


Peace Research for the 1990s

EDITED BY JUDIT BALÁZS AND HÅKAN WIBERG


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
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Introduction

The first years of the 1990s brought enormous changes for Europe. Formations believed to be stable or at least to have a long life ahead of them collapsed, alliances believed to be fraternal and indissoluble broke up and their enemy image evaporated. In the wake of all this Europe finds itself confronted with new challenges and new dangers.

The world has become militarily unipolar and Europe economically unipolar, but this has not made Europe a more secure region. The creation of a united Europe will remain an illusion for a long time to come; the East–West division still exists although in other forms than the recent decades of a military ideological version. The earlier bloc system that had kept Eastern-Central Europe together, the subordination of national interests to the interests of the alliance and above all those of the Soviet Union created an artificial cohesion. The underlying national and international interests were temporarily frozen only to erupt with renewed force later. Ethnic conflict, thought to be a thing of the past in Europe, has grown into several alarming civil wars, the escalation of which threatens the stability of the whole of Europe.

The division of Europe had earlier been organized more or less along ideological and economic borderlines and was reduced to the confrontation of alliance systems and East–West conflicts.

Today the factors threatening Europe and its security are far more complex and their unexpected emergence has found the region unprepared. Who would have thought that the process of democratization in practically all the former socialist countries would lead to the appearance and advance of extremist forces and that the economic transition would bring numerous pitfalls which paradoxically counteract democratization? Despite the successive disintegration of the federal systems, so far the armed conflicts have remained within the earlier borders although there is a real danger that with their escalation and the destabilizing processes they could shift to the international level, a danger which Europe must face. But it must also face the danger threatening it from outside the region since

the borders of the earlier East–West confrontation have shifted towards the East and the danger of a generalized Christian–Islamic confrontation unknown in the earlier period is beginning to emerge.

However, Europe's transformation from military domination by two superpowers to unipolarity in the economic field has not created a united Europe: the ideological confrontation has given way to countless contradictions arising from the uneven development of the former socialist countries and the rivalry among them, and it is doubtful whether this is being counterbalanced by the efforts to shape the new alliance systems.

The Western half of Europe is also divided by numerous processes and although European integration has reached a level which has had a homogenizing influence on the Western half of the region, the further force of cohesion inherent in the integration is waning and it is precisely along the line of its East–West policy that new fault lines could appear. The conflicts outside Europe or escalating in the Balkans have placed the trans-Atlantic contradictions affecting Europe in a new dimension.

In an environment fraught with such tension and crisis, the peace researchers have an especially great responsibility since they must identify and reveal previously unknown processes, the projection of which could provide a guide to their solution or reduction, or even to averting the consequences, thereby contributing to the processes of stabilization which could guarantee the security of our continent over the long term.

With its establishment, the European Peace Research Association has also set itself this ambitious goal. The present volume has been selected from the writings of peace researchers aimed at a complex examination of the problems, in many cases adopting an interdisciplinary approach. It covers the areas judged to be the most important and the most relevant for European development.

On behalf of EUPRA, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for publication of the volume, creating the possibility for the wide dissemination of the research findings and efforts associated with the work of the organization of European peace researchers.

Judit Balázs

European peace research in the 1990s

by

HÅKAN WIBERG

The European transformation since 1989 is preparing a third crisis — danger and opportunity — for European peace research. The future agenda of European peace research is envisioned to draw on three agendas. The Old Agenda consisted of causes of war and means of conflict resolution on the one hand, arms races, arms control and disarmament on the other hand. It has not lost its urgency; in particular, problems of conversion has been added to it. The New Agenda was about dominance, dependence and development; the main challenge to this agenda is in finding adequate theoretical models to understand the new situation of Eastern Europe and its relation to the West. The Post-New Agenda has the understanding of identities and nationalism as a main challenge, and will be related both to the Old Agenda and to the New Agenda.

How has the radical transformation of Europe since 1989 affected European peace research? How should it affect it?

The first question is difficult to answer right now because of the years it takes from the beginning of a serious research project until its results appear in book form. Very few research projects had a head start by working on the transformation even before it became dramatically visible; some research teams had just finished an old project in 1989 or 1990, and could therefore get straight into a new one. In the first years after 1989, however, most publications reported research planned and largely made before the transformation, sometimes referring to it in introductions or epilogue chapters.¹

In the 1990–1991 issues of the *Journal of Peace Research* (JPR), for example, references to the new situation were largely confined to “Focus On” articles. The main exception among the articles was one by Björn Hettne on “Security and Peace in Post-Cold War Europe” (1990, p. 3); on the other hand, the Focus On in the following issues (1990, p. 4) had the headline “Why Does the Cold War Continue in the Third World?”

It is therefore even more difficult to spot clear trends in peace research now than when Converse (1968) reviewed the first twelve years of the *Journal of Conflict*

Resolution or when I made my own attempt (Wiberg 1981) at distilling the first sixteen volumes of *JPR* into an article. The most recent picture of European peace research is given by what were the themes of the eight largest workshops at the First European Peace Research Conference in Firenze in November 1990: "Peace education"; "Center/Periphery, North/South relations and economic security"; "Concepts of security and peace"; "Conflict resolution in the Middle East"; "Identities in Europe"; "Military security and conversion"; "Eastern Europe"; and "Institutions: macro and micro perspectives". It should be read with caution: we do not know how representative the 140 peace researchers at the conference were of all their European colleagues. We may be heading for a new crisis in peace research in addition to the two major crises we have already had (Wiberg 1988), so let us shortly look back to improve the perspective of the future.

Crises in peace research

The first crisis period in peace research occurred in the years around 1970. The major confrontation was — in terms of topics — between the protagonists of the "old agenda" (causes of war, conflict resolution, peaceful systems, etc.) and those of the "new agenda" (imperialism, dominance and dependence, etc.). It turned out that there was no absolute contradiction: the agendas could not only peacefully coexist, but even be integrated with each other, e.g. in Wallensteen (1973) studying how the international economic pattern of dependence affected who got into war with whom. The peaceful coexistence was assisted by the departure from peace research of most of the minorities who insisted on making their own agenda or theoretical approach the only valid one in peace research, and the 1970s were a period when more and more topics and traditions found their way into peace research.

This brought peace research into a second crisis, which was less visible than the first one, acrimonious clashes at conferences and heated polemics in peace research publications being largely absent. To the extent it was verbally formulated, expressions tended to be more low-key, like the following sigh from Hylke Tromp (1981, p. xxvii):

"... peace research has become what a black hole is in astronomy. There seems to be no social problem which in the final analysis does not have its legitimate place within peace research, and therefore is absorbed by the definitional processes in peace research. Peace research nowadays ranges from food policy ... to communication theory ...; it focuses on peace education ... and at the same time on rural development in the Third World. Peace research encompasses simulation and gaming,

philosophy of science, nuclear physics and sometimes even international relations. Occasionally it has concentrated on attitude formation, attitude change and regularly on the study of public opinion. Peace research is in that sense a black hole which absorbs everything that comes into reach. But the negative side of this has become all too clear. As an institution, peace research has not been developed far enough to come to grips seriously with all the problems peace researchers recognize as their problems. The one solution is to go on with the institutionalization programme; the other one, to try to focus again on *priorities in research*."

In many peace research institutes, the past decade has indeed been one of priority-setting. There have also been quite pragmatic reasons for this. Even without a maximalist definition of peace research, the field is obviously so broad that no single person can cover more than a limited part of it with some degree of mastery; nor can any single institute. The price for achieving excellence in some areas by focusing on these was to give up the claim of being a "peace research institute" in the most general sense, ready to answer all questions. Focusing on some areas means throwing others out of the research programme of an institute. (Generalists are indispensable for peace research by keeping its ramifications together; but much of their work is to relate research produced by *others*.)

This fruitful development has strengthened many institutes both professionally and in terms of survival. Yet the problem looks different on the third level: there is no obvious similar reason for the entire peace research community to throw some areas out in order to strengthen others: Heaven forbid that all institutes make the same priorities! Peace research congresses will therefore continue to give the same impression of the tower of Babel as congresses in, say, sociology or political science. The way to cope with this lies in trying to develop some common core theory and in having generalists that can integrate the field across differences in topics, theoretical approaches for sub-areas and languages.

The third crisis is right now, especially in a Europe that has been radically transformed — in other parts of the world, the problems may to a sickening degree be the same as before — or even worse! This crisis has to do with one of the main original ambitions of peace research: to discover means of transcending the cold war (often myopically referred to as the "East-West conflict"). Does that leave us intellectually unemployed when this conflict has been called off? Can we use the theoretical instruments for analysing North-South conflicts in studying the new conflict patterns emerging in Europe, or must we develop new theory? What instruments do we have for understanding types of conflicts that are (with varying degrees of justification) seen as "ethnic"? Do we need a "post-new agenda"? Let me go through some main substantial areas to see where changes in research approaches may be called for.

Issues of disarmament and conversion

Immediately after the calling off of the cold war, many believed that this would give rise to a large "peace dividend" using for peaceful purposes. It was not that simple however. Security problems have neither disappeared in the more limited military sense, nor in the more embracing sense. Even if few have followed the Swedish decision in 1992 to *increase* its arms expenditures, the slashes in defence budgets are mostly relatively modest — and largely in the future tense.

There are several reasons for this. A defence budget has something like the inertia of an ocean liner. The lack of predictability in several respects has fostered a "wait and see" attitude in many governments — the benefit of doubt normally given to the military budget claims. Even if budgets *are* shrinking in the USA and the USSR, Thee (1991) argues that the elements of *future* growth are increasing: budgets for military research and development are growing, definitely in relative terms, perhaps even in absolute terms.

A classical argument against disarmament has been that it creates economic problems; it was first employed by Krupp a century ago (Manchester 1970, p. 255). It has also been a matter of theoretical controversy, and there used to be a funny symmetry here. Marxists argued that the USSR and its allies would have no problems because of their planned economies, whereas the anarchical capitalist economies would, while liberal theorists argued that flexible market systems would create no problems, but rigid command economies would. Neither theory was put to a concrete test, arms expenditures increasing virtually everywhere. The only tests possible were thus by means of applying econometric models to specific capitalist economies. The typical result was that some sectors and regions would indeed suffer in terms of incomes and employment — but others would gain so much more that the total effect on GNP or national employment would be positive.² That largely disposed of the Krupp argument on the *macro-level*; two waves of studies of the possibilities of conversion also tried to allay economic fears on the *micro-level* by looking at alternative uses of money, of R&D, of land and installations, of production facilities and even of military products.

Today disarmament is already legitimized and does take place to some extent; the demand for concrete models of conversion cannot keep pace. This is most clearly visible in parts of the former WTO, where the combination of economic reforms and crisis and drastically reduced defence orders put factory managers before the problem of simultaneously adapting to new production and to a market economy — with a market that in many respects does not yet exist and whose features are largely unknown. The first attempts at coping with this used the traditional methods of the command economy: directives from one of the defence production ministries to produce macaroni machines or bicycles rather than tanks or fighters. More radical changes were needed — and have gradually been

introduced — as the market reforms began to take effect. Exactly how to define and implement these changes poses an important research problem — and a very urgent practical problem, as has also been realized in the West (Rose–Roth 1992). The first empirical studies are just appearing on micro-level (Cronberg 1993) and on macro-level (Voronkov 1993).

Unwarranted optimism may also have the harmful effect of slackening the efforts for disarmament, arms control and confidence and security building measures. Indeed, we need more devotion to these areas: many things are now possible that appeared hopelessly unrealistic a few years ago — such as conversion — and they may become unrealistic again sooner than we think. *If* we get a new period of tensions and rearmament, the measures that are implemented now may come to have a ratchet effect against rapid acceleration of this spiral, just as most of the achievements of the Helsinki Final Act managed to survive and limit the Second Cold War, e.g., by insulating to some extent the relations between the two German states from the tension between the superpowers, thus paving the way for eventual unification.

Issues of war

A confrontation between the two blocs used to be seen as the primary risk of a war in Europe. The blocs also managed to keep — some kind of — peace among their own members: Greece and Turkey, Hungary and Romania. The predominant risks today appear to be of another kind, linked with the breaking up of states and empires, sometimes in several stages: the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh look to Yerevan for support when they refuse to become citizens of an independent Azerbaijan, just as the South Ossetians in Georgia and the Dniestr Russians in Moldova look to Moscow for support and the Krajina Serbs in Croatia or the Serbian majority areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Belgrade, to mention just the most visible examples of the “Shetland syndrome”.³

Interminable wars in Lebanon, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Angola, Myanmar, Kampuchea, Sudan, Irak, Iran, Turkey, Northern Ireland, India, Sri Lanka and many other places indicate that ethno-national wars inside state boundaries tend to be extremely bitter — and that external actors could normally do very little about them, the traditional international system not having much instruments available (Wiberg 1991). Prior to the end of the cold war, our century has had two cases only of completely peaceful secession of contiguous states (the record of the decolonization process is more mixed). One was the secession of Norway from the union with Sweden in 1905, the other that of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. In all other cases, the breaking up of states into new ones was an effect of a major war or the very object of a war; in the latter case, the attempted secessions failed in most cases (Wiberg 1983).

After the end of the cold war, several bi- or multiethnic states have broken up or are in a process of so doing: the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia and Somalia are merely the most well-known examples.

The record is now more mixed than before. The first round in the Soviet Union, making independent states of its republics, started with its recognition of the (restored) sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in autumn 1991, and quickly became complete, even if most of the other states opted to join the CIS. It was virtually entirely peaceful, which is not true for the second round. There are 180 potential conflict spots in the territory of the former USSR, 79 of them involving territorial claims. The CIS General Staff of Operative and Strategic Studies has recorded 24 military conflicts and 74 explosive situations within the CIS and near its borders in the past two years (Ivlev 1993).

From its very beginning, the fission of Yugoslavia was more similar to traditional secession processes, even if its complexity was far above normal. At least in Europe this series of wars probably defines the worst case come true, Yugoslavia in 1991 having the worst possible prognosis on several counts. No state in 20th century Europe had had as deep an economic crisis as Yugoslavia in the past decade, nor as great economic inequality between different regions, and the trade between its republics had been shrinking for a long time (Schierup 1990). No state in Europe included peoples with as deep historical traumas between each other, from World War II or much older, nor administrative boundaries that differed more from the national boundaries than in Yugoslavia, and the constitutional dispute that eventually triggered the war by declarations of independence dated back to even before the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 (Wiberg 1992, 1993). Yugoslavia was full of powder kegs, and the generation of politicians of all different nationalities that had managed to keep it together after its rebirth in 1945 had died or retired in the 1970s and 1980s. Their successors did not take their shoes off in the powder room; they smoked cigars there.

Of what is the series of wars in the former Yugoslavia an instance? What theoretical lenses are useful to understand them and how generalizable are they? Where do we have to look for possible solutions?

Balance of power

One set of lenses is offered by *traditional* balance-of-power theory, dealing with an anarchy with several actors of roughly equal standing, as analyzed by Kaplan (1957) and interestingly used by Ramet (1992) in her analysis of Yugoslavia before the explosion. The *bipolar* version of the theory is something else, assuming that blocs are ideologically based and that they are long-lasting. This is what Western

politicians and journalists have been trained in for decades; it has proved worse than useless in the Yugoslav case, blinding them to the nature of the conflict dynamics and shifting coalitions between Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in the north, between Serbs, Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc.⁴ While the traditional theory of anarchy and balance of power may provide a good diagnosis and prognosis, it has have less to offer in terms of therapy, except for the warning lamp that actors tend to prefer taking a crisis to passing up opportunities to augment their capabilities. This warning lamp is also visible in analyses of how neighbours and great powers have related themselves to these conflicts (Vukadinović 1992, Zametica 1992).

International law

The Yugoslav crises provide an instructive example of the limitations of traditional international law in such conflicts. From a purely *legal* perspective (at least by the traditionally predominant interpretation) the sovereignty of a state with no Non-Self-Governing Territories in it meant that it already *had* exercised its right to national self-determination (Hannum 1990, Ch. 3). This was the case with Yugoslavia; any legitimate right to interfere in its internal affairs must therefore either be derived from UN provisions concerning human rights and the UN machinery for handling such complaints, or from the CSCE provisions. While international law (with some specific exceptions, especially apartheid) neither prohibits, nor forbids, rebellion and secession,⁵ it does forbid actions from other states to support any armed actions against the legitimate government of a state. Once the Western great powers had decided to intervene in various ways, they therefore had to *change* international law and established diplomatic practice so as to transform the situation to make their individual or collective intervention legal. This was done by recognitions and by establishing new principles about boundaries of seceding units. The by-product of this was to make it clear to 5–6 million people (Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albanians in Serbia, especially Kosovo, and Macedonia), that if they did not want to get locked into states that they regarded as grave threats against their identity and security, they would have to fight. Only the Albanians opted for non-violent means (so far).

Another legal possibility was provided by the state of flux in the right to humanitarian intervention, first demonstrated in favour of the Kurds in northern Iraq. While the Security Council has authorized UN units in Bosnia-Herzegovina to use force if blocked in their humanitarian operations, the military commanders

there have systematically avoided that, presumably being more sensitive to the difficulties in combining different and contradictory roles.

Even so, the instruments attempted by the great powers have largely had to be based on the *state* paradigm, thus making Yugoslavia and Croatia hostages for the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina (who form a majority there together). While Belgrade and Zagreb must have considerable influence over their compatriots in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the developments have confirmed that that influence cannot reasonably be assumed to be sufficient to make them sacrifice what their leaderships see as their vital national interests.

National self-determination

In particular, the Yugoslav crises have highlighted the strong and dangerous confusion that surrounds the notion of "national self-determination". Once it became clear that Yugoslavia would, in fact, be divided and that one must therefore find a way of dividing the estate, the crucial issue was who had that right. Belgrade formulated two questions to Lord Carrington for the consideration of the Badinter commission: "Who can be the subject of the right to self-determination from the standpoint of international law — a nation or a federal unit; is the right to self-determination a subjective collective right or the right of a territory?" (Zametica 1992). The Badinter commission, however, avoided the issue and used another line of argument why the former administrative boundaries should divide the estate, thus "misplacing" some 5–6 million people in the sense indicated above.

Battles over the *legal* sense of the principle is one thing, however, and *political interpretations* very much another; in conflict dynamics it is mainly the latter that counts. When the effective leadership, however recruited, in a territory (especially when ethnically mixed) insists that it is entitled to have a sovereign state of its own and is willing to fight for it by all means, that normally means a high risk of war. By contrasting what has typically happened with ethno-national conflicts in postwar Western Europe with what has happened in parts of the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia (and many other places), we may tentatively define some qualifiers: violence is less likely if the conflicts take place where there is a high and increasing standard of living, a solidly rooted democratic tradition and a high degree of regional integration than if neither of these conditions are fulfilled. In Western Europe, there has only been minor exceptions from the general rule that these conflicts have been handled by mobilization, confrontation, elections and referenda, haggling, bargaining and compromising until reaching what everybody could live with — in short, the normal procedure of a democracy.

These qualifiers are very important, and the formulation above is only a first approximation. In a world where we have a couple of thousand nations and less

than 200 states, the great majority of which are multinational, we need to know much more about this. For example, the formulation above does not just mean that democratization is the solution: Paret nicely summarizes the dilemma defined by the researchers in this field by saying that on the one hand political pluralism tends to increase the tendency for a multinational state to break up — and on the other hand continued suppression of nationalism tends to make it even more explosive. The entire history of Yugoslavia seems to illustrate both points. We might add a third: the situation is particularly explosive when one nationalism, in this case the Croatian, is primarily based on the myth of the state and the other, here the Serbian, is primarily based on the myth of the nation. (This has prevented neither party from using the other myth too when it suits him.)

Some have argued that Yugoslavia was an “artificial” state by its multinationality; by that criterion, so are the overwhelming majority of states in our world. Even in Europe the list of almost ethnically homogeneous states is shorter than that of the others. Slovenia is the only former Yugoslav republic that would clearly qualify as “non-artificial” by a high coincidence between territory and nation. In all other cases we either find sizable groups from other nations in the territory, or sizable groups of the nation outside the territory, or both. In particular, if Yugoslavia was too “artificial” to be viable, the same is even more true about Bosnia-Herzegovina with some 40% Moslems, 32% Serbs, 18% Croats and 10% others (primarily “Yugoslavs”).

Peace research must get prepared to be able to offer more than now on various methods for conflict resolution in conflicts about “national self-determination”, both by studying the successful and unsuccessful cases and by widening our theoretical grasp of mechanisms of conflict resolution. “Multi-track diplomacy” (Diamond and McDonald 1991) connotes that this is far too important to leave to diplomats alone, no matter how indispensable they are in some respects. Among the promising approaches for bringing conflict parties together we find the seminars arranged by the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Kuzmanić and Truger 1992) and the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly (Palau and Kumar 1993), and the “conflict mitigation” approach of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Futures Studies in Lund (Henricson-Cullberg et al. 1991).

Traditional thinking often assumes that nations exist before the conflict. But nations are in many cases created or at least shaped by the conflict. In Yugoslavia, the role of religion has changed drastically in a few years. Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Moslems have frantically destroyed each other’s churches and mosques — which would have appeared unthinkable a few years ago. Religion has also largely decided who have won the propaganda war where: the Croats and Slovenes in the Catholic world (with its Protestant appendix), the Moslems (and Albanians) in the Islamic world, and the Serbs and Montenegrins in the Orthodox world.

This development is extremely ominous: it may herald the widening of the old and deep East/West cleavage in Europe, the Catholic/Orthodox boundary,⁶ as well as a deepening of the cleavage between Islam and Christianity. How can the role of religions as part of the solution outweigh that as part of the problem? The World Council of Churches is working on this; UNESCO convened a symposium on "The Contributions by Religion to a Culture of Peace" in Barcelona in April 1993; much more needs to be done.

Religion is but one focal point of identity in the creation and moulding of nations. Language is another, state traditions and historical perceptions a third, and territory a fourth. What combination of dimensions predominates in what population under what circumstances defines an important research issue; in particular, the Caucasus and Yugoslav conflicts have emphasized the need for an "early warning system": to what extent is it possible to identify what combinations of competing nationalisms are especially explosive?

Division of labour in the international mediation machinery

The Yugoslav crises have highlighted — and sometimes contributed to — the confusion concerning what is whose area of competence in the international system. Many bodies have been involved or approached by one or more of the parties: the CSCE, the EC, the WEU, NATO and the UN. When the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991 led to military confrontation, Austria found a way of involving the CSCE machinery: by calling for Yugoslavia to explain its "unusual military activities". Once Yugoslavia had done so, there was nothing more for the CSCE to do in that respect. Later on, however, it has suspended Yugoslavia from participation, and has developed a machinery for monitoring of human rights and minority protection; it appears to have played no further role in conflict resolution.

The EC first constructively tried to mediate between the republics in spring 1991, with promises of development aid as a carrot (tiny in comparison with the later destruction). Once the parties were at war, the EC offered a combination of good offices and truce observes. This worked out well in Slovenia, where the initial test of strength had convinced Yugoslavia of common interests in not making Slovenia a forced ally of Croatia. It failed in Croatia, in part because the EC increasingly combined its mediator role with a self-appointed role as arbitrator, increasingly seen by the Serbs as highly partial. They would ascribe that partiality to the EC being predominantly Catholic and Germany playing a leading role, whereas in EC's opinion the Serbs had themselves to blame for over-reacting when

the Croats broke the ceasefires or for breaking them themselves. When Yugoslavia declared in December 1991 that it no longer regarded the EC as a mediator, the EC attempted to appear as mediator between the Serb, Croat and Moslem leaderships in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with largely the same result: its self-appointed position as arbitrator made the local Serbs see it as increasingly partial, and when the EC put an end to the local negotiations by recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, the all-out war started on the same day. It may have been a contributing factor that that day was 6 April 1992, the fifty-first anniversary of Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia. Serbs would read the date as a signal, not believing that the ignorance of the EC decision makers could be that great. It probably was.

Until the German unilateral recognition of Croatia (and Slovenia) was followed by a breakdown of the fourteenth ceasefire, the involvement of the United Nations had been limited. The Security Council had decided an embargo on arms deliveries to all parties in former Yugoslavia, had supported the EC peace initiatives and had appointed a special representative of the Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, who could thus take over the mediation and create a package that actually led to a (largely) tenable cease-fire for a whole year, until the Croatian offensive on 22 January 1993. The UN, and in particular the Security Council, has then taken an increasingly active role, in particular after the outbreak of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, deciding on a series of economic and political sanctions against Yugoslavia and also occasionally criticising the behaviour of Croatia in Krajina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The London conference in August 1992 set up a new negotiation framework and confirmed that the UN had taken over the main role, even if there continued to be an EC fingerprint: Lord Carrington was replaced by David Owen as EC representative in tandem with Cyrus Vance.⁷ Negotiations continued in Geneva (and elsewhere); and the ensuing plan almost succeeded in spring 1993. The Moslems had grudgingly followed the Serbs and Croats in accepting a largely confederal constitution with several autonomous provinces, and later also in accepting a package on ceasefire, monitoring, etc. The plan got stuck on its third element, however: its map for the provinces, which largely favoured the Croats in comparison with the distribution of population before the war, both favoured and disfavoured the Moslems (less but better territory) and, at least in their own opinion, clearly disfavoured the Serbs by giving them less and worse territory than before the war. The Serbs rejected the map.

It is still too early to make any diagnosis — or *post mortem* — of the negotiations; the only thing that can be said with certainty is that negotiations *will* continue, or be taken up again. Every war ends, and few wars end with the total and unconditional capitulation of all parties but one.

The dynamics of mediation and negotiations

Some important issues of much more general scope have been identified by the developments. One of them concerns what roles it is possible for an external party — here the EC and later the UN — to play simultaneously. The normal role of a mediator is to find a solution that all parties can accept. The normal position of an arbitrator is to be accepted as such by all parties concerned and find a solution that he thinks is right. They may therefore be difficult to combine, but we know too little about the limits.

The more general issues concern the role of external parties in conflicts and when they do more good or more harm, respectively, in the search for conflict resolution. One aspect of this is what has been referred to as the mischievous motives of mediators. To what extent have the actions of the major powers been dictated by an internal power struggle among them and among competing intergovernmental organizations — WEU and NATO; UN, EC and CSCE; etc.? What effects have they had for the possibilities of conflict resolution in former Yugoslavia? One hypothesis is that the behaviour of the EC and later the Western alliance, in particular their signals on what they might do in case one or more parties proved recalcitrant, has improved the possibilities by creating converging expectations on what solutions might be possible. The opposite hypothesis is that they have worsened the possibilities for convergence by nourishing first Croatian illusion politics, Serbian paranoia politics and Slovenian *Realpolitik* in the north, then Moslem illusion politics, Serbian paranoia politics and Croatian *Realpolitik* in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We need to know more about the dynamics of external party intervention (Wiberg 1992).

The former Yugoslavia is by no means the only place where tenable ceasefires have been difficult to establish. Warring parties are unlikely to enter or keep them under two circumstances: when the war is going well (“why stop when victory is within reach?”), and when it is not (“better try to get more favourable negotiating positions first”). It is therefore difficult to find an equilibrium, especially when there are many and largely independent armed forces; in addition, it is rarely stable.

In particular, we need to know more about the interaction between negotiations and ceasefires. Negotiations tend to be easier when there is a ceasefire, but both the militarily stronger party and the weaker party tend to have the objections indicated above, and either party may also suspect a ceasefire line of becoming a quasi-permanent boundary (Kashmir, the Middle East, Cyprus, etc.). On the other hand, ceasefires are easier to establish when the parties concerned can see at least the outlines of an eventual solution or principles for it; ceasefire agreements may therefore call for a more comprehensive package to be included in. This “Vance logic” seems to be supported by the developments in Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina, whatever the practical difficulties in implementing it.

Recent literature (Zartman 1985, Haass 1990, Stedman 1991) has taken up a specific and potentially important aspect: when a conflict is "ripe" for mediation and how to recognize that situation. One point of departure is that mediation is not necessarily fruitful, and that it may even worsen a conflict if mis-timed. This is also something we need to know more about.

Issues of development

Yugoslavia was a European microcosm: virtually all boundaries in Europe have gone through it, with the late but not lamented bloc conflict as an exception. (In Yugoslavia, the disappearance of the bloc conflict was rather among the manifold causes of war; for it eliminated an important part of the *raison d'être* of Yugoslavia.)

In addition to the issues raised or reactualized by the Yugoslav conflicts reviewed above, emphasis must also be given to two aspects of the North/South dimension. On the one hand, nowhere in Europe were regional differences greater than in Yugoslavia. Like in Italy, the United Kingdom, etc., they were also increasing, in spite of attempts at equalization by development funds, and economy played a role in increasing the contradictions (Schierup 1990). There is no simple relation between economy and secessionism however. Some ethno-national movements argue that their region is poor because it is exploited by the Centre of the state; others argue that because they are richer, they have to leave so as not to be drained by the Centre and other parts of the state. The former Yugoslavia exemplified both types of nationalism. We need to know more about the interaction between economic and political integration *within* states and try to identify warning signals.

On the other hand, we have the economic relations *between* states and regions. In Europe, the "East-West" label overshadowed for a few decades the age-old center/periphery relations between Western and Eastern Europe. They are now very visible again, and there is much doubt as to whether there is sufficient statesmanship in Western Europe to overcome the worst threats deriving from them.

One of the basic problems derives from the different time scales of economic and political processes. The needs for economic rehabilitation of the "Eastern" economies are extremely great, and the Western assistance very small, with the exception of the enormous funds going into the Eastern parts of Germany; what other peoples have received per capita amounts to a few per cent of what the East Germans have had.

The problems are improved or worsened, according to what theory one believes in, by much of the Western aid and loan being conditioned on economic reforms in the recipient states. If the traditional centre/periphery thinking of Galtung and others is right, this will lock the recipient states into a pattern of dependence and actually widen the differences between the regions of Europe. If the neo-liberal theorists are right, then a period of rising unemployment, drastically falling GNP and standard of living, etc. will be the inescapable cure to create the opposite trends later.

The different time scales mean that governments, perhaps even the new democratic systems as such, have to survive the lean years while waiting for the fat years — if they come. Historical experiences shows that this may be very difficult, and that there is a distinct risk of collapse in many countries; when the hope of improvement recedes, the pipe dream of “strong men” solving the problems by simple solutions will gain in strength. Who these “strong men” will be, and whether they will carry ultra-right, ultra-left, ultra-nationalist or populist flags, will depend on local circumstances — and on the policies of Western Europe. To what extent is the West willing to open its markets for those products and services where the East can be competitive? How much is it ready to relax conditions that are politically dangerous, whether or not their economic rationale is well-founded? How much is it willing to put up in direct assistance? What are the best ways of using it? We are in a great hurry to find out how to avoid what may in the worst case be a transformed repetition of the development in the interwar period, when almost every democratic regime in the central and eastern parts of Europe foundered.

Conclusion: The peace research agenda

What conclusions can be drawn about the “post-new” agenda of European peace research? As I see it, it will include both the “old agenda” and the “new agenda”, with the obvious exception of the aspect of the former military/ideological blocs. It will need to give increased emphasis to a continued reconceptualization of security (Wæver et al. 1993). It will also include the areas of the conversion problematique within its competence, which will call for theoretical development. It will give greater focus to “Eastern” Europe, developing theoretical tools for studying a completely new type of societies, for which the term “post-Communist” is merely an empirical label. It will have to improve its ability to relate “ethnic” conflicts to much more complex formations without throwing the difficult analysis of identity out together with simplistic notions about what constitutes “ethnicity”. And it is likely to make new and brilliant extensions that my own crystal ball is not clear enough to let me see.

Notes

1. Wiberg et al. (1993), dealing with inadvertent nuclear war, is a good but frustrating example. It originated in a conference in summer 1990, the edited book manuscript was ready in summer 1991. The publishing process was then so slow that when it was to go to print in 1993, several articles dealing with disarmament treaties, nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, proliferation in different parts of the world, etc. had to go back to the authors once more for radical updating.
2. For recent overviews of the state of the art, see Chowdhury (1991), Gleditsch et al. (1988), Lindgren (1984), United Nations (1987, 1991), Wellmann (1988) and Wiberg (1989).
3. The Shetland Islands voted against Scottish devolution: if they were to be ruled from somewhere else, they preferred London to Edinburgh.
4. Even this is a simplification, there being

seven political leaderships and nineteen largely independent armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina only. It must also be added that there *are* journalists, such as Glenny (1992) that have grasped much of the complexities.

5. Slovenia and Croatia based themselves on the right for republics to secede stated in the Yugoslav constitution, but argued that the clause "provided that all republics agree" was not valid.
6. M. Kundera in only the most famous among many authors from Hungary, CSFR, Poland, the Baltic states, Croatia and Slovenia who have argued that "Europe ends here", trying to exclude the Orthodox Europe.
7. Whereas Cyrus Vance has an impressive record as mediator in the Middle East, Yugoslavia and elsewhere, the previous time when he worked together with David Owen as mediator, in Rhodesia in 1976–1977 is not in that record; it was only lord Carrington who succeeded in 1979.

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in peace research

Woman : Man = Peace : War? Peace theory, feminist theory and epistemological adequacy

by

JOHAN GALTUNG

This paper explores the relation between gender and direct violence, more specifically between male sexuality and male aggressiveness. The reasoning will partly be biological, but not biologicistic, meaning a discourse with independent variables chosen from one discipline only, *in casu* biology. To account for peace/violence as dependent variable a four-factor independent variable discourse will be used: *body* and *mind*, *structure* and *culture*, the first pair at the individual, the second pair more at the collective level. "Body" will be discussed here as female/male; "mind", as high/low empathy; "structure" as horizontal/vertical ("hierarchical" might also be used) and "culture" as contracting/expansionist. The general idea is that female/high empathy/horizontal/contracting disposes for peace; male/low empathy/vertical/expansionist for violence.

Of course, "it is not so simple as that!", and the studies of violence and peace are considerably more complex. But this is a discourse sufficient for the present paper. However, we also need a discourse for violence, making distinctions between direct violence intended to insult the basic needs of others (including nature), structural violence with such insults built into social and world structures as exploitation and repression, and cultural violence, aspects of culture (for instance in religion and language) legitimizing direct and structural violence.¹

1. Patriarchy as direct, structural, and cultural violence

Five variables can be combined in many ways, with ten bilateral, ten trilateral and four quadrilateral relations to explore, and on top of that the full use of all five. The quadrilateral combination of gender, structure, culture and violence, for instance, brings us straight to patriarchy as a social formation. Failure to see the reality of patriarchy in human society can perhaps best be explained as an example of cultural violence at work. Feminist theory has made important contributions to peace theory by pointing this out.² As any concept is best understood in terms of

its negation, the point should be made that the peaceful negation of patriarchy is not matriarchy, but parity, or gender equality; a horizontal structure relating the genders in partnership.³

Patriarchy is then seen as an institutionalization of male dominance in vertical structures, with very high correlations between position and gender, legitimized by the culture (e.g., in religion and language), often coming out as direct violence with males as subjects and females as objects. Patriarchy, like any other deeply violent social formation (such as criminal subcultures and military structures), combines direct, structural and cultural violence in a vicious triangle. The three forms reinforce each other in cycles starting from any corner. Direct violence, such as rape, intimidates and represses; structural violence institutionalizes; and cultural violence internalizes that relation, especially for the victims, the women, making the structure very durable.⁴

All this is done in countless ways, explored in feminist studies, mostly by women.⁵ Men should enter the field much more, especially exploring the male side of the equation.⁶

2. Direct violence is essentially a male phenomenon

To say that 95% of direct violence is committed by men is probably an understatement. This does not mean that women may not participate in criminal, even violent gangs, support warfare etc., only that the directly violent acts are committed by men. Correlations between gender and violence are not only very high but also seem to be space- and time-invariant. No evidence of "amazoness",⁷ ferocious and belligerent women, has been unearthed; probably a male myth like "women enjoy rape", a way of getting even with women on violence. But such correlations are too high to be seen; social scientists usually operate with more modest percentage differences.

There is massive male direct violence at all social levels; as criminal violence in the family and the society, and as political violence within and between societies. Recent Swedish statistics point to 1,400 cases of reported rape and 14,000 cases of violence inside families during one year, the real figures of course being much higher.⁸ For violent crimes ratios like 25:1 men to women have been standard in criminology; for sexual assault, including rape, higher. Political violence from above, state terrorism against citizens, seems to be almost a monopoly of men, whether committed by judges and torturists⁹ during the Spanish Inquisition from late 15th century, but with decreasing violence, or as police violence and torture today (routine in about 60 countries, occasional in 30 more). Political violence from below, however, makes more use of women, including couples in love engaged in terrorist activity.¹⁰ And combat, killing as soldiers is

almost completely a prerogative of males, both in giving and executing orders. Just as evident as the positive male predisposition for violent activity is the negative female predisposition, close to 0% of all violence.¹¹ But why?

Men have obvious vested interests in directing research away from that question; the findings are bound to reflect badly on man as male, not as species. Better study "human aggressiveness", hiding gender specificity by using "man" ambiguously.¹²

But women may also have reasons to shy away from the topic. Their problem is not rejection of facts, but finding acceptable explanations. Using the four factors above some explanations can be found in cultures with male culture high on aggressiveness and assertiveness, female culture on compassion and submissiveness; in structures, with males given more incentive and opportunity to be violent; and in the mind, with males lower on empathy, never having nursed nor prepared for nursing. Differential¹³ socialization, deeply rooted, but modifiable. The moment biology enters violence looks unmodifiable. Biologism is used as cultural violence against women, legitimizing male dominance through muscular strength and alleged female instability and withdrawal during menstruation and procreation cycles. Biologism against men could easily boomerang; and in addition, what do you do about it?

This would be a special case of the more general human inclination only to accept a problem the moment a solution is on the horizon, if not in practice, then on paper. A deep problem without a solution becomes unbearable, hence repress it, forget about it. That is probably the mechanism underlying the failure to take seriously this overwhelming correlation, and what is meant here by saying the correlation is simply "too high". The mechanism works both for men and for women, including researchers, but in different ways. Men accept biologism not wanting change; women not, wanting change. This paper tries to steer a middle course.

3. Male violence: the sexuality–violence interface

The general thesis to be explored is that part of the explanation for the male predominance in violence is found in the interface between male sexuality and male aggressiveness. This is certainly known to military planners. It was hardly by accident that U.S. (male) bomber pilots on the USS Kennedy watched porno videos before they went on their sorties to destroy military and civilian targets and kill soldiers and civilians (reported by Associated Press, but deleted by the censors as "too embarrassing"¹⁴). In war the rape of enemy women (in addition to easily available prostitutes) is part of the ritual. The condition for this is a ground war,

however; in an air war the target population is more at a distance. But there can be other approaches, as indicated. Why this linkage?

One theory would be sex as compensation for risk and sacrifice. No doubt there is something to this. But the point to be explored here would be the interfaces between sexuality and the job of the soldier, to kill and destroy.

Here are six hypotheses:

(1) *Male sexual orgasm and violence share much of the same physiology.* Imagine the physiological state of the male body measured over time, noting high adrenaline level, rapid pulse, perspiration, panting, uncontrolled vocalization and high blood pressure, leading to vision and hearing reduction. Over a period of days, weeks, or at least months chances are that a typical adult human male will pass through some orgasms and moments of anger. His physiological trajectories will run parallel given that they share much of the same physiology,¹⁵ lustful in one, fearful in the other. Corresponding singleminded states of mind may also not be that different.

(2) *Being neurological neighbours, triggering one may trigger off the other.* The physiological modes of orgasm and anger are mediated by impulses from the same centers of the sympathetic nervous system; calling for a model with "energy" (*élan vital*?) flowing from one to the other if some threshold is lowered. One example is torture, the torturers being male, the victims often female, and the torture of women usually directed against genital and breast areas.¹⁶ Rape would be another, whether conceived of as violent ways of obtaining sex, or sexual ways of committing violence.¹⁷ The carry-over comes easily once the threshold is lower, and the process is two-way. Producers of porno films know this, presenting neurological neighbours as visual neighbours. Money is made linking sex and violence, blocked in public for socio-cultural reasons, predominantly for male viewers in front of private video screens, adding liquor to lower the threshold. But there is also money to be made linking sex and love in socially legitimate movies etc., by far preferred by women.¹⁸

But this is by no means the only link. Sado-masochism¹⁹ is another way of combining sex and violence, inflicting pain and having pain inflicted, before, during and/or after orgasm. To dismiss it as perversion does not eliminate neurological links to sex.

Possibly more important is the linkage between torture and sex, with both torturer and victim experiencing sexual arousal, even without any explicitly sexual element in the torture. Boys and men are likely to have erections while reading about torture, or at least feelings that are not negative, even pleasant. Soldiers in combat are often reported to have erections, as are the hangmen and their "clients". All male roles!

(3) *Being neurological neighbours, repressing one may trigger off the other.* Given their common neurological basis, sexuality (S) and violence (V) might be like communicating vessels : $S + V = K$ (constant) as opposed to the preceding thesis ; S triggers V ; V triggers S in an escalatory spiral.

Wilhelm Reich explored the repression of sexuality in Nazi Germany and the use of males for extreme violence as SS, as guards in concentration camps, etc. This does not contradict the trigger hypothesis; just as "Not having eaten the whole day I was very hungry", does not contradict "The more I ate, the more hungry I became"; the triggering mechanism being activated at a higher level.

Sigmund Freud²⁰ linked socially unacceptable sexuality and violence to creativity (C) in an $S + C = K$ formula, repressed energy coming out as creativity through processes of sublimation. One such insight does not stand in the way of the other, noting that Reich and Freud were observing different social classes with $S + V + C = K$, but C blocked for the lower and V for the higher classes.

(4) *The testosterone curve for men coincides with military age.* If we assume a curve coming up through pre-puberty, tapering off after middle age we arrive at intervals like 12–65, corresponding to what was mobilized by Nazi Germany at the end of the Second World War. This may be seen as a triviality since there is a third factor: muscular strength. But not all military tasks are muscular. Rather, it probably has to do with the definition of a real man as capable of socially legitimate erection–ejaculation sequences, as opposed to the very young and the very old male. The useful male for violence is the sexually mature male; peaking sexually around 18–20, which is also peak military age.²¹

(5) *The estrogen curve for women is cyclical and more complex.* Women seem to be more aggressive in the sense of being outer-directed, brilliant, radiating, socially active and creative in the premenstruation phase, until ovulation; socio-biologically possibly a strategy to catch men for fertilization. Menstruation would signify that the strategy failed (that month), leading to a certain inner-directed dullness; to be activated again with the next cycle. Any military use of higher readiness for violent activity among women would, consequently, have to be tuned to the menstruation cycle, using pre-ovulation female aggressiveness. But the high point of potential for violent aggression on the monthly cycle of an average woman is far below the corresponding point in the life cycle of an average man. It should also be noted that with the advent of old age the predisposition for violence in the human male is considerably reduced, making the male more "human", like a male child, or at least a male infant. The use of steroids in sports competition is built on this linkage.²²

(6) *The monoamino oxidase (MAO) level differs between the sexes.* A low level of these enzymes predisposes for aggression. The level is low in 90% of males but increases with age, and it is low in 10% of females. The MAOs are responsible for the metabolic breakdown of amines, particularly the biogenic amines held to

be critical²³ components in the pathogenesis of various psychotic disorders. Low level of MAO means less ability to break down the biogenic amines, hence higher likelihood of certain psychotic disorders. Violence, then, could be seen as pre-psychotic or psychotic; a warning of a serious disorder underneath.

4. Some cultural and structural factors adding to the interface

There is no assumption that biology is ruling this ground alone. But other factors do not necessarily counteract the male biological predisposition toward violence; they may also pull the same way. And they also may not, to be explored later.

Starting with culture, and more particularly language, a very frequently used word in English, by men very much more than by women, is *fuck*. Among some U.S. males one may easily get the impression of a language reduced to one word only, used as verb, noun, adverb, adjective etc. The use of this word to denote sex in one form or the other is clear. But the sentence "my car got fucked up yesterday!" is also correct English, even if not clearly descriptive of any sexual activity, nor is the more imaginative "I had my car defucked", probably indicative of a successful visit to a garage. The point is obvious: neurological neighbours are covered by the same term, for both sexual and destructive activity. The same goes for the use of words for genitalia as abuse, the user's professed desire for sex notwithstanding. In this there is also the ambivalence toward sex, intense pursuit and intense rejection being neighbours in psychological space.

The phallus shape of missiles and bombs have been commented on *ad nauseam*, which makes it neither more nor less valid. But how about new bombs, smart bombs? One of their major functions during the Gulf war was to penetrate heavily fortified targets by entering a hole (a ventilation shaft, a door) often at night, entering and exploding, sometimes even with two smart bombs entering the same hole. Gang-rape in other words. Safe bet on pilot comment afterwards: "we gave them a good fuck, didn't we"?

Going from language to religion, another heavyweight in the general syndrome of cultural violence, one might ask: which of the three Christianities, orthodox, catholic, protestant, would tend to be the most violent? One guess would be Protestantism as *Christianity without Maria*, a trinity with two males, Father and Son, the Third being of doubtful, even dubious gender and Maria being reduced to birth mother. Defeminized Christianity, carrying the process from the Middle East origins of Christianity²⁴ even further, coinciding with the advent of "witch" processes.²⁵ Add to this the general difficulty Christianity has had with sexuality,

and we get linkages between sexuality and aggression that are not congenital but rooted in culture, in a dehumanization of women made easy by the absence of women from the occidental pantheon.

Turning to structure, but still close to religion: besides religion, how do human beings solve the problem of finite life? For women eternal life is guaranteed through the children, the offspring, particularly matrilineally. For men the answer is less obvious. Patrilineal, patrilocal, even patriarchic systems are partial answers, starting with giving children the father's family name. Beyond that there is competition, entering eternity through corrosion-proof fame, be that in arts or science, sports or entertainment, business or politics, or by military prowess. The latter has the advantage that lasting geopolitical changes often carry the names of battles and generals, at least so far. The most visible monuments around the world seem to be dedicated to the man of violence, on horseback. Hence one more reason for violence, fame obtained through structures of competition.²⁶ And each major city in the world seems to have some phallus-shaped monument (Nelson column, Place de la Concorde or the Eiffel Tower, the Lincoln Monument and so on).

Then there is the fourth independent factor, the mind. Assuming nursing and nurturing to be one way of creating and expanding human empathy, women do have a near monopoly position in some very basic physiological ways. Nevertheless, males as infants also benefit from mothering, from warmth and safety and concern, from having first priority. At some stage, however, probably very early, differences in nursing set in. Boys are treated more roughly, assuming they can take it, or with more care, assuming they are more valuable.

A general process of creating physical and emotional distance between mother and child male or female, starts with birth and ends with biological death. But before that it can safely be hypothesized that more distance is created to the male offspring, if for no other reason because the man will never be fully in the mother's role. A girl's life can be spun around the theme of high empathy from infant-hood to mother-hood to grandmother-hood. We do not have to assume that the boy is trained for more risk-taking, less consideration, even for violence, to postulate a lower level of empathy. All we have to assume is less training for motherhood. Both infants transit from the same warmth of the inside to the warmth of the outside of mother's body. But the girl is invited to stay, the boy to leave; this must have some deep effects.²⁷ The girl has an entrance ticket to that warmth: she is permitted socio-culturally to cry, to be cuddled and comforted. The boy is less in possession of that entrance ticket, and will probably tend to spend less time skin-to-skin with the mother, more time roaming around.²⁸

This skin-to-skin contact is probably of prime significance. Sexuality is a combination of genital and skin contact; the latter decreasing in significance with rear entry of the woman. If we now hypothesize that for men the genital contact is more important and for women the skin contact, then the frustration felt by women

when they are insufficiently caressed before and after *coitus*, and by men if women are mainly interested in the skin contact, can be better understood. In addition to that, the near-sexual nature of nursing a baby becomes more comprehensible as intense skin-to-skin contact. The proverbial Saturday morning in many families with the mother close to the children with skin-to-skin contact and the father close to the car with skin-to-metal contact illustrates how the man is deprived of rich experiences also based on the complex working of hormones.²⁹

A sense of rejection, sacrifice and envy in the young man can be compensated by notions of superiority as the chosen gender for production, not “only” reproduction. An envy for the womb in all senses, probably much deeper than any penis envy.³⁰ Maybe rapists, torturers and soldiers are punishing women? Maybe what they are doing is not an expression of the cry by Jesus, “My Father, my Father, why have you forsaken me?” (Matthew 27:46), but “My Mother, my Mother, why have you forsaken me?” Thus, (deep) psychological and biological mechanisms can reinforce each other.

5. Conclusion: what can we do about it?

That question is entirely legitimate and to the heart of peace studies, not to be postponed by the safe “we-have-to-do-more-research-first”. We shall never get final knowledge, least at all in a field as complicated as this. Whatever we do we are merely testing hypotheses in order to develop new hypotheses.

But hypotheses, like concepts, can only be understood if they come complete, with their negations. Only by better understanding the conditions under which an hypothesis is false can we understand the conditions for the hypothesis being true. And since we have been riding on four factors we should, in principle, have a number of approaches at our disposal.

