret treaty that was behind the surprising new order General Raimondo Montecuccoli received from Vienna: he was to march his troops to the Transylvanian border by way of a show of strength, and await the election of the new prince. Montecuccoli was outside Kolozsvár when he received word that on 14 September, 1661, the Diet that Ali pasha had had herded together had, under duress, confirmed the pasha's choice of Mihály Apafi as prince of Transylvania. The very next day, Montecuccoli withdrew the bulk of his troops to the Kingdom of Hungary. The unsuspecting János Kemény did his best to cope with the new wave of marauding Tatars who were laying waste the Székelyföld, and died in the clash near Nagyszőllős on 23 January, 1662.

Prince Mihály Apafi had been brought up and educated by Cartesian teachers. His main interests were philosophy, astronomy and mechanics. He, too, had been among the prisoners taken by the Tatar khan in 1657 at the end of the Polish campaign, and had spent over three years in captivity. The dignity of prince of Transylvania had been forced upon him, but he managed to pursue a policy that soon brought his realm a period of peace. With gifts for the pashas and compensation for the Porte and promises of higher tributes than had ever been paid he persuaded the Turkish and Tatar troops to withdraw from Transylvania. He won the Saxons to his side, and restored order in the Székelyföld. The most influential and respected of his precedessor's advisers he entrusted with key positions: János Bethlen was made chancellor, Dénes Bánffy military high commander, and Gábor Haller and Mihály Teleki councillors in what was soon a strong central government. While declaring himself a loyal vassal of the sultan, Apafi was a ruler in his own right whom even the Habsburgs had to recognize. He was vocal in his conviction that Transylvania and the Kingdom of Hungary formed "two Hungarian homelands", and that the survival of one was inseparable from the survival of the other. Apafi was on confidential terms with the dignitaries of the Kingdom of Hungary, and cooperated closely with them. When in early 1663 the new grand vizier Ahmed Köprülü sent him word to prepare for a campaign against Hungary, the purpose of which was to make the entire country into a vassal state like Transylvania, Apafi immediately notified the palatine. Though fear of Tatar retribution kept him from openly defying Köprülü's army of a hundred thousand, which marched into Buda in the summer of 1663, and then on to lay siege to the strongest western fortress of the Kingdom of Hungary, Érsekújvár, Apafi secretly supported the Hungarian side.

42. View of Kolozsvár from the north. Copper engraving, 1617

43. Banister of the pulpit of the church in Farkas Street, Kolozsvár. The alabaster inlays were made by Elias Nicolai, 1646

44. Portrait of Gábor Bethlen. Copper engraving by Egidius Sadeler the Younger, 1620

45. Gravestones of Saxon *comes* in the Lutheran church at Nagyszeben. On the left is Valentin Seraphin (d. 1639), next to him Valentin Frank (d. 1648)

46. The New Testament in Romanian published by György Rákóczi I.
Gyulafehérvár, 1648

47. Greek Orthodox Romanian church in Fogaras founded by Constantin Brîncoveanu, ▶
voivode of Wallachia, 1697–1698

48. Coins issued by princes:

1. Ten forint coin issued by György Rákóczi I, 1631. Obverse and reverse

2. Thaler issued by György Rákóczi II and minted at Nagybánya, 1652. Obverse and reverse

3. Thaler issued by Ákos Barcsay. Minted at Kolozsvár, 1661. Obverse and reverse

4. Thaler issued by János Kemény. Minted at Kolozsvár, 1661. Obverse and reverse

49. Mihály Apafi and Charles of Lorraine, 1688

TRANVILVANIA

50. Interior of the Roman Catholic church at Csíkdelne. Building: second half of the fifteenth century; ceiling: 1613; altar: 1675

In collaboration with Miklós Zrínyi, Palatine Wesselényi, Lord Chief Justice Nádasdy and György Lippay, archbishop of Esztergom turned in the summer of 1663 to the League of the Rhine to send an international army to succour Christian Hungary. By then, Érsekújvár was in Turkish hands, and the hawks had carried the day in Vienna, which until then had been anxious to make peace with Köprülü. In the autumn of 1663, the League of the Rhine meeting in Regensburg proposed that the pope, the Habsburg emperor, Venice, Poland and Russia form a coalition and take the offensive against the Turks. Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia were also to form part of the alliance.

In the meantime, the towns and counties of the Kingdom of Hungary were flooded with "patents" issued in Apafi's name, in which Ahmed Köprülü promised self-government, freedom of religion and absolute protection to any town or country that would, like Transylvania, submit to the Porte's authority, and accede to a lump sum payment of a not overly high annual tax. In fact, the grand vizier's idea was not so far-fetched as might seem at first glance. Especially those living in the border towns and counties had wearied to the point of despair as much of the waves of religious persecution suffered from the Habsburgs as of the destruction wreaked time and again by the bands of marauding Turks. For these people, an explicit Turkish orientation seemed a possible way to put an end to the decades of death and destruction. That Köprülü's plan did not succeed was due to a great extent to the position taken by Apafi himself, who worked hand in glove with the high lords of the Kingdom of Hungary to frustrate it.

It was only after the grand vizier's third summons that Apafi and the Transylvanian army appeared in the Turkish camp at Érsekújvár, and then only to forestall the Tatar punitive expedition that Köprülü had threatened him with. Köprülü needed Apafi, for he was a key figure in his plans: Apafi was to be made ruler of the prostrate Kingdom of Hungary. The prince, however, made use of the entire arsenal of contemporary political manoeuvring — feint, cunning diplomacy and bold risk-taking — to keep himself from becoming the pitiable tool of the Porte's designs. Köprülü had issued patents in Apafi's name calling on the population to submit. These only served as an occasion for the palatine to make a public declaration of his own. Wesselényi's proclamation issued in the autumn of 1663 gave a dramatic picture of Transylvania's utter vulnerability under the Porte's suzerainty, and declared that if the Kingdom of Hungary came under Ottoman rule it would mean the end of monarchy in Hungary even as an ideal, and would lead to Transylvania's complete destruction. In the meanwhile, Apafi was sending out secret instructions of his own to the people of the counties bordering on Transylvania: let them not give credence to the promises of the perfidious Turks, let them stand firm, hard though it be, for the time was at hand when all Hungary would be freed from the Turkish yoke.

Apafi took enormous personal risks in helping to organize the anti-Turkish alliance. Relying on the goodwill that Gábor Bethlen had won for Transylvania among the Protestant princes of Europe, Apafi turned to the English ambassador to the Porte, Winchelsea, in 1662, and in 1664 appealed directly to Charles II of England to champion Transylvania's cause. It was due partly to Transylvanian diplomatic efforts that all of Europe was humming with

news of the Christian forces' successful campaigns in the winter of 1663 and early 1664, when the army led by Miklós Zrínyi, together with the armies of the League of the Rhine under Count W. Julius Hohenlohe, inflicted considerable losses on the Turks, including on 2 February, 1664 burning the bridge on the Dráva River at Eszék which formed part of the major transport network for Turkish supplies and reinforcements.

France, though not openly at war with the Turks, took part in the campaign as a member of the league. In the spring of 1664 Miklós Bethlen, son of the chancellor, János Bethlen, returned from Paris with a letter to Apafi from the minister of foreign affairs, Hugues de Lionne, and General Henri de Latour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, who had been appointed to lead the French troops against the Turks. Apafi had also established contacts with the Romanian voivodates, and won the voivode of Wallachia, Grigore Ghica, to join in the anti-Turkish alliance. The official notification Leopold I sent Apafi of the international preparations being made against the Turks contained the clause that Vienna was counting on Transylvania's co-operation. This was tantamount to the recognition that Transylvania would participate in the alliance as a sovereign state.

The plans of the spring campaign of 1664 called for the Hungarian, the imperial, the German and the French troops to launch an attack on three fronts. Zrínyi, the commander of the Hungarian troops, was to lay siege to Kanizsa supported by the League of the Rhine armies. The main body of the allied army under Montecuccoli was to attack along the Danube. A campaign was to be launched in the Várad region, too, with a view to recapturing Várad itself. Though it had been a difficult start, it was an auspicious one: on 1 August, 1664, the allied armies won a great victory against the grand vizier at Szentgotthárd, and hopes ran high in Transylvania that the generations of Turkish vassalage were nearby ended. These hopes were dashed when, at the end of September, an imperial proclamation informed the country that on 10 August, Prince Johann Ferdinand Porcia, president of the Imperial Privy Council and leader of the faction opposing the war with the Turks, had made peace with the Porte at Vasvár. The treaty had been kept secret; neither the other allied countries, nor even the officers of the imperial army knew of its existence until the proclamation was issued nearly two months later.

The Peace of Vasvár thoroughly disregarded Transylvania's interests in every detail. The Habsburgs had given Apafi no hint that they were about to come to terms with the Porte. Várad and all its vast surrounding region, as well as the territorial gains the Turks had made, Lugos and Karánsebes, were to remain in Ottoman hands. The castle at Székelyhíd, which was now the westernmost fortress not in Turkish hands, was to be razed to the ground. Leopold I and the Porte agreed not to aid each other's enemies, and that, of course, included Transylvania.

After the Peace of Vasvár, Apafi co-operated even more closely with the political leaders of the Kingdom of Hungary, who, counting on a long-term Habsburg-Ottoman truce, were devising ways of safeguarding Hungary's statehood. The idea of a confederation including the Kingdom of Hungary, the Principality of Transylvania, Croatia and Poland was put forward. Then,

on 18 November, 1664, Miklós Zrínyi was killed while hunting wild boar. Apafi, mourning him, was the first among the many who would note that the nation had lost its greatest politician at the most critical moment. He was all too well aware that after this, Transylvania's chances were not what they had been.

Apafi's Balancing Act
and the Transylvanian–French Alliance

Though the allied anti-Turkish campaign of 1664 had ended in failure, Prince Apafi and his advisers could have no doubt that the Ottoman Empire was no longer as strong as it had once been. Perhaps at greater cost than they had envisaged, but the time to rid Hungary of the Turks would soon be at hand. Apafi was a politician of European vision, who was determined to safeguard what the principality stood for, to modernize his government, and thus strengthen Transylvania's sovereign statehood. Precariously balanced between the Porte and the Habsburgs, determined to revive the Kingdom of Hungary, Apafi achieved considerable domestic stability, and took full advantage of the changes on the international scene to establish contacts abroad. Apafi's immediate circle consisted of strong individuals of considerable erudition and experience: the venerable chancellor, János Bethlen; the young privy councillor, Mihály Teleki; Dénes Bánffy, a diplomat and the commander of Kolozsvár; the young Miklós Bethlen, and others of equal stature. Apafi's corps of diplomats whether of noble or non-noble birth and whether accredited to the Porte, to Poland or to the courts of the German electors, consisted, as Transylvania's diplomatic corps always had, of men of outstanding competence, and, for the most part, of men who had been brought up on Descartes.

Apafi based the power of the central government on a stable economy and a modern armed force, which he achieved through domestic loans, a free trade policy, and the building up of enterprises financed by the treasury. The reforms to be introduced were submitted to the Diet for approval, and it was the Diet — which Apafi convened with unprecedented frequency — that supervised their implementation. Along with the representatives of the "Three Nations" — the Hungarian nobility of the counties, the Székely seats, and the towns of the Saxon University — Apafi invited to the Diet the Greek Orthodox bishop of Transylvania, the representative of the only institution that Transylvania's Romanian population could call its own. Though there is no indication that the bishop ever addressed the Diet during the years of Apafi's rule, the innovation was still a milestone: it was the first time that Transylvania's Romanians had access to a political forum.

The new circumstances in which the Kingdom of Hungary found itself after the Peace of Vasvár dictated that Transylvania, too, try a new orientation. The chief dignitaries of royal Hungary — Lord Chief Justice Ferenc Nádasdy, Péter Zrínyi, ban of Croatia, and Archbishop György Lippay — joined with the palatine, Ferenc Wesselényi, in trying to find a way to restore the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary. The Habsburgs' agreement

with the Porte prohibited even defensive warfare, and yet the garrisons in Turkish occupied Hungary continued to conduct regular forays into the neighbouring kingdom, exacting enormous tributes, and annexing riding after riding to the area under direct Turkish control. Wesselényi and his supporters wanted to see the country reunited. They pinned their hopes on Ferenc Rákóczi I, the son of György Rákóczi II and designated prospective prince of Transylvania since 1652, who had turned Roman Catholic after his father's death, and lived with his mother, the dowager Princess Zsófia Báthory, on the family's estate at Munkács castle, which secured the thoroughfare between Poland and Transylvania, or at Sárospatak.

Though Wesselényi toyed with the idea of a Rákóczi comeback as a way of strengthening Hungary through union with Transylvania, when neither French nor Polish help was forthcoming against the Turks, he decided to seek a *modus vivendi* with Apafi instead. In the summer of 1666, the dignitaries of the Kingdom of Hungary met with Mihály Teleki and Miklós Bethlen at Murány, and agreed, among other things, that the Tisza River would constitute the border between Transylvania and Hungary once they had managed to drive the Turks out of the area. Until they did, however, there was but one way to forestall the total collapse of the Kingdom of Hungary as far as Wesselényi and his supporters could see: they had to try to come to terms with the Ottomans in the hope that an even higher yearly tribute would buy the country some measure of security. Their approach to the Porte in the autumn of 1666 through the tried and tested diplomatic channels that Apafi put at their disposal met with a rebuff from Ahmed Köprülü. The grand vizier, still busy with the siege of Candia, did not want war with the Habsburgs at the moment, and kept to his secret agreement with Leopold I that they would not aid or abet one another's subjects. After he took Candia in 1669, Köprülü, sure of his power in the Mediterranean, was ready for a new war, and prepared to march against Poland. To guarantee peace in Hungary in order to secure the Habsburg–Ottoman trade routes, the Porte made a new agreement with the Habsburgs.

Things went from bad to worse for the Wesselényi group. With Wesselényi's death in the spring of 1667, they had lost their most judicious leader. Subsequent actions were such that they provided the hard-liners in Vienna with a fine opportunity to try to eradicate what was left of the independent statehood of the Kingdom of Hungary: in the spring of 1670, the pockets of local resistance to the imperial troops were ruthlessly suppressed, along with the rebellion in Upper Hungary led by Ferenc Rákóczi I. Lord Chief Justice Nádasdy, Péter Zrínyi, ban of Croatia, his brother-in-law Ferenc Frangepán, Count Erasmus Tattenbach, a Styrian aristocrat, and Ferenc Bónis, one of the leaders of the insurgent lesser nobility of Upper Hungary, were tried for treason and for conspiring with the Turks, and executed in 1671. The constitution of the Kingdom of Hungary was suspended, the Hungarian border regiments, about 10,000 men in all, were dismissed, and imperial troops garrisoned in the border fortresses. Urban self-government was abolished, and Protestant ministers were summoned to appear before special courts set up in Pozsony. The hundreds of noble families from Upper Hungary who were implicated in the conspiracy had their lands confiscated, and had to seek refuge abroad (1670–1674).

Apafi's Transylvania followed its own sovereign course throughout this entire period, becoming a tool in the hands neither of the Turks, nor of the Habsburgs. As the sole embodiment of Hungarian statehood, Transylvania kept Europe informed of developments in the Kingdom of Hungary. It became a place of refuge for the persecuted Hungarians, and gave a helping hand to the now destitute former soldiers of the border castles, to fugitive serfs and fugitive noblemen to rally and arm along the border and in the Partium, and conduct forays against the imperial forces stationed in their homeland.

Behind Apafi's successful balancing act was a new king of Transylvanian foreign policy. Apafi's ties abroad were multifarious. He made peace with Poland and cooperated closely with the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia. He built on the contacts Transylvania's Reformed churches had in the Netherlands, England, the German principalities and Sweden to establish cultural and political ties with the Protestant powers. At the same time, Apafi signed an agreement with Leopold I, normalizing relations between Transylvania and the empire.

Apafi was quick to realize that the renewal of the Habsburg-Bourbon rivalry was something that Transylvania could exploit to its advantage, as indeed had Pázmány and Zrínyi in their time. Apafi was not the first prince of Transylvania to pin his hopes on the French connection, but he was unusually energetic in its pursuit, establishing ties through the French ambassador to Vienna, through the French residents at the Sublime Porte, and through Francophile Polish politicians. In November 1673, the hetman Jan Sobieski, after a brilliant victory over the Turkish armies, turned to Apafi asking him to join France to mediate between Poland and the Porte in the war that had been going on since 1672. The French orientation, however, aroused considerable opposition in Transylvania. Apafi ruthlessly suppressed the faction trying to force him to follow a pro-Habsburg policy. Their leader, Dénes Bánffy, was executed, and his supporters eliminated. In March 1675, the French envoy, Roger du Fresne Akakia, who had come to Transylvania with the Polish ambassador, signed a preliminary agreement with the prince of Transylvania in Fogaras. The Franco-Transylvanian alliance itself was signed in Warsaw, in May 1677, by the marquis François Gaston de Selles Béthune, the new French ambassador to Poland, and Apafi's envoy, Dániel Absolon. By the terms of the treaty, France, which was at war with the Habsburg emperor, undertook to support the Hungarian army of exiles assembled on the Transylvanian border with an annual sum of 100,000 thalers, and promised French and Polish support for any major action against Leopold I. Transylvania was to provide the exiles with a general, Mihály Teleki, and with commanders, and to guarantee them a retreat area, but without openly going to war against Hungary's Habsburg king. Louis XIV promised to represent Transylvania's interests, too, at the peace negotiations with the emperor, and, in case the Turks sent a punitive expedition, to defend the principality against the Ottoman aggression.

The Porte had meanwhile made peace with Poland, and did not want to jeopardize its own French connections with an open attack on Transylvania's Francophile foreign policy. Instead, it secretly encouraged Pál Béldi, an ambitious aristocrat determined to exploit domestic disaffection in Tran-

sylvania. Apafi, however, proved to be the better politician, and Béldi fled to the Porte, where, in fact, he was disowned.

It was at this time that the exiles assembled along the Transylvanian borders began to be called *kuruc*. The origin of the expression is uncertain. From the late 1670s, a *kuruc* was anyone who took up arms against the Habsburgs' rule in Hungary, and fought for the Protestant faith and for the country's liberty. Their first military attempts did not bring lasting success. Teleki was a fine organizer and an enterprising diplomat, but had no real talent as a military commander. In the spring of 1678, the exiles, in the presence of the delegate of the French king, elected Teleki as their "chief magistrate", and the command of the army was taken over by the new general, the twenty-year-old count Imre Thököly.

Imre Thököly, who had fled to Transylvania from the Kingdom of Hungary in 1670 as a child to escape the repression of those suspected of complicity in Wesselényi's movement proved to be nothing short of a military genius. Europe watched in awe as his cavalry regiments and their French and Polish reinforcements took the mining towns of western Hungary in the autumn of 1678. Thököly's military success had a great deal to do with France's including Transylvania in the Treaty of Nijmegen. For Apafi, it was an unprecedented diplomatic success. Though Article 3 of the treaty mentioned the principality and its interests only in general terms, Louis XIV's letter to Apafi of 8 June, 1679 made clear that by the terms of the treaty, Transylvania had been recognized as one of France's allies. Soon another ally, John III Sobieski, elected king of Poland in 1674, but crowned only in 1676, appointed an ambassador to Apafi's court, and Transylvania was sending Dániel Absolon to Paris as its special envoy. The Habsburgs, too, had to start reckoning with Transylvania's new diplomatic weight, to say nothing of Thököly's military successes. After a nearly twenty years' recess, they convoked the Diet at Sopron, restored Hungary's constitution, appointed a palatine, filled the other high posts of the realm, and agreed to a limited degree of religious liberty for the Protestant sects.

In the meanwhile, Thököly, who, with his army of twenty thousands men had became a power to be reckoned with, had determined to make Upper Hungary into an independent principality. Thököly had the support of the wealthy burghers of Upper Hungary: of Eperjes, Bártfa, and Lőcse, and his marriage to Ilona Zrínyi, widow of the hereditary prince of Transylvania, Ferenc Rákóczi I, had made him master of the enormous Rákóczi estates, and heir to the Rákóczis' and Zrínyis' traditional authority. The Porte was relatively quick to recognize that Thököly's advent upon the Hungarian political scene was potentially divisive of the forces committed to restoring Hungary's independent statehood. Support for Thököly would isolate Transylvania, and clip Apafi's wings. In 1682, the Porte commanded Thököly, whose latest spectacular victory had been the occupation of Kassa, the heart of Upper Hungary, to join, the Ibrahim pasha of Buda at the castle of Fülek, where Apafi, too, was ordered to appear with his troops if he did not want the Tatars to ravage Transylvania.

Apafi had to stand by and watch the carnage as Ibrahim pasha took Fülek at great cost to his own men as well. With the fall of Fülek, the Kingdom of Hungary lost the fortress that had secured the roads between "Lower Hun-

gary" in the west, and "Upper Hungary" in the east. Ibrahim pasha celebrated his victory by declaring Thököly prince of Upper Hungary. Apafi had no illusions about the dangers that the Ottoman "divide and rule" policy and Thököly's sovereign power involved for Transylvania.

But neither the venerable old prince, nor his ageing advisers felt in the position to alter the course that it seemed events were bound to take.

Secret Membership in the Holy League

The renewal of the Turkish wars (1683–1699) resulted in radical changes in the position of the independent Principality of Transylvania. The change, however, war gradual, and for some time it was not clear just what direction it would take. For as soon as France had secured her positions in the Habsburgs' political hinterland, she set about strengthening her influence with the Porte. After the death of the grand vizier Ahmed Köprülü (1676), the forces of internal disintegration within the Ottoman Empire seemed, for a while, to gain ascendancy. With the janissaries in revolt and the empire's coffers empty, Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa looked to a new western campaign to restore morale and solve his financial difficulties. Encouraged by Louis XIV's dislike of the Habsburgs, he set out with an army of a hundred thousand in the summer of 1683, making his way through Hungary to lay siege to Vienna.

Apafi and his seasoned government were less impressed by the Ottoman armies than most of Europe. Postponing the moment with "gifts" of Transylvanian gold, Apafi heeded the sultan's call to arms only in the late summer. Even then, he marched into the Kingdom of Hungary only with a Székely regiment a few thousand strong to link up with the grand vizier's army. In fact, Kara Mustafa did not trust him to let him near the scene of the battle itself, but had Apafi and his troops guard the bridges on the rivers Rába and Rábca just south of Győr. All the while, Apafi kept in constant contact with the palatine, Pál Esterházy, who remained loyal to the Habsburg side throughout the campaign. Apafi formulated his political creed as follows: they should all steer the course of events in such a way that "final ruin might not come to the Hungarian nation".[2]

On 12 September, 1683, the Ottoman forces were routed at Vienna, thanks to the timely arrival of John III Sobieski and Charles, duke of Lorraine. By the time Apafi and his plague-decimated troops had made their way through a Hungary ridden with marauding bands of defeated Turks, a great many things had changed in Transylvania's favour. The Porte had made Thököly the scapegoat of the battle lost at Párkány (9 October, 1683), and had decided to seek support from Apafi instead. Mihály II Apafi, the ageing ruler's little son, whom the Transylvanian Diet had elected to succeed his father, was now confirmed by the Porte as the next prince of Transylvania. The lessons of the previous few months, however, were not lost on Apafi either. The future, and so Transylvania's future, lay with Christendom.

2. Letter by Prince Mihály Apafi to Palatine Pál Esterházy. June 1683. *EOE* XVII, 127–128.

In the spring of 1684, Pope Innocent XI gave his blessing as Poland, Venice and the Habsburg Empire joined to form the Holy League, a military alliance dedicated to driving the Turks out of Europe. The members of the league were quick to realize Transylvania's strategic importance in a war that would involve the entire area stretching from the Ukraine to the Mediterranean and down into the Balkan Peninsula. Over and above its potential as a supplier of food and raw materials, Protestant Transylvania's stand in the upcoming struggle had also a symbolic importance: the German principalities, as well as England and the Netherlands which had promised the league financial support, all set great store by Transylvania, a Protestant power, being on the Christian side in the historic struggle. In fact, the international agreements containing the plans for the great campaign specified as much. Leopold I was building on tradition, as well as satisfying international expectations when in April 1684 he invited Prince Apafi to join the Holy League.

Transylvania, however, was not in the position openly to join an anti-Turkish alliance. On the western borders, Turkish garrisons in Várad, Temesvár and a host of smaller fortresses watched every move Apafi made. One word from the Porte, and the Tatar hordes would cross the Carpathians and leave Transylvania in smouldering ruins. And though the Turks had been scattered before Vienna, the Ottoman forces were still formidable, as their successful defence of Buda the following year showed.

Besides the objective difficulties, there was also Apafi's well-founded reluctance to treat with the Habsburgs. Transylvania's involvement with the Holy League, however, was soon being urged also from another quarter: the Francophile John III Sobieski, who had fallen out with Leopold I, was encouraging Apafi to join the anti-Turkish alliance under his aegis.

In the end, it was again expediency that determined Apafi's course. Seeking to get whatever guarantees he could of his small country's security, he tentatively set about making joint cause with Christendom fighting the Ottomans. With Teleki's mediation, in the spring of 1685, Transylvania signed a secret preliminary agreement in Kercsesora with the Habsburg emperor. By the terms of the agreement, Transylvania recognized the suzerainty of the king of Hungary, while Leopold I guaranteed Transylvania's independent statehood and independent political institutions. Transylvania became a secret member of the Holy League, and undertook to provide certain of the imperial troops with winter quarters. Concurrently, Apafi made a treaty with Wallachia, in which the parties promised one another mutual protection against the Habsburg emperor and the Porte, and tried to get Poland, to guarantee the agreement. With Thököly, however, Apafi was unable to come to terms.

As prince of Upper Hungary, Thököly had had no part in the siege of Vienna, and after the fiasco, offered to join the Christian cause with his twenty thousand men. The Habsburg government, however, smarting under the affront that his princely title offered to the dynasty, rebuffed him; in vain did Charles, duke of Lorraine, insist that he could not afforded to do without Thököly's seasoned troops in the Hungarian theatre. The Porte, however, did not take kindly to being crossed, and ordered Thököly's arrest. Apafi refused to carry out the order, and probably even alerted Thököly

of the danger he was in. He could not, however, overrule the pro-Turkish party in the Diet: Thököly's Transylvanian estates were confiscated in the spring of 1685, and his followers imprisoned. In the autumn of 1685, the pasha of Várad captured the prince of Upper Hungary by ruse. Thököly's army — the only one in the Kingdom of Hungary or Transylvania that could have fought for Hungarian interests — disbanded, though scattered units of his men, integrated into the imperial regiments, were to fight against the Turks. About four thousand of his soldiers, as well as Thököly's diplomatic corps, sought refuge in Munkács castle, the home of Ilona Zrínyi and the Rákóczi children. It was they who, under the chatelaine's leadership, defended the castle, when late in 1685 the imperial troops lay siege to it with a great show of strength.

Thanks to the mediation of the pope, Russia and Poland made peace in 1686. The tzar joined the Holy League, and the Russian troops engaged the Crimean Tatars, much to the relief of Poland and Transylvania. The imperial forces abandoned their siege of Munkács, the *Kriegsrat* directing the war having wearied of the outraged protestations coming from abroad and the humiliatingly protracted and futile effort. The castle was put under blockade instead. Munkács was no longer the issue; more momentous things were in the making. All of Europe watched in anticipation as the allied forces of the Holy League proceeded to surround Buda. Thököly, who had in the meanwhile been released by the sultan, did not take up arms. The time had come for Transylvania's envoys to finalize with Vienna the detailed conditions of Transylvania's joining the alliance.

The agreement signed on 28 June, 1686, by János Haller for Transylvania, and Chancellor Heinrich Johann Strattmann and Hermann of Baden, president of the *Kriegsrat* for Vienna, pronounced Transylvania a member of the Holy League. The agreement was to remain secret until Várad was recaptured from the Turks. As long as Temesvár and Belgrade were in Turkish hands, Transylvania would not go to war, but would contribute fifty thousand imperial thalers a year to the war effort, as well as transport and foodstuffs. To facilitate the provisioning, for the duration of the war, the garrisons in Déva and Kolozsvár were to consist of two-thirds imperial troops, and one third Transylvanian soldiers. Transylvania, as part of the Holy Crown of Hungary, recognized the king of Hungary as its sovereign lord. Leopold I, for his part, would vouch for the free election of Transylvania's princes, for the inviolability of its effective ecclesiastic and secular laws and administration, and for the independence of its government and economy. The treaty concluding the war was to make explicit reference to Transylvania's interests. (A copy of the agreement is among the documents kept at the Public Record Office in London.)

Apafi was to more than fulfil his part of the agreement in the autumn of 1687, when, at enormous risk to the entire country, he provided the utterly exhausted imperial armies with winter quarters. The Christian forces' recapture of Buda (2 September, 1686) had spurred the Porte to reorganize the Ottoman military machinery, and it was with this reinforced army that the grand vizier set out in the summer of 1687 to retake Buda castle, the Ottoman Empire's administrative centre in Hungary. The Ottoman forces were annihilated by the allied army at Nagyharsány on 12 August in a fierce

battle led by Charles of Lorraine. But it was close to a Pyrrhic victory for the Holy League, for the long-standing personal antagonisms within the high command exploded. With no unified leadership, the allied army broke into fragments; a great many of the rank and file simply deserted. The duke of Lorraine was left with only the imperial army to command. Their food supplies exhausted, their horses dying for lack of fodder, their ranks decimated by disease, the imperial troops struggled on over roads made practically impassable by weeks of relentless rain. In was this exhausted army that Apafi — defying the advice of the Diet — offered to quarter and provision for the winter in late 1687.

An agreement signed at Balázsfalva on 27 October, 1687, provided for the imperial troops wintering in Transylvania, with utmost regard for the interest and security of the population. Signed by Charles of Lorraine and Mihály Teleki, it confirmed the principality's status as an independent political entity, reiterating the provisions of the agreement of 1686.

Reunion with the Kingdom of Hungary within the Habsburg System

In early 1688, Leopold I appointed General Antonio Caraffa commander-in-chief of Transylvania with explicit instructions to bring the principality into line with the new constitution approved by the Hungarian Diet in Pozsony.

Hungary, traditionally an elective monarchy, had recognized the Habsburgs as the country's hereditary monarchs. In return for the Hungarian Estates' giving up their ancient right of election, Leopold I undertook to respect the traditional institutions they set about restoring once the Turks had been driven out of the country. It was a compromise that both sides expected to benefit from. In Transylvania, however, Caraffa used military terror to pressurize the Estates to renounce the country's independence. By the Declaration of Fogaras, they recognized Leopold I — and his 9-year-old heir, Joseph I — as the principality's hereditary rulers, agreed that imperial troops should garrison the country's fortresses, and acquiesced in paying Vienna an annual tax of seven hundred thousand florins.

When Transylvania's leaders reminded Leopold I of the political guarantees he had given in the agreement of 1686 and at Balázsfalva, the only right he confirmed was that of freedom of religion, with a promise to put an end to the army's abuses. However, no concrete measure followed in either area. A number of towns — Nagybánya, Beszterce and Brassó among them — took up arms to protest against the Declaration of Fogaras, and either finally surrendered in the unequal struggle, or held out to the last, as did the insurgent population of Brassó which, led by the goldsmith Gáspár Kreutz, had towed cannons onto the town ramparts. Transylvania's central government organs and the feudal institutions of the Estates were but a shadow government. The commmander-in-chief had absolute power, and collected the imperial tax by force of arms.

Prince Apafi, who had been gravely ill during the last year or so of his long reign, died on 15 April, 1690. The Sublime Porte immediately proclaimed Imre Thököly the new prince of Transylvania.

After his release from Turkish captivity in 1686, Thököly was never again trusted by the Christian allies. Casting in his lot with the Turks once and for all, he had been fighting against the troops of the Holy League in Wallachia, forming a confederation with the voivode, Constantin Brîncoveanu in 1689. But it was the shift in the European balance of power that gave him a chance of obtaining the throne of Transylvania.

The imperial troops' occupation of Belgrade (1688), and their advance into Wallachia gave the Habsburgs such an edge in the area that France and Poland began to seek ways of restoring the balance. Louis XIV's troops invaded the German principalities, and the Sun King looked to Transylvania as the potential ally to keep the Habsburgs in check in east-central Europe, as indeed did John III Sobieski, who had driven the Turks out of Kameniec at enormous cost. But while Louis XIV declared himself ready to help finance Thököly's accession to the princedom, Sobieski could not bring himself to trust him, even when the Porte showed an inclination to make peace.

The matter was brought to a head by the Ottoman counter-offensive. On 21 August, 1690, having crossed the well-nigh impassable high mountains with an army of six thousand Hungarians, Wallachians, Turks and Tatars, Thököly surprised and annihilated the core of the imperial troops stationed in Transylvania. Mihály Teleki, who had been Apafi's most influential councillor, lay dead on the battlefield of Zernyest. Thököly was elected prince by the Diet assembled at Kereszténysziget. As the new prince of Transylvania, he pledged himself to implement the country's constitution, reaffirmed each subject's right to practice freely any of the four received religions, and confirmed the Three Nations in their prerogatives, and the Estates in their freedom to elect the prince *(libera vox)*. At the same time, he offered to come to terms with Leopold I: he would turn against the Turks and side with the Holy League if the Habsburgs recognized him as prince of Transylvania and honoured him with the title of "duke", and if Venice and Poland would guarantee the agreement.

In the meanwhile, the grand vizier Mustafa Köprülü had surrounded Belgrade with an army of sixty thousand, reoccupying it on 8 October, 1690, after almost a week's siege. But the supreme commander of the imperial troops, Louis of Baden, thought Transylvania to be of greater strategic importance than Belgrade. Leaving the gateway to the Balkans to its fate, he marched the main body of the imperial army against Thököly. The two men never met, for Thököly, after his lieutenants had lost most of his army, crossed the Bodza Pass with the remnants of his army on 25 October, never to return.

Councillor Miklós Bethlen, all the while, was using to Transylvania's advantage the commotion caused in Vienna by the news of the Turkish counter-offensive: the fall of Belgrade and Thököly's election. He presented the emperor with a draft diploma that would guarantee Transylvania freedom in domestic matters, while recognizing the foreign policy restrictions imposed on it by the political realities of its situation. The *Diploma Leopoldinum* which received royal sanction in late 1690 and was the basic docu-

ment of Leopold I's rule over Transylvania, put an end to military rule and guaranteed Transylvania a sovereign civil administration. It also provided guarantees for freedom of religion and for free trade and commerce, and guaranteed the inviolability of Transylvania's cultural and educational institutions.

The Transylvanian Estates assembled at Fogaras in early 1691 elected a *Gubernium*, a governor's office, to administer the country's affairs for the duration of Mihály Apafi II's minority. György Bánffy, son of the executed Dénes Bánffy, was elected governor; Miklós Bethlen was chosen chancellor. Gergely Bethlen was chosen commander-in-chief, and János Haller was elected lord treasurer. The Gubernium was divided in many respects, but agreed on gingerly aiming at an English–Dutch orientation. In 1690, at Miklós Bethlen's urging, the boy Mihály Apafi II signed a declaration recognizing the elector of Brandenburg and William III of England, as his guardians. This appeared a realistic move under the circumstances, for not even the immeasurably costly victory of the Christian forces at Szalánkemén was able to stem the Turkish tide.

The Habsburg government was suffering one loss after the other, and its allies, the maritime powers, England and the Netherlands were anxious to see Leopold I make peace with the Porte, and save his forces for effective action in the impending war against France. Peace in Transylvania was also being urged by the English and Dutch Protestants, as well as by the commercial interests of these countries, and it was because of pressure from these groups that Transylvania's liberties were expressly provided for in the draft peace treaties. The treaty proposed to the Habsburgs and the Porte by the English and Dutch mediators insisted that Transylvania maintain its independence. In March of 1691, Leopold I himself approved the draft treaty that the English envoy, Sir William Hussey, presented to the Porte, and which provided for Transylvania's remaining an independent state, with Mihály Apafi II ruling the country under an internationally guaranteed joint Turkish and Habsburg protectorate. Later, Lord William Paget was to recommend that the prospective peace treaty guarantee Transylvania's security and independence in view of the principality's past political role. The grand vizier, too, adopted the English and Dutch position, and by January 1698 was taking the stand that Transylvania had to be restored to its former — pre-1688 — status.

The Habsburg governing circles were in two minds about it. In the end, however, the more intransigent position carried the day: an independent Transylvania guaranteed by the English and the Dutch posed a threat to the dynasty that they could by no means countenance. From 1692 on, Vienna thus, raced against time to consolidate its hold over Transylvania before the peace negotiations effectively got off the ground. After a costly siege, the imperial troops took Várad from the Turks in 1692. Mihály Apafi II was detained in Vienna, and never again allowed to return.

In 1695, an imperial force of eight thousand again occupied Transylvania. In 1696, it was put under the military government of General Rabutin de Bussy.

The change was attended by a shift in the relative strength of the various denominations of Transylvania. The Catholic church had been gaining

ground for years. Wealthy Catholic aristocrats were acquiring political appointments, and were in the position to make rich endowments for the benefit of their parishes and schools, and to give financial support, too, to the scattered groups of Jesuits working in the country. In early 1690, the Catholic Estates presided over by István Apor came to an agreement with the Calvinist consistory over the disputed church properties. Bishop András Illyés, the head of the Catholic church in Transylvania, sent a memorandum to Rome outlining the principles along which he wished to reorganize the See of Transylvania: in the spirit of Catholic universalism but also in a national spirit worthy of the nation's history, within the ancestral framework of the Kingdom of Hungary, but in keeping with the interests of the principality.

In the 1690s, the Greek Orthodox bishop of Transylvania was still appointed by the metropolitan of Wallachia, though subject to confirmation by the prince of Transylvania. The bishop was invited to attend the Diet, the Greek Orthodox priests had been exempted from feudal services and dues and enjoyed the prince's protection against their landlords, and the wealthy among the Greek Orthodox faithful had ties to Transylvania's leading political circles. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Greek Orthodox church of Transylvania thus had not only evolved as a discrete and characteristically Transylvanian body thanks to its vernacular culture, but had also become integrated into the state system. The Calvinists' attempt at union and Rome's persistent efforts to win converts did not have much of an impact. While Transylvania was governed by Transylvanians, the traditions of religious toleration were kept alive.

This organic process of development was cut short by the Habsburg government. The "Transylvanian Council" under Chancellor Kinsky had decided on rude intervention in Transylvanian religious affairs. Religion was now to serve the empire's interests, and the Jesuits working in Transylvania under the direction of the Austrian provincial were to receive state subsidies to see that it would. The other measure — the union of the Greek Orthodox church with the Roman Catholic — was to guarantee the Romanian population's "integration" within the Habsburg system.

After preliminary talks, Leopold issued an imperial patent declaring that if the Greek Orthodox church accepted union with the Roman Catholic, the Romanian clergy would enjoy certain feudal privileges including exemption from state taxation. After the theological basis of the union was agreed on — essentially, the Greek Orthodox church's recognition of papal supremacy —, in 1697 Bishop Theophilus proposed to the Orthodox synod the union of the church entrusted to his care with the Roman Catholic church, on condition that its priests were given the promised social and economic privileges. In 1699, Leopold issued an imperial diploma confirming that the Uniate Greek church shared in all the rights of the Roman Catholics (the First *Diploma Leopoldinum*). In 1700, Athanasie Anghel, the new Greek Orthodox bishop, declared at the meeting of the synod that the church accepted the union, and the protection of the Habsburg government. Bishop Athanasie was consecrated bishop of the Greek Catholic church midst due pomp in Gyulafehérvár, and with this, the union was formally accomplished.

It was confirmed by Leopold in 1701 by the Second *Diploma Leopoldinum*, which reiterated the Greek Catholic Romanian clergy's exemption from feudal obligations and affirmed their noble privileges. They were to gain admittance to the Catholic institutions of higher education, and to be eligible for Catholic scholarships. An "auditor general" appointed by the archbishop of Esztergom was to aid the work of the Greek Catholic bishop.

In the long run, the union served the rise of the Romanian nationality in Transylvania. It was, in part, a political agreement, and the masses of the faithful had difficulty following the changes involved. The Romanian serfs protested against the union, and so did the merchants and small nobility. The disaffected formed the Greek Orthodox Estate, under the leadership of Gábor Nagyszegi. The imperial general, however, soon had him in prison. The government in Vienna pushed through the union in a race against time as the peace negotiations with the Turks were also going on.

In 1698, the English mediator at the negotiations wanted the principality's independence and freedom of religion for the Protestant churches made a provision of the proposed agreement. But with the union, the Protestant churches had lost their numerical superiority, and this provision was never included. The Peace of Karlowitz of early 1699 ended the fifteen years of war with the Turks, attaching the principality to the central government of the Habsburg Empire.

Ferenc Rákóczi II, Prince of Transylvania

Hungary's fate had been decided by the Porte and the Habsburgs without as much as Hungary's diplomatic representation. "*Sine nobis, de nobis*" was the way Ferenc Rákóczi II put it in his "Manifesto to the Peoples of the World", antedated as of 7 June, 1703, the day of the start of the Rákóczi war of independence, but actually published only in early 1704. And yet, the Principality of Transylvania had contributed beyond its strength, as an ally fully recognized in international agreements, to the victory over the Turks.

The imperial government's implementation of the terms of the Peace of Karlowitz was equally resented by all social classes in both Hungary and Transylvania. Instead of their reunification, Hungary and Transylvania were incorporated with the Habsburg Empire as two separate units. With complete disregard for the agreements of 1686 and 1687, both were divested of the basic preconditions of independent statehood: they lost their armies and their domestic self-government; the population was deprived of its freedom of religion and of its right of culture in the vernacular; and both Hungary's and Transylvania's foreign contacts were severed, and with them, their opportunities for keeping abreast of developments in the rest of Europe. There was hardly a reflective person of whatever rank or station in either land who did not see the situation as leading to Hungary's complete integration with the Habsburg Empire. The future of the Hungarians as a nation was at stake. In Transylvania, it was not only the Hungarian aristocrats, noblemen and burghers and the Székely lieutenants who were of this opinion, but the Saxon leaders as well. A wealth of contemporary docu-

ments testify to the fact that the people of Transylvania — Hungarians, Saxons and Romanians alike — believed that only an independent principality stood to secure them a future.

Transylvania's geographic position and its traditional active western orientation made it particularly sensitive to changes in the international balance of power. And in this respect, the new century certainly seemed the dawn of new alternatives.

The decline of Ottoman power in Europe involved changes in the international power structure as a whole. The balance of power between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs had been of vital interest to every country of Europe for generations. Thus, when the long-ailing king of Spain finally died at the end of 1700, England and the Netherlands were far from indifferent to the question of who would succeed him: Leopold I's candidate for the Spanish throne, or Louis XIV's. At about the same time, Sweden found itself faced with a new competitor for the Baltic trade routes, Russia. It had been clear ever since 1698, the time of Tzar Peter I's visit to Vienna, that Russia, too, was aspiring to a greater role in European politics. When the War of the Spanish Succession broke out, Transylvania found that old treaties and alliances tied it to a number of participants on the two opposing sides: to France, but also to England and the Netherlands which supported the Habsburgs. Transylvania also had an old treaty with Sweden, which was fighting Russia in the north, and was also tied to it by a sense of community as a Protestant nation. Religious sentiment, as well as church scholarships and foundations, to say nothing of personal ties of friendship, all drew Transylvanians to the Protestant communities now confronting each other, especially to the German principalities.

The war of independence led by Ferenc Rákóczi II was Transylvania's attempt to break out of the bind that the Peace of Karlowitz had put it in. The two simultaneous great wars had made it clear to the countries of east-central Europe that the Habsburgs' hegemony in the area was not yet a foregone conclusion. In Upper Hungary, members of the lesser nobility as well as the small nobility, captains of the border castles as well as enterprising serf tradesmen rallied around Ferenc Rákóczi II in the first years of the new century in an effort to define a new place for Hungary in what looked to be the birth throes of a new power constellation. The uprising that broke out in Upper Hungary in the spring of 1703 had a social as well as a patriotic programme: its leaders hoped to win and then secure the country's independence to modernize its government, and to reform its social order. With this accomplished, they hoped that Hungary would be strong enough to achieve the traditional aim of union with Transylvania, and to resume its former place among the countries of Europe.

Ferenc Rákóczi II was only twenty-seven years old in 1703. Descended from the Báthorys and the Rákóczis, his life had been intimately tied up with the last quarter-century of Transylvania's and Hungary's history. His father was Ferenc Rákóczi I, prince elect of Transylvania, whose marriage to Ilona, daughter of Péter Zrínyi, ban of Croatia, was arranged to serve the interests of the Wesselényi group. When the conspirators were discovered, Ferenc Rákóczi I paid enormous sums for his own safety, and died in 1676, a few months after his son was born. The orphan Ferenc Rákóczi II was

brought up to rule. His grandmother, Zsófia Báthory, looked back to István Báthory, prince of Transylvania and king of Poland, and instilled in the boy the sense that he was heir to the Polish crown; Ilona Zrínyi, his mother, saw her son as the heir to the Transylvanian throne. Throughout the vast Rákóczi estates and in all of Upper Hungary, the boy was called "prince", or "the young prince" by all he met. He was known and kept track of in Vienna, but also in all Hungary. At the age of nine, he joined his stepfather, Imre Thököly in his campaign in Upper Hungary; he was in the castle of Munkács all the time it was under imperial siege, and his name became known throughout Europe. In the three years that she withstood the siege, Ilona Zrínyi took effective diplomatic steps to provide for her son's education either at the Polish or the French court. After Munkács surrendered, the twelve-year-old boy was brought up among the sons of the Austrian aristocracy as Leopold I's ward in the Jesuit college at Neuhaus in Bohemia. At the University of Prague, he studied mostly architecture and natural sciences. Subsequently, he lived with his brother-in-law, Count Aspremont, a Francophile Austrian soldier aristocrat, in Vienna and was soon at home with the complexities of the European political scene. Ferenc Rákóczi II was also well read in contemporary political theory and in the modern theory of government. As the scion of Transylvanian princes, and as the young hopeful of Hungarian politics, he won for his wife Charlotte Amalia, daughter of the duke of Hessen-Rheinfeld, and with her family's help, the title of prince of the Holy Roman Empire.

In 1694, he moved home to the Rákóczi estates and entered Hungarian politics as hereditary *főispán* (lord-lieutenant) of the county of Sáros. Just then, in 1697, a rebellion broke out in the Hegyalja, one of the country's most famous wine-growing districts, which held the bulk of the Rákóczi estates. The growers, serfs, burghers of market-towns, taking up arms under former captains of Thököly's army, turned to Rákóczi to lead them in their struggle against Habsburg military rule, which had added the monopoly of trade to its instruments of oppression. Rákóczi, however, turned down their request. He did not believe that a movement which represented only particular interests both socially and geographically had a chance of success, and their hopes of getting Turkish help he thought particularly unrealistic.

After 1698, however, it was a nation-wide movement that looked to him for leadership. The organizers were Miklós Bercsényi, lord-lieutenant of the county of Ung, as well as a number of other aristocrats, and the network built up by the nobility of Upper Hungary spread throughout Transylvania as well. Rákóczi himself contacted Louis XIV. In the spring of 1701, however, Leopold I discovered the conspiracy, and Rákóczi was arrested. He was put in the prison cell whence his grandfather, Péter Zrínyi had gone to meet the executioner, and it took an internationally engineered plot to effect his escape and save him from certain death. He fled to Poland, where, with Miklós Bercsényi, he set about organizing the diplomatic, financial and military backing needed for a war in Hungary against the Habsburgs.

In the years 1700–1701, while Bercsényi, Rákóczi and their supporters were preparing for the insurrection, they sent envoys to Transylvania, too, who had talks with the governor and the chancellor Miklós Bethlen. What

Rákóczi and his allies had in mind in connection with Transylvania, however, can be reconstructed only from the plans they sent to the French and Polish monarchs. These called for Thököly to return from Turkey, rally his scattered troops, and take over as prince of Transylvania. In the spring of 1703, however, it became known that the Porte would not let Thököly return, for to do so would violate the peace made with the Habsburgs. Without him, however, Thököly's lieutenants and old soldiers who did manage to return were unable to organize the rebels into an effective army.

Since its occupation by the imperial troops, Transylvania itself had been the scene of incessant local unrest. After 1701, plots and insurrections were ever more frequent in the towns, especially Kolozsvár and Gyulafehérvár, in the Székelyföld and Máramaros, as well as in the districts of Kővár and Fogaras, to say nothing of the mining centres, but all were discovered and ruthlessly suppressed. The commander of the well-trained imperial army of eight thousand men, Rabutin de Bussy, had filled the prisons with burghers, priests, tradesmen, Székelys and serfs. The Partium was kept in terror by the Serbian auxiliaries stationed around Várad. In the summer of 1703, Rabutin had Gábor Nagyszegi, the leader of the Romanians opposing the religious union, imprisoned, the Transylvanian Estates — aristocrats, noblemen, and all those holding public office — summoned to Szeben, and had the military guard the town gates locked behind them. The Saxon count Johann Harteneck, who had refused to countenance the violations of their rights, was tried and beheaded by the order of Rabutin. The young count Mihály Teleki, commander of the district of Kővár, was the only one who refused to obey Rabutin's summons, and took shelter in Kővár castle.

In the autumn of 1703, after his troops had occupied Upper Hungary and the Tiszántúl, and Huszt castle, Nagybánya and Debrecen had sworn allegiance to him, Rákóczi issued proclamations addressed to the Estates of Transylvania, separately to the counties, to the Székelys and the Saxons. Simultaneously, Rákóczi addressed the "Vlach nation" in a separate proclamation, the first Hungarian statesman ever to do so. But it was not until the spring of 1704 that Rákóczi's general staff was in a position to send troops to Transylvania. Louis XIV's plan that a joint French, Bavarian and Hungarian army would surround Vienna came to nought, and on 13 August, 1704, the duke of Marlborough commanding the allied armies of England and the empire, the latter led by Prince Eugene of Savoy, won a great victory over the French at Höchstädt-Blenheim. It was clear that the war would be a protracted one. Diplomacy would play an increasingly important role, and Rákóczi, too, needed to establish relations with the countries of Europe which, in the past century, had recognized Transylvania. For by including Transylvania in a number of international treaties, these countries had recognized it as an independent state. Rákóczi, once he was prince of Transylvania, would be representing lawful authority and a sovereign state. Until then, no envoy of his could be received in the courts of the Protestant states — Sweden, England, the Netherlands, and the German principalities.

What is more, the aristocrats and high dignitaries who had managed to get out of Szeben by some ruse or other, and the Saxon seats, whose insurgent forces gathered near Brassó, as well as the deputations sent by the

burghers of the counties and the towns were all appealing to Rákóczi to cross into Transylvania. The military and economic backing available for the independence movement in Transylvania fell far short of that in the Kingdom of Hungary; every day that decisive action was postponed was costing thousands of lives. The leader of the Romanian insurgents of Máramaros and the Kővár district, Grigore Pintea, had already fallen in battle. The Székely armies under Mihály Henter were losing one battle after the other, and so were some of Thököly's old captains: István Guthi and Pál Kaszás. On 13 March, 1704, a punitive detachment of imperial troops had burned down Nagyenyed and the Calvinist college, slaughtering those who had taken refuge there. Women, children, teachers and students suffered terrible wounds or died inside the charred ruins.

The chancellor, Miklós Bethlen, who had stayed in Szeben, addressed a pamphlet to the countries of Europe, asking for their intervention so that peace might be restored to Transylvania. His *Columba Noe* appeared in Amsterdam under the pseudonym Fridericus Gotefridus Veronensis. He suggested that the country's independence be restored under a Protestant monarch and be internationally guaranteed, for Transylvania could then be a factor in restoring the balance of power in Europe. (This argument was one that Rákóczi and his circle also used.) Meanwhile, in the late spring of 1704, Rákóczi sent reinforcements into Transylvania, and the revolutionary forces acquired control over the more important parts of the country. The new commander-in-chief, Count Simon Forgách, had turned the tables on Rabutin, and held his troops trapped in Szeben and Brassó. János Radvánszky, a councillor of the *Consilium Aulicum*, the new governing body that had been set up in Hungary, could begin to organize the administration and the economy in those parts of Transylvania that were already under Rákóczi's rule.

On 8 July, 1704, the Estates of Transylvania assembled at the Gyulafehérvár Diet elected Ferenc Rákóczi II prince of Transylvania. The following year Rákóczi and his government settled the matter of Transylvania's relationship to Hungary at the Diet that met in Szécsény in September. It was while it was in session that the news was brought of Prince Imre Thököly's death in Nicomedia, and this gave added urgency to the matter. The Szécsény Diet ruled that the two Hungarian "homelands", the Kingdom of Hungary and the Principality of Transylvania, were to be united in a confederation. A few weeks later, Rákóczi set out for Transylvania, but on 11 November, 1705, his troops were stopped at the Zsibó Pass. And it was not until the spring of 1706 that the Transylvanian Estates could confirm the two countries' confederation at the Diet meeting in Huszt. The Székelys had Benedek Henter for their spokesman, the counties Zsigmond Balogh, the towns Péter Gálffy, the Partium (some counties, originally "parts" of the Kingdom of Hungary, for certain periods under Transylvanian administration) György Dolhay, the Saxons Andreas Soppel, and the Romanians Gábor Nagyszegi. The army, too, sent its representatives. For the aristocratic party, Simon Kemény, Mihály Teleki, Mihály Mikes, Ábrahám Barcsay, and János Sándor voted for the confederation, among others.

Emperor Leopold I, who died in the spring of 1705, was succeeded on the throne of Hungary by Joseph I, the first ruler to succeed to the Hungar-

ian throne by hereditary right. Rákóczi's rule was a threat to both the Habsburgs' supremacy and to their dynastic interest. For this reason, Vienna continued to send considerable forces for the "defence" of Transylvania, and used all its diplomatic weight to try to discredit Rákóczi's principality. In England and the Netherlands, however, there was ever-growing sympathy for the Protestant cause in Transylvania, and collections were taken up in England to help rebuild the college at Nagyenyed. The governments, for their part, were anxious to get access to the copper and quicksilver mines of Lower Hungary and Transylvania whose products serviced their loans, and in the summer of 1706, started mediating between Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II and the Emperor Joseph I. The English envoy, Lord George Stepney, and the Dutch ambassador to Vienna, Jacob Jan Hamel-Bruyninx, both recognized Hungary's and Transylvania's demand for the status of an independent state as valid, and recognized also their claim to economic independence and freedom of religion. Vienna, however, would not hear of the internationally guaranteed peace with Transylvania, which they proposed.

The military situation was such that it was only in the spring of 1707 that Rákóczi crossed into Transylvania. "Transylvania is in need of nothing but a good prince, who will be a father to his people",[3] noted Rákóczi, after he had visited most of his forbears' principality, and he appeared before the Diet meeting in Marosvásárhely to confirm him in his high dignity. A number of the resolutions passed by this Diet served to modernize the Transylvanian state. To create a standing army, they emancipated the serfs doing military service from their feudal landlords. They set the economy on a more sound footing, gave mining a boost, provided guarantees for the free practice of religion, and tried to regulate the burdens that devolved on the population with the army's quartering. The *Consilium* was made the chief organ of central government; the feeding and supplying of the army was entrusted to a Commissariat, and the mines were put under the competent management of the outstanding Jakab Grabarics. For all their efforts, however, Transylvania's self-government did not meet with much success: the new commanders-in-chief, Count Lőrinc Pekry, and then Baron Sándor Károlyi, were unable to hold the country in the face of the imperial troops' overwhelming numerical superiority, and it was occupied by the Habsburg army. Rákóczi's Transylvanian army under General Mihály Mikes sought refuge in Moldavia. Smaller armed units and countless Transylvanian families were given shelter in the nearby counties of Upper Hungary.

By the turn of 1708–1709, it was clear that the powers of Europe were exhausted, and preliminary peace negotiations were started. Since they sought to make a peace that would take most of the conflicting interests into account, the negotiations dragged on for years. Rákóczi and his government realized the significance the discussions had for Transylvania's future, and did everything they could do to hold France to the promises it had made before the start of the war. As for England and the Netherlands,

3. *Mémoires du Prince François Rákóczi sur la guerre de Hongrie, depuis 1703 jusqu'à sa fin.* With an essay by B. KOPECZI. Text prepared for publication by I. KOVÁCS. In: *Archivum Rákóczianum.* III/1. Budapest 1978, 151.

in 1706 they declared it both right and necessary that Hungary's relations with the Habsburg dynasty be settled with international mediation, and that the Principality of Transylvania, too, be included in the "universal peace" that was to bring the European war to a close. Rákóczi sent envoys to the preliminary peace conferences held at the Hague in 1709 and at Geertruidenberg in 1710. Though it was only semi-official talks that they could conduct with the two maritime powers, England and the Netherlands, they were able to present their demands to the English Parliament as well, and the move proved a success. Rákóczi pronounced himself willing to renounce his princely title, if only the country's independence and sovereignty were guaranteed. The duke of Marlborough and Anton Heinsius, the leader of the Dutch government, both approved of Rákóczi's position as fair-minded. It was at this time that there appeared in England an album on Transylvania, containing about a hundred and fifty pictures painted on fine Norfolk paper, each with a caption explaining the illustrations to the English reader. It was not only on Protestant Transylvania that the still unknown painter of the highly artistic pictures focused; the album provides a realistic overview of the religious and ethnic heterogeneity of the country. This unprecedented English interest in Transylvania was probably due to the dominant political conviction of the time, a principle which Daniel Defoe put as follows: "A just Balance of Power is the Life of Peace".[4] This conviction coincided with the one Rákóczi and his government had been consistently voicing, namely, that an independent Principality of Transylvania could become a bastion of the European balance of power, in short, a bastion of peace. It was this same line of thought that was expounded by Rákóczi's diplomat, Domokos Brenner, in a pamphlet published in French and Latin for distribution throughout Europe. Citing Grotius and arguing from natural law, he outlined the major agreements that had been made in the past between the Habsburg government and Transylvania, documenting in this way the validity of the principality's claim to independence. Brenner's pamphlet appeared in August 1710, at the same time that a proclamation of Rákóczi's announced to the country that peace negotiations were to start with the Habsburgs through international mediation. In a letter to Queen Anne, Rákóczi asked her to use her influence that the agreement about to be made might be one that the allied powers might guarantee. Queen Anne sent a special envoy to Vienna to assist the English ambassador with the peace negotiations. One of the main tasks entrusted to Charles Mordaunt, earl of Peterborough, was to make sure that Joseph I's negotiations with Rákóczi formed part and parcel of the preliminaries of the peace treaty that was to end the War of the Spanish Succession.

In the meanwhile, Prince Eugene of Savoy, anxiously protecting the interests of the Habsburg dynasty, was doing everything possible to make sure that the war in Hungary would be concluded not by an internationally

4. D. DEFOE: *The Two Great Questions Considered:* I. What the French King will Do, with Respect to the Spanish Monarchy. II. What Measures the English ought to Take. London 1700.

negotiated and guaranteed treaty between sovereign states, but in the form of an agreement between the monarch and his subjects. The prince of Savoy was especially determined that the Habsburgs should keep Transylvania, and used a combination of brute force and the promise of unconditional pardon to win over the Transylvanian elite from Rákóczi's side. Those who had fled from Transylvania had their homes, properties, and estates all confiscated; their homes were ransacked and members of their families who had stayed behind, and even their distant relatives, were subject to ruthless reprisal and extortion. At the same time, Joseph I promised complete pardon and restitution of all their properties to those who would return to Transylvania, and swear allegiance to the House of Habsburg.

While the two generals charged with the preparations for the armistice, Count János Pálffy, commander-in-chief of the imperial forces in Hungary, and Baron Sándor Károlyi, commander-in-chief of Rákóczi's forces, were negotiating, the Hungarian and Saxon members of the Transylvanian Council established in 1710 again swore loyalty to Rákóczi, declaring that they had the welfare of the peoples of "the dear homeland" at heart. Meanwhile, Rákóczi and his government, in order to be able to keep up their international contacts, removed to Poland. Though he managed, indirectly, to stay in touch with the earl of Peterborough throughout the latter's negotiations with Prince Eugene of Savoy, Rákóczi was unable, considering the pressure the country was under, to delay Hungary's coming to terms with the emperor. In the spring of 1711, when Károlyi made a separate peace with Pálffy, and surrendered the castle of Ecsed to the imperial forces, and relayed a message from Pálffy to Mihály Mikes in Moldavia, Transylvania's politicians panicked. As Vienna's treaty with the Porte had been renewed, and the Porte had declared war on Russia, the Transylvanians, whose country the Ottoman troops would have to cross, dreaded the thought of Turkish intervention. Without Rákóczi's knowledge, they sent a few members of the Consilium to Hungary to attend the Szatmár assembly involved in the peace negotiations. Meanwhile, to take the wind out of the English and Dutch mediators' sails, and to be able to bring the war in Hungary to a conclusion before the news of Joseph I's unexpected death (on 17 April, 1711) became widely known, Eugene of Savoy included some of Rákóczi's provisions among the points of the agreement: he promised not only that the nobility's properties would be returned, but also that provisions would be made for freedom of religion.

Among the Transylvanian signatories of the Peace of Szatmár of 29 April, 1711, Mihály Barcsai and Mihály Teleki the younger signed for the Transylvanian Consilium, and Judge István Hunyadi from Nagybánya and Judge János Szász from Felsőbánya signed for Transylvania's towns. All their names, as indeed the names of both the Transylvanian and the Hungarian generals, appeared on the document in a private capacity; there was no talk of their representing a sovereign state. The peace itself was a compromise between the dynasty and the Estates, and contained no guarantees.

Practically every Transylvanian nobleman who had sought safety in Poland, Moldavia or in Hungary returned to Transylvania. Mihály Mikes took his oath of allegiance to the imperial commander of Brassó in the summer of 1711. Very few Transylvanians followed Rákóczi into exile.

In France, Rákóczi tried once more to secure international guarantees for Transylvania in the European treaty that was still in the making. At the time the peace conference was meeting in Utrecht, Rákóczi still trusting in France's promise, again sent out an appeal to the peoples of Europe. He reminded them that "it is a dictate of human rights that in extreme cases, oppressed subjects be succoured" by the powers of Europe, and adduced a series of historical examples to prove that a number of small countries had been able, through peace treaties, to regain their independence, an independence which "various great powers, on a number of pretexts — at times simply by right of conquest — had taken away. Transylvania's case is more or less a case of this kind; and to Transylvania, too, these same rights are due".[5]

2. Economy and Society

Population and the National Economy

The population trends in Transylvania were determined in the fifty years following 1660 by three kinds of factors: whether there was war or peace, the government's economic policy, and cultural traditions.

For the two decades following 1662, in the country substantially reduced in size by the loss of Várad there were no foreign armies. From 1683, however, Transylvania was the transit zone of Turkish, Tatar, German and Hungarian troops, and then the scene of battles and military occupation. After 1687, imperial armies eight to ten thousand strong used to spend some time of each winter in Transylvania, turning into an army of occupation in 1696. By the turn of the century, the population clashed regularly with the hungry soldiers. From 1703 to 1709, Rákóczi's forces fought against the imperial army on Transylvanian soil. By the time peace was concluded, emigration, famine and epidemics — primarily the plague — had decimated the population.

The five decades saw three changes in administration and in the economic policy of the state. During the decades of Apafi's rule (1661–1690), the solid economic circumstances of the first two decades of peace not only contributed to natural population increase, but also attracted immigrants from the neighbouring countries in great numbers. With the economy booming, there was a shortage of labour, and immigrants were welcome. Apafi's policy of religious tolerance made Transylvania a haven of refuge for persecuted religious minorities of all kinds, and the government deliberately encouraged population growth. By way of contrast, during the period between 1690 and 1703, when Transylvania came under the direct rule of the Habsburg emperor in his capacity as king of Hungary, the exorbitant tax

5. Deduction des droits de la Principauté de Transylvanie (Utrecht 1713). In: *A Rákóczi szabadságharc és Európa.* (The Rákóczi war of independence and Europe.) Ed. B. KÖPECZI. Budapest 1970, 385.

burdens imposed on the population made for a veritable wave of emigration. The Counter-Reformation being enforced at the point of bayonets also impelled many Protestant families and communities — Hungarians as well as Saxons — to seek refuge abroad. The census figures of 1689-1690 indicate that 33 per cent of the holdings had no serf families living on them. This is a significant number, even if we remember that it cannot be taken at face value: no tax census of the time could escape the distorting effects of the population's determination to boycott taxation. The union resulting in the establishment of the Greek Catholic church caused unrest among those serfs and trader and merchant groups who would not give up their Greek Orthodox faith. And the government's policy of economic exploitation drove large groups of tradesmen, artisans and merchants out of the country. Even when Ferenc Rákóczi II ruled as prince of Transylvania from 1704 to 1709, the government's policy of religious tolerance and its deliberate attempts to attract artisans and merchants proved inadequate to counterweight the effects of the ongoing war, which, to put it mildly, discouraged resettlement, to say nothing of immigration.

The third factor with a decisive effect on Transylvania's population trends in the last half of the seventeenth century was something peculiar to the country's long-term development. The scholars returning from universities abroad, the merchants doing business at the fairs of western Europe, and the aristocrats spending time in Vienna, all brought back information that contributed to improved hygiene and to better nutrition. Medical care improved especially in the towns and in the Királyföld, inhabited by Saxons, and in places conditions were better in this respect than in Hungary. The population relied on its great traditions of survival to weather the years of crop failure or war: grains were stored, perishable foods were salted down, fruit and vegetables were dried, or preserved in other ways. All this resulted in a gradual, long-term population growth, in the decline of mortality, and in the biological stabilization of the population. At the same time, the fact that the troops of the Holy League managed to drive the Turks out of two-thirds of Hungary that had been under occupation resulted in massive population movements in Transylvania. Especially after 1692, when the Turkish garrison withdrew from Várad as well, great masses of people emigrated west. They went particularly to the neighbouring county of Bihar, but the more enterprising also to much more distant, sparsely populated areas.

There is no documentary evidence for the size of the country's population as a whole. The best we can do is to make estimates on the basis of local sources, tax censuses, registers of statutory labour, and on the basis of the population figures and the number of houses in certain towns. The economic reports compiled for the Habsburg government by the *Cameratica Commissio,* and those of Rákóczi's war commissars are also informative. On the basis of all these, we can state with a considerable degree of certainty that between 1660 and 1711, the population of Transylvania proper varied between seven and nine hundred thousand people.

The distribution of the population was predetermined by Transylvania's topography and settlement structure. We have no way of knowing even the relative population densities of the non-populous river valleys and plateaus,

of the isolated mountain villages, and of the settlements of the transhumant shepherds. However, Transylvania's relatively dense urban network consisted of towns that had populations of between one and five thousand people each. There were quite a large number of market towns as well. By the second half of the seventeenth century, the border of the Turkish occupied area had moved very close to Debrecen. While Apafi still gave the town a great deal of support, after the Turks had left the country it could not be counted as one of the principality's towns. Thus, Brassó and Szeben became Transylvania's most populous towns, with three to five thousand inhabitants each. The towns were surrounded by a ring of suburbs and villages whence the serf population brought in produce to the market. A relatively densely populated area was the Barcaság (Burzenland), where the population was engaged in the hauling trade. All in all, Transylvania counted as a populous country when compared with Moldavia, Wallachia or the Ottoman territories, but was relatively sparsely populated when compared with Upper Hungary.

We have no more precise data for the ethnic distribution of the population, and must rely on estimates here as well. The majority of the Hungarians were Calvinists, with a much smaller group of Catholics, and comprised 40-50 per cent of the total population. (In the dozens of Hungarian villages of Moldavia, there were about ten thousand *Csángó* Hungarians, who were Catholics.)

The Saxons comprised no more than 10–15 per cent of the population, their relatively small numbers being offset by their strong urban character and powerful — Lutheran — church organization.

The Romanians must have made up about 30 to 40 per cent of the total population. One part of them, those who settled in the country in previous centuries, lived primarily in the villages and on the outskirts of the towns, intermixed with Hungarians and Saxons. More homogeneous blocks of Romanians were to be found in the Érchegység, and particularly in the counties of Hunyad and Fogaras in the south of the country, though there were large numbers of Hungarians working in the iron foundries.

Finally, a very small portion of the population was made up of a number of other ethnic and religious groups: Greeks, Macedo-Romanians, Armenians, Jews, Moravians, Poles, Serbs, Gipsies, and even Turks. Some of these groups, for instance, the Armenians and the Jews, played an increasingly important part in the economy in the last decades of the century. The differences in economic position, legal status and privilege did not quite follow the ethnic demarcation lines.

Transylvania was a society in flux, one characterized by an open-ended hierarchical order. Modern research has confirmed the contemporary opinion that the population was divided into three large structural units: the upper estate, the middle estate, and the lower estate. The majority of those in the upper estate were Calvinists, but there were some Catholics and Lutherans as well. The two major groups comprising it, the aristocracy and the middle nobility were predominantly Hungarian. During Apafi's rule, a great many of the leading government posts were filled by upstarts, most of them Calvinist Hungarians. But, for example, Count Harteneck, one of the leaders of the Saxon University, was the son of an immigrant Lutheran

pastor. Among the nobility of the county of Máramaros, there were many Romanians.

The middle estate, a typically Transylvanian social formation and numerically rather a large group, was a mixture of Hungarians, Saxons and Romanians. The freemen doing military service were also mostly Hungarians, but around Fogaras, for instance, there were considerable numbers of Romanians. The burghers of the towns, who comprised the majority of the middle estate, were Saxon and Hungarian. Kolozsvár became a military town after 1660; the inner city was Hungarian inhabited, while in its suburbs, Saxons, Hungarians and Romanians lived peacefully side by side. Merchants of every nationality and religion were to be found in Transylvania in the second half of the seventeenth century. After 1672, the large immigrant Armenian community which had been given substantial trading privileges consolidated its hold on the economy. The miners were Hungarians and Romanians. The salt traders were a considerable group, and from the contemporary invoices that have come down to us, we find that some of them were Mohammedan Turks.

The main body of the intellectuals — clergymen, schoolmasters, teachers at the grammar schools and colleges, clerks, and bailiffs — formed a special group within the middle estate, and were Hungarians or Saxons. The Romanian intellectuals were clergymen and schoolmasters. Independently of ethnic affiliation, a great many members of the middle estate hoped to get a boost up the social ladder by buying themselves patents of nobility.

The lower estate consisted of the peasantry, or the serfs. The Saxons lived in homogeneous settlements, and the Hungarians also formed a more or less uniform block of settlements from the Székelyföld to the Partium, with some mixed Romanian–Hungarian villages interspersed. In the southern part of the country, most of the peasantry were Romanians. The mountain shepherds were Romanians, with some Hungarians among them. The more enterprising among the lower estate were not only able to buy themselves patents of nobility, but during Apafi's rule were able to do so without regard for ethnic origin or religious affiliation. The union of 1698 placed the Greek Catholic clergy within the ranks of the privileged.

Production and Governmental Economic Policy

As has repeatedly been pointed out, Transylvania's natural resources were such that it had for a long time been part of the European economy. The expansion of this economy, and especially the ongoing changes put a premium on the mineral wealth that served as the raw material for the nascent industries: the world market price of minerals kept rising. Transylvania's rich salt deposits had won the interest even of the Fuggers in 1528; after 1661, the Turks wanted to occupy them. The Apafi government, however, succeeded in protecting the salt "ports" along the rivers from the Ottoman raiders. Thus, the country's income from the sale of salt was enough to cover the tribute it had to send to the Porte each year. Sweden had been one of the first to realize the value of Transylvania's copper mines. Around the

turn of the century, when the Habsburgs had to take up English and Dutch government loans, it was Transylvania's copper mines — along with the equally substantial quicksilver deposits — that served as security. Though the country's precious metal mines were nearing depletion, there was still enough for what the mints needed. Rákóczi, too, must have derived substantial income from the mines at Abrudbánya and Zalatna, which were put under a manager capable of directing their expert exploitation.

One of Transylvania's greatest natural endowments, the hydro-energy from rivers and streams springing in the mountains had traditionally been put to use in a great many ingenious ways. In the last half of the seventeenth century, the building of watermills, of mechanical systems capable of using and transforming water energy, was the most profitable investment. Besides the simple mills for grinding grain, there were plenty of more complex systems working. The recognition that it was overshot mill wheels that worked with the greatest efficiency was generations old in Transylvania. The Turkish traveller Evlia Chelebi noted with approval the hundreds of sawmills operating west of the castle of Udvarhely. For decades, enterprising aristocrats and burghers vied with one another for the possession of the great mill of Torda. From the contemporary technical descriptions of the sawmills in Szentimre and Huszt it is clear that the technology used was essentially identical with that used in earlier — and subsequent — centuries, but the widespread appearance of sawmills is definitely peculiar to this half-century. Mills were used to supply energy to the most diverse machinery. Inventories and registers indicate that mills were used to operate oil presses, to make grits, to grind grain, to pulverize gunpowder, to full cloth, and to crush ore. The use of hydro-energy in the mining and smelting of iron ore, and in the ironworks, however, was limited by the extreme temperatures of the long, cold Transylvanian winters. Very "modern", on the other hand, are those Székely village by-laws which show how aware these communities were of their streams and rivers as supporters of life: their pristine state was consciously protected and measures were prescribed to minimize the pollution of the water by trades such as tanning or cloth dyeing, and by the retting of hemp.

Though the three decades of war caused great losses to Transylvanian industry, the attempt to meet the needs of the army did have a stimulating effect on production, especially in the iron industry. The years of Apafi's rule had been years of economic openness and stable growth. The Habsburg government's economic policy, on the other hand, with its uniform centralization, its tariff regulations and trade monopolies, and not least deleteriously, its attempts to make the right to engage in trade conditional on ethnic and religious qualifications, brought this organic economic development to a halt, which in certain areas was followed by a steep decline. Ferenc Rákóczi II tried to return to Apafi's basic policies, though in many respects updated them. There were some local results, but his rule was too short for any more palpable change.

Transylvania's markets showed radical fluctuations throughout these fifty years. After 1660, the country lost a number of the markets for its flourishing clothing industry. With the end of the Turkish occupation, the markets of the reconquered territories also opened up to Transylvania, but the more

developed western industries tended to export more to the principality than vice versa. It was at this same time that inexpensive frieze from the Balkans started to become widely available in Transylvania. But all in all, throughout the period, demand kept growing for some of Transylvania's major products: iron utensils, roughly prepared timber, pewter and copper tableware, pottery, glassware, and wooden articles.

Of the wealthy entrepreneurs and known politicians among the aristocracy — János Páter, András Horváth, László Székely, János Bethlen, István Apor, and later Mihály Teleki and Miklós Bethlen — practically all were involved to some extent in the Levantine trade. They all managed to accumulate considerable fortunes. It gave a great boost to their activity that Apafi, like the greatest of his predecessors, promoted trade and commerce with considerable treasury subsidies. In the 1660s and 1670s, Apafi lent state support to every enterprise, and the entrepreneurs were all given a place in the state's administrative apparatus either as silent partners, or as active policy makers.

Apafi's governing group, well aware of the greater role that other countries had allotted to the promotion of industry, patronized all industrial activity in Transylvania as a deliberate policy. It is left for subsequent research to determine the effectiveness of the mercantilism practised by Apafi, and subsequently, by the Habsburg government. In Transylvania, as in the Kingdom of Hungary, the major industries grew up not in the towns, but in the countryside. They were run by enterprising aristocrats and by people who rose to prominence purely on the strength of their economic acumen.

The salt mines tripled their production between 1660 and 1680, and this gave great impetus to the industries related to their exploitation, for instance the iron industry, rope making, the leather and timber industries, and the development of lighting technology.

For quite some time, there had been a tendency to locate iron foundries in the close proximity of the mines. The iron foundry at Csíkmadaras, for example, used the latest hydro-technology. As far as we know, the mining and smelting of iron ore found at Csíkmadaras began in the middle of the sixteenth century. István Báthory and Zsigmond Báthory had both been aware of its value, and there are sporadic data indicating that Gábor Báthory and later Gábor Bethlen subsidized iron production there. From the time of György Rákóczi II, the foundry was princely property. Detailed information on the value of the foundry and its production, its technology, and the working conditions of its labour force have so far been uncovered by researchers only for the years of Apafi's rule.

The iron foundry with the largest output was the one in the county of Hunyad, which operated partly with modern "German" blast-furnaces, and partly with the more traditional "Vlach" blast-furnaces. The iron mines and the foundries were owned partly by the Exchequer, partly by landowners, some of them being rented out to entrepreneurs. Whoever ran them, they all suffered from a shortage of labour. Those working in the mines were paid task wages. The skilled workers employed in the foundries and forges were paid wages as well. Haulage, however, the stoking of the furnaces, and every kind of work that did not call for skilled labour was done by serfs as *robot*. The iron foundries produced pig iron cast in various shapes and

sheet iron which was marketed for subsequent processing. They also manufactured cannonballs, thousands of horseshoes, nails, and simple tools.

The famous older iron mine and foundry located near Torockó was worked along very different principles. The region lying to the northwest of Torockó, an area rich in iron deposits, was originally communal property. Though the population of Torockó were serfs, they enjoyed a great deal of freedom as compared to the villeins who owed *robot* to their lords. The basis of their freedom was communal property. The "burghers" of Torockó, that is, the members of the community, were free to exploit whatever iron deposits they discovered on the communal land. They were equally entitled to their share — regulated by customary law — of the landed property of the community. They were free to use water for energy, and had the freedom of the forests. Certain communal rules specified the procedure of the smelting and the working of the iron, setting out a diversified system for the division of labour, but essentially, both forms of activity were areas for private enterprise. The many foundries of Torockó all had their bellows and hammers powered by hydro-energy. In the course of time, however, landlords acquired the arable and forests of Torockó for their own property, and with this, the community's charcoal and fodder supply was lost. Communal iron production by the "burghers" of Torockó had fallen on very hard days by the last half of the seventeenth century.

Three urban paper-mills built at the beginning of the century were still in operation. The paper-mill at Görgényszentimre, destroyed during the wars, was rebuilt by Prince Apafi in 1663; additions were made to it later on. It was this paper-mill which supplied the needs of the court, as well as the printing presses and schools of Transylvania. Fine-quality paper was imported.

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, there were glaziers working in guilds in the Saxon towns of Szeben and Brassó. We have data for a glaziers' guild in Marosvásárhely in 1615. It is the inventory made for the seigniory of Fogaras in 1632 that makes the first mention of a new development in the era, the establishment of the glass *officinas*. This glass works located in Porumbák made great strides forward in the second half of the century. Here, too, the haulers, the woodcutters, and the stokers were serfs. The skilled work was done by wage labourers. The *"officina vitraria"* produced bottles, carafes, decanters, and other glassware for household use, and sheet glass for window-panes. While in the case of most crafts and trades practised in Transylvania the technical language was German, the names of the tools as well as of the work processes used in glass manufacturing are given in the Fogaras inventory in Hungarian.

But it was the Moravian Anabaptist artisan communities (called "Habáns") that had the most conspicuous impact on the development of Transylvanian handicrafts between 1660 and 1680. These communities, which settled in the country to escape religious persecution, received a great deal of support from Apafi, and did much to improve the standards of pottery and broadcloth production, until the Habsburg takeover obliged them to move on from Transylvania as well.

The first sporadic instances of investment of working capital in the manufacture of broadcloth can be found in this era. An entrepreneur at Alvinc

was supported by the prince's court which helped him with the transportation and marketing of his commodities. The most sought-after broadcloth throughout the period was that produced in Brassó. The homespun products and blankets of peasant weavers were also much in demand. Both in pottery and linen production, there was a tendency for the cottage to work together with the master craftsmen, a development analogous to that taking place on the estates of enterprising landowners, where the industry was complementary to the type of agricultural production engaged in on the estate, and vice versa.

Within the guild system, silversmiths continued to produce goods up to the traditional high standards, in spite of the fact that demand fluctuated at best. The Transylvanian silversmiths' ties to the western guilds loosened toward the end of the century, as fewer and fewer journeymen were in the position to improve on their skills by going to work abroad for a while. Tinsmiths and coppersmiths, however, were perfecting their trade, and were producing more and more quality consumer goods. Woodworkers and masons still relied on the old technology, and were much in demand with the constant rebuilding that needed to be done.

With 70 per cent of Transylvania's territory consisting of high mountains, it was only natural that animal husbandry and forestry were the major agricultural branches; nevertheless more and more energy was being turned to the cultivation of cereal crops. On the narrow strips of land in the fertile river valleys and basins, market gardening flourished alongside the grain. At the foot of the mountains and on the sunny lower slopes and plateaus, there were grazing lands, vineyards, and orchards. The forests were a source of livelihood for thousands. The Székely village by-laws reveal a strong awareness of the need for forest conservation. Even when the forestry industry was booming, there were strict sanctions against those who disrupted the balance of nature in these genuinely ecology-minded communities.

The greatest part of the land was owned by the treasury, the aristocracy, and the nobility. The churches and the towns, too, had considerable estates. The area of land owned by non-noble freemen grew in the first half of these fifty years, and then fell back by the end of the century.

The seigniories continued to consist of discontinuous units of small or medium-sized estates. The large estates, "*latifundia*" many thousands of hectares in size, which were coming to predominate in the Kingdom of Hungary at about this time, were most rare in Transylvania, though those holding high government offices tried to acquire properties grouped around the prince's estates. The prince's private estates and the lands of the Exchequer were handled separately. These latter, the treasury's estates, were rather larger in size, and tended to lie in continuous blocks. They were managed by an adroit group of entrepreneurs responsible to the dowager princess, Anna Bornemissza, Apafi's wife.

The seigniorial centre, the manor, was located on one of the lord's small or medium-sized pieces of land, the wooden-balconied manor house or castle standing at the centre of the surrounding settlement. At this time, the lord's demesne generally was still on one rotation with the serfs' holdings, and was not distinguished from those in any way except in respect of who had

title to the produce. In Transylvania, unlike in the kingdom, no noble small holder class developed. On the other hand, there were a great many members of the lesser nobility who farmed estates providing a livelihood only for themselves and the one or two serf families with whom they worked it.

The manorial lands were, for the most part, worked by the serfs as part of the feudal service they owed the lord. Among the serfs doing labour, however, quite a few were better-off, and many of them had a number of draught animals.

In Transylvania, the manorial system did not develop as fully as in the Kingdom of Hungary. What was produced by the manors was a function of the quality of the land, of the climate, and of the demand of the accessible market. Throughout the period, there was a shortage of labour. The landowner tried to protect his serf, to tie him to himself and not to his land, and to welcome every new settler. The manors produced mostly cereal crops: maize was introduced at this time, and would soon replace millet. Flax and hemp were cultivated with great care, and tobacco appeared. On the manorial lands, as on the serfs' holdings, a great quantity of fruit was produced. Richly diversified vegetable gardens surrounded the manor houses and the serfs' homes. Apiaries and fishponds lay on the outskirts of the towns and villages and contributed to the population's improving nutrition. The traditional wine-growing areas — the Küküllő Valley, and the region around Beszterce and Enyed — were still unmatched, but grapes were grown in a great many other places as well, and the quality of the wine produced was extremely varied.

Animal husbandry was an organic part of the manorial system. The prince's studfarms were the centres of horse-breeding for which Transylvania was famous. It is indicative of the standards of cattle and sheep farming that there was enough butter, cheese, milk and wool produced not only to satisfy local consumer demands, but also to sell on the market even in the most difficult decades.

The greatest part of the agricultural produce came off the serfs' holdings, and off the communal lands worked by the various privileged communities. They grew mostly bread grain and oats. The three-field system was common, but by no means universal. Nevertheless, though Transylvania lost much of its corn-producing lowlands in 1660, it was still able, in the following decades as well, to produce enough bread not only for its own population, but also for the various armies of occupation and re-occupation, which practically fattened on Transylvania.

Trade in these decades depended on the accessibility of the trade routes, and this varied a great deal with the fortunes of war. There was a real danger of Transylvania's economic isolation. Entrepreneurs, aristocrats, burghers, serfs, soldiers, professional merchants and the economic interests representing the successive state treasuries all competed for Transylvania's trade

In the second half of the seventeenth century, hardly an aristocrat in Transylvania was not engaged in trade. Chancellor János Bethlen bought up cattle to have them driven to Vienna. Councillor Mihály Teleki added to his fortune by trading in salt, wine and horses. István Apor regularly shipped wine to Wallachia, Pál Béldi to Moldavia. The aristocrat merchants, though

they faced stiff competition, managed to keep their dominant position to the last decade of the century. Nevertheless, great inroads were being made by the so-called "Greek" trading companies, the *Compania Graeca* of Brassó, which included Hungarian and Saxon burghers as well as concerns located in Szeben and England, by the Armenian merchants, and by the agents of the Habsburg-backed *Compania Orientalis*. The Hungarian aristocracy took the defensive step of allying themselves with some burgher entrepreneurs to form trading companies of their own.

There was a certain dualism in the trade policy that Apafi pursued. On the one hand, he maintained his control over the more important articles of trade by introducing government monopolies or semi-monopolies. On the other hand, however, he tried to compensate for the system of monopolies by granting trade concessions, restricted trading privileges, and treasury loans, and by regulations that served to stimulate domestic trade. The tariff registers and reports dealing with those three decades show a steady and unbroken upswing of trade: the great trade fairs of old were revived, tariff revenues grew, and every year showed more and more profit from the sale of salt. The *Compania Graeca*, as the intermediary of the English Levant Trading Company, built up a system of connections to a number of Balkan merchant companies, and became the company with the largest capital assets in Transylvania. They granted loans to the government and conducted transactions to further the prince's economic policies; the prince, in turn, pursued a flexible trade policy that promoted their development and protected the company from foreign competition, especially that coming from Vienna.

The head of the Brassó-based Greek Company, János Páter, was one of the most daring of all Transylvanian entrepreneurs at the time, and in 1671 won for the company the right to market some of the country's salt.

The introduction of Habsburg rule radically changed Transylvania's economic life. The treasury closed the quicksilver mines at Zalatna, so that they might offer no competition to the mines in the Tyrol. Cattle trade became the monopoly of the *Compania Orientalis* of Transylvanian pro-Habsburg aristocrats living in Vienna. In 1695, a request for the formation of a similar company made by some other Transylvanian aristocrats was refused. The salt monopoly was given to the *Palatino-Transylvanica Societas* set up with the capital backing of the chief pro-Habsburg entrepreneur, Sa-muel Oppenheimer, and under the auspices of Palatine Pál Esterházy. The salt mines in the personal possession of Mihály Apafi II, now interned in Vienna, were taken over by the *Hofkammer* in 1701.

The price of salt skyrocketed from 1 florin to 5 florins, and the local sale of salt was paralyzed. The tariff regulations introduced by the court in 1702 cut the country off from its traditional markets. The towns became deserted as entire industrial branches came to a standstill. It was an economic policy based on the theories of the "cameralists", a group of the imperial government's policy makers, and a policy designed to serve the interests of the "court" aristocrats, and one that took absolutely no account of local conditions. It was, moreover, a policy gravely deleterious to Transylvanian society, for it completely inhibited the circulation of money.

In the last decade of the century, all over the country people were complaining of having been forced out of trade and commerce. The govern-

Map 15. The economy of Transylvania in the second half of the seventeenth century

Industry

- Iron furnace, foundry
- Manufacture of arms
- Gun-foundry
- Manufacture of iron tools
- Gold exchange
- Mint
- △ Wood working
- Ⓟ Paper mill
- ▽ Glass manufacture
- ⬠ Cloth manufacture
- Tailoring trade
- Fur trade
- ◊ Leather trade
- $ Grape growing and wine production
- H Place of the thirtieth tax
- Ⓗ Place of the thirtieth tax up to 1660
- Direction of goods trade

(board, shingle)

Máramarossziget
Rónaszék
Sugatag
Nagybánya
Kapnikbánya

Radna

Dés
Szamosújvár
Désakna
Szék
Kolozsvár
Beszterce

Torda

Orockó

Ujakna
Nagyenyed

ehérvár

Marosváradja
Lámkerék

szebes

Vizakna

Nagyszeben

Porumbák

Vöröstorony Pass

Radnót
Görgényszentimre
Maros-vásárhely
Paraj
Székelyudvarhely
Ebesfalva
Segesvár
Medgyes

Fogaras

Gyergyó-szentmiklós
Csikmadaras
Gyimes Pass

Csíksomlyó
Industrial goods
Ojtoz Pass
Bereck
Kézdivásárhely

Brassó
Bodza Pass

Törcsvár Pass
Tömös Pass
Rics- fish

Industrial goods

Timber, board, shingle

Raw materials

Pigs- wine

Cloth, industrial products

Garments and metal products

Salt, cloth

ment's policy was such that they were unable to make profits sufficient to cover the investments that needed to be made in industrial production and marketing, nor did they have enough to be able to pay their taxes. There are no end of written sources expressing contemporaries' opinion that the country was poor because commerce was taken out of the hands of those of its sons who held it dear. In reflecting on the causes of the Rákóczi-led war of independence, they emphasize that one of the reasons for their taking up arms was that the profits from commerce ultimately benefited foreigners. The only way to balance the economy was to revive the country's trade.

The success of Apafi's fiscal policy is the best indication that there was a great deal that the state could do to help even a war-torn economy. Between 1657 and 1662, Transylvania's war against the Turks practically exhausted the country's supply of money. Apafi's government was able to stabilize the currency relatively quickly, and even achieved a certain degree of financial equilibrium. The essence of the policy was the following: the export of precious metals was prohibited, provisions were made for the regular issuing of money and for the centrally-controlled exchange of foreign currencies, and Draconian measures were introduced to put an end to the minting of counterfeit coins. A great deal of good Dutch money came into the country — probably through the trading companies — the so-called "lion thaler", and this contributed greatly to the revival of trade between 1660 and 1680.

After 1687, the expenses of the Turkish war and of the wintering of the allied armies ate up the country's supplies of money. But the economic policy of that period restricted trade, and there was no way to refill the empty coffers. The "emergency money" issued by Leopold I — worthless coins of copper and leather — and the system of vouchers were hardly calculated to help the situation. The results were so catastrophic that even taxation became impossible between 1690 and 1703.

The tax burden of the Transylvanian population accrued to it from a number of different obligations. The country was obliged to pay an annual tribute to the Porte, an amount of forty thousand florins. On top of this, however, there were the extraordinary taxes and the food ransoms in times of war. Including all the back payments on the unpaid war indemnities, between 1664 and 1686 Transylvania paid Constantinople a sum of between one hundred and ninety and two hundred thousand florins a year. After 1687, the taxes to the Porte were replaced by the obligation to quarter and provision the imperial troops. The actual amount to be paid was the subject of lengthy negotiations. At the treaty of Balázsfalva signed in 1687 the amount agreed was close to two million florins, for it included also the cost of what was squandered in the slovenly transport and wasteful distribution of the provisions. Certainly, there was no way to give a realistic estimate of the value of the tramped-down vegetable gardens, the burned corn fields, the sheaves of unthreshed wheat used to fodder the horses, the destroyed mills, and the fruit trees used for firewood. Securing the "discretion" of the party to whom the tax was to be paid also amounted to a regular supplementary tax, and took the form of "gifts" to the commander-in-chief, to the various officers, and to the tax collectors. These gifts took a number of forms. Besides the cash payments, the officer would specify whether he wanted a

pair of handsome horses, a carriage, or some other valuables. It was not just his "trouble" that the taxpaying communities, counties, towns and villages were thanking him for in this way; they were also hoping to win special treatment thereby. It was, in fact, both a tip and a bribe; and except for the value of the goods involved, there was nothing particularly new about it. When traditional power relations are as thoroughly upset as they were with the eight to ten thousand strong imperial army's occupation of Transylvania, the collection of taxes too, becomes a form of undisguised tyranny. The controls were simply not working: everything was subordinated to the interests of the military. This kind of taxation, which was far more than they could pay and was collected by force, drove the population to find a more peaceful life in the area reconquered from the Turks. Others took up arms, and with their determination to restore Transylvania's autonomous government, were the vanguard of the Rákóczi-led war of independence.

How far was Transylvania able to support the costs of government as an independent state? It was, as we have seen, capable of covering the expenses of István Báthory's and Gábor Bethlen's grandiose state-building, foreign policy, and foreign wars. By the time of Apafi's rule, the expenses of government were growing throughout Europe. In Transylvania, from the 1660s on the money needed to run the central government was handled separately from the money needed to cover the expenses of the prince's household. The first, which included the cost of keeping up the court in a way that foreign visitors would find impressive, as well as the cost of entertaining them, also included the upkeep of the prince's guard, and came to between seven and eight thousand florins. The prince's private, family expenses amounted to four or five thousand florins. Maintaining the prince's court thus cost Transylvania an average of eleven to thirteen thousand florins. Besides this, there were the substantial expenses of government administration, and the salaries and other emoluments paid to the officials and high dignitaries of the realm. It would be difficult to arrive at a figure for these, for a great many of the government officials received a substantial part of their remuneration in kind.

Transylvania in the 1670s was even able to feed and give regular payments of money to the host of eight to ten thousand refugees — members of the lesser and middle nobility, and the soldiers discharged from the garrisons of the border castles — who crossed over from the Kingdom of Hungary.

When the Habsburgs took over Transylvania, its tax burden was set at between eight hundred thousand to a million Rhenish florins in cash, and the supplying of an army of from six to ten thousand men. This unprecedentedly high tax, when allocated to the various towns and regions of the country, proved to be simply too much to pay. In the most difficult years, Apafi had been able to see to it that the nobility contributed to the payment of the tax, and that the aristocracy helped out the population with loans. The Habsburgs' attempts to introduce similar measures failed, primarily because with the system of monopolies there was not enough money left in circulation within the country.

In the first years of the war of independence, Ferenc Rákóczi II tried to make up for the lack of currency and to stimulate the economy by issuing

emergency money himself, the copper *"libertas"*. The period of his rule, however, was too short to permit any conclusions as to the effectiveness of his economic policy. The profits from the partial monopolies could not circulate back into the Transylvanian economy. For years, the small principality had two armies and two state bureaucracies to finance. The pro-Habsburg Gubernium had moved to Szeben, and the imperial army had control of the southern part of the principality throughout, while the rest of the country was, more or less continuously, in the hands of Rákóczi's army and government. Both governments collected taxes, and the taxpaying population was totally exhausted. Rákóczi's plans called for reviving the economy with reforms that extended to the kingdom and the principality as well. The Diet that met at Ónod in 1707 passed a tax reform which called for a regular income tax on every member of the population, the nobility included. The only group to enjoy exemption was to be the families of the men doing military service. The taxable income was to come from the restoration of free trade, and the development of mining and industry, both of which were to be given state support. Transylvania, however, had no time even to introduce the reforms.

Social Mobility in a Society of Estates

The constant changes in the country's economy and government did a great deal to accelerate the ongoing process of the restructuring of society, to hasten the dissolution of the closed autonomous communities of Transylvania. In the decades of stability under Apafi's rule, there was an organic process of restructuring, as the diverse social groups of the old feudal order — the aristocracy, the nobility of the counties, the burghers of the towns, the Saxon University, and the Székely districts along with the majority of the population, the serfs — regrouped into the three large social groupings that had been evolving for some time: the upper estate, the middle estate, and the lower estate. During the fifteen years of Habsburg military occupation, this organic development was cut short, and Transylvania seemed well on its way to social anarchy. A series of riots broke out, and by 1702 or so, every social group in Transylvania was looking to Rákóczi's rule to restore social order. In the eight years of the war of independence, Rákóczi managed to introduce measures which tended to restore social harmony, and promoted the kind of long-term organic social restructuring that had been arrested.

The most populous group within the lower estate was the serfs. Its numbers were continuously augmented by the déclassés, people who had fallen outside the protective shell of the various closed former communities, and by Romanians from Moldavia and Wallachia seeking refuge from poverty in Transylvania. The serfs were far from being a homogeneous social group. The differences between the circumstances of the Saxon peasantry and the inhabitants of the Hungarian villages were matched by the great discrepancies that existed among the Székely serfs, the Romanian mountain shepherds, the old Romanian agriculturalists and the new Romanian settlers.

There was a constant labour shortage, and this, and the economic prosperity behind it, opened new opportunities to them, which in itself made for considerable social tensions within the class. The landowners, for their part, tried to bind as many serfs as possible to perpetual servitude. From the 1660s, the amount of service exacted from the serfs on the nobility's estates was no longer tied to any upper limit in terms of man hours. The serf was adscript not so much to the soil as to the landlord, which meant that the landowner was free to move him and his family from one estate of his to the other, as need dictated. The landed nobility's involvement in trade and commerce meant that the serfs were obliged to do a great deal of haulage; as for the industries that were established on the estates, these involved an infinite variety of jobs for the serfs. Those serfs who worked in the paper-mills learned a great deal, and their horizons broadened. But the work load was excessive: reports on the iron works in the county of Hunyad indicate that the serfs employed there had not one day of rest. On the treasury's estates, however, circumstances were somewhat better. Apafi's government sought to protect the serfs from over-exacting bailiffs and landlords, as well as tyrannical soldiers. But the institutional framework through which the serfs could turn to the government for the redress of their grievances was established only by Ferenc Rákóczi II. During the last half of the seventeenth century, as indeed before, the serfs' interests had been protected only by the communities, by customary law and the village by-laws, and not least importantly, by the churches. Even landowners were known to set up hospitals and poorhouses for the sick and very old on their estates, though on a very modest scale.

The other great and even more heterogeneous group in the lower estate was the well-off peasantry, the enterprising cotters engaged in a craft or in trade, the hauliers, the drovers, and the day labourers. Those who rose to the middle estate would be mostly from this group. There were a number of kinds of way up: armed service, a patent of nobility gained with money, with loans, or with merit. The more talented sons of the serfs would go on from school to help manage the seigniory, or, after spending a few years teaching in an elementary school, would go abroad to continue their studies, to return to fill posts as pastors or teachers at the grammar schools.

The middle estate was a loosely-knit class consisting of a great many social strata. Most characteristically in this period, it consisted of the military stratum coming into existence as a result of the modernization of the country's armed force, and of the enterprising burghers and members of the lesser nobility.

During these decades the principality was building up an army consisting partly of paid soldiers, and partly of soldiers who were given the free use of state lands and other privileges. The centralizing princes had long been trying to draw the closed and autonomous Székely military communities under their own control. There are two highly significant censuses available on the Székelys: one from 1614, the other from 1720. A comparison of the data shows that the homogeneous Székely society of yore was breaking into discrete groups with different occupations and statuses, and that these then integrated into society at large. Apafi sought to speed up this process by having a great many Székelys in his court army. Other Székelys he as-

signed to garrison the various castles. But there were also considerable numbers of Székelys who remained within their original communities and continued to enjoy the old Székely privileges in return for their readiness to perform military service. Foot soldiers, guardsmen and cavalrymen, it was they who comprised that considerable military force that the Székely districts still represented. It is interesting to note, however, that Apafi appointed men of his own to command the armies of the Saxon districts. Of those Saxons who were no longer fit for warfare, many went to work in the salt-mines, or found work transporting salt. Others were reduced to serfdom, or farmed their land as freemen, or earned their living as hauliers. Of the lands once held by the privileged *lófő* Székelys, more and more had been taken over by outsiders. The Székely villages, however, stoutly protected their communal social order and self-government.

The most energetic group within the middle estate were those who had just recently been awarded patents of nobility. Apafi liked to recognize the services that soldiers, officials, merchants and entrepreneurs had rendered the country. In a quarter of a century, so many people acquired nobility in this way that one contemporary source declared half the population to belong to the nobility. Transylvania had no well-to-do landed gentry owning estates of medium size, and so the road to advancement lay wide open to the newly ennobled and to the lesser nobility. The imperial official taking the tax census in 1703 compared the growing group of Transylvania's lesser nobility following the peasant way of farming to the free peasantry of the German principalities and Silesia.

During the years of Habsburg centralization, a great many people in the middle estate stood in danger of sliding back into serfdom. In social terms, however, it was the burgher stratum that suffered the most. The years from the 1660s to the 1680s had been a time of a peaceful and steady increase in prosperity for this bourgeoisie, and also a time when the closed, autonomous urban economies were opened up by irresistible forces. The new entrepreneurs, merchants and artisans of Szeben and Brassó, taking part personally, with investments or loans, in the state enterprises, themselves promoted the process slowly evolving everywhere in Europe, namely, that the closed urban economies opened up and were integrated into a national economy.

Among the traditional urban groups, the financial superiority of the goldsmiths and silversmiths appeared to be untouched. In other trades, only a small group managed to become really wealthy and to acquire the prestige that goes with wealth, and there was a growing number of those who were poor. In Gyulafehérvár, which was slowly being rebuilt, there was an increase in the numbers of hauliers and gold washers, while in other towns, there were more and more carpenters, masons, rope-makers, tinsmiths, watchmakers, millers, barbers, and so on. Torda and Dés were given privileges of nobility; Kolozsvár was declared a military town, and a great number of noblemen chose to settle there among the burghers. It was at this time that the Székely towns, for instance Csíkszereda, and especially Marosvásárhely, acquired their leading positions. It was in Marosvásárhely that the last prince of Transylvania in the person of Ferenc Rákóczi II was installed in his office by the Diet. The life of the urban middle estate continued to centre around the beautiful homes they had started cultivating at the

beginning of the century. They now had "bath-closets", glazed windows, and libraries. The Danish ambassador on his way from Vienna to St. Petersburg, stopped over in Kolozsvár in the home of Ferenc Szakál, master carpenter, and spoke with the highest approval of the comforts available and the fine taste in which it was furnished.

The elite among the urban burghers had social and business ties to the upper estate, as for instance did Councillor Mathias Miles of Szeben, and the Greek entrepreneur János Páter. Many of them, however, could not keep pace with the stiff competition for a place higher up the social ladder; others were to fall in political battles.

The upper estate, in whose hands effective political power was concentrated, was composed of diverse elements. The old aristocratic families emerged considerably shaken from the political struggles of 1657–1662, and had been much reduced in number. Soon, however, new upcoming families of a first-generation elite joined their ranks. Transylvania's most influential politician in this period, Mihály Teleki, who had the duties of chancellor, was the son of a prison warden. The father of László Székely, a member of the Prince's Council and postmaster general, had worked as a steward, managing one of the large estates. Márton Sárpataki, who held the office of protonotary, was the son of a serf.

The size of the estates owned by the aristocracy was generally about what a middle landowner in the Kingdom of Hungary could boast: 10 to 30 villages. Most of Transylvania's aristocrats were Calvinists; some were Catholics. Religious affiliation, however, was still not an issue for those aspiring to high office. The Catholic Hallers — János, Gábor and Pál — were all councillors and members of the corps of diplomats. The orphaned son of István Apor, the Catholic chief magistrate of Kézdivásárhely, rose from poverty to become one of the highest dignitaries of the land. The upper estate was open. Education, talent, money, economic finesse, service rendered to the state were all passports to the upper estate, but it was just as easy to fall back to a lower estate. Apafi's rule was a difficult one for the aristocracy. Dénes Bánffy was beheaded because he did not understand what Apafi meant by centralization. The conspiracy organized by Pál Béldi landed many aristocrats in prison. Nevertheless, what was achieved during Apafi's rule had a great deal to do with the political astuteness of this Janus-faced upper estate.

The aristocratic families were close-knit. They preferred to educate their children abroad. It is indicative of their insatiable need to keep up with the best that after the German principalities, the Netherlands became the measure of what a state should be, and after the French orientation had had its day, they turned with ever greater interest to England. Chancellor János Bethlen's son, Miklós, had barely visited England; his grandson, Mihály, went there to study. Transylvania's aristocracy enjoyed a growing affluence, and were able to consummate their already luxurious life-style. Their *châteaux* had cut-glass windows, and spacious halls with open fireplaces. Two cultures met in the interior decoration of these sumptuous homes: Turkish and Persian rugs and Venetian, Dutch and French tapestries on the walls; Eastern clothes and hunting weapons, and Western clocks and vir-

ginals. Alongside the gold and silver dishes on their tables, glass and porcelain tableware and earthenware appeared. Their account books reveal strict economy: half a sack of nuts was put on the books no less than a set of silvered harness. They kept a lot of expensive jewellery in the house: since there was no bank, this was the way of keeping their savings safe. They made generous endowments to their church, not only having their salvation in mind, but also seeing this as a contribution to the church's ability to give loans in case of need, and as a way of securing the education of future generations.

When the Habsburg government took over, initially most aristocrats flocked enthusiastically to Vienna, and were anxious to be among the first to receive the title of count or baron, distinctions Leopold I conferred in an effort to make them into docile courtiers. When Rabutin ordered them to Szeben in 1703, practically all of Transylvania's aristocracy heeded the command. It was not until the general took all the valuables that they had taken with them for safekeeping — money, jewellery and provisions — that they realized that they had been trapped. It was at that point that they went over to Rákóczi, even risking their lives to break out of the town. When the Peace of Szatmár was signed, however, the young Kelemen Mikes was the only one to follow Rákóczi into exile.

3. The Varieties of Culture

Cultural Policy, the Intellectuals, and the Vernacular

The heyday of Transylvanian culture was just this half-century, when wars and local skirmishes ravaged the countryside for over thirty years, and the trauma of the country's palpable loss of independence shook every member of the population. During these decades, Transylvanians remained susceptible to the intellectual currents coming from the West, and produced works which set the trend that the country was to follow in culture and education for generations to come.

Attaching importance to education was rooted in Transylvanian tradition, but was reinforced by the infectious spirit of innovation that spread throughout Europe in those years. It was Transylvanian society's immanent needs that coincided with the challenge of the age, and this resulted in some spectacular progress in the field of education. The framework and the opportunities, however, were provided by the state's educational policy.

The fact that education was the cement of the country and the token of its development was something Mihály Apafi recognized as well as the best minds of that century. Apafi was called the prince who put Descartes's theories on education into practice by contemporaries such as the theologian F. István Tolnai, who had studied at English and Dutch universities, and Ferenc Pápai Páriz, the greatest Hungarian physician and physicist of his time, who had studied in Basel. Apafi, an avid student of the writings of Bacon, Machiavelli, Grotius, Justus Lipsius and Cocceius, held that the

Gyöngyös
1652
1634

Hajdúnánás
~1650

Hajdúböszörmény
1621—

Debrecen
~1635

Printing press of Sárospatak 1671

Printing press of Várad 1660

Huszt

Németi

Szatmár
~1640 — 1658
1660—

Hajdúszoboszló
1621—

Karcag
1676

Mezőtúr
1696—

Székelyhíd

Várad
—1660
1640—1660

Somlyó

Zilah
1646—

Egeres

Vista

Gyalu
1605—
1615—

Hódmezővásárhely
1657—

Borosjenő

Fekete-Körös

Gyulafehé

Alvinc

Déva

Szászváros
1692

Vajdahunyad

Lugos
—1658

Karánsebes
—1658

0 10 20 30 40 50 km

MAP 16. SCHOOLS, PRINTING PRESSES AND ARTS IN THE 17th CENTURY

Legend

Catholic | Calvinist | Lutheran | Unitarian | Romanian Orthodox

Schools

University

Secondary school with faculties of philosophy, theology and law

Secondary school with faculties of philosophy and theology

Secondary school

Grammar school

Romanian school offering secondary school qualifications

Transfer of school

Change in the type of the school

Change in the type of the school by transfer

School theatrical company

Secondary particular school of the Debrecen and Kolozsvár colleges after 1660

Printing presses

Minor printing press

Major printing press

Transfer of printing press

Music

Centre of ecclesiastic music

Centre of lay music

Published notes, manuscripts

Church music

Lay music

Applied arts

Centre of metalwork

Architecture

Late Renaissance | Early Baroque

Newly built palace

Rebuilt palace

Burgher's house

Fine art

Statue

Painting

Hungarian — Turkish border in 1606

Hungarian — Turkish border after 1664

Máramarossziget
Beszterce
Szamosújvár
Bethlenszentmiklós Küküllővár Fehéregyház
Magyarfülpös
Mikháza 1669—
Marosvásárhely
Szentgericze
Radnot Szentpál Gyalakuta
Csíkszereda Csíkszentpál
Székelyudvarhely 1603, 1685
1670
Déva
Segesvár 1620
Medgyes Berethalom Keresd
Éger 1680
Almakerek
Alsórákos
Esztelnek
Kanta 1696—
Oltheviz
Szeben Fogaras 1692—
1657—
Brassó 1635—

prince's most important task was to develop the school system, and to provide the institutional framework in which modern science might flourish.

Apafi took over as prince of Transylvania when the court at Gyulafehérvár had just been destroyed. Until it could be rebuilt, he set up his court at Fogaras. Apafi set great store by pomp and circumstance. A great many ceremonial occasions enhanced the splendour of his court. The gifts received from other rulers were exhibited as diplomatic tokens of Transylvania's esteem abroad. The exquisite gardens laid out with great care were meant to symbolize peace, renewal and rebirth. Apafi and his wife, Anna Bornemissza, whom he on occasion called his "co-ruler", did their utmost to make the court the centre of Hungarian culture, a culture which measured itself by the standards of western Europe, but safeguarded national traditions as well. Apafi surrounded himself with a small group of second-generation Hungarian Cartesians, all of whom had studied abroad. He regularly informed his adherents of the news from abroad in little circulars, or "novels". He was dedicated to religious tolerance, and intervened personally to guarantee freedom of thought and education. His greatest dream, to establish a modern university in Transylvania, Apafi did not live to realize. But he had continued traditions which made for standards of culture and education that stood the country in good stead in later, less auspicious years.

The Habsburg educational policy of the 1690s was diametrically opposed to every one of Transylvania's traditions. The dynasty's interests were thought to require an empire where there was but one religion, and the school system, though based on the Jesuit schools which were known for their high standards, met with fierce resistance from Protestant Transylvania as bastions of religious intolerance. The court was in far-away Vienna, and could have little cultural impact. Szeben, General Rabutin's military headquarters and the home of the Gubernium, was no more than the centre where orders were issued and decrees were made known.

Ferenc Rákóczi II and his government were intent, as far as the ongoing warfare permitted, to emphasize the continuity of his court with those of his historic predecessors, even while having to remove constantly: from Gyulafehérvár to Marosvásárhely, and then to Kolozsvár. In the time he had at his disposal, Rákóczi attempted to restore Apafi's spirit of openness and tolerance in educational and religious affairs.

Though Transylvania could boast an intelligentsia which was numerous in comparison with that of the neighbouring regions, it was not enough. The category of "intelligentsia" as such covers a most motley group. The creative intellectual elite and the "service sector" — schoolmasters, scribes, village painters, officials, court and army musicians — may all be included. The ecclesiastics were still in the majority, but the weight of the lay intelligentsia was growing. All the great writings in this period were secular works written by laymen. The scholar who wrote the internationally acclaimed history of mining in Transylvania, or a physician or a printer were more determinative of intellectual life as such than the man in the much more prestigious job of court chaplain, or any member of the Hungarian, Saxon, and, after the union, Romanian clergy. The proportion of those with university degrees within the population was high. In respect of their ethnic distribution, the Hungarians and the Saxons greatly predominated.

During Apafi's and Rákóczi's rule the country's official language was Hungarian, but the prince's decrees to the Saxons and Romanians were published in their native language as well. Apafi set such great store by education in the vernacular, that at the request of the Greek Orthodox Romanian lower clergy he removed Bishop Sava Brancovici from his office, because he refused to obey the prince's order that religious instruction was to be given and books were to be printed in Romanian for the greater edification of the faithful. The Habsburg government used mostly German, and sometimes Latin in its communications with the population. General Rabutin who, for all practical purposes, ruled Transylvania as a viceroy, knew only French. The German officers were unable to communicate even with the Saxons, who spoke their own dialect.

The Principality of Transylvania was extraordinarily open to languages. Considerations of foreign policy, the need for diplomats accomplished in a number of languages, also contributed to the encouragement of study abroad. In times of peace foreigners were attracted, in times of war they inevitably moved to the country, but both groups brought along their own language. The language of science was still mostly Latin, but the language of education for those who studied abroad, could be German, Dutch, French, and in the last decades of the century, English. Sámuel Köleséri probably also attended Newton's lectures in England, since after his return to Transylvania he was an exponent of Newtonian ideas as opposed to those of Cartesian physics. But in these same years a plea was made for Hungarian as a language of science and it was made so forcefully, that it sounded modern even in the age of the Enlightenment. French was coming to replace Latin as the language of diplomacy, but the voivodes of the Romanian principalities frequently corresponded with Apafi in Hungarian. Most of the orders sent from the Porte, it seems, arrived in Hungarian, translated by scribes in Buda, Temesvár, but mainly Constantinople, but all the princes of Transylvania employed scribes who knew Turkish well.

In this multilingual milieu, it is interesting to note the emphasis placed on the use of one's native language. Transylvanian Hungarian, which had undergone a linguistic renewal in earlier decades, was now enriched with categories in areas to satisfy the new cultural demands: government, political theory, social responsibility, history, epistemology, and science all needed to be discussed in a precise terminology, as indeed did the various branches of industry and commerce. The facile language of light-hearted social intercourse developed at this time, as did forms of communication capable of transmitting more complex feelings and ideas. A comprehensive programme of linguistic renewal was worked out, but cut short by the political crisis. Miklós Misztótfalusi Kis, a typographer and printer of rare artistry and ingenuity, was the one who standardized Hungarian spelling. A new, revised Hungarian edition of the Bible was printed, designed for mass readership.

The cultivation of the German language was an important part of Saxon culture and education. German was the language of schooling, of the churches, of science, and of urban life among the Saxons, especially after Pietism got a foothold in Transylvania (before anywhere else in the region).

Apafi's educational policy gave a great boost to the modernization of the Romanian language, and the union with the Catholic church had the positive effect of raising the standard of the vernacular among the Romanian clergy. It was in Transylvania that the first Romanian–Latin word book was compiled.

Schools, Presses, and Science

By the mid-1660s, the prince's educational programme and the system of endowments had brought teaching in the vernacular and education for girls to the village schools. The four "received" religions and the Greek Orthodox church were obliged, by social pressure, to establish more and more schools. It was during these years that the college at Szászváros — a type of school close to the English public school of the period — was established, as well as the Calvinist college at Székelyudvarhely. Unitarian schools were becoming more efficient and the Greek Orthodox school system got off the ground. Apafi not only consolidated the financial foundations of the Romanian school of Fogaras established by the dowager Princess Zsuzsanna Lórántffy in 1657, but gave it his special princely patronage so that it might grow into the most prestigious Romanian educational institution of the time. Though we have no way of establishing the precise number of Romanian elementary schools operating in the villages around Fogaras, and in Brassó, Hátszeg and Lugos, it is quite certain that there were relatively many Romanian schools in Transylvania at the end of the seventeenth century. It was in Transylvania that the first Romanian textbook was printed in 1699, a Cyrillic primer entitled *Bucoavna*.

The elaborate system of foreign scholarships established by the Protestant schools was extended, including scholarships to Frankfurt on the Oder, Leyden, Franeker and Zurich. Though by this time the focus of interest was in the Netherlands, Switzerland and England; fifty-three Transylvanian students enrolled at Wittenberg between 1700 and 1703. In 1702, passing through Transylvania on his way home from Constantinople, the English ambassador Lord William Paget was joined by three Hungarians and one Saxon student — the young painter, Jeremias Stranoves — who were to continue their studies in London.

Catholic education picked up after the Jesuit order was settled in Transylvania. The Franciscans made immense contributions to the education of the Catholic Székelys. The Habsburg government made no attempt to carry on with Apafi's plans for a university; they wanted no institution of higher education in the principality. Rákóczi, in his turn, founded "The Society of Noble Youths", a court institution located at Kolozsvár and designed to educate and train young men suited for high government jobs and high military posts. Hungarians, Saxons and one Romanian youth were among the members.

In education, more attention than ever before was paid to teaching everyone to read and write. In the "public schools" and colleges, the emphasis began to be placed on creative thinking and on the natural sciences.

Transylvania's wonderful old libraries suffered irreparable losses in this period. The court library in Gyulafehérvár was burned down by the Tatars, the library in Brassó burned down in 1689, and the library of the college at Enyed was destroyed by the imperial army. The price of books probably declined somewhat; their value had certainly grown. Apafi's court made a concerted effort to reassemble "the country's library". The number of private libraries was growing; school libraries were augmented with the teachers' own collections, and with specialized literature classified and grouped according to subject matter. Books published expressly for children, and some especially with women readers in mind crop up on the book lists. Books in Hungarian were beginning to comprise an ever larger percentage of all publications. Sámuel Köleséri, the physician of Szeben, had a library of four thousand volumes.

Transylvania's presses proved inadequate to the growing demand for something to read. Between 1650 and 1680, nearly four hundred books were issued by the presses of Brassó, Szeben, Kolozsvár and Gyulafehérvár, and with the type salvaged from the press in Várad in 1660 and taken to Debrecen, and thence to Szeben. Printing in Transylvania began to make great strides once Ábrahám Szenci Kertész and Mihály Veresegyházi Szentyel returned from learning the trade in the Netherlands and set up their own presses. But it was Miklós Misztótfalusi Kis, who also had learned his art in Holland, who modernized Transylvanian printing. It is indicative of his skill as a cutter that his type characters have been considered to equal those of Garamond and Grandjean, and recent research has demonstrated that the famous "Janson type" was actually first designed and cut by the Transylvanian master printer. Besides working to fulfil Dutch orders, he cut punches for the types needed in Polish, Swedish, German, Armenian, English, Italian and Georgian orthography. On returning to Transylvania, Misztótfalusi Kis set up his *Typographica Officina* with the prince's help, publishing inexpensive but aesthetically satisfying books in large editions. With the Habsburg takeover, he found it even more difficult to work because of the personal attacks against him. After 1690 the workshop declined, and then, following his early death, disintegrated.

Cartesianism was the dominant intellectual current in Transylvania from the 1660s on. Outstanding among the first generation of Cartesians was Sámuel Enyedi, a physician, who subscribed to a variant of rationalism which owed a great deal to Henricus Regius' theories, with Cartesian dualism being central to his system of thought. It was he who, after the fall of Várad, established the second centre of Cartesian rationalism at the college at Enyed, together with the much younger János Nadányi, Márton Dézsi, and others. Descartes's philosophy was given a systematic exposition in 1690 by the eminent third-generation Cartesian, Ferenc Pápai Páriz. In a work published in Amsterdam, Miklós Apáti, a member of Poiret's circle, maintained that free will was at the centre of all consciousness, and, adapting Descartes's methodology, concluded that mathematical reasoning was the principal means of our discovering the laws of nature, something that Apáczai, too, had maintained. Mihály Régeni, who taught at the Unitarian college in Kolozsvár, contributed to the Europe-wide controversy sparked by Descartes's

theories by building on the philosophy of Ehrenfried Walter Tschirnhaus, a free-thinker who anticipated Newton in some respects. Mechanics and astronomy as taught in Transylvanian schools evidently derived from the heliocentric Copernican theory. The latest approach to the natural sciences is reflected in the lecture notes on mathematics published by Sámuel Kaposi, who taught at the school in Marosvásárhely after completing his studies in England and the Netherlands, as well as by János Köpeczi's *De Cometis*, and Sámuel Köleséri's discourse on light. Exceptionally influential was the Saxon rationalist Andreas Teutsch, who had studied medicine in Utrecht, and returned to Transylvania via Leipzig and Halle with the ideas of Jakob Spener on the need to free scientific thinking from thralldom to religious belief, and of Spener's fellow Pietist, August Hermann Francke, on education. He practised medicine on his return, and became Saxon chief magistrate. In the Királyföld, anticipating Maria Theresa's decree, it was Teutsch who prohibited witch trials.

Another doctor of medicine, Bartholomeus Bausner, a native of Kőhalom who had studied in Amsterdam, published a treatise on the circulation of the blood, and on the harmony that existed between the various parts of the human body. Regius' textbook on medicine which ran into several editions made reference to the work of three young Transylvanian doctors: János Sikó, Sámuel Enyedi, and Johann Gunesch. The prescriptions of János Bánffyhunyadi of Nagybánya, a specialist in the preparation of medicines, were included in the textbook on pharmacology published in 1681 by Jonathan Goddard, a chemist and Fellow of the Royal Society. Köleséri's work in medicine was pioneering in that he observed and described the diseases afflicting miners as a direct consequence of their working conditions; he also did a great deal to organize free medical care for the poor. Köleséri recognized that it required the central government's nation-wide intervention to prevent the occurrence and spread of plague epidemics. But he was not the only one to realize the importance of preventive medicine. The *Regimen Sanitatio Salernitanum* put out by the renowned *Schola Salernitana* as a collection of guidelines to healthy living was translated into Hungarian by György Felvinczi (Kolozsvár, 1693), and into German by the Transylvanian physician Lucas Seuler (Brassó, 1694).

The most outstanding medical work to appear in Transylvania, however, was Ferenc Pápai Páriz's *Pax Corporis, a treatise on the maladies of the body, their causes, their hotbeds, and the means to cure them*, which appeared in 1690. The need for the book was enormous. The practice of medicine in the villages, manors and market towns was still largely in the hands of "healers" using home remedies, while bones were set, teeth were pulled and wounds were attended by barbers, whose work was regulated by guilds, although in every larger Transylvanian town, there were university-trained medical doctors to be found by this time. It was for this largely non-professional army of "medical practitioners" that Pápai Páriz's book, written in lucid Hungarian, was so invaluable. A systematic presentation of the latest in medicine, the book emphasized the scientific approach to healing, calling attention to the importance of prevention and hygiene, and maintaining that human negligence and not predestination was the cause as much of

mankind's illnesses, as of its ills. *Pax Corporis* became the textbook of thousands. Eleven editions of it are known to have come out in the eighteenth century, and among the Hungarian-speaking Csángós of Moldavia, it was used as a handbook of home medicine even in the twentieth century.

Material Culture and Mentality

Transylvania's material culture in the second half of the seventeenth century was a unique admixture of the traditional and the modern.

People continued to build with unflagging energy throughout the period. In Kolozsvár, about 1,800 houses had to be rebuilt after 1655; and practically all of Brassó was rebuilt after the great fire in a relatively short time. The most important piece of school architecture was the Calvinist college in Kolozsvár, designed as a public school for boarders by the Italian Agostino Serra. The aristocracy were great builders: in a little over a decade, from 1666 to 1679, the Teleki *château* at Sorostély was put up, as was the Bethlen family's at Betlenszentmiklós; the *château* in Keresd was rebuilt, as were the manor houses at Bethlen, Uzdiszentpéter, and Bonyha. Church architecture preferred to use wood; the great bell tower at Magyarsáros was built in 1699. In the Fogaras region, Greek Catholic churches were built.

Both the *châteaux* and the manor houses consisted of a number of buildings enclosed by a wall. The main building was the home of the noble lord, a two-storey edifice consisting of four, but usually eight, and sometimes ten or more rooms, some with wooden balconies. The upper storey was divided into ladies' and gentlemens' quarters. Downstairs were the common rooms — the dining room and the reception room — and these often had crystal glass windows. The other windows, and the windows of the other buildings were of plain glass, or crown glass, or had only wooden shutters. The aristocracy's town houses and the more elegant of the burghers' homes generally had window panes set in lead, tile roofs, and fireplaces. The rooms were friendly and comfortable, with painted or inlaid, highly polished furniture. Aristocrats were likely to have furniture ornamented with patterns of shells brought from the Netherlands via Poland. A piece of furniture adopted from peasant homes was the bench with a hinged back. Tapestries from the great tapestry-weaving centres of western Europe covered the walls of the palatial homes, depicting well-loved Biblical stories and scenes from mythology. The hangings covering the walls of the less affluent homes showed scenes that were simply painted on, and there was a kind of tapestry woven in many colours, called "painted cloth". Turkish carpets were widely used, including the so-called "Transylvanian carpets". Brass and iron candelabra were popular, and lanterns with sides made of glass were just coming into use. Earthenware and ceramics, as we have seen, enjoyed popularity at every social level, and were provided in abundance by the highly-advanced domestic industry. Glazed and tin-glazed vessels, pots and tableware were basic household items. Glazed tiles decorated only the more affluent homes.

Transylvanians loved their gardens: no holiday, no great family event, no birthday, no wedding, no funeral was complete without flowers. Herb gardens offered health to the body, and the streams, bridges, and gold-fish ponds of the affluent proffered refreshment to the soul.

The relatively large number of household inventories kept by aristocratic, noble and burgher householders that have come down to us testify to a highly developed sense of hygiene. No better home could do without a variety of copper and wooden bath tubs, adult size and children's size, as well as numerous silver, copper and pottery basins, and towels of every type and size. The master plumbers of Brassó were known far and wide, as were the mineral water vendors of the Székelyföld. Transylvania was rich in mineral waters, and the hot water springs and sulphur and mineral springs of various kinds supplied baths which had long been a part of Transylvanian urban living, and which now people came to frequent not only for their health, but also for relaxation, for purposes of socializing, and even to keep in the mainstream of political events.

As for clothing, Hungarian style dolmans and mantles were made equally from expensive English broadcloth, Turkish velvet, and inexpensive cloth from Brassó and later from the Balkans. Turkish, Polish and Austrian fashions all made their influence felt. The latest Italian, French and German models were soon copied, but the older styles were also to be seen. Clothing reflected one's status, one's office, but principally, one's ethnicity. The use of jewellery was widespread, and not just among the very well-off. The jewellery made of gold and precious stones worn by the Saxon ladies were no more famous than the pewter and tin jewellery and glass beads of the Saxon peasant women. Even poor Romanian farmers' wives had their glass beads and silver chains. Among the men, no aristocrat or nobleman was really well dressed without his sabretache, beaded and embroidered with gold thread, his bejewelled sword, and his gold, silver or brass plume clasp, which served to attach to his hat the plumes which generally indicated also his military rank.

A coupé, one with glass windows in particular, was a status symbol, but so was a thoroughbred, a fine firearm, or a clock. Inventories make mention of "English clocks" — masterpieces of precision which mark the time with the rotation of miniature heavenly bodies, the clashing of armies, or dancing figurines — as the pride of aristocratic households. Binoculars were treasures of equal value.

People of every rank were deeply religious, and set great store by a happy family life. Scrupulously frugal, they wrote wills which indicate that an unsullied reputation and the goodwill of their neighbours was something they wanted to have even after their death. Hospitality was regulated by custom refined to the level of art; the guest's right to hospitality was unassailable.

Recent research on the sense of cohesion in the Transylvanian society of the time indicates that it was influenced both by factors general to the societies of east-central Europe, and by its peculiarity of being an amalgam of three ethnic and five religious groups.

By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the feudal categories were being slowly undermined by the forces of those intellectual currents which were to become decisive for the future.

On the one hand, there was the new value system of the Cartesians, the Puritans and the Pietists, which placed education, knowledge, the succouring of the poor and the use of the vernacular at the centre of what a community should aim at, thereby paving the way to a modern "national" consciousness. Their ideas were especially attractive to the middle strata of society, to the merchant and the soldiering classes.

The second type of current was a nascent sense of ethnicity born of a growing awareness of the diversity of popular culture and folk traditions, as well as of the ethnic differentiation expressed even by the varied national costumes. This sense of ethnicity, however, was no more than a consciousness that Transylvanian society was composed of diverse coexisting ethnic groups, and was, in fact, the tolerant acceptance of the fact of this diversity.

At the same time their common past tended to reinforce the sense of mutual dependence. The Saxons, for all their insistence on safeguarding their traditions, rallied to Apafi's state. Rákóczi addressed his proclamations to the "Saxon Nation" and the "Vlach Nation", and the Romanians identified with the goals of the Rákóczi government. The policy of religious tolerance had as its corollary the support of education in the vernacular, and pointed in the direction of Transylvania's developing into a modern state. At this point, it still could have grown into the Switzerland of east-central Europe.

Transylvanians, especially the townsfolk, were becoming aware of the value of time. Clocks appeared above the entrances to manor houses and in the town squares, as neither noblemen nor the urban intellectuals could do without them. Idleness was a sin; there was no way to make up for time lost doing nothing. Calendars did a lot to influence these attitudes; and partly in deference to those denominations which did not accept Pope Gregory's calendar reform, gave the dates both Old Style and New Style. (In Transylvania, too, "time is money"; but there was also an awareness of the significance of historical time, and the more educated were becoming familiar with the concept of "relative time".)

The pace of life of the Hungarian, Saxon and Romanian population was a function of Transylvania's climate and history, a history kept alive by tradition and folklore. The yearly cycle of religious holidays that set the rhythm of agrarian life throughout Europe was rendered a little discontinuous by the multiplicity of religions, and had, at any rate, to be adapted to the demands of the environment: the mountains, the snow, the mines, and the rivers, all of which involved elements of uncertainty.

Art and Literature

In the most impressive building of the period, the *château* at Betlenszent-miklós, the Italian Renaissance was wedded to local traditions. Its open arcades are reminiscent of Venetian palaces. But Transylvanian Renaissance architecture is mostly home grown. In Kolozsvár, Brassó and Szeben we find typical garlanded stone door posts and window frames. Zsigmond Kornis's *château* at Szentbenedek was reconstructed in a style that is a blend

of Renaissance and early baroque stylistic elements: garlanded pilasters and coping. In Greek Orthodox church architecture, Byzantine stylistic elements were revived.

The paintings of the period were mostly commissioned by the Protestant churches, and reflected their demands. The local masters used Renaissance motifs, and both Christian and antique symbolism. It took a sculptor of extraordinary talent to create the exquisite Renaissance pulpit in the Unitarian church at Kolozsvár, the pelican feeding its young on its sounding board carrying the same symbolic meaning as the one on the top of the sundial at Corpus Christi College in Oxford, or indeed, any of the contemporary pelican reliefs to be found in Rome or Amsterdam.

Most of the masters of the applied arts — wood-carvers, painters on wood, potters, ironmasters, and leather-workers — working in this period have remained anonymous. One outstanding goldsmith known to us by name is Sebastian Hann, a Saxon. Of the coffered ceilings, one of the most beautiful is the one in the church at Csíkszentmárton, its paintings are the work of Saxon carpenters. The painting on the baroque coffered ceiling of the chapel at Csíksomlyó was done by a Franciscan friar of Italian origin. One of the first of Transylvania's baroque altars was executed by Péter Lengyel for the Franciscan friary at Szárhegy. Jeremias Stranoves of Szeben painted the early baroque altar piece of the church at Segesvár. The symbolism of Transylvanian folk art was what it had ever been: birds facing one another for love; birds with their backs to one another for fidelity beyond the grave; and the tree of life for survival.

Transylvanian literature produced all the genres typical of the times. School plays were written and performed in the Unitarian, Calvinist, and later the Jesuit schools. The first theatre manager of Kolozsvár, György Felvinczi — originally the town's sheriff and a popular lawyer — got imperial permission in 1696 to put on performances on the town square, his idea being to make the theatre, which he saw as performing essentially an educational function, available to all. He himself wrote didactic poems and dramas. His *Comico-tragoedia*, with its many classical allusions, is in many ways akin to Marc Antonio Cesti's *Il pomo d'oro*, the most popular opera of the time.

Diaries and memoires are the genres most characteristic of the period. All the authors without exception wrote in their native langue, Hungarian, or German. Among the great number of these diaries the most informative are János Kemény's autobiography written when he was in Tatar captivity, and István Wesselényi's voluminous diary written while he and the rest of Transylvania's political elite were interned by Rabutin in Szeben. Miklós Bethlen started his autobiography in 1708, when he was transported from Szeben to Vienna, and finished it there just before his death. Bethlen's work, with its consistent attempt at objectivity, is one of the finest of Hungarian prose works. Many of the diarists and memoirists copied among the details of their personal lives those contemporary documents which they deemed to be significant. The *Historia* written by Mihály Cserei, a member of the middle nobility, is a veritable storehouse of the various contemporary reflections on the ever-changing political scene.

Pamphlets were mostly meant for a home audience; the works written for a European audience were more carefully thought out. Best among these are the — mostly French — works written in the years of Rákóczi's rule, which base their arguments on natural law and seek to demonstrate that an independent Transylvania would promote European stability.

Histories were written in various languages and were of various kinds. Hungarians and Saxons wrote histories of their schools and churches for the first time, and the first attempts were made in the field of the history of urban development. Of the Hungarians writing in Latin, János Bethlen's works of 1663-1664 are the best. János Nadányi's *Florus Hungaricus* appeared in English as well, and is noteworthy for disowning the theory of the Hungarians' Hunnish ancestry; by dispensing with chronicles, it makes an attempt to give an overview of Hungary's history that is based on primary sources. Continuing an unfinished manuscript work of István Szamosközy, Farkas Bethlen wrote a separate history of Transylvania. The first history of Transylvania in Hungarian was János Szalárdi's *Siralmas magyar krónika* (A Woeful Hungarian Chronicle) of 1662. In discussing Transylvania, he examines what it was that led to its greatest catastrophe so far, the Turks' ravaging of the country in 1657–1660, and gives a detailed account of the heroic defence of Várad.

The Saxon historians, in line with the humanist trend of tracing the origins of the various peoples of Europe, wrote such "genealogies" of their own, Johann Troester in 1666, Lorenz Töppelt in 1667, and Mathias Miles in 1670. These works trace Transylvania's Saxons to the Dacians, the Huns, the Goths and other peoples who had passed through Transylvania before the Hungarian Conquest, and contain a great deal of fascinating information on contemporary life in Transylvania. It was the Saxon count Valentin Franck von Franckenstein, a fine poet as well as historian who proved these theories to be ahistorical in a work published in 1696, and demonstrated that the Saxons were the descendants of settlers brought in by the king of Hungary in the twelfth century.

Fascination with the early history of Transylvania as the Roman province of Dacia dated back to the Humanists of the fifteenth century, and was still a pet preoccupation of historians, the Hungarians included. The idea of relating this period and its inhabitants to the Romanian population of modern Transylvania was one introduced by Moldavian chroniclers earlier on in the century, but was not taken up in Transylvania, not even by the Romanian humanist poet, Mihai Halici. A chronicle written in Romanian by Gheorghe Brancovici in 1687 discusses Transylvania's ties with Wallachia as well.

Two significant literary works were produced in this period. The one, Dávid Rozsnyai's *Horologium Turcicum*, a Hungarian translation of the Turkic version of the *Panchatantra*, was never published. János Haller's *Hármas história* (A Tripartite History) which appeared in Kolozsvár in 1695 correlates three sets of legends: the *Gesta Romanorum*, the "lives" of Alexander the Great, and the Trojan War.

The Transylvanian writers of the time were most profilic as poets. Poems were written in praise of the arts and crafts, of soldiers, of chivalry and of valour; poems reflected on student days, others on life in exile. The first

significant woman poet appeared: Kata Szidónia Petrőczy. Mihai Halici, a translator of psalms who had studied with Cartesians at Enyed, was the first to write metric poetry in Romanian.

Both conceptually and in respect of their symbols, these were typically both Renaissance and baroque poems. They relied as much on ancestral word pictures as on the classical allusions and symbolism of the seventeenth century. The expressions used as well as the thoughts expressed reflected the new personal religiousness, the nascent sense of individualism, and the communal experience of political strife, wars, and concern for the country's future. The historical epics revolve around the "nation", and reflect the value system of antiquity, the Renaissance cult of the hero, and the preoccupation with the nation's economy. The poems of these mostly anonymous writers were moulded and polished by the community, as indeed were the folk songs and folk ballads. The ballads often carry historical motifs, as for instance, the ballad of László Rákóczi, who died during the siege of Várad in 1664; the ballad of Izsák Kerekes we can find in a number of variants. The various Romanian ballads on Grigore Pintea all commemorate Rákóczi's war of independence. Certain details and motifs of the political poems would crop up again in the folk ballads and outlaw ballads of later centuries, preserved in manuscript hymnals, or simply in oral tradition.

The musical life of the Saxon and Hungarian towns was traditionally lively, and church and school choirs flourished. In the homes of the aristocracy, friends gathered to play chamber music, and the children's music education was a priority. Though Puritans and Pietists frowned on instrumental music and the Calvinist church renounced singing in parts, the school at Enyed used an organ in the teaching of hymns.

Singing was an important feature of the cultural life of villages of whatever nationality. Transylvania had always been a thoroughfare musically speaking as well. Music historians have proved that some Transylvanian folk song motifs hark back to seventeenth-century hymns, some others to sixteenth-century French *chansons*. One of the versions of the *Rákóczi Song* appears as dance music in the *Kájoni Codex* of Csík (1634–1670), the other version was registered as a "Vlach dance" in the *Vietorisz Codex*. The tune itself is still current — it is now a church hymn. Most of the Transylvanian tunes are of the old type; it was only after the turn of the century that the antecedents of the later "*Verbunkos*" (recruiting) music appeared.

The apogee of late seventeenth-century culture was a literary work born in exile. Kelemen Mikes, a Székely nobleman and a bodyguard of Rákóczi's accompanied him through Poland and France to Rodosto in Turkey. He wrote his classic *Törökországi levelek* (Letters from Turkey) between 1717 and 1758. His taste had been polished in Paris and his perception shaped by the years of exile, but the basic tenor of his delightful prose reflects the Transylvanian mentality, the linguistic heritage of a homeland lost but never forgotten, and the new cultural ideals of the latter half of the seventeenth century.

411

PART FOUR

TRANSYLVANIA UNDER THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

PART FOUR

TRANSYLVANIA UNDER THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

I. The Long Eighteenth Century (1711–1830)

1. The New Order

With the Peace of Szatmár, 1711, the integration of Transylvania into the Habsburg Empire — begun in 1698 — gathered momentum. The Habsburgs continued to ignore the old feudal constitution, and in the first half of the century wanted more than once to introduce military rule in the principality.

At the beginning of our period, the court saw Transylvania as being primarily of military value, constituting as it did the empire's eastern bastion against the Turks. In the 1710s Vienna was able to defeat the weakened Ottoman Empire in a new war, and — something which was significant for Transylvania also — was able to seize Oltenia from it. However, in the second half of the 1730s, this acquisition (which amounted to the western half of Wallachia) was again lost to the Turks.

Vienna was determined to pursue a policy that would guarantee the long-term stability of Habsburg rule in Transylvania. In 1723, Charles III got the Diet to accept the *Pragmatica Sanctio* — which recognized the Habsburgs' right of succession through the female line in the event of there being no male heir — by holding the vote when not even half of the members of the Upper House aristocracy were present. The preamble of the bill ran as follows: "How great the advantage which accrues to this Hereditary Principality and the territories attached to it from enduring union with His Majesty's Hereditary Lands and Provinces, which makes permanent the ties based on primogeniture with respect to both sexes; what national glory and security, and what benefit to every citizen of the land ...".[1]

It was at this time that the special administration of Transylvania was brought into line with the governmental principles and practices applying inside the empire generally. The Gubernium was reestablished in 1712–1713. From among the so-called "essential offices" specified in the *Diploma Leopoldinum*, only that of governor was filled. The Transylvanian Estates still enjoyed no influence on military and financial matters. The office of captain-general was not filled; experts from the Hereditary Lands directed the treasury administration and were answerable only to the *Hofkammer*. The Gubernium, which directed administrative and judicial affairs at the national

1. F. TOLDY, *A magyar birodalom alaptörvényei.* (The Fundamentals of the Hungarian Empire.) Buda 1861, 192–195.

415

REPUBLIC OF CRACOW
SILESIA
Prague
Cracow
Lemberg
BOHEMIA
GALICIA
MORAVIA
Brünn
LOWER
Linz
Pozsony
BUCOVINA
VORARLBERG
UPPER
Vienna
Danube
PARTIUM
Salzburg
AUSTRIA
Buda
Innsbruck
STYRIA
HUNGARIAN KINGDOM
Kolozsvár
TYROL
Graz
COUNTRIES OF THE HUNGARIAN CROWN
Brixen
CARINTHIA
TRANSYLVANIA
LOMBARDIAN
2
Laibach
Zagreb
Szeben
Milan
AND VENETIAN
3
KINGDOM
Trieste
4
Venice
5
Drava
Sava
DALMATIA
Legend
1 SALZBURG
International boundaries
2 CARNIOLA
Boundaries of provinces and
districts of frontier guard
3 ILLYRIA
Boundary of the German Alliance
after 1818
4 CROATIA–SLAVONIA
Ragusa
National or provincial
5 MILITARY FRONTIER
GUARD DISTRICT
seat of governorship
6 TRANSYLVANIAN FRONTIER
GUARD DISTRICT

Map 17. Transylvania in the Habsburg Empire, 1815–1847

level, was under the control of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery in Vienna. The court's decisions, of course, were not made there but in the Imperial *Ministerialkonferenz*, which Prince Eugene of Savoy headed for two and half decades. It was the *Ministerialkonferenz* which proposed to the monarch as to membership of the Diet, as well as on the date and place of this convocation. National offices were filled and proposed bills accepted or rejected on the recommendation of the *Ministerialkonferenz*, which also took the initiative in all political measures, reforms included. The Transylvanian Court Chancellery was little more than a purely executive organ.

Transylvania had moved from the often purely nominal Turkish vassalage of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into a Habsburg Empire governed with a comparatively high level of organization, or, in other words, from a state of loose dependency to one of strict integration. A military success in Transylvania for the Rákóczi exiles, with Turkish support could have provided an alternative; the price of such support would, naturally, have been the restoration of Turkish vassalage. On a number of occasions, this seemed like a plausible option. The first occurred in the summer of 1717 when some of the Rákóczi emigrés joined an army of Turks, Tatars and Moldavians to enter northern Transylvania. But nothing came of this on the political level, for the Turkish and Moldavian forces turned back on

416

hearing of the Turkish defeat at Belgrade. A second occasion was in 1737. The commander-in-chief of the imperial armies unexpectedly attacked the Turks, and initially scored victories against the enemy, which was taken by surprise. József, the son of Ferenc Rákóczi II, has a plan to establish a Transylvanian principality. The ahdname sent him by the Porte was essentially the same as that enjoyed by the Transylvanian princes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The hopes that attached to the re-emergence of the Rákóczi name, however, proved to be illusory. The Hungarian troops in the Habsburg army did not desert to Joseph, and in Transylvania itself no move was made for independence or for a return to a Turkish alignment.

Population and Society

Transylvania's belonging to the Habsburg Empire brought it one hundred and fifty years of peace. By contrast, the neighbouring Romanian principalities served as the theatre for continual Russian-Turkish (and from time to time, Austrian) military campaigns and occupations — lasting for one hundred and thirty-six years between 1689 and 1857. The "Pax Habsburgica" brought important changes in the population not just of Transylvania itself but also of the whole area. As far as it can be made out, migration processes begun earlier were completed, although, partly on account of the inaccessibility of local sources, historiography has yet to provide an in-depth and fully objective examination of this issue.

The population of Transylvania without the Partium around 1710 can be estimated at around 800,000–860,000 persons. According to the census evidence, this figure rose to 1.5 million in the 1770s and to 2 million by the middle of the nineteenth century. The average annual rate of population increase fluctuated between 0.6 and 0.7 per cent during the eighteenth century, falling back to about 0.45 per cent between 1786 and 1850, although after the great famine of 1817 (the 1820s to the 1840s) it approached 1 per cent. Great surges and falls are likely to have occurred during the eighteenth century, too — the result of epidemics, famines and, especially at the beginning of that century, vigorous emigration. The plague of 1717–1720 carried off almost 20 per cent of the population. Epidemics of this kind were enough to depopulate whole settlements, and triggered large-scale internal migration among the serfs. An unprecedented impetus was given to such migrations by the extraordinarily strong vacuum effect of the (much depopulated) Hungarian territories liberated from the Turks.

The lords of the Great Hungarian Plain lured Transylvanian serfs to their virtually-deserted estates in that region with offers of exemption from taxation and services over a number of years. Probably hundreds of thousands of serfs, mainly landless cotters, left infertile and intractable soil and set out for the land of promise — prompted all the more to do so by the heavy burden of feudal services and onerous taxes applying in Transylvania. In some cases, it was the Transylvanian landlords who owned land in both places transferring their serfs to their estates in Hungary. "Many villages are nearly deserted", lamented the Transylvanian authorities. In vain did

the court order the return of those who had migrated to Hungary. "Those deserted places", wrote the Transylvanian government agency to the chancellery, "have swallowed up the migrants so completely that we are unable to trace them".[2] Such complaints recurred continuously until the middle of the eighteenth century.

But migration was not one-way. People moved to Moldavia and Wallachia also, although far fewer than those moving westwards. Nevertheless, the attraction of the areas beyond the Carpathians seems to have been considerable. As late as the 1810s, the population density of Wallachia — 13–14 persons per sq km — was still somewhat lower than the population density of Transylvania one hundred years earlier. These migrants were attracted by the much lower grain prices, and the exemptions promised by the landlords there. Even so, while during the first half of the eighteenth century, there were still more people coming into Transylvania from beyond the Carpathians than vice versa.[3] In the second half of the century, migration beyond the Carpathians was the "*morbus Transylvanicus*". With the passing of lean times in Transylvania, the greater part of these migrants returned, mainly on account of the vicissitudes of war and the tax burdens, which were heavier in Moldavia and Wallachia than in Transylvania. These disadvantages were not always offset by the fact that the Romanian landlords had not been able to increase the *robot* to the level applying in Transylvania. Their attempts foundered in the face of opposition from the peasantry (whose main weapon against their lords was migration), and in economic and social conditions different from those in Transylvania.

In 1776, the *Hofkammer* expressed to the king its disapproval of the fact that the Transylvanian authorities were letting in so many refugees from Wallachia. "For these people have ties of kinship to the Romanians of Transylvania, or have forged close ties of friendship with Transylvanian Romanians; in consequence, they can easily persuade the penniless populace here to emigrate, something which the latter are all the more likely to do because of these close ties. Soon one will be hard put to find a Romanian who has not crossed over to Moldavia or Wallachia at least once in his life".[4] The peasants' struggle against their lords, their keen instinct for survival, and the appeal of a freer way of life was the basis of this movement of peoples across the Carpathians, in which Hungarians, principally the Székelys, also took part. The Romanian population, as some Romanian historians have also stressed, was more mobile because it was poorer. Migration was a form of "adaptation". For the Hungarians, on the other hand, moving on was a form of revolt. When, in the 1780s, many people were crossing into the principalities to escape the famine (only to return later, according to county records), an Austrian report on the situation concluded that, besides brutal treatment of the peasants by the nobility, the other cause of Transylvania's depopulation "is the antipathy that the nobility feels for the Hungarians of Transylvania. The reason for this is the spirit of resistance that is in the

2. *OL* Erdélyi Udvari Kancellária Levéltára. (Transylvanian Court Chancellery Archive.) *Acta generalia* 1712:80, 137.
3. A.-M. DEL CHIARO, *Revoluțiile Valahiei*. Iași 1929, 6.
4. Hofkammerarchiv, Vienna, Siebenbürgen, r. No. 256, 5 June, 1776.

nature of the Hungarians, which makes them less likely to bow their heads to the yoke of servitude than the Romanians." Instead, the Hungarian serfs migrated to Hungary proper or to Moldavia. "We can find proof of this in many villages where forty or fifty years ago there were only Hungarian subjects: today, half the population is Romanian." If this continues, "there can be no doubt that in half a century, measures of this sort will have completely annihilated the subject peoples of this nation, unless the demesnes are soon obliged in villages which fifty or more years ago were inhabited by Hungarians to gradually again bring Hungarians in place of the Romanian settlers that they had brought in, and to do so on less systematically...".[5]

Table 2. The breakdown of the population of the historical Transylvania by ethnicity–nationality with respect to the combined data of the 1850/51 and 1930 Census (broken down according to areas existing before 1848)

Ethnic unit	The counties and the Fogaras region		Székelyföld		Szászföld		Transylvania without the Partium	
	1850/51	1930	1850/51	1930	1850/51	1930	1850/51	1930
Romanian	781,791	1,203,046	54,246	102,167	207,810	320,650	1,043,650	1,625,863
Hungarian	159,396	319,613	303,975	440,243	25,063	68,288	488,434	828,144
Saxon	49,166	56,887	1,163	2,399	141,425	177,738	191,754	237,024
Jewish	10,644	45,229	1,042	10,370	165	9,725	11,851	65,324
Gipsy	41,117	41,750	10,022	11,657	25,244	16,025	76,383	69,432
Others	6,935	9,638	2,464	1,724	1,544	4,492	10,953	15,854
Total	1,049,049	1,676,163	372,912	568,560	401,251	596,918	1,823,222	2,841,641

As a result of these multi-directional migrations, the ethnic composition of the various areas was continually changing. In the seventeenth century Vasile Lupu, voivode of Moldavia, keen to emphasize how numerous the Romanians were, wrote that more than one-third of Transylvania's population was Romanian. A government estimate of 1712–1713 put the proportion of the Romanians in Transylvania at around 34 per cent, that of the Hungarians at 47 per cent, and that of the Saxons at 19 per cent — with the total number of families being put at the unrealistically low figure of 80,000. The question is to what extent the spectacular spread of the Romanians in certain regions (for example, the Szászföld for which we have the most reliable data) can be attributed to internal or external migration. According to church registers, the rate of increase in the number of Romanians far exceeded the national average (between 1733 and 1761 almost 2 per cent, between 1750 and 1761 as much as 2.7 per cent). By then the Romanians already constituted an absolute majority of Transylvania's population, with estimates ranging from between 50 per cent to 60 per cent. From the 1820s onwards, the increase in the Romanian population — as far as our data

419   5. *HHStA* Ungarn specialia. Transylvania separata, fasc. 362.

show — did not exceed the national average. After the 1820s, ethnic pro-
portions in Transylvania were relatively stable, because there was no new
settlement to disturb the co-existence of the peoples already there for quite
some time. Both in 1850 and in 1930 the proportion of Romanians was 57.2
per cent; that of the Hungarians rose from 26.8 to 29.1 per cent during the
same period, while that of the Saxons, that is, the Germans, fell from 10.5 to
8.3 per cent.

The area under cultivation grew in line with the increase in the popula-
tion, and by the 1820s the greater part of the cultivable land was being tilled.
While this was taking place the centre of gravity of agricultural activity
shifted from animal husbandry to land cultivation. Afterwards this pro-
cess, given the backwardness of the productive forces, was to lead to a cri-
sis of relative over-population, from which only a change of production
methods could offer relief.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Transylvanian society was
restless, and almost all of its constituent parts appeared to be in a state of
flux. Integration within the empire had brought significant changes in its
make-up, if not in its overall structure. The Habsburgs rewarded their sup-
porters primarily by distributing new titles of aristocracy, but the building
up of a new aristocracy in this way did not have much effect on the internal
balance of power. Political influence in Transylvania during the eighteenth
century was in the hands not of the newly-appointed top officials or the
military aristocrats, but of six or seven powerful families which had ac-
quired patents of aristocracy before the end of the principality period. These
families provided almost all of the governors, chancellors and holders of
other national offices. Only a few members of the Saxon Seeberg and Bru-
ckenthal families were truly new men, e.g. Samuel Bruckenthal, who rose to
be governor in the 1770s and 1780s. In total the number of aristocratic fami-
lies in eighteenth and nineteenth century Transylvania can be put at fifty to
sixty. The number of tax exempt (aristocratic, middle and small landown-
ing noble) families was roughly four thousand.

The middle landowning nobility survived by means of the role it played
in municipal life, in county and district-level jurisdiction and public admin-
istration, which were very much interconnected. The central government
smothered the small nobles, whose way of life was similar to that of the free
peasants — making those who had three or fewer serfs or landless cotters
liable to taxation. The lesser nobility made up 5 or 6 per cent of the popula-
tion of the counties, and more than half of the population of the Székelyföld.
Of course, even the small nobles could not be deprived of their political
rights, and accordingly these people came to constitute the social bedrock
of feudalism. For their feudal liberty was practically all that made their
lives more attractive than the existence led by the peasant serfs, who were
at the mercy of landlords and state alike.

Paradoxically, the state was most able to intervene in the life of society
where feudalism had really managed to establish itself: in the Királyföld
(Königsboden, or Fundus Regius), and in the Szászföld (Sachsenland). In the
free peasant village communities of the Szászföld, bitter struggles some-
times broke out between the Saxons (who possessed the political power in
these communities and who regarded themselves as the rightful inhabit-

ants) and the Romanians, whom they declared to be "Johnny-come-latelys". Under the pressure of relative over-population, the Saxons restricted the Romanians' usage of land. Occasionally, these conflicts were exacerbated to such an extent that the Saxons would even attempt to expel the Romanians from the village, something which was only prevented by the intervention of the central government. At the same time it was no accident that the most cultured Romanian villages of Transylvania were to be found in the Királyföld. This was primarily due to the freer way of life existing there, but also to the fact that the conditions for commodity production were the most favourable in this region. In the Brassó and Nagyszeben area the villages involved with transhumance developed dynamically, and transhumance itself, interconnected with small-scale trading, grew in Transylvania generally. There were reasons for this: because of the increase in land cultivation, pastures were shrinking and, at the same time, industry's demand for wool was growing. Around the 1750s, 20–25 per cent of the one million-strong taxable sheep stock was driven every year to winter pasture on the banks of the Lower Danube. One hundred years later, sometimes more than half of the sheep stock, which had in the meantime grown to two million, made the same journey. Similar possibilities for commodity exchange existed only in certain regions bordering on Hungary, for example in Zaránd county, which delivered wood to the Great Hungarian Plain and to the Banat and where, according to Commander-in-chief András Hadik, who gave a detailed description of eighteenth-century Transylvania, every inch of available land was cultivated. "The plough has brought results beyond all expectation", and "they have been able to lessen the sway of miserable poverty thereby".[6] The free peasant way of life of the Székelyföld was such that hard work paid.

Within the system of feudalism, large and small farms, in spite of their interrelations and their interdependence, were not able to foster each other's development. The ratio of allodial land to villain holdings was 1:2, with the holders of the latter making up about one half of the population. The landlord led every form of peasant activity, and by means of his monopolies — which extended to the sale of alcoholic drinks and the grinding of grain — strove to exploit the purchasing power of the peasants to the fullest possible extent. For example, only the landlord's inn would operate for much of the year, or the village inn would be obliged to sell the lord's wine. It was characteristic of Transylvania's backwardness at the beginning of the nineteenth century that in spite of the boom in grain sales resulting from the Napoleonic wars, the Bánffy estate at Bonchida, near Kolozsvár, for instance, made as much money on a yearly average from the sale of beverages as from the sale of grain, hay and animals combined. Actual commodity production was minimal. In line with their earlier practice, estates stored their produce for long periods and in time of famine sold or advanced it to their own serfs. The commodity production activities of the latter, however, were aimed almost exclusively at earning the sums necessary for the paying of their taxes.

6. Ibid.

Transylvania's network of towns was not developed enough to act as the motor of commodity production; indeed the population of the towns was growing more slowly than that of the villages. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Brassó, with its 16,000 inhabitants, had been by far the biggest town of the whole historic Hungary. By the 1780s — when it had 18,000 inhabitants — it was only the ninth biggest, although still the largest in Transylvania and ahead of Kolozsvár and Nagyszeben, each with a population of 13,000 to 14,000. Urbanization in Transylvania developed primarily as a function of the fact that the region was within the empire and could fit itself into the east-west division of labour. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the growing agricultural boom primarily favoured agrarian Hungary. Hungary cut Transylvania off from the markets of the Hereditary Lands, and Hungary mediated the more developed agricultural practices which by the end of the eighteenth century had increased agricultural productivity to the point at which modern urbanization became possible. Meanwhile, urbanization in the Transylvanian counties was largely determined by the movement of a part of the landowning nobility to the towns during the second half of the eighteenth century. The consumption demands boosted town industry to some extent. Nevertheless, it was town commerce which primarily benefited, as well-to-do nobles and patricians tended for the most part to purchase Austrian goods.

Those who brought goods into the country from abroad and integrated the country into the division of labour between East and West were primarily immigrants from the Turkish Empire who had settled in Transylvania, and whose privileges had been conferred by the Transylvanian princes. Armenians settling in Transylvania in the 1670s had, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, already founded two towns: Erzsébetváros and Szamosújvár. At the top of the merchant hierarchy (which extended all the way down to the village grocer) were those who drove cattle from Moldavia, and to a more modest degree from Transylvania, to Vienna — via the Great Hungarian Plain, where the animals were fattened up. Armenian leather dominated Transylvania's market with especially red leather boots. The "Greeks", a term which was also applied to Macedo-Romanian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Serbian and also to some Transylvanian Romanian merchants, linked the economy of the Ottoman Empire with the economies of the Habsburg Empire and of central Europe generally. It was they who imported raw materials from Turkey, for the most part Macedonian cotton, and at the same time delivered the products of the Saxon, Hungarian and Romanian handicrafts and cottage industries to the territories beyond the Carpathians. In the 1770s, more than 60 per cent of all Transylvanian exports went to Hungary, one-third to the Turkish Empire, and the rest to the Hereditary Lands. Consumer products of every kind were delivered to the Ottoman Empire, mostly to the well-to-do peasantry and to medium-income consumers in the towns. Broadcloth was delivered primarily to Hungary, likewise to better-off peasant consumers.

For Transylvania integration into the Habsburg Empire brought security above all else. During the second half of the eighteenth century, as the Habsburg Empire assumed prominence in the international sphere, the eastern traders attempted to take out Austrian citizenship. The more advanced

provinces of the empire, of course, developed more rapidly. The division of labour within the empire was an inheritance from the past, but the imperial policy-makers, pointing out that the Hungarian nobility paid notax,did their best to preserve it. It was not that they necessarily wanted to hinder the industrialization of Transylvania. For example, they took steps to develop iron production there when they saw that it represented no competition for Styrian industry. Nor was it to Transylvania's disadvantage that, to all intents and purposes, the high tariffs imposed excluded foreign industrial products from the empire's markets. It was, rather, Transylvania's peripheral position that accounted for its slow development. At the same time, it was natural that contemporaries urged economic and political measures that had proved successful in the more developed provinces — in the spirit of fairness and reciprocity. Economic self-interest thus sometimes dictated co-operation between different power groups which normally opposed each other. The determination to overcome backwardness inevitably took a political form.

The Counter-Reformation and its Consequences

In Transylvania, too, the imperial policy was to try to strengthen loyalty to the state by insistence on the Counter-Reformation. The religious equality established during the hegemony of the Calvinist religion — the system of four "received" denominations — was ruthlessly destroyed. In the first place, the authority of the Roman Catholic bishop was increased to the detriment of the others. Charles III appointed the Catholic bishop first councillor to the Gubernium, which meant that he presided in the governor's absence. The Roman Catholic religious orders, primarily the Jesuits and the Piarists, were strengthened in their authority, and many churches were taken back by the Catholics.

The Counter-Reformation (using methods which had proved successful elsewhere) attempted to win over primarily the most influential elements in Transylvanian society. Lest evangelizing zeal prove insufficient, it relied also on more effective measures: Catholics were preferred in appointments to offices and in government agencies. This was also true when posts were being filled in the municipalities, the Saxon ones included.

It was the Unitarians who suffered the most from the Counter-Reformation. Relatively speaking, it was they who incurred the biggest losses as the result of church repossession by the Catholics. They were also systematically forced out from official positions.

The offensive launched by a reinvigorated Catholicism appeared to endanger the whole of the Transylvanian constitution. Already in 1712, the Catholic Estates had demanded the modification of those paragraphs in the *Diploma Leopoldinum* which seemed injurious from their point of view. This action was without consequence. In 1724, they called for the repeal of the anti-Catholic paragraphs of the *Approbata* and the *Compilata*. At the same time, they urged the punishment of apostasy, the severing of non-Catholics' foreign ties (even their contacts with Hungary), and a severe restriction of the activities of the Unitarian church. They called for a declaration that

Unitarians were ineligible for office, and for the suppression of Sabbatarianism. The immediate result was a few court actions against Sabbatarians (1724–1729). Such attempts, however, were to recur. In 1731, an arbitrarily convened Gubernium proposed unhindered the abolition of the system of the four received religions. It suggested that the churches, etc. built by the Catholics be handed back to them; that the Protestants' foreign contacts be banned; that the censorship of books be introduced, and that cases involving mixed marriages be referred to the Holy See. These demands, however, were unsuccessful. By the middle of the 1730s, the opposition was growing stronger in Transylvania. In the spring of 1738 — to the alarm of the Protestant Estates — the administration arrested the Calvinist bishop, István Szigethi-Gyula, along with many other church figures and numerous Calvinist nobles on charges of conspiring to effect a Rákóczi restoration, but was forced to release them at the beginning of 1739. In 1741–1743, the issue widened into official demands for the repeal of the anti-Catholic and anti-Habsburg laws, and for the enactment of the *Pragmatica Sanctio*. In 1744, the Estates accepted the abrogation of their right to elect a prince, as well as of the decrees dealing with the links between Transylvania and the Porte. They also enacted the *Pragmatica Sanctio* and, finally, repealed the anti-Catholic laws.

Transylvania's re-Catholicization, however, was not totally negative in its effects. It brought some worthwhile cultural results. With the Counter-Reformation, baroque culture began to spread in Transylvania in a big way — principally through Catholic ecclesiastical architecture. As a pattern there served the Jesuit church at Kolozsvár, which was built between 1718 and 1724, perhaps on the basis of plans drafted in Vienna. Initially, the baroque sculpture of the time was associated with ecclesiastical baroque architecture, but later also became linked with baroque country-house architecture, which came in during the middle of the century.

By way of self-defence in the face of the Counter-Reformation, the Protestants reacted not only with political activism, but with renewed efforts to preserve their ties with western European Protestantism and with European intellectual life. The Protestant determination to continue to provide modern education in Transylvania was a major form of this effort. After a lengthy struggle and in spite of repeated attempts at official restriction, Transylvanian Protestantism was able to remain in touch with western Europe, primarily with the German universities. It was from here (primarily from Halle) that Pietism together with the early German Enlightenment reached Transylvania. Within the Saxon Lutheran church, the battle between the Pietists and the religious conservatives had begun as early as the Rákóczi War of Independence; with the victory of the Prussian Pietists in 1719, however, the intellectual basis of conservatism was considerably weakened. Very soon, primarily among the Saxons, Christian Wolff had a decisive influence on the Transylvanian Enlightenment.

Pietism had fewer influence in the Calvinist church, although Professor András Huszty, who established the teaching of law and political science at the college at Kolozsvár, was a Calvinist and a Pietist. Huszty also contributed to the foundations of Finno-Ugrian linguistics, establishing, with almost complete accuracy, the order of relation among the Finno-Ugrian lan-

guages. The pioneer of natural sciences education, István Vásárhelyi Tőke, introduced the teaching of experimental physics into the college at Nagyenyed. Sámuel Nádudvari, a teacher at the Marosvásárhely Calvinist college in the 1730s and 1740s, translated many of the works of Christian Wolff. Worthy of note was the contribution made by the Unitarian college at Kolozsvár to modern education. Mihály Szent-Ábrahámi, the greatest figure of eighteenth-century Transylvanian Unitarianism, began teaching law and geography there just before the transfer of the college to the Catholic church. This marked the beginning of systematic legal education in Transylvania. The Kolozsvár college was organized anew after 1718, and Szent-Ábrahámi taught experimental and theoretical physics there in 1726; his geography notes of 1727 expounded also Copernicus' theory.

The greatest Transylvanian figure of the early Enlightenment was Sámuel Köleséri, a public administration official, who worked as a doctor, then as a mining expert, and, finally, as secretary and adviser to the Gubernium. Köleséri's scientific and scholarly connections extended from Constantinople and Venice to Paris, London and St. Petersburg, and articles of his were published in German journals. His activity was of fundamental importance in many branches of natural science. His best-known work, the *Auraria Romano-Dacica* (Romano-Dacian Goldmine), dealt with the mineral riches of Transylvania and with their exploitation. But he also wrote works on medical science: in the one dealing with scurvy in the Érchegység, he linked the disease to poor nutrition among the miners (seven years after Ramazzini's work, which laid the foundations of industrial pathology).

By the middle of the century, the culture of the period was already less a function of contemporary politics than it had been during the previous decades. True, with the strengthening of absolutism censorship made its appearance: Maria Theresa issued a decree in 1753 ordering the Gubernium to prohibit printing houses from publishing works which undermined respect for God, were hostile to the person and rights of the ruler to the public order, and to the "received" religions, or contained new heresies. All material intended for publication was to be presented to the Gubernium, without whose permission it could not be put on sale. The decree, however, had little practical effect, for censorship was inefficient. And enough people had ties with western Europe for some fine scholarly libraries to get off to a good start.

It was in the 1750s — somewhat later than the Protestant schools — that the Jesuit academy at Kolozsvár could boast its first really outstanding figures: men such as the astronomer Miksa (Maximilian) Hell, who was to achieve world fame and who came from Nagyszombat to head the academy's mathematics department in 1752. Hell established an observatory in his home and set up a physics laboratory at the school. His contributions to establishing the connection between magnetism and electricity were of lasting influence. In 1755, Hell was promoted director of the Observatory in Vienna, and was appointed university professor.

The most important Transylvanian scholar of the age was Péter Bod, a Calvinist village parson and uncompromising theologian. An ecclesiastical historian, he wrote an extensive history of the Hungarian Calvinist church, and was also an expert in canon law. However, Bod is renowned primarily

425

for his literary works and works on cultural history. Bod was the author of the first Hungarian literary lexicon, the *Magyar Athenás* (Hungarian Athenaeum) published in 1766, which was also the first systematic treatment of the whole of Hungarian literary history. He was also the first since János Apáczai Csere to call for a Hungarian academy. In 1756, Bod proposed the establishment of a "literary society" consisting of members from Hungary and Transylvania. He called for a conscious cultivation of the language, and for the publication of a good Hungarian grammar book. In 1760, Bod was already explicitly pressing for a "Hungarian society consisting of learned men, a society like those that exist in other nations, for the revival of the Hungarian language". His ideas at their best, marked the beginnings of the Enlightenment.

Romanian Religions and National Movements

A form of Catholic expansion peculiar to Transylvania was Greek Catholicism, a union of the Romanian Orthodox with the Roman church.

The foundation of this religious union had been laid during the previous era, at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Following a spectacular start, it was badly shaken by the storms of the Rákóczi War of Independence. It was almost impossible to tell who was Orthodox and who was Uniate among those following the Greek rite in Transylvania during the five decades after 1711. There was only one legal church for the Greek faith in Transylvania, the Greek Uniate church. However, the government was obliged to tolerate the existence of an Orthodox enclave in Brassó. For the Transylvanian Orthodox church, though it functioned without bishops, had protectors outside Transylvania: the Russian tzar, the Serbian Orthodox archbishop of Karlowitz, and the churches of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Uniates enjoyed considerable state support. Their bishops received estates, and, as a result of the union, they enjoyed better opportunities for the training of their clergy and other intellectuals than those available to the Orthodox church. Besides the Jesuits college at Kolozsvár, the Uniates could also attend the university at Nagyszombat, could study in Vienna and also at the Collegium de propaganda fide in Rome.

The Uniate church was given a certain political standing by the government; its bishops Ioan Pataki and Inochentie Micu-Klein were raised to the rank of baron, and after 1732 the latter was invited to attend the Diet as a royal favour. The greatest Romanian personality of eighteenth-century Transylvania, Micu-Klein took office in 1729. He immediately set about improving the position of his clergy and his church, and since he was determined to extend his authority to those of the Greek Orthodox faith, in practice his efforts meant the amelioration of the lot of all Transylvanian Romanians. The legal basis of his argument was the so-called Second *Diploma Leopoldinum* on the Union of 19 March, 1701. This document of disputed validity exempted Uniate priests from rendering feudal services, and regarded as Catholic not only the Uniate clergy but also the Uniate laity, and even the commoners *(plebeae conditionis homines)*. Through his persistent

endeavour, Micu-Klein was able to get the monarch to appoint a committee in December 1732 to examine his grievances. In 1733 his petitions were also read out at the Diet. The Estates, however, doubted the stability of the Union (and rightly so). They had Micu-Klein declare the catechism and creed of his church and found both to be in order. Nevertheless, they thought it necessary to order a census of the Romanian priests and of their congregations as well.

It was in 1735 that Inochentie Micu-Klein first spoke of the Transylvanian Romanians as a body politic. The bishop, referring to the findings of the 1733 Census, argued that the Romanians were a larger group than any Transylvanian "nation", and that although the second *Diploma Leopoldinum* entitled Uniates to hold any public office, Romanians were still discriminated against in favour of the Calvinists and Lutherans. (With understandable tact, the bishop chose to ignore the fact that it was the Catholics who occupied the majority of public posts). It was not true — he justly wrote — that there were no learned Romanians of noble rank who were suitable for office. Accordingly, he asked the monarch to appoint him to the post of councillor which was about to fall vacant at the Gubernium. Micu-Klein's request was not granted, as the *Ministerialkonferenz* opposed it. His appeal, though, may have played an indirect part in the fact that in 1736 Petru Dobra, the first prominent secular politician of Romanian origin of the post-1711 era, became the *director fiscalis* of Transylvania.

It was also in 1735 that the Daco-Roman, or to be more precise, the Roman continuity conception of history first appeared in Micu-Klein's pronouncements. "We are the oldest inhabitants of Transylvania, here since the time of the emperor Trajan", he wrote in his petition to the monarch. The timing was crucial. There already existed the three necessary preconditions for the emergence of the Transylvanian Romanians as a political factor: the Uniate church as an organizational framework (into which the bishop was prepared to force all Transylvanian Romanians); an historical ideology serving as the basis of a national identity; and finally the demand for a share in public offices.

From the spring of 1736 until 1738, Micu-Klein fought at a number of Diets for the Uniate clergy's right to their share of the tithes collected, but to no avail. When in the autumn of 1737, he tried to speak "*totius nationis per Transylvaniam valachicae nomine*", in the name of the whole Romanian nation in Transylvania, the Estates protested against this expression. However, the bishop, this lone precursor of the Romanian national movement, had the resilience to withstand such rebuffs. In August 1742, he petitioned again in Vienna. Now Micu-Klein already explicitly urged that the Romanians be recognized as the fourth "Nation" of Transylvania and that they be integrated as such into the existing "Three Nations" system. Because the regional separation of this fourth nation would be almost impossible, he envisaged this in the form of the Romanian nation's joining the Hungarians in the Hungarian counties, and the Székely and Saxon nations in the Székely and Saxon municipalities. A more important new suggestion, and proof of Micu-Klein's political genius, was his demand that the people should not be burdened with unlimited taxes and that the *robot* should be reduced to two days per week. This was not merely a case of the "shepherd" protect-

ing his "flock". Micu-Klein was formulating what was to become a persistent feature of the national movements among the Transylvanian Romanians: national demands conjoined to peasant demands. It was this idea that would later develop into the "Hungarian landlord — Romanian serf" thesis. It should be noted that there was indeed a higher percentage of Romanians in the Transylvanian serf population than the percentage of Romanians in the total population warranted. If, however, we consider the Romanian peasantry as a whole (that is, if we include the free Romanian peasants of the Királyföld) we shall find that the percentage of peasants who were Romanian roughly corresponded to the percentage that Romanians comprised of the total population of Transylvania.

In 1744, after a long battle, the existence and properties of the Transylvanian Greek Catholic diocese were recognized by law. It seemed that the Uniate church, and the Transylvanian Romanians as a political factor, would be removed from the political scene.

In the spring of 1744, however, a Serbian Orthodox monk named Visarion Sarai, who could not even speak Romanian, arrived in Transylvania from the Banat. As the saintly Visarion made his way to Szeben preaching provocatively through an interpreter, the Union in southern Transylvania disintegrated at almost a single blow. The Uniate Romanians drove out their priests and in their place Orthodox priests suddenly sprang up. Visarion was arrested and taken to Vienna, and nothing more was ever heard of him, but his exploits put a valuable card into the hands of those who had argued that the Union was only apparent and not real. (In many places the Calvinist nobility had supported Orthodoxy all along, not only for the sake of peace with the serfs, but also in the spirit of toleration which was reviving in the face of Catholic oppression.) Micu-Klein declared himself prepared to bring the renegades back into the Uniate fold by peaceful means, provided that his long-standing demands were met. Because of this, however he became suspect not only to the Estates but also to the military high command, and even to the central government of the empire, which now saw him as superfluous. In June 1744, when Micu-Klein was ordered to Vienna, the bishop responded with a last bold move. He summoned the synod to Balázsfalva: Romanian laymen, even Orthodox laymen (nobles and serfs) were in attendance, in addition to the clergy. It was real national assembly, the only Romanian national assembly, in fact, until 1848. Its composition pointed very much to the future, as did the issue raised by the bishop: as the letters of privilege from the time of Leopold I which needed to be confirmed (and which served as the public law basis of his programme) also applied to the people, should the people be asked whether they would be willing to take part in this struggle and, if so, in what way? The suggestion was tantamount to calling for a straightforward plebiscite. However, no one dared to follow the century's greatest Transylvanian Romanian this far. The synod approved the participation of the people in theory, but, under the circumstances, did not want to involve them directly.

Micu-Klein had gone further than even the boldest of his supporters considered expedient. He was called to Vienna for questioning in the autumn of 1744; inevitably, his political career would be at an end. He therefore fled to Rome; he died in exile, a lonely old man. His followers showed more

astuteness in pressing their national demands. Following the Roman Catholic model, they gradually developed Balázsfalva into an important spiritual centre. In addition to attempts to improve the standards of culture and education, they tried to stabilize their position by fighting Orthodoxy.

By this time, the Orthodox church was leaning on Russia for support, the more so because the Habsburg–Russian alliance of 1746 was one of the empire's most important foreign policy pillars. At the end of the 1740s, the first Romanian to visit Russia for political purposes set out for St. Petersburg. He was Nicolae Pop, a former Uniate dean, who was able to get the empress Elizabeth to have her ambassador in Vienna inquire about the problems of the Orthodox Romanian clergy and laity in Transylvania, and if necessary, to intervene at the Habsburg court on their behalf. The Orthodox church also received support from Wallachia and from the Serbian Orthodox church of Hungary. When, with the outbreak of the Seven Years War, the Habsburgs had increasing need of the Russian alliance and also of domestic calm in Transylvania, the court was obliged to be more lax about the Union in the principality.

In the summer of 1758, it was decided to appoint an Orthodox bishop independent of the archbishop of Karlowitz; within a year, Vienna issued the Orthodox decree of toleration. Though the decree contained only the promise of the bishop's appointment, people left the Uniate churches en masse. The secession movement acquired a leader in the person of a monk named Sofronie (Stan Popovici), whom the authorities were powerless to deal with. The government now hastened to send its chosen bishop (Dionisie Novacovici, formerly the Serbian Orthodox bishop of Buda) to Transylvania, and simultaneously commissioned Baron Buccow, the military high commander of Transylvania to separate the Uniate and Orthodox congregations along with their respective properties. Buccow found that there were 25,164 Uniate and 126,652 Orthodox heads of families. The government, while salvaging the organization and endowments of the Uniate church, now gave legal recognition to the Transylvanian Orthodox church as a "tolerated", though not "received" religion.

Feudal Constitutionalism and the Viennese Central Government

In the first half of the eighteenth century, the political activity of the Habsburg administration in Transylvania was confined to the imposition of taxes and to the promotion of the Counter-Reformation.

The Estates' most important forum of representation, the Diet, had no particularly valuable traditions dating from the time of the principality. The Estates had usually been galvanized only at times of changes in the dynasty or simply when one prince succeeded another. Any moves towards the creation of a larger role had been regularly thwarted by the strengthening of the ruling prince's power. Initiatives of any importance in the Diet were also with the ruling prince, and he could make the Diet accept whatever he wished.

There had been no changes in the structures of the Diet after 1711. It was still unicameral; the place of the Prince's Council had been taken by the Gubernium (the governor, the councillors, and even the secretaries), the judicial board was invariably present as were the high-ranking municipal officers and Catholic high clergy; there were the Regalists men, summoned by the crown attending in numbers varying from fifty-five to one hundred and ten, as well as the elected representatives of the municipalities, and of the Hungarian and Székely towns. The government, had it wanted to, would have been able to vote down its opponents in the Diet, had the principle of majority voting applied at all, which it did not, any more than it had before 1690. In accordance with the principle *"vota ponderantur sed non numerantur"* (the votes are to be weighted but no counted), it was the opinion which was considered decisive, as interpreted by the president of the Diet. The government could avoid implementation of Estates resolutions which were inconvenient for it by not confirming the proposed laws; conversely, it could issue in the form of a decree bills which had been rejected by the Estates. The government took a position adopted by the Estates into account only on grounds of political expediency.

As a result, little could be expected from the Estates. Up to 1750, Diets were held almost annually, and not infrequently twice a year. The issues on their agenda, however, were for the most part commonplace ones: taxation, the maintenance of the army, nominations to posts subject to election by the Diet, and discussion of legal cases. This rather monotonous routine was rarely disrupted by more substantial initiatives.

It was only once, in 1725, that the Estates worked out an economic policy. This alone gave them an edge over the Habsburg administration, which lacked a comprehensive plan. However, the system of protective tariffs they devised to relieve the shortage of money proved to be unacceptable to the imperial government.

The little that was done up to 1758 to ameliorate the lot of the serfs was also initiated by the Estates. The Diet held at the beginning of 1714 passed the earliest law for the regulation of the feudal services owed by the serfs of Transylvania: serfs were to perform four days of *robot* service per week, and landless cotters three. This burden of service seems horrendous, yet was moderate when compared with the earlier, unlimited, *robot*. However, as is known, this law remained a dead letter for several decades; it only received royal sanction in 1742, when the Viennese court, now in defiance of the Estates, began to enforce its policy of the protection of serfs.

Beyond this, to the late 1740s, the Estates were mostly preoccupied with their grievances: demands that the court observe the feudal constitution, and the struggle for the vacant posts.

Towards 1750, however, fundamental changes began to unfold. The central government now turned its attention to Transylvanian affairs. The empire had lost Silesia and its debts had grown considerably during the War of the Austrian Succession. It now needed to develop its resources, to stabilize its economy. Although the Habsburgs had still no deliberate economic policy for Transylvania, taxation and excise were made much more systematic. While earlier the tax burden had been allocated between the three constituent Nations, which themselves were then responsible for arranging the

manner of the imposition and the recovery of the taxes, the new taxation system was based on the tax-paying individual. It was the individual taxpayer who paid both poll tax according to his legal status, and a property tax according to his assets. In addition, members of certain trades and professions also paid income tax. If it is a criterion of absolutism that the monarch can collect taxes from his subjects without the Estates' acquiescence, then 1754 counts as a landmark in the history of Habsburg absolutism in Transylvania. By levying tax on the taxpayers' land, the new taxation system shattered the feudal principle of *"onus non inhaeret fundo"* (burden does not attach to land).

In the spring of 1751, a committee of the Diet headed by László Teleki, and including, among others, Sámuel Dobosi, a rich Szeben merchant, drew up a draft proposal whose original purpose had been to recommend ways of increasing trade turnover. But what this draft actually amounted to was an economic reform programme. It recommended establishing new settlements to augment the population, and importing animals for breeding purposes, as well as more careful animal husbandry (keeping animals indoors, etc.). It suggested the introduction of cheesemaking, the revival of beekeeping, the breeding of silkworms, the regulation of grain prices, the establishment of granaries, improvements in the methods of winegrowing, and measures aiming at producing industrial crops — all of this in many cases combined with restrictions on imports. Teleki and Dobosi's plan was to make admittance to the guilds easier, and to invite craftsmen from abroad to settle in Transylvania. It also provided for the establishment of factories, especially in the textile industry, primarily with a view to breaking into the markets of the two Romanian principalities, and supplying the seven regiments of soldiers who were stationed in Transylvania every winter. The plan also proposed the abolition of the tariff barrier between Transylvania and Hungary. To achieve all this it suggested the creation of a monetary fund and the setting up of a commercial committee *(Commissio Commercialis)*, as well as more road repairs and the regulation of credit. The idea was to make room for all innovations which would make the country ready to benefit from possible structural reforms from above.

The plan, however, was frustrated. The part of it that was realized was put into effect by the central government some decades later. In the autumn of 1751, the draft proposal was rejected by a conservative-dominated Transylvanian Diet as "unrealistic". Some of Teleki's most progressive proposals were outright scoffed at. After this, the *Ministerialkonferenz* deemed it sufficient to set up an economic committee in Transylvania for the development and supervision of manufactories. László Teleki was appointed to chair this committee as well, but conditions were such that no results could be achieved.

In the Transylvania of the 1760s, the Habsburgs began to experiment with wholesale changes in their earlier methods of government.

- The Diet in Transylvania was summoned in the autumn of 1761 for the last time. The military high commander, Baron Buccow, surpassed himself in manipulating and blackmailing the Estates, whose political activity, from his point of view, was entirely superfluous. The representation to the monarch, dated during the first days of the Diet, contained a detailed scheme

for shaking up the country's administration: the governor was to be forced to resign; he, Buccow was to be appointed to head the civil government also, and councillors from the Hereditary Lands were to be appointed to the Gubernium. All land grants were to be subject to review. Buccow was also determined to give substance to the principle that the privileges of nobility accrued to persons, and not to land. Finally, it proposed the organization of a 7,000-strong frontier regiment.

The newly-formed *Staatsrat* received the plan with polite silence; nevertheless, it was this proposal which set the tone for the changes which took place in Transylvanian's power structure during the 1760s. In the middle of 1762, the military high commander took over as president of the Gubernium. After this, the military high commanders headed the Gubernium for almost a decade, with the rank of royal commissioners. (Buccow was succeeded on his death by András Hadik, who was followed by O'Donel.) This amounted to a civilian-military regime which, in terms of its form, was unprecedented in Transylvania since 1711.

The organization of the frontier regiment proved to be the most delicate issue. The men were drawn partly from the Székelyföld, partly from the Fogaras region, from Hunyad county and from certain parts of the Királyföld. Among the Székelys, a certain constitutional basis was offered for the recruitment by the obligation of the Székely nation to render military service — an obligation specified also in the *Diploma Leopoldinum*. In the case of the Romanian frontier regiments, no constitutional justification was attempted. Border guard service, however, did not involve the old type of obligation to stand ready to go to war in return for which the Székelys had enjoyed their privileges. Rather, it was a late version of the military colony, a well-known by-product of east-central European and east European backwardness, and which did duty for a mercenary army. (In the south of Hungary, it had been introduced quite some time earlier.) Recruitment began in the region of Naszód, a Romanian area, and in the Székelyföld. Naszód had an old dispute with the people living in the Beszterce region: the latter considered the Naszód people to be serfs, while they themselves demanded rights equal to those of the Saxons. Buccow now offered freedom to those people of the Naszód district who were willing to join up. To begin with, large numbers of men volunteered and turned Uniate, a condition for joining the frontier regiment. The Székelys, after taking up arms as evidence of their willingness to join the frontier force, proceeded to set definite terms for their participation: restoration of their old rights, restriction of their military service to within Transylvania, and treatment according to the ancient laws. Here, the recruitment was effected partly on a voluntary basis, and partly through the use of force. It was such force that triggered off a disturbance at the beginning of September 1762 in the district of Udvarhely, when the inhabitants of a number of villages refused to do military service or sought to evade conscription. Buccow himself went to Udvarhely, where a violent clash was only narrowly averted. In the Csík and Gyergyó districts, those called on to take the oath of border guard reiterated the old demands, making them more specific and adding to them in places. Now they also wanted to be allowed to serve under their own officers, and asked to see the royal edict setting up the frontier regiment. Later, having grown tired of the fruit-

less negotiations, they attacked the place where Buccow was lodging. But for the intervention of the *főkirálybíró* (lord chief justice), the commanding general would have been beaten to death. As it was, only a handful of people ended up taking the oath.

This, however, was only one battle in what can be described as the *"bellum omnium contra omnes"* which developed in the Székelyföld in the course of the attempts to organize the frontier regiment. Such battles were numerous. The nobility in the Székely districts made repeated demonstrations against encroachments by army officers. On the other hand, the Székelys who had joined up in the frontier regiments turned on the nobility in many places, looting their houses and attacking those who failed to take up arms — individuals and even whole villages. It boded ill for the future that some of the border guards refused to till their lands, and sold their cattle to buy horses. The officers in charge of organizing the frontier regiments enlisted serfs in some places, relieving them arbitrarily of the bonds of serfdom. Tension mounted between landlords and those of their serfs who had joined up as border guards, or who wanted to join up. By the first half of 1763, freemen who had refused to join the frontier regiments were setting out for Moldavia to escape the onerous services the officers tried to impose upon them, and in the effort to flee the wanton hostility of those who had joined. The Naszód region was no less troubled, but there opposition focused on the authorities' attempts to force all would-be border guards to turn Uniate.

It was at this point that the government decided to change its tactic. On 6 January, 1763, the queen ruled that only volunteers would be accepted in the frontier regiments. At the end of January, Baron Buccow sent a joint military-civilian committee headed by General Antal Kálnoki, a Székely aristocrat, to the Csík and Háromszék districts to calm passions. Shortly thereafter, however, the central government entrusted a new man, Lieutenant General Siskovics, with the organization of the frontier regiments, for Buccow's methods had not proved to be sufficiently effective.

Siskovics, determined to brook no further resistance, went to Csík in December 1763. The male population, no less determined to avoid being recruited into the frontier regiments, took refuge in the woods. Fearful that this kind of insubordination would spread, in the early morning of 7 January, 1764, Siskovics ordered 1,300 troops, with two field guns, to attack Mádéfalva, the place where the rebels had gathered. Though there was no armed resistance, the soldiers slaughtered many hundreds of people. As a result, Székely opposition to the recruitment was broken; the Székely frontier regiments were set up within two and a half months. The Romanian border guard was organized with less violence, but blood was nevertheless shed in the process, at least in the Naszód region.

The differences in attitude which developed between Székelys and Romanians to the frontier population's organization into military colonies were, however, due not so much to the different circumstances of the two frontier regiments' establishment, as to the very diverse social and cultural implications that the organization of the border guard had for the two nationalities. The self-government and the established rights of the Székely villages were both seriously undermined by the fact that the frontier regiment commandants could influence the election of the village magistrates, and that

433

border guards themselves were allowed to conclude property deals and to marry only with the consent of their officers (the latter also being empowered to ban them from dancing, smoking a pipe, and even attending the funerals of relatives). The frontier regiments seriously interfered with agriculture in the border areas and in the Székely school system. Only the cohesive strength of the village community gave protection against the military authorities: the village officials simply did not carry out a great many of their instructions. The organization of the Romanian frontier regiments had involved fewer grievances, although there were some cases of Romanian and Hungarian small nobles' having been pressed to enlist (e.g. in Hunyad county), and of boyars in Fogaras who were unwilling to serve being deprived of their houses and animals. The long-term consequences, however, were much more propitious. The organization of the frontier regiments entailed a significant step forward for Romanian education in Transylvania. In the places where the regiments were based (Naszód and Orlát), Latin and German grammar schools were set up, and in every centre of the 2nd Romanian Frontier Regiment elementary schools as well. The frontier regiment as an institution even helped to foster a consciousness of the Romanian nation as forming a continuity with ancient Rome: the inscription on the colours of the 2nd Romanian Frontier Regiment was *"Virtus romana rediviva"*.

The central government began to address itself to the fundamental issue of feudal services and dues in Transylvania only when the matter was already being dealt with in Hungary. Following protracted preparatory work based on the stance adopted by, the Gubernium, the charter of the first experiment in the regulation of feudal relations in Transylvania, the *Bizonyos Punctumok* (Certain Points), was published in the autumn of 1769.

Essentially, the charter was an extension of the laws already in force. It did not contain any particular provisions on the size of serf holdings, but rather general guidelines to the effect that the landlord should provide his serfs and landless cotters "with a suitable dwelling in line with their status", and in addition, parable and meadows "in accordance with the endowments of the outlying areas". Thus, it avoided the firm assignment to the serfs of plots of land of definite size in line with regional and local agrarian conditions, as was the case in Hungary. Among the serf's benefits, it specified that the woods used by the village community should remain in its possession, with the landowner's property rights being reserved. As regards the services the serfs were oblige to render, it resorted to earlier measures: at most four days a week of manual labour, or three days work with a plough — four days if the "buddy system" of sharing a holding was in effect. Retained was the obligation of the serf to pay the tenth and the ninth.

The *Bizonyos Punctumok*, therefore, was no real settlement in respect either of the size of serf holding or of the services owed. In the decades that followed the heterogeneity of feudal services and dues as defined by local factors continued intact, as indeed it had for centuries.

434

2. From the Enlightenment to Liberalism

Enlightenment and National Cultures

The Enlightenment virtually exploded onto the Transylvanian scene at the beginning of the 1770s. Once again, culturally, Transylvania was much farther ahead than was plausible, given her pitiful social and economic circumstances. There was a simultaneous flowering of two seemingly antithetical intellectual trends: of Illuminism, with its strong supranational element, and of national sentiment which was to lay the foundation of the various national cultures of the area. But we do not find two distinct camps: the followers of Christian Wolff, the translator of Montesquieu; the Freemasons; the government officials who believed in the Habsburgs' enlightened absolutism; and the internationally-oriented neutral scientists on one side, and those dedicated to promoting their own national cultures on the other. On the contrary: every one of Transylvania's intellectuals at the time belonged to both sides to some degree. Nor is this particularly surprising, given the national complexion of Transylvania, and the nature of her intellectual climate.

Freemasonry was the principal cohesive force behind the Transylvanian Enlightenment. It was in the early 1740s that two Hungarian aristocrats and the Saxon Samuel Bruckenthal, later one of Transylvania's great conservative statesmen, first came into contact with Freemasonry. Maria Theresa rewarded their initiative by confining them to their Vienna residences for a time in 1742. Nevertheless, the Freemasons soon became established in Transylvania, though for the first few decades only among the Saxons. The first short-lived lodge, "Zu den 3 Säulen" (3 columns), was established in Brassó in the early 1750s. More successful was the Saint Andrew lodge set up in Szeben in 1764. Its founder was a young Saxon patrician, Simon Friedrich Baussnern, and its members were Saxons who had become Freemasons during their student years in Germany. To 1778, the lodge's Transylvanian members were exclusively Saxons. But it also had some members from the Hereditary Lands, like Alexandru Moruzi Mavrocordat, whose brother was a Moldavian prince. The first Hungarian member of the lodge was György Bánffy, the later governor. During the 1780s and 1790s, the intellectual elite of Transylvania, many Romanians among them, were all members of the Szeben lodge. The new lodges that were set up were all coordinated by the Saint Andrew lodge, led by Grand Master Bánffy.

The opportunities open to Freemasonry altered somewhat when Joseph II ordered the fusion of the lodges in 1785. In Transylvania, the reform patent allowed the operation of only one lodge, the one in Szeben. In January of 1796, Francis I ordered the dissolution even of that. Freemasonry, which in its heyday would attract the most illustrious of Transylvania's political leaders, had become suspect to a central government still in a state of shock from the French Revolution. Yet Transylvanian Freemasonry from the 1770s on had primarily been an alliance of those morally committed to promoting

the public weal. It was far from being a political force of some definite complexion, much less a political party. A role of this sort would have been as incompatible with the essence of Freemasonry as with Transylvania's political situation at the time.

The flourishing of modern science confirmed the spirit of the Enlightenment in Transylvania, where some outstanding men made their appearance from the 1750s on.

József Benkő, Péter Bod's spiritual heir, was a true Enlightenment personality, equally at home in the social and natural sciences. His major work, *Transsilvania*, was pioneering in its methodology, and conceived of history as the manifestation of the spiritual development of a society, as well as of its material progress. Benkő followed Linnaeus's taxonomy in preparing his trilingual (Latin–Hungarian–Romanian) botanical dictionary, the *Flora Transsilvanica*. He was the first to write a handbook of speleology in Transylvania, and also published his suggestions for the utilization of sumach in the leather industry (*A középajtai szkumpia* — The Középajta Cotinus), and on tobacco growing. He also took advantage of the new opportunities that journalism provided for the popularization of science, contributing articles to the *Magyar Hírmondó* (Hungarian Herald). All this would have earned him a university appointment anywhere else. But at home, Benkő never received the recognition he deserved: he spent most of his life as a village pastor, after his few years of teaching at Udvarhely were terminated by petty intrigue. Driven from one parish to the next by the machinations against him, he turned to drink for consolation. It was a pattern familiar to the outstanding sons of Transylvania, and one that would often be repeated in the future.

The career of his contemporary, János Frivaldszky, was perhaps less reminiscent of that of a folk ballad hero, but he, too, received less recognition than his achievements warranted. After receiving his degree in Vienna, he was appointed professor of Latin and natural sciences at the Jesuit academy in Kolozsvár. Unlike Benkő, he was primarily interested in the natural sciences, in fact, in the applied sciences. For Frivaldszky was an innovator whose inventiveness found fertile ground when the Societas Agriculturae was established with a view to promoting Transylvanian agriculture. He came up with methods for using potatoes to make bread and to brew beer, and found ways of distilling spirits from corn, and of making paper from reeds, rushes, flax, and hemp. He held demonstrations to the society to show how peat could be used for fuel. But neither his comprehensive programme of economic reform, nor his countless innovations and suggestions were ever put to practical use. Neither the social nor the technological preconditions were ripe for their adoption.

The third outstanding Transylvanian natural scientist of the period, József Fogarasi Pap, had a brilliant start: his dissertation on "force" in the broadest sense of the term won first prize at the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 1778. His work reflects the influences of Leibniz and of German idealism. For example, he held that the final cause of all force lay outside matter, in God; and that the force of imagination was also a true natural force. But Fogarasi Pap was also in close contact with the latest currents in natural sciences. He died just before he could take the chair he had been offered at the university in Pest.

Both the Calvinist colleges and the well-equipped Saxon secondary schools were workshops for the new learning. József Kovács, who taught physics at Nagyenyed from 1767 on, translated and published Krueger's Newtonian physics in 1774. Another teacher at Nagyenyed was Ferenc Benkő, the geologist, botanist and mineralogist, a member of the *Jenaische Naturwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft* (Natural Science Society of Jena).

Natural sciences at the Kolozsvár academy, which was taken over by the Piarists after the dissolution of the Jesuit order, received considerable impetus in the 1780s when André Étienne, professor of chemistry and metallurgy and the popularizer of Lavoisier, joined the staff, along with the oculist Ioan Piuariu-Molnár. The medical books were all written by practising physicians, (e.g. István Mátyus and Sámuel Rácz) whose chapters on the importance of diet and of preventing disease are a fine source of information on the state of medicine and hygiene at the time.

Freemasonry and the natural sciences: these were the supranational manifestations of the Enlightenment, the forces making for the cohesion of otherwise diverse groupings. But in Transylvania, the awakening of national consciousness coincided with the Enlightenment. Initially, this awakening was non-political in nature. For these were decades when the political sphere in Transylvania was restricted indeed: no Diet was convoked for almost three decades after 1761, nor was there any other nationwide political forum. The awakening of national consciousness during these decades took the form of the revival of the various national cultures.

Initially, the Saxons were at an advantage. For Saxon students had continued to study at the German universities: in 1774, for instance, Michael Hiszmann, Martin Lang, Karl Bruckenthal and Johann Filtsch were all at Göttingen. The *Königliche Deutsche Gesellschaft* (Royal German Society) in Göttingen had close ties with the leading Saxon intellectuals of Transylvania. In 1799, Filtsch, J. C. Eder and A. Wolf were made corresponding members. Hiszmann stayed on in Göttingen after completing his studies, and was a prolific translator of English and French philosophical works. An Enlightenment thinker himself, his works abound in scathing attacks on metaphysics. Preoccupied with the relationship of mind to matter, he was often critical of Leibniz, and decidedly antagonistic to Wolff. In the Lessing–Goethe dispute, he took Lessing's side. His philosophical activity, however, effectively cut him off from returning to Transylvania. The Lutheran bishop Andreas Funk proscribed the circulation of Hiszmann's philosophic "letters", and his friends dissuaded him from attempting a return.

Stronger yet than these scholarly ties was the influence that the German theatre had on Transylvania's Saxons. It was as a by-product that their first modern literary efforts were published, in the *Theatralisches Wochenblatt* (Theatrical Weekly) which appeared for a time in Szeben, in 1778. More than a theatre review, it informed its readers of what was going on in literature abroad, primarily in the German-speaking world.

Of all the branches of Saxon scholarship, historiography was the most instrumental in raising national consciousness. For instance, there were the series of articles Johann Seivert wrote on leading Saxon churchmen and politicians in the *Ungarisches Magazin* (Hungarian Magazine) that appeared in Pozsony. No less significant was his major work on Saxon cultural his-

tory: *Nachrichten von siebenbürgischen Gelehrten und ihren Schriften.* Another key figure during these years was J. C. Eder, the nucleus around whom the Saxon historical society formed in the 1790s.

Indicative of the expansion of Saxon culture was the growing demand for regularly available reading matter. The Samuel Bruckenthal Collection also functioned as a public library. The first lending library opened in Szeben, in 1782. The first reading society was established two years later, to be followed by more. The Enlightenment also introduced periodicals among Transylvania's Saxons — some local publications, and a number of German periodicals. It was this latter feature of Saxon culture — the advantage of having direct access to all the German-language literature coming in from abroad — that proved to be its greatest weakness. Some of the finest German literature was being written at this time, and its availability seemed to discourage, rather than inspire native Saxon writing.

Literate Hungarian Transylvanians who tried their hand at writing had reference points of quite a different kind. The previous half century had produced only one Transylvanian Hungarian writer of note, Kelemen Mikes, the young scribe to Ferenc Rákóczi II. His "letters" written from exile to a fictive aunt lay in a desk drawer in Rodosto (Turkey) for decades, and were published only in 1794, but then became an inspiration to Hungarian patriots for generations to come. All the stay-at-home writers likewise wrote diaries or memoirs. The swan song of Transylvania's memoirists was the autobiography of Kata Bethlen, an aristocratic widow, Calvinist to the point of bigotry in the face of the Counter-Reformation, a woman of iron will who had a paper mill built to supply paper for the religious tracts she was determined to see published, and who was the patroness of Péter Bod. She, however, had to wait another two hundred years for true recognition.

It is an irony of history that the Hungarian literature of eighteenth century Transylvania was born in Rodosto and Vienna. The pioneers of Hungarian Enlightenment literature were the "guardsman writers", the young noblemen in Maria Theresa's Hungarian Bodyguard, a formation established by the empress with the explicit aim of heightening the baroque pomp of her court. For decades, the Hungarian Bodyguard was the major workshop for Hungarian literature. The principal figure was György Bessenyei; but the man generally considered to have been next in importance was a Transylvanian, Ábrahám Barcsay. Barcsay retired from the army with the rank of colonel, but no Hungarian poet ever sang more eloquently of the blessings of peace, the precondition of all human liberty.

No Hungarian periodical was published in Transylvania during these years. But a great many Hungarian Transylvanians contributed to the Hungarian journals appearing in Hungary and Vienna. For this reason, too, as well as by virtue of the many ties of friendship and shared conviction linking them to their counterparts in Hungary, the considerable literary output of Transylvania's Hungarian writers must be seen as an integral part of Hungarian culture as a whole.

Of the three nations living in Transylvania, the Romanians were at the greatest disadvantage during these Enlightenment decades. All the more impressive, then, is what they achieved.

There was no flowering of Transylvanian Romanian literature during these years. The cultural task at hand was to raise Romanian national con-

sciousness — to take up again the cause that Inochentie Micu-Klein had fought for. It was in this that the three most significant spokesmen of Transylvanian Romanian culture — Samuil Micu-Klein, Gheorghe Șincai and Petru Maior — achieved their most impressive results. All there were polymaths who had also studied in Vienna and Rome, outstanding research scholars as well as popularizers of their findings, in the best traditions of the Encyclopaedists. Central to their system of thought was the theory of Daco-Roman continuity. Equally important was their conviction that the Romanians living on the two sides of the Carpathians were one and the same people. Though they were Greek Catholics, they were free of the anti-Orthodox prejudice of the previous generation, and had a fine understanding of the intricacies of Orthodox church history. Their writings on religious matters were an amalgam of Gallicanism, of Josephinism and of Orthodox traditionalism.

Encouraged by the possibilities inherent in enlightened absolutism, and arguing on the legal grounds that all these areas had once been lands of the Hungarian Crown, Samuil Micu-Klein expressed his hope that a religious union that respected Orthodox traditions might become the basis of the unification under the House of Habsburg of all the Romanian-speaking areas. His *Elementa linguae Daco-Romanae sive Valachicae* (Elements of the Daco-Roman in Valachian Language) was published in Vienna in 1780, and was meant to convince primarily the non-Romanian reading public of the Latin origin of the Romanian language. Micu-Klein himself published his works using the Cyrillic alphabet, but he was the first to use a Latin transcription in the Romanian-language prayer book he put out in 1779. His translation of the Bible also appeared in 1779, but his historical works were published only later. Some of them are in a manuscript form even today.

Gheorghe Șincai took an active role in implementing the educational policies of enlightened absolutism. As inspector of the elementary schools of the Uniate church, he helped set up a great many village schools. He also wrote a Latin-Hungarian-German-Romanian primer for the schools in Balázsfalva, a Romanian primer for use in the other Romanian schools of Transylvania, a Latin grammar, an introduction to arithmetic, and a catechism. Practically all his life he kept working on his comprehensive history, the *Hronica românilor* (Chronicle of the Romanians). Among the sources he cites we can find the scholarly works of every east European nation, but primarily Hungarian works. He also relied heavily on Transylvanian family archives, on dietal reports and on sources collected by Hungarian scholars, many of whom were his personal friends. It was while in Vienna that he came to know József Benkő, Dániel Cornides, and Márton György Kovachich. In the course of his chequered career, the Wass family came to his aid on several occasions. He found his final resting place on their estate.

The most active years of Petru Maior, the third member of the great triad of the Romanian cultural revival, coincided with the Reform Era, and are best discussed in that context.

Of the Greek Orthodox Romanian scholars, the classic example is the Brassó schoolmaster, Dimitrie Eustatievici. He studied in Kiev, and wrote a Romanian grammar in 1757. For him, however, Romanian national identity did not involve turning away from the Greek language of the Orthodox

liturgy. Politically, he sided with those who wanted to see the Romanians recognized as heirs to the rights of the Illyrian nation. Secretary to two Orthodox bishops, he was inspector of the Greek Orthodox schools of Transylvania under Joseph II, organizing the six-week crash courses (for groups of 11–12 prospective teachers) meant to temporarily ease the shortage of educators. Another dedicated champion of the Orthodox school system was Ioan Piuariu-Molnár, who was also professor of ophthalmology at Kolozsvár. It was he who had the greatest impact as a popularizer of obstetric and agricultural know-how, primarily because his pamphlets and books were written in a language that his readers had little difficulty understanding. The best Romanian grammar was also his work.

The Romanian cultural revival went hand in hand with a growing political role for Transylvania's Romanian intelligentsia. During the reign of Joseph II, Romanians held positions both in the Gubernium and in the Transylvanian Court Chancellery. István Koszta was a councillor of the Gubernium during the last years of Joseph II's rule, and was later made *cancellarius provincialis*, the chief overseer of the Gubernium as the executive arm. He was a bureaucrat of exemplary diligence and precision: thousands of extant pages in a beautiful hand testify to his thoroughness and inventiveness in seeing matters through to their conclusion. In the course of the slow dismantling of the Josephine system, it was he who attended to the unpleasant, and at times dangerous, tasks facing the Gubernium. At the county level, however, very few Romanians were to be found in the administrative apparatus, for there was no real Romanian landowning class to speak of.

The First Decades of Enlightened Absolutism

It was around 1770–1771 that enlightened absolutism began to have an impact on Transylvanian politics. Least felicitous from Transylvania's point of view was the economic policy adopted by the Habsburg court. In fact, none of the economic reform proposals that the various new committees (e.g. the *Commissio Commercialis* /Trade Committee/, and the *Commissio Œconomica* /Economic Committee/) came up with were calculated to bridge the enormous gap separating Transylvania from the industrially more developed western parts of the empire. On the contrary, since manufacturing was discouraged, and restricted to the production of household staples, Transylvanian industry fell even farther behind in these decades. Those industries that were set up functioned in defiance of official policy, some of them, e.g. the paper mill at Orlát and the iron, gold and silver works set up with the help of other government agencies.

The 1770s were no more successful from the point of view of resolving the matter of the serfs' feudal services and dues. The government could come up with nothing better than to keep to the *status quo*, nor did it really want to. True, in June of 1770, Maria Theresa — fearing that rumours of the serfs' emancipation in Moldavia would lead to a large-scale exodus across the border — did order that steps be taken to work out the regulation of feudal services and dues along the lines proposed in Hungary, but her good intentions foundered in the morass of bureaucracy.

Gravestone of Miklós Misztótfalusi Kis with an inscription by Ferenc Pápai Páriz. Kolozsvár, Há-ngárd cemetery, 1702

52. Watermarks of seventeenth century paper mills in Transylvania: 1. Kolozsr ꞁnostor, 1635; 2. Nagyszeben, 1664; 3. Gyulafehérvár, 1665; 4. Nagyszeben, 1672

Prospect
Der Ungarische
Stadt
Clausenburg

.1. Das Schloß. 2. Die Dom Kirche. 3. Die Jesuiter. 4. Die Franciscaner, 5. Die Schulen, 6. E
.10. Das Mühl Thor; 11. Das Münster Thor, 12. Arianische Bett-Häuser.

53. View of Kolozsvár from the south. Pen-and-ink drawing by Conrad von Weiss, 1735

hes Bet-Hauß. 7. Calvinische Kirch. 8. Calvi. Collegium, 9. Das Mittel Chor.

54. The Gyulafehérvár citadel of Charles III. Delineation from the middle of the eighteenth century

55. Jesuit, later Piarist church in Kolozsvár, 1718–1724. Lady-column: 1744 (Photograph by Ferenc Veress, 1860s)

56. View of Beszterce from the south. Pen-and-ink drawing by Conrad von Weiss, 1735

In church–state relations and education, however, the government was much more successful in implementing its policies. Vienna was determined to place the Roman Catholic church under closer supervision, and to put an end to , or at least to restrict, its prelates' assuming high government posts. The Catholic bishop of Transylvania was divested of his right to preside over the Gubernium. The central government's intervention in the Catholic church's affairs was far-reaching: it acquired control over its organization and finances, and practically over all matters involving education. In 1781, the *Norma Regia* (Royal Norms) placed every aspect of education in Transylvania under the Gubernium, more specifically, its newly established *Commissio Litteraria* (Literary Committee). The uniform system of education was binding on all denominational schools. Elementary education was made compulsory from the age of six. Secondary education, however, was reserved for those who had not only the proficiency, but also the financial means to attain it.

The "second decade" of enlightened absolutism is generally identified with the person of Joseph II, who came to the throne in 1780. Few rulers have been so variously evaluated by contemporaries and historians alike. The "libertarian" school of thought portrays Joseph II and all his measures as a direct attack on Hungary's liberties and on Hungarian interests. At the other end are those who picture the emperor as more than a reformer: he is seen as a veritable revolutionary, one who would have introduced a new and perfect order into his empire, but who was overcome by the forces of reaction. Countless variations and permutations exist of these two themes. It is not only Hungarian considerations that are reflected in the pictures that have evolved. Joseph II's policies opened hitherto unimaginable opportunities to the most conscious advocates of Romanian national rights. The Saxons, on the other hand, stood to have their privileges totally annihilated by the ruthless rationalism of Joseph II's system. In fact, the emperor's main motive in everything he did was to consolidate the strength of the empire. For all that, his Patent of Toleration published in 1781 was a significant step toward the freedom of religion and conscience in Transylvania as well.

Joseph II's economic policy had two main elements: free competition in the domestic market, unfettered by the restrictions imposed by the trade guilds; and protectionism in foreign trade. The emperor's goal was to make the empire an autarchic economic unit. The tariff barriers between Transylvania and Hungary were removed, which was tantamount to the economic unification of the two areas, coming, as it did, after their administrative unification. The tariff barriers which guaranteed the Hereditary Lands their preferential treatment were, however, preserved, with the result that the more complete the autarchy that the empire managed to achieve, the more stark were the differences in the economic development of its various parts.

Joseph II had no comprehensive industrial policy in Transylvania, but in practice, there was no sign of discrimination. For instance, Giovanni Gallarati's attempt at silk production enjoyed definite government support, and it was at this time that the iron foundries of the Vajdahunyad region received a real impetus. Transylvanian industrial products enjoyed protection even against the goods coming in from the Hereditary Lands, for the

◄ 57. Armenian Catholic church at Szamosújvár, second half of the eighteenth century
(Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

simple reason that Transylvania, as Joseph II pointed out, carried a heavier tax burden than Hungary.

There can be no questioning Joseph II's good intentions towards the serfs. What measures were, in fact, introduced, how far these were implemented, and how they were received is, perhaps, the best reflection of the Josephine system in Transylvania. During one of his visits to Transylvania, in 1783, Joseph II ordered Vice-Chancellor Pálffy to draw up immediately the proclamation of the serfs' emancipation. The chancellery was able to torpedo the plan, but Joseph II's decree of 16 July, 1783 guaranteed the serfs the right to marry and to learn and practice a trade or profession without their lords' permission, to dispose freely of their lawful possessions, and to enjoy security of tenure in their holdings unless removed from them by court order. The decree specified that they were not to be relocated from one county to another, and that they were not to be obliged to perform services inconsistent with the temporary regulations already in effect. Before, however, either the conclusive regulation of feudal obligations or an emancipation proclamation could be promulgated, one of the most violent peasant revolts of all its history swept through Transylvania.

The Horea–Cloșca Revolt

A whole set of circumstances had prepared the ground for the violence that erupted in the autumn of 1784. Throughout Transylvania, relations between landlords and serfs had been getting more and more strained. As for the Érchegység region, there were specific reasons for the growing discontent. The Zalatna seigniory of the Exchequer, was a mountainous area with extensive forests. The terrain was such that the inhabitants of the scattered villages had had no difficulty concealing just how many people actually lived there, i.e. how many were liable to pay taxes. As the result of a close investigation, however, after 1772, the tax burden of the seigniory doubled; the obligatory feudal services, too, were specified, and were substantially more than what had been customary. The *robot* was set at two days a week, obligatory wage labour (at notoriously low wages) was introduced, and a number of concessions were withdrawn. The treasury received three times its former income from the more than seven thousand tenant farmers on the Zalatna seigniory. The people turned directly to the emperor to seek redress of their grievances. The delegation that went to Vienna in 1779 included Horea and Cloșca, leaders of the 1784 uprising.

Horea was born Vasile Nicula in 1730. First a fugitive serf, he later redeemed himself and had travelled extensively throughout Transylvania. Working as a carpenter, he had acquired a considerable fortune by peasant standards. It was because of his reputation as a man of experience that he was sent to Vienna in 1779 to represent the people of the seigniory. Subsequently, he was to go there a number of times. In May of 1782, a disturbance broke out in Topánfalva at the annual fair over the licensing of the tavern on the Zalatna estate. Local people, angry that two Armenians had been given the licence, pierced the bottoms of the two lessees' barrels. The

442

manorial court of Zalatna passed death and other grave sentences on the culprits, while the two lessees demanded compensation. Horea (who took part in the disturbance) again went off to Vienna with the appeal, and was received by the emperor. There was nothing extraordinary in this, as Joseph II was in the habit of personally receiving the serfs' written requests, speaking a few words of encouragement as he did so. In April of 1784, however, even at the chancellery Horea was assured that the Gubernium would be obliged to protect the people of the Zalatna seigniory from abuse by the local and the county officials until Joseph II brought a decision on their case. Accordingly, Horea and his fellow plaintiffs, when neither the Gubernium nor the county authorities would come to their assistance, turned to the military command at Gyulafehérvár for support.

Shortly before, Joseph II had decreed that volunteers living in the frontier zone be registered with a view to reinforcing the frontier regiments. In June of 1784, as the result of a misunderstanding, the peasants who had come up for the Gyulafehérvár fair volunteered en masse, so that by mid-August, the menfolk of 80 villages were ready to take up arms. A number of the conscripts, on returning home, refused to perform their *robot*, others aggressively urged the stay-at-homes to join them in the army. In many ways, the situation was similar to what had transpired when the Székely frontier regiments were being organized in 1762–1763. The Gubernium, however, which had had no part in the conscriptions and even no knowledge of them, intervened, put an end to the registrations, and invalidated the conscriptions that had already taken place. It was at around the same time that Horea and his fellows turned to the Gyulafehérvár military command. Thanks to another misunderstanding, the rumour was soon abroad that Horea had received an order from the emperor to take up arms. From here on, the revolt was practically inevitable. Gheorghe Crişan, a fugitive serf from the Zalatna seigniory, called a meeting of the peasants of the Fehér-Körös Valley in Mesztákon; from there they set out for Gyulafehérvár to ask to join the frontier regiments. They were accosted along the way by a troop of county officers and haiduks, and a violent skirmish ensued. The revolt had erupted, and in days the peasantry of all south-western Transylvania had joined. In Zaránd county, the insurgents looted dozens of manor houses, and the violence spread to the adjacent parts of Hungary as well. Practically the whole of Hunyad county was in a state of revolt. The peasantry of the Érchegység — led by Horea and Cloşca, and by Crişan, who had joined them with his men — wreaked havoc in Abrudbánya and Verespatak, lynching county officials, officers of the treasury, non-Romanian priests, and even the village judges.

The government was slow to take decisive action. Governor Samuel Bruckenthal asked the army to move against the insurgents, but the high command, having received no orders, was at a loss what to do. With the revolt spreading like wildfire, the military high command and the Gubernium both began separate negotiations with the rebels. In the meanwhile, in some places the nobility started to organize their own defence: at Déva, they routed the insurgents with the help of the local hussars, summarily executing fifty-six of the captured rebels. The rebels clashed with the nobility's forces in a number of other locations as well. In some areas, the army —

mostly Hungarian and Székely hussars — clashed with the rebels even before orders arrived.

Joseph II and the central government's difficulty in taking a unanimous stand on the rebellion was compounded by the fact that they had very little news of what was actually going on. The reports that did get through were out of date and contradictory. The central government was still debating what policy position to adopt. Initially, considerations of national security dominated. Joseph II first received word of the revolt on 12 November, 1784, and immediately sent orders to the military high commands to quash the rebellion by force of arms. Soon, however, social policy considerations came to predominate. Reading a circular put out by the Gubernium around 17 November, Joseph came to suspect that the revolt was, in part, sparked by abuses on the part of the county authorities. By 19 November, he was convinced that the responsibility lay with the landowners who oppressed their serfs in every way they could, and sent Antal Jankovics, one of his most trusted men, on a fact-finding mission to the troubled area.

The emperor was experiencing a profound crisis of conscience. On hearing of the mass executions at Déva, he could not help but sympathize with the nobility. On the other hand, he felt that the revolt showed that his own policies had been a failure. He was reluctant to condone the idea of some harsh reprisal, and considered it politically mistaken as well, being of the opinion that counter-violence would erupt at the next opportunity. Accordingly, he gave orders which were intended to stop summary convictions, and to prevent the nobility as a body from taking up arms. Joseph II was convinced that the first step to a political solution was to announce the emancipation of the serfs.

Considerations of national security — the military's arguments — however, won through. On 13 December, 1784, the emperor published a whole series of ordinances, whose drift was that military might was the only way to put an end to the revolt. It was a mistake to have vacillated so long, and time for the army to take decisive action. By then, however, the insurrection had been put down. The two battalions of 750–800 men each that the military high command had sent into the Érchegység had scattered the rebels. Horea and Cloșca were turned in by the peasants at the end of December.

The retribution that followed was in keeping with Joseph II's explicit wishes. The rebel leaders were to be made an example of. They were put on display in all the places where they had committed their most "heinous crimes", and were to be executed before the assembled serfs in a way that would discourage such acts in the future. Altogether, six hundred and sixty peasants were put on trial. The three hundred who had joined the rebels under duress, and against whom there was no weighty evidence, were allowed immediately to return to their homes. Those who had volunteered for the rebel army or had plundered and looted, about one hundred and eighty men, received corporal punishment and were also sent home. Of the hundred and twenty people accused of capital crimes, thirty-seven received the death sentence; the rest were given prison sentences. Joseph II pardoned all those condemned to death, except the three leaders. Crișan committed suicide in prison; Horea and Cloșca were broken on the wheel on 18 February, 1785, in full view of the crowd of peasants ordered there for the ordeal.

444

Had there really been an element of national vengeance in this peasant revolt, as Joseph II thought? The unrest had flared up in areas where the serfs were predominantly or exclusively Romanian, and the landowners and county officials were Hungarian, or considered themselves as such. The putatively "national" character of the insurrection seems also to be borne out by the fact that the rebels "rebaptized" their noble hostages according to the Orthodox rite, and forced the daughters of Hungarian noblemen into mock marriages with Romanian peasant lads. It appears, however, that in all this the decisive motivation was rooted not in ethnic or national considerations, but in religious ones, reinforced by a strong peasant "egalitarianism": determination to level social and class distinctions. The most recent research has shown that Hungarian and Saxon peasants also volunteered for the frontier regiments, and then joined in the revolt. There were Hungarian miners from Abrudbánya, even among the leaders. The Saxon villages around Kisenyed, as well as the predominantly Hungarian village of Torockószentgyörgy also swelled the ranks of the insurgents. In Torda and Kolozs counties, a number of Hungarian serfs were sentenced for their part in the revolt. At the same time, the spokesmen of nascent Romanian nationalism, the Romanian intellectuals had absolutely no sympathy for the revolt. Samuil Micu-Klein, for instance, called Horea and his followers "accursed men" who "wanted to destroy the nobility".

The peasant revolt confirmed Joseph II in his conviction that the serfs' grievances required an immediate political solution. With the publication of the edict of 2 August, 1785, which reiterated the provisions of the 16 July, 1783 decree, the serfs were free to move: they were no longer tied to the land. Beyond that, however, Joseph could do no more than to legislate on some questions of detail. He could make no real headway in the matter of regulating feudal services and dues. The preparatory work was begun in 1785, when the serfs' holdings, usufructs and services were registered as they had been in Hungary. But no consensus was even reached on just what area of land was to constitute a "full holding". Joseph II decided to let the matter rest for a while, but never returned to it. The regulations with which the emperor tried to lessen the burden of the serfs' dues and services had very little practical effect. For one thing, the landowners resented this kind of government interference in their dealings with their serfs. For another, the details of Joseph's regulations were hardly in keeping with the realities of Transylvania. For instance, the 1787 regulations provided not only that the landlords or their bailiffs keep written records of each serf's robot, but that the serfs themselves each keep a book in which the bailiff could put down the number of days they were to spend in *robot*, and keep track of the number of days work already done.

Administrative Reforms

Joseph II tried to introduce some rational order into government at all levels, and took steps to unify the Hungarian and the Transylvanian chancelleries. On the grounds that Transylvania was, in fact, a land of the Hungar-

ian Crown, he proposed the possible reintroduction of the office of voivode as it had existed before Transylvania's "first separation" from the Kingdom of Hungary.

One of the most difficult problems was the matter of municipal administration, and the need to modernize the existing administrative units. For the counties spanned the entire width of the country from east to west, in strips at times no more than a village or two wide. The Saxon and Székely seats, all separate administrative units, were hardly the size of a riding, and Felső-Fehér county was particularly fragmented. There could be no question that some administrative re-organization was imperative. A great many things, however, militated against it. One serious obstacle was the reluctance of the local nobility — and of the Saxon patricians in the Saxon regions who likewise monopolized the offices of local government — to cede their prerogatives. A further complication was that the municipalities reflected the settlement patterns of the Three Nations, and thus often had administrative powers and traditional rights specific to one or the other nation. No thoroughgoing modern administrative reform, however, could take these national differences into account.

For all that, the Josephine government embarked on the programme of reform. The first blow was suffered by the privileged Saxons when equality of citizenship was extended to the Romanians of the Királyföld living there (*Concivilität*). The next blow came in 1782, when Joseph II had the treasury confiscate the properties of the Saxon nation, giving as his grounds the circumstance that the Királyföld belonged to the Exchequer.

In 1784, Transylvania was divided into eleven counties which fact put an end both to the traditional system of the Three Nations, and to municipal autonomy. In January 1786, regional commissions were set up: the counties were grouped into three regions, with Szeben, Fogaras and Kolozsvár as the three administrative centres, each headed by a regional commissioner. The system was meant to function as the administrative arm of centralist absolutism, but in fact remained a dead letter.

The attempts to separate clearly the judicial from the administrative arm were equally unsuccessful. The new Criminal Code, an admixture of enlightened ideas and the belief that only the full rigour of the law could be a deterrent to crime, was introduced in 1787 in Transylvania, as in the rest of the empire. It is questionable, however, how far Transylvanian justice was receptive to the spirit of the new law.

One of the most controversial of Joseph II's measures both at the time and subsequently was the introduction of German as the official language. He saw it as a step towards the uniform administration of the entire empire, recognizing the fact that Latin was no longer suited to be the common official language. The central government was switching more and more to doing business in German; and it therefore seemed logical to have German replace Latin in its official communications with Hungary and Transylvania as well. However, only 12–15 per cent of Transylvania's population was of German origin; a considerably larger percentage was Hungarian, and the absolute majority was Romanian. Introducing the language of the smallest national minority to replace an obsolete official language which, however, had the advantage of being the native tongue of none of the nations was

something for which not even the Saxons could muster enthusiasm. The decree of 1784 made German the official language of dealings not only with the central government offices, but also with municipal and town authorities. Later, Joseph II wished to see German made the official language of the Diet, too, although he never convoked it. From the autumn of 1784, admittance to secondary school was conditional on the applicant's proving that he could read and write German. Naturally, the decree was implemented half-heartedly at best. The Gubernium published its ordinances with the German and Hungarian (sometimes Latin) text running in parallel columns. The lesser authorities had a great deal of difficulty in finding staff capable of satisfying the provisions of Joseph's language decree. Its most lasting effect proved to be the significant growth of Hungarian nationalism in Transylvania.

Resistance to Joseph's reforms in Transylvania, too, was motivated partly by conservatism, and partly by the new demands of a new age. In just what proportions is reflected by the memoranda the Three Nations submitted to the court in 1787. Practically everyone of any influence in all three nations took part in working out the positions to be adopted. The months of discussion, however, yielded no common platform. The *Natio Hungarica* and the *Natio Siculica* submitted a joint memorandum, while the *Natio Saxonica* sent a more cautiously-worded remonstrance of their own.

The remonstrance of the Hungarian and the Székely nation took as its premise the doctrine that the Estates were members of the Holy Crown of Hungary: they shared with the king. Joseph II, however, had overturned the fundamental laws, the whole system of government: no Diets had been convened; the Three Nations no longer existed, for *Concivilität* had made newcomers and foreigners coequal with the Estates; and the counties had lost their former jurisdiction. The introduction of German as the official language they found particularly offensive: the Hungarians had become strangers in their own country; having had to change their language, they could next expect to lose their liberties.

The memorandum cited the frequent changes in the administrative system as a major cause of the Horea-led revolt. It practically accused the central government of inciting further insubordination: the serfs, seeing that the rebels' heinous crimes were not punished with the full rigour of the law, were growing ever bolder, especially now that capital punishment was abolished. There would be no security of life and property until the landlords' authority — all official authority — was restored. It was difficult to argue against the next point, namely, that the serfs' new freedom to migrate removed the incentive they had to renovate their homes, to make improvements or to fertilize the soil. The framers of the memorandum pointed out something else that would be sure to give its readers food for thought: the serfs could easily believe that they had achieved their freedom to move through their revolt. The regulation of feudal services and dues, however, was still undecided. The tentative steps that had been taken in this direction came in for a great deal of criticism. Another measure to which the landlords took strong exception was the royal decree of 14 June, 1786, which put an end to their functioning as tithe farmers for the treasury, and ordered that the Exchequer's tenth be collected in kind.

The Hungarian and Székely Estates also reiterated their traditional grievance that the Diet had not voted the taxes Transylvania was obliged to pay (no Diet had been called for twenty-five years), and that the new system of taxation violates the principle of *"onus non inhaeret fundo"*. Turning to military matters, the most strongly criticized was a pre-Josephine measure: the organization of the frontier militia. In the case of the Székely regiments, the main emphasis was on the injustice of this provision: the Székelys could not be obliged both to perform military service and to pay taxes. Establishing the Székely frontier regiments had disrupted the legal order of the Székelyföld, and had led to some absurd property claims.

The Romanian frontier militia that had been organized was seen as an outright threat by the writers of the memorandum. It was to be feared, they said, that the Romanians would use their arms to disturb the peace; they might even ally with the Romanians of Wallachia and the Banat to turn against Transylvania. (In fact, the Romanian frontier regiments of the Banat had helped to defeat the Horea revolt; and there is absolutely no evidence anywhere of any joint military action having been planned in these decades by the Romanians of Transylvania, Wallachia and the Banat.)

Reading the above memorandum, one would expect to find elements of it recurring in the programme adopted by Transylvania's leaders in the 1790s. However, the programme that was adopted at the moment when it seemed that real action might be taken was much more realistic in its evaluation of the Josephine reforms, and showed a much greater sense of political responsibility.

The Saxons submitted their own list of grievances at the end of 1787. Though milder in tone than that of the other two nations, the Saxon petition was even more conservative in tenor.

Joseph II had the chancellor for Hungary and Transylvania express his displeasure with the writers of the memoranda. Nevertheless, resistance to his policies continued to grow, especially when in 1788 Joseph entered the war against the Ottoman Empire on Russia's side, and the effects of the mobilization (requisitioning and skirmishes along the Turkish border) began to be felt throughout Transylvania. It was not in Transylvania, however, that the Josephine order was defeated. The revolutionary unrest in the Austrian Netherlands, the failure of the campaigns against the Turks, the conflicts of interest with Prussia and domestic discontent, especially in Hungary, all combined to convince the emperor that his policies had been mistaken.

The *Restitutionsedikt* (Edict of Restitution) which Joseph II passed on his deathbed revoked a whole series of his reform decrees. How much of their spirit nevertheless survived the next few decades were to tell.

Feudal Reaction and Reform

The complex of events subsequent to the publication of the *Restitutionsedikt* reflected conservative attempts to restore the feudal order, as much as the determination of those committed to the Josephine system to salvage his

58. Greek Orthodox Romanian church at Brassó–Bolgárszeg, sixteenth–eighteenth centurie ▶
The tower was built in 1752 with the help of Empress Elizabeth of Russia
(Photograph dated from the beginning of the century)

ФЛОАРЕ АДЕВЭРУЛУЙ
Пентру Пачѣ, ши Драгостѣ
де ѡбщие,
Дѣла средниилѣ Сфинтелоръ
скриптурй. Прима маре
Стрададиа ѕукрименилоръ
а ѫтре Іеромонъ, аддмэнэстиръ
Сфинтей Троицы дела Блажъ,
Акѫмъ ѫтѫй ѡбѫдеа.
Кирѣ Аѧаминатѣ Адевэрѫлъ
къ ЅНІІГ Ѣ данта пѫаоте, фара
ѡбман кредница, ши дѣла
тѫра Сфицилоръ Пэричии.

Гѵпэрнѫбеаѵ Блажъ
анѫлъ Дѫмѫѕѫй адин.
Мартіе а.

60. Romanian publication printed with the letters of
Miklós Misztótfalusi Kis at Balázsfalva, 1763

61. Romanian publication printed with Cyrillic letters
cut by István Páldi Székely at Balázsfalva, 1763

SANCTI PATRIS NOSTRI
JOANNIS DAMA SCENI
MONACHI ET PRESBYTERI
HIEROSOLYMITANI
OPERA PHILOSOPHICA ET THEOLOGICA
QUÆ EIUS NOMINE CIRCUMFERUNTUR
Ex editione Veneta & Parisiensi.
Pars Prima complectens
Dial:ecticam Physicam & Hereses.

cum
Illustrissimi, ac Reverendissimi
Domini
PETRI PAULI AARON
de Bistra
EPISCOPI FOGARASIENSIS Benedictione,
nunc primum hoc ordine typis edita.

Balasfalvæ Anno Domini MDCCLXIII.

62. The main square of Balázsfalva with the former Greek Catholic cathedral and theological institute, around 1900

63. Fresco from the Saint Nicholas Greek Orthodox Romanian church at Fogaras, eighteenth century

64. Horea and Cloşca at the head of their troops. Copper engraving, 1780s

66. Great hall of the Batthyaneum at Gyulafehérvár. Building: after 1781, interior: around 1820 ▶
(Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

65. The main square in Nagyszeben with the Bruckenthal palace, 1778–1779
(Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

67. Sámuel Teleki. Oil painting by Johann Tusch, 1798

68. Samuel Bruckenthal. Oil painting by Martin von Meytens, shortly before 1770

69. Courtyard facade of the Bánffy palace at Bonchida. Built by Johann Eberhard Blaumann, middle of the eighteenth century (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

70. One-time Maria Theresa stateroom of the Bánffy palace at Bonchida

reforms. Reform proposals that went beyond Joseph II's programme also made their appearance. The national movements that sprang up everywhere in 1790 complicated the above picture, some promoting, some impeding, the efforts at reform. But the framework within which all these movements had to find space for themselves was the pragmatism of Leopold II's central government, under which the empire retrogressed from enlightened absolutism to Franciscan reaction.

The restoration was most easily accomplished in the case of the municipal system and the Saxon institutions: the Josephine county system disintegrated, the regional commissions disappeared, and the Saxon University was revived. The Saxon position was clear: loyalty to the Habsburgs, amicable relations with the nobility, and the preservation of the union of the Three Nations.

The Hungarian and Székely nations had more far-reaching goals, and at the same time also had to deal with pressure coming both from above and below that stood to threaten their privileges. These two nations saw union with Hungary as the best means of protecting feudal rights, but there was also a genuine national motivation in the modern sense of the term in their advocacy of unification. The proposed union, however, was rejected at the Hungarian Diet. The central government was, by then, following a "divide and rule" policy, Leopold referred the question back to the Transylvanian Estates, and he became crowned king of Hungary without committing himself in principle to the union. In the meanwhile, the serfs of Transylvania were growing restive, for there were rumours that the nobility was determined to abolish the benefits that Joseph II's reforms had brought them.

The nobles began to arm themselves for what in some localities was seen as a fight against the Habsburgs, and it took the sober judiciousness of György Bánffy's Gubernium to keep the mutual distrust from flaring up into an armed clash.

When the Transylvanian Diet finally convened in December 1790, the Estates were most concerned to see the "constitutional forms" of government restored. But they also confirmed in his governor's post the man who had, in fact, been heading the Gubernium for years, György Bánffy, Transylvania's most outstanding statesman, and a staunch believer in the Josephine reforms. An opposition grouping, however, demanded that certain high government officials be called to account for the way the Estates' rights had been encroached upon, and the Diet demanded that the Gubernium pass on to it whatever information it had on proposals and plans that might be detrimental to the country. Insistence on the Estates' traditional rights and the idea of ministerial responsibility are both present here.

In the matter of Transylvania's official language, the Estates took a positive stand. The Minutes of the Diet were recorded in Hungarian. The assembled Estates also discussed György Aranka's proposal for what was to become the first Transylvanian (and Hungarian-speaking) academic organization, the *Erdélyi Magyar Nyelvmívelő Társaság* (Transylvanian Hungarian Philological Society).

The third main topic with which the Diet dealt in the first session was the issue of the union with Hungary. It was not only the Saxons who stood to oppose the union. The Székelys, too, felt that union might jeopardize

their special rights, while the Protestants were reluctant to see their rights placed at the mercy of a Catholic majority. But before the Diet as a whole could discuss the question of the proposed union with Hungary, Leopold II had decided to split the Hungarian and Transylvanian Chancellery into two distinct bodies. This decision (of 25 February, 1791) effectively put off the matter of unification. The Transylvanian Diet, however, was not informed of this turn of events, and set about specifying the conditions of unification: the inclusion of Transylvania in the coronation oath of the king of Hungary; guaranteeing Transylvania's governor the right to appear at the Hungarian Diet; and the confirmation of Joseph II's measures — the unified Hungarian and Transylvanian Chancellery, and the Transylvanian–Hungarian customs union. Naturally, Leopold II rejected the Diet's proposal.

Finally, in early April, 1791, the Diet began discussion on the royal rescript on administrative reorganization and on the regulation of the position of the serfs. The legislative work that resulted has remained unparalleled in Transylvanian history. One hundred and sixty-two bills were submitted, and a coherent code of law and a constitution were drawn up.

Transylvania's constitutional position was specifically defined: the House of Habsburg ruled Transylvania as a member of the Hungarian Crown, by virtue of their title of king of Hungary. Transylvania could not, therefore, be governed as part of some other area of the Habsburg Empire.

The Diet passed thirty-seven bills on the oath of the union recognizing that the Estates have an equal share in legislation, and that fundamental rights of the Hungarian and Transylvanian Chancellery be immutable. Further bills dealt with the Diet's rules of procedure; with the nobility's right to hold office (the non-landed nobility and the non-Saxon *cives* were restricted in the offices they could hold, and non-nobles and non-*cives* were declared ineligible for office); and with their right to elect the high officials of the land (the king was to have power only to confirm the choice).

Among the laws dealing with feudal rights and obligations, there were laws which dealt with the rights of the serfs. The Diet was relatively moderate in its approach to the free migration of the serfs. It did, in fact, declare that the serf was no longer bound to the soil, but made his ability to move conditional on strict prerequisites which were difficult to satisfy. The Diet also declared that the landowners had exclusive rights of ownership over the forests.

A law was passed which guaranteed the Hungarian language primacy over all the other languages in use in Transylvania declaring it to be the language in official use within the country itself. The Diet also called for a bill to ratify the plans for the *Erdélyi Magyar Nyelvmivelő Társaság*.

The matter of taxation was exhaustively dealt with. The Diet reiterated the principle that *"onus non inhaeret fundo"*, and restored the freedom from taxation of a number of privileged groups — noble ecclesiastics, the landless nobility, and the two Székely military strata — further of some privileged administrative cadres. The Diet also declared again its exclusive right to determine the amount of Transylvania's yearly tax, as well as its right to levy and to collect it.

A number of important laws dealt with religious issues. One law specified once again the system of four received religions, and guaranteed the

freedom of worship to the faithful of Greek Orthodoxy, "which is already considered one of the tolerated religions". The Diet improved on the Patent of Toleration by specifying that in the case of mixed marriages, the girls were to be baptized in the mother's religion, the boys in the father's.

While all this work was going on, Leopold II forwarded to the Diet the national demands summed up in the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (Supplicant Booklet of the Wallachians), the most important political document that Transylvania's Romanians produced in the course of the eighteenth century.

The *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* was a collective work: the moving spirits behind it were Ignatie Darabont, Uniate bishop of Várad, and his circle; it was edited in Vienna, having been written primarily by Iosif Mehesi, who relied for his historical documentation on Samuil Micu-Klein. The petition took final shape in March 1791. Its historical argumentation followed the theory of Daco-Romanian continuity, and as such reflected the shortcomings of a great many of the "national" histories of the period, when the neophyte ardour of national sentiment often found expression in an invented glorious past. But there can be no arguing on one point of the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum:* the Romanians were the most numerous of the peoples of Transylvania. Accordingly, it demanded the recognition of the Romanians as the Fourth Nation, with rights for Romanian ecclesiastics, nobles and commoners equal to those enjoyed by the analogous classes of the Three Nations. Further, it called for the exclusive or additional use of the Romanian language in municipalities and localities inhabited exclusively or predominantly by Romanians. The *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* sought to give Transylvania's Romanian population a place within the feudal order, and was not yet a political statement of nationalism in its modern sense. As the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox bishops wrote to the emperor in 1792: "The greatest dignity and right of a citizen of Transylvania is to take some part in lawmaking and in administration, and to this end to elect dietal representatives and government officials, and be himself elected as such". It occurs very rarely, however, that the Hungarians elect a Romanian to fill any office, "and it is this that really accounts for the bitter and protracted oppression of the most populous nation of Transylvania".

At about the same time as the above document was framed, the Uniate clergy addressed a petition to the emperor which contained practically the same demands, but without the historical claims.

Leopold II referred both documents to the Transylvanian Diet: let the Diet be the one to reject them. The *Supplex Libellus Valachorum,* when read to the Diet, met with silence. The Estates had come to the realization that Romanian nationalism was a fact of Transylvanian political life. After discussing the matter in committee, the Diet took the stand that the Romanians could not be given more than the present civic rights in the areas of the Hungarian and Székely nation, for the rights of the nobility and of the *libertini* were equal, and independent of ethnic affiliation, as were the burdens borne by the serfs. (The Saxons postponed taking a stand.) As for religious liberties, the Diet noted that the Uniates already had liberty of worship, and a bill was in the making to give the Orthodox church the same right. As far as the Diet could see, the main cause of the Romanian population's backward-

ness was the ignorance of their priests; a Standing Committee for Ecclesiastical Affairs was entrusted with the task of finding a way to improve matters.

The breakthrough the Romanians had hoped to achieve did not come. In the matter of political equality, they received the answer that was to be expected. As for the two Greek churches, they did, in fact, enjoy religious freedom. But the Three Nations were not about to admit of a fourth lacking a landed nobility.

The central government did a thorough job of screening the bills submitted by the Diet of 1790–1791. Instead of the union with Hungary, the law that was passed pronounced Transylvania to be essentially independent of it.

The government would not hear of legislating the immutability of the Estates' fundamental rights. The sovereign's prerogatives, however, were reiterated with an absolutistic slant. Nor was the central government inclined to ease the exhaustive screening of those wishing to study abroad. As for the law which made Hungarian the official language, its wording was such that subsequently it could be misinterpreted to apply to Latin. For all that, the government did approve some of the bills guaranteeing the nobility's rights. Thus, for instance, in keeping with the *Restitutionsedikt*, the old legal system was reinstated. Most of the bills the Diet submitted on religious matters received Vienna's approval, including the one guaranteeing the Orthodox faithful freedom of worship. The regular committees that were to elaborate on the Diet's reform proposals were placed under the direction of György Bánffy. He was to choose — from among those the Diet had nominated — the eight men who were to take part in the actual work of each committee an effective way of eliminating opposition.

The bills the Diet of 1790–1791 had submitted were taken up by the next two Diets as well, but without much more success. By 1794–1795, the Estates were growing more and more impatient. At the beginning of 1794, some aristocrats and members of the nobility had formed the Diana Hunting Society, with a programme that foreshadowed the activities of various societies that were to spring up in the Reform Era: translating handbooks on agriculture, encouraging horse breeding, undertaking the moral education of Transylvania's youth, and providing opportunities for social contacts between the aristocracy and the nobility. The Gubernium, however, found the "hunting society" much too politicized for its taste. Bánffy wisely counselled it to dissolve before the government broke it up, and the members listened to his advice.

By the summer of 1794, the Jacobin movement had reached Transylvania from Hungary. In some counties, the opposition landowners won the day, and the county refused to provide new conscripts. Even those already conscripted were sent home, and the military aid requested by the government was denied. László Türi, chief justice of Transylvania, the most capable of the opposition's leaders, headed the group which worked out a comprehensive plan for the reform of the Transylvanian military: a mercenary peasant army of four thousand, and a noble army of the same size that was to rotate in monthly stints under the command of its own generals. Türi's proposal was submitted to the Diet, but the government intervened, for even Bánffy could not ignore rumours of a Jacobin group determined to

provoke a "general conflagration", and the chief of staff received "information" that Türi and the nobility had forty-eight thousand armed men at their disposal although Jacobins in Hungary had already been arrested by this time. Governor Bánffy, however, soon became convinced that no "conflagration" threatened Transylvania, and put an end to the matter by simply dismissing Türi. There were to be no Jacobin trials in Transylvania.

The proposals submitted by the standing committees set up by the 1791 Diet are the chief indicators of the political attitude of both the Transylvanian nobility and of the Gubernium, for the committees worked under Governor Bánffy's direction.

Regulating the serfs' feudal services and dues continued to be a task that involved seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Part of the difficulty was the old problem of Transylvania's overpopulation. The committee finally settled the size of a full holding at 3.5 to 6 *holds* of arable, and 1.5 to 3.5 *holds* of meadow, and required that the copyholder do 2 days of *robot* a week with a draught animal, or with a plough by way of service. For cotter, the *robot* was set at 25–35 days annually. When the Gubernium reviewed the committee's recommendations, it suggested that an entire holding be defined as an area of 5–7.5 *holds* of arable (for some regions, the suggested upper limit was 10 *holds*), and that in meadow, 2.5–6.5 *holds* constitute an entire holding. The chancellery supported the Gubernium's modifications. But the issue never went beyond the stage of preliminary discussion at the 1810–1811 Diet. Regulating the serfs' services and dues had got no farther than it had been in the 1770s.

The recommendations made by the various standing committees are detailed enough to fill a library. Paging through them, we get a comprehensive picture of practically every aspect of contemporary life, including pollution, and the legal discrimination encountered by various more or less ethnically defined occupational groups, such as, for instance, Jewish peddlers and Gipsy horse traders. Every recommendation was aimed at modifying legislation in the direction of a more modern, less discriminative system.

The voluminous proposals made by the Committee on Economic Policy constituted the most comprehensive overview of the Transylvanian economy since 1751. Their primary goal was to increase productivity. But the central government could not accept a fundamental element of the committee's programme, the need for protectionism and for reciprocity in Transylvania's ties with the Hereditary Lands.

The committee headed by László Türi, by then the leader of the opposition, submitted a draft Criminal Code that was as enlightened as Joseph II's Code of 1787, and which, moreover, had been worked out explicitly with Transylvanian conditions in mind.

Another typical Enlightenment attitude was revealed in the recommendation submitted by the Committee for Ecclesiastical Affairs on some matters raised by the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*. The central issue was the question of the Romanian population's education. The Saxon position, particularly as represented by Michael Soterius, a councillor of the Gubernium, called for a ruthless "civilizing" campaign. There was to be strict regulation of Romanian habits of building and dressing; certain Saxon institutions were to be introduced into the Romanian villages; assimilation was to be forced;

and the Romanian forms of recreation were to be "reformed" — for one thing, outlaw ballads were to be banned. Mózes Bartha, a Uniate jurist from Kolozsvár and a town councillor, attributed much greater weight to education (including some attempts at magyarization), and saw the internal reform of the Romanian church and the teaching of trades as being of major importance. The Josephine chairman of the committee, János Esterházy, and Bánffy himself, felt that the main emphasis should be on education, but that the purpose of education was to increase the number of the emperor's loyal subjects, rather than knowledge itself. On this view, a better educated Romanian clergy was of the utmost necessity. In the end, it was Esterházy and Bánffy's ideas that were submitted to the government. The point was never reached of treating Romanian national grievances as a political issue, of the Romanians' being invited to discuss their own future: the committee had no Romanian members. In the final analysis, it did not much matter. For by the time the committee's recommendations had filtered through the official government channels, all that remained was the proposal for setting up an Orthodox seminary and teachers' college.

No Diet met to submit the committee recommendations until 1810, and by then the political leaders of the 1790s were either too old, or no more. The laws that were passed in 1810–1811 were a conservative and loyal modification of the original proposals. Politically, the twenty years that followed practically ruled out the possibility of reform initiatives.

Up to the 1830s, it was in the cultural sphere that Transylvania's would-be modernizers had to try to continue what had barely started in the realm of politics.

Culture and Bureaucracy

No sphere of Transylvanian culture escaped the influence of contemporary European trends.

The philosopher and mathematician Pál Sipos was first a Kantian, and then, after reading Fichte and Schleiermacher, developed his own brand of idealism, an amalgam of Enlightenment principles and Christian morality. The most erudite and systematic Kantian not just in Transylvania but also in Hungary at the time was Sámuel Köteles, professor of philosophy at the Calvinist colleges of Marosvásárhely and Nagyenyed.

In botany, it was Johann Christian Baumgarten who gained an international recognition for the two decades of research summarized in his *Enumeratio Stirpium in Magno Transylvaniae Principatu praeprimis indigenarum* (Enumeration of the Genera in the Great Principality of Transylvania especially the indigenous). From 1804, Farkas Bolyai taught at the Calvinist college at Marosvásárhely, raising the standards of education in the natural sciences there to a European level.

Transylvania proved particularly receptive to certain innovations in medicine. Vaccination against smallpox was introduced just a year after the first vaccines became available, thanks in part to the efforts of Ferenc Nyulas. Nyulas was also an expert on the medicinal properties of Transylvania's

thermal springs, publishing a book on the subject in 1800. The first medical book in Romanian which also dealt with mineral waters was written in 1821 by Vasile Popp. He was physician to the miners at Zalatna, and his first work, a doctoral dissertation, was on Romanian burial customs. Popp also compiled the first scholarly bibliography of Romanian literature.

These were the years when attempts were made to establish an institutional framework for the country's various cultures. We have already referred to György Aranka's raising the matter of the Transylvanian Hungarian Philological Society at the 1790–1791 Diet. Although it had the Diet's support, the central government refused on some formal pretext to allow this. György Bánffy, however, provided for this functioning under an alternate name of *Próba Társaság* (Testing Society). The society operated from 1793 to 1806; most of its members were Hungarians, but the Romanian Ioan Piuariu-Molnár also belong. The Saxon Martin Hochmeister published its members' articles in the *Siebenbürgische Quartalschrift* (Transylvanian Quarterly) of (Nagy)Szeben. The society gave a great deal of support to the Hungarian theatre at Kolozsvár, with a number of the members, Aranka among them, translating plays for it to perform. Many of the ambitious plans that the Hungarian society started out with were never realized: the systematic study of Transylvania's flora and mineral deposits, the improvement of education in the natural sciences, and the encouragement of the use of the country's natural resources. The society had also planned to set up a library and a museum — something along the lines of the Bruckenthal Collection, which had given a great boost to Saxon culture. By the early 1800s, a great many of the society's activities were being discontinued. Indifference, lack of funds, and the deterioration of the political climate combined to bring it to a complete standstill in 1806. The *Kéziratkiadó Társaság* (Manuscript Publishing Society) affiliated to the *Próba Társaság* had managed to bring out only a few publications.

Hungarian culture in Transylvania received its new impetus from Hungary. An abettor in this was Gábor Döbrentei, the son of a Hungarian Lutheran minister who had settled in Transylvania to be a tutor. Encouraged by the great Hungarian writer, Ferenc Kazinczy, he started the *Erdélyi Múzeum* (Transylvanian Museum) in 1814. Though relatively short-lived, this was to become the most prestigious Hungarian literary journal of the age. Its success was due as much to the survival of Freemasonic traditions as to the fact that the Transylvanian aristocracy, isolated as they were, had a heightened appreciation of their vernacular — for which they were often quoted as an example to Hungary's aristocrats by the literary gentlemen. However, the nation-wide famine and the competition coming in from Hungary proved too much for the *Erdélyi Múzeum*, and it ceased publication in 1817.

It was the theatre, taken very much as a part of a social intercourse, that generated the most enthusiastic activity. The pioneers of Hungarian theatre — János Kótsi Patkó, Pál Jantsó, József Benke — were all Protestants and Transylvanians, having got their start, as indeed did the Hungarian theatre, on the stages of the Protestant colleges. By 1821, the Hungarian National Players' Company *(Magyar Nemzeti Játékszín)* was operating in Kolozsvár. One of its greatest patrons was the leading oppositional politician, Miklós

Wesselényi the Elder. But the theatre company also had the support of Governor Bánffy, and his non-Hungarian wife, Jozefa Palm.

Though love of the Hungarian language stood at the centre of all this activity, the really significant Transylvanian scholarly achievements in linguistics occurred abroad. For the government did not succeed in isolating the country completely. It was thus that Sámuel Gyarmathy's major work, the *Affinitas linguae hungaricae* (Affinity of the Hungarian Language) appeared in Göttingen, in 1799. Gyarmathy was a pioneer of comparative linguistics, using vocabulary and inflectional homologies to arrive at the identification of the entire family of Finno-Ugrian languages.

Within two decades, the other great Transylvanian linguist, Sándor Kőrösi Csoma, had set out from Transylvania for east-central Asia in search of the ancient homeland of the Hungarians. What he found was Tibet, and the project of his life: the compilation of the first Tibetan–English dictionary.

There is less to say about Saxon culture during these decades. Cultural life in Szeben received a setback when the Gubernium moved to Kolozsvár. The contemplated Academy of Sciences was never set up. Instead, the *Societas Philohistorum* (Society of the Adherents of History) was founded, and the publication of Transylvanian chronicles began. Of the Saxon journals, the *Siebenbürgische Quartalschrift* appeared until 1801; the *Provinzialblätter* (Provincial Papers; 1805–1824) was its intellectual heir.

More impressive was the Romanian cultural activity of these decades. True, its centre was outside Transylvania, in Buda and Lemberg. Micu-Klein, Şincai and Maior who were regarded and called the Transylvanian Triad had had their fill of the growing conservatism of the Romanian clergy, and of the excellent manager, Bishop Ivan Bob, who, though a patron of Romanian culture, tended to discriminate against men more talented than he. They moved to Buda, and went to work for the University Press there. As the leading publisher of Romanian books, it became a cultural centre for Moldavia and Wallachia as well, catering the wealthy boyars who wanted to publish either literary works or political tracts arguing their country's right to independence. It is indicative that after Ioan Piuariu-Molnár had tried vainly in Transylvania to set up a popular educational journal and a philosophical society, he made considerable profits by publishing Orthodox religious literature in Buda, for sale in all the Romanian-speaking lands. While the eclectic Samuil Micu-Klein, and the nonconformist Gheorghe Şincai, were able to get only a fraction of their works published, Petru Maior, a realist, became the most prolific Romanian author of the time. It was he who handed down the views of the Enlightenment historians on the origins of Transylvania's Romanians in his *Istoria pentru începutul romanilor în Dacia*. The work deals with Transylvanian history essentially to the time of the Hungarian Conquest in the pragmatic, and as yet civilized, style of argumentation characteristic of the age, and without looking for scapegoats for the way events developed. Maior's *Istoria* became a bible for the next generation of Romanians on both sides of the Carpathians.