First, there is the possibility of some kind of medication for males, an anti-testosterone drug for instance. The problem is that if *S(ex)* and *V(iolence)* are real neighbours, then suppressing one may also suppress the other, and few males would be willing to have the potential for violence reduced at the expense of reduction of sexual potency. What males would demand of that drug would be anti-*V* specificity. Men have been more than willing to administer medication to the female half of humanity in the form of biochemically based contraceptives, for their own pleasure, being less inclined to develop corresponding male contraception. Maybe the time has come for females to get even? With 38% of the parliamentarians in Sweden being women, the power configuration is approaching parity; with 83% it would be more similar to what males have enjoyed. But there are only 2% women on the boards of Swedish corporations; and Swedish ministries of defense and foreign affairs are still essentially boys' clubs.³¹

Second, there is the possibility of increasing the empathy level of males through a socialization pattern similar to that for women. From the point of view of reducing violence, parity between genders should not be obtained by raising girls like boys, nor by raising both to some in-between positions, but rather by raising boys like girls in this extremely important psychophysiological area. Doing so there should be considerable gains to be made in violence reduction, with the warning that the topology of the physiological space would still be relatively similar, possibly with a higher threshold. Some of this must also apply to females; female orgasm and anger not being that different, even if less single-peaked and violent.³²

Third, there is the possibility of prolonging the mother-son relation by women undertaking the task of humanizing males, on a one-to-one, many-to-one, one-to-many or many-to-many basis. Polygynic alternatives might be embraced with enthusiasm by males, noting its institutionalization in Islam, possibly partly for that reason, with four as the classical maximum.³³ This might lead to new patterns in male-female relations, some of them more similar to relations women have among themselves. This might break down the pattern of women having more close woman friends than men have men friends, men's closest friends also being women, but then their mistresses rather than their wives.³⁴

Fourth, rather than using the remaining two factors one at the time let us now look at the total configuration, drawing on the multi-factor discourse. Thus, imagine a highly vertical structure in a highly expansionist chosen gender-race-nation type country, and put on top of it a low empathy male, adequately stimulated with porno, maybe some alcohol/drugs and a combination of coffee and sweets (the ubiquitous "Danish" pastry).³⁵ We get a high violence potential, noting that pornography and alcohol/drugs may be for lower classes and coffee/pastries for the higher.

Then, put a woman low on empathy with other social classes and ethnic groups on top of that structure, imbued with the same culture, and we get a Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir or an Indira Gandhi. The gender factor is insufficient when isolated from the other three clusters of variables.

But then change the equation. Make the structure horizontal from early age on, as a stage for participation, solidarity, cooperation, and make the culture less exclusive, with steep Self-Other gradients, more inclusive, able to see Self in Other and Other in Self. Put into that a woman and she would probably feel, literally speaking, at home. Put into that structure a male and he might grow humanly to like it. His physiology would remain about the same. But thresholds, motivations, capabilities and opportunities would be drastically changed, or at least so we might assume. Result: reducing direct violence, to the great benefit of all, using the reduction of structural and cultural violence as some of the ways to bring that about.³⁶ On top of a male decision to yield to, and not to blame, his physiology.

And that leads us to a conclusion about epistemological adequacy. The point is simply the necessity of always doing feminist and peace studies within multi-factor discourses. Stick to one of the four factors alone, and not only the discourse, but also the theory and the possible practice will become very meager, even very dangerous, counterproductive. Rich discourses come, easily to such interdisciplinary new social sciences as women's studies and peace studies. Older sciences, take note. You have only your poor discourses to lose.

Notes and references

1. These concepts are defined in "Cultural Violence", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1990, pp. 291–305.
2. See, for instance, Betty A. Reardon, *Sexism and the War System*, New York, Teachers College Press, 1985; Hilikka Pietilä, "Patriarchy as a State of War", IPRA 25th Anniversary Conference July 1990; Birgit Brock-Utne, *Educating for Peace. A Feminist Perspective*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1985.
3. See Riane Eisler, *The Chalice and the Blade: Our History, Our Future*, San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1987. In this connection it should be pointed out that there is a weak distributional interpretation of "gender equality" as low or zero correlation between gender and any social status variable, and a strong relational definition as equitable interaction relations between the genders, at home, at work, in society at large. Parity aims at the stronger interpretation, beyond the "50%" and equal opportunity positions.
4. A pattern of direct violence that has become firmly institutionalized, like vendetta, gang warfare or female infanticide, could be referred to as ritualized, or institutionalized violence. That type of violence tends to be accepted socially as part of "human nature" or social reality. To take rape out of this category requires consciousness-building, mobilization and confrontation exactly the way this is done, particularly by U.S. feminists, hammering away layers of internalization and institutionalization to expose rape as direct violence, even as war between the genders. Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics*, New York, Ballantine, 1969, finds its place along with Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*.
5. I have found Marilyn French, *Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1985 particularly useful.
6. In Norway the work by Øivind Holter, building on Harriet Holter's work on gender roles, is very promising. In Germany the SPD parliamentary fraction (Renate Schmid, Gabriele Abild-Schindler, made an impressive contribution to the general goal of having men discuss more the situation of men in this connection.
7. *Encyclopedia Britannica* does not even spend a word on the subject.
8. Figures on the Swedish situation from speech by Margot Wallström, then cabinet minister for women's affairs, on Mansmässan, Göteborg, 21 May 1991.
9. For the Inquisition, see Cecil Roth, *The Spanish Inquisition*, New York — London, W.W. Norton; and Robert Held, *Inquisition—Inquisición: A Bilingual Guide to the exhibition of torture instruments from the Middle Ages to the Industrial Era presented in various European cities in 1983–92*, Firenze, no publisher or year indicated. All texts and pictures attribute the violent roles to men, with women frequently among the victims.
10. See Francesco Alberoni, *Innamoramento e amore*, Garzanti, 1979. The pattern of women in love committing acts of direct violence together with their lovers was found in the German RAF, the Italian Brigata Rossa and

- the Japanese *sekigun*. See Robin Morgan, *Demon Lover* about exactly this syndrome.
11. But the indirect contribution of women as Mittäterinnen should be emphasized. See, for instance, Batscheider, Lang, Petry, "Kriegerische Manner — Friedliche Frauen?", *Friedensforschung Aktuell*, No. 24, winter 1990. What is so shocking about the famous paintings by the 17th century florentine painter Artemisia Gentileschi is that she portrays the violent act itself with women killing men brutally, and dispassionately.
 12. Thus, Konrad Lorenz seems to have been a conservative extremist as described by one of his former assistants, Norbert Bischof, *Gescheiter als alle die Affen*, Hamburg, Rasch und Rohring, 1990. Lorenz always talked about "Mensch" when "Mann" would have been appropriate.
 13. As pointed out later in the text access to mother love in the concrete sense of skin contact comes in addition to raising the children differentially into stereotypical gender roles. If boys receive less of that love than girls, then they may also as fathers be less able to give it to their own children, reproducing the pattern diachronically.
 14. See *Village Voice*, 26 March 1991.
 15. I am indebted to Professor Herman Tennesen for this insight.
 16. Robert Held, *Inquisition*, Part 5, "On Women and Torture" makes this point very clear, particularly by analyzing the torture instruments.
 17. Or both, the discourses do not exclude each other.
 18. But instead of seeing these differences as shaped by social role-playing as children and adults, the perspective in this paper tends more toward seeing it as caused by early experiences in the mother-father-daughter-son quadrangle with the women learning more to associate sex (= skin contact) with love (physical, mental, spiritual intimacy) and men more to associate sex (= genital contact) with exploration, penetration, maybe also violence.
 19. Marquis de Sade became particularly notorious not only through his flagrant maltreatment of a young prostitute, Rose Keller, but also through his legitimation of the sex-violence linkage through his writings, with such titles as *Les crimes de l'amour*. The Austrian novelist Leopold von Sacher-Masoch was also a man.
 20. The theory of sublimation can be understood as a general theory about the displacement of instinctual energies to non-instinctual spheres of activity, seeking to explain the evolution of "higher functions" from lower ones; *Penguin Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*, article on sublimation.
 21. And, of course, peak age for a related phenomenon, competitive physical sports.
 22. Sports women may try to become pregnant ahead of major sports competitions, make use of the hormone effect in early pregnancy, and then abort afterwards; reportedly practiced by some in the former DDR where abortion was easily obtainable.
 23. See *Penguin Medical Dictionary*, article on monoamino oxidase.
 24. For one analysis of the preeminence of goddesses in the Near and Middle East, see Toni Liversage, *Den Store Gudinde*, Kopenhagen, Gyldendal 1990.
 25. See Gunnar Heinsøhn and Otto Steiger, *Die Vernichtung der weisen Frauen*, Hemsbach, Marz, 1985 on the natalist background for the "witch processes".
 26. There is something strange about the military profession as career opportunity. Where other professions offer a relatively steady opportunity to prove oneself the military profession implies very many years of waiting for that sudden opportunity, the war. Of course the war is embraced with enthusiasm as the chance to enact the skills, as if an author were only given access to paper once or twice a lifetime. *Village Voice*, 26 March 1991, reports the enthusiasm among Desert Shield military in the Gulf area when Desert Storm was declared.
 27. Carol Gilligan in her famous *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Womens's*

- Development*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982, points out how women tend to see ethical problems in terms of care and direct consequences for those concerned; men in terms of abstract principles. Another way of putting it might be as follows. Women see the alternative to direct violence in direct care and love. Men, afraid of their own violent inclinations (and those of other men) try to engage themselves in social hierarchies with strict control, giving those on the top monopoly on (commanding) violence; and/or in verbal hierarchies of commandments, commands and general norms, produced in theology and law. In other words, they try to build themselves into structural and cultural violence in order to escape from direct violence and its alternative, direct care.
28. Thus, the grown-up girl would be more inclined to link sex to love and the grown-up boy more inclined to link it to exploration, conquest, maybe even violence.
 29. See Anthony Walsh, "The Biological Relationship Between Sex and Love", *Free Inquiry*, Summer 1991, pp. 20–24 about the role of the endorphine hormones in connection with sex in the genital contact and skin contact varieties.
 30. Freud-bashing in connection with the penis envy has already a long tradition. It should be pointed out that what is suggested here is not womb-envy, but womb/mother-longing and the mother double advantage of women: enjoying mother closeness longer, and being able to recreate it through their own motherhood.
 31. For the inclusion of women in most ministries and their exclusion in the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, see Karin Lindgren, *Participation of Women in Decision-Making for Peace*, New York and Vienna, United Nations, 1989.
 32. Adding this to the skin-to-skin contact and the endorphins would already tend to make female sexuality more holistic, as opposed to genital, single-peaked male sexuality. It should be pointed out that this tradition is also Occidental, a Chinese alternative for males being described in great detail in Jolan Chang, *The Tao of Love and Sex*, New York, Dutton, 1977.
 33. But on the condition that all four are equally much loved by the man; a condition perhaps not so easily fulfilled.
 34. Getting stuck in emotional problems they cannot solve in the marriage and not having a tradition of intimacy with men, the only alternative is woman-friends, among them mistresses.
 35. See Warshawsky, Titkin and Engle, *It All Adds Up*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1983, particularly chapter 9, for an analysis of the synergistic effect of coffee and sugar. The expression "Danish pastry", by the way, for those sugary things served in the U.S., is an insult to the reputation of Denmark.
 36. Just like the three types of violence reinforce each other in a vicious cycle they may also undo each other in a virtuous cycle.

Peace research after the Cold War: An essay on the micro/macro dimension of security issues

by

JAAP DE WILDE

It is erroneous to assume that peace research was a product of the Cold War. Yet, political sciences, including peace research, can be held responsible for not being able to cope with the end of the Cold War. The shortcomings may in part be explained by the dominance of state-centric thinking in political science. The interstate level of analysis is mistaken for either the macro-dimension of world politics or an intermediary level between the micro- and macro-dimensions. States are too diverse to be treated as equals in empirical terms. In a historical perspective states are not stable enough to function as collecting-boxes for empirical data. Due to the incongruence among the units of the state-system and the practice to collect data in a state-centric way, the study of IR produces a distorted image of social issues that are crucial for security policies.

The 20th century is characterized by two contrasting worlds. On the one hand people are aware that we are living in a *world society*. We do know more about events at the other side of the globe than people in the early Middle Ages knew about events in their neighbour countries. There is a global interdependence in social-political, military, economic and ecological affairs, and a growing number of people is getting aware of that. Since the seventies, this image of a "global village" has obtained a legitimate place within the debate about the nature of international relations.

But we also live in the era of individualism, the ego-era. This can be recognized in the human rights declaration and, of course, in democratic principles — the right to vote and to be elected. Human rights issues and democracy illustrate the acceptance of societal pluralism in its most extreme form: the individual human being as the prime actor. This perspective has obtained a legitimate place within the IR-debates, too.

"Somewhere" in-between these micro- and macro-realities of world politics a third reality exists: that of the global state-system. Typical for this system of nation-states is a distinction between internal and external affairs.

Given this distinction, it seems reasonable to use the state-system as an intermediary level of analysis, linking the micro- and macro-dimensions. The

state-system seems both to bridge and to separate these dimensions: sovereignty marks the division between domestic and foreign affairs; governments then try to translate domestic interests into foreign policy and global interests into domestic policy, thus bridging the worlds they first divided. By defining the state-system as the intermediary link, the micro-dimension of politics is equated with domestic affairs, and the macro-dimension with interstate relations.

This equation, however, gives a distorted image of the issues relevant for conceptualizing peace and security issues. In this chapter it is argued that the failure of peace research, and political science in general, to predict or even to explain the end of the Cold War is related to the failure to understand the interplay between the micro- and macro-dimensions of world politics.

The alleged end of peace research

In 1989, there was a strong controversy in the Netherlands as to whether peace research should be buried together with the Cold War (De Wilde 1991b). Similar debates can probably be found in other countries (Nobel 1991). Proponents of the burial either point at the failure of East–West specialists to foresee the end of the Cold War, or they point out that contemporary peace research was a product of the Cold War and thus has had its time. Critics of the burial, including the present author, reject the first argument because of its simplicity and the second because it is wrong.

To start with this second point: Peace Research as a science started in the interwar period (thus not during the Cold War) and even had some predecessors in the 19th century. (The works of Quincy Wright, Lewis Richardson and Sorokin are still worth reading, like those of Jan de Bloch and Norman Angell.) In the same period the study of International Relations (IR) was institutionalized. It is striking that these early IR-institutions were characterized by a normative orientation similar to contemporary peace research. There was, to use the words of the Dutch pioneer in peace research, Bert Röling, a “pre-scientific commitment to peace”. This means that the organized use of violence, with warfare as its extreme, in principle is valued negatively: the use of force is seen as a failure of diplomacy, and not, as was the case until the First World War, as the crown on diplomacy.

This pre-scientific commitment does not imply a pacifistic posture and an *a priori* condemnation of military action or of the armed resistance against such action. Nor does it release the peace researcher from the duty to keep a sober attitude towards his or her subject. The importance of the choice for peace primarily, if not solely, concerns the composition of the research agenda. In the interwar period, the First World War motivated the scientific search for the causes of war and the conditions of peace. The scope and character of this war was

unprecedented and unforeseen. Nowadays one can read in the history books that the Balkans were the powder keg of Europe, but at that time this still had to be discovered. The global dimension of its explosion surprised almost everyone. Here, war presented itself as a misunderstanding and a misjudgment; a crisis that ran out of control. Better knowledge of the causes of war could help to reduce or prevent future misjudgments. This became the purpose of the study of IR — at that time synonymous with peace research.

But not all violence rests on misunderstandings and tragedies. Military action has been part of politics for ages, and still is for every country with an army. Governments are still devising strategies and policies to determine where, how fast and by what means military troops can be used to restore or keep the order or to protect the “national security interests”. In this context the “*pre-scientific choice for peace*” does not so much imply a search for more accurate insights in the dynamics of violence as a search for concrete alternative diplomatic instruments by which the same goals can be achieved and for the structural conditions under which the use of military means is no longer a rational option. Welfare theories, interdependence theories, regime theories, civilization theories, theories on structural violence, integration theories, theories about functionalism and some deterrence theories aim at the latter: how to define the social conditions in which the rational arguments for using organized violence are marginalized? Theories on social or civil defence, non-provocative defence, embargo policies, economic warfare, silent diplomacy, conference diplomacy, etc. aim at the first: the enrichment of the instruments of power politics in order to make option of violence more complicated. Both forms of peace research aim at contributing to the “demilitarization of politics”; internationally focused on diplomacy, nationally focused on the maintenance of order.

The revival of peace research in the early sixties has to be explained primarily in terms of concern about the first type of war: by misjudgment. The first mainspring was the nuclear bomb. Hiroshima and Nagasaki had given some idea about the effects of these weapons, though even these experiences were quite meaningless in face of the quantitative growth of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in countries like the Netherlands, leaflets from the governmental Civil Defence Agencies advised people to shelter behind the staircase in case of a nuclear alert. Together with the East–West conflict (before the Cuban crisis no one could be sure that it would remain a “cold” war) this public lack of knowledge and ignorance was alarming. The information gap had to be filled.

The second mainspring of contemporary peace research was similar to the one in the interwar period: the experience of a world war and the explicit wish “never again”.

Though the East–West conflict from the outset dominated contemporary peace research, peace research is not its product. Instead it is a product of the nuclear age,

and, in a broader historical context, of the globalization of organized violence. Though many wars are still local in scale, this is no longer so by definition. The times in which warfare was by nature a marginal social phenomenon are over. In the words of Rölöf (1981, p. 7): "Striving for peace no longer is an activity exclusively for 'people of good will', but has become an imperative for anyone with a sound mind." Since 1914–1918 we can be aware of that.

Prisoner of state-centric approaches

Because peace research is not exclusively a product of the Cold War, it is far too simple to connect its institutional fate to the fate of this institutionalized tragedy. Peace researchers did, however, concentrate a lot of their energy in the analysis of the Cold War. Therefore, the argument that they should be blamed because of their collective failure to really understand this war is more serious. Indeed, criticism is at its place; but it would be quite narrowminded to restrict this criticism to peace research only.

The unforeseen end of the Cold War raises some serious questions about all political sciences. The end of the Cold War apparently led to a change of parameters in world politics. The statist world map has changed geographically and also in its power configurations. New changes have announced themselves, varying between a disintegrated Yugoslavia and an integrated Western Europe. Given the present scientific practice, this has far-reaching consequences: almost all statistics are based on the statist map of the world. People look for data in nation-states because they think that that is where to find them, and they explain politics by what they have found. The result is a self-confirming circle.

Whether one is talking about Gross National Products, unemployment rates, balances of power, illiteracy rates, human rights violations or a comparison of international sports achievements of teams and individuals, the data are reflecting sovereign states and the international state system. Patterns of outcome change each time state borders are disrupted. Since the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the undecided status of the EC, etc., many facts and figures refer to a non-existing political world order.

The parameters of research have changed. Yet, considered in a historical context, these changes are not that dramatic at all (compared to events like the Russian Revolution of 1917, the many Balkan wars, both World Wars, the decolonization process, etc.).

An important question is therefore whether alternative methods for data-gathering about micro- and macro-political developments can be found. Methods that are less one-sidedly based on the juridically defined international state system (with sovereignty rights as the juridical criterion); methods that are sometimes

based on the behaviour of individuals, sometimes on developments in regions, and sometimes focus on a global context; methods which are sometimes issue-specific, sometimes based on a geo-political context. Most importantly, we strongly need a theory to specify the "sometimes".

The quest for alternatives is not altogether new (in development studies, for instance, there is an almost traditional search for useful indicators of welfare other than GNP per capita), but because of the relative stability of the state system since the decolonization, under conditions of the hegemonial bipolarity of the USA and the USSR, this problem received only marginal attention. The end of bipolarity and the shifts on the statist world map affects virtually all social disciplines. The political sciences are not equipped to deal with structural changes in the international state system, neither methodologically, nor theoretically. Theory and method are too much part of the state system.

Scientists studying East-West relations did not escape this pitfall. It is illuminating that none of them seriously considered the possibility that the Cold War could be ended; let alone that the Soviet Union would give the starting signal. There were two extreme positions, but neither of them took this possibility into account. The one extreme was taken by those who claimed that the East-West conflict could be "civilized". The work of Dieter Senghaas (1988) illustrates this. But even in their scenarios the required steps had to be taken and were expected to be taken by the West. The other extreme position was the expectation that the Eastern bloc would collapse economically, whether or not as a result of the arms race with the USA. The adherents of this variant did not foresee either that members of the party system, which was considered to be rotten to the core, would take the lead in the attempts to reform the system. The relatively non-violent implosion of the Eastern bloc in 1989 surprised everybody. The astonishment about Gorbachev was overwhelming, especially when he appeared not to be a temporary outsider but a moderate representative of a broad reform movement.

If one feels the urge to blame peace researchers and other East-West specialists, one can say — with hindsight! — that they have concentrated their attention too one-sidedly on the (dis)armament aspects of the East-West conflict. They restricted their search for alternatives to options for detente or slow convergence. Even despite the good contacts with dissidents, scientists, party members and governmental officials one was not able to really understand the internal dynamics of the East-European societies, the Soviet Union in particular. Apparently, president Ronald Reagan was not the only one who arrived at the amazing conclusion that an "evil empire" could produce something "good". In all realistic scenarios about the future of the Soviet Union and the security in Europe, the pyramidal domestic social structure was considered to be a constant — it turned out to be a variable.

A good illustration is the debate in the eighties about economic relations with the East. That debate focussed exclusively on the question *whether* economic

cooperation with the East would be good or bad for European security, whether a COCOM regime was needed, and that type of questions. The question how to cooperate with the East, once the moment was there, simply was not asked, even less systematically analyzed. At the time when this question became urgent, the East–West specialists could only improvise, or point out in general terms the risks of increasing, or failing to increase, the economic interlinkages.

In short, *insofar* as peace research is synonymous with “the study of the East–West conflict”, it shares the malaise provoked by the end of the Cold War: the peaceful disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the German unification, the revolts in Eastern Europe, the partial democratization, the decolonization of the Soviet Union, the revival of nationalism, the collapse of the planned economies under the pressure of free market forces, the rising criminality, the massive mobilization of the people, the coup and its failure — the average scientist observed it all and described it, but did not really understand it. Science was thrown back to the level of journalism: description instead of explanation; intuition instead of analysis. The fact that this characterized the Western (scientific) world in general may make it less severe; but collective failure remains a failure. One of the conclusions should therefore be that state-centric approaches in which domestic developments are defined as exogenous factors prevent accurate knowledge of world politics. Obviously, this conclusion also affects the analyses of Western states: here too social forces, trends and movements develop in directions which may differ greatly from the image one gets from looking at the surface of the state only. Examples are given by the neglect of inner city “wars”; the neglect of police records in security studies; the turmoil about the referenda in Denmark, Ireland and France on the Treaty of Maastricht (showing that Eurocrats and national governments had lost touch with the domestic factor; the neglect of organized crime, etc.).

Obscuring the peace research agenda

The practice of accepting state-centric data as the main points of reference is not restricted to typically state-centric theories (mostly referred to the term Political Realism). Also in transnationally oriented and structuralist theories, nation-states are the implicit or explicit points of reference. A lot has been written on the discrepancy between the reality of the state-system and the reality of the world society, yet most authors continue to use state-centric points of reference. Both in the literature that highlights the validity of state sovereignty and in the literature that questions its validity, the central focus is on the state. That is, on the issue to what extent the state-borders that are laid down by international law coincide with

the borders of economic, military, political, social, cultural and communicative activities — or to what extent national governments (“sovereignty-bound actors”, as Rosenau 1990 calls them) can control activities that run across state borders.

In this context, the debate on security issues is about the question within which borders societies can be effectively protected against external threats: which extension of scales is needed?

The thinking of East–West blocs is a typical example of “stretching” the state-centric logic because of growing constructional interdependence (that is, the perceived necessity to cooperate — De Wilde 1991a, pp. 24–25): loyalty within the alliance appeared to be a prerequisite for “national” security. An interesting result of this interdependence was that international conflicts *within* the alliance had to be resolved peacefully. A complete demilitarization of diplomatic relations, except for Greece and Turkey, took place.

In the studies of the Club of Rome, the Brandt Commission, the Brundtland Commission, the World Watch Institute, etc. the state-centric logic is stretched even further: there are global challenges (disarmament, sustainable development, environmental preservation) which involve the “national interest” and therefore require collective, cooperative action. The main theoretical debate embodied in this literature concerns the question how to overcome the imperfections of the state-system. States, however, remain the point of reference for the analysis of these macro-political problems.

Less account is given of the opposite process: the increasing value of the micro-dimension of politics. Growing interdependence among social groups or national societies does not only enlarge the scale of social processes, but also stimulates an increased individualization within these groups and societies (De Wilde 1991a, ch. 8). The results are social crises and upheavals — examples range from South Africa to Yugoslavia and from religious fundamentalism in India and Egypt to riots in Los Angeles. Traditional structures for conflict management within the group or society are challenged. The need to adjust the existing order to changing social structures may provoke serious conflict.

Due to the globalizing aspects of growing interdependence, moreover, one cannot afford to neglect these “internal” or “local” security issues. Yet, such neglect is exactly what happens because of state-centric thinking. It is illustrative that the US administration showed much more reluctance to protect the Kurds (internal issue) than to protect the people of Kuwait (international issue). In both instances the question remains to what extent it is wise to think globally and intervene locally in this way; theory does not tell us how the global and local dimension are related. One thing is clear, however. As long as states remain the units of research serious methodological inaccuracies will occur.

Social, economic and political data are collected or accumulated on national scales, but in research these accumulated facts are used as if the *ca.* 180 nations of

the world are equal entities. This makes conclusions about transnational networks, international elites, trade dependencies, etc., rather dubious. Obviously, China is not equal to Malawi, and Lesotho cannot be compared to Luxembourg, New Zealand or Chile. In empirical terms it is nonsense to treat states as equals. Europe and Africa are crowded with international relations, while at other continents these are completely absent. One of the results is an uneven regional representation of similar social problems.

This uneven treatment must have a negative impact on many conclusions derived from the "hard facts" of political science. Sometimes data are measured on continental scales (for example in the USA) and sometimes in terms of cities (for example in Singapore). Sometimes data are related to one billion people (China), sometimes to tens of thousands only (San Marino). Speaking in strictly empirical terms, the problem is that apples are compared with pears. In economic statistics completely incomparable countries are treated as equal entities with great ease. "Top-tens" are compiled about industrial, cultural, military and sports achievements of nation-states as if there were no differences. This practice, though understandable in terms of historical traditions, is rather unsatisfactory in terms of scientific criteria.

The differences in size of countries and populations cause an unbalanced awareness of social problems: the "international" relations on the European territory are automatically subjected to research, while the "internal" relations of huge countries, like for instance Brazil and China, are not. Only since the disintegration of the USSR and its successor, the Russian Federation do scientists stress the security risks inherent in this unstable complex of societal structures. It is of great relevance for theorizing about peace and war whether countries like the USA, India, Brazil, Germany, etc. are considered to be monolithic nation-states, regional state-systems or pluralistic parts of a world society. It certainly means a difference for the definition of security issues. One example: in April 1991, even before one shot was fired, the US State Department issued a warning not to travel to Yugoslavia: the US government could not guarantee the safety of its inhabitants abroad. But this concern appears to be quite selective. In 1992, about 25,000 Americans were killed by Americans in America, at home in their own country. The State Department did not warn the citizens to leave Washington, though the US government seems not to be very successful in guaranteeing security in that city (about 400 murders took place in 1990). Belfast is probably a safer place to be than Washington. Yet, Northern Ireland is present at many lists of conflicts and war, while Washington is not. In the 1980s, a baby born in Bangladesh had a higher life expectancy than one born in Harlem. The anarchy in parts of the USA is called "crime" — a domestic problem, neglected in studies on war and peace.

Apparently, the methods for defining security issues do not produce a balanced survey of political violence, stability, order and justice. What can be done?

Some clues

From the outset one of the main incentives of peace research has been the question why some wars remain local while others globalize. This is in fact a question about the relationship between micro- and macro-politics. But so far peace research has only recognized part of this problem. Studies on the causes of war focussed on either the micro- or the macro-factors.

Typical is Kenneth Waltz' famous book *Man, the State and War* (1954). Waltz presents the three main perspectives in theories on causes of war: the first image is that war is the product of human nature (the causes of war are within man); the second image is that war is the product of national societies (the causes of war are within the structure of separate states); the third image is that war is the product of the international state-system (the causes of war are within the anarchical state-system). Studies on the conditions of peace focus on the mirror image of this triad: educate man, civilize the state, organize the state-system. But there are hardly any theories about the interactions and interlinkages among these micro- and macro-dimensions.

James Rosenau (1990) gives a consistent attempt to operationalize world politics along these lines, but generally IR-scholars fall back upon hunches and intuition when they change from one set of explanations to another. A revision of the level-of-analysis debate is needed.

A second step would be to compile a detailed survey of the distorted image state-centric data of the issues that are important for peace and security policies. In addition, indicators, categories and methods of analysis should be developed which are independent of political structures, yet inform us about the security risks within these structures.

The implications for peace research are expected to be serious: it is of no use to focus only or mainly on the defense efforts of governments. The real security agenda is only marginally formed by the problems of interstate warfare: looking at figures of political violence, people have more to fear from their own governments than from governments of other countries. According to data collected by PIOOM (an Interdisciplinary Project for the Study for Root Causes of Human Rights Violations), in 1991 there were only two "traditional" interstate wars (India/Pakistan and Iraq/Kuwait) as against more than thirty "domestic" political conflicts, in each of which over a thousand people were killed (Jongman 1992).

But even these figures may be misleading. It might be more appropriate to define security agendas in relation to the direct environment in which actors have to function. These environments are not necessarily geographical in nature, but related to the specific social activities the actors are involved in. The direct environment of the e.g. businessmen includes all stock-exchange markets around the world, while it may exclude the suburbs of the city they live in. Monetary

stability is more important for this group of actors than social security. Extreme nationalists will bother more about the security of their compatriots abroad than about the safety of foreigners at home. In other words, it is difficult to define micro-macro environments in geopolitical or in state-centric terms, and it might be more promising to define them in functional and issue-specific terms.

The paradox that the 20th century is characterized both by an increased collectivization and globalization of politics (the "global village" image) and by an increased individualization (the human rights image) means that we are beyond the nation-state both at the macro and at the micro dimension of politics. Still, the international state-system is a reality as well, and the nation-state remains a central subject of research. This centrality, however, makes it necessary to develop theories which are independent from the state and the state-system. Why an apple falls is not explained by a theory about apples but by a theory about gravitation.

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Transformations in Eastern Europe: The lessons for peace research

by

WOJCIECH KOSTECKI

The rise of the peace research movement is connected with the consequences of World War II and the Cold War. Since then peace research has grown into a multi-dimensional and intellectually diversified field of inquiry. Its three main stages of development can be summed up in the following mottoes: 1. against direct violence, 2. against structural violence, 3. against oppression of the individual. The knowledge accumulated by the peace research community makes it well-equipped to respond to the transformations in Eastern Europe. But these also have many implications for peace research. First, the 1989 changes and subsequent events dealt a definite blow to the bipolar pattern of world forces. Second, there is an opportunity now to concentrate on strategies for building peace through international cooperation. Third, the very concept of a relationship between structural violence and direct violence is beginning to assume a new content. Fourth, the recent developments confirmed that peace is a dynamic pattern of various social processes; some of them can lead to new conflicts and threats. Fifth, it is still rational and necessary to maintain and increase the research into conditions of peace and origins of war.

Over the past decades the Cold War carried a threat of total nuclear disaster, coercion of whole nations, social injustice on an international scale, oppression and disrespect for human dignity. Throughout the years these phenomena have been in the focus of peace researchers who analyzed them to produce theories explaining mechanisms of violence and drew up strategies for a more peaceful and safer world. Today the world agrees — and hopes — that the Cold War belongs to the history. Its demise begun in mid-1989 with the first non-communist government coming to power in Poland, followed by the "Autumn of Nations" sweeping over Eastern Europe and culminating in the collapse of the Soviet empire and finally the Soviet Union itself. These stunning developments have put on the agenda the relations between peace research and the events of the past years.

They are also useful for evaluation of outcomes and prospects for peace research. Why, what the social researchers actually have at hand is a rare real-life laboratory. In front of our eyes Europe is going through an unprecedented process

of peaceful — in most cases — transformations of political, economic and social structures. Putting it into peace research language: on vast areas of the continent the structural, indirect violence is eliminated largely without resort to direct violence or armed force.

The rise and development of peace research

It is rational and useful to look at the rise and development of peace research as a scientific discipline first. As one can expect it will provide us with the knowledge which is necessary in order to examine the relationship between peace research and the current reality of Eastern Europe and the continent as a whole.

There is a justifiable view among the researchers that the rise of the peace research movement (Wiberg 1988) is connected with the consequences of World War II and the Cold War. The drama of the former and the reality shaped by the latter: powerful atomic and hydrogen bombs along with long-range weapons delivery systems, problems of stabilizing the world economy, the war in Korea, the Cuban missile crisis, the German issue — all imbued peace with a new meaning. In view of possible mutual annihilation, war lost all sense — reasoned the peace researchers. Under such circumstances the tenet of an overriding importance of national interest, developed through so-called political realism, lost its previous validity. A new category appeared: the common interest of the entire international community. It is true that survival and development of that community is still fraught with myriad dangers, but it must be stressed that conflicts arise out of perceptions of the participants in international relations driving at divergent objectives. In order to eliminate conflicts from international life it is necessary to prevent misperception. Hence, it was claimed, there is a need for consistent, scientific reflection on communications between members of the international community, their behaviour in conflict situations, the process of rationalizing options and choices in foreign policy (Wallenstein 1988).

Such statements came especially from the socio-psychological analysis. The questions on the agenda were: What are the ways in which individuals relate themselves to the issues of war and peace? What are the effects of international cooperation and exchange that may have an impact on the relations between two nations and may reduce the likelihood that conflicts between them will take violent forms? At least four types of these effects were considered: an increased openness among key individuals in each nation, in their attitudes toward other nations; a reduction in the level of tensions between the two nations; an increased commitment to an international ideology; a development of a network of relationships cutting across national boundaries (Kelman 1965).

Generally, the first stage of peace research could get the motto: "*Against direct violence*". In the studies, which started at around the mid-fifties, peace was linked above all with elimination of violence caused by international war and large-scale conflicts from social relations. Research focussed primarily on the causes of war, dynamics of armaments, disarmament negotiations, security and conditions necessary for peace defined as the absence of war (Thee 1986).

In the late sixties peace researchers proceeded to the first summing up of their efforts. An invitation to discussion was made by the opinion that peace research so far was marred by a fundamental flaw. It was the absence of a generally accepted answer to the question about "what is peace?" (Galtung 1967). That doubt was extended by further suggestions that peace research should not focus on the "traditional" balance-of-power threats. The new situation in which the main axis of East-West international contradiction has become supplemented by an axis of contradiction between (the rich) North and (the poor) South has turned the attention of peace researchers also to the phenomena of social and economic violence, built into the international system (Schmid 1968).

The numerous statements of scientists which followed brought about the development and orderly conceptualization of "negative" and "positive" peace. Such differentiation seems banal now, but at the time became the object of many arguments. The most often quoted concept was to understand peace as a multi-stage process. Between the two extremes of "negative peace", meaning the elimination of war, and "positive peace" — international cooperation at every step —, there are several intermediate phases, described as ridding social relations of (direct) personal violence, and (indirect) structural violence: manifestations of injustice. The result of such a process is the improved addressing of human needs and development of human personality (Galtung 1975).

In effect, a shift took place in the peace research conducted in European countries. A major current surfaced, defined as "critical peace research". It quickly made inroads in Third World countries. The "critical" or "radical" research on peace focussed much on the macro-structural aspects of international relations, such as imperialism, inequalities of the international division of labor, asymmetries of interdependence, etc. It was noted that "traditional peace research" was subordinated to the values of stabilization, upholding the status quo in East-West relations and overfocussed on questions of resolving conflicts. "Critical" research is based on sociological analyses, attaching values to social phenomena from the point of view of their impact on individual and collective attitudes of aggressiveness (Kiss 1982). While for an affluent, developed society peace means the avoidance of nuclear conflict, protection of personal liberty, disarmament, preservation of higher living standards, for a poor developing society peace it is tantamount to eliminating social injustice and political instability, getting away from poverty and hunger (Chaudhri 1968).

So the second stage of peace research development obtained the motto: "*Against structural violence*". It was realized that structural violence not only reflects on the human condition but also gives rise to tensions leading to conflict and war. In effect, such questions were taken up as underdevelopment, domination and international forced dependence or social structures conducive to exploitation and inequalities. Social injustice on the international scale becomes one of the main research topics (Thee 1986).

The eighties opened with East–West tensions running high and gradually losing their thrust. The explosive growth of anti-nuclear, pacifist and ecological movements in the West and new forms of peace activity as well as independent political movements in the East took place. Social and political scientists took note of the phenomenon of mass scale, spontaneous civic protest movements. This led to another considerable extension of the field taken up by peace research.

This was true above all of the questions of human rights and protection of the individual. It was noted that human well-being has to become a key element of analysis of every pattern of social relations (Galtung 1980). Next came ecological questions on reconciling the need for developing civilization with the imperative of preserving the natural environment of man (Friberg and Hettne 1982), and the questions of harmony between culture and social structure, interconnection between "world peace" and a multitude of "small peaces" occurred inside different types of communities (Smoker 1981).

The interest of peace research extended to new theoretical and methodological issues relating to the supposedly clear distinctions: foreign policy vs. domestic policy, or negative peace vs. positive peace. Researchers eagerly took up questions connected with militarization of the economy and social awareness as one of the main obstacles to social progress on the international scale.

The third stage of peace research then had the motto: "*Against oppression of the individual*". Research focussed on restraints put on the freedom and the basic human rights on many levels: small groups, ethnic groups, the society at large, an international collectivity, man–nature relationship.

Thereby peace research grew into a multi-dimensional and intellectually diversified field of human inquiry as well as a very extensive one (Galtung 1985, Kostecki 1990, Wiberg 1981). This does not mean that the development of peace research as an autonomous discipline of science was free from substantial crises—in terms of topics, priorities in research, and the value of cognitive tools (Wiberg 1993). But the knowledge accumulated during the decades of studies and the advanced theoretical instruments make the peace research community well equipped to respond to the transformations in Eastern Europe.

Challenges for peace research

There are of course many challenges for peace research caused by changes in 1989 and subsequent events. Håkan Wiberg (1992a) noted that such a widespread tradition in peace research and specific to its domain as Center/Periphery theory (structuralism in Galtung's version) has not been seriously applied. At the same time the transformations in Eastern Europe affected or will affect various components of peace research — its theory of peace and peaceful change, methodology of research, etc.

The starting point for the discussion should be that — as Dieter Senghaas (1991, p. 18) expresses it

“With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the trend now being followed in the [former (W.K.)] Soviet Union, the original content of the conflict between East and West has evaporated: the East–West conflict is dead at its core”.

It means, *first* and foremost, that European development dealt a definite blow to the bipolar pattern of world forces — although it is true that the movement from a bipolar to a multipolar international system has been going on for years (Wiberg 1992a, p. 19). There is also one important exception: the socio-economic asymmetry between the Western and the Eastern part of the continent, which of course may be a powerful source of future conflicts in Europe. But in general a new multipolar pattern of international relations will eventually emerge. One of the consequences will probably be another form of competition — between forces of integration and fragmentation in the international environment. That means that peace research will have to encompass a much greater number of variables within the framework of its theory and analysis.

Let us look at one example: the idea of security complexes. The security complex theory — introduced by Barry Buzan (1983, 1991) and developed in a number of Copenhagen research group works (e.g. Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, Tromer and Wæver 1990, Wæver 1992a, Wæver, Lemaitre and Tromer 1989) — reflects a current patterning of global politics: the regionalization of security relations. It explains that security complexes are the natural patterns of security interdependences and eventually addresses the full range of analytical levels: the domestic security environment, the security complex itself, relations between particular security complexes, and great power complexes that constitute the system level.

Second, the old strategies for sparing the world a disastrous large-scale armed conflict between East and West — whether drafted or analyzed within the scope

of peace research — have now become rather outdated. These are the ideas of deterrence, nuclear-free zones, arms limitation, the concepts of peaceful coexistence, non-alignment, etc. (Chipman 1992). The peace research community has got an opportunity now to concentrate on strategies for building peace — through multilateral and comprehensive international cooperation. In effect more stress may have to be put on *positive peace* and the impact of international interdependence as a foundation of peaceful relations among the nations (Gaddis 1991, Senghaas 1990). The question of the authority of international law and respect for moral norms in international dealings should be analyzed more extensively as well as different techniques of conflict management. Special attention can be paid to the international organizations which provide the institutional environment for approaches on many peace-related issues. Without doubt, the issues of conversion will be a major topic of scientific debates and publications (Wiberg 1993).

Summing up this point, it should be stressed that one has to think not only about how to lower and diffuse tensions but also — and even more carefully — how to build thrust in international relations.

Third, the very concept of a relationship between structural violence and direct violence is beginning to assume a new content. It is true that transformations in Eastern Europe have set in motion democratic mechanisms in that part of the continent. At the same time they have “de-frosted” a great many conflicts, which had for dozens of years been kept under the lid. The one obvious example is the war in the former Yugoslavia, which — as Håkan Wiberg (1993) says — “*is a European microcosm: virtually all boundaries in Europe have gone through it*” (Catholic/Orthodox, Moslem/Christian, North/South). Other potential areas of conflicts are, for instance, the disputes related mainly to the question of national minorities, their identity, rights and duties; the disagreements between Bulgaria and Romania about Dobrudja, and Romania and Hungary about Transylvania; the issue of Macedonia giving rise to heated passions in Greece, not to mention different dramatic events on the territory of what used to be the Soviet Union. The transformations in Eastern Europe also keep arousing ever new tensions, particularly over economic matters which reflect the (still growing) gap between the needs and aspirations of the societies and the chances for their satisfaction.

The task for peace research is then to see whether and how democratic mechanisms can cope with these threats (Kostecki 1991). Or, putting it in other words, whether they could prevent the present peaceful revolution from boiling over into an armed struggle, and whether other countries of Europe might contribute to that effect. It was pointed out elsewhere that communism will, or rather may, be replaced — in what is only the worst case, I hope — “*by the cruder politics of nationalism and communalism, perhaps coupled in certain places with a quasi-Stalinist revival*” (Brown 1990, p. 116). So far peace research the question is and remains: how to establish and maintain peace both among the nations and within them.

Fourth, the end of the Cold War means that peace may no longer be seen as the necessity of preserving the status quo. A commonly felt fear of a "hot" war is no longer a guarantee of peace, nor is the notorious balance of power. The image of "enemy" has changed, although not completely disappeared. The recent developments have confirmed that peace is a dynamic pattern of various social processes (Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre 1993).

They will have to be controlled somehow but surely not by force or threats — rather on the basis of accords struck by every sovereign party concerned. Therefore peace research is facing a need of producing cognitive tools that will match the new substantial tasks.

Fifth and finally, it is rational and necessary to maintain and increase the research into conditions of peace and origins of wars. Paradoxically, the risk of conventional armed conflicts breaking out in Europe has become greater now that they may no longer grow into a nuclear war between the superpowers. Next, peace research was born as a response of the scientific community to the great concern for the fate of our world when individuals took control of forces that allowed them to decide about the lives of millions. Today when the idea of peace has become so broad and differentiated and when whole nations look with new hope to a better and safer future, the goal facing the peace research movement is to *maintain and enlarge the commitment of science to peace*. It is both its responsibility and fascinating challenge.

Last but not least, the breathtaking changes in Eastern Europe have proved that ideologies, systems and elites whose power seems to be so overwhelming and so entrenched may be relegated to the past overnight. This is a warning to the enemies of peace and an encouragement to its friends.

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II. Dissolution of the blocs: will there be a peace dividend?

by
BJØRN MØLLER

This article attempts to place "conversion" into context. One dimension of military to civilian production is merely one aspect of a process that might be described as "societal transition from a war to a peace mode". The various aspects of conversion in this broad sense are described. Firstly, "institutional conversion" in three different varieties: former demobilization, transformation and a lowering of the state of readiness; secondly, "translational conversion" from military to non-military forms of technology, namely "alliance conversion", which might culminate in the establishment of a collective security system. Subsequently the various aspects of conversion in the narrower sense are analyzed: material and human as well as economic conversion. Finally, it is pointed out that actual conversion is conflated with "conceptual conversion", i.e. replacement of the traditional security paradigm with broader conceptions of security.

Even though the end of the Cold War is by no means tantamount to the creation of a peaceful world, it does mean that substantial disarmament is finally on the agenda. Hence a growing interest everywhere in how to "cash in the peace dividend".

The term "conversion" usually signifies a shift of production from that of military to civilian commodities, or from a military to civilian use of resources (Dumas 1988, Köllner and Haack 1990, Sørensen 1991, Pinner 1992). Here, even though these are very important topics in themselves, conversion in this narrow sense is merely one aspect of a broader problem, namely the transition of society from a war to a peace system. This article outlines a possible research plan for "conversion studies" in the broad, generic, sense of the term, by addressing the basic question: "What are the implications of reaching that war end-state?"

Transarmament and conversion: A comprehensive agenda

by

BJØRN MØLLER

This article attempts to place "conversion" into context. The conversion of military to civilian production is merely one species of a genus that might be described as "societal transition from a war to a peace mode". The various aspects of conversion in this broad sense are described. Firstly, "intramilitary conversion" in three different varieties: conventionalization, transarmament and a lowering of the state of readiness; secondly, "transmilitary conversion" from military to non-military forms of defence; thirdly "alliance conversion", which might culminate in the establishment of a collective security system. Subsequently the various aspects of conversion in the narrower sense are analyzed: material and personal as well as economic conversion. Finally, it is pointed out that actual conversion is interlinked with "conceptual conversion", i.e. a replacement of the traditional security paradigm with broader conceptions of security.

Even though the end of the Cold War is by no means tantamount to the creation of a peaceful world, it does mean that substantial disarmament is finally on the agenda. Hence a growing interest everywhere in how to "cash in the peace dividend".

The term "conversion" usually signifies a shift of production from that of military to civilian commodities, or from a military to civilian use of resources (Dumas 1988, Köllner and Huck 1990, Southwood 1991, Renner 1992). However, even though these are very important topics in their own right, conversion in this narrow sense is merely one aspect of a broader problem, namely the transition of society from a war to a peace system. This article outlines a possible research plan for "conversion studies" in the broad, generic, sense of the term, by addressing the basic question: "What are the implications of realizing that war isn't coming?"

Intramilitary conversion

The first step down the conversion path is likely to be what might be called "intramilitary conversion", which does not transcend the boundaries of the military domain, but remains a set of military answers to what are still understood as military problems. Particularly relevant are three transition processes, all of which have implications for doctrine, strategic conceptions, deployment, military practices and equipment:

- "conventionalization" from nuclear to conventional defence;
- transarmament" from offensive to defensive military forces;
- a substitution of "inflatable" for standing armed forces.

The process of conventionalization or "denuclearization" is already well underway. Eventually, it may come to fruition in a total nuclear abolition, albeit most likely after a protracted transitional phase during which the nuclear postures are configured according to the standards of "minimum deterrence".

In the opinion of the present author, "existential deterrence" would be entirely compatible with a complete abolition, i.e. a shift to what has been called "blueprint" or "postexistential deterrence". Exactly because the nuclear "genie" is out of its bottle for good, a future war between major powers would automatically be "sub-nuclear", rather than truly conventional in the classical, Clausewitzian, sense (Booth and Wheeler 1992, Neild 1990, pp. 46–73). Still, most governments appear to think otherwise, and nuclear abolition hence does not seem to be "in the cards" just yet. Even the modest achievement of a shift to minimum deterrence would, however, entail deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals combined with the adoption of no-first-use policies and a shift to deployment patterns compatible therewith, etc. The path towards this goal may not be all that long. NATO has already declared that nuclear weapons should henceforth merely be means of the "last resort", and nuclear disarmament is underway, with the INF Treaty and the recently signed START treaties, accompanied by unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear forces.

To what extent this process should be accompanied by a build-up of conventional forces is a matter of dispute. Some (the "rearmers") would argue for a quantitative expansion, whereas others (the "disarmers" and "arms controllers") would place their hopes in achieving balance through arms control. Still others (the "transarmers", to whom the present author belongs) would deny the importance of "balance" and emphasize the paramount importance of qualitative transformation.

If the rearmers were to prevail, denuclearization might well lead to a "reverse conversion" of resources from civilian to military consumption, since conventional forces simply provide "a smaller bang for the buck" than nuclear forces, hence

cost more bucks. If, however, proponents of the second approach should hold the floor, a genuine conversion of military resources would be indispensable. As it happened, the latter was one consequence of the CFE Treaty of 1990, which established ceilings on the holdings of major weapons systems (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters) in the entire Atlantic-to-the-Urals area and obliged the signatories to destroy their excess holdings. Radical though it appeared in 1990, however, the CFE has since been overtaken by unilateral build-down by the signatories, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War.

The final of the three different approaches has recently come somewhat closer to implementation: The Vienna seminars on military doctrine have thus placed military strategies on the political agenda, and the CFE Treaty itself was *expressis verbis* designed with a view to reducing capabilities for "surprise attack and large-scale offensive actions", through disproportionate reductions in such types of equipment as lend themselves best to offensive operations, i.e. a form of material transarmament to more defensive postures (Hamm and Pohlman 1990, Wittmann 1989, Dean 1990).

The thus initiated "transarmament" from offensive to defensive forces will imply a shift of emphasis in a number of fields, including strategic conceptions, exercise activities, deployment patterns, etc. As a result, the overall profile of each country's defence posture will undergo a rather profound transformation, depending, of course, on which particular model, or mixture of models, of non-offensive defence (NOD), will be used as a blueprint (On the range of models, see Møller 1991 and 1993. The best concrete model is that of SAS 1989).