Among the early Transylvanian Romanian literary works, by far the most outstanding was Ion Budai-Deleanu's *Ţiganiada*. Budai-Deleanu had taken an active role in defending the theses of the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* from the attacks published on it (his *Widerlegung* /Reputation/ is a defence

of the theory of Daco-Roman continuity), and he drafted the new petition the Romanian nation sent to the emperor in 1804. But he is best remembered for the *Țiganiada*, a wry anti-epic about the Gipsies, who, in return for their help against the Turks, are offered the chance to establish their own state by Vlad Țepeș, the dread voivode of Wallachia. Fighting they do little of, but as soon as the Turkish menace ease, begin arguing as to whether they should establish a democracy or a monarchy. They can come to no agreement, and anarchy returns; with the result that their chance to establish a state goes astray. A lonely, aging Transylvanian Enlightenment figure writing in Lemberg, Budai-Deleanu attempted to pass on to his people a lifetime's worth of sobering experience.

The Orthodox Romanian writers represented the "popular" element in Transylvanian literature. While the University Press in Buda published scholarly books and handbooks on agriculture and animal husbandry, the presses in Nagyszeben and Brassó put out "chap books" for popular reading, written by men like Vasile Aron and Ioan Barac. Even Radu Tempea, the director of the Orthodox elementary schools, whose grammar followed the latinizing trend, made some concessions to his readership.

The petty cares of day-to-day survival put great strains on the Orthodox church as well, as pressure from the Greek Catholics mounted. To forestall the flare-up of religious conflict among the Romanian churches, in 1789 Aron Budai-Deleanu, Ion's brother, secretary of the consistory and a councillor of the treasury, together with Radu Tempea, recommended to Vienna a United Romanian church that would be Catholic in name, Orthodox in its rites and laws, and more autonomous in its relationship with the government. The Gubernium rejected the proposal in view of the critical foreign situation, which made the prospect of any popular movement unappealing. The Orthodox church was defenseless against the growing strength of Greek Catholicism. It was partly because of this that it looked to the Romanian lands beyond the Carpathians in expanding the range of its educational activities. Piuariu-Molnár was the one who actually visited the principalities, bitterly noting that it was Moldavia and Wallachia which benefited from the educated Romanians' determination to leave Transylvania behind. In the 1810s, Gheorghe Lazăr was one of these voluntary exiles, who came into conflict with his bishop and established a higher education in Romanian excluding thereby the Orthodox Greek. This was to have such dedicated followers later.

The only noteworthy political activity of the 1810s was the renewed attempt to regulate feudal services and dues. The Diet of 1810–1811 did not really deal with the issue. But in 1813 famine lent some urgency to the matter: serfs were leaving the land in droves for the principalities, for Hungary, and for the less affected areas of Transylvania. On 31 December, 1813, Francis I called on Chancellor Sámuel Teleki to submit his reform proposal, and two weeks later, the chancellery presented a modified version of the Hungarian regulations. There the matter rested, until 1817, when Francis I, on his visit to Transylvania, saw for himself what famine at its worst could be like. He called on the aging Governor Bánffy to implement the reform, and a commission was set up for the purpose. The commission suggested accepting the recommendations made by the standing committee appointed

in 1790–1791, and that the Diet be convened to do so. In the end, the Council of State took over the matter on 17 May, 1819. For the time being, it did not specify the size of an entire holding, but wanted a new census taken. A novelty of the proposed regulation, however, was that it finally set the *robot* at the level it had been in Hungary for over fifty years: one day a week with a draught animal, and two days a week without. This would have meant a great improvement for Transylvania's serfs, though their position would still have been much worse than that of the Hungarian peasants, because they had much smaller holdings.

But the proposed regulation satisfied no one. The central government thought it best to call in impartial outsiders to carry the reform through, a group of royal commissioners headed by Antal Cziráky, vice-president of the Hungarian Treasury.

The county assemblies protested vehemently, gleaning their arguments from every possible source: from Hungarian customary law to Rousseau's social contract. In the fray we find some of the future leaders of Transylvania's liberals: Miklós Wesselényi the Younger, Ádám Kendeffi, and others. For opposition to the proposed regulation of feudal relations in 1819–1820 brought into one camp the conservatives who were determined to give no concessions to their serfs, and the "feudal constitutionalists", those who insisted on the Diet's passing whatever measures needed to be taken. The two groups were to diverge greatly in the decades to come: in a generation, the latter group would be initiating the emancipation of the serfs.

The general air of discontent did nothing to alleviate the very different kind of discontent among the serfs. Peasant movements sprang up everywhere: in Doboka county, the eastern corner of Kolozs county, in Küküllő, and in Alsó- and Felső-Fehér counties. At the centre of the dispute was the size of the holdings: the peasants demanded a new land survey, and the rectification of the injustices they had suffered in the previous one. Some wanted to join the frontier regiments, others wanted to see the proposed maximum two-days' *robot* confirmed.

II. The Reform Era (1830–1848)

The 1830s marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the peoples of Transylvania. Gone was the oppressive torpor of the previous decade; political and social activism was more widespread and more lively than perhaps ever before. Hungarian historians are wont to call this period of ferment the "Reform Era", indicating thereby that it was characterized by a commitment to liberal reforms among Hungarian politicians, who wanted to see the country gradually make the change from feudalism to capitalism, and were determined to remove the impediments to economic, social and political modernization. Contemporary — especially Romanian and Saxon — sources, however, generally refer to the period as the era of "national awakening", a term which focuses on perhaps the decisive element of the value system and the view of life of the time. For these were the decades when among Hungarians, Romanians and Saxons alike more and more people dedicated themselves to wakening their respective nations from their passivity, convinced that there was not another moment to lose if they were ever to establish a free community of east-central Europe, national revival centred around the national language. "The nation" became a sacrosanct concept denoting both the social collective of native speakers of a particular language, and the entire complex of conscious and unconscious factors making for their sense of cohesion.

These national ideologies, which focused on the collective whole, inspired the belief that the changes involved in the ongoing process of bourgeois transformation would serve to bridge the existing social differences. At the same time, the idea that east-central and south-eastern Europe might be reorganized along the lines of a community of coequal, linguistically homogeneous nations kindled hopes of radical changes in the existing power structure and political system. Intransigent nationalism and profound idealism characterized the thinking of most contemporaries; more precisely, some admixture of these two elements, in proportions that varied with the personality involved. These were the decades when the modern ideas of human rights and personal liberty become established beyond eradication, but concomitantly they gave birth to the ideologies that would militate against them.

Hungarian Liberalism and the Feudal Constitution

The first national movement to make its appearance on the Transylvanian political scene was that of the Hungarians.

The Transylvanian movement was an organic part of the reform movement afoot in Hungary, though it had a dynamism all its own. In Hungary, the liberal reformists had a much stronger basis of support. For there, the middle nobility was much more numerous. It was this social group that had the greatest stake in comprehensive social and political reforms, and which consciously and proudly assumed the role of "middle class" which in western Europe had been played by the bourgeoisie. The middle nobility was a social formation specific to Hungary; in all of eastern Europe, there was no group with comparable autonomy of local self-government. For the municipal government of the counties was in the hands of the middle nobility. Thanks to the county system, there were as many small power centres in Hungary as there were counties, and these centres of local resistance to central government from Vienna had learned to work in concert for greater effectiveness.

Transylvania had no middle nobility of any great consequence, but many more of its aristocrats took an active role in the reform movement than Hungary's. So much so, that conservative detractors of the Transylvanian movement tried to convince the court that it was no more than some new machination devised by the aristocracy. In fact, the half a dozen or so aristocrats with the largest properties were conservative, and for the most part deeply in debt. Most Transylvanian aristocrats, however, had incomes hardly surpassing that of members of the middle nobility in Hungary. Their social influence, nevertheless, was all the greater. Most of them had strong family ties to the middle and lesser nobility who shaped the direction of county politics. During their education the young aristocrats forged lifelong friendships with their teachers, and with the intelligentsia as such. Culture and education in Transylvania were becoming a social force that was to undermine the traditional class system.

It can hardly be a coincidence that it was during these years that the term "intelligentsia" acquired currency. But Transylvania never produced a classical intelligentsia, the class of politically dispossessed social critics so typical of Poland and Russia in the nineteenth century. For while the Polish intelligentsia could do no more than keep alive the faint spark of hope for national independence, and the Russian no more than indefatigably sustain literary protests, in Transylvania, the intelligentsia was able to enter the fray and take part in the struggle for modernization.

Yet, though Transylvania's feudal institutions permitted initiative, they fell far short of providing a framework for consistent reform. The counties here were much more at the mercy of the central government than in Hungary. The county administrations had no right to collect taxes for their own purposes; it was the central government which distributed the monies available. When the time came to elect new local officials, the county assemblies elected a candidate from each of three received religions, but it was the government which selected which one of them would, in fact, hold office.

Still, the counties' formal autonomy permitted a large degree of organized resistance to the central government. At times, the county assemblies were attended by as many as three or four thousand people. The fact that they had a part in the choice of who would run the county administration and judiciary, and could choose their representatives to the Diets made participation in public affairs a matter of personal interest even to the considerable numbers of illiterate among the lesser nobility.

Structurally, the unicameral Transylvanian Diet was at an advantage over the Hungarian when it came to pushing through the programme of reform. The Regalists — drawn for the most part from among the aristocracy and, for the sake of balance, the lesser nobility — when they joined with the senior municipal officials and the members of the Gubernium, who also voted in the Diet, comprised a majority of 200–230 votes. The initiative, however, was in the hands of the county delegates (thirty-six men), primarily by virtue of their psychological and moral superiority as the representatives of "the people". They generally won the support of the delegates of the Székely seats, as well as of the town delegates (between thirty-six and thirty-eight) each of whom could cast one vote (unlike in Hungary, where all the towns together were entitled to but one vote). As often as not, they also had the delegates of the Saxon seats (twenty-two votes) on their side, to say nothing of the fact that not all Regalists were conservative.

The central government had convoked no Diet since 1811, though by law it should have called one every year. This flagrant violation of the constitution had the result that when the Diet did convene, Transylvania's nobles joined forces against bureaucratic absolutism to a man.

The liberal nobility supported the demands of some urban and intellectual personalities for the democratization of town politics, and of all representative bodies. For the landowning nobility had moved into the towns in considerable numbers, and they, too, kept coming up against the bureaucracy of the closed oligarchies. Kolozsvár had become a "capital city" of sorts after the aristocracy had built sumptuous residents there. The nobility, who enjoyed freedom from taxation in the countryside, paid local taxes like any resident of the town. Their integration was so complete that many a nobleman acquired the rights of a burgher in his town. The town casinos were set up in the effort to bridge the social gap between the noblemen and the urban middle classes, and laboured to diffuse middle-class values. The role played by the liberal nobility in the towns, and the grudging respect of their rural peers, considerably enhanced the prestige of the Hungarian towns at a time when the nobility as a whole was losing something of its old authority.

The Transylvanian reform movement is characterized by a curious dichotomy. While the Liberals' political programme called only for the restoration and consolidation of the old feudal constitution, there was more and more talk of the need to win recognition for bourgeois civil liberties. What they wanted was democracy for the nobility, only to be able to take the step to a full-fledge liberal bourgeois democracy. No one career illustrates this duality of Hungarian liberalism in Transylvania better than that of Baron Miklós Wesselényi.

In the 1820s, he was the one who organized the nobility's resistance to the central government's efforts at regulating feudal dues and services. Ten

years later, he was one of the leaders of the reformist opposition at the Hungarian Diet, and it was largely thanks to his powers of persuasion that the Liberals made comprehensive social reform part of their programme of constitutional self-government. For it was Wesselényi who was one of the first to advocate "making common cause on the basis of common interests", in other words, who wanted to convince landlords and serfs alike that modernization and national revival were in the interest of them both. Wesselényi's book, *Balítéletekről* (On Preconceptions) — which appeared in 1833, after a delay of two years and in Leipzig because of the censorship — contained proposals that were far too radical for even his liberal contemporaries. He recommended that a regulation, applicable nation-wide, be introduced, stipulating how much a serf was to pay his lord and on what terms in order to become the free owner of his land, that is, to redeem, once and for all, the holding he lived on from its burden of services and payments in kind. And while Wesselényi was presenting motions for thoroughgoing social reform at the Hungarian Diet convened in Pozsony in 1832, in the same year in Transylvania he was still calling on the central government to redress the Estates' grievances. In other words, he was insisting that the feudal constitution be restored intact. His demand that the nobility's liberties be respected won him enormous popularity especially in the Székelyföld.

The Hungarian Liberals of Transylvania were keenly aware that they needed to formulate their demands with an eye on their supporters, and on the possibilities open to them. Károly Szász, the brilliant exponent of the opposition's policy of grievances and of the legal and historical arguments used to support it, had this to say: "We can proceed only step by step. He who steps out of line to race ahead will not be able to move the masses, and will himself fall victim to his recklessness. He who stays in line, at least encouraging the others on, has a chance of getting his fellows to proceed a little faster".[1]

In the cultural sphere, it is relatively easy to trace the path from the Enlightenment to liberalism, and the turning-point, too, is clear cut. Sándor Bölöni Farkas, who translated Goethe and Schiller, and in the 1820s still maintained that in compiling the first menu in Hungarian he was doing "more ... for the cause as a whole than by some theoretical work" on the importance of national customs,[2] returned a few years later from a trip to the United States to score the publishing success of the decade with his travelogue. Until that time, America for most Transylvanians had been synonymous with freedom of religion; in Bölöni's book, it was hailed as the country of "common sense".[3] His objective accounts still convey the impact of a political creed: "It is only liberty that can mellow man for liberty and culture".[4]

1. K. Szász, Oskolákról (On Schools). *Nemzeti Társalkodó*, 1841, 2nd semester, No. 2.
2. Letter by Sándor Bölöni Farkas to József Gedő. 11 March, 1829. Cited by E. Jakab, in: Bölöni Farkas Sándor és kora. (Sándor Bölöni Farkas and his Epoch.) *Keresztény Magvető*, 1870, 277.
3. S. Bölöni Farkas, *Utazás Észak-Amerikában.* (Travelling in North America.) Edited and introduced by S. Benkő. Bucharest 1966, 274.
4. From the diary of S. Bölöni Farkas. Ibid. 51.

Bölöni represented the radical, democratic trend in liberalism, a trend highly congenial to the Unitarian cast of mind. Though they comprised only 10 per cent of Transylvania's Hungarians, the Unitarians' fine school system guaranteed them considerable social mobility. At the same time, since the Unitarian was the lowest ranking of the received religions, Unitarians were often at a disadvantage when it came to jobs in the civil service. This, as much as the Deism implicit in their theology, made them particularly susceptible to rationalism and liberalism.

The Calvinists were the largest and most powerful group among the Hungarians of Transylvania. The contemporary reforms within the Calvinist church were, thus, significant as the first experiments in modern democratic community organization. Under the new system, every head of a family could cast his vote for the members of the consistory, and commoners, too, could be chosen elders in the two-round election. The Calvinists expressly set out to follow the American Constitution in their organizational reforms, and the government watched them with apprehension, fearful that the opposition would try to reform the Transylvanian constitution, too, in this spirit, if it ever acquired a majority in the Diet.

Nevertheless, central government could not ignore indefinitely the pressures being put upon it especially by the Hungarians, and finally called the Diet to meet in the summer of 1834. Archduke Ferdinand d'Este, who was sent to Transylvania as royal commissioner, hastened to inform the court that should the nobility take arms against the central government, the Romanian peasantry would turn against them in a ruthless jacquerie. Nor did the archduke waste any time bringing his conviction home to the reformist opposition. Things were no more auspicious at the Diet, where already a discussion of the rules of procedure raised antagonisms to such a fever pitch that the house was constantly under threat of dissolution. It did not take long for the threat to become reality. The government considered the moderately liberal "doctrinaire liberal party" even more dangerous than the "Radicals" led by Miklós Wesselényi. And though it was commonly believed that the Diet had been dissolved to chastize Wesselényi for having dared to distribute lithographed copies of the Diet's debates, in fact the ruler ordered the dissolution before work of the publications had even reached Vienna. Chancellor Metternich had made up his mind to institute exemplary reprisals against the Transylvanian reformers, in part to discourage those inclined to call for liberal constitutional reforms in other parts of the empire. Charges of treason or insubordination were brought against all who had taken part in the movement; Wesselényi's case was heard by both the Transylvanian and Hungarian Diets, and in the end, he was sentenced to three years in prison. The Transylvanian nobility, for the most part, reacted to the court's repressive tactics with passive resistance, so much so that finally, the government decided on a more conciliatory tone.

In 1837, a new Diet was convened. The Estates received assurances that certain important elements of the feudal constitution would be respected, especially as regards the election of officials. Both sides seemed determined, for the moment, to steer clear of the most divisive issues. Nevertheless, the opposition won a real victory when Archduke Ferdinand, the court's candidate for the position of governor, failed to get the requisite number of votes, and left Transylvania, mortified.

The Hungarian Liberals' Attitude toward the Nationalities

In Hungary, too, the 1830s ended on a note of compromise between the court and the reformist opposition. Thus the unbridgeable differences became less manifest for some time. Not that Vienna had abandoned bureaucratic absolutism; but it did make certain concessions to feudal constitutionalism. The Hungarian national movement was dedicated to the idea of building a nation-state. Its leaders thought to ally with liberal forces throughout the empire to transform the Habsburg lands into a confederation in which Transylvania would be unified with Hungary. For the Hungarian were haunted by the spectre of national extinction which Herder had conjured up at the end of the eighteenth century, haunted by the fact that they were kinless in the "sea of Slavs". The sense of ethnic isolation was but compounded by the Hungarian Liberals, who spoke of four million Hungarians and ten million non-Hungarians, when in fact there were five million Hungarians, and the total population of the lands of the Hungarian Crown was at most twelve million. (The majority of the Hungarians lived in the dynamically developing heart of the Carpathian Basin, and only ten to twelve per cent in Transylvania, where they comprised around thirty per cent of the population.)

The proposed unification of Transylvania and Hungary was part and parcel of the Liberals' programme for the modernization of the empire as a whole, and certainly would have entailed considerable changes in Transylvania. For Hungary was farther along the road to replacing feudal institutions with more equitable ones; it had a more modern legal system, with the peasantry enjoying some degree of legal protection; and commodity production, too, benefited from being fewer restrictions on the market.

Unification — the details of which the Liberals proposed to leave to the two Diets — was conditional on the introduction of liberal reforms in Transylvania, and on regulating the peasantry's services to bring them in line with the provisions in effect in Hungary. But it also assumed that the multi-ethnic communities in both countries could be integrated into what would, after all, be a Magyar (Hungarian) nation-state. The Hungarian Liberals considered that social reform had to go hand in hand with "magyarization", for a multi-national country, they felt, would forever remain in thrall to feudal particularism and local oligarchies. The particular syllogism on which their programme rested ran as follows: if the Hungarian nobility were able to push through its programme of social and constitutional reform, the newly enfranchised non-Magyar peoples would prove loyal to the "Hungarian" nation-state, even to the point of learning the Hungarian language. For it was an axiom of the age that the supremacy of the national language was a precondition of progress. The Hungarian reformers appreciated neither the difficulties of learning Hungarian, nor the elemental strength of the resistance with which every attempt at forced assimilation necessarily meets. The fact that the ethnic conflicts of previous decades were essentially class conflicts rooted in the feudal system that they were proposing to do away with, also helped fuel their illusions. And the analogies they thought to

464

71. The Wesselényi palace at Zsibó, 1778–1785

72. Covered suspension bridge at Torda. Built by János Kövesi, 1797–1804

Grund und Aufriß
von der Lehrhütten Unteren Schmelz
Hütte in welcher 2 Stückhöfen er-
baut werden

74. The Nagyszeben sugar refinery in the first half of the nineteenth century

LÍBERA REGÍAQVE CÍVÍTAS

75. View of Marosvásárhely from the southeast. Steel engraving by Sámuel Nagy, 1827

SICULICA MAROS VÁSÁRHELY.

Almae Patriae

APPENDIX.

SCIENTIAM SPATII *absolute veram* exhibens:

a veritate aut falsitate Axiomatis XI *Euclidei (a priori haud unquam decidenda)* in-
dependentem; adjecta ad casum fal-
sitatis, quadratura circuli
.geometrica.

Auctore JOHANNE BOLYAI de eadem, Geometrarum
in Exercitu Caesareo Regio Austriaco Ca-
strensium Capitaneo

76. The *Appendix* by János Bolyai (A Treatise on Non-Euclidian Geometry), 1833

ІСТОРІА

пентру

ачепутул ромънилор ън Дакіа.

— ▪ —

А томить

А е

ПЕТРУ МАІОР де Дичо - Сжимэртин ,

Протопоп , ши ла Дикъцат Крэескул Консіліум Документенціале ал Унгаріеи Крэеск ал Кърцилор Ревісор.

ла Буда ън Крэіаска Тіпографіе ла анул 1812. типэрить

———

Іар акум претипэрить

прин

ІОРДАКІ де Мълинеску ,

Секретарюл Архівіи Статулуй а Прінціпатулуй Молдавіей ;

ку адаучерѣ Діалогулуй, ши а Діспутаціилор урмате ън лимба латінескъ асупра ачестеи Історіе , ши тълмъчите ромънеци

прин

Д. ДАМАСКИН БОЖИНКА ,

Іуріосконсултул Прінціпатулуй Молдавіей.

———

Historia de origine Valachorum.

ън Буда

ку Тіпарюл Крэіцеи Тіпографіе а Універсітатеі Унгуреціи.

1 8 3 4.

77. Petru Maior's influential historical study on the origin of the Romanians. Buda, 1834

78. Bem during the capture of Nagyszeben on 11 March, 1849

discover in studying the history of other nations only confirmed their conviction that civic liberties and national homogeneity were correlatives. They cited the example of France for what a unified people could achieve. They pointed to the United States as an example of the power of political rights to integrate people of the most varied ethnic backgrounds into the same "nation", and by way of domestic examples of the same, spoke of the spontaneous magyarization of the non-Hungarian nobility, and of the non-Hungarian lesser nobility's loyalty to the reformist cause.

In the 1830s, the demands for social reform and for magyarization appeared as an organic whole. "I spared no effort in spreading the ideals of democracy. ... I lived and died for the language of my native land, and I tried to suppress the languages of others ... and make it the sole language, for I wanted to make of every inhabitant [of this land] a free Hungarian", wrote Bölöni in his diary in 1835,[5] only to take a very firm stand against magyarization later. Wesselényi, too, initially wanted to make their learning Hungarian a precondition of the serfs' emancipation. By the 1840s, however, seeing the political activism of the non-Magyar peoples, he warned against forceful magyarization on a number of occasions. The change shows common sense and a growing moral sensibility to values other than one's own. Increasingly, the Hungarian reformers came to see interference in the language any citizen chose to use of the private sphere as unworthy and unjust. However, they still insisted that Hungarian replace Latin as the official language. "To do less would be cowardice; to demand more would be tyranny; either course of action would be suicide", was the way Kossuth put it in the *Pesti Hírlap*.[6]

There was one point in the Hungarian Liberals' programme, however, which from the beginning stood to promote the interests of the Romanian nation: their insistence on the freedom of religion. At the beginning of the 1830s some counties were already frustrating the government's attempts to spread Greek Catholicism at the expense of the Greek Orthodox faith, and instructed their delegates to the Diet to take a stand for the legal recognition of the Orthodox church. Less than ten years later, the Transylvanian Diet of 1841–1843 instructed its standing committee to prepare a bill to this effect and also provided for the emancipation of the Jews.

A number of the local assemblies meeting in preparation for the Diet voted to instruct their delegates to support the liberal aim "to do away" with national, religious and denominational strife. And yet, hardly had the Diet convened, than the Liberals submitted a bill on the use of the Hungarian language which was bound to have just the opposite effect. True, the thrust of the action was to force the central government and the conservative Estates to recognize Hungarian as the official language of Transylvanian administration and legislation. The Székely nation's and the Hungarian nation's municipalities had always used Hungarian in their official deal-

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5. *Bölöni Farkas Sándor naplója.* (Diary by Sándor Bölöni Farkas.) Foreword written by E. Jancsó. Bucharest 1971, 49.
6. L. Kossuth, Bánat és gondolkodás. (Sorrow and Contemplation.) *Pesti Hírlap*, 2 October, 1842, No. 183.

ings. But now there was a wish to make it compulsory for the counties, and for the Saxon seats too, to keep their church registers in Hungarian. Furthermore, the bill provided that in ten years' time, Hungarian be the language of instruction in the Greek Catholic school of Balázsfalva, and at the Orthodox seminary as well. This last set of provisions, however, was repudiated by leading Liberals as an attempt at forceful assimilation, and this, as well as the outcry among the Romanians and the court's reluctance to sanction the bill in the above form, led to the provision's being omitted from the second draft.

The Hungarian Liberals respected the traditional autonomous institutions of the nationalities. Their proposal that these institutions correspond with the Hungarian municipalities and the Gubernium in Hungarian was meant to give expression to the country's concord. How far they were committed to safeguarding the traditional Three Nations' institutions is reflected in Wesselényi's *Szózat a magyar és szláv nemzetiség ügyében* (Appeal for the Question of the Hungarian and the Slav Nationalities) published in 1843. Here, Wesselényi, advocating the empire's reorganization as a confederation, recommends that the Slavs living in Austria be given national autonomy analogous to that of the Saxons of Transylvania. The Saxons, however, were by that time demanding an autonomy more consonant with the modern idea of a nation.

The bill to introduce Hungarian as Transylvania's official language gave rise to heated debate in the Hungarian, Romanian and Saxon press. And though a great many unfounded accusations were hurled on all sides, looking back two decades later, the Romanian George Bariț, had this to say about the "language war": "Let us concede without respect for nationality, that war, the war of pens, was justified, was magnanimous ... and was natural; it was human nature fighting for self-preservation."[7]

The sound and fury of day-to-day power politics, however, inspired also quite another response: the longing for a society that knew no national distinctions, where all men were equal. We can find traces of Transylvanian utopianism in the 1843 *Arithmetica* (Arithmetic) of Farkas Bólyai, the preserver of the eighteenth-century *homo universalis* idea and professor of mathematics at Marosvásárhely. His oblique references to communal property were taken up by his son, János, the same János Bólyai who, in 1832, had been the first to introduce the principles of non-Euclidean geometry in the "Appendix" to his father's *Tentamen* (Experiments). A passionate romantic, János Bólyai was to work out a comprehensive theory of social organization in his "Üdvtan", a set of precepts for the common weal, which took into account and tried to forestall the possibilities of emotional conflict among the members of his Utopian society, where all property was to be held in common. Another Transylvanian Utopian was Sámuel Brassai, polyglot professor at the Unitarian college, who had his schoolmaster expound the following theory in the pages of the Sunday paper supported by the Kolozsvár Casino: "It is the different languages which embody, which cause, which aggravate and perpetuate the conflicts among the nationalities. If all man-

7. G. Bariț, Limbile oficiale. *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, 1860, No. 32.

kind spoke but one language, soon they would form but one people, and every individual would love every other as his kinsman."[8]

But for most of Transylvania's Liberals, the introduction of social reforms seemed a more feasible means of defusing national antagonisms, and it was on this that they concentrated their energies.

Attempts at Social Reform

The regulation of feudal services and dues was far and away the most important socio-political issue that the reformers had to take a stand on. The government's abortive attempts in this direction — made in the 1780s and then again in the 1810s — had made it clear that in reality no less was involved than the abolition of feudalism: the emancipation of the serfs, and the introduction of modern forms of ownership. But first, it was necessary to establish the legal status of the existing properties: to clarify which lands counted as allodial, that is, were the sole property of the landowner, and which were held of him in villeinage, for the idea was that the serfs, once emancipated, were to be able to acquire these latter holdings as freeholds.

Sorting out the issues involved, however, threatened to undermine the existing political and economic order, to disturb the existing system of appropriating the economic surplus which the peasantry produced, and to set in disarray the complex of shifting alliances and counter-alliances which the peasantry, the landowners, and the central government had forged with, and against, one another. The majority of Transylvania's landowners lived in terror of the thought of any regulation. For the peasantry had managed to conceal from the state tax collectors the existence of about half of the land actually under cultivation. Any regulation of services and dues would necessarily involve a thorough survey of all the cultivable land, and would inevitably raise the question of how the presently concealed land was to be classified. If it were counted as belonging to the village, that is, as held by the serf who in fact cultivated it, the serfs would find themselves owing so much tax to the central government that a cutback in the services due the landlord would be necessary if they were not to go under. If, on the other hand, some of the newly registered land were counted as allodial, then relations between the landlords and their peasants would certainly go from bad to worse. It was a dilemma to which the only good solution seemed to be to forestall as long as possible the accurate registration of the land.

For all that, in Transylvania, unlike in Hungary, the measure of wealth was not the size of one's allodial land but the number of one's serfs. Yet it was clear to everyone that wage labour, and even share-cropping, was more productive than work done as *robot*. The difficulty was the shortage of ready cash. At most, the vineyards were worked for wages. To be in the position to oblige his serfs to undertake share-cropping or to rent out his land, the

8. S. Brassai, Az iskolamester. (The Schoolmaster.) *Vasárnapi Újság*, 1 January 1843, No. 452.

landlord had to appropriate as much land — mostly forest and pasture — as possible; it was this that guaranteed his hegemony within the village.

More importantly, however, the entire system of land cultivation needed to change. For the landlords' arable often lay scattered in dozens of strips around the village, cultivated, like the lands held in villeinage, according to the two-field or three-field system. He, like everyone else, was obliged to let his fallow strips of land be used for pasture. This centuries-old system was thought to have obvious advantages. The fallow was what guaranteed the livestock their grazing land. As for the land being parcelled into tiny strips, it gave people the feeling that everyone had some land of poor quality and some that was better, to say nothing of the fact that if a hailstorm destroyed the crops on one strip, they still had produce on the other strip a mile or so away. The two- or three-field system was so widespread that forty per cent of the arable lay in fallow. It was a system that permitted no personal initiative, but did provide the necessary degree of security. The difficulty was the relatively high rate of population growth — almost half a per cent per annum between 1786 and 1850, and one per cent between 1820 and 1840. This kind of management virtually forced Transylvanian society to stagnate. The only way out, the only way to increase agriculture, was to start cultivating the fallow. This, however, involved keeping livestock indoors, which, in turn, necessitated the growing of adequate quantities of fodder.

The modernization of agriculture was initiated by the Saxon smallholders and the Hungarian large and medium landowners. Feudal institutions had remained foreign to the Saxon communities of the Szászföld, and thus the changeover to modern agriculture there stood to involve much less conflict than in the other parts of Transylvania.

The first step was to contract the various lands which had been segmented into different strips. This of course met with resistance from the villagers in most places: they felt that the lord was taking the best strips of land for himself, as well as cutting the size of the village's pasture. But it was clear that the traditional system had become untenable: its economic usefulness was as questionable as the social assumptions on which it had rested. The nobility felt that "the landowner derives profit from less than a quarter of his lands"; at the same time, despite the positive elements of paternalism, he "is no longer the guardian, but rather the extortioner of those under him".[9] For the landowner continued to exact his dues whatever the serfs might do to improve their lot — spinning, weaving, raising chickens, and even gathering fruit, nuts or firewood.

A rather large proportion of the estates in Transylvania were held in villeinage. Most landowners tried to combine this kind of subsistence agriculture with producing for the market, though contemporaries complained that the unstable prices and the narrowness of the market made real market orientation impossible. And yet, in Transylvania about a fifth of the arable and pasture lands — an area which amounted to about half of all the lands

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9. Contract concluded between Juliánna Sombory and Mihály Ketzeli against distillation of brandy. Kackó, 6 February, 1841. *OL* The Archives of the Hatfaludy Family, paquet 37.

held in villein tenure — was allodial. It was these tax-free lands of the nobility which contemporaries estimated produced over a third of the maize that served as the staff of life for Transylvania's peasantry. Villeinage in Transylvania meant primarily *robot*, an annual eighteen million days of unpaid labour, fifty nine per cent of it manual, the rest using draught animals. This meant between two to four days of labour per family, depending on the size of the villein family's holding, as well as on local custom. In Transylvania, both the allodial land area and the average villein holding were smaller than in Hungary, and yet the number of days of *robot* exacted was twice the Hungarian norm. Contemporaries were inclined to blame this on the poorer soil and on the more backward techniques of farming. But we must also keep in mind that the census of 1819–1820 on which the above estimates are based gives a somewhat distorted picture. The serfs confessed to smaller holdings than they actually had, lest their taxes be raised, and at the same time exaggerated the number of days they spent in *robot* working the lord's allodium. The government's purpose in the census was to lessen the serfs' burden of feudal services; the landowners, however, did not want to see the *robot* cut back. The more days of *robot* his serfs owed, the greater a lord's power over them: it was he who disposed over their time and energy, and they were dependent on his good will for days off to work their own land.

Like all feudal societies, Transylvanian society, too, rested on force, but backwardness set limits to the degree of the serfs' exploitation. Though serfs were free to migrate, what really gave them some degree of protection were the holy days. The Greek Orthodox church specified one hundred holy days of obligation; on such days, the peasants would not work their own lands, but would, at most, work for hire, for the saint whose day had been thus violated would punish the one responsible: the lord whose land one had worked. Open conflict between a landowner and his peasants would ensue only where the lord had appropriated woods, pastures or perhaps even arable which the village community was wont to consider its own to use. All in all, feudalism in Transylvania was still viable as a social system; as an economic system, however, it was untenable, and this was underlined by the relative overpopulation and Transylvania's poor showing when compared to the rest of Europe.

The system permitted only a limited degree of modernization. Certain technologies were introduced, as were some new types of higher-yielding cereal crops and new breeds of horses and cattle, but this was an option open only to the great landowners. The smallholders — the Hungarian and Romanian free peasantry, and the Saxon burgher-peasants — could improve their lot only through working their lands yet more diligently. The only way the serfs could improve their "production" was to appropriate at harvest time some of what the new types of grains yielded on the lord's allodial land.

The Liberals did not have a monopoly on wanting to see their estates and country prosper. Conservatives and Liberals alike joined the *Erdélyi Gazdasági Egylet* (Transylvanian Economic Society). The difference was that while every Liberal was an advocate of the modern market economy, certainly not every Conservative was. Still, the main division was along ideological lines: how far someone was dedicated to the idea of Transylvania's

becoming a modern nation-state. This transformation the Liberals saw as necessarily linked to social reform. Conditions had to be such that the small-holder could prosper, for only this would guarantee the viability of the modernized great estates. The emancipation of the serfs would win them to the cause of modernization; and modern constitutional government would integrate the country into the mainstream of European development.

The more radical of the Liberals had close contacts with the cultural and political life of Hungary as well. Some of those who stood for election to the Transylvanian Diet of 1841–1843 even came from there. The reform cause in Transylvania was seen as inseparable from the cause of the Hungarian reformers, and the tactics adopted were, in many ways, the emulation of Kossuth's tried and tested methods. The *Erdélyi Híradó* (Transylvanian Courier), like Kossuth's *Pesti Hírlap* (Pest News), became a formidable weapon in the Liberals' hands in the early 1840s. A thoroughly modern example of committed political journalism, the *Híradó* kept its readers' eyes constantly focused on the rest of Europe, and trumpeted the slogan: "Reforms immediately; union with Hungary as soon as possible". One of the journal's tactical ploys was to emphasize that the government was on the side of "progress" — some of the Liberals actually believed this, others felt it was a good way of taking the wind out of the Conservatives' sails. The central government in Vienna, however, wanted no alliance with the Liberals. It was careful to avoid even the semblance of having yielded to liberal pressure in any concession it made, for a reputation for "impartiality" was what it needed to keep its absolute hold over the masses of the nobility as well as the peasantry.

The regulation of feudal services and dues involved lengthy preparatory work. Most of the Liberals wanted to work out a comprehensive bill that would deal with every detail of every possible type of situation. The regulation itself was to be introduced along with the regrouping and with tax reforms. Even those supporting it calculated that the introduction of a complex measure of this kind would require about twenty years. But a great many people believed that there was a great deal to be said for procrastinating, to say nothing of the fact that the party which stood to gain the most by the regulation — in the form of increased tax revenues — was the central government.

To make this aspect of the measure more palatable to the conservative majority, and to give the Diet some say in the use to which the funds were put, the Liberals tried to get the government to recognize again the Diet's traditional right to vote the taxes it could collect. However, implementation of this proved to be beyond their means. The other principle of the liberal tax reform programme was that everyone, the nobility included, should share in the tax burden. On the first point, it was the government that was intransigent; but for the second, they did not win even the Diet's support. The Liberals, thus, had to change tack, and they managed to push through bills which meant greater freedom and security for the serfs in certain matters of detail. With this, the Diet recognized the need for more thoroughgoing reform "in principle", and specified the direction that future legislation was to take. It was a compromise which, under the circumstances, was seen as a victory for the cause of reform. In fact, many Conservatives felt that the

470

Diet had gone too far, and it took all the Liberals' prestige and tactical skill at the local assemblies to keep the irate lesser nobility from recalling their "radical" dietal delegates. The Saxon delegates, though they strongly objected to the Hungarian Liberals' determination to make Hungarian the official language, supported them in matters of social reform.

Thus it was that the Diet was able to send for approval to Vienna bills which had, in effect, made a chink in the nobility's armour of feudal privilege. The bills confirmed the serfs in their right to migrate at will, set an upper limit to feudal services and dues, and guaranteed the serfs' right to acquire property. A bill was passed specifying that the landed nobility, too, was bound to participate in paying for public works projects, and this was seen as the first step to sharing in the tax burden as well. In some matters — for instance, the ability of non-nobles to hold office in the Gubernium — the Transylvanian Diet was ahead of the Hungarian, and wanted to create a precedent. But most of the legislation merely aimed at making Transylvania's legal system congruent with Hungary's, in preparation for the proposed union. The Diets of the "two brother homelands" were together to decide what elements of its independence Transylvania was to retain.

Transylvania's modernization was of vital interest to Hungary as well. The Hungarian reformist opposition — for instance Lajos Kossuth in his *Pesti Hírlap* — was, thus, happy to be able to point to the Transylvanian Liberals' successes, and upbraid the skeptics in Hungary: the Transylvanian nobility, which so many of them had held to be a retrograde force, was proving to be more progressive than its Hungarian counterpart. Clearly, Kossuth was exaggerating to make his point. But there can be no disputing what he gave as his reason for it: "Transylvania's present constitutional position is such that proceeding along the path of reform involves many more impediments than in Hungary. Consequently, every step taken in that direction deserves much more credit".[10]

The Revival of the Romanian National Movement

The stormy 1830s caught the Romanians of Transylvania somewhat unawares. For after its brief flowering under the impact of the Enlightenment, Romanian cultural life in Transylvania was allowed to continue only within the churches. The Romanian national movement necessarily lacked the organizational basis of the Hungarian movement, but its ethnic appeal was all the greater. And the attempts to modernize Transylvania were making a political category of ethnicity. It was, as we have seen, Inochentie Micu-Klein who first based his demands for the Romanians' political recognition on their absolute numerical superiority within the country, and on the fact that it was this Romanian majority that bore the brunt of the tax burden. The feudal constitutional thinking of the eighteenth century, however, could

10. L. KOSSUTH, Szózat a Részek és az Unió iránt Magyarhonból. (Hymn for the Parts and the Union from the Hungarian Homeland.) *Erdélyi Híradó*, 22 March, 1842, No. 23.

not admit the existence of a Romanian "nation", for a nation of serfs seemed a contradiction in terms. The reformers working on Transylvania's modernization, however, had set the emancipation of the serfs as one of their major goals; and the Romanian intelligentsia was quick to point out that this call for social advancement also involved political claims. Transylvania's Romanian cultural elite set about working out a modern national ideology, one that would establish its right to share in political power. But once again, ideas and demands did not yet add up to opportunities for change.

The most progressive of Transylvania's Romanians were intellectuals who were not content with the opportunities available to them within the framework of the churches, which had a monopoly over education. In the 1830s, the Greek Catholic school at Balázsfalva had expanded into a *líceum,* a junior college of sorts. With its student body of two hundred and fifty, Balázsfalva came to resemble the Hungarian college towns — Nagyenyed, Kolozsvár, Székelyudvarhely, and Marosvásárhely — where about a thousand students received their education, a great many Romanians among them. Of the twelve to thirteen hundred students studying at the thirteen Roman Catholic gymnasia of Transylvania, about a third were Romanians, as were about a quarter of the two hundred and fifty students at the Kolozsvár *líceum.* Thirty of the two hundred legal apprentices working at the court of appeal in Marosvásárhely in 1848 were Romanian.

Though in absolute terms the number of Romanians trained in the professions was quite small, job opportunities were even harder to come by in their case than in the case of the Hungarian and Saxon intelligentsia. There were at most thirty to forty Romanians — more precisely, officials of Romanian origin — in the civil service, and they all worked in some lowly post. Though the number of Romanian clergymen was considerable — there were 1,400 Greek Catholic priests and 1,100 Orthodox priests — the pastoral posts were generally filled not by the better-educated, but by men whose fathers had also been priests in the area, men who were less learned, but satisfied with lower salaries. It is a telling circumstance that when in 1849 the Romanians themselves took stock of how many of the unemployed intellectuals or of those holding ecclesiastical appointments would be able to hold civil service jobs, they found fewer than three hundred men with secondary school education and nearly half of these were under thirty years of age. According to a reliable contemporary estimate, a fifth of the "numerous Romanian intellectuals" found jobs in one of the professions, another fifth "after completing their legal studies" end up taking over their fathers' estates and living off their lands, two-fifths emigrated to the Danubian principalities, and one-fifth assimilated.[11]

Gradually, however, Romanian national consciousness began to preclude assimilation as an option. People who spoke Hungarian better than Romanian became enthusiastic supporters of the Romanian national cause. For the young Romanian intellectuals of the time had even more cause to feel that the *status quo* was an affront to their human dignity than their Hungar-

11. George Bariţ to Samu Wass. Brassó, 10 December, 1841. Biblioteca Academiei RSR (Bucharest), Ms. rom. 973, 263–264.

Szilágysomlyó

Zilah

O △ Beszterce

Gyergyószentmiklós

Kolozsvár

Torda

Marosvásárhely

Csíksomlyó

Nagyenyed

Erzsébetváros ☐ ■ O Székelyudvarhely

Székelykeresztúr

Segesvár

Zalatna Balázsfalva Medgyes

Gyulafehérvár

Kanta
(Kézdivásárhely)

Szászváros

Nagyszeben

△O Brassó

Legend

	Roman Catholic	Greek Catholic	Calvinist	Lutheran	Unitarian	Greek Orthodox
College with secondary school	●	◐	■	▲	▮	
Secondary school	O	☐		△	☐	
Seminary	●	◑				●

Map 18. Secondary schools and colleges in 1846

ian counterparts. The *Approbata Constitutiones*, the collection of the laws in effect in 1653, had never really been superseded, and was a daily reminder that they were but a "tolerated" nation. Its tone and provisions could not but rankle, especially in the minds of those born into serfdom. Like the Romanian nationalists of the eighteenth century, they found confirmation for their sense of personal worth in the ideology of the nation's Roman heritage, and this conviction predisposed them to see their own ideals and goals reflected in the cult of linguistic and national revival initiated by the Hungarian Liberals. They, too, saw Bölöni's book on North America as carrying the message of the New World; but the message was addressed to them, the Romanians. True romantics, more and more Romanian intellectuals turned to the unspoiled "people" as the repository of some pristine national wisdom and virtue.

473

The events taking place in the Danubian principalities in the 1820s contributed greatly to the revival of national consciousness among Transylvania's Romanians, for they raised hopes that the cultural and political aims of all Romanians in whatever state they lived might be co-ordinated. The contacts between them were constant, for starting in the 1820s, there was remarkable exodus of Romanian intellectuals from both Hungary and Transylvania across the Carpathians, due probably as much to the accelerated development of that area as to the surplus of unemployed Romanian professionals in the Habsburg lands.

The revolution of 1821 in Wallachia led by Tudor Vladimirescu helped spark the Greek War of Independence, and had the result that the Porte never again set a Greek Phanariot to rule over either of the Danubian principalities. The outcome of the Russo-Turkish war of 1828, a six year period of Russian occupation, proved a veritable blessing in disguise. The man appointed governor of both principalities, General Pavel Kiseliov, was an enlightened reformer of considerable ability, who oversaw the introduction of constitutional rule, though admittedly one concentrating power in the hands of a narrow caste of boyars. More and more of these boyars, however, came to identify with the cause of Romanian cultural revival, and gave it both moral and financial support. Thus, while the Transylvanian Romanian expatriates with their penchant for asceticism often felt ill at ease in the principalities with their glaring extremes of Oriental luxury and utter destitution, it was clear to them that this strange admixture of east and west provided just the cultural milieu in which they could be the most effective. It was these expatriates who were to mediate the theory of "Daco-Romanian" continuity, an interpretation of history that the Romanian national renaissance embraced with enthusiasm, fusing it with elements from the storehouse of French and German liberalism. The history of the Romanians that Petru Maior published in Buda in 1812 became the bible of the new generation. Transylvania was seen as "the eternal refuge of the Romanian nation"[12] by the nationalists, and Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) as the father of Romanian national unity.

Though the principalities had taken the lead as centres of Romanian national culture, it was nevertheless in Transylvania, in Brassó, that they published the journal which was to do the most to foster the sense of Romanian solidarity: *Gazeta de Transilvania* and its supplement, *Foaie pentru minte,* both of which started up in 1838.

This first thoroughly modern Romanian journal catered to the catholic tastes of the well-informed student community at Balázsfalva, and was sponsored by the Romanian merchants of Brassó, who were at the pinnacle of their prosperity. The wealthiest of the Romanian merchant families had moved from the outlying historic Bolgárszeg into the Saxon inner city, and now wanted to see the Romanian nation represented in Brassó's government. Simultaneously, they wanted to win all of the city's Eastern merchants to the Romanian national cause, and even went into publishing to propagate their ideals.

12. N. Balcescu, Mersul revoluției în istoria Românilor. Paris 1850. Published by N. Bălcescu, *Opere* I, Bucharest 1953, 309.

It is interesting, in noting the success of the *Gazeta*, that the "literary" weekly established just a year earlier, in 1837, had attracted practically no readership with its translations of stories taken mostly from German journals. It was the printer, Johann Gött, in Brassó, who asked George Bariț to be the editor of the Romanian paper he wanted to start up along with a number of others.

Bariț, freshly returned from Bucharest and teaching at the school established by the Romanian merchants, made the two Romanian journals of Brassó an enormous success. Nearly half of the papers' readership was in the principalities, and annual subscriptions fluctuated between five to eight hundred. (Even the Bucharest papers could boast no more than three hundred subscribers each for most of the 1840s.) The secret of Bariț's success was that he approached the problems facing the various strata of Romanian society from a coherent national point of view. His reports on the efforts being made by the Hungarian reformers were also calculated to encourage the Romanian national cause. Bariț tried to dispel the emotional attachment which many Romanians felt for the Orthodox tzar by pointing out that a common religion was by no means a common nationality. It was in the *Gazeta* that the word *naționalitate* was first introduced. Not surprisingly, the Russian consul in Bucharest got the paper banned from the principalities.

Romanian Political Aspirations

The Romanian intelligentsia perceived the 1841 draft bill on the introduction of Hungarian as Transylvania's official language as posing a mortal danger to the Romanian nation. It made little difference that what the bill was proposing did not change the situation of the Romanian intellectuals, for the proposal was to introduce Hungarian at those levels of government where Latin was still being used; in the proceedings of the Diet and in the counties, the language in use had for centuries been Hungarian. Local administration and the lower courts functioned in the language required by the local circumstances: the lower-level officials communicated with the common people in Romanian.

The attempt to give Hungarian wider currency as the "national" language was an affront to the Romanians' own hopes of national self-realization. In vain did the leading Hungarian Liberals dissociate themselves from any attempt at forced magyarization. The Romanians could not but see the proposed measures as the first steps in that direction, for these specified that all church registers were thenceforth to be kept in Hungarian, and Hungarian was to be the language of instruction at the Romanian schools in Balázsfalva. Though the draft bill did not take a conclusive stand on the matter of elementary education, it was expected that Hungarian would soon be made compulsory at that level as well.

Resistance to the draft bill at Balázsfalva was unanimous, and implacable. Its leader was the philosopher Simion Bărnuțiu, a Kantian who grounded his theories in natural law and liberalism, and had learned a great deal from Herder. The axiom that each individual has a natural right to

self-realization he interpreted to apply to each individual nation, and defined the nation's language as organic to this process. Language was at once the means and the measure of culture: "In it is rooted the character and the nationality of a people". Thus, language "is inseparable from our souls and our religion, and from everything that is most sacred and most valuable on earth".[13] Bărnuţiu posited a multinational state as opposed to the Hungarian ideal of a homogeneous nation-state, and saw the different national aspirations in cultural terms: "Culture and happiness are the chief goals of every one of the peoples of Transylvania; the Hungarians want to achieve this in a Hungarian way, the Saxons in a Saxon, the Romanians in a Romanian way, each in the way natural to them. All these ways are equally rightful, and ones we have each been following for centuries in peace; and each of our various ways ties in with the high road to mankind's happiness and culture."[14] Bărnuţiu considered the attempts at magyarization morally reprehensible, but spoke with approval of some Hungarian philosophers, and of the Diet's proposals for social reform. Bărnuţiu's system, like Herder's, was innocent of the great contradiction inherent even in cultural nationalism. Still, the fact that he called the Romanians Trajan's colonists who kept vigil and were preparing for great deeds left room for dreams of national hegemony based on historical right, dreams which were to prove more potent than Bărnuţiu's humanitarian ideal of a multinational state.

Transylvania's Romanians were unanimous in their repudiation of the draft bill on the use of the Hungarian language. When, however, the Hungarians withdrew those proposals which were directly prejudicial to the Romanians, the united political front gave way to a number of different trends. The opportunity for direct political action was open only to the bishops, primarily the Greek Catholic bishop, who attended the Diet in his capacity as a Regalist. Ioan Lemény, Greek Catholic bishop of Balázsfalva, chose to try cooperation with the Hungarian reformers after the petition — along the lines of the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* — which he and the Orthodox bishop Ioan Moga had submitted to the chancellery in 1834 had been rebuffed. Rather than insisting on Romanian national rights globally, the two bishops called on the Diet to take a stand for the rights of the Romanians of the predominantly Saxon Királyföld *(Fundus Regius)*, who were obliged to pay tithes to the Lutheran pastor, whose right to pasture land for their herds was being curtailed, and who were discriminated against on religious grounds when it came to eligibility for the town councils. (The Saxons, in their turn, could cite the privilege which stipulated that whoever worked a Saxon holding was to pay his tithes to the Lutheran church. As for the second point, the dispute over the use to which the land was put, there was no denying that the Saxon farmers paid much higher taxes than the Romanians, who lived off their flocks of sheep. Nor could anyone honestly dispute the fact that the Romanians of the Királyföld generally lived better and enjoyed greater liberty than the Romanian serfs of the Hungarian counties.)

13. S. BĂRNUŢIU, O tocmeală de ruşine şi o lege nedreaptă. Published by Gh. BOGDAN-DUICĂ, *Viaţa şi ideile lui Simion Bărnuţiu*. Bucharest 1924, 201, 204.
14. Ibid. 211.

The Hungarian reformist nobility supported the two bishops' grievances against the Saxons not only as a way of keeping the Saxons in check, but also because they were in line with their legalistic way of thinking, as well as with their liberal views. Bishop Leményi was probably perfectly sincere, and technically speaking, perfectly correct when he declared in the name of the entire Romanian nation at the 1841 Diet that, as far as the Hungarians were concerned, "since 1791 a Romanian, social class or person, has never been debarred from public office".[15]

Bishop Leményi's decision to ally with the Hungarian Liberals had the support not only of the Romanians of the Királyföld, but also of those Romanian noblemen who hoped that the constitutional representative system of government would, gradually, find a means of satisfying Romanian national demands. Alexandru Bohățel, writing in the Kolozsvár Erdélyi Híradó "in the name of a number of his co-nationals" called attention to the fact that the Hungarian language law did not impinge on the use of the Romanian language at the community level: "Since Transylvania is a Hungarian homeland, ... let the members of my nation use their language as befits Romanians, and learn Hungarian as befits the citizens of this homeland".[16]

The crucial question, of course, was who had the right to speak for the nation. The majority of the teachers at Balázsfalva strongly disapproved of the approach taken by Bishop Leményi, and demanded that a synod be convoked. Bărnuțiu, the most articulate leader of the disaffected, felt that the church should represent the political and cultural interests of the Romanian nation. Leményi would not hear of a synod, and students and teachers alike began to rebel against church discipline. Matters came to a head during Holy Week in 1843. Bishop Leményi had debarred one of the students from the traditional Holy Thursday washing of feet; the students retaliated when no one showed up for the ceremony. Balázsfalva was a house divided against itself. In the end, it was the government that restored order by force of arms, removing some of the rebel teachers — Bărnuțiu, the ringleader, among them — and about a dozen students, who then proceeded to make their way through Transylvania as martyrs to the national cause.

The Romanian press in Brassó tried to remain objective in the face of events. Bariț did not approve of the campaign against Bishop Leményi, and was anxious lest the Romanians enter the labyrinth of Transylvanian politics unprepared. Bariț proposed no programme; rather, he tried to give an accurate picture of where the various national factions stood, and encouraged dialogue between them. He urged the Hungarian Liberals to moderation, and encouraged them to try to meet the demands of Transylvania's Romanians. He pointed out that the Romanians' demand for recognition as the "fourth nation" was fitting and just. Far from being simply a call for their participation in the feudal constitution, it was a national demand that

15. Protocol recorded on the Diet started on 15 November, 1841 in the royal free borough of Kolozsvár attended by the Estates of the Three Noble Nations of the Transylvanian Grand Duchy and the Parts reannexed to it. Kolozsvár 1841, 715.
16. By Sándor Boheczel lawyer on behalf of his associates from several nations: Komoly szó a Gazeta de Transilvániához. (Serious Word to Gazeta de Transylvania.) Erdélyi Híradó, 3 March, 1843, No. 18.

presumed respect for the aspirations of the other national movements in Transylvania, and at the same time would operate as a check on any nation's aspiring to hegemony. Bariț was just as consistent in his repudiation of the Romanian ploy used against the Saxons: the appeal to the coequality of noble privilege. He spoke to all of Transylvania's peoples at once, and to all the factions within each nation: "Who shall we blame for Hungarians, Székelys, Saxons, Romanians, Armenians, etc. all seeing the light of day under the same sky, in one and the same valley, or on one and the same mountain, or along one and the same river? ... Why do we conjure up the spirits of our ancestors from their graves to frighten one another?"[17]

The Saxons' Awakening to their German Identity

At the Diets which were finally allowed to meet in the 1830s, the Saxons had taken no real independent stand of their own. At the Diet of 1834, the small contingent of Saxon delegates had sympathized with the goals of the Hungarian opposition, and had even backed some of their constitutional demands. By 1837, Saxon support had shifted to the government. Nevertheless, they made no objection to the bills being drafted in Hungarian, and agreed that Transylvania's laws should be promulgated in Hungarian as well as in Latin. Subsequently, however, political expediency and Saxon nationalism both militated against the possibility of their co-operating with the Hungarians.

In preparation for the Diet of 1841, the leaders of the Saxon community assembled in the Lutheran Consistory worked out their own stand on the matter of languages, which they regarded as the most important. Joseph Bedeus von Scharberg — whom the Diet had elected provincial high commissioner in charge of provisioning the army in 1837, and who was, thus, the highest-ranking Saxon government official of the period — proposed that Transylvania, as one of the Lands of the Hungarian Crown, should accept Hungarian as the official language of central government: "There is nothing new in this, for even when Transylvania was ruled by its own princes, affairs of state were conducted in Hungarian, and the laws were drafted in Hungarian".[18] But the vocal majority of the Saxon leaders insisted on linguistic equality on the old feudal constitutional basis of Saxons and Hungarians being equal in rights: they wanted to see the use of German introduced on an equal footing with Hungarian.

The Saxons' insistence on their old constitutional rights was but one aspect of a growing movement aimed at the creation of a modern national political framework. More and more people wanted to see the Saxon's nation status legally recognized as involving territorial autonomy and the right to use German as their official language. In short, more and more Saxons wanted to see the Királyföld — the "Fundus Regius" — become a "Fundus Saxonum" in every sense of the term. Saxon nationalism, however, was

17. *Gazeta de Transilvania*, 15/27 December, 1847, No. 100.
18. J. BEDEUS, *Erinnerungen*. Archivele Statului, Sibiu, Fond Bedeus, 112. I. 301–302.

essentially a form of German nationalism: since the Middle Ages, only those of "German origin" had been recognized as full-fledged members of the Saxon nation and this status involved undisputable economic, social and political advantages. This very exclusiveness made the position of the Saxons within Transylvanian society somewhat precarious. Their sense of isolation inclined them to seek an ally in the Habsburgs' authority, which was glad to make use of them as counterweights to the Hungarians. Thus it was that the majority of the Saxons, who were the chief motors of Transylvania's economic development, in the political sphere tended to support bureaucratic absolutism, if not out of conviction then by default. For other Saxons, however, the sense of German nationalism was a spiritual motor that propelled them beyond the provincialism of the Habsburg Empire, and set them to work for the national future of the Saxons along liberal lines patterned on some of the most progressive of the intellectual and political currents taking shape.

The patrician upper class took its lead from a corps of senior officials who were highly versed in the law, and the whole Saxon population looked for leadership to the Lutheran church, and to the network of schools run by it. Teachers and ministers suddenly acquired a prestige comparable to what they had had at the time of the Reformation. At the same time, the regulation of town and village self-government which the Viennese government had obliged the Saxons to accept in 1805 debarred teachers and ministers from politics and public office. Lack of job opportunities for the educated Saxons was a real problem. Each of the five gymnasia employed fifty to sixty teachers, and had student bodies of between a thousand to fifteen hundred students. And though many elementary school teachers were needed, every year between three and four hundred secondary school leavers continued their education, half of them aiming for careers in the church at a time when the two hundred and fifty Lutheran parishes could support only five hundred clergymen. Many highly educated Saxon clergymen and laymen returned from the German universities to become disseminators of national revival.

Most educated Saxons saw the democratization of society and the modernization of the economy as the means to national reform, though of course they tended to interpret these liberal ideals within the context of their own heritage. Enthusiastically, they discovered the ancient Saxon constitution to provide the formal elements of a democratic representative system; and enthusiastically they adopted as their democratic slogan the "*unus sit populus*" (the people should be one) of the *Diploma Andreanum*. There were even those who argued that the "Saxon nation" ought to be considered to include the German-speaking serfs living in the counties, who comprised about a fifth of Transylvania's Saxons. They were proud to declare that the Saxon people were a community of industrious craftsmen, tradesmen and agriculturists. On this view, serfdom as such was foreign to the Szászföld, for the Romanian and Hungarian serf villages did not form part of the nation. (The feudal dues and services owed by these villages, it was added, were less onerous than those of the serfs in the Hungarian counties of Transylvania.) The Saxons were also one of the first in the 1840s to propose the abolition — with compensation — of the church tithes that weighed so heavily on the free peasant class as well.

479

It was the *Siebenbürger Wochenblatt* (Transylvanian Weekly) founded in Brassó at the end of the 1830s, as well as its literary supplements, the *Blätter für Geist* (Leaflets for Spirit) and *Der Satellit* (The Planet) that represented the more radical forms of social criticism. At times more than a thousand copies were sold. The publisher Johann Gött was a man of erudition who had made his way to Transylvania from Frankfurt-am-Main, like his collaborators, Anton Kurz from Moravia, and Leopold Max Moltke from Prussia, to escape the penury facing many an intellectual in the German states, and no less to escape the heavy hand of political repression. The correspondents writing for the Brassó papers from Segesvár had become acquainted with the ideas of liberalism during their student years in Berlin, and it was in this spirit that they launched their attack on the sluggish, "bewigged" administration of the bureaucrats. As the precondition of all reform, they demanded that public affairs indeed be conducted in public, and that the members of the *communitate*'s organs and of the town councils be elected by the citizens. In a number of Saxon seats, the outraged establishment demanded that court action be taken against the Brassó journals. It took the authority of the Saxon professor of jurisprudence, Josef Andreas Zimmerman, to convince the Nagyszeben council, for instance, that the Saxon journals must be permitted as much liberty as the Hungarian press in discussing issue of national concern.

Though initially the Brassó papers came out strongly against the draft bill on the use of the Hungarian language, and in general took issue with the Hungarian press, soon their chief adversary was Der *Siebenbürger Bote* (Transylvanian Messenger), which was a staunch supporter of bureaucratic absolutism. The press also reflected the rivalry between the two towns: the burghers of Brassó wanted to see an end to Nagyszeben's hegemony. While the latter envisioned a *"provincia cibiniensis"* (Szeben Province), an autonomous Saxon national unit centrally directed from Nagyszeben, the Brassó reformers' programme for economic and political development was summed up in their slogan: *"Kronstadt voran"* (Brassó, lead on!).

Societies sprang up everywhere in the Saxon towns, uniting the like-minded to common action, and answering every type of interest and need. There were industrial associations, agricultural societies, and savings societies. The *Verein für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* (Association for Transylvanian Native Knowledge), ostensibly a cultural association, and its conventions became rallies in which townspeople participated as if celebrating a national holiday.

Perhaps the most typical of the Saxon reformers of the age was Stephan Ludwig Roth. He had worked in Switzerland alongside Pestalozzi as a young man, but his views on education published in the 1820s still met with indifference. Encouraged by the example of the German youth movements of the post-Napoleonic era, he wanted to see physical education and singing introduced into the curriculum of the high school in Medgyes where he taught, but the conservative small town would have none of it. The 1840s found him a village pastor, but one who became a leader of the Saxon national movement. It cannot be said of him that he was a consistent politician. While some of his pamphlets were romantic anti-capitalist defences of the guild system and of the affluent free Saxon peasantry, he nevertheless

called for the modernization of industry and agriculture. His contribution to the debate on the introduction of Hungarian as the official language did little to clarify matters. For he attributed to the Hungarian reformers an extreme position which none of them had ever held, and pronounced the Hungarian language as such unsuitable for being a state's official language. He emphasized that there was no need for a language of the country *(Landessprache)*, for there already was one: Romanian. Romanian, being spoken by the greatest number of people in Transylvania, was — as the Hungarian reformers, too, had often pointed out — the prime language of day-to-day communication among the various nationalities. Roth proposed that the Romanians be recognized as Transylvania's Fourth Nation, though he was cautious enough to publish this view only in a journal which appeared in Pest. But he hastened to add that this recognition could not involve territorial autonomy; rather, it would mean that the Romanians, too, would have one vote in the Diet, like each of the other Three Nations. (For Saxons were advocating a return to the system of voting by nations at the Diet.) In theory, Roth was a staunch advocate of national equality; but his concrete suggestions for the various spheres in which German, Latin and Hungarian should be used were of feudal character and he took care not to infringe the interests of the central government.

Roth's main concern was to rouse Transylvania's Saxons to a sense of moral responsibility for the *Volkstum*, the nationality, and he did much to raise Saxon social consciousness. The Hungarian press tended to simplify when accounting for the conflict between Hungarians and Saxons in terms of the struggle of liberalism against bureaucratic conservatism. Roth, on the other hand, described the Transylvanian scene in terms of trilateral relationship of mutual dependence and conflicting interests between the Saxon burghers, the Hungarian nobles, and the Romanian serfs, and insisted that it behooved the Saxon middle class to undertake the role of mediator. Roth's analysis ignored the fact that the Saxon burghers clung to their prerogatives no less desperately than the Hungarian nobles. But on the practical political level, inasmuch as it assigned to the Saxons the role of the historic middle class, it was an effective incentive to their co-operating with the Hungarian Liberals. The other side of the matter, of course, was that Roth assigned to the Saxons in the context of Hungarian–Romanian relations the same arbitrator role that the Hungarians arrogated to themselves in respect of Saxon–Romanian affairs.

The liberal call for civil equality raised, in the minds of many Saxons, the spectre of the nation's fatal isolation. The problem was that the Romanians of the Szászföld were, by then, an absolute majority. But not even the Saxon Liberals were willing to hear of collective — national — rights for the Romanian majority. The farthest that the most of them would go was to recognize the right of each individual Romanian inhabitant of the Szászföld to equal membership in the Saxon nation. The solution, according to a pamphlet written in 1844, was for the Romanians "to assimilate to the Saxons in language and culture".[19]

19. J. Trausch, *Bemerkunken über die von siebenbürgischen Bischof Basiliu Moga in Jahre 1837 den zu Hermannstadt versammelten Landesständen unterlegte Bittschrift.* Kronstadt 1844, 24.

Though the above was by no means a stand universally subscribed to, it does illustrate how far the idea of the "Saxon Nation" was coming to mean not so much a *natio* of the privileged, but rather the community for those speaking the same — German — language. More and more Saxon intellectuals believed that it was their national mission to pass on to the east the achievements of German culture. This belief was consistent with a number of political attitudes. The Liberals of Germany and Hungary were allies in a common cause, and many Saxon Liberals hoped that this community of purpose would moderate Hungarian linguistic nationalism, and make cooperation possible in Transylvania as well. Others went further. For it was clear that the Saxons, as the smallest ethnic group, had the most to lose by the national hegemony of either the Hungarians or the Romanians. It was, thus, among the Saxons that we find intellectuals most receptive to the idea that Transylvania's circumstances necessitated its transformation into a modern, multinational state.

The Brassó Saxon papers often cited Switzerland or the United States as examples of nationally neutral federal structures which left room for national self-determination at the level of local self-government — a notion which was, in part, consistent with the aims of the Hungarian Liberals. Joseph Marlin — the first Saxon man of letters to live by his pen, though not in his hometown of Szászsebes but in Pest — had this to say to his countrymen in the *Pesther Zeitung* (Pest Newspaper): "Let everyone learn to love not only the Szászföld but Transylvania as well; let everyone work for his homeland and not just for his nation, and the squabbles between the nationalities of Transylvania will come to an end. And then we'll hear no more foolish talk of magyarization, germanization, and even romanization".[20]

Real cooperation between Saxons and Hungarians took place only in the sphere of culture and education. Anton Kurz, editor of the *Magazin für Geschichte* (Magazine for History) published articles by Hungarian writers as well. As he wrote in his letter to the president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: "One can be a good German, and yet sympathize with the liberal aims of the Magyars, especially in the field of science, which does not distinguish between languages and countries".[21] The sense of German national identity was quite compatible with Transylvanian patriotism. And it was a Prussian-born poet, Leopold Max Moltke, who in 1846 wrote at the behest of his Saxon compatriots the anthem still sung in praise of his adopted land:

Transylvania, you tolerant land,	Transylvania, dear, sweet land,
Haven safe for every faith!	Dear land that gave us birth!
Safeguard through the centuries,	Blessed be your timeless charms ,
All your sons' liberties,	And may the sons of all your climes,
May plain talk never quake.	With amity be girt.

20. J. Marlin, Politische Aphorismen aus dem Sachsenland. *Der Satellit*, 6 May, 1847, No. 36.
21. Letter by Anton Kurz to Ferenc Toldy. Brassó, 27 October, 1843. Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Manuscript Archives, Hungarian Literary Correspondence, 4-r. 79.

The Conservative Counter-Offensive

By the end of the Diet of 1841–1843, it became clear that the hopes the central government might come out in support of reform had been illusory.

The government in Vienna feared that the liberal reforms being urged in Hungary and Transylvania alike — linked as they were to an ever more comprehensive programme for national and linguistic revival — would undermine the whole monarchy. The chief of police was even afraid that if the union of the two lands were to take place, "the centre of gravity of the monarchy would inevitably shift to Hungary".[22] The court had worked out no alternative to the Liberals' programme. The government was reluctant to lend open support even to the ostensibly loyal "German element", and did not revive its old policy of centralization and germanization, for it mistrusted German nationalism almost as much as Hungarian. What encouragement Metternich gave the minority nationalities in their resistance to Hungarian initiatives followed the traditional "divide and rule" formula.

There was, however, one political grouping that did have a comprehensive programme explicitly aimed at "the solution of the Hungarian question" which many saw as a real threat to the integrity of the empire. This grouping of young mostly Hungarian politicians formed the Conservative Party in 1846. The young Conservatives clearly saw that modernization and reform were inevitable. But they wanted to make certain that it was the landowning nobility which would reap the benefits of "embourgeoisement", too. As opposed to the more radical liberal programme, they stood on a platform of "prudent progression", that is, of gradual reform. A great many of the progressive Conservatives were genuinely dedicated to the cause of reform, and were even ready to cooperate with the Liberals on certain issues. But in the quickened political life of the late 1840s, the Liberals remained their chief rivals as they launched an all-out offensive to gain control of the forums of feudal constitutional representation. In this contest, the Conservatives of Transylvania were at a great advantage. For the vice-chancellor of Transylvania, Baron Samu Jósika, was one of their number, and he used every weapon in the arsenal of contemporary politics. With infinite skill, Jósika played both on the anxieties that the nobility had in connection with the proposed reforms, and on the fears and uncertainties of a central government haunted by the spectre of anarchy. In Transylvania, he pretended to enjoy the confidence of the imperial government; in Vienna, he claimed to hold the key to the court's consolidating its hold on Transylvania. Jósika was able to win the majority of the nobility to his side, threatening some, and enticing others with what they could expect from the proposed unification of Hungary and Transylvania.

The central government watched Jósika's machinations with some apprehension. They feared that he would give one-sided preference to the nobility's interests at their expense, and that the population's ability to pay state taxes would be further sapped by the Diet's setting a more onerous burden of feudal services and dues. Already, Transylvania's arrears of debt

22. *HHStA*, Kabinettsarchiv, Staatsconferenz-Akten, 1846:1055.

had quadrupled since 1830. The young Conservatives did not hesitate to capitalize on Vienna's fear of the unification of Hungary and Transylvania when this served their purpose. Thus, when a member of the *Staatskonferenz* suggested that Transylvania adopt the regulation of villein holdings and of *robot* that had been introduced in Hungary (where a holding was about twice the size of what it was in Transylvania, and the services due the lord per holding were considerably less onerous), György Apponyi, a fellow-Conservative of Jósika's and the head of the Hungarian Chancellery, argued against it in terms that were bound to hit home in Vienna. "From a higher point of view this is hardly advisable", he said, "for everything that tends to diminish or to erode the legal or *de facto* differences between the two lands ... will tend to diminish the Transylvanian nobility's antipathy to the union, which in that case would involve no further economic drawbacks, but would promise definite political advantages".[23]

The beginning of 1846 was marked with an event that could not help but influence the mood of the Transylvanian Diet which was about to convene. In Galicia the Polish nobility staged a revolt only to find the peasantry turn against the "emperor's enemies" in a veritable massacre. This brutal suppression of the Polish nobility's fight for independence stunned the neighbouring lands. The Habsburg court was again confident and self-satisfied, but the Hungarian reformist opposition drew the lesson that the Hungarian nobility, too, might meet the fate of their Polish brethren if they did not soon emancipate their serfs. In Transylvania, too, the Polish events conjured up the phantom of a peasant revolt in the minds of the nobility of Kolozsvár, until reassuring reports came in to the Gubernium from every part of the country. Many people, like the leading tactician of the reformers, János Bethlen the Elder, believed that "with a very few exceptions, the peasants of Transylvania are the same as they were in 1817 ... their hands clasped, they would rather starve to death than lay even a finger on what was not theirs".[24] But the Transylvanian nobility could not help but realize that the peasantry could turn into a formidable weapon in the hands of the government.

The test of strength between Liberals and Conservatives came at the Diet of 1846, when the decisive matter of the regulation of feudal dues and services was again the order of the day. Jósika had made sure that the counties were represented either by well-off Conservatives, or by those who were dependent on the government. The Regalists he had had summoned were all men who needed his financial support just to be able to attend the Diet.

The Liberals tried to appeal to considerations of social justice in rejecting the data of the land census taken by order of Count Antal Cziráky in 1819–1820. They argued that the census had failed to register at least a third of the lands held in villeinage as such, and pleaded that "claims based on custom" could not be disregarded: all land used by serfs should be classified as lands held in villeinage.

23. Ibid. 1846:970.
24. Letter by János Bethlen to Miklós Wesselényi. Kolozsvár, 31 July, 1846. *OL* Film Archives, 8367.

The Liberals, however, were a minority that soon found itself isolated. The majority at the Diet insisted that the distorted picture given by the Cziráky census should form the basis of what was to be treated as allodial land, and what as land held in villein tenure.

In vain did the Liberals protest in "the holy name of the people". In vain did the far-sighted governor, Count József Teleki, turn to the monarch, asking him to refuse to sanction a bill that involved such dire consequences for the peasantry. Whatever second thoughts the court might have had faded in the glow of the victory won over the Liberals. The court was also pleased by the Diet's tractability in the matter of voting recruits: it voted more new conscripts than it was actually asked to.

As a return gesture of goodwill, the court approved the bill the Transylvanian Diet had passed on the supremacy of the Hungarian language. True, the bill had been revised: it introduced the use of Hungarian in the keeping of church registers, but only in areas where the sermon was also preached in Hungarian. Jósika, who had been elected chancellor in the course of the Diet, once again proved an astute politician: recognizing the Saxons as a "nation" equal in rights with the Hungarian, he made sure that the laws were promulgated in an official German translation, and that German was accepted as the official language of the Királyföld, where most Saxons lived. Jósika's manoeuvres, however, did not win all the Saxon representatives over to the Conservative camp. The chancellor found himself having to rebuke the press censor of Nagyszeben, for the *Siebenbürger Bote* had reported that according to one of the Saxon delegates the oppositionist Liberals with their attempts to smooth over social conflicts, promoted the emergence of a free middle class within the ranks of the two brother nations.[25]

The Liberals, however, had to recognize that the peoples of Transylvania — each with their own forms of social organization, their own traditions and own institutions — were too heterogeneous for even those committed to modernization and reform to consistently unite in service of the common cause. Having lost, in the Diet, the fight for the reduction of the serfs' burdens, Transylvania's Liberals retrenched to await the next opportunity. It became evident that a new integration was needed for the region, one which would transform the rigid framework of the empire and open the road for national development.

25. *OL* Transylvanian Court Chancellery, Presidential Documents, 1847:421.

III. Revolution and the War of Independence (1848–1849)

The spring of 1848 swept Transylvania back into the mainstream of European history. The "Springtime of the Nations" started as a celebration of solidarity in which all the burgeoning national movements took part, and as in all of east-central Europe, ended up as a desperate social and national confrontation.

What was it that led to this tragic outcome? How was it all perceived by those who had to take a stand for, or against the revolution? And what did the revolution in fact achieve? Before we can turn to these questions, we must take a cursory look at Transylvania's place in the east-central European power structure that determined its options.

Transylvanian Society in the "Springtime of the Nations"

The first unmistakeable sign of ferment was when on 3 March, Lajos Kossuth called for the introduction of bourgeois constitutionalism for all the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy at the Hungarian Diet meeting in Pozsony. Ten days later, the people of Vienna were up in arms, and Ferdinand I felt obliged to promise a constitution and constitutional government. On 15 March, the revolution triumphed in Pest–Buda: tens of thousands of people took to the streets and the army did not dare to intervene. The leaders of the radical youth summarized the objectives of two decades of struggle for reform in the twelve categorical points for the whole world to see: "What the Hungarian Nation Wants".

In the meanwhile, the Diet in Pozsony, functioning as a constitutional assembly, declared Hungary to be an independent constitutional monarchy. The king appointed as prime minister Count Lajos Batthyány, who immediately ordered the publication of the law on the emancipation of the serfs passed by the Diet. The proclamations appeared on 23 March, and it was hoped that the measure would ward of the possibility of the Habsburgs' being able to use the serfs to undermine the process of democratization and national liberation. On 11 April, the monarch gave royal sanction to the legislations that had been passed, among them the one providing for "the

486

absolute union with Hungary, under one government, of Transylvania, which belongs to the Hungarian Crown".[1] The law specified that the implementation of the union would be dependent upon the approval of the Transylvanian Diet which was to be convened.

The Hungarian Liberals of Transylvania asked for the support of the Pozsony Diet as early as 19 March. On 20 March, they were still issuing a joint declaration with the Conservatives; on 21 March, Kolozsvár had joined Vienna and Pest on the road to revolution. There were enthusiastic demonstrations by the burghers of the town with the students in the lead, and the town council addressed an appeal to the Gubernium calling for the convocation of the Diet and for union with Hungary, and also for radical social reforms: equality before the law, the emancipation of the serfs, and universal taxation. The other towns followed suit. The country assemblies and those of the seats met, many of them turning into veritable mass meetings of the entire population. They adopted the demands formulated by Kolozsvár, and threatened to send representatives to the Hungarian parliament if the Diet was not convened. The instructions that were worked out for the representatives to the Diet read like revolutionary proclamations. Some of the municipalities, acting on their formally recognized autonomy, themselves introduced universal taxation. The governor, József Teleki meanwhile called the Diet to meet on 31 May without first securing royal consent.

The tide of revolution sweeping through Europe swept most Transylvanians with it; those it did not stood overawed by its force. The Conservatives, who had had the upper hand but so recently, either joined the liberal camp in an effort to salvage what they could, or disappeared from the political scene. Chancellor Samu Jósika, a staunch conservative and an optimist at heart, hoped that the revolutionary discontent of the peasantry could be kept from getting out of hand by the army, and with appeals to the "good emperor" myth; the nobility, too, he believed, would soon find its revolutionary ardour dampened by considerations of class interest, and so he did his best to postpone measures for the emancipation of the serfs until March of the following year. It was at Jósika's suggestion that Ferdinand I named Jellačić, who was known for his unconditional loyalty to the dynasty, to the post of ban of Croatia.

The course of events Jellačić's infamous role in the quashing of the Hungarian revolution was to prove the "wisdom" of his choice. After the Transylvanian Diet had approved the union with Hungary, however, Jósika felt that things were not going quite as he had planned, and resigned. Transylvania had become ungovernable with the traditional means available to imperial manipulation and provincial narrow-mindedness, so elementary were the social and national forces that had erupted.

Unexpectedly powerful was the impetus of the Romanian national movement. Its goal was to build up a basis of mass support, and to work out a programme around which Romanians could rally. Young radical professionals, lawyers, jurists, and articled clerks went to work. Initially, they did not reject Transylvania's union with Hungary, but made approval conditional on the recognition of the Romanian language as one of the official

487   1. The Law of 11 April, 1848.

languages, and on the emancipation guaranteeing the peasantry an improved livelihood. It was with these provisions appended that Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian and Avram Iancu subscribed to the memorandum of the Hungarian jurists of Marosvásárhely, and it was these provisions that formed the core of the petition submitted by Ioan Buteanu. In March yet, Simion Bârnuţiu was the only one of the leading Romanians who definitely opposed the union with Hungary. Bârnuţiu, who had started studying law in Nagyszeben at the age of forty, and had been a teacher of philosophy at the Balázsfalva *líceum* until removed from his post by force, was categorical. "A curse for all eternity on any Romanian who dares conclude arms from the union before the Romanian nation is given political recognition..." for "without national rights, even a republic is but accursed tyranny".[2]

As against this self-seeking nationalism, George Bariţ tried to work out a programme that would satisfy both social and national demands, and maintained that a system of autonomous counties where the population's free use of its native language would be guaranteed was the system of government that should be aimed at. Such attempts to find a compromise solution, however, were relatively soon overwhelmed by the ever stronger spirit of confrontation.

The peasantry erupted on the scene like some gigantic collective personality, one who is as aware of his weaknesses as of his strength. It was the demonstrations held by the county nobility and the townsfolk that first alerted the peasantry to the fact that the world has changed. The emancipation of Hungary's serfs had an enormous impact. It was on the strength of this measure that people began to refuse to do their *robot*, primarily in the Hungarian villages. In inner Transylvania, the proclamations carried from one parish to the other by the young Romanian revolutionaries had the greatest effect. If the priest refused to read it out to the people, they simply forced him to do so, as in Drág, where the priest was compelled to read to the assembled villagers a proclamation written in Buda. What they registered of these proclamations was not the actual message that Transylvania's union with Hungary would bring emancipation to the Transylvanian serfs as well, but that the day of "freedom" was at hand. As one of those listening to the manifesto at Drág made out: "The yoke of the Romanians has been broken; their bright sun has risen, their heaven has opened its gates; for from this moment on, never again shall we serve lords".[3] The habits of thought and expectations of centuries were what came to the fore. Declarations of the nobility's intention to effect the emancipation at the county assemblies only confirmed their suspicion of the nobility, so sure were they that the "good emperor" had long sent out the proclamation of emancipation, and that the lords had concealed it. In some places people even claimed to know that the emperor had given the serfs the lord's demesne. But primarily, the villagers went on strike, and prepared for some great, "redemptive" change. Their messianism was as effective as the au-

2. V. Cherestesiu, *A balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés, 1848. május 15–17.* (The National Meeting at Balázsfalva, 15–17 May, 1848.) Bucharest 1967, 221–222.
3. Contemporary translation of the proclamation. *OL EOKL* Gubernium Transylvanicum in Politicis, 1848: 9012.

thorities' attempts to restore political order. They went into passive resistance when the Gubernium and the county authorities declared a state of emergency, setting up gallows at the edge of the villages and threatening to hang on sight the young men going about with their proclamations and talking of revolution. As if the heroic dispensers of justice from the folk tales had finally appeared, the peasants spoke of Bărnuțiu as "the king in Balázsfalva"; Avram Iancu was spoken of as the young prince. And László Nopcsa was remembered as king, though that conservative former *főispán* merely exploited his Romanian descent to try to infiltrate the Romanian national movement, in order to be able to denounce it to Vienna all the more effectively. Whoever "the lords" were afraid of, the peasantry saw as their liberator.

The liberal nobility's attempt to rally support among the masses of the people was most successful in those social strata whose sliding down the social scale had been due to the central government's measures. They met with greatest success in the Székelyföld, especially in Háromszék, where the population's structure of employment was more complex. The need to coordinate their diverse interests in order that at least some of them might be realized had led to a habit of concerted action. The serfs wanted to be the equals of the frontier guardsmen, the soldiers wanted a status equal to that of the landed nobility. The serfs wanted ownership of the land they worked as soldiers, with a gun in hand; the soldiers and the nobility, however, protected their own. The three groups competed with one another, but they were all protective of the representative organs which guarded their Székely privileges, and in spite of all differences, had learned to work together in the process. It was thus that their feudal constitutionalism had gradually acquired liberal and democratic features. And thus it was that at the end of April, a number of frontier guard units heeded the instigation of two young lawyers and refused to obey the order of the military high command that they should march on Brassó. Instead, they swore allegiance to the Gubernium, and one of the small towns elected the two young lawyers to be their representatives at the Diet. At the end of May, at one of the mass assemblies, on the initiative of the border guards the *robot* was abolished.

Paradoxically, the key figure in all the various ongoing conflicts was King Ferdinand V. By no means a strong personality, Ferdinand felt torn between his extended family — which tried to terrorize him into determined action to maintain the dynasty's absolute rule at all cost — and the Hungarian prime minister, who was looking for ways to reconcile Hungary's independence with the interests of the rest of the monarchy.

It is possible to distinguish two major trends in the tactics of Transylvania's politicians. One group sought to legitimize its goals by enlisting the support of the emperor, the other sought to give its proposed measures the effect of law by winning for them the royal sanction of the constitutional king of Hungary. What made it difficult to see clearly at times was the fact that these two functions were held by one and the same person: the emperor Ferdinand I was Ferdinand V in his capacity as king of Hungary. At any rate, it became evident that the social and national conflicts of Transylvania were just another aspect of the more comprehensive struggle to change the very structure of the empire.

At the end of April, the Austrian government, which had come to power as a result of revolutionary pressure and whose jurisdiction did not, according to the Pozsony laws, extend to Hungary, in order to establish its claim to being the heir of the previous central government organs, started considering how Austria's position as a great power might be secured at the expense of Hungary's independence. Initially, there were no concrete plans. Some members of the Austrian government were inclined to compromise; others, the advocates of centralized absolutism, were nothing loath to try a military "solution". One high-ranking officer originally from Transylvania but now stationed in Vienna wrote back to some friends: "We'll start restoring order by taking control of Transylvania, so as to be able to attack insurgent Hungary from both sides", relying also on "help" from the Romanians.[4] Some Austrian cabinet ministers, dreaming of expansionism in the Balkans, set great store by Transylvania's remaining independent of Hungary, for they hoped that "perhaps the Romanian nation of Transylvania would be the core to which the Danubian principalities would join under Austrian suzerainty."[5]

Initially, the leaders of Transylvania's Saxons were practically paralyzed by the revolution, though it was clear that no real internal social strife was likely, and any cause for discontent was soon remedied by a series of reforms. The great question as far as the Saxons were concerned was whether Saxon territorial autonomy could be preserved, an autonomy which guaranteed the Saxon leading strata regional hegemony, and which provided the framework within which the Szászföld had been able to develop in a way that placed it far above the surrounding regions. It was these concerns that led to the Saxons' seemingly contradictory response to the revolutionary situation: enthusiastic support for liberalization and democratization as a way of breaking the hold of the bureaucracy; and a no less determined insistence on their old institutions, and on their legendary Nation status.

The apple of discord within the Saxon community was the issue of whether or not to unite with Hungary. Nagyszeben had sent a declaration of allegiance to Vienna at the end of March, and by the end of April, the *comes*, Franz von Salmen, was organizing his supporters against the union. At the same time, in Brassó and Segesvár petitions calling for the liberalization of political life were framed, and up on the tower of Brassó's town hall, the Hungarian red, white and green flag was waving. Once the journals entered the fray, the sides spared no energy. The Brassó papers declared utopistic the idea of territorial autonomy with Nagyszeben as the centre, and insisted that the solution was municipal self-government within the framework of a constitutional state with democratically elected "free institutions". They looked not to the Austrian Empire, but to a liberal Germany

4. Letter by Ádám Récsey to János Bethlen. Bus, May 1848. In: *A szabadságharc története levelekben, ahogyan a kortársak látták.* (The History of the War of Independence in Letters, after the Contemporaries.) Edited by I. Deák, Budapest n. d. 77.
5. Statement of the ministerial council attended by the ministers of finance, labour and defence on 1st June. Published by Á. Károlyi, *Az 1848-diki pozsonyi törvénycikkek az udvar előtt.* (The 1848 Acts of Pozsony before the Court.) Budapest 1936, 344.

as the promise of the future, trusting that a liberal Hungary allied with Germany would provide for the Saxons' development as a German nation in the effort to keep their "natural alliance".[6]

A group of young Saxon Radicals proudly proclaiming their anti-union sentiments, along with some older Conservatives, chose their time to influence public opinion to coincide with Governor József Teleki's visit to Nagyszeben. It was partly due to their efforts that the papers gave their Saxon readers a distorted account of the event. Thus, when the governor stated that the use of the German language in the state administration would be guaranteed, the papers simply reported that Teleki had said that "the official language has to be Hungarian".[7] By way of response, the hitherto peaceable citizens of Szeben put on black and yellow colours, and took to the streets, with soldiers marching in the lead. The anti-unionists compared the newly published Austrian constitution with the Hungarian constitution, to the detriment of the latter. And when the University worked out its draft Saxon constitution, elements of the Austrian model were adopted, to facilitate integration within the empire as a whole. To prevent the spread of discontent among the Romanians of the Szászföld, the University made some concessions to the Romanians; others went further, and promised the Romanians' recognition as Transylvania's Fourth Nation in their effort to win the support of the Romanian movement.

In the counties of Transylvania, the peasant movement which unfolded as attempts were made to co-ordinate the spontaneous eruptions of local discontent, soon became a part of the larger Romanian national movement. Encouraged by the prevalence of local activism, Aron Pumnul, who taught philosophy at Balázsfalva, issued a proclamation calling on the rural deans to assemble at Balázsfalva on 30 April with one or two men from every village. The bishop turned to the authorities to ask them to approve the convocation of a national assembly, and the Gubernium set the date for 15 May. Between thirty and forty thousand serfs made their way to Balázsfalva in the hope that their presence would further the cause dearest to their hearts: their emancipation.

The leaders of the Romanian national movement preparing to address the assembled and to influence the resolutions they would adopt were by no means a homogeneous group. Their views were a function of their evaluation of the possibilities open to the Romanian nation given the strengths and weaknesses of the various forces and powers trying to establish or re-establish their control over Transylvanian society, but all of them showed a sense of grave responsibility. Those who underwrote Transylvania's union with Hungary soon found themselves without a following. Others simply trimmed their sails to suit the wind, like the scholar and newspaper editor Timotei Cipariu, whose series of articles on the union started by pointing out its advantages, and ended with an exposition of its drawbacks, and included an article which appeared in the *Wiener Zeitung* (Vienna Newspa-

6. 1852. Notes écrites sous la dictée de N. Bălcescu sur les événements qui ont précédé la révolution de 1848. Biblioteca Academiei RSR, Bucharest, Archiva Ghica, VI. 562–563.
7. *1848 la Români. O istorie în date şi mărturii.* Ed. by C. BODEA. Bucharest 1982, 463.

per) urging that the Romanian principalities join the great family of the peoples of Austria.

On the other hand, Nicolae Bălcescu and Ion Ghica, working on the preparation of the revolution in Wallachia, sent August Treboniu Laurian to Transylvania with the instruction not to break with the Hungarians; though taking a firm stand for Romanian rights he was to try to make the Hungarians understand that their union with the Romanians was the way to save both nations.[8] Laurian, having written a poem advocating the union, wrote one extolling the advantages of the Romanians becoming the Fourth Nation. Bariț insisted that some consensus had to be reached, and pledged to support whatever that would be. As for the radical youth, their desire to see action was only fanned by the manhunts initiated by the authorities.

Bărnuțiu was accepted as the authoritative voice in virtue of his reputation as the chief ideologist of Romanian liberty, and as one who had foreseen the inevitable conflict between the imperial government and the new Hungarian government as early as April. On 14 May, he addressed the assembled at the church in Balázsfalva, speaking of national sovereignty, national equality, and of the harmonious coexistence of all nations. These inspiring words of national consciousness, however, were tinged with extreme mistrust of the Hungarians' intentions: "Poisoned is every morsel taken from the table of the Hungarian liberty." While holding up Switzerland as the example to emulate, he accused Hungary of having cast its eyes on the Danubian principalities, and spoke of Hungary's vulnerability without Transylvania in the most disparaging terms: "Our homeland is a fortress which nature has surrounded with high walls; without it, the Hungarians of the Pannonian lowlands are as exposed to enemy attacks as the wild rabbits of the plains". Furthermore, "without the union, the ties between the Magyars of Transylvania and the Magyars of Hungary will break and the Magyars of Transylvania will slowly undergo a process of natural extinction."[9]

While the Hungarian national movement, thus, sought to establish its hegemony in virtue of its social superiority, the Romanian movement hoped to base its ascendancy on the Romanian population's superiority in numbers. Both groups tried to compensate for their very different inner weaknesses by making political gains as quickly as possible, thereby undermining the chances of the very cooperation that both of them professed to be their long-term goal.

In this overheated atmosphere of nationalism, human relations were subordinated to the primacy of the nation. Bărnuțiu was the most optimistic with regard to the benefits that would accrue to the individual with the achievement of Romanian national liberty, but considered nothing so insidious as the individual's failure to subordinate his own will to the will of the nation. And since a considerable number of the Romanian intellectuals feared that the emancipation and the liberal government introduced in Hungary would cut into the potential support of the Romanian national movement, more and more of them felt that Bărnuțiu's arguments were the only ones adequate to the given situation.

8. CHERESTEŞIU, op. cit., 491.
9. Ibid. 510.

Still, there was a great deal of room for individual opinions. As opposed to those determined to achieve Romanian hegemony on the grounds that "we've suffered long enough", Avram Iancu wanted to see a real "Springtime of the Nations": to see Transylvania become a federated state where the equality of all the national languages was guaranteed. And there could be no doubting the sincerity of the attempt to try for coexistence within their multi-ethnic state when on 15 May, the opening day of the Romanian national assembly, those present not only took an oath of allegiance to the emperor and the Romanian nation, but also swore respect for "all the nations of Transylvania".[10]

In the spirit of Bărnuțiu's address, they laid claim to Romanian self-government as then understood: the independent Romanian nation was declared an integral constituent part of Transylvania. They demanded parliamentary representation and a share in the offices of government in proportion to the ratio the Romanians comprised of the entire population. They called for the emancipation of the serfs and for universal taxation, and — for the first time in the history of the Romanian national movement — for the abolition of the tariffs between Transylvania and the Romanian principalities. As the last of their resolutions, they called upon "the nations living with us ... not to conduct negotiations about the union until the Romanian nation has become a constitutional and organized nation, one taking part in the discussions of the house of legislature with the right to propose motions and to vote".[11]

It was to Ferdinand I that those assembled looked to give his royal sanction to this declaration of Romanian independence, and though a delegation was sent off to Kolozsvár as well, its job was simply to hand over a copy of the Balázsfalva petition for the Diet's information. They wanted no discussion to interfere with their freedom of action, or call into question the legitimacy of their self-government. The Romanian intelligentsia convinced the village population of the advantage of having Romanians in the public administration with arguments that were probably analogous to the ones adduced in a proclamation issued on the morrow of the assembly: "Let the Romanians have officials from among their own people at every level of public administration, men to whom the Romanians can turn with their complains if they have suffered injury, so that they might not always have to complain to foreigners who despise them, and will not do them justice." Various peasant groups, in issuing their national demands, declared: "We want to be a nation: we want Romanian lords and our Romanian language."[12] All this was, at times, conjoined to invective aimed at other nationalities and religions, for even a poet like Andrei Mureșan could write of "heathen oppressors... who knew no law and knew no God".[13]

In the aftermath of the national assembly at Balázsfalva, the Romanian peasantry, encouraged by the lettered men among them and the Saxons,

10. AL. PAPIU-ILARIAN, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Superioră.* Sibiu 1942, 36.
11. CHERESTEȘIU, op. cit., 491.
12. Ibid. 510.
13. N. POPEA, *Memorialul Archiepiscopului și Metropolitului Andrei baron de Șaguna.* I. Sibiu 1889, 80.

tried to arm in a number of places, though without any concrete plans for a revolt of the kind that Ioan Axente, Bărnuțiu's old school-mate at Balázsfalva, was urging them to in mid-April. It was more in a spirit of the "Springtime of the Nation" that they sought to prove their own national coming-of-age to the other nations of Europe by arming. For, as Ioan Buteanu, one of the framers of the Kolozsvár petition of late March, wrote from Nagyszeben: "The Austrian Empire has grown very weak, and it seems on the way to complete disintegration. In Paris the French, in Frankfurt the Germans are holding national congresses; that's where the future of the European empires will be decided; and that's where the decision shall be made" on the future of the Romanians as well. Once they come to know of our movement, they are sure "to give us, too, a share of sweet liberty." And since Romanians and Hungarians alike were equally threatened by Pan-Slavism, which looked to the tzar for support, if the Hungarians "were right-minded men, they cold take our hand as brothers, and recognize us as a political nation."[14] At the same time, Bărnuțiu declared that the three "legal nations" would bear the responsibility for the ensuing civil war if they did not meet the demands of the Balázsfalva assembly.

It added fuel to the fire that the conflicts between the Hungarian landlords and the Romanian serfs acquired a national tinge. The Romanian leaders saw the very existence of their nation as being threatened when at the beginning of June, the Székely frontier guards whom the Szeben military high command had sent out to Mihályfalva shot into the crowd, and killed dozens of Romanian peasants who had taken possession of the lord's pasture, and would not disperse. Iancu wanted the population of the entire Érchegység to rise up in arms: if the Diet in Kolozsvár "will not abolish *robot* the way the Hungarian Diet had done for the peasants there, then we shall forcibly see to it ourselves".[15] Papiu, anticipating an armed insurrection by the Serbs and Croatians, tried to organize the people of the Mezőség. After this, the Gubernium put a prohibition on the functioning of the Romanian National Committee, and tried to arrest some of the more vocal leaders, but all in vain. Everyone had started to arm in self-defence (multi-ethnic national guards had been organized in the towns, though in a short while the Romanias left it and formed separate units), but more and more, the peoples of Transylvania were inclined to turn their weapons and to use their energies against one another.

The Bourgeois Revolution in Transylvania

That the conflicts found no solution and seemed to be making for civil war had a great deal to do with the crisis engulfing the empire as a whole, and with the fact that the revolution simply could not come to a head. Similar

14. Ioan Buteanu's letter to Simion Balint. Nagyszeben, 27 May, 1848. *OL* Gub. Trans. in Pol. 1848:7327.
15. Evidence from the record book of the Kozma investigating committee set up by the Gubernium. Ibid. 1848:9012.

signs of chronic structural weakness were evident in Hungary as well. In Buda, the commander-in-chief had the army shoot into the crowd; in fact a great many in the officer corps regarded the new Hungarian government with animosity. The ban of Croatia openly defied the government, and the Serbs wanted to declare their part of the country an independent crown province, which brought civil war to the south.

On 15 May, a new revolution broke out in Vienna, and this strengthened the Hungarian government's bargaining position on the matter of the union against the advocates of imperial centralization at the court. Prime Minister Batthyány disarmed his opponents and won the monarch with the argument that he was working in the interest of the empire as a whole. On these grounds, he called the Székelys to arms as early as 19 May, with the intention of using them against the Serbs in southern Hungary. On 29 May, Ferdinand promised to attend the opening of Hungary's first representative parliament, and defied the Austrian government by placing the commander-in-chief of Transylvania under the palatine, Archduke Stephen, who, as viceroy, was to work in concert with the Hungarian government until September. Since Commander-in-chief Puchner was also the royal commissioner appointed to the Transylvanian Diet, this decision was tantamount to an order not to interfere with the work of legislation.

By the time the Diet assembled, there could not be much question of which way the vote would go on whether or not to enter into union with Hungary. Transylvania's Hungarian Liberals were unflagging in their zeal, the spirit of revolution held Kolozsvár in its grip, and the outcome of the Viennese revolution as much as developments abroad made the union seem inevitable. The Hungarians of Transylvania, with their slogan of "union or death" clearly believed that they were fighting for their lives, and their determination was but reinforced by the conviction that union was the road to peaceful revolution. The Hungarians' evaluation of the national aspirations of the non-Magyar peoples was coloured by a growing paranoia: more and more they saw these as the work of a "hidden hand" and the ever more radical Romanian and Saxon movements were identified as instruments of the rallying forces of imperial centralization. There were rumours that the Conservatives wanted to make Transylvania into the Vendée of the 1848 revolution.

The majority of the Saxon nation's representatives to the Diet subscribed to the union after a fierce debate stretching far into the night, convinced at last mainly by the arguments adduced by Carl Gooss of Segesvár, which called attention to the advantages to be derived from Hungary's development under a modern constitutional government, and to the fact that union, as the example of Germany also showed, was the way forward into the future. On 30 May, the Diet in Kolozsvár which had three Romanian representatives, unanimously passed the reunion of the "two brother homelands".

Law I of 1848, "On the Unification of Hungary and Transylvania", provided for civil equality: "As a consequence [of the union], just as the equality before the law of every inhabitant has been declared and put into practice in Hungary, the brother homeland, so here, too, [it] is recognized as an eternal and immutable principle in respect of every inhabitant of the homeland without regard to nationality, language or religion, and concurrently,

any past law to the contrary is declared to be null and void."[16] The reunion of the two lands thus guaranteed Transylvania a liberal constitutional system, but since the suffrage introduced in Hungary was inapplicable in Transylvania, the Kolozsvár Diet had to pass a new suffrage bill. However, the further regulation of Transylvania's unique institutions they entrusted to the competence of the new parliament of the whole of Hungary which was soon to meet, and appointed a Union Committee, which was to help work out the bills that the ministries would be submitting for discussion.

On 6 June, the last Diet of Transylvania's Estates approved the bill on the emancipation of the serfs worked out by the Liberals, and specified 18 June as the day from which *robot* was no longer due. The governor, József Teleki, had the legislation proclaimed throughout the country before it ever received royal sanction, as indeed the Hungarian prime minister had done in March. More than 160,000 families — half the population — had been relieved of their feudal services and dues. The next step was to replace the feudal terms of land holding with the modern system of property rights, and the big question was who should receive land to dispose over freely as his own, and how much of it he should get.

It was the task of the Diet to determine what lands were to become available for ownership and their tenants freed, and which were to remain the landlord's property, with those living on them still liable to render him services in lieu of rent. But the law that was passed, a compromise solution, did not distinguish clearly between allodial and village land. The law did specify, however, that without due process of law, neither copyholders nor landless cotters were to be restricted in the use of the land that was "in their hands". Wherever the legal status — i.e. whether it was allodial or not — of the land held by a cotter was not clear, he was not obliged to render services during the time the case was being decided by the courts. In this respect, the Transylvanian law was more partial to the peasantry than the Hungarian "model", due in part, perhaps to the high number of disputed cases that were expected to come up. On the Liberals' reckoning, the law provided the peasantry with possession of up to a third more arable and meadow area than what Cziráky's census had projected. It is understandable that the nobility felt that the myth of its paternal generosity had been borne out as fact.

The law specified that the landowners were to be compensated by the state. The peasants were not compelled to pay direct financial compensation to their former lords, as they were in most of the Austrian Hereditary Lands, nor to compensate them by surrendering a part of their holdings, as in Prussia. The Transylvanian peasantry thus set out on the road to modernization relatively unencumbered, though the opportunities available to them — the quality of the land and the backwardness of agricultural production — were all even worse than in Hungary. At the same time, the preponderance of the great estates could not be felt with the brutality characteristic to many eastern European countries, which in Transylvania (in

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16. *Magyar törvénytár. 1540–1848. évi erdélyi törvények.* (Hungarian Law Archives. Transylvanian Laws: 1540–1848.) Edited by S. Kolozsvári – D. Márkus – K. Óvári. Budapest 1900, 667–668.

15–23. Pictures of costumes from the eighteenth century

15. High-ranking Hungarian nobleman

16. Young Hungarian gentlewoman
18. Saxon citizen of Nagyszeben

17. Burgher from the Council of One Hundred
19. Transylvanian Jew

39

13

49

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Ein Wallachischer Dorst-Pfaff.

Ein Wallach aus dem Hatzager gebürth.

Eine Wallachin die alt Hatzinnen geht zum Hannen.

Eine Wallachin aus dem Fogarascher district.

20. Romanian village pope

21. Romanian man from the Hátszeg region

22. Romanian woman with spindle

23. Romanian woman from the Fogaras region

24. Romanian family going to the fair. Painting by Miklós Barabás, 1843–1844

25. Miklós Wesselényi. Painting by Miklós Barabás, 1836 ▶

27. The Marosvásárhely gas-works. Buildings designed by Ede Thoroczkai Wigand and Károly Kós. Picture postcard, around 1911

28. Wood-pulp works at Torda. Picture postcard, around 1900

◄ 26. Imre Mikó. Painting by Miklós Barabás, 1884

29. Stained-glass window by Sándor Nagy in the mirror hall of Marosvásárhely's
Palace of Culture, 1913

case the 1847 Census came into life) would have made the conditions of the life of the peasants even harder.

It was to take decades for all the conflicting claims that attached to a great many pieces of land to be ironed out, and those who ended up with no property were still obliged to render services in lieu of rent. For all that, we must consider the emancipation of the serfs in Transylvania an important, and relatively early, step toward the elimination of serfdom in eastern Europe. In Russia and the Romanian principalities, it was to be another fifteen years until emancipation, and even then, the power of the great landowners was practically unbroken. No small and middle peasantry comparable in vitality to the Transylvanian could develop. The smallholder peasantry, considered one of the positive features of Romanian social development, in Transylvania, was started on its way by the progressive provisions of the emancipation bill of 1848.

The nationality policy of the Hungarian Liberals of the last Transylvanian Diet continued along lines evolved in the Reform Era. In vain did some Romanians look to the Diet to make a grand gesture of compensation, and to recognize the Romanians as the Fourth Nation before the system of nations as such was abolished. In vain had the Hungarian Károly Szász even worked out a bill which read as follows: "The Vlach Nation, which the old laws of the homeland placed under various restrictions and repressive measures, is hereby joyfully received by the other Nations of Transylvania within their brotherly circle as their equal in rights and obligations; and in place of the old 'Vlach' [Oláh] name for this Nation, to which memories of oppression and various kinds of indignity adhere, henceforward ... the name 'Romanian' is to be used."[17]

The Liberals, however, were both too careful and too dogmatic to accept such a bill. Since the matter affected Hungary's Romanians as well, they did not want to anticipate the decisions of the Parliament to meet in Pest. Instead, they merely passed a resolution rescinding "every restriction and subordination which, according to the laws in effect until now, have adversely affected the various peoples of Transylvania, particularly the Vlachs, or have been prejudicial to any of the various religions."[18] A bill declaring the Greek Orthodox church one of the "received" religions was also being prepared. All this, however, could not serve to calm passions half so well as the passing of the original bill — the one prepared by Károly Szász — might have. What is more, Ferdinand, in receiving the Romanian delegates sent by the Balázsfalva assembly, had assured them that he would try to persuade the Batthyány government to satisfy their demands by legislative means. Again, the emperor was playing the role of "defender of the Romanians", and the impact was not lost.

The majority of Transylvania's Hungarian Liberals were just as intransigent when it came to the matter of the use of languages other than the official Hungarian language at the various administrative levels in various parts

17. Published by A. MISKOLCZY, Társadalmi és nemzeti kérdés az utolsó erdélyi rendi országgyűlésen. (Social and National Question at the Last Transylvanian Diet of the Estates.) *Sz* 1979, No. 5, 875.

497

18. Cited by MISKOLCZY, op. cit., 881.

of the country. They were convinced that any concession would lead to the inundation of the Hungarians by the other nationalities, and to their destruction. They were so committed to the ideal of the unitary nation-state that Wesselényi — seeing that the national and social tensions within the country were worse than ever, and that both the Austrian developments and the attitude of Russia augured ill for the revolution — in a letter of 18 June to one of Hungary's ministers, suggested the possibility of a new, territorially smaller, but ethnically homogeneous Hungarian state, or rather of one consisting only of citizens who were conscious of themselves as Hungarians. Assuming that the Romanians would want to secede from the rest of Transylvania and eventually unite with Romanian Moldavia and Wallachia, he thought in terms of an exchange of populations, whereby the Hungarians living interspersed among the Romanians would change abodes with Romanians "living closer to the border of the land truly inhabited by Hungarians". With the optimism typical of the Liberals, he assumed that the Saxons would want to join the Hungarians in the new Hungary. This "unprecedented but not implausible ... migration of peoples ... is to be realized through peaceful discussions in keeping with the culture and spirit of the present age".[19] Wesselényi's reasonable, though impracticable, idea was conceived in the midst of civil war, which, however, was drawing to a close as the Hungarian government consolidated its position. On 10 June, Ferdinand gave his royal sanction to the Transylvanian Diet's union bill. It seemed as if Hungary were going to slip out of the grip of the empire, and that Transylvania's Hungarians would not, after all, be playing the role of hostage in a Hungary-wide civil war.

Transylvania's administration and judiciary continued to function under the direction of the Gubernium. The Court Chancellery of Transylvania, an office responsible to the government in Vienna, was abolished; the Hungarian cabinet took its place. Miklós Vay was appointed by the Batthyány government royal commissioner to Transylvania; his circumspect moderation smoothed over many a local conflict. The comprehensive regulation of Transylvanian affairs, of course, was something that the Pest Parliament was to have seen to. That is never found the time was due, in part, to the fact that the Hungarian government tended to base its understanding of Romanian national demands on the way these appeared in Hungary proper. There, however, though the Romanians called for the free use of their language in schools, churches and at various levels of public administration, they generally were careful to steer clear of any demand for a separate political nation. It was only later that a small group of more militant Romanian nationalists consisting mostly of landowners and priests swelled into pro-Habsburg forces demanding territorial autonomy. At the other end of the spectrum were the Romanian nobles of Máramaros, who, declaring themselves to be Romanian-speaking "Hungarian citizens", stood firm by Hungary's constitutional government.

The first demand that Hungary's Romanians made involved autonomy for the Romanian Orthodox church. They wanted to break free of the Ser-

19. *Wesselényi Miklós levele Klauzál Gáborhoz.* (Letter by Miklós Wesselényi to Gábor Klauzál.) Kolozsvár, 18 June, 1848. In: MISKOLCZY, op. cit., 877–878.

bian church hierarchy, and, since they felt threatened by the Serbs — the Serbian national programme presented in May had laid claim to considerable areas inhabited by Romanians — they looked to the Hungarian government for support, especially since the constitutional guarantees enshrined in the Pozsony laws in many ways assured the social betterment both of the masses and of the Romanian intelligentsia, who identified with them. The discontent of the peasantry did not have the elementary force it had in Transylvania. The lawyer Eftimie Murgu, who had been arrested in 1845 on charges of Daco-Romanism and inciting to riot, was freed from prison in March of 1848 at the insistence of Hungarian Radicals. But when he called on the Romanian nation to meet in Lugos at the end of June, he had the government's approval. At the mass meeting, pointing to the Serbian threat, they asked to set up a Romanian national guard, demanded independence for their church from the Serbian Orthodox church, and the option of communicating with the authorities at all levels of public administration in Romanian. The Romanians of Bihar, the Kővár region and the Banat, however, for the most part tended to seek satisfaction of their more immediate national needs, and were inclined to be more receptive to what the Hungarian government was trying to achieve. They supported the idea of Transylvania's union with Hungary enthusiastically, seeing it as a step to the integration of the Romanian people. It was the promise of integration of this kind that Bariț was hailing in Brassó when he wrote: "The new Hungarian and Transylvanian laws have done away with every law that has oppressed the Romanian or any other people", and that these new laws has met "every point [of the petition submitted by the Balázsfalva assembly], with the exception of the nationality in the strictest sense of the term."[20]

In practice, however, the new constitutionalism failed to fulfil the hopes attached to it. When the new suffrage law was being debated in Kolozsvár, the Diet, fearful of Romanian preponderance, set the census requirement very high: in the counties, franchise was tied to an annual tax of eight silver florins, and all those who already had the right to vote continued to enjoyed it. Even so, fourteen of the seventy-three electoral districts were overwhelmingly Romanian, but only six Romanian representatives were actually elected, for the old ways of conducting elections and the old loyalties were still alive.

In Hungary proper, fifteen of those elected to the new parliament were Romanians. No wonder, then, that the Romanian intelligentsia of Transylvania, which spoke for what was, after all, the majority of the population, felt frustrated. In the short run, liberalism proved inadequate to create a solution that all sides could accept as a compromise. In the long run, however, it did provide the framework within which the country's Romanian citizens could rise into the ranks of the middle class, and thereby set the stage for a confrontation between Hungarians and Romanians as equals.

For the time being, the leaders of the Transylvanian Romanian national movement pinned their hopes on Wallachia. The revolution had spread to the principality by June, and they were hoping that the provisional govern-

20. *Gazeta de Transilvania,* 14/26 June, 1848, No. 48.

ment in Bucharest would influence the Hungarian cabinet in the direction of a more consistent liberalism in their response to Romanian demands. The Hungarian government, too, they thought, would benefit from having Wallachia for an ally, and the precondition of that was for them to guarantee the Romanians their national rights. It was this line of thought that Bariț — who was by then thoroughly disillusioned with the way things were going for the Romanian cause — had in mind when he wrote in his paper: "The fate of the Romanian nation is decided in Bucharest and Iași, not in Kolozsvár or Balázsfalva in Hungary".[21] And it was for this reason that he had helped pave the way for the Wallachian revolution with various proclamation calling on the people to take up arms, even promising the help of Transylvania's Romanians, all the while reiterating the need to build on the "natural alliance" between Romanians and Hungarians.

The idea of a Romanian–Hungarian alliance, and of the Danubian Confederation of which it was to be the core, was first proposed by the Polish émigrés living in Paris. It was an idea that was gaining support at the same time as the Romanian movement for national independence and unification, and the two currents at times reinforced, at times crossed one another. The idea of a Romanian state stretching from the Dniester to the Tisza was the dream of quite a few Romanians, especially in Wallachia, but one that was, perforce, confined, to the sphere of lyric poetry and conspiratorial confidence. To say it out loud was to run the danger of intervention from two sides. The Russian foreign minister Count Nesselrode threatened Moldavia and Wallachia with military occupation for their governments' countenancing the Daco-Romanian movement, and the commander-in-chief of the imperial troops in Transylvania watched all the clandestine movement with no more sympathy. Bărnuțiu, in his public address at Balázsfalva, had thought it prudent to speak only of a unified national culture, and had been careful to point out that a nation could live under the rule of a number of governments.

The Wallachian revolutionaries had adopted the "Danubian Confederation" ideal, and wanted to see Romanian and Hungarian national aspirations mutually reinforce one another. For their goal was to establish a federal state — of what component nations was as yet undecided — capable of arresting the expansion of tzarist absolutism.

That their dream never had a chance was due not to any personal inadequacy of theirs, but to the circumstances. The Hungarian government could not undertake to support a cause of this kind, which had no support in western Europe. Batthyány and his government were inclined to an alliance with the Danubian principalities, but the fact that the imperial framework was still formally binding made this very difficult. Nor were the representatives of the Wallachian government to the cabinet in Buda particularly forthcoming in fulfilling their instructions to cooperate with the Hungarian government. For the time being, Wallachia's foreign policy orientation was being determined by those who wanted to see the Romanian unification movement tie its fortune to the analogous movement for German

21. G. Bariț, Terorismul străin in Moldavo-România. *Gazeta de Transilvania*, 27 May/8 June, 1848, No. 43.

unity. Alexandru Golescu, for instance, while he declared the Hungarian emancipation law to be the one that his countrymen should emulate, was, by the middle of the summer, urging the Romanians of Transylvania to ally with the Croatian and Saxon counter-revolutionary forces. His letters were intercepted, and made known to the government, and this, naturally, made for bad blood between the two countries. At the same time, the Wallachian German orientation was inclined to come to some compromise solution with Hungary: the same Ioan Maiorescu who later wrote appeals to the Frankfurt assembly strongly disapproved of Transylvania's Romanians siding with the forces determined to defeat the revolution.

Still, the Romanians' antipathy could not help but grow as the shortcomings of the Hungarian government's nationality policy and the tendency to procrastinate become ever more dominant, and as the —admittedly few — voices advocating expansionism became more and more shrill. For Hungary's leaders, anxious to secure their country's position as a modern power, were eagerly seeking to find its place within the concert of Europe, and believed that they had found it as heir to the non-Austrian parts of the Habsburg Empire. When it looked as if the Austrian Hereditary Lands would join with the German states to create a unified Germany and Hungary could finally consolidate its independence, her statesmen — along with a great many foreign observers — naively believed that the Danubian principalities would want to join with Hungary of their own free will.

The inconsistencies which characterized both the Romanian and Hungarian foreign policies were, in part, a reflection of the extreme instability of the European political scene. The immanent weaknesses of both the Romanian and the Hungarian revolutions, and the fact that both new systems tried to make their way with the menacing shadow of foreign intervention looming over them, did a great deal to undermine the chances of a real Romanian–Hungarian alliance. Though the revolution in Wallachia had no nationality problem to contend with, the new government was unable to see the matter of emancipation through to its realization. At the end of September, Bucharest was occupied by Turkish, and the Russian armies, and the revolutionary experiment came to a violent end.

The Hungarian progressives — in Transylvania as well — mourned the end of the Wallachian revolution as the loss of a potential ally in the revolutionary cause. The lesson was not lost on them, for in the meanwhile the forces of counter-revolution had rallied in Hungary too, and in Transylvania civil war was at hand.

Counter-Revolution and Civil War

There are three schools of thought on the causes of the civil war in Transylvania. The first conceives of it in terms of the teleological "vulcano" model: the centuries of oppression, suffering and humiliation grew worse and all at once became unbearable. It was this that made the peasantry take up arms, for the emancipation had not delivered what it had promised, nor had the Romanian national demands been met. At the other pole is what has been called the "agitator" model: on this view, it was the machinations

of the army officers and associated déclassés, fearful of losing whatever hold on society the old hierarchy still gave them, which let loose the passions that were the undoing of the revolution. Quite distinct from both these models — which, with their strong emotional appeal and categorical claims are but versions of the contemporary explanations — there is the "political" model based on a comparative study of the whole series of revolutions which broke out in 1848–1849. This political model takes social, and not national categories as basic, and speaks not of subjective passions but of revolutions and counter-revolutions and their genesis. It accounts for the collective violence which both embodied in terms of conflicts of interest and competition between the various power groupings, and accepts as axiomatic the statement that war is only a political struggle continued by other means. What complicates any analysis of Transylvania's particular situation is Transylvania's "multiple integration": it was newly integrated with Hungary, and was still integrated within the Habsburg Empire, and was, thus, multiply bound and committed at a time when everyone from serf to aristocrat was actively involved in politics each in his own way, and when the masses of the peasantry showed extraordinary political cohesion in their determination to see their utopistic expectations realized.

The counter-revolution's main strength was those army units which had remained loyal to the emperor, units which had won an overwhelming victory in the Italian provinces, and which had provoked a hardly insurrection in Prague so that reprisal might be all the more ruthless. By August, the conservative aristocracy and the military high command felt that the liberal revolutionary government had forfeited enough support for them to be able to restore "order". The Viennese court, however, continued in its duplicity, lest the planned military intervention be suspected. It was not until the beginning of October that Ferdinand openly turned against the constitution that he had sanctioned.

Once it was evident that the Hungarian government was hemmed in on all sides, Jellačić, the ban of Croatia and the commander of the Croatian military frontier zone, volunteered to suppress the Hungarian revolution, and his offer was enthusiastically received by those whose voice counted at court. It is one of the tragedies of the history of the Danube region that his attack came at the very moment when the Hungarian government was at last willing to grant Croatia complete autonomy.

Initially, the Hungarian revolution received at least moral support from abroad. On hearing that Viennese troops were being deployed to aid Jellačić's forces, the people of Vienna took to the streets again on 6 October. Though the Hungarian army was able to beat back the Croatian attack, it was unable to succour Vienna, and the revolutionaries succumbed.

As the confrontation between Hungary and the imperial government headed for a show-down, the social and national conflicts in Transylvania grew worse and worse.

It was in the two Romanian frontier regiments that discontent was most rife: they formed the centres of resistance, and then provided the backbone of the offensive. The frontier regiments carried weight that went beyond their military strength. The freeman status of frontier guardsman was one that the serfs aspired to, though the Romanian small landowners in the

regiments would just as soon have done without their military obligations. In the same way as the Horea rebellion of 1784 had started with mass volunteering for the frontier regiments, in 1848 the movement to join up was one of the forms that the peasantry's class struggle took. Paradoxically, of course, for by then serfdom as an institution had been abolished by the revolution. The proclamation of emancipation, however, could not in itself satisfy the powerful messianic expectations that would follow in its wake, especially since it had led, rather, to endless of conflicts between the landed nobility and the peasantry. The delays involved in settling the various claims through the courts made for mistrust and a sense of insecurity on both sides.

In vain did Imre Mikó, who had charge of the Transylvanian Gubernium, ask the Hungarian minister of justice, Ferenc Deák, to take steps to avert a crisis without delay, by appointing those commissions which, in keeping with the principles of Transylvanian civil law, would decide village by village what lands the lord had a rightful claim to, and what was, by right, the peasantry's property. Until the committee on the union had submitted its detailed proposals, the hands of the minister of justice were tied.

In some 10–15 per cent of the villages in the counties, the entire population was challenging the lord as one man. Dispute centred on those pastures which the lord now arrogated to himself on grounds of its being allodial land, and on the question of who controlled the forests. The position of the serf called "curialists", who had acquired only personal freedom by the emancipation because the land they lived on and worked was part of the lord's demesne, was another source of extreme tension. Though this group comprised only about 15 per cent of all villeins, a great many peasants feared that they, too, would be similarly dispossessed. In many places the peasantry refused to harvest the crops on the lord's own lands even in return for a share of the produce, lest their share-cropping be interpreted as a recognition of their former dependent status, and their lands be categorized as part of the lord's demesne. The situation became critical when time came to harvest the corn, and the county authorities tried to regain control of the situation by exacting the peasantry's *robot* arrears, and by obliging the former curialist serfs to go to work in the fields.

At the end of September, from one day to the next, the mass of the peasantry actively turned against the government. What triggered the event was the government order for the conscription of a national guard, the *Honvéd* army. Though its function was to be purely defensive, there were rumours in the villages that the "lords" wanted to use the conscripts against the emperor himself. There were instances of sabotage everywhere: the men went into hiding, ripped pages from the church registers to destroy the "evidence", and simply did not let the conscripting officers enter the village. On 12 September, an army of two hundred soldiers sent by the revolutionary government of Hungary and the men of several villages clashed in Aranyoslóna, and dozens lay dead when the skirmish ended. The incident became the symbol of "popular" resistance against the backdrop of such aggression, the myth of the "good emperor" loomed large, and became the focus of a vast variety of discontents.

By the time the government put a stop to the conscriptions, it was too late: the forces of counter-revolution were channelling the discontent as they

saw fit. Events followed one another like the unfolding plot of a well-written play. As early as September, Commander-in-chief Puchner had noted in a letter to the minister of war in Vienna: "It is possible that we might have to influence the Romanian people — which, in respect of its strategic location and loyalty to His Majesty is just like the Ruthenians of Galicia — in a way that will help us curb the Hungarian democratic forces".[22]

In the meanwhile, between 11 and 14 September when Jellačić crossed the Dráva to occupy the Hungarian capital Buda, representatives of all the villages of the military frontier zone were called together to Orlát and Naszód to pledge their support for the unity of the monarchy and the army. These meetings were taken as a signal by the Romanian peasantry, who flocked to volunteer for the frontier regiments. Though the high command in Nagyszeben was careful to avoid anything that Hungarian public opinion might interpret as "provocation" until the time was ripe, Karl Urban, the lieutenant colonel of Naszód, on returning from Vienna on 8 September acted on "higher" instructions and promised imperial protection for all the communities that had boycotted conscription into the Hungarian national guard. Priests, seminarians and law students encouraged the villages to send delegates to Urban for their *pajură* (meaning "eagle" in Romanian), a document stamped with the Habsburgs' two-headed eagle seal, which attested in glowing German that the community in question was loyal to Emperor Ferdinand and would, in case of need, send its young men to testify to this with their life-blood.

Community solidarity, or perhaps more precisely, the compelling strength of the collectivity, was extraordinary. Those flocking to Naszód — some Hungarians among them — often dragged along with them the local landowner, the Calvinist priest, and the county officials. By the end of September, 527 villages had sworn their allegiance. On Urban's estimate, just of those who had arms of their own there were more than ten thousand men in readiness.

The Romanian national movement, which to this point had had no scope for action, co-operated with the imperial military authorities, but also tried to influence the course of events as a force in its own right. In northern Transylvania, around Naszód, there was little chance for this last aspiration, so strong was the dominance of the Austro-German officer corps. In the south, however, it was the Romanian officers, priests and schoolmasters who dominated the scene, men who were committed to national self-government. Here, the military never did acquire direct control over the disaffected. Balázsfalva became the gathering-point of those whose opposition to the Hungarian government was grounded primarily in social and national grievances. Ioan Axente, who had spoken of the possibility of armed revolt as early as the spring, set out from Orlát with a few hundred followers and arrived at Balázsfalva with thousands. Peasants from all over Transylvania, Hungarians included, were making their way to Balázsfalva, which from mid-September on was, for two weeks, the scene of a gigantic encampment, and another national assembly. The assembly demanded the

22. Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Hofkriegsrat, Präs. MK 1848:5462.

abolition of the *robot* — in actual fact, only *robot* arrears were still being exacted — and of the labour service being demanded in lieu of rent for the land used. What is more, they declared the union with Hungary null and void, and pronounced the Austrian constitution valid in Transylvania as well. The assembled called for a provisional government composed of Romanians, Saxons and Hungarians, and demanded that a Diet be convened to decide on Transylvania's future. "The elected representatives of the Romanian people of Transylvania", with Laurian at their head, turned to the Viennese Parliament, requesting that Austria make its presence felt in the east, and guarantee the independence of the two Romanian principalities, so that they might "join whichever great power they trust". As for Austria, let it be "a voluntary alliance of free peoples".[23]

The Austrian officer corps was clearly troubled by the excessive nationalist sentiment of the intelligentsia, but for all that, the generals at Balázsfalva, as Laurian reported, "promised everything":[24] that they would pass on the Romanian demands to the emperor, and that they would provide the peasantry with arms.