Weapons platforms (major surface combatants, combat aircraft, tanks, and the like) will, as a general rule, be built down relatively to the weapons themselves (missiles, guns, mines, ammunition, etc.), with a distinct emphasis on shorter-range weapons. Depending on the time-frame of the transarmament scheme, this may entail more or less demanding procurement requirements, and will render several categories of expensive military equipment redundant. The resultant posture would, in principle, undoubtedly be cheaper than the present one, in the sense that a hypothetical country building a defence "from scratch" would have to pay less for an NOD posture than for an offensive or dual-purpose one. Nevertheless, since this is not how defence postures are created, in real life the costs of such defensive transarmament might, in practice, be comparable to those following from offensively oriented schemes.

Due to economic constraints, however, it seems most unlikely that major procurement programmes would be embarked upon by any state, and much more likely that defensive restructuring will commence with a simple and cheap redeployment and partial reconfiguration of existing forces, accompanied by reductions of particularly offensive-capable force components and entire forma-

tions. In order for NOD transarmament to be feasible, it may thus have to be accompanied by disarmament, as has persistently been emphasized by Eastern NOD proponents (Valki 1990). New types of weapons would, of course, have to be procured, but in moderate numbers and not according to very demanding schedules. They might thus be financed entirely from savings on the follow-on systems that would otherwise have had to replace the current generations of tanks, combat aircraft, major warships, etc.

The presumably modest size of procurement budgets notwithstanding, some form of "intra-industrial conversion" would inevitably ensue, i.e. a shift of military orders from some producers (ship-yards, airframe plants, etc.) to others. A further conversion task might ensue from the retirement of henceforth "undesirable" weapons which would have to be either turned into scrap iron or converted to civilian use. In both cases it would necessitate some material modification and thus create some employment.

Its importance notwithstanding, the replacement of equipment would, however, not be the most important element in the envisioned defensive conversion, which would, above all, be a matter of transforming military strategy. Since the shift to an NOD strategy would imply planning for fighting on one's own territory (or that of one's allies) but only to a very marginal extent on that of one's enemy, it would make various types of defence preparations appear much more worthwhile than they are today. One element therein might be various terrain modifications, i.e. what might be called a "conversion of the countryside", not from civilian to military use, but rather from civilian to "dual purpose utility". Forests and plantations are instances of "dual purpose" terrain, since they, on the one hand, constitute strictly defensive, yet quite potent, antitank barriers which on the other hand have obvious benign recreational and environmental side-effects. A number of currently exclusively military installations could likewise be made available for civilian use in peacetime.

Finally, a conversion from actual to potential military forces would reflect a shift from a quest, on the part of states, for immediate defence readiness to contentment with the possession of adequate mobilization potentials. Such a lowering of the state of readiness based on the availability of longer warning, furthermore, is already well underway, in recognition of the disappearance of whatever "standing-start" attack options the Soviet Union may or may not have possessed in the past. The West seems determined to reap the fruits of this longer preparation time by shifting from in-place to home-based forces, and from large to smaller standing armies, yet with an enhanced growth potential. Small "inflatable" armed forces are thus becoming the ideal: handy, cheap, and less visible, hence less of a nuisance to the civilian population, and a more elusive target for peace movement campaigns.

Whereas the resultant posture would, on balance, be preferable to the present postures, if only for economic reasons, it is not without problems. The First World War demonstrated that rigid mobilization schemes may under certain circumstances lead to malign interactions between adversaries, in the course of which growing fears of war may lead, through a process of escalation, to the point of war: the so-called "Guns of August syndrome" (Tuchman 1962, Miller 1985). To avoid a repetition, an "inflatable defence" had better be deprived, as far as at all possible, of offensive capabilities, whilst provided with a generous margin of defensive superiority. If so, no mobilization could be perceived by adversaries as a threat requiring a response.

A shift to an inflatable defence will have implications for production. First of all, some equipment would have to be in place, both for use by the allied reinforcements to be received by any country under attack, and for the country's own mobilized reserves. Secondly, in addition to equipment in storage, the time-scale of such a future war might point to the need for industrial mobilization schemes as well. If the ensuing war should turn out to be protracted, it would not be entirely a "come as you are" war, in which only in-place forces and equipment would matter, such as was the planning assumption during the Cold War.

The ability to initiate, continue or expand military production during war might thus become important, something which would militate strongly against making industrial conversion irreversible. Preferably plants should, for instance, produce civilian vehicles in peace-time whilst being able to shift to building armoured vehicles in times of war. Whereas conversion studies have hitherto pointed to the need for schemes of how to convert military into civilian production, schemes to the opposite effect might thus be equally important, albeit only as blueprints which will hopefully remain in the cupboards indefinitely. According to the same logic, substantial military R&D (research and development) programmes might prudently have to be continued, albeit without ever reaching the production stage.

The availability of such blueprints might, furthermore, facilitate the actual conversion of factories, shipyards, etc. to civilian use, since it would deprive "hard-liners" of their "better safe than sorry" arguments. Presently, the need for an adequate military production capability for the unlikely, yet conceivable, eventuality of war serves as a rationale for the maintenance of actual military production in peacetime. If the former insurance were to be had without the latter implication, a substantial actual, i.e. material, conversion could thus be achieved at the price of opting for a deliberately reversible conversion, which would under certain viewpoints indisputably be sub-optimal.

Firms would be entitled to some compensation for being obliged to produce particular items in a situation which may never arise, in particular because such a readiness would not merely require blueprints, but also some training of workers, storage of spare parts, etc. The demands thus placed on business by the state would

seem to be roughly comparable to those presently ensuing from "economic defence", involving emergency stocks of various commodities. The analogy, however, would seem to indicate that the costs would dwarf those of continuing the present military production system on a permanent basis.

Professional armed forces are not particularly suitable for such an inflatable defence, since they tend to be rather expensive in peacetime, and possess limited mobilization potentials. The abandonment of conscription in favour of all-volunteer forces that seems to be underway in both the former East and the West thus seems to point in the wrong direction (even though it may, of course, be politically wise). According to the scheme proposed here, states should rather seek to shorten the term of service as much as possible, while still conscripting, in principle, all eligible young males, since this would provide for a maximum of mobilization potential (as demonstrated e.g. by Finland). An approximation to a militia type system along Swiss lines might be even better in this respect, even though it may not be a real option for all countries.

Transmilitary conversion

A somewhat more radical, hence probably more long-term, option than the above "intramilitary conversion" might be called "transmilitary conversion", of which one might distinguish between two varieties:

- non-military answers to defence problems;
- a complete denial of the need for defence.

Suggestions for non-military answers to security problems have been about for decades. The strategy of civilian-based or social defence "came of age" by the late sixties when it was elaborated upon by i.a. Gene Sharp, Johan Galtung, Adam Roberts, Theodor Ebert, Håkan Wiberg, Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, all of whom conceived of "social defence" (also known as "nonviolent" or "nonmilitary defence") as a "functional substitute" for military defence. It was based on the belief that victory could be denied to an aggressor by withholding submission, even subsequent to invasion and occupation, whence would presumably follow a considerable dissuasive (as opposed to deterrent) potential.

In terms of conversion of resources, a shift to social defence would have quite dramatic implications. First of all, weapons would become superfluous and the existing arsenals would hence have to be either converted to civilian use or destroyed. Secondly military production would have to be shut down for good and plants subsequently converted to the production of civilian commodities, and/or alternative employment found for the workers.

Thirdly, the personnel of the armed forces would become redundant. Even though "standing unarmed forces" are not inconceivable in principle, nobody has actually proposed such a scheme, whereas the drill of non-violent forms of resistance (e.g. under some form of conscription) has been suggested. The general structure of such forces would thus resemble a militia, albeit without arms. The effects of such a personnel conversion would be most severe in countries with all-volunteer armies, whereas in other countries the conscription period for social defence training would not necessarily be any shorter than that for military service.

Fourthly, and with very wide-ranging implications indeed, society and its political and administrative structure would have to be "converted" in order to meet the requirements of social defence. With a view to hampering an aggressor's establishment of societal control, society would have to be made as ungovernable as possible, while the needs of the civilian population would still have to be met (if only to boost morale) through the anticipated protracted period of resistance. This dual requirement has led social defence proponents to recommend "continued work without collaboration", which may, however, be easier to define than to implement in practice.

With the dual aim of strengthening morale and of depriving the enemy of conceivable blackmail options, some social defence advocates have, furthermore, recommended enhancing society's invulnerability, i.a. by decentralization, economic self-sufficiency, etc. Others have held the opinion that the stipulated strategy of exploiting vulnerability for coercive purposes would anyhow be futile and might therefore safely be ignored. They have hence warned against making a profound societal transformation a precondition for a shift to non-violent defence.

A related problem pertains to the transition period, which might well make conversion to social defence a non-starter: there is an unmistakable similarity between the instrumentarium of social defence and that of "subversive activities" such as anti-government demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, sabotage, etc. Even though one need not be a schizophrenic to struggle for the overthrow of a regime in peacetime, but stand up in its defence against aggressors (from within or without) in times of war, a ruling government might still be uncomfortable with placing powerful means of political struggle at the disposal of its opponents. The more effective the methods might appear, the less likely the ruling strata might hence be to introduce them on a large scale amongst the population.

The above conversion problems might be blunted somewhat through a piecemeal conversion from military to civilian-based defence. The two forms of defence might be combined either spatially, temporarily or functionally. Some have e.g. suggested to maintain a military defence in the countryside whilst defending cities exclusively by nonmilitary means, whereas others have advocated social defence as a fall-back option, to which a government might resort after having capitulated militarily. Still others have (in the present author's opinion wisely) rejected any

specification, and merely advocated social defence as "a special option for special circumstances". Whatever type of combination is selected, the effect of mix conceptions would not appear to represent any new form of conversion problems, but would only prolong the conversion schedule, hence render the shifts more gradual.

An even more radical form of "transmilitary conversion" than non-violence is conceivable: if the assumption were to prevail that (at least large-scale European) war had become not merely improbable, but actually inconceivable, the need for defence of whatever type would vanish into thin air. This would amount to a truly paradigmatic change. Even if it should be taken into account that unforeseen threats might eventually emerge, it might still be viewed as superfluous to prepare for such contingencies, since the capacity for improvisation might be deemed a perfectly adequate safeguard. The world is actually full of imaginable hazards against which nobody cares to take precautions, because their likelihood seems negligible.

Such a perspective ought not to be dismissed as inconceivable for the indefinite future, i.e. because something like it is already in existence on a local and regional scale. "Security communities" (i.e. dyads or groups of states or alliances between which war is no longer an option) already exist between, say, the USA and Canada, or between the Nordic countries. As far as the world at large is concerned, however, the perspective of a "global security community" does seem to belong somewhere in the quite distant future.

Alliance transformation

The rigid post-war alliance structure in Europe was based on several premises which are unlikely to hold in the future, above all on the assumption that the risk of war were imminent, hence the presumed need for a high defence readiness. Just as this preparedness was found to require in-place forces, it was also believed to call for "in-place friends", i.e. permanent, or at least durable, alliances. As far as West Germany was concerned, the two requirements were even combined in the form of in-place friends stationing in-place forces along the inter-German border.

However, the discrepancies between the different forms of "power" have grown to such proportions as to make a maintenance of "nuclear-based hegemony" within NATO untenable in the long run. The economically prosperous EC countries have surpassed the USA along most dimensions, and are unlikely to remain indefinitely acquiescent with a position of subordination to the holder of a nuclear deterrent which is felt to be increasingly dispensable and irrelevant, since the threat has vanished.

What might happen to NATO as a consequence of the disappearance of its Eastern counterpart as well as the generally receding fears of war is still an open question. However, when viewed in, say, a ten-year perspective, NATO's survival seems less than a foregone conclusion, in view of the fact that the threat it was supposed to guard against has vanished, and is openly acknowledged to have done so.

It seems conceivable that the "skeleton" of NATO might be maintained, but whatever "flesh" might remain on its "bones" would consist of political, rather than of military, cooperation. Even though capabilities for deterring, say, a reemerging Russian threat may still be regarded as a prudent "hedging of all one's bets", the military cooperation is most unlikely to attract much day-to-day attention.

Furthermore, in addition to a shift of attention to political cooperation, new members might eventually be co-opted into NATO, e.g. through the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), thus gradually transforming the present "western" alliance into a more encompassing, eventually perhaps truly pan-European, security organization.

Futuristic visions about a peaceful Europe aside, a considerable conflict potential will undoubtedly remain in Europe, consisting e.g. of "internal" conflicts between a central government and cessationist movements, intermingled with inter-state disputes. Whereas the reemergence of a new all-encompassing alliance structure does therefore seem unlikely, there would seem to be preconditions for the emergence of a patchwork of small, almost local, and partly *ad hoc* alliances.

Hopefully, however, states will only resort to competitive alliance-formation if cooperative structures fail, hence the advisability of establishing (and, for the near future, laying the groundworks for) a genuine collective security system. One might e.g. envision the United Nations vested with the power of an actual collective security organization responsible for keeping and restoring peace on a global scale. Subordinate to it might be several regional organizations with comparable prerogatives, of which the European would merely be one (elaborated upon in Møller 1992).

Material conversion

As a longer-term perspective, it stands to reason that a transfer of resources from wasteful military to productive civilian purposes will become possible and will prove beneficial for all economies and societies. The question is merely when the fruits of disarmament and conversion may be reaped. There will, indeed, be a peace dividend, even though it may be impossible to "cash it in" as soon as one might hope.

The disarmament process in progress will undoubtedly entail some genuine conversion in the narrow sense of the term. In this category, one might distinguish between forces-in-being and force generation potential. I shall relegate the latter to the subsequent section on the conversion of production, and in the first section focus on the conversion of those resources presently consumed by the armed forces. The actual military resources which might lend themselves to conversion fall into various sub-categories: material objects, human resources, land and money, each of which lends itself to further subdivision. As far as the material objects of military consumption are concerned, there are, first of all, the weapons themselves, for most of which it would be impractical to find any civilian use.

As far as those weapons are concerned for which some civilian (albeit far from non-violent) utility might be conceivable, the world will undoubtedly be a safer place if they are simply destroyed, rather than falling into the hands of terrorists. Some subcomponents (say, sensors and data processing components) of complex weapons systems might, however, be recycled for civilian use without any ensuing hazards. Secondly, the weapons platforms might in some cases prove useful for civilian purposes. Tanks without guns may be used for entirely peaceful purposes such as demolition and earth-moving; warships stripped of guns and missiles have as good hulls as other vessels, and usually better engines and navigation equipment, etc. In case some such conversion will be embarked upon, this will obviously open up certain job opportunities. Thirdly, there are all the basically civilian resources consumed by the present armed forces, from paperclips and food to trucks and transport aircraft. In most such cases, the only "conversion" that will be called for is a change of ownership, plus an occasional paint job. The cost-effectiveness of such physical conversion will largely depend on the market for the derived commodities: a subject for study by economists, from competing with whom the present author shall prudently refrain.

Human conversion

As far as the human resources presently allocated to the military sector are concerned, they fall into six broad categories: rank-and-file soldiers, NCOs, commissioned officers, technicians, scientists and support staff, to which should be added, for some analytical purposes, a final category, namely the families of the military employees.

Whether the conversion of the rank-and-file soldiers would present more problems than opportunities or *vice versa* seems to depend primarily on the type of enlistment. In countries with universal (male) conscription, the effect of a complete or partial abolition whereof would, above all, be the availability of about

half an entire age group, for whom additional job opportunities would have to be found, lest they either end up on the dole or push their older colleagues onto the street. In the absence of such additional jobs, the most practical and least unfair solutions from a social point of view would appear to be either a lowering of the retirement age or an extension of compulsory primary education.

In countries with professional armed forces, the henceforth redundant soldiers may experience difficulties with finding alternative employment, also because the armed forces have tended to attract a disproportionate number of underprivileged young males, with a lower-than-average level of education, etc. Social problems might well ensue from merely decommissioning large numbers of such soldiers. On the other hand, the problems may be slightly smaller than they would have been if this group of people had never been enlisted in the first place. Whereas they would in many cases have received no education or job training whatsoever in the civilian sector, they have often benefited somewhat from military service, say, in the form of truck-driver certificates and the like.

The NCO group constitutes a large group of professionals in certain countries, whereas in other countries NCOs are merely conscripts with a longer term of service. One should therefore beware of generalizations. The professional NCOs might find it somewhat difficult to find alternative employment; not so much because they are people who "cut throats for a living" (skills for which there is, alas, some civilian demand), but rather because their skills are so particular for the armed forces. On the other hand, there are job niches in the civilian sector, into which they might fit well, e.g. as foremen in factories that are still run "the old way".

As far as commissioned officers are concerned, problems may well be severe: First of all, officers have usually been taught several skills which are in small or zero demand in the civilian sector. Secondly, officers have usually been socialized according to social norms which may not be easily compatible with the value system of "postindustrial society". Even though the skills of these officers in the art of leadership might be valuable in industry and elsewhere, the particular styles appropriate for military barracks on the one hand, and industrial plants or city offices on the other, will often be wide apart. However, various institutions (say, hospitals) remain rather hierarchically organized, and might hence be interested in the particular leadership and administrative skills of decommissioned officers. Finally, there are certain groups of officers (say, pilots or ship captains) who may find it quite easy to find alternative employment.

As far as the category of technicians (mechanics and the like) is concerned, some additional job training might well be required before the persons in question will be eligible for the civilian job market, but in principle this should constitute no major problems.

As far as the scientists are concerned, a conversion of their know-how to civilian purposes might prove highly beneficial for the civilian economies. Hitherto, the military sector has effected a veritable brain-drain from the civilian sector, due to its generally higher wages and the attractiveness of working with distinctly high technologies under extremely generous budgets. To what extent private industry would be able to absorb (at least part of) the inflow of military R&D employees is impossible to answer in general terms. An educated guess might be that the opportunities would tend to be good, at least after a period of adjustment. Such a development would amount to an actual privatization, in conformity with what is being attempted for society as a whole by numerous governments in the West. Should the privatization venture nevertheless fail, for whatever reason, the obvious alternative would be to launch state-sponsored civilian research programmes, in which case the conversion should involve no major problems except a simple transfer of funds from one part of the state budget to another.

Most of the residual category of support personnel should present no problems (apart from those always involved with a shift from one job to another), since cooks, office clerks, nurses, clergymen, drivers, etc. might perform exactly the same functions in the civilian sector. Whether there would actually be a demand for this manpower would appear to be largely a macro-economic problem, since the personnel profile of the armed forces does not seem to be particular in any sense. However, just as is the case for the redundancy of the other categories of military personnel, this may constitute an, occasionally severe, problem for local communities which often depend to a very large extent on the resident military forces.

Persons belonging to all of the above categories have families, a fact which reduces their mobility considerably, or which at least increases the complexity of the relocation task. If a military installation were to be dismantled, and alternative employment should prove impossible to create nearby, this would have reverberations in many fields: not just the former military employee, but also his family, would have to be provided with employment, housing, kindergarten and/or school facilities, etc. elsewhere. Furthermore, some such services would become redundant at the original location, where houses would also be vacated (with implications for real estate prices, rents, etc.), something which might also have employment implications (albeit on a smaller scale) for other groups, etc. Even though the ensuing problems are in principle no different from those involved with closing down any other place of work, they may well have staggering proportions from the point of view of the affected local communities (Paukert and Richards 1991, Lall and Marlin 1992, and various chapters in Köllner and Huck 1990).

Terrain conversion

In addition to material and human resources, the military also consumes land: for barracks, storage sites, harbors, airfields, exercise grounds, etc. Under the impact of disarmament, much of this territory would be vacated for civilian utilization. Since this land is almost everywhere in public possession, an obvious possibility would be to find alternative use for it as a common good, say, for recreational purposes, "social experiments", or whatever.

Alternatively, the land might be sold (i.e. "privatized"), something which would have repercussions locally, e.g. in terms of falling real estate prices. Local house owners would thus suffer (but their tenants gain), albeit perhaps only marginally. The problem might, however, be compounded by the fact that the communities with much space made vacant through conversion would tend to be the same as would stand to lose many of their inhabitants, or would have above-average unemployment rates.

Land is not merely land, but often contains a good amount of infrastructure (telephone cables, roads, railtrack, etc.) most of which has, of course, been designed for military purposes which may not be compatible with civilian needs. To quite a large extent, however, it would be, although modifications might well be required. However, the military has often not merely used, but rather abused, the land allotted to it, much of which is in a poor state and in need of extensive "renovation". Conversion of land thus not merely entails finding alternative use for it, but may also require extensive "terrain modifications", in their turn opening up some job opportunities.

Economic conversion

Finally, the military establishments have represented a drain on the financial resources of the country fielding them, and some fiscal savings might thus be made possible through disarmament. In the discussions in the public at large, such benefits have often been exaggerated, e.g. by disregarding how large a part of the total military expenditures consists of wages which would anyhow have to be paid (or at the very least replaced by dole money). Furthermore, lost (income and consumer) tax revenue would also have to be taken into account. On the other hand, due to the relative capital intensity of military spending, the portion of actual savings might still be relatively substantial. The effects thereof could undoubtedly be fairly easily modelled, but no guesses as to the results shall be ventured at this stage.

As far as the investment element of military expenditures is concerned, the economic implications of savings differ, depending, *inter alia*, on the import quota. In the case of small countries, dependent to a large extent on imports of military commodities, the military spending has all along been more wasteful (in terms of GNP) than has been the case for largely self-sufficient countries. Conversely, the benefits of savings would be more substantial for the former than for the latter countries, both in terms of overall economic (e.g. employment) effects, and with regard to the balance of trade. The main determinant of the economic effects would thus be the multiplier for military investment, a fact which points towards excellent opportunities for economic modelling and large-scale computing.

The effects of the fiscal benefits of disarmament would, of course, depend heavily on what use is made of the freed fiscal resources. Whereas political parties in general, and the pro-disarmament ones in particular, tend to be generous (especially when out of government) in their proposals for spending the "peace dividend" on popular and, per implication, vote-winning purposes such as development aid, environmental protection and the like, governments in general, and treasurers in particular, tend to be more parsimonious. Unless there is strong pressure for alternative public consumption or investment, the "peace dividend" may thus end up in a "bottomless pit", by simply being used for servicing the public debt.

Conversion of production

With the discussion of defence expenditures and military investment, we have in fact entered the realm of "potential military forces", i.e. the force generation potentials stemming from military production, including R&D. This has been the traditional preoccupation of students of conversion, although it is (as will hopefully now have become apparent) only a small part of the aggregate conversion problem. Precisely because the topic has been covered so extensively, a very rough sketch must suffice for the present purposes.

Once disarmament "takes off", and reductions are being made in the forces-in-being, there will be a growing call from politicians for curbing military production, since it makes little sense to continue producing, say, tanks, when these are simultaneously being scrapped in increasing numbers. The imperative of continued production will, on the other hand, not disappear entirely, since some production is, of course, a precondition for a continuous modernization of the equipment for the armed forces.

What might prevent large-scale conversion would be the very powerful forces with vested interests in military industry, who should be expected to lobby enthusiastically for continued production. These observations pertain to the entire

“military-industrial complex” (MIC), but it is also quite conceivable that certain trade unions might lend their support to the demands of the MIC for maintaining plants, with a view to avoiding redundancy for their members (on the theory of the MIC, see e.g. Pursell 1972, cf. for a critique: Sarkesian 1972).

An obvious solution for firms whose regular customers suddenly become parsimonious would be to look for other “big spenders”. A rise in oil prices might e.g. allow countries in the Third World, above all the OPEC countries, to make a bid for the now available weapons on the open market. If governments in the countries with a traditionally large military production sphere share the opinion of the present author that a compensatory expansion of the global arms trade would be a most unfortunate development, precautions had better be taken to prevent this from happening.

Alternative orders for the firms hit most severely by the discontinuation of military production will be essential in order to neutralize the ensuing opposition to disarmament. Whether this will be possible depends both on local circumstances, and on the general structure of the MIC, including the diversification and geographical distribution of industry. The more diversified, i.e. the more the military orders are distributed amongst many firms, each of which is only marginally dependent on them, the easier the conversion task will tend to be. Likewise, the more military production is scattered amongst localities the less demanding the conversion task.

Finally, to the extent that military plants have all along produced for the civilian sector as well as for the armed forces, the easier will conversion to strictly civilian purposes *ceteris paribus* tend to be. The latter is the case for the ex-USSR, where, however, *ceteris* is far from *paribus*. In actual fact, the military sector has been isolated from the rest of society and military plants which have actually attempted conversion have found it exceedingly difficult to adjust to the demands of the ex-Soviet citizens.

Functional conversion

Just as the conversion of plants from producing one type of commodities to another might be called “direct conversion”, so might also the option of maintaining at least the bulk of the armed forces as regular military forces, whilst providing them with supplementary tasks in order to make up for the loss of the enemy: what might also be called “functional conversion”.

Environmental protection is merely one of the tasks that have been mentioned as “retirement roles” for the armed forces, in addition to the numerous peacetime and basically civilian functions which the military perform already today. Military

units might serve as "expeditionary relief forces" in case of natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, floods and the like, or of man-made disasters such as melt-downs of nuclear reactors, explosions in chemical factories or whatever. Furthermore, warships might be suitable for patrolling the seas with a view to environmental protection, etc.

These certainly seem to be notions worth exploring, if only because nobody would expect soldiers to fight all the time. The more useful they could be in their "time off", the more value the taxpayers would receive for their money. An important caveat does, however, seem warranted. Such useful peacetime tasks might gradually come to be experienced as a sufficient *raison d'être* of the armed forces, the existence of which might hence come to be perpetuated well beyond their actual redundancy for defence purposes.

Conceptual conversion

The notion of thus putting military forces to other uses is related to a "conceptual conversion", which likewise seems to be on the intellectual agenda, in the form of calls for broadening the conceptions of "threats", "defence" and "security".

Under the prevailing "Realist paradigm", threats have usually been conceived of as risks of what other states might deliberately do to one's own state, and occasionally people. Security has tended to be narrowly understood as merely the absence of such threats. However, it has to be acknowledged that there are other transnational and global challenges facing mankind than those of war and related types of state-to-state aggression.

First of all, there are transnational problems such as pollution, which do not respect national borders. Secondly, there are international problems, stemming i.a. from the structure of the international system, including the North-South problems. Thirdly, there are truly global problems such as the exhaustion of the global pool of resources, the rapid disappearance of the rain forests, global warming, ozone depletion, etc.

There are obvious trade-offs between the quest for meeting the various types of threats, if only because the same money cannot be spent twice. With the partial exception mentioned in the previous section, money allocated to the defence budget can neither be used for containing pollution, nor for development aid or other, equally urgent, purposes. Whereas this holds true for all countries, it applies *a fortiori*, to the developing countries, in which the level of "militarization" influences their ability to create a sustainable economic development, feed their populations, avoid exhaustion of their resources, etc. (see e.g. Ball 1988).

There are thus sound reasons for a "conceptual conversion" (with or without a change of terminology), i.e. for a shift of attention from military to non-military

perils, as well as from inter-state to intra-state and global threats. Such a shift seems to be gradually underway, inter alia through the acknowledgement on the part of the ex-USSR of the importance of "global problems", as well as by NATO's apparent awareness of the need for some kind of "Marshall Plan" to the benefit of its former enemies.

* * *

We have thus seen that "conversion" as usually understood is merely one aspect of a much more encompassing "pacification venture", for which the concept might just as well be employed.

Conversion thus conceived would involve a transformation of armed forces, defence modes, alliance structures, forms of enlistment and employment, patterns of thought, etc. It would thus be an obvious subject for a truly multi-disciplinary research endeavour.

If only this broader framework is not forgotten, it may, on the other hand, be most sensible to reserve the term "conversion" for the narrower conception of shifting resources from the military to the civilian sector or the even narrower one of converting military into civilian production.

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Bankers vs. generals: East–West financial relations and reductions in military expenditure in the East (1985–1991)

by

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The process of replacement of East–West military confrontation with financial cooperation has constituted the most significant factor of changes in international relations since 1985. From the Eastern perspective it appears that financial cooperation with the West, including various forms of Western financial assistance, along with savings made on military spending, have become the main elements of Eastern post-Cold War "peace dividend". Unfortunately, data concerning both domains of East–West relations are scattered among publications on disarmament and on financial analysis. The main aim of the paper is to present a preliminary analysis of those two components of the peace dividend in the period from the beginning of 1985 until December 1991.

Additionally, potential links between reductions of military expenditure in the East and East–West financial relations in that period are evaluated so as to give ground for further studies.

1. Introduction

Uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms taking place in the countries of the "Former East" undermines the validity of any detailed analyses and far-reaching forecasts. It is possible, however, to identify some aspects of those changes that can be considered as representative and to some extent invariant. It seems that the process of replacement of East–West military confrontation with financial cooperation constitutes the most significant factor of the current changes.

The main aim of the paper, which is an introductory part of a broader project, is to provide some preliminary answers to the following questions:

- a) What are the components of the Eastern "peace dividend" and how are they related to the financial cooperation with the West?
- b) What have been the links between disarmament and cuts in military spending in the East and East–West financial relations from 1985 until the end of 1991?

Thorough answers to these questions cannot be given immediately. For example, to study the cuts in Eastern military expenditure, which is a significant element both of the "peace dividend" and of reduction of military confrontation, we have to wait for further improvement in access to Eastern data. Moreover, it must be also explained why the investigations are limited to the process of replacement of East–West military confrontation with financial cooperation since 1985.

It is quite clear that in the transition period the financial relations constitute the core of the present East–West economic cooperation. Various forms of financial relationships with the West are nowadays the main factor of economic reforms in the East. Meanwhile, they also create foundations for the future, normalized economic relations. Additionally, profits stemming from the financial cooperation with the West are perceived in the East as a significant element of the "peace dividend".

To avoid any terminological problems the actors involved in the discussed processes are defined as follows:

East: Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia and its post-1992 successors, Hungary, Poland, Romania), plus the USSR and the "Post-USSR Constellation".

West: G-24 with the special role of G-7 governments, EEC, private banks and investors, World Bank, IMF, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); in addition, the initiatives of the London Club and the Paris Club are considered.

In the analysis of the process of replacement of military confrontation with financial cooperation, quantitative disarmament in the countries of the East is investigated mainly in relation to reductions in their military expenditure. The following forms of Western financial cooperation with the East are taken into account: grants, credits, credit guarantees, debt rescheduling, various forms of debt reduction and debt conversion.

2. Links between development of East–West financial relations, disarmament and reductions of military expenditure in the East: Framework of analysis

The preliminary analysis of dynamics of financial relations and disarmament in Europe merely constitutes a framework for further, more detailed studies based on a broader data collection. Exact data are still not so easily available, in particular information on military spending and, paradoxically, data on East–West financial relationships. Nowadays the countries of the former WTO provide international

research institutions, e.g. UN, IISS and SIPRI, with more accurate figures concerning their military expenditure; yet in most cases those data are rather incoherent with previous official reports (Deger and Sen 1990). In the case of the CIS the situation is even more complicated due to the whole process of collapse of the former Soviet Army.

As far as East–West financial relations are concerned, reliability of quantitative information is undoubtedly higher than that of military expenditure. Yet the composite effect of the speed of changes, various methods of computing the amounts of resources and some “noise” caused by a large number of widely publicized pledges of financial assistance offered to the East is that in many cases a discussion on East–West financial cooperation can only be supported by crude estimates.

For studying the coincidences and Eastern trade-offs in the East–West financial relations and disarmament in Europe from 1985 until the fall of the USSR the following periodization appears most suitable:

Period I:	March 1985	—	December 1988
Period II:	January 1989	—	December 1991
Period III:	January 1992	—	

Obviously the size and scope of the paper do not permit us to conduct a thorough analysis of the whole process. It is possible, however, to present some of the most representative coincidences and links between disarmament in the East, exemplified by reductions in military expenditure, and the development of East–West financial relations in all of those three periods.

3. Eastern post-Cold War “peace dividend”

The end of the Cold War brought about numerous expectations and hopes expressed by the parties hitherto involved in 45 years of military confrontation. For the countries of the East, the end of confrontation was supposed, apart from political advantages, to provide a substantial reduction of the economic burden coming from their involvement in the arms race with the West. The profits stemming from the current changes in international relations are also referred to as “peace dividend” and that term is frequently used in a very confusing way, either as a general description of all the profits and investments associated with the end of military confrontation, or in a narrow sense, as savings on military expenditure (Fontanel 1992, Hartley 1992, Intriligator 1992).

Limiting our attention to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the CIS, we may elaborate a general concept of the Eastern post-Cold

War “peace dividend” which could be useful in further theoretical and empirical research. Wanting to avoid both extreme interpretations of that term, we will consider as the “peace dividend” of the East associated with the current changes the profits gained under the following circumstances:

- a) Development of new forms of scientific and technological cooperation with the West which were not possible to realize in the period of military confrontation, e.g. the lifting of COCOM restrictions.
- b) Access to new, efficiency-oriented expertise, especially in economics, management, marketing and banking that was inapplicable in centrally planned economies, e.g. ,training and consulting assistance provided by the West since 1989.
- c) Broadened economic and financial cooperation, including various forms of assistance provided by the West as support for democratic changes and encouragement for further economic and political reforms.
- d) Profits stemming from disarmament, reductions in military expenditure and conversion of military industry.

These components of the Eastern “peace dividend” are not separable from each other. Their overlaps are quite easy to enumerate. Focussing our attention on the problems of replacement of military confrontation with financial cooperation in Europe we will refer to the second and the third components.

4. March 1985–December 1988: Two-fold opening of the East

4.1. USSR: Beginnings of new thinking in disarmament and in external borrowing

The period between Gorbachev’s coming to power in March 1985 and his speech at the United Nations in December 1988 when he declared deep cuts in Soviet military power can be briefly characterized as a two-fold opening of the WTO, both in disarmament and in financial relations with the West. The main initiative and permission for the process came from the USSR.

Since the very beginning, the new Soviet leader was aware that his country needed what can be called “peredyshka” (respite) from various competitive pressures so as to concentrate energy and resources on rebuilding the bases of its power. It could be achieved by decreasing the burden of armaments and by seeking more external resources in the West. In that period, correlations of Soviet disarmament and reductions in military spending with financial relations with the West revealed the three following general regularities.

First, in the beginning of “perestroika” the Soviet authorities expected that those two processes would run independently. Although even in 1985 the first efforts were made by Gorbachev to talk, at least, about reductions in military expenditure (Parrot 1988: p. 7), the process of its constant growth was continued until 1988 – see *Table 1*. At the same time, the West shared the same views, separating disarmament talks from financial cooperation while waiting for the outcome of Gorbachev’s initiatives. As a result of this approach, combined with the Soviet economic difficulties and the willingness of the Western states and bankers to lend to a “reliable borrower”, the external debt of the USSR rose sharply in that period.

Table 1: Debt and defence expenditure trends of the USSR, 1985–1988

	1985	1986	1987	1988
Gross debt to West (billion \$US)*	31.4	37.4	40.3	42.5
Gross debt growth (1985 = 100)	100	119	128	135
Net debt to West (billion \$US)*	18.3	22.5	26.1	27.2
Net debt growth (1985 = 100)	100	123	143	149
Defence spending (billion 1982 roubles)	111.0	115.3	120.5	124.0
Defence spending growth (1985 = 100)	100.0	103.8	108.5	111.7
Defence burden (% GNP)	16.2	16.2	16.7	16.8

* Soviet Union and the CMEA banks

Sources: Debt: UN ECE (1989, p. 44). Defence spending: Steinberg (1990, p. 687).

Defence burden: Davis (1992, p. 196).

Second, while the Soviet Union never directly declared its intentions to use Western credits both for financing restructuring economy and maintaining its military position, Western politicians and scholars repeatedly underlined that credits offered by the West allowed the USSR not to reallocate resources from military sector to other areas – “fungibility” of capital (Shelton 1989).

Third, the first declarations of a Western linkage between economic and financial cooperation with the Soviet Union began to appear after signing the INF Treaty in December 1987, when it became clear that the USSR intended to abandon

military confrontation with the West and to replace it with political, economic, and financial cooperation. This became especially clear after the Reagan–Gorbachev Moscow summit in May–June 1988, when the European Community, NATO and individual Western countries decided to associate their economic and financial cooperation with the Soviet Union with further democratic changes and a decrease in military spending.

In spite of the absence of any openly pronounced linkage between borrowing in the West and a policy of softening the burden of military expenses, it is easy to conclude that in the discussed period the USSR indirectly used Western loans as a means of supporting its military machine, which consumed more and more of Soviet national income at least until the end of 1988. It will require further studies to investigate the scope of that “fungibility” of capital. The dynamics shown in *Table 1* together with well-known facts about Soviet efforts to acquire Western military technology, nevertheless lends some support to the above hypothesis (Sanders 1990).

4.2. Non-Soviet WTO countries: More signs of differentiation

The first promises of a more liberal approach coming from Moscow after 1985 caused mixed reactions among Soviet allies. Gorbachev’s calls for change and later approval of political and economic reforms stimulated a further differentiation among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

A preliminary analysis of correlations between the positions of those countries in their policy of military spending and in their financial relations with the West permits us to identify several significant discrepancies. The “Non-Soviet WTO countries” divided themselves into a group of reformers: Hungary and Poland, and a group of “hard liners” following the old patterns of behaviour. The special stance of Romania also remained characteristic in that period.

Similarly to the USSR, the smaller countries of the Warsaw Treaty did not declare any links between their military expenditures and efforts to broaden their financial cooperation with the West. An analysis of the estimates gathered in *Table 2* and *Table 3* allows us to disclose several dissimilarities reflecting different attitudes towards the links between disarmament and financial relations with the West.

Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic continued a constant growth of their military expenditures in line with the Soviet desire to match the challenge of the SDI. At the same time, Bulgaria became a very active borrower, using the same opportunity as the USSR. Referring again to the “fungibility” of capital it is thus possible to conclude that the sharp increase in Bulgarian military expenditure must have been partly supported by intensive borrowing — mainly from commercial banks (UN ECE 1988, p. 41).

**Table 2: Military expenditure of non-Soviet WTO countries
1985–1988**

(US\$m at 1988 prices and exchange rates)

	1985	1986	1987	1988
Bulgaria	800	1071	1180	1337
1985 = 100	100	134	148	167
Czecho-Slovakia	3838	3962	4097	4241
1985 = 100	100	103	107	111
Hungary	2375	2321	2285	2343
1985 = 100	100	98	96	98
Poland	4730	5945	5863	5657
1985 = 100	100	126	124	120
Romania	1470	1483	1407	1402
1985 = 100	100	101	96	95

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1992, pp. 259–260.

After a significant increase in 1986, Poland, like Hungary, began to restrict its military spending. While this behaviour cannot be regarded as a direct linkage, the efforts by both those countries to get Western financial support for their economic reforms and debt problems suggest that their attitudes can be regarded as a certain “signalling” of the will not to get involved in any additional economic burden within the WTO.

**Table 3: Estimated convertible currency net debt
of Central European countries, 1985–1988**
(US\$bn, end-of-year)

	1985	1986	1987	1988
Bulgaria	1.4	3.5	5.1	5.9
1985 = 100	100	250	364	421
Czecho-Slovakia	2.3	2.7	3.5	3.6
1985 = 100	100	117	152	157
Hungary	9.5	12.9	16.2	16.0
1985 = 100	100	136	171	168
Poland	28.1	31.8	36.2	35.6
1985 = 100	100	113	129	127
Romania	6.3	5.8	4.3	1.5
1985 = 100	100	92	68	24

Source: UN ECE (1989, p. 44).

Romania also followed a similar pattern, keeping its military spending at a low level and trying to repay its external debt. In addition to economic reasons, this was also due to the traditional Romanian striving for independence from the USSR which, paradoxically, led to a deepened isolation of that country from changes taking place in the East in 1988.

5. January 1989–December 1991: Financial cooperation replaces military confrontation

5.1. Central Eastern Europe: Western financial assistance and cuts in military spending

In the period from January 1989 till December 1991 relationships between East and West were finally transformed from military confrontation into close cooperation in various areas with finance and economy occupying the dominant role. In that period the mutual links between military expenditure in Central Eastern Europe and financial cooperation with the West were determined by three factors.

First, it was the will of the West, including NATO, to support changes in the countries of that region. There were several conditions concerning mainly political and economic issues, including disarmament and reductions of military spending in the East, e.g. in the speech of NATO Secretary General, Dr Manfred Woerner at the NATO Economic Colloquium (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 March 1989, p. 511).

*Table 4: Military expenditure of non-Soviet WTO countries
1988–1991
(US\$m at 1988 prices and exchange rates)*

	1988	1989	1990	1991
Bulgaria	1337	1122	1053	842
1988 = 100	100	84	79	63
Czecho-Slovakia	4241	4159	3363	1768
1988 = 100	100	98	79	42
Hungary	2343	1944	1411	1354
1988 = 100	100	83	60	58
Poland	5657	3904	3869	3612
1988 = 100	100	69	68	64
Romania	1402	1416	1373	...
1988 = 100	100	101	98	...

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1992, pp. 259–260.

Second, the countries of the West treated their financial assistance to the first reformers in the East as a part of their security policy aimed at preventing destabilization of Europe. Such an attitude was expressed at many occasions and especially strongly at the signing of the CFE Treaty in Paris in November 1990.

Third, the countries of Central Eastern Europe did not declare any linkage between their disarmament, reductions of military expenses and expectations of financial assistance from the West. They tried to forget their Soviet-imposed military policies as soon as possible. Due to that attitude the Warsaw Pact swiftly disbanded itself in July 1991.

Table 5: Global assistance committed to Central Eastern Europe
(January 1990–June 1991, US\$bn)

	Total	G-24	International financial institutions
Bulgaria	2.2	1.6	0.5
Czecho-Slovakia	4.0	2.2	1.9
Hungary	9.1	5.9	3.2
Poland	14.6	9.7	4.9
Romania	2.8	1.7	1.1
Regional unlocated	6.2	6.2	...
Total	38.9	27.2	11.6

Source: UN ECE Survey 1992, p. 181.

5. 2. USSR: Money for disarmament and troops withdrawal

In contrast to the countries of Central Eastern Europe whose financial cooperation with the West was only indirectly connected with their military policies, the links between Western assistance and Soviet disarmament were made absolutely clear almost from the beginning of perestroika. Especially after the acceleration of Soviet arms reduction marked by Gorbachev's speech at the UN in December 1988 the West declared that any further cooperation would be depending on Soviet economic and political reforms as well as on disarmament and cuts in military spending. The Soviet response pronounced several times by Gorbachev was also clear: we want to cooperate instead of competing in arms race. His message to the leaders of G-7 meeting in Paris in July 1989 stated this emphatically.

It would be very difficult to present all direct and indirect links between Soviet disarmament and Western assistance that were declared in the discussed period, the most significant ones apparently occurred in the following areas.

First, as a consequence of reforms, internal economic problems and Western claims, in 1989, the USSR declared deep cuts in its military expenditure. In the same period the country was also provided with an increasing amount of various forms of financial assistance extended by Western states and credits offered by private banks, the latter gradually decreasing after 1990. In the period 1989–1991 the Soviet military expenditure was reduced substantially, probably beyond the 14% reduction of aggregate defence spending proclaimed by President Gorbachev in May 1989 (*SIPRI Yearbook* 1992, p. 214). Even if any judgment of the Soviet military budget is poorly reliable, we may estimate the cuts in spending in 1989–1991 at between 26bn and 32bn current US\$. *The Military Balance* (1992–1993, p. 218) estimates the cuts between 1990 and 1991 to have been 36bn US\$ in 1985 prices and exchange rates.

In the same period the convertible currency gross debt of the USSR rose from 58.5bn US\$ (UN ECE 1991, p. 105) in 1989 to between 60bn US\$ (UN ECE 1991, p. 105), and 74bn US\$ (*International Herald Tribune*, 20 November 1991).

The above figures show that in the last period of its existence, the USSR did not intend to explore the “fungibility” of capital; if it was continued, it was in a less extensive way. In that period the Western partners also fully rejected any security concerns about financing a potential adversary and made a decisive shift in their linkage policy.

First, under the growing real and/or imaginative fear of consequences of a break-up of the Soviet Union, more or less skillfully stimulated by the Soviet authorities (“Social unrest and chaos in a country with 30,000 nuclear warheads”), the Western governments began to link assistance to the USSR with their security concerns in an absolutely different manner. That approach found its climax before and during the G–7 London Summit in July 1991 when Gorbachev directly warned about threats to reforms, albeit with little success, the reasons for which would require further elucidation.

Second, taking into consideration the critical situation of the Soviet economy, the high costs of nuclear and chemical disarmament and the risk of proliferation, the countries of the West, mainly the USA, declared that they would financially support the elimination of weapons in “the remaining USSR” with 400mn US\$ (*International Herald Tribune*, 28 November 1991).

There are also other examples of links between Soviet disarmament and Western financial assistance. One case is the promise from the government of Germany to recompensate the USSR for the costs of its withdrawal with 15bn DM, plus 15bn DM in state-backed export credits (*The Economist*, 29 June 1991, p. 25).

Another case concerns Western assistance in conversion. After initial optimism, the participation of Western governments in Soviet conversion until the end

1991 did not take off; only a limited number of private investors dared to enter that market, with more or less success (Izyumov 1991).

It should also be mentioned that in the last days of the USSR the Western governments and private investors were encouraged to take part in supporting the post-Soviet space industry and in preventing emigration of Soviet military specialists to conflict-affected areas. In spite of some limited preliminary steps, the aims and scope of any more elaborated projects in that field are apparently still under discussion.

6. Conclusions

The aim and scope of this paper do not allow any far-reaching conclusions about the process of replacement of East–West military confrontation by financial cooperation in the period between 1985 and 1991; they will require more studies in the areas primarily described in the paper. Nevertheless, even a preliminary study makes it possible to present the following conclusions that may prove useful in further studies. First, the countries of Central Eastern Europe were not involved in any direct linkage policy between disarmament and financial cooperation with the West. Its absence was due both to their own policy in the process of decay of the Soviet empire and to the lack of any direct influence from the West. The only example of “signalling” the will not to be suspected of using Western resources for military purpose can be traced in the behaviour of Hungary and Poland after 1986 when they began to reform their economic systems.

Second, after a short period of a specific “dual track” approach to disarmament and financial relations approved both by the West and by the USSR, the linkage between financial relations and Soviet disarmament and cuts in military spending became absolutely dominant. In the period 1988–1989 the links were associated with a Western will to obtain Soviet military concessions. Afterwards, in the period 1990–1991, those links were predominantly prompted by “suicidal blackmail” based on the threat of potential chaos in the former Soviet Union.

Third, numerous Western initiatives in financial support for Soviet disarmament and conversion were primarily of declarative character; their practical realization was slowed down by obstacles arising on both sides.

The results of the paper and the questions that remain unanswered show the direction of further investigations. It seems that the dynamics of replacement of East–West military confrontation with financial cooperation from 1985 onward, also after the break-up of the Soviet Union, should be studied by means of quantitative measures as well as with reference to parallel institutional changes taking place in East–West relations in that period.

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Conversion in Russia

by

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Conversion in Russia was officially initiated in December 1989, but failed because it remained within the Soviet Union's militarized institutional structure. After the August coup a rapid demilitarization of the economy seemed to take place, but in reality institutional change was slow, partial and reversible and accompanied by intense power struggles. A political, economic and social crisis ensued, which made conversion even more difficult, as firms faced procurement cuts of up to 90%. The relocation of the armed forces was also hampered, and the military faced deprivation and anarchy. Instead of a peace dividend, conditions were created for the outbreak of civil war. These developments are explained using the concepts of "technical lag" and "institutional lag".

"The extensive militarization of all aspects of state and public activity is a law of modern war preparations. Woe to him to whom militarization is merely metaphysics" (Svechin 1927).

"The mere anticipation of war and preparations for it deforms an economy, [...] this tendency for a peacetime economy to approach wartime forms is a general and inevitable law, but the over-energetic distortion of the natural forms of economic development has a quite negative effect and hinders the overall success of a country" (Svechin 1927).

"Once the rocket goes up, who cares where it comes down. It's not my department", said Werner von Braun."

1. The end of the Cold War and the technical lag

Peace researchers, like generals, are children of their times. Generals have been accused of preparing for the last war instead of the next one. But didn't the end of the Cold War take even peace researchers by surprise? We have all spent much energy studying the Cold War, but have neglected the problems emerging from that war's termination, and the new type of conflict that could ensue from it: civil wars arising out of the disappearance of that state monopoly on organized force which

had been one of the axiom's of Cold War deterrence theory. We knew that the existence of an external enemy could bind centrifugal forces. That the opposite might be equally true, that the disappearance of the enemy could loosen those forces, leading to civil war and anarchy, was not remembered. The mechanisms of the arms race were well documented, but the mechanisms of its winding down were unknown. The build up of the military-industrial-scientific complex was relatively clear, but its dismantling was unexplored. Just like the scientists who developed the armaments, peace researchers never wondered how difficult it might be to destroy them. Clearing up the mess after the Cold War was just nobody's department. Now that we are in that mess we have some catching up to do.

One could counter this argument by pointing to the fact that peace researchers have always been interested in conversion. Conversion has indeed long been a theme for research, but for other reasons. It served as an argument against the arms race by showing that its winding down would produce a substantial peace dividend. Now we face an unexpected situation. The arms race between the superpowers has slowed down, if not ended. Disarmament is underway. Still, the peace dividend has not yet materialized. Conversion has proved much more difficult, now that the political will is there. That is something peace researchers were not really prepared for.

Let us try to formulate one or two hypotheses that could shed some light on our predicament.

First, we have seen that the relaxation of international tension can take place unexpectedly and at a relatively rapid pace. This is because it involves a "Gestalt switch". The enemy image suddenly evaporates. This enemy image was built up out of diabolic qualities including that of greatness and everlasting life. This idea that the enemy is immense and immortal — and that he could draw us into hell — gives the inspiration and legitimation to build up a defence which should match him in volume and duration. Questions about dismantling that defence system was taboo.

When the Gestalt switch takes place, a "technical lag" appears between the cultural level of thought — and feeling — about the former enemy and the technical level of the defence machine. No one is prepared for its dismantling. Neither know-how, nor the facilities are easily available, and funds have not been reserved. If defence technology is far developed, the defence machine can acquire the tenacity once attributed to the enemy. In its extreme this is symbolized by plutonium, which indeed, to all human intents and purposes, has everlasting life. This makes the dismantling of the obsolete parts of the defence machine an extremely costly and complicated task. That it will take a long time, much longer than it took to lose the enemy image, is now obvious.

Nevertheless, after some time a break-even point should be reached, after which society will gain from this process. The possibility of wrangling a peace dividend

from the disarmament process centres on the concept of conversion. Conversion can be defined at the political or societal level as the reallocation of factors of production from the military to the civilian economy (Ballantine 1991). It should not be confused with what is generally known as spin-off (or spin-back), whereby civilian and military production are improved simultaneously.

It is useful to distinguish two additional, lower levels of conversion, which should then be evaluated in terms of this highest level. On the lowest level conversion implies the use of already deployed military assets for civilian purposes, perhaps after some adaptations. Here, one could distinguish between manpower, military hardware, and land. Of these, demobilisation of manpower carries the greatest social importance. A related but different problem is the relocation of manpower, as armed forces are pulled back from forward positions. As far as hardware is concerned, items with a dual-use character can be converted to civilian use. But this is much more difficult, if not impossible, for weapon systems and munitions. Here destruction could be called for, which is important for security reasons, but will deduct rather than add to a society's resources.

On the enterprise level, conversion can be defined as the use of the factors of production of a given enterprise, i.e. capital (machines, buildings, etc.), resources, manpower and know-how, for civilian rather than military needs. It must not be confused with diversification, which means that defence firms engage in more production for civilian markets without reducing defence production. Most Anglo-Saxon analysts are sceptical about conversion on the enterprise level, preferring diffusion, that is leaving the adjustment to decreased defence spending to the market, with defence firms contracting or going bankrupt and firms in other sectors expanding in size and number. This approach presupposes the availability of ample capital for setting up new plants. It also presupposes that defence workers can by and large adjust to other jobs. This however is not always so simple. An active policy of economic restructuring, including retraining and support for new investments, preferably on a regional level, could ease adjustment. Cronberg (1992b) argues that in countries like Japan and Russia, where social security and social benefits are tied to the enterprise, and laying off workforce is contradictory to management ethics, enterprise level conversion could provide a socially more adequate solution. It could also be economically more efficient in a situation where capital is not abundant.

An interesting case for studying the process of dismantling the defence system and converting the associated resources is to be found in the "former Soviet Union". The Soviet "war" effort was indeed enormous. The armed forces counted four and a half million persons, backed by a tremendous military industry. The official figure on military spending is 20% of GNP (Kortunov 1992), as compared with less than 6% in the United States. Of the machine-building output, 40–60% was defence related. The national outlays for defence R&D are estimated at a level

between 50% and 75% of the total resources for R&D, compared to 31% in the USA. Defence oriented R&D and construction bureaus employ 70% of the nation's researchers. One fifth of Russia's population is thought to depend either directly or indirectly on this military and industrial complex. In some towns and regions the dependence is even greater. In Omsk in Siberia, a town with 1.5 million inhabitants, 70% of industrial production is for military equipment, and in Udmurtia, an autonomous area in Russia, 83% of production is for military purposes (Konovalov 1992). It is of interest to explore which difficulties the "former Soviet Union" experienced in dealing with this military machine, once its *raison d'être* had disappeared.

2. Lip-service to conversion

Conversion on the political level became official Soviet policy on 7 December 1988, when Gorbachev announced in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly a reduction of military expenditure and production. A few years later it became clear that the various attempts to reallocate even a small part of the massive potential used for defence purposes had not lived up to expectations (Cronberg 1992b, Ballantine 1991, Izyumov 1990). What are the reasons for this?

It can be argued that under Gorbachev conversion was to a great degree declaratory policy. A conversion programme was formulated in a draft law in 1989, and was accepted by the Government in December 1990. It seems to have proposed the conversion to start in 420 enterprises and 200 R&D institutes and design bureaus. Yet the law was not published and not even actually presented to the Supreme Soviet, thus making its financing difficult, if not impossible. Actual policy was directed towards the increase of spin-off from the military to the civilian sector, and a further extension of the military industry's methods to the civilian economy. As mentioned above, conversion should not be confused with increasing "spin-off". In the West, the spin-off argument was traditionally used to legitimize high military spending, especially in R&D, over and above security needs. In the Soviet Union this type of spin-off hardly materialized, because of the watershed between military and civilian production. For although the output of the defence production ministries used for civilian needs amounted to 40%, the tight security controls, even between and inside research institutes, design centres and production units of the same ministries, virtually prohibited the transfer of technology to civilian production.

Increasing such transfers was one of the aims of the Gorbachev government. The first type of transfer involved managers. Thus Boris Balmont, the Minister of General Machine Building (spacecraft and ballistic missiles), a "genius" of the defence industry, was made Minister of Machine Tool Industry. This was not a

success however. He was replaced shortly afterwards for failing to speedily restructure this civilian Ministry.

The second form of transfer was that of methods. Thus, to improve quality in the main civilian sectors, the imitation of the military "voenpred" system of quality control, by well-paid, independent inspectors was undertaken. The "gospriemka" system entailed a similar method, with state quality inspectors working alongside enterprise quality controllers, with responsibility for the acceptance of the final production to state orders. This method, copied from the military production system, has the obvious weakness that the State Standards Committee does not directly represent the interest of the customers, whereas the military control of military products does. In fact, it is a typical "administrative" measure, rather than an introduction of customer control through some kind of market mechanism (Cooper 1990).

A third type of transfer aimed at allowing the civilian sector to profit from technologies developed in the military sector under — previously — intense secrecy. An example here is the effort to make some 600 modern technological applications from the Buran/Energiya space shuttle programme available for civilian industry (Vid 1990).

A fourth type of transfer was organizational. It entailed that military production ministries actually took over civilian enterprises, in order to modernize and reorganize their production process (Alexander 1990). In some cases a whole sector of civilian production was transferred to defence production ministries. A famous example is the taking over in the spring of 1988 of the entire "Minlegpishchemash", the Ministry of Machine Building for the light and food industries, with its 260 enterprises transferred to the defence production ministries. Similarly, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (nuclear weapons) took over civilian nuclear power industry and was renamed Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry (Cooper 1990). However beneficial to the efficiency of the enterprises taken over this might have been, it does represent a substantial increase in power of the defence sector over production sectors vital to civilian society, rather than an increase of the strength of civilian industry as such.

These four types of transfers were welcomed in the more enlightened military-industrial circles, as ways of enhancing the prestige and influence of the more advanced parts of the military sector. Something similar can be said for the opposite of spin-off — a process which we shall call "Spin-back".

In the West one could here think of the development, also through military R&D, of dual-use technologies, which would allow production of components for both civilian and military use, thus increasing the scale of production, and decreasing costs. A Soviet example was the vigorous campaign by aviation circles to diffuse throughout the civilian sector the use of new composite materials

developed for aviation and space/missile purposes, and previously more or less unknown outside the defence sector. The idea was that by increasing the demand, and thereby the scale of production of these materials, costs would fall, thus benefiting the defence production as well (Cooper 1990, p. 183).

Was this policy of increasing spin-off and spin-back adopted by the Gorbachev government to ensure the support of enlightened military-industrial circles for the reduction of the somewhat rigid mass army and production of traditional weapons systems such as tanks? Was this a move towards a leaner but meaner military machine?

3. Conversion in the perestroika period

In the more traditional sectors: tanks, aircraft and medium range ballistic missiles, there were substantial cuts in military procurement under Gorbachev, and attempts to convert the associated military industry. This took place according to the same methods which had been so successful in producing the military build-up. Thus the conversion process was led by Ligachev, the second man in the Communist Party. Entirely in the tradition of central planning, targets in this programme were given in quantitative terms. Conversion was to be started in 420 enterprises and 200 research institutes. Defence industry would raise its output of consumer goods from 40% to 60% of its total output in two years. Goods to be produced were to be selected by the central planning organs rather than the consumer, on the basis of technical feasibility. What this in fact meant was that certain defence plants were simply ordered to produce certain goods, without much concern for consumer demand or for the most economic use of the technical capabilities of the plant in question. In fact, very expensive high-tech methods were often used to produce simple consumer goods, amounting to a great wast of skills and high quality raw materials. This was the origin of the now widespread joke about tank plants producing perambulators. Wast was also due to the failure to adapt the supply streams, still in the hands of the defence production ministries, to the conversion plan. An example of supply problems is the tank plant, ordered to produce sewing machines, which could not get hold of the right components. So it sold tanks on the world market and bought sewing machines in China, and was right on schedule in the end. A similar problem occurred with distribution. This resulted for instance in taps or artificial limbs for invalids piling up in the yards of defence firms.

The civilian goods thus resulting from conversion were expensive, also because high overhead costs, associated with secrecy and privileges, were passed on to the customers as far as possible, as the Government relaxed its price control. Nevertheless, "converted" workers experienced salary cuts and firms loss of

profits, because of the substantially higher price levels of defence systems, compared with civilian products.

On the other hand, defence procurement was cut in a rather haphazard fashion, with enterprises confronted with cancellation of orders for products planned to roll from its plants within six months. The result was that the enterprises most badly hit had to fend more or less for themselves. This involved the necessary ingenuity. Some entrepreneurs who saw the demand for their product shrink, made a deliberate effort to find a new marketable product.* But this was a race with treble handicaps. Due to price controls and a the lack of an independent (legal and efficient) distribution system, there was practically no profitable domestic market. There was no open market for raw materials and intermediary goods and services. And as defence firms were generally not allowed to keep their profits, they had hardly any financial resources to invest in the necessary new machinery and materials. It is no wonder that in this situation conversion failed.

Production for the civilian market by the defence sector increased by 5% in 1989 and 1990 instead of the planned 10% per annum, whilst military procurement was lowered by the envisaged 10% per annum (NATO 1992). Only 50 defence plants had been ordered to convert fully, and of these only 5 or 6 were actually converted (Ballantine 1991). Additional civilian products were exceptionally expensive. The benefit gained by the civilian economy from the defence cuts was thus disappointing, whilst those directly involved in the conversion process were frustrated.

This frustration was one of the factors leading to the coup against Gorbachev. Two of the eight coup leaders were leading representatives of the military industrial complex: Baklanov, the Central Committee secretary responsible for the military production ministries, with a background in the ballistic missile production; and Tizjakov, chairman of the reactionary Union of State Industrial Enterprises. The coup was an attempt to save not only the Communist Party and the centrally planned economy controlled by it, but also the privileged position of defence industry.

4. Militarized structures

In the perestroika period conversion failed because it remained within the bounds of a militarized economy (see also Rubanov 1991, Ballantine 1991). Conversion in a heavily armed country like Russia also implies far-reaching institutional change and thus the redistribution of power and privileges. Such a gigantic military

* For some examples of firms which did succeed in conversion on their own initiative in spite of these handicaps see ter Borg (1992) and Cronberg (1992).

machine could be developed only by creating a specific institutional structure geared to giving the military sector absolute priority. In a sense, the Soviet Union followed the recipe so well formulated by Svechin in 1927, as the law of "the extensive militarization of all aspects of state and public activity". In the course of decades, this had indeed, as Svechin prophesied, resulted in the "over-energetic distortion of the natural forms of economic development" and, to put it mildly, had had "a quite negative effect" and had hindered "the overall success of" the country. To allow for a more "natural" development of the economy, a demilitarization of the institutional structure of the whole economy was called for.

The structure of Soviet society is usually described in political or economic terms. Its restructuring is then designated as a process of democratization and economic reform. Here, the stress is on a third aspect of perhaps equal importance, the militarization of Soviet society. The assumption is that these three structural characteristics hang closely together. The Soviet Union had a planned economy and an undemocratic political system partly in order to channel society's energy towards the fulfilment of military needs. The Soviet war economy can be described in terms of five characteristics.

The first is the central planning of production, in terms of the definition of the end product and the control of production factors needed to produce it. Not only did the Ministry of Defence place orders for end- and intermediate products (i.e., prototypes, etc.), which is the common approach in practically all countries. R&D and production itself was also performed by the state, via the seven Ministries of military production. These ministries had their own research institutes, design bureaus and production plants. This meant that vertical relations were paramount, and that enterprises hardly had any horizontal relations with consumers or suppliers.

A second typical element is the interweaving of state and party institutions at every level of policy-making and implementation. At the highest level, the Defence Council set tasks for the armed forces. It seemed to act as a subcommittee of the Politburo, but was a state body which could make legally binding decisions. It consisted of the highest representatives of both state ministries and the party, with the party's general secretary at its head. The head of the Military-Industrial Commission was probably also a member. This commission seems to have been the pivotal body for the planning of the defence industry performed by the seven defence production ministries. Here again, the members included not only representatives of scientists, the military, or the defence production ministries, but also of the party. An important figure was the party secretary for defence industry, himself a Politburo member.* Further down the ladder, party representatives were in place at the enterprise level, where they kept an eye on policy implementation.

* Baklanov, one of the coup leaders, had this function under Gorbachev.

Primary party organizations functioned on the plant level, and managers were usually *nomenklatura* positions, which meant that appointments had to be made from a list of "reliable" persons made up by party organs. Thus party and defence interests merged, and there was no countervailing power which could counter and control defence interests.

A third aspect is the privileged position of the defence sector in the economy. It was provided with the best machines and a more or less guaranteed supply of the necessary materials. High quality labour was attracted by the privileges offered in terms of salary and, equally important in a scarcity economy, in terms of housing, medical care and recreation. Such a system of social benefits was meant to hamper labour mobility, as was the social security system, which included pensions and family allowances but not unemployment benefits. The customer, i.e., the military, was also given a privileged position, being entitled to perform quality control before accepting the product ordered.

The fourth characteristic of the militarized economy is the high level of secrecy, not only between the military and the civilian sector, but even between parts of the military sector itself. Internal restrictions on information exchange are considered to be far more detrimental to technological progress in Russia than the restrictions imposed by the West under the COCOM regulations (Rubanov 1991, p. 10).

The fifth characteristic is the one-sided geographical distribution of defence industry, with 75% all defence industry concentrated in the Russian Federation. Clusters of defence firms were concentrated around a few towns, such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Perm in the Urals. Defence firms were connected vertically to their respective Ministries in Moscow, and there were hardly any horizontal regional ties. Many of the defence industries were in one of more than 80 closed towns, known only by their postal codes, which depended wholly on defence and were completely isolated from their rural surroundings (Malei 1993). Reflecting the imperialistic character of the Soviet Union, the armed forces consisted of a core of professionals mainly of ethnic Russian origin, with conscripts mainly from the other republics.

Not only the characteristics of the military industry are relevant here, but also those of the civilian production. In many ways they are just the other side of the coin. The civilian economy was underprivileged, inefficient and on a low technological level. Interestingly, enterprises of the Ministries for military production produce quite substantially for civilian needs. Traditionally, the civilian production by the military sector has been 40% of its total production. This made a rapid mobilization of the civilian industrial potential possible in times of war. Instead of aiming at cost-effective satisfaction of civilian needs, the choice of production techniques and locations was guided by mobilization flexibility and survivability in times of war. In fact, such mixed firms were obliged to retain facilities and plans

for rapid mobilization of their civilian production capacity. It is the underprivileged position of civilian industry and the treatment of the best part of civilian industry as a mobilization potential that most convincingly show that the Soviet economy as a whole was "militarized". It was this institutional militarization that made it possible to divert a great part of society's resources to defence.

5. The institutional lag

The Soviet example shows that at the end of a war or an arms race we can be confronted not only with a technical, but also with an institutional lag. Dismantling the military machine and converting the resources devoted to it to civilian needs is not just a technical operation but requires internal institutional change. Still, this takes time. The institutions of a militarized economy are not everlasting and not as tenacious as some munitions; but they are much slower to change than the prejudices which they served. Institutional change entails a redistribution of power and prestige, and is therefore vehemently opposed by those with vested interests in the existing structure. Change on the scale of a whole society is especially cumbersome. The ensuing power struggle can result in a political crisis as political organs fail to produce and implement decisions. Because of the power struggles, the process of institutional change is partial and inconsistent, with often detrimental consequences for those concerned. Fundamental institutional change in an economy can quite easily lead to an economic crisis. The process of institutional change is also easily reversible as power relations shift. Its erratic and unpredictable path causes great uncertainty, possibly leading to a degree of anarchy, in which trust in the state to provide for certain conditions of individual survival is lost. A social crisis develops, with individuals and groups providing for their own survival, if necessary by illegal or even violent means.

The political, economic and social crises in a disarming country may be so intense as to hinder the orderly dismantling of the military machine. On top of its technically difficult and costly character it can then become a dangerous process, resulting in the diffusion of arms throughout society. The State, which had already lost most of its legitimacy, also loses its monopoly on organized force, which, according to Weber, is its very essence. Together with the political, economic and social crisis, this produces the conditions in which civil wars become possible.

In social theory, inspired by the 19th century thinkers, crises are seen as something to be got through on the road to perfection, and their victims as martyrs for humanity's progress. Yet, recent history teaches us that sometimes "Verelendung" is not overcome. Far from rising as a phoenix from the ashes of its dis-

integrated institutions, some nations do not even manage to "muddle through". The end of a war or an intensive arms race does not necessarily produce a peace dividend. It can also bring forth civil war. A peace researcher must face even that worst case scenario.

6. Demilitarization in Russia

What we have been seeing since the August coup in the (former) Soviet Union can be interpreted as such a risky process of institutional change. The militarized institutional structure of the Russian economy appeared to fall apart in a surprisingly short time. The Communist Party lost its central position and was even banned. The Defence Council and the Military-industrial Commission, the state/party organs directing the military economy, disappeared. Price liberalization was introduced as a first step to replacing the central planning system by a market economy. At Christmas 1991 the Soviet Union as imperial superstructure officially ceased to exist. In Russia, which had inherited the major part of the Soviet military machine, there were cuts in military procurement by 70%, in some branches even 90%, in the first months of 1992. And defence firms threw open their gates to the former enemy, enticing foreigners to invest in conversion.

The general enthusiasm for joining the world market, after decades of isolation and secrecy, was also to be found in the formulation of a new Russian conversion policy.

On March 20, 1992 a "Law of the Russian Federation on conversion of defence industry in the Russian Federation" was signed by President Jeltsin (*Conversion Cooperation Newsletter*, August 1992, pp. 7-9). Contrary to previous Soviet policy, which aimed at conversion inside existing Soviet enterprises within traditional planning structures, the approach of the Russian government was externally oriented, relying heavily on the opportunities on the world market and investments from the West. The idea was to merge the technological and other capabilities of the Russian defence industries with Western industrial potential (Kortunov 1992). Joint projects were to be undertaken which preserved and made use of the existing capable teams of Russian firms and design institutes. The projects were to be organized in joint stock enterprises, not remaining in the organizational structure in which they were previously embedded. The Western input into these ventures would be mature manufacturing, marketing and financial skills, and obviously capital. The Russian government would create the legal conditions for these joint ventures and the necessary infrastructure. Converting enterprises would be entitled to carry out foreign activities independently, within the laws covering export of defence systems.

The successful implementation of this conversion policy presupposed that the militarized institutions had indeed been swept away in the aftermath of the August coup, and that they could be instantly replaced by institutions adapted to the development of a civilian economy. Institutional change turned out to be slow however. A year after the policy formulation the legal conditions and the infrastructure needed to attract foreign capital were not in place. The conditions to acquire foreign aid — price stability and a stable currency — were not met. On the contrary, the country experienced a galloping inflation (reaching a hyperinflation of 2600% per annum in February 1993) while the exchange rate of the ruble was divided by four from February 1992 until February 1993. This was in part due to the partial character of institutional change. On the one hand, the Government had liberalized prices, thus giving up price control, one of the tenets of central planning. On the other hand, state firms retained their monopoly. In spite of the formal legitimacy of private firms, apparatchiks used various means, from existing networks to simple bureaucratic obstruction, to keep the monopoly of State enterprises more or less intact. Thus, high prices were unable to induce production increases. On the contrary, production fell by about one fifth in 1992. State firms, and especially defence firms, got heavily into debt, but were able to obtain easy and cheap credits, as the Central Bank (which was rather illogically subordinated to the Supreme Soviet, not to the Government) printed ever more rubles. This also contributed to inflation.

Another factor aggravating the economic crisis was the partial character of the disintegration of the Soviet Union as an imperial structure. The USSR was disbanded, but the imperialistic geographical division of labour, once coordinated from Moscow, was still in place, and decentralized trade relations between former USSR republics had not yet developed. Enterprises lost suppliers and customers, who now suddenly became foreigners. As a consequence all republics suffered substantial economic losses. The production in Russia fell by 20% in 1992.

Thus the partial character of institutional change, both between republics and inside them, led to the enrichment of speculators and the deprivation of the large masses of the population. The relevant political bodies were not even debating these issues, being locked in a seemingly endless power struggle between executive and legislative bodies resulting in a constitutional crisis. The Communist party had been liquidated in name, but many party members retained their positions. In 1993 Jeltsin's ban on the party was declared illegal and the party reestablished, without regaining its formal position however. The Congress of People's deputies, among whom (ex)communists held a majority, tried to strip the president of most of his functions in March 1993, on the basis of the old Communist axiom of "all power to the Soviets".

The erratic and unpredictable course of politics and the economic crisis led to political apathy among the population. Daily experience became a struggle for life, in which people were pressed to acquire an income on top of their salary or pension. This was mostly attempted by trade, carried out very inefficiently, by more corruption or by crime, especially blackmailing or robbing those who did produce valuable goods or services. All three methods, which added nothing of real value to the economy, contributed to inflation. Crime and corruption flourished in a situation in which political decision-making and policy implementation were paralyzed by confrontation politics at every level, and where the public authorities were losing control (see for instance *Moscow News*, April 1993). Less than one third of taxes due were collected. Tax collectors, of which 70% were women, were afraid of being threatened when performing their duties (*Moscovia Consultancy*, 1993). Citizens were forced to turn to private security teams and possession of weapons to provide for their own protection. The attempts to change the militarized economy had thus contributed to an economic, political and social crisis, rather than paving the road to a peace dividend.

This treble crisis had a negative impact on the process of dismantling the military machine inherited from the Soviet Union. Conversion at the political level, a reallocation of society's resources to civilian needs, was severely hampered by the partial character of institutional change. Diffusion was hindered by the economic crisis. Scientists and technicians from defence industry who tried to set up business in the civilian sector were hampered by the lack of affordable credits. Commercial credits were short term (two months) and with rates of interest surpassing the inflation. Diversification on the enterprise level was hindered because demand fell as markets in now independent republics became more difficult to enter. The falling production lowered the demand for intermediary goods, and an inflation without adequate compensation in salaries led to a collapse of the market for durable consumer goods. Firms were now under severe pressure to convert as defence procurement had been so drastically cut, but converting firms were obliged, as reaffirmed by the Supreme Soviet in 1992, to retain their mobilization potential. Export of weapons was one of the ways in which defence firms sought to counter this difficult situation.*

As for the lowest level of the dismantling process, there were practically no financial means or facilities available for destroying the hardware made obsolete by disarmament treaties; the fate of nuclear and chemical warheads gave special cause for concern. There were not by far enough facilities for the military families returning in ever greater numbers from outlying areas.

* For a plea to finance conversion and social facilities through weapons export, see Malei (1993).

7. Demilitarization and the armed forces

The end of the Cold war, and the erratic institutional changes ensuing from it had particularly severe consequences for the armed forces and their families, once a relatively privileged category. Large numbers had been forced to pull back rapidly from the former Soviet satellite countries. When the Soviet Union disintegrated the military were pressed to leave former Soviet republics, in particular the Baltic States. Civil wars in the periphery sometimes forced Russian military families to leave overnight. The additional need for housing in Russia was a burden added to a severe housing problem already existing for middle and lower officers, as well as for civilians.

On the other hand, the partial institutional changes led to a diminishing of construction capabilities.* The building brigades of the armed forces, expected to construct the infrastructure for the new living quarters, disintegrated themselves as conscripts formerly recruited from other republics stayed home. Supplies of building elements, always scarce in Russia, were further hampered by the deepening economic crisis. Most building elements now entered the commodity exchange market, where they were subject to several rounds of price rises, before reaching their final destination. Here as in other sectors price liberalization had hardly brought forth the entry of new competitors on the market.

The civilian state construction firms tightened their grip on the construction market. New private companies were hampered by all sorts of bureaucratic obstruction. The necessity to pay bureaucrats for practically every necessary permit drove prices further up. Houses became so expensive that the traditional scheme of state financing collapsed, as rents were unable to keep up with construction costs. Construction companies were enticed to concentrate on private housing for the *nouveaux riches* from semi-legal trading circles, former *nomenklatura* and mafia, or on facilities for foreigners. Social housing was neglected.

The rapidly rising prices of housing were matched by the decline in government real income, so that housing for military families, now a Government priority, could not be financed. Even worse, many military men were receiving their salaries, already much lower in real terms due to the rapid inflation, only intermittently. On top of that came uncertainty about career perspectives. After a long period of indecision a reduction of armed forces was announced, from the two million left to Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union to about 1.3 million. Whether promised finances for retraining would be available, or new jobs emerge in the civilian economy, seemed unlikely.

* Information on the housing problems is mainly based on interviews with Alexander Rackitsky, director of a private construction company building for the Air Force, on 23 March 1992 and 4 August 1992, and on a case study of a building project in Monina near Moscow.

Apart from lack of housing, lower real incomes and dubious career perspectives, the military faced another problem. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, succeeded by the elusive Commonwealth of Independent States, left the former Soviet armed forces without clear hierarchical relations. On the one hand, the majority of conscripts, who traditionally came from other republics, did not turn up. The official figure for conscript turnout rates in the autumn of 1992 was 20%. This left the professionals, officers of Russian origin, with no more than a handful of subordinates. On the other hand, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the political stalemate in the Russian Federation left them without a clear master. In short, the armed forces, once the pride of the Soviet Union and the fear of the West, were left in a situation of anarchy and deprivation.

The disappearance of clear and legitimate power structures gave the military the possibility to find their own ways of countering deprivation. Military sold their hardware and their services, from helping out with the local harvest to acting as private bodyguards (*The Times*, March 10, 1993). Russian mercenaries were spotted in Armenia. Sjevarnadze invited Russian military experts to serve in the new Georgian Army (*Moscow News*, April 1993). Volunteers were organized, for instance by the leader of the nationalistic Socialist party, Beljajew, to serve with the Serbs in Bosnia (*Moscow News*, February 1993). Units stationed west of the Dnjestr river in Moldavia freed themselves from Moscow's control (*Die Welt*, April 1 1993), and in Russia itself some local commanders were reported to be acting as more or less independent warlords. These developments reached such a scale that a bill was proposed to Parliament prohibiting the organization of private armies of mercenaries (*Moscow News*, April 1993).

8. Conclusion — fuel for new fires

The image of the enemy against which the Soviet Union had built the largest defence system in history has evaporated in the course of a few years; but the dismantling of that system, and the conversion of substantial parts of the resources devoted to it, have lagged behind the relaxation of international tensions. Given the size and technical level of the defence system, this task would in any case be time consuming and costly, if not in some cases even technically unfeasible. In addition, the Soviet Union was also faced with an institutional lag. Its economy remained organized for war when the Cold War was over.

Under Gorbachev attempts were made to dismantle and convert the military machine whilst remaining more or less within the limits of these institutional bounds. The failure of this approach possibly contributed to the August coup. In

its aftermath a process of rapid deinstitutionalization took place, including a demilitarization of the economy. Yet, as so often, this process of institutional change provoked intense power struggles resulting in indecision and lack of policy implementation. The result was that the demilitarization of the economy was partial and inconsistent. This was a major factor leading to the deepening of the economic crisis. This in its turn hampered the conversion of military industry, encouraging firms to export arms and know-how. The economic deprivation and the political anarchy also contributed to a social crisis, with individuals turning away from the state in a bid for personal survival. The military suffered from these crises in two additional ways: economic deprivation was heightened by their forced retreat; and anarchy was intensified by the diluting of hierarchical structures. Their situation led at least some of them to sell their arms and services, which were in demand due to the inability of public authorities to tackle the increasing crime rate. This led to a diffusion of arms throughout society, so that the government lost its monopoly over organized force. Whether these developments will lead to new armed conflicts in the Russian Federation itself or between Russians and other ethnic groups, as in Moldavia, remains to be seen. Already more than a handful of civil wars have broken out in the periphery of Russia, in some of which Russian mercenaries have offered their services.

It is too early to say what the role of Russian arms and men has been in these wars. Their origin obviously lies in all kinds of specific factors, such as ethnical and religious contradictions. In how far the end of the Cold War in general, and the failing conversion process in the USSR and its successors in particular, has contributed to the outbreak and continuation of these wars, is a question for both debate and further research. That a war cannot be fought without a fighting capability is a truism, the concern expressed in this chapter is that these capabilities can be strengthened, and perhaps even brought to a critical point by chips from a larger defence system in the process of being dismantled.

The point of this chapter has been to explore the consequences of the fact that intentions can change faster than capabilities and the institutional context in which they were fostered. This is especially the case if the defence system is technologically advanced. This holds for the build-up, but also for the dismantling of these systems, that is when intentions become more peaceful. Conversion might be initiated within the inherited militarized structures, but will sooner or later require institutional change. This however will bring forth power struggles, making reforms partial and reversible. Depending on the relative weight of the defence sector and its associated institutions in the economy and society as a whole, this can lead to a political, economic and social crisis. This makes the dismantling and conversion processes even more difficult. A possible result is that chips from the old defence system act as fuel for new fires.

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III. What future for the new market economies

Evaluation of the process after four years from the beginning of "Autumn of Nations"

by

KATARZYNA ŻUKROWSKA

The paper presents an evaluation of the transition process in post-communist countries after four years from the beginning of "Autumn of Nations". It discusses Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union. Considering different strategies and different models of transformation and their results and stating several problems which still are considered as open questions. It gives rich updated statistical data, shows some similarities as well as differences of the processes underway in the region, and stresses a strong interrelation between changes in the political life and further democratization of the economy.

The final conclusion is controversial (for neoliberals and liberals) and internationally provocative, as it says that despite initial positive signs in the economy the expectations of the countries in the region are being revised gradually. This in turn will probably lead in the near future to a revision of the policy which has to incorporate such elements as job creating, industrial policy, development of infrastructure, social benefits and environment.

1. Democracy: what do you mean by that?

Despite national differences one can see strong similarities in the stages of power transfer in all European countries belonging in the past to the Soviet sphere of dominance. In each case there was an evolutionary process which could be compared to a "gradual inheritance" shifting the political power from the old generation to a new one. And this was the beginning of the shift in political power, making a sharp division between the old and new elites. Now it is high time to break those divisions and restructure the elites.

The first leg of the road towards political democratization in all East-European countries went through round table agreements where opposition elites, no matter how strong they were and what was their background, came to an agreement with the communist party leadership. In the second stage the communist party was dissolved or reformed. In the third stage a multi-party system started to develop, and

Different strategies of systemic changes in East Central Europe

Evaluation of the process after four years from the beginning of "Autumn of Nations"

by

KATARZYNA ŻUKROWSKA

The paper presents an evaluation of the transition process in post-communist countries after four years from the beginning of "Autumn of Nations". It discusses Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union, considering different strategies and different models of transformation and their results and stating several problems which still are considered as open questions. It gives rich updated statistical data, shows some similarities as well as differences of the processes underway in the region, and stresses a strong interrelation between changes in the political life and further democratization of the economy.¹

The final conclusion is controversial (for monetarists and liberals) and internationally provocative as it says that despite initial positive signs in the economy the expectations of the countries in the region are being revised gradually. This in turn will probably lead in the near future to a revision of the policy which has to incorporate such elements as job creating, industrial policy, development of infrastructure, social benefits and environment.

1. Democracy: what do you mean by that?

Despite national differences one can see strong similarities in the stages of power transfer in all European countries belonging in the past to the Soviet sphere of dominance. In each case there was an evolutionary process which could be compared to a "gradual inheritance" shifting the political power from the old generation to a new one. And this was the beginning of the shift in political power, making a sharp division between the old and new elites. Now it is high time to break those divisions and reshuffle the elites.

The first leg of the road towards political democratization in all East-European countries went through round table agreements where opposition elites, no matter how strong they were and what was their background, came to an agreement with the communist party leadership. In the second stage the communist party was dissolved or renamed. In the third stage a multi-party system started to develop, and

that was followed by fourth stage of first steps in economic reform. Schematically, systemic changes were introduced in this specific order, although in some cases those stages were introduced in parallel rather than in sequence.

This was the most natural way to transfer the power in a peaceful manner in all the countries of this region. Exceptions were defined by casualties that occurred here or there: in Romania, former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus republics. But such revolutions cannot be carried out without certain losses and costs. It is rather clear that tensions have not been overcome in this region.

The effectiveness of the new political elites is measured by at least three indicators: the first is their ability to carry out decisions; the second is the frequency with which they are changed; the third one concerns their degree of radicalization, whether growing, abating or stabilized.

From a close distance quick changes and disintegration of political elites seems to be a destabilizing factor, and the lack of such movements is interpreted as a comfortable stabilization. From a distance they are also very often interpreted this way. In other words, disintegration and changes are interpreted as chaotic "over-democratization", while some kind of political stagnation is taken as calm political evolution.

The reality is not so simple as that. Although a calm political evolution is possible, it more often means a lack of opposition, which would be needed to give a stimulation kick and control those in power. It seems that political fermentation is necessary at the first stages of systemic changes as it helps to select the right people and eliminate political wranglers. It helps to define different groups of interests and creates lobbies which identify themselves with specific interests. Such an opinion is supported by both political scientists and economists. Of course the intensity of this process can be different in different countries.²

Ken Jowitt, the author of *New World Disorder — The Leninist Extinction* and co-editor of a journal called *East European Politics and Societies* says that Solidarity — the biggest civic movement in this region — helped to integrate people from different societies, break down prejudices and work out habits of tolerance and cooperation over the existing divisions. In his opinion, despite numerous existing obstacles, this gives the best prospects for carrying the systemic revolution to a success.

In his opinion the route to democracy of countries in this region is going to be rather long and curvy, as in the case of the Latin American region. The main similarities between those regions are: fragmentation of social life; such institutions as army or labor unions are developing into a state in a state; dominating capitalism is bureaucratic capitalism, with a central role of state and interpenetration between state employees and businessmen.

Elites have to define themselves in the new conditions, adjusting to them and integrating into more representative groupings. According to Jowitt the biggest

danger for transformations should be seen in "movements of rage": quasi Nazi, nihilistic movements that will develop in remote peripheries, far from intellectual and cultural urban centers, uniting people under such populist slogans as renaissance of national cultures, being against everything that is cosmopolitan, western, different and strange...

The first years after a start into systemic changes have to be considered as a period in which a new political elite, interest groupings and lobbies are created. This process is developing with different speed in different countries. It has to embrace first of all disintegration, which is followed or will be followed by integration when the elites find out that they have to work out a consensus to make cooperation possible.

It seems that one of the main tasks of the political elites in those early stages of systemic changes is to initiate and advance as far as possible the process of marketization of the economy. There are two reasons for that: first that further political changes are closely interlinked with changes in the economic field³; second that increasing political dispersion can lead to a paralysis in the field of decision-making and implementation.

Practice shows that problems connected with this issue can be overcome in at least three ways. One is by granting special powers to the government, which very often would not know how to use them effectively; such powers can be misused despite the intentions or may finally lead to a dictatorship. Another alternative is to leave the economy in the hands of an infant market, in the belief of the superiority of an imperfect market mechanism over an imperfect government. The third way means new legislation admitting to the parliament only people representing bigger political parties, which would force integration and consensus among divided politicians and help to select knowledgeable bureaucrats.

The last possibility seems to be the best one for the new democracies, as it helps to unite political elites and gives prospects for finding a balance between those who are taking the political decisions and those who are implementing them.

Conclusion: changes are irreversible, but no one knows how far they will go in each of the countries and how long the transition will last...

2. Different strategies, different models to change the economy

The strategies of transforming the economies differed from country to country as far as the speed and depth of the applied therapy is concerned. This in turn resulted in differences in the outcome of the changes. It is rather clear that the economic strategies have their political dimension, which indicates what kind of market each country is aiming at.

It should be stressed that there are no doubts in those countries, from the extreme left to the extreme right wing, that the economic system should embrace market economy. The parties disagree on the shape of the market. Putting it differently, the main question is: what kind of market? Should it be a liberal one, a social democrat solution or a social market⁴?

Another question concerns the choice between the IMF program of stabilization and controlling the budget deficit and, on the other hand, a policy embracing investments in the infrastructure, financed by a deficit, not by newly printed money as in the past, but by government loans from abroad, which cannot be considered as a factor that generates inflation.

Supporters of the IMF stabilizing program argue that the economies will start to develop when the inflation is calmed down and the recovery will be automatic. The advocates of the second concept say that the process of controlling inflation after putting the prices on a real footing, reflecting the level of market prices, is too long and that it decapitates all the assets of the producers and drags the economy into a deep post-communist structural crisis. By contrast, the policy they offer cuts the burdens of transition and helps to stimulate the development.

Generally speaking, the strategy of each country should be studied as a separate model of systemic transition. All strategies that were applied in this region fall under three groupings: shock therapy, a mildly radical course or a middle, in-between course.⁵

Poland: the reform here is the most radical in the region and could be compared with the methods used in East Germany.

In 1991 L. Balcerowicz introduced his "big bang" reform which covered elimination of the most price controls, convertibility of currency and lowering trade barriers. The external relations are regulated by means of the exchange rate which is adjusted according to the moves of exchange rates of main world currencies.

In 1991 and 1992 the private sector was growing at a high speed, which was fuelled by the small privatization scheme. At the end of 1992 over 90% of retailing and distribution and a significant share of transport was in private hands. Most restrictions on foreign investments were abolished. The Warsaw stock exchange began its operations in April 1991. Privatization of state-owned factories is being pursued through liquidations, management buy-outs, joint ventures and sales to foreigners, but is going more slowly than expected. A program of mass privatization was discussed in the Sejm (Polish Parliament) in March 1993. Despite this rather slow speed of privatization, which is criticized by some Polish economists, the private sector has a relatively high share in GNP, more than 45%. Out of a total number of 14 mn people in the labor force, 8 mn engaged in the private sector.

The scale of inflation in 1992 was rather high. Early estimates indicate that the price index grew by about 50% during the year.

Privatization of the banking system is continued with the stress put on expansion of commercial banking. The interest rate is high, although it was lowered from 60% in 1991 to about 40% in 1993. The high interest rate is playing a double role: it stops companies from replacing cancelled subsidies by credit loans and crowds out the demand for credits, forcing the companies to adjust to market conditions and external relations.

Czech and Slovak Republics — I am writing about those countries together as their divorce at the end of December 1992 is a new thing and until that moment those countries were developing as one state. The divorce will help both countries to take sovereign decisions about the future of economic reforms, as this problem was arising the greatest controversies between the two republics. The Czech Republic was opting for a shock therapy forced by Vaclav Klaus, while the Slovak Republic was supporting the idea of social market economy and state intervention.

Talking about the divorce, one should mention its consequences for both countries. Preliminary estimates show that the Slovak Republic will be a net loser, while the Czech Republic will gain from the divorce. First of all, standards of living are different in the two countries (GDP per capita in 1991 for the Slovak Republic was estimated at 1,943 US \$, while in the Czech Republic it reached the level of 2,346 US \$). The disintegration also resulted in the fall of mutual turnover. In 1992 the drop of exports to the Czech Republic for Slovakia was 20%, while in the opposite direction it was 17%.

The program applied in Czecho-Slovakia was less radical than in Poland, which is mainly reflected in the approach to liberalization of prices. In 1991, 15% of all prices remained under direct government control. The remaining 85% were either indirectly controlled or completely free. The government also controls the levels of wages. The rate of inflation is considerably limited: in 1992 it did not exceed 12%. The low rate of inflation and a positive foreign trade balance made possible the lowering of the discount rate in the Central Bank, which was decreased in March 1992 from 9.5% to 9.0%, and in August further to 8%.

Despite the fact that small privatization proceeded with greater moderation than in Poland a program of mass privatization was launched in 1992. The private sector contributes 1/4 of the GNP. By mid-1992 the contribution of the private sector was 22.9% in the Czech Republic, while in Slovakia it did not exceed 5%.

On 1 January 1991, internal convertibility of the currency was introduced, but still the access to foreign exchange cannot be considered as unrestricted. After a slight devaluation of crown in 1991 it gained in value in 1992 by nearly 10%.

Hungary is following a three-year reconstruction plan, which was published in September 1990. It encompasses reduction of intervention in economic processes, adjustment of the financial mechanism to market economy rules and expansion of the role of the private sector. In contrast to Poland, stabilization and economic balance are to be achieved without essential shocks.

Prices were liberalized on a smaller scale than in Poland or Czecho-Slovakia. Quite a big share of prices is indirectly controlled by the government. According to estimates the scale of inflation in 1992 was 23–24%.

Substantial progress has been made in Hungary in 1991 in liberalization of foreign trade, although the government is very cautious in its policy on convertibility of the domestic currency. Despite a price rise the exchange rate of forint did not change in 1992. According to Hungarian economists the exchange rate has been lowered, compared to its real value.

Hungary is a reformer with long-lasting traditions and already had some elements of market economy under the communists, such as private business and a rudimentary stock exchange, state-owned commercial banks and a large number of small private business companies. The private sector contributes roughly 35% of the GDP.

Those long-lasting traditions are working to its advantage and help this country to avoid many adverse side-effects of the passage from one system to another.

Bulgaria — the market program reforms were commenced in February 1991 with liberalization of almost all prices. Despite that step, the decision to go into a market economy was taken in October 1991. Most of the institutions and mechanisms were reorganized with a view of meeting the requirements of a social market economy.

Bulgarians stress that their country is the most stable as far as the social and political tensions are concerned.

The country had a favourable balance of payments in 1992 and is negotiating the conditions of repaying the external debts with the London Club, which considers the possibility of a 80% debt write-off. The privatization program is going slower than it was planned, although the speed differs from area to area. It is faster in services than in the industry. In agriculture 50% of the land was returned to the owners.

Of course the process also has some shadows. One of them is the fall of industrial production, the increase of inflation (75% in 1992) and unemployment (20,000 lost job per month). The rate of unemployment is 12% of the entire labour force.

The fall in industrial production was estimated at 17.5%, while in 1991 it exceeded 22%.

In 1993 the exchange rate of lev has been increased from 26.63 l/US\$ to 26.48 l/US\$. Bulgarian National Bank used 23 mn of dollars for keeping the exchange rate of its currency. The interest rate went up from 47% to 51%.

Romania — the program commenced here in 1991 resembles the Bulgarian one. It gave a start by liberalization of prices, almost 50% of them having already been freed in 1990. The next stages of introducing real prices were postponed by worker protests.

Wages are subjected to state control. The government was forced by workers to rise the wages several times. The inflation is very high. The monthly index of price rise exceeds 10%. The early estimates for price rise in first eight months of 1992 show an increase of 228%. The share of the private sector in GNP does not exceed 20%.

The Romanian government still controls foreign trade, licenses being required for imports and exports of the overwhelming majority of commodities. The Romanian currency remains internally as well as externally inconvertible. Despite that, the exchange rate of the dollar to the leu is soaring: between March 1990 and March 1991 by 74%, and between March 1991 and March 1992 by 435%.

The unemployment rate in this country is fairly low in comparison to the other countries of the region and amounts to 3% of the labor force. The industrial production fell by over 13%, while in 1991 it fell 17%.

*The Soviet Union, CIS and former Soviet Republics*⁶: The formal breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 threw into sharp relief the differences between the republics over reform policy. Most of the republics have liberalized their prices in accordance with Yeltsin's announcement in October 1991 of a complete liberalization of prices, effective from 1 January 1992. Some prices have already been freed in 1990, what has led in practice to hikes of several hundred percent. In June 1992 prices in Russia were higher by 886% in comparison with their level a year before. The rises of prices were irregular: highest in January 1992: 350%, lowest in summer: 9%, increasing again in autumn to 20%.

The hyperinflation was accompanied by a deep downturn of the exchange rate: from 210 Rb/US\$ in September to 350 Rb/US\$ in October and over 400 Rb/US\$ by the end of 1992. The hyperinflation acceleration was to a large extent due to bringing the petrol prices up close to world market level.

Russia has difficulties with keeping the budget deficit within the 5% limit agreed with the IMF. It is estimated that the budget deficit in 1992 was somewhere between 12 and 18%.

The unemployment rate is estimated at 1,5% of the total labor force. Over 230,000 people were registered as unemployed in Russia. According to ILO estimates the total unemployment in former Soviet Union will reach 15–30 mn in short time; estimates from other sources are even higher, expecting this indicator to grow up to 30–50 mn.

The industrial production fell down by 18.8% in 1992, while a year earlier this indicator was estimated at 5%. In other republics of the former USSR the downswing in production was much deeper: Lithuania by 50%, Estonia, Moldavia and Latvia by 30%, Belorussia by 10% and Ukraine by 9%.

The main aim of the economic program in the former republics of the USSR is to calm down the inflation. In Russia it has to be limited to the level of 70% per year, what gives 3% each month, in Ukraine 6%, in Latvia 2% by mid-1993.

It is planned that the subsidies for state-owned plants are going to be cancelled gradually in 1993. The only progress made in 1991 in privatization in the former Soviet Union was in sporadic cases which involved only small establishments (mainly stores) and were carried out spontaneously by local authorities.

The rises of wages in all the republics were lagging behind the rises in prices. In Russia wages were multiplied by 11 in 1992 since the prices were multiplied by 26, this meant a fall in real earnings by 56%. It is estimated that about 4 mn citizens in Russia live under the poverty limit. The estimates show that in other republics the proportion between price and wage rises are similar to those observed in Russia. For instance, in Lithuania the wages were raised 17-fold, the prices multiplied by 32. In Latvia the real decrease of earnings is estimated at 30%, in Estonia at 25%.

In 1991 there was also a partial decentralization of foreign trade. However all imports and exports continued to be handled by state enterprises, which were fully taking advantage of their monopolistic position.

Conclusion: the difficulties in transforming the economies into a market system have become more apparent in 1992. This can be illustrated by such economic indicators as the fall in the economic performance, increased unemployment, rising inflation and difficulties in keeping the planned level of budget deficit. In addition, a decreasing demand in the internal market and deep perturbances in the external relations should be considered as factors which halt the speed of recovery.

3. Positive signs

Despite a generally sad picture of the economy in the region there are some signs indicating that things are going the right direction.

Some of the signs could be seen in Section 2, such as the falling rate of inflation and the decelerating growth of unemployment as well as the feeble and hesitant increase in the industrial output noted in the Polish economy in the spring 1992 and at the end of the year.

The countries in the region were successful in improving the balance of external trade and payments. The miracle was extremely difficult, especially in regard of shrinking export markets after dissolving CMEA, the switch from transfer rubles into dollar payments and from the periodically adjustable but low and unrealistic CMEA prices to real market level prices. All three countries leading in the reform process noted high rates of exports to Western markets over the last five, six years. The Polish balance of foreign trade shows that even in a slump economy having serious problems with competitiveness of its exports, this country was able in a relatively short time to replace the less demanding Eastern markets by Western ones with tough competition.

The privatization process is accelerating and has growing influence on the branch structure of the industrial production. Despite lack of deeper changes produced by an active industrial policy, new investments and buy-offs are shaping the economy according to the new needs of the internal and external market.

Conclusion: the positive signs of transformations have a special meaning and should be announced in public. In doing so the government must be aware that lies and false information on those issues will turn against it in short time and that democracy, even in its infant stages, like in this region, has its own rules. Very often the new political elites forget about this fact and behave according to the well-known totalitarian patterns.

4. The revision of expectations

The first years of the reforms have shown that there is a close interaction between politics and economy in the first stages of the transition. In the literature I have met the opinion that the transition of the economy depends on the transition in the political life of a country, as well as statements to the opposite effect. My opinion on this issue combines the two ideas, as I say that there is a feedback between democratization of the economy and democratization of the political life.

The old system had a built-in safety mechanism which limited all economic reforms at the stage where they could undermine it. In other words, the experience of the previously undertaken attempts to reform the economy brought about the conclusion that the economic system cannot be changed into a more effective one without parallel changes in the political system. To put it differently: the economic reform has to be forced politically and this moreover requires support from the nation. It cannot be achieved against the will of the people. The depth of changes in the economy allows further changes in the political life of a transforming country. A semi-democracy can develop into a full democracy like a larva develops into a beautiful butterfly, but this is conditioned by the development of transformations which can be stopped at any point by freezing the status.

At the beginning of the transition period people were supporting system changes as they were promised a quick improvement of their standards of living. The first years of the reforms brought about deep changes, but only a small fraction of each nation in this region can experience all the benefits. This situation is natural and well-known to the people living in developed democracies, but it is something new for people experiencing first stages of democracy in this part of the world.

For most people systemic transitions introduced one positive effect: the shelves in shops are full and the lines in shops have vanished; but earnings are low and people are deprived of most of the social benefits they had in the past. They feel insecure, especially in conditions of growing prices and shrinking real incomes.