The organizers of the Balázsfalva assembly called on the people to arm in defence of the nation. The armed units they set up followed the Roman traditions that they claimed to be theirs. They divided Transylvania into districts called *prefectura*, and started to set up *legione* in each one under the command of a *prefect*. Going down the hierarchy of command, there were the ranks *tribuns*, *centurios* and *decurios*. The leaders assumed names such as Sever, Probu, and Marțian. Whenever possible, they persuaded the villagers to drill with scythes and spears under the command of some local veteran, in the hope that Commander-in-chief Puchner would keep his promise and send them arms and real army officers. They started setting up the *"alarm trees"*, and building the fire which, when lit, would mark the start of the attack.

The Hungarian revolutionary government found it more and more difficult to hold its own in Transylvania. Once the villages went into explicit opposition, the administration was paralyzed. The most it could do was send reports to Buda on how events were unfolding. The threat of a "bloody upheaval" was in the air. As one of the *főispán*s reported about the attitude of the villagers to the county administration: "Where there is no opposition, one is terrified by the excessive obsequiousness, and a turn of phrase that one meets time and again: 'We'll obey, until it turns out how things will go'."[25]

The ominous situation gave some impetus to the attempts to satisfy some of the Romanians' national demands. At the end of August, Wesselényi had presented a bill on the use of the Romanian language. The Romanian repre-

23. Published by C. BODEA, *Lupta românilor pentru unitatea natională 1834–1849.* Bucharest 1967, 337–340.
24. Letter by A. T. Laurian to G. Bariţ. Nagyszeben, 22 September/2 October, 1848. Published by BODEA, op. cit., 340.
25. Report by Baron István Kemény, *főispán* (lord lieutenant) of Alsó-Fehér county to the Gubernium. Nagyenyed, 30 September, 1848. *OL* Gub. Trans. in Pol. 1848: 11 302.

sentatives of Hungary proper also called for analogous rights, emphasizing the need for the two nations to be allies.

In more settled times, Kossuth's warning, too, might not have fallen on deaf ears: "Hungarians and Vlachs shall both find a bright future in brotherly unity, and not if one is deceived into oppressing the other; for with oppression, they resort to a weapon which is likely to backfire."[26]

At the end of September, the committee on the union — which had coopted some Romanian members, Cipariu, the scholar, among them — finally came up with a draft bill which might have opened up a new chapter not only in Romanian–Hungarian relations, but also in the lives of all of Hungary's non-Hungarian peoples. The draft bill recognized the Romanian people as a collective legal person. Its basis was that "the nationality and language of the Romanians were recognized". In their schools and in their churches, it guaranteed the use of the vernacular, and provided for its use in the forums of county and urban government "wherever half of those present are Romanians". It held out the prospect that Romanian would be a language of command in the national guard. The draft bill specified that Romanians were to be given public administrative posts in some "fair proportion", and declared that "all rights and privileges which accrue to the other citizens of the homeland, or shall be won by the legislature in the future, are to be shared in by the Romanians".[27]

The draft bill never got beyond the desk of the Speaker, so busy was everyone by then with organizing the revolution's defence. Still, these developments touching on the Romanians were well received by some of Transylvania's Romanian leaders. People were more optimistic, but it did not undermine their co-operation with the imperial army. "The emperor will give us everything that is our due. But you should know that the Parliament in Pest, too, has granted everything, has recognized our nationhood in all its manifestations", wrote Nicolae Bălășescu[28] at the beginning of October on hearing the news from Cipariu who had come from Pest. Cipariu, however, returning to Balázsfalva, stayed with the side that stood to win, and put up the black and yellow flag.

It seems that the Romanian leaders believed that their military preparations and the Croatians' arms would restrict Hungary's independence of action enough to intimidate the Hungarian national government into salvaging what it could, and accepting the constitutional reforms that had been worked out in Vienna for the entire monarchy. Though its precise nature had never been specified, a constitutional framework of this kind, as the Brassó papers pointed out, based as it putatively was on some balancing act to keep the national aspirations of the various nations of the empire from overwhelming one another, would give the Romanians, too, a significant

26. Speech by Kossuth on the 26th August session of Parliament. Published by *KLÖM* XII. Edited by I. Sinkovics. Budapest 1957, 804.

27. *Az 1848/49. évi népképviseleti országgyűlés.* (The 1848/49 Peoples' Representative National Assembly.) Edited and introduced by J. Beér – A. Csizmadia. Budapest 1954, 583–585.

28. Nicolae Bălășescu's letter to G. Barit. Nagyszeben, 24 September/6 October, 1848. Bucharest, Biblioteca Academiei, MS 993, 60.

role in shaping their own destiny. It was on the basis of this consideration above all else that the Romanian leaders chose to run the risk of siding with the imperial military, for they must have known full well that the generals were no friends to constitutionalism.

The leading Saxon politicians based their decisions on their evaluation of the balance of forces within the empire. In the first half of September, when they saw that the Hungarian government was preparing for a military confrontation, the Saxon representatives to the Hungarian Parliament — with the exception of Elias Roth of Brassó — renounced their mandates one after the other, and went home to Transylvania. They considered it a serious violation of their traditional rights that the draft bill submitted by the committee on the union proposed that the highest officials heading the Saxon (and Székely) seats be appointed by the ministry in the same way as the *főispáns* of the counties. They did not feel that their autonomy was sufficiently guaranteed by the fact that they were to continue to elect their *comes*, that their municipal organizations and the University were to continue to function, and that the use of the German language was to be guaranteed in all the Saxon municipalities with the exception of Szászváros. They were intransigent in insisting on their traditional privileges, in spite of the fact that the recent election had shown that the liberalization of municipal politics did not endanger the ascendancy of those who saw the Saxons' future to lie in an expressly German cultural orientation.

As far as Stephan Ludwig Roth was concerned, by the beginning of October the choice was clear: "1. If we stand by the Hungarians, we'll be against the Romanians and the empire. 2. If we stand by the Romanians, we'll be against the Hungarians in defense of the empire. The Hungarians and Romanians are incidental. What counts is the empire, for it is on this principle that the newly proclaimed Austrian constitution rests." Constitutionalism, the sense of being German, and loyalty to the emperor — these were what counted even had the Hungarians "acceded to all our conditions"; but since "this is not the case, the decision is even more clear-cut".[29]

With both groups siding with the counter-revolution, the conflict between Saxons and Romanians became of secondary importance. Two major Saxon political trends emerged. One aim was to make Transylvania into a confederation of four territorially autonomous nations, with equal representation for each of them in the federal government. It was this programme that was adopted at the beginning of October by the municipal assembly of Nagyszeben. The other aim involved the repudiation of Transylvania's historic traditions, and advocated a counter-revolutionary solution: germanization and a strong imperial central government. Those who supported it envisioned territorial autonomy in the form of the Szászföld's becoming a unit of the empire completely separate from Transylvania, and subject to the authority only of the imperial ministry in Vienna.

The Szászföld became the centre of counter-revolutionary military operations. At the beginning of October, Puchner grouped his forces around the Saxon towns, ostensibly to make the Romanian population turn against

29. Letter by Roth to Johann Gött. Muzsna, 14 October, 1848. In: S.L. ROTH, *Gesammelte Schriften und Briefe*. 7. Bd. Hrsg. O. FOLBERTH, Berlin 1964, 115–116.

the Hungarian government with this show of force. In fact, he was looking for a base of operations whence to set out on his campaign to "rescue" Transylvania from the maelstrom of civil war — that is, whence to embark on its conquest.

Once the regular troops were withdrawn from the counties, hostilities reached a fever pitch. After having experimented to no avail — as we have seen — with a policy of conciliation at the beginning of September, the Hungarian politicians of Transylvania turned to repression. They used Hungarian volunteer troops and members of the national guard to try to break into the recalcitrant peasant communities, and summarily executed some of the arrested Romanian organizers of the resistance. The idea was to weaken the imperial army's supportive hinterland, to try to crack the live shield of peasant rebels behind whom the main enemy, the army, had sheltered. But the Hungarians did not want to operate openly against the imperial forces until the latter forced the confrontation. By this time, progressive Hungarian public opinion saw the Romanian and Saxon nationalists co-operating with the Habsburg army as nothing but the tools of the reactionary forces aiming at the annihilation of Hungarian constitutionalism and national development. In the struggle against them, the Hungarians drew strength from their belief that the struggle for a modern constitutional Hungary belonged in the mainstream of the European wars of liberation. "May our words awaken the conscience of the world, and if our nation must perish — which there is no reason to believe it will — let us die gloriously as the champions of European liberty", wrote the Hungarian radical paper of Kolozsvár in mid-September.[30]

The Hungarian public as it prepared to defend the "nation" hoped that the mobilization of the Székelyföld would turn the tide. The parliament abolished the frontier regiments in mid-September, in order to remove the Székely troops from under the imperial military high command. Nine government commissioners were sent to the area to see that the law was carried out, and to recruit volunteers. One of the commissioners, László Berzenczey, the representative for Marosszék, ignoring the disapproval expressed by the local Hungarian authorities, called the Székelys to a national assembly at Agyagfalva, the nation's ancestral place of assembly, "to reclaim the Székely Nation's liberties of yore". Every male of military age was to attend the meeting set for 16 October, on pain of forfeiting his life and property, as in the days long past. And attend they did, all sixty thousand of them. It was now Agyagfalva that became the scene of a demonstration of national solidarity that could not but arouse confidence in the hearts of the national leaders. Those who attended would have been hard put not to feel that they were taking part in an all-European revolutionary movement.

The Hungarian flag flew over the tribune, and on the top of the flagstaff was a Kossuth hat, the symbol of the assembly's identification with the cause of national self-defence, an answer to Kossuth's proclamation of 10 October calling on the Székelys to rise as one man against the traitors. The assembly swore an oath to uphold constitutional monarchy, and expressed its grati-

30. D. Dózsa, Hazafiak! (Patriots!) *Ellenőr*, 14 September, 1848, No. 74.

tude "to Lajos Kossuth, the first great champion of Hungarian constitutional liberty", as well as to the revolutionary students and intellectuals of Vienna, "who have protected not only the liberties won by the Austrian people, but also the constitution... of Hungary against the machinations of the Viennese camarilla".[31]

The government commissioners suggested that the majority of the Székelys return to their homes and prepare there for the fighting that would surely come. Berzenczey was the only one who insisted on immediate action, but he was outvoted. When, however, the secret order to attack that Latour, the Austrian minister of war, had sent to Puchner on 3 October was read, as were accounts of how the Hungarians of the counties were being molested, the majority began to waver. When it was reported — it turned out incorrectly — that Urban had marched against Marosvásárhely, the assembled masses were not to be put off: they would attack immediately. But they had not even set out when, on 18 October, Puchner's proclamation announced that he had temporarily taken over the government in the name of the emperor.

The Hungarians of Transylvania had not wanted to be the ones to take the step which led to the brink of civil war, and now they did not have to. The Székely assembly turned to "our Saxon and Romanian brethren" in one of its proclamations, declaring: "We respect your nationality, your language and your religion".[32]

The Romanians responded in kind: "Though our ideas on political rights and liberty do not agree, let us at least both subscribe to the principle of humanity. But this was not enough to counterweight the passions aroused by their slogan: "Annihilate those enemies who can do us harm".[33]

Puchner "greatly" overestimated the forces the Hungarian government had at its command in Transylvania, and, for this reason, wanted to make sure of his superior numbers by calling the entire population to arms. He expected the Romanian intelligentsia to mobilize a force of 195,000 volunteers. To assure co-operation between the professional officer corps and the volunteers, he set up a Pacification Committee of Romanians and Saxons, headed, to avoid misunderstandings, by one of his generals.

Initially, recruitment took place without the two Romanian churches being officially involved, though there were quite a few priests among the activists. The two Romanian bishops, too, were expected to take a stand. The Greek Catholic bishop, Lemenyi stayed loyal to the Hungarian government, and for this reason the commander-in-chief took the thoroughly illegal step of removing him from office. The few canons at Balázsfalva who shared Leményi's views he had imprisoned. The Greek Orthodox bishop Andrei

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31. Records of the Székely national assembly at Agyagfalva. L. Kővári, *Okmánytár* ... 98.

32. Published in: *Erdély szabadságharca. 1848–49 a hivatalos iratok, levelek és hírlapok tükreben.* (The Translyvanian War of Independence. 1848–49 in the Mirror of Official Documents, Letters and Newspapers.) Collected and edited by G. Bözödi. Kolozsvár 1945, 52.

33. Published by L. Kővári, *Okmánytár* ..., 102.

Şaguna, on the other hand — who had recently been to Pest and had had Hungarian statesmen plead with him in vain to issue a pastoral letter urging his flock to peace and reconciliation — subordinated himself to Puchner's imperial command.

The first task that the imperial army set itself in the second half of October was to try to render the Hungarian national guards ineffective. While in strategically important southern Transylvania Puchner deployed primarily the regular army, north of the Nagyszeben–Arad line to Kolozsvár he left the volunteers to deal with the Hungarian national guards. There were good political reasons for this: with Transylvania's various national groups fighting against one another, it would be easy enough to present the matter as an outbreak of civil war. It was then that the imperial armies would come upon the scene full strength, and play the part of pacificator. How far this was indeed the plan is illustrated by the case of Gyulafehérvár, where it was the Romanian peasantry of the surrounding districts that was mobilized against the 150 national guardsmen of the town, in spite of the fact that Transylvania's only enormous, modern fortress lay just on the outskirts. And, in keeping with the scenario, after the first clash, it was the regular army that mediated between the Romanians and the Hungarians, who were obliged to disown their cause. In Kisenyed, near Nagyszeben, for two whole days Romanian peasants laid siege to a large manor house where about a hundred noblemen and their families had taken refuge. Here, the army did not mediate: they did nothing to stop the massacre of over a hundred people. The army also left it to the Romanian peasant army to deal with the Hungarian national guards of the town of Zalatna and of the villages of Alsó-Fehér county, though it was well known that national antagonism in the area had been most acute for some time. Here, hundreds of Hungarians — many of them miners — were slain.

The Habsburg *levée en masse* triggered all the passions of a peasant movement. It was as if the masses had been bent on destroying the entire framework of their dreary life of toil, in order that they might regain some of that ideal state of happiness which the priests said had once been man's in Eden, and the like of which, they knew, many of their "betters" enjoyed now here on earth.

But whenever there was a village that refused to heed even the emperor's call to arms, like those around Kolozsvár, where the county authorities had made the population swear loyalty to "the King" and the Hungarian government, the military high command resorted to threats and to rumours to get the peasantry to act. They sent out pamphlets menacing with perpetual servitude anyone who did not report for military duty, and with the vengeance of the Russians anyone who did not use arms against the Hungarian government. Where anger and desperation were not enough, fear and suspicion did the job. In actions aimed at making the Hungarian national guards lay down their arms, it was almost always in the last minutes of what seemed like successful negotiations that someone — probably out of fear — pulled the trigger, both sides blaming the other for the carnage that ensued. Fear often lay behind the peasants' determination to wipe out the "enemy", so that they might not have to fear reprisal. Let there be no one left to order the Székelys out against them.

510

Map 19. Military operations in Transylvania, 18 December, 1848 – 9 February, 1849

In fact, the Székelys were used as "bogies" much too freely. For their part the Székely volunteers, once in action, lost much of their revolutionary idealism and patriotic high-mindedness. Those assembled set out in four groups and in four directions. Considerable numbers of the officers let their troops go on a rampage either in a deliberate effort to demoralize them and thus undermine the revolutionary cause, or in defence of landed property, or just for fun. Thoroughly undisciplined and surfeited with their wanton brutality to the peasant population, these Székely units turned and fled as soon as they came face to face with the imperial army.

The Székely forces which set out to meet Urban initially met with more success, but then forfeited their glory. The unit from Csík marched through Marosvásárhely with the reverence they thought due a crusade, lighted candles in hand and singing psalms. Urban's peasant volunteers they simply put to rout; but when they got to the little Saxon town Szászrégen, they looted homes and set them on fire, losing more lives in skirmishes during the pillage than they had on the battlefield.

There were two occasions in 1848 when the Székelys surprised Transylvania. The first time was when, after looting Szászrégen, they came up against the imperial regulars just before Marosvásárhely, and ran when the first few cannons were fired; the second time was when the people of Háromszék held out heroically until the end of 1848.

Puchner made a serious mistake when, with victory in sight, he called on Háromszék to surrender unconditionally. The fear of the uncalculable served to cement social cohesion. Even the local military command, which had proven incompetent in the autumn rallied, and did a fine job under the supervision of the village and public meetings co-ordinated by the Radicals. Puchner was quite right to complain that Háromszék "tied half my troops down at the most decisive moment".[34] Thus, the resistance put up by the citizens of Háromszék was decisive in the series of initial victories that the Hungarian revolutionary army was able to achieve in late 1848, for the imperial forces stationed in Transylvania were not free to move west and pose a threat to central Hungary. They were not free to move westward even though the revolution's troops in Transylvania were ineffective everywhere else, and had to withdraw to Hungary proper without an actual battle taking place.

With the exception of Háromszék, Transylvania was under imperial military dictatorship by the second half of November. Civil government was taken over by the Romanian national movement. The Romanian National Committee was revived in Nagyszeben, and the peasants called it the "Romanian Gubernium" when they turned to the "Romanian lords" who now brought the decisions that affected their day-to-day lives. Inevitably, though, the Romanian intelligentsia was subordinated to the Austrian military. The commanders of the Romanian volunteer units had to take their orders from the career officers placed above them when it came to the execution of planned offensive manoeuvres. Yet, though the committee had to do Puch-

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34. Report by Puchner to Viennese Minister of Defence Cordon. Nagyszeben, 27 February, 1849. *Feldakten ACS* 145. Fasc. 2/33.

ner's bidding without a murmur, it nevertheless set about trying to realize some of the goals formulated in the Balázsfalva demands. What it did not undertake to do, however, was to work out the principles by which the lord's demesne was to be distinguished from the lands held in villein tenure. For this reason, no final decisions were made in any conflict involving land claims between a lord and his former serfs. The committee thought its prime task to be the organization of the country's administration. The old county framework was kept. The counties and the districts were headed by administrators appointed by Puchner, men who had greater power than the *főispán*s of yesteryear, and were mostly retired army officers of Romanian origin. Immediately under them, to do the actual work, Puchner appointed one or two lettered men, either priests or lawyers. The other posts were elected offices, the choices in theory reflecting the national composition of the local population. In fact, however, the Romanians tended to continue the same kind of ungenerous nationality policy that they had so much deplored in the Hungarians, though among Romanians, too, there were those who did their best to be equitable.

Revolutionary Consolidation and its Contradictions

In the middle of December, the imperial forces stationed in Transylvania set out in the direction of Nagyvárad. The offensive, however, was stopped short by the newly reorganized Hungarian defence for the president of the Hungarian National Defence Committee, Lajos Kossuth, had appointed a new commander-in-chief to head the Hungarian army in Transylvania: József Bem, a Pole who had won renown in the Polish insurrection of 1831, and was a "professional soldier of liberty". In October of 1848, he had been in charge of organizing the defence of revolutionary Vienna: it was after Vienna fell that he came over to fight in Hungary. Bem mounted his counterattack from the direction of Nagybánya on 20 December, with an army of ten thousand and sixteen cannons. It had been generally thought that it would take an army of fifty thousand to reoccupy Transylvania, but by Christmas Bem and his men were in Kolozsvár. It was the first Hungarian victory since the end of September, when Jellačić and his army had been routed in Transdanubia.

With his occupation of Transylvania, Bem cut the Austrian army in two, and so its superiority in numbers was less overwhelming. First he liberated northern Transylvania, driving Urban's troops out to the Bukovina, and then turned against the main army under Puchner's command. From Kolozsvár, he moved east, to Marosvásárhely, to mobilize the Székelyföld. In an effort to cut him off, Puchner attacked, but was defeated in the first serious clash at Szőkefalva on 17 January. The Hungarian army pressed on to Nagyszeben. At this point, however, Bem's triumphant progress was abruptly halted. He had suffered heavy losses and had to retrench. Of his six to seven thousand men, he sent the Székelys home to return with reinforcements, and sent another significant contingent off toward Déva to meet the reinforcements expected to arrive from Hungary. The main army, thus, was left with about two and a half thousand men. Puchner — after clearing

his plan at the very highest level — turned for help to the Russian armies of occupation stationed in Wallachia. But to avoid the public embarrassment of such a move, he made the Romanian Committee — which was reluctant indeed — do the "dirty work". At the very end of December, a few members of the committee empowered Bishop Șaguna and Gottfried Müller, a Saxon teacher, to ask for the tzar's protection in the name of the Romanian and Saxon nations. No sooner had the seven thousand strong Russian army arrived, Puchner inflicted heavy losses on Bem at Vízakna. Bem's army greatly outnumbered, cut its way back into Hungary, all the while engaging in constant battles with his pursuers as well. At Déva, however, Bem was met by a reinforcement of three thousand men. With his army thus swelled to eight thousand, on 9 February Bem fought the bloodiest battle of the war on Transylvanian soil near Piski. In the end, the imperial troops ran out of ammunition, and had to withdraw. Bem did not pursue them toward Nagyszeben, but ingeniously slipped through between the fortress of Gyulafehérvár and the Austrian main army. Once again, his goal was to establish contact with the Székelyföld. And his hopes were not disappointed.

True enough, Háromszék was unable to keep up its resistance after the end of December. News of the liberation of Kolozsvár had reached the Székelyföld too late; the leaders of the Háromszék resistance made an armistice with the imperial officers. But in vain had the generals and the leading officials of the seats taken the oath of allegiance to the emperor. At the news of Bem's victories, the people followed the radicals. The generals let the junior officers take over, the corporals and the second-lieutenants, who had always been the heart and soul of the resistance. By the beginning of February, Second-Lieutenant Sándor Gál had clashed with a Russian army of two and a half thousand. He could even have won, had he been more energetically on the offensive. The Székely troops returning from Nagyszeben, however, were swelled by such a host of reinforcements, that they were able to take Medgyes. It was here that they awaited Bem, who had first to chase Urban back into the Bukovina before he could march against Puchner. The Austrian general defeated Bem at Medgyes, but he was unable to use his victory to advantage. When he tried to surround Bem as he was retreating to Segesvár, Bem, noticing what he had in mind, executed one of the most brilliant manoeuvres of the war: circumventing his pursuers and leaving them far behind, on 11 March he occupied Nagyszeben in a flash. Within days, he had pushed the Russian forces out of Transylvania, and then drove Puchner out as well. In his first, unbridled anger, Tzar Nicholas I wanted to send an army of fifty thousand against Transylvania, but the "doves" at court talked him out of it. By the middle of March, there were no regular imperial troops left in Transylvania capable of mounting an offensive. Only the castles of Gyulafehérvár and Déva were still in Austrian hands, and Bem marched on to the Banat, whence, a month later, he drove out the reorganized Austrian forces which were using Wallachia as a base of operations against Transylvania.

In the meanwhile, two decisions had been taken concerning the fate of Transylvania, one in Olmütz and one in Debrecen.

At the beginning of March, the imperial government, believing that it had managed to strike a conclusive blow at the Hungarians, dissolved the

514

Map 20. Military operations in Transylvania in the spring of 1849

imperial parliament, discarded the draft constitution that had been based on the principle of popular sovereignty, and instead, decided to decree a "constitution" published in the name of the sovereign for the entire empire. This constitution aimed at the unity of the empire above all, and restored Transylvania to the status of an independent crown colony. "Equality *(Gleichberechtigung)* of nationalities" was the leitmotif of the new constitution, though only the rights of the Saxon nation were expressly dealt with.

The constitution of Olmütz left no doubt that the Habsburgs wanted no part of Hungarian constitutionalism, and this gave a great impetus to the Hungarian forces pressing for independence, especially coinciding as it did with a series of victories won by the Hungarian army, which was beginning to rid the country of imperial troops. On 14 April, the Hungarian Parliament sitting in Debrecen approved the Declaration of Independence, which deposed the House of Habsburg, and pronounced Hungary — including Transylvania — an independent constitutional state. Kossuth was elected governing-president. Though the majority of the liberal representatives from Transylvania, as members of the "Peace Party", would rather have sought a compromise with the monarch, public opinion in Transylvania tended to approve of Kossuth's more categorical approach, convinced that it was the only road open to a secure future.

Political life in Transylvania after the Austrian troops were driven out was again regulated by the laws passed between April and June of 1848. Once more, the state apparatus was in the hands of plenipotentiary national commissioners. At the first sign of trouble, Kossuth sent one of his most loyal supporters, László Csányi, off to Transylvania. Csányi contributed greatly to Bem's victories by reorganizing the administration, mobilizing the Székelys, and providing a constant stream of conscripts.

Bem, the champion of national independence for all peoples, has often been contrasted with the Hungarian government commissioners who, so the comparison goes, stood for more narrow class interests. In fact, the Polish general was echoing the sentiments of Hungary's leading circles when he said: "The Hungarian army is fighting for the common liberty of all peoples; that is why children of the most diverse nations fight within its ranks; it is in virtue of this that its name shall be blessed as the vanguard of European liberty".[35]

In practice, Bem usually did what he thought expedient for his army's readiness for battle and for mobilizing mass support. He is especially known for the amnesty he gave to every Transylvanian, without ever seeking the government's consent. He did not even want reprisal for the wanton violence of the Romanian volunteer army which, in its flight — according to George Bariț "purely for revenge"[36] — burned down Nagyenyed with its college and library, massacring its Hungarian population. Bem was a great believer in the moral impact of a general amnesty; but once he found that his magnanimity met with ingratitude, he wanted to punish more severely

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35. Bem's proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Nagyszeben. Nagyszeben, 12 March, 1849. Published by L. Kővári, *Okmánytár...* 158.
36. G. Bariț, *Părți alese din istoria Transilvaniei pe doue sute de ani din urmă.* II. Sibiu 1890, 416.

than the law would ever allow. When, for instance, the Romanians of Naszód went over to Urban, who was attacking from the Bukovina, Bem wanted to evacuate the entire rebel population, and settle Székelys in their place. It took all of Csányi's powers of persuasion to frustrate this fatal plan. And, in the Szászföld, in spite of his own amnesty, Bem played the role of executor of the government's (that of the Committee of National Defences) will, and introduced martial law.

For the fact was that the Hungarian government held the Saxons mostly to blame for the Romanian *levée en masse* and the Russian intervention, and had quite abandoned its good intentions of the spring of 1848. "Over-hasty clemency is a knife we put into the hands of our enemies so that they might stab us in the heart",[37] declared Kossuth to Bem. According to this principle, on the orders of Csányi summary courts were set up, one of which, as a warning to all, had Stephan Ludwig Roth executed, although the pastor trusting in Bem's amnesty had refused to flee the country.

Such interference with Bem's amnesty on the part of the government proved to be a costly mistake. It was a positive sign of political consolidation, however, and an action initiated by the government, that the Saxons' municipal administrative system was reintroduced, and that the election of their officials and representatives was made more democratic.

It helped calm passions that the man elected mayor of Nagyszeben was Simon Schreiber, who had been the chief representative of the Saxons' cause at the diets of the Reform Era. It also helped restore confidence that the government approved the use of German as the Szászföld's official language, and that Csányi's lieutenant, Mózes Berde, accepted petitions written in German. The government commissioners appointed to Brassó and Nagyszeben were men who avoided punitive measures as far as possible, and tried to compensate the population for the unruliness of the soldiers stationed there. In both towns, the Saxons press started up again, that there was now no censorship. The intellectuals of Brassó celebrated the triumph of their ideals with the revolutionary ardour so typical of the age. Anton Kurz had been an adjutant of Bem's. Brassó's German language paper was now edited by Leopold Max Moltke, who hailed Kossuth as "the president of the first republic of Eastern Europe", and wrote of a Hungary which would guarantee unlimited liberty of language to all the nations living within its borders.

Hungarian–Romanian Relations in the Spring and Summer of 1849

Hungarian-Romanian relations were a function of the attempts at revolutionary consolidation and their shortcomings. While toward the Saxons the government adopted a policy of collective responsibility, in the counties resistance met with reprisal, and compliance with pardon, lords and peas-

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37. Kossuth to Bem. Debrecen, 23 April, 1849. *KLÖM* XV. Edited by I. Barta. Budapest 1953.

ants alike being subject to the full rigours of the law as far, of course, as the unsettled military and political circumstances permitted.

The many courts of summary justice that were set up certainly did not make for consolidation, nor did the establishment of free corps — ostensibly to supplement the small regular army — which, in addition to helping to maintain order, thought it was their duty to hound down rebels and to restore property to its "rightful" owner, often going from village to village driven by the thirst for revenge. Fear of such mindless retribution, however, only strengthened the spirit of resistance among the Romanians, much in the same way as not so long before fear had cemented the determination of the people of Háromszék.

In the Érchegység, the mountains formed the fortress within whose walls the outlaw peasant armies could camp, and give mutual support to the great fortress in Gyulafehérvár, which was also under Hungarian siege. This was the region whence Horea and his men had set out. The spirit of rebellion had been kept alive since then by the fact that here, where Europe's highest-yielding gold mines were located, the treasury restricted the peasantry's and the miners' use of pastures and forests precisely to conserve the raw materials needed in the smelting of gold. In the 1840s, a noblewoman, Katalin Varga, had acted on behalf of several villages in their litigation with their lords, and had encouraged a movement that led to peasants refusing to do their *robot* for years. In the end, Bishop Şaguna laid a trap for "our lady", as the people called her, which led to her arrest. The Romanian resistance of 1848–1849 was led by the intelligentsia, primarily by Avram Iancu. The peasants called their former lawyer the "king of the mountains", and Iancu, too, donned peasant garb. He became the legendary personification of a struggle in which, for all the dauntless determination, there were moments when people feared that the peasants themselves would surrender their leaders to the enemy.

The series of Hungarian military victories persuaded the Romanian deputies in Debrecen to try to mediate a reconciliation between the Hungarian government and the rebels. They wanted to spare their people from the consequences of a military defeat, and hoped to gain greater might as spokesmen of the Romanian nation. Ioan Dragoş, a representative for Bihar, assumed the role of conciliator. He returned from his first visit to the Érchegység with reports so encouraging that Kossuth spoke of the prospects of reconciliation even in Parliament. In his letter of 26 April to Dragoş, Kossuth outlined the conditions he attached to the settlement: while Hungarian was to be the language of government in the country, "we want to allow every language free currency and every nationality freedom to develop, and, in fact, want to promote such development in the interest of civilization".[38] Romanian was to be used freely at the municipal level, in the schools and in the churches, and there were good prospects for a general amnesty, wrote Kossuth, for all except Bishop Şaguna, whom Kossuth could not forgive for having in January asked the Russian troops to intervene in Transylvania. Kossuth's conditions did not meet the Romanians' demands,

38. *KLÖM* XV, 137.

but were a basis on which negotiations could start. (Though admittedly, Kossuth wanted the Érchegység to send not delegates to negotiate but a messenger bearing the news that the Romanians had decided to cast in their lot with Hungary and would volunteer for the Honvéd army.) The forms that the concrete discussions might take and the terms to be discussed had not yet been formulated to mutual satisfaction when Dragoş — presenting a rather idealized picture of the other's inclinations to both sides — pressed on with his self-imposed mission.

His good intentions foundered not so much on mutual mistrust, but on the absence of co-ordination between the civil and the military authorities. By March, plans had been worked out for a concentrated attack on the Érchegység, but had been shelved by the ministry of war on the grounds that the "pacification" of the Romanians was a job for the Transylvanian authorities. Sometime after Kossuth's above-quoted letter to Dragoş had gone off, however, through a series of coincidences, the command of the Hungarian troops encamped before Abrudbánya on the edge of the Érchegység fell to Imre Hatvani, a young dilettante of a soldier dreaming of military glory. Thus, while Dragoş's negotiations in Abrudbánya were almost at a stage when Kossuth's conditions would have been accepted, Hatvani, egged on by false rumours that the Hungarians of Abrudbánya were being maltreated, marched into the little town with an ill-equipped and poorly disciplined army of a thousand men. In vain were Dragoş's frantic protestations: the civil war had recommenced.

Iancu managed to escape, and then surrounded with his troops the poorly-commanded Hungarian army. Verespatak and Abrudbánya went up in flames. Dragoş was killed by the Romanians. Kossuth, misled by false rumours, ordered that the military action be continued. There came another humiliating defeat at Abrudbánya; even Kossuth's order got into Romanian hands. Hatvani, smarting under his ignominious failures and burning for revenge, had Ioan Buteanu executed; Petru Dobra had been killed "while trying to escape". That ended the lives of even the two men who had been hoping to get to Debrecen to negotiate. The Hungarian population of Abrudbánya, which until then had lived in peace with the Romanians, suffered heavy casualties. The tragedy confirmed both sides in their suspicion that the other had sought to ensnare it.

All this, of course, fuelled the Romanians' resistance, but also roused a sense of mutual responsibility. At the end of June, Iancu's answer to the Hungarian demands for peace contained the sentence: "In these two brother homelands, the Magyars cannot speak of life and of the future without the Romanians, nor can the Romanians without the Magyars", for "arms will never decide between us".[39]

In the meanwhile, the Hungarian armies had been so successful that the Habsburgs felt obliged to turn openly to the tzar for help. The all-out offensive started in the middle of June, and by July the Hungarian government was obliged to cede northern Hungary and Transdanubia. At this point,

39. Letter by Avram Iancu to Lieutenant Colonel József Simonffy. Topánfalva, 15/27 June, 1849. Published by A. ROMAN, Documente la istoria revoluţiunei ungur. din an. 1848/49. Transilvania 1877, 54–56.

two Romanian political groupings started urging alternatives which were diametrically opposed.

Once the Romanian resistance movement got off the ground, the weight of the intelligentsia within the movement gradually diminished, while that of the church grew anew. At the end of 1848, Bishop Şaguna was again one of the acknowledged leaders of the Romanian national movement, and was entrusted with the task of communicating the nation's wishes to the emperor. He went to Vienna and Olmütz, where he co-operated with Laurian, Maiorescu and Bărnuţiu in formulating a series of petitions to the monarch and the government which presented the aims of the Romanian national movement in a new form. There was no more talk of an independent Transylvania. In February of 1849, they asked that the Romanians of the "Austrian provinces" might unite as an "independent nation" with their own Romanian national administration. This formula managed to cover the aims of a number of different groupings. Bishop Şaguna suggested that the various nationalities might organize their national self-government on a model patterned after the Orthodox church organizations. Maiorescu, on the other hand, believed in territorial autonomy, and saw the establishment of a "Romanian Austria" as the purpose of the February petition. In June of 1849, the intelligentsia were calling for a separate Romanian crownland. The arguments advanced to support their claim reflect the tragic schizophrenia of all eastern European national movements: pointing to the oppression they had always suffered, they described their fear of the other nations' hegemony, but in the same breath recommended the recognition of a unified Romanian nation within the Austrian state as a means of keeping the other nations in check.

It is an odd quirk of fate that it was exactly at this point that the Wallachian émigrés and the leaders of revolutionary Hungary opened up new vistas to the peoples of Transylvania. A number of the leaders of the Wallachian revolution had watched the political moves of Transylvania's Romanians anxiously. Though the Austrian troops did their best to keep them out of the country, some of them did manage to get to the Érchegység, and had actively supported Dragoş' attempts to effect a reconciliation. Seeing the enthusiasm that all Europe felt for the Hungarian War of Independence, the Wallachian émigrés revised their earlier stand. Their self-criticism was next to self-flagellation, so deeply did they regret their lost opportunities: "Ah, if we had been a real Romanian government, the glory of liberating the world from slavery would be ours, and not the Hungarians': or, had we allied with the Hungarians, we certainly would have taken Vienna, and could have proclaimed general freedom. Instead, we tremble, and try to collect morsels off the Hungarians' table" — wrote Constantin A. Rosetti in Paris.[40]

The first concrete result of the feelers put out by the Romanian émigrés came when Cezar Bolliac, a revolutionary poet to the quick, started up a paper in Brassó, the *Espatriatul*, in which he condemned the Transylvanian Romanians' political orientation in terms so vehement as to shock even those

40. Letter by Constantin A. Rosetti to Ion Ghica. Iaşi, 20 April, 1849. In: I. Ghica, *Amintiri din pribegia dupa 1848*. I. Edited by O. Boitoş, Craiova, n. d., 70–71.

520

who shared his views, emphasizing particularly that "today in all of Europe there is but one struggle: that between liberty and tyranny: between the peoples and those enthroned".[41]

No one worked harder to try to harmonize the Romanian and the Hungarian ideas of national liberty than another Wallachian émigré, Nicolae Bălcescu. His basic tenet was that every war of liberation consist of a number of successive stages. Hungary's help was to be relied on to secure the independence of the Danubian principalities, so that at that stage the question of Romanian national unity might be attended to. This unity, he thought, was in Hungary's interest as well, for a unified Romania would assure Hungary of an ally. In the meantime, the Romanians of Transylvania would have to stay "in a slightly subordinate" position. Bălcescu made no real criticism even of Bem's preparations for an attack on the Érchegység: "I believe that all who love liberty must support the Hungarians; they are the only people who are armed, and they are fighting against tyrants, Russia's allies."[42]

"The role France played in '89, to emancipate Europe, has now fallen to us, and as far as I can see, we have no choice: either we play the role, or we'll be laughed off the stage", so wrote László Teleki, a Transylvanian oppositionist politician in the 1840s, and now the Hungarian government's representative to Paris, and a man with close ties to the Polish émigrés. Speaking from experience, he stated: "We ought to set up a system of government wherein the absence of national homogeneity is compensated for by the harmonization and equity of personal and national rights." He trusted that the neighbouring peoples and those within the country "would gladly accept Hungary as the centre of a future Danubian confederation, and its queen".[43] It took optimism of this kind for Kossuth finally to make up his mind, and at Bălcescu's urging, work out his plan for a reconciliation in Szeged on 14 July.

The *Project de Pacification* did not promise territorial autonomy, but guaranteed the right to use Romanian as an official language in counties with a Romanian majority and in the national guard. Kossuth's programme countered the Austrian government's slogan for "equality for all nationalities" with a different one: "the free development of all the nationalities". Restrictions on the use of any language on grounds of *raison d'état* were expressly specified: "the use of Hungarian as a diplomatic language" means only its use in Parliament, in administration and in government "to the extent that this is absolutely necessary to the preservation of the state". Kossuth's plan opened up the possibility of co-ordinating the two peoples' struggle for freedom. The government made a separate agreement to finance the setting up of a Romanian legion. "The legion will swear allegiance to Romania and to Hungary. It shall fight for liberty and independence, but never against another nationality."[44]

41. *Espatriatul*, 25 March, 1849, No. 1.
42. Bălcescu's letter to Ghica. Pest, 6 June, 1849. BALCESCU, *Opere* IV. Corespondenţă. Edited by GH. ZANE. Bucharest 1964, 185–187.
43. Letter by László Teleki to Lajos Kossuth. Paris, 14 May, 1849. Published by GY. SPIRA, *The Nationality Issue in the Hungary of 1848–49*. Budapest 1992, 169–170.
44. *KLÖM* XV, 723–727.

The success of these Romanian–Hungarian negotiations encouraged the Hungarian government to essay a policy toward the nationalities that really was exemplary. On 28 July, the Parliament passed a motion proposed by the prime minister, Bertalan Szemere, and a law regulating the position of Hungary's non-Hungarian peoples in the spirit of the reconciliation plan. Szemere was right in noting that Hungary had taken a step "for which no government had ever set a precedent".[45] The problem was only that the step had come too late.

The Last Days of the War of Independence in Transylvania

Transylvania's fate was sealed when the joint tzarist and Austrian forces crossed the border in mid-July 1849. Bem's troops were twice outnumbered, and the best he could try for was to stall the enemy's progress toward the Great Hungarian Plain so as to give himself time to deploy most of the government forces in southern Hungary, into the Tisza–Maros triangle. He decentralized his forces, and went to head now one, now the other unit, always the one which had been forced to retreat. Almost at the same time as the Romanian–Hungarian negotiations were concluded, Bem, with Kossuth's approval, attacked Moldavia, hoping to provoke a revolution. He did not. The Russian troops, however, only got from Brassó to Nagyszeben in the space of a month, and had not dared attack either Kolozsvár or Marosvásárhely. At the end of July and the beginning of August Bem's troops suffered two grave defeats. Hungary's greatest poet, Sándor Petőfi, died on a Transylvanian battlefield, and so did Anton Kurz. Bem played the invaders a few more unpleasant tricks, but then was hardly able to escape with his life. The troops disintegrated, and after the main Hungarian army laid down its arms on 13 August at Világos, on 25 August the Transylvanian chiefs of staff surrendered in Zsibó.

The most Iancu could achieve during the great Russian advance was to keep his Romanians neutral. Recognizing the neutrality of the Romanians of the Érchegység, some Hungarian troops surrendered to Romanians, and Iancu even let some Hungarian prisoners go, much to the irritation of the Austrian military advisor attached to him.

It was to take the many painful disappointments of the ensuing years to have people in the Érchegység sing songs about how Iancu and Bem fought side by side. Disappointments, the rethinking of the lessons learned, as well as new opportunities were needed for the various groups committed to national liberty to seek solutions to the "question of Transylvania" which would be acceptable to all the peoples of the common homeland.

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45. Circular letter by Szemere on 29 July to the government commissioners. Cited by Z. I. Tóth, A Szemere-kormány nemzetiségi politikája. (The Nationality Policy of the Szemere Government.) In: Ibid., *Magyarok és románok.* (Hungarians and Romanians.) Budapest 1966, 367.

Map 21. Military operations in Transylvania from June to August 1849

PART FIVE

FROM THE EMPIRE
TO CIVIC HUNGARY

PART FIVE

FROM THE EMPIRE
TO CIVIC HUNGARY

I. The Era of Neo-Absolutism (1849–1867)

1. The Establishment of Despotic Rule

The most serious trauma to affect the empire in the three hundred years of its history was followed, at the end of the summer of 1849, by a historic moment most favourable for the imperial court. The defeated revolutions had given a substantial boost to the bourgeois transformation of the economy and society, thereby creating the basic conditions for updating the workings of the empire. After its victory over the revolutionary movements and the Hungarian War of Independence, and in the calm guaranteed in Europe by British foreign policy and Russian military power, the Viennese court, without too much difficulty, could begin to reorganize and consolidate its empire.

Reprisals and Consolidation

On 11 August, 1849, proclamations were put up in Transylvania announcing the establishment of martial law, so that punishment might be meted out "for all deeds, aberrations and insolent crimes"[1] connected with the Hungarian revolution.

"For a century to come there will be no revolution in Hungary, for I shall pull up the weeds by the roots,"[2] boasted Haynau, the Austrian commander, in a message to Vienna. He gave detailed instructions that "every rebel leader... is to be hanged". "Of those who served as privates or non-commissioned officers in the revolutionary army or elsewhere, the Romanians, Croats and Saxons are to be sent home at once. On the other hand, the Hungarians, Székelys and Poles, as well as those who belonged to the German legion are to be enlisted as private soldiers [in the imperial army]."[3] Courts martial passed sentences in great number, and with great rapidity. In Arad, of the 475 officers charged, 231 were sentenced to death, although

1. Orders of Haynau to Lieutenant General Karl v. Schönhals on 21 August, 1849. In: *Az aradi vértanúk.* (The Martyrs of Arad.) Collected and introduced by T. KATONA. Budapest 1979, II, 70.
2. Haynau's letter to Lieutenant General Karl v. Schönhals on 24 August. Ibid. 58.
3. Letter by Haynau to Ludwig v. Wohlgemuth on 21 August, 1849. Ibid. 58.

far fewer were actually executed. Some three weeks after the execution in Arad of thirteen generals on 6 October, General Lajos Kazinczy, the last commander of the Honvéd army in Transylvania, was shot. From Transylvania alone, seventy-two Hungarian officers and twenty-five civilians were sentenced to death, and another sixty-four were sentenced to long periods of imprisonment.

The leaders of the Székely uprising were pursued relentlessly, since they were blamed for the failure of the imperial forces in 1848 to attack the Hungarian revolution from the rear and thereby suppress it at an early stage.

On balance, however, the reprisals in Transylvania were less harsh than in Hungary proper. In Transylvania the revolutionary camp was smaller in size, and the struggle had lasted longer. As a result, most of those who would have borne the brunt of the punitive action had already fled the country.

Reprisals went hand in hand with rewards. The highest decorations were bestowed on Franz Salmen, *comes* of the Saxons, and on the Greek Orthodox bishop, Andrei Șaguna. Avram Iancu and some Romanian tribunes were presented with the Gold Cross of Merit, as were some Hungarian and Saxon officials. A special point was made of bestowing rare honours on peasants who were judged to have suffered much in the Habsburg cause, or to have been loyal.

The military presence constituted one side of the counter-revolution. On the other side, though, were the attempts at modernization and the reluctant implementation of some of the revolution's demands. These were represented by the imperial government, which was partially made up of liberal-minded ministers. In place of the ideal of national freedom for each of the empire's peoples, the government was offering a centralized monarchy and, by promising a constitutionalism, it tried to obviate the demand for democratic liberties. Of course, the government did not turn into a reform administration — quite the contrary in fact. From 1851, it became positively rigid under the direction of Minister of Internal Affairs Alexander Bach, to whom the era owes its name.

The first military and civilian governor of Transylvania, Baron Ludwig Wohlgemuth, was sent to the south-eastern border province with secret instructions to eradicate its distinctive characteristics and to integrate it into the monarchy as a whole. The seat of the local government was again shifted from Kolozsvár to Nagyszeben, with the army becoming the omnipotent masters of the province.

Transylvania was full of burnt-down villages and hard-hit towns, and its population was now subject to yet another trial — a new tax system based on general and proportionate sharing of taxation, some novel tax burdens and the old services to a much larger military establishment. In the absence of an efficient means of supplying the troops, a great deal of carting service for the army burdened the people of Transylvania, especially in the south. A veritable hard blow on the civilian population was the billeting of officers and men, with no exemptions accorded to former nobles, the Saxon towns, or even to loyal supporters of the regime. Kossuth banknotes ceased to be a legal tender — causing a serious shortage of money and to top it all, cattle-plague spread far and wide. In order for Transylvania to recover, a

state subsidy would have been needed. However, there were hardly any funds available, and those were allocated on the basis of political considerations. In 1850, because of its loyalty, the Saxon University was granted a loan of 1.5 million forints, to be paid back on favourable terms. On the Hungarian population of the Székelyföld, however, a collective fine was imposed on account of their "disloyalty" in 1848–1849.

In the spring of 1851, following the unexpected death of Wohlgemuth, who had always remained aloof from the inhabitants of the province, the monarch appointed General Prince Carl zu Schwarzenberg as the new governor of Transylvania. The prince, a scion of the most powerful aristocratic family in Bohemia, was a man of wide culture and was granted more power than his predecessor. Unlike Wohlgemuth, Schwarzenberg also maintained a house in Kolozsvár, learned to speak Hungarian, often went hunting with the local aristocrats and paid regular visits to some of them. All this, however, did not really alter his political outlook.

The government wished to mould Transylvania into a province free of national and social strife, as well as of journalistic and political controversies. It wanted to create a region which was stable, strictly controlled, and in which progressive efforts centred on unqualified allegiance to the emperor.

No separate conception specifically applicable to Transylvanian circumstances was ever worked out. Combined with the weakness of the domestic support, this policy meant that the development of Transylvania continued to be a function of conditions pertaining to the empire as a whole and to Hungary proper.

The Absolutist System

After the defeat of the War of Independence, the union of Hungary and Transylvania was, as a matter of course, declared null and void, and the Partium was again attached to Transylvania. The ethnic composition of the country was taken into account to some extent when six districts — three Romanian, two Hungarian and one Saxon — were formed. Each of these was headed by a military commander who exercised executive power and who issued the more important decrees. A minimum of influence was exerted by the local civilian commissioners, who were subordinated to the imperial commissioner, Eduard Bach. However, these local commissioners were obliged to obtain the consent and signature of the military commanders even when sending their reports to Nagyszeben. The only area in which a different system applied was the Saxon district of Szeben. Headed by the Saxon *comes*, Franz Salmen as civilian commissioner, it was created out of the Királyföld, which retained its self-government to some extent. The aldermen of the municipalities were appointed by the military governor or the district commanders, their official duties being performed in line with the dictates of the district civilian commissioner. The administration required a great number of loyal civil servants who were selected from among the Saxons, although many of the appointees came from the western part of the empire.

In the towns, the police were strengthened. From 1851 onwards, Transylvania also had a network of modern state organizations engaged in fighting crime, i.e. the military-type gendarmerie seen by contemporaries as a symbol of the regime. With the establishment of the imperial police authority in 1852, an independent political police force was created which was to control all areas of life — from tourism to the theatres. In the police and gendarmerie network, an important role was assigned to the host of informers who were active at all levels of society.

The control of cultural life also fell to the police. The setting up and operation of dance halls and theatres, as well as the staging of any play, required the approval of the governor. No books could be imported into the country except with a licence from the governor's office. Starting a newspaper of any seriousness required the approval of the imperial police chief. In line with the principles of centralization, the operation of any economic association or savings bank, or of any scholarly or artistic society, was subject to the consent of the emperor himself, or at least of the minister of the interior.

The new tax system was based on general and proportionate sharing of taxation which enabled the state to acquire a share of the wealth produced. This it did in two different ways, under an assessment rate which was made uniform throughout the whole country. Direct taxes were levied on land, houses, earnings and income, but, in addition to these, indirect taxes on consumption were also significant.

The first judicial organs were the courts martial themselves. In 1850, as part of the separation of the executive and the judiciary, the foundations of the modern judicial system in Transylvania were laid down. New rules of procede, the Austrian criminal code, and the Austrian civil code were introduced in 1852 and 1853.

The decrees relating to internal affairs, finance and justice issued in 1853 constituted perhaps the most important administrative measures of the period. The governor-general's office which directed the crownland represented a link between the local authorities and the central government bodies in Vienna. The all-powerful military and civilian governor-general, who acted as viceroy issued instructions on political questions but was answerable to the minister of the interior.

In the summer of 1854 the administrative system was modified. Transylvania was split up into ten districts instead of six, taking into account its existing division for taxation and the administration of justice. The military frontier zone was given a civilian character in 1851 when the Székely regiments were dispersed, followed by the disbanding of the two Romanian infantry regiments. Saxon autonomy was also abolished. The assembly of the University was dissolved, its judicial function was taken away, and Beszterce and Szászváros were detached from the Királyföld.

The new neo-absolutist state organization was a big step forward when compared to the centuries of feudal administration and its short-lived military counterpart. However, it had several defects which called into question the modernity of this late Enlightenment arrangement.

For a decade Transylvania was actually governed direct from Vienna by foreign governor-generals acting on the basis of secret instructions. The

monarch had the power not only to issue laws and decrees but also to modify or revoke them at any moment. As a result, it was in vain that absolutism brought in administrative measures formulated on the basis of general European practice, and that the ministries were headed by knowledgeable experts; in the last resort, every government measure was transitional in character. Even worse, the openness that is imperative for any bourgeois constitutional arrangement and the citizens' ability to exercise control over the conduct of public affairs — the formal prerequisites of participation in power — were entirely lacking.

2. Political Life during the Absolutist Period

The Abolition of Saxon Autonomy

The establishment of absolutism involved a series of disappointments for the Saxon burghers. This was in spite of the fact that the emperor's manifesto of 21 December, 1848 — entitled *To Our Loyal Transylvanian Saxon People* — and the rescript addressed to the Saxon University both pledged to strengthen the position of the German ethnic group. However, in Vienna, there was an awareness that an independent Szászföld, a privileged nationality were hard to reconcile with the modern system of equality of rights. As early as 1849, the autonomy of the Saxons began to be curbed systematically, although the Szászföld long remained an island of civilian rule in a province under military administration. The Saxons were less affected by the political rigour of the state of emergency, and were manifestly favoured in the drawing up of the new administrative system in which the Szeben district was expressly formed out of diverse and geographically separate areas.

In December 1849 the University convened to work out modern principles of organization and autonomy based on direct dependence on the crown. Many complications were caused by the fact that the Romanians were in the majority in the Királyföld, and that, through the formation of the Szeben district, new, purely Romanian, areas, were annexed to it, areas which the Saxons would gladly have done without. At the beginning of 1850, the Saxons summarized in five petitions their ideas on the autonomy and new administration of the Szászföld, but their hope of creating a "*Markgrafschaft Sachsen*" was fading fast. The governor-general of Transylvania regarded the plan for a Saxon crown province as an attempt to compromise the unitary character of the state, and the central government also rejected it.

After December 1851, when absolutism was openly declared, the Saxon *comes*, Franz Salmen, the spokesmen of Saxon liberties, was removed from his post. After this the University was deprived of its juridical rights, and in the autumn of 1852 the emperor issued a decree to the effect that the Saxon institutions were to be replaced by state offices. The old seats were split up. Beszterce and Szászváros were joined to "alien" districts, while the Romanian district of Fogaras was joined onto the Szeben district. "We were struck dead without sentence being passed, and were buried without cross and

candle. That was our reward for all we had done and suffered in the years of peril..."[4] wrote Joseph Bedeus in his diary at the beginning of 1853, voicing the sentiments of the Saxon civil servants and burghers.

"Even though the Saxons are dissatisfied with the influx of foreign officials, with the suspension of their guilds and their republican community organization, and are disenchanted with the Concordat," ran a confidential report of 1856, "in their eyes all this constitutes a minor evil compared to the destruction of their nationhood, which would surely ensue of the country ceased to be an Austrian province."[5] Clearly absolutism had achieved its aim: the abolition of autonomy notwithstanding, Vienna retained the allegiance of the Saxons who were anxious about the future of their nation.

The Repression of Romanian National Aspirations

At the end of the summer of 1849, the leaders of Romanian political life in Transylvania may have felt that the future of their people was assured. With some justice, they ranked themselves among those who had saved the empire. Partly as a reward and partly out of the historical necessity following from the formation of bourgeois nations, they hoped that all the Romanians in the Austrian Empire would be organized in a separate administrative unit. In their eyes, the guarantees of further national development would have needed to include a separate (Orthodox) Romanian pontiff, a national leader, their own representation in Vienna and an annual Romanian national assembly.

Still, the position of the Romanian leaders was far from encouraging. The Saxon press accused them of revolutionary intent. When their *levée en masse* was disbanded at the end of 1849, Prefect Axente was arrested, and later attempts were made to prosecute Avram Iancu, the "king of the mountains". The governor-general even found fault with the behaviour of Bishop Şaguna, who was well known as a man of unbending loyalty. In terms of the government's conservative and pragmatic approach, the Romanians "did not meet the conditions for self-government or self-administration because of low level of their political and intellectual development and the paucity of their trained political leaders".[6] Although the new regime was prepared to employ almost every Romanian intellectual, by 1860 the number of Romanian civil servants — as shown by Bariţ's data — was less than two hundred.

At first, the Romanian politicians, guided by Bishop Şaguna, virtually inundated Vienna with requests and petitions. In addition, they voiced their grievances at minor rallies and launched petition movements. But these

4. Cited by E. Friedenfels, *Joseph Bedeus von Scharberg. Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte Siebenbürgens im 19. Jahrhundert.* II. Wien 1877. 251.
5. I. Martius, *Grossösterreich und die Siebenbürger Sachsen 1848–1859.* München 1957. 71.
6. The statement by Alexander Bach is cited by K. Hitchins, *Studien zur modernen Geschichte Transylvaniens.* Klausenburg 1971. 18.

disciplined expressions of discontent were insufficient to make the government take the Romanians' requests seriously. For a short while, the only Romanian newspaper, Bariţ's *Gazeta de Transilvania*, was banned.

Vienna's reluctance prompted the Romanian leaders to gradual moderation. The political-national demands receded, giving way to endeavours concerned with culture and the church. In 1853, Pope Pius IX made the Greek Catholic diocese at Balázsfalva an archdiocese making it independent of Esztergom. When the Greek Catholic diocese of Nagyvárad, as well as the sees of Lugos and Szamosújvár, which had just been created, were subordinated to the new Archdiocese of Balázsfalva, the unified autonomous national church of the Romanians in Transylvania and Hungary was established. At the same time, the Greek Orthodox church, which had as many members as the Greek Catholic church, continued to be subordinated to the Serbian archbishop at Karlowitz. What is more, Bach would even have preferred to remove Bishop Andrei Şaguna from Transylvania, despite his being a loyal servant of the dynasty. (In fact, the bishop stayed on and was later made a baron for his services.)

The emperor's visit to Transylvania in 1852 was a disappointment. After their struggles in 1848–1849, the Romanian peasants of the Erchegység were convinced that they would win their centuries-old legal dispute with the treasury. They hoped that their claims on the forests — for them a means of livelihood — would finally receive a hearing, especially, perhaps, since the people of the two disbanded Romanian frontier regiments — unlike the Székelys — had just been allowed to retain their woods as a "reward". Francis Joseph toured the picturesque Romanian regions, but made no reference to meeting the Romanian demands.

The Romanian were not happy with the new regime. Even those of them who held office bore with frustration and "a kind of stoical indifference the burden of absolutism which they saw as a version of equality before the law, but only in negative term".[7]

Hungarian Resistance

The establishment of neo-absolutism dealt its heaviest blow to Hungarian society in Transylvania. Those Hungarians who did not emigrate were reduced to silence. The ranks of the liberal reformers, who had been short of real organization even beforehand, were thinned as a result of deaths. Dénes Kemény died in 1849, Wesselényi, the outstanding figure of the reform opposition in the "two brother homelands" in the spring of 1850, and Károly Szász, the scholar-politician, in 1853. In the absence of these figures, the liberal camp in Transylvania lost much of its identity, and in times to come was obliged to adjust its political attitude to that of the Liberals in Hungary proper.

For a long period, it was only the right wing of the aristocracy that enjoyed some limited scope for political action. The Transylvanian aristocrats,

 7. I. Puşcariu, *Notiţe despre întîmplările contemporane.* Sibiu 1913, 45–46.

especially Baron Sámuel Jósika, enjoyed great influence at the beginning. Later, however, when its tentative moves toward the government were rebuffed, and after its members were, not unreasonably, branded as reactionary in the press, the conservative aristocracy also adopted an increasingly passive attitude.

By this time, the attitude of the liberal landed gentry was shaped by Ferenc Deák's passive resistance, which was seen as a blueprint for Hungary as a whole. As a result, a significant part of the landed gentry was not just excluded from power, but also held aloof from it, frustrating the actions of the authorities as much as it could and tending to exclude their representatives from mostly society. The conduct of the burghers and peasants was influenced by this general attitude on the part of the landed gentry and the intellectuals: there were a whole host of treason trials in which ordinary people expressed their adherence to the principles of 1848–1849 in simpler and often more radical terms.

For a long time the Hungarians put their faith in the resumption of the War of Independence, and looked forward to the reappearance in the country of the exiled Kossuth at the head of an army of liberation. Even some of the Romanians trusted in Bem's return to the scene.

As early as 1850, the Hungarian, Romanian and Polish exile groups took the view that an armed uprising would shortly break out in Transylvania. In the summer of 1851, József Makk, a former colonel, began to organize a plot. The plan was that at the moment of the pan-European revolution ("European explosion") which was expected to occur in 1852, the Székelys, supplied with weapons delivered through Moldavia, and possibly joined by the Romanians later on, would occupy Transylvania and then advance into Hungary proper. However, the preparations were discovered. At the end of 1851 Makk's secret residence in Bucharest was raided, and the documents that were found were passed to the Austrian authorities. After this, arrests were made in Transylvania, and the guerilla bands organized to liberate those who had been detained were rounded up. After a prolonged investigation, seven persons were executed and scores, including women, were sentenced to long periods of imprisonment.

With the crushing of the plot in the Székelyföld, the most powerful secret resistance movement in the whole of the Habsburg Empire was condemned to defeat. From this time onwards, the struggle against absolutism was possible only on a political level. Control of the resistance passed from the hands of the plebeian-democratic agents who had played a key role in the secret plot into those of the liberal landowners. Relying on the old traditions, this social class used the cultural and economic associations, and indirectly, the whole of gentry social life, as the framework of political organization.

In Transylvania, Count Imre Mikó, who was regarded as "the Transylvanian Széchenyi", took charge of masterminding operations. It was the donations of aristocrats won over by him, followed by those of the burghers, which saved the National Theatre in Kolozsvár from the bankruptcy it faced, and which in 1855 helped establish the *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* (Transylvanian Museum Association) — which was to become a real cultural centre. The *Erdélyi Gazdasági Egyesület* (Transylvanian Economic Society) ap-

534

praised the state of agriculture and industry, organized study tours and exhibitions, and spread new technological know-how. These many-sided activities served as a partial replacement for public political action, which the time did not allow.

The Hungarian Exiles and War in Italy

After the Hungarian surrender in 1849, large numbers of Hungarian soldiers and politicians fled abroad. The exiles had learned from the revolution and war which followed it that without the support of the Romanians and Serbs they would never achieve Hungarian independence. The liberal Romanians who had emigrated after the collapse of the Wallachian revolution and the Russo–Turkish occupation appeared to be the most likely associates. Though national antagonisms were hard to overcome, for the sake of winning support from the western powers, negotiations were urged on all sides.

At the suggestion of the Polish, in 1850 negotiations began in Paris concerning a possible Hungarian–Romanian–Serbian alliance. The Romanian Nicolae Bălcescu outlined a plan for a "Danubian United States", ruled by a regional government consisting of a representative from each of the member states and meeting now in this country, now in that, but having no authority over the internal affairs of those three states. The Hungarians were divided on this, and László Teleki and Bertalan Szemere, who recommended acceptance of the idea, ended up in a minority. While the Romanians insisted on territorial integrity, the Hungarians tended to insist on historical rights and would not go beyond the provisions of the nationality law passed in Szeged in 1849. Count Teleki was the only one to realize that the transformation of the nationalities into nations required that the Hungarians make territorial concessions. But Teleki soon left Paris, while Bălcescu, by then terminally ill, returned to his historical studies. The activity of the other émigrés was limited to the reiteration of old arguments in press debates.

Kossuth, in exile in Turkey until 1851, opposed Bălcescu's plan, seeing it as a means of detaching Transylvania from Hungary. Encouraged by the European Democratic Central Committee led by Mazzini, he worked out a draft constitution in 1851 which, addressing itself to the ethnic complexity of the country, suggested a dual structure. This sought to combine the political supremacy of the Hungarians, which was rooted in history, with the pursuit of autonomy of ethnic groups within the framework of a democratic state organization. It would provide for democratized and self-governing counties, as well as for separate social organizations for each ethnic group to serve both as a guarantee of their equal status and as bases of their cultural, religious and national life. Hungarian public opinion seemed inclined to accept this scheme. The Romanian émigrés, however, regarded it as unsatisfactory on account of its failure to make mention of the detachment of Transylvania from the rest of Hungary.

Despite their conflicting views, both sides were disposed to continue cooperation and soon the international situation offered the possibility of fresh initiatives.

The New Terms of the Emancipation of Serfs and the Compensation for the Landlords

In order to maintain law and order within the country, the abolition of serfdom needed to be finalized, and this constituted a major political task. By ending the organic relationship between landowner and serf and between peasant holding and noble estate, the redemption of feudal services and dues legislated in 1848 had brought about a change of historic importance in production and in property relations. The great majority of the peasants, about 70–80 per cent, now began to operate as independent proprietors, with either medium-sized farms or smallholdings. However, after the revolution, landowners and serfs, who were now "free citizens", were again caught in a conflict over the issue of the distribution of landed property dating from the feudal era.

Article IV of the 1848 Transylvanian Diet provided for leaving in the hands of peasants the land they actually used, independently of the nature of their title to it, and left it to subsequent legislation to determine what share had been held in villein tenure and would pass to them as private property, and what part would revert to the former landowner as his own. Neo-absolutism had inherited the task of implementing in detail the emancipation of the serfs.

Until 1848 the forests, which covered half of Transylvania, had been used jointly by landowners and peasants, although formally the landowners had been the exclusive proprietors since 1791. Now the former landlords attempted to deprive the peasants of the right to use the woods, with the prime intention of re-admitting the peasants to them only in return for labour or money. It was easier to agree on the use of the pastures because it was in the interests of the former owner to maintain the peasant's stock of animals which supplied traction for working his lands as well.

For use of the contested lands, the former owners — often assisted by the military — tried to force the peasants to perform certain services. Amidst much confusion over land tenure and obligations, combined with new demands for the payment of various tithes, the peasants feared that "their lordships" were bent on restoring serfdom. In this period of semi-serfdom and semi-freedom, the relationship between the nobility and the peasants was extremely tense. In 1851, the writer Pál Gyulai observed: "The people are busy occupying lands, and the landowners are forced to retaliate through litigation; the people harbour thoughts of revenge, and the landowners live in fear of their lives."[8]

In the summer of 1854, an imperial patent was issued on the legal implementation of the emancipation of the serfs. Retaining the basic assumptions of the 1848 laws, it guaranteed that the state would pay compensation for land held in return for *robot* while Székely patrimonial or demesnial serfs and cotters would have the option of redeeming their own services and dues. The edict thus distinguished between serfs who worked *robot* and

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8. P. GYULAI, *Erdélyi útibenyomások.* (Transylvanian Travelling Impressions.) Budapest 1921, 42.

those who did not — a distinction which was unnatural in the final analysis — with the apparent intention of using legal means to continue the bondage of part of the liberated peasantry (about one-third of those who had so far lived in a stage of dependence).

The complex and extensive work of re-regulating landed property relations was performed by "*robot* courts" staffed partially by officials from the state administration. These courts began their work in Transylvania in 1858. The *robot* courts decided all cases in which the parties concerned had been unable to reach an understanding. In the Székelyföld, one in five cases at most was solved through peaceful compromise, whereas in the old counties the percentage was much higher. The bitterly contested cases, of which there were many, remained unsettled for decades.

The complex character of landed property relations in Transylvania and the lack of regulation before 1848 make it impossible to give a precise account of the results of the emancipation of the serfs in the period 1848–1854. It seems that in Transylvania and the Partium, 78 per cent of the dependent peasantry (that is, 175,543 plots held in socage, or some 974,846 persons) received emancipation with the state paying compensation to the former landlord. These peasants were to possess as civil property 1,616,547 *holds* of arable land and meadow. Eighty per cent of this passed into the hands of Romanian peasants, which opened up new vistas for national development. On the other hand, in the Székelyföld the situation of the old *robot* peasantry took an extremely adverse turn: the number of peasants forced to pay compensation on their own or to accept the status of agricultural labourers was well above the national average. But on the territory of the old counties, three-quarters of the peasantry were freed with aid from the state.

The 1848 laws concerned with the emancipation of the serfs formally guaranteed the compensation of the former landlords: not for the land lost, but for the services previously enjoyed. Besides landed property, the landowners suffered a loss of 8.7 million days of manual *robot* labour, 5 million days of service with a cart drawn by four bullocks, and 2.5 million days of service with a cart — or plough — drawn by two bullocks. The view held by contemporaries seems apt: "In Transylvania the wealth of the landowner was based on the abundance of *robot* service."[9] The 1854 Patent established a fund to compensate the landowner class which was capitalized at twenty times the value of the services performed annually by the serfs. (Its sum total was estimated at 70 million forints.) In the meantime, landed estates stagnated, with owners having to contend with shortages of both labour and capital. A strange situation ensued in which the landowners in many places looked forward to a national war of liberation (to the victory of the "revolutionary party") to provide a more appropriate settlement for them, as Hungarian peasantry at the other end of the social scale looked also to Kossuth providing them with more favourable emancipation terms.

Discrimination devised to weaken the Hungarian medium landowning class ended after 1856. However, the advance sums of compensation which were remitted in modest instalments after 1851 were handed out almost

9. *Kolozsvári Magyar Futár* (Kolozsvár Hungarian Courier), 17 July, 1856.

exclusively in bonds whose stock exchange price fell considerably short of their face value at the time of issue. A great part of the compensation money went to pay off the debts incurred by the landlords since 1848. According to the best Austrian civil servant in this field until the spring of 1861 almost half the sums assigned by the courts had to be paid to creditors rather than to the landowners themselves.

The landowners were not compensated for all their losses, because it was genuinely impossible even to calculate exactly how much they had benefited by way of services. Owing to the underdeveloped conditions and the rapid changes, the large and medium estates tended to decline for a while, and occasionally were at a lower, more rudimentary, level than the peasant holdings.

The Impact of the Crimean War

In 1853, a conflict developed on the borders of the empire when Tzar Nicholas I, as a prelude to challenging the power of Turkey in Europe, occupied the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia which were Turkish protectorates.

At first Vienna opted for neutrality. Later, however, having come to an agreement with Prussia, France, Britain and (in July 1854) with Turkey, it forced Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldavia and Wallachia.

The Romanian principalities, because of their nearness to the Turkish Empire, their sympathy for the Hungarian cause and the vacillating policy of their governments, offered opportunities for the Hungarian exiles to build up a communications and supply base there.

The clouds of the Crimean War were gathering, and a large-scale European conflict soon broke out. The oppressed peoples of the monarchy held the firm belief that in the midst of the conflagration they would achieve their freedom by means of an armed rebellion supported by the western powers. From 1853 onwards, secret organizing work began in Transylvania. In the autumn of the same year, Kossuth and Dumitru Brătianu agreed to call on the Hungarian and Romanian peoples of the monarchy to act in consent, asserting than when the victory had been won, the inhabitants of Transylvania would decide whether they wished to live in an independent principality or in union with Hungary. However, these plans were frustrated because the western powers, entering the war on Turkey's side and focusing on the Crimea as a theatre for military operations, abandoned the idea of attacking Russia by way of the Danube. In August 1854 the principalities were occupied by Austrian troops, and this put and end to any further preparations.

The occupation of the Romanian principalities involved tremendous financial expense. The government called on the population, and in some cases actually forced it, to subscribe 500 million in a "national loan", 13.6 million of which was imposed on Transylvania. This money had to be paid by landowners in return for bonds, as well as by the wealthy Saxon burghers in the towns.

538

The Crimean War left not only Russia but also Austria the loser. A century-old friendship between the two had come to and end. The Peace of Paris, concluded in 1856, prevented Austria from keeping the Romanian principalities under its armed control, and in the west an anti-Austrian Franco-Piedmontese alliance soon began to take shape.

The process of the decline of absolutism now started. In 1857, the emperor granted an amnesty to many political prisoners, and in 1858 several exiles returned to Transylvania. The improving political climate acted as a stimulus to cultural life and economic organization. From the autumn of 1857 onwards, ties with Hungary were less clandestine; indeed, the Liberals of Kolozsvár and Pest almost flaunted their solidarity.

3. Autocracy in Decline

The Italian War and the Actions of the Hungarian Exiles

Piedmont's participation in the Crimean War elevated it to the status of a European power. At the same time, it enabled it to win the support of Emperor Napoleon III for the cause of Italian unity, and to prepare to drive the Habsburgs out of Italy. A new period was also beginning in the history of the Hungarian emigration. Count Camillo Cavour, the Piedmontese prime minister, now became the main supporter of Kossuth and his associates. The exiles made efforts to become an independent ally of the powers challenging Austria. At the beginning of 1859 the two Romanian principalities elected Alexandru Ioan Cuza as their joint ruler. Cuza initially pursued an anti-Austrian policy and was also favourably disposed towards the exiles.

When in 1859 the outlines of a coalition against Austria came into sight, preparations were made to establish a Hungarian legion in Italy and to open a second front in Hungary. At the prompting of Napoleon III György Klapka, a former general of the 1848 Revolution, called on Cuza to win the prince over as an ally. The Hungarian exiles and the Romanian prince concluded a military agreement supplemented by a political accord. Cuza agreed to establishing Hungarian arsenals in Moldavia, in return for which Klapka, on behalf of Hungary, pledged to help Cuza seize the Bukovina, to organize the Romanian soldiers in Transylvania into separate army units, to observe individual and, in the fields of religion and education, collective national equality, and to ensure self-government there at the local and county levels. In the long run, Klapka aimed to a confederation of Hungary, Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia. The crucial clause concerned the future status of Transylvania: it was to be granted self-government if a future national assembly renounced the union declared in 1848. This was the maximum concession the Hungarian émigrés were prepared to make on the issue of Transylvania.

However, the implementation of the accord was rendered possible only in part. During its Italian campaign of June 1859, Austria suffered major defeats at Magenta and Solferino; but the armistice was concluded well

before a popular uprising could occur in Hungary. The exiles could do nothing but stop the delivery of arms. Defeat on the battlefield was regarded by opposition forces within the empire as the prelude of the defeat of absolutism. (Refusal to pay taxes, which was in fact a political gesture, was so widespread that half the households of Transylvania suffered punitive measures.) The monarch was inclined to make concessions, and dismissed both Bach and Baron Kempen, the minister of public safety, the two main symbols and agents of autocracy.

Meanwhile, a movement begun in Pest had been taken up in Transylvania. The commemoration of the centenary of the writer Kazinczy by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was followed by memorial sessions held in the Transylvanian towns, with speeches which left no doubt that the fostering of Hungarian literature was a form of political action. It became fashionable to raise money for cultural purposes and also to study Hungarian literature and Hungarian public law. Towards the end of November an Academy delegation headed by Baron József Eötvös went to Kolozsvár to attend the festive inauguration of the *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* (Transylvanian Museum Association), and was welcomed with illuminations, a torchlight procession and placards which read "God Bless the Two Brother Homelands". At the banquet which followed this meeting, the speeches rang with determined opposition, and a Saxon Lutheran priest, speaking on behalf of the Saxons of Brassó, gave voice to his joy that the various peoples of the country were growing in harmony.

At the beginning of 1859, the Romanian population of southern Transylvania had given a warm reception to the union of Moldavia and Wallachia (the creation of Romania), and clearly sympathized with Garibaldi and the Italians. By the end of the year, the security forces were haunted by fears of military co-operation between the Hungarians and the Romanians. The commander of the gendarmerie reported that Avram Iancu, who had been ill for many years and who was under constant police surveillance, had, in Topánfalva, pronounced himself again prepared to serve as commander-in-chief, and that "the Székelyföld, too, still lives on, and with the Székelys one can conquer the whole of Europe".[10] Meanwhile, agents commissioned by the Hungarian exiles, notably László Teleki, toured Transylvania on a fact-finding and organizing mission, and at the same time assessed the likely reactions of the Romanian population there.

Certain manifestations of the Hungarian national movement evoked a favourable response from both the Romanians and the Saxons. Many Romanians and Saxons went along to the Kazinczy memorial services, and even more attended the Széchenyi requiems which mobilized the whole province, and many participated in the cultural events. Celebrations held by the Romanians and Saxons were ostentatiously attended by liberal Hungarian landowners, with the express aim of promoting understanding. The country experienced a wave of fraternization, although full agreement was limited to the joint condemnation of absolutism. The larger differences of opinion about the future continued, which was why the émigrés again had

10. M. POPESCU, *Documente inedite privitoare la istoria Transilvaniei intre 1848–1859*. Bucharest 1929, 306.

to address themselves to the difficult task of working out some platform for substantial collaboration.

In 1860, the year in which Piedmont was engaged in schemes for a new war against the Habsburg Empire in pursuit of Italian unification, the Hungarian exiles concluded another agreement with Cuza. In return for their support for Romania's full independence from the Porte and their pledge to concede minority rights, they asked Cuza to back the Hungarian liberation movement, and to use his influence to prevent the Transylvanian Romanians from opposing the Hungarian national endeavours. However, the new arms deliveries to Romania came to light, and under pressure from the great powers, the weapons were returned to Italy. For a time, Klapka, who called on Cuza in December, thought the cause to be lost, as did Kossuth. Nevertheless, on 8 January, 1861, a new accord was agreed. Essentially, the pact of 1859 was renewed, the difference being that now more emphasis was laid on the secret character of the preparations as well as on future Hungarian military aid to the prince of Romania.

The agreement, however, proved to be a dead letter. Cuza's position was gradually becoming more secure, and this made him more cautions. He had no desire to be at odds with Austria. In Moldavia the government of Kogălniceanu, which had supported the Hungarian cause, fell — due in no small part to its sympathy for the Kossuth emigration. The most important factor, however, was that because of lack of support from Napoleon III, Piedmont felt insecure, and Cuza, in his turn, was completely paralyzed. In the end, French assistance failed to materialize, as did the war itself.

Exploratory talks between Cuza and the Hungarians continued for some years to come, as long as the exile and the home-based politicians considered the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire a possibility. But Romanian politicians, for their part, became increasing inclined to call for a Transylvania separate from Hungary.

The Conservative Federalist Experiment: The October Diploma

At the prompting of the conservative aristocracy, on 20 October, 1860 Francis Joseph issued the so-called *October Diploma* "as a permanent and irrevocable law of the state" which, through the monarch's "munificence" "restored" the separate interior administrations of the various historic countries of the empire. The Hungarian and the Transylvanian court chancelleries were restored. The head of the former was legally made a member of the central government (state ministry), which was now reshaped. Another provision held out the prospect of a provincial assembly devised to amend the "constitution of Transylvania", and entrusted its preparation to a prospective conference "made up of excellent men belonging to various ethnic groups, religious denominations and Estates" to be convened at a future date.[11]

11. *Okmánytár Erdély legújabb jogtörténetéhez, 1848–1865.* (Document Archives to the Latest Legal History of Transylvania, 1848–1865.) Collected by J. SANDOR. Kolozsvár 1865, 116.

The *October Diploma* was not received with the degree of enthusiasm its sponsors had hoped for. The Austrian bourgeoisie considered it to be a plot of the federalist large landowners against centralization. The Hungarian Liberals denied the sole right of the emperor to issue alone resolutions of national importance, and did not recognize the authority of any central, that is external, government organ or of any imperial parliament. They continued to demand the restoration of the responsible Hungarian parliamentary and ministerial system established in 1848. In Transylvania, the Hungarian Liberals felt added repugnance towards the diploma because it considered the union achieved by the 1848 revolution null and void. "Without the union, the Hungarians of Transylvania are lost for ever; of this, even the lowest Hungarian peasant is convinced", was the message they conveyed to Pest.[12]

The diploma got a very different reception from the Romanian and Saxon burghers. Bariț was full of enthusiasm for it, commenting in his newspaper: "Today the emperor has declared that the Romanian nation in Transylvania has come of age and is on an equal footing with the other nations." The autonomy of Transylvania had been guaranteed forever, and "our future has been placed in our own hands".[13] During November, the Romanian intellectuals held several meetings at which they resolved, more or less, to pursue the implementation of their national programme of 1848. The Orthodox synod at Szeben called for a Transylvanian parliament made up of representatives of the individual nations in equal numbers, and for the equal status of the three languages. At some meetings, however, a call was made for the establishment of a Romanian province within the empire.

The Saxon burghers demanded the restoration of the ancient Saxon rights and institutions and called for a situation in which the future Transylvanian national assembly would operate on a pre-1848 basis. Decisions on the updating of the suffrage and on the issue of the union — which the majority of them did not support — were postponed for the time being.

On 9 December, the emperor appointed Baron Ferenc Kemény, the moderate conservative president of the last Transylvania Diet, to take over temporarily as head of the chancellery. At the same time, Count Imre Mikó was nominated as president of the Gubernium, the local arm of the central government restored in Kolozsvár. Both in the chancellery and the Gubernium, Kemény and Mikó set up Romanian departments to be headed by independently-thinking Romanian counsellors selected for the first time on the basis of national criteria.

The first inter-nationality meeting designed to arrange the next Transylvanian Diet and to work out a draft plan for elections was called for 11 February, 1861, in Gyulafehérvár. In the selection of its members, an Estate-specific approach prevailed: those invited included eight Hungarian, eight Székely, eight Hungarian urban, eight Saxon, and eight Romanian notables. The Hungarian majority embittered the stronger, anti-union wing of the other nationalities' politicians well in advance. Schmerling, the new pre-

12. Cited by Gy. Szabad, *Forradalom és kiegyezés választútján (1860–1861).* (On the Crossroads of Revolution and Compromise. 1860–1861.) Budapest 1967, 389.
13. V. Netea, *Lupta românilor din Transilvania pentru libertatea națională (1848–1881).* Bucharest 1974, 158–159.

mier (minister of state), now licensed the two Romanian prelates to convene a smaller national meeting. At this a resolution was passed recognizing the *October Diploma*, and calling for the recognition of the Romanian nation as a separate political entity. The abolition of some old, injurious Transylvanian laws(which, as a matter of fact the union of 1848 had already once invalidated) was demanded, as well as a relatively broad suffrage. A co-ordination committee was formed, namely, the Romanian national committee headed by Bishop Șaguna afforced by the Greek Catholic Archbishop Șuluțiu. This committee was to assume great importance later on.

At the conference in Gyulafehérvár some frank speaking took place. The Catholic bishop, Lajos Haynald, firmly advocated the implementation of the union and the 1848 laws, including the franchise in force at that time. For his part, Archbishop Șuluțiu insisted on the autonomy of Transylvania, arguing that the chances for fraternal co-existence depended on a separate Transylvanian Diet which would emancipate the Romanian nation and give it its fair share in government. Konrad Schmidt, a Saxon, expressed his sympathy for the union and the 1848 laws but pressed for the convening of a Transylvanian Diet in order to place the rights of the nationalities, and particularly the autonomy of the Saxons, on a firm footing. The conference ended without any convergence of views as far as the interested parties were concerned. But the cause of the union had again been brought into the focus of political interest, and sparked off debates in the Hungarian, Romanian and German press.

The Liberal Centralization of the Empire

In the meantime, the Austrian haute bourgeoisie and the central bureaucracy had openly turned against the *October Diploma*, especially because of the concession it granted to the provinces. The blatant nationalist festivities held by the Hungarians and Romanians, the refusal to pay taxes, and the social tensions which manifested themselves most obviously in the Romanian peasantry's occupation of woods and pastures eroded the authority of the new establishment even before it began to operate.

In mid-December 1860, Anton von Schmerling, who intended to create moderate bourgeois parliamentarianism by using absolutist means, achieved a key position in the government.

The so-called February Patent, issued on 26 February, 1861, provided the whole empire with a "constitution" through a centralist re-interpretation of the *October Diploma*. A new type of all-imperial centralization now became official government policy. Hungary could send eighty-five, Transylvania twenty-six and Croatia nine representatives to the three hundred and forty-five seat *Reichsrat*. But the February Patent made no mention of a government accountable to parliament, nor of the need for the emperor's measures to be ratified by ministers. At any time the emperor had the right to choose deputies to the *Reichsrat* directly, by-passing the various national assemblies. Therefore, if need be, he could govern for years in accordance with apparently liberal principles without convening the Hungarian Diet.

543

As was to be expected, these measures, which were seen by Francis Joseph and his ministers as the greatest concessions possible, aroused strong resistance among Hungarian Liberals. By calling for the implementation of the 1848 laws, the Hungarian Diet convened in April 1861 supported the reestablishment of a bourgeois Hungarian state which was to be entirely independent in its internal affairs. Accordingly, this Diet insisted on the elected representatives of Transylvania and Croatia participating in its work, something which did not, however, materialize. The ethnically mixed regions of the Banat, Arad, Bihar, Szatmár and Máramaros delegated nineteen Romanian representatives to the Diet in Pest, who — unlike the majority of the Romanian politicians in Transylvania — attempted to base the future of the nationalities on a compromise with the Hungarian forces.

In order to achieve a common platform, Deák also included in his famous address to the Diet, which itemized the principles of Hungarian liberal policy, the urgent need to resolve the nationalities issue. Eötvös, in turn, formed a parliamentary committee with twelve non-Magyar members which made preparations for a separate nationality law. The committee put forward its proposals in August 1861. "The citizens of Hungary, whatever language they speak, constitute one nation politically, the unitary and indivisible Hungarian nation in accordance with the historic concept of the Hungarian state," said the draft law, and went on to declare: "Magyars, Slovaks, Romanians, Serbs, Germans and Ruthenians are to be considered as nationalities with equal rights", nationalities, which, on the basis of human rights and freedom of association, can realize their aspirations for their own particular nationality, without restriction.[14] It provided that the townships and the counties be free to use any language in conducting their official business, permitting those with a predominantly non-Magyar population to correspond with each other and to issue official documents in their own languages. In the minority proposal of the committee, Romanian representatives Vlad and Popovici subscribed to the concept of the "political nation" with an amendment emphasizing the separate identity of the various nationalities: "They are to be recognized as nations on an equal footing with the Magyar, and their total sum constitutes the political nation of Hungary".[15] Some details of their proposal anticipated a federation of the various non-Magyar areas.

The rump Diet of 1861 was incapable of passing any law. In August of that year it was dissolved by the monarch because it was not prepared to come to an unconditional agreement with the monarch, insisting on the restoration of the 1848 laws as a whole.

14. Cited by Gy. Szabad, op. cit. 553.
15. I. Mikó, *Nemzetiségi jog és nemzetiségi politika.* (Nationality Law and Nationality Policy.) Kolozsvár 1944, 179.

The Struggle for Local Power

As a challenge to the multi-faceted resistance in Hungary, Schmerling attempted to establish, at least in Transylvania, a Diet which was ready to accept the new arrangement. By doing so, he hoped to reduce the impact of the defiant mood in Pest and to help facilitate the crushing of the Hungarian opposition.

In the summer of 1861, Schmerling promised the Romanians that he would considerably lower the property franchise qualification. This amounted to guaranteeing the Romanians a majority in the Transylvanian Diet. For his part, Francis Joseph, when receiving a Romanian delegation, twice stressed: "Gentlemen, regarding the union of Transylvania and Hungary, I assure you that I shall never permit such a union to come about."[16]

In Transylvania itself, local administration from the spring of 1861 on assumed a dual character as a result of the conflict between Kemény's and Mikó' moderate unionism and Schmerling's centralizing aspirations. For in the spring of 1861, the emperor had ordered the abolition of absolutist internal administration in Transylvania as well, and at the same time ordered that the counties, seats and royal free towns be restored and re-organized as units of self-government.

The tactics of Transylvania's Hungarian Liberals — approved by the opposition in Pest and worked out in part on the advice of the exiled Kossuth — aimed at challenging Vienna's attempts at centralization in the counties and in the towns. What made this a promising tack was that until 1848, local political power had been subordinated to the Parliament — like general assembly of the counties and other municipalities. It was this body that elected and supervised local administrative officials, oversaw the operation of the courts, levied the taxes, and generally set the course of local political life. It was to this system that the county commissions set up in the spring of 1861 by the group of landowners and intellectuals rallying round Domokos Teleki and the younger János Bethlen harked back. Through the commissions, and the officials they elected, this group acquired a leading position in the political life and administration of Transylvania. From this position of relative strength the group called for the reinstatement of the 1848 laws. Regarding the union as legally *a fait accompli,* the group requested that the representatives of Transylvania also be invited to the Diet being convened in Pest at this time.

What mattered most was the extent to which these two men could reach a practical understanding with the Romanian intellectuals, who accepted most of the 1848 laws including those providing for the emancipation of the serfs and for embourgeoisment generally, but who — secure of the backing from the government circles in Vienna — stuck to the idea that Transylvania should have separate status. These intellectuals called for civil rights to be guaranteed on a national basis and rejected not only the union but also the Hungarian idea of solving the nationalities issue by guaranteeing their

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16. *Corespondenţa lui Ioan Raţiu cu George Bariţiu (1861–1892).* Edited by K. Hitchins — L. Maior. Cluj 1970, 51.

members individual and cultural rights. The Hungarian side consented to Naszód and Fogaras which had ethnic Romanian majorities establishing a Romanian administration (Felső-Fehér and Hunyad counties were also under the authority of Romanian *főispáns*), and also thought it advisable for the Romanians to have a greater say in the government of the Királyföld. However, when it came to the counties — ancient bulwarks of Hungarian politics — they were inclined to admit them at most on a fifty-fifty basis. The county commissioners were normally recruited from those officials of 1848 who were still alive, but a quarter of them, and a number of higher officials, were nominated by the *főispáns* from the ranks of the Romanians. "They are as eager to find Romanians to fill various offices," wrote the *Gazeta Transilvaniei*'s correspondent in Doboka, "as they are to impress men into the army."[17] The Romanian language was not only introduced into public life but also gained a dominant position in several regions. In Naszód, even the government commissioner, Count Gábor Bethlen, presiding over the statutory meeting of the municipality, made his opening address in that language.

The Saxon patrician bureaucrats and the Romanians who had become a force to reckon with in the Királyföld in terms of both numbers and property became involved in a serious conflict over the issue of their participation in the new arrangement. As compared to the counties, in this region the Romanians were in an inferior position. *Comes* Salmen sought to update the restoration of the *status quo* begun in 1805, which was ever harder to reconcile with the idea of civil equality, by delegating a few offices to the Romanians. In 1861, for the first time in its history, four Romanian deputies were admitted to the Saxon University. Soon a large delegation was asking Salmen to constitute the government bodies of the Királyföld from both Romanians and Saxons on the basis of equal representation. While in the counties the Romanian intellectuals could cherish the hope of receiving help from Vienna against the Hungarian landed class, in the Királyföld the Romanian grievances were received with the traditional sympathy by the Hungarian-led Gubernium and by the court chancellor, Ferenc Kemény. The Hungarian press was also anxious to back the Romanian's fight in the Szászföld.

By the autumn of 1861, the municipalities of Transylvania had been reorganized. As a result, a relative political equilibrium was established between the various nationalities. However, this failed to calm social tensions. In the Hungarian-led counties, the Romanian militants protested against the hegemony of those in power, while in the Romanian-led municipalities Hungarian militants protested similarly, theatrically walking out of country assemblies, going into passive resistance, and sending memoranda as tokens of their unwillingness to accept the established power structure as appropriate.

It was the exiles who again came up with a comprehensive proposal for how these national antagonisms might be settled.

17. Foaie pentru minte, inimă și literatură. 26 April, 1861. Cited by S. Retegan, *Dieta românescă a Transilvaniei (1863–1864)*. Cluj–Napoca 1979, 48.

The Plan for a Danubian Confederation

With the Hungarian's inclination towards a compromise with Austria growing stronger, and with the émigrés having had to face up to the fact that the Great Powers were determined to preserve the equilibrium in Europe, Klapka and Kossuth drew up a new blueprint for co-operation in southeastern Europe designed to defuse national antagonisms and to reinvigorate the liberation movements. The plan for a Danubian Confederation devised in May 1862 outlined a confederation of the "old historic states" lying between the Carpathians, the Danube, the Black Sea and the Adriatic for the period following a victorious war of liberation. The joint affairs of the member states would include foreign affairs, defence, tariffs and commerce and these would be administrated by a federal authority, which would, in turn, be answerable to a federal parliament. The federal government would alternately sit in Pest, Bucharest, Zagreb and Belgrade, the presidential duties being performed at any given time by the head of the country concerned. The above affairs apart, however, the executive, legislature, and judiciary of every member state would be entirely independent. The separate status of Transylvania was also considered.

This scheme of Kossuth's envisaged free national development and a collective great power status for the countries of the area: "They will be a leading, rich and powerful state numbering thirty million inhabitants and weighting substantially in the scales of Europe."[18] It promised a solution in a region that was highly complex ethnically and so badly needed the co-operative of independent nations. However, the plan was leaked out before the necessary preparations could be made for its publication. It evoked no noticeable response among the neighbouring peoples, and the majority of the Hungarian politicians either refused to endorse it, or, like Ferenc Deák, remained silent on the issue.

The Hungarian landowning class, with its great power mentality was determined to create in independent constitutional state that would play a dominant role in the region, a state in which, it claimed, history, tradition, and practical considerations alike predestined the Hungarians for a pre-eminent political role. It was becoming increasingly clear, however, that this could be achieved only if Hungary remained integrated with Austria as a major power. Accordingly, the search for an appropriate status within the empire for a Hungary united with Transylvania constituted the central political issue of the ensuing few years.

The majority of Hungarian Liberals insisted on the union with Transylvania but within this they were prepared to make compromises. Deák thought of handling Transylvania rather like Croatia — it would be allowed to hold a separate provincial Diet which would, in turn, send deputies to the Diet in Pest. In order to reconcile them, the Romanians would be recog-

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18. L. Kossuth, *Irataim az emigráczióból.* (Writings in my Emigration.) Edited by I. Helfy. III. 1859–1860. Budapest 1882, 734. On the conception of the plan see L. Lukács, *Magyar politikai emigráció 1849–1867.* (Hungarian Political Emigration 1849–1867.) Budapest 1984, 202–223.

nized as "the Fourth Nation". On the other hand, the Hungarian Liberals in Transylvania feared that Deák's solution would give a tactical advantage to Vienna: the government would be in the position to make the union a matter of continuous debate, thereby further exacerbating conflicts between the nationalities.

The Provisorium and the Nagyszeben Diet

In September 1861, the monarch ordered the convening of the Transylvanian Diet on the basis of a property voting qualification set at eight forints and to include every type of direct tax — i.e., on a property tax considerably lower than that applying in 1848. Chancellor Kemény did not deem the monarchic principle to be compatible with the broader franchise and tendered his resignation. The Gubernium headed by Mikó protested in a lengthy memorandum against the calling of a separate Diet, reproaching the government with extending voting rights out of tactical considerations "when in Your Majesty's other provinces the interests of the people, especially those of the broad masses, have not been treated with such favour."[19] Mikó and his associates, backed by the officials in the counties, resolutely opposed the preparations, thereby incurring the anger not only of the government but also of the Romanian National Committee. In his own memorandum to the monarch, Archbishop Şuluţiu called the Gubernium anarchic and hostile to the spirit of the age "because it brands Your Majesty's reign and all Your ordinances as unlawful."[20] Finally, on 21 November, Mikó also resigned.

Kemény's and Mikó's resignations were followed by those of the leading Hungarian administrators. The newly-appointed *főispáns* were reliable supporters of the government. Romanian *főispáns* now headed Doboka and Küküllő counties, in addition to those who retained office in Naszód, Fogaras, Hunyad and Felső-Fehér counties, and the number of Romanian-led municipalities thus rose to six.

The new chancellor of Transylvania, Count Ferenc Nádasdy — according to Francis Joseph, the most hated Hungarian of all — set as his goal the disruption of the Hungarian-led counties: he needed supporters in the counties for the coming elections. The weight of the Romanians grew in the newly constituted county commissions and among the government officials, although the Hungarian landowners and junior officials were still the majority. The Hungarian towns and the Székelyföld were the areas by and large retained by the Liberals. By the spring of 1863, the administrators had managed to suppress resistance to a degree which at last permitted the parliamentary elections to be held.

At these elections, it was not the increase in the number of voters that was the chief novelty but the changed make-up of the electorate. While in

19. *Okmánytár Erdély legújabb jogtörténetéhez, 1848–1865.* (Document Archives to the Latest Legal History of Transylvania, 1848–1865). Collected by J. SÁNDOR. Kolozsvár 1865, 178.

20. L. ÜRMÖSSY, *Tizenhét év* ... (Seventeen Years ...), 339.

1848 every nobleman had automatically had the franchise, now only those who satisfied the eight forint property qualification were eligible to vote — in the counties, only one nobleman in five. Traditionally, this layer had constituted the chief support of the Hungarian cause, irrespective of the given individual's Hungarian or Romanian ethnic affiliation. The Romanians were placated by increasing the number of their deputies in the counties, although proportional representation was not introduced. (In Fogaras and Naszód, one deputy represented 10,000 people, in the Székelyföld 14,500, and in the Szászföld 8,700.) In the counties, over half the electorate was Romanian. A fact regarded as encouraging by the Romanian National Committee, which launched a massive election campaign. It looked forward with confidence to the forthcoming Diet as a historic event which was to mark the emancipation of the Romanian nation and given it its due share of political power.

In the elections of the summer of 1863 — for which the government is understood to have spent 800,000 forints on influencing an electorate of 75,000–80,000 — 49 Romanian, 44 Hungarian and 33 Saxon candidates won mandates. The Hungarian liberal camp took the seats in both the Székelyföld and the Hungarian towns, but suffered a disastrous defeat in the counties, the ancient organizational units of political life. Out of the thirty-eight deputies for the counties, only two were Hungarians. The monarch invited eleven Regalists selected from the "men of standing" or officials of every nationality, in the hope that they would play the counter-balancing function performed in other countries by an upper house. In the final analysis, sixty (later fifty-nine) Romanians, fifty-six Hungarians and forty-nine Saxons got the chance of participating in the Diet.

The political forces of all three nations engaged in feverish preparations for the opening of the Diet. The Hungarians held a two-day meeting to discuss how they might support the demand for separate national rights for the Romanians in a way consistent with their insistence on the 1848 law on the union and their protest in principle against the convening of this separate Transylvanian Diet. Their resolution, which was translated into a memorandum for the monarch, declared that "the very idea of a Transylvanian Diet was contrary to law."[21]

The confidential contacts established between the Hungarian, Romanian and Saxon representatives — contacts spurred by the realization that there was strong support among the Romanians for some wide-ranging constitutional settlement — similarly failed to bring results. They hardly could have. For the Romanian Liberals and some of the Saxons were hoping that the presence of the Hungarians would serve to consolidate the constitutional forces in the Diet. The Hungarians, however, were intent on persuading the former to boycott the entire event. They reiterated the promise that in the Diet meeting in Pest, "we shall give legal guarantees for [the realization of] all the national demands that you might have".[22] The viewpoints could not be reconciled. As a result, the Hungarian representatives, and all the Hungarian Regalists except three, stayed away from the Diet.

21. Abbreviated records of the conference see *OSZK* Archive of Manuscripts, Fol. Hung. 1430. 1–3f.

22. I. Puşcariu, *Notiţe despre întîmplările contemporane.* Sibiu 1913, 75.

The Hungarian boycott undermined the hopes the Centralists had attached to the Transylvanian Diet. With the Hungarians refusing to take part, the Diet did not represent all three nations of Transylvania. Moreover, thirty-six out of the fifty-nine Romanian representatives were bureaucrats, and fifteen were clergymen; and of the thirty-three elected Saxon representatives, twenty-two were officials, as were half of the Regalists. The number of truly independent representatives — for example, the Saxon Maager and the Romanian Barit — numbered around ten. In this form the Diet was to be exactly what Schmerling had intended: a congress of dependent bureaucrats, a strictly controlled and passive body. This was the first, and the last, Transylvanian Diet at which the Romanians were represented as a nationality, and indeed, formed a majority.

The Transylvanian Diet opened on 15 July, 1863. The royal commissioner, Governor Lieutenant General Crenneville, clad in Hungarian gala dress, read the monarch's address to an assembly at which no Hungarians were present. The address promised the restoration of the old constitutional rights, as well as the formation of a representative system based on equality before the law. It called on the deputies to pass the *October Diploma* and the February Patent and to declare that Transylvania's 1848 union with Hungary was null and void. The government invalidated the mandates of the Hungarian deputies, called new elections in their electoral districts, and appointed new Regalists to take the place of those who had stayed away. At the elections in August, the same Hungarian deputies as before were victorious in their old districts; then, having demonstrated the strength of their support, they formally renounced their seats. Nádasdy attempted a third election in October 1863, a fourth one in May 1864, and a fifth election in August 1864 in an effort to break the resistance of the Hungarian districts, but to no avail. With the nomination of new Regalists, he managed to win over all of eleven Hungarians. Even the government, however, did not attempt to present these eleven men as the representatives of the Transylvanian Hungarians.

Meanwhile, the Diet had discarded the proposal made by the majority of the Saxons — who were supporters of imperial centralization — for the formation of four separate national regions which, even so, would not have been homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. No one considered this suggestion to be liberal; in several counties, it would also have totally prevented the Romanians' numerical predominance from finding expression. A minority of the Saxons were liberal unionists, for instance, Franz Brennberg who, after taking a stand for the union at the Diet, resigned his seat. On the other hand, Franz Trauschenfels, while maintaining his pro-union views, contributed to the work of the Diet, and was, in fact, the one to present the committee motion recommending equal rights for the Romanians. (The Hungarian Liberals wished to leave the choice of their official language to the discretion of the counties and townships, but wanted Hungarian to be the only language used by the government and the Diet. However, Count Domokos Teleki, a politician of some standing, thought that with time Romanian might become the official language of Transylvania.)

A government proposal which was passed made Hungarian, Romanian and German the official languages, but provided for the regulation by decree of the language to be used in legislation and by the higher authorities,

as well as in correspondence with the central government bodies. The purpose was to remove defining the official state language from the competence of the deputies. During the discussions, a heated debate developed between the Romanians and the Saxons, who wanted only a gradual introduction of the equality of all Transylvania's languages. Though it was not until the beginning of 1865 that the monarch gave the royal assent to the law, the government passed it to the Gubernium in Kolozsvár for implementation as early as the end of 1863.

With the grant of equal rights to the Romanian religions and with the language measures, the political emancipation of the Romanian nation was formally accomplished. However, at this time there was little chance of its actual realization. It was unlikely to constitute a lasting settlement because of opposition from Transylvania's Hungarians, the oldest political force in the country and the one with the greatest potential, as well as strong allies in the rest of Hungary. It was the misfortune of Romanian society at the time that the most it could produce was a body of clerical and bureaucrat intellectuals, a group unable by itself to form an efficient political force. To redress the imbalance, Bariţ and several of his associates at the Diet advocated modern constitutionalism, thus adopting a part of the policy of the Hungarian Liberals. From 1861 onwards, Ioan Raţiu had been warning his associates not to commit themselves fully to the Schmerling government and suggested seeking ties with the Hungarian politicians.

Following the passage of the first laws, public opinion grew even more hostile to the Diet. It was strongly suspected that Schmerling's underlying purpose was to force Hungary into the *Reichsrat*. The conviction grew that the government was simply playing with the Nagyszeben Diet. Certainly, there was no lack of evidence to support this view. Vice-chancellor Reichenstein always had with him the royal rescript which empowered him to dissolve the Diet at any time. The man named president of the Diet was Gusztáv Groisz, a Hungarian Conservative, who had obtained the fewest votes of the six candidates for the post. And when necessary, a majority was simply overturned in a new vote. At the prompting of the monarch, twenty-six deputies (thirteen Romanians and thirteen Saxons) were selected without delay for the *Reichsrat*. They duly appeared in Vienna, but were unable to achieve anything: the section of the state budget dealing with Transylvania was passed without modification. The Austrian representatives, for their part, regarded them as yes-men of the government.

In May 1864, the Nagyszeben Diet reconvened. The interim regulation applied in 1863 was presented as a draft suffrage bill. The reorganization of the judiciary, and Raţiu's proposals on the use of the forests, on the emancipation of the serfs in the Székelyföld, and on the distribution of the pasture lands — which the Liberals described as communistic — were never really dealt with. At the end of October, the session was adjourned, never to be reconvened. For in the course of 1865, the political situation changed out of all recognition. The laws that had been given royal sanction, only six in number, were of no significance: not only were they opposed by the Hungarian policy-makers, but, because he had never taken the coronation oath, were not even binding on the monarch. If the Diet had any lasting effect, it was that it helped accelerate the development of Saxon, and especially Romanian, national consciousness and political education.

The Termination of the Provisional Government, and the Kolozsvár Diet

Though the policy pursued by Schmerling had been unable to break the resistance of the Hungarian Liberals, it did manage to soften some of them up. The protracted period of absolutism did not bring economic advancement for the landed class. A role in public life also required money, and it had had to finance the administration of the whole Mikó era virtually on its own. With the exact ownership and the precise legal status of so much of their land unclarified, nobles could not get credit; and for lack of investment, these estates were rapidly losing their value. According to the well-informed Romanian commander of Fogaras, the entire land of Transylvania could have been bought for a few million forints. The need to find a way out strengthened the group of those who were prepared to negotiate with the court.

In the spring of 1865, the famous "Easter article" of Ferenc Deák launched negotiations for a compromise. Deák averred that Hungarian interests and the 1848 laws could be reconciled with the "stable existence of the empire", emphasizing one of the key demands of the Hungarian Liberals, namely that constitutional government had to be introduced also in the Austrian half of the empire. In the course of the exploratory talks edging towards a compromise, on 26 June, 1865, Zichy, the Hungarian chancellor, and Nádasdy, the Transylvanian chancellor, were forced to resign — the latter being replaced by Count Ferenc Haller, a cavalry general. The key figure of the old regime, Schmerling, was also turned out of office, to be succeeded by Count Belcredi. Vienna finally agreed to the restoration of the union. Francis Joseph now summoned *comes* Konrad Schmidt and Şaguna, since 1864 autonomous archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Romanians of Hungary and Transylvania. He informed them of his intention of reaching a compromise, and promised to honour the national rights of the non-Magyars, provided that the Saxons and the Romanians were able to accommodate themselves to the new situation.

The monarch called a new Diet to Kolozsvár for 19 November, 1865. Its "sole and exclusive subject" was the renegotiation of the "Article I of 1848 dealing with the union of Hungary and Transylvania". The administrative system was restored such that the corporate bodies formed in 1861 began to operate again as previously composed.

The property qualification for the new elections was set on the basis of the suffrages of 1791 and 1848, and was considerably higher than that applying in 1863. But despite raising the property qualification, estimates (in the absence of exact data) suggest that a few thousand more people were eligible to vote than in 1863. This is explained by the fact that members of the small nobility, who had been reduced to peasant status economically, were again eligible to vote on the basis of their "old rights". These people formed the reserve of the Hungarian political forces.

The new turn of events and the new suffrage were a blow to the Romanian intellectuals. The Romanian vice-president of the Gubernium judged that this experiment, too, would be short-lived, and that the Romanians

had merely to wait for it to fail. He encouraged Archbishop Şuluţiu and his associates to resist. Following the recent example of the Hungarians, the Romanians did attempt a boycott of the election, but failed to co-ordinate their actions. At the last moment, Bariţ and his supporters opted for participation in the elections. The Saxon University opposed the new measures, but was nevertheless willing to attend the Diet. It also accepted the union, "given advance legal state guarantees of the Saxon nationality's municipal constitution."

At the November elections, the monarch's support for the union had considerable psychological impact, and the changes in the franchise, which cut back the number of the Romanian electors, were not without their effects. There were now just fourteen elected Romanian deputies — and, in addition, thirty-four Romanian Regalists — who either opposed the union or who stipulated stringent conditions for it. The fifty-nine elected deputies of the Hungarians — and the one hundred and thirty-seven Hungarian Regalists — dwarfed the Romanians and the thirty elected Saxon deputies (plus twenty Saxon Regalists). Even discounting the Regalists, the Unionists were in a majority.

On 19 November, 1865, Baron Ferenc Kemény, who had presided over the 1848 Diet, opened the assembly which, predictably, neither of the two major political forces in the country regarded as a real Diet. The Romanians considered it to have been illegally convened, and called for the continuation of the Nagyszeben Diet. Even the majority of the Hungarian representatives considered it to be a national meeting whose sole task was the confirmation and revival of the union of 1848. The inter-nationality reconciliation talks held in advance of it produced no results, and the Diet's work began with only thirty-two of the forty-eight Romanian deputies actually taking part. The sittings of the Diet abounded in fine speeches, the deputies putting their cases for and against the union, reiterating the arguments developed between 1848 and 1865. Over Şaguna's and Maager's objections, and in spite of the twenty-nine Romanian and twenty-six Saxon votes against it, the Diet adopted the Hungarian pro-union resolution, which secured one hundred and sixty-six votes (including four Romanian and eight Saxon). The motion adopted described the union as necessary — firstly on the basis of historical rights and secondly on grounds of the great power position of the empire, which required the restoration of the integrity of the Hungarian state. This was a vital issue for Transylvania also, argued the resolution, referring to the backward economy of the country, its general impoverishment and its inability to pay taxes. Material prosperity, it said, could be expected from such "a lawful and natural unification of interests and uniting of forces". On the issue of equal rights for the non-Hungarians, it declared that the monarch's "paternal heart and the recognized liberalism of Hungarian legislation" afforded sufficient guarantee that the interests of the denominations and of the nationalities would be met on the basis of civil equality.[23]

23. *Erdélyi Hírlap* (Transylvanian Newspaper), 28 December, 1865; L. ÜRMÖSSY, *Tizenhét év* ... (Seventeen Years ...), 251.

Appended to the resolution was a Romanian minority statement submitted by Archbishop Șaguna, which called for a Diet to be convened in line with the 1863 prescription so that the Romanians could discuss the union on the basis of a fairer suffrage. One of the dissenting opinions from the Saxons which was also appended made the acceptance of the union dependent on the guaranteeing of the special rights of the various nationalities. The sittings were adjourned pending the response of the monarch to the Representations, although after Francis Joseph's speech at the opening of the Diet in Pest this action was but a mere formality.

On 10 January, 1866, a royal rescript was read out which "permitted" Transylvania to send deputies to the Diet in Pest, but which suggested that the implementation of the union was dependent on the full conclusion of an Austro-Hungarian compromise. In addition, it stipulated that the "rightful" claims of the nationalities and denominations should be met in advance. For the Saxons and Romanians, this seemed to be very little: while the Hungarian Liberals judged the declaration of the conditions to be no more than a bit of one-upmanship. However, they did not voice their opposition, and the union Diet in Kolozsvár ended with the statement: "We have made great progress towards the realization of our final goal.

With this, the separateness of Transylvania came to an end. It had been achieved not only through pressure from the Hungarian political forces there, but was also recognized to be an indispensable prerequisite for the success of negotiations on the more comprehensive compromise aimed at consolidating the empire. The Hungarian liberal camp, the strongest political force in Transylvania, had had an important part to play in this agreement, and had managed to prevent Transylvania from being "consolidated" as a separate unit at the expense of Hungary proper and in the line with imperial centralist schemes.

The restoration of the union made it possible for Transylvania to be involved in the capitalist transformation of the monarchy not just as a modest border province but as an integral part of its socially and politically more advanced mother-country. As such, it was now in the mainstream of European economic development.

The future was to show exactly to what extent the union facilitated the cultural and political development of the nationalities, and how far they were able to close the economic and social gap which had historical roots and had been a source of tension for so long.

II. Population and Economy in the Age of Capitalism

1. Population

Population Growth and Mobility

During the six decades between the revolution of 1848–1849 and 1914, the population of Transylvania grew by about 750,000, or 40 per cent. This demographic increase occurred within an area of 58,000 square kilometres, some minor modifications having been made to the frontiers of historic Transylvania proper by the administrative reform which united Transylvania with Hungary in 1876. Two-thirds of this population increase occurred in the three decades preceding the First World War. The annual increase is presumed to have been about 8 per thousand head of population between

Table 3. The growth of the population of Transylvania (1850–1910)

Year	Transylvania and the Partium (1102 □ mile, 60,700 sq km)		Transylvania between the old boundaries (998 □ mile, 54,948 sq km)		Transylvania between the 1876 boundaries (57,804 sq km)	
	the present civilian population in absolute numbers	average yearly growth, ‰	the present civilian population in absolute numbers	average yearly growth, ‰	the present civilian population in absolute numbers	average yearly growth, ‰
1850	2,073,737		1,856,000		1,900,000	
1857	2,172,748	6.7	1,926,797			
1869	2,393,206	8.1	2.101.727	7.3	2,152,805	
1850–1869	+319,469 (15.4 %)	7.6	+245,727 (13.2 %)	6.6	+252,805 (13.3 %)	6.6
1880					2,084,048	-2.7
1890					2,251,216	7.9
1900					2,456,838	8.8
1910					2,658,159	7.9
1850–1910					+758,159 (39.9 %)	5.6
1869–1910					+505,354 (23.5 %)	5.2
1880–1910					+574,111 (27.5 %)	8.1

1839 and 1845; it was 6.2 per thousand head of population between 1851 and 1857, rising steadily in the 1860s, a rise which was, however, followed by a sharp decline. This decline resulted from the last mediaeval-type demographic disaster to sweep the region: the cholera epidemic that reached Transylvania in 1873. Whereas Hungary recovered from this disaster within three years, it took Transylvania until the early 1880s to resume its earlier rate of population increase.

While, as a rule, the so-called Industrial Age was ushered in by a demographic boom, in Hungary — and even more in Transylvania — the population increased in a long drawn-out process. There were even counties which reported a surplus of deaths over births during the great cholera epidemic and for years after it. In Csík and Nagy-Küküllő counties for example, a low birthrate combined with emigration led to an actual decrease of the population from 1869 on, and the counties of Brassó, Háromszék, Udvarhely and Fogaras lost 6 to 7 per cent of their natural population increase due to the same two factors. Throughout the whole period, the rate of population growth in Transylvania remained below the average for Hungary as a whole.

Demographically, Transylvania was clearly a part of Hungary's eastern region, characterized by early marriages as compared to other regions, with the average age of those marrying, however, showing a rising trend throughout the period. A massive higher population growth rate bloc comprising Szatmár, Bihar, Máramaros and Szolnok–Doboka counties contrasted sharply with the zone immediately south of it westward from Beszterce through Hunyad as far as Baranya where fertility was decidedly low. Historians have yet to account for this. Areas with rapidly growing populations lay in the central part of Transylvania, in the roughly rectangular area between Kolozsvár, Marosvásárhely, Segesvár and Szászsebes. It was in this central part, too, that population density was the highest, reaching 50 to 80 per square kilometre by 1890, whereas the average for the whole territory east of the Királyhágó was 39.32 in the same year, only reaching 46.3 even in 1910. The fertility index was particularly low among the Romanians of southern Transylvania. Much as in the Transdanubian part of Hungary, among the Transylvanian Saxons restrictive birth control was widespread. A one- or two-child family model was commonly adopted, in order to prevent the splitting up of smallholdings.

In respect of its high birth and death rates, early marriages and high fertility, Hungary's demographic structure conforms to the eastern European model, whereas the other feature, the early adoption of restrictive birth control methods, bears a certain resemblance to the western European model. A lower fertility index, greater life expectancy and a relatively low mortality rate, then, imparted to Transylvania a distinct position within the demographic structure of the whole of Hungary.

It was in this 1849–1914 period that a public health care network was established and became a serious factor in shaping demographic trends. Although some improvement in medical care was discernible from as early as 1850, no major advance took place until the end of the century. As early as the 1850s and 1860s there were "national hospitals" at Kolozsvár and Marosvásárhely, and there were sixteen other hospitals as well. With the introduction of vaccination in 1887, smallpox — previously a formidable

scourge — was virtually eliminated. A public health law passed in 1876 spelled out the health care duties of the state, as well as of the county and village authorities. It also provided for the supervision of health standards in public institutions. Towns and the more populous villages were obliged by law to employ doctors, while the district doctor cared for patients in the smaller villages. Treatment was free for the poorest. Medical care and hospital services improved substantially as a result of these measures. Whereas in 1893 there were just twenty-nine hospitals with 1,900 beds, by 1913 there were fifty-six hospitals with 5,645 beds. According to the 1910 (the last pre-1914) Census data, 3,001 persons were employed in the public health sector, of whom 545 were doctors and 523 pharmacists. Twenty-two per cent of all health workers and 13 per cent of the doctors were ethnic Romanians. For every 100,000 inhabitants, there were twenty-nine physicians, sixty-two midwives and 191 hospital beds. Naturally, health conditions varied enormously from town to country, as well as from region to region. The number of deaths recorded as due to accidents was around 500 per annum at the time. The number of suicides was around 300 per annum — three times the figure of fifty years before, and the comparable statistics for Háromszék county were staggering. One hundred cases of murder were reported annually, with the counties of Háromszék and Hunyad heading the list in this respect. In sharp contrast to the earlier figures, however, the number of murder cases had halved since the mid-nineteenth century, a reflection of the tempering effects of civilization.

In the first period of the Industrial Age, unnatural death took its heaviest toll during the First World War. According to the official statistics alone, by the end of 1917 already 24 per thousand of Transylvania's population had been killed at the front, with the figure being 37 per thousand among the Székelys. Those born in 1895 and 1896 were the hardest hit: around 20 per cent of these young men became casualties. There was a rising mortality rate among civilians — with the Romanian offensive of August 1916, Transylvania effectively became a combat zone — and a distinct fall in the birth rate (by 55–58 per cent).

A famine following a natural disaster or poor harvest had an adverse effect not only on peoples' livelihood, on their sheer survival, but also on reproduction. This was in spite of the fact that the authorities increasingly felt that it was their duty to provide relief for disaster-stricken areas. Public readiness to provide aid took some of the pain out of the famine of 1864–1865. By the turn of the century, the distribution of free grain in villages affected by a poor harvest had become accepted government policy. After this there were no more serious famines, but malnutrition caused by the substitution of maize for wheat bread as the staple diet frequently caused pellagra among the village people. The inhabitants of Brassó, Fogaras and Háromszék counties were the relatively best fed. In the 1880s, the annual amount spent on food was 65 forints per head, which approximated to Hungary's national average. All the same, the Transylvanians were on shorter commons, generally speaking. Although fruit consumption was high, it hardly made up for the other deficiencies of their diet. Hard liquor consumption reached alarming levels; Kis-Küküllő county led the statistics with an annual consumption of forty-one litres per capita.

The turn of the century saw an upsurge in the geographical mobility of the population, although even it the pre-1867 days people from Transylvania — both ethnic Romanians and Székely men and unmarried women — had regularly gone to Romania in search of work. In the late 1870s, the official records mentioned a figure of 40,000 "Hungarian subjects" living in Romania. Between 1880 and 1900, the number of migrants there was roughly 70,000, about one-third of them being Székelys. Between 1900 and 1914, these were followed by another 80,000. Official statistics, of course, do not take account of those crossing the long Carpathian frontier in secret, a frontier that was unguarded by any modern standards. Nor should we forget that most migrants sought temporary jobs, rather than permanent residence, in Romania. This accounts for the low proportion of children among the emigrants as well as for the relatively high proportion of those over fifty years of age. In 1913 — the last complete year of peace — over 200,000 Hungarian-born people, including non-Transylvanians, lived in the Kingdom of Romania.

From 1900 on, with the gradual shift of the European emigration zone from west to east, the overseas emigration fever reached Transylvania. Within a period of fifteen years, 95,000 emigrants left the region for America and another 10,000 for Germany. The mountainous area between the Olt, the Maros, and the Kis-Küküllő and Nagy-Küküllő rivers became a veritable centre of emigration. Transylvanian emigrants flocked in ever-growing numbers to the steel mills and mines of Pennsylvania and to the factories of Ohio, New York and New Jersey.

Within Transylvania, population movements occurred on a smaller scale than in the rest of Hungary. A mere 18 per cent of Transylvania's inhabitants had permanent residence away from their birthplace, whereas the percentage was nearly double this in Transdanubia. But mobility did intensify in Transylvania at the turn of the century. Although the number of villages remained unchanged, the population of the existing ones was slowly growing. There were a little over 100 villages with populations of more than 2,000, while the number of villages with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants was over 1,800. A typical Transylvanian village had a population of between 500 and 1,000 inhabitants. Regional peculiarities and historical heritage continued to shape the character of villages. In the Érchegység, for instance, there were so-called "scattered settlements" each of which stretched endlessly through the landscape. By contrast, Hosszúfalu, a village in the vicinity of Brassó, was, by the turn of the century, contiguous with three other village communities engaged in handicrafts and was practically of urban character. Meanwhile, large, sprawling villages such as Romanian-inhabited Szelistye and Resinár prospered on transhumant sheep farming and related activities. It might have been this very traditionalism — together with the pull of nearby industrial Nagyszeben — that thwarted the urbanization process here. Hungarian-inhabited Torockó was also denied the possibility of growth, owing to the decline of the small ironworks there.

Urbanization was undoubted the factor behind internal migrations. The twenty-seven communities that were legally considered towns in the early 1900s rapidly expanded in size and increased their populations between 1850 and 1910, the total number of their inhabitants rising from 149,471 to

324,955. Naturally, the real increase in the urban population far exceeded this, as a further 50,000 or more people lived at this time in industrial or mining communities such as Petrozsény and Lupény, which, as regards the degree of their urbanization, were on a par with any small Transylvanian town. From the 1890s on, just as in Upper Hungary and Transdanubia, half of the inhabitants of major towns earned their living in industry and commerce, and about half of them had been recent in-migrants. The Transylvanian towns, as regards both their appearance and the occupational distribution of their citizens, followed the general central European model of urban development.

Transylvanian urbanization had received its first great impetus in the two decades following the 1848 revolution, but then growth abated, and for twenty years hardly any increase in the urban population was recorded. After 1890, however, another 100,000 people were added by the march of capitalist development. The Hungarian cities and towns which bordered on Transylvania proper — Máramarossziget, Szatmárnémeti, Nagyvárad, Arad and Temesvár — made great progress on the road to urbanization and exercised a pull on the rural population from all directions. On the other hand, Brassó and the urbanized Nagyszeben showed a moderate but steady increase, while smaller towns such as Vízakna or Abrudbánya stagnated because of the decline of mining there; the population of the latter even fell. The typical Transylvanian small town was characterized by traditionalism and slower structural development. Urbanization could not overcome regional discrepancies inherited from the past. In 1910, 12.7 per cent of Transylvania's population were already town dwellers. This was, however, the Transylvanian average: the ratio was 7.3 in the Székelyföld, but was as high as 22.1 in the former Királyföld.

Ten years after the 1867 Compromise, administrative modernization was thought to require an overhaul of the legal status of the thirty royal free towns. Twenty-two of them were classified as towns and only two, Kolozsvár and Marosvásárhely, were accorded municipal rights in conformity with their earlier status. Kolozsvár was a good example of the rapid progress that was possible: by 1867 this "capital of Transylvania" had caught up with Brassó, hitherto the largest city in that region. During the next four decades, it far outdistanced its rivals with a further 122 per cent population increase. Although, by and large, the town still retained its earlier appearance, the development of its infrastructure and public utilities, set it on an unmistakable course of metropolitan progress.

The Ethnic and Denominational Composition of the Population

As far as churches and denominations were concerned, Transylvania continued to be a very mixed region — more so than any other part of Europe. Capitalist transformation did not fundamentally alter this situation: no less than before, church and religion were factors which decisively shaped cultural and political attitudes, and, even more, the reproductive behaviour of millions of people.

The Greek Orthodox church could claim the most followers. The Greek Catholics came second, numbering nearly as many believers, primarily among the ethnic Romanians of northern Transylvania. The former four "received religions" — the Roman Catholic, the Reformed (i.e. Calvinist), the Evangelical (i.e. Lutheran), and the Unitarian churches provided spiritual leadership for the Hungarian and Saxon populations. The Saxons were predominantly Lutherans and the Székelys partly Catholics and partly Calvinists. The majority of the Hungarian community as a whole (including the Székelys) was Calvinist throughout the period. The members of the tiny Unitarian church were also Hungarians. According to the 1850 statistics, there were only a few thousand practising Jews. The Jewish community was more substantial in the adjacent Hungarian towns of Arad, Temesvár and Nagyvárad than in Transylvania proper: in 1869, they made up 11.34 per cent of Arad's population and 22.43 per cent of Nagyvárad's. In Transylvania the number of Jews approached that of the Unitarians by 1910.

Denominationally, the towns were often isolated from the surrounding countryside, a fact that becomes clear if we compare the proportional weight of the various denominations within the overall population with their respective weights in the urban population. The Roman Catholic church claimed 13.3 per cent of the whole population of Transylvania, but 25.9 per cent of the townspeople. The respective overall population/town population percentages were 14.7/23.4 per cent for the Calvinists, 9.0/16.1 for the Lutherans, 2.6/2.4 for the Unitarians, and 2.1/6.3 for the Jews. In sharp contrast, 30.3 per cent of the overall population and only 15 per cent of all urban dwellers belonged to the Greek Orthodox church. The discrepancy was greater still for the Greek Catholics who made up 28.0 per cent of the overall population but only 11.6 per cent of the town dwellers.

Population growth varied somewhat according to denomination. As early as the years 1851–1857, the net increase among the Lutherans (who were mostly Saxons) had fallen to 1.2 per thousand per annum. The rate of annual increase was 6.6 per thousand among the Unitarians, 7.1 per thousand among the Calvinists, 9.1 per thousand among the Roman Catholics, 6.8 per thousand among the Orthodox and 5.7 per thousand among the Greek Catholics. Subsequently these trends did not fundamentally change. Throughout the period, the Roman Catholics and the Calvinists showed the greatest net increase — surpassed only by that of the small Jewish community — and the Greek Orthodox church showed the lowest. Only the fertility index of the German peasantry of the Banat — which was the least prolific of all — fell short of this.

Inter-denominational barriers were substantial though by no means impenetrable. Towards the end of the century, an annual average of 2,000–3,000 mixed marriages took place, which amounted to more than 10 per cent of all marriages registered. Certainly, these inter-denominational marriages tended to be within the same ethnic group, which explains why mixed marriages between Calvinists and Roman Catholics were so common. The assimilation of the growing number of Jews did not necessarily entail their conversion to Christianity. With very few exceptions, the Jews became increasingly magyarized: 44.73 per cent in the 1880 Census and 64 per cent in the 1900 Census declared themselves to be Hungarians.

Table 4. The population of Transylvania according to religions

Religion	Number				per cent			
	1850*	1880	1900	1910	1850*	1880	1900	1910
Roman Catholic	219,536	263,816	331,199	375,325	11.37 / 10.6	12.7	13.3	14.0
Greek Catholic	664,154	575,866	691,896	749,404	29.20 / 32.2	27.5	28.0	28.0
Greek Orthodox	621,852	662,936	748,928	792,864	32.26 / 30.2	31.8	30.3	29.6
Lutheran	196,356	199,551	222,346	229,028	10.53 / 9.5	9.6	9.0	8.6
Calvinist	298,136	296,395	364,704	399,312	13.56 / 14.5	14.2	14.7	14.9
Unitarian	45,112	55,068	64,494	67,749	2.42 / 2.2	2.6	2.6	2.5
Israelite	15,606	29,993	53,065	64,074	0.63 / 0.8	1.4	2.1	2.4
Others	893	423	366	611	0.05 / 0.04	0.2	0.0	0.0

* First line of data: together with the Partium; second line of data: territory after 1876 (legal population)

Source: Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, New Series, Vol. 9 (1902); Vol. 19 (1911); Hungarian Statistical Bulletin, New Series, Vol. 5 (1907). OL F 551.

More than six decades of socio-economic transformation brought no major changes in the relative proportions of the ethnic groups in Transylvania. The 1850 Census gave a figure of 26 per cent for the proportion of Hungarians in Transylvania's population, a figure subsequently corrected to 28.2. This latter estimate, though closer to the mark, can only be accepted as the lowest possible figure. Prudently, the first Hungarian census after the Compromise of 1867 carried out in 1869, did not inquire into the nationality of those questioned. As a result we cannot but rely on the contemporary statistician Károly Keleti's calculations which showed an ethnic distribution of 31 per cent Hungarians, 58 per cent Romanians and 11 per cent Germans. From 1880 on, in the decennial censuses, citizens were regularly asked their mother tongue, though not their nationality. Arguably, these statistics may have been one-sided or manipulated. However, it is known that the Statisztikai Hivatal (Statistical Office) genuinely aimed at accuracy and, in the 1900 and 1910 censuses especially, it made strenuous efforts to exclude any distortion of the statistical data in favour of the Hungarian element.

Throughout the period under review, the size of every ethnic group increased steadily, with the partial exception, perhaps, of the Saxons, whose population began to stagnate well before the First World War. In Transylvania — just as in the Habsburg Empire as a whole — it was the Hungarian community whose proportion increased most rapidly. The Hungarians increased their numbers by 287,740, or 45.63 per cent, which meant that by 1910 they made up more than 34 per cent of the total population of Transylvania proper. One of the reasons for this runaway growth was the higher rate of natural increase among the Hungarians. As already seen, the regions of lower fertility were those regions predominantly inhabited by Romanians or Saxons. The relatively low rate of increase among the followers of the Greek Orthodox church was also a confirmation of the Romanians' demographic position. It was only on the eve of the First World War that a counterbalancing trend began. The natural population increase of all ethnic Romanians living in the Kingdom of Hungary was 5.8 per cent between 1896 and 1900, and 10 per cent between 1909 and 1912. Nor were the nationalities hit by emigration equally: many more Romanians than Hungarians emigrated. According to official data, 130,000 ethnic Romanians left Transylvania between 1899 and 1913. On the eve of the First World War, the Romanian nationality came very close to taking the lead over the Slovaks and ethnic Germans their proportionate share in emigration from Hungary as a whole.

Assimilation, too, albeit to a moderate extent, added to the numbers of the Hungarian population. In Transylvania proper, as everywhere else in the Kingdom of Hungary, the Jews were rapidly magyarizing. This course was also followed by the Armenian community as well as by the sprinkling of Czechs, Poles and Italians, a few thousand in all, who were drawn by the industrial development to this easternmost corner of the monarchy.

This was the key day of the evolution of nationalism, when ethnic assimilation would turn from a simple demographic or social phenomenon into a burning political issue. The fact that Transylvania looked like a patchwork quilt of different ethnic groups was an added reason for each nationality to foster its ethnicity and seek to increase its numbers. With hindsight,

Table 5. The population of Transylvania accordidng to native languages

Population	1850* population (persons)		1880 civilian population (persons)	1900 total population (persons)	1910 total population (persons)	1850* per cent		1880 per cent	1900 per cent	1910 per cent
Hungarian	585,342	488,927	630,477	806,406	909,003	28.23	26.11	30.25	32.82	34.20
Saxon	219,374	192,204	211,748	229,889	231,403	10.58	10.27	10.16	9.36	8.71
Romanian	1,202,050	1,091,208	1,184,883	1,389,303	1,464,211	57.97	58.28	56.85	56.55	55.08
Slovak			1,092	2,209	2,341			0.05	0.09	0.09
Armenian	7,879	7,372	3,450			0.38	0.39	0.17		
Jewish/Jiddish	6,220	11,760				0.30	0.63			
Gipsy	52,665	77,201	48,064			2.54	4.12	2.31		
Others	207	3,765	4,334	29,031	51,201	0.01	0.20	0.21	1.18	1.93
Total	2,073,737	1,872,437	2,084,048	2,456,838	2,658,159	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

* First line of data: together with the Partium (numbers corrected by Czoernig); second line of data: territory after 1876, the origmal data of the census.

Source: *Hungarian Statistical Bulletin,* New Series, Vol. 64 (1920). OL F 551.

from a distance of one hundred years, it can reasonably be concluded that no assimilation to speak of, took place among the Romanians and the Saxons. Even in the Székelyföld, the Romanian element was growing in absolute numbers, although here part of the Romanian increase was inevitably lost to magyarization. Also, a certain degree of ethnic Romanian expansion was already discernible elsewhere: by the early 1900, the Romanians had became an absolute majority in the Küküllő region and their proportion was rapidly increasing in several counties. Most of the Romanians lived in massive ethnic blocs; their religious affiliation, their culture and social structure were quite different from those of the Saxons and the Hungarians. These constituted reasonably effective barriers to assimilation.

With capitalist progress centering on the towns and given the strong Hungarian character and overwhelmingly Hungarian population of most towns, the towns were held commonly by contemporaries to be the "melting pots of magyarization". Over 90 per cent of the inhabitants in Kolozsvár, a big city, as well as of Felvinc, a small town, spoke Hungarian, as did over 80 per cent of the population of Dés, Torda and Szászrégen. Within a decade (1880–1990) the proportion of Hungarians had increased from 37.5 to 46.9 per cent in Déva and from 35.3 to 42.6 per cent in Gyulafehérvár. Yet there were clear limits to the assimilating capacity of the towns. During the same years, for example, the percentage of Hungarians in the town of Nagyenyed decreased from 77.5 to 71. The rural masses, by far the majority of the population, were hardly, if at all, affected by assimilation. The low level of state authority and intervention was itself a guarantee that the massive ethnic blocs would be left intact. Hungarian historians now put at a maximum of 100,000 the net loss of the ethnic Romanian community due to assimilation in the whole Kingdom of Hungary between 1850 and 1910.

The multi-ethnic character of historic Transylvania was a reality to be felt in all walks of life, a fact clearly reflected in the low level of the knowledge of Hungarian throughout the fifty years of dualism. In 1880, there were 109,190 non-Hungarians (7.57 per cent of the non-Hungarian population) who declared that they knew Hungarian; in 1910, the figure was again only 266,863 (15.2 per cent of the non-Hungarian total). These statistics tell of an era never to return: the happy days of yore, when millions of people could go about their daily business without ever bothering to learn the official language of the state.

2. Economy

The Transition to Capitalism

The revolution of 1848 forms the great watershed in nineteenth-century Hungarian history; the subsequent period saw the disintegration of the feudal economic system, its gradual replacement by a capitalist economy and the emergence of the basic class structure of the new socio-economic forma-

tion. For decades to come, though, the new formation presented itself as a structured unity of divergent modes of production, with the new, capitalist model gradually gaining the upper hand. Within fifty years, the whole of Hungary became an integral part of the capitalist world economy.

Transylvania was, at the outset, one of the monarchy's most backward regions: the marketing of agricultural products was sporadic before 1848, the general level of culture, industrial development and urbanization was markedly lower than in the territories lying to the west of it. Until as late as 1868, the three main railway lines stretching from the west had their termini outside Transylvania proper: in Nagyvárad, Arad and Temesvár.

The pioneers of the new credit financing were the savings banks in the Saxon towns of Nagyszeben and Brassó. Yet it was not until 1854 that the National Bank of Austria began discounting bills in Brassó. In 1857, Vienna's *Creditanstalt* opened a branch in that town, and another credit institution, of a modest size, was founded in Kolozsvár in 1865. Financial life received a new stimulus in the wake of the Compromise, and especially at the end of the century. In 1873 there were twenty credit banks and savings banks in Transylvania, in 1894 eighty-five, in 1909 two hundred and twenty-three. The number of credit associations was by then 497, with around 110,000 members. The total amount of mortgages secured against landed property was well over 100 million crowns. The rate of increase in the value of loans for municipal and community services and public utility projects was higher than the Hungarian national average.

In agriculture the rotation system still prevailed. Branches of intensive cultivation, such as cereal crop and vegetable growing, fruit production, viticulture, and haymaking accounted for 43.7 per cent of total agricultural production in 1869, little more than in Croatia. Wage-labourers were greatly outnumbered by peasant farmers cultivating their own lands. As late as 1872, only 38 steam engines were employed in agriculture in the whole of Transylvania, about half the number used in a single Transdanubian county.

In the industrial sector, Transylvania seems to have made up lost ground, partly at least, between 1857–1869 and seems to have approached the average all-Hungarian level. The proportion of independent tradesmen and industrial employees in the population grew at a faster rate than in the rest of the Kingdom of Hungary. In 1867, 3.7 per cent of Transylvania's population belonged to these categories. Even before the union with Hungary, though, mechanical power was employed in the iron and metal industries, in the milling industry and in distilling. This, however, amounted to about one-tenth of the mechanical power used in other regions, for instance, in Transdanubia.

Throughout the period there existed an imbalance between the labour supply and the increasing demands of the manufacturing industry. The demand for labour outstripped the supply of both skilled and semi-skilled industrial workers. The day labourer, on the other hand, often had a hard time finding employment.

In education, which was the key factor in creating a modern labour force, progress was retarded. Even among males, the literacy rate was as low as

21.7 per cent in 1869, and 56.7 per cent of those over 6 years of age were totally illiterate. Fifty-nine out of every 100 children of school age never actually went to school and it was not until the turn of the century that this figure fell to 30 per cent.

The modernization of agriculture followed the emancipation of the serfs and the abolition of feudal duties only after a long delay. The big estates — although evidently destined to be the agents of modernization — preserved their non-profit oriented, non-entrepreneurial qualities, while cumulative handicaps, for example, widespread illiteracy, clinging to obsolete methods, general backwardness and, above all, the diminutive size of their plots, prevented the peasant farmers from turning their holdings into viable commercial concerns. Peasant farmers who were lucky enough to accumulate a substantial amount of money would therefore purchase more land, rather than machinery. The great majority of artisans remained untouched by the more modern business spirit and earned their living in the old way, by meeting the traditional demands of their traditional clients.

During the early 1850s the state, which had played so crucial a role in the initial phase of industrialization, soon gave up its own experiments in introducing new technology, and even sold off some of the state plants. It was only later, under the dualist system, that state participation re-emerged and the government played a greater part in the task of technological modernization. Foreign capital, too, which was present from the 1880s and began experimenting in introducing new technologies, had an important role. Nevertheless, right up to the end of the century factories and mining areas were places apart, pockets of industry in a rural world which still invariably adhered to traditional values and antiquated social relations. True, even in the 1850s, the highly proficient small-scale industry of the Saxon towns could boast several mechanized workshops, modern by the standards of the day. But, more often than not, foreign engineers and mechanics from distant lands were required for starting a new iron foundry or sinking a new pit, as well as for the operation and reconstruction of these — even though some of these industrial sites had a centuries-long history.

Following the Compromise and the union with Hungary, Transylvania shared in the benefits which accrued from Hungary's relatively more advanced level of development as compared to the other economies of east-central Europe. More foreign capital was injected into the economy to finance the establishment of a banking system, the construction of the railways, and the establishment or modernization of industries. Domestic Hungarian capital, to be sure, was present from the very start (as was Transylvanian capital, although on a smaller scale). In the new century, particularly after 1910, Transylvanian capital accumulation came to play a more substantial part in restructuring the economy, primarily through industrialization.

For the Transylvanian region, the way out of economic backwardness inevitably required a new type of integration into the national market. The creation of an up-to-date communications system was essential both to agricultural reorganization and to the establishment of a manufacturing industry.

The Establishment of a Communication Network

The trying task of reconstructing the roads of mountainous Transylvania, a region strewn with every sort of natural obstacle, had begun back in the 1850s. The strategic interests of the Habsburg Empire decided which major roads would be repaired and developed into imperial highways or *Reichstrassen*, and which direction these roads would take — roads which, according to contemporary accounts, had theretofore hardly been worthy of the name. By 1860, Transylvania had 230 miles of truly improved roads.

The second phase of road improvement began in 1890. Before the century ended, there were 753 kilometres of paved state road on stone foundations in Transylvania and 1,250 kilometres of secondary state road. The 4,204 kilometre-long network of municipal roads had also been greatly improved by this time. It was the maintenance of rural parish roads, accomplished through local effort, that lagged behind most: around 1900, half of these roads, a network 7,126 kilometres long was still unimproved.

The telegraph was introduced in Transylvania in 1853. Within a few years, the wires stretched over large areas, greatly improving business possibilities and private communication alike. In the year 1914, 558 telegraph stations were in operation. In the 1880s the first telephone lines were installed. By the early 1890s, a so-called municipal telephone network had been established in several counties, dense enough to allow for a private telephone service. Town telephone exchanges were built in Kolozsvár, Brassó, Nagyszeben and Marosvásárhely, and what is more, from 1910 onwards reconstruction work began on these. In 1914, 6,525 telephone "stations" were functioning in Transylvania, which, measured in units per given area, even puts the province above the national average.

Railway construction within the territory of Transylvania began in earnest after the 1867 Compromise.

To be more precise, surveying work for the section of line between Nagyvárad and Kolozsvár had begun as early as 1848. However, protracted and bitter wrangling had then ensued between rival interest groups as to which of the two railways projected should be given priority: an Arad–Gyulafehérvár–Nagyszeben line or a Nagyvárad–Kolozsvár–Brassó line — a crucial issue indeed, as this would determine Transylvania's main transport artery, very probably for good. Representatives of the Hungarian landed gentry and spokesmen for the citizens of Brassó — which was then by far the most developed town in the province — took a joint stand for the latter project, while the citizens of Nagyszeben — who were of less moment in the financial world but more influential politically as the Gubernium was located in their town, understandably favoured the former, Arad–Gyulafehérvár–Nagyszeben, scheme.

Then, in 1867, the *Első Erdélyi Vasút* (First Transylvania Railway) with the backing of the Rothschilds, began construction work on the Arad–Gyulafehérvár section, thus ending the debate. This was completed by December 1868 and inaugurated as a Christmas present to the two towns. The *Keleti Vasút Társaság* (Eastern Railway Company) began work on the Kolozsvár railway line in 1868, with the involvement of Britain's Waring Brothers and

the Anglo-Austrian Bank. The Nagyvárad–Kolozsvár section was opened in 1870; the builders then proceeded to construct a line which cut across Transylvania. By 1871 the railway reached Marosvásárhely and in the summer of 1873 the first train arrived in Brassó, crowning the achievement. It was this railway, 633 kilometres long when fully built and the product of the labour of well over 20,000 workers — that finally ended Transylvania's isolation. It was this line which linked the major towns, one after another, to the economy of the Dual Monarchy and which provided the grain of the Mezőség and the salt of Torda, Parajd and Marosújvár with better access to the national market of the monarchy. At Tövis junction, the Eastern Railway linked up with the First Transylvanian, the railway company which conveyed the coal of the Zsil Valley and the iron ore of Hunyad to customers in other parts of the monarchy.

In 1876 the Eastern Railway passed into state ownership and in 1884, the First Transylvanian Railway was also nationalized. Henceforth the MÁV, or *Magyar Államvasutak* (Hungarian State Railways), controlled all the main railway lines of Transylvania. In 1879, two rail links with Romania were established, followed by a third in 1895.

The construction of this railway system was an important and near-heroic chapter in the story of Transylvania's modernization. Overcoming the challenges of an unspeakably difficult terrain which required many bridges and viaducts to be built and long tunnels to be driven, with the workers frequently exposed to the hazards of landslides, gorges and water, was a remarkable achievement of civil engineering. The transport system thus created left its stamp on Transylvania's modernizing economy and was greatly to determine its future. At the outbreak of the First World War the 2,384 kilometres of Transylvania's railways comprised 11 per cent of Hungary's total railway network, with 6.7 kilometres of railway per 100 square kilometres and 1.02 kilometres for every thousand inhabitants. Although this fell short of the national Hungarian average density, it was well above general eastern European standards.

The Economic Policy of the State

Throughout this period of more than half a century, the liberal school held sway in the field of economics. The principles of *laissez faire* and free trade were universally held to be the levers of progress for Hungary, and consequently for Transylvania also, once the two were bound by a unity of interests. According to these tenets, direct state intervention was unwarranted; instead the best the state could do to help the capitalist economy was to clear internal and external obstacles out of the way of business and then leave it alone.

However, theory was frequently at variance with political practice. In 1850, under absolutist rule, a decree abolished the century-old customs barrier between Hungary and the Austrian half of the empire. However, the central protective tariff regulations, promulgated in 1854, distinctly favoured

WINE-DISTRICT OF SZILÁGYSÁG

WINE-DISTRICT OF ÉRMELLÉK

WINE-DISTRICT OF ARAD-HEGYALJA

Nyíregyháza
Mátészalka
Szatmárnémeti
Nagykároly
Debrecen
Karcag
Szolnok
Törökszentmiklós
Mezőtúr
Szarvas
Nagyvárad
Szilágysomlyó
Zilah
Feketeerdő
Sólyomkőpestes
Nagyszalonta
Szentes
Békéscsaba
Gyula
Orosháza
Belényes
Egeres
Gyalu
Hidegszamos
Vaskoh
Hódmezővásárhely
Szeged
Makó
Mezőhegyes
Nagyszentmiklós
Nagybánya
Körösbánya
Brád
Ruda
Zalatna
Gyalár
Zenta
Nagyág
Nagykikinda
Zsombolya
Temesvár
Déva
Szászváros
Kudzsír
Vajdahunyad
Pusztakalán
Lugos
Nagybecskerek
Boksánbánya
Karánsebes
Resicabánya
Ünkány
Lápos
Vérsec
Stájerlak-Anina
Pancsova
Fehértemplom
Herkulesfürdő
Zimony
Orsova

0 10 20 30 40 50 km

MAP 22.

THE ECONOMY EAST OF THE TISZA RIVER AT THE TURN OF THE 20th CENTURY

Legend

Agriculture

Sandy soil, with intensive vegetable and fruit cultivation

Sodic soil with external utilization

Corn-growing area in the Great Plain

Hills and the Transylvanian Basin mainly with agriculture

Intensive vegetable cultivation in the hills

Closed small basin at a higher altitude, river valley with mixed sylviculture and agriculture

Mountainous region with sylviculture and high altitude pasturing

WINE-DISTRICT OF KIS-KÜKÜLLŐ   Wine-district of importance

Mining and industry

Coal

Iron ore

Salt

Precious and non-ferrous metal ore

Mineral and medicinal water

Natural gas

● Merchandized mill

■ Distillery, brewery

Manufacture of champagne and brandy

Sugar mill

Other food producing factory

Cotton mill

Hemp and linen industry

Wool industry

● Leather and shoe industry

Glass factory

P Paper mill

▲ Oil refinery

Iron industry

Chemical industry

Engineering industry

F Wood-mill

Power stations producing for public use as well

Thermal station   Hydroelectric station

Medium (500—1000kW)

Larger (above 1000kW)

Main line	Local railway	Narrow gauge railway	Railways
			Built up to 1867
			Built between 1867 and 1885
			Built between 1886 and 1899
			Built between 1900 and 1918
		Ⓥ	Urban tram

Akmasztatina
Máramarossziget
Akasztifata
Kapnikbánya
Oradna
Szentbenedek
Szamosujvár
WINE-DISTRICT OF
MEZŐSÉG
Kissármás
Szászrégen
Gyergyószentmiklós
Balánbánya
Szováta
Marosvásárhely
Parajd
Korond
arosujvár
Kis-Küküllő
WINE-DISTRICT OF
KIS-KÜKÜLLŐ
Nagy-Küküllő
Székelyudvarhely
Lővéte
Medgyes
Segesvár
Tusnád
NE-DISTRICT OF
Szentágota
Kőpec
Málnás
Vizakna
Nagyszeben
NAGY-KÜKÜLLŐ
Olt
Sepsiszentgyörgy
Kovászna
Nagyvárad
Felek
Cód
Nagytalmács
Keresztényfalva
Brassó
Zernest

the interests of Austrian and Bohemian manufacturers and were — in the opinion of contemporary economists — unfavourable from the point of view of Hungarian industry and even Hungarian agriculture. But a more serious problem lay elsewhere: in unstable government as well as in the fact that native Austrian capital was insufficient to satisfy the credit demands of the "eastern provinces", while the absolutist regime could not provide the political guarantees foreign creditors required as a precondition of any major capital investment.

Economic policy underwent a radical change in the wake of the Compromise of 1867. The political consolidation of the monarchy opened up new economic vistas for the Hungarian government which now took office after eighteen years of absolutism. The new government seized the opportunities open to it, embarking on an economic policy that primarily had specific Hungarian national interest in view. New legislation instituted constitutional liberalism, thereby providing foreign investors with the long-awaited guarantees. Their new confidence now led them to move capital into the country at an unprecedented rate. The government also contributed to the material development of the country to no small extent. The construction of part of the railway system was government-financed. The government fostered the establishment of modern credit facilities and vocational training institutions, and itself often engaged in entrepreneurial activity. The legislature, meanwhile, regulated business in detail, providing the legal framework for a modernizing economy.

Hungary and Transylvania united economically under absolutism, and following the Compromise politically, were now in a better position to advance their interests against those of the more industrialized western half of the monarchy. The very fact that Austria and Hungary, each of which had a different economic structure, constituted a single customs union gave rise to many controversies both between the Austrian and the Hungarian leading establishments and concerning the Dual Monarchy's foreign trade relations. Conducting a mutually agreed commercial and customs policy inevitably involved compromises. All of this had a direct bearing on Transylvania, as was amply illustrated by the case of commercial relations with Romania.

The Romanian principalities had, for long, been a good market for the manufactured goods of the Habsburg Empire as well as for Transylvanian handicrafts. In return, they exported various commodities to Transylvania, mainly foodstuffs and other agricultural products needed by southern Transylvanian craftsmen. From the 1850s on, however, these Transylvanian craftsmen faced formidable competition at home from Austrian and Bohemian manufactured goods, and a still more formidable competition abroad from British and French products that were being dumped on the market by way of cheap water transport. To overcome the crisis, the Transylvanian business community attempted to promote exports and to increase their volume by whatever means possible. Before long, its members were clamouring for state intervention to ensure their privileged position in the principalities or to recover at least some of the ground they had lost in that

market. Urged by their entreaties, the minister of commerce tried to conclude a trade agreement with Romania in 1869.

In 1875, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy did indeed arrive at a free trade agreement with Romania — a country still formally part of the Ottoman Empire. This effectively meant that, first among the great powers, the monarchy recognized Romania's independent sovereign status in advance. Such a valuable diplomatic gesture had its price — in the form of commercial concessions. Although the export of grain from Romania to Austria-Hungary was exempt from duty, this was not the case for livestock exports. The tariff on the latter was contingent upon the tariff that Germany was to impose on livestock imports from Austria-Hungary. Romania, moreover, had to shelve some of its more ambitious plans to protect its domestic industry and open its markets to manufactured goods from Austria-Hungary.

In the space of five years, the monarchy trebled its exports to Romania. In the meantime, expectations of a yet more dynamic increase in Romanian imports to the monarchy were disappointed, as Germany soon closed its borders to Austro-Hungarian livestock on the pretext of health regulations. Austria was then obliged to follow suit and, from 1877, to impose restrictions on imports from Romania (and Russia), using the same pretext. After 1882, small numbers of sheep and pigs were occasionally admitted here and there, but the legal importation of cattle stopped altogether. Subsequently when the commercial treaty expired, Bucharest withdrew the preferences on imports from Austria-Hungary, to which the latter retaliated by imposing a 30 per cent punitive tariff on all imports from Romania.

The ensuing tariff war, which lasted from 1886 to 1893, reduced Romanian imports to a minimum. In the final analysis, however, this policy cost the monarchy equally dearly: exports to Romania dwindled, and Austria-Hungary's towering presence in that market was gone for good. Transylvanian small-scale manufacturers, with their simple products (timber, wooden articles, certain kinds of textiles, earthenware and glassware) suited for the most part to the peasant customer, were to suffer most from this: "All along we knew it was only a matter of time before our products would be squeezed out of the market; even so, we found ourselves in that predicament sooner than we had expected, because of the wrecking of the Romanian trade agreement"[1] wrote the Kézdivásárhely tradesmen's association.

At the 1886 conference of the *Erdélyi Kereskedelmi Egylet* (Transylvanian Commercial Association), a joint Saxon and Hungarian scheme was drawn up to find a way out of the recession. The scheme was comprehensive, and called for a wide range of remedies, from export bounties and government orders for the domestic industry to the organization of co-operative societies and railway development. These suggestions were listened to by the government, which rallied round to help. State contracts were given to manufacturers and tradesmen in the eastern border areas. New markets were discovered inside the monarchy, for example in the Bukovina, and outside

1. Petition of 15 June, 1886. *OL* Földmüvelés-, Ipar- és Kereskedelmügyi Minisztérium iratai. (National Archives. Documents of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade.) 1886, Vol. 38. 32255.

it, for instance in Bulgaria, to compensate for the fall of sales in established ones. These measures were coupled with tariff preferences and tax relief.

The effects of the customs war accelerated the decay of certain traditional industries. Subsequently, though, trade relations were renegotiated and restored by a new commercial treaty in 1893, which enabled Austro-Hungarian manufactures partly to recover the ground they had lost in the Romanian market. Some of the now medium-sized textile workshops in the Saxon towns, which offered quality products, managed to re-enter that market too. Other small-scale Transylvanian industries and handicrafts were not so fortunate.

From the 1880s, domestic industries were heavily supported by the government: first through tax concessions and interest-free loans, then, increasingly, in the form of direct subsidies. After 1907 the government was in a position to spend lavishly on industrial development. Transylvanian businessmen — irrespective of their nationality, Hungarian, Romanian or other — received substantial sums, particularly in the Brassó area.

In spite of its limited means, the government also made an important contribution to the improvement of the state of agriculture. The effects on agriculture of such activities as, on the one hand, the establishment of model farms and breeding centres, the improvement of livestock, the organization and extension of vocational training and, on the other, a macro-level agrarian policy are well known. In order to secure higher profits from the land, the big landowners in the government forced through a series of protective agrarian tariff measures by means of which Hungary (and to a lesser extent, Galicia) obtained a virtual monopoly in the entire agricultural market of the monarchy. Necessarily, by the turn of the century, this policy had come to offset the downward pressure on prices caused by a more competitive international commodity market, and even caused an upward trend: after 1906 this monopoly engineered a rise of about 30 per cent in agricultural prices within the monarchy. It was largely the situation thus created that made profitable farming a possibility in Transylvania, in view of the backwardness and underdevelopment agriculture in the province. For the shrewd Saxons, who had enjoyed a head start, this meant no less than an approximation to the standards of efficiency achieved by Transdanubian agriculture, which was the best in the whole of Hungary. For the more numerous Hungarian and Romanian peasants this protectionism meant security: a modest but adequate living.

Isolated regional actions to alleviate poverty, occasional small grants and tax relief were the government's initial steps in the field of social policy towards the village poor — strictly within the framework of economical liberalism. The first major undertaking came with the economic rehabilitation programme in forty-four villages of the Naszód area, a former military district of ethnic Romanian frontier guards. From 1890 the government took over for proper management more than 200,000 *holds* of communal forest in this region, creating the Forest Directorate of Beszterce for this very purpose. Railways were built in the district; a model dairy farm and model sheep farm set up; and village tax arrears, which had built up over many years, were written off. Forestry management was supervised by elected representatives from the villages. The net income from the forests — some

several hundred thousand crowns annually — was allocated primarily for the villagers' cultural purposes, while about 60,000 *hold*s of forest were for the owners, i.e. the villages, to use as they thought fit. All this contributed much to the revival of the Naszód region, a secluded Romanian micro-world.

At the same time, the government displayed a chronic inability to tackle the Székely question, the most serious problem of the day. An alarmingly large number of Székelys had been reduced to *zsellér* (cotter) status by the emancipation of serfs and the abolition of the military frontier zone. The shrinking of common pastures and forest deprived them of their earnings from grazing animals and from timber-cutting, from which most of the poor among them had previously derived a living, at a time when there was no alternative source of income in sight. Here the negative effects of capitalist transformation were cumulative. Traditional handicrafts were now exposed to irresistible competition from cheap manufactured goods produced on a mass scale — especially after the main railway lines had been built. This was a painful process, full of human tragedies, and in the course of it many a small business was ruined. The trade war with Romania after 1886 was to accelerate the process.

News of the Székelys' large-scale emigration to Romania in their search for work, as well as of never returning "temporary" migrants drew the attention of the Hungarian public to the Székelys' plight. There were repeated attempts on the part of the central authorities to lure more coachmen, agricultural labourers and housemaids from the Székelyföld to the Hungarian heartland. At the end of the century, the Ministry of Commerce launched its Action for Székely Industry, with the aim of rallying support for the cottage and other small-scale industries of the region, and to promote training in industrial skills.

In 1902, the *Székely Kongresszus* (Székely Congress) at Tusnád held jointly by government and opposition, expressly called for state intervention to cure the ills of the region. Accordingly, in the same year a new programme of state assistance was initiated to improve the conditions in the four Székely counties. With the help of the Ministry of Agriculture, hundreds of farmers's associations sprang up, and practical farming courses were organized. Also, from 1905 visits were organized to agricultural schools, to Saxon farms, to vegetable farms around Kecskemét and to state-run stock-improvement centres. Instruction in cottage industry practices, free legal advice, and public library services were to serve the purposes of enlightenment. The most fruitful results came in the raising of stock for breeding and in the improvement of pastures, that is, in enterprises for which local conditions were generally favourable.

Subsequently, in response to the requests coming from several counties, the scope of the "Székely Action" was gradually extended. Although it bore no spectacular results at the time, it did have its significance for long-term development. The programme, could serve as a substitute organizational framework for the assertion of local interests, something that was unable to evolve organically at the level of village society.

Agriculture in Transition

Most of Transylvania was hillside pasture and woodlands, but there was also extensive crop cultivation in the river valleys, and this was to be of great significance in the future structural development of agriculture.

In the course of the three decades after 1848, the old feudal ties between manorial land and peasant land were broken or transformed beyond all recognition. The overhaul of the old system, brought in with the land reform, was not, however, an unmixed blessing. At the outset, this seemed more to add to the existing ills of agriculture than to cure them. "In our present world a purely agricultural nation is like a one-legged man. Our agriculture is ailing, so even the one leg we have is crippled,"[2] wrote a liberal politician in 1865. In the same way, the introduction of a modern tax system after 1850 did nothing to encourage production but much to promote pauperization, since the per capita tax to be paid in the region was higher than in vastly more developed Transdanubia. In the early 1860s the amount paid in the form of both direct and indirect taxes by the "proprietors" on an estimated 13–15 million forint surplus from the land was estimated at 12 million forints. Accordingly, most contemporaries took the view that even the richest and thriftiest of citizens would eventually be ruined by such heavy taxation, and were making worrying calculations as to when Transylvania's taxpayers would finally default.

It was peculiar to the transition period that grain could not, as a rule, be profitably grown on what remained of the landlords' estates, for the costs of production on arable land were now four times as high as they had been before 1848. By comparison, the peasant farm enjoyed — and long retained — an advantage over the estate as a producer for the market, thanks to its existing stock and equipment as well as to the unsparing efforts of the peasant and his family to increase productivity. To cope with the difficulties caused by the shortage of labour and the chronic scarcity of credit, a practice began to take root whereby peasants cultivated the landlords' estates on a crop-sharing basis, and another whereby they used the land in return for labour, or performed labour in return for concessions in grazing or forestry. In the early 1870s, amid more favourable price conditions and with credit becoming more plentiful, mechanization began on the estates, a process that was to continue throughout the period, although with repeated lapses. This would compensate the gentlefolk for the fact that most of the draught animal stock continued to remain in the peasants' hands.

Grains — primarily wheat and maize — were the main crops to be grown on the peasant farms, which accounted for roughly two-thirds of the cultivable land area, using an improved version of the three-field system, but the two-field system was also still employed in the rough terrain of the mountainous areas. In the 1860s, a switch to new technology began to take place on the peasant farms. The iron plough made its appearance in Transylvania — although in 1872 there were still very few to be found — and be-

2. [D. Teleki], *Siebenbürgen und die österreichische Regierung in den letzten vier Jahren 1860–1864.* Leipzig 1865, 141.

came common by the turn of the century. By then, however, many farmers had been compelled by soil erosion in the mountain districts to switch back to their old wooden ploughs. In the Saxon territory, seed drills increasingly came into use, as a growing proportion of land came to be planted with need crops. The drift of agricultural progress was not without its oddities, one being that mechanical harvesting was introduced a decade before the scythe replaced the sickle.

Thus, all over Transylvania, by the turn of the century the agricultural techniques inherited from past centuries were on the way out. Farm equipment had changed considerably, the continued use of certain old implements notwithstanding. A combination of factors, such as the improvement of farm implements, the introduction of western breeds of cattle and, above all, the impact of the market precipitated the quick demise of the crop-fallow cultivation cycle.

The progress brought about in agriculture by the abandonment of the field system in some areas, or by the improvement of the cycle in others, as well as by the enclosure (which was partly achieved in the period under discussion) was of truly historic importance. Whereas back in the 1850s 40 per cent of all arable land in Transylvania was left fallow, the figure had fallen to 20 per cent by 1910. In Brassó county, the amount left fallow even dropped below 5 per cent. In other words, the amount of land cultivated in Transylvania increased from 2,163,067 *holds* in 1857 to 2,741,642 *holds* in 1910.

In the 1840s maize was still the main crop, and was grown on twice the area of land used for producing wheat. Oats were the third most popular crop, followed by rye and then barley. Maize, which provided comparably high yields, was cultivated chiefly by the Romanian peasants (together with vegetables which were gaining prominence as cash crops), while rye was the staple favoured by the Saxons, principally around Brassó. Oats were sown everywhere, for this was the cereal best accustomed to the harsh Transylvanian climate. By the turn of the century, the areas of land sown with maize and wheat respectively were about the same.

In the grain-producing counties the amount of land sown with wheat was comparable to the Hungarian average although most of it was inferior spring-wheat quality and lower yielding. In years of bumper or richer than average harvests, Transylvania was self-sufficient in grain. In ordinary years, however, it depended on imports from Romania and from the Great Hungarian Plain. In the second half of the period under review, grain was imported exclusively from the latter. When maize was imported, this was mostly purchased from Romania.

Some industrial crops such as flax and hemp for various types of cloth had long been of importance to cottage industry. The production of sugar beet began to achieve prominence towards the end of the century, after two big sugar factories had been established. Although this crop was grown on a mere 0.42 per cent of the cultivable area of Transylvania, in Brassó county, where yields were high, it was cultivated quite widely.

Growing urbanization gave rise to intensive vegetable production in the environs of major towns, like the villages of Aranyosszék, which sold their produce in the town of Torda and Hóstát and in the Móc area. The "carrot country" around Marosvásárhely produced parsley, onions and watermel-

ons on the alluvial soil of the Nyárád River Valley. Thanks to a long-standing tradition of skill in their cultivation, certain crops, such as potatoes and cabbages, produced generally greater yields in Transylvania than in the rest of Hungary. Around 1848 viticulture accounted for about 0.5 per cent of Transylvania's total cultivated area, although included in this were renowned wine-growing regions with centuries-old traditions, for example, the region along the Küküllő rivers and the vicinities of Nagyenyed and Gyulafehérvár. Here, too, however, the area given over to vineyards began to diminish from the early 1880s onwards. In 1889 phylloxera ravaged 10,000 *hold*s out of an already reduced area of 38,000 *hold*s. In subsequent years, a whole series of wine-producing districts all over the country were affected by the disease. The government fostered recovery by distributing cheap new vines and copper sulphate to the growers, and by giving tax relief.

Plum trees were to be found everywhere in Transylvania, and plums were the most common fruit in the province, representing two-thirds of all the fruit grown. It was in the last three decades of the nineteenth century that fruit production began to be established on a larger scale; the statistics put the number of fruit trees at eleven million at the end of the century. At this time conditions for the marketing of fruits improved greatly and Transylvanian apples even found their way to the Stuttgart cider-apple market, where Hungarian apples made up 30 per cent of all sales.

Transylvania was endowed with excellent natural conditions for forestry. More than half of the utilizable land was forested — there were 3.5 million *hold*s of woodlands. After the land reform of 1848, the former seignorial landlords lost a larger proportion of their arable land than they did forest. Even so, approximately one-half of the forest land remained in the hands of the peasantry as common or communal property, yielding a substantial income to the villages. We cannot as yet ascertain the position of this property (1.2 million *hold*s of villages-owned forests, with other common forests of unknown extent) in the structure of peasant farming. Nevertheless, some idea of its significance is given by the fact that at the turn of the century 210,000 cattle and no fewer than 300,000 sheep grazed in these forests.

In the state-owned forests, the primitive practice of simple forest clearance had for some time been replaced by more systematic woodland management. The forest legislation of 1858 — and especially of 1879 and 1898 — facilitated the government's attempts to assume responsibility for forestry management, which is a long-term business, requiring as much patience and care as expertise. After the turn of the century, the state also managed the forests of the counties and the villages.

Not all of the change was the government's doing. Well-capitalized companies established large-scale timber production in the wooded districts. The timber trade had become an enormous business. It was no wonder that often the rural population of entire regions became dependent on such firms for their livelihood, as was the case in the Székelyföld where half of the population lived from the forests in one way or another. For all the grab and sway of these mammoth companies, however, a substantial proportion of the common forests were retained by the locals, and many of the locally-operated sawmills also remained in business throughout the period. It was largely on the basis of these that a thriving rural wood-working industry

grew up, an industry which produced a variety of wooden articles, ranging from timber beams through stringle roof tiles and barrels to wooden spoons — products for which Transylvania was famous throughout the monarchy.

Transylvania was also ideally suited for animal husbandry. The physical features and natural endowments of the country carried in themselves the promise of an eastern version of Switzerland. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the common pastures amounted to about 780,000 *hold*s or 56 per cent of the total grazing area.

Sheep farming was a central activity, and for centuries had been the mainstay of a large section of the population. Indeed, animal husbandry was the activity traditionally assigned to the province in the Habsburg Monarchy's division of labour. This was particularly true of the Romanians in southern Transylvania. As mentioned earlier, traditional Romanian sheep farming sustained the thriving village communities of Szelistye and Resinár in Szeben county, places where development was visible, and which also constituted a vast reservoir on which the Romanian intelligentsia could draw.

The archaic traditional practice of transhumance was now gradually disappearing with the advent of the new age. Before 1848, well over a million sheep, together with a smaller number of cattle and horses, were driven every year through the Carpathian passes to the Lower Danube, to Wallachia and the Dobrudja for the winter season. Yet, as early as the 1850s, these huge flocks of sheep had dwindled to less than half their former size. The numbers of the drovers dwindled also, although not so quickly — to 10,000 by 1879, down from about the 20,000–25,000 of thirty years before. Many left Transylvania for good, choosing to settle in the Dobrudja. Although the days of transhumance seemed numbered, a steady demand for wool as well as for mutton and milk products was to ensure the survival of this archaic way of stock keeping. For a long time it continued to exist side by side with market production, but as a subsidiary activity.

In this respect the characteristic trend in Transylvania did not quite conform to that in Hungary generally, which showed a steady decrease in the sheep stock from around 1860 onwards. In Transylvania the number of sheep also declined for a while, yet this was followed by a dramatic increase after the turn of the century. Over 90 per cent of the sheep were kept by small holders and dwarfholders.

The old-style practice of all-year grazing cattle in the open air was losing ground — literally so, since with the decline of the traditional agricultural system the fallow was shrinking and part of the common pasture land was being ploughed up. The old system of agriculture was slower to break down in Transylvania than in central or western Hungary, but the improvement of the cattle stock — through the introduction of foreign breeds — occurred at an equally unhurried pace.

By the middle of the 1850s the price of cattle had gone up considerably, and (disregarding a brief period of decline in the 1880s) continued to rise moderately throughout the period. After the first railway connections to Transylvania had been established, a large number of cattle and pigs were sent to Pest. However, as early as 1868, the cattle population was decreasing perceptibly. The only practicable way of arresting this process was the introduction of new stock. This was the course of action embarked upon by

79. Iron bridge in Nagyszeben cast by
the Füle foundry in 1859

80. Manhole cover from the Rieger
factory, around 1900

83. Railway embankment at Sztána from the southwest (Photograph by Ferenc Veress, 1868)

84. Railway line near Bánffyhunyad at the beginning of the 1870s (Photograph by Ferenc Veress)

81. The First Transylvanian Railway's bridge across the Maros River, 1870

82. Railway station of Pisk, 1870

85. Lead-smelting works at Ó-Radna with the characteristic smoke (Photograph by Ferenc Veress, 1870s)

87. The Austro-Hungarian Railway Company's Siemens-Martin steel works at Resica at the beginning of the century

◀ 86. Coking works at Lupény at the beginning of the century

88. Bird's eye view of the Péterfalva paper mill

89. A medium-sized industrial concern: interior of the Lántzky foundry at Szentkeresztbánya at the beginning of the century

90. Cast iron dish from Resica, middle of the nineteenth century

91. The Vajdahunyad State Ironworks, 1896

92. Salt cutters at Torda in 1894

the Saxon agricultural association, with government assistance, in the 1870s. The breeds imported from Austria and Switzerland were superior in many respects to the indigenous varieties. They grew faster and were heavier than the latter, and the dairy cows yielded more milk — some 1,000 litres more per animal per annum — than the native Transylvanian breeds. And yet the rate of naturalization of the new breeds in Transylvania lagged considerably behind the Hungarian average. The principal reason for this was that the Transylvanians specialized in breeding draught oxen, and the native Transylvanian stock produced draught animals which were far superior to the western breeds and which were also ten times more resistant to disease. Subsequently the Ministry of Agriculture designated the Székelyföld, together with Nagy-Küküllő and Alsó-Fehér counties, as an area for the preservation of the native Transylvanian cattle stock, and also introduced several measures to provide for the improvement of this stock.

Under the joint influence of the administrative measures, market research, and positive traditions, cattle breeding in Transylvania underwent a course of thorough modernization, which, at the same time, was not detrimental to the diversity of the stock. The buffalo also continued in use and even became more popular. At the end of the period under discussion, the Transylvanian region as a whole was one of lower livestock density. But the size of the stock kept on the peasant farms and pastures was larger in Transylvania than the Hungarian average. In Fogaras county the number of animals per thousand inhabitants was 678.2; one of the highest ratios in Europe.

The size of the horse stock was markedly less subject to market conditions and business considerations than was the case with other kinds of livestock as horses were bred on the large- and medium-sized estates also for reason of prestige. Nor did the volume of the contracts from the army, the biggest purchaser of horses, follow the fluctuations of the market. Furthermore, with the coming of the railway age, traffic on the roads servicing the railways became heavier, which was even to increase the demand for horse-drawn carriages. All this created favourable circumstances for the steady increase of the horse stock, an increase which came to a halt only when the century ended. Two major state enterprises, the Fogaras stud farm (founded after the Compromise) which specialized in breeding Lippizaners, and the Kolozstorda stud farm, set up to foster the Transylvanian breed, played a part in improving the horse stock.

The regional distribution of the animal stock shows certain distinctive characteristics. The greatest part of the stock of cattle, horses, and pigs belonged to the Saxons. Sheep rearing was a virtual Romanian monopoly. The Romanian-inhabited areas had a proportionally greater share of the livestock than the Hungarian parts. The cows of the Romanians were for the most part better milkers, whereas the cattle of the Hungarians on average were heavier.

Throughout the period under discussion, more than 80 per cent of the animal stock remained in peasant hands. The medium-sized estates kept about half as many cattle, and the large estates around one-third as many, as did their counterparts in Transdanubia. By contrast, the average number of cattle raised on farms of between five and twenty *holds* in size was higher than the Transdanubian average. At the same time, when it came to market

sales, the prices of livestock raised on estates were on an average 30 per cent higher than those charged by the peasants for their stock. As regards the quality of the stock, the judgement of the market clearly favoured the manorial estates, an advantage the latter did not fail to exploit. It was precisely in safeguarding and improving the quality of stock that the gentry estate made its contribution to the animal husbandry of Transylvania, while the maintenance of the greater part of the livestock fell to the peasantry on common pasture lands that continued to shrink in size.

The Modernization of Industry and Mining

It was the requirements of the Habsburg Monarchy's unified customs area, established in 1850, and the underdevelopment of Hungary, with its shortage of capital and its generally low level of domestic capital accumulation that basically determined the prospects for industrial development in Transylvania. Progress in this field was to be conditional on the influx of foreign capital and on state participation in investments, although for the most part the foundations were laid by local enterprises, old and new. The industries of the province were based on mining or, generally speaking, on the exploitation of the raw materials to be found locally.

Until very late, the Transylvanian mines supplied around one-half of the Habsburg Empire's total rock-salt production, and together with the Máramaros salt-mines to the north, were a rich and important source of revenue for the treasury, the salt trade being state monopoly. After 1867 it was primarily the salt works of Marosújvár that underwent modernization; here provisions were made, towards the end of the century, for the processing of waste salt by the chemical industry.

Although its mediaeval heyday was long past, after 1850 gold mining in Transylvania still accounted for two-thirds of the gold produced in the Habsburg Empire. Apart from the treasury, a fair cross-section of society — including aristocrats, burghers and peasants alike — had mines or shares in mines in this region, which contained the most valuable gold deposits in Europe. The most famous corporate mine owned by a syndicate of landowners was the *"Rudai 12 apostol"* (Twelve Apostles of Ruda), where 400 miners produced 46.3 kilograms of gold in the year 1864. The treasury mines yielded one-third of the total amount of gold produced in the 1880s. The mine at Orla employed 400 miners, the one at Nagyág, 880. It was around this time that Transylvania's mineral wealth began to attract foreign capital on a larger scale, a development which signalled the revival of private mining enterprises, for which (with few exceptions) business was slack. A number of German, British, Belgian and French financial institutions, ranging from the *Deutsche Bank* to the *Crédit Lyonnais*, entered the mining business by way of several home-based companies. Having taken over the Twelve Apostles mine, *Harcort AG* of Gotha augmented it by building an ore-processing plant which ranked first in Europe. Henceforth this mine produced around a half of the gold mined in Hungary. There was to be no question of a gold rush in the Californian manner, although the gold mining industry did revive con-

siderably not only in Transylvania, but also in the treasury-operated mines around neighbouring Nagybánya. British and German mineral experts and technicians came, and the opening of new pits was preceded by systematic prospecting. The smelting works operated by the Central Mine Inspectorate at Zalatna processed the ore taken there from the dwarf-sized private gold mines — an annual amount of 3,000 metric tonnes before the First World War. The bullion was then minted as coins at the Körmöcbánya mint in Upper Hungary.

Compared to the production of gold, and even of silver — which was of markedly less significance — copper mining was truly negligible. This was in spite of repeated efforts in the field by several joint-stock companies, efforts going back to as early as 1858. Here, as with lead production, business was ruined partly by the fall in the price of metals on the European market. At the end of the century, the utilization by the chemical industry of the non-ferrous metal ores began on a large scale.

Coal mining got off to a slow and unimpressive start, only to exhibit an ever more spectacular development later on. Bohemian coal, too, was transported to the region on the railways coming from the West. Then in the neighbouring province of the Banat the Austrian National Railway Company (STEG), in which the French had a majority holding, increased the mining of the local anthracite coal and related iron production to an enormous degree, and coal-production there reached a figure of 100,000 metric tonnes annually as early as 1860. After 1857, in Transylvania proper, the exploitation began of the abundant deposits of the first grade lignite in the Zsil Valley as a result of co-operation between the state and the *Brassói Bánya- és Kohómű Rt.* (Brassó Mining and Metal Works Co.). In the 1880s the annual production of the Zsil Valley reached 200,000 metric tons. At the turn of the century, this mining area was already dominated by two other joint-stock companies: the *Salgótarjáni Kőszénbánya Rt.* (Salgótarján Coal Mining Co.) and the *Urikány–Zsilvölgyi Kőszénbánya Rt.* (Urikány–Zsil Valley Coal Mining Co.), a joint Franco-Hungarian enterprise. Under their management, the mines were operated at a very high technological level, and the amount of coal extracted here peaked at 2.5 million metric tons in 1913. Skilled mineworkers came flocking in from distant lands: Czechs, Poles, and Germans. Large mining communities quickly developed, with the usual service facilities. Tiny little hamlets, like Petrozsény and Lupény, grew into veritable towns, which was just as well, considering that 14,000 people were employed in mining alone.

Apart from the Zsil Basin, collieries were also to be found in Egeresfalva, developed first with local Transylvanian capital, then with Belgo-Hungarian capital. There was also a colliery at Keresztényfalva opened by Saxon entrepreneurs, and one at Köpecbánya in the Székelyföld, worked by a company set up in 1872 by a group of aristocrats.

The iron industry amounted at the beginning of the period to a number of shabby smelting works widely scattered and operated at almost mediaeval levels of technology. Furthermore, their production was uneven, with frequent breakdowns. Only the state iron works were capable of more continuous production.

As in the coal industry, progress in the iron and steel industries started in the Banat. From 1862 onwards, the Resica and Bogsán works of the aforementioned STEG company developed into a smelting centre which was to be unrivalled in Hungary for a long time to come. In Transylvania, meanwhile, the Brassó Mining and Smelting Company bought out the old iron-smelting works one by one starting in 1856, modernized them, and in 1867 was producing as much pig iron as the state works. In 1872 the company ordered two up-to-date blast furnaces to be built at Kalán by Belgian engineers. This promising trend petered out towards the end of the century, when the company went bankrupt before being resuscitated in 1898 with German, Austrian and Hungarian capital under the new name of the *Káláni Bánya- és Kohómü Rt.* (Kalán Mining and Smelting Co.).

In 1867, the treasury had five old-type blast-furnaces in Transylvania, all of them in a state of dilapidation. The Hungarian Parliament strongly opposed the use of government money to modernize these and, as a result, no major investment in this field took place until much later. After 1884, several new iron-smelting plants were built by the state in Hunyad, and it was here in 1895 that Hungary's largest blast-furnace was erected to produce a projected 40,000 metric tons of iron annually. The state's iron and steel works at Kudzsir likewise came to be modernized in the 1880s. Thereafter the combined output of the Kalán company and the state plants amounted to almost the entire iron production of Transylvania. At the other end of the spectrum, the old peasant foundries as in the Torockó area gradually passed out of existence, while the enterprising medium-sized private venture at Szentkeresztbánya managed to hold out, producing articles ranging from threshing machines to hoes and spades.

In the engineering industry, out of the dozens of artisan workshops, few managed to expand into a large-scale factory. No such fortune came the way of the engineer Péter Rajka, an innovative builder of quality agricultural machinery who was compelled to sell his own workshop, in Kolozsvár, to an entrepreneur. In 1874 this workshop produced the first steam engine built in Transylvania; yet even then there was no chance for it of developing into a large-scale firm. Among the medium-scale enterprises at the end of the century, the Rieger Machine Works of Nagyszeben stood out, with its extremely diverse range of products. In this branch of industry should be included the MÁV railway engineering workshops which were assuming considerable dimensions at Kolozsvár and Piski-telep. Machine-building in the strict sense of the term forged ahead more convincingly in the adjacent region of the Banat. Here again it was the STEG company at Resica that established machine-manufacturing on a really imposing scale, building in 1872 the first railway locomotives made in Hungary. Another industrial plant not far from Transylvania, the Weitzer Carriage and Waggon Works in Arad, expanded steadily from the turn of the century. Next to it was established, with French participation a pioneering plant, which produced motor cars after 1909 and then, during the First World War, even engines for aeroplanes.

The chemical industry was a latecomer in Hungary. Both in Transylvania and the Banat, though, oil refineries were set up as early as the 1850s, the oil being imported from Romania (after the end of the century from

Galicia and Russia). Some sulphuric acid was produced in Brassó and Zalatna. In 1894 a soda factory was established at Marosújvár followed by another in Torda; their productive capacity was large enough to satisfy domestic demand completely. In 1909, the natural gas reserves of the Mezőség were discovered. After failure to attract British or American capital to fund their exploitation, the *Magyar Földgáz Rt.* (Hungarian Gas Co.) — founded in 1915 — was set up with German capital. By this time gas pipelines were already in operation; in 1918, thirty-eight wells were functioning in the gas fields.

In the Saxon towns, the textile industry grew up organically on the ancient foundations of the small artisan workshops. Favourable factors, for example, their established positions in both the home (Transylvanian) and the Romanian markets and then government subsidies in later, harder, days enabled some clothiers in Nagyszeben and Brassó, notably Scherg and Leonhardt, to adjust, and to transform their businesses into large-scale commercial enterprises, and even to earn a reputation for their woollen and linen products. Some cotton cloth production also took root in the region.

Food processing in Transylvania proved to be an excellent means of capital accumulation, although it was nothing like as widespread as in the rest of Hungary. A series of large distilleries were established in the towns along Transylvania's western border, from Nagyvárad in the north to Lugos in the south. But in Transylvania proper, too, commercial distilleries were set up as early as 1849. One such plant was founded by Elek Sigmond in Kolozsvár, in 1851. Indicative of the development at one distillery, Jeremiás Baruch's in Marosvásárhely, was the fact that the first Transylvanian-made steam engine was installed there, in 1874. The distilling business was a sure profit-maker, and for the most part entrepreneurs invested the money made there in other branches of industry, for example, milling. In 1878, 125 distilleries producing industrial alcohol operated in Transylvania, with the largest of them mainly processing maize imported from Romania. The two largest producers were the Saxon Czell family and the Sigmond family; the other distilleries came nowhere near the size of those of the Banat. An important subsidiary source of profit for the distillers was the fattening of beef cattle, many of which were then sold either in the Hungarian heartland or in Vienna. The brewing industry began to expand towards the end of the century. Besides the smaller breweries there were two — one in Torda and one in Marosvásárhely — which expanded to produce 120,000 hectolitres of beer annually.

In the all-important flour-milling industry, the big modern mills were located primarily in Pest and on the edge of the Great Hungarian Plain, and had been set up with capital accumulated through trade. Accordingly, while in the year 1873 as many as thirty steam-driven mills were in operation in Arad, Bihar and Szatmár counties, only four are known to have existed in Transylvania at this time. The distiller Elek Sigmond founded a steam-driven mill in Kolozsvár in 1853 and Jeremiás Baruch built another mill in Marosvásárhely in 1855. The latter was still of the old, water-powered type but was to undergo much subsequent development and even to generate power to light the city streets decades later. The number of water-driven mills long continued to rise: between 1850 and 1890 no fewer than 1,525 such

mills were built. Even as late as 1895 out of a total of 5,236 flour mills in Transylvania, only 88 were steam-powered. The close of the century saw rapid modernization. Between 1881 and 1906 109 steam-driven mills were constructed and at the latter date the Transylvanian mills helped pioneer the use of internal-combustion engines in the industry. On the other hand, however, many timber-built rustic watermills continued in existence. At this time, 1,031 such mills were in operation in Hunyad county alone.

After 1849, sugar production experienced a decline in Transylvania, as well as in the rest of Hungary. However, after decades of flagging business, government intervention in the form of tax and freight concessions helped resuscitate the industry, and in 1889 the *Magyar Cukoripari Rt.* (Hungarian Sugar Industry Co.) established a large factory at Brassó–Botfalu. In 1912 this plant employed 1,218 workers and produced 145,000 quintals of sugar. Another sugar refinery was set up in Marosvásárhely in 1893 by some aristocrats. The capital for the enterprise was raised partly by borrowing from the government and partly by selling shares to the growers, who then paid for them in sugar beet. In 1912 the factory employed 405 workers and produced 47,000 quintals, some of which was exported to Britain, Italy, and Egypt, among other countries.

Other branches of the food-processing industry — not counting the two state-run tobacco factories — were largely confined to the Saxon districts. There were salami factories in the towns of Nagyszeben, Brassó, Beszterce, Medgyes and Szentágota. Canning factories operated in Dés and Déva. The largest dairy products plant was established in Nagyszeben in 1902.

The wood-processing industry has been left to the end, not least because — strange as it may seem in view of the scale of wood production — it never assumed sizeable dimensions. The logs floated down the Maros River were processed at Szeged, but timber was also floated down the Olt and the Zsil rivers to Romania. The railways were the first really big consumers of wood, with the mining industry close behind. Later the mines became the largest single consumer: on the eve of the First World War the Petrozsény coal mines alone used some 100,000 cubic metres of timber for pit props. Sawmills were set up at every logging site, but only a few furniture and other woodworking factories existed. By contrast, as has been mentioned before, the rural sawmills employed a whole string of timber-working communities, especially on the edges of mountainous areas. Here were produced, among other things, boards and wooden roof tiles, for the town market. The best hand-made timber beams came from Zetelaka, in the Hargita. At Bedecs, meanwhile, they specialized in the large-scale manufacture of pre-fabricated timber cottages. When the customer had seen the house and placed an order it was taken to pieces, taken to his place of residence and reassembled there. At the beginning of the century dozens of houses, huts and barns were to be found at any given time on Bedecs village green, waiting to be dismantled and taken away to some distant place which had been previously ravaged by fire.

Almost the whole of Transylvania's material development reflects a dual reality. The industrial age came rushing in, introducing as it did the most up-to-date manufacturing technologies. Alongside these, however, the traditional occupations and crafts survived — from gold-digging to woodwork-

ing and charcoal-burning — in which the old, archaic methods were still employed. The network of small workshops can be regarded only as constituting an outworker system, which was of great importance.

3. Cultural Life and the Ethnic Communities

Intellectual ad cultural life in the nineteenth century was dominated by liberal nationalism. While it is true that the nationality issue, which flared up after the 1848 Revolution and the subsequent civil war in Transylvania, ended the alliance of liberalism and nationalism, and that the two ideologies repeatedly clashed in the political arena later on, their earlier unity continued to be preserved in the popular mind. The intellectual and cultural life of the fifty years following the revolution was basically determined by the generation whose members had lived through that historic time, mostly as active participants in the events which had decisively influenced their characters.

In the promotion and organization of the nationalities, the fostering of national culture and the education of the people were regarded as the principal objectives. In Transylvania where the three nationalities with diverse cultural traditions co-existed, the balance of power was most delicate. The intellectuals of each nationality felt that their own ethnic group was in imminent threat of linguistic dissolution and cultural domination by the others. The anxiety for the future of the nationality, as well as the prospect of its eventual ascent, led these intellectuals to be endlessly involved in cultural activity.

In fact, Transylvania's separate cultural life had ended even before its territorial separation was effected, firstly in 1848 and then again in 1867. Gradually the region's local cultures were dissolving in broader national cultures. Under the absolutist, and especially the dualist, regime this process accelerated: Hungarian intellectual life in Transylvania became submerged in that of the mother country, while Romanian culture became irreversibly linked to that of the Romanians in the Danubian principalities. Of course, this process of fusion did not occur uniformly, as Hungarian and Romanian nation-states emerged under different political conditions. Also, the Carpathians had served as an effective natural barrier for a very long time, and all through the nineteenth century the cultural level of the Romanian state remained below that of Hungary. This explains how with Transylvanian Romanians regional literature could flourish as in the Banat or in Bihar, while the same could not be said in the case of Hungarian literature. In this period only the Saxons maintained a traditionally independent local culture — despite their ongoing exchange of ideas with Germany, and despite the fact that Saxon intellectuals identified themselves with Germany proper, and regarded themselves as the advance guard of the German nation.

During this period, therefore, one can speak of a separate Transylvanian culture only in connection with the Saxon population; in the Romanians' case such a culture existed only in a limited sense, while the Hungarian population had no separate culture after 1867. For this reason a brief summary only will be given of Romanian and Saxon cultural life in this chapter.

The Various Societies and their Programmes

Under the neo-absolutist regime mobilization of civil society proceeded along avenues opened up during the Reform Age. All three nationalities established their own scientific and cultural "societies" which, beside doing valuable work in the field of science, indirectly served national and political purposes.

The Saxon *Verein für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde* (Association of Transylvanian Native Knowledge) was established as early as 1840. From this developed the *Siebenbürgischer Verein für Naturwissenschaften* (Transylvanian Association of Natural Sciences) shortly after 1849. The *Siebenbürgischer Verein* was active not only in its parent organization but also in the Bruckenthal Library and in the grammar schools, addressing itself to ethnography and history as well as to zoology, botany and the mineralogy of the Carpathians. The leading Saxon scholars were all trained at German universities, and were vanguards in their professions. (The strong German connection partly explains why, with the exception of a few personal contacts, these researchers never built up close connections with their Hungarian colleagues.) To list all the achievements of the scholarly bodies supported and organized by the *Verein* would be impossible here. Instead, we shall content ourselves with mentioning only two — Georg Daniel Teutsch's series of studies entitled *Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen* (History of the Transylvanian Saxons) which were based on original sources and which gave the first comprehensive account of Saxon history when their publication began in 1852, and the *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen* (Archives for the History of the Germans in Transylvania), a series which is still regarded as basic source material. Several other cultural associations also existed. The best known of these was the *Karpaten-Verein* (Carpathians Association), founded in 1881, which distinguished itself in the fields of tourism and wildlife protection.

The Saxon schoolmasters — whose political weight during this period increased at the expense of that of the jurists — considered scholarly research to be an integral part of their job. (Incidentally, such thinking is still very much alive among the Saxons.) At this time literacy was already highly valued among Transylvania's Saxon population.

Following the revival of and old idea and inspired by the Saxon example, the *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* (Transylvanian Museum Association) was founded as an institution to serve the Hungarians. Count Imre Mikó donated ten *hold*s of land (1 *hold* = 1.42 English acres) and a villa in Kolozsvár for the association and it was he who worked out its constitution and obtained Vienna's approval. The inaugural meeting was held in 1857, although official permission was only granted in 1859. The association's first president was Mikó himself, who thought that "our society can be a practical workshop of self-government". The *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* began as an exclusively Hungarian-language scholarly society with its exhibits coming from the collections and donations of aristocrats, intellectuals and members of the middle class. Its funds also came from donations, the largest being the 10,000 forint contribution of the ultra-conservative Baron Samu Jósika. This mini-

ature academy had a range of interests covering everything from history to natural sciences, and eventually became the largest scientific body in Transylvania. It had a huge collection of antiques and several thousand deeds and manuscripts, to which a valuable collection of 1848 material was later added. Its natural sciences section provided valuable help in scientific research, and its yearbook *Erdélyi Múzeum* (Transylvanian Museum), which was edited by the polymath Sámuel Brassai, enjoyed considerable popularity.

We have already seen, in the section dealing with the political history of the neo-absolutist period, that the setting up of foundations and organizations was then still regarded as a political act. In the more liberated atmosphere of the 1860s, and especially after the Compromise of 1867 and Hungary's subsequent union with Transylvania, the *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* lost a great deal of its political significance, although its scientific standing remained. The founding of the University of Kolozsvár in 1872 brought a new turn in the history of the *Múzeum Egylet*: its collections were loaned to the university and the custodians of each collection became university professors in their respective fields. After this the *Múzeum Egylet* was always closely linked with the university, but without surrendering its independence. Considerable changes in the next century when touring conferences and the popularizing lectures were organized regularly. Its publications included some valuable scientific works.

The best-known Hungarian cultural society, EMKE, was established in 1885. This organization, which for a time voiced strong political views, will be discussed in a later chapter.

In Romanian circles the idea of establishing an academy or a linguistics society had been mooted as early as 1852. The foundation of the Hungarian *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* provided further impetus and finally, in 1861, the *Asociațiunea transilvană pentru literatura română și cultura poporului român* (Literary and Cultural Society of the Romanian People of Transylvania), abbreviated to ASTRA — was set up in Nagyszeben. The society, while also having a natural sciences section, was primarily interested in history, literature and linguistics. Putting aside all religious differences, it often united intellectuals who had previously been opponents. Although its first president, Baron Șaguna, was a leading ecclesiastic, it had a religiously impartial secretary in the person of Bariț. In the years immediately after its creation ASTRA's significance spread beyond Transylvania's borders; no such institution existed in Romania at this time and as a result ASTRA also functioned as the Romanian Academy for some years.

ASTRA was less wealthy than the Hungarian *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* or the Saxon *Verein*, although it even received donations from Romanian intellectuals living beyond the Carpathians. It should be mentioned that, in addition to the contributions of the clergy and the middle classes, the generosity of the peasantry was also required to launch the society; for example, the village communities agreed to deliver a certain amount of corn in support of ASTRA for five consecutive years. The society's importance did not wane following the Compromise; the Romanian population of Transylvania carried on its political struggle for national emancipation, and — irrespective of its temporary setbacks — ASTRA continued to play an important role in this. To begin with, the society's regional organization followed

the territorial organization of the deaneries. After 1868, however, ASTRA set up its own regional bodies and, after 1895, it extended its operations beyond the historical lands of Transylvania to cover Bihar and the Banat. The first Romanian encyclopedia was published at the turn of the century by the flourishing society: this contained some 38,000 entries, half of which were written by authors in Romania. The ASTRA Museum, the building which, in addition to a museum, also housed an office, a library and a theatre, was built in Nagyszeben in 1905. The society published popular books and also organized lectures for the peasants, for whom it established several small public libraries. The ASTRA rallies held before the war seemed more like mass demonstrations. If the Hungarian *Múzeum Egylet* distinguished itself in the field of scholarship, then the Romanian society's principal achievements where in public enlightenment. In the last two decades of the period under discussion ASTRA served as a substitute for a Romanian education ministry in Transylvania.

Close co-operation between the three great societies was never achieved, although initially each society felt obliged to invite honorary members to represent the other two nationalities, and some contact always existed between the scholars in the course of their work. However, people were still preoccupied with building up their nationality institutions and with the process of national integration or the "nationality struggle", so the need to foster connections with the parallel organizations of the other nationalities was inevitably accorded lower priority.

From time to time the total submergence of the Hungarian and the Romanian nationalities in the culture of the "mother nations" resulted, during the second half of the century, in an exodus of intellectuals to Pest and Bucharest respectively. Budapest, which in the meantime had grown into a large metropolis, drew artists and scholars almost like a magnet. Many Romanian intellectuals were eager to move to Bucharest, also. Among them were ethnic Romanians who resented the political discrimination and who had come into conflict with the state, but there were also those who had made successful careers in Hungary. Victor Babeș of the Banat, the author of the first bacteriology textbook in Hungary and a highly esteemed professor at the University of Budapest who corresponded with such eminent scientists as Pasteur, Koch and Wirchow, moved to Bucharest at the invitation of the Romanian government in 1886. His brother, a chemist, also emigrated to Romania, as did George Crǎiniceanu, the acclaimed eye-specialist who wrote several treatises on the subject both in German and in Hungarian. Their example shows that in an age of national awareness creative intellectuals could only work to their full capacity in their own national environment. Of course, there were exceptions, for example, the poet-publicist Grozescu, who returned to Budapest from Romania, but these only prove the rule.

Education

The school systems of the three Transylvanian nationalities did not enjoy an equal start. Each nationality had different traditions, economic power and attitudes towards culture. These differences were compounded by the state, which interfered in the development of the school systems for its own purposes. At the beginning of our period all schools were church-owned and in this there would be no major change for the next fifty years.

The history of the Hungarian schools in Transylvania has still to be written, and at present we do not even possess reliable data concerning the number of schools in operation during the whole of this period. In 1851 949 schools were Hungarian out of a total of 2,146 such institutions. (There were 1,436 Romanian and 273 German schools — the rest were bilingual.) Of the 113,000 Hungarian children of school age only 47,000 actually attended school, with perhaps half of them turning up for classes on a regular basis. Among the Saxon population almost four out of five children of school age attended school. A considerable number of parents — especially those living in the villages — regarded the educational authorities as hostile. A survey conducted in 1870 by the Ministry of Religion and Public Education revealed the distressing fact that very often even well-to-do families tried to have their children exempted from schooling.

Besides its general backwardness, another feature of the Hungarian school system in Transylvania was its denominational variety. The Unitarians were regarded as the most concerned when it came to education, or at least it was they who had the best record for school attendance. The Calvinists came next, closely followed by the Catholics. One cannot, of course, draw conclusions about educational standards from these observations, since they differed greatly from region to region, and even from school to school. One thing was certain, though: in the Hungarian schools it was the Catholic teachers who were the best paid.

After the Compromise, the Hungarian schools enjoyed preferential treatment from the state. This was partly to protect scattered Hungarian communities, but mostly to promote the use of the Hungarian language among the non-Hungarian population. The government's school-building programme and the occasional grants made by the churches undoubtedly advanced the cause of education conducted in Hungarian. At the turn of the century there were 797 schools in the Székely counties, and at this time these alone had twice the number of pupils attending Hungarian schools in the whole of Transylvania shortly after the Compromise.

The neo-absolutist regime modernized and standardized secondary education, and the dualist state showed a willingness to build new grammar schools and training colleges. The old and prestigious grammar schools and colleges continued to preserve their reputations. The grammar schools of Kolozsvár, Nagyenyed and Marosvásárhely were all nationally acclaimed institutions, and the Piarist grammar school at Kolozsvár, together with some others, always had a large number of Romanian students. Endre Ady was not the only famous pupil of the Reformed gymnasium at Zilah: Iuliu Maniu, one of the great Romanian statesmen of the twentieth century also studied there.

The Hungarian educational system in Transylvania was not complete until the Francis Joseph University was set up in Kolozsvár in 1872. This was based on a now abolished law school and institute of surgery, and on the *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet*. Initially the university faced serious difficulties, but the quality of its staff and increasing support from the government helped to turn it into a renowned centre of learning and scholarship by the turn of the century. With the foundation of the university, Kolozsvár became an established educational centre where, by 1914, a quarter of the population was made up by students and teachers.

The Saxon school system showed a rate of progress which was impressive even by European standards, and not just when compared to educational developments in the Carpathian Basin generally.

Although the Saxon grammar schools were modernized under the neo-absolutist regime in line with the wishes of the government, unlike the Nagyszeben law school they were not transferred to the state. As early as 1850 the resources of the University were used to establish an independent fund to provide school subsidies, which guaranteed continued functioning of the school system. By 1869 80 per cent of Saxon children of school age attended school, an attendance rate very much greater than that which could be claimed by the Hungarians and the Romanians. The affluence and the commitment of the Saxons enabled them to hold out against the dualist government's magyarization attempts in the classroom; the Saxons were careful to accept only those government subsidies which did not jeopardize the autonomy of their schools. (Between 1907 and 1910 the Saxon settlements spent 1.3 million crowns on building schools, and, of the banks, the *Hermannstädter Sparkasse* alone gave more than 2.6 million crowns up to 1912 for so-called "charitable" causes — mostly educational.) In 1907 the University set up another, 18 million crowns, fund from the sales of its forests, which, together with the increasingly substantial government subsidies after 1910, was sufficient to cover the expenses incurred through the timely renovation of their grammar schools. The teachers in these schools had mostly studied in German universities, and many also carried out scientific work. Hermann Oberth was perhaps the most famous example: a scientist who had conducted experiments since childhood, after 1918 went on to become one of the founders of astronautics.

By the end of the era illiteracy was eradicated among the Saxons; they had at least one school in every village and a total of about 700 well-paid teachers. By contemporary standards the secondary and grammar schools and the four colleges and two teacher training colleges amply met the educational needs of the 220,000-strong Saxon population. The fact that nearly a quarter of the students in the Saxon grammar schools were either Romanian or Hungarian by nationality indicates the high level of teaching in these institutions, and the esteem in which they were held.

The poor state of the Romanian school system was felt as a painful reality and a national grievance by the Romanian intelligentsia and the entire Romanian population of Transylvania and Hungary throughout the period.

Before 1848 the Romanians of the Greek Orthodox faith did not possess a single grammar school, while the grammar school at Balázsfalva was incapable of meeting the demands of even the Greek Catholic population.

Although in the 1850s the establishment of eighteen Romanian grammar schools was thought necessary in order to eliminate cultural backwardness, only two were actually founded during the neo-absolutist years: one by the Orthodox church authorities in Brassó in 1850, the other in Naszód from a special fund in 1863. The elementary schools (no reliable information exists on their number in this period) were also run by the two churches. The subjects taught there included Romanian grammar and German language, with Romanian history being added later.

Eötvös's Education Act of 1868 made school attendance compulsory — at the time of the Compromise one year earlier only 28–33 per cent of Romanians actually attended — while also giving schools the freedom of instruction. As a result, a large number of schools were founded, both by the churches and the villages. Although in the poorer areas the state was legally obliged to set up elementary schools — in which the language of tuition had to be that of the local pupils —, for a long time this duty was not taken very seriously, even in the Hungarian regions. (In the Romanian regions it was founded by the government.) In this way the village schools remained in the hands of the churches, with the priest serving as "headmaster", the rural dean as superintendent, and the archdiocese as the highest educational authority. Although the government published educational guidelines and a journal and Eötvös even had a Romanian teachers' training college set up in Déva in 1868, apart from overseeing a few minimal requirements of the profession, education was basically left in the hands of the church authorities and the townships. The teaching of Hungarian was not yet compulsory in the Romanian elementary schools, and Romanian textbooks used in Transylvania were much sought after in Romania itself.

One can look back on the decade following 1868 as a period of great development in the history of the Romanian school system. By 1879 there were 2,755 Romanian elementary schools in Hungary, but then the progress came to a halt. This coincided with the beginning of the magyarization policy already mentioned in connection with the political history of the period. The teaching of Hungarian was made compulsory in non-Hungarian elementary schools in 1879, and the state was eager to close down schools graded inadequate in order to replace them with Hungarian or bilingual ones. The poorest villages were only too glad to shed the burden of supporting a school, which made the government's efforts to control the schools all the more successful. All this caused Romanian education to stagnate, and at the turn of the century the rate of illiteracy among the Romanian population was higher than among the Hungarians or Saxons. (In Szolnok–Doboka county only 20.8 per cent of the population could read and write, but the situation was not much better in Kolozs and Hunyad counties, either.) Many Romanian schools were closed, while others were forced to accept government grants (with the consequent loss of their independence) when the "Lex Apponyi" was passed, which raised the salary of every teacher by law. This could only mean one thing: that the teaching of Hungarian became more intensive. In 1904 government records showed 2,433 purely Romanian and 407 bilingual schools; by 1913 their sum total was only 2,170. (On the other hand, the Romanian churches seemed to know of more schools:

their records give a total of 2,665 institutions, with 3,350 teachers receiving government subsidy.)

The impoverished condition of the Romanian community coupled with the governments' school policy of magyarization led to the unfortunate situation whereby the churches were unable to build up the Romanian school system any further. The government subsidies given to the two churches for educational purposes (3 million crowns in 1914) were only enough to maintain the existing network. As a result 10–20 per cent of Romanian pupils (33 per cent according to other calculations) were forced to attend Hungarian or German schools, while the percentage of Romanian children who never went to school (39.2 per cent) surpassed even the Hungarian figure.

In the dualist age there were five Romanian gymnasia. This was partly because the churches did not have the resources to build more, and partly because the government put obstacles in the way, as in Karánsebes. Official school policy placed special emphasis on magyarization. The government set up Hungarian grammar schools in the non-Hungarian regions for example in Nagyszeben, Fogaras, Karánsebes and Cravica, and while their purpose was allegedly to protect the minority Hungarians of those communities, they also served to educate pupils from the other nationalities. In the academic year 1911–1912 1,913 Romanian pupils attended Romanian secondary schools, while 4,256 attended Hungarian and German ones as there were only five state-run schools which taught Romanian. The extent to which secondary education was considered a political issue during this time is best shown by the periodic prosecution of teachers and pupils at Romanian grammar schools charged with "unpatriotic conduct". The Romanian grammar school at Belényes was magyarized on such a pretext. There were other issues, too, such as the debate on Romania's subsidy of Brassó's Romanian grammar school at the turn of the century, or István Tisza's negotiations with the leaders of the Romanian National Party, whose principal demand was the establishment of additional Romanian secondary schools.

The Romanian presence in higher education was, again, relatively small. Beside the three Greek Orthodox and four Greek Catholic seminaries there were six Romanian teacher training colleges which altogether accepted some 400 students a year before the First World War. No Romanian academy of law was established, in spite of the strong pressure exerted by the generation of 1848. Romanians wishing to continue their studies enrolled at universities in Budapest, Vienna, Graz or in Germany. A Chair of Romanian was set up at the University of Budapest in 1862, and its first head, Alexandru Roman kept his position until 1897, despite prosecution and conviction for alleged press offences. Romanian demands that the University of Kolozsvár be made bilingual were rejected, and the petitioners had to settle for the creation of a Chair of Romanian there. Grigore Silași the man appointed to head it, was forced into retirement for political reasons and his successor, Grigore Moldovan was widely regarded as a renegade for his strong opposition to the Romanian National Party. The two Hungarian universities and the academies of law had around 600–700 Romanian students before the First World War.

The nationality associations, banks and foundations provided valuable help for the Romanian students. Besides the churches, the Gozsdu Founda-

tion, established in 1871, was the most important, paying out a total of more than 1 million crowns in grants to some 3,000 students before the end of the First World War. Grants were also given by the Naszód, Karánsebes, and ASTRA funds, and, quite often, by private individuals.

The Changing World of Sciences

In the Reform Era Hungarian scientific life in Transylvania was closely linked to that of Hungary. In the age of neo-absolutism — as we have already seen in the case of *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* — science had a direct national-political purpose. After the Compromise, Transylvania's separate scientific life ended for good. Even the work of the various local archaeological and historical societies tended to link up with national research generally.

The foundation of the University of Kolozsvár proved to be a momentous event, and had repercussions well outside Transylvania. It was also a watershed in the history of Hungarian scholarship. Although Sámuel Brassai, the great debater and the last of the polymaths', remained active in a number of fields, the following decades were marked by the emergence of the specialists.

László Kővári, a historian of the 1848 generation, wrote a six-volume political history of Transylvania, with his account of events in Transylvania in the period 1848–1849 being published in 1861. Sándor Szilágyi's comprehensive work on cultural history is closer to modern concepts, however. The archivist Elek Jakab also wrote about 1848–1849 and published an excellent work on the history of Kolozsvár. By that time, though, source publication had gained considerably in importance, thanks to Imre Mikó's series entitled *Erdélyi történelmi adatok* (Transylvanian Historical Facts). The best-known edition of sources was published by Szilágyi under the title *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek (1540–1699)* (Records of Transylvanian Diets, 1540–1699) in twenty-one volumes. The next century saw works on local history, and all showed the influence of Balázs Orbán's monumental work *A Székelyföld leírása* (A Description of the Székelyföld), which was published in Budapest between 1868 and 1873. Despite the general trend towards specialization, history and politics continued to be dealt with together; this was best illustrated in the work of Benedek Jancsó *Szabadságharczunk és a dákoromán törekvések* (1896) (Our Fight for Freedom and Daco-Romanian Ambitions).

In the field of the natural sciences the university was most successful in producing eminent figures. The magnificent university library, the second largest public library in the country, was built after the turn of the century, and laboratories and other ancillary facilities also underwent substantial development. Individuals worthy of note here are the philosopher Károly Böhm; the zoologists Géza Entz and István Apáthy (the latter was shortlisted for the Nobel Prize); Professor Ferenc Veress, who made revolutionary discoveries in colour photography; Lajos Martin, who undertook theoretical work in aeronautics; and the geologist Gyula Szádeczky-Kardoss. The work of Hugo Meltzl might also be mentioned as a curiosity: it was he

who called Nietzsche's attention to Petőfi's poetry and who, together with Brassai, brought out the *Összehasonlító Irodalomtörténeti Lapok* (Comparative Literary Gazette), an internationally acclaimed journal of comparative literature published after 1877 in twelve languages.

Individual perseverance and sacrifice played a large part in the development of Romanian scientific life, since the organizational and institutional infrastructure was completely lacking in Transylvania, and since even in Romania this began to be established only in the 1880s.

Among the Romanians historiography, a typically "national" branch of scholarship, contained two basic strands during this period. The first comprised those general works written after the 1850s which attempted to substantiate Romanian claims to the region by uncovering the eventful and heroic national past (August Treboniu Laurian, Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian). The second consisted of publications presenting source material, the basis of all serious historical investigation, and commenced at roughly at the same time. A fine contemporary synthesis was Bariț's three-volume *Părți alese din istoria Transilvaniei pe 200 de ani in urmă* (Selected Papers from Transylvania's Last Two Hundred Years' History), which was published in Nagyszeben between 1889 and 1891, and which also marked the end of an era. Later studies dealt with shorter periods, or simply looked at the history of either smaller regions, historical personalities, or the churches and the schools. In the meantime the number of source publications increased. Scholarship and day-to-day politics were never, of course, separate even for those who had studied at the University of Budapest, and in any event the ongoing national and political struggle would not have made this possible. It is very revealing that Teodor V. Păcățian's eight-volume *Cartea de aur, sau luptele naționale ale românilor de sub corona ungară* (Golden Book or the National Struggles of the Romanians Living under the Hungarian Crown), which deals with political history, was also a source publication aimed at serving the immediate goals of the Romanian national movement.

In the development of Romanian linguistics Transylvania still played an important, although gradually decreasing, role during the second half of the century. Timotei Cipariu, the erudite canon of Balázsfalva, continued the traditions of Micu-Klein, Șincai and Maior in the Reform Era. It was he who published the first philological magazine which, besides dealing with etymology and phonetics, also pressed for the introduction of a Latin-based written style: a style which, incidentally, was very different from the spoken language. The big change came in the 1860s when the Transylvanian Romanian press exchanged the Cyrillic script for the Latin. Naturally, these attempts to remove the non-Latin elements from the Romanian language also found favour with certain individuals beyond the Carpathians: the Bucharest Academy endorsed the changes, although the excesses in the reform were only done away with after decades of debate.

After the Compromise Transylvania's Romanian scholars and scientists could be divided into three categories: those who emigrated to Romania, either before or after completing their education (for example, Ioan Bogdan who founded Romanian slavistics); those who elected to work in Budapest after completing their studies at Hungarian or foreign universities (for example Victor Babeș, G. Alexici); and those — a growing number — who

found jobs in the Romanian schools in Transylvania after graduation and who pursued research work with the help of ASTRA or the churches. Professionals, such as the aeroplane constructor Aurel Vlaicu, who became known beyond the border of both states, were the exception rather than the rule.

Literature and the Arts

During the period from 1849 until the outbreak of the First World War the underlying orientation of literature and the arts gradually moved away from idealized subjects reflecting national aspirations to what is now referred to as modernism. Thanks to the advances in schooling, a wider section of the middle class and even the better-educated peasantry were able to enjoy literature and the arts, not just the privileged for among the nobility and the intelligentsia. (Naturally, here the terms "literature" as "the arts" embrace popular, and not just high, culture.) Lack of space prevents detailed discussion of the complex interrelations manifasted in art and literature and of the cultural needs of the various social groups. Accordingly, we must content ourselves with an outline of developments in this field.

In the first decades of the period in question Romanian literature in Transylvania still maintained close links with its immediate geographical surroundings, and with Pest–Buda which was also one of the centres of Romanian intellectual life. Beside the short-lived cultural magazines and anthologies published in the Banat, Bihar and Pest, it was Bariţ's newspaper *Foaie pentru minte, inimă şi literatura* (Leaves of the Mind, the Soul and Literature) and, more importantly, Iosif Vulcan's *Familia* which provided opportunities for those with literary aspirations. The former was published in Brassó; the latter was founded in Pest in 1865, before moving it to Nagyvárad in 1880. Vulcan still was a classic proponent of the programme of national revival. He was a literary organizer, a newspaper editor and a folklorist, who in addition, also wrote poems, short stories, plays and even a novel, and he maintained excellent contacts with the Pest intellectual scene. Vulcan was also a member of both the Kisfaludy Society and the Bucharest academy. He deserves special credit for regularly publishing Hungarian literature translated into Romanian, and it was he who published the first poems of the greatest Romanian classical poet Mihai Eminescu. Beside the newspapers, there were also almanacs to provide reading matter for the wider public.

Before the appearance of the *fin-de-siècle* generation there was no really important Transylvanian Romanian writer. The poetry of Andrei Mureşanu had come to blossom by 1849 and had become a part of Romanian culture generally. For quite a while the historic past remained the principal motif in the poems of Mureşanu's Transylvanian followers. The writers, the literati, and the journalists of the age all considered the discovery and the publication of Romanian folk literature to be a national duty. Atanasie Marienescu was the first to publish a collection of Romanian folk songs, and this appeared in 1859.

The polemics which developed between Romanian and the Hungarian scholars in the course of their folklore research was typical of the age. The Unitarian bishop and poet János Kriza published his collection of Székely folk poems — entitled *Vadrózsák* (Wild Roses) in 1863. It was attacked in *Fővárosi Lapok* by the otherwise-excellent Iulian Grozescu, who claimed that the poems "Kőműves Kelemen" and "Molnár Anna" were merely translations of Romanian folk ballads. The long debate which came to be known as the "Vadrózsa–trial" finally established the existence of distant interactions and parallel development in the history of the two folk cultures. It also helped to generate interest in Romanian folk poetry among the Hungarian literati. With the assistance of Grozescu and Vulcan the first anthology of Romanian folk poetry translated into Hungarian was published in 1870. Ion Pop Reţeganul, an author of short stories noted for his excellent translations of Hungarian literature, made an outstanding contribution to the study of folk poetry. He collected several thousand folk songs and ballads, which were then studied scientifically by Grigore Silaşi and Grigore Moldovan, professors at the University of Kolozsvár.

By the end of the century the progress towards the national integration of the Romanians both in Transylvania and Hungary also manifested itself in works of literature. Although the short stories and the novels of the realist writer Ioan Slavici — who also founded the Nagyszeben *Tribuna* — described life in Transylvania's Romanian villages, his activity as a writer was entirely associated with Bucharest. The poet George Coşbuc began his career with *Tribuna*, although — like Brassó's Ştefan Octavian Iosif — he soon moved across the Carpathians to assist in the revival of Romanian poetry.

At the beginning of the new century the Hungarian capital once more began to feature substantially in the political and intellectual life of the Romanians. The career of the poet Octavian Goga, who had originally come from the Szeben region, blossomed while he was in Budapest working for the literary journal *Luceafărul* (established in 1902). The profile of this publication was very much determined by Goga's personality. His first poems were also published in it. The contributors to the journal articulated a new, nationally and politically committed populist feeling. Ioan Agîrbiceanu, an excellent writer of prose, also began his career with *Luceafărul*. For Goga the discovery of Hungarian poetry, and especially the poetry of Endre Ady, the most important Hungarian poet of the age, were great experiences. The two poets were on good terms until their friendship came to an abrupt end in 1914. In 1906, four years after being launched, *Luceafărul* transferred to Nagyszeben. Goga moved there too, using his considerable talents in the service of the Romanian national movement.

Naszód's Liviu Rebreanu began his career as a short story writer in what could only be described as a distinctly Hungarian environment. (Initially he even attempted to write in Hungarian.) The former army officer settled in Romania in 1908 and became a great novelist there after the First World War. The career of the poet and writer Emil Isac, who maintained close contacts with the progressive forces in Hungary and who was drawn to the Social Democrats, ran a different course. Isac, whose poems already featured working-class people, continued to stand by his Hungarian friends despite wartime nationalist fervour. The fact that it was he who took the

last good quality photograph of the mortally ill Endre Ady in the moments of historic Hungary's disintegration could well be regarded as symbolic...

Those Saxon writers and poets who embarked on the discovery of folk poetry, or those who tried to educate the public through historically inspired poems, short stories and plays, all regarded their work as serving national goals. Viktor Kästner, a well-known poet of the age, wrote his stanzas in Saxon dialect, thus establishing a new literary style. Friedrich Wilhelm Schuster, on the other hand, regarded Saxon culture as part of German culture generally, as his poems clearly show. Michael Albert's traditional poems were intended for the edification of the public. In the last third of the century, however, political poetry was on the decline even in Saxon literature. During the first decades of the period the historical short story, play and novel constituted the characteristic genre. Examples were Traugott Teutsch's *Die Bürger von Kronstadt* (The Burgers of Brassó, 1865), which looked back to the seventeenth century, or his major work written later entitled *Schwarzburg* (1852), which described the internal struggle in Transylvania during the fourteenth century. After the Compromise the Saxon writers were still concerned with the struggle for national survival, as they had done earlier. This was also the central theme of Traugott Teutsch's *Johannes Honterus* (1898), considered by many to be his finest play. Historical subjects continued to dominate Saxon literature, especially drama, even though there were times when this was not so evident. Writers kept returning to the themes of the settlement of the Saxons in Transylvania and their early history in the region, indicating the continuing preoccupation of the Saxon intelligentsia with the endurance of this small ethnic group.

In the changing world of the *fin-de-siècle* and in the wake of the new movements in art a more modern literature emerged which concentrated more on the present. The best known representatives of this literature were Oskar Wittstock and Adolf Menschendörfer, the second of whom founded the modern literary and art journal *Die Karpathen* (The Carpathians) in 1907. As well as their work, a colourful literature grew up in both prose and in verse which described rural life, often in local dialects. The propagation of these dialects was a part of national integration and therefore did not undermine the strong Saxon attachment to German culture as a whole.

Even before 1848 Pest had undoubtedly been the centre of Transylvania's Hungarian literary life. Although the novelist Miklós Jósika did not return from exile, in his novels and short stories he remained true to his Transylvanian past. Zsigmond Kemény (who also took up residence in Pest) built his strongly psychological novels around Transylvanian themes. It was also in Pest that the one-time Transylvanian poet Pál Gyulai, who belonged to the 1848 generation, became a great literary critic and one of the leaders of intellectual life. For a long time Dániel Dózsa was almost the only Hungarian writer and poet living in Transylvania, and he frequently turned to the Székely past for material.

There were renewed efforts to organize regional centres of literary and scientific activities in the period following the Compromise. The *Kemény Zsigmond Társaság* (Zsigmond Kemény Society) was established by the Protestant pastor and writer Lajos Tolnai in Marosvásárhely in 1876. After a difficult but promising start, in 1884 the society nearly dissolved owing to

lack of interest but in 1896, under the presidency of István Petelei, a writer of short stories and a determined advocate of decentralization, it made some kind of recovery. Before the First World War its members included Farkas Gyalui, Sándor Márki, Károly Szász and László Ravasz. The *Erdélyi Irodalmi Társaság* (Transylvanian Literary Society) was founded in Kolozsvár in 1888. For a long period Count Géza Kun, an outstanding orientalist, was its president, while the core of the society comprised the politicians József Sándor and Miklós Bartha, the scientists Kővári and Brassai and the writers István Petelei and Elek Benedek. The society's journal, *Erdélyi Lapok* (Transylvanian Journal), was edited by Miklós Bánffy in 1912.

Before the First World War Transylvania provided a market for more than one-third of all books published in Hungary but — as Elemér Jancsó has pointed out — it was never able to produce a wide-ranging and self-sufficient literary culture of its own.

At the present stage of research, history has very little to say about the fine arts in Transylvania during this period. The leading figures — Miklós Barabás and Károly Szathmáry Papp — both left Transylvania quite early in life. Bertalan Székely the Younger probably did execute a portrait of Governor Carl zu Schwarzenberg in Nagyszeben sometime in the 1850s, but it was in Hungary proper that he became one of the finest historicist painters. Jenő Gyárfás, a Székely, remained in Transylvania and still became nationally famous, despite the fact that his best pictures were the least known to his contemporaries. Ferenc Veress, some of whose photographs have been included in the present book, gained international recognition for helping to lay the technical foundations of this new art form. In general, the work of the region's Hungarian artists at this time is still hardly known and the only thing we can state with certainty is that there was no outstanding Transylvanian art in the period.

It was in Nagybánya, not far from the Transylvanian border, that Simon Hollósy founded his famous school of painting in 1896. It broke with the traditions of the academicism of Munich and became an important workshop of Hungarian impressionism, attracting much interest from distant countries. The well-known pioneers of modern Hungarian painting — Károly Ferenczy, István Réti, and Béla Iványi Grünwald — all became important painters there, although it was in Budapest that they eventually achieved recognition and success.

Immediately after 1848 it was non-Transylvanian Germans who took the lead in Saxon fine arts for a while, people such as Theodor Glatz and Theodor B. Sockl. In the 1880s, however, a new generation left the secondary schools and achieved renown at the first Nagyszeben art exhibition, held in 1887. Members of this generation had been studying in Budapest, Munich and Italy. Robert Wellmann, Karl Ziegler and Fritz Schullerus are the best-known representatives; the last painted large pictures about the Saxon past in the style of the academicist painters. Arthur Coulin was a pioneer of modern Saxon painting and also the art designer of the journal *Die Karpathen*. After the outbreak of the First World War the supremacy of naturalism began to wane in Saxon painting also.

János Máttis Teutsch was an unusual Transylvanian artist who spent all his life hovering between international recognition and total oblivion. At

the time he was the region's most modern painter, and is claimed by both Hungarian and Saxon art history. The son of a Székely father, he was brought up in a Saxon family. Máttis Teutsch's talents first appeared while he was at Brassó's wood industry school, where he learned wood carving. He afterwards went on to Munich and Budapest to study and started with academist style sculpting. As a painter Teutsch initially produced traditional portraits and landscapes, but later became one of the first representatives of expressionist and abstract painting in Hungary. Máttis Teutsch lived on and off in his home town, Brassó, working as a teacher.

Some of the Romanian artists elected to work abroad (for example, Constantin Lecca); others, like Mişu Pop, worked both at home and abroad. Pop sprang from a family of icon-painters in Fogaras and painted churches and portraits in the Biedermeier style. (Almost every important Romanian personality of the 1848 generation sat for him.) Of the Romanian painters working in the Banat, the best known were Nicolae Popescu, who was clearly influenced by Bertalan Székely and the Viennese painters; the very talented Constantin Daniel, who painted several historical paintings; and Ioan Zaicu, the church- and portrait-painter.

Octavian Smighelschi belonged to the turn-of-the-century generation and was a close friend of the Saxon Coulin. Together they painted Nagyszeben's Orthodox church and went to study in Italy. Smighelschi was known to contemporaries not only for his Byzantine-style work in churches but also for his portraits and landscapes.

The Transylvanian sculptors were mostly content to fashion busts and small sculptures. When the erection of large and expensive bronze sculptures began at the end of the century, it was usually artists from outside Transylvania who were commissioned. The statue of Honterus in Brassó was made by a Berlin sculptor in 1898 and the sculpture of Georg Daniel Teutsch, the bishop and historian, was the work of an artist from Stuttgart. The Teutsch statue was unveiled in Nagyszeben in 1899. The equestrian statue of King Matthias in Kolozsvár (1902) and the statue of Wesselényi in Zilah (1902) were both executed by János Fadrusz.

Transylvania's architecture was dominated by the styles which were generally popular in the age. As the painter and art historian József Bíró put it: "Architecture also followed the fashion set by Budapest; the new styles from neo-Gothic to art nouveau were superimposed on the traditional urban landscape." But the new century did bring at least some changes. In the same way that Bartók and Kodály sought the roots of Hungarian folk music in Transylvania, a separate branch of the art nouveau style, as represented by the works of Ede Thoroczkai Wigand, Dezső Zrumeczky and, above all, Károly Kós, drew on the architectural heritage of the Kalotaszeg and the Székelys. Accordingly, there developed a "popular" style of architecture which manifested itself in a small number of private and public buildings in Transylvania and in Hungary proper as well. These buildings, examples of the vanished architecture of Transylvania, can still be seen in Hungary.

The new endeavours in literature and art, which were opposed to the nationalist-populist movement at the beginning of the century, mostly found adherents along the western border of historic Transylvania, in the "borderland" zone stretching from Nagybánya to Temesvár, where the under-

currents have not yet been studied in any detail. It was Nagyvárad, more than any other place, which became the stronghold of the bourgeois radical (and socialist) movement which developed in the face of the officially-accepted traditional literature and which came to be symbolized by the poet Endre Ady.

III. Political Life and the Nationality Issue in the Age of Dualism (1867–1918)

1. The Dualist System

The Restoration of Constitutionalism and of the Union

After the negotiations that started in 1865 and the monarchy's defeat in the Austro-Prussian War, the Compromise of 1867 was agreed. This transformed the Habsburg Empire into a constitutional dual monarchy. Austria and Hungary were to conduct their internal affairs separately and independently, while there was to be a joint apparatus, strongly influenced by the monarch, to handle foreign policy and military matters.

The Compromise ended Transylvania's 300 year-long separate history, since one of the basic conditions for the agreement on the Hungarian side had been the complete restoration of the union between Hungary and Transylvania legislated in 1848. The monarch's rescript 20 June, 1867 formally dissolved the Diet at Kolozsvár while another rescript annulled the resolutions that had been passed by the Nagyszeben provincial assembly.

On 8 March, the Hungarian government formed by Count Gyula Andrássy was granted full powers by the Parliament to run Transylvania's affairs. Manó Péchy, a *főispán* from Hungary, was put in charge of the Gubernium, which survived for the time being, with the title of royal commissioner. His duties also included reporting on the nationality movements.

The government was in no hurry to restore the union completely, if only because — in the words of one of its critics within the Hungarian opposition — "it wanted to deal carefully with Transylvania on account of the nationalities issue".[1] For example, the government annulled the decision of some county assemblies to allow their meetings to be conducted in Hungarian only. The royal commission used German in its communications with the Saxon seats and Romanian in its dealings with Fogaras, Naszód and Hátszeg, and the government was asked to follow suit. In connection with posts in the county administrations, the minister of the interior ordered that "in view of the different religions and nationalities, at least three, and at most five, suitable persons should be put forward for every elected office".[2] The government hoped to secure the — at least partial — co-operation of the leading figures of each nationality. Eötvös called on George Bariţ, the most respected figure in the Romanian opposition, to accept — without

1. *Magyar Polgár* (Hungarian Citizen), 2 September, 1868.
2. *Törvények és hivatalos rendeletek gyűjteménye.* (Collection of Laws and Official Orders). Edited by B. Okrös. Pest 1868, 207.

abandoning his principles — the position of ministerial advisor with responsibility "for directing the education of Romanian youth".[3] These gestures, as well as the deliberate slowing down of the process of unification, showed that the government, faced with administrative problems as well as protests from the Hungarian counties which opposed the Compromise, did not wish to create a political climate in Transylvania that was wholly unacceptable to the Saxon and the Romanians.

A district law (Law XLIII of 1868) provided for the detailed regulation of the union. This again declared the principle of equal civil and political rights, as well as the abolition of all earlier privileges specific to a given nation. At the same time, the legal equality of the various churches was confirmed anew, and their autonomy guaranteed. The Gubernium was finally done away with and from now on the *királybírós* of the Székely and the Saxon *ispán* were appointed on the basis of governmental recommendation. The Saxon University was allowed to continue for the time being, although its juridical powers were taken away. A whole list of laws dating from the period of absolutism continued to apply, since the government did not want to subject Transylvania to Hungarian legislation before the planned general reform of the legal code had taken place. In this way Transylvania continued to constitute a separate legal area for some time to come. New laws gradually reduced the differences, but the complete elimination of disparities was never really achieved. This duality resulted in politicians claiming that the conditions in Transylvania were in some ways more modern than those in Hungary proper, and, at the same time, also less liberal.

The up-to-date Austrian Civil Code and the Mining Law of 1854 remained in force, although, naturally, some amendments were made. In Transylvania (and in Croatia, too) the government kept the centrally-controlled gendarmerie, which was more modern than the system of local *pandúrs* employed in the rest of Hungary. In the decision to keep the gendarmerie, the need to be able to put a brake on the nationality movements definitely also played a part. Anti-liberal press regulations were also preserved until changes took place in 1871. This was done in order that "the freedom of the press, as guaranteed by the institution of trial by jury, be also extended to Transylvania".[4] Six "not guilty" votes from the twelve jurors were enough to dismiss charges of press offences and this measure undoubtedly helped to curb the arbitrariness of the authorities.

Liberal Legislation and Patriarchal Power

In the new political situation the liberal leaders of Hungary could not resolve the contradiction between their old ideal — a unitary nation-state —

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3. Letter by János Gál to G. Bariţ on 25 May, 1867. In: *George Bariţ magyar levelezése.* (Hungarian Correspondance of George Bariţ.) Edited by I. CHINDRIŞ — F. KOVÁCS. Bucharest 1975, 103.
4. Az igazságügyi és belügyminiszter 1498/1871. sz. rendelete. (No. 1498/1871 Order of the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs.) In: *Rendeletek Tára* 1871, 183, 207.

93–94. The old (around 1860) and the modern (around 1900) Kolozsvár, as seen from the same point

95. The towers of the mediaeval fort of Kolozsvár still standing in the 1870s
(Photograph by Ferenc Veress, taken of the tower in Híd Street)

96. Student hostel of the University of Kolozsvár ▶

97. The main building of the University of Kolozsvár, around 1900 ▶

98. View of Nagyszeben from the northeast (Photograph by Emil Fischer, around 1900)

99. The Palace of Culture and the Town Hall in Marosvásárhely. Built by Marcell Komor and Dezső Jakab, 1913 (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

100. The staircase in the Palace of Culture

101. Equestrian statue of King Matthias in Kolozsvár's main square, by János Fadrusz, 1902

and the reality of the country as it was, that is a land of several nationalities. The national ideology built on historical rights formulated — on the basis of the principles of the unity of the country and the equality of political rights — the concept of a "unitary political nation", which incorporated every nationality. It recognized the distinctness and cultural-linguistic autonomy of these nationalities only insofar as they did not threaten the historically-established hegemony of the Hungarians. But the Liberals did not have, within this conception, a detailed policy for dealing with the nationalities. Since conflicts connected with the nationalities had flared up again during the decade when absolutism was waning, the granting of the nationalities' demands was regarded by the Hungarians as a "concession" rather than as a reform task — although what counted as a "concession" always depended on the actual balance of political power at any one time.

The liberal elite — Ferenc Deák, József Eötvös, and Lajos Mocsáry — hoped to solve the problems of the nationalities not only through the granting of civil liberties but also by creating an administrative system based on self-government. It was probably Mocsáry who went furthest when he openly acknowledged that Hungary was a "polyglot state", and that the only way to hold it together was to ensure the possibility of free development for each of the country's nationalities, in the hope that these would opt to preserve the old union. Eötvös, who thought the question through several times on a theoretical level, wrote in his diary in connection with the Transylvanian problem that he was willing to go so far as accepting the idea of a confederation, even a republican one: "I would, however, consider it both beneficial and fortunate if, by contenting ourselves with dualism for a while, we could buy a little time to enable the Hungarian people to become more mature in every respect — but especially culturally — so that it can fulfil the great mission that lies ahead of it."[5] Eötvös saw that while a strong Hungary was a necessity for all the peoples of the Carpathian Basin, it was not possible to transform it into a pure nation-state. He was also of the opinion that the "fair" political and cultural demands of the awakening nationalities should be satisfied, and that they should be given more freedom than they could hope to achieve in the neighbouring countries. The more sceptical Deák advocated a fair nationality policy on the basis of liberal principles and a more realistic assessment of the situation. He wanted the Hungary of 1867 to be a state above nations, working for every individual — although with the hegemony of the Hungarians preserved.

The nationalities law (Law XLIV of 1868), even in the amended form in which it was finally passed, was an important liberal achievement. Its birth was preceded by long debates in various committees, the nationalities demanding independent political and cultural institutions and the organization of the counties on a nationality basis — in other words, a federation —, and the Hungarians defending the primacy of the state and the existing Hungarian hegemony in the counties. The final wording of the law reflected Deák's skill at compromise. It guaranteed the right of every citizen to speak in his own language at local and municipal meetings. Citizens were also

5. J. Eötvös, *Vallomások és gondolatok. Eötvös József művei*. (Confessions and Thoughts. Works of József Eötvös.) Edited by M. Bényei. Budapest 1977, 624.

permitted to hand in petitions, even to the central government, in their mother tongue, and they were entitled to receive an answer in the same language. People could speak their own language in the lower courts of law and, in the higher courts, they were entitled to hear the judgment also in their mother tongue. Communes, churches, the church authorities and the township and church schools enjoyed complete freedom to use the language of their choice. The government was required to provide education in the mother tongue of a community "up to the point where higher academic education begins" and was also obliged to find "suitable persons" from among the members of the nationalities to fill high positions in the legal apparatus and the administration.

Although the law primarily concentrated on full personal liberty, it also proclaimed certain collective rights. One of its most important sections permitted the formation of associations, societies and funds "for the promotion of languages, art, science, economy, industry and trade".[6] This section allowed the nationalities to create, wholly independently of the government, financial bases for their organizations, thereby assuring them some degree of independence and stability in an ever-changing political climate.

But the Hungarian drive for hegemony (which was supported by the greater part of the ruling class), together with the nationalities' attitude of protest and rejection, sealed the fate of the nationalities law. A majority in the government party tried to implement the bare minimum of the political concessions granted in the nationalities law, using the nationalities' rejection of it as an excuse, and utilizing the lack of legal sanctions in the statute in order to do this. Several laws were passed in the following decades which contradicted the spirit of the nationalities law. Eötvös and Deák approached the nationalities issue with tact, but with the consolidation of dualism and the deaths of the great liberal leaders the more impatient elements in the landowning class became the decisive force in political life: their nationalism far exceeded their liberalism on the nationalities issue. Gusztáv Beksics, the liberal publicist, later summed up the policy of this group: "A unitary and indivisible state, a unitary and indivisible nation: this is our point of departure, the goal of our endeavours, and the regulating principle of our actions. This is the categorical imperative to which all our reforms are subordinated."[7]

The strengthening of the unitary state and the declining political power of the nationalities eventually led to a strange situation. By the end of the dualist period, the nationalities, who had earlier found the nationalities law inadequate and who had therefore condemned it, were demanding that it be observed. On the other hand, the Hungarian nationalists who had passed the law, denigrated it as a piece of unworkable legislation, created by "the nation in an irresponsible moment"[8] of dangerous leniency. In this way the liberal law, which was remarkable even by European standards, was never fully enforced.

6. *Magyar törvénytár.* (Hungarian Body of Laws.) 1836–1868. Budapest 1896, 490.
7. G. Beksics, *Kemény Zsigmond, a forradalom s a kiegyezés.* (Zsigmond Kemény, the Revolution and the Compromise.) Budapest 1883², 333.
8. G. G. Kemény, *Iratok* ... (Documents ...). III, 65, 273; IV, 474.

MARAMAROS

SZATMÁR

BESZTERCE-
SZOLNOK-
SZILÁGY
DOBOKA
NASZÓD

Dés
Szamosújvár
Beszterce

BIHAR

MAROS-
KOLOZS
KOLOZSVÁR
Szászrégen
TORDA
Gyergyószentmiklós

TORDA-
Torda
MAROSVÁSÁRHELY
CSÍK

ARANYOS
Felvinc
Dicsőszentmárton
Székelyudvarhely
Csíkszereda

ARAD
Abrudbánya
Nagyenyed
KIS-
KÜKÜLLŐ
UDVARHELY
ALSÓ-FEHÉR
Erzsébetváros
Segesvár
Gyulafehérvár
Medgyes
Kézdivásárhely

NAGY-KÜKÜLLŐ
HÁROMSZÉK

Déva
Szászváros
Szászsebes
Vízakna
Sepsiszentgyörgy
Vajdahunyad
Nagyszeben
Fogaras
BRASSÓ
HUNYAD
SZEBEN
FOGARAS
KRASSÓ
Hátszeg
Brassó
SZÖRÉNY

Legend

○ Municipal borough

● Town with council

◙ ◙ County seat

Map 23. The administrative division of Transylvania in the age of dualism (1913)

The complicated and much-criticized electoral system, which had additional complexities in Transylvania, was to a great degree responsible for the facility with which political rights were restricted.

Throughout the period the franchise was determined by the laws passed in 1848. The abolition of feudal privileges was in effect achieved merely by extending the circle of the privileged: beside the nobility and the burghers, who retained the right to vote, those with the appropriate property or education (engineers, doctors of medicine, lawyers, priests, teachers, etc.) also acquired the suffrage. In a country of variegated natural endowments and widely differing levels of economic development, the minimum wealth needed to qualify for the franchise was calculated in such a way as to en-

sure that the affluent locals in every district were granted it. In Hungary proper the right to vote in villages was conditional on ownership of at least one-quarter of a holding. For town dwellers the possession of a shop, factory or better-type house was necessary, or in the case of craftsmen, the employment of a journeyman. In Transylvania the property qualification in the villages was the payment of eight forints in direct taxation, nearly half as much again as in Hungary.

In 1874, a legal amendment slightly extended the franchise in Transylvania when the village intelligentsia was given the vote. However, the number of electors declined for some time to come because in other respects the property qualifications were raised across the country. The law completely excluded the broad layer of workers, day-labourers and hands hired by the week from the ranks of those who could realistically hope to acquire the vote. The Transylvanian electorate numbered between 75,000 and 87,000 throughout the period. Initially two-third of these electors voted on the basis of "ancient right" while only 10,000 people qualified in 1848 to do so on account of their property, and even in 1869 this number barely reached 25,000. The electoral law passed in 1913 (but never implemented) would have improved the situation in Transylvania, although it would only have doubled the size of the electorate there — to 150,000.

Usually more electors were to be found in the Hungarian areas than in the Romanian ones. Of all male adults, 25 per cent of the Saxons, 20 per cent of the Hungarians and only 9 per cent of the Romanians were eligible to vote. (There was no such discrepancy in Hungary proper.) The towns had more voters proportionally than did the countryside and this, again, favoured the Hungarians and the Saxons. It was this electoral system that provoked the Romanian intellectuals to declare that they were "humiliated in the most unfair way possible".[9]

But the whole electoral system was much more complicated than one simply designed to exclude the Romanian population while favouring the Saxons and the Hungarians. The records of the 1904 election, which is the most reliably documented one, show that, except for the Székelyföld and the counties of Kolozs and Torda–Aranyos, voters with Romanian as their mother tongue were everywhere in the majority in the rural areas, as they were in Hungary in the counties of Szilágy, Máramaros, Arad, Temes, and Krassó–Szörény. In Hunyad county, which was Romanian in character, a single delegate represented half as many people as in the Székely counties of Udvarhely, Háromszék and Csík. Many Hungarians thought that "the electoral system favours the Romanians, but they don't make use of it".[10] The explanation for all this lies in the fact that the pro-independence opposition hostile to the given dualist system found it easy to attract voters in the Hungarian areas, while in the Romanian ones the Hungarian voters

9. *Emlékirat.* A román választók képviselőinek 1881. évi május hó 12-étől 14-éig tartott egyetemes értekezlete meghagyásából szerkesztette és közzéteszi a kiküldött bizottság. (Memoires. Universal Meeting of Representatives of Romanian Electors Held in 12–14 May, 1881 and Made Public by the Delegation.) Nagyszeben 1882, 87.
10. L. Ű[RMŐSSY], Az oláh kérdés. II. (The Vlach Question.) *Ellenzék,* 5 October, 1894.

supported the government, their attitude also influencing the Romanians there. At the same time, the village population regarded both the elections and the system of parliamentary representation primarily as the business of the gentry. Given the level of political consciousness among the population, one can see how the Romanian electoral districts could remain strongholds of the government party until the turn of the century. The restrictive Transylvanian franchise survived primarily for this reason and became an "all-too-important building block"[11] of the state, as Count Szapáry put it to King Carol I of Romania in 1892.

The electoral system provided one of the principal supports of dualism. It guarded parliamentary constitutionalism against any new absolutist experiment coming from Vienna, while the limited franchise forming part of it guaranteed that, though the emerging democratic social and national movements could not be eliminated altogether, at least the dualist regime and the hegemony of the ruling classes would not be challenged at the higher political level.

At the beginning of the seventies one section of the Hungarian pro-independence opposition still saw a potential ally in the nationalities which were equally hostile to dualism, and attempted to gain their support by offering to extend their rights. The government, too, made efforts to placate the nationalities by offering them a compromise. But the efforts of Prime Minister Lónyay — as we shall see later — met with failure in 1872. Dualism was consolidated in 1875 with the merger between the centre-left opposition and the government party, a merger which created a the large *Liberális Párt* (Liberal Party) under the leadership of Kálmán Tisza.

With this merger, the clear majority of Hungarian landowners gave up their opposition and accommodated themselves to the dualist regime. But through an odd sort of compensation mechanism, the abandonment of parliamentary resistance was accompanied by an upsurge of impatience towards the nationalities. The tactful handling of the ethnic question was gradually dropped, and Kálmán Tisza, who served as prime minister for fifteen years, became the "oppressor of the nationalities", even though he had defended certain of the nationalities' rights on several earlier occasions. Besides the magyarization of public life, the policy was introduced of trying to utilize the education system to the same end.

For a few years after the Compromise the administration still thought it natural that those speaking the same language but living in different states should be able to give financial support to one another's cultural projects across the borders, even in the form of government subsidies. The Ministry of Culture, for example, had forwarded the modest sums sent by the Romanian government to aid the Romanians of Transylvania. In 1875, however, the schools and churches were forbidden to accept foreign subsidy. In 1879, against the wishes of the king, legislation was pushed through Parliament

11. Report by the German ambassador in Bucharest on 3 February, 1892 on the discussion between Carol I and Szapáry. Edited by T. Pavel, *Mișcarea românilor pentru unitatea națională și diplomația puterilor centrale 1878–1895*. Timișoara 1979, 259.

which made the Hungarian language a compulsory subject in every elementary school. Paradoxically, this was motivated not by nationalism, but by reasons of parliamentary strategy. Nevertheless, it violated the school-boards' sovereign right to decide the languages to be taught. Still, the more respectable circles within the ruling class hoped to achieve magyarization not through the school system, but through a peaceful evolution of fifty to one hundred years. They only wanted to speed up this process by interfering with school autonomy or, which was also frequently case, by restricting the activities of the nationalities' politicians.

During the reform of the county system in 1876–1877, the traditional autonomy of the Királyföld was ended and the Saxon and Székely seats were incorporated in a uniform county system. Fifteen counties were established in the territory of historic Transylvania. These were named in such a way as to preserve their historical traditions as far as possible (Szolnok–Doboka, Maros–Torda, etc.). At the head of each county there was the government's representative, the appointed *főispán*, while the *alispán*, his deputy and in charge of the county's administration, was elected by the county assembly for a period of six years. Another elected official, the *szolgabíró*, ruled supreme in the ridings, controlling the agencies of both the central and the county's own government. The period was characterized by a decline of county autonomy, although the county assembly remained, besides the Parliament, the only constitutionally-guaranteed forum in which questions of national politics could be raised. Half of the members in the county assembly were elected, with the other half being made up from the so-called "virilists", the top taxpayers. The creation of this latter category guaranteed the participation of the new bourgeoisie − in a blatantly anti-liberal fashion. In any case, the circle of the virilists was quite large. In less prosperous Transylvania all those who paid taxes of around one hundred forints were included in it. In Hungary proper the figure was twice this.

The communes and villages had no political rights, as they were entirely controlled by the county administration. Here, too, half of the village's representatives had to come from among the top taxpayers, the virilists. Nevertheless, the broad village suffrage extended to every independent male resident in the village, aged twenty or more, and holding land.

Naturally, the situation was much more up-to-date in the towns, and the government's policy of deliberately encouraging the bourgeoisie helped a great deal in this.

Quite often Romanian or Saxon majorities were to be found in the various lower representative bodies, and there were also many Romanians and Saxons in the county administration, although the percentage of Romanians and Saxons who occupied key positions was falling rapidly. The practice whereby nationality districts could be administered by officials who did not speak the language of the local people and who knew very little about their culture and traditions began to emerge during Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza's long term of office. The Saxon burghers held out everywhere, especially in Szeben county where the official language remained German almost until the end of the dualist era. At the same time, by the turn of the century, the Romanians had been very definitely driven out of county politics as a result of both official magyarization and their own pas-

sivity in Parliament. In several places (for example, Brassó county and Maros–Torda county) they even failed to gain representation in the county assemblies, and elsewhere they constituted a modest but valued minority. Only in Beszterce–Naszód and Hunyad, as well as in Krassó–Szörény and Máramaros counties did the Romanians remain in a strong position. Here the authorities were forced to make concessions, as the smooth running of the administration — or, to use a contemporary phrase, "the survival of the Hungarian nation" — could only be guaranteed by repeatedly coming to agreement with them.

The Attitude of the Hungarians

Naturally, the separate political history of Transylvania's Hungarians ended with the new regime, as those involved in politics were entirely submerged in the great parliamentary parties. While nobody denied that special interests existed, emphasizing them was for a long time considered inappropriate, and was branded as particularism by those who shaped public opinion. The institution which attempted to fill the roles of both provincial assembly and local arm of the Hungarian government could only be established in a roundabout way, riding on the predominant nationalist sentiment. This institution which was, thus, not at all what is claimed to be, was called the *Erdélyrészi Magyar Közművelődési Egyesület* (the Magyar Cultural Association of Transylvania), or EMKE, for short. [Another such institution was the *Erdélyi Gazdasági Egylet* (Transylvanian Economic Association).] "Though we have lost our primary, political function (from the principality period), there remains the more rewarding one — the improvement of the material and cultural level of the people through communal and individual efforts,"[12] wrote the *Kolozsvári Közlöny* (Kolozsvár Gazette).

The EMKE began its official work for the propagation of Hungarian culture and the Hungarian language — as well as for the cultural development of the smaller, more scattered, Hungarian settlements — in the spring of 1885. In keeping with the convention of the time, the organization invited an aristocrat to be its chairman in the person of Count Gábor Bethlen, a former Garibaldist, who later, as *főispán* of Kis-Küküllő county, persuaded the county assembly to vote an additional 2 per cent county tax (10,000 forints) for the purposes of the EMKE. The heads of other counties tried to follow his example, provoking an enormous public outburst among Romanian and Saxon intellectuals. The fostering of the small, dispersed, Hungarian settlements was a very sensitive issue in the ethnically mixed country. The attempts to "re-magyarize" a few smaller settlements which had been — or were thought to have been — "romanianized" deeply offended the Romanian population, as did the paragraph in the EMKE's founding docu-

12. Cited from the 29 August, 1884 issue of the *Kolozsvári Közlöny*. In: *Az EMKE megalapítása és negyedszázados működése 1885–1910.* (The Founding of the EMKE and its Activity during a Quarter of a Century 1885–1910.) Kolozsvár 1910, 78.

ment which urged the Romanians "not only to speak Hungarian but also to regard themselves as Hungarians".[13]

The whole history of the EMKE is characterized by what was a very typical phenomenon at that time: the contrast between the blustering patriotism of the speech making, and the modesty of the deeds that the realities permitted. While people wished to make up for the "neglect of centuries" through magyarization, so that "the ethnographic mass of Székelys might be linked through appropriate methods of public education to the great sea of Hungarians on the Great Hungarian Plain", the money available for the realization of their plans came from charity balls, collections and modest donations. It is very revealing that with his 20,000 forint donation in 1888, a non-Transylvanian landowner became the "first great founding member" until finally Count Kocsárd Kun left an estate of 2,190 holds to the association to help the relocation of Székelys. However, instead of Székely settlers, a Székely agricultural school was set up on the property, largely financed by the Ministry of Agriculture and, ultimately, remaining under the latter's control. Like the resettlement of the Székelys, magyarization, too, came to nothing.

The actual work done by the EMKE began with annual grants of between 50 and 150 forints to support destitute priests and teachers in the scattered Hungarian settlements. It continued with the founding of nearly 300 schools, more than 200 public libraries and a certain number of nurseries.

In the economic sphere, the EMKE obtained considerable government orders for the owners of small industrial enterprises seriously affected, after 1886, by the tariff war between Austria–Hungary and Romania. The association promoted Transylvanian products, and its leaders organized exhibitions, wrote memoirs and encouraged tourism. From the beginning it was one of the EMKE's principal projects to establish a big agricultural credit bank in Kolozsvár, but this was set up too late, because of the lack of government support. Hence, instead of creating a bank to rescue landowners, the EMKE acted as a mediator in land deals and credit transactions and pressed for the creation of a credit association. The EMKE also played a part in the establishment of a chamber of trade and commerce in Marosvásárhely (1891) to protect the interests of the Székelys, and in the founding of the *Erdélyi Iparpártoló Szövetség* (Transylvanian Association for the Support of Industry).

The Saxon and Romanian bourgeoisie regarded all this with suspicion, although they soon discovered that the activities of the EMKE posed a threat neither to the culture of the nationalities nor to their ethnicity. In spite of the EMKE's growing wealth and numerous grants, its significance began to wane after the turn of the century. Its Hungarian critics tried to steer it towards the promotion of economic growth. "If EMKE does not hasten to the aid of the economy with all its resources... then its four million crowns will only be enough to buy a wreath for the grave of Hungarian Transylvania,[14] wrote an economics journal two years before the outbreak of the First World War.

13. Ibid. 80.
14. The 1893–1894 Annual Report by EMKE. *EMKE Értesítő*, 20 May, 1894.

But at the turn of the century, the Hungarian political leaders of Transylvania were not concerned with future dangers. Instead, they settled down comfortably with the dualist regime, which, with its economic prosperity and its building up of the state administration, swept along even those who had earlier been unhappy with the country's semi-dependence on Austria. Just as Transylvanian politicians were present in the main political forums of the country and sometimes formed Transylvanian lobbies even within the parties, in the same way the entire intelligentsia was also focused on Budapest. Publicists and writers favoured the capital's newspapers, and the Transylvanians formed a powerful group within the Academy. Only the Székely problem became a national issue: the unfavourable economic conditions in the Székelyföld and the resulting emigration from the area continued to haunt the nation's conscience, even if no appropriate measures were available in the given situation to alleviate the problem. In spite of the local difficulties, the public at large approved of the strong centralization, saying that "only a strongly centralized administration could serve the interests of Székely and Saxon survival".[15]

A peculiar version of the bourgeois state came into existence with the implementation of the dualist arrangement. Being sufficiently liberal and modern to permit the accumulation and importation of capital as well as the encouragement of enterprise, it was acceptable to the bourgeoisie, even though this class received very little political power to match its growing economic weight. The regime preserved enough of the traditional institutions and of the feudal mentality and methods to maintain the political influence of the landowning class — and of its supporters in the intelligentsia — which, although it had initiated the bourgeois transformation, gradually lost control of the process. For this reason, the system as a whole was acceptable to the traditional ruling class as well. From the conflicting interests, a semi-modern political-administrative governmental structure emerged, in which the state could not expect its citizens to identify with the regime and had to be content with their acceptance of it as a reality.

In the context of the contemporary international situation, the Compromise of 1867 immobilized Hungary as a whole. With the chance to settle the nationality problem in a radically different way now completely gone, the territorial integrity of the state and the retention of Transylvania became the cornerstones of policy. But the preservation of historic Hungary was associated with the leadership of the gentry, something which the bourgeois sections of Hungarian society accepted in good faith, in the same way as they accepted Francis Joseph's empire as guaranteeing their security. A quarter of a century after the Compromise this rational acceptance had become an immutable dogma. Apart from one or two clear-sighted individuals (it would be more appropriate to regard them merely as people with good intuition), nobody reckoned with the possibility that the monarchy would break up, and historic Hungary with it. Even the Hungarians of Transylvania, who in general were more sensitive to these dangers, kept dismissing their recurring fear of losing their country. The newspapers al-

15. Report by the German ambassador in Vienna on 9 April, 1890. *PA AA Bonn.* Österreich 92. No. 6a, Bd. 3 A 4781.

ternated between articles concerning the successes of magyarization and reports on the "progress ahead of the nationalities", while the government, again out of party political considerations, treated as classified all Statistical Office information which suggested that in the Hungarian–Romanian language war conducted in the mixed population areas, "the Hungarians had suffered serious defeat all along the line" by the turn of the century.

The dualist regime was a trap: it provided a sense of security for the Hungarian ruling classes, while at the same time blinding them to the dangers threatening not only themselves but also historic Hungary.

2. The Crisis of Accommodation in the Saxon and Romanian National Movements

The Saxons' Position in the Dualist System

For the 200,000 Saxon inhabitants of Transylvania, whose leading layer of intellectuals and officials feared for their privileged position under dualism, adaptation to the new system was easier than it was for the Romanians, although certain problems remained.

The government implemented the switch over to the new system with the support of the so-called *Neusachsen* ("New Saxons"), the bourgeois professional stratum seeking to assimilate, and, in addition, also used certain administrative means. It appointed a new Saxon *comes* in the person of Moritz Conrad as early as February 1867, and blocked the convening of the University, where there would have been an anti-union majority. Though the law of 1868, which confirmed the union mentioned the Saxons' right to self-government, the incorporation of the Királyföld into the bourgeois state began the following year.