Moreover, for the first time in their life they face the fear of unemployment. In other words, the costs of transition are much higher than expected and everything indicates that the period of transition will also be longer than assumed at the starting point.

Using R. Dahrendorf's allegory: all the roads to democracy lead the East European countries through a "Valley of Tears". In other words, people living in those countries must become much poorer than they were before before getting rich. The question is, where are the limits of poverty? When can one see the light in the dark tunnel? The answer to this question can be only very simple: the future will show, the future which relies on our contemporary decisions and contemporary activities. And the burden of this fact can also be so heavy that it can paralyze all the actions which have to be undertaken. Moreover it can stop the process and undermine regional security.

The scale of recession in East-Central Europe

Country	Cumulated drop in production	Rate of inflation per year			Unemployment rate		
	1990-1992	1990	1991	1992	1990	1991	1992
Albania	54	.	400	.	.	50.0	70.0
Bulgaria	55	26	317	154	.	10.0	11.0
Czecho-Slovakia	45	10	58	17	0.6	6.3	6.5
Poland	37	586	70	41	5.6	10.0	13.0
Romania	43	4	180	264	1.0	2.7	4.6
Hungary	44	29	36	27	1.5	8.3	8.9
USSR*	38	5	73	200	.	0.5	1.5

* Estimates from: CUP and Nowa Europa.

Source: W. Kuczyński, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 213, 10.09.1992 (quoted after: Madej, Zbigniew, 1993, *Krach gospodarczy w Europie Wschodniej*, unpublished manuscript).

The experiences in this region shows that people are impatient and they want their government to keep the promises given in the election campaign. The relations between the voters and politicians are very fragile. It must be clear that despite the fact that changes last quite a bit the support can vanish overnight. This is a lesson to both politicians and voters: the first ones should know that sometimes it is better to tell the bitter truth than to promise miracles; to the second ones, democracy can be an effective tool in reaching goals but also can act as an obstruction to desired changes. Using this tool one has to take into consideration not only short sighted goals and private interests but first of all long term strategy. It sounds utopian, but without such an approach we will stay where we are and the world around us is moving fast forward.

The reform experiences indicate that the market is not able to do the job of transformation on its own as it requires (sorry for this unpopular word) intervention. The question is how much intervention and where? This intervention should not be understood as central commands but as the utilization of the newly introduced market tools and market mechanism. Our choice is between the strategy that points out how to keep the path and another which shows how not to keep it.

The answer to the question where to intervene is usually difficult, as many mistakes have been made in the past when economists tried to prescribe a pattern of specialization that was not validated by practice. Contemporary economists often say that the market will show which branches should be developed and which abandoned. While this is true for developed market economies, in the case of economies in transition the intervention should be directed at the branches without which the economy, or even the country, is not able to exist. Those branches should create a first strong network, which will be able to drag the economy into the track of development.

The crises in Western economies, which was not short and shallow as expected, being debt driven, show that monetarist economics has its limits and that some new elements should be added. Seeking effective ways of economic recovery, economists increasingly return to the classical economics of Say, Keynes and Walras. But will their prescriptions be sufficient for the contemporary times? The answer is unknown as economy does not supply us with ready-made patterns and simple "yes" or "no" answers when it tackles more complicated issues, which very often have to be left without answers for a while.

This means that when Western economists are seeking new solutions for their economies which, like in case of Clinton's new program of economic revival, embrace the job creation element, there is no reason to omit such strategies in East Central Europe where they seem fully appropriate, especially in the specific conditions of a post-communist economy. They also fit into crisis management strategy, although it is debatable whether other countries less advanced in the reform process should begin with such a strategy or follow the path of the three pioneers in this field and add a new strategy at a certain point of the transition. Next question: how to find the appropriate point to introduce the strategy, etc...? One can multiply such questions...

The destruction process cannot be totally driven by the market forces, especially in the regions where industrial centers are concentrated. Market forces left alone in such districts can be dangerous and serve as a factor undermining the regional security. Transition requires effective policies in such fields as industry, infrastructure, job creation, social expenditures and environment.

Conclusion: The experience of the first four years of systemic changes shows that they should be fast and deep and that the decisions about this should be taken

at the beginning of the political swing as the support of the people deteriorates in later stages. In other words: it is ideal when the first stages of transition introduce such changes that enable the economy to catch its own momentum.

5. Concluding remarks

In 1992 there were some characteristic features that distinguished the countries of East-Central Europe from other geographical regions.

First of all, those countries were continuing their way from a command-distributing system towards a market economy. The democratization of the economic system was followed by, or conducted in parallel with the process of democratization in political life.

Second, all those changes were initially conducted under the pressure of the people, but the support for these processes began to wane. What seems to be one of the paradoxes of those times in this region is the fact that on the one hand people are not supporting the changes any more, but on the other hand they would not like to go back to the old system. At the same time polls indicate that a majority or close to a majority of the population thinks that the governments are heading in the right direction.

Third, all the countries in question have experienced a deep economic slump, a situation with which they have not been familiar in whole post-war period. The downswing in the economy cannot be considered as a crisis that is a part of a cycle. It is a crisis of a transition period, which requires a special surgical treatment, which is adjusted to the very situation of accelerating the growth in these specific conditions, and which should take into consideration the weight of the transition burden and the social costs of it.

This crisis means that in addition to new, and for many frustrating, regulations, people have to face the fear of losing their jobs, low incomes and earnings, and price increase which are not followed by readjustments of their incomes or pensions. Moreover, realistic prices have swept away their savings, which in the old times were considered to be one of the main economic problems as most of them were not voluntary savings but forced ones in the period of a deep gap between demand and supply on the market.

Fourth, fundamental changes have taken place in the external relations of the region. Most of the countries experienced both a move and a stimulation effect in their foreign trade. Western experts consider this as one of the indicators that the economies in transition are able to survive this drastic surgical treatment.

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The social-economic dimension of stability in Hungary

by

JUDIT BALÁZS

After forty years of political and economic dictates the countries of Eastern Europe found themselves on the fringe of development. Although great expectations were attached to the attempts at reform in Hungary in the 1960s, politics did not permit a full transformation. The democracy arising on the basis of formal pluralism in Hungary has many ambiguous features. The multiparty system has been created, but democratic institutions are still lacking. The most serious social strain, increasing in intensity, is represented by the acceleration of the development of social inequalities. In such conditions there may be a considerable latitude for political demagoguery, degrading democracy to slogans, actually waging a struggle for redistribution. The years of transition will be very hard. Great social shocks and rearrangements will be the price of later having a democratic Hungary. "We survived forty years of socialism, but it remains to be seen whether we can endure one year of Hungarian capitalism."

Global processes in the world economy — the fate of Eastern Europe

In the course of the last two decades the world's leading industrial economies have shifted to a new growth path. The new type of growth has brought about a lasting change in the order of values in the world economy and the outlines of a new balance of forces are emerging.

As a result of the change of direction in the world economy to a technology-intensive growth path, the elements of a change of economic model and restructuring of the formation have appeared in the developed market economies too: the elements of the neo-collectivist model of economic management which took shape after the Second World War and became predominant by the 1970s were increasingly replaced by a neo-liberal model which by the 1980s transformed the traditional industrial societies into post-industrial informatics societies.

The differing dynamics of the growth path resulted in a shift in the power centres of the world economy. The competitive advantages in the field of tradi-

tional consumer goods gradually shifted to a number of countries in the Third World, while Far Eastern success economies grew up and new financial capital markets were created beside the American capital dominating transnational flows.

Parallel with this, Western Europe, which had achieved a growth rate exceeding the world average during the 1960s and 1970s, lost its former position in the world economy. Although in Eastern Europe the post-Stalinist ideological opening theoretically allowed a certain scope for experimenting with a more effective economic model in Poland and Hungary, it was fundamentally imposed on economies that were greatly restricted in their capacity for renewal.

After forty years of political and economic dictates the countries of Eastern Europe found themselves on the fringe of development. The double burden of the historical legacy of unfinished revolution and the heritage of decades of socialism has left the present generation with a need for fundamental transformation — and the challenge to meet it with totally new policies.¹

Across Eastern Europe reform processes have been accompanied by the erosion of the brotherly community of socialist countries. Societies once believed so stable have been rocked by landslides: a new type of revolution, the revolution “in the East” took shape.

Countries of Eastern and Central Europe experienced the “revolution of the East” in different ways. What is to be taken into account above all is that the economies formerly based on a common ideological concept and on identical principles of functioning experienced separate national developments.²

Hungary's pioneering role

The path that led from the reform to a fundamental social economic transformation was long, even in Hungary, in spite of that country's pioneering role in this process.

In the 1960s great expectations were attached to the attempts at reform. Since 1968 and the “New Economic Mechanism” which partially decentralized economic decision-making, Hungary has made repeated well-intentioned half-measures to reform the command model. The introduction of certain market elements into the system based on strict plan directives appeared as a revolutionary step at a time when, despite all international contradictions, the political system seemed to be so stable that the idea of a political landslide affecting the whole region was inconceivable.

Politics did not permit a full transformation; an economy only partially free, like people only partially free in their political life, is ultimately demoralized when false hopes are dashed by experience.

The attempts at economic reform did not and could not result in a radical change of the political system.

The decisive turn was represented by the rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine. Essentially, this made it obvious that the Central European countries were ripe for a turn and that the latent discord and the internal contradictions of the system were likely to permit a revolutionary situation if no external power intervened.

The radical change in the European political situation and in the balance of forces between political and military superpowers by the late 1980s evoked an extremely rapid political landslide in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which led to the overthrow of the totalitarian systems, and setting out from the primacy not of economy, but of politics: the *status quo* which emerged has permitted the detotalization of the economy.

Historical chance

The economic structure of the developed countries was created during the industrial revolution in the 18th–19th centuries, without any kind of strict plan, conception or control, solely as a result of the functioning of market forces, according to the very fashionable *laissez faire* capitalism.

The elements of dysfunction this system has created over decades and centuries have affected the different strata of society and the different sectors of the economy in different ways.

Hungary has come to a turning point of its history, which should make it possible to avoid the mistakes made in the development of other countries. Since the political and institutional framework have been created the road is opened for a fundamental economic and social transformation.

In Hungary obsolete branches of industry will be phased out; private initiative will encourage the establishment of new, efficient industries and sectors of the economy.

This is a unique historical chance for Hungary to create a new society and economy meeting the expectations of a deliberate and consistent economic policy based on a general democratization.

The legacy of the past is hard to overcome. At the threshold of the transformation the Hungarian economy presented the following picture: the private entrepreneurial sector is small and undercapitalized, operating mainly in fields that demand little capital. At least half of the entrepreneurs pursue their activities on a part-time basis while also holding a job in the state or cooperative sector.

A rapid development of the private sector is constrained by several factors. Investment of personal funds, whether one's own or those of families or friends,

which in market economies is often the most common capital source for new business, is difficult in Hungary. The savings of the average person are low and are not increasing. What savings exist are typically not invested in domestic business but seek more secure opportunities, such as foreign currency or real estate, which does not particularly help overall economic growth.

The most binding constraints are found in access to finance. At present, the Hungarian banking system is poorly adapted to provide financing because the economy is dominated by very few large banks that pay little attention to small enterprises.

Bureaucratic obstacles, such as compliance with central and local rules and regulations, are still extensive. The tax burden on entrepreneurs is high. Business rental property is scarce and expensive.

The Hungarian economy and society are facing a tremendous task, since stability in the country could be adversely affected by increased unemployment, rising prices and inadequacy of the supply of goods and services during a long transitional period that could cover the coming decade.

In order to ensure a peaceful transformation we have to create a comprehensive economic security system. This implies financial security, since the indebted Hungary, like the other Central and Eastern European countries, is simultaneously facing the problems of managing an obsolete, disintegrated production system and a high debt service. The international image of the economies is closely linked to the balance of payments position and their creditworthiness, but for the internal economy there is no real guarantee for financial stability, since the state extracts resources from the economy and the revenues are uncertain.

Economic support from the West to the systemic changes in Central and Eastern Europe would be highly appreciated. Nevertheless, there are many facts worth considering. A high proportion of financial support is in the form of credits, increasing the debts. This results in a net outflow of resources, generating the most dangerous destabilizing factor.

Security of market access contributes to the success of the transformation process, both for economic and political reasons.

Security of the supply of energy must be reconsidered, since it was largely based on the CMEA system. Another precondition of the functioning of the economy is missing: the infrastructural security. The human infrastructure is fragmented, and the inherited physical infrastructure falls far short of meeting the demand of a modernizing economy.

As for social security, the transitional period is accompanied by social restructuring, polarization and increasing social inequalities. The responsibility for social security has been shifted from the state to the employer and the employee, generating serious uncertainties concerning their continued existence and prospective behaviour.

The social costs of transformation

The current Hungarian economic leadership apparently considers the emergence of a stratum of entrepreneurs as one of the most important preconditions for restructuring and for catching up with the world market. At the same time, it is precisely this economic policy which is the fundamentally determining source of the current social strains.

The new bourgeois stratum in Hungary which is emerging from three sources³, has understandably been faced by conflicting interests from its very moment of birth. The petty capitalist stratum is threatened, to the extent of full suppression, by the rising enterprises that are well supplied with capital by Hungarian standards; even the system of regulators primarily encourages the development of middle-class and big capitalists.

Considerable changes have occurred within the intermediate strata. The formerly stable middle class stratum, small in numbers, has become divided into two, with one pole sinking to the level of poverty, whereas the upper part of stratum has not only been able to stabilize its situation but also to gain upward social mobility.

Above all, there will be no strong middle-class stratum of capitalists, which is the main power of all bourgeois systems; what will develop is a monopolistic oligarchy intertwined with the ruling power, exhibiting, as far as can be foreseen, all its negative concomitants.

Examining in more detail how the income relations of the various social strata and their social mobility have evolved, we obtain the following picture. If in respect of income relations the population is very roughly classified into poor, intermediate and well-off strata, then the lowest mobility can be experienced within the stratum of the poor. In actual fact, the two poles have moved farther from each other here, too, and there has been a major shift from the relative towards the actual subsistence level. The decisive change in this context is that today the situation of those living around the subsistence level is far more devoid of prospects than it was earlier. Formerly, in fact, social allocations, modest by themselves yet sufficient for overcoming the most serious difficulties, represented at least some transitory solution; but these have now been entirely phased out. As a social prop, the system of soup-kitchens, recalling the early times of capitalism, has reappeared. According to official Hungarian statistics, one million⁴ people live at approximately the level of physical subsistence, and about the same number of people can be classified as living only slightly above it. A further tapping of the poor strata with a view to expanding the sources of accumulation for the higher-situated ones is practically impossible, since the situation which has arisen has, on the one hand, intensified the social strain to an extent where it could easily produce

a social explosion and, on the other hand, has entailed a total erosion of the scale of values and a social devaluation of the whole country.

The most serious social strain, increasing in intensity, is represented by the acceleration of the development of social inequalities. In fact, Hungary was perhaps the first socialist country where the monolithic power of the state began to erode, and it was here that the social inequalities based on access to the political power system first became manifested. Earlier, this and similar manifestations of the power had not been so apparent as in the other socialist countries, financial and material allotments remaining covert, as did to a certain extent the exercise of privileges deriving from power, so that social inequalities were less irritating for the society than they are now. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with social inequalities could not be expressed in the two first postwar decades, when spiritual and physical terror understandably kept it suppressed.

In the 1980s, and particularly on the eve of the 1990s, social inequalities began to increase at a rapid rate. The appearance of inflation, in clearly manifested forms, can be dated back to the beginning of the previous decade; it then speeded up over the following years.⁵ The increasing gap between prices⁶ and wages understandably called forth a growing dissatisfaction in broad strata of the society. The actual rearrangement of social positions and the new pattern of income distribution became manifest and objectively measurable in the last two years of the 1980s. Simultaneously with the democratization of political processes a social polarization was accelerating, reducing ever larger masses to living at or close to the physical subsistence level. Thus, however paradoxical it may seem, simultaneously with democracy gaining positions, it was accompanied, just like some grotesque twin, by a threatening uncertainty of existence.

State intervention played a decisive role everywhere in the early stage of capitalist development. It is sufficient to refer here to America, Finland or the more recent cases of South Korea or Taiwan. It became quite clear that the market economy in its pure form is no more able to resolve the basic social tensions than is etatism in its pure form. However, in the half-and-half Hungarian system, the social security guarantees based on state intervention are gradually eroding, while the social safety net provided by the developed market economy has not been created. With the gradual erosion of the social guarantees that were embodied not in the wages, but in the budget, a steadily growing breeding ground has been created for speculation capital.

One of the most important social attainments was the free educational system, creating equal opportunities for the future generation. Now, on the other hand, that system of free education is to be given up, together with equal opportunities. The plan for "commercializing" health care, which was formerly free, raises the prospect of a catastrophic outcome.

And under the slogan of freedom of speech and action, an inflation of human values on a vast scale is taking place. All these hopefully are just the teething troubles of democracy.

Political demagoguery equates the market economy with the generalization of private ownership and economic security achieved on the basis of democracy. At the same time the basic pillars of social security are at risk: the organized trade union movement, the comprehensive system of social insurance, free education based on equality of opportunity, provision of the elementary conditions of existence, in particular the housing system. However, it is precisely these factors and not "ownership" that form the background to political freedom, economic freedom and economic security.

The democracy arising on the basis of formal pluralism still has many ambiguous features and is producing some strange forms. The multiparty system has been created, but the democratic institutions and institutional systems which could provide the real frame for the exercise of democracy are still lacking. Most of the parties are still in the stage of seeking an orientation and are struggling to cope with identity disorders: the over-politicization of the parties serves their confused self-justification and in reality hides the lack of policies that could serve the political and economic advancement. In our ambiguous democracy a "defenceless" society is taking shape where the main front of political tensions lies in the zone between the representation of interests and national politics.

In such conditions there may be a considerable latitude for a political demagoguery which, within the frameworks of the "political" democracy achieved, will have to be legally tolerated. Thus, the scale of values of a political democracy not matched by economic democracy will definitely become open to question. The gradual elimination of a totalitarian society always entails a great deal of shocks for various strata of the society. At the same time, the Central European changes could be an exemplary model if they were based on a really democratic transformation, and if an imaginative political power assessed the actual needs and possibilities of the economy and society and institutionalized democracy accordingly, instead of the current situation where those in power and those expecting to come into power, degrading democracy to demagogic slogans, actually wage a struggle for redistribution.

The years of transition will undoubtedly be very hard. Great social shocks and rearrangements will be the price of later having a democratic Hungary, a really democratic one. It is perhaps only a joke to say that we survived 40 years of socialism, but it remains to be seen whether we can endure one year of "Hungarian capitalism".

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1. For a comprehensive analysis of recent social and economic transformations, see Håkan Wiberg, *Eastern Europe in Transition: a Chance or Threat to Peace*. In Wojciech Kostecki (ed.), *Eastern Europe in Transition: A Chance or Threat to Peace*. Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1991.
2. For a recent analysis of differentiations in national paths of democratization, see Judit Balázs, *Peace and democratization in Eastern Europe*. *Soviet Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, July–September 1990.
3. The three main sources of recruiting the stratum of capitalists are:
 - those whose existence was due to toleration, but by no means stimulation of their entrepreneurial activity, the so-called “garage capitalists”,
 - the upper stratum of the former enterprise managers,
 - the stratum of the professional intelligentsia linked to and promoting foreign capital, reflecting some analogy with the comprador bourgeoisie known from the Third World development.
 For a comprehensive analysis of this topic see: Judit Balázs, *Democracy post-state-socialist style*. In: *Eastern Europe in Transition: A chance or threat to peace*. Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1991.
4. Figures refer to statistics of 1991. One million is equal to 10% of the population.
- According to the latest estimation (January 1992), the proportion of people living at subsistence level increased by 11%, and now involves 30% of the population. Estimation made by the Institute for Economic Research, Budapest.
5. The accelerating trend of inflation was particularly significant in the years 1990–1991. The official rate of inflation reached a peak of 35 and 40% respectively. According to the calculation of the Institute for Economic Research the figures are much higher, reaching a level of more than 50%. For the period of October 1990 – October 1991 the inflation rate was 35.6%, 73.6%, 60%, in Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republic respectively. Source: *Népszabadság*, 25 January 1992.
6. In the course of the last three years the average annual increase of wages and salaries amounted to 8–10%, differently affecting various strata of the population. The more than three times higher inflation rate caused a wide-ranging differentiation in income distribution. Source: *Yearbook of Statistics*. In January 1992 the officially stated existence minimum — without housing — was an amount between 7000–7600 Forints (appr. US\$ 100). The official fixed minimum wage is 6800 Forints. Source: *Heti Világgazdaság*, 4 January 1992.

IV. The spectre of ethnic conflict

by

OLE WÆVER

Several candidates compete in the identity arena. A political concept of French origin, the nation as the citizens of a state, interacts with the original German notion of a nation as a people united by language and culture. German, French and Russian notions of Europe have different emphases on formal organisation, informal networking and common culture — while Europe is too small to be a delimited economic area and too big to permit a common cultural identity. New problems and tensions in Western Europe stem from an increased coupling of state and nation and cultural defences against that; those in Eastern Europe have much to do with state and nation getting more tightly linked. There are mechanisms that make these two sets of problems reinforce each other. Both state and nation may eventually fade away by losing positions in the identity budgets of individuals.

In an essay from 1978, Isaiah Berlin noticed that the great social thinkers of the 19th century and the beginning of this century (from Condorcet, Tocqueville and Saint Simon over Marx to Weber) after all made an impressive number of correct predictions about our modern world — the increasing role of bureaucracy, the conformity and monotony of democratic egalitarianism, and the military-industrial complex. But one thing is missing in them all: an expectation about the immense importance nationalism was to have in the 20th century: first in Europe, and then, in the post-war period, in the third world. Liberal as well as socialist thinkers have assumed that nationalism was a passing phenomenon, set to disappear as certain conditions were fulfilled. Experience now seems to give it somewhat better odds.

In these days, people are generally disposed to take nationalism and national identity rather seriously. A common starting point is then to point out that "Nation" has two meanings.

— The "French", political concept of the state-nation, where the nation is a rather abstract but necessary correlate to the state, where the legitimacy of the state is almost metaphysically based in the common will of the people

Identities

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— The "French", political concept of the state-nation, where the nation is a rather abstract but necessary correlate to the state, where the legitimacy of the state is almost metaphysically based in the common will of the people

on the territory; not necessarily a people in any ethnic sense, but in the form of citizens supporting this state (i.e. willing to die for it).

— A “German”, romantic-organic concept of a “people” united by language, culture and history, whether it is conscious of this or not.

In a way these two concepts have so very little to do with each other that it is hard to see why they have to be covered by the same word — the French about state, territory and citizens, and the German about a people and its culture. However, as Anthony D. Smith (1991), has recently pointed out, in practice most people think about a nation with some of the connotations from both (not least in France and Germany, where the two ideas have all the time been mixed in practice). This ambiguity is what has made the use of the (one) word “nation” possible.

And with the idea of the *nation state* it has become “natural” to expect that all this has to reach a higher synthesis: people, culture, state, territory — all has to be brought in line. It is because these two ideas have been fused that a bridge has been constructed from “identity” to “politics”, from an alleged essence of my individual identity (my nationality) to the essence of politics. It is not self-evident that there should be such a close link between identity and politics — although it has come to appear so to us.

Before the French revolution, this was not so evident. There was no idea that the King should necessarily speak the same language as the peasants — why should he, he had nothing to talk with them about. The idea that nations are somehow greater families, where we are all connected by blood — and that this is a natural basis for politics — is a pretty new idea (200 years), but it is a powerful idea, not likely to disappear that easily. However, it might transform itself, and we therefore now study *identities*, not only national, but other forms of political identity too.

Here I want to make some comments at three levels: two remarks on *European Identities*, two on *National identity and nationalism*, and two strange remarks on *personal/inter-national identity*.

1. European identities

It was noticeable at the beginning of the 1980s, well before détente and Gorbachev, that the reference point in security/political debates had started to change. Until then, discussions had taken place in East–West terms. From the early 1980s this shifted and “Europe” gradually became the codeword, a word all agreed to refer to. We may think of Gorbachev’s “Common European Home”, but also of the wave of Europe literature in France. Russians, French, Germans — everybody acted in the name of Europe, *for* Europe. Did this mean a sudden agreement on aims and ways? No, scratching the surface one could see that commentators were not talking

about the same Europe. These "Europes" had different boundaries to the West as well as to the East — different organizing principles, and different "European" values. To some, Europe was from the Atlantic to the Urals, i.e. about getting the Americans out, while others had figured out how Europe would materialize as soon as the Russians were out. To some, the European project was dependent on the creation of a strong centre (Bruxelles), whereas it was said in many places that the essence of Europe was the lack of a centre.

The tendency to phrase security and politics as a question of *Europe* became much more obvious from the conclusion of the INF-treaty in 1987, the new détente and the changes in the East. It was widely assumed that these processes would somehow lead to a "Europeanization" of Europe. "Europeanization" signified not a specific development, but an empty space to be filled. The old order and its limitations were removed, and several projects were competing to fill the space. The discourses necessarily shifted to a different kind of reference point. Since the issue was to install a new order as legitimate, a new pattern as "natural", there was a tendency towards "deeper" references: a search for new principles. The result in the 1980s has been a much closer link between the fields of security on the one hand and culture, history and geography on the other. The arguments have pointed inwards (to culture), backwards (to history) or downwards (to geography) to something seemingly solid and pre-political. Identity, European identity, became trump in European security (Wæver 1989, 1990; Holm 1993; Wæver et al. forthcoming).

The main competing Europes have been:

The French

— "Europe" is imagined as state-like, an actor with will and capacity to act, modelled on the French nation-state, but just bigger in size (since France has become too small to do what she is supposed to do).

The German

— consisting of non-state and sub-state networks; it is about decreasing the dividing character of borders, because then an informal *Mitteleuropa* can (and will) unfold. It does not rest on political structures but on pre-political cultural, economic and societal networks.

The Russian

— about setting the border of Europe, of defining who are in and who are out; previously in order to get the Americans out, now in order to make sure the Russians do not get pushed out.

Since German unification these have become increasingly linked, and all have been accelerated.

It can be seen on the basis of the three competing Europes that *since February 1990 German diplomacy is very active in building the French and the Russian Europe*. Why? Because the Germans are getting their own Europe — one with room for national unity and economic expansion in Central Europe — but in order to keep the overall process stable it is necessary to keep a balance between all three major Europes.

Accordingly, we get an EC largely in a French format and a CSCE for the Russians (possibly linked more and more to NATO — the key interest of the Americans, but also of others). The EC and CSCE are very different: actor and arena, super-state and inter-state cooperation. In the process of Europeanization these are Europe's two most important formal institutions appearing in an illogical but necessary mix. A third pattern is there too, but invisible. It is a "German" network of business contacts, *Länder* politics and human relations across borders, building sub-regional networks like the new Hansa in the Baltic Sea Region. This should definitely not take an institutional, formal form — which would provoke fear and counter-alignments among the other European powers. Thus, it is not done by Germany, but largely by Germans.

This Europe is far less logical than what any junior security expert or political scientist would be able to design. A more neat European organization is easy to figure out. Yet politics is different. A constellation of interacting projects, each containing their "Europe" is actually the illogical Europe we are living in. Each follows a different grammar, there is no common denominator — but in political terms it is *one* configuration.

For the last ten years, "European Identity" thus became a privileged issue for research; not because there was or was not a European Identity, but because the discourse on it was so exceptionally powerful and yet split — an arena for competition. Essential politics was conducted *as if* it was a debate on European Identity.

Now, *another question* is emerging regarding European Identity. If we assume that the European Community continues its process of integration towards Economic and Monetary as well as Political Union, and probably lets in an increasing number of European countries, a key question will be: what kind of identity does this new construction generate/demand — and how will it relate to national identity? Will the EC create a European identity taking the form of the nation state — a national, European identity — and thereby crush the old, national identities? Or is it no identity question at all?

The dilemmas of Europe and nation can be seen as generated most fundamentally by the tension between, on the one hand, an economy becoming more and more global, and, on the other hand, cultural communities that may not become generally entrenched but at least are definitely not able to extend infinitely. Nathan Gardels (1990, p. 22) has referred to a tension between a civilization of the

soil and a civilization of the satellite. To this there are basically two answers on the market:

1. go for a compromise at an in-between level, i.e. Europe, which is big enough to be the basis for economy and small enough to be community and cultural identity;
2. rely on the general post-modern multiplication of identities, and be confident that in the future we can be national on some issues, European on others, global cosmopolitans on yet others — and sometimes city-loyal or more concerned about our professional identity or that stemming from hobbies, sexual orientation or what have you. In this perspective the doubling into Europe and nation will just be a part of a general multiplication.

Neither option is ultimately convincing. The first is not because economy probably cannot be limited to the European level, and cultural identity definitely cannot be expanded to the European level. The second option, total disintegration of personal identity into identity atoms, might not be psychologically manageable — it might be yet another example of enlightenment belief in rational human orientations, again producing an emotional reaction towards meaning and belonging. Is this the dynamics behind the reemergence of neo-Nazis in Germany, the country where people have most consistently been asked to avoid centralized identity and rationally delegate it to the appropriate places, be they “the West”, the *Land* or the EC?

Let me venture a “solution”. The clearest way of presenting it is to take as our point of departure that the driving energy of EC integration at the moment largely stems from the security area.

The present security situation involves a powerful logic presenting the actors with a basic choice between integration and fragmentation (Buzan et al., 1990, Wæver 1993), between a Europe based on the *nation state form* or a *Europeanization* which would in this context mean first of all integration in the EC, but includes all that is necessary to hedge against the dynamics of renationalized power balancing. In other words, the often presented choice between Western Europeanization (EC) and pan-Europeanization (CSCE) is false — the structural options are, on the one hand, combined Europeanizations and, on the other hand, re-nationalization. The pressure of this choice has been increased with the failed coup in Moscow. The crisis zone has grown from the Balkans to the whole area between Tallinn, Trieste and Tashkent, at the same time as independent European medium powers have appeared on the other side of this zone, opening for the options of French or German alliances with Russia (or Ukraine) — and (self-fulfilling) fears that the other will do it. The former Soviet Union was, in security terms, not a part of Europe but the

counterpart of the USA; Russia is now small enough to become part of Europe, and large enough to make a difference.

With the emergence of mutual Franco-German suspicion over Yugoslavia, it does not seem that far-fetched to posit the option that Europe could move from a period (1945–1989) when the “normal” regional balance of power logic was suppressed by the superpowers, *via* a period where stability was secured by the EC leaning heavily on the relatively small “rest-Europe”, *to* the reemergence of the regional security complex in the form of shifting alliances and power balancing. An awareness of this danger is probably at present the most powerful argument *for* integration. More generally, it can be claimed that the logic of security is at this stage driving European integration, that it is causing the process of especially political integration to be speeded up close to the limit of what European populations and political structures can handle, thereby pushing it close to the breaking point where the outcome in the form of one of the two structural long-term options is decided.

This has made Jacques Delors argue: “The heart of the European Union is the desire to shape a joint foreign and defence policy”.

What kind of union is this? It is one that does not necessarily demand that close integration of peoples, shared culture, homogeneity; it is first of all a *political body* that is needed, a *political Europe* (Wind 1992).

Then the future relationship between European and national identity develops like this:

— at the European level, a political state identity along “French” lines is generated. Foreign and security policy become the focus of a “republican” construction of a state subject, a “nation” (in French). To this belongs “citizens”, a people who chooses at the level of politics to identify with the values of this state subject, who are patriotic in terms of politics — but do not necessarily feel that they are in any organic sense one big family. It can be rather hollow, as long as the shell is hard;

— the national level (together with, in some places, the regional one) remains the focus for cultural identity, for community. The “German” type nation remains at the national or the intra-national level — but in its original Herderian form, where the nation is so important that expression in a state becomes unnecessary.

Thus we are not asking people to have numerous political identities, but *two* clearly defined, each attaining a considerable weight in the area where it counts. (For critique of this vision, see Hassner 1993.)

Anthony D. Smith has rightly argued that in practice the two “French” and “German” concepts are not separate, but actually both at play when most people

common-sensically talk of nations (that is why we can actually get along using this single word for two phenomena that seem to be almost unrelated: state/territory and a linguistically united *Volk*). But the two may again move in separate directions, which we can only talk clearly about by disentangling the two meanings of nations, calling them for instance civic state-nation ("French") and organic people-nation ("German"). Then our future could possibly consist of a dualism, with Europe as the civic state-nation and our old nation states as organic people-nations.

Identity and politics are delinked, but refocussed.

2. National identity

It might very well be, as several participants have argued (not least at the EUPRA conference), that nationalism always has *other* causes — economic or whatever. When it is *there*, however, it has an enormous self-propelling energy:

1. when the ethnic glasses are on, all problems, all controversies are seen as expressions of the ethnic question. This in a sense is normal, all conflict generates self-reinforcing interpretations; the ethnic one, however, has a second trait:

2. contact between the parties will be broken off, "because there is no reason to talk to them — they are different, think different from us — not to be reasoned with". Because ethnic thinking operates on the principle that people *are* something by nature, there is nothing to talk about, nothing can be changed by discussion or politics. It becomes mute, symbolic, — and violent expression is logically inherent in this kind of conflict (Knudsen 1992). The task of conflict resolution in ethnic conflict hence becomes both extremely difficult and especially important.

What, then, do we know about nationalism? Much research and theory has appeared in recent years, and it tells us five things; I am now building mainly on Benedict Anderson (1983), Anthony D. Smith (1991), and not least an older article by Isaiah Berlin (1978).

1. The force and future importance of nationalism is repeatedly underestimated.
2. Nationalism hits most often and most strongly in phases of modernization, industrialization, and Westernization, i.e. when a significant social group or all of society is shaken off its roots and becomes alienated by a processes of modernization. It was under these conditions that the Germans in the late 18th and early 19th century invented modern, ethnic nationalism; it was such situations that stimulated it in Eastern Europe in the 19th century and in the third world in the post-war period.

3. Hurt pride and humiliation contribute decisively because nationalism is a very existential matter — the incredible force and effects of nationalism are only understandable seen in the light of its role in each individual as an answer to the meaning of one's own being. Thus, nationalism triggers strong reactions to seemingly trivial issues of prestige, and at the same time it offers a particularly attractive mode of identification in times of crisis and depression since the link to a glorious past and meaningful pattern (of evolution or repetition) gives immediate relief, pride and shield against shame in contrast to alternative political programmes that through economic or political action often place the individual in a less attractive symbolic context during the long haul towards betterment (Šiklová 1991).

4. The development of nationalism is accelerated by an idea about the existence deep in the national soul of a deep meaning and a golden future — i.e. the ability to think along lines which make *the national* the supreme value and the uniting point.

5. Nationalism is a kind of module. *The nation* has been developed as an idea and movement through a number of phases, which are each time taken over in other places in its most developed form. A kind of *acceleration effect* is thus created, where new nationalisms do not have to return to the French revolution and make all the experiences themselves, but have the chance of entering where Germans, Americans, East Central Europeans and third world people have taken the concept.

Yes, not only *can* they do it; there seems to be an inner strength in the national idea making it hard *not* to do it. When a political conflict erupts (especially when a country is breaking up, people freeing themselves from oppression of any kind), whatever the original driving force, this conceptual package will arrive and be so effective that one can hardly avoid that someone will make use of it and thereby gain a relative advantage in political struggle, thereby forcing others to use this device, etc.; as we have seen it in for instance Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia, where the non-nationalist politicians seemed very skillful and clever — they have had a hard time.

Conclusion: Since the factor of humiliation seems to play such a large role, we can draw some conclusions as to Western policy towards East-Central Europe and especially Russia — that we must not define the others as beggars and failures, that the elite in Russia must not feel the West is misusing their withdrawal from power against them. The humiliation will probably be generated anyway in the relationship among ex-Soviet peoples, between Ukrainians, Russians and seceded republics. That factor will most likely be there. And so will the modernization, obviously. And the modular factors, i.e. the ideas of national unity and meaning are historically in circulation in Eastern and Central Europe and therefore have a more profound resonance in Germany, Scandinavia, East-Central Europe and the former

Soviet Union than in the more Western part of the continent. Conclusion: all factors are present, and it is very likely that nationalism will to an increasing degree play a decisive role.

Why do I make this logical, pessimistic prediction? Because it is important in the West to see these developments in the light of theories and empirical knowledge largely generated in the West, because this tells us that it is "natural" if nationalism has a high wave in the East. There is an unpleasant tendency in the West at the moment to see this as a proof that Russians are less civilized than we, etc. On the other hand, there are people who — in order to combat this — want to totally deny the existence of nationalism among the political forces they like ("it is only healthy national consciousness"). No, it is more than is healthy and we should try to dampen it — but the West should avoid passing judgement about how "they" are on this basis. The structural conditions are such that a wave of nationalism was to be expected, whoever the people there. This nationalism should neither be glossed over, nor used as a Western excuse for cutting off "those nationalists" from the "true Europe".

Still nationalism — or maybe more appropriately "problems relating to national identity" — is absolutely not confined to Eastern Europe. It is actually important to watch some strange dynamics in the West, where "nationalism" takes new forms (Hassner 1990).

Here we have to return to the point made above about the complex nature of *Europeanization* taking the form of an illogical mix of three Europes:

- classical *inter state* cooperation, especially in the field of security, and in relation to the two semi-European states, USA and Russia/Soviet Union, in NATO and in the CSCE;
- creation of a *super state*, the EC, which takes on a number of state-like traits without ever becoming a nation state or even a normal sovereign state;
- the emergence of *sub-state and around-state* structures, especially with German *Länder* and other regions, with business and all kinds of networks.

The common denominator for this mixture is the dissolution of the modern state system as we have known it since the end of the Middle Ages. What happens now is that political authority gets dispersed over more and more levels, which undermines the exclusive, sovereign, *territorial state*.

The new structures can be seen as "neo-medieval" in the sense that overlapping authority is returning. And the medieval metaphor has the advantage of drawing our attention to the change in the organizing principle of the *sovereign, territorial state*, not the *nation state* (which is only half as old). The national idea is obviously not dying out, nor is politics as such — what is modified is the organization of political space through the principle of territorially defined units with exclusive rights inside, and a special kind of relations on the outside — international

relations, foreign policy, without any superior authority. There is no longer one level which is *clearly* the most important to refer to, but a set of overlapping authorities, and thereby even the nations most closely approaching the ideal type of the nation state lose the option of referring always to "their" state; the close link between state and nation is broken (Wæver 1991).

What does that mean for the security agenda? It means the increasing importance of what one could call "societal security" (or "cultural security"), situations where significant groups in society feel threatened, feel their identity to be threatened — by immigration, integration or Americanization — and try to defend themselves against this (Wæver et al. 1993).

The reason for these problems is that EC integration is not the creation of a new nation state (concentrating power, authority and identity), but rather a dissemination of power. A lot is taken to Bruxelles, but without attaining a new synthesis. Cultural identity largely remains at the national level, even with a tendency to move down towards infra-national identity. And these levels are definitely not achieving the synthesis of the nation state. No sovereign Euro-state is created, but nor will we have sovereign member states. The coupling state-nation is weakened.

What disappears is not the nation (despite all the talk of "end of the nation state"), but the *territorial* state with its principle of sovereignty.

Left behind we find nations with less state, cultures with less shell.

In the old situation when a nation/culture felt threatened (by immigration foreign products, international cooperation), it could call on "its" state to close the borders for immigrants, lead a protectionist economic policy or withdraw from international cooperation. No longer! Border control and several forms of economic policy move towards the EC level, and in reality there is no way back from this cooperation (at least not without drama, crisis and conflict).

How then do cultures defend themselves today? With culture. If you feel your identity threatened by internationalization or europeanization, you have to strengthen the national expression. Culture has become security policy.

This is not necessarily a good thing; far from it, actually. This can easily be seen if we move from the sphere of "culture" to another form of "societal security policy", another case of do-it-yourself defence of societies not relying on the state: people beating up foreigners in the streets. This is "societal security policy", too. Cultural/Societal security is not necessarily something to hope for, but nor is "security" of the classical type *good* per se: the defensive actions normally referred to as "security" are less pleasant than the situations where people are "relaxed" enough not to activate special measures, not to label developments as threats, but only see them as challenges, etc. (cf. Wæver, forthcoming).

The reason why I focus on the sphere of culture is first of all because this is where I first noticed the phenomenon. I was asked several times to speak about "Europe" and/or "identity" to activists involved in alternative theatres as well as

a seminar by the Ministry of Culture. Slowly it dawned on me that what was discussed here as "culture" and "national identity" was a security debate, and when one suggested labels like "societal security" or "cultural security" it immediately made sense to people. In Denmark we have in the last years had a number of TV programmes and seminars on "Danishness" and the like; not necessarily linked to the anti-EC programme of recreating a tight state-nation correspondence, but rather, I think, as a correlate to an *acceptance* that EC is to be reckoned with, to be lived with (in). The future and form of a Danish (non-state) nation is then at issue, and the *cultural community* has been first to approach these new themes, which is in a sense logical, since these are predominantly questions of identity and "culture" (in the wider sense of the word).

It is not necessarily the case that we are threatened. I do not want to contribute to the impression of, for instance, *Danishness* being threatened by immigration and/or the EC. It is not a given result that we should reach for this kind of cultural security policy. In many ways it is preferable that this does not happen. It is better when cultures are sufficiently self-assured not to employ defense operations. A bit simplistically, one can say that a sound, relaxed national identity is the best guarantee against nationalism, against reactions of fear and defence.

But the political challenge is real, the defences are there, the tension between the different ways of reacting is one of the most important political issues at present. Nations that feel threatened and do *not* rely on the cultural, non-state option call the state back in instead, i.e. reclaim the state for the nation and thereby block European integration. This mechanism manifested itself in the Danish "No to Maastricht" referendum (June 1992), where the *state* was willing to Europeanize itself, whereas the *nation* did not feel comfortable with this. Which form the security policy of the *nation* takes in Western Europe is of extreme importance to the project of European integration and thereby European security. European integration hinges on the nation slackening its link to the state, relying more on cultural, non-state reproduction (Wæver et al. 1993, ch. 4). Controversies over the possibility of delinking state and nation are decisive, though unsettled.

This is what we see in the West.

In the East, the tie between state and nation is being reforged. The ideal that every nation (people) should have its state, and that the borders of the state should correspond to those of the nation, is an ideal with a strong position in the Eastern part of Europe. This creates the basis for classical type conflicts: over borders, groups of people, the historical right to territories, over minorities leaving bigger states and possibly "re-uniting" with a mother-land (Hungarians in Romania, Moldova's possible reunification with Romania).

Simultaneously, the overall geopolitical context for these "local" conflicts has changed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the period 1989–1991, the big question was whether Europe would slide back into old fashioned balance of power

logic with changing alliances, mutual Franco-German suspicions, etc. — the way it was until the super powers in 1945 uniformized European security with the East-West conflict. Would the end of the East-West conflict lead us back to the time before? No, this did not happen. In the final instance, it did not happen because the West European actors were kept together by the EC structures (and NATO) and were in combination “heavy” enough to dominate Europe. Europe consisted of the EC plus its rimland, Eastern Europe. Soviet Union was on the US table. Now, after the 1991 coup, Europe is growing far eastwards. A new great (but not super) power is appearing: Russia. The fear is thus recreated that the European great (or medium) powers Germany, France, England, Italy and Russia will start playing with each other in shifting formations, as they used to do. The pull at the European anchor, the EC, is much increased. The zone for crisis has grown, and on the other side of the zone is a new player. If we are to avoid net tensions in Western Europe, it seems that Western European integration has to be speeded up very fast, not least in the area of defence and security. This is a logic operating very actively in European (not least French and commission, but also German) politics at the moment.

We are now ready to outline the overall pattern. In the West we have a development where state and nation are de-coupled. Much of the power of the state moves to the EC level, leaving the nations vulnerable to new threats — with a new (kind of) vulnerability.

In the East, in contrast, we see a tight — and in many places tightening — link between state and nation, leading to increasing conflicts of the classical type — when state and nation do not fit, and one nation(’s state) makes claims on territory today controlled by another state, etc. The different nation-state pairs get into conflict with each other when they all try to tighten their own fusion of state and nation (whereas the nationalist reactions in the West appear when nation and state are decoupled).

These conflicts in the East become more pressing, more dangerous, not least in the light of the changing geopolitics following the rebirth of Russia. The only way to avoid that they pull the whole continent into new-old power balancing and alliance policy (with spheres of interest for each great power, etc.) is seen to be a strengthening of integration in Western Europe and thereby the creation of a capable actor with integrated economic, moral, political and military power, the EC. The problems of the Western new-type are increased by that. Even more “state” is pulled away from the nations, and now at a speed that is not generated from within Western Europe, but increasingly due to “external” logics. The risk of fear reactions in the West is growing.

The *security* logic is actually not the only one taking this circular form. Another necessary measure for stabilizing the East is opening Western markets for Eastern products, especially in the agricultural field. And what happens if this is

considered? French farmers are immediately out in the streets, protesting that “their” state is betraying them, responding more to “European” logic than to French society.

The circle has been closed. Old style nationalism (in the East) and new style nationalism (in the West) enter a dangerous loop.

The modular character of nationalism is involved too. There is generally more talk in national terms today than, say, five or ten years ago, and the talk about other nations hence creates a tendency to use the national lenses and see our own complex, many dimensional conflicts as expressions of *national* frictions.

3. Personal identity beyond international politics?

Finally, we might speculate about changes in the fundamental nature of the international. It has been pointed out by deconstructivists in (or on the border line of) the discipline *International Relations* that international politics as a special sphere is constituted as a mirror image of domestic affairs (Richard K. Ashley, R.B.J. Walker). This contrast is not simply a coincidental after-the-fact difference, but it is the way the two fields are constituted. Our idea of the international is basically built on an idea of what it is *not*: domestic politics, rule of law, centralized. And this concept of domestic politics as the unfolding of “community” and enlightenment ideals about rationality and progress, peace and justice — this concept is stabilized by having a field *outside* where the “other” is pushed out, where all the anomalies, the contradictions, violence, repetition and regression can be seen as spatially distinct — or temporarily differentiated as that which is *not yet* covered by modernity’s progress where development and civilization has still to move (Ashley 1987).

The field of international politics is the field where normal optimistic principles do not hold, where the different can only be controlled by the “heroic statesman” who dares to go to the borderline and handle that which is different, and go back and teach the civilized people in the enlightened state that there is this world out there, which they should not naively treat as part of the world of progress. Out there history repeats itself, in archaic ways.

The basic principle constituting this structuring of political space (and time) is the sovereign state. The organizing idea of state sovereignty was a powerful solution to the dilemmas posed by the waning medieval order; it consisted of the dual (mutually constitutive) principles of fragmentation of global political life into autonomous units, which are *internally* centralized, holding a monopoly of power and authority over a specific territory. This split meant in the words of R.B.J. Walker (1990):

"An exceptionally elegant resolution of the apparent contradiction between centralization and fragmentation, or phrased in more philosophical language, between universality and particularity. [...] The principle of state sovereignty emerged in early-modern Europe as a replacement for the principle of hierarchical subordination."

which gradually gave way to the secular, territorial state, to the principle of spatial exclusion. Universal principles are then applicable within, not externally — difference on the other hand is concentrated outside, and international relations is seen as essentially lacking "community" and can therefore only with difficulty be analyzed as *politics*.

Richard Ashley (forthcoming) has then argued that this image of the sovereign state, which is at the heart of the construction, is actually modelled on the idea of a sovereign individual.

"The practical significance and power of the modern state depends upon the institutionalization of a figure of 'man in domestic society' of whom state institutions can be an analogue, on the one hand, and the constitution of state institutions whose principles, practices, and orchestration of collective violence can be understood and legitimated on analogies to 'man in domestic society' on the other. Each institution — 'man' and 'state' — is differentiated from the other — the one as a pure presence represented and the other as a representation of that presence. But since each is presupposed in the constitution of the other, each must contain and express the constitutive principles of the other."

In this view the sovereign individual and the sovereign state are two sides of the same coin. If state sovereignty is seen as a problem, then sovereign man is at the heart of that problem.

Actually, another excentric author in *International Relations* has argued the opposite. According to James N. Rosenau, we are witnessing at present a change in the nature of individual identity and attitude to authority which undermines the logic of the inter-state system of sovereign states. This logic continues in some fields, but is increasingly challenged by a "second world" where the actors are not bound by the principle of state sovereignty. Rosenau talks of "sovereignty-free actors", but actually the image of these agents is very much that *they* become sovereign individuals (freed from *state* sovereignty).

This issue is of special importance to us as researchers — especially as *peace* researchers concerned about increasing the general awareness among people. What we do is a part of this process of creating competent and "sovereign" individuals.

It may then be interesting to know the effects of this.

A global system which to a larger extent derived its dynamics from "sovereign individuals", how would that be? Obviously, it would lose a lot of the rigidities of the present, stereotyped nation state system. Apparent "iron laws" of international politics would be seen as conventions, functioning only as long as they were constantly reproduced by actors adhering to their logic (Wendt 1992). This clearly has an "emancipatory" aspect.

However, it would probably be an over-dynamic, not very stable system, marked by what Jim Rosenau has labelled "cascading interdependence" — that every relationship or interaction immediately impinges on other relationships. Dynamics will move to the level of *the relationship of relationships*. At the same time "authority" will be extremely unstable, all individuals will all the time be on the way in and out of new loyalties, meaning that key political units will be much more often disintegrating, reintegrating, re-arranging; what we see in the Soviet Union today could become normal processes; the EC might end up in somewhat similar processes of disintegration in some corners, attempts to integrate at others. All this adds up to a much, much more open and dynamic game of competing identities. Politics — in a global system of sovereign individuals — will decreasingly be a struggle among closed, stable identities — "closed crowds" in Elias Canetti's terminology. It will be competition among "open crowds" (Canetti 1960).