In 1869, with the help of the new electoral law issued by decree, the University was composed in such a way that the eighteen new Saxons supported by four Romanians and one Hungarian could outvote the twenty-one old Saxons. Accordingly, the representative worked out a proposal for the reorganization of the Szászföld along the lines of the county system in a manner acceptable to the government. The two Saxon factions formally merged in 1872, and in the Saxon National Programme issued at a meeting at Medgyes on 11 May, they accepted dualism by acknowledging the Hungarian unitary state, provided it did not promote centralism. They acknowledged the legitimacy of the Hungarian state language, provided that the possibilities for using the nationality languages were extended, and subscribed to the more modern electoral system, provided that it did not lead to the preponderance of the "immature masses". Their much-qualified consent had its price, and this was the preservation of the Királyföld in the form of a distinctly independent county.

The ancient Saxon institutions came under pressure from above as a result of the centralist aspirations of the modern state, and from below as a result of the emancipation of the Romanian masses whose representatives

wished to fill lower and middle positions in public life. The strongest interest group wanted good — in reality, acceptable — relations with the government, and this explains why Saxon representatives joined the Deák party, even though Andrássy clearly indicated to the influential Bishop Teutsch in 1870 that his fellow ministers were irritated by the Saxon privileges.

Since the Romanians were also urging the dismemberment of the Királyföld, saying that the old system left no room for the exercise of their political rights, the Tisza government, after repeated consultation, passed the Law XII of 1876, which dismembered the Királyföld for a third time, this time for good. The political and administrative functions of the University were abolished, and it was transformed into an enormously wealthy foundation for the support of schools. The end of its nearly 700 years of autonomy was felt very acutely by the Saxon bourgeoisie, but did not result in what the old Saxons had feared — namely, "the obliteration of the Saxons from the face of the Earth". The language of administration remained German in the Saxon areas, and the University continued to be a rich and influential institution. In questions of finance the dualist government was consistently liberal; it only prescribed that, in line with the idea of equal rights, the University should also spend money on the cultural projects of the non-Saxon, primarily Romanian, population. The constitution of the Saxons Lutheran church continued unchanged, and served as one of the bastions of national and cultural autonomy. In reality, the loss was limited to Saxon privileges, with the Saxon themselves remaining in a strong position until the very end of the period.

The *főispán*s of the new counties were either new Saxons or Hungarian aristocrats. Representatives of the latter group, including such people as Count Gábor Bethlen in the two Küküllő counties or Baron Dezső Bánffy in Beszterce, pursued a policy of harsh magyarization. The situation was different in the Brassó county. Here greater understanding existed between the Saxon and the government. This was partly because Brassó was a more progressive county and, as such, it was the bastion of the new Saxons. Nevertheless, the Tisza era was, by and large, characterized by continual confrontation between the government and the Saxons. Both the Saxon deputies and the church protested against the Education Law of 1879, which made Hungarian a compulsory subject in every elementary school, although eventually the Saxon opposition was able to secure a reduction in the minimum number of Hungarian lessons per week. In the early 1880s, from the time of its conception onwards, the Saxon opposed a law regulating secondary education, a law which also obliged the would-be teachers to pass their final examination in Hungarian. But as it turned out, the excessive apprehension concerning the 1883 legislation was unfounded. Saxon secondary education shifted away from the humanities and towards the sciences, while at the same time becoming more uniform. Those studying for a teaching diploma did not, in general, suffer academically from spending a year at a Hungarian university. Government control of secondary education remained within the limits of professionalism.

In its struggle to maintain its position, the Saxon bourgeoisie received considerable moral support from the German intelligentsia and press, which denounced the Hungarian government's efforts both to reduce the Saxon'

autonomy and to step up their magyarization. The German universities already played a decisive role in the replenishment of the Saxon intelligentsia and clergy, and the Franco-Prussian War increased the pro-German sympathies of the Saxons and thus strengthened the appeal of the pan-German ideology. All this, however, offered very little in the way of direct political advantage. Chancellor Bismarck resolutely opposed German nationalist aspirations in Hungary: "We set such great political store by the strengthening of the Hungarian Empire and its unity that our sentimental desires in this respect must take second place". Most of the support for the Saxons came from various associations in Germany.

After a while, a noticeable restructuring began to take place within the ranks of the Saxon bourgeoisie. The old guild-master stratum declined, with quite a few of its members becoming the owners of prosperous medium-sized factories. Though the merchant population grew substantially, there were great individual differences in wealth. Of the traditional bureaucracy, large sections became impoverished, and the significance and hegemony of the bureaucracy as a whole weakened. At the same time the new, rising bourgeoisie — the lawyers, teachers and doctors — grew in importance and consequently the defence of the outdated particularism of the nation had to give way to the forces of economic and cultural development. This change was the result of capitalist transformation and, as such, it allowed the *Sächsische Volkspartei* (Saxon Popular Party), established in 1876, to seek a compromise, even if the party as a whole joined the opposition and its representatives voted against the government throughout the 1880s. A new agreement was born with the fall, in 1890, of Kálmán Tisza, the symbol of enmity. New *főispán*s were appointed to head the so-called Saxon counties — for example, the Saxons' long-time champion, Gustav Thälmann, was put in charge of Szeben — and careers in the administration were opened to the Saxon intelligentsia, without pressure to give up their national identity. In the counties an increasing number of officials were either Saxons or were sympathetic towards them. The Saxons' small and medium-size industries were given a substantial share of the government subsidies. It is very revealing that the same Count Gyula Szapáry whom the Saxon bourgeoisie had earlier wanted to prosecute as the minister responsible for the termination of Saxon administrative autonomy was the one to reach agreement with them when he became prime minister.

The 700 member *Sachsentag* held in Nagyszeben on 17 June, 1890 adopted a modification of its earlier political programme: it accepted dualism, the idea of a "unitary Hungarian nation-state", the Nationalities Law of 1868, but demanded equal opportunities for the Saxon intelligentsia to participate effectively in the implementation of the government's work. Great emphasis was given to the Saxon demand for a say in the running of the economy — the peasant economy and industry, especially manufacturing industry. On the basis of the new programme, the Saxon deputies joined the government party en bloc. Although future relations between the Saxon MPs and the government were not without tension, the former continued to support the government throughout the period, while official policy towards them remained moderate and conciliatory.

The opposition, the so-called "Green Saxon", movement launched in the 1890s, intended to provide leadership for every German in Hungary, but was unable to secure a majority even in the Saxon heartland. The government rewarded the moderate "Black Saxons" by regularly granting their churches state subsidies. Also, in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War, government financial assistance enabled the Saxons to rebuild five of their secondary schools.

The integration of the Saxon bourgeoisie into the dualist system is a good illustration of the possibilities and limitations of the nationality policy pursued by successive governments in Budapest. As long as the political leadership of a national minority genuinely accepted dualism (and helped to get it accepted by those it represented), and acquiesced in a few, mostly superficial, magyarization measures the government subsidized their religious and cultural institutions, tolerated their representatives in key positions of middle- and lower-level politics, allowed them to shape their towns and provinces in their own likeness and to represent a separate strand within the state. Such compromises, however, could only be arrived at by the political leadership of a nationality which already possessed an elaborate network of institutions and secure positions.

Romanian Politics: The Road to Passive Resistance

The Compromise of 1867 dealt a very heavy blow to the Romanian national movement. Shortly before it was concluded, the autonomy of Transylvania had seemed secure for the foreseeable future, and even if the Romanians there had been fearful, they had also hoped that they could gradually achieve political preponderance within the Grand Principality. The union, however, robbed them of this prospect. What they were given instead — constitutionalism and the disappearance of the legal distinction between the Romanians of Transylvania and those of Hungary — did not strike them as a change for the better.

The tendency which advocated passivity as a weapon against the Hungarian Parliament and which saw the sole guarantee of the Romanians' existence as a nation in the preservation of a separate Transylvania emerged as early as the elections to the coronation Parliament which met in 1867. On the Hungarian side, however, there was no longer any need to make concessions. When delegates finally approached Deák with their demands on 3 June, 1867, he could only tell them that it was too late, and that autonomy was already out of the question. The only thing he could promise them was fully equal political rights.

On his first fact-finding tour, the government commissioner appointed to administer the abolition of Transylvania's separate status was met by a number of Romanian intellectuals who protested ceremonially against the Compromise. He, of course, recommended that they accept the *fait accompli*, and refused the request of the bishop of Balázsfalva to convene a Romanian national assembly. However, there was no legal obstacle to prevent a

gathering at Kolozsvár, under the auspices of the ASTRA, the Romanian cultural society that was once again flourishing. Even the government commissioner was present at the first meeting and at the concert which followed it. This assembly adopted a policy that was to remain in force for some time: to wait until the dualist experiment collapsed, and, in the meantime, to use every opportunity to protest against both the union and the Compromise. This was followed by the *Pronunciamentum* of Balázsfalva in the spring of 1868, which adopted a stand calling for an autonomous Transylvania, a separate Parliament, and the sanctioning of the legislation passed by the Nagyszeben Diet in 1863–1864. Initially the government wanted to prosecute the authors of this declaration, along with the newspaper editors who published it, but the grand legal battle — which some people hoped would rally European public opinion behind the Romanian cause — never took place, as the government thought is wiser to stop the proceeding.

During the debate on the Nationalities Law of 1868, the Romanian politicians of Hungary, together with the Serbian deputies, tabled a counter-proposal. The Mocsonyi–Miletić plan, as it became known, regarded each nationality of Hungary as a separate nation, and accordingly, wished to give each of them a separate political-administrative body, though it conceded the need for all of Hungary to form some kind of territorial and political unit. However, even Lajos Mocsáry, the most liberal of politicians could not adopt it, and the Hungarian opposition, led by Dániel Irányi, was only prepared to make tactical concessions. The Romanian demand for Transylvania's autonomy was once again rejected by Deák in the debate on the legisiation regulating the union of Transylvania and Hungary.

Lack of success increased the influence of those who advocated passivity in Parliament. While Transylvania's Romanians went into passive resistance, the Romanian political leaders in Hungary proper continued to advocate active oppositionist politics. On the basis of their own, different, historical experience, they hoped to secure their national rights in spite of the government, but still within the framework of the unitary Hungarian state. This occasionally enabled them to co-operate tactically with the Hungarian parties. The Romanians of Transylvania, with their initial choice of passive resistance, soon found there was no way out of it. Beside the deterioration of the political situation, internal divisions and lack of organization also pushed the Romanian intelligentsia towards passivity.

Not that there were no Romanians to warn of the pitfalls of political passivity. The Szerdahely conference convened in March 1869, was presided over by a layman, Elie Măcelariu, who was also a member of parliament. At the meeting a number of political activists warned of the possible dangers: passivity was tantamount to abdication of the intelligentsia's responsibilities towards the people; it would result in the peasant masses coming under the influence of other political forces; and, by eschewing Parliament, the Romanians were renouncing an important public platform. Of the roughly 300 participants, however, only four voted for an active political line, because, once again, Archbishop Şaguna did not wish to lead his followers into a confrontation with the other side. The overwhelming majority enthusiastically supported Canon Micu-Moldovan's call for passivity: "Twenty or thirty years in the life of a nation is the mere twinkling of an

eye. But we all know that we are living in an enlightened century, in the nineteenth century, when it would be madness to think that the empire of injustice could endure for decades..."[16] The participants adopted the memorandum which he had submitted to the sovereign in 1866, at the time of the campaign to stop the Compromise, and which denounced the union and objected to several of the 1848 laws. A committee of twenty-five was given the task of launching the *Partidul National Român din Transilvania* (Romanian National Party of Transylvania). The government responded by dissolving the committee on the grounds that it was anti-constitutional; in fact the authorities recognized no parties which were organized on the basis of national exclusiveness.

The Romanian party operated in the borderland of legality: from time to time it was prohibited, although the government never tried seriously to enforce the ban. This state of affairs characterized the greater part of the dualist period. The boycott organized by the Romanian voters had a considerable effect on the elections of 1869. As a result of it, the Romanians were represented in Parliament by fifteen "Hungarian" (National Party) deputies and eight from the government party. The deputies, who formed a separate faction, actively participated in the work of the Parliament and often spoke out in support of Romanian political and cultural interests, demanding universal suffrage, the extension of press freedom and improvements in the administration.

Evading the government's prohibition, the Transylvanian advocates of passivity formed a six-man deputation at Torda in the beginning of 1870. This was to lead the political resistance being organized in the county assemblies instead of in Parliament. In 1872, during his visit to Transylvania, Prime Minister Menyhért Lónyay asked the leaders of this resistance to submit their demands. Their memorandum made the acceptance of the dualist system conditional on a new administrative division of Transylvania along ethnic lines, the recognition of Romanian as an official language, a more democratic electoral system and the appointment of a number of Romanian officials. The coercive elections of 1872 were generally characterized by Romanian abstention in Transylvania, although the Romanians of Hungary proper also suffered a painful setback. The two leading personalities, the landowner Alexandru Mocsonyi and the intellectual Vincențiu Babeș were also defeated. Seeing the activists' latest failure, Archbishop Șaguna retired completely from public life and, embittered by the decline and the accompanying dissension, died the following year. With his death, the Romanian nationalist movement was essentially freed from the tutelage of the clergy.

The Romanian intelligentsia of Hungary, who had become more resolute in the aftermath of Romania's independence struggle of 1877–1878, gained considerably in political maturity during the struggle against the Education Act of 1879 (devised by Trefort) which encroached upon the rights of the nationalities' school boards. After organizing preparatory meetings and sounding out government officials both in Budapest and in Bucharest, they held a conference in Nagyszeben on 13 May, 1881, with the participa-

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16. Cited by V. Netea, *Lupta românilor din Transilvania pentru unitatea națională 1848–1881.* Bucharest 1974, 381.

tion of one hundred and seventeen delegates from Transylvania and thirty four from Hungary proper. The meeting decided that passive resistance would be continued in Transylvania, while active opposition would be organized in Hungary's Romanian regions. Also, the founding of a united Romanian National Party was declared, and Partenie Cosma, the talented lawyer of the Albina Bank, was elected as its president. The programme of the united party primarily listed the old demands, with autonomy for Transylvania as the paramount objective. "The Romanian nation can never, under any circumstances, be reconciled"[17] to the dualist regime, they wrote in 1882 in a memorandum which summed up their grievances and which was published in several languages with the help of the Romanian government. This dignified but introspective programme — which left very little room for tactical manoeuvring — remained the charter of the Romanian national movement right up to 1905.

The policy of passivity was based on the initially widespread and quite justifiable opinion, one especially prominent in Austria, that dualism was merely a temporary experiment that would only last for a few years. However, the system built on the Compromise became consolidated in the early 1870s, as all attempts to transform it failed. Under the circumstances, the "passivist" political line generally adopted after 1867 changed from an initial tactical miscalculation into a basic strategic error. Instead of obstructing government policy, which aimed at the slow but thorough magyarization of the administration and the establishment of a new institutional structure, the policy of passivity, with its boycotts and solemn protestations achieved the very opposite of what it intended. The deliberate shunning of Parliament in a country in which virtually the whole of political life was concentrated there proved to be a self-restriction with far-reaching consequences. The Romanian electorate, for want of its own candidates, voted for the government's nominees, while the Romanian opposition enjoyed the lasting support of only one or two thousand intellectuals.

The Romanians of Transylvania and the Kingdom of Romania

Naturally, the people of Romania regarded the Romanian population of Hungary with interest and brotherly affection. In the Romania of the 1860s and the 1870s, a period dominated by the struggle for independence, it was primarily the intelligentsia and the university students who took up the case of the Romanians of Transylvania, although some gestures were also made by successive governments in Bucharest.

The Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878, during which the faltering Russian offensive was revived as a result of Romanian assistance, greatly improved the standing of the Romanian state, especially since victory was finally achieved by placing the Russian army under the command of Carol, prince

17. *Memorandum.* Nagyszeben 1882, 121.

of Romania. Many young Romanians left Transylvania to join the Romanian army, causing the monarchy, which was officially neutral in the conflict, considerable diplomatic embarrassment. Enthusiastic movements started among Hungary's Romanian population: people collected money, clothing and medical supplies for the Romanian army. The upsurge of Romanian fervour caused grave concern to the Tisza government, which was well aware of the recurring belief that it was only a matter of time before Transylvania would be annexed by Romania. The government restricted these collections, although it did not attempt to prevent them completely. There were also a number of Saxons and Hungarians among the contributors, illustrating the kind of political–psychological schizophrenia with which the Hungarian public responded to the war. Transylvania's Hungarian population also regarded the liberation struggles of the Turkish-ruled peoples as a positive development, although at the same time it feared the consequences of growing Russian influence in the Balkans. In line with liberal public opinion in Europe, sympathy with the Turkish cause finally won the day. This sentiment provided the emotional background for the last romantic conspiracy in Hungary. Its Transylvanian organizers, Gábor Ugron, Balázs Orbán and Miklós Bartha, all members of the *Függetlenségi Párt* (Independence Party), attempted to recruit several hundred Székelys to form a private legion. Their aim was to cut the Russians' sole supply line to the Balkans by blowing up one of the bridges on the Szeret River in Moldavia. The plot was probably financed with money from England. A few Romanian intellectuals were already considering a counter-strike, when Tisza apprehended the organizers. Six hundred rifles were seized and the matter then closed.

With Romanian independence achieved there was an upsurge in romantic nationalist feeling beyond the Carpathians. So-called Daco-Romanian calendars and maps became increasingly popular, showing the Romanian population between the Black Sea and the Tisza River as one continuous bloc. A growing number of articles discussing the Transylvanian situation appeared in the Bucharest newspapers, some of which were written in Transylvania itself. In Bucharest a number of allegedly independent organizations were founded — for example, the Transylvania Society (1867) and the Carpaţi Society (1882) — which took up the cause of their fellow Romanians across the border. The leaders of the last mentioned body worked on plans for an uprising in Transylvania as early as 1882. Its emissaries travelled the length and breadth of Transylvania, planning to smuggle in proclamations that called for an insurrection and the establishment of the Grand-Romanian state. In 1885 they called on the population of Romania to raise the irredentist flag, and also made a passionate appeal to the Romanians living in Hungary to begin an armed revolt.

Not only did these enthusiastic schemes of a few individuals lack popular backing, but international political developments also militated against them. The Kingdom of Romania sought the support of both Germany and Austria-Hungary to offset Russian influence in the region. Romania joined the Triple Alliance by signing a secret agreement with the monarchy in 1883. In addition, Bucharest always distanced itself from agitation against the monarchy, without ever formally committing itself to stifling such agitation. The Romanian government gave a certain amount of moral and finan-

cial support to the Romanian population of Hungary for their cultural and national projects but at the same time placed the Carpaţi Society under its control. The irredentist conspiracy in 1885 was crushed, and its six organizers expelled from the country. Using diplomatic means, Vienna partly suppressed, partly tempered and, after realizing its harmlessness, partly acquiesced in a moderate Romanian unionist movement from the early 1880s onwards.

In the meantime, the situation and the future fate of the Romanians of Transylvania had become an intricate party political issue in Romania. As a result, Vienna was unable to use its full influence as a great power in connection with the Transylvanian question without endangering its fragile alliance with Romania and bringing down the government in Bucharest. On the other hand, successive Romanian governments tried to induce the leaders of the monarchy to follow a nationalities policy more favourable to the Romanians of Transylvania, pointing both to their own precarious domestic position over the nationalities issue and to their status as loyal allies. These efforts found little favour in Vienna, but occasionally more in Berlin.

The act of joining the Triple Alliance cleared the way for the Bucharest government to intervene officially on matters of Romanian national development in Transylvania. Precisely at a time when it seemed that the monarchy's apparatus of neutralization, which was designed to silence Romania on the Transylvanian question, was working, Romania's role in international politics began to increase, and so, consequently, did its influence on the future of the Romanian population of Transylvania.

The Memorandum Movement

Tribuna, a modern Romanian daily newspaper was first published in Nagyszeben in 1884. Under the direction of Ioan Slavici, a Transylvanian writer who had just returned from Romania, and drawing on the talents of a group of young intellectuals, it delivered the fiercest attacks yet on the government, and especially on the emphatically moderate Romanian National Party recently founded by the archbishop of Szeben, which unconditionally accepted the union and the Compromise. In one and a half years this party disintegrated, or, as the *Tribuna* ironically put it, "died of moderation".[18]

The new movement was not satisfied with the old liberal methods, which were more or less limited to protests and cultural projects, and was determined to incorporate the everyday problems of a wider public into its policy of national grievances. Modern bourgeois journalism was brought to the Romanian population of Transylvania by the *Tribuna*, as was shown in its hard-hitting criticism of every departure from its own adopted views and its energetic style, which was similar to that of the great Bucharest or Budapest papers. While initially it called attention to the need to create "a *modus*

18. Cited by S. Bíró, Az erdélyi román értelmiség eszmevilága a XIX. században. (The World of Ideas of the Transylvanian Romanian Intelligentsia in the Nineteenth Century.) In: MR II, 173.

vivendi, acceptable both to us and to our fellow citizens of other nationalities",[19] less than six months later it could write: "If the maintenance of Romanian ethnicity is not possible within the Hungarian state... then our only course of action in pursuit of liberation remains the elimination of this Hungarian state, as well as the struggle to achieve this. To ally ourselves with the enemies of the Magyar ethnic group appears to us to be an organic necessity".[20]

The new movement tried to find new grounds for a Romanian national identity. It proudly proclaimed the cultural union of the Romanians on both sides of the Carpathians and presented Romanian foreign policy towards Hungary as a party political issue in Bucharest. This led to several confrontations, but also lent a new driving force to the ossified movement at home.

Members of the Tribunist youth movement procured the positions of vice-president and secretary within the Romanian National Party and forced it to carry out its earlier resolutions, as well as to present a long memorandum to the monarch, listing the collective political grievances of the Romanians living within the Hungarian state. The campaigners now received support from Bucharest: the *Liga Culturală* (Cultural League), a society for the promotion of Romanian cultural unity, was founded in 1891. The *Liga* subsequently established branches in Paris, Berlin and Antwerp to carry out international propaganda work. The Liberal Party, which was led by Dimitrie A. Sturdza and which formed the opposition in Bucharest, discovered in the nationality issue the perfect means of bringing down the government — a tactic similar to that employed in the Hungarian Parliament. Accordingly, the Liberal Party was able to use the Romanian movement of Transylvania as a weapon of party politics. It supported, and very soon even took over, the running of the *Liga*, which was the publisher of a memorandum of the Romanian university students issued in 1891. The leaflet was addressed to western youth and the Europe of the future, and was published in 15,000 copies in Romanian, French, German and Italian. After a short introduction relating the history of the Romanian people and its place in European development, it listed the national-cultural grievances of the Romanian population of Transylvania since 1867. After official prompting, Hungarian university students replied in the form of an *apologia*, which was prepared with the help of professor Grigore Moldovan, a Romanian supporter of the ruling party in Kolozsvár. This, in turn, provoked a response from Aurel C. Popovici, a medical student writing on behalf of the Romanian students of Hungary. Popovici's article was published in Nagyszeben in 1892, and led to legal proceedings. A court in Kolozsvár found its author guilty of incitement, but Popovici fled the country to escape sentence.

In evaluating the effects of the pamphlets war, Rațiu, the future party leader, declared: "Our complaints, now widely known in Europe, are heeded by all nations; they are judged as real and legitimate complaints and, accordingly, it is no fault of ours if European public opinion has come to the

19. Cited by I. SLAVICI, *Sbuciumări politice la români din Ungaria.* Bucharest 1911, 23, and *Românii din regatul ungar și politica maghiară.* Bucharest 1892, 33.
20. *Tribuna*, 25 September, 1884. *MR* II. 171.

realization that something is rotten in this state."[21] The immediate submission of the great *Memorandum* was now decided on.

The circumstances certainly favoured a memorandum campaign. There was a government crisis and election fever in Hungary. Germany, in contrast to the leading circles of the monarchy, envisaged an important role for Romania in the Balkans and tried to put pressure on Budapest by asking it to make concessions in its policy toward the nationalities. This was the time when the idea of a "conditional alliance" was born in Bucharest, that is making the Romanian alliance conditional on the better treatment of the Romanian population in Hungary. In January 1892, King Carol held discussions in Budapest with Count Szapáry, the Hungarian prime minister, asking him to extend the franchise in Transylvania and to halt linguistic magyarization and the administrative attacks on cultural institutions. Szapáry was unwilling to concede the first demand and, because of the opposition, was afraid to give ground on the latter. The prime minister's *"non possumus"* was also confirmed by Francis Joseph. Finally, Carol himself consented to the action of the memorandists, and informed those working on its formulation of his support.

The basic contradiction in the opposition stance is apparent throughout the lengthy document. While basically scouting the legitimacy of the Compromise, of the union, of the nationalities law, in short, of the whole system, elsewhere it demands the observance of the various laws. The abolition of a separate Transylvania was "nothing less than the open repudiation of the Romanian people".[22] It condemned the Law XLIV of 1868 because, "except for its name, the whole statute contains nothing of the glorious ideal of equality", and, with the introduction of the notion of the political nation, it committed a blatant assault on the existence of the non-Hungarians. The *Memorandum* also spoke out against the more restricted franchise in Transylvania and the electoral infringements there, because these prevented the Transylvanian public from being properly represented. It also criticized the harsher censorship in Transylvania and the practice of putting journalists on trial. As opposed to the period between 1848 and 1866, which was considered to be an emancipatory phase, the objective of the 1867 system was "to take back everything that we had been given by the unitary monarchy". The *Memorandum* on the one hand denounced magyarization in the schools, the compulsory Hungarian lessons, the lack of Romanian universities and state secondary schools, on the other the method of allocating state subsidy for Romanian priests which encroached on the church's autonomy. It claimed that the regime hardly employed any Romanian officials and prosecuted the intellectuals, and therefore "they are forced to conclude that they are regarded as foreigners in their own country". There was no freedom of assembly or association for the Romanians, and the societies aiming at magyarization injured them in their national identity: "We are challenged and brazenly humiliated every day".

The message of the *Memorandum*, what set its very tone, was that "after twenty-five years of constitutional existence we confront each other with

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21. Cited by *Unirea Transilvaniei cu România*. Edited by I. POPESCU-PUȚURI — A. DEAC. 2nd ed. Bucharest 1972, 208.
22. Published by G.G. KEMÉNY, *Iratok* ... (Documents...). I, 827.

more hostility than ever before", and that the Romanians "can no longer trust either the Budapest Parliament or the Hungarian government". A breakthrough could be expected only as a result of the "natural mediation" of the sovereign, so that "the system of government should be changed legally by involving the appropriate bodies".

The *Memorandum* was taken to Vienna by a 237-strong delegation in May of 1892, on the eve of the celebrations to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of dualism. The king, however, complying with the wishes of the government, declined to receive the delegation, and as a result its president, Rațiu, left the *Memorandum* with the cabinet office in a sealed envelope. From there the unopened envelope was sent to Budapest, whence the Hungarian cabinet posted it back to the address of its "sender", Rațiu. The first attempt, therefore, ended in failure.

It was the Hungarian government and the nationalist mood of the Hungarian public which came to the rescue of the Romanian leadership. "We never did anything so stupid that the Hungarians did not retort by doing something even more stupid",[23] recalled a self-critical Romanian politician. Protesters damaged Rațiu's house in Torda, which caused an enormous public outcry in Romania. The *Memorandum*, which was circulated also through the *Liga Culturală*, had been published in 11,000 Romanian-language copies and in 2,000 copies in other languages. After a certain amount of vacillation, the government finally gave in to the nationalist pressure. In May 1893, it ordered the public prosecutor in Kolozsvár to start proceedings against Rațiu and those party leaders who stood by the document.

The *Liga Culturală* had organized rallies in Romania, stepped up its propaganda in western Europe and raised money to help the banned *Tribuna* to publish again. At the same time, in Bucharest, the liberal opposition attempted to exploit the situation to bring down the conservative administration, which they accused of betraying the Romanians of Transylvania. Sturdza, head of the Bucharest Liberal Party, proposed that the entire national committee should leave Hungary in order to escape prosecution and should establish its headquarters in Romania "to give the struggle a European significance".[24] The party leaders, however, realized that Sturdza's sole aim was to topple the conservative government: "What would the peasantry, which knows nothing of the complications of foreign policy, say if its leaders turned their back on them to revel in honours in Romania, while poor, ordinary people went to prison?"[25] In November Rațiu travelled to Bucharest where he was assured, both by the government and by the king, that the Hungarians would soon grant concessions. On hearing this, he immediately left for Pest, but all he received there were promises of future improvements, while the Hungarian government demanded that the Romanians abandon their 1881 programme. The discussions ended without result. Meanwhile, the pros and cons of the controversial issue of whether to go

23. V. Braniște, *Amintiri din închisoare. Însemnări contimporane și autobiografice.* Annotated and published by A. Porțeanu. Bucharest 1972, 188.
24. Letter by Ioan Bianu to Brote on 12 September, 1893. Published by Ș. Polverejan — N. Cordoș, *Mișcarea memorandistă în documente (1885–1897).* Cluj 1973, 224.
25. Cited by I. Georgescu, *Dr. Ioan Rațiu. 50 de ani din luptele naționale românilor ardeleni.* Sibiu 1928, 156.

into emigration or to stay and fight were discussed at length in the Romanian press, causing internal chaos and compounding the earlier conflicts. It was this that was behind the later view that "Sturdza demoralized us more thoroughly in one year, than the Hungarian government did in fifty".[26]

The *Memorandum* trial opened in Kolozsvár on 7 May, 1894. Both sides prepared to put on a great performance, and Slovak and Serbian lawyers were also invited to represent the accused. In order to present a united front, mandatory formulae had been worked out for both the defence lawyers and the defendants. Raţiu and his companions were fêted at a number of railway stations on the way to the trial, and telegrams of approval and support came flooding in. In the first few days, more than 3,000 — according to other sources, 25,000 — Romanian sympathizers marched through the town where substantial military forces stood by. Also, several sympathy rallies were held in the countryside and these began to worry the authorities. The trial proceeded very slowly and much time was needed just to decide what language should be used in the recording of evidence. While the accused were granted the use of their mother tongue, the court obliged the lawyers to speak in Hungarian.

Only partially did the defendants succeed in turning what was technically a simple press offence into an occasion for a major political polemic, which was their underlying strategy. They were unable to initiate an in-depth debate on the *Memorandum* as a "dissertation on history and civil law". After the deliberately restrained indictment from the public prosecutor, Raţiu read out an impressive plea on behalf of the accused, a plea which had been written by the secretary of the party and a liberal politician from Bucharest. Raţiu claimed that he had been sent to Vienna by the entire Romanian people in order to procure the king's support for the protection of their much-abused rights. In reality the case was about "the hundred year old dispute between the Hungarian and the Romanian nations" in which "the court of the civilized world... some day will judge you more severely than it has done up to now. Condemning us in a spirit of intolerance and a fanatical racism unknown in Europe can only prove to the world that the Hungarians represent a jarring sound in the concert of civilization".[27]

At the end of the seventeen day long trial, the jury found the great majority of the accused guilty as charged, while acquitting four others.The court — against the advice of the judge who appealed for a new trial — wanted to condemn the whole spirit of the *Memorandum* and the accused as well, thereby satisfying both the Hungarian nationalists, and the desire for confrontation of the Romanian National Committee. The sentences were extremely severe. Fifteen people were sent to gaol for between two months and two and a half years, while Secretary Lucaciu, allegedly the chief organizer of the *Memorandum*, was given — despite the recommendations of both the judge and the prosecutor — the maximum punishment: five years in prison.

26. BRANIŞTE, op.cit., 215.
27. See the Hungarian text of the 25 May speech by Raţiu in law-court in G.G. KEMÉNY, *Iratok* ... (Documents...). II, 253–254.

3. New Tendencies at the Turn of the Century

Changes in Government Policy
at the Turn of the Century

It was a Transylvanian politician, Baron Dezső Bánffy, who formed the government which took office in early 1895. While in earlier years, as *főispán* of several Transylvanian counties, Bánffy had made himself hated by the Romanian and Saxon intelligentsia, as an advocate of ruthless magyarization, who combined patriarchal oppression with police methods. Even his Hungarian contemporaries referred to him as the "Pasha of Doboka (county)". Bánffy firmly believed that, instead of chafing against the Compromise, Hungary should join forces with Austria, with the dynasty, in the fight against the nationalities, and that every effort should be made to accelerate the magyarization process. In other words, he was offering Hungarian nationalist public opinion a more militant chauvinism to compensate it for compliance with Vienna.

In his nationality policy, Bánffy discarded the previous practice of trying to achieve magyarization by legislative rather than confrontational means, and brought an institutional and bureaucratic approach to the handling of the nationalities issue. His aim was to gather information about the cultural and political life of the non-Hungarian nationalities and, on the basis of this, systematically to realize, in every area and at every instance, those nationalist objectives which earlier Hungarian governments had pursued only haphazardly and sporadically.

The first step in this direction was the creation of a nationalities department within the prime minister's office, the control of which Bánffy kept for himself. It was a part of his shrewd tactics that he allowed the Serbian, Slovak and Romanian nationalities to organize a joint conference in Budapest on 10 August, 1895. This conference passed a resolution backing the territorial integrity of Hungary, but at the same time listed the grievances of the nationalities and urged the political recognition of the pluralistic character of the country, and the introduction of autonomy for the nationalities on the basis of the county system. By forming a co-ordinating committee these three nationalities wanted to give a common direction to their struggle. However, as the government had hoped, nothing much came from this co-operation in the end, except for a few meetings, some correspondence and a joint protest against the Millennial Celebrations of 1896. The conference hold in Budapest attested to the growing importance of the capital, for all nationalities.

The Romanian nationalist movement was at a low ebb due to an internal crisis. The excitement generated by the *Memorandum* trial, which for a time had caused tempers to flare on both sides, quickly subsided. Those convicted in the trial and still in captivity were pardoned in 1895. In any case, the Hungarian nationalists had grown weary of the trials and of the inevitable "fabrication of martyrs" that ensued. In Romania the Liberal Party, which had always exercised the stronger influence on the Transylvanian move-

ment, now took power and its leader, Sturdza, in a declaration of loyalty to the monarchy, repudiated his earlier views. He announced that Austria-Hungary "as it stands, is of vital importance to the European balance of power" and to the security of the Romanian state, and that the cessation of "every misunderstanding and quarrel" between the Hungarians and the Romanians was therefore desirable. He practically ended Bucharest's (officially secret but in fact widely-known) aid to the Romanian churches and schools of Transylvania, which meant the loss of 150,000–200,000 crowns in annual subsidy for these institutions. Only the Greek Orthodox grammar school in Brassó and its related institutions continued to be financed from the Romanian capital, because in this case Bánffy was prepared to make an exception and to allow the aid (admittedly channelled through Budapest) even though there was no doubt about its being against the law. Because it received money from Romania, the prestigious grammar school did not need to accept financial support from the Hungarian government, and as a result escaped the effective control of Budapest.

The government attempted to attack the schools from two separate directions. It tried to coax churches and villages into accepting government subsidy, as it was only with difficulty that these could pay the legally-prescribed minimum teacher's salary. The Romanians, who felt their cultural autonomy to be threatened, resorted to various counter-measures: their teachers either turned down the higher salary or they accepted paper increases from the church. In response, Bánffy ordered the counties to collect from the communities maintaining schools the sums necessary for the salary increases and, by imposing on them a higher "culture-tax" (which in Arad, for example, amounted to between 70–100 per cent of the property tax) forced all teachers concerned to apply for state assistance. This experiment also backfired on the government: the church authorities did, finally, levy the tax for the salary increases, but the politically unpopular task of collecting it fell to the administration. As for the creation of a body to supervise the finances of the two Romanian churches, this was a plan which was impossible to implement.

Law IV of 1898, which was designed to deal with place-names, was considered to be a magyarizing measure typical of this period. It stated that every settlement could only have one official name, and caused outrage among the Romanians and Saxons since it meant that only the Hungarian equivalent of a place-name could appear on any official document or signboard. And yet, in school books and school documents, the nationalities' own designations could also be included, and any form of a place-name, or indeed any language, could be used in the press and in business.

Nevertheless, the coercive nationalities policy of the Bánffy government was more bark than bite. It was unable to affect the Saxons, and even the Romanian leaders could recover from their persecution in a year or two. Bánffy was also frustrated in his ultimate scheme, since he was unable to unite the discordant forces of Hungarian politics under the banner of persecuting the nationalities and the Socialists. The parliamentary opposition accused Bánffy of selling out the nation's rights to Austria, and finally brought down his government in February 1899. His fall also sealed the fate of the Sturdza cabinet, as it turned out that Bánffy and Sturdza were in complete

102. Moldavian csángó women at the parish-feast at Csíksomlyó, 1930s

103. Székelys at Csíkmenaság on their way to a dance (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

104. Church-goers at Magyarvalkó (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

105. Folk costume of Torockószentgyörgy (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

106. An interior at Gyimesközéplok, showing a table with a chest built in (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

107. Hungarian church-goers at Oltszakadát (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

108. Fulling at Parajd (Photograph by Sándor Beluszkó, 1911)

109. An interior at Torockó (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

110. Romanian interior at Orlát (Photograph by Béla Révész, 1908)

111. Talmács, a wealthy Romanian shepherd village at the entrance of the Vöröstorony Pass (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

112. Romanian women's costumes from the Nagyszeben region (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

113. Saxon women's folk costume with rosette (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

agreement on questions concerning the Romanians of Transylvania. This was something that the Romanian public was not prepared to tolerate.

Kálmán Széll, Bánffy's successor as prime minister, decided to do away with his predecessor's methods. He promised the country a return to principled administrative methods in the spirit of Deák and Eötvös, under the banner of "Right, Law, and Justice". With a reinforced government party behind him, Széll was able to hold free elections in 1901. At this point the nationalities realized that the conditions for their return to the Parliament had greatly improved. The elimination of the nationalities department — a decision justified on foreign policy grounds as well — and the phasing out of the petty police methods also helped to reassure the Romanian opposition.

By the end of the nineteenth century the handling of the nationalities issue was more than just another police responsibility. Even though its satisfactory solution was not given a very high priority, it ranked among the daily political worries of every government, and required a great deal of professionalism on the part of the administration.

But something else was taking place at this time which was of great importance for the Transylvanian Hungarians. Measures indirectly supportive of the Hungarian ethnic group were introduced. Plans were drawn up for the improvement of Transylvania's banking facilities and for the expansion of the co-operative movement, and as we have seen there were preparations for the implementation of a socially- and nationally-oriented resettlement policy. The most important achievement was the Székely Congress at Tusnád in 1902, which presented a complex, government-backed programme for the development of the Székelyföld. Later on the Romanians also appealed for similar government grants to boost their own depressed areas.

Hopes for a Settlement Fade.
Renewed Romanian Activity

Traditional Romanian politics reached their zenith with the *Memorandum* movement. This provided moral gratification for the organizers of the movement and for those who sympathized with them, but did nothing to remedy grievances and offered no prospects for the future. It took years before the National Party was able to adjust its profile to the changing political situation and meet the new demands of a transforming Romanian intelligentsia and bourgeoisie.

The lack of prospects revealed itself in a crisis which began at a time when the party leaders convicted in the *Memorandum* trial were still in prison. A struggle broke out between the party leadership and the more radical Tribunist youth, which in 1896 spread to émigré circles in Bucharest, further increasing the ideological confusion.

Political circles in Romania were the first to point out the need for a new programme. The Tribunists, together with the Liberal Party in Romania, worked out the details of the programme which emphasized the need for a *modus vivendi* between the Romanian population of Transylvania and the

Hungarian government. According to the new policy, the party was to abandon its passive approach, and once it was back in Parliament was to reach an agreement with the government: the demand for Transylvanian autonomy was to be dropped in return for an electoral system more favourable to the Romanian population. (This was the programme which every Hungarian government had promoted all along as an initial basis for negotiations.) The Tribunists launched a new paper in 1897, the *Tribuna Poporului* (People's Tribune), this time in Hungary proper rather than in Transylvania. They established the paper's editorial offices in Arad, where there had always been Romanian representation in county politics opposed to the idea of passive resistance, and where the paper could rely on considerable support from the better-off peasantry. Although only fifteen per cent of the population of Arad was Romanian, it had the largest Romanian urban community after Brassó, with a Romanian bishop, a Romanian seminary and the second largest Romanian bank, the Victoria.

But the renewal of political activity could not stem from the leaders in Arad, who were far too progressive and who were deeply committed to the Liberals of Romania. It was the financially independent and politically uncommitted new social stratum, the modern bourgeois layer of the Romanian middle class, which took over the Arad programme and restyled it to fit the traditions of the party. Ioan Mihu, a landowner and bank director, announced the revision of the 1881 programme in a new paper, the *Libertatea* (Liberty), in 1902. The new programme accepted dualism, abandoned the demand for Transylvanian autonomy, and outlined a more detailed nationalities policy and a new social welfare policy. A young lawyer, Iuliu Maniu, worked out the details of an action plan which called for grass roots political organization in the countryside, active participation in county politics and a modern propaganda campaign in the press. In the summer of 1903, Aurel Vlad managed to get himself elected in Hunyad county as a National Party deputy without as much as a mention of the demand for autonomy.

While the Hungarians had misgivings about the appointment of Count István Tisza as prime minister in the autumn of 1903, the Romanians and Saxons pinned high hopes to the appointment of a man thought to be a loyal supporter of the court. István Tisza had attached great significance to the Romanian question from the very beginning of his political career, and accepted the fact that the Romanian population of Hungary had unbreakable links with their kinsfolk living in the sovereign Kingdom of Romania. In the interest of strengthening the multinational state (and Austria–Hungary in general), Tisza pressed for a settlement with the Romanians, who constituted the largest national minority within the country. In his inaugural address as prime minister, he stated that "to won and to strengthen the trust and the sympathy of the country's non-Hungarian speaking citizens" was an important national task. He also attempted to detach those moderate Romanians who were willing to co-operate from the "dangerous subversives"[28] in the national movement. Tisza quickly reached an agree-

28. Prime ministerial policy speech. In: *Gróf Tisza István képviselőházi beszédei. II.* (Count István Tisza's Speeches in Parliament. II.) Introduced and annotated by J. KUN. Budapest 1935, 15–64.

ment with the Saxon leaders who subsequently returned to the government party. The left-wing Romanian activists in Arad saw in the prime minister's statements a justification of their policy and gave further signs of their readiness to negotiate. The following declaration was printed in their newspaper: "We accept the unity of the Hungarian state without conditions and without equivocation; we are ready to shed our blood and risk our property for the political unity and the unimpaired territorial integrity of the Hungarian state, as long as this state guarantees, by means of strong and reputable institutions, the freedom of our development along the lines of our national and ethnic character. We do this in the firm belief that a stable Habsburg state in central Europe provides a stronger guarantee of our Romanian national existence than would a Romania which incorporated all the Romanians of Dacia Traiana in the absence of a Habsburg state. This is our response to the statements of Count István Tisza."[29] The greater part of the Romanian party leadership, however, did not place much trust in Tisza, who in actual fact considered the ending of an unprecedented parliamentary crisis to be his main task, and who, as a result, was soon forced to make concessions to the pro-independence opposition. In this way it was precisely the Tisza government which, instead of exploring the possibilities for some kind of truce, ended up making plans to take control of the nationalities' schools. The nationalities unanimously protested against the proposal, which was submitted by Albert Berzeviczy, the minister of education, in October 1904. On the other hand, the Hungarian opposition which pressed for even stricter government control, also found the same proposal unsatisfactory. In the course of his parliamentary crusade Tisza finally withdrew all his proposed legislation for tactical reasons.

From the point of view of the Romanian movement, the importance of the first Tisza administration must be judged by its gestures which indicated moderation and foreshadowed the conciliatory policies of the second decade of the century. Tisza instructed his *főispán*s to involve the Romanian population in the political and social life of the counties as much as possible. He practically ended press trials, permitted Romanian intellectuals to conduct protests against the Berzeviczy scheme, and handed over to ASTRA, the Nagyszeben cultural association, funds previously confiscated by Bánffy (together with the interest that had accrued). This money had been illegally collected to pay for a statue to commemorate Avram Iancu. After a long intermission, meetings with prominent Romanians were again considered. In the meantime, however, the parliamentary opposition was able to form a united front against Tisza and soon managed to topple his government.

On the eve of the elections of January 1905, and following a break of eleven years, the Romanian National Party held a conference in Nagyszeben. Instead of Transylvanian autonomy, the new programme pushed through by the younger generation demanded "the acknowledgment of the state-creating political character of the Romanian people and the assurance of the latter's ethnic and constitutional development through legal institutions". Other demands included the observance of the nationalities law of 1868, self-government for administrative districts defined to coincide with the

29. Contele Tisza István. *Tribuna Poporului*, 10 November, 1903.

various linguistic areas, and the introduction of universal manhood suffrage and the secret ballot together with some social welfare measures.

The new, constitutional phase of the Romanian national movement got off to an ominous start: only eight parliamentary seats were secured instead of the forty that had been hoped for, in spite of the fact that the administration's pressure on the electorate had been less intense than on previous occasions. The movement failed to become a sizeable parliamentary grouping.

The 1905 elections did more than just cause the fall of Tisza. For the first time in four decades the greater part of the electorate voted for the opposition, in the hope that it would further ease the country's links with Austria and help Hungary to advance on the road to full independence. With the electoral victory of the so-called 'Coalition', the nationalities' search for a satisfactory settlement reached a new stage.

The Coalition Period and Vienna's Last Experiment: The Workshop of Francis Ferdinand

The monarch, fearing for the unity of the empire, did not permit the leaders of the victorious oppositionist Coalition — Count Albert Apponyi, Count Gyula Andrássy the Younger and Ferenc Kossuth, the son of Lajos Kossuth — to form a government. Instead, he instructed Baron Géza Fejérváry to form an extra-parliamentary administration. The new minister of the interior, József Kristóffy, vexed the Hungarian supremacists and the Coalition, which jealously protected the political power of the landed class, with his plan for the introduction of universal suffrage. He did this in the hope that the Coalition leaders would renounce their demands for an independent Hungarian tariff area, a Hungarian central bank and the use of Hungarian as the language of command in the joint army's Hungarian regiments in return for the government's abandonment of the universal suffrage scheme. The Saxons greeted the idea of an electoral reform with reservations, although the Romanian leaders welcomed it wholeheartedly, considering that it represented the granting of an old democratic demand. It seemed that the king was finally siding with the nationalities. But Kristóffy, unlike Tisza, would not even permit the Romanians to hold a national conference: he did not want his government, which was already under constant attack from the opposition for its antinationalism, to be exposed to charges of weakness. In a further development, the minister of education simply issued a decree ordering that, in state schools, religion should henceforth be taught in Hungarian and not in the language of the respective denominations. Still, in contrast to the coalition parties which launched a noisy and theatrical but — except in one part of the Székelyföld — completely ineffective campaign of "national resistance" in Transylvania, the Romanian leaders urged their followers to pay all their taxes and to complete their term in the army — in short, to serve the dynasty.

In the end the monarch managed to tame the opposition Coalition, and Sándor Wekerle, a loyal adherent to the Compromise, was able to form a

government with strictly "fixed directives" in the spring of 1906. This caused some concern among the Romanians, who, after the end of the century, regarded the Independence Party as their principal enemy and as the "champions of Hungarian chauvinism". However, the new government leaders invited the two Romanian bishops and a few Romanian politicians to a confidential meeting. Although nothing came of the proposed co-operation in the elections because of the resistance put up by the counties, nevertheless eighteen Romanian deputies won parliamentary seats in the 1906 elections. Most of them, together with their Serbian and Slovak counterparts, actively participated in the work of the Parliament. Beside airing their national grievances, from time to time they also spoke out in the interests of the peasantry.

In its methods, the nationality policy of the Coalition period showed similarities to that of the Bánffy era: the concessions to Vienna were balanced by the hard line adopted on the nationalities issue, only this time the administration was having to deal with much stronger nationalist movements. In any event, the Coalition programme was inspired by the vision of building a "Hungarian nation-state". All these factors together helped to bring about frequent trials for press offences, as well as a new wave of pamphlets discussing whether or not the Romanians were actually oppressed. This policy resulted in an education law which made use of the earlier Berzeviczy plan and which became known as the "Lex Apponyi".

According to Law XXVII of 1907, the salaries of teachers in both community and church schools were to be raised. For this purpose, the government offered to give state subsidy to the communities and churches maintaining the schools, provided that a list of strict conditions were complied with. The schools were now supposed to give "an impeccably patriotic civic education" to their pupils, which in part was to be ensured by the more intensive teaching of Hungarian literature and the Hungarian language, as well as by lessons on the constitution. This was how cultural policy intended to change the fact that about 40 per cent of the country's population could not speak the official language of the state. There was another heavy-handed measure that later proved to be the source of frequent confrontations. According to this, Hungarian was to be the language of instruction in all the schools where half of the pupils were Hungarian, while in schools where Hungarian pupils comprised 20 per cent or more of the total, teaching in Hungarian had to be provided for them. All this was supplemented by regulations which magyarized outward appearances: every school had to display the Hungarian coat of arms as well as the name of the school in Hungarian. In addition, on every public holiday the Hungarian state flag had to be flown, official forms printed in Hungarian had to be used, and pictures showing scenes from Hungarian history had to be exhibited in every classroom. The Saxons and the Romanians protested at this.

In the nationalistic atmosphere which existed at the time the law was being drafted, there was no worthwhile response to the attempt made by the Bourgeois Radicals, who appeared on the scene at the turn of the century and were the most progressive section of the Hungarian bourgeoisie, to enlist the nationalities' parties as allies of the Hungarian democratic movement. The leader of the Radicals, the scholar-politician Oszkár Jászi, coura-

geously stood up for the nationalities, as did the Social Democratic Party which was the sole organizer of the Hungarian and non-Hungarian proletariat. The Bourgeois Radicals forged some personal links with certain representatives of the Romanian National Party, but never really managed to achieve close co-operation. On the Romanian side, the socialist movement was viewed with varying degrees of hostility: the Romanians tried to learn from the organizational methods of the Socialists and sometimes even considered the idea of an alliance. Nevertheless, among Romanian nationalists there was a fear that the Socialists would undermine the influence of the clergy over the poorer Romanian peasants.

In what constituted a difficult situation, the offer of an alliance came from exactly the place the Romanian intelligentsia had always hoped that it would: from Vienna. However, it was not the aging monarch who was behind this, but the heir to the throne, the archduke Francis Ferdinand. After 1906 a secret "Workshop" came into being around him, one which worked out a new state policy very much opposed to the Hungarians, who were considered to be enemies of the dynasty.

Whereas the Transylvanian Saxons did not establish contacts with the archduke. From the autumn of 1906, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, a Romanian doctor of medicine by profession who was also a parliamentary deputy, prepared reports for the Workshop using an assumed name. In February 1907, Francis Ferdinand granted Vaida-Voevod his first audience, after the latter had delivered a speech in the Parliament in which he had declared his loyalty to the dynasty and criticized "Hungarian separatism". This meeting was held secretly, as was the one to which Canon Augustin Bunea and Miron E. Cristea, a future bishop, were invited, and whose purpose was to clarify the views of the two Romanian churches.

It was around this time that Aurel C. Popovici, an exile living in Vienna, worked out a plan for a federal Grand Austria in his book *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Grossösterreich* (The United States of Grand Austria). In this the various ethnic regions, rather than the historic territories, would be given the kind of autonomy which the member states of the United States of America then enjoyed. According to this scheme, all the Romanians living in historic Hungary would be grouped together in one unit (with a separate region being created for the Székelys), and the plan also made provisions for the Kingdom of Romania to join the Habsburg Empire. As the strengthening of the dynasty was also among the objectives of the plan, the Workshop recruited Popovici, even though the archduke did not accept the latter's proposal — he approved none of the programmes in its entirety — and later gave orders for the plan to be revised in a conservative spirit.

The Romanian participants in the Workshop looked to the prospective monarch to end Hungarian hegemony and to extend the nationalities' rights. They knew his hostility towards dualism and his animosity towards the whole of Hungarian society. ("All Hungarians, be they ministers, princes, cardinals, burghers, peasants, hussars of domestic servants, are revolutionaries and scum,"[30] he wrote in 1904.) They knew that, in order to bring

30. The letter of 30 July, 1904 by heir to the throne is published by R. A. KANN, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien*. Wien 1976, 114–115.

down the Coalition government, Francis Ferdinand's aim was to "turn all the nationalities loose on the Hungarians", and that he hoped to achieve this through the introduction of universal suffrage. Vaida and his supporters offered the assistance of the Romanian party in the fight against the Coalition. In this way they secured Francis Ferdinand's acceptance of their national movement, and this association undoubtedly helped improve their political standing.

The Last Experiment of Budapest: István Tisza's Negotiations with the Romanian National Party

The fall of the Coalition government and the appointment of Count Károly Khuen-Héderváry as prime minister in January 1910 proved to be a watershed in the political history of dualism. In order to solve the continuing political crisis, a new government party, loyal to the spirit of the Compromise, was formed by uniting the entire spectrum of the country's conservative forces.

Transylvania's Hungarian population grew also disgusted with the Coalition. For their part, the nationalities considered the new government's members to be faithful followers of the court and, realizing that the archduke expected the administration to implement his policies, allowed their hopes to be raised even higher. The government was very careful to keep these hopes alive. It abruptly suspended the sentences of a whole list of political prisoners, dropped a number of the press trials it had inherited, and tacitly permitted the use of the Romanian tricolour. The Supreme Court announced that the public singing of the song *Deşteaptă-te romîne* (Romanian, awake) which was tantamount to a national anthem was not prohibited, and Apponyi's educational policies were placed under review.

The first measures of the new government found a favourable reception with the *Tribuna* group in Arad. The members of the latter realized that Khuen-Héderváry would need the nationalities' support in his fight against the Hungarian pro-independence opposition. They were also urged by the Liberal Party in Bucharest to press for a "fair settlement" and immediately started to organize a campaign. The leaders of the national committee *(Comitetul Naţional)* regarded the latest changes with anticipation, and Khuen assured them that the government did not intend to crush the nationalities in the elections. It is claimed that the Romanians promised to support the government in sixty constituencies, for which the government offered substantial electoral subsidies in return, subsidies amounting to 60,000–100,000 crowns in some cases.

The leader of the Bucharest Liberals, Ioan I.C. Brătianu, also sent a considerable sum to the Romanian party, whose members, in addition, could rely on Khuen-Héderváry's good will, the support of Francis Ferdinand, and the backing of Karl Lueger and his Viennese Christian Socialists. The party put up thirty-three candidates in thirty-seven constituencies, but internal cohesion was lacking. The cautious words of the level-headed Maniu fell on deaf ears when he told the voters of Alvinc: "I beg you not to listen to

those malicious rumours which suggest, with special reference to us former Romanian deputies, that we have made some kind of a deal with the new government..."[31]

The 1910 election — especially in the Hungarian areas — was one of the most coercive ever. The ruling *Nemzeti Munkapárt* (Party of National Work) which had been founded by István Tisza, wanted a victory that would simultaneously annihilate a number of different parliamentary opponents, among them the nationalities, in order to block the emergence of a strong parliamentary grouping which supported Francis Ferdinand. The changing attitude of the public, who had been disappointed in the jingoistic nationalism of the Coalition, contributed to the fact that the Party of National Work scored a great victory. Tisza declared to a gathering of trusted supporters that he was now ready for the archduke.

Only five of the Romanian candidates won seats, three of them in constituencies where there was no other candidate. By contrast, nine Romanian delegates were returned to the Parliament on the government ticket. There was such surprise at the outcome of the election that people did not even attribute it to governmental interference: "Two seats at most were lost due to electoral malpractice, since in a number of places our candidates failed to win thousands of Romanian votes,"[32] wrote one of the most moderate Romanian newspapers. The press organ of the Archdiocese of Nagyszeben, which had adopted a stand for compromise with the government, described the election in terms of the Romanian nation's having turned away from a programme which stood absolutely no chance of success.

Count István Tisza, the Hungarian ruling classes' "man of Providence", had come out in favour of an agreement between the Hungarians and the Romanians even before the elections. His speech had been warmly received by the Romanian press, and Balázsfalva's *Unirea* (Associate) had instantly compared him to Deák as the refuge of the nationalities. In July, Tisza repeated his view in Parliament. The Romanian National Committee accepted this as a basis for negotiations, and endorsed the idea that Ioan Mihu, a man of great wealth who had already played a part in the party's decision to return to active politics, should begin negotiations with Tisza. Abandoning his former policies, Tisza immediately acquiesced in the continuing existence of the separate Romanian party and agreed both to the inclusion of its leaders in further talks, and to the ratification by a Romanian national conference of any future agreement. The party leadership drafted the party's demands, deciding on a "more moderate" line in Parliament and promising to prepare a new party manifesto.

The political, economic and cultural demands of the Romanian National Party were sent to Tisza in the form of a memorandum in the autumn of 1910. The demands, which took the form of twenty-three points, included the extension of the franchise, the assurance of fifty electoral districts, the systematic use of Romanian as an official language, the establishment of a minimum number of positions for Romanian officials, the setting up of three new Romanian dioceses, the revision of the "Lex Apponyi", an increase in

31. *Tribuna*, 4 June, 1910.
32. *Libertatea*, 4 June, 1910.

government subsidies for Romanian cultural projects, the founding of three Romanian grammar schools and the extension of the "Székely Action" to Romanian areas in order to promote economic development there. In return, the party promised to accept the Compromise of 1867, but did not undertake to support government policy. Tisza (and Khuen) regarded this as unacceptable, but considered it as a basis for negotiations. The Romanian party sent a delegation to the talks but its members were unable to reach agreement among themselves. Maniu and Vlad were not even willing to admit the legality of the *status quo* and Mihu, who had become embittered as a result of the disunity and the multiplying demands, decided to resign. The various factions paralyzed the negotiations with their counter-proposals, and the suspicion — by no means groundless — was growing within the government circles that the Romanian leaders were not masters in their own house. The speedy elimination of factionalism became a matter of sheer political survival.

The strongest faction, the Tribunist movement of Arad, included Octavian Goga, a poet of considerable renown who had become popular on both sides of the Carpathians through his *Luceafărul* (Evening Star) and *Ţara Noastră* (Our Country) literary-political magazines, which he had launched in Budapest in 1902. In a series of incisive articles, Goga attacked the national committee for the lost election and urged the committee's revitalization. His followers, the "youth of steel" wanted a popular movement which rejected all alien — Hungarian or Jewish–Hungarian — influences. They developed a political concept founded on messianism, religious mysticism and conservative anti-capitalism but which also exhibited democratic overtones, as well as the influence of contemporary sociology and Hungarian bourgeois radicalism.

The Romanian party leadership first attempted to bargain, then denounced factionalism, and finally set up an official party newspaper, again based in Arad. From early 1911 *Românul* (Romanian) was published, with an ex-Tribunist, Vasile Goldiş, as its editor. The new paper had only one objective: to smash the Tribunist movement. The war in the newspapers, which often involved personal attacks, gradually developed into a real-life inquisition, to the great delight of the Hungarian journalists commenting on it. In the end the crisis was resolved from the Romanian capital. In March 1912, Constantin Stere, a man well-placed within Bucharest liberal circles, turned up in Arad and abolished the *Tribuna* through a series of harsh measures. The newspaper and its assets passed into the possession of the committee. Later, it was merged with *Românul*. The twenty-five year history of the *Tribuna* movement thus ended. Although the more democratic wing lost out, the committee gained room to manoeuvre, while its capacity to compromise also increased.

Romanian public life in Transylvania was revitalized, partly due to the continuing internal struggle. After 1910 one political mass meeting followed another and the societies once again flourished, thanks in good measure to donations from Vasile Stroescu, a previously unknown Bessarabian landowner. (These were worth at least 500,000 crowns in the three years beginning in 1909.) The celebrations commemorating ASTRA's fiftieth anniversary turned into a vast Pan-Romanian political demonstration, during which

Aurel Vlaicu, the talented Transylvanian aviator, played a symbolic part by attempting to fly across the Carpathians.

The second round of negotiations between the governing National Work Party and the Romanians of Transylvania began partly because of prompting from Bucharest. In January 1913 Teodor Mihali, Iuliu Maniu and Valeriu Braniște handed over the party's demands, which were now listed in the form of eleven points. On the advice of Francis Ferdinand, however, these were worded in such a way that any potential agreement based on them "would appear as though the Hungarians were violating it and therefore, could be considered null and void".[33] The document demanded the teaching of the Romanian language at every level in state and community schools, the introduction of Romanian in the administration and in the courts, unrestricted freedom of assembly and freedom of the press, and, finally, proportional representation in the Parliament. Tisza's response was deliberately cautions, and there is no doubt that the spectacular escalation of the demands had something to do with this. His reaction was limited to addressing easily manageable religious and administrative grievances and to giving some undertakings in connection with economic policy. The Romanian decision to break off the talks was supported by Francis Ferdinand.

The third round of negotiations began in the autumn of 1913, at a time of serious international tension following the Treaty of Bucharest which concluded the Second Balkan War. Tisza, who was prime minister at the time, renewed the talks with the three delegates who — conscious of the support they enjoyed both from a stronger Romania and from Francis Ferdinand — added to their earlier list of demands. For his part, however, Tisza made greater concessions. He promised to guarantee the right to use one's mother tongue both in writing and in speech in the administration and at the lower levels of the judiciary, to oblige administrators to pass an examination in the language of the region where they worked, and to extend the teaching of Romanian. He also promised a public Romanian secondary school, increased state subsidies to the Romanians (which then stood at seven million crowns), and finally, to give the Romanians nearly thirty constituencies. He was also willing to "reconsider" the *Lex Aponyi*. But Tisza's conditions were equally severe. He wanted the Romanian party to abandon its programme based on the old grievances, to accept without reservation the existing form of government, to accept the Compromise as a long term solution, and to fashion its policy in compliance with it. In this way, Tisza hoped to settle the Romanian question once and for all.

The Romanian party faced a serious dilemma. Its leaders could not have doubted the sincerity of Tisza's intentions. Bucharest wanted an agreement, and Vienna also pressed for some kind of a settlement, while the Romanian bourgeoisie wished to reach an understanding with the government in order to carry on with its business in a normal fashion. The Romanian party would have accepted Tisza's offer had he not demanded from them the acceptance of dualism, or as they put it, a declaration of surrender. The narrow leading stratum of the party wanted the agreement but was afraid

33. Letter by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod on 23 January, 1913. Kriegsarchiv, Wien. Militärkanzlei Franz Ferdinand, Rumänische Akten, 303/9.

of the consequences, and also wanted to stay in opposition. Its dilemma was made even more serious by Francis Ferdinand who promised to assign a major role to the Romanians after his succession which seemed more and more imminent with every day that passed. This partly explains the continuing extension of Romanian demands, which peaked in 1913 with the request for a Romanian minister without portfolio and two Romanian state secretaries. After this the Hungarian prime minister made further concessions. Seeing Francis Ferdinand's intentions, Tisza tactically dropped his last demand: he no longer attempted to have the Compromise accepted as final by the Romanians and ceased to insist on a "declaration of surrender". In this way he managed to lay the responsibility for failure squarely on the shoulders of the Romanians. There was nothing left for the Belvedere to do but come out in its true colours. In December 1913 the view of Francis Ferdinand and his adherents was still that "an agreement must be made".[34] In January 1914, however, the heir-apparent already revealed that he had agreed to the negotiations only after much hesitation and under the pressure of the international situation: "I am basically against an agreement, because it would involve the danger of our Romanians being drawn into the anti-dynastic Hungarian camp, which would involve very grave future consequences from my point of view."[35] The word was sent out that it was not at all necessary to come to an agreement, something which the vacillating Romanian National Committee was pleased to hear. The committee made the following declaration at its meeting of 17 February, 1914: Tisza's offer was "unsuitable for preventing, even temporarily, conflict between the Romanians and the governmental policy of the Hungarian state"[36]

If until 1913 it had been the Romanian politicians who had been the ones pressing for an agreement with the Hungarian government, now it was only the aging King Carol who urged this. Tisza, too, could see that failure would probably result. He wrote to Mihali: "It is painful to admit, but I now have little hope that our goal will be accomplished. Still, I am happy to see that you, too, think there has been substantial progress and convergence."[37]

In early 1914 a last attempt was made to integrate the Romanians — including, this time, those who advocated separatism — into Hungarian political life on the basis of the existing balance of power within the dualist system. Unlike a similar experiment with the Saxons, this attempt too ended in failure.

34. Memorandum of 30 December, 1913 by Carl von Bardolff for the heir to the throne. Kriegsarchiv, Wien. Militärkanzlei Franz Ferdinand, Rumänische Akten. Unnumbered.
35. Draft letter of January 1914 by Francis Ferdinand to Czernin. Kriegsarchiv, Wien. Militärkanzlei Franz Ferdinand, Rumänische Akten. Unnumbered.
36. Cited in: *Magyarország története 1890–1918.* (History of Hungary, 1890–1918.) Edited by P. Hanák, *Magyarország története tíz kötetben.* (History of Hungary in Ten Volumes.) 7. Budapest 1978, 853.
37. Tisza's letter of 12 February, 1914 to Mihali. Cited by F. Pölöskei, Tisza István nemzetiségi politikája az első világháború előestéjén. (István Tisza's Nationality Policy on the Eve of the First World War.) Sz 1970. No. 1.

The official Hungarian-Romanian negotiations took place over the heads of Transylvania's Hungarian politicians, as the Transylvanian question had long ceased to be merely a power struggle between the Hungarians and Romanians living in the region. Apparently the conduct and the views of these Hungarian politicians were shaped by their anxieties, which grew substantially after 1913, when in the wake of the Treaty of Bucharest, Romania became a power to be reckoned with in south-eastern Europe. Although Hungarian politicians knew that the Romanian problem had to be addressed again, they failed to come up with an up-to-date conception of how this could be done. Most of them thought that even Tisza's concessions had gone too far, as the speeches of Count István Bethlen and Zoltán Désy revealed in the course of the unusually cultivated parliamentary debate held in late 1913 and early 1914. The former preferred the policy of flat rejection, while the latter considered that a profound general democratization in itself would be the best way to resolve the problem.

The Social Democratic Party, which formed the optimistic wing of the progressive forces in Hungary, and especially the Bourgeois Radicals, felt the urgency of settling the nationalities issue more than most did, but could not manage to build on the talks. The Socialists, in line with the thinking of the time, saw in the negotiations a struggle between progressivism and reaction. From this they had a presentiment of the emergence of a conservative bloc extending from Tisza himself to the nationalities' parties. The bourgeois Radicals held somewhat similar views. Jászi alone attempted to address the question as a problem of non-linear development.

In early 1914, many still believed that an agreement — more probably without the much-criticized Tisza than with him — was imminent. The outbreak of the First World War, however, was to produce a completely new situation.

4. The First World War

The First Years of the War

During the political crisis which followed Francis Ferdinand's assassination in Sarajevo, it was the Hungarian prime minister who alone opposed the war against Serbia. The fear of a possible attack on Transylvania greatly influenced his views. Tisza regarded the Kingdom of Romania as an enemy from the outset. He thought that Hungary could not start a war "when we have already practically lost Romania, without getting any compensation".[38] But even Tisza's resistance was worn down by pressure from Berlin, once the Germans had guaranteed Romania's neutrality and once the general staff had promised to strengthen Transylvania's borders and to send reinforcements there.

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38. Tisza's memorandum is cited in *Magyarország története*, 7. 1086–1087.

On 26 July, 1914, a state of emergency was declared throughout the zone from Serbia to Galicia, and hence throughout the whole of Transylvania. Border-crossing was limited, and so was freedom of assembly and the administrative authority of the counties. Trial by jury was suspended and a speeded-up criminal procedure brought in. Censorship of the press was introduced in the country generally which enabled the authorities to make checks on private correspondence, telegraph traffic and telephone conversations. Horses and motor vehicles were requisitioned by the army and mass conscription began. The Kingdom of Romania, which was formally allied to Austria-Hungary, remained neutral at the beginning of the world conflagration and by all sensible reckoning, it was in Romania's interest to preserve its military forces intact for as long as possible. However, even at the beginning of the war the Entente and the Central Powers were competing for Bucharest's support, and in this way Transylvania suddenly found itself among the bargaining chips of international diplomacy.

Those Romanian politicians who feared tzarist Russia, and therefore gravitated towards the Central Powers, attempted to pressurize the Budapest government through both Vienna and Berlin. They suggested an autonomous Transylvania, as well as the transfer of a part of the Bukovina (in the Kingdom of Romania). In this way they hoped to ensure that Romania sided with the Central Powers. The German ambassador in Bucharest learned from King Carol that Russia had promised to give Transylvania to Romania, together with an assurance that it would obtain the consent of Great Britain and France for this. The Germans now increased the pressure on Tisza, and the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, personally asked him to make concessions to the country's Romanians. Tisza's view, however, was that Romania's attitude would depend solely on the outcome of fighting on the battlefield: victory for the Central Powers would render any concessions unnecessary, and these would be worthless in the event of defeat. Not everyone shared the prime minister's views: initially it was not realized that only the conservative politicians in Bucharest wished Romania to enter the fighting on the side of the Central Powers while all Brătianu had in mind in return for the Austro-Hungarian concessions was temporary Romanian neutrality. (According to the Russo–Romanian pact signed on 1 October, 1914, Russia had already promised to give Romania Transylvania and Southern Bukovina, on condition that Romania would remain neutral.) Under pressure from all sides Tisza finally agreed to making substantial concessions at the crown council held on 12 September. On the following day he summoned the leaders of the Romanian party and promised to extend language rights, to revise Apponyi's education act and to create more Romanian constituencies — provided that "the entire Romanian race" stood by Austria–Hungary. Vaida agreed to this but Maniu remained so evasive that Tisza had to break off the talk.

Political circles in Bucharest and Berlin hinted at a package deal consisting of the appointment of a separate Romanian minister, a few Romanian *főispán*s, a complete Romanian school system and forty Romanian constituencies. The plan was outlined during a meeting between Bucharest's ambassadors to Austria–Hungary and Germany on the one side, and Vaida, Vlad and Goldiş on the other, after the diplomats had convinced them-

selves that the latter were "unquestionably loyal to the emperor".[39] By this time the German foreign ministry was well acquainted with the history of the Romanian demands in Transylvania, and was also familiar with the comprehensive records of Tisza's pre-war negotiations with the Romanians. "The responsibility for the hostility of the Romanian public towards us lies with Hungary, and in the end Count Tisza will have to make concessions, while there is still time,"[40] opined the German ambassador to Bucharest, expressing a view which was in complete harmony with that of the German chancellor. But by a moderate extension of the pre-war concessions Tisza only wanted to keep the leading Romanian circles in suspense: he tried to delay their arrival at a decision in the hope that Hungarian policy might be able to circumvent the whole problem without making substantial sacrifices.

Correspondence between the prime minister and the archbishop of Nagyszeben was published on 8 November, 1914. It revealed that Tisza had promised to extend the rights of the nationalities as early as September, while acknowledging the loyalty of the Hungarian state's Romanian subjects and their heroism in the war effort. The press trials were dropped, the Romanians convicted of political crimes were granted amnesty and the use of the Romanian national flag was allowed. These measures made little impression on Romania, but sufficed to outrage Hungarian nationalists. In an interview given to the magazine *Az Ujság* (The News) Maniu appealed to Tisza for more details on the institutional guarantees of Romanian national rights. It is a fact that the position of the Romanians of Transylvania was relatively good as a consequence of the diplomatic efforts to win over Romania itself. In addition to the measures outlined, after the end of 1914 the government was very careful not to provoke Romanian public opinion. *Romănul*, the newspaper of the Romanian National Party, was effectively kept alive by the government, as its editors had wanted to cease publication in late 1914 on account of the censorship which was then in force.

The relationship between the Central Powers and Romania became tenser in the course of 1915. German pressure was strong when the military situation worsened for the Central Powers, but it was equally intense when they scored successes on the eastern front: they badly needed Romania's military strength. Mathias Erzberger, a special envoy from Berlin, travelled to Budapest and Vienna in May and June 1915. He had discussions with the Romanian leaders in Hungary, and even touched upon the reorganization of the monarchy on federal lines. Tisza, of course, would have none of this: in fact he personally visited the German capital in June to reject these proposals and to obstruct any experimentation.

The temporary improvement of the military situation and Bulgaria's entry into the war (on 1 October, 1915) eased somewhat the Hungarian government's problems. The Romanian newspapers were rebuked for not commenting on the various declarations of loyalty. Maniu, the staunchest figure in the opposition, was sent to the front and the police were given special powers. Finally, in March 1917, *Romănul* was also suspended.

39. Telegraphic report of 18 October, 1914 by Bussche, German embassador in Bucharest. *PA AA Bonn.* Österreich 104, Bd. 13, A 2720.
40. Ibid.

Romania's Attempt to Occupy Transylvania

Austria–Hungary's military failures during the summer of 1916 moved the Bucharest government to consider joining the war. In a memorandum, Tisza asked the king to concentrate a deterrent force along the Transylvanian border. He also wanted to secure Germany's help, and in return, was willing to renounce the monarchy's territorial demands in connection with Poland. The German, Austro–Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish general staffs agreed to launch a joint counter-offensive against Romania should this become necessary.

Believing the military defeat of the Central Powers to be imminent, the Romanian government succumbed to continuing French pressure and joined the Entente in a secret pact signed in Bucharest on 17 August 1916. The Entente undertook to support Romania by launching new offensives on the Salonican and Galician fronts, and also by sending war supplies. Much was expected from Romania's joining the hostilities, in return for which it was to receive parts of the Bukovina, the whole of the Banat and historical Transylvania together with further territories lying to the west, roughly extending to the line of the Tisza River but not including the Debrecen and Orosháza areas. During one of the last crown councils Prime Minister Brătianu asked: "Who knows whether there will ever be a moment so favourable in the centuries to come?"[41] On Sunday, 27 August, Romania's declaration of war on the monarchy was handed over in Vienna, and the troops of King Ferdinand, Carol I's successor, advanced across the Carpathian passes during the night.

Hungary's Transylvanian borders were guarded almost entirely by gendarmes: the troops posted there earlier had long been sent to the Russian front. The authorities began the evacuation of the threatened zone on the first day of the attack: the population was called upon to evacuate the areas beyond the Maros River, which above all affected the Hungarian and Saxon town dwellers and the inhabitants of the Székelyföld. The refugees numbered well over 200,000.

The Romanian attack shocked the people of Hungary, even though no one really doubted that the invaders would be driven back. The Romanian national movement also found itself in a precarious situation. While the party made no official comment, it agreed to its leaders' publicly swearing allegiance to the monarchy and denouncing the Romanian attack. At this time it seemed that Transylvania's Romanian population had less sympathy with the invading troops than the Romanian and Hungarian official circles had anticipated. According to King Ferdinand, "even the Romanians of Transylvania treated them as enemies",[42] and the professor-politician Nicolae Iorga noted that "not one word of greeting could be heard from them when the Romanian army crossed the border in 1916". These

41. Cited by V. Atanasiu — A. Iordache, *România în primul război mondial*. Bucharest 1979, 139.
42. N. I. Iorga, *Supt trei regi*. Bucharest 1932, 288. A. Marghiloman, *Note politice*. II. Bucharest 1927, 221–223.

extreme generalizations, of course, resulted from bitterness. There were many who cheered the Romanian troops, believing that national union would now ensue. But the majority of the Romanian population remained aloof. In spite of his complaints about the intelligentsia, the *főispán* of Szeben county pointed out in a confidential summary report on the Romanian invasion that the behaviour of the Romanian population was "satisfactory for the most part".[43]

According to the Romanian plan of operations, the 400,000 strong army should have reached the Maros River within a few days, so that it could afterwards invade the open plains of the Tiszántúl from two separate directions. Although on the Hungarian side there were only some 70,000 men even after the arrival of the first reinforcements, the offensive proceeded quite slowly. Although Romanian troops marched into an evacuated Brassó on 30 August, and then occupied the greater part of the Székelyföld, they afterwards captured only Petrozsény and Orsova, deciding not to occupy Nagyszeben, even though it had been evacuated. In the meantime the army of Field Marshal von Mackensen scored a victory over the Romanian forces along the Bulgarian border. This forced the Romanian military leadership to halt the invasion of Transylvania in mid-September and to put its forces on the defensive.

The Central Powers concentrated the First Austro-Hungarian (defensive) Army at Marosvásárhely, and the Ninth German (offensive) Army along the southern section of the Maros River. The latter was hastily assembled from various German and Austro-Hungarian units posted on different fronts. Falkenhayn, the recently dismissed German chief of general staff, led this army to victory against the Romanian forces in the Battle of Nagyszeben on 26–28 September, following this up with another success at Brassó on 7–9 October. Afterwards the First Army, under the command of General Arz (a Transylvanian Saxon), inflicted another defeat on the enemy, south-east of Marosvásárhely. The Romanian withdrawal now began. The retreating troops took hostages with them, but a significant part of the Romanian intelligentsia of the southern border region fled the country of its own accord. In some cases whole parish councils left with the Romanian forces. In mid-November, after heavy fighting in the Carpathians, the forces of the Central Powers reached the Oltenian plains and on 6 December, following further battles, they entered Bucharest.

Romania's losses in the 1916 campaign amounted to more than 100,000 casualties and 150,000 prisoners of war. The army was reorganized with the help of the French military mission under General Berthelot, and in June 1917 it managed to prevent the overrunning of Moldavia. Nevertheless, two-thirds of Romania (including the richest part of the country) came under German and Austro-Hungarian occupation, and two years accumulated agricultural produce fell into enemy hands.

After the Russian revolution Romania was left without direct support and, despite its obligations to the Entente, signed a separate peace with the

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43. Report on 5 November 1916. *OL* Miniszterelnökség 1917, XVI. 362 res. (1916. 6922 res.)

Central Powers in the spring of 1918. In accordance with its terms, Romania's entire economy passed into German and Austro-Hungarian control and its army was forced to demobilize. A narrow strip of land, between two and ten kilometres wide and with a population of 23,000, was annexed to Hungary on the pretext of a "strategic border correction", and Romania lost almost the whole of the Dobrudja. At the same time, it was allowed to keep Bessarabia which it had seized from Soviet Russia in January 1918.

The Measures Following the Fighting

After driving out the enemy, the government made spectacular gestures in order to reassure the Hungarian and Saxon population of Transylvania. In early November 1916 Archduke Charles (the new heir to the throne) and the king of Bavaria both visited Transylvania, while the German emperor made a ceremonial visit the following autumn. State and community assistance came flooding in. At the same time — and mostly to salve the administration's guilty conscience for leaving Transylvania almost completely unprotected — the civilian, and especially the military, authorities introduced harsh retaliatory measures against the Romanian population. Internments, arrests and trials followed one another, irrespective of the fact that hundreds of thousands of Romanians had fought valiantly on the monarchy's side. In the autumn of 1917 the minister of the interior admitted to the internment of 825 persons, although the Romanians knew of more than 1,000 such cases.

When the Tisza government was replaced in the middle of 1917, Count Albert Apponyi, the new minister of religion and public education, embarked on the establishment of a so-called "culture zone" along the Romanian border, in which all Romanian denominational schools were to be taken over by the government, except for about fifteen to eighteen institutions which were to be left with the Romanian Orthodox church on account of their illustrious past. According to the plan 1,600 state elementary schools and 800 nurseries were to be created within four or five years. A permanent supervisor was assigned to every Romanian teacher training college. By June 1918 all forms of state subsidy had been stopped to 477 teachers employed in 311 Romanian church schools. Only developments in the autumn of 1918 cut short these changes.

In 1917, the Wekerle government issued a decree which restricted property transactions in Transylvania (and in Upper Hungary). The new law did not explicitly exclude the Romanian peasants from buying land, but through administrative means, made this very difficult. Its aim was also to prevent the Romanian bourgeoisie from purchasing land in the villages.

The military operations following the Romanian attack caused some serious damage (especially in the Székelyföld), but this came nowhere near the devastation which occurred on the western and eastern fronts. With some help from the government, Transylvania recovered relatively quickly from the consequences of the chaos and destruction. Industry was still prospering, although there were serious problems with steel production, coal

production and transport. A number of companies and credit institutions — among them the Romanian *Economul* — increased their capital significantly. In 1917 alone, nineteen new joint-stock companies were formed and in Transylvania proper the total capital increase was nearly 33 million crowns. There had not been such an abundance of money since 1911. New branches of industry developed, for example, gas utilization, the chemical plan at Dicsőszentmárton and bauxite mining in Bihar.

It was the peasants who bore the brunt of the war. The consequences of requisitioning and the shortage of labour weighed most heavily on them, as did the burden of conscription. Yields, the area of land cultivated, and the number of livestock were all declining. The system of requisitioning introduced in 1917 left to the producers just ten to twelve kilograms of grain per family member, and any surplus left over from sowing was taken away then. Periods of acute hunger, if not quite the kind of organized famine experienced in Germany, did occur, primarily among the urban population but also in the villages. The soup-kitchens which were set up could do very little to help the very poor.

Because of the food shortages and also the decline in real wages, workers' protests became frequent after 1916. As is well known, these struggles coincided both with peace movements provoked by the growing war weariness and with the onset of political crisis. In May 1916 there was a series of strikes in the Zsil Valley coal mines, prompting retaliatory arrests and prosecutions. The Russian revolution in February 1917 gave the working-class movement a boost. In early May, there were workers' demonstrations in Kolozsvár, Brassó, Arad and Temesvár. The railway employees and the miners organized a new wave of strikes. By 1918 even the fear of reprisals was not enough to stop the masses. Their demands everywhere were for the improvement of living standards, universal suffrage and peace. The power of the trade unions with these movements suddenly became substantial.

Because of the danger of an internal explosion, it soon became very urgent to end hostilities. However, the crisis spread with such speed that there was no time for the government to save the situation through a rapid conclusion of peace.

IV. Revolutions and National Movements after the Collapse of the Monarchy (1918–1919)

The Michaelmas Daisy Revolution

The triumph of the October revolution in Russia in 1917 radically changed political relations in east-central Europe. While a strong Russia existed, the Habsburg Empire had had a historical mission: to preserve the European balance of power. With the downfall of tsarist Russia and the decline of Germany's military might, however, the monarchy lost its former importance. The future of the empire, and that of its 50 million inhabitants, became an open question.

The proclamation issued on 2 November by Russia's Council of Commissars called on the peoples of the monarchy to effect the unity of the proletariat and outlined the prospect of a vast, united revolutionary front. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, wished to split up the empire on the basis of the Wilsonian version of national self-determination, and also to block the emergence of such a large proletarian unit.

The Entente spent much time deliberating the fate of the monarchy. French politicians preferred the complete dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire, while the British and the Americans initially thought that its preservation would be more useful. In the spring of 1918 it seemed that the Entente did not consider the 1916 secret agreement with Bucharest to be still valid — if for no other reason than Romania's separate peace with the Central Powers. However, by the time autumn set in, the British and the French prime ministers had promised the "council for Romanian unity" their support for the union of all Romanians. By contrast, President Wilson, in his reply of 18 October to the monarchy's peace offer, only attached importance to granting the Czech and South Slav demands and did not even mention the Romanians.

The early autumn of 1918 marked the beginning of intense political activity. In the *Reichsrat* in Vienna the Romanians of the Bukovina demanded their separate state within the monarchy, and the Romanians of Transylvania did the same in Budapest. Following their meeting on 12 October, the members of the national committee informed the press that "… they would announce that the Romanian population of Hungary had no intention of seceding" and the "they only want the right to self-determination on the

basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points".[1] In Parliament, Vaida-Voevod demanded "complete national freedom" for the Romanians.

The majority of Transylvania's Hungarian politicians insisted on preserving the old state unity and any concessions they were willing to make were purely administrative (the appointment of a Romanian minister, for example) or concerned the use of the Romanian language. "Naturally, ceding counties [to Romania] is out of the question, but it is also pointless to talk about the division of Hungary into self-governing units".[2]

Károlyi and Jászi (who represented some sort of a shadow cabinet) had their first discussions with the delegates of the Romanian national committee on 18 October. Károlyi suggested a plebiscite to settle the future of Transylvania. The committee first of all wanted Károlyi's assurance that a future government headed by him would allow them to convene a Pan-Romanian national meeting. At the Budapest Social Democratic Congress held on 13 October, the Romanian delegate announced that "it is in our interest to support Hungary's struggle for democratization, since once we have won the rights due to us in this country, we shall not lose them even if we are annexed to another".[3] At the same time, serious reservations were also voiced about the Romanian National Party.

The Hungarian National Council, the body created as a result of an agreement between the Radical Party, the Social Democrats and the Independence Party, issued a proclamation on 26 October. In this it declared that the national minorities were to be granted self-determination as suggested in Wilson's Fourteen Points, and without delay — "in the hope that these elements will place Hungary's territorial integrity... on more secure foundations".[4] Also, a Transylvanian Committee of the Hungarian National Council was formed, with István Apáthy, the rector of the University of Kolozsvár and a scholar of European renown, being elected as its chairman, although his nationalism had long been a source of irritation to the Romanian intelligentsia. Jenő Janovics, a member of the Radical Party and a theatre and film director, became a deputy chairman, as did the Social Democrat Sándor Vincze.

Concurrently with the October revolution in Budapest and following the example of their Hungarian brothers, the Romanian Social Democrats established links with the Romanian National Party and pressed for the setting up of a Romanian national council. This was achieved in Budapest as early as 31 October. The National Party imposed the condition that only those Social Democrats should be delegated who "will not obstruct the passage of resolutions" by opposing the nationalist trend.

During the day of the bourgeois democratic revolution there was also unrest in Transylvania, culminating in serious demonstrations in Kolozsvár

1. *Aradi Hírlap* (Arad News), 12 October, 1918; *Gazeta Poporului*, 27 October, 1918.
2. *OSZK Kézirattára* (Manuscript Collection of the National Széchenyi Library), Apáthy-iratok. (Apáthy Documents.) Quart. Hung. 2955.
3. *Adevĕrul*, 20 October, 1918.
4. *A magyar munkásmozgalom történetének válogatott dokumentumai.* (Selected Documents of the History of the Hungarian Working-Class Movement.) V. 7 November, 1917 – 21 March, 1919. Edited by Mrs. S. Gábor, Budapest 1956, 267.

on 30–31 October. Political prisoners were released and censorship was abolished.

The Károlyi government, which the revolution helped to power on 1 November, immediately released the remaining internees, lifted the restrictions on those newspapers which had been banned, ended the sequestration of the property of those convicted, reopened all the nationalities' schools, consulted the nationalities over the appointment of new *főispán*s, complemented the general political amnesty with a general military pardon and announced a relief programme for the Transylvanian counties.

An independent workers' and soldiers' council was formed first in Temesvár, and then in the Zsil Valley, and there were revolutionary movements in Szeben, Bihar and Szilágy counties.

The actions of the workers and the soldiers in the first days of November resulted in the disintegration of the remaining army units. Accordingly, the most effective means of control, the army, for all practical purposes ceased to exist. In several places, for example, in Kolozsvár and Arad, the Social Democratic Party relied on the organized workers to maintain law and order.

The revolution in Budapest and a series of working class protests in the provinces stirred up the villages, already charged with social discontent, while tens of thousands of exhausted, but revolutionized, soldiers who returned from the front in early November provided the main body of those determined to effect change. On 6 November, the *főispán* of Krassó–Szörény county reported: "The unbridled masses, which initially consisted of soldiers only, gradually won the whole population of the villages to their own purposes and turned on everyone whom they saw as an enemy because they were well-off... One cannot even say that this was aimed against any particular nationality, as looting has been reported also in villages inhabited entirely by Romanians."[5]

A number of estates and government properties were attacked, and the furniture in a number of mansions and looted storehouses smashed. The violence of the peasantry was most intense in the more developed areas — in Arad, Temes, Krassó–Szörény and, to some extent, Bihar and Kolozs counties. "... In all the ridings of Kolozs county, almost without exception, bolshevism, the distribution of land, either implemented or under preparation, and the violation of property have raised their heads,"[6] ran one official report. The unrest did not have a nationalist character. Sentences such as "Romanian priests and notaries were expelled here, as were Hungarians in the purely Hungarian Great Hungarian Plain," or "quite frequently Romanians and Hungarians went on the rampage together" occur regularly in the reports.[7] Nor did the Romanian peasantry spare the property of its "own leaders". Romanians attacked the 3,000 *hold* estate of Gheorge Pop, the aging Romanian party leader, in the same way that they attacked the lands of the Mocsonyis or of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Nagyvárad. At Nagyilonda

5. *OL* Nemzetiségi Ügyek Minisztériuma (National Archives. Ministry of Nationality Affairs), 1918. Vol. IX, 27.
6. Ibid. 839.
7. *Erdély története.* (History ofTransylvania.) II. Edited by M. Constantinescu. Bucharest 1964, 425; *Aradi Hírlap,* 2–5 November, 1918.

the wealthy landowner, Mihali, fired on the Romanian peasants, in defence of his life — or more likely — his property.

The government proved powerless against popular movements. The gendarmerie, which was not large enough even for its everyday duties, was confined to the centre of population in order to protect the lives of its members. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the government looked to the national councils for help. As soon as the revolution broke out a joint Hungarian–Romanian–Saxon appeal had been issued in Transylvania calling on all its peoples to establish contacts with each other in order to protect life and property. As a result of the meeting between Aurel Vlad, Ioan Erdélyi and Rudolf Schuller representing the non-Hungarian peoples of Transylvania on one side and Oszkár Jászi on the other, the minister of public education abolished the short-lived "cultural zone". As Jászi also noted, however, that "first, we conferred about the ways of maintaining law and order in the Transylvanian regions. On this question, there was complete agreement between us."[8]

Encouraged by the central government and the local authorities, councils were formed even in places where such bodies had not been organized spontaneously. Both the more conservative and the more radical councils used national slogans to calm the social unrest. The Romanian councils, as well as the government, were afraid of losing their reputation and influence as a result of possible violent clashes between the nationalities.

The Hungarian bourgeoisie was dissatisfied with the weakness of the central government and demanded that "if necessary, the government should not hesitate to impose martial law. This measure, when introduced against criminals who threaten the safety of property, is not inconsistent with social liberty".[9] Quite a number of people fell victim to mob violence and to the reprisals which followed it. Earlier historiography exploited the two best-known instances to instigate nationalist animosity. On 6 November, the peasants raided a few (closed) shops in Facsád and even volleys fired by the gendarmerie were unable to disperse the mob. Looters then broke into the grain storehouses and into a shop belonging to a co-operative society. An aeroplane arrived from Arad and dropped bombs on the crowd: it was claimed that 104 people lost their lives. The Arad newspapers found it reassuring to know that thereafter aircraft were constantly patrolling the skies. Italian prisoners of war together with Romanian peasants ransacked a sawmill and the castle at Jósikafalva. A few days later the troop recruited privately by the owner's brother captured and executed about twenty peasants and burned their bodies. The joint committee of the Kolozsvár Romanian and Hungarian national councils found the vigilantes still on the scene on 12 November and, naturally enough, condemned the action.

8. *Aradi Hírlap*, 3 November, 1918.
9. *Aradi Hírlap*, 5 November, 1918.

The Emergence of the Romanian Bourgeoisie's Power Base

The revolution and the mass movements broke the back of the old order. Those who for decades had blocked the Romanian National Party's rise to power were mostly displaced or driven away, thus providing the opportunity for the party to try for political supremacy.

The Károlyi government treated the Romanian bourgeoisie in a fundamentally democratic way: it could hardly do otherwise. The government in Budapest "not only allowed the Romanians to organize national councils and militia, but even encouraged them to do so, since the government regarded these as autonomous organizations which were, nevertheless, part of the state apparatus".[10] The government also allocated considerable sums to the Romanian national guards. The Romanian militiamen contributed to the restoration of order, and by mid-November they undoubtedly constituted the most reliable policing force.

Initially the relationship between the Hungarian authorities and the Romanian councils was friendly. The growing strength of the republican movement and the continuing radicalization of Hungarian society seem to have helped to speed up the emancipation of the Romanian bourgeoisie. "As far as we Romanians are concerned, we can only regard it [i.e. the revolution] as a national catastrophe. We must use every opportunity to give this revolution a national character," wrote their main newspaper, also stressing that "the Romanian National Council was not born of revolution." "... No one should expect us to follow the example of Budapest and become republicans, enemies of the dynasty, or revolutionaries. We have not been such up to now, and have no reason to become such in the future ." "We shall go our separate way [...] taking care to avoid the fate of Budapest, for we do not wish to be taken where we do not want to go, nor to arrive where we do not want to be."[11]

The Central Romanian National Council, which in the meantime had moved from Budapest to Arad, now attempted to organize a larger independent armed force. The central officers' and soldiers' council was based in Vienna, where with about 100 officers, Maniu formed the Romanian soldiers' council. This represented an infantry regiment of 5,000 Romanians from the monarchy and further soldiers in Wiener-Neustadt. The aim of the Vienna project was to reorganize into new units those Romanian soldiers who were returning from the front in their thousands and to send them back to Transylvania. In this way the Romanian National Council would have acquired what at the time was an enormous military force of roughly 50,000 men, which could have altered the balance not only between Budapest and Arad, but perhaps even between Bucharest and Arad, with unforeseeable results. A certain number of soldiers did arrive back in Transylvania, but the Serbian high command, which was still worried about the

10. *Les négociations de la paix hongroise*. I. Budapest 1920, 384.
11. *Românul*, 7 December, 1918, 12 November, 1918; *Drapelul*, 19 November, 1918. See also V. LIVEANU, *Din istoria luptelor revoluționare din România*. Bucharest 1960, 507, 510, 547–548.

uncertain future of the Banat, thought it wiser to demobilize the well-equipped Prague Romanian Legion, which was returning in a roundabout way from Bohemia. With this, the hopes for an independent Romanian army disintegrated.

The so-called "Lansing-message" was published after the outbreak of the revolution, on 5 November. This revealed that the American president "sympathized with the idea of national unity for all Romanians everywhere. The USA will not miss the opportunity to exert its influence at the appropriate time to help the Romanian people to satisfy their legitimate political and territorial demands".[12] By now all the victorious powers supported Romania's territorial claims, which meant that Transylvania's union with Romania was going to be achieved through the use of force. Even Berlin sent a message to the Romanian government on 9 November, saying that "it would show sympathy towards Romania's claims on Transylvania", provided that Mackensen's army was not molested as it withdrew from Romanian soil.

The new circumstances prompted the Romanian politicians of Transylvania to act. They wanted to speed up the impending process and, also, to reinforce their own positions in such a way that they would be able to defend as well as to increase their independence in any new situation. On 9 November, the Romanian National Council in Arad sent an "ultimatum" to Budapest in which it called on the "government of the Hungarian National Council" to transfer the control of eastern Hungary. In giving its reasons, besides stressing the right to self-determination, the council deliberately emphasized the need to protect life and property in the area. Besides historic Transylvania, the disputed area included Torontál, Temes, Krassó-Szörény, Arad, Bihar, Szilágy, Szatmár and Máramaros counties, as well as the "Romanian areas of Csanád, Békés and Ugocsa".[13] The Romanian National Council wished to assume power on the basis of complete legal continuity, and asked the government, of its own accord, to make over to it every institution and authority and also to inform the public in a proclamation about the new state of affairs.

The Hungarian government discussed the memorandum at an extended cabinet meeting. Even the strongly nationalist Apáthy and Count István Bethlen accepted the proposal of Oszkár Jászi the nationalities minister, who wanted to negotiate with the Romanians over the Transylvanian problem, and who wished to solve it through the creation of a Swiss-type confederation of cantons. The Hungarian public expected much from Jászi's trip to Arad, even though the Transylvanian newspapers sounded the alarm as early as 9 November that parts of Transylvania would be evacuated. If these negotiations were successful then "we could avert Transylvania's annexation to Romania, and also, besides protecting our territorial integrity against the Czechs, we could lay the foundation for a federal state".[14] Thus ran the optimistic message emanating from government circles.

12. B. Jancsó, *A román irredentista mozgalmak története.* (The History of the Romanian Irredentist Movements.) Budapest 1920, 123.
13. See the letter of the Romanian National Council, *OL* Nemzetiségi Ügyek Minisztériuma. 1918. Vol. IX, 240.
14. *Magyarország* (Hungary), 12 November, 1918.

On 13 November, the Hungarian delegation arrived in Arad with members of the Saxon and Swabian national councils. Jászi told the journalists: "The stand we are taking is such that if the Romanians are serious about wanting place, they cannot very well not have it".[15]

Because of the Romanian protests, the representatives of Transylvania's non-Romanian councils could only attend the negotiations as observers, even though, according to Jászi's figures, of the 6.8 million inhabitants in the territories demanded only approximately 2.9 million were Romanian by nationality. This restriction already showed that the Romanian leaders took a one-sided view of the right to self-determination.

In Arad, Jászi submitted the plan of the new democratic state for a federal system. He offered self-determination and full governmental powers to all the territories where Romanians lived in solid blocks or where they were in an absolute majority. The Romanians could also send representatives to the peace negotiations. Jászi's proposal, if accepted, would have significantly reduced the Romanian territorial demands. He singled out the Orsova–Élesd–Zilah–Visó Valley line as the western boundary of the area he was prepared to hand over for organization on the Swiss pattern. In addition, Jászi wished to create an elaborate system for the government of isolated ethnic regions, a system reflecting Transylvania's national complexities. In Jászi's plan the Székelyföld and the Kolozsvár area would have been Hungarian "islands", and the regions of Petrozsény, Vajdahunyad, Resica and Lugos would have all be given Hungarian autonomy. At the same time, three Romanian regions would have been set up deep inside the Hungarian territories. Jászi completed his offer with the suggestion that an international body should check the Statistical Office's figures on the ethnic breakdown of the area by conducting investigations on the spot. He promised to allocate places to Romanian politicians in the government and wanted to set up joint committees to handle common affairs. All this rightly aroused the suspicion in the Romanian leaders that Jászi in fact wanted to present the peace negotiators with a *fait accompli*. The Romanians themselves were looking for a solution elsewhere.

The next day news came that on 13 November, Károlyi and Franchet d'Esperey had signed an armistice convention in Belgrade. According to this, the Budapest government was left in charge of the administration of the whole of Hungary, although Entente troops were permitted to advance up to the line of the Maros River. The Hungarian delegation was encouraged by the news, although the course of the negotiations was unaffected by it. Jászi was told that his offer was rejected. The Romanian leaders found that the "provisional solutions" in no way guaranteed the restoration of order and the safety of life and property in the territories demanded by them. After repeated and futile attempts at bargaining, Jászi asked what the Romanians really wanted. Complete secession was Maniu's answer.

The talks had failed. It was quite clear that the Károlyi government had sincerely wished to settle the nationalities issue in a democratic way. Although it wanted to preserve the country's integrity, it planned to do this

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15. J. Komaromi, Jászi Aradon. (Jászi at Arad.) *Új Magyar Szemle* (New Hungarian Review), 1920, No. 1, 27–35.

on a completely new federal basis. It could not, however, agree to the total secession of substantial parts of the country.

The Romanian leaders left the final decision to the army of the Romanian state and the peace negotiators. They abstained from a quick and unilateral proclamation of a take-over since that "would cause enormous confusion among the peoples of Hungary and this confusion might serve to upset an already fragile order".[16] The gradual take-over began without this.

The Romanian National Assembly at Gyulafehévár

Negotiations were still going on in Arad when Maniu sent a memorandum to Paris in which, contrary to the spirit of the Belgrade armistice convention, he requested permission for the Romanian army to cross the Maros River. He also invited the Romanian government to intervene in Transylvania and convinced King Ferdinand that his troops would find there sufficient food, clothing and boots — in short, everything except resistance — and that their advance would not be challenged. With this the question of military intervention was settled.

In a proclamation addressed to the "peoples of the world", on 20 November the Romanian National Council declared a sovereign state as its ultimate goal. It also announced that the government opposes "the brute force of the oppressive state" with the just claims of the Romanian nation.[17] The next day, anticipating the intentions of the Romanian government, the council published another manifesto which called on the Romanian population to hold a national assembly. The same manifesto also contained the proclamation of the chief of the Romanian general staff made on the occasion of his troops' entering Transylvania. In a confidential circular the national committee called on the local councils in as many communities as possible "to proclaim their unconditional accession to the Kingdom of Romania under the rule of the present dynasty". The committee even enclosed a sample proclamation with the added comment that the communities should make their own proclamations in a number of copies: the Romanian diplomats going to the peace negotiations would also be needing some.

"In this way a plebiscite can probably be avoided",[18] ran the circular, summing up the aim of the action. Rather than try to prevent the Romanian national assembly, the government even ordered the Hungarian State Railways to lay on special trains to take the Romanians to Gyulafehérvár on 1 December.

This meeting posed a lot of problems for the Romanian Social Democrats. The left took a clear stand: "We will be united with Romania, but we

16. *Aradi Hírlap*, 15 November, 1918.
17. See the duplicated circular published in the name of the old national committee. *OL* Nemzetiségi Ügyek Minisztériuma. 1918. Vol. X, 242.
18. Regarding the details see also L. NAGY, *A kisebbségek alkotmányjogi helyzete Romániában*. (The Constitutional Status of the Minorities in Romania.) Kolozsvár 1944, 18–19.

must impose certain conditions. [She] must be ready to move with the times and expel the tyrants, and the people of Romania, who would then be liberated as we are now, should shake hands and let us create a great, free and democratic country. We need longer neither the boyars, nor the symbol of their power (the king)."[19] The right-wing Socialists also thought that "the national assembly should solemnly declare that it would preserve the autonomy of free Transylvania until the sorry conditions which presently prevail in Romania have changed".[20] Finally, a compromise was agreed: the right-wing Socialists renounced republican propaganda, while the National Party would accept a slower implementation of the union and would guarantee democratic reforms. Even prominent bourgeois politicians contemplated the idea of an autonomous Transylvania within Romania.

After reconciling the various views, a select committee drafted the plan for a new resolution on 30 November. This draft made no mention of the institution of the monarchy and put into writing such democratic principles as universal suffrage and the secret ballot, unqualified freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience and freedom of the press, agrarian reform and the extension of the workers' political rights. The III. section of the resolution dealt with the national minorities: "Complete national freedom for the peoples jointly inhabiting. All peoples have the right to their own education and government in their own language, with their own administration, and by individuals chosen from among themselves."[21] This indicated that the Romanian leaders had learned from their earlier minority status to promise wider freedom to Transylvania's Hungarians and Saxons than those granted to the Romanian population under the dualist Hungarian state.

On 1 December, 1918, the 1,228 delegates at the Gyulafehérvár assembly accepted the union with Romania with the comment that "our specific institutions necessitate the preservation of a temporary autonomy which by no means alters the fact of the unconditional union".[22] The assembly elected a Grand National Council with 200 members, which also included thirty Social Democrats, besides the bishops, prominent members of the intelligentsia and a select group of wealthy burghers who became automatically members.

The great rally took place in the field by the castle where the resolution was read out to a large number of peasants and a smaller group of workers. The audience — 100,000 strong according to Romanian tradition — listened with unequivocal enthusiasm and ardour. The progressive tone of the basic principles was encouraging.

The Grand National Council appointed the fifteen members of the Governing Council — including two Socialists — and sent a telegram of obeisance and a delegation to Bucharest, the latter for the ceremonial presentation of the resolution proclaiming the union. On 24 December a law was

19. *Adevĕrul*, 24 November, 1918; T. ALBANI, *Douăzeci de ani de la Unire*. Oradea 1938, 206.
20. *Adevĕrul*, 1 December, 1918.
21. The complete text of the resolution see: I. CLOPOȚEL, *Revoluţia din 1918 şi unirea Ardealului cu România*. Cluj 1926, 61 and L. NAGY, op. cit., 208–211.
22. ALBANI, op. cit. 236.

enacted in the Romanian capital which declared that "the territories specified in the resolution of the assembly held in Gyulafehérvár on 1 December, 1918 have once and for all been united with the Kingdom of Romania".[23] Only the local administration was left in the hands of the Governing Council, which, in turn, was allocated three important places in the Bucharest government.

The form which the establishment of Romanian unity took seriously divided the progressive forces of Romanian society. For the next few years the left wing of the bourgeoisie was completely overawed by seeing its greatest hopes fulfilled in the shape of a Grand Romania. The right wing of the Social Democratic Party supported national unity in the hope that it would help the integration of the working class movement into Romanian political life and strengthen the party. By contrast, from the very beginning the party's left wing — which then gradually split up into Centrists and Communists — would not agree to close co-operation with the right wing and the Nationalists. Its members formed the "internationalist faction of the Romanian Socialists" and conducted an earnest propaganda campaign along the eastern edge of the Great Hungarian Plain, as well as among the Romanian workers living around Budapest. The left wing convened a congress of the "Romanian Internationalist Socialists of Austria, Hungary and Transylvania" in Budapest on 31 December. The congress "spoke out against the Gyulafehérvár resolution proclaiming union with the Kingdom of Romania".[24] It reserved the right of the Romanians of Hungary, Transylvania and the Banat to form an independent state after each nationality had held a plebiscite. This movement followed in the internationalist tradition which the Romanians had established as early as the spring of 1918, in co-operation with the Hungarian prisoners of war who returned from Russia during the first few months of Soviet rule.

In January 1919, the minority right wing of the Romanian Social Democrats held a conference of their own in Nagyszeben. Those who had taken part in the left-wing conference in Budapest — in other words, the representatives of the workers of large factories — were banned from this gathering. The conference announced the forming of the Social Democratic Party of Transylvania and the Banat.

The majority of the organized industrial workers in Transylvania consisted of Hungarians and Saxons. Naturally, they considered their historical mission to be the creation of a democratic and socialist-type society, rather than union with Romania.

The End of Hungarian Rule in Transylvania

The Hungarians of Transylvania were unable to accept the fact that a millennial state organism could vanish within weeks, or that they were destined to constitute a minority in an economically and socially more back-

23. Law-decree of 1918, No. 3631. *Monitorul Oficial*, 13 December, 1918.
24. *Glasul Poporului*, 2 February, 1919.

ward foreign country. In bourgeois circles either a feeling of helplessness prevailed or, alternately, frenzied panic. Besides the Hungarian national councils, in late November a Székely National Council was formed first in Marosvásárhely, then in Kolozsvár. This sometimes emphasized the need to preserve existing territorial integrity, and at other times stressed the importance of Hungarian autonomy, a reflection of the uncertainty of the times. The Hungarian government also vacillated between its maximum programme — a federal state recognizing the autonomy of the nationalities — and the minimum programme which admitted that complete secession could not be prevented and aimed to secure, in a peaceful way, the national rights of the Hungarians. The government did not regard the Gyulafehérvár resolution as fully legitimate. The establishment of a Transylvanian military force now began, the core of which was a unit organized in Kolozsvár and known as the *Székely Különítmény* (Székely Detachment). This force would have been sufficient to halt the Romanian advance at the demarcation line. Such a move, however, would have caused unforeseeable international implications and, as a result, the government did not dare defend itself. It was also impossible to divine Paris's intentions, as the overmighty French generals in Belgrade and Bucharest and the officers of the Entente mission in Budapest only added to the confusion with their often inconsistent acts and statements. In the first days of December, for instance, General Henri Berthelot, the commander of the French Eastern Army, gave permission for Romanian troops to cross the demarcation line between Arad and Máramarossziget and to occupy eight towns. The Hungarian government, however, was informed of this decision only weeks later.

The government appointed Professor Apáthy as general government commissioner of eastern Hungary on 8 December. From the very next day he directed the administration of the continually diminishing territories from his headquarters in Kolozsvár. It was around about this time that the Romanian Governing Council in Nagyszeben, which considered itself the provisional government of Transylvania, began its actual work.

Naturally, the Hungarian councils of Transylvania thought that the principle of self-determination would also be valid for the Hungarians, and wished to give expression to their view at a mass meeting in Kolozsvár on 22 December. General Moşoiu, the commander of the Romanian army in Transylvania, protested against the planned mass meeting and threatened to break it up with artillery fire. Nevertheless, a large crowd of about 40,000 people carrying national flags and red flags gathered in Kolozsvár's main square. Among them were representatives of the Romanian Socialists and the Swabians of the Banat who, like the Saxons, wished to remain within the Hungarian state for the time being. As one would expect at such a meeting, the speeches covered various different subjects, from the preservation of the unity of the state to the protection of the rights of the proletariat. The resolution submitted by the Hungarian Socialists and passed by the meeting declared that, on the basis of the principle of self-determination, "we wish to live in a commonwealth with the Hungarian People's Republic. It is within the framework of a unified and intact Hungary that we demand complete equality of rights, freedom and self-determination for all the na-

tions inhabiting this land".[25] The following day the Royal Romanian Army marched into Kolozsvár.

The general government commission remained in position even after the Hungarian troops had pulled out of Kolozsvár, so that the appearance of legal continuity could be maintained. The Romanian command introduced a state of siege, as well as internment, censorship and corporal punishment. All political organizations were banned and freedom of assembly and even the freedom to travel were suspended. The persecution of the left began, and this involved the use of very heavy-handed methods in certain areas. Later Apáthy himself, the government commissioner, was arrested on charges of spreading bolshevik propaganda.

After the occupation of Kolozsvár the slow advance of the Romanian troops continued, "justified" by national objectives, the Entente's endorsement and the struggle against bolshevism. By 22 January, the Romanian troops had reached the Máramarossziget–Csucsa–Zám line. With this King Ferdinand's army took possession of historic Transylvania without a fight.

During the day when the monarchy was disintegrating before their eyes, the representatives of the Saxon and Swabian bourgeoisie definitely saw their future within the Hungarian state. However, when Grand Romania began to take shape, they were forced to adapt to the new circumstances. Following the Romanian assembly at Gyulafehérvár, they demanded self-determination, autonomy for the 212 townships of the Saxon territories (*Munizipium Sachsenland*), and the creation of autonomous national units in Transylvania along the lines of Jászi's proposals.

Yielding to the wishes of Bucharest, and also to those of certain French political circles, the Romanian Governing Council representing Romania's authority in Transylvania sought to reach an agreement with the Saxon intelligentsia. As a result, the Saxons accepted the new political situation and, at the meeting of the Saxon National Council held in Medgyes on 8 January, 1919, they announced that Transylvania's Saxon population, in hopes of guarantees of their own national autonomy, also supported the union between Transylvania and Romania. They delivered their resolution to Maniu, the chairman of the Governing Council, who assured them that the "national rights of the industrious Saxon people would be protected and respected".[26]

In the Banat, where there was a strong determination to establish a local republic within Hungary, neither the Swabian nor the Hungarian workers wanted union with Romania. On 2 December, in Temesvár, they proclaimed the autonomy of the Banat under the leadership of the socialist Dr. Otto Roth. The Károlyi government, acting together with the German national council, worked out the details of an autonomous territorial arrangement for the area, which was now represented in the Budapest cabinet by Johann Junker. The arrival of Serbian troops in Temesvár put an end to this experiment.

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25. See the text in: I. Mikó, *Huszonkét év.* (Twenty-two Years.) Budapest 1941, 12.
26. *Desăvîrşirea unificării statului naţional român.* Red. M. Constantinescu – Şt. Pascu. Bucharest 1968, 446–447.

After mid-December a new wave of Socialist movements emerged in Transylvania, this time behind the lines of the army of occupation. The inhabitants of the Romanian villages were suddenly gripped by fear that the promised distribution of land would not take place. The miners' councils in the Zsil Valley wanted to form a separate workers' republic. The reviving miners' movements sometimes led to shooting between its members and the Romanian army. Joining the miners, on 23 January, the railway workers (who were mostly Hungarian), organized a general strike, with postal workers, printers, civil servants and some factory workers also joining the industrial action.

The proletariat had lost all respect for the remnants of the old state apparatus, the new and largely bourgeois national councils. But the workers were no more in awe of the Romanian army; nor did they regard it as their main opponent. This attitude, which was new in historical terms, confused the bourgeoisie. The Hungarian bourgeoisie vacillated between regarding the proletariat as the last possible crusaders of territorial integrity, and suspecting them of being Socialists one and all, cynical traitors to the national interest. At the same time, the proletariat was seen by the Romanian military intelligence as a political force embodying the combined menace of bolshevism and Hungarian nationalism; they overlooked the fact that is was only the Communist Party which had completely renounced the traditional principle of territorial integrity. Slowly discarding the old political values, the best of the proletariat marched, together with Budapest, towards the creation of a new society, towards a Socialist revolution.

Parallel with the new revolutionary upswing, and almost by way of countering it, the building up of the new Romanian state began. The Romanian army started to disarm the national guard and, more importantly, the workers' armed units as early as January 1919. In the middle of the month the Romanian Governing Council rejected a proposal from Kolozsvár's Hungarian intelligentsia that the administration remain Hungarian in the areas inhabited by Hungarians, while in the Romanian regions, of course, continuing to be Romanian.

On 24 January, the Governing Council reinstated the old (Hungarian) laws and authorities, but ended the self-government of the counties and the communities. It appointed Romanian prefects to head the counties, and these officials required the earlier administrators and state employees to swear an oath of allegiance to King Ferdinand. The Romanian national councils were also disbanded, creating the strange situation wherein such councils existed only in territories controlled by the Hungarian army.

Since the Entente did not comply with any of the earlier agreements and since the Romanian troops continued to press forward, the Hungarian government considered the possibility of armed resistance. On 2 March, Károlyi announced that "if, in contradiction with the Wilsonian principles, as well as with the self-determination of peoples and the idea of a negotiated peace, the Paris Peace Conference decides on Hungary's dismemberment, then, as a final resort, we will liberate this country even by force of arms".[27]

27. M. KÁROLYI, *Az új Magyarországért. Válogatott írások és beszédek. 1908–1919.* (For a New Hungary. Selected Writings and Speeches. 1908–1919.) Edited by GY. LITVÁN. Budapest 1968, 294.

Yielding to Romanian pressure, the Paris Peace Conference passed a resolution concerning yet another shift of the Hungarian-Romanian demarcation line, which in fact amounted to further territorial concessions. It adjudged the resolution proposed handing over to the Romanian troops a strip of territory containing the towns of Szatmárnémeti, Nagyvárad and Arad while also establishing a neutral zone to the west of this, to include both Debrecen and Szeged. (In addition, the Hungarian administration in this neutral area would be placed under French control.) It was in this way that Paris wished to secure the rear of the Romanian army, which France planned to use against Soviet Russia, and also to protect the Temesvár–Szatmár–Csap railway line, to which great importance was attached on account of sending war materia to Poland.

The so-called "Vyx Note" which contained these territorial demands and which was handed over on 20 March, 1919, was unacceptable to the Hungarian government. The peace conference had not appreciated the policy of co-operation with the Entente which the government had so far pursued. With the hope of an acceptable peace treaty gone, Károlyi and his government resigned. The coalition between the pro-Entente democratic bourgeoisie and the moderate Social Democrats had ended in moral and political bankruptcy.

The Socialist Alternative: The Republic of Councils

The Republic of Councils was proclaimed in Budapest on 21 March, 1919. Inspired by the events in Russia, it was the world's second proletarian state and promised a historic turning point in the lives of the nations inhabiting the Danubian Basin. The Communists, who had already acquired experience during the Russian revolution, merged with the left wing of the Social Democrats to form the Socialist Party. The acknowledged leader of this party, and also of the Revolutionary Governing Council, was Béla Kun, commissar for foreign affairs and a man who had grown up in the Kolozsvár workers' movement.

The Republic of Councils represented both a new foreign policy and a new political line towards the nationalities. It openly distanced itself from the nationalities policy of the democratic Károlyi regime, and while it did not champion the cause of territorial integrity, it was not prepared to hand over large parts of the country to the armies of the neighbouring states, which by now were blatantly serving the objectives of the imperialist powers. The new government rejected the Vyx Note. In its first proclamations it called for the liberation of the country's mines and food producing areas and also promised to fight "against the Romanian boyars", thereby inviting support from the Romanian proletariat. The leaders of the Republic of Councils firmly believed that the revolutionary working class movement could abolish national frontiers and create a united and international state. A prerequisite of this was the "brotherly alliance of the workers, a federal republic". Every nationality was required by law to form a national council. The Germans and the Ruthenians were given full national self-government, and the use of every language, both in writing and in speech, was permitted in

114. Train of refugees at Brassó, end of August 1916

115. Brewery near Brassó damaged by shell-fire

116. Captured guns at Brassó with on-lookers

118. King Charles IV with a Székely guard of honour

119. Emperor William II's visit to Nagy-szeben, 1917

117. German troops in Brassó

120. Declaration of the Hungarian Republic on 16 November, 1918

121. Greek Catholic Bishop Iuliu Hossu reads out the proclamation by the Romanian National Assembly on 1 December, 1918 of the unification of Transylvania and Romania

the administration. The constitution declared: "The Republic of Councils is a free alliance of free peoples."

By the time the new government assumed power the whole of historic Transylvania was under the rule by the Royal Romanian Army and the Romanian Governing Council at Nagyszeben. The present state of research does not enable us to assess the influence of this dictatorship of the proletariat on the inhabitants of Transylvania or to estimate how profound its repercussions were. We know that after December 1918 the influence of the Communists was increasing there, that many Romanian soldiers deserted in order to join the Hungarian Red Army; and that quite a few of the future leaders of the Transylvanian working class movement fought in this army. Another indication of the mood which then prevailed is the fact that the railway workers began a general strike in the first days of April. In Nagyvárad, Nagykároly and Szatmárnémeti, which were not yet under Romanian occupation, as well as in several villages, directories were formed to run the administration, and local organizations of the new party were created. Within a week several workers' battalions were organized in Nagyvárad for the Hungarian Red Army, which was then in the process of being formed. When in early April the elections to the councils were held, 42 per cent of the area's population turned out to vote, roughly the same figure as in Budapest.

The political situation was different in the countryside. In the majority of the Romanian villages the Romanian Communist faction operating from Nagyvárad could not effect a swing to the left, although it carried out systematic propaganda work even in areas occupied by the Romanian army. A large number of the roughly 500,000 Romanians who still lived under Hungarian rule remained aloof from, or even showed hostility towards, the new government, which for them was mostly represented by town-dwelling agitators or by the presence of the Székely Detachment (renamed Székely Division).

The Entente Powers, though not fully agreed on many issues, regarded the Republic of Councils with utmost hostility from the very beginning. Nevertheless, the Republic of Councils, through its resolute approach, achieved greater international recognition than had the Károlyi regime. Béla Kun's proposal to resolve the border issue on the basis of real self-determination for the peoples was handed to the Great Powers in a memorandum on 24 March. General Smuts travelled to Budapest as the delegate of the Peace Conference and proposed a demarcation line which was somewhat more favourable than the one outlined in the Vyx Note. This proposal would not have delivered the towns of Nagyvárad and Szatmárnémeti into the hands of the Romanian military command, although, under the pretext of demilitarization, these cities would also have been effectively taken out of the Republic of Council's control. Referring to the principles set out in the Belgrade armistice convention, Kun's counter-proposal requested a still more favourable solution. More importantly, Kun suggested that the representatives of Hungary and the neighbouring countries should be summoned to discuss among themselves the border disputes and future forms of economic co-operation. The conciliatory British and American political line, however, gave way to the more militant French view.

On 15 April, the Romanians, using substantial military forces, launched an offensive along the entire Hungarian–Romanian demarcation line. Their main thrust was directed against the Székely Division which was deployed along a front of 130 kilometres. Quite apart from being the largest Hungarian fighting unit with 649 officers and 12,000 men, this was also the only reasonably equipped and combat-ready military force in existence at the time the Republic of Councils was proclaimed. From the outset its officers were, for the most part, apolitical that is "counter-revolutionaries" in the given historical situation and the politicians influencing them were also of a similar persuasion. There was mutual distrust between the new political leadership and the division. Szatmár and Nagyvárad had to be abandoned, followed, on 23 April, by Debrecen. At first the Székely Division resisted the Romanians as it fell back, suffering heavy casualties in the process, but then broke off contact with Budapest. On 26 April, its leaders surrendered to a Romanian cavalry division agreeing to lay down their arms and even submit to internment in exchange for the release of relatives detained by the Romanian army.

On 27 April, the French also made a move and occupied Makó and Hódmezővásárhely. Czechoslovak troops also advanced and linked up with the Romanian army. In a desperate attempt to buy time, on 30 April Béla Kun telegraphed first to Wilson and then to the governments of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, unconditionally agreeing to "all the territorial and national claims" of the neighbouring countries. By early May the Romanian army had reached the Tisza River, and, using measures of extreme ruthlessness, restored the traditional class system everywhere it went.

The front line now stabilized and although the Romanian general staff urged the Entente Powers to launch another attack, it did not want to run risks of its own. The peace conference, however, would not permit any further advance, and the situation became deadlocked. Soviet Russia — the Republic of Councils' only ally — greatly contributed to this last development by preparing a large-scale attack along the Dniester River in order to ease the pressure on the Hungarian revolution.

On 30 May the Hungarian Red Army launched an offensive on the Czech front, in the direction of Kassa. Influenced by its initial successes, the peace conference at first showed a willingness to invite Hungary to the peace talks. On 14 June Clemenceau announced the final borders — which were identical to those defined back in March — in the form of a dictate, although he also promised to have the Romanian troops pulled back form the Tisza River as soon as Budapest withdrew its forces from the newly-occupied north-eastern territories. In his reply Kun explained the absurdity of the proposed borders, although he did not reject them outright. The withdrawal of the Red Army from the above territories did take place, but the Bratianu government was dissatisfied with the new borders, as these were less favourable to Bucharest than those promised in the secret pact of 1916. Accordingly, the Romanians refused to pull back. On 20 June the Hungarian Red Army launched an offensive to liberate those areas east of the Tisza which the peace conference had returned to Hungary. After initial gains the greatly outnumbered Hungarian troops were forced to retreat. After cross-

ing the Tisza River on 30 July, the Romanian army advanced on Budapest. The Hungarian Red Army disintegrated and the Revolutionary Governing Council resigned. Thus ended the overt experiment for a new world and a new type of society in which national conflicts and border disputes would assume peripheral importance in the lives of the peoples inhabiting the Danube Basin.

Counter-Revolution and the Treaty of Trianon

The Romanian army marched into Budapest on 4 August, although the Entente Powers condemned the move. Two days later the temporary trade-union government was toppled and a counter-revolutionary cabinet was formed which was almost entirely controlled by the Romanian military command. This, too, was unable to consolidate its power and create an independent army, as the army of occupation made this impossible. After receiving an ultimatum from the peace conference in mid-November, the Romanian army finally withdrew from Budapest and the area between the Danube and Tisza rivers. Admiral Horthy's "national army" now entered the capital. This strongly counter-revolutionary and originally insignificant fighting force (it consisted of only a few hundred men in the days of the Republic of Councils) was under French protection. The Hungarian peace treaty was concluded with the same counter-revolutionary regime held to power by the Entente.

On the issue of Transylvania, the Hungarian peace delegation led by Count Albert Apponyi travelled to Paris in January 1920. It had been invited by the victors not to conduct negotiations but to accept peace terms which had already been decided. The conference allowed Apponyi merely to deliver an address on 16 January concerning Hungary's citation and the Hungarian government's position. Apponyi summed up all the arguments which the Hungarian peace planning committee had worked out under the direction primarily of Count Pál Teleki. He attempted to persuade the victors that the borders marked out were consonant neither with self-determination nor with the ethnic principle, and that there simply was no just easy to implement the latter in the Carpathian Basin. Apponyi stressed the economic unity of the old Hungary and presented compelling arguments in favour of preserving this unity in areas ranging from transport and water management to the migration of labour and the interdependence of the various parts of the country.

On the issue of Transylvania, the Hungarian delegation submitted a separate proposal in several different versions: it should either be an autonomous province within Hungary's borders or a completely independent, Swiss-type, neutral country which guaranteed the equilibrium between the various nationalities. The delegation hoped to secure the nationalists' rights within Transylvania by setting up three autonomous administrative areas of basically homogeneous ethnic composition and one of thoroughly mixed ethnic composition. Finally, the Hungarian delegation requested that a plebiscite be held in Transylvania, and indeed in all the disputed territories, de-

claring that "we accept in advance the outcome of the plebiscite, whatever it may be".[28]

All the proposals of the Hungarian delegation were turned down. The Millerand letter, the official reply, made the point that the slightest change would render the whole system nonsensical, implicitly admitting that a certain unfairness and fragility was built into the settlement.

The Hungarian-Romanian border, which came about from a compromise between the Great Powers, was left unchanged. Romania gained considerably less than it had been promised in 1916, but more than had been suggested by the American and the Italian politicians. On 4 June, 1920 the peace document was signed in the Trianon palace. With this 102,093 square kilometres of territory (Transylvania proper together with the eastern edge of the Great Hungarian Plain) which amounted to 31.7 per cent of old Hungary, were transferred to Romania. That means that by international law Romania acquired 5,257,476 inhabitants (of whom 1,704,852 were Hungarians and 559,824 were Germans), some 25.2 per cent of Hungary's former population. Another period had come to an end in the history of the peoples of Transylvania.

The annexationist peace treaty, which also involved a serious violation of the national principle, was condemned equally by the revisionist bourgeoisie of the defeated countries and by the international working class movement.

By wanting to replace the anachronistic Habsburg Monarchy with more up-to-date arrangements, the Entente politicians had created tensions in the Danube Basin which were far greater than those existing before the world conflagration, and which delivered the new successor states into the hands of the Great Powers. This also had a decisive impact on the history of Transylvania, which was now incorporated into Romania.

28. Speech by Albert Apponyi at the peace conference on 16 January, 1920. In: *A magyar béketárgyalások. Jelentés a magyar békeküldöttség működéséről.* (Hungarian Peace Talks. Report of the Hungarian Peace Conference Delegation.) I. Budapest 1920, 278.

Map 24. Draft proposals by experts and the border adopted by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (after V.V. Tilea)

PART SIX

TRANSYLVANIA SINCE 1918

PART SIX

TRANSYLVANIA SINCE 1918

International Forces

The history of Transylvania since 1918 is part of the history of Romania, and needs to be analyzed in terms of the development of Romania as a whole. The very concept of "Transylvania" was redefined after the war. The territories which are today called Transylvania — territories which, under the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, Romania annexed from what had been Habsburg Hungary — include not only historic Transylvania, but as we indicated in the Preface also the very different areas lying to the west of the Érchegység, and also a part of the Banat.

In the new context we give an outline of the main trends of the changes until 1945 trying to present the complexity of the international and internal situation.

From 1918 onwards, Romania opted for an Anglo-French orientation in her foreign policy, and for this reason became a founding member of the "Little Entente" (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia), created to preserve the *status quo* established by the peace treaties in central and eastern Europe. The main objective of Romanian foreign policy was to ensure territorial integrity, and different governments subordinated domestic policy — and within it, nationality policy — to this. The Soviet Union did not recognize the peace treaties concluded after the First World War and never renounced Bessarabia. In addition, Bulgaria did not accept Romania's annexation of Southern Dobrudja. The Hungarians, for their part, took cognizance of the Trianon peace terms, but made no secret of the fact that their aim was to have them changed. Hungary's claims concerning Transylvania posed no immediate threat to Romania, since, initially, not a single Great Power supported them. However, with time this situation changed. In 1927, Hungary succeeded in breaking out of what amounted to complete isolation when fascist Italy, itself dissatisfied with the Paris peace system, officially adopted a position which supported Hungarian border revision demands. The practical significance of this was small, but it nevertheless strengthened the hope of Hungarian revisionists that a radical change in European power relations would, in fact, transform the territorial *status quo*. This hope was further boosted when fascism came to power in Germany, and Hitler also demanded the re-examination of the peace treaties.

The treaties which concluded the First World War thus had a decisive effect on relations between Hungary and Romania, and on the fate of their respective peoples. The borders that had been established did not take into account the right of peoples to self-determination, and did not pay much attention to the population's ethnic composition either. Accordingly, rival power blocs inevitably formed, one which aimed either to preserve the *status quo* or to change it.

Internal Situation of the New Romania

Between the two world wars, Romania was a backward agrarian country. This is well illustrated by the fact that in 1930, 78.7 per cent of its active population worked in agriculture, and only 6.7 per cent in industry. In agriculture dwarfholdings and small farms predominated, and after the land reform, which was implemented in 1921, their preponderance increased. In industry and commerce, the large proportion of small enterprises was conspicuous. Oil extraction and coal mining together with iron and steel production characterized economic development in the longer run, as did, to some extent, the development of the machine-building industry. Besides Romanian capital, French, Belgian, German and, to a lesser degree, in Transylvania, Hungarian capital had a stake in the larger industrial enterprises, as well as in the banks.

As was typical in eastern Europe at this time, Romania's social structure bore the marks of economic underdevelopment. This meant that the peasantry constituted the majority of the population, and broad sections of it lived in traditional, backward circumstances; standards of living were extraordinarily low. The working class, which was comparatively undeveloped, lived in a geographically limited area, and was concentrated in only a few branches of industry. Small businessmen, small traders and white collar workers made up the equivalent of a bourgeoisie. The state was directed by representatives of big business and the large landowners.

As to the form of government, Romania was a constitutional monarchy, within which a multiple system based on parliamentary elections operated until 1938. However, because of the backwardness of socio-economic development, constitutionalism was of limited effectiveness. For most of the 1920s it was the *Partidul Naţional Liberal* (National Liberal Party) that was in power, supported primarily by big business in Bucharest. The Liberals were led, with short intervals, by the Brătianu family,[1] and used every opportunity afforded by the corruption rampant in Romania public life to implement the modernizing economic policy which it had proclaimed to the nation. A great part of the Transylvanian Romanian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia supported Iuliu Maniu's National Party. In 1926 this united with

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1. Ion C. Brătianu was five times prime minister serving in 1909–1911, 1913–1918, 1918–1919, 1922–1926, and in 1927. He was succeeded in this post by his brother, Vintila (prime minister 1927–1928).

the Smallholder's Party, which drew its support from the lower middle-class elements beyond the Carpathians. This merger produced the second largest grouping in the country, the *Partidul Naţional Ţărănese* (National Peasant Party). Advocating democracy built on the primacy of the peasantry, the National Peasant Party became the Liberals' main rival. Nevertheless, after coming to power in 1928 it was unable to fulfil its promises of a healthier public life and "clean" government — to the disappointment of many sections of the population and its own leaders. This undermined popular support for the party.

In opposition to the essentially right-wing policies of governments by 1920–1921 a workers' movement existed which operated independently in all provinces and which maintained its regional framework throughout the period. The *Partidul Comunist Român* (Romanian Communist Party) was founded in 1921, but three years later, in 1924, it was declared illegal and forced underground. However, in spite of the functioning legitimate *Partidul Socialdemocrat* (Social Democratic Party) the Communists were able to bring the majority of trade unions under their control, carrying on their activity in organizations such as the *Blocul Muncitoresc-Ţărănesc* (Town and Village Workers Bloc), which recruited two-thirds of its supporters from Transylvania. Among the Romanian Communist Party's members and leaders were numerous Hungarian workers and intellectuals, many of whom had participated in the workers' movement before 1918 or in the struggles of the Hungarian Republic of Councils. In 1924, the third congress of the party declared the right of the peoples to self-determination even if this involved secession, and proclaimed that, with the combining of different provinces, Romania "had changed from being a national state into being a multinational one".[2] From this it concluded that especially great emphasis was to be placed on the strengthening of relations between the workers of different nationalities. The party later rescinded this decision, but to the very end the demand for a democratic solution to the nationality question characterized its policy: the class struggle required a united working class, and the divisive nationality issue could not be allowed to sap its strength.

The Communists took the lead in coordinating the struggle of workers of different nationalities against the adverse consequences of the world economic crisis. The biggest such action — the 1929 strike of the Lupény coal miners against dismissals and wage reductions — was crushed by special forces in a clash which claimed the lives of at least thirty people. Among the victims were a significant number of Hungarians. [There were Hungarians on the "other side" as well: capitalists from Hungary held positions on the board of directors of the *Societatea Anomimă Petroşani* (Petrozsény Mining Company), and a number of Hungarians held shares in the Zsil Valley mines.] The Gyimes Valley peasants' movement in 1934 was similarly directed by the Communists, as were the strikes for higher pay — which continued for many weeks — in Kolozsvár's Dermata leather factory in 1935, and in the Arad textile factory the following year. In these struggles a new unity was

2. *Documente din istoria Partidului din România 1923–1928.* II. Bucharest 1953, 258.

forged between Hungarian and Romanian workers. In the atmosphere of nationalist hatred which then existed this was unique, and was to exercise considerable influence on the future.

The new nationalist wave gained strength in Romania in the 1930s. Its main vehicle was a Fascist movement which originated in Moldavia in the 1920s; in this, Romania was a lot ahead of the rest of Europe. Made up of many strands, and centred around Corneliu Zelea Codreanu's *Garda de Fier* (Iron Guard) founded in 1930, Romanian fascism battened on the Great Depression, and grew powerful. The Iron Guard made political capital out of the crisis and out of the backwardness of the peasantry, which was not only exploited by gentry society but was also neglected by it. It also drew on the hatred for aliens and the deep antipathy felt by young populist intellectuals against the immorality of party conflicts and bourgeois public life. The international situation favoured its consolidation, as did the advance of nazism in Germany. In addition to fascism's well-known social demagogy, the movement also exploited the penchant for mysticism to which many Greek Orthodox believers in Transylvania, too, were prey. The movement proclaimed that a more just and more moral world was in the making, while in practice it introduced murder as the means of settling scores with its political opponents.

It was the workers' movement that took the strongest and most consistent stand against the Iron Guard. Intellectuals of all nationalities strove together with the Communists and the Social Democrats, but were unable to build a bulwark against the spreading of fascism.

In the elections of December 1937, a tactical coalition between the Iron Guard, under Codreanu, and the National Peasant Party emerged victorious. Confronted by fascism both at home and abroad, the Romanian ruling class established a right-wing dictatorship. It attempted to build a system on the personal rule of King Carol II, and a national sentiment adjusted to it. At the beginning of 1938, the government led by Octavian Goga was dismissed and a referendum held on the draft of a new, corporative-type constitution, which was to sanction the new system. The referendum was held amidst a veritable state of siege: out of the 4.3 million voters, only 5,483 people dared to vote against the constitution, most of them in Transylvania. All parties and organizations were dissolved; legislation was entrusted to various so-called interest representations in place of the traditional national representative body; and rightist military commanders were appointed to the public administration. The *Frontul Renașterii Naționale* (Front of National Revival) was declared the sole political party, and the nationalities' organizations also fell under its control. Carol II's experiment — a peculiar alloy of fascism, nationalism, partial civil rights and administrative and economic modernization — did enjoy some support. For want of a better alternative, it was accepted also by those middle class Transylvanian Romanians who agreed with the drastic measures being taken for the liquidation of the Iron Guard, and who thought that the new system would strengthen Romania in its fight against Hungarian revisionist ambitions, which were becoming ever stronger by this time.

668

Economic Circumstances

The western territories granted to Romania under the Treaty of Trianon constituted 34.8 per cent (102,000 sq km) of the total territory of the country and contained 30.7 per cent (in 1930, 5,548,000 people) of its population. In 1930, 76.6 per cent of the active population of these areas worked in agriculture, 9.6 per cent in industry, 4.7 per cent in commerce and 9.1 per cent in other branches. Forests covered one-third of this territory. Grain was produced on 76.6 per cent of its arable land, fodder on 9 per cent, root crops on 4.5 per cent, and crops for industrial use on a little over 2 per cent. In the 1930s, one hectare of land yielded an average of 9 quintals of wheat or 11 quintals of maize. In 1935 the area contained 35 per cent of Romania's cattle and 44 per cent of its stock of pigs, as well as 24 per cent of its sheep. As a result of better technology and more careful cultivation, agricultural production in Transylvania was higher than in other parts of Romania (in 1938, 44.8 per cent of all tractors and 42.6 per cent of all threshing machines were to be found in Transylvania, which contained only 24.5 per cent of all the arable land in Romania).

In mining, the extraction of salt, coal and non-ferrous metals continued. The mining of iron ore flourished, and especially the exploitation of Transylvania's natural gas reserves. In the vicinity of the coal and iron ore mines, iron and steel production continued to develop, and in the areas where salt and natural gas were extracted the chemical industry prospered. In many places, the building materials industry forged ahead. Paper manufacturing and such traditional industries as the food industry, the leather industry, the textile industry, the ceramics industry, the glass industry and the timber industry also expanded. Manufacturing industry was concentrated in the traditional industrial zones: in the plants of Resica, Arad, Temesvár, Brassó, Kolozsvár and Nagyvárad, and in the factories and foundries of the Hunyad region. In 1937, Transylvania's factories provided 38.6 per cent of Romania's total production. The industrial production of the whole country, after a period of serious crisis, approximately doubled in the fifteen years from the middle of the 1920s. In the Transylvanian territories, the increase — at only 60 per cent — was more modest. This can be explained largely in terms of lack of capital and the absence of state support, and partly in terms of a higher initial level.

Between 1921 and 1938, the capital invested in enterprises in Romania as a whole increased from 16 billion lei to 61 billions. A great deal of this was foreign capital, which grew from 10.8 billion lei in 1921 to 38.9 billions by 1938: from 67.5 per cent to 63.8 of all investments.

Examination of the larger branches of production from the point of view of property relations reveals that in Transylvania small-scale private ownership was the rule. The 3,500,000 hectares of arable land were divided among 1,164,000 owners. Of these, 1,007,000 persons had properties of less than five hectares, 105,000 had properties of between five and ten hectares, and 53,000 had holdings larger than this. In 1930, the total number of industrial and commercial enterprises was 96,611, and 362,125 people worked in these. In 1937, there were 1,691 big industrial plants which employed a total of 130,000 workers, almost twice as many as in 1919.

The country's settlement structure, reflecting its level of economic development and the population's occupational division was largely agrarian in character. In Transylvania in 1930, 82.7 per cent of the population lived in villages, and only 17.3 per cent (958,998) in towns. More than half of the population lived in small settlements of under 2,000 people. Officially, there were forty-nine towns but, of these, only six had more than 50,000 inhabitants. With the development of industrialization, bureaucracy and services the urban population had increased by 285,000 since 1910; the village population stagnated during these twenty years.

The villages were still for the most part geared to self-sufficiency, and only the most essential industrial products were obtained from traders. With the exception of the priest, the teacher, the shopkeeper and perhaps one or two independent skilled workers, the inhabitants of any given village were, for the most part, tillers of the land. Among these would be a few well-to-do farmers with the rest being smallholders of dwarfholders, or agricultural labourers.

The bulk of the town population was made up of artisans and craftsmen, traders, salaried workers and, to a lesser degree, intellectuals, but in many places there were also considerable numbers of farmers who supplied the market with vegetables, fruit and small livestock. The working class was concentrated in a few large industrial centres and towns. Village and small-town society was organized very much on a hierarchical basis, and preserved the attitudes and ways of life prevalent in the nineteenth century.

Romanians in Predominant Situation

Besides the differences in cultural heritage and level of economic development, it was mainly its ethnic composition that set Transylvania apart from the rest of Romania. According to the 1930 Census, the nationality composition of Romania was as follows: 71.9 per cent Romanians; 7.9 per cent Hungarians; 4.1 per cent Germans; 4 per cent Jews; 3.2 per cent Ruthenians; 2.3 per cent Russians; 2 per cent Bulgarians; and 4.6 per cent "others". According to the census figures giving the division of Transylvania's population by nationality, out of a population of 5,548,363 57.8 per cent were Romanians, 24.4 per cent were Hungarians, 9.8 per cent were Germans, 3.2 per cent were Jewish; and 4.8 per cent were of some other nationality. This census distinguished between ethnic affiliation and mother tongue, and accordingly presented the Jewish — and Gipsy — ethnic groups separately, even if their members spoke Hungarian as their mother tongue. (According to the 1910 Census — on the basis of mother tongue — 53.8 per cent of Transylvania's population were Romanians, 31.6 per cent Hungarians, 9.8 per cent Germans, and 4.8 per cent "others".)

The change of regime favoured the Romanians, from both the economic and the cultural points of view. According to the official statistics, up to 1 June, 1927, in Transylvania 212,803 Romanians, 45,628 Hungarians, 15,934 Saxons and Swabians, and 6,314 persons of other nationality had benefited from the measures introduced by the 1921 Land Reform Law. The state, by

670

means of its tax and credit policies, did its best to assist small farmers who were getting into debt with the banks, but technology was so backward that there was no increase in agricultural productivity. Smallholders and dwarf-holders lived poorly, and the lot of the peasantry of all nationalities continued to remain a major social problem.

The state, through economic and administrative means alike, supported those Transylvanian traders, artisans and craftsmen who were of Romanian origin, but in spite of this, the size of this group did not increase significantly. Transylvania's Albina Bank became one of Romania's great financial institutions; in Kolozsvár the Banca Centralǎ was set up to develop Transylvanian commerce and industry, and the Banca Agrarǎ to provide finance for agriculture. However, the development of Transylvanian credit facilities ground to a halt in the face of competition from the Bucharest banks.

The change of regime especially favoured the employees and the intelligentsia, because the state and the cultural apparatus expanded, and because many Hungarians had either moved to Hungary or had lost their posts. However, the opportunities available to the Transylvanian Romanians were restricted by the large number of arrivals from old Romania, and this soon became a source of conflict.

Differences in culture and ways of life also contributed to antagonisms. In old Romania, that is the Regat, the overwhelming majority of people were Greek Orthodox. In Transylvania, however, the Romanians belonged to two different churches which earlier had enjoyed equal status. (In 1930, 1.9 million Romanians declared themselves to be Greek Orthodox and 1.4 million Greek Catholic.) Romania considered the Greek Orthodox faith to be the state religion, but ensured "rights of priority" to the Greek Catholic church over the other (non-Romanian) denominations. Both the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholic churches received significant state subsidies, but in spite of this the Greek Orthodox church, with organization of new parishes and building of new churches, enjoyed the advantage. With the nationalization of the Romanian network of church schools, the Greek Catholics lost their characteristic, traditional institutions, and therefore the opportunity to preserve through their education of the young a continuity stretching back to the eighteenth century, and a cultural inheritance which lined them both to Rome and to Vienna.

Since the peasantry provided the social base of Romanian national politics in Transylvania, here the Romanian ruling class reacted to the problems of the villages more sensitively than did its counterparts in the Regat. Differences existed between Romania and Transylvania also in respect of economic traditions and traditions of public administration. A very different set of moral norms developed in public life, and there were different customs with regard to everyday living.

Tradition, economic and cultural values, and differences in lifestyle — all these explain why a great many of the Romanians of Transylvania supported the programme proclaimed by Iuliu Maniu's Romanian National Party which explicitly espoused Transylvania's special interests. As early as 26 December, 1920 the Kolozsvár newspaper *Patria* took a stand against those coming from the Regat, that is from the old kingdom: "Transylvania is regarded and treated like a colony". In 1922 the National Party boycotted

even the coronation ceremony. When Maniu head of the National Peasant Party which had its counterpart in the Regat, finally came to power, his government was unable to advance Transylvania's special interests. Even the half measures the party took with a view to protecting the peasants' interests backfired in the wake of the economic crisis. By allowing the sale of land, it made it easier for small peasants to lose what land they possessed and the co-operative societies and people's banks that had been set up became the instruments for the exploitation of the poor.

In the 1920s, while Maniu was calling for a certain degree of self-government for Transylvania, other Transylvanian Romanians, for example the grouping led by the poet Octavian Goga, proclaimed the need for strong centralization in the face of attempts to gain autonomy. At the same time, the territorial revisionist ambitions of the Hungarian ruling class served to strengthen the appeal of the unitary state idea even among those Romanians who condemned the corrupt rule of the parties and who would have liked to see Transylvania's particularist standpoint asserted.

The postwar changes brought evident cultural and educational benefits to the Romanian population. In Transylvania in 1910, half of the population was unable to read and write, and the majority of these people lived in counties inhabited by Romanians. (In Hunyad, Alsó-Fehér, Kolozs, Szilágy and Máramaros counties the number of illiterates constituted two-thirds of the adult population.) With the nationalization of the schools, the extension of the school network and the growing number of teaching personnel, conditions for education improved. By 1930, the proportion of those able to read and write had grown to 67.4 per cent in the villages. In Kolozs, Hunyad, Szilágy, Bihar, Torda and Máramaros counties the illiteracy rate in the villages was still between 37.4 per cent and 68.6 per cent. The decisive majority of those able to read and write had only completed four classes of elementary school.

Secondary education expanded and became more differentiated, and this facilitated an increase in the number of Romanian intellectuals and professional people. For the most part, the intelligentsia was educated at the well-equipped University of Kolozsvár, which operated in the Romanian language from 1919 on. In 1921 in Temesvár a technical college was established, and this later grew into a university.

A more differentiated Romanian intelligentsia came into existence, one which was composed not just of schoolteachers and clergymen, but also of doctors, engineers and members of other professions. The fact that a significant part of the intelligentsia had originated in the villages, mainly from among the children of well-to-do peasants, served as confirmation for the belief that there was an opportunity for social advancement, and to share in the exercise of political power. In such circumstances, the decisive majority of the new Romanian intelligentsia supported the ruling class; very few of them identified with the workers' movement. The nationalism of the intelligentsia was coloured by populism, which had characterized Romanian culture since the nineteenth century, and which primarily manifested itself in the promotion of folk art and in lofty talk about a mythicized peasantry.

It was this trend in Transylvanian Romanian culture that was developed by Lucian Blaga, who in his poetry sought answers to the great questions of

672

life, and who in his studies — drawing on German *Lebensphilosophie* and Romanian folk poetry — painted a mythical picture of the destiny and character of his people. The distinguished journal, *Gândirea* (Thought), was the main mouthpiece of this literary and cultural trend, which served to strengthen the spirit of Romanian nationalism. The prose, too, focused on the world of the Romanian village; Liviu Rebreanu and Ion Agîrbiceanu portrayed the Transylvanian Romanian peasantry partly in an idyllic environment, but also recalled the tragedies of everyday life and the peasantry's struggles against the Hungarian ruling class, against "Magyar rule".

At the University of Kolozsvár, scholarship concentrated mainly on the national problem, and archaeologists, historians, linguists and ethnographers there expended a great amount of energy on proving the theory of Daco-Roman continuity, and on studying the Transylvanian Romanian national and social movements, together with folklore and folk art. In response to the needs of the economy, Romanian natural science also became established, and was taught by outstanding scholars at the University of Kolozsvár.

Sufferings of the Hungarians

The Gyulafehérvár resolution, which declared the union of Transylvania with Romania, had been intended by the leaders of the Transylvanian Romanians to be also a charter of liberties for the various nationalities. To quote: "There is to be full national liberty for the country's various peoples. Every nation has the right to education, government, and justice in its own mother tongue, with its own administrative arm drawn from its own ranks. In the legislative bodies and in the national administration every nation has the right to representation in proportion to its share in the population."[3] The resolution reflected the spirit of bourgeois democracy in political and social questions, and prompted hopes that the same spirit would inform the government's treatment of the minorities.

In an international agreement of 1919, Romania undertook to honour minority rights. The convention on the minorities guaranteed to non-Romanians equal rights, the free use of their languages, and their own education facilities. For the Saxons and Székelys, it held out the prospect of some cultural autonomy, and it authorized the nationalities to turn to the League of Nations for the redress of their grievances. In principle, equal rights for the non-Romanian population were confirmed by the 1923 Constitution, but this same constitution also declared the country to be a "Romanian nation-state", and did not enact the important pledges of the Gyulafehérvár resolution. Throughout the inter-war years, there was a great discrepancy between political practice and constitutional provisions, and this greatly circumscribed the possibilities for co-operation between the majority population and the minorities.

The 1930 Census in Transylvania — on the basis of mother tongue — put the number of Hungarians at 1,400,712. According to some estimates, 200,000

3. I. Mikó, *Huszonkét év.* (Twenty-two Years.) Budapest 1941, 265.

(according to other sources, 300,000) Hungarians — mainly intellectuals and employees — had "repatriated" after 1918, or in other words, had left Transylvania and settled in Hungary. More then one-third of those remaining lived in the Székelyföld, approximately one-quarter in the Transylvanian towns, and almost one-quarter along the western border with Hungary.

Table 6. The distribution of the population of Transylvania
according to mother tongue and nationality on the basis
of the 1910 Hungarian and the 1930 Romanian Census

Population	1910	1930		1910	1930	
	according to mother tongue 1000s	according to mother tongue 1000s	nation- ality	according to mother tongue %	according to mother tongue %	nation- ality
Romanians	2830	3233	3208	53.8	58.2	57.8
Hungarians	1664	1481	1353	31.6	26.7	24.4
Germans	516	541	544	9.8	9.8	9.8
Jews/Yiddish	49*	111	179	0.9	2.0	3.2
Gipsies	60	44	109	1.2	0.8	2.0
Others	144	138	155	2.7	2.5	2.8
Total	5263	5548	5548	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Calculated data

Sources: For the 1910 Census data, see: *M. Stat. Közlemények. Új Sorozat,* 42. kötet (Hungarian Statistical Bulletin, New Series, Vol. 42.); E. JAKABFFY, *Erdély Statisztikája* (Transylvania in Statistics), (Lugoș 1923); for the 1930 Census figures, see: *Recensământul general al populației din 29 Decembrie 1930.* II (Bucharest 1938), 1–180.

The composition of Transylvania's Hungarian society in terms of occupation and social structure was traditionally more complicated than that of the Romanian. As compared to the population as a whole, the Hungarian population was less agricultural in character: farming provided a livelihood for only 58 per cent of its members. Nearly 20 per cent of the Hungarians earned their living from mining and industrial occupations, and 7.8 per cent from the commerce, credit and transport sectors. On the other hand, at 2.5 per cent, the proportion of those living from the proceeds of occasional work (for the most part as day-labourers) was comparatively high.

The situation of the Hungarians in Romania during the inter-war years deteriorated partly because of certain detrimental socio-economic developments and partly because of discriminatory nationality policies. The backwardness of industrial development afflicted the Hungarian-inhabited areas, mainly the Székelyföld. It was the Hungarians who were the most likely to work in industry, or as independent skilled workers, tradesmen and traders, and who were, thus, the hardest hit by the Depression. Although the 1921 land reform did benefit the Hungarian peasantry in some places, it did not do much for the Hungarian agrarian proletariat. The reform, which

reflected marked discrimination against the nationalities, was implemented primarily at the expense of the large and medium Hungarian landowners, but also seriously hit the Hungarian churches and villages. While the lands of the Romanian churches were augmented, more than 314,000 *holds* of land were taken away from the Hungarian churches, which had traditionally used the income mainly for cultural and educational purposes.

The economic discrimination manifested itself in the fact that in the Székely counties, people paid more tax than in the regions which had Romanian majorities. The situation of Hungarian artisans, craftsmen and traders was made more difficult not only by taxation but also by the refusal, or even the discontinuation, of credit. The Hungarian banks did not receive the same support from the Romanian National Bank as the others, and therefore were only able to provide limited funds. At the same time these banks, influenced by inflexible business considerations, did not help the hardpressed Hungarian peasantry, even within the limits of the real possibilities open to them.

The natural resources of the Székelyföld counties did not favour agriculture, and since there was scarcely any industry there, many of the young people were obliged to migrate to the Regat (the destination, according to estimates, of about one hundred thousand Transylvanian Hungarians during this time). Others were driven to seek work in the Transylvanian towns, a large number of them finding employment as servants. The economic crisis boosted emigration as well — the number of emigrants to the West, and mainly to the United States, can be estimated at a minimum of fifty thousand.

A part of the aristocracy left Transylvania, but those of its members remaining there — in spite of loss of property — were able to play a role in public life on account on their contacts in Hungary and in leading Romanian circles. A good many of the middle landowners sank into poverty, their children trying their luck in the towns, or emigrating. In 1919, many civil servants refused to take the oath of loyalty to the new regime, and were discharged. Later, civil servants were dismissed for not knowing Romanian, and even postal workers and railwaymen were given notice to quit on these grounds. In the middle class and among the intelligentsia, there were many who lived in uncertainty because the new regime was not prepared to recognise them as Romanian citizens. In the 1930s the so-called *numerus valachicus* was enforced even by private companies: the idea was that the management and the majority of the employees were to be Romanian-speaking.

Everything was done to make the Romanian language predominant. In areas where there was a Hungarian majority, place-names and street names were not allowed to be written up in Hungarian; signboards in two languages were first taxed, and finally banned. After 1921, court cases were heard only in Romanian, and those appearing before the court who did not know Romanian had to speak through an interpreter. All official petitions had to be drawn up in the language of the state. In public places inscriptions appeared announcing that "Only Romanian may be spoken". New Romanian settlements were established, especially along the western border and in the Székelyföld, although these did not result in any great ethnic change. A special campaign began for the romanianization of the Székelys:

Table 7. The distribution of the population of Transylvania according to nationality and main occupational groups in 1930 (active and dependent population)

Main occupational group	Romanians		Hungarians		Germans		Jews		Other nationalities		Total population	
	1000s	%	1000s	%	1000s	%	1000s	%	1000s	%	1000s	%
Primary production	2,598	81.0	786	58.0	294	54.1	16	9.2	171	64.5	3,865	69.7
Mining, industry	209	6.5	270	19.9	130	24.0	48	26.7	42	15.9	699	12.6
Commerce, credit, transportation	112	3.5	106	7.8	40	7.2	72	40.4	8	3.0	338	6.1
Public administration	48	1.5	25	1.8	8	1.5	3	1.9	2	0.6	86	1.5
In the service of religious denominations	16	0.5	8	0.6	2	0.5	6	3.6	1	0.2	33	0.6
Public education	26	0.8	12	0.9	6	1.1	2	1.0	1	0.3	47	0.8
Army and law and order forces	63	2.0	5	0.4	3	0.6	2	1.2	7	2.7	80	1.5
Health	10	0.3	16	1.2	10	1.8	3	1.7	2	0.8	41	0.7
Occasional workers	37	1.2	34	2.5	7	1.4	5	2.7	13	4.9	96	1.7
Others, unknown	89	2.7	91	6.9	44	7.8	22	11.6	17	7.1	263	4.8
Total	3,208	100.0	1,353	100.0	544	100.0	179	100.0	264	100.0	5,548	100.0

Source: Recensământul general al populației din 29 Decembrie 1930. VII (Bucharest, n.d.)

nationalists insisted that these people were in actual fact magyarized Romanians, and that the campaign was merely an attempt to "re-romanianize" them. After 1924, the authorities tried to speed up the romanianization of the Székelyföld, whose population was totally Hungarian by mother tongue, and of the ethnically mixed strip of territory along the western border (where there was also a Hungarian majority) by creating a so-called "culture-zone". The zone extended over ten counties in these areas; the declared aim was to make Romanian education more intensive. The teachers from the Regat who were appointed to the state schools in this zone received 50 per cent higher salaries than their peers, and a ten hectare resettlement plot. School was intended, in other words, to be the main means of assimilation.

After 1919, education carried on in the Hungarian language was, in practice, confined to denominational schools, and more than 1,000 state schools in which the language of instruction had been Hungarian were abolished. In the academic year 1930-31, 483 Hungarian-language elementary schools were maintained by the Reformed (Calvinist) church, 297 by the Catholic church, 36 by the Unitarian church and 6 by the Lutheran church — all without government subsidy. These schools were attended by 76,255 pupils, 57.6 per cent of the Hungarians of school age. In principle, the rest should have attended Hungarian-language state schools or the Hungarian-language stream in Romanian schools, but the number of these decreased continually: by 1934-35, for example, their number had already fallen to 112, with the number of children enrolled being 11,484. It was characteristic that in counties such as Csík and Szatmár, there was not a single state school with a Hungarian-language stream. It followed from this that a significant percentage of Hungarian children had to attend schools in which the language of instruction was Romanian. In the Székelyföld, children were obliged to attend Romanian-language schools if their name was interpreted as indicating Romanian origin. The language of instruction in state kindergartens — at least according to official statistics — was everywhere Romanian. The number of Hungarian denominational kindergartens in this period was eighteen.

In secondary education the situation was even worse. In the academic year 1930–1931, there operated twenty-three Hungarian-language denominational higher elementary schools, seventeen *líceum*s (secondary schools for girls), seven teacher-training institutions, four higher commercial schools and four agricultural winter schools, all of which had been deprived of their endowment. This was a more or less 50 per cent reduction compared to the situation in 1918, when just the denominational Hungarian-language secondary schools numbered 116. Some of the denominational secondary schools could grant valid certificates only if the Romanian school authorities gave their approval. In the period from 1930 to 1935, 2,609 young Hungarians studied in institutions declared private schools. In addition to this, 3,645 attended secondary schools in which the language of instruction was Romanian.

The "private education law" introduced in 1925 required not only that Romanian be taught in the schools, but also that history, geography and civics should be taught in Romanian. Those finishing at the *líceum*s had to take their final examinations in Romanian and were examined by commit-

tees consisting of Romanian teachers from other schools. The result was that the majority of the Hungarian candidates failed.

One grave consequence of this truncated school system was that it failed to provide for the education of workers for industry and trade. There were scarcely any Hungarian-language vocational schools, and there were few places for young Hungarians in Romanian schools of this type at the very time that jobs in trade and commerce were becoming the careers of the future. Skilled worker education was carried on in the factories and small workshops, although from 1927 apprentices were allowed to be instructed only in Romanian.

Those few Hungarians who did manage to graduate from secondary school encountered many difficulties when they attempted to pursue their studies further. An official prohibition had caused the failure of an attempt to establish a Hungarian university of all denominations. The number of Hungarian students at Romanian universities fell continually: in 1933–1934 it stood at 1,443; by 1937–1938, it was just 878. Every year about 2,500 students were admitted to Kolozsvár's Romanian university: on average, there were 300 Hungarians, but few of these were able to complete their studies. In the first ten inter-war years, a total of 304 Hungarians received degrees, 6–7 per cent of all the graduates. The opportunities for Hungarians to join the ranks of the intelligentsia were effectively cut off, and the 200 or so young people who studied at universities or colleges in Hungary did not all return to Transylvania. Among the Hungarian university graduates, the lot of teachers was the most difficult. They could find employment only in denominational schools for a modest salary, and their tenure was conditional on their passing various examinations.

Hungarian-language schooling deteriorated in the 1930s because, as a result of the worsened economic situation, many Hungarian pupils were unable to pay the high fees charged in the denominational schools. Many parents yielded to the pressure of circumstances and sent their children to the state schools. The discriminatory measures were so obvious that when in 1938 the royal dictatorship worked out its own minority statute, it made significant concessions to the demands of the minorities in the field of education — without, of course, being able to provide for their implementation.

Because most institutions of Hungarian-language education — and, it should be added, of Hungarian-language culture — existed within a denominational framework, the role of the churches increased in the life of the minorities. Priests, especially young priests, did much to spread Hungarian culture by way of the church associations, in spite of harassment from the authorities.

Post-Trianon Romania placed restrictions on Hungarian-language publishing as well. It was not until the middle of the 1920s that the Hungarian press in Transylvania was allowed to publish again, and fill the gap left by the Budapest newspapers, which for years were proscribed by the censorship. True, the circulation figures were not high — with the exception of the *Brassói Népújság* (Brassó People's Daily), which sold as many as 50,000 copies per issue. Press trials and the continually renewed state of emergency curtailed the freedom of the minority press, which, in addition to the conservative trends, was also the forum of the Liberals. A number of Hungar-

ian journals were published. In 1921, the literary journal *Pásztortűz* (Campfire) was started, and in 1928 the *Erdélyi Helikon* (Transylvanian Helicon) appeared, which helped the work of the *Erdélyi Szépmíves Céh* (Transylvanian Craftsmen's Guild) founded in 1924. In 1926, *Korunk* (Our Times), a social science and literary journal, was established. This was Marxist in spirit and consciously European in its horizons.

Of Transylvania's artistic institutions, the activity of the Hungarian theatre at Kolozsvár deserves special mention for its staging of works by Transylvanian Hungarian writers. Since their cultural institutions were restricted in their activities, many amateur theatrical troupes and music ensembles cropped up among the Hungarians during these years.

In rallying the Hungarian men of letters, Károly Kós, Aladár Kuncz, Sándor Reményik, János Kemény and Count Miklós Bánffy took the lead. In the 1930s, some outstanding new talents made their appearance in Transylvanian Hungarian literature: Áron Tamási, István Asztalos and Sándor Kacsó in prose, and Lajos Áprily and Jenő Dsida in poetry. This Hungarian literature set itself the task of self-examination, and of strengthening the self-awareness of the Hungarians. Its goal was to confirm its readers in their determination to adhere to their language, homeland, and values.

Of the Hungarian intellectuals, many became advocates of "Transylvanism", a movement founded in an interpretation of history which saw Transylvania and the Hungarians of Transylvania as entrusted with the special role of finding the means to the reconciliation of the peoples living together in the new state. These were the decades of growing sensitivity to social problems, and writers and sociologists alike gave their accounts of the lot of the Székelys, and of the social conflicts that beset Transylvanian urban life. There were also, of course, writers who painted idyllic pictures of peasant life, which conjured up the mystical, mythical world of folktales.

One of the challenges facing Hungarian intellectuals was to acquaint themselves with Romanian literature and to introduce it to the Hungarian-speaking public. The effort led to co-operation with certain Romanian writers, among them Octavian Goga, Emil Isac, and Victor Eftimiu. Many Hungarian writers became mediators between the Romanian and the Hungarian literary world. A number of populist writers in Hungary — for instance, László Németh — took a lively interest in the "minority's lot" and sought contacts with Transylvanian Hungarian writers, and through them, with Romanian writers, too. Attempts were also made to promote collaboration between Hungarian and Saxon writers, with members of the *Klingsor* circle, for example. But these attempts to reach out to one another were not enough for a real change, and in the atmosphere of rampant nationalism all efforts at establishing lasting co-operation necessarily failed.

The opportunities open to Transylvania's Hungarian scholars were very limited, and only a few individuals actually engaged in research. There was hardly an institution in which such work was possible, and there was no university. The activity of the *Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet* (Transylvanian Museum Association) was limited to the publication of scholarly findings, and to encouraging historical research, principally on the common Romanian–Hungarian past.

Literature served political and ideological purposes under the circumstances: it nurtured national self-consciousness, and gave direction to culture and education. Up to the mid-1930s, the intelligentsia were happy to relinquish the main political arena to aristocratic and bourgeois circles, convinced that both their traditions and financial position made them more suited to the task.

Once the Treaty of Trianon had decided Transylvania's legal status, the conservative Hungarian political leaders declared their loyalty while pledging themselves to a policy of protecting minority rights. At this time they did not consider the founding of a political party. The democratically minded artist-architect, Károly Kós, organized a People's Party at Bánffyhunyad in the June 1921, but this was unable to attain national significance. After various attempts on the part of both democrats and aristocrats to form a party, at the end of 1922 a more permanent organization, the *Országos Magyar Párt* (National Hungarian Party) was set up. This party was directed in a conservative spirit by representatives of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie, but enjoyed a firm base in that national grievances were common to all social layers.

In 1923, the party concluded an agreement with the poet Octavian Goga, who had negotiated on behalf of General Averescu's *Partidul Poporului* (People's Party). This agreement promised a certain autonomy to the Hungarian churches, the right of the denominational schools to issue certificates, fewer restrictions on other Hungarian-language cultural institutions, and the wider use of Hungarian in the administration of justice and in communities which were at least 25 per cent Hungarian populated — provided the two parties fought the elections jointly and were victorious. The National Hungarian Party later renounced this agreement, and in 1926 made a similar one with the Liberal Party, which it considered to be stronger. Afterwards it returned to its alliance with the People's Party, later forging links with the German minority and then again with the Liberals. Agreements of this type ensured the election of a few Hungarian parliamentary deputies, in spite of an electoral system which was weighted against the small parties. However, successive governments did not keep their promises, and in practice the lot of the Hungarians was not improved as a result of this pact policy. Modest steps towards the democratization of the country brought a certain improvement — the temporary lifting of the state of siege and the cleaner elections held by the Maniu government in 1928 (in which the National Hungarian Party took third place), but even these worthwhile developments were swept away by the general political dislocation and shift to the right which followed in the wake of the Depression.

The National Hungarian Party and the groups it supported from time to time attempted, on the basis of the 1919 minority protection agreement, to turn to the League of Nations — mainly with property violation and education grievances. Once presented for arbitration to the League, however, such grievances naturally became political issues for the Romanian government, which accordingly did everything it could to prove the groundlessness of the complaints, alluding, among other things, to the fact that the German minority was "satisfied with its lot", and that it did not seek outside help. With the exception of certain compromises over property, which mainly

122. Georg Daniel Teutsch, Lutheran bishop and historian

Ardealul în România.

Cucerirea nu e recentă. Datează tocmai de un veac. Dela Gheorghe Lazăr am început să ne mutăm sufletele dincolo de Carpați, jertfind fiecare generație pentru întărirea Principatelor, a României libere cea mai bună parte a energiilor născute pe acest pământ al suferințelor. Capitalul de energii ce l-am trimis dincolo de munți a fost productiv pentru frații noștri și ne făgădueşte şi nouă dobânzi mari tocmai acum în zilele negre ale existenței noastre naționale. Numai să fim vrednici a le primi şi a le preface în aurul sufletesc al credinței în izbândă prin muncă sistematică şi conştientă. Sunt semne că dela răsboiul din Balcani sufletul românesc a intrat într'o nouă fază; în faza muncii pozitive unitare şi a unei apropieri conştiente. Astăzi ne simțim rândurile mai strânse şi lucrăm cu toții în vederea aceluiaş scop, care mai înainte ni se părea un vis îndepărtat, dacă nu o utopie. Faptele tinerelor popoare balcanice ne-au învățat că idealurile naționale

se pregătesc şi că atunci când sună ceasul mult aşteptat, întregul popor se ridică pentru întruparea lor.

Idealul nostru, unitatea culturală, se țese de sufletele distinse ale artiştilor. Ei sunt înainte mergătorii! Atunci, când glasul lor e ascultat, când cuvântul lor pune în mişcare mulțimea — e semn de biruință.

O asemenea biruință a câştigat de curând poetul Oct. Goga la Bucureşti. În piesa lui „Domnul Notar" a smuls o parte a vieții reale din Ardeal şi a arătat-o pe scena Teatrului Național bucureştenilor. Cărțile, discursurile, oricât de cu măiestrie scrise şi rostite, nu pot pune în mişcare mulțimea ca teatrul. Chiar şi boierii intelectuali, cari s'au interesat de soartea noastră, au rămas de multeori indiferenți la multele strigăte de durere ce plecau de aici. A trebuit să vină un artist, cu intuiția lui puternică şi cu ochiul lui sigur să zugrăvească realitatea aşa cum este: crudă, înfiorătoare şi revoltătoare. Acea-

Octavian Goga

124. Octavian Goga, poet and politician

◄ 123. Béla Bartók on a collecting tour in Csík county

125. Endre Ady in the autumn of 1918 (Photograph by Emil Isac)

favoured landowners who had emigrated to Hungary, the League of Nations was unable to protect minority rights. Attempts which sought to enlist the help of the Vatican for the redress of the Catholic church's grievances were similarly unsuccessful. All this showed that, even given the possibility of international supervision, the minority protection system did not work effectively.

Among the Hungarians, the main spokesmen for social progress were the Communists, who played an active part in the *Partidul Communist din România* (Romanian Party of Communists) and in organizations which maintained contact with it. The struggle against nationalism and increasing exploitation was helped by the *Magyar Dolgozók Országos Szövetsége* (MADOSZ, Hungarian Workers' National Association) which was established in 1934 with the assistance of Communists in opposition to the Hungarian Party. The MADOSZ sought a solution to the nationality question as part of a progressive economic and social policy and of general democratization. Not only the Romanian Communists worked together with the MADOSZ, but so did certain representative Social Democrats and the radical *Frontul Plugarilor* (Ploughmen's Front), which began in Hunyad county and grew into a national movement under the leadership of Petru Groza.

In 1937, at the initiative of the Communists and other democratic intellectuals, the Vásárhely Meeting took place, intended by the Transylvanian Hungarians to be an event of epoch-making significance. It was opened by the writer Áron Tamási and adopted as its aims the fight against fascism, co-operation with Romanian democratic forces, and the establishment of a people's front — declaring that for the historically interdependent Romanian and Hungarian peoples, voluntary "brotherly union" represented the only solution. The meeting had great effect on the progressive Romanian intelligentsia, and on intellectual life in Hungary as well.

In 1938, after the dissolution of the parties and the official establishment of the corporative state the *Magyar Népközösség* (Hungarian People's Community) was set up under the leadership of Count Miklós Bánffy, its purpose being to provide cultural and socio-economic representation for the Hungarians. Discussions began about a new minority statute, which promised greater latitude for cultural institutions and the churches, especially in education. Given the continuing national oppression and the ever more chaotic state of domestic politics by this time, the majority of Transylvanian Hungarians regarded such attempts at negotiating with scepticism, and looked to external factors for the improvement of their lot. The numbers of those — Hungarians and Romanians — who sought the common future of their people in a united front against fascism dwindled daily.

German Seaking Ways

There were 543,852 Germans living in the western territories annexed by Romania according to the 1930 Census. One block of Germans lived in the former Saxon districts between the Maros River and the Carpathians, and another, bigger group — the Swabians — in the Banat, around Temesvár.

On 8 January, 1919 the representatives of the Transylvanian Saxons had declared that they would join the Kingdom of Romania, and welcomed the nationality programme of the Gyulafehérvár resolution as one whose realization would create the preconditions under which their accession could take place. A few months later the Swabians of the Banat made a similar declaration.

The reason for all this should be sought primarily in the fact that the conflicts between the German bourgeoisie and the Hungarian ruling class had intensified during the war years, and the Germans hoped to achieve a more favourable position in the new state. Their willing adherence brought the Germans certain advantages over the Hungarians. They could continue their economic activities freely, could remain in public service in considerable numbers, had a good chance of getting their representatives elected to parliament, had greater educational and cultural opportunities, and their schools — unlike the Hungarian schools — received regular government subsidies. However, the Germans soon realized that the Romanian government would not keep to the promises made at Gyulafehérvár, nor to the international convention on the minorities. The land reform deprived the German Lutheran church of the greater part of its property, some 55 per cent. In 1937, the remaining property was divided between the Lutheran church and the Romanian cultural organization *Aşezământul Cultural Mihai Viteazul* (Cultural Foundation M.V.)

According to the statistics, the agricultural sector provided the livelihood of 54.1 per cent of the Germans, this proportion being somewhat higher among the Swabians of the Banat. Twenty-four per cent of Germans earned a living in industry and mining, and 7.2 per cent in commerce, banking and transportation. In commerce, banking and transportation the number both Jews and Hungarians exceeded the Germans, although the latter not significantly. Among those employed in education, the proportion of Germans was the highest; while of those earning a livelihood through casual labour the proportion of Germans was almost as favourable as that of the Romanians.

German peasants in Romania for the most part used modern farming techniques, and this ensured their prosperity. However, as measures were introduced to benefit the Romanian peasantry, the German peasants found themselves at a disadvantage, and this caused a great deal of bitterness among them. German artisans, craftsmen, tradesmen and traders had to work ever harder to compensate for the restrictions placed on their access to credit.

In matters of culture and education, Transylvania's Germans relied to a large extent on the Lutheran church, which maintained contacts in Germany, and which was, thus, able to finance denominational education and provide for the cultural needs of the Lutheran community. The *Kulturamt* (Culture Office), the organization headed by Richard Csaki, the journal *Ostland,* and *Klingsor,* the literary journal edited by Heinrich Zillich, all did a great deal to foster German culture during these years. Transylvanian Saxon literature had a special quality all its own, as can be seen in the works of writers such as Adolf Meschendörfer, Erwin Wittstock and Heinrich Zillich. The social science journal *Siebenbürgische Vierteljahrschrift* edited by Karl Kurt Klein, was read outside Transylvania as well.

A decisive change as compared to the previous era was the ending of the traditional political separateness of Saxons and Swabians. Organizationally the two groups united, and Saxon consciousness gave way to a consciousness of all Germans which found expression in the name given their party, and in the names of their institutions and newspapers. The German Party, which stood for bourgeois constitutionalism, was influential in the 1920s and from time to time co-operated with the Hungarian Party, though it was more prone to enter into coalitions with the government party, and by so doing to ensure its position in parliament. (For a time, one of its members, Rudolf Brandsch, held the post of state secretary for minorities.)

Many German workers participated in the workers' movement, and quite a few were active in the illegal Romanian Communist Party. The Depression, the systematic discrimination against the nationalities, and Hitler's coming to power in Germany boosted the influence of national socialism in Romania, especially among young people. After 1935, the Hitlerists gained control of the German wing of the national revival movement, and bound the fate of Romania's German minority to Germany, going so far as to subordinate its interests to the foreign policy objectives of the Reich. The Romanian ruling class, especially after 1938, endeavoured to play into their hands, hoping that they would act as mediators in the assertion of the new Romanian foreign policy, which had suddenly shifted from the Anglo-French alliance towards Hitler's Germany. Certain segments of Romania's German bourgeoisie was opposed to Hitler — as were the liberal patricians led by the Lutheran bishop Victor Glondys — but they were isolated in the general move to the right.

The Second World War and the Divided Transylvania

Within the space of a few years, the change in power relations in central and eastern Europe that followed the Nazi take-over of power brought both Hungary and Romania under the hegemony of the Reich. The Hungarian ruling class, albeit with certain reservations, supported the fascist powers, and in doing so strengthened its own position. In 1938, with the agreement of the Little Entente, Hungary acquired the right to equality of armaments, although this was not so much a concession as a recognition of the new international situation. The Little Entente had grown weak, and, with the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938–1939, it collapsed altogether.

It was this new international climate that led Romania to drop its up-to-then exclusively Anglo-French orientation, and to switch to a policy of balancing between its earlier supporters and Berlin. A paradoxical situation ensued: Hungary was laying claim to German help in support of its revisionist plans at the same time as Romania was attempting to defuse Hungarian ambitions by trying to enlist Germany to support its cause. In March 1939, a German–Romanian economic agreement gave Romania a breathing space. Budapest, seeing that it could not count on German assistance, worked out a new plan: it would consider launching a war of its own against Romania at an opportune moment. The project very much overestimated Hun-

garian military strength, and the domestic troubles of the neighbouring country. In the autumn of 1939, Ribbentrop made it known that Germany would not tolerate an attack on Romania, and Italy, too, warned the Hungarian government against such a move. The Western Powers also disapproved of the proposed military action. In February 1940, the Teleki government dropped the military plan, and at the same time informed London and Paris of its decision.

The spring of 1940 was, for Hungary, a time of Germanophile neutrality. When Budapest got word of the Germans' plan for a possible seizure of the Romanian oilfields, it put out feelers in London as to whether or not it should allow German troops passage through the country. On receiving a negative answer from the British, Teleki decided on the maintainance of armed neutrality. However, the German offensive in the West created a new situation. For the Hungarian government, reconsideration of the Transylvanian issue was again becoming urgent, the more so as it was becoming clear that Romania would soon officially align itself with Germany. On 1 July, 1940 the Romanian government renounced the British guarantees and published a statement declaring its about-turn in foreign policy. Directly after this, the king appointed a pro-German government, in which the leaders of the Iron Guard were also given posts. Already on 27 June, however, the Hungarian government had decided on military steps to press its territorial demands. In July, Hitler called in Prime Minister Pál Teleki, and announced that he would take the "settlement" of the Transylvanian question into his own hands. The Führer was principally looking for a solution which would suit his preparations for war against the Soviet Union, and which would guarantee him Romanian crude oil, Hungarian wheat, and the railway networks of both countries for the conflict in the East. He persuaded Romania to begin talks with Hungary about handing back the Transylvanian territories. At the Hungarian–Romanian negotiations at Turnu Severin on 16, 19, and 21 August, even the basic principles could not be agree: the Hungarian negotiating team wanted the handing over of substantial territories, while the Romanians — perhaps with the aim of gaining time — proposed an exchange of populations. The Hungarian government now once again considered an independent military move, but Bucharest (according to some sources) raised the idea of arbitration by Berlin — a move Hitler had already been considering. On 27 August, Hitler chose among the border variants that had been worked out by German experts for the division of Transylvania, and then summoned representatives of the Hungarian and the Romanian governments to Vienna. After some hesitation, the Hungarians accepted the arbitration decision, as did the Romanian Crown Council, by a two-thirds majority.

The second Vienna Award, proclaimed by the Germans and Italians on 30 August, 1940, gave to Hungary the northern and eastern parts of Transylvania (43,492 sq km), leaving the rest in Romanian hands. The award was based neither on ethnic nor on any particular economic considerations, but was, in fact, the implementation of the "divide and rule" principle. From the ethnic point of view, it meant that, with northern Transylvania, Hungary acquired another 1,344,000 inhabitants whose mother tongue was Hungarian, 1,069,000 whose mother tongue was Romanian and 45,000 whose

mother tongue was German, comprising 52.1, 41.5 and 1.8 per cent respectively of Northern Transylvania's population according to the disputable 1941 Census data.[4] Among the counties given to Hungary were also some with Romanian majorities — for example, Beszterce–Naszód and Máramaros. The capriciously defined border now dividing Transylvania split in two what had been an economically integrated whole. Towns were cut off from their traditional hinterlands and staggering transportation difficulties were created. (For example, no Hungarian railway link existed between Budapest and the Székelyföld.)

Politically the award meant that Hungary and Romania became Hitler's playthings: German policy made the future fate of Transylvania dependent on the two countries' participation in the anti-Soviet war. Budapest hoped to retain the territory gained through German favour; Bucharest, on the other hand, hoped to recover the same region by the same means. Although Prime Minister Teleki proclaimed Hungary's attitude to the Romanians to be one of "brotherly understanding and co-operation in a spirit of peace", this was rendered an empty phrase by government and administrative measures that only compounded tensions and increased national animosity. Goaded on by their loss, Romanian nationalists vented their frustration on the Hungarian population of Southern Transylvania. A veritable exodus of Hungarians was the result. Some 100,000–150,000 Hungarians from Southern Transylvania fled either to Northern Transylvania or to Hungary to escape discriminatory measures, imprisonment, and other denials of rights.

In their turn, about one hundred thousand Romanians — mainly civil servants and intellectuals — fled southwards from Northern Transylvania, away from Hungarian rule which was establishing itself there. The number of Romanian refugees reached more than two hundred thousand by 1944. The Hungarian army, which marched into Northern Transylvania at the beginning of September 1940, encountered no resistance; nevertheless, many incidents took place. These included serious atrocities at Ipp and Ördögkút, where a company of soldiers murdered many Romanian inhabitants. The military administration compromised the policy of the Teleki government, expelling even those Romanian intellectuals whom the prime minister wanted to invite as parliamentary representatives. The memorandum submitted by the Transylvanian Hungarian representatives to Parliament, which made a plea for equal rights and protection for the Romanians, fell on deaf ears. Policies of so-called "reciprocity" now began, in which expulsion was matched by expulsion, internment by interment, and school closure by school closure. The German–Italian military commissions, which examined complaints on both sides, condemned both governments, which answered with loud protestations but with no measures aiming at redress.

4. Z. FOGARASI, A népesség anyanyelvi, nemzetiségi és vallási megoszlása törvényhatóságonként 1941-ben. (The Municipal Division of the Population According to Mother Tongue, Nationality and Religion in 1941.) *Magyar Statisztikai Szemle* (Hungarian Statistical Bulletin), 1944. I. 1ff. — Romanian statistics say that the number of Romanians was 1,171,000 (49.1 per cent), that of the Hungarians 912,000 (38.2 per cent). *Analele Institulului Statistic al României*. I. Bucharest 1942, 340ff.

Northern Transylvania

The economic situation in Northern Transylvania was basically one of war-time exploitation. The goal was to utilize to the utmost the natural resources and forests there, and to this end, certain industrial development also took place. The development of transportation, and especially the establishment of links between the Székelyföld and the other parts of Transylvania, was a major problem.

Amidst the generally worsened living conditions, national discrimination exacerbated the situation of the predominantly peasant Romanian population. Many Romanian men of military age were called up for labour service, and many families lost their breadwinners. In the face of the economic difficulties, the *Plugarul* (Plough) co-operative network — the important economic organization belonging to the Romanians of Northern Transylvania — could only extend modest assistance. In areas with a Romanian majority, Romanian-language elementary schools (there were 1,345 of them) were able to function, but Hungarians was made a compulsory subject. At secondary school level, only fourteen Romanian-language schools, or schools with a Romanian-language stream, continued to operate. For some time, only one Romanian newspaper, the Kolozsvár *Tribuna Ardealului* (Transylvanian Tribune), appeared, and even later the number of Romanian periodical publications allowed was just four. The Romanian churches became more active in cultural affairs and education, in spite of the fact that some priests were subject to harassment.

At county level, relatively few Romanians were elected to, or involved in, local government, although more were to be found in the leaderships of villages. They had no special representatives in the Budapest Parliament, and only Iuliu Hossu, a Greek Catholic bishop, had a seat in the Upper House. The Romanian National Commonality led by Emil Haţieganu and Aurel Socol — which was refused formal recognition by the authorities — was the only political organization which both Budapest and Bucharest accepted as the body representing the interest of Northern Transylvania's Romanians.

Initially, it seemed that in Northern Transylvania the second Vienna Award had created a favourable situation for the Hungarians. It soon turned out, however, that only a narrow section really benefited. Former landowners challenged the 1921 land reform, and filed a whole host of lawsuits, most of them against Romanian peasants. As a result, in many places landowners were able to recover their estates, or a part of them. Certain advantages accrued to Hungarian capitalists, and even to traders and independent artisans, craftsmen, and tradesmen, who could now obtain credit and in places make new investments. The change also benefited the Hungarian intellectuals, who were again appointed to government posts and government jobs after so many years of penury. However, the position of the peasantry and the working class did not alter: in the initial period of economic changeover, many were unemployed. Especially difficult was the position of the Székelys, whose accustomed commuting, migratory and work possibilities were now restricted, along with their markets, and the new administration was scarcely able to compensate for this.

For the Hungarians, the second Vienna Award brought real liberation only in the fields of language use and of culture and education. Hungarian-language state elementary schools wee again established, and the network of secondary schools in which Hungarian was the language of instruction expanded. A Hungarian university again operated in Kolozsvár, and the *Erdélyi Tudományos Intézet* (Transylvanian Institute of Sciences) was set up to promote scholarly activity. At the same time, some of the verve of artistic and intellectual life was lost with the discouragement of socialist and the more radical bourgeois democratic trends. The best of Transylvania's writers grew ever more vocal in their criticism of this state of affairs as the war wore on. It was clear that the national question was inseparable from the issue of social progress, and that, despite its advantages, the division of Transylvania had not solved the nationality problem. New solution would have to be found for Romanians and Hungarians to be able to co-exist. Some Transylvanian Hungarian intellectuals sought links with left-wing circles in Budapest, the populist writers, the Social Democratic Party and the Communists.

By late summer of 1940, employees and civil servants from Hungary were flooding into Northern Transylvania. Transylvanian Hungarians took exception not only to this attempt at wholesale take-over, but also to the chauvinist spirit with which the immigrants, and especially the initial two-month military administration, was imbued. The locals were offended by the newcomers' conservative political thinking, their gentry attitudes, their wire-pulling and mainly by their determination to wrest compensation for Trianon, which took the form of rapid enrichment at any cost. In the midst of the deteriorating wartime economic circumstances, the arrogant, conceited behaviour of public administration officials, and especially of members of the officer corps, was especially hard to bear.

The military administration shut down the left-wing press. It quickly banned almost all progressively-minded political organizations, and soon began to persecute left wingers generally, primarily the Communists. The sole legal working-class organization, the Social Democratic Party, was exposed to constant harassment and surveillance. This was also true for the trade unions, which, with some success, took up the fight against the dismissal of Romanian industrial workers also.

After the second Vienna Award, representatives to the Hungarian Parliament from Transylvania, together with some Transylvanian members of the Upper House, formed the *Erdélyi Párt* (Transylvanian Party). This supported the government but also attempted to protect the special interests of the area — with little success. The party did not identify itself fully with the prevailing policy; it rejected some of the more inhuman manifestations of fascism as for example, the more conspicuous and violent forms of anti-Semitism, and tried to adopt a more progressive standpoint on social questions. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the party rejected the main features of the ruling circles' conservatism and nationalism. Hungarian nationalism was greatly strengthened by the awareness that the Transylvanian question was far from having been settled. In the interests of Transylvania, during the last years of the war not only the Hungarian left wing but also a part of the ruling class sought the possibility of common action with the Romanians against Hitler's Germany.

The modest number of Germans in northern Transylvania automatically became members of the German *Volksgruppe* in Hungary, an organization which, however, was not give as wide sphere of authority as its counterpart in Romania. Among other things, the Lutheran church was able to keep its denominational schools. In 1942, the German and Hungarian governments agreed that the *Waffen SS* could recruit from among Hungary's Germans. Although joining up was voluntary, the *Volksgruppe* took good care to exert adequate pressure on Germans in Hungary, and therefore on Transylvanian Germans, too.

Southern Transylvania

A few days after the second Vienna Award, General Ion Antonescu took power in Romania and King Carol II abdicated in favour of his son. Ruling as *conducător* (leader) alongside King Michael I, Antonescu at first had the support of the Iron Guard. But soon he found it impossible to govern a state in which another state effectively exist. The Iron Guard's attempted coup of 21 January, 1941 was suppressed in a day or so, and Antonescu took Romania into the war against the Soviet Union, hoping to acquire Bessarabia and territories beyond the Dniester — and also to recover Northern Transylvania. This was one of the reasons why he ordered substantial forces to the eastern front; the twelve divisions initially sent had grown to twenty-five by 1944. Nazi Germany also played on these hopes, especially with the start, in 1942–1943, of Prime Minister Miklós Kállay's "see-saw policy", based on taking whatever opportunity presented itself to get Hungary out of the war. Hungary was becoming unreliable as far as the Germans were concerned. Prior to his occupation of the country in March 1944, Hitler declared: "Germany does not consider it expedient to continue to function as a power guaranteeing the Vienna Award."[5]

The war hit Romania's population very hard, but nationalism in Southern Transylvania further inflamed by the loss of the northern areas, forced back the progressive forces, and strengthened the position of fascism. On the Transylvanian issue Romanian fascism was supported by former adherents of bourgeois democracy and also by a good part of the intelligentsia, which regarded the Vienna Award as unjust. In such circumstances it was easy to enlist all forces in education, in the press, and even in scholarship in the service of nationalist propaganda.

In southern Transylvania, economic conditions deteriorated with Romania's involvement in the war, but certain branches of industry did develop. The war naturally also afflicted the Romanians of the area, but their economic situation did not deteriorate as much as that of the local Hungarians. The Vienna Award had left some 500,000 Hungarians in southern Transylvania (about a fifth of them, as we have seen, fled north or to Hungary). Many of those who stayed were called up for labour service, others were

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5. *Hitler hatvannyolc tárgyalása 1939–1944.* (Sixty Eight Negotiations of Hitler 1939–1944.) II. Selected and annotated by Gy. Ránki. Budapest 1983, 268.

interned or simply thrown into prison. Their cultural activities became more restricted; only the *Erdélyi Gazdasági Egylet* (Transylvanian Economic Association) continued to provide some kind of organizational framework. Elemér Gyárfás, Pál Szász and Bishop Áron Márton, who together led the Hungarian community, tried disparately to mediate between Bucharest and Budapest to mitigate the growing pressure on the nationalities on both sides of the border.

After the Vienna Award, the overwhelming majority of Romanian Germans, some five hundred thousand people, found themselves in Southern Transylvania. In November 1940, the Romanian government signed an agreement with Germany in which it recognized the special economic and political rights of the German *Volksgruppe*, and also gave it control of the German denominational schools. With this the battle which had continued for years between the Hitlerists and the bourgeois democratic groups among the Germans was unequivocally decided in favour of the former. Only within the church did some opportunity remain, if not for opposition, then at least for attempts to preserve moral values, as, for example, in hindering the introduction of new pagan customs. In 1943, the two countries signed an agreement according to which Romanian Germans could be enlisted in the German army. Some sixty to seventy thousand Romanian Germans became members of the *Waffen SS*, and about fifteen thousand others worked for the German war machine.

The Extermination of the Jewish Population

Fascist policy was accompanied by anti-Semitism on both sides of the border. The 1941 Census in Northern Transylvania placed on file 153,333 persons of Jewish religion, against whom strict discriminatory measures were enforced. After the German occupation of Hungary, on 19 March, 1944, the Jewish population of northern Transylvania was deported, despite the protests of progressive intellectuals and church leaders. No exact statistical data is available concerning the number of those deported. According to various sources, the Hungarian authorities sent 110,000–130,000 people from Northern Transylvania to German concentration camps, and it is calculated that some 90,000–100,000 of them died there.[6] (Of the more than 400,000 who were deported from the entire territory of Hungary at this time, 320,000 lost their lives.) In Southern Transylvania, the Antonescu government stripped Jewish inhabitants of all their rights, but their deportation — although planned — did not take place. (Romanian anti-Semitism claimed its victims primarily in Moldavia, Bessarabia, and the territories beyond the

6. Data concerning the serious loss of lives among the Jewish community are still extremely diverse. See the figures referred to in I. SEMLYÉN, Demográfiai viselkedés — népesedési politika. (Demographical Behaviour — Demographical Politics.) *A Hét* (The Week), 3 September, 1982; T. STARK, *Magyarország második világháborús embervesztesége.* (Casualities of Hungary During the Second World War.) Budapest 1989, 46; M. CARP, *Cartea neagră.* III. Bucharest 1947, 13, 31; R. L. BRAHAM, *The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary.* I-II. New York 1981.

Dniester River. According to estimates, in these territories 280,000–300,000 Jews were exterminated.)

Transylvania's Jewish inhabitants on both sides of the north-south divide were Hungarian by mother tongue and felt themselves to be a part of Hungarian culture. As far as their occupation was concerned most of them worked in commerce and as independent tradesmen and craftsmen (in 1930 in whole Transylvania 67.1 per cent of the Jewish population, but in Northern Transylvania 9.2 per cent of the Jews were engaged in agriculture, too). A significant number of Jews were members of the intelligentsia, and had made substantial contributions to Hungarian culture, many of them participating in working-class and other progressive movements.

Fight against Fascism

The second Vienna Award was condemned by Communist in Hungary and Romania alike as something which hindered the common fight against fascism and which did not serve the true interests of the Hungarian and Romanian peoples. The Communist Party of Hungary declared: "With the unfortunate Vienna Award a border has been drawn through the middle of Transylvania, and a centuries-old economic and cultural unit has been divided in two. The German National Socialists, with the help of Hungarian and Romanian reactionaries, have stolen the liberty and independence of both countries, and the peoples of Transylvania are free neither in the one part nor in the other."[7] Of the Transylvanian Hungarian Communists, many gave their lives to awaken Hungarian society to this realization. With the agreement of the Romanian and Hungarian parties, they worked out a policy corrected for the new conditions and sent a delegation to Moscow for the international coordination of the common struggle. The actions taken by the Hungarian authorities against them in 1941 and 1943 were unable to put an end to their dedicated organizational and propaganda work, and with the setting up of the *Békepárt* (Peace Party), their influence also reached bourgeois circles.

Hungary's withdrawal from the war was nowhere urged so much or so openly as in Transylvania, and from 1943 the leaders of the Transylvanian Party also joined in the demand. When it became clear that the fascist powers had lost the war, the Transylvanian politicians encouraged the Budapest government to conduct negotiations. However, the nearness of the German army, bad relations with the neighbouring countries, fear of communism and not least the desire to retain Northern Transylvania paralyzed the capacity for action. When, in 1943, the Hungarian government sent Count Miklós Bánffy to Bucharest to meet with the Romanian opposition, it turned out that there, too, people knew what kind of hellish game Hitler had drawn them into. Nevertheless, mutual mistrust and differences in views were too great for them to turn jointly against nazi Germany.

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7. D. CSATÁRI, *Magyar–román kapcsolatok.* (Hungarian–Romanian Relations.) Budapest 1958, 166–167.

The Communists, co-operating with other progressive forces, played an important role in preparing for Romania's withdrawal from the German alliance, and — in agreement with the king and the bourgeois opposition — organized the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship. Militarily, the opportunity for this was provided by the advance of the Soviet army, which in August 1944 had broken through the front at Iași, and was advancing towards the Romanian capital. It was this situation that was exploited by the Bucharest uprising on 23 August, which turned the Romanian army against the German forces, and at the same time brought Romania into the anti-Hitler coalition.

After this, the Romanian army took part at the side of the Soviet army in the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, suffering heavy casualties and losing about 160,000 men (of whom more than 40,000 fell in Hungary).

Once More in Romania

The armistice agreement concluded with the Soviet Union on 12 September, 1944, stated: "The Allied governments consider the decision of the Vienna Award relating to Transylvania to be null and void, and agree that, conditional upon ratification in the peace treaty, Transylvania, or the greater part of it, will be given back to Romania, and that with this end in view, Soviet troops will participate with Romania in joint operations against Germany and Hungary."[8] In October 1944, after the defeat of a senseless German–Hungarian attack against Southern Transylvania — Romanian troops advanced into Northern Transylvania alongside the Soviet army. The Hungarian government's own attempt to pull out of the war on 15 October failed, and, as a result, the opportunity was lost for Hungary's military forces to turn against Hitler's Germany.

The coalition government that was formed in Bucharest after 23 August, 1944 with General Sănătescu at its head comprised besides the so-called historic parties, not only the Communists but also the Social Democrats. It was principally the National Peasant Party which was determined to avenge the injury that Romanian national feeling had sustained as a result of the second Vienna Award. When, in accordance with the armistice agreement, the Romanian administration again took over Northern Transylvania, the population fell victim to the bloody atrocities of the Maniu Guard in some villages of the Székelyföld, mainly in Szárazajta and Szentdomokos, and elsewhere, too, as in Egeres, near Kolozsvár, and in Bihar. The Romanian police and gendarmerie arrested and interned tens of thousands of people, especially refugees but also left-wing Hungarians. As a result, at the beginning of November 1944, the Allied Control Commission removed the Romanian administration from Northern Transylvania, and only in March 1945,

8. D. Csatári, *Forgószélben. Magyar–román viszony 1940–1945.* (In Whirlwind. Hungarian–Romanian Relation, 1940–1945.) Budapest 1968, 430; *23 August, 1944. Documente.* II. Edited by I. Ardeleanu – V. Arimia – M. Mușat. Bucharest 1984, 699–703.

after the formation of the Groza government, was it allowed to come back. In the four month transitional period, it was the Romanian and Hungarian Communists — the latter's mass backing being provided by the local and county organizations grouped together into the newly founded *Magyar Népi Szövetség* (Hungarian People's League) — who organized and directed political life and reconstruction work in Northern Transylvania.

The Romanian public administration returned when the government of Petru Groza, the founder of the *Frontul Plugarilor* (Ploughers' Front) promised to guarantee internal order and nationality rights. The assembly convened at Kolozsvár on 13 March, 1945 — at which Andrei Vishinsky, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, took part as Allied representative — sent a telegram to Stalin. This expressed "Northern Transylvania's deep gratitude for being placed under Romanian administration" and assured the Soviet leader that the Romanian authorities would "do everything to maintain peace and order behind the front, and would ensure that the rights and duties of the peoples living together prevailed".[9]

On 10 February, 1947, the peace treaty deciding Romania's new borders was signed in Paris. Passing over the alternative possibility mentioned in the armistice agreement, and taking into account the sacrifices Romania had made in the struggle against the fascist powers, the peace treaty returned the whole of Transylvania to Romania and accordingly restored the Romanian–Hungarian border drawn in 1920. The treaty left the Soviet Union in possession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and Bulgaria in possession of Southern Dobrudja.

Transylvania's post-1918 history has been one of constant hardship. Wars and radical changes of systems of government have influenced its economic and social circumstances, and have determined the relationship of its various peoples and cultures one to another. There can be no doubt that Romanians, Hungarians and Germans alike have and equal stake in the economic, social and cultural development of Transylvania, and that such development must involve modernization, democracy, and respect for the equality — and uniqueness — of each national group.

Transylvania is unique in east-central Europe in respect of its ethnic and cultural plurality. Its future will influence the future of the whole region, and will determine the prospects for co-operation between Romania and Hungary — something that neither country can well afford to forego.

9. Ibid. 461–463; *Scînteia*, 14 March, 1945.

List of Abbreviations

Acta Ant. Hung.	Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae
Acta Arch. Hung.	Acta Archeologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae
Acta Hist. Art.	Acta Historiae Artium Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae
AEMA	Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi
AH	Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae
AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS	Opera. I–III. London 1956–1958
AMN	Acta Musei Napocensis
Annales regni Francorum	In: *MGH SS* rer. Germ. in us. schol. Ed. F. KURZE. 1895
Anonymus	P. Magister quondam Bele regis Hungariae notarius Gesta Hungarorum. Ed. L. JUHÁSZ. Szeged – Budapest 1932
ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. Eds W. HAASE — H. TEMPORINI, Berlin – New York
Arch. Hung.	Archaeologia Hungarica (Budapest)
AURELIUS	VICTOR AURELIUS, Epitome de Caesaribus. Leipzig 1961
AUSB	Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestiensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae. Sectio Historica
AVSL	Archiv des Vereines für siebenbürgische Landeskunde (Hermannstadt)
BARIŢ, *Părţi alese...*	G. BARIŢ, Părţi alese din istoria Transilvaniei. (Chapters from the History of Transylvania.) I–III. Sibiu 1889-1891
BENKŐ, *A helyzettudat...*	S. BENKŐ, A helyzettudat változásai. (Changes in Situation Awareness.) Bucharest 1977
BÍRÓ, *A fejedelmi hatalom...*	V. BÍRÓ, Az erdélyi fejedelmi hatalom fejlődése 1542–1690. (The Growth of Transylvanian Power 1542–1690.) Budapest 1924
CIL	Corpus Inscriptionum Latinorum. III. Berlin 1889
CORIPPUS	CORIPPI CORIPPUS, Africani grammatici libri qui supersunt. Ed. I. PARTSCH. Berlin 1961 — *MGH AA* III, 2
CSEL	Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Vienna

DAI	Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De administrando imperio. Eds GY. MORAVCSIK — R. J. H. JENKINS. Budapest 1949; Washington 1967
De origine antiquisque Getarum	De origine antiquisque Getarum. Ed. TH. MOMMSEN. In: *MGH AA* V, 1, 1882
Descriptio ...	Descriptio civitatum ad septentrionalem plagam Danubii. Eds B. HORÁK — D. TRÁVNÍČEK. Prague 1956
DFGS	Deutsche Fundgruben zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens. Eds J. KEMÉNY — E. TRAUSCHENFELS, Klausenburg 1839-1860
DION CASSIUS	Cassii Dionis Historiarum Romanum libri
DMÉ	A Debreceni Déri Múzeum Évkönyve. (Yearbook of the Déri-Museum, Debrecen.)
DOBÓ, *Inscriptiones...*	Á. DOBÓ, Inscriptiones extra fines Pannoniae Daciaeque repertae ad res earundem provinciarum pertinentes. Budapest 1975⁴
Dolg. ENM	Dolgozatok az Erdélyi Nemzeti Múzeum Érem- és Régiségtárából. (Papers from the Numismatic and Antiquarian Archives of the Transylvanian National Museum.) Kolozsvár
DRH Transilvania	Documenta Romaniae Historica (Documente privind istoria României) C – Transilvania. I–VIII. Bucharest 1951–1981
EHH	Études historiques hongroises. Budapest 1975, 1980, 1985
EOE	Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek. Monumenta comitialia regni Transsylvaniae 1540–1699. Ed. S. SZILÁGYI, I–XXI, Budapest 1875–1898 — *MHH–C*, III/b (Comitialia series)
EOKL	Transylvanian National Governmental Archives
ETA	Erdélyi történeti adatok. I–IV. (Transylvanian Historical Facts. I–IV.) Eds I. MIKÓ — K. SZABÓ. Kolozsvár 1855-1862
EUTROPIUS, *Breviarium ...*	EUTROPI EUTROPIUS, Breviarium ab urbe condita. Ed. C. SANTINI. Leipzig 1979
Excerpta ...	Excerpta de legationibus fragmenta. Ed. C. DE BOOR. Berlin 1903
FA	Folia Archaeologica (Budapest)
FBHH	GY. MORAVCSIK, Fontes byzantini historiae hungaricae aevo ducum et regum ex stirpe Arpad descendentium. Budapest 1984
Festschrift A. T. SZABÓ – ZS. JAKÓ	Forschungen über Siebenbürgen und seine Nachbarn. Festschrift für Attila T. Szabó und Zsigmond Jakó. Eds K. BENDA — T. VON BOGYAY. Munich 1987
FRONTINUS, *Strategemata*	S. I. FRONTINUS, Kriegslisten. Lateinisch–Deutsch von G. BENDZ. 2nd ed. Berlin 1978 (Schriften und Quellen der Alten Welt, 10)
FVLK	Forschungen zur Volks- und Landeskunde (Sibiu)
GDGR	Geschichte der Deutschen auf dem Gebiete Rumäniens. Ed. C. Göllner, Bukarest 1979
GOMBOS, *Catalogus ...*	A. F. GOMBOS, Catalogus Fontium historiae Hungariae aevo ducum et regum ex stirpe Arpad descendentium ab anno Christi DCCC usque ad annum MCCI. I–III. Budapest 1937-1938, Index: Budapest 1942

694

GYÖRFFY, *Geographia* ...   GY. GYÖRFFY, Geographia historica Hungariae tempore stirpis Arpadianae. I–III. Budapest 1963-1987

Die Habsburgermonarchie...   Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918. I. Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Ed. A. BRUSATTI. Wien 1973; III. Die Völker des Reiches. Eds A. Wandruschka — P. Urbanitsch, Wien 1980

HERODOTUS   HERODOTUS, Historiarum libri IX. Ed. H.H. DIETSCH. 2nd ed. Leipzig 1936–1937

HHStA   Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna

HOREDT, *Das frühmittel-*   K. HOREDT, Das frühmittelalterliche Siebenbürgen.
alterliche...   Innsbruck 1988

HOREDT, *Frühmittelalter...*   K. HOREDT, Siebenbürgen im Frühmittelalter. Bonn 1986

IDR   Inscriptiile Daciei Romane. I. Introducere istorica si epigrafica. Diplomele militare. Tablitele cerate. Ed. I. I. RUSSU. Bucharest 1975

JAKÓ, *Írás, könyv* ...   Zs. JAKÓ, Irás, könyv, értelmiség. (Writing, Book and Intelligentsia.) Bucharest 1976

JORDANES, *Getica*   JORDANES, Romana et Getica. Ed. TH. MOMMSEN. Berlin 1961

KATONA, *Historica critica* ...   S. KATONA, Historica critica regum Hungariae I–XI. II. Pest – Pozsony – Kassa – Buda – Kalocsa – Kolozsvár – Vác 1779–1817

KELEMEN, *Ekv...*   Emlékkönyv Kelemen Lajos születésének nyolcvanadik évfordulójára. (Festschrift to Mark the Eightieth Birthday of Lajos Kelemen.) Kolozsvár 1957

KEMÉNY, G. G., *Iratok* ...   Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában 1867–1918. (Documents on the History of the Nationality Question in Hungary in the Age of Dualism.) Ed. G. G. KEMÉNY. I–VI. Budapest 1952–1985

KLÖM   Collected Works of Lajos Kossuth

KŐVÁRI, *Okmánytár* ...   Okmánytár az 1848–49-i erdélyi eseményekhez. (Collection of Documents to the 1848–49 Events in Transylvania.) Ed. L. KŐVÁRI. Kolozsvár 1861

LIBANIUS, *Oratio*   LIBANIUS, Opera. Vol. 1, fasc. 1. Ed. R. FOERSTER. Hildesheim 1963

LUKINICH, *Erdély*   I. LUKINICH, Erdély területi változásai 1541-1711. (Changes in Transylvania's Borders.) Budapest 1918

MBIÖ   Mitteilungen des Bulgarischen Instituts in Österreich

MENANDER PROTECTOR   See: *Excerpta* ...

MGH AA   Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctores Antiquissimi

MGSz   Magyar Gazdaságtörténeti Szemle (Review of the Hungarian Economic History)

MHH C, D and S   Monumenta Hungariae Historica. I. Diplomataria; II. Scriptores; III. Comitialia

MR   Magyarok és románok (Hungarians and Romanians). I–II. Eds J. DEÉR — L. GÁLDI. Budapest 1943-1944

Műv. T.   Művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok. (Studies in Cultural History.) I–II. Eds E. CSETRI — Zs. JAKÓ et al. Bucharest 1979-1980

NK	Numizmatikai Közlöny (Numismatic Gazette), (Budapest)
OL	Hungarian National Archives
OROSIUS, *Historiarum adversum paganos*	P. OROSIUS, The Seven Books of History against the Pagans. Washington 1964
OSZK	National Széchenyi Library, Budapest
PA AA Bonn	Politisches Archives des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn
PĂCURARIU, *Istoria Bisericii*	M. PĂCURARIU, Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române. (A History of the Romanian Orthodox Church.) I–II. 2nd ed. Bucharest 1980-1981²
PASCU, *Voievodatul ...*	ȘT. PASCU, Voievodatul Transilvaniei. (The Voivodate of Transilvaniei.) I–II. Cluj 1972-1979
RAPMP	Relations between the Autochtonous Population and the Migratory Populations on the Territorry of Romania. Bucharest 1975
Ravennatis ...	Ravennatis anonymi Cosmographia et Guidonis Geographia. Ex libris manuscriptis. Eds M. PINDER – G. PARTHEY. Aalen 1962
Res gestae Divi Augusti	Monumentum Ancyranum. Ed. E. DIEHL. Bonn 1925⁴
RHC	Revue d'Histoire Comparée. Études Hongroises (Paris)
RMK	Régi Magyar Könyvtár (Old Hungarian Library)
RRH	Revue Roumaine d'Histoire
RT	Rákóczi tanulmányok. (Studies on [György] Rákóczi [II].) Eds B. KÖPECZI – L. HOPP – A. R. VÁRKONYI. Budapest 1980
SHA	Scriptores Historiae Augustae. Ed. E. HOHL. I–II. Leipzig 1965
SRH	Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum tempore ducum regumque stirpis Arpadianae gestarum. I–II. Ed. EM. SZENTPÉTERY. Budapest 1937-1938
Studii	Studii (Studies.) Revista de istorie (Bucharest)
SUBB-H	Studia Universitatis Babes–Bolyai. Series 4: Historia, Cluj
Sz	Századok (Centuries)
Székely felkelés...	Székely felkelés 1595–1596, előzményei, lefolyása, következményei. (The Székely Uprising of 1595-1596. Its Antecedents, Events and Consequences.) Eds S. BENKŐ – L. DEMÉNY – K. VEKOV. Bucharest 1979; Romanian version: Răscoala secuilor din 1595-1596, antecedente, desfășurare și urmări. Bucharest 1978
SZENTGYÖRGYI, *Jobbágyterhek...*	M. SZENTGYÖRGYI, Jobbágyterhek a XVI–XVII. századi Erdélyben. (Serf Burdens in Transylvania in the 16th and 17th Centuries.) Budapest 1962
TACITUS, *Germania ...*	TACITUS (PUBLIUS) CORNELIUS, Libri qui supersunt. I. Eds S. BORZSÁK – K. WELLESLEY. Leipzig 1986
TBCM	Transilvania, Banatul, Crișana și Maramureșul 1918-1928. (Transylvania, the Banat, Crisana and Maramuresul.) I–III. Bucharest 1929
TEt	Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről. (Studies on the History of Transylvania.) Ed. I. Rácz, Debrecen 1988
TSz	Történelmi Szemle (Historical Review)

ÜRMÖSSY, *Tizenhét év...*

L. ÜRMÖSSY, Tizenhét év Erdély történetéből. (Seventeen Years from the History of Transylvania.) Temesvár 1894

ZA — Zeitschrift für Archäologie

ZOSIMUS — ZOSIMUS, Historia nova. Ed. L. MENDELSSOHN. Hildesheim 1963

Bibliography

There is an enormous literature in several languages on the history of Transylvania, the bibliography of which could alone fill a large volume. Readers who seek a more detailed bibliography than the one which follows are referred to the bibiliography of the earlier, three-volume, Hungarian edition of the present book. There the bibliography, although still far from complete, mentions all the more important publications: Béla Köpeczi (editor-in-chief), Erdély története I–III / A History of Transylvania I–III/, Budapest 1986³, I. 542–611; II. 1141–1185; III. 1779–1830.

In the bibliography of the present book only the most important sources and publications are listed, together with those few books and papers which have been published on the subject since 1986.

We quote the titles of the more frequently cited books, journals, and series in the form shown in the List of Abbreviations. The same applies to the footnotes in the text.

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The large and comprehensive works which deal with the history of Transylvania, Hungary, and Romania — and which deserve repeated mention in connection with all chapters of the book provide the reader with basic orientation. These are:

L. Kővári, Erdély története / A History of Transylvania/ I–V (Pest 1859–1866); S. Szilágyi, Erdélyország történelme különös tekintettel művelődésére / A History of Transylvania with Special Regard to its Culture/. I–II (Pest 1865–1866); B. Jancsó, Erdély története / A History of Transylvania/ (Kolozsvár 1931); M. Asztalos (ed.), A történeti Erdély / The Historical Transylvania/ (Budapest 1936); L. Makkai, Erdély története / A History of Transylvania/ (Budapest 1944); its French version: Historie de Transylvanie (Budapest – Paris 1946).

Şt. Pascu, Istoria Transilvaniei (Sibiu 1944); V. Daicoviciu — Şt. Pascu — V. Cherestesiu, Din istoria Transilvaniei. I–II (Bucharest 1961); its Hungarian version: M. Constantinescu (ed.), Erdély története / A History of Transylvania/ I–II. (Bucharest 1964); C. Daicoviciu — M. Constantinescu (eds), Brève histoire de la Transylvanie (Bucharest 1965); C. C. Giurescu, Erdély a román nép történetében / Transylvania in the History of Romanian People/ (Bucharest 1968); Şt. Pascu, A History of Transylvania (Detroit 1982); G. D. Teutsch — Fr. Teutsch, Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen für das sächsische Volk. I–IV (Hermannstadt 1899).

L. Szalay, Magyarország története / A History of Hungary/. I–VI (Leipzig – Pest 1852–1860); M. Horváth, Magyarország történelme / A History of Hungary/. I–VIII (Pest 1871 – Budapest 1973); S. Szilágyi (ed.), A magyar nemzet története / A

698

History of the Hungarian Nation/. I–X (Budapest 1895–1898); B. Hóman — Gy. Szegfű, Magyar történet /Hungarian History/. I–V (Budapest 1938). Also useful is Zs. P. Pach (ed.), Magyarország története /A History of Hungary/. Volumes published so far: I, III, V–VIII (Budapest 1978–1985).

N. Iorga, Istoria românilor. I–X (Bucharest 1936–1939); N. Iorga, Geschichte der Rumänen und ihrer Kultur (Hermannstadt — Sibiu 1929); Istoria României. I–IV (Bucharest 1960–1964; M. Constantinescu — Şt. Pascu — C. Daicoviciu, Histoire de la Roumanie (n. p. 1970).

Finally, the reader should bear in mind that the present work is a concise and, in certain parts, revised version of the three-volume "Erdély története" /A History of Transylvania/, published in 1986. All the material in this book is based on the three-volume edition.

Part One — Transylvania in Prehistoric and Ancient Times

I. Prehistory and Antiquity

The monographs and papers dealing with the prehistory and ancient history of Transylvania, as well as the region's history during the Great Migrations are arranged in thematic order in the series started by J. Banner and carried on by I. Jakabffy, A Közép-Dunamedence régészeti bibliográfiája /An Archaeological Bibliography of the Central Danubian Basin/ (Budapest 1954–1981).

A complete collection of classical sources on Dacia and the Dacian people are found in the volumes Izvoare privind istoria României I-II (Bucharest 1964–1970). For the Roman inscriptions of non-Dacian origin see Á. Dobó, Inscriptiones...

There are useful overviews in D. M. Pippidi (ed.), Dicţionar de istorie veche a României (Bucharest 1976) and in G. B. Fedorov — L. L. Polevoy, Archaeologiya Rumini (Moscow 1973).

1. The Prehistory of Dacia

The study of Transylvanian prehistory dates from the nineteenth century, although its antecedents go back even earlier. The archaeological and numismatic collection of the Bethlen College of Nagyenyed was founded in 1726. *AVSL* was first published in 1845 and the *Erdélyi Múzeum* /Transylvanian Museum/ appeared in 1876. After 1899, when the University of Kolozsvár offered its first archaeology courses, a series of Hungarian and Saxon archaeological excavations took place which threw more light on the history of the region. The first truly comprehensive Romanian work is I. Nestor, Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Frankfurt a/M. — Mainz — Berlin 1933). Further useful books are: D. Berciu, Romania before Burebista (London 1967); E. Condurachi — C. Daicoviciu, Rumänien. Archeologia Mundi (Genf 1972). A basic, albeit somewhat outdated, work is C. Daicoviciu (ed.),Istoria Romîniei I. (Bucuresti 1960).

There has been only one work in response to the three-volume Erdély története /A History of Transylvania/ since its publication: A. Vulpe, Die Geto-Daker. Geschichte eines Jahrtausends vor Burebista (*Dacia* 31, 1987).

2. The Dacian Kingdom

A monographic treatment of the period can be found in H. DAICOVICIU, Dacia de la Burebista la cucerirea romană (Cluj 1972). See also: C. DAICOVICIU, Dakien und Rom in der Prinzipatzeit (*ANRW* II:6, 1977) and I. H. CRIŞAN, Burebista and his Time (Bucharest 1978). The most recent work is G. VÉKONY, Dákok, rómaiak, románok / Dacians, Romans, Romanians/ (Budapest 1989).

3. The Roman Province of Dacia

A bibliography of works dealing with the history and archaeology of Dacia during the Roman period is to be found in the above-mentioned A Közép-Dunamedence régészeti bibliográfiája / The Archaeological Bibliography of the Central Danubian Basin/, by BANNER and JAKABFFY.

An earlier but still useful summary of the history, culture and archaeology of the region is C. DAICOVICIU, La Transylvanie dans l'Antiquité (Bucharest 1938); in German: Siebenbürgen im Altertum (Bucharest 1943). There are brief accounts of the province's history in the exhibition catalogue Römer in Rumänien: Ausstellung des Römisch-Germanischen Museums, Köln und des Historischen Museums Cluj (Köln 1969). The Tabula Imperii Romani volumes provide information (and further reading) concerning the topographical investigations on a site by site basis: TIR L–34, Aquincum–Sarmizegetusa–Sirmium (Budapest 1968); TIR L–35, Romula–Durostoru–Tomis (Bucharest 1969); TIR K–34, Naissus–Dyrrhachion–Scupi–Serdica–Thessalonike (Ljubljana 1976). The inscriptions are published continuously in the volumes Inscriptiones Daciae Romanae (Bucharest since 1975).

For a new approach and ample literature on the conquest and social structure of the province readers are referred to K. STROBEL, Untersuchungen zu den Dakerkriegen Trajans. Studien zur Geschichte des mittleren Donauraumes in der hohen Kaiserzeit (Bonn 1984), Antiquitas, Reihe 1, Abhandlungen zur Alten Geschichte 33. On the proconsuls and the public administration: A. STEIN, Die Reichsbeamten von Dazien (Budapest 1944); B. E. THOMASSON, Laterculi praesidium Moesia, Dacia, Thracia (Gothoburgi Westrogotorum 1977).

Defence questions are dealt with in: N. GUDEA, Der Limes Dakiens und die Verteidigung der obermoesischen Donaulinie von Traianus bis Aurelian (*ANRW* II:6, 1977). Like most Romanian authors and quite without substantiation, GUDEA considers the Tisza and Maros rivers to be the borders of the province.

Important accounts on mining: S. MROŻEK, Aspects sociaux et administratifs des mines d'or romaines de Dacie (Apulum 7, 1968); S. MROŻEK, Die Goldbergwerke im römischen Dazien (*ANRW* II:6, 1977). H.-CH. NOESKE, Studien zur Verwaltung und Bevölkerung der dakischen Goldbergwerke in römischen Zeit (*Bonner Jahrbücher* 177, 1977). For a brief summary concerning money transactions: J. WINKLER, Der Münzumlauf (Römer in Rumänien, Köln, 1969, 57–60). On the coin treasures of Dacia: D. PROTASE, Les trésors monétaires de la Dacie romaine (Congresso Internationale di Numismatica. Atti, Roma 1965, III). On the coin treasures of the northern Balkans: B. GEROV, Die Einfälle der Nordvölker (*ANRW* II:6, 1977).

For the wars in the Danubian region during the Severus age: J. FITZ, A Military History of Pannonia from the Marcomann Wars to the Death of Alexander Severus, 180–235 (*Acta Arch. Hung.* 14, 1962); A. BODOR, Impăratul Caracalla în Dacia (in: In memoriam Constantini Daicoviciu, Cluj 1974).

On the urbanization of the province: F. VITTINGHOFF, Der Bedeutung der Legionslager für die Entwicklung der römischen Städte an der Donau und in Dakien (Studien

700

zur europäischen Vor- und Frühgeschichte, H. Jankuhn gewidmet. Neumünster 1968); H. WOLF, Miscellanea Dacica. II (*AMN* 13, 1976).

For the language and the ethnic composition of the inhabitants: D. DETSCHEW, Die Thrakischen Sprachreste (Vienna 1957); I. I. RUSSU, Die Sprache der Thrako-Daker (Bucharest 1969). The names were collected by A. KERÉNYI: A dáciai személynevek /Dacian Personal Names/ (Budapest 1941). A later analysis: I. I. RUSSU, L'Onomastique de la Dacie romaine (L'Onomastique Latin. Colloques Internationaux du CNRS, No. 554, Paris 1977, 353–363).

There is only one work dealing with the religious life of the province: L. W. JONES, The Cults of Dacia (*Classical Philology*, 9, 1929). A short summary can be found in: I. I. RUSSU, Die Kulte in der römischer Dobrudscha (In: Römer in Rumänien, n.p. 1969).

On the political history of the third century: C. DAICOVICIU, Einige Probleme der Provinz Dazien während des 3. Jahrhunderts (*Studii Classice*, 6, 1965). The date of the withdrawal from Dacia is only certain as within the reign of Aurelian: A. BODOR, Impăratul și părăsirea Daciei (*SUBB-H* 17, 1972).

From the sizeable bibliography on the population's continued presence, assumed by the Romanian authors: D. PROTASE, Der Forschungsstand zur Kontinuität der bodenständigen Bevölkerung im römischen Dazien (*ANRW* II:6, 1977); J. HOREDT, Siebenbürgen in spätrömischer Zeit (Bucharest 1982). For a review of the latter: E. TÓTH, Zur frühen Völkerwanderungszeit von Siebenbürgen (*Acta Arch. Hung.*, 37, 1985).

II. From Dacia to Transylvania.
The Period of the Great Migrations (271–895)

A new monograph on the age, K. HOREDT, Frühmittelalter..., discusses the period covered by the present volume in this and the next chapter. The monograph is divided into three main parts: Germanische Zeit (7–58), Slawische Zeit (59–110) and Ungarische Zeit (111–192) — the last of which runs parallel to the next chapter of the present work. On a number of points HOREDT's conclusions agree with those of our contributors, or at least show similarities. On the other hand, we disagree with him fundamentally in the assessment of certain important periods (Goths, Avars). There is a shorter treatise on the subject by the same author: Das frühmittelalterliche .... A basic archaeological source is always J. HAMPEL, Alterthümer des frühen Mittelalters in Ungarn I–III (Braunschweig 1905). For the eastern context of the Great Migrations of the Eurasian peoples see K. CZEGLÉDY, From East to West. The Age of the Nomadic Migrations in Eurasia (*AEMA* 3, 1983), and CS. BÁLINT, Die Archäologie der Steppe (Wien — Köln 1989). To the Hun period: I. BÓNA, Das Hunnenreich (Stuttgart 1991). Archaeological and historical views which approach the subject from the hypothesis of Daco-Roman continuity: M. RUSU, Bodenständige und Wandervölker im Gebiet Rumäniens: 3–9. Jahrhundert (*AMN* 17, 1980) and D. PROTASE, Die dakisch-römische Bevölkerung nördlich der Donau in der Periode von Aurelian bis zu den Slawen (7. Jh) im Lichte der aktuellen Dokumente (in: Die Völker Südosteuropas im 6. bis 8. Jahrhundert. Südosteuropa Forschungen 17, Berlin, 1987).

An archaeological overview of the latest Roman, Dacian Carp and Gothic age (one which the author would surely write differently today) is: K. HOREDT, Siebenbürgen in spätrömischer Zeit (Bucharest 1982). For the Carps and the Septér cemetery: G. MARINESCU — N. MIROȚIU, Die karpische Nekropole von Șopteriu (*Dacia* 31, 1987). On the third-fourth-century history of the Goths: L. SCHMIDT, Geschichte der deutschen Stämme. Die Ostgermanen (Munich 1941). E. A. THOMPSON, The Visigoths in the Time of Ulfila (Oxford 1966), and H. WOLFRAM, Geschichte der Goten (Munich

1979). A thorough critique of the latter with respect to the Goths of Dacia can be found in I. Bóna, Bemerkungen zu einer neuen historisch-archäologischen Bearbeitung der Visigotenzeit in Dazien (*Acta Arch. Hung.* 33, 1981). A work which should be treated with considerable scepticism, especially with regard to archaeology is H.S. Burns, A History of the Ostrogoths (Bloomington 1984). See also E. K. Chrysos, Gothia romana. Zur Rechtslage der Westgoten im 4. Jh. (*Dacoromania* 1, 1973). Marosszentanna: I. Kovács, Cimetière de l'époque de la migration des peuples à Marosszentanna (*Dolg. ENM* 3, 1912); idem., Station préhistorique de Marosvásárhely (*Dolg. ENM* 6, 1915); E. Beninger, Ein westgotisches Brandgrab von Maros-Lekencze (*Mannus* 30, 1938). For the chronology and history of the termination of the Marosszentanna culture, see Z. Székely, Der Fund von Tekerőpatak (Kom. Csík) (*FA* 5, 1945).

On the archaeological homogeneity of the Visigoth culture within and beyond Dacia: Gh. Diaconu, Das Gräberfeld von Mogoșani (*Dacia* 13, 1969); idem., Über die Fibel mit halbkreisförmiger Kopfplatte und rautenförmigen Fuß aus Dacien (*Dacia* 17, 1973); idem., Über die scheibengedrehte Keramik in der Sîntana de Mureș-Tschernyahow-Kultur (*Dacia* 14, 1979).

Of the authors who have attempted to question the Goths' settlement in Dacia: B. Mitrea, Die Goten an den unteren Donau — einige Probleme in III.–IV. Jahrhundert and I. Ioniţa, Probleme der Sîntana de Mureș-Černjachov-Kultur auf dem Gebiete Rumäniens (both in U. Hagberg [ed.], Studia Gotica. Stockholm 1972). The Dacian 'conclusions' drawn by the last author contradict his work which analyzes the Gothic cemeteries outside Transylvania: Chronologie der Sîntana de Mureș-Černjachov-Kultur (in: Peregrinatio Gothica. Łódź 1986). The latest and quite impartial Scandinavian analysis of the Marosszentanna culture is irreconcilable with these views: U. Näsman (in: Jernalderens Stammesamfund. Aarhus 1988).

Comprehensive works on the fourth and fifth century German finds in the Central and Lower Danube region: V. Bierbrauer, Zur chronologischen, soziologischen und regionalen Gliederung des ostgermanischen Fundstoffes des 5. Jahrhundert in Südosteuropa — with an internal chronology of the cemetery of Marosszentanna — and R. Harhoiu, Das norddonauländischen Gebiet im 5. Jahrhundert und sein Beziehungen zum spätrömischen Kaiserreich, accompanied by a list of the finds and sites. Both in: H. Wolfram — F. Daim (eds), Die Völker an der mittleren und unteren Donau in fünften und sechsten Jahrhundert. Vienna 1980).

On the Gepids and the Huns of the Hunnish age (in addition to the examples already quoted) I. Nestor, Zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens in IV. Jh. u. Z. (*Dacia* 19, 1975); N. Fettich, Der zweite Schatz von Szilágysomlyó (*Arch. Hung.* VIII, 1932); D. Protase, Ein Grab aus dem V. Jh. aus Cepari (*Dacia* 4, 1961); T. Rosu, Hunnenzeitliche Funde aus Oradea (*Dacia* 9, 1965).

Mojgrad's princely grave and treasure from the Hun period, which was repeatedly mentioned by N. Fettich and K. Horedt, must be struck out of the literature, since they are nothing other than modern fakes: I. Bóna, Über die Falschungen des Goldschatzes von Moigrad (Publicationes Museorum Com. Veszpremiensis 18, 1986). Neither could the silver plated fibula presented by K. Horedt (Frühmittelalter... Abb. 7,2) and presented with "Karlsburg" excavation site originate in Transylvania, according to the evidence of 1879 and the information of 1884.

On the history of the Gepids, besides L. Schmidt's book Die Ostgermanen see: H. Sevin, Die Gepiden (Munich 1955); W. Pohl, Die Gepiden und die Gentes an der mittleren Donau nach der Zerfall des Attilareiches (in: Die Völker an der mittleren und unteren Donau im fünften und sechsten Jahrhundert. Vienna 1980). For a brief historical and archaeological summary, see I. Bóna, The Dawn of the Dark Ages. The Gepids and the Lombards in the Carpathian Basin (Budapest 1976); idem., Ungarns Völker im 5. und 6. Jahrhundert (in: Germanen, Hunnen und Awaren. Nürnberg 1988).

Das I. gepidische Königsgrab von Apahida: N. Finály — P. Hunfalvy, Fund von Apahida (*Ungarische Revue*, 1890); N. Fettich, La trouvaille de tombe princière hunnique à Szeged-Nagyszéksós (*Arch. Hung.*, XXXIV, 1953).

On the Gepid royal grave at Apahida II, see: K. Horedt — D. Protase, Das zweite Fürstengrab von Apahida (*Germania* 50, 1972). On the Szamosfalva treasure: Ein völkerwanderungszeitlicher Schatzfund aus Cluj-Someșeni (*Germania* 48, 1970).

D. Csallány sums up Gepid archaeological finds up to the end of the 1950s in: Archäologische Denkmäler der Gepiden im Mitteldonaubecken (454–568 u. Z.) (*Arch. Hung.*, XXXVIII, 1961).

A summary of Gepid finds in Transylvania can be found in K. Horedt, Zur Geschichte der Gepiden in Siebenbürgen (in: idem., Untersuchungen zur Frühgeschichte Siebenbürgens. Bucharest 1958). On the earliest Gepid graves in Transylvania: idem., Die Polyederohrringe des 5.-6. Jh. u. Z. aus der SR Rumänien (*ZA* 13, 1979). For the archaeological chronology of the period: idem., Der östliche Reihengräberkreis in Siebenbürgen (*Dacia* 21, 1977). A critique of the last mentioned work can be found in: I. Bóna, Gepiden in Siebenbürgen — Gepiden an der Theiß (*Acta Arch. Hung.*, 31, 1979).

Mezőbánd: I. Kovács, Les fouillages de Mezőbánd (*Dolg. ENM* 4, 1913).

Gepid graves and treasures: M. Roska, Das gepidische Grabfeld von Veresmort-Marosveresmart (*Germania* 18, 1934); M. Comșa, — D. Ignat, Gräber aus dem 6. Jh. in Mediaș (*Dacia* 15, 1971); I. Glodariu, Ein Grab aus dem 5. Jahrhundert in Slimnic (*Germania* 52, 1974); D. Popescu, Das gepidische Gräberfeld von Morești (*Dacia* 18, 1974); M. Rusu, Pontische Gürtelschnallen mit Adlerkopf (*Dacia* 3, 1969).

Monograph on the settlement and cemetery at Malomfalva: K. Horedt, Morești. Grabungen in einer vor- und frühgeschichtlichen Siedlung in Siebenbürgen (Bucharest 1979).

The latest comprehensive monograph on Avar history is: W. Pohl, Die Awaren. Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa, 567–822 n. Chr. (Münich 1988). On the historical background of the relations between the Avars and the Slavs: W.H. Fritze, Zur Bedeutung der Awaren für die slawische Ausdehnungsbewegung im frühen Mittelalter (in: Studien zur Völkerwanderungszeit im östlichen Mitteleuropa. Marburg/Lahn, 1980). Their short history recorded in archaeology is in: I. Bóna, Die Awaren. Ein asiatisches Reitervolk an der mittleren Donau (in: Awaren in Europa. Frankfurt a/M. - Nürnberg 1985); idem., Die Geschichte der Awaren im Lichte der archäologischen Quellen (in: Studi della XXXV. Settimana "Popoli delle Steppe: Unni, Avari, Ungari". Spoleto 1988).

For a register of Avar archaeological sites up to the mid-1950s: D. Csallány, Archäologische Denkmäler der Awarenzeit in Mitteleuropa (Budapest 1956). In a forthcoming new register mention is made of more than 2000 Avar sites, almost twice as many as in the earlier volume.

Comprehensive works on Avar archaeological sites in Transylvania are: K. Horedt, Das Awarenproblem in Rumänien (Študijné Zvesti 16, 1968); in addition: idem., Frühmittelalter...; M. Comșa, Slawen und Awaren auf rumänischen Boden (in: Die Völker Südosteuropas im 6.-8. Jahrhunderts. Berlin 1987).

On the Gepid–Avar cemetery at Marosnagylak: M. Rusu, The Prefeudal Cemetery of Noșlac VIth–VIIth Centuries (*Dacia* 6, 1962). On the historical and archaeological problems of the age, arguing for Daco-Roman continuity: idem., Avars, Slavs, Romanic population in the 6th–8th centuries (*RAPMP* 1975).

On Slavic immigration in general: I. Nestor, L'établissement des Slaves en Roumanie (*Dacia* 5, 1961). An attempt to minimize the importance of the Slav population is evident in: M. Rusu, Aspects des relations entre la Romanité orientale et les Slaves (*RRH* 19, 1980) and idem., Les populations du groupe turc, les Slaves et les autochtones du bassin carpato-danubien aux VIe–IXe siècles (*RRH* 21, 1981). By contrast, the early Slav occupation of the whole of modern-day Romania has lately

been assumed by the Polish author M. PARCZEWSKI, Nejstarsza faza kultury wczesno-
slowianskie. Die älteste Phase der frühslawischen Kultur (Kraków 1988). PARCZEWSKI
also admits the presence of the Avars in Transylvania.

On Slavic archaeological finds in Transylvania: Z. SZÉKELY, Die frühesten
slawischen Siedlungen in Siebenbürgen (*Slavia Antiqua* 17, 1970); idem., L'aspect de
la culture matérielle des VIIIe–Xe siècles dans la sudest de la Transylvanie (in: Les
questions fondamentales du peuplement du bassin des Carpathes du VIIIe au Xe
siècle. Budapest 1972); K. HOREDT, Die Brandgräberfelder der Mediaş-Gruppe aus
dem 7.–9. Jh. in Siebenbürgen (*ZA* 10, 1976); idem., with the same title (in: Rapports
du IIIe Congrès International d'Archéologie Slave I. Bratislava 1979); TH. NÄGLER,
Vorbericht über die Untersuchungen im Hammersdorfer Gräberfeld (*FVLK* 14, 1971,
No. 1).

The summary of the 2nd cemetery at Baráthely: E. ZAHARIA, La population
roumaine en Transylvanie aux VIIe–VIIIe siècles. Le cimetière No. 2 de Bratei (Bu-
charest 1977).

On Szilágynagyfalu: J. HAMPEL, Alterthümer... ibid. Further excavations: M. COMŞA,
Kurganniy mogilnik s truposozheniem v Nushfaleu (*Dacia* 3, 1959); eadem.,
Vostochniye elementi v pogrebalnom obryade kurgannikh mogilnikov v Nushfaleu
i Somesheni (in: Drevnaya Rus i Slavyane. Moscow 1978); M. MACREA, Slavyanskiy
mogilnik v Somesheni (*Dacia* 2, 1958).

On the history of the Bulgar conquest of Transylvania: V. GYUZELEV, Forschungen
zur Geschichte Bulgariens im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Bulgarica 3, Vienna 1986).

For a summary of Bulgar rule in Romania and associated archaeological finds:
M. COMŞA, Die bulgarische Herrschaft nördlich der Donau während des IX. und X.
Jh. (*Dacia* 4, 1960); eadem., La civilisation balcano-danubienne (IXe–XIe siècles) sur
la territoire de la R. P. Roumanie (*Dacia* 7, 1963). In her more recent works she has
revised her earlier views.

On the Bulgar cemetery of Maroskarna: K. HOREDT, Die Ansiedlung von Blándiana
(*Dacia* 10, 1966). A critique and correct evaluation is to be found in: I. FODOR, Die
Bulgaren in den ungarischen Ländern während der Ansiedlungsperiode der Ungarn
(*MBIÖ* VI, 1984).

For the Danubian Bulgar parallels, crucial to the Bulgar culture in Transylvania,
see Ž. N. VAŽAROVA, Slawen und Protobulgaren (Sofia 1976).

Part Two — Transylvania in the Mediaeval
Hungarian Kingdom (895–1526)

I. The Hungarian–Slav Period (895–1172)

Source documents: the laws of the kings of the House of Árpád are found in vol. I of
D. MÁRKUS (ed.), Corpus Iuris Hungarici (Budapest 1899); a collection of narrative
sources: *SRH*, and GOMBOS, *Catalogus* ...; the Byzantine Greek sources: *FBHH* and
GY. MORAVCSIK, Byzantinoturcica I–II (Berlin 1958), and Constantin Porphyrogennetos
(DAI); official documents: I. SZENTPÉTERY, Regesta regum stirpis Arpadianae critico-
diplomatica. I (Budapest 1923), and the relevant Romanian publications: *DRH
Transilvania* I and IX. Of the later narrative sources, ANONYMUS is the most impor-
tant, but on certain questions J. THURÓCZY, Chronica Hungarorum (Augsburg 1488;
facsimile edition: Budapest 1986); and A. BONFINI, Rerum Hungaricarum decades...
(Leipzig 1936).

An essential work is GY. GYORFFY, Geographia...; and GY. KRISTÓ — F. MAKK — L. SZEGFŰ, Adatok korai helyneveink ismeretéhez — Données à la connaissance des toponymes hongrois anciens. I–II (Szeged 1973–1974); O.G. BOLSHAKOV — A.L. MONGAIT (eds), Putyeshestviye Abu Hamida Garnati v Vostochnuyu i Centralnuyu Yevropu (1131–1153) (Moscow 1971); O. GÓRKA (ed.), Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis (Cracoviae 1916).

Studies on the early Hungarian sources: C. A. MACARTNEY, Studies on the Early Hungarian Historical Sources (Budapest 1940); idem., The Mediaeval Hungarian Historians. A Critical and Analytical Guide (Cambridge 1953).

In connection with this chapter the volume I of the three-volume *Erdély története* should be mentioned of which the part dealing with settlement archaeology during the Hungarian Conquest and the founding of the state was written by myself, while the section on the history after 895, based on written sources, was the work of L. MAKKAI, whose basic ideas are at variance with the overall concept of the book. There are further important comprehensive works: Gy. PAULER, A magyar nemzet története az Árpádházi királyok alatt /A History of the Hungarian Nation during the Reign of the House of Árpád Kings/ (Budapest 1899, reprint: 1984); Şt. PASCU, Voievodatul...; the relevant chapters of *RAPMP*: M. RUSU, The Autochthonous Population and the Hungarians on the Territory of Transylvania in the 9th–11th Centuries; GY. GYORFFY, István király és műve /King Stephen and his Accomplishment/ (Budapest 1977); K. BAKAY, A magyar államalapítás /The Foundation of the Hungarian State/ (Budapest 1978); F. MAKK, Magyarország a 12. században /Hungary in the Twelfth Century/ (Budapest 1986); GY. KRISTÓ, Levedi törzsszövetségétől Szent István államáig /From the Levedi Tribal Alliance to the State of St. Stephen/ (Budapest 1980); idem., Tanulmányok az Árpád-korról /Studies on the Árpád Age/ (Budapest 1983); idem., A vármegyék kialakulása Magyarországon /The Emergence of the Counties in Hungary/ (Budapest 1988); idem., A 10. századi Erdély politikai történetéhez /To the Political History of Tenth-Century Transylvania/ (Sz 1988).

An archaeological–historical summary of the period following the Hungarian Conquest according to the Saxon view: K. HOREDT, Frühmittelalter...; idem., Das frühmittelalterliche...; for brief French, English and German reviews of the period and Hungarian history: L. MUSSET, Les invasions: le second assaut contre l'Europe chrétienne (VIIe–XIe siècles) (Paris 1971); C. A. MACARTNEY, Hungary, a Short History (Edinburgh 1962); idem., Geschichte Ungarns (Stuttgart – Berlin – Köln – Mainz 1971).

The theory of the ninth- and tenth-century "Romanian feudal state", based on the absolute authenticity of Anonymus, was established decades ago: B. CÁMPINE, Le problème de l'apparition des États, féodaux roumains (in: Nouvelles Études d'Histoire. Bucharest 1955). Since then the theory has not changed essentially: ŞT. ŞTEFÁNESCU, Les premières formations étatiques sur le territoire de la Roumanie (*Dacoromania* 1, 1973); M. RUSU, La population autochtone et les Hongrois sur le territoire de la Transylvanie aux IXe–XIe siècles. Congressus Quartus Internationalis Fenno-Ugristarum. II (Budapest 1980); idem., Frühformen der Staatsentwicklung in Rumänien. Betrachtungen zur sozialökonomischen und politischen Lage (ZA 18, 1984); ŞT. OLTEANU, State Formations on the Territory of Romania and the Process of their Unification in the Ninth–Fourteenth Centuries (in: *RAPMP*); idem., Rumänische politische Strukturen im 9.–11. Jahrhundert (in: Interaktionen der mitteleuropäischen Slawen und anderen Ethnika im 6.–10. Jahrhundert. Nitra 1984).

A similarly desperate attempt — based exclusively on the Gestas of ANONYMUS and the late thirteenth-century SIMON OF KÉZA — is the hypothesis concerning the existence of two separate and independent Hungarian states in the tenth century: the Pannon state of "Hetumoger" and the Transylvanian state of "Onogur", as put forward by I. BOBA, in his work entitled, Transylvania and Hungary: From the Times of Álmos and Árpád to the Times of King Stephen (in: *Festschrift A.T. Szabó — Zs.*

Jakó). Anonymus is the primary source of L. MAKKAI's latest summary, Politische Geschichte Siebenbürgens im 10. Jahrhundert, also published in *Festschrift A.T. Szabó – Zs. Jakó*. This work, which looks beyond the 1986 edition of *Erdély története*, matches and combines the names of people mentioned in the Gesta with place-names and puts them in the context of the (unfortunately, all to scarce) extant contemporary documents, hence outlining a new and continuous history of the period.

The evolution of the critiques of ANONYMUS and the latest view on the later's work is to be found in: GY. GYÖRFFY, Formation d'États au IXe siècle suivant les "Gesta Hungarorum" du Notaire Anonyme (in: Nouvelles Études Historiques. Budapest 1965); idem., Abfassungszeit, Autorschaft und Glaubwürdigkeit der Gesta Hungarorum des Anonymen Notars (*Acta Ant. Hung.*, 20, 1972). Another fundamentally important book is: M. GYÓNI, Les Volochs des Annales primitives de Kiev (Études Slaves et Roumaines 2, 1949).

The Hungarian Conquest and the incursion: C.A. MACARTNEY, The Magyars in the Ninth Century (Cambridge 1968); A. BARTHA, Hungarian Society in the 9th and 10th Centuries (Budapest 1975); GY. GYÖRFFY, The Original Landtaking of the Hungarians (Budapest 1975); idem., Landnahme, Ansiedlung und Streifzüge der Ungarn (*AH* 31, 1985); I. FODOR, Der große Wanderung der Ungarn vom Ural nach Pannonien (Budapest 1982); K. MESTERHÁZY, Die landnähmenden ungarischen Stämme (*Acta Arch. Hung.*, 30, 1978); R. LÜTTICH, Ungarnzüge in Europa im 10. Jh. (Berlin 1910, reprint: 1965); G. FASOLI, Le incursioni ungare in Europa nel secolo X (Firenze 1945); Sz. DE VAJAY, Der Eintritt des ungarischen Stämmebundes in die europäischen Geschichte (862–933) (Mainz 1968); M. SCHULZE, Untersuchungen zu den Ungarneinfällen nach Mittel-, West- und Südeuropa (899–955 n. Chr.) (Jahrbuch des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 31, 1984); TH. BOGYAI, Ungarnzüge gegen und für Byzanz (Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher, 8, 1988).

On the Byzantine connections: F. DÖLGER, Ungarn in der byzantinischen Reichspolitik (Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis 8, Budapest 1942); GY. MORAVCSIK, Die byzantinische Kultur und das mittelalterliche Ungarn (Berlin 1956); idem., Studia Byzantina (Budapest 1967); idem., Byzantinum and the Magyars (Budapest 1970); GY. GYÖRFFY, Zur Geschichte der Eroberung Ochrids durch Basileos II. Actes du XIIe Congrès International d'Études Byzantines II (Belgrade 1964); idem., Rôle de Byzance dans la conversion des Hongrois. Cultus et cognitio (Warszawa 1976); GY. SZÉKELY, La Hongrie et Byzance aux Xe–XIIe siècles (*AH* 13, 1967); N. OIKONOMIDES, À propos des relations ecclésiastiques entre Byzance et la Hongrie au XIe siècle: le métropolite de Turquie (in: Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes 9, 1971); F. MAKK, Der ungarische Staat und Byzanz in der heimischen Forschung des letzten Jahrzehnts (*Acta Ant. et Arch.*, 23, 1981); GY. KRISTÓ, Ajtony and Vidin (Studia Turco-Hungarica V, 1981); F. MAKK, The Árpáds and the Comneni. Political Relations between Hungary and Byzantinum in the 12th Century (Budapest 1989).

Hungarian archaeological finds from the age of the Conquest: I. DIENES, Die Ungarn um die Zeit der Landnahme (Budapest 1972); idem., The Hungarians cross the Carpathians (Budapest 1972); K. BAKAY, Archäologische Studien zur Frage der ungarischen Staatsgründung (*Acta Arch. Hung.*, 19, 1967); J. GIESLER, Untersuchungen zur Chronologie der Bijelo Brdo-Kultur. Ein Beitrag zur Archäologie des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts im Karpatenbecken (*Praehistorische Zeitschrift* 56, 1981). A comprehensive critique of the last-mentioned work is to be found in: L. KOVÁCS, Über die Datierung der Grabfunde des 10. Jahrhundters in Ungarn anhand der Arbeit von J. Giesler (*Acta Arch. Hung.* 37, 1985). Tenth- and eleventh-century Hungarian objects and customs in the Carpathian Basin: CS. BÁLINT, Les tombes à chaval chez les Hongrois aux IXe–XIe siècles (*AEMA* 2, 1982), and A. KISS, Studien zur Archäologie der Ungarn im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert (in: Die Bayern und ihre Nachbarn. Vienna 1985); L. KOVÁCS, Münzen aus der ungarischen Landnahmezeit (Budapest 1989).

On the Hungarian archaeological finds from the age of the Conquest: I. Kovács, Der landnahmzeitliche Friedhof von Kolozsvár–Zapolya-Gasse (Közlemények az Erdélyi Nemzeti Múzeum Érem- és Régiségtárából /Papers from the Numismatic and Antiquarian Archives of the Transylvanian National Museum/ 2. (Kolozsvár 1942); K. Horedt, Die Metallfunde des 10.-11. Jahrhunderts aus Siebenbürgen (in: idem., Untersuchungen zur Frühgeschichte Siebenbürgens. Bucharest 1958). On the (B) cemetery of the Hungarian conquerors in Maroskarna: K. Horedt, Die Ansiedlung von Blandiana (*Dacia* 10, 1966). Concerning its definite Hungarian origin, see I. Fodor, Die Bulgaren in den ungarischen Ländern (*MBIÖ* VI/1984/2).

Hungarian settlements, and state apparatus in the tenth and elevent centuries: Gy. Györffy, Autour de l'État des semi-nomades: Les cas de la Hongrie (*EHH* 1, 1975); idem., Système des résidences d'hiver et d'été chez les nomades et les chefs hongrois au Xe siècle (*AEMA* 1, 1976). Pages 80–83 contain a critique by I. Bóna on the interpretation of the Doboka archaeological excavations; I. Kniezsa, Ungarns Völkerschaften im XI. Jahrhundert (*Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis*, 4, 1938) from which long passages have been quoted; G. Schramm, Eroberer und Eingesessene. Geographische Lehnnahmen als Zeugen der Geschichte Südosteuropas im ersten Jahrtausend n. Chr. (Stuttgart 1981); G. Haller, Comitatus Bihariensis. Die historischen Ortsnamen von Ungarn Bd. 20. (Munich 1983).

On St. Stephen (I): I. Bogyay, Stephanus rex. (Vienna – Munich 1976); J. Szűcs, König Stephan in der Sicht der modernen ungarischen Geschichtsforschung (*Südost-Forschungen*, 31, 1972); Gy. Györffy, König Stephan der Heilige (Budapest 1988).

For the Hungarian population, economy and society in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, see Gy. Györffy, Zur Frage der Herkunft der ungarischen Dienstleute (*Studia Slavica Acad. Sc. Hung.*, 22, 1976); I. G. Bolla, Das Dienstvolk der königlichen und kirchlichen Güter zur Zeit des frühen Feudalismus (*AUSB* 17, 1978); Gy. Györffy, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft der Ungarn um die Jahrtausendwende (Graz – Köln 1983); J. Jagamas, Beiträge zur Dialektfrage der ungarischen Volksmusik in Rumänien. Studia Memoriae Belae Bartók Sacra (Budapest 1956); L. Benkő, A magyarság erdélyi megtelepedése a helynévanyag és a nyelvjárástörténet tükrében /The Hungarian Settlement of Transylvania in the Light of the Place-Names and the Etymology of Dialects/ *Új Erdélyi Múzeum*, 1, 1990 and *Magyar Múzeum*, 1, 1991.

For early Árpád age settlements, ecclesiastical relics, objects of art, and border defence, see: Gy. Györffy, Die Entstehung der ungarischen Burgorganisation (*Acta Arch. Hung.*, 28, 1976); M. Rusu, Castrum, urbs, civitas. Transylvanische Burgen und "Städte" des 9. bis 13. Jahrhunderts. Berichte über den II. Internationalen Kongress für Slawische Archäologie. III (Berlin 1973); K. Horedt, Moreşti. Bd. 2. Grabungen in einer mittelalterlichen Siedlung in Siebenbürgen (Bonn 1984), a thorough critique of the book is to be found in I. Bóna, Arpadenzeitliche Dörfer, Kirche und Friedhof am Marosfluß (*Acta Arch. Hung.*, 37, 1985); R. Popa, Streisîngeorgiu. Ein Zeugnis rumänischer Geschichte des 11–14. Jahrhunderts im Süden Transilvaniens (*Dacia* 20, 1976) — an excellent publication on an excellent excavation, although it contains no Romanian finds predating the thirteenth century. The earliest Romanian data concerning the Hátszeg region are from the thirteenth century, compare: idem., La începuturile evului mediu românesc. Ţara Haţegului (Bucharest 1988). The idea that Transyvania was ruled by the Pechenegs and the Cumans in the tenth–twelfth centuries is entirely without foundation: M. Rusu, Quelques remarques d'orde archéologique et historique sur les places fortes transylvaniens des IXe–XIIe siècles. Actes du VIIe Congrès International des Sciences Préhistoriques et Protohistoriques 2 (Prague 1971).

On the Benedictine monasteries: L. Csóka, Geschichte des benediktinischen Mönchstums in Ungarn (Munich 1980).

On the earliest religious buildings and graves in Transylvania: G. Entz, Die Baukunst Transilvaniens im 11.-13. Jahrhundert (*Acta Hist. Art.* 14, 1968); R. Heitel,

Archäologische Beiträge zu den romanischen Baudenkmälern aus Südsiebenbürgen. I–II (*Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art* 9, 1972 and 12, 1975). The only excavation of the main square of Kolozsvár which was ever published is: I. Méri, Ásatás a kolozsvári főtéren, 1943 /Excavation on the Main Square of Kolozsvár, in 1943/ (Budapest 1986). For the origins of the two earliest towns, incorporating some untenable assumptions, see K. Horedt, Die Anfänge von Karlsburg (Alba Iulia) und Klausenburg (Cluj-Napoca) in Siebenbürgen. Stadtkernforschung (Köln – Vienna 1987).

For a detailed description and summary of all the clay-pot finds from the Árpád Age: M. Takács, Die arpadenzeitliche Tonkessel im Karpatenbecken (Budapest 1986). In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the majority of the sites mark villages which were deserted during the Mongol invasion of 1241–1242 and our map should be interpreted with this in mind.

On border defence in the Árpád Age: H. Göckenjan, Hilfsvölker und Grenzwächter im mittelalterlichen Ungarn (Wiesbaden 1972); Z. Székely, Beiträge zur Szekler-Frage in Süd-Ost Transilvaniens (*Crisia*, 4, 1974). Archaeological evidences on the origin of the Székelys: I. Bóna (*Korunk*, II/12, 1991).

For a modern review of Hungarian coin issues: L. Huszár: Münzkatalog Ungarns von 1000 bis heute (Budapest – Munich 1959).

The style and age of the eleventh-century Gyulafehérvár tympanum was determined by E. Marosi (Athleta Patriae, Budapest 1980).