Whether this is necessarily good or bad can be hard to tell. My feeling would be: mainly good. But that might be a professional disposition: of course it will be more attractive to intellectuals — the openness, the flexibility, the multiple identities, that suits us; but it will be hard to handle for many people and will probably regularly produce backlashes into the more stereotyped, exclusive and total identities we know as national identity. Thus we are probably not that close to a completely different non-national system of sovereign individuals. We are on our way to a dialectical living between the two worlds, the world of nationalism and that of strong individuals with multiple identities. The two will each be generating its counterpart.

So, the final remark will be: it seems that the question of *identities* — identities competing horizontally with other identities at the same level (nation vs. nation, Europe project vs. Europe project) and vertically (Europe vs. national vs. individual) — will remain at the heart of the security agenda as well as the wider field constituting the interest of peace researchers. The theme of "identities" opens for a number of specific exciting and important research agendas, at the same time as in the present conjuncture it appears as the unifying currency with which one can move between and link the many questions confronting us.

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Ethnic conflict resolution in the new Europe: A case for an integrated systems approach

by

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This chapter explores (1) causes and conditions of violent ethnic conflict in post-Cold War Europe; (2) some of the likely consequences of the continuation of these conflicts; (3) why existing institutions and processes, especially those associated with the CSCE, have not been effective in either preventing or otherwise dealing with these conflicts; (4) how the CSCE institutions and processes could be made more effective; and (5) what else can, or should, be done to deal with these manifestations of the "New World Disorder" in Europe.

A major conclusion of the study is that *integrated systems of conflict resolution networks* are required to deal with these conflicts, in part, to dampen whatever "multiplier-effect" dynamics might be operative, and thereby prevent the conflicts from "spilling over" to, and adversely affecting peace and security in, other parts of Europe and elsewhere.

Such networks should be comprised of new and evolving ("track-1") CSCE mechanisms and integrated with corresponding *nongovernmental* ("track-2") mechanisms of conflict resolution.

Such networks should also include appropriate *peacekeeping* mechanisms for separating warring factions in "out-of-control" spirals, but only as a *necessary condition* of more "positive-peace"-oriented efforts to deal with the underlying causes and conditions of violent ethnic conflict.

Introduction

During 24 March–8 July 1992, the fourth review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) took place in Helsinki, capped by a summit meeting during 9–10 July, to build further upon previous CSCE meetings to "institutionalize" the CSCE and contribute to post-Cold War developments, including the development of new mechanisms for *early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping, and the peaceful settlement of disputes*.

Also during March–July 1992, the Yugoslavian war, which had been raging between Serbia and Croatia since June 1991, resulting in some 10,000 deaths,

spilled over from Croatia into Bosnia-Herzegovina, resulting in, by September 1992, perhaps as many as 50,000 fatalities, mostly Slavic Muslims, plus in excess of two million refugees, indeed, a refugee problem unlike anything seen in Europe since World War II (Battista 1992, CSCE Helsinki '92, p. 12). By March 1993, the numbers of killed or missing Slavic Muslims had exceeded 100,000 (Shelton 1993).

Clearly, the new and evolving CSCE institutions for dealing with conflict in post-Cold War Europe have not facilitated either the prevention or the resolution of the Yugoslavian wars or of any of the other ethnic conflicts which have reemerged, simultaneous to, and/or in the wake of, the ending of the Cold War (e.g., in Nagorno-Karabagh, Georgia, Moldova).

This article explores five questions:

1. What are some of the likely causes and conditions of violent expressions of ethnic conflict in Europe, especially the brutal wars in the former Yugoslavia?
2. What are some of the likely consequences of the continuation of these violent ethnic conflicts?
3. Why have existing institutions and processes, especially those associated with the CSCE, proven to be ineffective in either preventing or otherwise dealing with the violent manifestations of these conflicts?
4. How can these institutions and processes be made more effective in dealing with these conflicts?
5. What else can, or should, be done to deal with these manifestations of the "New World Disorder" in Europe?

A point of departure: Fukuyama's post-Cold War *Zeitgeist*

Francis Fukuyama (1989) provoked intense debate a few years ago by arguing that the end of the Cold War signalled the "end of history" — the triumph of democracy over communism. The "end of history" also meant a "diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states" (1989, p. 18). But:

"This does not by any means imply the end of international conflict *per se*. ... Conflict between states *still in history*, and between those states and those at the end of history, would still be possible" (emphasis added).

Although ideological tensions between East and West have clearly diminished, and Fukuyama recognizes that "there would still be a high and perhaps rising level

of ethnic and nationalist violence" (ibid.), he seems to have overlooked the "spillover" potential of the ethnic and other conflicts that he admits will continue to occur: Such conflicts could undermine further democratization and reform in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and ultimately sabotage the development of a new "East-West Peace and Security Commons".

Ethnic conflict: Toward explanation and action

Basic terms

The general phenomenon being addressed here is conflict, which has been defined elsewhere (Sandole 1986) as "a dynamic phenomenon,... a *manifest conflict process* (MCP), comprised of phases of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination/resolution". More specifically, an MCP is: "a situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of one another".

There is nothing inherently wrong with *conflict* itself, as it may signal that something is wrong with an otherwise valued relationship. And if the parties continue to value the relationship, they will want to fix it. My concern, therefore, is with the choices people make about how to deal with conflict: whether by *competitive* or *cooperative* means (see Deutsch 1973). If competitive means are selected, MCPs could escalate into what I call *aggressive manifest conflict processes* (AMCPs), where the parties attempt to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by: physically damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of one another; and/or psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcibly eliminating one another.

What do theory and research tell us about the transition from MCPs to AMCPs?

Basic human needs, frustration and ethnic conflict

In addition to *disagreement*, the above definition of MCP includes parties' "attempts to *undermine* one other", to "win", or at least, not to "lose". This means that each must do something about, or *to* the other to prevent it from winning. As suggested by Anatol Rapoport's (1960) classic work, this undermining can be achieved by one or some combination of three modes: "Fights, Games, [or] Debates". *Debates* involve attempts to convert the opponent or some important third party; *games* involve attempts to outwit the opponent; and *fights* (the equivalent of AMCPs) involve attempts to destroy the opponent.

It does not matter how the parties attempt to undermine one another because fights, games, and debates all involve various degrees of *frustration*.

"To undermine one's opponent is to prevent him/her/them from achieving their objective. And the closer the process of undermining is to a fight, the more intense should be the frustration" (Sandole 1986, pp. 119–120).

Without getting into the 50-year-old debate surrounding the classic work on the frustration–aggression theory of John Dollard et al. (1939), we can hypothesize that

"the more intense the frustration, the more likely it is that *some kind of* experience or expression of aggression will occur — whether internal or external, physical or verbal, direct or indirect" (Sandole 1986, pp. 120–121; emphasis added).

But what is it that is being frustrated that can cause conflict to be expressed *violently*? James Chowning Davies makes an explicit theoretical connection between the frustration–aggression theory of Dollard et al., and his (Davies') modification of Abraham Maslow's (1987) "hierarchy of needs". For Davies, the frustration of *substantive* (physical, social-affectional, self-esteem, and self-actualization) or *implemental* needs (security, knowledge, and power), can convert MCPs into AMCPs: "Violence ... is produced when certain innate needs or demands are deeply frustrated" (Davies 1973, p. 251).

John Burton (1979, 1990) hypothesizes a link between frustration and basic needs for *identity* as well as for security and other goals (e.g., recognition, autonomy, dignity, and bonding). Burton's emphasis on *identity* (and his use of the concept *identity group*) renders his framework particularly relevant to "conflicts in multi-ethnic societies [which] account for *most* of the protracted violent conflicts in the world society" (1990, p. 137; emphasis added). In this regard, Don Podestra (1987), in his analysis of ethnic and religious conflict in 25 countries during 1987, found that "These simmering conflicts [are] rooted in the most basic forms of human *identity*", reflecting "the *need* to assert *group identity*" (emphasis added), and originating in one particular emotion: a *fear of group extinction*. (On ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict resolution, see Horowitz 1985 and Montville 1990.)

Apropos "group extinction", Ted Robert Gurr and James Scarritt (1989) have determined that there are at least 261 minority groups *at risk* in 99 countries. Gurr's work with Barbara Harff (1988) on state repression of outgroups, indicates that there have been 44 instances of genocide and politicide in all world regions since 1945, with estimated casualties ranging between 7 to 16 million people: "at least

as many who died in all international and civil wars in the [same] period" (ibid., p. 359). And Rudolph Rummel (1987, p. 28) tells us that, "the worldwide risk of being killed by one's own government because of one's race, ethnic group, politics, etc., is more than three times greater than the risk of war".

Clearly, "Genocides and politicides are brutal efforts to maintain the security of one's 'identity group' at the *total expense* of other groups" (Sandole 1990, p. 63; emphasis added). Given this association between ethnic conflict and the "fear of group extinction", it is not surprising that:

"So far there has been no solution to any major multi-cultural or multi-ethnic conflict. Ethnic and cultural conflicts persist and either become an on-going part of a social-political system, or erupt, leading to violence and the destruction of the system" (Burton 1990a, p. 138).

(The wars in the former Yugoslavia are a major testing ground for these hypotheses.)

Conflict resolution and "prevention"

We are discussing *ontological* "needs" — imperatives which transcend culture, personality, time, and situation. Everyone (including other forms of life) has "needs" in some sense — they are requisite to survival: of self, identity group, and species. Hence, there is an important *biological* element here (see Sandole 1990). (What is influenced by culture, personality, time, and situation are the ways in which people seek to express and to meet their needs; see Avruch et al. 1991). No matter what barriers they may encounter, people will aspire to meet their needs, one way or another, even to the extent that they may be defined by others as "deviant", even as *criminal* (e.g., *terrorist*).

Minority groups are often circumscribed in their developmental aspirations by a variety of barriers; they are, with respect to majority groups, in a condition conceptualized by Johan Galtung (1969) as "structural violence": situations of disadvantaged access to the political, economic and other resources typically enjoyed by the mainstream.

Structural violence is not always perceived by minorities; however, if or when it is, "rank disequilibrium" (Galtung 1964) and/or "relative deprivation" (Gurr 1970), or some other experience of "felt dissonance" may result. In the event, minorities may attempt, *within the mainstream*, to fulfil their needs for identity, security, recognition, and other objectives, but *without success*. Subsequently, via *frustration-aggression-based escalation*, they may "explode" their way into mainstream consciousness.

When violence does occur, there may be a “law-and-order” response in the short-run: State authorities may feel that they must respond forcefully to prevent loss of life, destruction to property, and the like. This may lead (perhaps, only temporarily) to *negative peace*: the absence of hostilities (Galtung 1969). This is not, however, *conflict resolution*: a durable agreement that deals with, to the satisfaction of all concerned, the issues that lead to the violence.

Accordingly, for *practical*, and not “only” ethical reasons, the parties should move toward *positive peace*: the absence of structural violence, and pursuit of *social justice* for all concerned, which means facilitating the access of minorities into the mainstream from which previously they were systematically excluded.

Incorporating minorities into the mainstream may initially involve bringing people “to the table” to enter into a dialogue, e.g., to negotiate a cease-fire or otherwise agree to stop killing each other (negative peace), in order to reverse the insidious dynamic of the *negative self-fulfilling prophecy* (NSFP) which otherwise fuels and sustains *action-reaction conflict spirals* (see Sandole 1986). The parties can then begin to collaboratively pursue social justice (positive peace) which will, in the long run, require *change* in the various structures and processes that would otherwise continue to reflect and maintain the structural violence. This is the meaning of Burton’s “provention”: “prevention of an undesired event by removing its causes, and by creating conditions in which it cannot occur” (1990a, p. 233).

A fundamental problem, however, is that political elites, in pursuit of their *own* needs for identity, security, and the like — what Burton (1979, p. 73 and Ch. 7) calls *role defense* — tend to resist efforts to empower minorities, usually because they (and not surprisingly, the minorities as well) see the world through *Realpolitik*, confrontational, power-based, zero-sum (win-lose) lenses.

The internal-external conflict nexus

Georg Simmel (1955) and Louis Coser (1956), among others, have argued that conflict with outgroups has the *function* of unifying and integrating each of the conflicting ingroups, to the extent that political elites have been known to follow Simmel’s (1955, p. 98) advice to *invent enemies* if none otherwise existed, in order to prevent or “manage” internal disarray and disintegration, thereby defending and preserving their “roles”.

That conflict with the “outside” can have “internal” value seems to be generic, applying to *all* systems levels, including the intrapsychic. Hence, Vamik Volkan’s (1988) argument that there is a *need for enemies* as well as allies, fulfilment of which is requisite to the development of one’s sense of *identity*.

Given the possibility not only of a “functional” spillover (Simmel/Coser), but also b) external intervention on behalf of ethnic “kin” and c) “multiplier-effect contagion”, there are disturbing implications for European security of increases in

ethnic and other conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: unless conflicts *within* ethnically divided societies are dealt with meaningfully *for all concerned*, they could exacerbate ongoing, or lead to new conflicts *between* the affected states and their neighbours, as well as exacerbate or lead to similar conflicts elsewhere.

Are we stuck with a violent conflict-prone system? Must the Cold War be re-invented to “put Humpty Dumpty (bipolar ‘stability’) back together again”?

The new Europe: Toward a post-Cold War peace and security system

Part and parcel of the dramatic changes that have been taking place in Europe are developments which constitute explicit efforts to *guarantee* the ending of the Cold War and to “plug” the Hobbesian “black hole” of international anarchy, at least in Europe; e.g.,

- a) agreements have been reached concerning conventional forces and confidence and security-building measures (see ACDA 1990, CSBMs 1992); and
- b) new organizations and mechanisms have been created to “institutionalize” the CSCE, including:

1. The *Conflict Prevention Centre* (CPC) in Vienna, initially to provide support for the implementation of a number of CSBMs (e.g., annual exchange of military information; consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities; a communications network; cooperation regarding hazardous incidents of a military nature; and annual implementation assessment meetings) (see Charter of Paris 1990, Part F).

2. The *Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes* (PSD), to facilitate the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes. The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) has been delegated with the responsibility for operationalizing PSD for any given dispute (see Valletta Report 1991).

3. The *Human Dimension Mechanism* (HDM), to facilitate investigations of any “human dimensions problem of concern and taking whatever actions ... thought desirable to further dialogue and a resolution of the problem” (CSCE Commission 1992, p. 27).

4. The *High Commissioner for National Minorities* (HCM), to monitor tensions involving national minority issues which ... have the potential to develop into a conflict ... affecting peace, stability or relations between [CSCE] states”. The

HCM may also visit any CSCE area and communicate with the parties concerned to explore “the nature of the tensions and recent developments ... and ... the potential consequences for peace and stability within the CSCE area” (CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, Chap. II).

5. A *Peacekeeping Mechanism*, which could make use of resources from NATO, EC, Western European Union (WEU), and the former Soviet Union (CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States), in order to “supervise and help maintain cease-fires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid and to assist refugees” (ibid., Chap. III).

All of these new CSCE agreements, organizations, and mechanisms are “purpose-built” — they are relevant contributions to the creation of an infrastructure supportive of *problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution in Europe*; however, their potential for cooperative conflict resolution has not been realized, in part, because of:

1. *Timing*: Given the temporal overlap between attempted institution building and resurrected ethnic conflict in the last few years, the new CSCE institutions and processes never had a chance. They were not sufficiently developed to be up to the task: they were — and basically still are — “too” new.

2. *Jurisdiction*: The CSCE exists against the background of the *sovereignty-protecting tradition of international law*. The CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, for example, has an “exceptions clause” (Valletta Report:11): any party to a dispute can prevent the establishment or continuation of a CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism if the “dispute raises issues concerning its territorial integrity, or national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to the jurisdiction over other areas”. Quite simply, any party to a conflict can effectively *veto* the process of peaceful settlement, if it decides that its sovereignty will be jeopardized by the process.

Pending fundamental changes in international law, the CSCE will remain basically concerned with relations *between* states, while many of the ethnic (and other) conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (*and elsewhere within the CSCE*) are about relations *within* states. This potentially “fatal flaw” has been a major challenge facing the “architects” of the post-Cold War peace and security system in Europe — one among the reasons for an alternative approach to conflict resolution.

The need for a second track

"Second-track diplomacy" is a term coined by diplomat Joseph Montville to refer to unofficial, *nongovernmental* efforts to get a constructive dialogue going between conflicting parties, often in situations where government officials (at the *track-1* level) have failed to do so (see Montville and Davidson 1981–82, Volkan et al. 1991a, b). Montville's fellow diplomat and *track-2* advocate, Ambassador John McDonald (McDonald and Bendahmane 1987), has, with Louise Diamond, generated additional "tracks" relevant to problem-solving conflict resolution (Diamond and McDonald 1991).

Problem solving conflict resolution, plus *facilitated conflict resolution* and *analytical problem solving*, are terms associated with the work of one of the pioneers in the field of conflict resolution, John Burton (see Burton 1969, 1979, 1990, Burton and Dukes 1990). Herbert Kelman, one of Burton's long-time colleagues, has developed from this tradition an *interactive problem-solving* process which he has applied primarily to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (see Kelman 1986).

Track-2 (or "multi-track") processes *could* be used in the short run to avert or to reduce and terminate hostilities, depending upon conditions on the ground; and in the middle to long term, to facilitate constructive management and collaborative solving of problems underlying potentially or actually violent conflict situations.

In either case, parties to conflicts would have to invite practitioners such as Burton, Kelman, McDonald, Montville, or others (e.g., from the *International Negotiation Network* [INN] associated with the Carter Center at Emory University in Atlanta; or from *International Alert* in London), to assist them in establishing and maintaining the appropriate processes, one objective being to *complement* and to link up with appropriate track-1 processes.

If practitioners such as Burton et al., are "too" reflective of "outsider" status (which in some situations might be an advantage), then recourse could be made to those more on the "inside". For example, in the last few years, *Partners for Democratic Change* has played a major role in creating centers for conflict resolution training and practice in *Russia* (Center for Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Research at Moscow State Pedagogical University); *Poland* (Center on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at the University of Warsaw); *Hungary* (Conflict Resolution Center for Training and Research at the Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest); the *Czech Republic* (Center for Conflict Prevention and Resolution at Charles University in Prague); the *Slovak Republic* (Center for Conflict Prevention and Resolution at Comenius University in Bratislava); and *Bulgaria* (Center for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at the University of Sofia) (see Partners for Democratic Change 1992).

Paralleling the work of Partners for Democratic Change is the *Helsinki Citizens Assembly* (HCA). Established in Prague in 1990, the HCA is a major example of Diamond and McDonald's *Multitrack Diplomacy* (1991); its objectives are, among others, *nonviolent conflict resolution*, plus the pursuit and maintenance of citizens' rights, including the rights of minorities, all within the context of the promises implicit in the CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Indeed, *the HCA is the track-2 (or "multi-track") complement to the track-1 CSCE* (see HCA 1990).

HCA is currently in the process of establishing "a network of centers for conflict resolution", with specific application to conflicts in the Balkans, Transcaucasus, Romania and Moldova, and Britain and Ireland (see HCA 1992).

Towards integrated systems of conflict resolution networks

To deal effectively with ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, the evolving peace and security system in the "New Europe" should comprise *integrated systems of conflict resolution networks* reflecting *vertical* as well as *horizontal integration*. By "vertical", I mean *integration between conflict prevention/management/resolution mechanisms* operating at different levels of social-political organization; for instance, at the *local*, "nearly local" (centers in neighbouring societies), *regional* (EC, WEU [Western European Union], NATO, CIS, CSCE), and *global* (UN) levels, with track-2 (e.g., Partners for Democratic Change and/or the Helsinki Citizens Assembly) liaising with and complementing track-1 processes whenever possible. This would be one way to further facilitate Europe's transition from what Anatol Rapoport (1974) terms an "exogenous" into an "endogenous" conflict environment (*ibid.*, p. 175), "wherein the conflicting systems are parts of a larger system that has its own mechanisms for ... controlling or resolving conflict".

By "horizontal", I mean *integration between negative and positive peace mechanisms*. In order for an integrated system of conflict resolution networks to succeed, it should include some degree of *Realpolitik*, but only for those still "in history", and only as part of a larger whole consisting largely of *Idealpolitik* measures and processes: to move to, but then beyond *negative*, and toward *positive* peace. This means that track-1, armed peacekeeping forces, representing the UN (see Boutros-Ghali 1992), CSCE, NATO, or WEU might, *under very clear conditions*, enter a war zone to effect and/or enforce a negative peace, as a necessary precondition for moving toward positive peace.

Such "clear conditions" should include the attempted imposition by one party of a genocidal "final solution" on another. In the event, the objectives of the peacekeeping operation would *not* include a "Balkan Storm", the bombing of

civilian centers, and the killing of tens of thousands in order to “win”, or to “impose solutions”, or — what is, in any case, impossible — to “solve” (through military means) the conflict, but a) to prevent genocide, b) permit international relief operations to get through to threatened populations, and c) to separate the warring factions in order to afford them a “cooling-off” opportunity, as a *necessary* (but obviously not *sufficient*) condition of collaborative resolution of the conflict which they have been expressing through violent means.

Reprehensible (and potentially escalation-prone) though even a “writ small” rendering of *Realpolitik* may be to many in the conflict resolution community, it is, *as part of a larger, Idealpolitik-oriented package*, nevertheless compatible with conflict resolution theory and practice (e.g., see Fisher and Keashly’s 1991 “contingency model of third party intervention”).

One basis for the *Realpolitik* component of this integrated system is the *North Atlantic Cooperation Council* (NACC), created by NATO during its Rome Summit of 7–8 November 1991, to facilitate consultation and cooperation between NATO and its former Cold War adversaries on matters of *common* security. As one example of a “reinvented” NATO, NACC could evolve into a *post-Cold War, trans-Atlantic/pan-European security system*, within the context of CSCE, one of whose functions would be to provide effective *peacekeeping* forces as agents of “negative” peace in crisis areas such as the former Yugoslavia (see Sandole 1992b).

Conclusion

This article set out to explore five questions, the first of which was: What are some of the likely causes and conditions of violent expressions of ethnic conflict in Europe, especially the brutal wars in former Yugoslavia? I have mentioned in this connection some possible examples of “conflict-as-startup conditions” (e.g., *frustrated basic needs* for security [the *fear of group extinction*], one response to which is *role defence*-based aggression), plus “conflict-as-process” which, via the *negative rendition of the self-fulfilling prophecy* (NSFP), tends toward *self-perpetuating* conflict spirals.

Once a *manifest conflict process* (MCP) has escalated, via *competitive* means, to an aggressive MCP (a “fight”), it no longer matters what the “startup conditions” were because then, the conflict is being kept alive by its own dynamics (*Eigendynamik*).

Under such circumstances, even if “negative peace” can be achieved, other interventions designed to improve and move the relationship “toward positive peace” may not be possible, at least not in the foreseeable future. According to war veteran David Hackworth’s (1992) definition of the carnage in Yugoslavia,

“viewed from almost any angle, [it] makes no sense at all. ... This is *indiscriminate violence and mindless slaughter*. ... After fighting like this, *the only thing sure to survive is hatred*” (emphasis added).

The second question was: What are some of the likely consequences of the continuation of these violent ethnic conflicts? In this regard, the potential is developing further for current and future “Yugoslavia” to overwhelm the conceptual, moral, and physical sensibilities and limits of Europeans and others with the images and realities of genocide, concentration camps, massive sexual assault, and a refugee problem unlike anything seen in Europe since World War II; further, in the specific case of the “current” Yugoslavia, to *spill over* to other areas (*Macedonia, Kosovo*), neighbouring countries (*Albania, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece*), making for a general Balkan war which, given the very real possibility of *Turkey and Russia* being drawn in, creates the conditions for a general European war; plus, in general, to *contaminate at all levels the human decision-making environment making violent means for dealing with conflict more rather than less likely*.

The third question was: Why have existing institutions and processes, especially those associated with the CSCE, proven to be ineffective in either preventing or otherwise dealing with the violent manifestations of these conflicts? Quite simply, although “purpose-built”, they are still “too new”, too “respectful of traditional state sovereignty”, and too reflective of “top down” to be of any use in dealing with the crises in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

The fourth and fifth questions were: How can these institutions and processes be made more effective in dealing with these conflicts? And: What else can, or should, be done to deal with these manifestations of the “New World Disorder” in Europe? The challenge here is for peace researchers, conflict analysts, conflict resolution theorists and practitioners to join with policymakers, activists, and concerned citizens to design appropriate *models of (vertically and horizontally) integrated systems of conflict resolution networks*.

Policymakers, of course, would have to be more receptive to track-2 than they have in the past. In this regard, such integrated systems of conflict resolution networks should take advantage of the recently enhanced potential for interaction between the CSCE and *nongovernmental* actors (see CSCE Helsinki Document 1992 [“Helsinki Decisions”], Chap. IV).

One idea might be to assign *permanent* representatives of track-2 organizations to the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna, the CSCE secretariat in Prague, and to other CSCE agencies (as well as to NATO and the EC in Brussels and to appropriate UN agencies in New York, Geneva and elsewhere), to facilitate “bottom-up” track— influence on track— and more effective *integrated* monitoring of, and *proactive* responses to, violent ethnic conflict in Europe and elsewhere.

Perhaps this is one "wave of the future" — bringing citizens and governments together in creative, innovative ways (with the former influencing the latter, "from below") to contribute to the creation of a "New World Order" that is truly "beyond history".

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V. The Middle East: Old conflicts and new

MATS HAMMARSTRÖM

This study deals with factors related to whether, and how, the onset of an interstate military conflict in a subregion will have direct or indirect diffusion effects on the disputes in its area. Three subregions in the Middle East during the period 1948–1988 are examined. A clear pattern was found, indicating that internal–external dyads between a military conflict dyad and a dispute dyad are associated with direct diffusion effects, whereas security relations involved in such dyads are associated with indirect diffusion effects.

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This study is part of an ongoing research project on interstate conflict diffusion funded by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The author is grateful to Peter Wiklundsson and Per Lindström for their comments on an earlier version.

1. Introduction

When several consecutive armed conflicts occur in a region, as has happened in the Balkans recently and in some parts of the Middle East, South East Asia and the Horn of Africa during the past decades, it is often assumed that such a militarization of a region or subregion reflects the operation of conflict diffusion processes. Previous studies on the diffusion of interstate military conflicts suggest that this phenomenon is rare and restricted to relations among neighbouring countries within a limited geographic area (see esp. Most, Starr and Siverson 1989). However, there have been few attempts to specify the diffusion effects that a military conflict may have on the disputes in its vicinity (cf. Starr and Most 1983, 1985). The present study represents a modest attempt to deal with this problem by exploring some of the circumstances under which an interstate military conflict might have a direct or an indirect diffusion effect on the disputes within a subregion. As a preliminary effort to identify and compare such diffusion effects, certain extremely conflict-ridden subregions appearing in the Middle East since 1948 are examined.

The diffusion of military conflicts in the Middle East: Direct vs. indirect effects

by

MATS HAMMARSTRÖM

This study deals with factors related to whether, and how, the onset of an interstate military conflict in a subregion will have direct or indirect diffusion effects on the disputes in this area. Three subregions in the Middle East during the period 1948–1985 are examined. A clear pattern was found, indicating that internal–external linkages between a military conflict dyad and a dispute dyad are associated with direct diffusion effects, whereas security relations involved in such dyads are associated with indirect diffusion effects.

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1. Introduction

When several consecutive armed conflicts occur in a region, as has happened in the Balkans recently and in some parts of the Middle East, South East Asia and the Horn of Africa during the past decades, it is often assumed that such a militarization of a region or subregion reflects the operation of conflict diffusion processes. Previous studies on the diffusion of interstate military conflicts suggest that this phenomenon is rare and restricted to relations among neighbouring countries within a limited geographic area (see esp. Most, Starr and Siverson 1989). However, there have been few attempts to specify the diffusion effects that a military conflict may have on the disputes in its vicinity (cf. Starr and Most 1983, 1985). The present study represents a modest attempt to deal with this problem by exploring some of the circumstances under which an interstate military conflict might have a direct or an indirect diffusion effect on the disputes within a subregion. As a preliminary effort to identify and compare such diffusion effects, certain extremely conflict-ridden subregions appearing in the Middle East since 1948 are examined.

2. Subregional diffusion processes

The definition of diffusion used in this study is that proposed by Most and Starr, who have made a series of pioneering studies of conflict diffusion. By "diffusion" they mean processes whereby "events of a given type in a given polity are conditioned by the occurrence of similar events in *other* polities at prior points in time" (Most and Starr 1981, p. 10, cf. Davis, Duncan and Siverson 1978, p. 778, Bremer 1982, p. 30, Levy 1982, p. 564).

In the literature on conflict diffusion, only Most and Starr (1990, pp. 407ff.) have paid attention to the distinction between direct and indirect diffusion relationships: By a *direct* diffusion they mean a relationship in which the occurrence of a phenomenon has an "unmediated and causal" impact on the occurrence of a similar phenomenon. By an *indirect* diffusion they mean a relationship in which the occurrence of a phenomenon affects some different, intervening factor(s) which in turn has an impact on the likelihood that a similar phenomenon will occur. Most and Starr have not tried to measure and compare direct and indirect diffusion. Rather, they indicate that it might be very problematic to obtain valid and reliable indicators on these relationships. With regard to direct diffusion, they consider it unlikely that any "truly causal and theoretically meaningful" direct diffusion effects can be identified. With respect to indirect diffusion, they emphasize that too many relationships may be classified as reflecting indirect effects, since virtually any policy occurrence could be seen to be indirectly related to prior occurrences of similar events "if one wishes to regress sufficiently far in history" (1990, p. 408). Keeping these problems in mind, some very crude and tentative measurement procedures will be offered in Section 3 below as approximations of certain direct and indirect diffusion effects.

Under what circumstances will an interstate military conflict have direct or indirect diffusion effects on the disputes in a subregion? Are there similar factors behind both direct and indirect conflict diffusion, or are there different processes at work? As a point of departure for addressing these questions regional conflicts will be considered from a systems perspective (cf. Lebovic 1986). One version of such a perspective may be called the *external security* approach since it focusses on the diplomatic and military relations that are established within a region. By its emphasis on the interdependence of the governments in a region concerning security issues, this approach seems pertinent to the study of subregional conflict diffusion processes. Of particular interest is the "regional after-shock" argument suggested by Bremer (1982). He maintains that just

"as earthquakes upset delicate geological balances and are followed by after-shocks until a new equilibrium is established, so might the use or threatened use of force in a region upset a precarious balance of power,

and trigger, further, such behavior by other members of the region until some form of equilibrium is restored" (1982, p. 43).

The regional after-shock notion seems relevant to the analysis of indirect diffusion processes as it suggests that the onset of an interstate military conflict within a region involves a change in the regional power structure which in turn may entail the onset of additional military conflicts. Furthermore, the external security approach in general appears more suitable to the analysis of indirect than direct diffusion effects since security relations within a region are likely to involve several factors (related to the regional power structure) that operate as intervening variables in decisions about regional conflict management.

Another version of a systems perspective on regional conflicts might be labelled the *internal-external linkage* approach since it emphasizes that a region might be regarded as a network of ideological, ethnic or religious rivalries among political groups or factions which cut across national boundaries. The idea of considering possible linkages between internal political factors and foreign policy, originally proposed by Rosenau (1969), has been elaborated and applied to the study of interstate disputes by Dowty (1971). He suggests that one should focus on "foreign-linked factionalism", defined as "the presence within a state of a competing faction that seeks or accepts aid from other states in order to seize or wield power by nonlegitimized means" (1971, p. 431). The notion of foreign-linked factionalism seems relevant to the analysis of direct diffusion effects as it suggests that the linkages between the governments and the non-governmental, opposition groups among a set of countries means the establishment of a tight network of contacts across borders which would make the actors involved sensitive to the changes in risks and opportunities accompanying the onset of a military conflict.

In what follows, a modest attempt is made to assess the empirical support for the thesis that the *external security* approach is relevant to the analysis of certain *indirect* diffusion effects, whereas the *internal-external linkage* approach is pertinent to the understanding of certain *direct* diffusion effects. The empirical focus is on diffusion effects within the context of militarized subregions in the Middle East.

3. Militarized subregions in the Middle East

A militarized subregion is defined as a subregional situation in which several consecutive interstate military conflicts occur within a limited period. The point of departure for identifying a militarized subregion is the onset of an interstate military conflict that functions as a potentially destabilizing factor in the subregion.

An interstate military conflict will be considered to have such a function if a) its intensity reaches that of a war as defined by Gochman and Maoz (1984), or b) its intensity is lower than that of a war but it represents the first dispute militarization in the subregion concerned in at least two years.¹

To obtain a set of "consecutive" interstate military conflicts within the subregion, it was decided to require that at least *two* of the disputes in the same subregion as the potentially destabilizing military conflict are militarized *within two years* after its onset. These militarized disputes thus become additional military conflicts which in turn might further destabilize the subregion by triggering the militarization of other disputes. For the sake of easy reference, the potentially destabilizing interstate military conflict will be called the "*primary*" military conflict and the additional interstate military conflicts will be labelled "*secondary*" military conflicts. An interstate dispute is regarded as *militarized* (and subsequently coded as a secondary military conflict) according to the rules for dispute militarization established by Gochman and Maoz (1984, pp. 588ff). A *subregion* consists of the primary military conflict and all the interstate disputes (whether militarized or not) appearing in the "vicinity" of the primary military conflict. The primary military conflict and a dispute are considered to be in the vicinity of each other if at least *one* principal participant of one of these conflicts shares borders with *both* of the principal participants of the other conflict.

By applying these specifications to the Middle East during a period from 1948 to 1986² three militarized subregions have been identified. Each of these will be examined, focussing on the thesis that internal-external linkages are related to direct diffusion effects whereas external security factors are connected to indirect diffusion effects. In the tables and case descriptions given below, the potential diffusion effect is registered as *absent* if a military conflict either is not followed by the militarization of the dispute concerned or the issue involved in the militarization of the dispute apparently is unrelated to the issue of the military conflict. A military conflict is considered to have a *direct* diffusion effect on a dispute if a) the militarization of the dispute represents the *first* transformation of the dispute after the onset of the military conflict and :b) the policy issues involved in both the dispute militarization process and the military conflict are related. By contrast, an *indirect* diffusion effect is registered if the militarization concerned is the *second*, third etc. transformation of the dispute and if the criterion of issue-relatedness mentioned above is applicable. A transformation of a dispute is regarded to take place when the dispute exhibits: 1. a change in the status of any of the parties involved, 2. a change in the number of parties involved or, 3. a change in the level of intensity (escalation or de-escalation).³ It should be noted that only those disputes (whether militarized or not) that appear in the same subregion as the primary military conflict and that are identified within two years from its onset will be considered in the tables. To emphasize this, the primary military conflict is italicized.⁴

The *first* militarized subregion is identified as a two-year period after the onset of the Palestinian War, which started on May 15, 1948.

Table 1: Subregional diffusion effects of the Palestinian war, 1948–1950

Military conflict (M) duration (month/year)	Dispute (D) near military conflict (M)	Militarization of (D)?	Diffusion effect of (M) on (D)
(M1) <i>Israel vs. Arabs</i> (Egypt/Syria/Jordan/ Lebanon/Saudi Arabia) 5/1948–3/1949	(D1) Syria vs. Jordan	Yes	Indirect
(M1)	(D2) Syria vs. Iraq	Yes	Indirect
(M1)	(D3) Syria vs. Lebanon	Yes	Direct
(M2) Syria vs. Jordan 4/1949–4/1949	(D3)		Absent
(M3) Syria v.s Iraq 4/1949–4/1949	(D3)		Absent

As indicated in *Table 1*, the Syria vs. Jordan dispute (D1) and the Syria vs Iraq dispute (D2) seem to display a similar pattern. Before the Palestinian War (M1), Syria was involved in a general power struggle with both Jordan and Iraq related to their common goal of incorporating Syria. These plans of the Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq were opposed by the republican Syria. But when the Palestinian War ended in March 1949, a military *coup d'état*, led by Colonel Husni Al-Za'im, brought about a major change in Syria's foreign policy. Za'im and his army officers were primarily concerned with the security of Syria against Israel and they considered the support of Jordan and Iraq essential. Za'im welcomed a federation with Iraq and Jordan, which means that its disputes with both of these countries suddenly de-escalated. Shortly afterwards, however, Za'im visited Cairo and established friendly relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which at that time were contesting the Hashemite plans. Za'im reversed his policy by committing Syria to the anti-Hashemite camp. In April 1949 he announced plans for a military mobilization against Jordan and Iraq (Petran 1972, pp. 80ff, Faddah 1974, pp. 154ff). This military threat is coded as a militarization of these disputes. Since the militarization represents the second transformation of the disputes (the first being a de-escalation) after the onset of the primary military conflict, its diffusion effect on the disputes is regarded as indirect. It has been hypothesized that such diffusion effects are related to *external-security* factors, and the course of events seems to support this thesis. As indicated above, the risk of standing alone against Israel was probably behind the attempt of the new Syrian government to seek a rapprochement with Jordan and Iraq. But the ensuing militarization of the disputes appears

to have occurred as a consequence of the dynamics of the rivalry between the Hashemite bloc and the anti-Hashemite group. When Syria approached the latter, it accomplished both its post-war goal of having allies against Israel and its pre-war ambition of opposing the plans of Hashemite kingdoms. It seems, then, that external security was a salient feature of Syria's policy decisions.

The dispute between Syria and Lebanon (D3) was militarized in May 1949, i.e., a few months after the armistice agreement that ended the Palestinian War. This militarization is coded as a direct diffusion effect of the war since it represented the first transformation of the dispute once the war had started (and the issue-relatedness criterion is fulfilled as shown below). To what extent is the internal-external linkage approach relevant to the understanding of this diffusion effect? Before the Palestinian war, the Syrian government was unstable and the popular discontent with the regime was intensified by the defeat, which was "the most traumatic experience in the history of modern Syria" (Malone 1973, cf. Petran 1972, pp. 95ff). The Syrian government sent soldiers into Lebanon to repress the Syrian exiles in the border area. This mission eventually developed into a series of military border incidents, a threat by Syria to intervene militarily and later on the stationing of Syrian troops in Lebanon (Butterworth 1976, pp. 131ff). As suggested by this narrative, *internal-external linkages* between the parties in the dispute were apparently operating and may explain the direct diffusion effect.

Once the disputes between Syria and Jordan/Iraq had become militarized they may also (according to the coding rules applied) be regarded as secondary military conflicts (M2 and M3) within the subregion. Since both of these started about a month before the militarization of the Syria-Lebanon dispute (D3) one may ask whether they had a diffusion effect on this dispute. According to the sources utilized, however, there was no connection between (M2) and (M3) on the one hand and (D3) on the other hand with regard to the issues involved in the militarization of each of these three conflicts, which means that no diffusion effect is registered.

The *second* militarized subregion is identified as a two-year period after the onset in December 1959 of a military confrontation between Iraq and Iran over Shatt al-Arab. This conflict involved only the display of military force by both sides. As mentioned above, such a low-intense militarization of a dispute might nevertheless be seen as destabilizing in a geographic area if it is the first militarization of a dispute in at least two years.

As shown in Table 2, two of the four disputes in the vicinity of the Iraq-Iran military conflict (M1) were militarized within two years from its onset. The first militarization concerned the dispute between Jordan and Syria (D1), but as the escalation process was exclusively related to the Palestinian issue, no diffusion effect from the Iraq-Iran military conflict can be discerned. The old border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait (D2) was militarized in June 1961 shortly after Kuwait was granted independence by Britain.

Table 2: Subregional diffusion effects of the Iraq–Iran military conflict, 1959–1961

Military conflict (M) duration (month/year)	Dispute (D) near military conflict (M)	Militarization of (D)?	Diffusion effect of (M) on (D)
(M1) <i>Iraq vs. Iran</i> 12/1959–1/1960	(D1) Jordan vs. Syria	Yes	Absent
(M1)	(D2) Iraq vs. Kuwait	Yes	Indirect
(M2) Jordan vs. Syria 8/1960–8/1960	(D2)		Absent
(M1)	(D3) Saudi Arabia vs. Iraq	No	Absent
(M1)	(D4) Saudi Arabia vs. Oman	No	Absent

This militarization, however, represents the second transformation of the dispute after the onset of the primary military conflict (the first being the change in status of Kuwait from colony to independent state). Hence, the diffusion effect of the primary military conflict on the dispute is regarded as indirect. There is at least one piece of evidence for conceiving of this indirect diffusion effect as related to *external security*. The Iraq–Iran military conflict and the militarization of the Iraq–Kuwait dispute appear to be related by the general security policy goals of the Iraqi leader Qasim. Once Iraq and Iran had settled the dispute over Shatt al-Arab in early 1960, Qasim challenged Iran by laying claim to Arabistan, the Arab name for the province Khuzistan in Iran situated in the Gulf area. Moreover, Gulf students were encouraged to come to Iraqi universities, and the Iraqi media turned their attention to Gulf issues (Marr 1985, pp. 180ff; Khadduri 1969, pp. 166ff). This suggests that Qasim's foreign policy was generally directed towards issues related to the Gulf border area between Iran and Iraq. Hence, the assertion of Iraqi interests in Kuwait immediately after the British withdrawal from the area (which started the crisis over Kuwait) might be seen as an integral part of a general security policy in the subregion.

The remaining disputes in the vicinity of the Iraq–Iran military conflict — Iraq vs. Saudi Arabia (D3) and Saudi Arabia vs. Oman (D4) — were old border disputes. As shown in Table 2, they were not militarized throughout the two-year period. In fact, during this period they did not undergo any transformation being issue-related to the military conflicts involving Iraq. This suggests that the conflict formation processes in this part of the Gulf (with Saudi Arabia as the dominating power) were unrelated to those in the Upper Gulf area around Iraq. Finally, it may be noted that the only secondary military conflict identified, the militarized dispute between Jordan and Syria (M2), was not issue-related to the dispute (D2) in its vicinity.

The *third* militarized subregion is identified as a two year-period after the onset of the military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen which started in October 1970. As in the previous subregional case, this military conflict did not escalate to a war but it is considered to have functioned as a destabilizing factor in this subregion by being the first dispute militarization in the subregion in at least two years.

Table 3: Subregional diffusion effects of the South Yemen–Saudi Arabia military conflict, 1970–1972

Military conflict (M) duration (month/year)	Dispute (D) near military conflict (M)	Militarization of (D)?	Diffusion effect of (M) on (D)
(M1) <i>South Yemen vs. Saudi Arabia</i> 10/1970–(1973)	(D1) South Yemen vs. North Yemen	Yes	Direct
(M1)	(D2) South Yemen vs. Oman	Yes	Direct
(M2) South Yemen vs. North Yemen 2/1972–10/1972	(D2)		Direct
(M1)	(D3) Saudi Arabia vs. Oman	No	Absent
(M2)	(D3)		Absent
(M3) South Yemen vs. Oman 5/1972–7/1972	(D3)		Absent
(M1)	(D4) Saudi Arabia vs. Iraq	No	Absent
(M2)	(D4)		Absent
(M3)	(D4)		Absent
(M1)	(D5) Iraq vs. Iran	No	Absent

As shown in *Table 3*, the dispute between South Yemen and North Yemen (D1) was militarized in February 1972. This militarization was the first transformation of the dispute after the onset of the military conflict between South Yemen and Saudi Arabia (M1) and it was issue-related to (M1). Hence, (M1) is coded as having a direct diffusion effect on (D1). Apparently, a relationship of foreign-linked factionalism existed between the two Yemeni states as each government did not hesitate to support subversive groups in the other country despite officially promoting the idea of a unification of the two countries. The primary military

conflict between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen, which was ongoing throughout 1972, seems related to this foreign-linked factionalism. Before the military clashes between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen, the North Yemeni government had withstood Saudi pressure to involve North Yemeni tribes in subversive activities against South Yemen. But after the onset of the primary military conflict the North Yemeni government accepted that Saudi agents used its territory as a base for military operations against South Yemen (Abir 1974, pp. 104ff). This case, then, supports the thesis that a military conflict may have a direct diffusion effect on a dispute through the operation of *internal-external linkages*.

According to the coding rules applied, both the primary military conflict (M1) and the secondary military conflict, South Yemen vs North Yemen (M2) had a direct diffusion effect on the dispute between South Yemen and Oman (D2). To what extent were internal-external linkages involved in these relations? The dispute between South Yemen and Oman concerned the Dhofar province in Oman. The radical regime in South Yemen was committed to a policy of supporting a revolutionary movement (PFLOAG) in Dhofar against the Omani governmental forces led by Sultan Qabus. By the summer of 1970, i.e. before the onset of the primary military conflict, the Sultan's armed forces were on the defensive. Once the primary military conflict had begun, the Sultan's forces launched a major military operation (June-September 1971). In this period, Saudi Arabia began to support the Sultan of Oman militarily by interfering with the supply routes between South Yemen and Dhofar. So far, however, no direct military confrontation had occurred between the governmental forces of South Yemen and Oman. Shortly after the dispute between South Yemen and North Yemen (D1) had escalated to a military level and thus had been transformed into a secondary military conflict (M2), the Sultan's forces increased their military operations in Dhofar and began bombing the PFLOAG's training center in South Yemen. Regular South Yemeni forces attacked the Omani forces in May 1972, and serious fighting between the countries started. The offensive by the Sultan's forces towards South Yemen seems to have been issue-related to the South Yemen vs North Yemen military conflict, as King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was at this time supporting both North Yemen and Oman in an effort to reduce the power of the pro-Soviet regime in South Yemen (Abir 1974, pp. 103ff, Townsend 1977, pp. 101ff). Thus, the *internal-external linkages* thesis seems to be supported, since a) there was a relationship of foreign-linked factionalism between South Yemen and Oman and b) both the primary and the secondary military conflicts (M1 and M2) reinforced these linkages.

Two of the remaining disputes in the vicinity of M1 were old border disputes between, on the one hand, Saudi Arabia and, on the other hand, Oman (D3) and Iraq (D4). Both of these were in fact included also in the previous subregional case. As before, the Saudi Arabian dispute with Iraq remained unchanged. But its dispute

with Oman actually de-escalated. As indicated above, King Faisal began in 1971 to support the Sultan Qabus of Oman (Abir 1974, p. 106). Finally, the rivalry between Iraq and Iran (D5) is included as a consequence of the coding rules (both countries are neighbours to Saudi Arabia), but in terms of conflict diffusion processes this dispute apparently did not belong to the subregion dominated by Saudi Arabia.

4. Conclusions

Given the tentative character of this study, the findings obtained should of course be treated with extreme caution. However, two sets of results seem sufficiently consistent across the cases to merit attention in future studies on conflict diffusion.

1. The processes behind direct and indirect diffusion effects appear to be different. All the cases coded as direct diffusion were related to internal-external linkages, whereas all the cases classified as indirect diffusion were connected to external security factors. More refined methods and a larger empirical domain would be required to assess the robustness of such a pattern. Moreover, the theoretical basis for focussing on the distinction between linkage politics and traditional security policy needs to be elaborated. It may be noted, however, that a related study (Hammarström 1993), focussing on Eastern Europe and the Balkans, indicates that direct diffusion effects are more associated with linkage politics than traditional security concerns. In turn, this suggests that it might be fruitful to further explore the prospects and limits of both linkage politics and security policy in the study of interstate conflict diffusion.

2. The diffusion of interstate military conflicts seems to be a very rare phenomenon. This is a descriptive finding obtained as a by-product of the research design employed. The present study has singled out subregions in which three consecutive military conflicts occur within a two-year period. In such an extreme environment diffusion effects might be expected to be frequent. Yet, out of the twenty possible dyadic diffusion relationships (a military conflict dyad and a dispute dyad), only seven actually experienced a diffusion effect (direct or indirect). Furthermore, the frequency of diffusion effects might be overstated if one merely looks at the sequence of additional military conflicts that occur after the onset of the first military conflict. Upon closer examination, several of these cases were found to be unrelated. This suggests that comparative analysis of individual cases is a useful complement to statistical analysis, which so far has been the predominant methodological approach to conflict diffusion.

Notes

1. If no interstate military conflict has occurred for such an extended period in a given geographic area, the mere onset of even a low-intense armed confrontation may represent an important shift from the previously "normal" pattern of interaction in this area.
2. It would have been desirable to study diffusion effects also after the year 1985, but the data required to classify and analyze interstate disputes were not considered sufficiently reliable for the most recent events.
3. Escalation is defined as the crossing of a salient limit in the current conflict relationship, whereas de-escalation is defined

as a co-operative act by at least one of the parties in the dispute (cf. Smoke 1977, p. 35, Barringer 1972, p. 20, Zartman 1984, p. 187). An event is not classified as an escalation or a de-escalation unless the change it represents takes place at a particular moment and within a specified context.

4. For further specifications of the central concepts used in this study, see Hammarström (1991), which also contains more detailed narratives of the disputes in each case of subregional militarization. It should be noted that the case selection procedure in that study is slightly different from that employed in the present one.

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The dynamics of disarmament in the Middle East

by

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The multipolarity and geography of the Middle East define strong challenges to traditional models of arms races. They also define considerable obstacles for such instruments as confidence and security building measures, negotiations on arms control and disarmament and non-offensive defence. No technological fixes will be sufficient; political solutions are necessary as input in order to get a peace process. These must combine acceptable security for Israel with an eventual Palestinian state, and there are ways of solving these two problems simultaneously — and making the solutions reinforce each other, since a Palestinian state would have a strong self-interest in cooperating for Israeli security and Israel would have a self-interest in the Palestinian state functioning. If an Israeli-Palestinian understanding succeeds, it may pave the way for eliminating, or at least ameliorating, some of the remaining conflict complexes in the Middle East, from traditional security problems in the relations to and between other parties to the aggravating conflicts over water rights.