On the history of the Romanian (Vlach) people in the Balkans during the sixteenth–twelfth centuries: G. Schramm, Die Katastrophe des 6. bis 8. Jahrhunderts und die Entstehung des rumänischen Volkes (Südosteuropa-Jahrbuch 17, 1987); M. Gyóni, L'oeuvre de Kekaumenos source de l'histoire roumaine (*RHC* 24, 1945); idem., Skylitzes et les Valaques (*RHC* 25, 1947).

In connection with the age under discussion, there exists a book by Şt. Pascu, entitled Was ist Siebenbürgen? (Cluj-Napoca 1983). This has been published in several languages but can, at best, only be regarded as a political pamphlet. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the figures supplied by the author in order to prove to the laymen the impossibility of Romanian immigration. He fails to mention that even today 34 per cent of Transylvania's territory is woodland, and that this figure must have been higher the further we go back in time. We know that arable only amounted to 20 per cent of Transylvania's territory in 1865. Between 271 and 1170 the area covered by uninhabited mountainous regions and woodlands could well have reached 90 per cent at times. It follows from the above that in the early Middle Ages Transylvania's population could be estimated at 100,000, at most, although generally it was below this figure (see K. Horedt, Das Frühmittelalteriche...). Şt. Pascu, on the other hand, puts the population of Transylvania at 550,000 before 1241, a figure which rises to 1,400,000 by 1500 and to 1,800,000 by 1550 in his account. In fact, the first of these figures equals the government estimates of 1710, while the latter two equal and even surpass the findings of the first census taken in 1786 (1,560,000). At all times, Pascu considers 65 per cent of the population, blown up to five to ten times its actual size and projected back into the Middle Ages, to be of Romanian nationality, even though the percentage of the Romanian population only reached 57.8 per cent in the official census of 1930. (In the 1910 Census the figure was 53 per cent.) Pascu's Romanians could not, indeed, have migrated by the million, given that in the early Middle Ages nowhere in Europe did a million people exist within a territory the size of Transylvania. In order to back up his figures, Pascu agrees completely with the American historian John Matley in that "the theory of a mass-exodus from Dacia followed by a mass-settlement of the territory from the regions south of the Danube is a phantasmagory which does not stand even as a hypothesis, since there is not a single historical source supporting it". This does not, however, alter the fact that the "unscientific" theory of an "uninhabited" Transylvania was not put forward by any serious historian or archaeologist, other than

themselves: in fact, quite the opposite was true. Any American historian who forgets that not a single white man lived on the American continent before modern times must be a very biased and prejudiced person.

PASCU offers only one admissible mediaeval source on the subject of Transylvania's population to prove the consistent Romanian majority of 65 per cent, and this is the papal tithe register from the years 1332–1337.

ȘT. PASCU, Die mittelalterlichen Dorfsiedlungen in Siebenbürgen bis 1400 (in: Nouvelles Études d'Histoire. Bucharest 1960, 135–148). He draws an incorrect conclusion from the figures published, namely, that out of the 2,600 settlements recorded in Transylvania before 1400, only 1,100 had Catholic (i.e., Hungarian and Saxon) parish and, therefore, the remaining 1,500 settlements must have been inhabited by Orthodox Romanian population. PASCU ignores the fact that, almost without exception usually more than one village belonged to each parish. He has already been taken to task for this by GY. GYÖRFFY, in: Zur Frage der demographischen Wertung der päpstlichen Zähntlisten (*EHH* Budapest, 1980, 61–85), who pointed out that, using PASCU's method, one could claim that around 60 per cent of mediaeval Polish villages had an Orthodox Romanian population. The thorough examination of the archdeaconries of Pata and Heves within the Archdiocese of Eger amounts to a very pointed scholarly repudiation of PASCU's theory. The examination reveals that the ratio between the parishes listed in the papal tithe registers and the missing, although, on the evidence of other official documents, already *existing* villages (filia) in the archdeaconries situated in the middle of divided Hungary's purely Catholic region was generally 1:3, and occasionally 1:4 or 1:1. (J.GY. SZABÓ, in: Tanulmányok Gyöngyösről /Studies on Gyöngyös/ (Gyöngyös 1984, 41–64).Therefore, the fact that only a portion of the villages appeared in the papal tithe registers was a national phenomenon, rather than a specifically Transylvanian "Catholic–Orthodox relation".

II. The Emergence of the Estates (1172–1526)

The documentary sources of Transylvanian history between the Hungarian Conquest and the military disaster of Mohács (895–1526) are found in publications of national, county, civic, religious and family collections, a large section of which is listed in I. LUKINICH, Les éditions de sources de l'histoire hongroise 1854–1930 (Budapest 1931). A comprehensive collection of the deeds written before 1360 in those parts of historic Hungary later annexed to Romania (Transylvania included), and which originated from various books of reference and, to a lesser extent, from archives, is found in *DRH Transilvania*. However, this book only gives the Romanian translations of the already-published deeds (or extracts from them), and the original Latin text is only provided in case of the previously unpublished deeds. Accordingly, the use of the general Hungarian and, more importantly, the Transylvanian archives is recommended. Of the latter archives the most important are: G. D. TEUTSCH — FR. FIRNHABER, Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens (Vienna 1957) — up to 1301; F.R. ZIMMERMANN — C. WERNER — G. MÜLLER — G. GÜNDISCH, Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen. II–V (Hermannstadt – Bucharest 1892–1975) — until 1457; K. SZABÓ — L. SZÁDECZKY — S. BARABÁS (eds), Székely oklevéltár /Székely Archives/. I–VIII (Budapest 1872–1934) — 1211–1776; A. FEKETE — L. NAGY — L. MAKKAI, Documenta historiam Valachorum in Hungaria illustrantia (Budapest 1941) — until 1400.

The collection of Hungarian narrative sources dealing with the period ending in 1301: *SRH* II; non-Hungarian sources: GOMBOS, Catalogus...; the Hungarian chronicles dealing with the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were completed and pub-

lished by J. Thuróczy, Chronica Hungarorum (Augsburg 1488, facsimile edition: Budapest 1986) and A. Bonfini, Rerum hungaricarum decades... (Basel 1568, German translation: Ungarische Chronica. Frankfurt a/M. 1581).

On the settlement and the coexistence of the Transylvanian nations: E. Mályusz, Erdély és népei /Transylvania and its Peoples/ (Budapest 1943); *MR*; I. Moga, Les Roumains de Transylvanie au moyen âge (Sibiu 1944); L. Demény (ed.), A magyar nemzetiség története és testvéri együttmüködése a román nemzettel /The History of the Hungarian Nationality and its Brotherly Co-operation with the Romanian Nation/. II (Bucharest 1976); B. Pukánszky, Erdélyi szászok és magyarok /The Saxons and the Hungarians of Transylvania/ (Pécs 1943); Th. Nagler, Die Ansiedlung der siebenbürger Sachsen (Bucharest 1979).

The most important works on the ancient history of the Romanian nation are: L. Tamás, Rómaiak, románok és oláhok Dácia Trajanában /Romans, Romanians and Vlachs in Dacia Traiana/ (Budapest 1936). A critique is to be found in: Gh. Brătianu, Une énigme et un miracle historique: le peuple roumain (Bucharest 1937); C. Daicoviciu — M. Petrovici — G. Ştefan, La formation du peuple roumain et de sa langue (Bucharest 1961); A. Du Nay, The Early History of the Rumanian Language (Lake Bluff 1977). On the Romanian people of the Balkans see the major theses of the synthesis prepared using several essays from M. Gyóni, A román történet bizánci forrásai /Byzantine Sources of Romanian History/ (*MTA I Oszt. Közl.* /Publications of Department I of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences/, 1954); S. Dragomir, Vlahii din nordul Peninsulei Balcanice in evul mediu (Bucharest 1959). For the Romanian shepherds' vocabulary and its spread: I. I. Russu, Etnogeneza Românilor (Bucharest 1981); L. Földes (ed.), Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur (Budapest 1969); G. Schramm, Frühe Schicksale der Rumäner (*Zeitschrift für Balkanologie*, 1985–1987). The latter was regarded as a touchstone in the present volume. On the Romanian population of Cumania and early southern Transylvania: L. Makkai, A milkói (kun) püspökség és népei /The Cuman Diocese of Milkó and its Peoples/ (Debrecen 1936); Gy. Györffy, Adatok a románok XIII. századi történetéhez és a román állam kezdeteihez /Facts Concerning the Thirteenth-Century Romanian History and the Beginning of the Romanian State/ (*Sz* 1964).

Earlier works on the formation of the Transylvanian counties are: K. Tagányi, Szolnok-Doboka vármegye területének története /The History of Szolnok–Doboka County/ (in: Szolnok-Doboka vármegye monographiája / A Monograph on Szolnok-Doboka County/). I (Dés 1901); Emma Iczkovits, Az erdélyi Fehér megye a középkorban /Transylvania's Fehér County in the Middle Ages/ (Budapest 1939); Éva H. Balázs, Kolozs megye kialakulása /The Formation of Kolozs County/ (Budapest 1939); D. Csánki, Magyarország történelmi földrajza a Hunyadiak korában /The Historical Topography of Hungary in the Age of the Hunyadi Family/. V (Budapest 1913) — Hunyad including its Romanian districts and the settlements of Kolozs, Torda and Küküllő; on the basis of the complete source material, up to the 1330s: Gy. Gyorffy, Geographia... — Beszterce, Brassó, Doboka, Fehér, Fogaras, Hunyad, Kolozs, Küküllő; for the eastern Hungarian Romanian self-governing communities outside Transylvania: F. Pesty, A szörény vármegyei hajdani oláh kerületek /The Old Vlach Districts of Szörény County/ (Budapest 1876); V. Belay, Máramaros megye társadalma és nemzetisége a megye betelepülésétől a XVIII. század végéig /The Society and Peoples of Máramaros County from the Settlement of the County until the End of the Eighteenth Century/ (Budapest 1943).

Fundamentally important on the large estates of mediaeval Transylvania (modified in the present text to incorporate the findings of the latest research): J. Karácsonyi, Magyar nemzetségek a XIV. század közepéig /Hungarian Clans up to the Middle of the Fourteenth Century/. I–III (Budapest 1900–1901); on the nobility and the peasantry: E. Mályusz, Az erdélyi magyar társadalom a középkorban /Hungarian Society in Transylvania in the Middle Ages/ (Budapest 1988). The Voivodate of Transyl-

710

vania is presented as a separate, although not quite an independent, Romanian country; a third Romanian voivodate in fact by Şt. Pascu, in Voievodatul... According to the latter the Romanian majority in Transylvania's population during the Middle Ages is explained by the late formation of feudal bonds in the Romanian-inhabited, mountainous regions, which in turn meant that the names of these villages were only mentioned in deeds after 1350. Of course, the Székely and Saxon villages, which had never been in feudal bond, were mentioned in deeds before 1350, and this contradicts Pascu's argument. Pascu states that large-scale and forcible reduction to serfdom of Transylvania's Romanian population took place in the middle of the fourteenth century — thus precipitating a series of national uprisings among the Romanian people — but this has been repudiated by another Romanian author, M. Holban, Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare în secolele XIII–XIV (Bucharest 1981, 245), who has pointed out that the social conflicts in question had no ethnic aspects. On the late thirteenth-century anarchy: Gy. Kristó, Kun László és Erdély /Ladislas the Cuman and Transylvania/ (Valóság, 1978, No. 11). On the Székely and Saxon nobility: Gy. Gyorffy, Geographia ... and G. E. Müller, Die Graven des siebenbürgischen Sachsenlandes. Festschrift Teutsch (Hermannstadt 1931). On Romanesque culture in Transylvania: G. Entz, Die Baukunst Transilvaniens im 11.–13. Jahrhundert (Acta Hist. Art. 14, 1968); idem., A gyulafehérvári székesegyház /The Gyulafehérvár Cathedral/ (Budapest 1958); J. Temesváry, Erdély középkori püspokei /The Bishops of Transylvania in the Middle Ages/ (Kolozsvár 1922); Gy. Gyórffy, Gyulafehérvár kezdetei /The Beginnings of Gyulafehérvár/ (Sz 1983); on the enoblement of the Romanian *kenezes* and voivodes, see the section dealing with the literature concerning the Romanian districts and also: Şt. Pascu, Rolul cnezilor din Transilvania în lupta antiotomanā a lui Iancu de Hunedoara (Studii şi Cercetāri de Istorie, 1957).

On the Turkish threat: G. Gundisch, Die Turkeneinfalle in Siebenbürgen bis zur Mitte des 15. Jhs (Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, II, 1937); Gy. Székely, A huszitizmus és a magyar nép /The Hussites and the Hungarian People/ (Sz 1956); L. Demény, Parasztfelkelés Erdélyben 1437–1438 /The Peasant Uprising in Transylvania, 1437–1438/ (Budapest 1987); L. Elekes, Hunyadi (Budapest 1952); C. Mureşan, Iancu de Hunedoara (Bucharest 1968); for summaries of the latest literature on Hunyadi: G. Barta, Nándorfehérvár 1456 (Budapest 1983); Katalin Kisfaludy, Matthias Rex (Budapest 1983). On the cities: P. Niedermaier, Siebenbürgische Städte (Bucharest 1979); O. Meltzl, Az erdélyi szászok ipara és kereskedelme a XIV. és XV. században /The Industry and Commerce of the Transylvanian Saxons in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries/ (Sz 1892); L. Makkai, Társadalom és nemzetiség a középkori Kolozsváron /Society and Nationality in Medieval Kolozsvár/ (Kolozsvári Szemle, 1943); Şt. Pascu, Meşteşugurile din Transilvania pînă in secolul al XVI-lea (Bucharest,1954); Zs. P. Pach, Magyarország és a levantei kereskedelem a XIV–XVII. században /Hungary and Levantine Trade in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries/ (Budapest 1986). For the Székely liberation movements: L. Szádeczky-Kardoss, A székely nemzet története és alkotmánya /The History and the Constitution of the Székely Nation/ (Budapest 1927); on the uprising led by Dózsa: G. Barta, Keresztesek áldott népe /The Blessed Crusader People/ (Budapest 1977).

On Gothic and Renaissance art in Transylvania, and Romanian education in the Middle Ages: E. Marosi, (ed.), Magyarországi művészet 1300–1470 körül /Art in Hungary around 1300–1470/. I–II (Budapest 1987); S. Tonk, Erdélyiek egyetemjárása a középkorban /The University Attendence of Transylvanians in the Middle Ages/ (Bucharest 1979); Fr. Pall, Contribuţii la problema locurilor de adeverire din Transilvania medievalā (Studii de Istorie Medie, 1957); Jolán Balogh, Márton és György kolozsvári szobrászok /Márton and György, Kolozsvár Sculptors/ (Kolozsvár 1934); idem., Az erdélyi renaissance /The Transylvanian Renaissance/ (Kolozsvár 1943); V. Drāguţ, Arta gotică în România (Bucharest 1979); G. Entz, Mittelalterliche rumanische Holzkirchen in Siebenbürgen (in: Omagiu Oprescu, Bucharest 1961); M. Pacurariu, Isotria bisericii... I (Sibiu 1962).

Part Three — The Principality of Transylvania

I. The Emergence of the Principality and its First Crises (1526–1606)

For the most important documents of the period: *EOE* I–V; several volumes of the series Documente privatoare la istoria românilor (E. Hurmuzaki, ed., Bucharest, from 1877— with various other editors later); the Székely Oklevéltár /Székely Archives/. I–VIII (Budapest 1872–1934); R. Gooss, Österreichische Staatsverträge. I. Fürstentum Siebenbürgen (Vienna 1911); Documente privatoare la istoria Ardealului, Moldovei și Tării Românești I–VII. E. Veress (ed.) (Bucharest 1929–1934); the volumes of ETA; E. Veress, Báthory István erdélyi fejedelem és lengyel király levelezése /The Correspondence of István Báthory, Prince of Transylvania and King of Poland/. I–II (Kolozsvár 1944); idem., Báthory István király levélváltása az erdélyi kormánnyal 1581–1585 /King István Báthory's Correspondence with the Transylvanian Government, 1581–1585/ (*MHH-D* 42, Budapest 1948); idem., Alfonso Carillo levelezése /Alfonso Carillo's Correspondence/ (*MHH-D* 32, 41, Budapest 1906 and 1943); L. Lukács (ed.), Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu, Monumenta Antiqua Hungarica. I–III (Rome 1969–1981).

The most important narrative sources are: N. Istvánffy, Historiarum de rebus Ungaricis libri XXXIV (Colonia Agrippina 1622); F. Bethlen, Historia de rebus Transylvanicis I–VI (Cibinum 1782–1793); *DFGS*; J. M. Brutus, Ungaricarum rerum libri, 1490–1552 (*MHH-S* 12–14, Pest 1863 — Budapest 1876); Szamosközy István történeti maradványai /The Historical Fragments of István Szamosközy/ (*MHH-S* 21, 28–30, Budapest 1876–1880); F. Forgách, De statu rei publicae Hungaricae 1542–1572 (*MHH-S* 16, Budapest 1886). A useful selection is given (with a Hungarian translation of all the passages quoted) in the series L. Cs. Szabó — L. Makkai (eds), Erdély öröksége /The Transylvanian Heritage/. I–X (Budapest 1942). There is no contemporary Romanian narrative source.

Regarding annals history, the introductions by S. Szilágyi, to the relevant volumes of *EOE* are still fundamental. On account of their uncommon subject matter, special attention is due to: I. Lukinich, Erdély... /Transylvania .../. This has been summed up in French by Z. I. Tóth, Biographie d'une frontière. La formation du "Partium" (*RHC* 24, 1946); Zs. Trócsányi, Erdély központi kormányzata 1540–1690 /The Central Administration of Transylvania, 1540–1690/ (Budapest 1980); idem., Az erdélyi fejedelemség korának országgyűlései. Adalékok az erdélyi rendiség történetéhez /Dietal Sessions in the Principality of Transylvania. Further Data Concerning the History of the Transylvanian Estates/ (Budapest 1976).

The most important works on the various periods are: L. Bárdossy, Magyar politika a mohácsi vész után /Hungarian Politics after the Defeat of Mohács / (Budapest 1944) — one must not, of course, give attention to the book's political considerations; G. Barta, A Sztambulba vezető út /The Road to Istanbul/ (Budapest 1983); F. Szakály, Remarques sur l'armée de Iovan Tcherni (*AH* 24, 1978); and the Gritti biography, also written by F. Szakály, Vesztőhely az út porában /Execution on the Road/ (Budapest 1986); V. L. Bourilly, Antonio Rincon et la politique orientale de François Ier (*Revue Historique* 113, 1913); R. Gooss, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in der Planung der deutschen Südostpolitik (Vienna 1940); R. Constantinescu, Moldova și Transilvania în vremea lui Petru Rareș, 1527–1546 (Bucharest 1978); the introduction to the new archives by M. Berindei — G. Veinstein, L'Empire ottoman et les pays roumains 1544–1545. (Paris – Cambridge 1987) also contains a useful historical survey; E. Veress, Izabella királyné /Queen Izabella/ (Budapest 1901); on Friar George and the circumstances of his death: G. Barta, Vajon kié az ország? /To Whom does the Coun-

try Belong?/ (Budapest 1988); the collection of essays entitled „Székely felkelés..." /The Székely Uprising.../ examines the entire century; similarly, the collection of Polish and Hungarian essays discussing the life of István Báthory has remained an essential work: Étienne Báthory, roi de Pologne, prince de Transylvanie (Kraków 1935).

On economic and social relations vitally important are: D. PRODAN, Iobagia în Transilvania în secolul al XVI. lea. I–III (Bucharest 1967–1968); M. SZENTGYÖRGYI, Jobbágyterhek... /Serf duties.../; there are important partial studies in L. KELEMEN, Ekv... *(Kelemen Memorial Volume)* and in the above-mentioned "Székely felkelés..." collection of essays: Studien zur Geschichte der deutschen Nationalität und ihrer Verbrüderung mit der rumänischen Nation (Bucharest 1976).

On the Reformation in Transylvania: L. BINDER, Grundlagen und Formen der Toleranz in Siebenbürgen bis zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts (Köln – Vienna 1976); G. WEBER – R. WEBER (eds), Luther und Siebenbürgen (Köln – Vienna 1985); L. MAKKAI, État des ordres et théocratie calviniste au XVIe siècle dans l'Europe centro-orientale (Budapest 1975); A. PIRNÁT, Die Ideologie der Siebenbürger Antitrinitarier in der 1570er Jahren (Budapest 1961); R. DÁN, Mathias Vehe-Glirius and Radical Reformation (Budapest 1982); M. BALÁZS, Az erdélyi antitrinitarizmus az 1950-es évek végén /Antitrinitarianism in Transylvania at the End of the 1950s/ (Budapest 1988); on the Romanian Orthodox religion see: M. PĂCURARIU, Bisericii... I. He considers Eftimie, who was appointed in 1571, to be the first bishop of Gyulafehérvár; although earlier historians believed him to be a deputy bishop.

For other aspects of cultural history: J. HORVÁTH, A reformáció jegyében /In the Spirit of the Reformation/ (Budapest 1953); and T. KLANICZAY (ed.), A magyar irodalom története /A History of Hungarian Literature/ (Budapest 1964); Á. DANKANITS, XVI. századi olvasmányok /Sixteenth-Century Reader/ (Bucharest 1974); several studies from the earlier-mentioned L. Kelemen, Ekv....; Ö. Sz. BARLAY, Romon virág /Flowers on the Ruins/ (Budapest 1986); P.P. PANAITESCU, Începuturile scrisului în limba română. Studii și Cercetări de Bibliologie (Bucharest 1963); Zs. JAKÓ, Irás, könyv... /Writing, Book.../.

Demographic data on the Saxons – using the reliable information of the earlier literature – is given by I. BAKÁCS – J. KOVACSICS, Magyarország történeti demográfiája /The Historical Demography of Hungary/ (Budapest 1963). E. WAGNER's independent approximation (Wüstungen in den Sieben Stühle als Folge der Türkeneinfalle des 15. Jahrhunderts, *FVLK* 21, 1978) overestimates the extent of the early Turkish devastations. We have been obliged to estimate the size of the Székely population from the 25,000–30,000 strong Székely contingents participating in the military campaigns of the late sixteenth century.

I. SZABÓ counted approximately 31,000 royal tax units *(portas)* in the seven counties before the fifteenth century (this is also in KOVACSICS) and about 1,750 settlements, including those of the Fogaras region, which means that using the factors generally accepted for the fifteenth century, the population can be estimated at 350,000 in this period and at 450,000 at the end of the sixteenth century. Actually, by the end of the fifteenth century there were only 1,400 settlements in the seven counties. Assuming a certain growth, the number of settlements at the end of the sixteenth century can be put at approximately 1,600. Accordingly, our previous estimate needs to be revised downwards a little to around 400,000, otherwise we would arrive at abnormally high population figures for the individual settlements. (An average population of 250 per settlement can only be accepted if a population of several thousands is assumed for the towns and market-towns.) Since the population of the Partium was a relative estimate (the number of *porta*s in the mid-fifteenth century in the seven counties was approximately 23,000; in the Partium it was around 17,000 – see V. BÍRÓ, A fejedelmi hatalom... /Princely Power.../: 24, 40 and 56 and I.

LUKINICH, Erdély... /Transylvania.../: 134, 141, 146 and 160), the relevant final figure should be reduced from 350,000 to 300,000.

To a small extent these corrections have a bearing on estimates of the strengths of the various nationalities. Of the settlements of the seven counties 550 were definitely tithe-paying, i.e., Hungarian or Saxon towns and villages; Zs. JAKÓ, Adatok a dézsma fejedelemkori adminisztrációjához /Data about the Administration of the Tithes in the Age of the Principality/ (Kolozsvár 1945). After taking into account the exemptions and the usual inaccuracies of contemporary administration, this figure can be amended to 650–700. On average, the population of Romanian settlements was one-third of the population of Hungarian and Saxon villages (Zs. JAKÓ, Bihar megye a török pusztítás előtt /Bihar County before the Turkish Devastations/. Budapest 1940, 187); L. MAKKAI, Szolnok-Doboka megye magyarságának pusztulása a XVII. század elején /The Decline of the Hungarian Population of Szolnok-Doboka County in the Early Seventeenth Century/ (Kolozsvár 1942, 31). Taking ethnic diffusion (mostly Romanians settling in Catholic villages) and the "unconstrained" shepherds into account, in the three-volume *Erdély története* a small Hungarian majority was estimated: 240,000 Hungarians, as opposed to the 200,000 Romanians in Transylvania and 170,000 Hungarians as opposed to 110,000 Romanians in the Partium. The corrections mentioned earlier have been incorporated into the ratios given in this volume.

So far no detailed study has appeared on the Fifteen Years War. The last work dealing with the role of Transylvania in this conflict was written by L. NAGY, Erdély a 15 éves háborúban /Transylvania in the Fifteen Years War/ (Sz 116, 1982). Hungarian and Romanian historians take a very different view of Mihai Viteazul. The most important of the earlier works on the subject by L. SZÁDECZKY, Erdély és Mihály vajda /Transylvania and Voivode Mihai/ (Temesvár, 1893) depicted him as a conquering and pillaging barbarian, while the best Romanian study so far P.P. PANAITESCU, Mihai Viteazul (Bucharest 1936) regards him as one of the heroes of Romanian national history. L. DEMÉNY's book A székelyek és Mihály vajda /The Székelys and Voivode Mihai/ (Bucharest 1977) is much nearer to the historical truth, while the latest Romanian summary by ŞT. OLTEANU, Les pays roumains à l'époque de Michel le Brave (Bucharest 1977) describes him as the wilful pioneer of an idea born a couple of centuries later: the idea of the "unification" of the three Romanian territories.

An earlier work, K. BENDA, Bocskai István /István Bocskai/ (Budapest 1942) and a relatively new book L. NAGY, Bocskai István a hadak élén /István Bocskai/ (Budapest 1981) deserve special mention from among the sizeable corpus of literature on the Bocskai insurrection.

II. The Golden Age of the Principality (1606–1660)

The following source publications have been used regularly in the writing of this chapter: *EOE* V–X; N. IORGA (ed.), Documente privitoare la istoria românilor (Vol. XV al colecţiei Hurmuzaki. Partea II. 1601–1825, Bucharest 1913); Erdélyország történeti tára /Historical Documents of Transylvania/. II (publ. by J. KEMÉNY and I. NAGYAJTAI KOVÁCS, Kolozsvár 1845); *ETA* I–IV; Á. SZILÁDY – S. SZILÁGYI (eds), Török-magyar-kori államokmánytár /Collection of State Documents from the Turkish-Hungarian Era/. I–III (Pest 1868–1870); L. SZÁDECZKY (ed.), Székely oklevéltár /Székely Archives/. VI (Kolozsvár 1897); and *DFGS* III. The following can also be seen as source publication: I. KATONA, Historia critica XXIX–XXXIII, and J. VON HAMMER-PURGSTALL, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches VI–VIII (Pest 1830–1832). Most of the sources in the publications are in Latin.

714

Works referred to when writing the chapter are: D. Ogg, Europe in the Seventeenth Century (London 1952); K. Uhlirz — M. Uhlirz, Handbuch der Geschichte Österreichs und seiner Nachbarländer. II (Graz 1927); C. J. Friedrich, The Age of the Baroque 1610–1660 (Stuttgart 1954); Th. Schieder (ed.), Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte. III (Stuttgart 1971); R. Mandrou, Des humanistes aux hommes de sciences (Paris 1973). C. M. Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic History of Europe. The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London 1974); R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550–1700 (Oxford 1979); the relevant chapters of GDGR I; I. Lukinich, Erdély... /Transylvania .../; I. Moga, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Siebenbürgens I (Bucharest 1943); L. Gáldi — L. Makkai (eds), Geschichte der Rumänen (Budapest 1942).

The principal sources and the most important literature, in sub-title order: S. Goldenberg, Le climat et l'histoire (RRH 1974). The data on taxation are taken from EOE and from V. Bíró, A fejedelmi hatalom... On the devastations and the demographic changes in general, see: L. Makkai, Szolnok-Doboka megye magyarságának pusztulása a XVII. század elején /The Decline of the Hungarian Population of Szolnok-Doboka County in the Early Seventeenth Century/ (Kolozsvár 1942); K. Albrich, Die Bewohner Hermannstadts im Jahr 1657 (AVSL 1883); the various volumes of Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Brassó. I–VII (Kronstadt — Brassó 1886–1918); F. Kramer, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Bistritz in den Jahren 1600–1603 (AVSL 1874). The latest works on the Székely censuses are: L. Demény — J. Pataki, Mihály vajda és a székelyek /Voivode Mihai and the Székelys/ (Bucharest 1978). On the Saxon censuses: G. Müller, Die sächsische Nationsuniversität (SUBB-H 1973). On genealogy: I. Nagy, Magyarország családai /The Families of Hungary/. I–XII (Pest 1857–1865); On the data of the serfs: Zs. Jakó, A gyalui vártartomány urbáriumai /Socage on the Lands of Gyalu Castle/ (Budapest 1944); D. Prodan, Urbariile ţării Făgărasului I, 1601–1630 (Bucharest 1970).

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pedia /Hungarian Encyclopedia/ (Ed. and introduction by J. Szigeti, Bucharest 1977); J. Spiellmann, A közjó szolgálatában /In the Service of Public Welfare/ (Bucharest 1976); B. Köpeczi, A kartezianusok politikája Magyarországon és Erdélyben a XVII. században és a XVIII. század elején /The Politics of the Cartesians in Hungary and Transylvania in the 17th and Early 18th Centuries/ (in: idem., Függetlenség és haladás /Independence and Progress/ (Budapest 1977); Emma Bartoniek, Fejezetek a XVI–XVII. századi magyarországi történetírás történetéből /Chapters from the Historiography of the 16th–17th Century Hungary/ (Prepared for publication by Mrs. Zs. Ritoók, Budapest 1975); Gy. Szekfű, A szász történetírás /Saxon Historiography/ (*Magyarságtudomány*, 1943); M. Szabó, Erdélyi diákok külföldi egyetemjárása a XVI–XVII. században /Students from Transylvania at Foreign Universities in the 16th–17th Centuries/ (in: *Műv. T.* II); G. Henk van de Graef, A németalföldi akadémiák és az erdélyi protestantizmus a XVIII. században, 1690–1795 / Academies in the Netherlands and Protestantism in Transylvania in the 18th Century, 1690–1795/ (n. p. 1979); Fr. Teutsch, Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Siebenbürgen. II (Hermannstadt 1922); H. Jekeli, Quellen zur Geschichte des Pietismus in Siebenbürgen (Mediasch 1922); Misztótfalusi Kis Miklós és köre. Az erdélyi Féniks. Misztótfalusi Kis Miklós öröksége /Miklós Misztótfalusi Kis and His Circle. The Transylvanian Phoenix. The Heritage of Miklós Misztótfalusi Kis/ (Introduction by Zs. Jakó, Bucharest 1974); N. Drăganu, Mihai Halici (Contribuție la istoria culturală românească din sec. XVII) (Bucharest 1928); B. Kelemen, Ioan Zobora és a puritanizmus /Ioan Zobora and Puritanism/; J. Nagy, A magyar–szász nyelvi érintkezés kutatásának eredményei és jövendő feladatai /The Results and Future Tasks of Research into the Linguistic Contact between the Hungarian and the Saxon Population/ (Both in: *Műv. T.* I.); Șt. Pascu, O schiță a istoriei politice și bisericești transilvane dela sfârșitul sec. al XVII-lea (Cluj–Kolozsvár 1947); Z. I. Tóth, Az erdélyi román nacionalizmus első évszázada, 1697–1792 /The First Century of Romanian Nationalism in Transylvania, 1697–1792/ (Budapest 1946); L. Szádeczky, Apafi Mihály udvartartása /The Court of Mihály Apafi/ (Budapest 1911); Szalárdi János siralmas magyar krónikája /The Miserable Hungarian Chronicle of János Szalárdi/ (Publ., introduction, notes by F. Szakály, Budapest 1980); Zs. Jakó — I. Juhász, Nagyenyedi diákok (1662–1848) /The Students of Nagyenyed, 1662–1848/ (Bucharest 1979); Zs. Jakó, Irás, könyv... /Writing, Book.../; Mária Kocsi — L. Csomor, Festett bútorok a Székelyföldön /Painted Furniture in Székelyföld/ (Budapest 1982); K. Kós — Judit Szentimrey – J. Nagy, Szilágysági magyar népművészet /Hungarian Folk Art in the Szilágy Region/ (Bucharest 1974); C. Prut, Fantasticul în arta populară românească (Bucharest 1972); G. Galavics, A Rákóczi-szabadságharc és az egykorú képzőművészet /The Rákóczi War of Independence and Contemporary Art/ *(RT)*; T. Esze, A kolozsvári pénzverőház II. Rákóczi Ferenc korában, 1703–1705 /The Mint of Kolozsvár in the Age of Ferenc Rákóczi II, 1703–1705/ (*NK* 194); Margit S. Sárdi, Petróczy Kata Szidónia költészete /The Poetry of Kata Szidónia Petróczy/ (Budapest 1976); P. Mikó, Női magyar levélstílus a XVII. században /The Hungarian Women's Style of Letter-writing in the 17th Century/ (Székelyudvarhely 1896); O. L. Cosma, Hronicul muzicii românești (Bucharest 1973); G. Brandsch, Die Musik unter den Sachsen (in: Bilder aus der Kulturgeschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen, publ. by Fr. Teutsch, Hermannstadt 1928); The essays of B. Bartók: Székely balladák; Népzenénk és a szomszéd népek népzenéje; A hunyadi román nép zenedialektusa; Román népzene /Székely Ballads; The Folk Music of the Hungarians and the Neighbouring Nations; The Musical Dialect of the Romanian People of Hunyad; Romanian Folk Music/ (in: Bartók Béla összegyűjtött írásai /Collected Writings of Béla Bartók/, publ. by A. Szőllősy, Budapest 1966).

720

Part Four — Transylvania under the Habsburg Empire

I. The Long Eighteenth Century (1711–1830)

From the early 18th century onwards all the official documents of the administration can be found and researched in the Országos Levéltár /National Archives/. We tried to investigate these papers more thoroughly than has ever been done before. A book which incorporates all this material, while also outlining the history of the Transylvanian administration is: Zs. Trócsányi, Erdélyi kormányhatósági leveltárak /Government Archives of Transylvania/ (Budapest 1973). On the workings of the Transylvanian state apparatus: R. Kutschera, Landtag und Gubernium in Siebenbürgen, 1688–1869 (Köln – Vienna 1985).

In spite of the wealth of available sources, there have been no monographs written on Transylvania's adjustment to the system of east-central European migration. The polemic which had been very much alive between the two world wars was closed (without being able to argue the amply illustrated points of view published in the two volumes of MR), in: D. Prodan, Les migrations des Roumains au-delà des Carpathes au XVIIIᵉ siècle (Sibiu 1945). The migration to Transylvania is implied in: A. Camariano-Cioran, Rapoartele inedite ale capucheielor lui Constantin Mavrocordat (Studii 1961), and M. C. Vlad, Colonizarea rurală în Ţara Românescă şi Moldova (Secolele XV–XVIII) (Bucharest 1973). The presently available numerical data is reinterpreted in a carefully written manuscript by: R. K. Nyárády, Erdély népesedéstörténete /The Demographic History of Transylvania/ (The Archives of the Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

A brief overview of the agriculture and the agrarian population of Transylvania: J. Berlász, Az erdélyi jobbágyság gazdasági helyzete a XVIII. században /The Economic Situation of the Serfs of Transylvania in the 18th Century/ (Budapest 1959); I. Imreh — E. Csetri, Az árutermelés fokozódása az erdélyi mezőgazdaságban a feudalizmus bomlásának idején /The Rising Production of Goods in Transylvanian Agriculture at the Time of the Decline of Feudalism/ (SUBB-H, 1962); L. Botezan — M. Roşca-Rosen, Contribuţii la problema premizelor sociale ale mişcărilor revoluţionare de la 1848 pe teritoriul ţării noastre (AMN 1965); E. Csetri — I. Imreh, Erdély változó társadalma 1767–1821 /The Changing Society of Transylvania 1767–1821/ (Bucharest 1980). On the management of the estates: Zs. Jakó, A magyarpataki és kalini hamuzsírhuta története /The History of the Potash Foundries of Magyarpatak and Kalin/ (Bucharest 1956); S. Benkő — E. Csetri — I. Imreh, Tanulmányok az erdélyi kapitalizmus kezdeteiről /Studies on Early Capitalism in Transylvania/ (Bucharest 1956); I. Imreh, Majorsági gazdálkodas a Székelyföldön a feudalizmus idején /Manorial Management in Székelyföld during Feudalism/ (Bucharest 1956); M. Roşca-Rosen, Veniturile şi cheltuielile băneşti ale domeniului Bonţidei 1780–1820 (SUBB-H 1971).

Further Hungarian additions to the large literature of transhumance: A. Veress, Păstoritul ardelenilor in Moldova şi Ţara Românescă (pînă la 1821) (Academia Română, Memoriile Secţiunii Istorice, Seria III, Tom. VII, Mem. 6, 1927); L. Földes, Quellen zur Transhumance in Siebenbürgen–Walachei aus der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (in: Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur. Ed. L. Földes, Budapest 1969).

On the economic policies of the Habsburg Monarchy: F. Eckhart, A bécsi udvar gazdaságpolitikája Mária Terézia korában /The Economic Policy of the Viennese Court in the Age of Maria Theresia/ (Budapest 1922); K. Müller, Siebenbürgische Wirtschaftspolitik unter Maria Theresia (Munich 1961).

On the merchant groups: E. LIMONA — D. LIMONA, Negustori bucureșteni la sfîrșitul veacului al XVIII-lea (Studii 1960); A. MISKOLCZY, A brassói román levantei keres-kedőpolgárság kelet-nyugati közvetítő szerepe, 1780–1860 /The Mediating Role Between East and West of the Romanian Levantine Merchants of Brassó, 1780–1860/ (Budapest 1987).

The monographs following up the Romanian national movements of the 18th and 19th centuries: Z. I. TÓTH, Az erdélyi román nacionalizmus első százada 1697–1792 /The First Century of Romanian Nationalism in Transylvania 1697–1792/ (Budapest 1946); L. BLAGA, Gîndirea românească in Transilvania în secolul al XVIII-lea (Bucharest 1966); D. PRODAN, Supplex Libellus Valachorum. I–III (Cluj 1948; Bucharest 1967, 1984); K. HITCHINS, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780–1849 (Cambridge, Mass. 1969); E. TURCZYNSKI, Konfession und Nation (Düsseldorf 1976); I. LUNGU, Școala ardeleană (Bucharest 1978); K. HITCHINS, Conșțiintă națională și acțiune politică la românii din Transilvania, 1700–1868 (Cluj 1987).

On social movements: C. GOLLNER, Die Siebenbürgische Militärgrenze (Munich 1974); D. PRODAN, Răscoala lui Horea. I–II (Bucharest 1984).

Researchers studying the Hungarian Enlightenment in Transylvania were successesful in discovering new sources in the field of cultural history: E. JANCSÓ, Az Erdélyi Magyar Nyelvművelő Társaság iratai /The Papers of the Hungarian Linguistic Society of Transylvania/ (Bucharest 1955); J. HAJÓS, Köteles Sámuel (Bucharest 1969); S. KOVÁSZNAI, Az ész igaz útján /On the True Track of Mind/ (Ed. L. KÓCZIÁNY, Bucharest 1970); S. FOGARASI, Marosvásárhely és Göttinga /Marosvásárhely and Göttingen/ (Ed. I. JUHÁSZ, Bucharest 1974); J. SPIELMANN, A közjó szolgálatában /In the Service of Public Welfare/ (Bucharest 1976); S. BENKŐ, A helyzettudat... /Awareness.../.

Praiseworthy Romanian monographies on schooling: N. ALBU, Istoria învăță-mîntului românesc din Transilvania pînŚ la 1800 (Blaj 1944); idem., Istoria școlilor românești din Transilvania între 1800–1867 (Bucharest 1971); The Hungarian research into cultural history have been interrupted, the latest important results can be found in: Zs. JAKÓ — I. JUHÁSZ, Nagyenyedi diákok 1662–1848 /Students of Nagyenyed 1662–1848/ (Bucharest 1979) and Műv. T.

The reformist tendencies of Hungarian nobility have been reinterpreted by Zs. TRÓCSÁNYI, Kísérletek teljes katonai uralom létrehozására Erdélyben, 1732–1739 /Attempts to Establish a Military Dictatorship in Transylvania, 1732–1739/ (Sz 1983/5).

On the early liberalism and its preliminaries: E. JANCSÓ, A felvilágosodástól a romantikáig /From Enlightenment to Romanticism/ (Bucharest 1966); S. BENKŐ, Sorsformáló értelem /Mind Over Destiny/ (Bucharest 1971); Z. ROHONYI, A magyar romantika kezdetei /Early Hungarian Romanticism/ (Bucharest 1975); E. CSETRI, Kőrösi Csoma Sándor (Bucharest 1984).

On the cultural interactions: E. VERESS, A budai Egyetemi Nyomda kiadványainak dokumentumai /Documents Concerning the Publications of the Printing-House in Buda/ (Ed. S. DOMOKOS, Budapest 1982); K. KÖLLŐ, Két irodalom mesgyéjén /On the Borderland of Two Literatures/ (Bucharest 1984).

It is a sad reflection on Transylvanian historiography that recent studies of the archives in connection with the daily life of the Saxon population, whose economic and cultural life was at a high level both by Transylvanian and east-central European standards, do not exist. The quoted synthesis by TEUTSCH is still the best on the subject.

II. The Reform Era (1830–1848)

In spite of their subjective nature, the memoirs and the studies based on personal experiences continue to be indispensable in the correct assessment of the bourgeois

transformation, the national movements and the bourgeois revolution: P. GYULAI (ed.), Kemény Zsigmond tanulmányai /The Studies of Zsigmond Kemény/ (Budapest 1870); J. PÁLFFY, Magyarországi és erdélyi urak /The Nobility of Hungary and Transylvania. I–II/ (Ed. A.T. SZABÓ, Kolozsvár 1939); F. GYULAI (ed.), Mezőkövesdi Ujfalvy Sándor emlékiratai /The Memoirs of Sándor Mezőkövesdi Ujfalvy/ (Kolozsvár 1941); L. KŐVÁRY, Erdély története 1848–1849-ben /The History of Transylvania in 1848–1849/ (Pest 1861); E. JAKAB, Szabadságharczunk történetéhez /To the History of our War of Independence/ (Budapest 1881); A. PAPIU-ILARIAN, Istoria românilor din Dacia Superiore, I–II (Vienna 1852); G. BARIŢ, Părţi alese...; E. FRIEDENFELS, Joseph Bedeus von Scharberg, I–II (Vienna 1876–1877).

It was first of all in the field of social history where the Romanian historians of Hungarian nationality produced the results which were necessary to clear the way towards a synthesis: I. IMREH, Erdélyi hétköznapok, 1750–1850 /Life in Transylvania, 1750–1850/ (Bucharest 1979); idem., A törvényhozó székely falu /The Legislating Székely Village/ (Bucharest 1983); Á. EGYED, Város, civilizáció /Town, Civilization/ (Bucharest 1981).

The analyses of biographies have a fundamental bearing on the various interrelations existing between social and political development: GH. I. BOGDAN-DUICĂ, Viaţa şi ideile lui Simion Bârnuţiu (Bucharest 1924); idem., Ion Barac (Bucharest 1933); G. KISS — S. TURNOWSZKY (eds), Károly Szász (Bucharest 1955); Á. ANTAL, Mihály Szentiváni (Bucharest 1958); J. MARLIN, Ausgewählte Schriften (Introduction by A. CONNERTH, Bucharest 1958); O. FOLBERTH, Der Prozess Stephan Ludwig Roth (Graz – Köln 1959); ZS. TRÓCSÁNYI, Wesselényi Miklós (Budapest 1965); S. BENKŐ, Bólyai János vallomásai /The Confessions of János Bólyai/ (Bucharest 1968); Kemény Zsigmond naplója /The Diary of Zsigmond Kemény/ (Introduction by S. BENKŐ, Bucharest 1966); GY. BARLA, Kemény Zsigmond főbb eszméi 1849 előtt /The Most Important Ideas of Zsigmond Kemény before 1849/ (Budapest 1970); I. MIKÓ, Az utolsó erdélyi polihisztor /The Last Polymath of Transylvania/ (Bucharest 1970); M. KRONER, Stephan Ludwig Roth (Cluj 1974); S. BÖLÖNI FARKAS, Journey in North America, 1831 (Ed. A. KADARKAY, Oxford, Calif. 1978); Á. ANTAL — J. FARAGÓ — A.T. SZABÓ, Kriza János (Kolozsvár 1971); Varga Katalin pere /The Trial of Katalin Varga/ (Introduction by A. KISS, Bucharest 1979); M. PRAZNOVSZKY (ed.), Teleki and his Age. Discussiones Neogradienses (Salgótarján 1987).

The largest source publications: L. ROTH, Geschammelte Schriften und Briefe (Ed. O. FOLBERTH, I–VII, Berlin, 1964–1970); ŞT. PASCU (ed.), George Bariţ şi contemporanii săi. I–VII (Bucharest 1973–1976).

The inherent logic of the Hungarian national aspirations, the relationship formed with other nations and the various ways of bringing about national unity are analyzed in: GY. SZEGFŰ (ed.), Iratok a magyar államnyelv kérdésének történetéhez /Documents Pertaining to the History of the Hungarian State's Official Language/ (Budapest 1926); M. ASZTALOS, Kossuth Lajos kora és az erdélyi kérdés /The Age of Lajos Kossuth and the Transylvanian Issue/ (Budapest 1928); E. ARATÓ, A magyarországi nemzetiségek nemzeti ideológiája /The National Ideology of the Nationalities Living in Hungary/ (Budapest 1983); GY. SZABAD, Kossuth politikai pályája /The Political Career of Kossuth/ (Budapest 1977); J. VARGA, Helyet kereső Magyarország /Hungary in Search of a Place under the Sun/ (Budapest 1982); A. MISKOLCZY, Társadalom, nemzetiség és ellenzékiség kérdései az erdélyi magyar reformmozgalomban, 1830–1843 /The Issues of Society, Nationality and the Oppositional Politics in the Hungarian Reformist Movement of Transylvania, 1830–1843/ (Sz 1983/5); GY. SZABAD, Nézetek Magyarország és Erdély államjogi viszonyának rendezéséről a polgári átalakulás korában /Views on the Settling of the Constitutional Relationships between Hungary and Transylvania in the Age of the Bourgeois Transformation/ (in the TEt volume).

A comprehensive view of the Romanian national movement is given in: G. Em. Marica — I. Hajós — C. Mare — C. Rusu, Ideologia generației române de la 1848 din Transilvania (Bucharest 1968); L. Gyémánt, Mișcarea națională a românilor din Transilvania, 1790–1848 (Bucharest 1986).

The relationship between Transylvania's Romanian population and the Romanians living over the other side of the Carpathians is analyzed in depth in: P. Cornea, Originile romantismului românesc (Bucharest 1872); O. Papadima, Ipostaze ale iluminismului românesc (Bucharest 1976); Al. Nicolescu, Individualitatea limbii romîne între limbile romanice. II (Bucharest 1978); K. Bochmann, Das politisch-soziale Wortschatz des Rumänischen von 1821 bis 1850 (Berlin 1970); V. Georgescu, Istoria ideilor politice românești, 1369–1878 (Munich 1987).

III. Revolution and the War of Independence (1848–1849)

After the politically motivated attempts of the contemporary historians, the systematic source publication of the archive material associated with the events of 1848–1849 only began relatively late, and then was left unfinished: S. Dragomir, Studii și documente privitoare la revoluția românilor din Transilvania în anii 1848–49. I–III (Sibiu 1944). Contradicting the genre and the aims of the authors, the sources are selected quite onesidedly at times in: Șt. Pascu — V. Cherestesiu (eds), Revoluția de la 1848–1849 din Transilvania. I (Bucharest 1977); Șt. Pascu — V. Cherestesiu (eds), Documente privind revoluția de la 1848 în țările române. C. Transilvania. II (Bucharest 1979); III (Ed. Șt. Pascu, Bucharest 1982).

On the importance and dynamics of the peasant movements: Zs. Trócsányi, Az erdélyi parasztság története, 1790–1848 /The History of the Transylvanian Peasantry, 1790–1848/ (Budapest 1956); E. Arató, Die Bauernbewegungen und der Nationalismus in Ungarn im Frühling und Sommer 1848 (AUSB 1967, 1977); 1848. Arcok, eszmék, tettek /1848. Faces, Ideas, Actions/ (Bucharest 1974).

The events of the spring and summer of 1848 are discussed professionally and with the legitimate assertion of the bourgois nationalist view of the Romanian people in: S. Dragomir, Studii și documente privitoare la revoluția românilor din Transilvania în anii 1848–1849, V (Cluj 1946). An attempt to overcome the one-sided nationalist approach: V. Cherestesiu, A balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés, 1848. május 15–17 /The National Diet of Balázsfalva, 15–17 May, 1848/ (Bucharest 1967).

The only modern regional monography: Á. Egyed, Háromszék, 1848–1849 (Bucharest 1978). The best biography: S. Dragomir, Avram Iancu (Bucharest 1965).

Greater emphasis is placed on Hungarian history, Hungarian-Romanian relations and the Hungarian government's nationality policy I. Z. Tóth, Bălcescu Miklós élete /The Life of Miklós Bălcescu/ (Budapest 1958); idem., Magyarok és románok /Hungarians and Romanians/ (Budapest 1980); Gy. Spira, A nemzetiségi kérdés a negyvennyolcas forradalom Magyarországán /The Nationality Issue in Hungary during the 1848 Revolution/ (Budapest 1980); A. Miskolczy, Rumanian-Hungarian Attempts at Reconciliation in the Spring of 1849 in Transylvania (AUSB 1981).

On the historical role played by the Saxons: C. Gollner, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in den Revolutionjahren 1848–1849 (Bucharest 1967); Z. Sárközy, Az erdélyi szászok 1848–49-ben /The Saxons of Transylvania in 1848–49/ (Budapest 1974).

Much has been written on the casualties of the civil war, although an accurate picture cannot be given because of the biased nature of the sources.

Only the "victims of Hungarian terrorism" were complied by the Austrian military government. The list was completed on a village-by-village basis and gave a total of 6112 victims. Of the people standing trial in the Hungarian martial law courts, at least 449 persons (769, at the most) were executed on officers' orders with-

724

out a formal sentence. 31 persons were hanged and 709 were shot after occupying various settlements; 2,871 people died in other ways. In the course of the military clashes 1,283 civilians lost their lives. The same 6112 persons in a different break-down: 5680 men, 363 women and 69 children. Broken down into nationalities: 5405 Romanians, 310 Saxons, 304 Hungarians and 93 people of other nationalities. In their propaganda the Romanian contemporaries put the number of Romanian casualities at around 40,000. Accepting this figure, 100,000 Hungarian casualities are mentioned in: I. STERCA ȘULUȚIU, Din istoria Munților Apuseni (*Gazeta Transilvaniei*, 1891, No. 18). In his book, Handbuch der Landeskunde Siebenbürgens, E. A. BIELZ, who knew both the above-mentioned Austrian survey and the demographic circumstances of the age, estimated the "unnatural" loss of lives of 1848–1849 at 18,000, also including in this figure the victims of the typhoid epidemic which owed its spread to the war situation. The psychological damage and shock had even graver consequences than the physical devastation and losses.

Part Five — From the Empire to Civic Hungary

I. The Era of Neo-Absolutism (1849–1867)

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III. Political Life and the Nationality Issue in the Age of Dualism (1867–1918)

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732

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List of Illustrations

Abbreviations: IM = Iparművészeti Múzeum (Museum of Applied Arts); MNG = Magyar Nemzeti Galéria (Hungarian National Gallery); MNM = Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum (Hungarian National Museum); MTA = Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (Hungarian Academy of Sciences); MTKCs = Magyar Történelmi Képcsarnok (Hungarian Historical Gallery); OL = Országos Levéltár (National Archives); OMF = Országos Műemléki Felügyelőség (National Office of Historical Monuments); OMM = Országos Műszaki Múzeum (National Technical Museum); OSZK = Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (National Széchényi Library); RMK = Régi Magyar Könyvtár (Old Hungarian Library); RMNy = Régi magyar nyomtatványok (Old Hungarian Prints); WHI = Hadtörténeti Intézet (War History Institute)

Black-and-White Pictures

1. Gold jewellery finds from the Bronze Age, Somogyom (MNM 180.1880.1–29.)
2. Scythian finds: 1. "Bronze bell", Gernyeszeg (MNM 3.1929); 2. Bronze mirror, Makfalva (MNM 29.1913)
3. Dacian silver jewellery: 1. Torockószentgyörgy, the vicinity of Nagyenyed, and Nagyvárad (MNM 29.1893; 110.1894.3; 81.1893.34–35); 2–3. Nagykágya, Darlac and Cserbel (MNM 2.1944.2–3; 102.1893.1–2; 77.1875.4; 15.1891)
4. Coins from Dacia: 1. Coin minted at the time of the foundation of the province of Dacia; 2–3. Denarii minted at the end of the Dacian wars with personalized representations of Dacia subjugated and the Danube River; 4. Coin minted in Viminacium during the reign of Philippus showing Dacia and the insignia of the emperor's legions (MNM Coin collection)
5. Wax tablets found at Verespatak (MNM)
6. Gothic pottery in Transylvania: ornate dish found at Bereck; side and bottom (MNM N 61.51.1)
7. Gepid jewellery: 1. Gold earring set with precious stones, Bánffyhunyad (MNM RN 84.1897.1); 2. Gold pendant set with precious stones, Nagyvárad (MNM N 82.3.1.=N 879); 3. Ornate sword pommel, Transylvania (MNM N 854); 4. Gold bracelet, Transylvania (Kolozsvár, Dept. of Antiquity of the former Transylvanian National Museum, No. 2364, archive photograph); 5. Gold ring, Nagyszentmiklós (MNM R 29.1895.31=N 693); 6–7. A pair of gilt silver fibulae (Original: Episcopal Museum 245-246.1889. Archive photograph, MNM Docu-

mentation Dept.); *8.* Gold pearls; *9.* Gilt bronze fibula, Nagyvárad (Original: Episcopal Museum 138.1911, one of the gold pearls 100.1901. Archive photographs. Collection of the Archeological Dept. of Eötvös Loránd Univ.)

8. Relics from early Avar graves: *1–2.* A pair of stirrups from the remains of a funeral pyre, Dicsőszentmárton (MNM RN 20.1913.1-2); *3.* Gold earring, Transylvania (MNM N 64.6.3=N.856); *4–6.* Bridle-bit and a pair of stirrups, Németpereg (MNM RN 84.1898.1–3); *7.* A pair of gold earrings from the grave of a high-ranking lady, Torda (MNM Orn. Jank. III.1–2=N.206–207); not published

9. Relics from Late Avar graves: *1.* Bronze belt fasteners, Zilah (MNM 8.1921.1); *2–12.* Bronze belt ornaments, buckles, belt fasteners and earrings, Aranyosgyéres (MNM 20.1913.1–2 and 22.1936.1–4. Latters from the private collection of István Téglás)

10. Relics from graves of Hungarian men from the time of the Conquest: *1.* Stirrup and a part of its underside, inlaid with silver from a grave, Kolozsvár, 3/1942); *2.* Sabretache pendant (The former Zápolya Street, Kolozsvár; grave, 2/1941) ; *3, 6–7.* Silver belt ornaments; *4.* Stirrup; *5.* Silver horse accoutrement (grave at Kolozsvár, 3/1942). (Archive photographs)

11. Silver treasure from the eleventh century: earrings ornamented with filigree work, fragment of pendant, silver pearls, Királyföld (MNM 62.1891.1–21)

12. Spandrel relief showing Christ in glory. Gyulafehérvár, first cathedral, around 1100 (Secondary placement)

13. Spandrel relief showing Christ in glory between two apostles. Gyulafehérvár cathedral, around 1210

14. Monastery of a clan at Harina, around 1200

15. Church built at Guraszáda for Romanian settlers, around 1300

16. Cistercian church and cloister built on the French model at Kerc, first half of the thirteenth century

17. The sanctuary of the Saint Bartholomew church in Brassó, built by masons from Kerc, middle of the thirteenth century

18. The south aisle of the third cathedral in Gyulafehérvár, first third of the thirteenth century

19. Greek Orthodox Romanian church built from Roman ruins at Demsus, middle of the thirteenth century

20. Greek Orthodox Romanian church at Zeykfalva, second half of the thirteenth century

21. The hall choir of the Lutheran church at Szászsebes, second half of the fourteenth century

22. An outstanding example of mediaeval European sculpture, the statue of Saint George by Márton and György Kolozsvári, 1373, Prague

23. Latorvár, at the Vöröstorony Pass, one of the mediaeval border-fortifications in Transylvania, fourteenth century (the cannon tower dates from the seventeenth century). In the background is the fourteenth-century fort at Talmács. Pen-and-ink drawing and watercolour, around 1735 (MTKCs 69.114)

24. Detail of a pietà of the Lutheran church at Nagyszeben, around 1400 (Photo: MNG Collection of photographs)

25. The interior of the nave of the Saint Michael church at Kolozsvár, 1430s

26. Fresco by János Rozsnyai in the sanctuary of the Lutheran church at Nagyszeben, 1445 (MNG)

27. View of Vajdahunyad castle from the southwest, fifteenth century (OMF Collection of photographs)

28. View of Vajdahunyad castle from the southeast. Pen-and-ink drawing and watercolour, 1735 (MTKCs 68.113)

29. Cover-plate of János Hunyadi's tomb at Gyulafehérvár, last third of the fifteenth century

52. Watermarks of seventeenth century paper mills in Transylvania: *1.* Kolozs-monostor, 1635; *2.* Nagyszeben, 1664; *3.* Gyulafehérvár, 1665; *4.* Nagyszeben, 1672 (*Századok* [Centuries], 1878, 531)

53. View of Kolozsvár from the south. Pen-and-ink drawing by Conrad von Weiss, 1735 (Its photo: WHI Collection of maps)

54. The Gyulafehérvár citadel of Charles III. Delineation from the middle of the eighteenth century (MTKCs 58.4052)

55. Jesuit, later Piarist church in Kolozsvár, 1718-1724. Lady-column: 1744 (Photograph by Ferenc Veress, 1860s. Photo album of Kolozsvár, Szabó Ervin Library, Budapest Collection)

56. View of Beszterce from the south. Pen-and-ink drawing by Conrad von Weiss, 1735 (Its photo: WHI Collection of maps)

57. Armenian Catholic church at Szamosújvár, second half of the eighteenth century (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

58. Greek Orthodox Romanian church at Brassó–Bolgárszeg, sixteenth–eighteenth centuries. The tower was built in 1752 with the help of Empress Elizabeth of Russia (Photograph dated from the beginning of the century. OMF Collection of photographs)

59. Greek Orthodox apologetic work. Balázsfalva, 1750 (OSZK)

60. Romanian publication printed with the letters of Miklós Misztótfalusi Kis at Balázsfalva, 1763 (OSZK)

61. Romanian publication printed with Cyrillic letters cut by István Pálfi Székely at Balázsfalva, 1763 (Published by ZSIGMOND JAKÓ, *Írás, könyv* ... / Book, Writing.../ Bucharest, 1976, Picture 67)

62. The main square of Balázsfalva with the former Greek Catholic cathedral and theological institute, around 1900 (OMF Collection of photographs)

63. Fresco from the Saint Nicholas Greek Orthodox Romanian church at Fogaras, eighteenth century (OMF, aquarelle reproduction)

64. Horea and Closca at the head of their troops. Copper engraving, 1780s (MTKCs 85.31)

65. The main square in Nagyszeben with the Bruckenthal palace, 1778–1779 (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

66. Great hall of the Batthyaneum at Gyulafehérvár. Building: after 1781, interior: around 1820 (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

67. Sámuel Teleki. Oil painting by Johann Tusch, 1798 (MNG)

68. Samuel Bruckenthal. Oil painting by Martin von Meytens, shortly before 1770 (Published by C. GÖLLNER, *Geschichte der Deutschen auf dem Gebiete Rumänians.* Bucharest 1979)

69. Courtyard facade of the Bánffy palace at Bonchida. Built by Johann Eberhard Blaumann, middle of the eighteenth century (Photograph by Josef Fischer, 1930s)

70. One-time Maria Theresa stateroom of the Bánffy palace at Bonchida (Published by JÓZSEF BÍRÓ, *Transylvanian Castles.* Budapest, n. d., Picture 36.)

71. The Wesselényi palace at Zsibó, 1778–1785

72. Covered suspension bridge at Torda. Built by János Kövesi, 1797–1804 (OMF Dept. of Plans)

73. The Zalatna foundry, 1799 (Wien, Hofkammerarchiv. Karten und Plänen N 218. Collection of Gyula Kiszely)

74. The Nagyszeben sugar refinery in the first half of the nineteenth century (Litograph. Archives of the Institute of History, MTA)

75. View of Marosvásárhely from the southeast. Steel engraving by Sámuel Nagy, 1827 (Budapest, in private collection)

76. The *Appendix* by János Bolyai (A Treatise on Non-Euclidian Geometry), 1833 (FARKAS BOLYAI, *Tentamen.* II. Marosvásárhely 1833)

Colour Pictures

Black-and-white photographs by

Colour photographs by

List of Maps, Tables and Figures

Maps

Tables

Figures

3. Ó-Hunyadvár (After the data of T. Mariş in R. Popa, La începurile evului mediu românesc. Țara Hațegului. Bucharest 1988, p. 58, fig. 11); 4. Biharvár (Gh. Anghel, op. cit., p. 13, fig. 17; M. Rusu, Contribuții arheologice la istoricul creății Biharea. *Anuarul Inst. de Istorie din Cluj*, 3, 1960, 7–25, and also after a plan, considering the restored aerial photograph in Istoria militară a poporului român. I. Bucharest 1984, p. 284; Drawing by S. Csonka); 5. Dobokavár (K. Crettier, A dobokai vár. /The Hillfort of Doboka./ *Dolg. ENM* 3, 1943, pp. 197–208, fig. 2; Șt. Pascu — M. Rusu — O. Iambor, Cetățea Dăbîca. *AMN* 5, 1968, pp. 153–202, plate I, and figs 1–2); 6. Küküllővár, border hillfort from the end of the eleventh century (Gh. Anghel, *Apulum*, 19, 1981, p. 154, plate I and after local examinations; in the middle a stone fort from the thirteenth century); 7. Sajósárvár (Drawing by S. Csonka after H. Finály, A sárvári földvárról. /About the Earthwork of Sárvár./ *Arch. Ért.*, 22, 1902, pp. 266–271, fig. 1)

164

Chronology

Part One — Transylvania in Prehistoric and Ancient Times

6th–4th centuries B.C.: Transylvania is inhabited by the Agathyrsi, the first Transylvanian nation known by name.

3rd-2nd centuries B.C.: Celtic rule in Transylvania.

2nd century B.C.: The beginning of Dacian rule.

1st century B.C.: Burebista unites the Dacian tribes; Dacian settlements in Transylvania.

Circa 44 B.C.: The assassination of Burebista, the Dacian king.

10 B.C.: The Romans hew a cliff road into the rockface at the Iron Gate.

85–86, winter: Oppius Sabinus, the governor of Moesia, is killed in a surprise attack by the Dacians.

86: Cornelius Fuscus, a Roman commander, crosses the Danube and advances successfully on Dacian soil. Fuscus is defeated by Decebal, the Dacian king, and is killed.

88: A Roman general, Tettius Julianus scores a victory over the Dacians at the Tapae Pass. Roman–Dacian alliance.

102: Emperor Trajan's first campaign against the Kingdom of Dacia.

105–106: The second Dacian war. Trajan occupies Sarmizegethusa, Decebal commits suicide. Dacia becomes a Roman province.

117–138: Reign of Emperor Hadrian.

118–124: New territorial divisions of Dacia: Dacia Inferior, Superior, Porolissensis.

167–170: New administrative divisions: Dacia Apulensis, Malvensis, Porolissensis.

167–180: War on the Dacian frontier with peoples living outside the empire, such as the Marcomanns, Vandals and Sarmatians.

193–211: Reign of Septimius Severus.

From 235: Goth incursions ravage the province of Dacia.

245–248: The empire abandones the defensive line beyond the Olt River *(Limes Transalutanus).*

269: Emperor Claudius II's victory over the Goths at Naissus.

271: Emperor Aurelian orders the evacuation of Dacia. Its inhabitants are settled south of the Danube where a new province, *Dacia Ripensis,* is formed. Dacia comes under Gothic rule.

From 291: Visigoths in alliance with the Taifali defend the earlier Dacia against the Vandals and Gepids.

332, 18 February: The Visigoth king, Ariaric attacks the Sarmatians from the Maros Valley, but suffers catastrophic defeat.

Circa 335: The Visigoth king, Geberic drives the army of Visumar, the Vandal king, from the Maros Valley.

369: The army of the Visigoth king, Athanaric withdraws to the southern Carpathians from the army of the emperor Valens.

376: Athanaric's army is defeated by the Huns at the Dniester. The king retreats to Transylvania (Caucaland), the Visigoth population flees onto Roman territory led by King Fritigern.

End of 380: Athanaric and his escort seeks refuge in Constantinople.

408: The Hun prince Uldin destroys the Roman counterforts along the Lower Danube up to the Iron Gate.

412: The Huns occupy Wallachia under the leadership of Prince Uldin.

424: The superior commander, Ruga moves the centre of Hunnish rule on territory east of the Tisza River. Hun dominion over Transylvania.

435–445: The second in command, Attila has his centre in Wallachia.

445–453: Attila becomes the king of kings of the Huns.

455: Ardaric, the Gepid king, and his allied forces defeat the Huns.

455-474: The Gepids occupy all the earlier Hun territories down to the Lower Danube. Gepid settlements in Transylvania.

539–551: The provinces Moesia Prima and Dacia Ripensis are under Gepid rule.

567: The Avars, in alliance with the Langobards, wipe off the Gepids. The Avars settle in Transylvania.

680: The settling down of Bulgar Turks (Proto-Bulgarians) on the territory of present-day Bulgaria.

From 700: Twenty-five Slav tribes live on the territory of the former province of Dacia.

802–803: Krum, the khan of the Bulgars launches a military campaign against the eastern part of the Avar Empire.

818–824: Fleeing from the Bulgarians, the Slav Timočani and Abodriti move to Dacia, north of the Danube and ask for the help of the Franks.

From 827: The Bulgar khan, Omurtag fights against the Franks and Slavs.

832: A peace-treaty signed with the Carolingian Empire secures the Bulgarians' conquests. Transylvania comes under Bulgarian rule.

838: The Hungarians appear at the Lower Danube.

862: The first Hungarian campaign against the Carolingian Empire.

881: The Hungarians and Kabars press ahead to the vicinity of Venia (Vienna).

892: The eastern Frankish king, Arnulf asks Vladimir, the Bulgarian khan, not to deliver salt to the Moravians; this is the first reference to the Transylvanian salt mines and salt trade.

894: Árpád and Kurszán, the leaders of the Hungarian tribes, enter into alliance with the Byzantine against the Bulgars. The Hungarian army attacks Bulgaria.

895: Bulgarian-Pecheneg counter-attack against the Hungarians. The Hungarian tribes flee to Transylvania via the Carpathians.

Part Two — Transylvania in the Mediaeval Hungarian Kingdom

895–900: The land of the Hungarians extends from the line of the Garam and Danube rivers to "Dacia" in the east in the Carpathian Basin.

900: The Hungarians occupy Pannonia and Moravia east of the Morva River.

934: First Hungarian attack against Byzantium.

943: Renewed Hungarian attack against Byzantium, which leads to a peace of five years.

948: The *horka* Bultchu and Termatchu of the Árpád dynasty arrive in Constantinople. Bultchu embraces Christianity and obtains the title of *patrikios,* and Termatchu obtains the title of friend. The supreme commander of the Hungarians is Fajsz, who also rules over Transylvania.

953–954: The *gyula,* the second prince of the Hungarians arrives in Constantinople and receives the title of *patrikios.* He returns with the missionary bishop Hierotheus.

955–971: Taksony is the supreme commander of the Hungarians. He also reigns over Transylvania.

970: The Hungarians are defeated at Arcadiupolis; end of the Hungarian attacks against Byzantium.

971: The army of Emperor Ionnas Tzimisces conquers eastern Bulgaria. The southern bank of the Lower Danube becomes a Byzantine province *(thema).*

After 971: The *gyula* shifts his seat to Transylvania.

927-997: Géza is the ruling prince of the Hungarians.

973, 23 March: The ruling prince Géza and his Bulgarian allies send an embassy to Emperor Otto I. Hungarian politics opens towards the West.

976: The Bulgarians drive away the Byzantines from the bank of the Lower Danube. The second *gyula* of Transylvania marries off his daughter Sharolt to the ruling prince Géza and acknowledges his supremacy.

977: Probable date of birth of Vajk (the later Saint Stephen), son of Géza and Sharolt.

From the 980s onwards: The rule of Prokuj, the third *gyula,* brother of Sharolt in Transylvania.

997–1038: Reign of (Saint) Stephen I.

1002: Emperor Basil II occupies Vidin and restores Byzantine supremacy at the Lower Danube.

1003: (Saint) Stephen I removes his uncle, the third Transylvanian *gyula,* who was seeking the help of Byzantium. He is carried to Esztergom with his family. Stephen integrates Transylvania into his kingdom.

1009: Foundation of the Diocese of Gyulafehérvár.

Between 1010 and 1015: Csanád, King Stephen's general defeats and kills Ajtony, the lord of Marosvár, and ally of Basil II. Marosvár is renamed as Csanádvár.

1030: King Stephen sets up the dioceses of Bihar and Maros (Csanád), the latter one is headed by Gerald (Gerhardt). Queen Gizella donates the Transylvanian villages Lopath (Magyar-Lapád) and Obon (Abony) to the Abbey of Bakonybél.

1048-1060: *Dux* Béla rules over the eastern part of Hungary, his headquarters is at Bihar.

1064-1074: *Dux* Géza (Magnus) rules over eastern Hungary with headquarters at Bihar.

1067: First mention of the Szalacs route along which the Transylvanian salt is transported.

1068: The army of the Pecheneg tribe Jula led by *Dux* Osul devastates Transylvania and the Bihar region. King Solomon and Prince Géza utterly destroy his army at the bank of the Sajó, at the *"Kyrie eleis"* (Kerlés) Hill.

1071: Franco is bishop of Gyulafehérvár *(episcopus Bellegradiensis).*

1075: The Abbey of Garamszentbenedek gets half of the salt tax in the neighbourhood of Tordavár, at the Aranyos River.

1075–1077: Ladislas is *dux* of Bihar.

1083, 25 July: Gerald, bishop of Csanád is canonised.

1091: Campaign of Kapoltch, the Cuman leader in Transylvania and Bihar. King (Saint) Ladislas I defeats him.

1092: Ladislas I donates the Transylvanian salt cutters and transporters to the Abbey of Bakonybél. This is the first Transylvanian list of personal names. King

Ladislas lays the foundations of Nagyvárad, where a chapter is established. At the same time he sets up the Benedictine Abbey of Kolozsmonostor in Transylvania.

1093–1095: Coloman is bishop of Bihar.

Before 1095: The construction of the new episcopal church is started in Gyulafehérvár.

1095–1106: Prince Álmos is the last *dux* of Bihar.

From 1111: The new title of the bishop of Gyulafehérvár is *"ultrasilvanus"*, that is the bishop of Transylvania.

1138: Béla II has the property donated by Prince Álmos to the Abbey of Dömös listed.

1150: The army of the Byzantine emperor Manuel I is defeated in the Banat.

Before 1162: Géza II settles German (mostly Saxon) knights and peasants from the Rhine and Moselle regions in Transylvania, in the locality of Nagyszeben and the Olt Valley. Earlier Székelys had inhabited these territories. German settlers continue to arrive for centuries.

1166: Two Byzantine attacks against Transylvania.

1192: Béla III lays the foundations of the Provostship of Nagyszeben.

1199: First mention of the voivode of Transylvania.

Around 1200: Presumably there is a region of Romanian frontier guards in the Southern Carpathians.

1211: Andrew I cedes the Barcaság to the Order of the Teutonic Knights.

1222: First mention of the Transylvanian Romanians in a diploma by Andrew II.

1224: Andrew II's charter (the Andreanum) is issued to the Transylvanian Germans.

1225, spring: Andrew II expels the Order of the Teutonic Knights from the Barcaság.

1226: Andrew II's son, Prince Béla takes over the government of Transylvania.

1241, April: The Mongols devastate and subjugate Transylvania.

1257: Béla IV divides his kingdom between himself and István, the junior king and duke of Transylvania, who rules over the eastern part of the country.

1263: The entire Transylvania is under the control of the voivodes, the *ispáns* of the seven royal counties are subordinated to the voivode.

1285: Renewed Mongol attack against Transylvania, the Mongols are defeated.

Late 13th – early 14th centuries: The increasingly independent voivodes govern Transylvania as their private property.

1316: Charles Robert restores royal power in Transylvania by force.

1316, 23 August: Kolozsvár is granted the rank of free royal city.

1324: Charles Robert restores the judicial authority of the voivodes of Transylvania, divides the province of Szeben into districts and appoints a royal judge of Szeben. The Transylvanian nobility acquire a similar position to that of the Hungarian ones by their exemption from taxation.

1334: Voivode Bogdan arrives in Transylvania with a large number of Romanian settlers. Romanians keep on coming during the entire course of the 14th century.

Mid-14th century: Guilds are organized in Transylvania.

1351, 16 December: Louis I grants the right to national trade to the inhabitants of Nagyszombat, which is later on extended over the territory of Dalmatia and Poland as well.

1357, 28 November: Zalatna is granted the rights of a mining city.

1368, 20 January: The voivode of Wallachia exempts the merchants of Brassó from the levy called 'thirtieth'.

1369, 18 December: The king grants Brassó a staple right over goods coming from the West.

1374: The compilation of the statutes of the Chapter of Várad is completed.

748

1376, 9 November: Renewal of the rules of Saxon guilds (19 guilds, 25 branches of industry).

1378: Nagyszeben is granted staple right.

1391, 28 April: King Sigismund's decree confirms the freedom of movement of the Transylvanian serfs.

1394, autumn: First Turkish incursions into Transylvania.

1396, July: Sigismund's crusade against the Turks. *August:* The Transylvanian voivode, Stibor heads a campaign to Wallachia. *28 September:* King Sigismund is defeated at Nicopolis.

From 1400: Transylvanian students regularly study at the University of Cracow.

1409, 18 October: King Sigismund donates the castle and manor of Hunyad to Vajk, the son of Sorba of Romanian descent, the father of János Hunyadi.

1420, September: Turkish victory at the Iron Gate over the army of the Transylvanian voivode, Miklós Csáky.

1437, March–December: Peasant revolt in Transylvania under the leadership of Antal Budai Nagy. *16 September:* Union of the Three Nations (the Hungarian nobility, the Székelys and the Saxons) at Kápolna; *December:* At Kolozsmonostor the army of the nobility defeats the peasants.

1438, 2 February: The Union of the Three Nations is renewed at Torda.

1441, February – 1446, 6 June: János Hunyadi is appointed voivode of Transylvania by King Wladislas I.

1442: The library of the Nagyszeben parish has 138 volumes.

1458: Revolt of the Saxons of Beszterce against their landlord, Governor Mihály Szilágyi.

1467, August–September: The alliance of the Three Nations against King Matthias I. The military uprising is suppressed.

1468, 28 September: Matthias I extends Brassó's staple right over goods coming from the Romanian voivodeships.

1469, 25 September: The king permits the Saxons to freely elect and depose their own chief justices, with the exception of the chief justice of Szeben.

1473, 9 December: Matthias I issues a new decree in which the Székelys' existing social stratification is recognized and exempts them from the payment of taxes.

Around 1477: The construction of the Black Church of Brassó.

1479, 13 October: The Turkish and Wallachian armies raiding Transylvania suffer a devastating defeat at Kenyérmező.

1489, 14 February: Matthias orders the use of the weights and measures of the Saxon seats at Transylvanian markets.

1495: According to a modern estimate, based on the number of households, the population of Transylvania was 450,000 people, out of which 60 per cent were Hungarians, 24 per cent Romanians and 16 per cent Saxons.

1506, summer: Outbreak of a Székely revolt against an extraordinary tax levied because of the birth of the heir to the throne. The revolt is suppressed.

1510, 10 November - 1526, 10 November: János Szapolyai is voivode of Transylvania.

1511: The Saxons of Segesvár revolt against the leaders of the town, and the common Székelys against the Székely *primors*.

1514, early July: The revolting peasants, under the leadership of the Székely György Dózsa, appear at the Transylvanian frontier. *15 July:* The army of the nobility under the leadership of Voivode János Szapolyai defeats the peasants at Temesvár.

Part Three — The Principality of Transylvania

1526: After the defeat of Hungarians at the Battle of Mohács and the death of King Louis II (*29 August*), János Szapolyai is elected king by the Diet in Székesfehérvár on *10 November*. *17 December:* Ferdinand of Habsburg is pronounced king of Hungary by the Diet in Pozsony.

1527: The struggle of the two kings against each other begins. *July:* German mercenary troops cross the Hungarian border. *27 September:* Ferdinand's general, Count Nicolaus Salm defeats Szapolyai's army at Tokaj. King John I asks the sultan for support.

1538, 24 February: John signs the Peace of Várad: the division of the country is done in keeping with the actual power relations up to the death of John I. Afterwards his part of the country would be inherited by the House of Habsburg.

1539, 2 March: King John marries Isabella, a Polish royal princess.

1540, 22 July: Death of John I soon after the birth of his son, John Sigismund.

1541, 29 August: Sultan Suleiman occupies Buda. Isabella moves to Transylvania, given to her by the sultan, together with her son, John Sigismund and the royal court. *18 October:* The first common Diet of the three Transylvanian nations and the counties in the regions east of the Tisza River in Debrecen. *29 December:* Agreement between the envoys of Isabella and Ferdinand at Gyalu on the unification of the country and on the transfer of Transylvania to Habsburg hands.

1542, 20 January: The Diet of Transylvania nominates George Martinuzzi governor of Transylvania. In the summer Isabella and Friar George shift their seat to Gyulafehérvár. *20 December:* The Diet of Torda rejects the agreement of Gyalu and acknowledges John Sigismund as "elected king".

1543: Transylvania pays 10,000 florins, the first tribute to the Turks.

1544, August: Transylvanian Diet at Torda with the participation of the eastern Hungarian counties. This is the beginning of common Diets.

1549, 8 September: A new agreement between the envoys of Friar George and Ferdinand I at Nyírbátor on the acknowledgement of Habsburg rule over Transylvania; Ferdinand promises military help against the Turks.

1550: The printing press of Kolozsvár, owned by György Hoffgreff and Gáspár Heltai, begins to work.

1551, June–August: Isabella and John II (Sigismund) leave Transylvania, occupied by the imperial mercenaries under Giovanni Battista Castaldo's command. *October:* Turkish punitive campaign against Lippa and Temesvár. *16 December:* Castaldo has Friar George assassinated.

1552, summer: The Turks occupy Lippa, Temesvár and Lugos, thus the defence of Transylvania against the Turks collapses.

1556, autumn: Isabella and John II return to Transylvania.

1559, 15 November: Death of Isabella.

1565: The beginnings of legislation in Hungarian language in Transylvania.

1566, summer: With the siege and occupation of the fortresses of Gyula, Világos and Jenő, the Turks eliminate the last bastions of Habsburg royal authority in the regions east of the Tisza.

1568, January: The Diet of Torda declares the freedom of religious practice of the four accepted denominations (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Unitarian).

1570, 16 August: Agreement between John II and Maximilian I at Speyer (ratified on 10 March, 1571): the emperor acknowledges John's principality. Should he die without an heir the territory of his principality would revert to the House of Habsburg.

1571, 14 March: Death of John II. *25 May:* The Transylvanian Diet elects István Báthory prince.

1575, 10 July: István Báthory's victory at Kerelőszentpál over the troops of the pretender Gáspár Bekes. *15 December:* István Báthory is elected king of Poland.

From 1575: The tribute to be paid by Transylvania to the Turks is 15,000 florins.

1581, 12 May: István Báthory founds the (short-lived) University of Kolozsvár. *May:* The Diet elects Zsigmond Báthory voivode, who would become prince later on.

1586, 13 December: Death of István Báthory, prince of Transylvania and king of Poland.

1588, 8 December: Zsigmond Báthory is elected prince. The Diet expels the Jesuits from the country.

1591, spring: The Jesuits return to Transylvania.

1593, September, 1594, February: Zsigmond Báthory's proposal of alliance to Emperor Rudolph about joining the Holy League; the Transylvanian Diet refuses to accept the alliance (the prince resigns for the first time, then returns).

1594, August: Zsigmond Báthory eradicates the pro-Ottoman opposition; the Diet thus intimidated, breaks off its contacts with the Turks. *5 October:* The Transylvanian prince, Zsigmond Báthory, the voivode of Wallachia, Mihai Viteazul, and the voivode of Moldavia join the Holy League.

1595, 28 January: István Bocskai, captain of Várad signs the alliance with Emperor Rudolph in Prague. *June–October:* The fortresses of Lippa, Arad, Világos and Jenő are re-captured from the Turks. *29 October:* After the liberation of Tîrgoviște and Bucharest, István Bocskai, Zsigmond Báthory and Mihai Viteazul defeat the Turks at Giurgiu.

1596, February: The nobility suppresses the beginning revolt of the common Székelys.

1598, April: After Zsigmond Báthory' abdication, the principality is taken over by Rudolph I's commissioners. *20 August:* Báthory secretly returns and takes possession of the country.

1599, March: Zsigmond Báthory's third resignation, the Diet elects András Báthory prince. *28 October:* Mihai Viteazul's victory over András Báthory's army at Sellenberk; the voivode becomes imperial governor.

1600, 18 September: The united imperial and Transylvanian armies defeat Voivode Mihai at Miriszló. *20 September:* General Basta's imperial soldiers begin pillaging Transylvania.

1601, 3 August: Zsigmond Báthory, who returns once more, assisted by Voivode Mihai, is defeated by the armies of General Basta at Goroszló.

1602, 20 January: Rudolph I appoints General Basta as commander-in-chief of the united imperial troops in Transylvania. *26 July:* Zsigmond Báthory leaves Transylvania for good.

1603, March–July: Mózes Székely, Zsigmond's former commander, takes over Transylvania with the sultan's appointment and Turkish military support. *17 July:* Mózes Székely suffers defeat and falls in a battle fought against the Wallachian army at Brassó.

1604, 15 October: The victory of István Bocskai and the haiduks over the imperial captain Barbiano at Álmosd. Bocskai's uprising begins, as a first attempt to unite the two parts of the country.

1605, 21 February: István Bocskai is elected prince of Hungary by the Transylvanian Diet.

1606, 23 June: The Peace of Vienna between Bocskai and the representatives of the Hungarian Estates, and the commissioners of Rudolph I: it redressed the grievances of the nobility of the kingdom, acknowledged Bocskai's rule and that of his male descendants in Transylvania, in the eastern Hungarian counties and in the three counties of Upper Hungary (Ugocsa, Bereg, Szatmár). *29 December:* Death of Bocskai.

1607, 12 February : Zsigmond Rákóczi is elected prince of Transylvania by the Diet.

1608, *6 February:* Alliance between the restless haiduks and Gábor Báthory. *7 March:* Gábor Báthory becomes prince of Transylvania.

1610, *20–21 March:* István Kendi's unsuccessful plot against the prince. *11 December:* Gábor Báthory occupies Szeben, the Saxon capital and makes the town his seat.

1611, *January–February:* In a successful campaign against Wallachia, Gábor Báthory installes himself as prince of Wallachia, but the sultan commands him to go home. *June–October:* Zsigmond Forgách, captain of Kassa and the discontented haiduks rise against the prince.

1612, *summer:* Báthory's envoy to the Porte, András Ghiczy returns to Transylvania with his own appointment by the sultan. *12 September:* Gábor Bethlen goes to Turkish exile.

1613, *September–October:* Gábor Bethlen returns to Transylvania with Turkish troops. *23 October:* He is elected prince by the Transylvanian Diet. *27 October:* Assassination of Gábor Báthory.

1615, *6 May:* Agreement of Gábor Bethlen with Matthias II: the king acknowledges Transylvania's right to the election of the prince, Bethlen acknowledges Transylvania's allegiance to the Hungarian crown, and the secret clause envisages joint action against the Turks.

1616, *June:* Bethlen hands over the fortress of Lippa to the Turks.

1619, *27 August:* Gábor Bethlen starts his campaign against Ferdinand II (with the support of the Porte, after he has contacted the Bohemian Estates): entry into the Thirty Years' War. *14 October:* The occupation of Pozsony. *27 November:* Bethlen reaches the gates of Vienna.

1620, *25 August:* The House of Habsburg is dethroned and Bethlen is elected king of Hungary by the Hungarian Diet.

1621, *31 December:* The commissioners of Gábor Bethlen and Ferdinand II sign the Peace of Nikolsburg: Bethlen renounces his title of king of Hungary. In return he was granted rule over seven counties (Szatmár, Szabolcs, Ugocsa, Bereg, Zemplén, Borsod, Abaúj) in Upper Hungary.

1622: Foundation of the College of Gyulafehérvár. The prince settles Moravian brethren (Habans) expelled from Moravia.

1623, *14 August:* Bethlen's new campaign against Ferdinand II.

1624, *2 April:* The Peace of Vienna between Bethlen and Ferdinand II: the renewal of the Peace of Nikolsburg with slight modifications.

1626, *25 August:* Bethlen's third Hungarian campaign. *20 December:* The Peace of Pozsony is concluded between Bethlen and Ferdinand II, based on the Peace of Nikolsburg.

1629, *25 November:* Death of Gábor Bethlen. His successor is his widow, Katherine of Brandenburg.

1630, *1 December:* György Rákóczi I is elected prince by the Diet of Transylvania.

1636, *October:* Rákóczi's victory at Szalonta over the Turks.

1643, *26 April:* In alliance with Queen Christina of Sweden, the prince enters the anti-Habsburg alliance.

1644, *2 February:* The prince's campaign begins against Ferdinand II. *12 March:* Kassa is captured. *April:* Rákóczi's army pushes as far as the valley of the Vág River.

1645, *28 May:* The Transylvanian troops occupy Nagyszombat. *13 July:* The troops are united with Torstenson's army near Brno. *13 December:* The Peace of Linz concluded between György Rákóczi I and Ferdinand III: freedom of religion in the Kingdom of Hungary and the seven counties (as of 31 December, 1621) would be retained by Rákóczi, together with several fortresses.

1648, *11 October:* Death of György Rákóczi I. His successor is his son, György Rákóczi II.

1650: In alliance with the voivode of Wallachia, György Rákóczi II expels the voivode of Moldavia. János Apáczai Csere begins his activities at Gyulafehérvár.

1653: The collection of Transylvanian acts, the *Approbatae Constitutiones Regni Transylvaniae* is published at Várad.

1657, 6 January: György Rákóczi II sets out for a military campaign against Poland after having entered into alliance with Charles X of Sweden. *April:* After the capture of Cracow, the Swedish and Transylvanian troops are united. *9 July:* Warsaw falls. The prince, left by his allies, accepts the conditions of peace set by the Poles, and departs. *31 July:* The main Transylvanian army, under Commander-in-chief János Kemény, is defeated and taken prisoner by the Tatars.

1658: Punitive expedition of the Turks in Transylvania. United attack of Grand Vizier Mehmed Köprülü's army and the Tatars, who had devastated the principality from Gyulafehérvár to Kolozsvár. *24 September:* The grand vizier appoints Ákos Barcsay prince. *7 October:* The Diet recognizes Barcsay as the new prince of Transylvania.

1659–1660: The struggles of Barcsay, György Rákóczi II, János Kemény, who returned from captivity, and the Turks against one another destroy the principality.

1660, May: New Turkish punitive expedition against Rákóczi. *7 June:* Rákóczi dies from wounds received in a battle near Szászfenes against the pasha of Buda, Ahmed Seide. *17 August:* The Turks occupy Várad and annex a large part of the Partium to the Turkish-occupied part of the country. *31 December:* Prince Ákos Barcsay resigns.

1661, 7 January: János Kemény is elected prince by the Transylvanian Diet. *June–November:* Turkish troops occupy Transylvania. *14 September:* The Turkish commander calls the Diet and makes Mihály Apafi elected prince.

1662, 23 January: János Kemény is defeated by the Turks and is killed in a clash near Nagyszőllős.

1663, 20 September: Mihály Apafi I joins the grand vizier's army fighting in Hungary after repeated commands.

1665: In the spirit of the Peace of Vasvár between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans (1664), the imperial army leaves Transylvania and the fortresses that had been occupied since 1661.

1667, 24 May: Apafi orders the setting up of a Romanian school and printing press from the incomes of the Romanian bishop of Gyulafehérvár.

1667–1670: Apafi, though he planned a campaign against the Habsburgs, obeys the Porte and denies help from the baronial conspirators of the kingdom.

1677, 27 May: Treaty of alliance between the envoys of Mihály Apafi I and of Louis XIV and the exiles of Hungary, signed in Warsaw.

1679, Late July: Prince Apafi appoints Imre Thököly commander-in-chief of the army of the exiles.

1680: One or two thousand Armenian merchants and artisans migrate to Transylvania from Moldavia.

1681, August–September: Prince Apafi goes to Hungary upon the order of the sultan, where the Transylvanian army is united with Thököly's troops and with the army of the pasha of Várad.

1682, August–September: The Transylvanian army is again fighting in the Hungarian front under the command of Apafi.

1683, 22 August: Grand Vizier Kara Mustapha, besieging Vienna, orders Apafi to defend the bridge over the Danube at Győr. *9 October:* The retreating Turkish army suffers its first defeat in Hungary at Párkány: the liberation of Hungary begins. *31 October:* The Transylvanian troops return home.

1685, 24 October: The Transylvanian Diet rejects Leopold I's appeal to join the anti-Turkish alliance. From *November* the imperial troops fighting in Hungary are commanded to move to the western and northern counties of Transylvania for winter quarters.

1686, 28 June: Treaty between Leopold I and Mihály Apafi, though advantageous to Transylvania, yet unrealized: Leopold would take over the defence of Transylvania, but the independence of the principality would remain intact, Transylvania would financially support the anti-Turkish campaign.

1687, October: Prince Charles of Lorraine marches into Transylvania. *27 October:* Agreement of Balázsfalva: the imperial troops would spend the winter in twelve Transylvanian fortresses, and the principality would pay 700,000 gold florins for transportation.

1688, 9–10 May: Declaration of Fogaras: Prince Apafi and the representatives of the Transylvanian Estates declare Leopold (and his descendants) the principality's hereditary ruler.

1690, 15 April: Death of Mihály Apafi I. His son, Mihály Apafi II, elected as his successor in 1691, is only a nominal prince. *8 June:* The sultan appoints Imre Thököly prince. *21 August:* Thököly defeats Emperor Leopold's Transylvanian army with the help of Turkish and Tatar troops at Zernyest. *16 October:* Leopold I issues the *Diploma Leopoldinum* in Vienna, which regulates the status of Transylvania: it maintains self-government by the prince and the Estates, delegates an elected regent to the minor prince, guarantees the freedom of religion, and specifies the taxes. *25 October:* After having suffered repeated defeats, Thököly flees to Wallachia.

1692, 5 June: General Heisler recaptures Várad from the Ottomans.

1696, 29 April: Leopold I appoints General Rabutin de Bussy military commander of Transylvania. *1 June:* Mihály Apafi II is interned to Vienna by Leopold I who grants him the title of imperial prince with pension.

1699, 26 January: Peace of Karlowitz between the Holy League and the Porte: Transylvania is attached to the central government of the Habsburg Empire. *16 February:* Leopold I approves in an imperial patent the establishment of the Romanian Greek Catholic church (movements for the union had been going on since 1697): he guarantees the legal equality of Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic priests.

1701, 19 March: The Second *Diploma Leopoldinum* corroborates the union of the church.

1703: The first successes of the War of Independence of Ferenc Rákóczi II, which broke out in May.

1704, 8 July: Ferenc Rákóczi II is elected prince by the Diet of Transylvania in Gyulafehérvár.

1705, 5 May: Joseph I accedes to the throne. *11 November:* Rákóczi's *kuruc* troops suffer defeat from the imperial army at the Zsibó Pass.

1706, 6 March: The Széchény Diet rules the unification of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Principality of Transylvania.

1707, 5 April: Secession from the House of Habsburg is declared by the Diet of Transylvania. Ferenc Rákóczi II is regarded as monarch invested with full general authority. *October:* The imperial troops under the command of General Rabutin occupy Transylvania.

1711, 29 April: The Peace of Szatmár is signed, a compromise between the Habsburgs and the Estates. *14 November:* After the fall of the Rákóczi War of Independence the Transylvanian Diet swears allegiance to Charles III.

Part Four — Transylvania under the Habsburg Empire

1712–1713: The distribution of the Transylvanian population according to an official estimate: 47 per cent Hungarians, 34 per cent Romanians, 19 per cent Saxons.

1713, 31 March: Charles III restores the Gubernium with its seat at Szeben.

1717, August: The last incursion of the Tatars into Transylvania.

1717–1720: The Black Death decimates the population of Transylvania.

1718, 21 July: Peace of Passarowitz between Charles III and Ahmed III: the remaining parts of Hungary are also liberated.

1723, 19 February: The *Pragmatica Sanctio* is passed by the Transylvanian Diet.

1735: Inochentie Micu-Klein, the Greek Catholic bishop, who took office in 1729, argues for the first time with the concept of the Daco-Roman continuity when he demands the political contribution of Romanians.

1737–1738: Catastrophic cattle-plague.

1744, 6 July: The synod of Balázsfalva, summoned by Bishop Micu-Klein, becomes the first national meeting of Romanians. *21 August:* At the Transylvanian Diet the Estates accept the abrogation of their right to elect a prince, enact the *Pragmatica Sanctio* and repeal the anti-Catholic laws. *9 December:* Bishop Micu-Klein flees to Rome from the investigation ordered by Maria Theresa.

1747: The first Romanian printing press at Balázsfalva.

1749: The foundation of the first Freemasonic lodge in Brassó.

1751, 13 September: The central administration of Transylvanian affairs is taken over by the Transylvanian Court Chancellery in Vienna.

1752, 21 August: The Transylvanian Diet strictly limits study tours abroad.

1754, 12 August: A new system of taxation based on the legal status and wealth of the taxpayer (further developed in 1763 and 1769) is introduced.

1758, summer: The court decides the appointment of a Transylvanian Orthodox bishop.

1759: The Orthodox Decree on Tolerance is the posterior acknowledgement of abstaining from the union of churches.

1762, 14 June: The organization of the Székely frontier regiments begins upon the order of General Buccow, commander-in-chief of Transylvania. By the *autumn* Székely resistance becomes general.

1764, 7 January: The imperial troops slaughter many hundred Székelys who protested against enlistment into the frontier guard. *8 October:* The unrest induces Maria Theresa to regulate the legal status of the frontier guard.

1765, 2 November: Maria Theresa declares Transylvania to be a grand duchy.

1769, 11 November: Certain points: the extent of *robot* is set as a first attempt to regulate the feudal conditions.

1781, 16 May: Norma Regia: Joseph II places every aspect of education in Transylvania under the Gubernium.

1782, 27 May: Joseph II unites the Hungarian and the Transylvanian Court Chancellery. The first lending library is opened at Szeben.

1783, 16 July: Joseph II's decree on the rights of serfs. *26 November:* New administrative divisions: ten counties (eleven from 1784); the organization of the Three Nations is abolished. *At the end of the year* the first Transylvanian newspaper, the Saxon *Siebenbürger Zeitung* is published.

1784, 11 May: Joseph II's decree on languages: up to 1790 the Gubernium would issue its orders in two languages. *27 August:* The complete abolition of tax barriers between Transylvania and Hungary. *31 October:* Romanian peasant

revolt under the leadership of Horea and Cloşca. *7–11 December:* The imperial army defeats the peasants in two battles.

1785, 1 August: Joseph II's decree restoring the free movement of serfs. Decree on schools.

1786: According to the first comprehensive census the population of Transylvania is 1,560,000. *30 November:* Law courts are set up in the new administrative districts.

1787: The introduction of the imperial Criminal Code in Transylvania. The representatives of the Estates of the Three Nations present their memoranda containing their grievances to Joseph II.

1790: The Gubernium moves from Nagyszeben to Kolozsvár.

1791, 25 February: Leopold II again separates the Hungarian Court Chancellery from the Transylvanian in Vienna. *11 March:* The Romanian bishops present the document entitled *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* to the emperor, asking for the acknowledgement of Romanians as the Fourth Nation.

1792, 21 August: After two years of negotiations the Transylvanian Diet passes the bills on the relationship between king and Diet, and on safeguarding the rights of the Estates. The founding of a permanent theatrical company in Kolozsvár.

1796, 16 May: Royal decree on treating the Greek Orthodox religion as an acknowledged denomination.

From 1797: The University Press of Buda prints textbooks and books of common interest in Romanian as well.

1798: Count Sámuel Teleki opens his library at Marosvásárhely to the public.

1819, 17 May: Emperor Francis I orders the regulation of *robot* in Transylvania.

1821, 21 March: The first permanent Hungarian theatre opens in Kolozsvár (Hungarian National Players' Company).

1832: János Bolyai's *Appendix*, the first non-Euclidean geometry is published in Marosvásárhely.

1834, 24 May – 1835, 6 February: The first reform Diet in Transylvania.

1835, 4 March: The treason trial of Count Miklós Wesselényi begins at the Royal Court of Appeal.

1836, 2 May: The monarch gives his royal assent to the bill of the Hungarian Diet on the annexation of the Partium to Hungary (implementation is delayed until 1848).

1847, 31 October: The king gives his royal assent to the bill of the Hungarian Diet on the introduction of Hungarian as the official language and on the regulation of the *robot*.

1848, 20 March: The Transylvanian Hungarian Liberals and Conservatives join the revolution of Pest by a declaration of programme: they demand civic reforms and union with Hungary. *11 April:* Royal consent to the legislations of the Pozsony Diet, including the one on the union with Hungary. *15 May:* Romanian rally at Balázsfalva, demanding political representation, civic rights and the acknowledgement of Romanians as a nation. *30 May – 18 July:* The last Diet of the Transylvanian Estates declares the union of Transylvania and Hungary and the liberation of serfs. *16 September:* Romanian national rally at Balázsfalva: it refutes the union and calls the Romanians to take to arms. *Early October:* Commander-in-chief Puchner concentrates the imperial troops on Saxon territory, thus making it the base of counter-revolution. *16 October:* The national meeting of the armed Székelys at Agyagfalva stands for the defence of the revolution. *18 October:* Commander-in-chief Puchner takes over supreme authority in Transylvania in the name of the emperor. *17 November:* Puchner occupies Kolozsvár. *29 November:* Kossuth appoints Jozef Bem commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army in Transylvania. *2 December:* After

the abdication of Ferdinand V Francis Joseph I accedes to the throne. *22 December:* Bem reoccupies Kolozsvár.

1849, 13 January: Bem liberates Marosvásárhely. *24 January:* Puchner asks for military aid from the Russian armies of occupation stationed in Wallachia. *4 February:* Puchner and the Russians win a battle against Bem at Vízakna. *9 February:* Bem defeats the imperial troops near Piski. *4 March:* The imposed imperial constitution of Olmütz again declares Transylvania to be an "independent" crown colony. *11 March:* Bem occupies Nagyszeben. *15–20 March:* The imperial and Russian armies retreat to Wallachia. *14 April:* The Declaration of Independece pronounces the complete state sovereignty of Hungary united with Transylvania and deposes the House of Habsburg. *5 May:* Upon Kossuth's appointment Ioan Dragoş begins peace negotiations with Avram Iancu, the leader of the Romanian rebels in the Érchegység. As the fightings flare up anew, the attempt at an agreement fails. *11 May:* Despite the amnesty announced by Bem, a political leader of the Saxons, Pastor Stephan Ludwig Roth is sentenced to death and executed. *28 May:* Negotiations begin between Kossuth and the Wallachian politician, Nicolae Bălcescu. *19 June:* The tsarist troops, invited to help by Francis Joseph, arrive in Transylvania. *14 July:* Kossuth and Bălcescu work out their plan for a reconciliation. *28 July:* A law on regulating the position of Hungary's non-Hungarian peoples is passed in Szeged. *30 July:* Bem is defeated in a battle at Segesvár. *6 August:* Bem suffers a decisive defeat from the Russians at Nagycsür, his Transylvanian army falls apart. *13 August:* The main Hungarian army lays down its arms at Világos. *October:* General Baron Haynau's decree on interim administration: Transylvania and the Partium are again detached from Hungary and divided into six "districts".

Part Five — From the Empire to Civic Hungary

1849, 20 October: Introduction of the land tax register and of the temporary land tax.

1850, 1 October: Development of the organizations of police, of the judiciary and of financial administration.

1851, 12 May: According to the new territorial division of administration, Transylvania consists of 5 districts and 35 areas. *July:* Anti-Habsburg movement in the Székelyföld. *4 July:* Introduction of a new juridical organization.

1852, 27 October: State offices replace the Saxon offices.

1853, 19 January: Transformation of the administration of Transylvania, regulation of the relations between the governorship and the governing organs in Vienna. *10 February:* Introduction of the Austrian system of customs. *20 April:* Transylvania is linked to the telegraph network.

1854, 10 March: Execution of the leaders of the secret movement in the Székelyföld. *21 June:* Imperial message on the detailed implementation of the liberation of serfs. *30 November:* The state of siege is withdrawn.

1857, 15 November: The Szeged–Temesvár railway line is opened. *17 November:* The courts of *robot* are set up.

1858, 25 October: The Szolnok–Arad railway line is opened.

1859, 29 March: Military agreement between the ex-general Klapka, representing the Hungarian emigration, and the Romanian prince, Alexandru Ion Cuza (renewed on 8 January, 1861). *23 November:* Founding session of the Erdélyi Múzeum Egylet (Transylvanian Museum Association) in Kolozsvár.

1860, 20 October: The *October Diploma* orders the renewal of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery at the court. *10 December:* Count Imre Mikó is appointed to head the Gubernium set up anew.

1861, 13–16 January: Romanian meeting in Nagyszeben. *11–12 February:* Conference of Hungarian, Romanian and Saxon representatives in Gyulafehérvár on the preparation of a Diet. *26 February:* The February Patent orders Transylvania to send 26 representatives to the 343-member *Reichsrat* of Vienna. *23 April:* Abolition of the governorship located in Nagyszeben. *6 September:* The constitution of the Romanian Association of Public Culture, the ASTRA is approved. *November:* With the resignation of Chancellor Ferenc Kemény and Governor Imre Mikó, the period of the provisional government begins in Transylvania as well.

1862, 18 May: Lajos Kossuth publishes his plan of the Danube Confederation of the "old historic states".

1863, 15 July: Opening of the Diet of Nagyszeben, where no Hungarian representatives participate. The Romanian Greek Orthodox church is made equal, Hungarian, German and Romanian are declared to be the official languages of Transylvania.

1865, 19 November: Opening of the Kolozsvár Diet (Hungarians are in majority). Resolution on the renewal of the union of Transylvania and Hungary.

1866, 10 January: The monarch permits Transylvania to send representatives to the Pest Diet.

1867, 29 May: The Hungarian House of Representatives passes Law XII of 1867, which reintroduces the union of Transylvania beyond the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.

1868, 15 May: The Romanian declaration of Balázsfalva *(Pronunciamentum)* stands an autonomous Transylvania. *5–6 December:* Royal consent to the law on popular schools (which also declares education in the mother tongue), Law XLIII of 1868 providing for the detailed regulation of the union with Transylvania, and Law XLIV of 1868 on the equality of national minorities. *22 December:* The Arad–Gyulafehérvár railway line is opened.

1869, 7–8 March: The meeting of Romanians at Szerdahely declares passivity in Parliament and the establishment of the Transylvanian Romanian National Party.

1872, 11 May: The Saxon National Programme accepts the system of dualism, provided it does not promote centralism. *12 October:* The University of Kolozsvár is founded. The Albina Bank (Romanian) of Nagyszeben is set up.

1873: The last major epidemic of cholera on the territory of the Hungarian state. *1 June:* The Segesvár–Kolozsvár railway line is opened. (Thus the construction of the Eastern Railway is completed.)

1876, 2 April: Law XII of 1876 eliminates the administrative separation of the Királyföld. *19 June:* Law XXXIII of 1876 merges the Saxon and Székely seats into the system of counties. *22 October:* The Saxon Popular Party is established.

1878, 20 May: The Temesvár–Orsova railway line is opened.

1879, 22 May: Law XVIII of 1879 introduces Hungarian language as a subject to be taught in each popular school.

1880: 119 steam-powered and 1224 other threshers operate in Transylvania.

1881: Founding of the united Romanian National Party.

1882: Establishment of the Carpați Society in Bucharest with the objective of giving cultural and political support to the Transylvanian Romanians.

1883, 23 May: Law XXX of 1883 (Law on secondary schools) confirms Hungarian language as a compulsory subject in secondary schools. — Romania joins the Triple Alliance.

1884, 26 April: The radical Romanian daily, the *Tribuna* is published from Nagyszeben. — Electric lights in Temesvár. — The first modern blast-furnace in Vajdahunyad.

1885, 12 April: The Magyar Cultural Association of Transylvania (EMKE) is formed in Kolozsvár.

1889: Beginnings of the regulation of the Lower Danube and the Iron Gate.

1890, 17 June: The *Sachsentag* of Nagyszeben accepts dualism and the idea of a "unitary Hungarian nation-state"; the Saxon representatives join the governing party.

1891, 24 January: The *Liga Culturală*, fighting for intellectual unity of all Romanians, is founded in Bucharest. *8 May:* The Kolozsvár organization of the Social Democratic Party is established.

1892, 28 May: The delegates of the Transylvanian Romanians present their *Memorandum*, containing their grievances, to the monarch in Vienna.

1894, 7–25 May: Trial of the propagators and authors of the *Memorandum* in Kolozsvár.

1895, 10 August: Budapest congress of the representatives of the national movements of Serbians, Slovaks and Romanians living in Hungary.

1898, 15 February: Law IV of 1898 states that every settlement can only have one official form of name.

1901: The first permanent movie in Brassó.

1904, 24 April: The gendarme shoot at the demonstrating peasants at Élesd in Bihar county.

1905, 10 January: The Nagyszeben conference of the Romanian National Party decides for the renewal of parliamentary activity. *5–6 December:* First congress of the Romanian section of Social Democrats at Lugos.

1907, 2 June: Law XXVII of 1907 ("Lex Apponyi") extends state control and the teaching of Hungarian language at village and church schools.

1909: The car factory starts production at Arad.

1910, 1–10 June: The parties of nationalities suffer a major defeat at the parliamentary elections. — During the course of the year negotiations begin between the leaders of the Romanian national movement and the government politicians.

1912, March: The party paper *Românul*, founded in 1911, merges with the daily *Tribuna* published at Arad.

1913, January and autumn: Renewed negotiations between Count István Tisza (prime minister since 10 June, 1913) and the Romanian politicians.

1914, 17 February: Tisza's offers are rejected by the Romanian National Committee, the negotiations break off. *28 July:* The monarchy declares war on Serbia in the wake of the Sarajevo attempt. *3 August:* Romania's declaration of neutrality. *14 October:* Russian troops temporarily occupy Máramarossziget.

1916, 17 August: The secret pact of the Entente and Romania, signed in Bucharest, promises practically the entire region east of the Tisza River to Romania. *27 August:* Romania declares war on the monarchy, its troops cross the state border beyond the Carpathians. *September:* The Romanian troops reach the Brassó–Petrozsény–Turnu Severin line. *Late September – October:* The troops of the Central Powers squeeze out the Romanian army from Transylvania and occupy Bucharest on *6 December.*

1918, 7 May: The Central Powers and Romania sign the Peace of Bucharest. *30–31 October:* Victory of the revolution in Budapest. *31 October:* The Romanian National Council is formed by Social Democrats and National Party members in Budapest. *9 November:* The Romanian Council demands in an ultimatum the transfer of governing authority over the 26 eastern counties. *13 November:* The signing of an armistice convention in Belgrade: the Entente troops

may march up to the line of the Maros River. *13–14 November:* Unsuccessful talks in Arad between the Hungarian government and the representatives of the Romanian National Council. *21 November:* The Romanian army starts to march into Transylvania. *1–2 December:* The Gyulafehérvár mass rally of Transylvanian Romanians declares unity with Romania, promises rights to the "co-existing national minorities", elects the Grand National Council, and the so-called Governing Council is set up. *24 December:* The Romanian army marches into Kolozsvár.

1919, 22 January: The Romanian troops occupy the entire territory of historical Transylvania. *20 March:* The Vix Memorandum demands the handing over of the Szatmár–Arad line and its neighbourhood from the Hungarian government to the Romanians. The Károlyi government resigns and the Republic of Councils is proclaimed. *16 April:* Beginning of the offensive of the Romanian troops. *1 May:* The Romanian army reaches the Tisza River. *25 July:* The counter-offensive of the Hungarian Red Army soon collapses. *4 August:* The Romanian army marches into Budapest. *14–16 November:* The Romanian army withdraws to the region east of the Tisza upon the order of the Peace Conference. *9 December:* The Entente signs the treaty on the protection of national minorities with Romania.

1920, 10 April: The activities of the Transylvanian Romanian governing council are wound up. *4 June:* The Hungarian peace document is signed in the Trianon palace of Versailles: Transylvania proper and the eastern edge of the Great Hungarian Plain are transferred to Romania. *17–26 August:* The Parliament of Bucharest ratifies the Peace of Trianon. *23–28 October:* General strike, as a consequence of which the state of emergency is reintroduced.

Part Six — Transylvania since 1918

1921, 11 January: The government makes Romanian compulsory at the law courts. *5 June:* Foundation of the Hungarian People's Party in Bánffyhunyad, the beginnings of the political activity of Transylvanian Hungarians. *23 July:* Act on land reform: 212,803 Romanians, 45,628 Hungarians and 15,934 Germans are given land; the Hungarian churches lose 85 per cent of their landed property.

1922, 5 February: Leaders of the Hungarian public life decide upon participation in the parliamentary elections. *12 February:* The National Hungarian Party is formed in Kolozsvár. *15 October:* Ferdinand I is crowned king of Grand Romania in Gyulafehérvár. *28 December:* The National Hungarian Party is formed by the merger of parties organized earlier, with Baron Sámuel Jósika as its first chairman.

1923, 28 March: The new constitution enters into force. *25 September:* Decree on compulsory bilingual teaching in the schools maintained by the religious denominations. *23 October:* Averescu's People's Party and the Hungarian Party reach a pact at Csucsa.

1924, 1 January: A language exam in Romanian is compulsory for the officials of minorities. *26 July:* The stipulations of the law on popular schools strictly limit minority education.

1925, 22 December: The law on private education qualifies the schools run by the churches as private ones; five subjects have to be taught in Romanian.

1926, 17–20 February: The Hungarian Party co-operates with the Liberal Party at the local elections. *27 March:* Parliament passes the new law on elections. *21 April:* An election agreement between the Averescu-government and the Hun-

garian Party: the party acquires 15 seats for MPs and 12 seats for senators in the new Parliament. *10 June:* Romanian–French treaty on friendship and military co-operation. *16 September:* The Romanian–Italian treaty on friendship and co-operation is signed in Rome. *10 October:* The National Peasant Party is formed by the merger of the Transylvanian Romanian National Party and the Peasant Party of old Romania proper. *12 November:* New church constitution of the Saxon Evangelical church.

1927, 7–9 May: The social democratic organizations of the different provinces are united in the national Social Democratic Party. *24 June:* Foundation of the Michael Archangel Legion, which later on becomes the well-known extreme rightist movement called Iron Guard. *20 July:* Death of King Ferdinand I; a council of regents exercises the rights of the ruler in the name of the minor Michael I.

1928, 6 May: The mass rally of Gyulafehérvár, organized by the National Peasant Party demonstrates against the liberal government. *10 November:* A National Peasant Party government is formed under I. Maniu. *12 December:* The governing party wins 78 per cent of the votes in the elections, the Hungarian Party becomes the second strongest party of Parliament.

1929, 2–5 April: The Temesvár congress of leftist trade unions; the authorities disperse the united trade unions. *20–22 March:* The alliance of the countries of the Little Entente is corroborated at the Belgrade conference. *5–9 August:* Miners' strike at Lupény. Its suppression demanded more than thirty victims.

1930, 4 April: End of the National Peasant Party government. N. Iorga's government of experts governs up to 6 June, 1932. *April:* Rudolf Brandsch is the secretary of state for minority affairs (up to 1932). *6 June:* Prince Carol, who resigned from his heirship in 1926, returns to the country and the Parliament acclaims him as king on *8 June.*

1932, 5 April: Foundation of the Kolozsvár Museum of Ethnography. *19 April:* The law on the conversion of agricultural debt reduces the burden of peasants struck by the Depression. *6 June:* A National Peasant Party government is again formed under the leadership of A. Vaida-Voevod.

1933, 8 January: The Ploughmen's Front of Petru Groza holds its statutory meeting. *1–5 October:* The last *Sachsentag* in Nagyszeben: the majority supports the so-called movement for renewal. *14 November:* A Liberal Party government is formed by I. G. Duca; the Liberals govern for four years. *30 December:* As the Iron Guard assassinated the prime minister, the government introduces a state of emergency and censorship all over the country.

1934, August: A leftist organization, called the Hungarian Workers National Association (MADOSZ), is formed.

1936, 27 March: With the regulation of the use of language in municipal, village and county councils, only Romanian can be spoken at the council meetings.

1937, 2–4 October: The Vásárhely Meeting of the Hungarian youth pledges itself for democracy, social justice and Hungarian-Romanian friendship. *20 December:* Defeat of the governing Liberal Party at the elections. The king appoints a right wing government headed by Octavian Goga.

1938, 10 February: Introduction of royal dictatorship. *27 February:* The new constitution enters into force. *30 March:* Dissolution of political parties. *4 August:* A Commission for Minority Affairs is set up. A resolution of the council of ministers ("Statute of Minorities") promises the fulfilment of the cultural and administrative demands of minorities.

1939, 11 February: The Hungarian People's Community under the chairmanship of Count Miklós Bánffy is set up in Kolozsvár, to provide cultural and socioeconomic representation for the Hungarians in Romania. *23 March:* Com-

prehensive German–Romanian economic agreement. *15 April:* England and France guarantee Romania's integrity. *16 December:* The only political party which is allowed to operate is the newly formed and official Front of National Revival.

1940, 26 June: Soviet ultimatum to Romania, under which Bessarabia and Southern Bukovina are annexed by the Soviet Union. *4 July:* A pro-German government is formed by I. Gigurtu. *16–24 August:* Unsuccessful Hungarian–Romanian talks about the Hungarian demands concerning Transylvania, in Turnu Severin. *30 August:* The Second Vienna Award: Northern Transylvania is returned to Hungary by the resolution of a German–Italian arbitration committee. Agreement with Germany on the rights of ethnic groups. *4 September:* Romania becomes a "national legionary state" under the leadership of General Ion Antonescu, with the participation of the Iron Guard in government. Michael I becomes king instead of his father, Carol II.

1941, 22 and 26 June: Romania and Hungary enter the war against the Soviet Union.

1944, 17 March: Secret negotiations begin between Romania and the Allied Powers in Cairo, where the demand and the possibility of returning Northern Transylvania to Romania is raised. *19 March:* Hungary is occupied by the German army. *May:* The Jews of Northern Transylvania are deported. *14 June:* The court and the opposition reach a secret agreement on organizing the exit of Romania from the war. *23 August:* Decisive turn in Romania: Antonescu and his government are detained, war is declared on Germany on *24 August.* *5 September:* German–Hungarian attack (against Southern Transylvania), which soon collapses. *12 September:* Romania and the Allies sign an armistice agreement in Moscow; the Soviet and Romanian troops march into Northern Transylvania. *11 October:* Kolozsvár is occupied, and the whole of Northern Transylvania is taken by *25 October.* Many Transylvanian Saxons run away with the German troops. *11 November:* The Allied Control Commission removes the new Romanian administration from Northern Transylvania, the local left wing organizes a civilian administration separate from the Soviet military one.

1945, 12 January: The Germans are deported to the Soviet Union to work on the reconstruction of the country. *6 March:* Petru Groza's coalition government is formed. *9 March:* Moscow consents to the transfer of the administration of Northern Transylvania to the Romanian public administration.

1947, 10 February: Peace treaty between Romania and the Allied Powers is signed in Paris; the Second Vienna Award is internationally annulled. *30 December:* Michael I is made to abdicate, Romania is declared a people's republic.

Index

Abbreviations and signs

→	see	k.	king
Ø	non-existent place	M	Macedonia
∩	integrated place	min.	minister
A	Austria	MO	Moldavia
archb.	archbishop	P	Poland
B	Belgium	pr.	prince
b.	bishop	prcess	princess
BG	Bulgaria	pr. min.	prime minister
BH	Bosnia-Herzegovina	R	Romania
BO	Bohemia	Rom.	Roman
Byz.	Byzantine	RU	Russia
c.	county	S	Serbia
chanc.	chancellor	SL	Slovakia
CR	Croatia	SLO	Slovenia
dyn.	dynasty	SP	Spain
emp.	emperor	SW	Switzerland
F	France	SWE	Sweden
G	Germany	T	Turkey
gov.	governor	Trans.	Transylvania, Transylvanian
GR	Greece		
H	Holland	U	Ukraina
Hung.	Hungarian	v.	voivode
I	Italy	vice-v.	vice-voivode

The *Index* contains the place-names in the form mentioned in the text. German and Romanian names are also given for the Hungarian place-names, when they exist. References used for the *Index* were the following: *Helységnévtár* (Official Gazetteer of Hungary), Budapest 1913; C. Suciu: *Dicţionar istoric al localitaţilor din Transilvania*, Bucharest 1967, and the work of E. Wagner: *Historisch-statistisches Ortsnamenbuch für Siebenbürgen*, Köln – Wien 1977. The *Index* does not contain names of rivers, mountains, passes, etc., furthermore, the name of Hungary as a historical land. Hungary and England are not referred to at the place-names. Places with identical or similar names are distinguished by indicating the names of present Hungarian counties or former counties in Hungary before 1918. The place-names in italics are non existing or not in use.

763

770

774

3030

6350

Tokaj

Beregszász, Berehovo

Husz

Nagyecsed

Nyirbátor

Szatmárnémeti, Satu Mare, Sathmar

Nagykároly, Carei, Karol

Erdőd, Ardud, Erdeed

Nagybán Baia M Frauenb

Debrecen, Debrecen

Tasnad, Tasnad, Trestendorf

Székelyhid, Sacueni

Szilagysomlyó, Şimleul Silvaniei

Zilah, Zalau, Zillenmarkt

Zsibó, Jibo

Szentjobb, Siniob

Szalacs, Sălacea

Mejgrád, Moigrad, Porolissum

Szolnok

Bihar, Biharea

Nagyvárad, Oradea, Großwardein

Mezőtelegd, Tileagd

Nagyszalonta, Salonta

Sebesvár, Bologa

Bánffyhunyad, Huedin

Kolozsv Cluj, Klausenburg, Nap

Gyula

Belényes, Beiuş

Gyalu, Gilău, Julmar

Borosjenő, Ineu

Dézna, Dezna

Szeged, Szegedin

Vilagos, Şiria

Arad

Topánfalva, Cîmpeni, Topersdorf

Verespatak, Rosia Montana, Goldbach

Abrudbánya, Abrud, Großschlatten

Csanad, Cenad, Tschanad

Nagyszentmiklós, Sinnicolau Mare, Großsanktnikolaus

Lippa, Lipova, Lippa

Zalatna, Zlatna, Kleinschlatten

Gyulafehérvár Alba Iulia Weißenburg/Karlsburg, Apulu

Törökbecse, Novi Bečej

Temesvár, Timişoara, Temeschwar

Facsad, Făget, Fatschet

Déva, Deva, Diemrich

Szászváros, Orăştie, Broos

Lugos, Lugoj, Lugosch

Vajdahunyad, Hunedoara, Eisenmarkt

Várhely, Grădiste, Bützöri, Sarmizegethusa

Hátszeg, Haţeg, Hotzing

Karánsebes, Caransebeş, Karansebesch

Petrozse Petrogani Petrosch

Resica, Reşiţa, Reschitza

Lupény, Lupeni, Schylwolfsbach

Nándorfehérvár/Belgrád, Beograd

Mihald/Mehádia, Mehadia

Orsova, Orşova, Orschowa

Szörényvár, Turnu Severin, Drobeta

Fou. Tisza

Prut. Prut

Máramarossziget.
Sighetul Marmatiei.
Siget

Felsöbánya.
Baia Sprie.
Mittelstadt

Succava

tea Chioarului

Oradna.
Rodna.
Rodnen

Näsröd.
Näsäud.
Nußdorf

Csicsóvár. Ciceu

Bistrita. Bistrita

Des.
Dej.
Desch

Nagy-Szamos

Szentbenedek.
Mánástirea

Beszterce. Bistrija. Bistritz

Szamosujvár.
Gherla. Neuschloß

Kerlès.
Chiraleș. Kirileis

Maros. Mare. Marosch

Szek. Sic. Seck

Bonchida.
Bontida.
Bruck

Apahida

Marosveca.
Brincovenesti.
Wetsch

Kolozs.
Cojocna.
Salzgrub

Szászrégen.
Reghin.
Sächsisch-Rëen

Gyorgyszentmiklos.
Gurghiu.
Görgen

Gyergyószentmiklós.
Gheorgheni.
Niklasmarkt

Bäko.
Bacäu

Marosszentanna.
Sintana de Mureș

Torda.
Turda.
Thorenburg. Potaissa

Marosvásárhely.
Tirgu Mures.
Neumarkt

Radnot.
Iernut. Radnuten

Eisenmarkt

Madéfalva. Siculeni

Marosujvár.
Ocna Mures

Csiksotalyó. Santulea

Csombord.
Ciumbrud

Csikszereda. Miercurea Ciuc. Szeklerburg

Kis-Küküllő

Szekelykeresztúr.
Cristuru Secuiesc.
Kreutz

Szekelyudvarhely. Odorhei Secuiesc. Oderhellen

Enszentmiklós.
Kloosdorf

Erzsebetváros.
Dumbráveni.
Elisabethstadt

Segesvar.
Sighisoara.
Schäßburg

Agyagfalva.
Lutija

Küküllővár.
Cetatea de Baltá.
Kokelburg

Balázsfalva.
Blaj. Blasendorf

Baráthely. Bratew. Breitau

Medgyes.
Medias.
Medwisch

Keresd. Criș. Kreisch

Bereck. Brejeu

Kezdivásárhely.
Tirgu Secuesc.
Szekler Neumarkt

al de Jos. Winzendorf
bes.

Nagysink. Cincu. Großschenk

Vizakna.
Ocna Sibiului.
Salzburg

Fogaras.
Fágáras.
Fogarasch

Földvár.
Feldioara.
Marienburg

Sepsiszentgyörgy. Sfintu Gheorghe. Sankt Georgen

Nagyszeben.
Sibiu.
Hermannstadt

Szászhermány.
Harman. Homgberg

Prázsmár. Prejmer. Tartlau

Orlat.
Orlat.
Winsberg

Porumbák.
Porumbacul.
Bornbach

Brassó. Brasov.
Kronstadt

Talmács.
Talmaciu.
Talmesch

Zernyest. Zárnesti. Zernescht

Törcsvár.
Bran.
Törzburg

Tirgovište

Ialomija

The history of Transylvania is a history of three nations who lived side by side for centuries. This region's past is important for each of them for a variety of reasons. There was a time when the principality was the last sanctuary of Hungarian political life and culture. The Romanians also see it as the cradle of their nation, where the first Romanian book was published, and Romanian national feeling was born. The Transylvanian Saxons lived here, as the eastern-most outpost of their people, a world totally different from their original one to which they contributed much, bringing a western life-style, and from which they learned much, shaping their own distinct culture.

The centuries-long coexistence resulted in both understanding and differen-ces. These differences have in part been solved by time, yet have in part become stronger, even turning to hatred. The most important corner stone of national consciousness is history: most of these differences are, whether real or imagined, of a historical context. Today, when the rights of individuals or communities, the securing of a future, have become key issues for the civilized world, a centuries-long coexistence like this and the historical tensions which accompany it certainly have a strange fascination that goes beyond the general teachings of history.

This is why Akadémiai Kiadó has decided to publish an abridged version of the original three-volume set *Erdély története* (History of Transylvania), which has also been previously published in French and German. We hope that the message of tolerance in this book will reach an even broader reading public.