1. Armament dynamics: Theoretical models and empirical results

An important part of the empirically based knowledge we have about the dynamics of arms races is what we know is rarely widely generalizable. There is even less empirical basis for saying much about the dynamics of *disarmament*. Let us therefore start by making the simplest available assumption about the potential dynamics of disarmament: It is the dynamics of armament, turned the other way around. If so, we have to identify the domestic and interactive factors that affect this dynamics and focus on those among them that are primarily possible to affect by political action, negotiated treaties, etc. So what do we know about armament dynamics?

1.1. Models and results

There have been many theoretical models — and much empirical research — on the dynamics of armament. Most of the theoretical models have not been empirically tested at all. Most of the empirical research has been at best weakly grounded in theory, which makes it questionable how generalizable the results are. Where theoretical models have been tested, the results have usually been weak. Some models have had some empirical confirmation, but rarely any strong one (Wiberg 1990).

Armament dynamics is thus a complex phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to very few variables (and if it can, the variables cannot be the apparently obvious ones, because they have mostly been tested, with modest results). Being a complex phenomenon means that several variables are required to account for variation in it, and often with more intricate relationships than linear ones. That in turn means that the number of parameters is uncomfortably large in comparison with the number of data points available. The models then become untestable in practice at worst, and receive quite modest support at best.

Omitting the mathematical and statistical details, we can categorize models of armament dynamics by asking: 1. Is there interaction in the model? 2. Are there internal forces in the model? 3. Does the model assume symmetry, in the sense that the behaviour of both (or all) states can be accounted for by the same equation (with possible variations in parameter values)? The answers to the two first questions define three types of states:

Type I: 1. Yes; 2. No. This is the pure interaction (or action–reaction) model, assuming no internal forces in the state. We will refer to such states as *reactive*.

Type II: 1. No; 2. Yes. This is the pure *Eigendynamik* (or autism) model, assuming armaments behaviour to be entirely decided by internal forces (military-industrial complexes, bureaucratic incrementalism etc.). We will refer to such states as *autistic*.

Type III: 1. Yes; 2. Yes. Both internal forces and the behaviour of the other state(s) affect the armament level. We will refer to such states as *mixed*.

Let us now look at systems of two states. We then have to answer the third question above: Do we assume symmetry or not? *A priori*, there are three symmetric cases (*A*, *D*, *F*) and three asymmetric cases (*B*, *C*, *E*):

		State X		
		Type I	Type II	Type III
State Y	Type I	A	B	C
	Type II	–	D	E
	Type III	–	–	F

Let us start with the symmetrical cases, in which the model builders have primarily been interested:

Case A is pure action/reaction, with no internal forces in either state. Theoretically there is no limit to how complex mathematical structures we may use in the model. If we limit ourselves to simple structures, however, they only permit two outcomes, depending on where the two parties start: they may stimulate each other into an accelerating arms race, or into moving towards total disarmament.

This is the classical type of model used in Richardson's (1960) equations for the arms race before World War I and in several later revisions and developments of it. It is, however, of limited *empirical* interest: few, if any, empirical cases come even close to it. (Later mathematical analyses have questioned Richardson's claim that his 1908–14 data supported it.)

Case D is bilateral autism, where each state is in an arms race with itself, even if it may look as if they were stimulating each other, for example because this is what their governments *say* they are doing.

There has been little mathematical modelling of this pure case, and it is of limited empirical interest. Some authors have demonstrated that *Eigendynamik* is an important *component* of armaments behaviour and some have argued that it has been the predominant component in some cases; nobody has convincingly argued that it is the *only* component.

Case F is the symmetrical mixed combination, where each actor is stimulated by internal forces and by the other actor. The only internal force operating in the classical Richardson model is the *defence burden*, which is a decelerator only: the higher the defence expenditures in a state, the slower its pace of rearmament. The opposite assumption is made in (simple) *Eigendynamik* models: the higher the armament level, the stronger pressure to increase it. The Richardson model can very simply be adapted to permit both possibilities by leaving the sign before the armament level in the equation open to empirical inquiry rather than *a priori* assuming it to be negative.

We then have three asymmetric combinations: In case B, a pure autist meets a purely reactive actor. This combination is common in political propaganda ("They rearm by their nature; we want to disarm, but must rearm so as not to be attacked"), but its combination of two pure cases makes it of little interest. Modern arms race modelling operates almost exclusively with Case F models. When these are confronted with empirical data by estimating a number of parameters, it is *a priori* possible that Case F is reduced to some other case by some parameter having a value close to zero. Normally, however, we get non-zero parameter values for both external and internal stimulation. We thus remain in Case F, even if we sometimes find the stimulation to be *predominantly* external and in other empirical cases *predominantly* internal.

1.2. Turning armament dynamics into disarmament dynamics

Richardson — and later analysts in his vein — are sometimes accused of determinism. Richardson's rebuttal is found in his own comment to his early model: "This is what is going to happen — unless somebody stops to think." One major virtue of the modelling attempts is that they make it easier to see more precisely *what* one has to think about.

In this respect the implications of different models are quite different. If *Eigendynamik* is the sole or predominant type of factor, the implication is that the roots of the arms race are *inside* the state(s), and that counteracting it must primarily be a matter for those *domestic* groups that are against it. In this case, one of the things they can do is precisely to use that knowledge to expose the pro-armament forces.

Where action/reaction plays some — or the major — role in an arms race, it may theoretically be counteracted in several ways. One is unilateral arms reductions aiming at providing smaller — or even negative — input into what the other side does. Another is to reduce overreactions on one's own side to what the other side does. A third way is to reduce such overreactions on the other side by means of confidence-building measures that limit his worst-case analyses. All these things can be done unilaterally or by negotiated agreements. The latter presupposes that the parties see the arms race as a joint problem calling for joint action, also how to remove temptations to cheat by verification procedures that provide a considerable probability of detection.

There is no *a priori* contradiction between unilateral and agreed measures; it may well be that an oscillation between them is optimal. This would mean a number of small and reciprocated unilateral measures (in GRIT fashion) that pave the way for negotiations where these measures get formally codified and others added, which in turn makes further unilateral measures easier to carry out, etc. In political thinking, however, they are often seen as contradictory: unilateral measures are avoided ("so as not to give away bargaining cards"), for which reason an ongoing or expected round of negotiations may make problems more difficult.

2. Armament dynamics in the Middle East

2.1. Particular complications

The Middle East offers several particular problems in the use of models of armament dynamics. First, most of the classical models have been bilateral ones, or have reduced the actors to two by means of seeing two opposing *alliances* as

actors. The situation in the Middle East is much more complicated. It is even too simple to term it multilateral, at least if we include the perceptions of the actors when we try to decide on a model. Let us shortly review the traditional (pre-Camp David) set of perceptions:

From Israeli perspective, the predominant worst-case scenario was "Arabs against Israel". This called for a level of armaments sufficient to take on a coalition of several Arabic states jointly attacking Israel. In addition, the Israeli doctrine was (and remains) one of "absolute security". When facing a situation with two or more fronts, it was imperative to maximize the benefits of inner communication lines by making knockout strikes in one or two directions, so as to be able to concentrate on the third. This also called for preventive or even preemptive strikes, Israel being unable to afford to wait for the other party to strike first. Israeli self-perceptions did not see that this combination of armaments and doctrine must appear utterly threatening to each neighbouring Arabic state (and after Entebbe and Osiraq, perhaps not only to them).

Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt must naturally see Israel as a major threat — but decidedly not as the only threat. Lebanon has had Syria to worry about; Syria has had both Jordan and in later phases predominantly Iraq; each Jordanian boundary — Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia — is with a potential adversary; and Egypt has had to worry about Libya and Sudan in addition to Israel. The security planners in all these states — and several of *their* neighbours — have thus had the same problem as Israel: imaginable wars on two or more fronts.

Iraq thus faces security problems in more than one direction, as do Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Some problems have also been linked to the general East/West conflict, where some states have had the same patron since decades: Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states as traditional Western clients, and the Yemeni states as traditional Eastern clients. Others switched from West to East (Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Libya) and sometimes back again: Egypt and perhaps Syria. (The early patterns are described in Øberg 1975.) Most of the conflicts and threat images are genuinely local, the East–West conflict having provided manoeuvring space and access to lots of arms, often at favourable terms. The East–West conflict is now called off; most of the local conflicts remain, but arms become more expensive for some of the states. Competent security advisors in Israel's neighbours will see it as a major security threat; those in Israel will see a grand coalition of Arab neighbours as a major security threat.

Israel is not alone in having problems with lack of strategic depth: all its immediate neighbours have their capitals uncomfortably close to the Israeli boundary.

2.2. Some research results

Several authors have used mathematical models and statistical estimation of parameters to analyze various parts of the history of Arab–Israeli armament dynamics (Lambelet 1971, Rattinger 1976, Taagepera 1979–1980.) The simplest summary of these results is that both external and internal stimulation play a role in Israel and its Arabic neighbours, but that their relative role depends much on what time period, what country and what category of arms we study.

In a study of the 1956–1973 period, Rattinger used separate indicators for tank, ship and air strength. It turned out that in the 1956–1967 period, Israel was in a tank race with Jordan, a ship race with Syria and an air race with Egypt; in all these races, the weight of external stimulation tended to be higher in Israel than in the other state. After 1967, however, there was a period of predominant internal stimulation everywhere, and especially in the Arab states. Rattinger's own interpretation is that Israel was more defensive and the Arab states more offensive. An equally plausible interpretation is that the defeat in 1967 made the Arab states fear another Israeli attack and made them try to get as much arms as possible as quickly as possible in order to deter it.

I have seen no arms race analyses of this mathematical–statistical type from recent years; the — partly contradictory — results of the earlier studies make it safest to assume that both external and internal factors affect the armament dynamics of all these countries today.

3. Problems to be overcome — and some solutions

Military geography and technology make the area inherently unstable, independently of the political characteristics of individual states and the relations between them. Arms control and disarmament thus face great obstacles; forceful counterbalancing factors are required to overcome them.

We have a traditional repertory for dealing with security problems that spur an arms race (which in turn worsens them, etc.). Its technical part (in a wide sense) contains such instruments as confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), negotiations on arms control and disarmament, regional regimes and non-offensive defence. Yet neither of these can be easily utilized in the Middle East.

In the most limited sense of *Confidence and Security Building Measures* (CSBMs), they can be delimited as measures aiming at increasing the transparency, so as to increase the self-confidence of the parties. One central aim of this is to achieve, by means of exchange of information, invited inspections, etc., verifiable information — in addition to what can be found by national means — that can reduce or eliminate *unfounded* threat perceptions: those that are based on

erroneous assumptions about the offensive *capability* of the other side. This in turn requires that the parties have some common interest in not making each others have such exaggerated perceptions; this is less likely to be the case in the Middle East than it was in Europe. (Cf. Khalidi and Evron 1990.) The intellectual and political challenges are therefore greater, in particular since we may also expect the bargaining aspect to be even stronger than in Europe: *X* exaggerates his own fears and suspicions (as compared with his "true" ones) in order to wring more concessions out of *Y* in the name of confidence building, and *vice versa* (Møller and Wiberg 1990).

Another problem lies in much of CSBMs being incompatible with retained capability for surprise attacks. In Europe, tactical surprise attacks from either side were possible; but any strategic surprise attack would have called for so much preparatory movements etc. as to be unfeasible. In the Middle East, surprise attacks have been more decisive for the outcome of entire wars (Israel's opening the 1967 war with a surprise attack on the Egyptian air force), and the political/military leaderships may be less inclined to abandon that option.

Arms control and disarmament negotiations will eventually be needed in the process of building peace in the Middle East; in order for them to have any prospects at all, some peace will probably first have to be built. The situation in the Middle East is far more complex than it was in the bipolar and — relatively — symmetric European situation. Since most states see multiple threats, bilateral negotiations will mostly be meaningless. Israel is generally assumed to have nuclear weapons, while Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria appear to be able to produce them within a decade, should they decide to do so. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya and Syria seem to possess chemical weapons, possibly also Yemen. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen have significant ballistic missile arsenals. (These data from Leavitt and Bracken 1993 refer to the situation immediately before the Gulf War.) The relative emphasis on land, air and naval forces differs much from state to state.

Regional categorical bans therefore have very dim prospects: the Haves will not abstain — and then the Have-Nots will not abandon the possibility to catch-up with the Haves. Possible solutions thus have to be found in a wider context, by making progress with the Non-Proliferation Treaty or with the implementation of the treaty on chemical weapons.

Building suitable *regimes* in the Middle East must be an eventual goal; but the historical experience is that a regime gradually emerges from a process, sometimes eventually getting codified by a treaty, rather than initiating the process. The essential logic is that a regime exists when all parties have so strong long-term interests in the survival of the regime norms that they avoid some actions that would be in their short-term self-interest. Several issue areas call for regimes in the

Middle East (arms control, trade, water, etc.); virtually all of these must be seen as long-term prospects.

Non-offensive defence (NOD — also called defensive, benign, non-provocative, etc. defence) can be used as a way of at least reducing — and in best case reverting — the pace of an arms race between potential adversaries. Its essential logic is to restructure national defence systems in such a way as to retain or augment defensive capability, while reducing or eliminating offensive capability. There are obvious arguments why this would improve crisis stability and escalation stability, as well as reduce or eliminate at least the reactive type of arms race factors, and a number of models and concepts — some of them very concrete — have emerged in the European debate. (For general presentations, see Møller 1991, 1992.)

A major conclusion from that debate is that the notion of NOD is no generalizable panacea: the analysis of possibilities will always have to be based on regional and local conditions, which will also decide affordability, etc. It is therefore natural that the conclusions of Gliksman (1990) and of Conetta, Knight and Unterseher (1991) differ considerably, their respective focus being on different ends of the Middle East.

Gliksman is primarily interested in the Israeli environment — and the entire Israeli doctrine, with Israel's lack of strategic depth as an essential premise, can be said to build on the very opposite of NOD, on having a defence with very high offensive capability. This must also mean great difficulties for asymmetric solutions. If its Arabic neighbours transarm in the direction of NOD, the Israeli doctrine might be likely to read that as an obstacle to its grand strategy: it would not be able to make knockout strikes in one direction, so as to concentrate in others. The counterargument is that precisely the non-offensive character would not make this necessary. It will be difficult to make convincing, however, since the small strategic depth of Israel would define extremely high demands on the non-offensiveness of these systems. It would then be questionable whether Jordan or Syria could organize any defence that met these demands and would still be workable — and especially whether it could be done without astronomic costs. Conetta, Knight and Unterseher, on the other hand, have the defence of Saudi Arabia as their main example; and if Saudi Arabia has any military asset, it is strategic depth.

3.1. The need for politics

"Technological fixes" are thus even more helpless in the Middle East than elsewhere. Any decisive improvement of the situation calls for *political* breakthroughs. This was also the declared aim of the negotiation process started in 1991, but it has predictably faced major difficulties.

One factor in this is the grand coalition formed by the USA after the Iraqi military aggression against Kuwait. By the general logic of grand coalitions (Riker 1962), it is unlikely to remain in place for any longer time, being too grand to find a mutually acceptable division of spoils.

Turkey has lost considerable trade and pipeline revenues, and has had its own suppression of its many millions of Kurdish population highlighted. Its gains have consisted in monetary compensations from European and oil-rich Arab countries, in being permitted to spend much of these in the USA to add to its air force, and in getting a (probably counterproductive) endorsement of its EC candidacy from President Bush.

Syria has lost trade incomes, in addition to which the regime took a domestic risk by engaging militarily as it did. Its main compensation has consisted in the USA terminating its diplomatic isolation of Syria and in getting a free hand to crush its main opponents in Lebanon: the armies of General Aoun and of PLA, so as to dominate those parts of Lebanon that are not under Israeli control.

Egypt has had major economic losses, primarily due to far over a million Egyptians losing their jobs in Iraq, Kuwait and other Gulf states, most of them forever. Its compensation has consisted in some economic support, in having much of its (unpayable) debts written off and in being permitted to create new debts by major military purchases in USA. Whether the gains or losses in different time perspectives predominate appears uncertain.

The losses and gains of Saudi Arabia depend heavily on the underlying hypotheses used to assess them. The vast foreign military presence may simultaneously have constituted a gain (deterrence against Iraq) and a loss (more conflict involvement than it initially desired, losing its image of independence). It gained economically by temporarily increased oil prices and by increased oil production (which was, however, expensive in terms of future exploitation) and lost by having to pay great amounts to the war chest; again, the colour of the bottom line is uncertain.

The losses of Israel consisted in being a target for Iraqi Scud missiles. While the casualties were insignificant by comparison with those of Kuwait and Iraq, there was a high psychological price: this was the first time that Israel did not hit back immediately and forcefully when threatened by an attack. Its gains have consisted in a US reaffirmation of its support for Israeli security. The multi-billion dollar extra subsidy it requested from the USA has not been forthcoming, however: by US logic, it was to a greater extent the USA that had done Israel a favour than *vice versa*.

One major problem with the peace negotiations will therefore consist in too many parties feeling that they have entitlements to be cashed in there. Israel feels that USA is indebted to it for sitting still in the Gulf War. Syria will feel entitled to have the Golan area back. Lebanon will call for the implementation of UN

resolutions about Israeli withdrawal from it. All Arab states will be under — varying degrees of — political pressure to insist on a visible solution of the Palestinian problem, having previously agreed with the refusal of USA to link it to the Gulf crisis. For some of them, this will not rank high in the real agenda; for others, it will.

The question will then be who is going to pay whom. The attempts as internal Arab settlements have already broken down, the oil rich states not being willing to commit themselves to economic support of Egypt and Syria in exchange for standing forces. That leaves the United States as the party to deliver the goods, whether directly or in a broker role to get Israel to pay up. Israel, on the other hand, sees itself as a creditor, not a debtor. It wishes to avoid multilateral negotiations (except for some purely decorative session), insisting on bilateral ones, and on being allowed to vet the delegation of the party with whom Israel primarily is in conflict: the Palestinians. Several Arab states, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, therefore have virtually nothing to negotiate about, and there is nothing to gain for Jordan and Lebanon, their bargaining positions being far too weak. Syria, finally, might possibly drop the Palestinian cause if it gets all of Golan back — but such a concession from Israel appears highly unlikely, even if it is no longer as excluded as before. Like previous rounds, the present round of negotiations may therefore be suspected of primarily being about who is to blame for their breaking down. Let us, however, make the more optimistic assumption that the negotiations *do* have a chance and look at the substantial regional issues to be solved.

3.2. The traditional scene

The simplest formula (if we are permitted to reduce a very complex set of conflicts to any formula) is that there are two absolutely necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) prerequisites for any solution to have a chance to promote long-term stability. Israel's security problems have to be taken care of to its satisfaction — and a Palestinian state has to be eventually created.

And herein lies the crux. It is easier to satisfy the first criterion, if the second is disregarded; but that can never create peace, only an unstable stalemate based on a balance of terror. On the other hand, it will be very difficult to create a Palestinian state without at the same time deepening Israeli security anxiety. And this crux defines the foremost challenge; it certainly does not define the only problem for peace and security in the Middle East — but it does define a necessary condition for solving any other problems.

Let us start with Israel: it (meaning virtually any imaginable government) wants security and peace, in that order. Since its creation, its standard solution has been deterrence. Nuclear weapons became the *ultima ratio regis*, and on a lower level

the deterrence operated by making it clear that unless neighbour states police their Palestinians rigorously, they face Israeli attacks, ranging between terror bombing or lightning tank force incursions and invasion plus occupation. For this to work these neighbouring states must have strong central governments able to carry out the policing; that factor is far more important than their rhetorical postures.

For a long time, this worked out with all immediate neighbours: Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The first half of the 1970s meant two changes. Egypt made a surprise attack in 1973, with the limited war aims to recover the territory Israel had occupied in 1967. The Lebanese state apparatus broke down after 1975, making the Palestinians able to appear as an independent military actor there.

In the case of Egypt, the problem was eventually solved in a way that somehow combined peace and security: a peace treaty was secured by withdrawing completely from occupied Egyptian territory, and the security aspect was taken care of by a complex mutual withdrawal procedure, an agreement making Sinai a highly thinned-out military area and making provisions for the monitoring of its implementation.

In Lebanon, on the other hand, Israel resorted to traditional patterns, first by using the logic of deterrence against local "governments" rather than the virtually absent central one and then by major invasions in 1978 and 1982. In terms of its proclaimed war aims, the 1982 invasion proved disastrous: the attempt at creating a strong central government (and, in addition, one friendly to Israel) collapsed, the peace treaty was never ratified (partly because its permission of Israeli military presence was incompatible with Lebanon's treaty obligations to Syria) and the influence of PLO in the Occupied Territories did not suffer from its military defeat in Lebanon — rather the opposite, with *intifadha* as eventual result. It was also the first war that divided public opinion in Israel.

The Palestinians have a limited veto against any state entering a peace treaty against the wish of PLO. The veto is based on the political costs for the government of that state becoming high, sometimes possibly higher than the potential gains from a treaty. The latter was demonstrated by the (partial) Arabic isolation of Egypt for years after Camp David. The argument was that Egypt had sold out Palestinian self-determination when getting its own house in order (whether or not Sadat knew that Begin would give the Palestinians nothing is a different issue).

Having washed its hands of the West Bank altogether in 1987, the Jordanian government has much to lose and nothing to gain from a peace treaty with Israel against the will of PLO (unless somebody is willing to bankroll payments similar to those given to Egypt and Israel in Camp David). Syria *does* stand to gain something: the Golan area left in Israeli hands after the wars of 1967 and 1973. Its costs for a treaty disregarding the Palestinians will be so high that it is hardly likely to settle for less than Golan. The Lebanese government has been able (but only by Syrian support) to reassert authority over an increasing part of the country and will

eventually be interested in extending that to the areas occupied or controlled by Israel. It will hardly make any deal against Syrian veto.

As for a Palestinian state, the Israeli public opinion is divided: if we simplify greatly, the right wing has long worked at "creating facts" with a view to keeping the Occupied Territories (or at least the West Bank) for good. The left wing regards a Palestinian state — whether they like it or not — as the only way to get stable peace, and is willing to make substantial territorial concessions (but not return all the 1967 war gains) to achieve that. The arguments presented by the wings are adapted to the audiences addressed; the arguments for keeping the Occupied Territories that are respectable enough to be internationally presented focus on Israeli security and the further loss of strategic depth that a Palestinian state would mean.

3.3. Possible breakthrough?

Two logics must be distinguished here. One of them is the deterrence logic used to force other governments to police Palestinians. By this logic, there is no need for Israel to keep the Golan heights, as long as the Syrian government is able to keep firm control over them — as its self-interest will obviously make it. By the very same logic, however, a Palestinian state should not be very problematic. For such a state would exist completely at the mercy of an Israel able to occupy it over night. Palestine would therefore have a strong self-interest in stopping any fedayeen raids into Israeli territory. The important question would then be whether it would have a sufficiently strong central government to take care of this, or whether there would be any risk of Lebanonization. If a Palestinian state is created, Israel will therefore have an interest in PLO being in firm control (no possible competitor being available) and in the Palestinian state having sufficient resources to carry out the policing.

The other logic is that of state-to-state warfare. By this logic, the commanding position of the Golan heights does define a problem, as does the lack of strategic depth. This logic, however, is precisely what a peace treaty is supposed to make irrelevant or at least less important; if it is *strongly* insisted on, there will be no point in trying to get any peace treaty.

This is not an all-or-nothing issue; peace treaties often take strategic factors into account. And while Israel may argue a claim to be secured against the Golan or the West Bank being starting points for attacks, keeping these areas is not the only way for Israel to be thus secured. As the Egypt–Israel treaty demonstrated, the third option is to return occupied territories on the condition that they are largely demilitarized and that this state of affairs is credibly monitored. The Sinai solution seems easiest to copy in the Golan case with necessary adaptations, whereas the Palestinian state defines a more complex problem: finding a suitable military level.

There is no way for a Palestinian state to build up a military force permitting it to defend itself against Israel. On the other hand, having some armed forces almost belongs to the same category as having a government, a flag or a seat in the United Nations: they define the very identity of being a state. Furthermore, Israel itself would have an interest in the Palestinian state having some armed forces, for the reasons mentioned above. The ceilings for various categories of units and armament would therefore be a matter for negotiation, as would the monitoring procedure.

Let us try to envision what a negotiated solution might mean in the near future. Let us assume a set of peace treaties whereby Israel returns the territories occupied in 1967 and later, with possible exceptions agreed with the new Palestinian state, the treaties also defining confidence building measures in terms of military ceilings and monitoring arrangements. What substantial conflicts would remain?

One set of conflicts would concern security; it takes more than a peace treaty to remove a potential threat. Israel would still have to regard an Arab coalition as a worst case, and its Arab neighbours would still have to see Israel as a threat. Yet suitable military provisions in the peace treaties might make the consequences of these facts less malign than now, e.g., by improving strategic and tactical warning times, thus reducing the need for high alerts and for high offensive capability and making possible crises less acute. This, in itself, would be a major achievement in comparison with today.

Second, there would be revisionists in several countries, especially in Israel and in Palestine. The treaties would weaken their domestic positions. In Israel revisionism would no longer be about sticking to the territory under Israeli control; it would have to advocate open aggression against Lebanon, Palestine and Syria, which would be far more difficult to sell to Israeli public opinion. In Palestine, revisionism would be tantamount to calling for military adventures against Israel; any Palestinian government would be aware of the jeopardy this would throw the Palestinian state into. The longer the peace treaties had been visibly workable, the more stable may the situation be expected to become in this respect.

Third, there would be a number of economic conflicts and disagreements. Disentangling the Israeli and Palestinian economies from each other to the extent required for both of them to become normal sovereign states will be a highly complex matter, some of which would probably have to be provided for already in the peace treaty so as not to become a virulent issue after it. If we can judge from the Egyptian experiences, it will take long time for any significant amount of trade to develop — not to speak of economic cooperation — and this will create some frustrations, especially in Israel.

The most important type of economic conflict, however, will concern *water*. What one state is doing in terms of dams, canals or just pumping it up from the aquifers will often have far-reaching consequences for other states, perhaps even

to the extent of defining a *casus belli*. There is one Turkey–Syria–Iraq water complex, potentially very threatening for the two lower states, and another Syria–Jordan–Israel–Palestine water complex, also defining tough competition for scarce resources. In particular, this will be a tough problem for Israel and Palestine to find compromises and agreements on.

Apart from these substantial conflict issues, there will of course be remaining conflict attitudes. On the other hand, they may recede, once they have less substantial conflicts to feed on. Peace between Israel and Palestine will remove the primary cause of Arab–Israeli conflict: the Palestinian question. The government of Palestine will have common interests with Israel in defining that issue as resolved, reducing the possibility for movements and governments in other Arab states to use it for their purposes. The derived causes of conflict primarily have to do with half a century of military confrontation having left its traces in extreme levels of regional armament; but provisions in the peace treaties could to some extent soothen and even reverse the dynamics of that.

3.4. From peace to peace?

Palestinian–Israeli peace is a necessary precondition for peace in the Middle East, but not sufficient. It may suffice quite a bit, however, much of the conflicts between Israel and its other neighbours originating in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. This would improve the possibilities for (explicit or implicit) arms control agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours, the multi-front problem having become somewhat mitigated. The *other* neighbours of these neighbours would thus arrive in a new situation: whether more or less threatening would depend on how well the “rings in the water” aspects of the new situation were exploited in widening arms control agreements beyond the immediate environment of Israel. And that in turn would improve the chances for sorting out by negotiations a number of security-related conflicts among Arab states, or between them and non-Arab neighbours. Many conflicts would remain; some reduction of them is better than none.

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Support for war: Public opinion on the Gulf War, 1990–1991

by

PHILIP P. EVERTS

How do democracies react to cases of conflict between the demands of peace and of justice? Is it easy to persuade public opinion to go to war, or does it represent a restraining force in this respect? The many public opinion surveys on the Gulf conflict 1990–1991 shed light on these questions. Besides data from the Netherlands less exhaustive data for ten other West-European countries and the United States are presented and discussed. The topics discussed include: support of government policies, the motives for the war, the justification of the use of force, participation of own's own country in the military action.

Large majorities from the beginning supported government policies in all Western countries concerned. That support, however, often seemed to be conditional, ambivalent and uneasy. On the eve of the military counteractions public opinion was strongly divided in all countries concerned. When the hostilities began, public opinion shifted drastically. In all countries agreement with the war and the policies of the respective governments increased rapidly.

There is considerable, both manifest and latent, public support for such UN sponsored actions as the Gulf War. However, the negative effect of casualties on political support has to be taken into account. In the short run democracies are not unsensitive to the stimulating effects of a successful war, as long as the human costs remain limited or can be kept out of sight. Public opinion does not seem to represent an undesirable barrier to future collective actions sanctioned by the UN. If, on the other hand, one sees democracies as a guarantee for the peaceful solution of conflicts and as a barrier to international violence the data reported here are rather a source of concern.

1. Introduction

The role of public opinion

For an overall image of the political forces at work in the Gulf conflict and the ensuing war of 1991, insight in public opinion is essential.¹ To gain such insight has also a value in itself. In the Gulf conflict fundamental moral and political questions were at stake. How do democratic societies react to such problems? The

outcome of research into this topic can also be relevant for the future. It was the very first opportunity for the organization of the United Nations to perform its task as originally intended. But this first chance might also turn out to be the last, depending on the degree to which public opinion would turn out to be willing to support such actions. The Gulf war was a test case in more than one sense. If the war should be won, but the public reaction would be one of "once, but never again" this would rob the military operation after the fact of an important ground of legitimation.

For a variety of reasons, including the shortcomings of our research instruments, it is difficult to properly answer the questions which we should like to ask, such as with respect to underlying motives and feelings of people. It is possible, however, to provide at least the beginning of an answer. This chapter aims to do so, and examines how public opinion in a number of European countries reacted to the conflict and war which arose out of the military occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990.

Methodological questions

In all research into and in every discussion on the content, role and influence of public opinion three sorts of questions play a role. First of all, there are conceptual questions: what do we mean by "public opinion"? Then, there are complicated methodological questions, which play a role: what is the best way of measuring public opinion, and what do we really measure? What is its actual influence? Finally, normative aspects are involved: what is the significance which public opinion should have? Especially because of the latter, the three aspects are often intermingled in a deplorable way. When certain polls seem to reflect one's own preferences one is less inclined to worry about the methodological doubts than in the opposite case. Somebody demonstrating in the streets will be more inclined to believe that theirs is the authentic "voice of the people" than the politician who considers his own, and different views, to be legitimized by the political process. Such discussions have therefore the tendency to spread more heat than light, but there is no way around this problem.

The discussion on public opinion on the conflict dealt with here makes no exception to this general rule. I realize that the data presented here represent only a partial view of public opinion. Public opinion — and more importantly, the image which people have of the "climate of opinion" — is shaped by many factors and manifests itself in various ways.

My own preference for public opinion research by means of surveys of opinions at the mass level is based on the consideration that — in spite of all its well-known and indisputable shortcomings — it provides more precise, reliable and concrete

information than other methods of defining and describing public opinion. This provides us with a firmer basis on which we can try to answer the question how democratic systems function with respect to questions of war and peace.

Democracy and war

Democracy means, among other things, that public opinion in its various manifestations is, at least in principle, allotted an important role in the political process. On the question of whether democracy works well or badly in questions of international politics and matters of war and peace in particular, an intense debate has been going on for a long time.² Some argue that democracy is unfit for international politics. With respect to all the demands which one should put to decisionmaking, De Tocqueville argued already 150 years ago, democracies fail the test. In a famous essay written in 1922 Walter Lippmann argued that public opinion is always wrong in matters of war and peace, being "too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist and too appeasing in negotiations, or too intransigent". Public opinion, so the conventional wisdom holds, is too little informed, too emotional and too unstable to give it an important place in decisionmaking.

Those views have, of course, been contested by others. Just as venerable is the tradition which sees in public opinion a peacepromoting force *par excellence*. Democratization of foreign policy is not only feasible but would also increase the chances of peace. The peace movement is the brainchild of this current of thought, which finds support in the empirical finding that apparently democracies have great difficulty in getting into war with one another (wars between democracies and non-democracies are, however, quite frequent) (Everts and Faber 1990).

Democracies are to a certain extent "syrupy" systems. It is difficult to set them into motion and bring about change, but once a certain course is set they tend to continue on the same course, at least for a while. The relationship between public opinion and policymaking is asymmetric. By this I mean that on the one hand public opinion tends to react quickly to events and changes of policy, but its impact on policymaking, on the other hand, is much more delayed, and if it does have an impact it is usually in the form of preventing certain courses of action rather than enforcing a particular change of course. In such systems there is little public pressure to go to war, but this support will probably increase, at least initially, once the government has taken a strong decision. That effect is, however, according to earlier findings, usually of very short duration. When wars last longer and in particular when people get killed on one's own side, this support usually decreases quite rapidly (Russett 1990). It is doubtful whether democracies have the endurance to withstand the direct confrontation with violence and suffering.

On the other hand it is also quite thinkable that the conviction that the other side is to blame for all this suffering leads to a degree of irreconcilability which makes it much more difficult to terminate the war. This wars, for instance, the case with respect to the demand of "unconditional surrender" in World War II and, more recently, to the demands put on Iraq in the Gulf war.

In this chapter I examine what available public opinion data tell us about public attitudes in general and in particular to what extent they shed light on these questions and confirm or refute the popular notion that public opinion in democracies prefers peace over war.

The data are drawn from public opinion surveys on the conflict and war between Iraq and Kuwait and its allies, in the period August 1990–March 1991. This analysis focusses on data from the Netherlands, but, while not aspiring to be exhaustive in this respect, data for a number of other countries are included for purposes of comparison.

2. The data: The Netherlands

Expectations with respect to the likelihood of war

How did the people in the Netherlands react to the events in the Gulf in August 1990 and particularly how did they estimate the likelihood of the conflict escalating into a war?³ In combination, the various data show an increasing pessimism in this respect.⁴ Expectations of war rose steadily, from 48% in August 1990 to 78% by mid-January 1991.

On the eve of the war 80% of the Dutch believed that the likelihood of war was greater than 50%. 59% expected terrorist attacks by Iraq in the Netherlands too. After the outbreak of the war the fear of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands increased, from 38 to 49%.

After the beginning of the military actions, pessimism increased sharply. Between 17 January and 1 February the number of those expecting a war of 3–6 months increased from 17 to 37%. For a war from 6 months to a year this was from 4 to 14% and for a war lasting more than a year this was from 4 to 9%. This last percentage had increased on 4 February to 19%. Apart from that, on 17 January only 47% of the interviewed felt that the intervention would in the long run be beneficial to a solution to the Gulf conflict. 28% felt negatively about this, while a quarter gave no answer to this question. Between 17 and 25 January the confidence in the media of communication decreased by half, and up to 1 February even further.⁵

There was little disagreement, however, as to who would win the war: 73% named the United States and its allies as the most likely victor, 2% tipped Iraq. One month later, in the beginning of February, the victory of the US seemed even more certain (to 80%).

The images of the enemy

A survey held in October 1990 concerning developments in public opinion on the images of possible enemies confirmed earlier impressions that "threats from the Arab world" had replaced the image of "the Russian danger" seamlessly.⁶ In reply to the question who constitutes the major military threat to the Netherlands "the Arabic (oil) countries/ Iraq/ Iran" scored highest by far (together mentioned by 42%, compared to for instance 2% for the Soviet Union).⁷ The leaders were judged more negatively than the people. This judgement was even worse than that concerning the Russian leaders ten years earlier. Contrary to the Russians at that time the people were now also judged negatively. Many more respondents used characteristics like "aggressive", "unreliable" and "cruel". The same applied to the Arab leaders.

Longitudinal research showed that between January and March 1991 no significant fluctuations in the enemy and friend images of countries occurred, however. It is not surprising that Iraq scored still high as a threat in March 1991 (and higher than any other country). Remarkable is the high score in January for Israel — which had diminished only a little in March —, especially in the light of the traditional relatively strong feelings of sympathy for this country in the Netherlands.

Support of government policy

At various moments the general question was put to the Dutch whether they agreed or disagreed with government policy with respect to the Gulf crisis. It is remarkable that whereas only a minority supported the government's policy until November 1990, its gradual shift to a more hardline position attracted increasing popular support. General support increased from 43 to 62% in early February 1991, and even more among men than among women. On the left side criticism and doubts were replaced by grudging acceptance of the government's *Realpolitik* arguments, on the right such arguments were greeted with sympathy anyway. This trend persisted until February. Regrettably, later figures on this general theme are lacking. We do have many data, however, on more specific questions, some of which are analyzed below.

Dutch troops to the Gulf

In mid-August, right after the government's decision to send two frigates to join the international military force in the Gulf, a first survey on this topic was held. It showed overwhelming support for this action: 82% were in favour. 38% of the respondents even felt that this decision should have been taken earlier. A clear majority (55%) thought, however, that weapons should not be used in connection with stopping shipping to Iraq. 39% felt that this should be allowed.


A few months later, in October 1990, this support had hardly decreased in spite of the mounting danger of war. Now, a majority (56%) also agreed that, if necessary, force could be used to enforce the embargo. 40% disagreed, a shift in the pro-violence direction of 15% compared to August.

In the beginning of January, opinions on the question of whether the Netherlands should also send ground forces in case of a war were divided 50–50. In that case, according to 69%, these should only consist of volunteers. In another survey, 77% explicitly rejected the idea that, if necessary, conscripts should be forced to participate.

Force justified?

In a recent survey — but not focussed on the Gulf conflict — a systematic effort was made to measure attitudes on the admissibility of the use of force, i.e. the Netherlands' armed forces.⁸ The survey explored to what extent the use of military force was seen as justified under varying conditions, depending on the goals and on the sort of victims. Would it be justified to safeguard: by means of a) threatening or b) the actual use of force (1) national interests (for instance the supply of oil), and if so, would this also apply if there would be victims, respectively among the opposite side, on the Dutch side, among members of one's family and oneself? The same was repeated for two other goals: (2) the protection or reinstatement of the international legal order and (3) the safeguarding of national independence. Thus, for each of three different situations six points of measurement were found. *Figure 1* gives a graphic indication of the degree to which people drop out on the use of violence. Victims, no matter whether on one's own or on the other side, do cause people to reconsider their position considerably. That is understandable but it shows clearly the ambiguity in attitudes on the threat to use violence on the other hand and the actual use of it. The survey shows that even in the case of the defence of the country against attack no majority favouring the use of force could be found if this would cause victims. Of course, an interview situation is very different from the real thing, yet this question gives some indication of the shades of real acceptance of violence in some hypothetical situations.

Figure 1: Support for the use of the armed forces (in %)



Source: Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken, KU Nijmegen.

With respect to participation in the concrete case of the use of armed force against Iraq, the Dutch respondents in October clearly differentiated among actions at the request of the United Nations and of the United States. In the first case 79% felt that the Netherlands should join in such action, in the second case only 32%; 16 resp. 61% was against such participation.

This was confirmed in another survey. 57% supported the sending of ground troops when this would take place under UN auspices. But if this would not be the case this action was only supported by 19%. 64% expressly opposed this and for 5% it depended on the circumstances. 64% thought that the naval units should not be withdrawn in case of war.

While in October there had been still very little support of operating under US leadership and command, when the chips were finally down, in January, most agreed with the decision of the government to do so, and with its acceptance by parliament (73% agreed and 22% disagreed).⁹

Motives to go to war

Among the "important" and "most important" motives selected in October, to participate in the eventual war 43% mentioned the desire "to suppress Iraq as a military super power".¹⁰ Other motives scored much lower in this connection. Repetitions of this survey in November 1990, and January and February 1991 revealed only minor changes. The significance attached to the supply of oil however decreased continually. The latter seems in line with the actual development. The feared (further) increase in the oil prices did not take place. In the end the firstnamed motive came to play a decisive role in the actual policies as well (Table 1).

Table 1: Motives to go to war (in%)

	"Very important"				"Most important"			
	10/90	11/90	01/91	02/91	10/90	11/90	01/91	02/91
Indignation over the occupation of Kuwait	54	55	60	55	21	25	22	25
The desire to form one front together with US and others	48	52	65	35	9	13	15	5
To safeguard the supply of oil from the Middle East	54	41	38	28	14	12	9	6
To suppress the emergence of Iraq as a military superpower	75	67	78	71	43	38	40	43
The protection of Israel	51	39	51	54	11	11	13	19
Don't know / no answer	—	—	—	—	1	1	2	2

Source: *InterView*, October, November 1990, January, February 1991.

Note: In the first columns more than one motive could be mentioned as very important. The total is thus more than 100%. For the next question: the "most important motive" the total is (vertically) = 100%.

War justified?

In November 1990 the people in the Netherlands were still strongly divided with respect to possible use of force against Iraq. A majority (57%) would agree with a Security Council resolution permitting the use of force against Iraq, but 37% disagreed.

Even on the eve of the hostilities opinions remained divided. "Should force be used after the expiration of the UN ultimatum on January 15 to remove Iraq from Kuwait"? 42% said "yes", and 47% "no". On this issue men (53%) were considerably more in favour of a hardline policy than women (30%). But a

somewhat different wording of the question, a few days later, gave different results: "The ultimatum ... expires. Do you or do you not think that after 15 January Iraq should be driven out forcibly from Kuwait?" Now, 58% said "yes" and 35% "no". Yet another formulation: "Do the United States and its allies have the right of attack?" On the eve of the war 65% felt that this was the case, 25% did not.¹¹ However, if Iraq would be prepared to accept a compromise and a partial withdrawal from Kuwait, 62% was prepared to still abstain from violence. A majority of similar size, however, rejected a linkage with the Palestinian problem as a condition for withdrawal.

One week later, just after the beginning of the military action of the US and its allies, 84% agreed to the attacks on Iraq (with only 9% pronouncing themselves against the action), a percentage which, however, decreased gradually (to 75% around 1 February) when the war went less smoothly than the euphoria of the first days had suggested. Those 84% would imply a doubling of supporters of force since the situation on the eve of the war. Between 17 January and the beginning of February, on the other hand, the number of those agreeing to the way the war was conducted by the coalition decreased from 82 to 64%. In the same period the number of those thinking that Israel should take part in the war increased from 14 to 20%.

Finally, in the same series of surveys the question was asked whether it would be permissible for the allied countries to use nuclear weapons in an emergency. Right after the start of the war the number of supporters on this issue was 17%, on 25/26 January 12% and on 1/2 February 18% (women 15, men 20%).

Should the Netherlands participate in the action?

With respect to an active participation of the Netherlands in a possible war skepticism prevailed until December. At that time only 42% thought that the Netherlands should join an American initiative to use force. A large majority was opposed (56%). That picture is in accordance with the difference in attitudes noted earlier between activities under the auspices of the United Nations and of the US.

Early in January there was still no consensus on Dutch participation in the war. The question was put "If force is used after January 15, should the Netherlands participate actively?". A small majority was now in favor (53%), but 37% against. This question had, however, been preceded by one which showed that there was no majority in favour of going to war. Apparently, the view prevailed: "We are against the use of force, but if it yet happens the Netherlands cannot afford to abstain." Another survey produced a much clearer picture, however. "If war breaks out against Iraq after the expiration of the UN ultimatum, do you think that the

Netherlands should take part in that war?" This statement was now supported by 65%, while only 30% disagreed. The initial reluctance had now been overcome. Early in February 82% felt, on the other hand, that the Netherlands was not obliged to contribute more to cover the costs of the war. The despatch of Patriot missiles to Israel and to Turkey however, found overwhelming support of 87 and 83% respectively.

The Netherlands did not send ground forces to the Gulf area. Should the Netherlands have offered to do so voluntarily? Only 29% agreed to this, a large majority disagreed, but if America should have put such a request to the Netherlands, almost everybody (94%) agreed that the Netherlands should have had to comply with that wish!

The war aims and the termination of the war

With respect to the war aims there was still a sharp division of opinion at the end of January. 42% thought that the allies should stop their actions as soon as the liberation of Kuwait would be accomplished, while 49% thought that this should only happen when Saddam Hussein was removed from office. On 25 February, the view that the regime of Saddam Hussein should be removed had gained the upper hand, however: 22 and 76%. That agrees with the 80% which agreed on 25 February to the decision to start a ground war against Iraq. At that time 67% felt that all diplomatic possibilities to prevent such a war had been exhausted. Taken together, this shows a remarkable degree of agreement with the war compared to earlier result.

With respect to the question of what should happen after the war, which was first put in a survey on 25 February, more than half of all those surveyed in the Netherlands (55%) felt at that time that the foreign troops should withdraw again from the region, but 39% felt that they should stay to guarantee a permanent peace. 78% agreed that the allies should, for the time being, occupy a part of Iraq to force Saddam Hussein and company to accept a peace settlement. In this respect the public was hardly divided. A very large majority also thought that Saddam Hussein should be forced to abdicate (85%), that he should be tried before an international tribunal after the war (77%), and that Iraq should be forced to pay reparations for the damage caused in Kuwait (76%). In view of these generally unconciliatory views it is remarkable that 64% of all Dutchmen did not want to maintain the economic blockade of Iraq after the war. Even among the more conservative voters only 35% opted for a continuation of the blockade. Apparently, in spite of a certain vindictiveness a sharp distinction was made between the people of Iraq and their leaders.

3. Views in other countries

Introduction: the general picture

Unlike the coverage of the Netherlands, which is probably exhaustive, the data from other countries reviewed below are much more selective. They are mainly drawn from reports in the international press. Whether they truly reflect the opinion climate in the countries concerned cannot be said with certainty. Yet, they offer interesting comparisons and help us to answer the question to what extent we may generalize the findings discussed so far.

Relatively few polls allowing comparisons across countries have been taken. In October 1990 some questions were included in the Eurobarometer.¹² These referred to such aspects as the institution or country most likely to contribute to a solution of the crisis, confidence in the UN, the role of the EC and changes in attitudes on the Arab countries and on moslems in Europe. About 15% admitted that their views on Arabs and moslems had become more negative. The answers to both questions showed little difference among the various countries. The respondents were also asked how the Community might best be able to deal with crises like that in the Gulf. In the Community as a whole 61% favoured speeding up the process of political, financial and economic integration, while 70% supported the plea for a common defense and/or the creation of a European intervention force (50%). With respect, finally, to the prospects of a political union, views were divided about equally among those who expected positive, negative or neutral effects.

Although certainly of some interest, these questions did not touch the hard core of the problem, which played a central role in the European debate: i.e. to what extent military force would be justified and necessary to bring about the liberation of Kuwait, and to what extent one's country should take part in eventual military actions. In general, the enthusiasm for the war was strongest in Great Britain. Early in January 75% of the British supported the use of violence as against 70% in Germany, 53% in France and 51% in Italy. That seems considerable, but it became less so when the more specific question was addressed as to whether, and to what extent, one's own country should be involved. Another comparative survey provides more information in this connection (*Table 2*).¹³

The contrast between the answers to the first and both other questions, or, if you want, the hypocrisy, is most remarkable in Germany and Spain.

Yet another survey, held early in February in European capitals (Benelux, France, Germany and Great Britain), did not only show nuances in opinion but also showed clearly that these nuances could not hide a widespread consensus concerning the policies of what had by now come to be generally known as "the coalition".

Table 2: Participation in military action in the Gulf (in %)

	France	Germany	Great Britain	Italy	Spain
Use of violence to liberate Kuwait					
– for	75	63	86	59	66
– against	20	24	12	34	28
– dk/na	5	13	2	7	6
Send military supplies					
– for	70	60	85	43	41
– against	24	32	12	44	51
– dk/na	6	8	3	8	7
Send military ground forces of your own country					
– for	62	28	77	33	33
– against	32	66	19	61	60
– dk/na	6	6	4	6	7

Source: Gallup Political Index.

The climate had even become bellicose. No less than 30% of those surveyed favoured the use of nuclear weapons if Iraq should begin to use chemical or biological weapons. The same survey also showed that in the countries involved in the survey there was large support (59%) for the continuation of the war until the fall of Saddam Hussein. The British again showed themselves most hawkish (75% favoured the removal of Saddam Hussein, see also below), and the Germans the least. I now want to present and discuss some of the data for the individual countries.

The United States

In the United States the policies of the Bush administration initially enjoyed considerable support (Jentleson 1992). Also, there was considerable optimism concerning the outcome of the crisis. There was even some enthusiasm. Various polls demonstrated that in August between 63 and 77% of the Americans supported the decision of President Bush to send troops to the Gulf. In early September three out of four Americans agreed that “the US should keep its troops in Saudi Arabia and the area of the Persian Gulf until Iraq withdraws its troops from Kuwait, even if this means that the US should keep its troops there for a few months or even years”, but 80% would be opposed to immediate military action.¹⁴ It seemed that the question of the hostages was the most important motive to go to war. This issue

was mentioned most frequently (by 52%) next to “liberation of Kuwait”, “securing the oil fields” and “protection of Saudi Arabia”.

However, as the crisis continued and the likelihood of war increased, agreement with the administration’s policies decreased and public opinion became more divided. Support for Bush’s conduct of the crisis decreased from 75% in the summer to 50% in December. At that time most Americans (48%) were still convinced that one should first wait and see whether the embargo would work, 45% supported a military action after 15 January, 8% did not reply. Ten days before the hostilities started, 52% of the public supported US military intervention and 39% were opposed (Rielly 1991, p. 96).

Once the war had started, however, there was a massive shift toward supporting the President’s policy. One survey after 15 January showed that 75% supported the decision to go to war. General support for Bush’s policy in the Gulf conflict rose again, from 55% in mid-December to 63% in the beginning and 79% in mid-January. That support was still at the same level in mid-February (79% for the war, 18% against). Among black Americans — constituting 12% of the population but a quarter of the armed forces — only a minority (45%) supported the government, however.

As the war progressed — and the number of casualties on the American side remained small — there was implicit and explicit public support for the extension of the war aims. On the eve of the beginning of the ground war (22 February) not only did 82% agree to government policy with respect to the war in the Gulf so far (and only 18% disagree), a larger number than ever before, but also at the end of January 82% even felt already that Saddam Hussein should be removed. 60% thought that the war should not stop before that goal would be accomplished, and as many shared the view that Iraq should not be permitted to withdraw from Kuwait together with its heavy armaments, like tanks and artillery. “Get even with Saddam Hussein” was clearly the general sentiment.

After the end of the fighting, when the US threatened to become more entangled in Middle Eastern politics than thought desirable by many, the enormous support enjoyed by Bush at the end of the war (91% support for his policy) decreased rapidly again, to 78% in mid-February. Another survey showed that the Americans were heavily divided over the question of whether the US should be involved with the problems of the Middle East. In April 45% (against 51%) preferred that Washington should support the insurrection against Saddam Hussein. Another survey around the same time showed that 55% of the respondents in the US thought that the US should not interfere in the struggle between the Iraqi troops and the Kurds. Half of the respondents also took the view that the US had no obligations to protect the Kurds. The polls also showed the extent to which Americans were divided over the question of whether the US had terminated the war too early or too late.

The behaviour of the Iraqi government after the war and the information which became available concerning its secret efforts to obtain nuclear weapons probably helped to remove any hesitations which the American public may have begun to have afterwards with respect to the motives for the war. In July 1991 85% agreed that the war was justified to destroy Iraq's potential to make war. The slogan "no blood for oil" was subscribed to by 25% of the Americans, but 72% agreed that it would be a justifiable cause of war to prevent Iraq from controlling the oil supplies in the world. 69% saw the restoration of the Kuwaiti government to power as a sufficient justification. While there was strong concern about Iraq's nuclear programme and Saddam Hussein's remaining in power, in July 1991 71% disagreed with the (renewed) use of military force against Iraq.

As the uncertainty increased of whether the war could be terminated quickly and successfully and with a limited number of casualties, rumors and threats of a possible use of nuclear weapons increased. While in the beginning of January 1991 — before the outbreak of the war — only 24% of the Americans had favoured the use of nuclear weapons to protect American lives, this percentage increased at the end of January to 45%. Although American and other politicians made reassuring statements in this connection, it was evident that there was rattling of the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons and that there was growing public support for such use. That was also the case in Europe.

France

In France, which presented contradictory images to the outside world, and where the government had to reckon more with large moslem minorities from Northern Africa than elsewhere, strong support for the government's policies was nevertheless evident in the various opinion surveys.¹⁵

Late in August 1990, 79% expressed support for Mitterrand's policies in the Gulf crisis. Although at that time opinions were divided as to the desirability of military action "at this moment", a majority of 53% supported French participation in such action. This was confirmed in later surveys. But here again we have a perfect example of how question wording can influence the answers. At the same time 83% supported the statement that "no single matter, even if just, is worth a war" and that "it is always better to negotiate and seek a compromise even with an aggressor like Saddam Hussein". Roughly speaking, there was more sympathy to go to war among the right, but even among the French communists 49% supported the sending of troops to the Gulf in September 1990. However, in December 1990 the climate had changed. At that time, according to another survey, 57% did not wish French participation in the war. *Le Figaro* concluded after a new poll that the

French had not only become more pessimistic but were also increasingly reluctant to "mourir pour le Kouweït". Only 36% favoured French participation in a war. This remained so until January. After the beginning of the counterattack by the coalition force, the climate suddenly changed. The day after the beginning of the action 67% supported the action to attack Iraq and 65% supported French participation. 53% hoped that France would play a "decisive" or an "important role" in the outcome of the war. As the war evolved, support increased, like in Great Britain and elsewhere, according to various polls, to some 70%. Some data suggested that the support for French participation even increased in the first week of the war, from 62% (18 January) to 71%. Other polls reported even stronger increases, from 37% support in early January to 70% a few days after the beginning of Desert Storm (cited in Heisbourg 1992, p. 28). In one poll 68% supported the policies of Mitterrand with respect to the Gulf. *Le Figaro* and *Libération* reported comparable figures (resp. 67 and 69%) (Heisbourg 1992, p. 21). As the war continued this support increased even further. On 24 February, just after the start of the ground war, it had increased to 78%. Three out of four Frenchmen also supported Bush's policies with respect to the ground war. 65% felt that it was right to reject the Gorbachev peace plan. 78% thought that the fall of Saddam Hussein was necessary for peace.

The war had a profound influence on the perception of other countries as possible threats. The emphasis here clearly shifted from a perceived threat from the East toward one from the South. The number of those agreeing that one should rather risk a war than submit to foreign domination increased from October 1990 to June 1991 by ten points, to 61%.

Germany

In Germany a majority (54%) still opposed any form of military participation in the Gulf conflict in September 1990. Only 33% favoured this. At that time 53% also opposed any change in the German Constitution making it possible for German troops to participate in war actions outside the NATO area. In spite of efforts by the peace movement to mobilize the population to demonstrate against the war, German public opinion did not differ from that in other countries in its general support for the allied efforts (Kaiser and Becher 1992). According to a number of polls and surveys 60–80% (depending on the questions) considered the war as necessary and the actions of the members of the coalition as justified.

According to another poll, 68% thought that Saddam Hussein was the guilty party, and a same percentage thought that Kuwait could only be liberated by

military means. Other sources report other outcomes, however, especially concerning German participation. Thus, in January 1991 75–80% would be opposed to military participation of Germany in the war. Other surveys had shown, however, that depending on the wording of the questions more support could be obtained. Thus, in another poll only 17% were in favour of using the Bundeswehr, but of those opposed to this 42% said that they were supportive of participation of German troops in a UN context (cited in Kaiser and Becher 1992, p. 48).

Apparently, many Germans were confused and had mixed feelings, which translated into inconsistent outcomes of opinion polls. Compared to other countries more Germans (44% compared to 35% in Great Britain) felt that the embargo should have been pursued longer. Relatively more Germans (49%) also felt in February that the West was not striving hard enough for a diplomatic settlement.

Great Britain

In Great Britain support for the war even exceeded the level of the U.S. (Fawcett and O'Neill 1992).¹⁶ 90% supported British participation in the war, in "a degree of unity unprecedented since the dark days of 1940", so the jubilant *Sunday Times*. 84% supported the policies of the Prime Minister, John Major with only 5% rejecting the war. 70% wanted the violent removal of Saddam Hussein. 60% was prepared to accept British casualties when the war began. On 3 March a remarkable 93% were either "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the way the government had handled the war. The government had, in short, what was referred to in the British press "a good war" (Fawcett and O'Neil 1992, p. 141). This contributed heavily to the growing popularity of Prime Minister John Major.

This support was an outgrowth of an opinion climate which already existed in September 1990. At that time 71% supported the government's policy of sending troops to the Gulf, including 65% among Labour supporters. A comparative survey by Gallup in Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy showed that the British climate was more hawkish than elsewhere. At the time some 85% supported the use of military means to free the hostages. Also, the support for the policies of President Bush was greater in Britain (80%) than in Germany (75%) and France (73%).

The way the war evolved contributed to maintaining the high degree of support in Britain. Early in February 80% considered the use of violence by the coalition to be justified, a considerable increase since the eve of the war, when 67% of the

men and 42% of the women did so. One month later these percentages were 86 and 73% respectively. The "gender gap" had decreased by one half, to 13%. Only 10% now rejected all violence and as few wanted to restrict the aims of the war to the liberation of Kuwait. 41% also wanted to neutralize the military power of Iraq, and 43% wanted to see the removal of Saddam Hussein as well.

Two weeks later (24 February), however, after the start of the ground offensive, the enthusiasm seemed to have waned somewhat. At that time less people supported the war than before and only 27% supported the idea that the victors should march on to Baghdad to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Belgium

In Belgium too, numerous opinion polls were carried out (van Beveren 1992). Taken together they gave the picture of a country which was wavering. Early in January 1991, 54% of the Belgians were against any use of force, 87% preferred to end the conflict by negotiations and 66% approved of Belgian decision to contribute some logistical and humanitarian assistance to the allied efforts, but to refuse to sell ammunition to Great Britain (van Beveren 1992, p. 13). At the end of the same month, in another poll 34% stated that Belgium could not restrict itself to purely defensive missions, and only 39% approved of the government's policy.

Italy

According to Laura Guazzone, Italian public opinion began to take an interest in the Gulf crisis only immediately prior to the war (Guazzone 1992, p. 85). In January a rapid shift could be noted from opposition to support of the efforts by the coalition. By this time supporters of Italian military participation in the Gulf conflict began to outweigh the number of opponents (Isernia 1991). On January 15, 62% opposed Italian participation in the war, 70% wished negotiations to be continued and considered the actions of the Italian (43%) and the United States government (36%) in the crisis barely satisfactory. In the immediate aftermath, however, 62% approved of the Italian participation. 44% ranked Bush the best leader in the conflict, followed by Gorbachov (36%) and the Pope (38%). This change of mind can be attributed to similar factors as were at work in other countries: extensive but sanitized coverage of the war by the mass media, enthusiasm over the technological advances shown in the war, the relaxation of the tension and the fear of a catastrophe that did not materialize (Guazzone 1992, p. 86).

have robbed the present action of its most important justification. If one admits that conflicts will recur, and that there will always be those who hope to profit from aggression, then one has to agree that the system laid down in the UN Charter admittedly raises a number of questions, but after all represents the only acceptable way to thwart the use of force, and — if it would function properly — would create the indispensable conditions for large-scale disarmament.

There is considerable public support for such UN actions, both manifest and latent. The figures reported here show this.¹⁹ It may be unfair that the very first time a collective security action as intended in the Charter was possible a country with the military power of Iraq was involved, but then history is seldom fair and we had no other example. Success was therefore essential, and so were the necessary sacrifices.

For an eventual successful ending of the war, the support of public opinion was indispensable — even though the pressure of public opinion has only a delayed and muted effect on policy-making. At the same time, this support would be subject to erosion the longer the war would take. A possible shortening, however, could only be obtained, if ever, by increasing the chances of casualties, certainly when air bombardments would turn out to be insufficient. More casualties would imply more protest and less support. That is the dilemma. As it turned out, support was massive.

The immense support was misleading, however. When people get killed and one is faced with the real choices, the semblance of unanimity can no longer be maintained. As long as it is not necessary most people are prepared to “mourir pour Danzig”, few when the chips are down. Does this mean that public opinion is inconsistent, emotional and unreliable? I am not convinced. The answer is only simple for those who succumb to the logic of “in for a penny, in for a pound”.

Another dilemma

There exists, as said before, still another dilemma, which consists of the question whether democracy and modern war are not irreconcilable entities. Many politicians indignantly reject such a suggestion in the public debate. On the other hand, in the US many have come to share the view that the Vietnam war was not lost on the battlefield but on the home front, especially because of the media reporting. This legitimated the acceptance, in the Gulf war, of a degree of censorship and interference with the media which could not be justified on purely military grounds (the revelation of secrets and other information useful to the enemy) but was merely intended to prevent the erosion of domestic support. Such interference cannot be squared with a democratic system. It takes less to admit that this represents an uncomfortable dilemma than to find an acceptable solution.²⁰

In the short run democracies appear not unsensitive to the stimulating effects of a successful war and as long as the human costs remain limited or can be kept out of sight by interference with the media. There is no reason to fear that under these circumstances public opinion would represent an undesirable barrier to future collective actions sanctioned by the UN. For some that is a comforting thought. If, on the other hand, one sees democracies as a guarantee for the peaceful solution and settlement of conflicts and as a barrier to international violence the data on public opinion in the Gulf conflict reported here are rather a source of concern.

Notes

1. This chapter is a revised and much reduced version of a paper presented at the first conference of the European Peace Research Association, Firenze, November 8–10, 1991, and published in revised form in Dutch as *De publieke opinie over het conflict in de Golf*. Leiden: Instituut voor Internationale Studiën, 1991, 35 pp.

In order to save space most references to sources as well as to the full text of questions quoted have been omitted here. A copy of the full report giving more detailed data, as well as all the necessary references can be obtained from the author, Institute for International Studies, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, Netherlands.

The systematic collection of data for this survey was closed in March 1991, but a few data from the period since then have been included. As far as the Netherlands is concerned it is probably complete. Data for other countries have been drawn mainly from reports in the international press and are therefore illustrative rather than exhaustive. I am much obliged to Arthur Faber and Ralph van Haren for their assistance in the collection of the data. I am also grateful to the various institutes and survey organizations for making the data available to me.

2. See for a survey of the arguments in this debate Goldmann 1986.

3. We should recognize that the war did not actually begin in January 1991, but already in August 1990 with the illegal occupation of Kuwait. When I speak in this paper about the beginning of the military actions I am referring, however, to 15 January 1991.
4. In this section data from the followings surveys have been included:
 - a) InterView for NDU, 14 August 1990;
 - b) idem, October 1990;
 - c) NIPO survey on enemy images on behalf of various institutions, October 1990;
 - d) InterView for *De Gelderlander*, 12 November 1990;
 - e) NIPO for NDU, 13 November 1990;
 - f) InterView for *NRCHandelsblad*, 26 November 1990;
 - g) idem for RTL4, 8/9 January 1991;
 - h) NIPO for *NOSLaat*, beginning of January 1991;
 - i) InterView for *NRCHandelsblad*, 11/12 January 1991;
 - j) idem for *Algemeen Dagblad*, 12 January 1991;
 - k) Team Vier for *De Krant op Zondag*, 13 January 1991;
 - l) InterView for RTL4, 17 January 1991;

- m) Trendbox for Panorama, 17–25 January 1991;
 - n) Bureau M4 for GPD, 17/18, 25/26 January and 1/2 February 1991;
 - o) NIPO for NOSLaat, 4 February 1991;
 - p) InterView for NRC *Handelsblad*, 25 February 1991;
 - q) InterView for *Algemeen Dagblad*, 26 February 1991.
5. This tendency was also visible in other European countries.
 6. See for earlier data Everts 1992. According to these data Iraq played no independent role in enemy images at that time.
 7. In September 1991, however, the threat perception of "Arab oil countries" (including Iraq) had been reduced again sharply to more "normal" levels, c.q. from 42% in October 1990 to 11% (Everts 1992).
 8. Survey on enemy images for Studiecentrum Vredesvraagstukken, Catholic University Nijmegen, October 1990.
 9. However, we should realize that any reference in a question to "a decision by the government" or "by the Second Chamber" always yields higher percentages of support than questions concerning agreement in general. In addition we should note that the question concerned did not refer to "American" but to "international" command, which probably sounds more attractive to many. The conclusion that one should use this result with care also appears if one considers that the same survey brought to light that the public was at least divided in equal parts on the view taken by the (social-democrat) PvdA that the Second Chamber would have to take yet a new decision allowing the participation in direct acts of war (46% agreed, 48% disagreed).
 10. This is also the only motive mentioned significantly more often by women compared to men.
 11. Team Vier for *De krant op zondag*, 13 January 1991.
 12. Eurobarometer 34, Fall 1990, reported in *Eurobarometer Flash*, No. 3, September–October 1990.
 13. *Gallup Political Index*, Report No. 262, October 1990.
 14. Data cited in 1990 Report, Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels, 1991.
 15. The evolution of public opinion in France is discussed extensively in Lellouche 1991, Dupoirier 1992 and Heisbourg 1992.
 16. See for an extensive local survey with similar outcomes as reported here Shaw and Carr-Hill 1991, 1991a.
 17. Vasconcelos 1992, 119–120. All figures cited in this paragraph are cited from this source.
 18. Cited from Closa 1991.
 19. Polling data from March 1991 suggest that in the United States at least there is widespread support for participation in multilateral action, especially under UN auspices. While 46% favoured unilateral US military action to settle world problems, 57% did so if costs of intervention were to be shared by "a broad group of allies". More than 80% favoured multilateral military action, including a role for the UN, against threatened use of chemical and nuclear weapons, or to thwart invasion of one country by another. 85% believed that the international body rather than the US should take the lead in combating future aggression. Meanwhile 59% agreed that the US has "a moral obligation to defend freedom around the world no matter what it costs", but 78% also believed that "we can't afford to defend so many countries". Data as reported by T. Wicker, *International Herald Tribune*, 10 June 1991.
 20. See on this topic Ottosen 1991, 1991a and the literature cited therein. See also Dworkin 1991.

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Portugal

Not unlike the other countries involved, public opinion in Portugal showed widespread support for the international coalition and its military actions, but mixed feelings about direct Portuguese participation.¹⁷ In August 1990, 46% agreed that there were sufficient grounds for military intervention. 35% were against and 19% gave no opinion. In January 1991, 61% were in favour of the decision taken by President Bush. In the intervening months this support seems to have grown gradually. The same poll showed, however, that support of the coalition's efforts did not imply support of direct Portuguese participation. 55% opposed participation in a multinational force. This opposition can be attributed to an "insular mentality", due to the relatively peripheral location of Portugal (Vasconcelos 1992). The government's policy in the Gulf crisis was supported by 83% of those surveyed. After the war there was little support for a continued foreign military presence in the region: 53% were against, 31% in favour.

Spain

In Spain finally, as shown already in *Table 2* above, there was much less enthusiasm for the war. Although a majority felt that the use of violence to liberate Kuwait was justified, there was no majority in favour of Spanish participation in such action. 54% was against this, with 48% opposing the sending of warships to enforce the embargo. One third felt that Spain should stay completely outside the conflict, and only 22% favoured the sending of non-military aid. In the case of a war Spain should follow the other EC partners, according to 32%, but a similar number felt that Spain should abstain from such common action.¹⁸

At the end of February, only 16% felt that the war should continue, while 78% preferred to "cease fire and negotiate". However, 54% also felt that Saddam Hussein should not be rewarded for withdrawal from Kuwait by scrapping his debts. 80% thought that he should be forced to abdicate after the war, but about as many (74%) thought that Iraq should be assisted to rebuild the country if Saddam Hussein would withdraw his troops, and two thirds also felt that in that case the economic sanctions should be lifted.

Early in March, 24% of those Spaniards interviewed considered the Spanish participation in the military actions to be "excessive". 17% thought this to be "insufficient" and a majority of 56% thought it was "sufficient". A similar majority (53%), however, thought that the economic and human costs made to terminate the war "disproportionate" and not "unavoidable". The government's policy on the war was generally supported, however. 52% thought so on 31 January. By March 1 this figure had risen to 62%.

4. Some conclusions

Summary of the results

There is much in the development of public opinion about the Gulf war which supports the arguments presented in the Introduction. The data justify some conclusions. In the first place, from the beginning large majorities supported government policies in all Western countries concerned. This is just as much true for the Netherlands and other European countries as for the United States. That support, however, was often conditional (despatch of warships: yes, use of force: no; use of force justifiable, but participation of one's own country not, etc.), or conditioned by the silent hope that it would after all not need to come to military action. When that hope faded and the expectations of war increased, support tended to decrease in the same degree. Besides unanimity and a preparedness to persist in the chosen course, there was an undercurrent of doubt and despair.

As the moment of truth approached, the trust of people in their own government in most countries decreased and divisions of opinion became more apparent. On the eve of the military counteractions it was hardly possible in most countries to construe clear majority support for these actions.

So far, both the content and the development of public opinion are not only understandable, but also seem reasonable and rational, although that judgement will be reached more easily if one happens to share the sentiments of the majority. There was a seemingly remarkable unanimity in public opinion, which, as said before, was made possible especially because there was still the possibility of a not too unhappy end. Those favouring continuation of the embargo could hide behind this policy to avoid having to face possibly awkward choices. If Iraq had withdrawn under the international pressure, pacifists too would probably not have argued that, while the use of force was of course not permissible, the threat of its use could apparently be effective. On the other hand, those who were willing to justify the use of force were not yet directly confronted with the most probable outcome of the war, i.e. that it would not in the least contribute to what was described in S.C. Resolution 678 as "the restoration of peace and security in the Middle East". Everyone could hedge his bets, and the unanimity was thus at least partially shallow.

At the moment when the hostilities began, in January 1991, public opinion shifted drastically. In all countries the agreement with the war and with the policies of the respective governments increased rapidly. Under such conditions the expression of doubts about the wisdom of prevailing policies is easily confused with a lack of patriotism. The British, next to the Americans, were most enthusiastic about the war, but elsewhere percentages of 70–80% in expressed support

were also not uncommon, except for Spain and Germany. There, the use of force by "the coalition" was supported but the use of the own military forces was largely rejected. Hence, it was understandable that others accused these countries of trying to be "free riders".

Above, I concluded with some satisfaction that a part of public support to the military action was attributable to the fact that it took place in a "UN framework", or was perceived as such. On the other hand, we are faced with the disagreeable situation that among the motives which for instance Dutch respondents mentioned to justify the military action, only a minor role was played from the beginning by indignation over the occupation of Kuwait and the protection of Israel, while the desire "to suppress the military emergence of Iraq" was mentioned as "most important" by many more. The latter is, however, a motive which even in a mild interpretation of international law cannot justify war. Its popularity as an argument reflects the presence of a "gut feeling" to which Bush and company could appeal with great success, no matter what we may think about this.

With respect to the first weeks of the war, opinion research showed us a phenomenon which we know from the (mostly American) literature, i.e. a growing pessimism, increasing doubts and decreasing support for the continuation of the hostilities (Russett 1990). Expectations on the duration of the war became more pessimistic, more people came to fear an extension of the war to the whole Middle East, and more people than before felt that the war should stop as soon as Kuwait was liberated. As said, this phenomenon has been registered before. In this case it was all the more understandable, in view of the quick dissipation of the euphoria of the very first days, after the authorities concerned failed to produce tangible and convincing evidence of the alleged results of the thousands of bombing sorties. The expectations which were raised by the way the war was presented to the public as a "live broadcast", 24 hours a day, and which were later disappointed, contributed to this effect. In the Netherlands we noted a remarkable halving of trust in the media in a very short time.

Those signs of decreasing support did not augur well for the case that in a ground war the numbers of casualties, especially on one's own side, would increase ten- or hundred-fold (as was predicted by many). In that case we probably would have witnessed a repetition of the strong correlation established on earlier occasions, between mounting numbers of casualties and decreasing public support. If the war would take longer — and that needed not be so long at all — what until now had remained an undercurrent could easily have become the main current. As a minimum one might have expected a strong polarization of opinion. In this connection it is interesting to note that the sizable demonstrations — both in the United States and elsewhere — which raised memories of the Vietnam period rather than the more recent struggle against the modernization of nuclear weapons, now already took place at the beginning of the war rather than after many years as

in the case of Vietnam. It is true that in this case only a, traditionally activist, minority took to the streets, but that needed not have remained so.

Opposed to this group was not only a, politically less vocal, "silent majority", but also the core of what could evolve into a strong movement to use all disposable means and "nuke Iraq". It was especially worrisome that around the end of January already 45% of the Americans polled favoured the use of nuclear weapons, a figure which had almost doubled compared to the situation when hostilities had not yet broken out. It is particularly disturbing since in this case politicians — referring of course to the standard arguments of the policy of deterrence — began already to undermine openly the long standing taboo on the use of nuclear weapons.

As the war progressed and the allied successes became visible, support acquired such euphorical proportions that the leaders no longer took any risks in terms of public relations in beginning the ground war and could safely extend their war aims explicitly or implicitly.

Because the war was terminated with a very limited number of casualties on the allied side (the Iraqi dead were apparently irrelevant in the formation of public opinion), the expectation that a rising number of casualties would cause support to drop rapidly could not be confirmed.

The question of public support

The question of public support is not an unimportant matter. Whatever the answer to the general question of whether war can ever be justified, among the grounds which could perhaps justify the military action of the coalition certainly the argument should be mentioned that while this action did perhaps, and for many reasons, not qualify as a true UN enforcement action according to the Charter, it came fairly close to it, closer anyway than ever before and closer than it may be reasonable to expect in future cases. Not a true action of collective security therefore, but something which came close enough to it to hope for success, no matter how much justifiable skepticism one might have concerning the motives of some of the so-called allies. But in a war one cannot always pick and choose one's friends. It was the very first chance for the UN to prove its worth not only as a peacekeeping but also as a peace enforcing agency. To prevent that it would also be the last, it was necessary, even essential, that the action should be successful and also be perceived as such. Possibly not the worst outcome — it is possible to think of worse scenarios — but yet a very awkward outcome, would have been if the defeat of Iraq or the liberation of Kuwait would have cost so many lives that the world — and particularly the members of the coalition most closely involved — would have concluded afterwards that such an action should never be taken again in the future, thus relieving the anxieties of potential aggressors. That would also

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VI. The building of peace in different time perspectives

by ANTONIO-LUIS MARTÍNEZ-PUJALTE

Three years ago, the Final Document of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe evoked a great enthusiasm both among the political leaders and in the peace research community. In November 1980, when the political changes in Eastern and Central Europe had just occurred, and the new threats to peace in Europe were only a remote possibility, the climate of optimism in the international community was reasonable, because the European continent faced a golden opportunity to build up a stable pan-European order of peace, security and cooperation. Unfortunately, this process has run very slowly until the present moment. Moreover, the failure of the CSCE to act in the Yugoslav conflict, as well as the increasing preoccupation of European Community in international relations, have reduced the CSCE to a clearly secondary role. The aim of this brief contribution is to defend the necessity of 'recuperating the faith' in CSCE: the role of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe as an international actor should be strengthened, and the plans to convert it into a permanent pan-European structure of security and cooperation — which have already been presented by several researchers and politicians, immediately after the political changes of 1989–1990 — should be put into practice.

1. Why CSCE?

According to Björn Hettne, three different organisational possibilities of what he calls the New European Security Order emerged on the political arena after the political changes in Eastern and Central Europe:

- (1) NATO with a strengthened European leg.
- (2) The EC takes on a politico-military role through the dormant West European Union.
- (3) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) becomes institutionalized and more permanent, and, above all, is given military powers (Hettne 1991, p. 282; see also Lodgaard 1993).

A plea for CSCE

by

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Three years ago, the Paris Summit of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe arose a great enthusiasm both among the political leaders and in the peace research community. In November 1990, when the political changes in Eastern and Central Europe had just occurred, and the new threats to peace in Europe were only a remote possibility, the climate of optimism in the international community was reasonable, because the European continent faced a golden opportunity to build up a stable pan-European order of peace, security and cooperation. Unfortunately, this process has run very slowly until the present moment. Moreover, the failure of the CSCE to act in the Yugoslav conflict, as well as the increasing protagonism of European Community in international relations, have reduced the CSCE to a clearly secondary role. The aim of this brief contribution is to defend the necessity of "recuperating the faith" in CSCE: the role of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe as an international actor should be strengthened, and the plans to convert it into a permanent pan-European structure of security and cooperation — which were already presented by several researchers and politicians, immediately after the political changes of 1989–1990 — should be put into practice.

1. Why CSCE?

According to Björn Hettne, three different organizational possibilities of what he calls the New European Security Order emerged on the political arena after the political changes in Eastern and Central Europe:

"(1) NATO with a strengthened European leg...; (2) The EC takes on a politico-military role through the dormant West European Union...; (3) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) becomes institutionalized and more permanent, and, above all, is given military powers" (Hettne 1991, p. 282; see also Lodgaard 1992).

Of these three possibilities, the third one should be considered as the surest path towards a new European order of peace, security and cooperation. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe seems to be, from a theoretical point of view, the most suitable instrument to build up a new structure of collective security and international cooperation which embraces the whole European continent. There are at least three reasons in support of this thesis:

a) In the first place, the CSCE is the only framework in which all the European countries, plus the United States and Canada, already take part (on June 19, 1991, Albania ceased to be the exception). This point has a great importance, because the key to stability in the future Europe lies in our success in overcoming the division of the continent. To achieve this objective it seems necessary that all the European countries are fully involved from the very beginning in the construction of the new European structures (Martínez-Pujalte 1991a, p. 23). That will not be the case if we use some other framework, like NATO or EC, to which only a small part of the European countries belong.

b) It must be recalled that the CSCE already has a large tradition of contributing to detente and to the development of cooperative relations among all the European countries. It is true that the CSCE process did not by itself mean immediate political changes, and that the Eastern countries to a large extent ignored some of the principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act (above all, those concerning the respect for human rights), due to the nonbinding and merely political character of this document. But it is also true that the Helsinki process was one of the most decisive causes of the end of the East-West conflict and the fall of Communist regimes. The Helsinki Final Act opened indeed a process of understanding among the European countries, which laid the basis for the latter formulation by Gorbachev of the new Soviet foreign policy doctrine. As Dennis Sandole has written,

“had the CSCE process not been intact and robust, *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* would have had an even less supportive environment that was actually the case” (1991, p. 10).

Moreover, the agreements on humanitarian issues contained in the third basket of the Final Act did mean an extension of personal relations between Eastern and Western citizens and attenuated the policy of “closed doors” of the Communist countries. This factor made possible the popular pressure for democracy, which was observed in Poland since 1980, and in the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries in 1989. Last but not least, the Helsinki Final Act, and to a higher extent the Stockholm Final Document of 1986, adopted a set of CSBMs which were generally well implemented, and which contributed in fact to increasing the level of confidence among the States. It must be underlined that, since 1986, the Soviet Union consented to inspection of its military activities on its own territory.

c) The most important security problems that Europe faces at the present moment and will face in the near future are the problems related to nationalities, frontier revisions and minorities. The nature and characteristics of the CSCE make it a very adequate organism indeed to provide for the peaceful settlement of that kind of conflicts. The best way to deal with territorial disputes and minorities conflicts inside Europe is to do it in the framework of a forum of dialogue where all European countries take part, and which includes international officials representing the great variety of cultures and nationalities of Europe and devoted to the promotion of peace and security. The CSCE has been unable to fulfil this task until the present moment, as discussed below, because it has lacked of the proper technical means and decision-making capacities. If it had had both, the Yugoslav conflict would have found a peaceful settlement in the framework of CSCE.

All these reasons support the central argument of this article: the CSCE should carry out a stronger transformation process, aimed at converting what until now has been a mere informal forum of dialogue and consultation into a proper international organization with own decision-making capacity. This renewed CSCE could then be the central body of a new pan-European security structure.

2. The recent history of CSCE: from Paris to Helsinki

The CSCE was born in the 1970s, as an informal forum of East–West dialogue. It was obvious that the dissolution of the East–West conflict was bound to cause profound changes in the CSCE and would open a new phase in the history of the Conference. This new phase began in fact with the Paris Summit in November 1990 (which was the second summit of Heads of State and Government of the CSCE, as there had not been any since Helsinki). The basic document of the CSCE is now, besides the Helsinki Final Act, the “Charter of Paris for a new Europe”.

The Charter of Paris meant, in the first place, a solemn confirmation of the end of the Cold War and the division of Europe. As the Preamble of the Charter states:

“We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and cooperation.”

Moreover, the Charter confirmed the commitment of the 34 states to the principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act, with a significative improvement in some of its aspects; in the field of basic principles, the Charter of Paris adds to

the Helsinki Document a strong option for democracy as the only adequate political regime, as well as a greater concreteness in the formulation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

But the most important aspect of the Charter of Paris is of course the institutional development of the CSCE. For the first time, the Charter set up three permanent organs of the Conference: the Council of Foreign Ministers, which will meet at least once a year; the Committee of Senior Officials, an auxiliary organ to the Council, whose functions are to prepare the meetings of the Council and to carry out its decisions; and a Permanent Secretariat, with its seat in Prague, headed by the Director of the Secretariat. In the framework of the Conference, a Conflict Prevention Centre, with its seat in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections, with its seat in Warsaw, were also created. The first one deals with the exchange of military information and with the application of the CSBMs, and the second one would have as its function to facilitate contacts and exchange of information on elections within the participating States.

After the Paris Summit, the new CSCE organs started to implement their functions. The Committee of Senior Officials met for the first time in Vienna on 28 and 29 January 1991, and — among other decisions — appointed the Directors of the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Center and the Office for Free Elections of the CSCE. Special significance had the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which took place in Berlin on 19 and 20 June 1991. The most important decisions taken by the Council were the approval of Albania's membership of CSCE, and the adoption of an emergency mechanism which permits every member state of the CSCE to call a meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials if it perceives an emergency situation in some country of its geographical area. However, the Committee will only be forced to convene if a minimum of another 12 member states support that petition.

The positive aspects of the Berlin meeting notwithstanding, it must be underlined that it made the difficulties of the CSCE process very visible. It also showed that the steps toward the institutionalization of the Conference were taken very slowly. For instance, no decision was taken in Berlin about the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, whose creation had been proposed by the Charter of Paris; afterwards, an assembly of the Parliaments of the 35 member states of the CSCE did meet in Madrid, but the Parliamentary Assembly proposed in the Charter¹ has been reduced to a mere informal forum of contacts and consultations. The discussions on the emergency mechanism were very difficult and, in particular, the reservations of the Soviet delegation made it necessary to articulate it in a much weaker and less operative form than initially designed.

The emergency mechanism was very soon put into practice for the first time. The break-out of the civil war in Yugoslavia after the declarations of independence of Croatia and Slovenia on June 25, 1991, caused the governments of three CSCE member countries (Italy, Germany and France) to call for the use of the emergency

mechanism. Its first phase, which consisted in requiring the Yugoslav government to explain the unusual military activities which were taking place in its territory, came to an end on June 29th, when Belgrade answered that the Yugoslav army was only taking control of the federal frontiers. The second phase started on June 30th, called by Austria, and the Committee of Senior Officials convened on July 3rd in Prague. Its only result was a declaration asking for the immediate stop of the war, the retirement of the troops, and the liberation of war prisoners. Two days later the Committee decided to send to Yugoslavia a group of observers, but it entrusted the organization of this mission to the European Community. That was the end of the CSCE intervention in the Yugoslav conflict. The complete failure of the emergency mechanism which had been approved two weeks before revealed the inability of the CSCE in conflict prevention and resolution, for one simple reason: the CSCE was not equipped with the necessary decision-making capacity and the necessary technical means to undertake such a task.

The Prague meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers in January 1992, as well as the Follow-up Meeting, taking place in Helsinki from March to July 1992, tried to continue the institutionalization process of the CSCE and to give the organization new capacities in the field of conflict management. The functions of the Committee of Senior Officials have been increased; the Office for Free Elections (now renamed Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) was provided with new tasks and faculties; a very important document on early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes was approved (Chapter III of Helsinki Decisions); and the role of the CSCE in disarmament matters was strengthened, creating for this purpose the Forum for Security Cooperation, that is to undertake a very ambitious agenda, named Programme for Immediate Action, which is also a part of the Helsinki Decisions. Despite all these positive advances, it must be underlined that the process continues to be very slow. In particular, the consensus rule, which has not been modified by the Helsinki Decisions, makes it very difficult for the CSCE to act in the field of conflict management. Therefore, the practical results of the new crisis management procedures approved in Helsinki remain to be seen. If the European countries really want the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe to be strong and active, it must be transformed in a real international organization with own decision-making capacity and with effective powers. Only in this way could the two problems that Dunay has recently pointed out concerning the CSCE find a solution:

"First, the convincing arguments of diplomats are not backed up by enforcement measures. Second, similar to the UN Security Council, the bodies of the CSCE do not work very effectively when the major participants disagree or are directly involved in the conflict" (Dunay 1992, p. 6).

3. What to do now?

So far the CSCE process has been based on legally nonbinding political documents; both the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris have this character. If the CSCE is to be transformed into a strong international organization with its own decision-making capacity, a legally binding international treaty is needed, as has been already suggested by several authors (see Brauch 1990, p. 56, Dean 1990, pp. 139ff, Skubiszewski 1990, p. 149). This Treaty should constitute the Fundamental Law of the Common European Home, and should give legal force to the essential principles of the new European design (most of them already contained in the Helsinki Final Act or in the Charter of Paris). Such principles are: rejection of the threat and use of force; commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes; respect for the territorial integrity of states and for the inviolability of frontiers; possibility of changes in the territorial *status quo* only by agreement and as a result of a resolution of CSCE's decision-making bodies; non-intervention in internal affairs, except in the cases of peaceful settlement of disputes, collective defence or violations of human rights; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and commitment to democracy as the only legitimate system of government; establishment of a system of common security; and commitment to non-offensive defence policies. The CSCE Treaty should also set up a new institutional structure of the organization, departing from the provisions of the Charter of Paris, but also establishing permanent organs not formed by the representatives of the countries but by international officials appointed by the Council (for example, a Political and a Military Committee, to each of which different Subcommittees and Departments could report); as Blackaby has written, "the experience of the European Community shows how important it is for an organization to have international civil servants who are committed to its objectives" (1990, p. 11; on these questions see also Martínez-Pujalte 1991a, pp. 25–26). In particular, the Treaty should also set up a directly elected CSCE Parliament.

A new and institutionalized CSCE would perform the following functions in the future:

1. It would arrange the conclusion of agreements and establish proper channels for all-European economic and cultural cooperation. Of course, these functions would be gradually absorbed by the European Community — in the economic field — and the Council of Europe — in the domain of cultural cooperation. But the CSCE will continue to have some role in these matters, due to the fact that its number of members is and will be larger than the number of members of the other two European institutions.

2. It would provide a forum for political cooperation and dialogue, thus taking over the functions of the EPC (European Political Cooperation) developed in the framework of the European Community (Brauch 1990, p. 54). In this context, the future CSCE would design the common European foreign policy, and should pay

special attention to the development of a cooperative policy towards the underdeveloped countries. In fact, the future Europe will probably have an outstanding level of economic development, internal cohesion, democratic stability and human rights protection, unknown anywhere else in the world, and should use these resources to benefit Third World countries, providing them with economic aid, political and legal counselling, etc. The construction of the Common European Home is also in the interest of non-European countries, who should profit from the positive economic and political conditions in Europe.

3. One of the most important tasks of the future CSCE will be the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this context, two fundamental principles of the new organization will be the complete abandonment of the use of force in the settlement of whatever political conflicts might arise among the member states and the commitment to the use of peaceful means to resolve conflicts (both principles were already stated in the "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States", the first part of the Helsinki Final Act). The CSCE organs will therefore have as one of their main tasks the settlement of possible conflicts among the member states, as well as between a member state and a non-member state. Of course, the peaceful settlement of future conflicts could have as their outcome, in some cases, the revision of the territorial frontiers of some European states. Accordingly, an essential principle of the future European architecture will be the possible revision of some European national frontiers (the territorial *status quo* is not unchangeable), although such a revision could only be accomplished by peaceful means and as result of a resolution adopted by the CSCE's decision-making bodies.² It must be stressed that the CSCE would also be involved in the peaceful settlement of disputes which could arise among some of its member states and non-European countries. In these cases, it would not be able to adopt binding decisions, but it would certainly be able to use the classical instruments of the peaceful settlement of disputes: "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, arbitrating, conciliation", in the terms of art. 33 of the UN Charter.

4. The CSCE would provide a pan-European framework of common security, and should be able to organize collective defence to repel any aggression against a member state coming from either another member state or a non-European country. The CSCE would need an adequate military structure to meet these obligations; hence, a system of collective security should be created in Europe, which has already been proposed by several authors (Wachterand Krohn 1989; Brauch 1990; Lutz 1990; Senghaas 1990, pp. 43ff). Of course, the construction of such a system of collective security, and the endowment of security functions to the CSCE organs, will be gradual and slow. During a long transition period, the CSCE security structure would coexist with other institutions, like NATO and WEU. During this period, several measures should be implemented: the constitution of a CSCE Military Committee (other authors have talked about a European Security Council: Brauch 1990, p. 23, Møller 1991, p. 71); the creation of a pan-

European permanent and professional peace-keeping force under a joint command (Senghaas 1990, p. 46, Martínez-Pujalte 1991b, p. 23); and the transfer of military means from the CSCE member states to the organization (Møller 1991, p. 71), among others.

"Whether a conversion of the present alliance system to such an agreement will ever be possible remains to be seen. To advance such ideas at the present juncture does, however, seem warranted according to the logic that, unless one knows where one wants to go, one is certain never to get there" (Møller 1991, p. 72).

I agree strongly with these words of Bjørn Møller. Moreover, I would like to add that if we want to achieve peace and stability in the European continent, it is our moral duty as peace researchers to advocate the creation of permanent pan-European structures. In this context, the present article has tried to advocate the creation of such structures in the framework of the CSCE and to define some guidelines for the possible future design of this organization.

Notes

1. This is the text of the Charter: "Recognizing the important role parliamentarians can play in the CSCE process, we call for greater parliamentary involvement in the CSCE, in particular through the creation of a CSCE parliamentary assembly, involving members of parliaments from all participating States. To this end, we urge that contacts be pursued at parliamentary level to discuss the field of activities, working methods and rules of procedure of such a CSCE parliamentary structure, drawing on existing experience and work already undertaken in this field".
2. The Helsinki Final Act declares that the participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement" (Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, principle 1).

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Nonviolence misconceived?

A critique of civilian-based defence

by

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Nonviolent action is sometimes thought of as a radical transformation of the individual and society, sometimes more narrowly as a potentially superior functional alternative to violent means of struggle. Gene Sharp represents the latter line of thoughts, but underestimates the resistance of the military system and fails to see that precisely a radical transformation will be necessary to overcome it. Otherwise, civilian-based defence will just become a subordinated adjunct to military defence. The nonviolent liberation and subsequent creation of military forces in the Baltic states illustrate this point.

Introduction

A critical historical examination and re-conceptualization of violence-avoiding ways of fighting suggests that the “nonviolent action” paradigm, especially in its more Gandhio-centric forms, is too confining (Huxley 1990, *passim*, especially chapters I, II).^{*} Consequently, in spite of the many insights it has provided, its historical interpretation is rather distorted and it may give a misconceived vision of what can be done through nonviolent struggle. This is the point of departure for the following comments on the conception of a defense system based on nonviolent action.

Nonviolence as an alternative to armed conflict can be interpreted in at least two ways. It can refer to a comprehensive transformation of the individual and society which would result in the significant reduction and ultimate eradication of armed conflict (for a recent example of this approach see *Rajsamand Declaration*). This

* “Gandhio-centric” does not refer here to a criticism of Gandhism in general, but only specifically to the widespread approach to studying conflict which paradigmatises Gandhian nonviolent resistance, thus setting it up as both the explicitly and implicitly assumed model through which similarly perceived events are classified (see for example Shridharani 1939, pp. 113–114; Sharp 1973, pp. 75–78, 82).

may include any of the vast array of piecemeal approaches, both governmental and nongovernmental, to promote equitable global common security (see Fischer, Nolte and Øberg 1989).

More narrowly, "nonviolence" can refer specifically to "nonviolent struggle" aimed at converting or imposing defeat on an enemy within using a range of means of force and coercion which can sometimes be differentiated from violent means of conflict only in that they stop short of direct physical violence.

Sometimes nonviolence in the narrow second sense, in the form of "social" or "civilian-based" defense (i.e., a functional replacement for the military) is seen as *the key* to the decisive reduction and even elimination of the military from society and the establishment of nonviolence in the first and broader sense. I hold that this is mistaken, and that even those who only see social defense as one ingredient of nonviolence in the broad sense may exaggerate its importance.

My argument is straightforward. First, in a conflict there are certain interests which cannot, or are best not, pursued violently. Secondly there are a wide range of ends in non-routine conflicts which can be pursued through either nonviolent or violent means, or even a combination of both. The choice between them will depend on intertwined practical, moral and other considerations. Finally, in acute struggle there exist goals, both offensive and defensive, which can be attained only through violent means; in such circumstances, there is no replacement for violence. Thus the only way to significantly reduce or abolish the ultimate dependence of communities on violent sanctions is to eliminate the pursuit of goals for which they are necessary. This can be achieved only through nonviolence in the broad sense.

To be sure, this is not to undervalue the role of acute nonviolent action in the multifarious activities involved in the broad sense of nonviolence.

Superiority of civilian-based defense?

Because it is presently the most advanced concise synthesis in the field, the analysis of Gene Sharp's *Civilian-based Defense* (1990) is a convenient way of providing a critique of the subject in general. For several decades Gene Sharp, through his own work and as a project director, has relentlessly promoted the exploration of the potential of nonviolent sanctions in conflict and defense. Indeed, anywhere in the world where nonviolent action is seriously studied by scholars and activists Sharp's works will be found.

Sharp argues that viable demilitarization schemes must recognize the necessity of deterrence and defense; those which do not he dismisses as utopian. Sharp demurely suggests that of the alternative defense proposals currently advocated, such as the European "nonoffensive defense" or "defensive defense", the nonmilitary

approach of "transarmament" to civilian-based defense (henceforth CBD) may well prove to be the superior option. Further on he abandons this modest statement, and claims that a strong society's "*most effective* response to attempts at internal usurpation and foreign aggression" is through defense organized around nonviolent societal power.

It is typical of the paradigm which Sharp represents to describe CBD as a functional replacement for, and a superior alternative to, military war for the defeat of a military aggressor. This position is often argued in the terms of military discourse. This obsessive emphasis on the functional preeminence of CBD in relation to other means, military and nonmilitary, contrasts strikingly with the more comprehensive proposals put forth, for example, by European peace and conflict researchers, social activists and defense experts (for example Fischer, Nolte and Øberg 1989). In this book and elsewhere Sharp caricatures other approaches or combinations of approaches to peace, including disarmament and social change, to bolster his one-sided emphasis on CBD.

Conditions for demilitarization

In his facile dismissal of what he arrogantly calls the "impressive-sounding reasons" used by "various intellectuals" to explain the formidable obstacles to the acceptance of CBD, Sharp reveals his own naiveté. By denying that "changing over from military to civilian-based defense" necessitates "prior transformation of the international system" or the "social system" Sharp neglects the fundamental fact that to a significant extent military powers and arms producers are manifestly against comprehensive general disarmament or demilitarization; to assume otherwise is blindness, even though the current global reduction of weapon procurement and expenditure is likely to continue.

"*This book*", Sharp emphasizes with italics, "*is based on the assumption that no country will permanently relinquish its military options unless and until it has a deserved confidence in a viable, developed civilian-based defense policy.*" This assumption may be noteworthy, but it is certainly not what is of paramount importance here, since many countries would not want to make this switch even if it were incontrovertibly viable. A relinquishment in favour of CBD or some other nonmilitary solution can only occur when countries are truly willing to renounce military interventionism and their economic dependence on the arms trade. Such a change would undeniably require a major transformation in international political and economic practices, and perhaps even a deeper change in the very cosmology of our civilization. Moreover, even in nations, such as Finland, Sweden and Norway, which are clearly militarily non-interventionist and defense-oriented, the elimination or even reduction of military institutions in society

will require more than the development of a pragmatic nonmilitary replacement. The military is an almost inextricable part of the identities and cultures of these peoples. To neglect this condition is to display lack of historical and anthropological insight.

Relations between Nordic countries provide a further serious challenge to the claim that states will not relinquish military capacity unless they have a well-developed CBD system. The defense forces of the Nordic countries are not maintained for fear of one another; armed encounters, little less war, between the Nordic states are virtually inconceivable. This is certainly not due to the existence of anything resembling CBD. Without going into historical detail, the evolution of relations between the Nordic countries, through cooperation and serious conflict, has given rise to structures of society, culture and international relations which decisively reduce the significance of military capacity. The Nordic and other comparable cases of relatively peaceful international relations are empirically so weighty (as is true of the CSCE process as well, despite its limits) that theorization concerning their further development cannot be blown over like the strawman alternatives dismissed by some advocates of CBD.

CBD bolsters military system

Sharp is, indeed, correct in pointing out that such countries have either seriously considered, or have already actually carried out, the integration of a civilian resistance component into their national defense systems. But such a component is not at all intended to replace any of the functions of military defense, to which it is completely subordinated; it therefore cannot validly be seen as part of the "change over" or "transarmament" to CBD which Sharp envisions. This idea of transarmament is even more utopian in relation to the interventionist and arms dealing powers, such as the USA, who speak not of a transformation to nonviolent defense, but rather of the incorporation of "low intensity warfare" into their comprehensive strategies of global politico-military control (Klare et al. 1988).

Simplistic power/violence dichotomy

The traditional models of civilian resistance as a component of, or primary foundation for, a polity's defense are mainly based on studies of cases of nonmilitary or nonviolent struggle throughout history. Nonviolent struggle has been understood as a technique ranging from protest and persuasion to economic, social and political noncooperation and even radical nonmilitary intervention; it is

seen as having a potential repertoire of hundreds of methods. Sharp has done his most valuable work in the study of nonviolent action as such, although his conceptual apparatus is flawed in resting on a simplistic dichotomy between societal power and violence that is insensitive to the complex relationship between the two. Drawing upon the long-established canon of numerous examples of nonviolent struggle Sharp particularly emphasizes certain cases (in Czechoslovakia, 1968–1969; the Kapp *Putsch*, Germany, 1920; in the Ruhr, Germany, 1923; the French generals' coup, Algiers, 1961) which he believes may provide lessons for the systematic development of CBD.

Invalid jump from the real-world to CBD?

The jump from real-world present and historical nonviolent struggles to a defense organization model distilled therefrom, intended to replace the military, is altogether misguided. Historically nonviolent collective action has been developed and employed in circumstances of long-term interrelation, or at least well-established military occupation, and of various degrees of mutual dependence between antagonists in the context of domination by one of them. Nonviolent struggles have certainly often involved confrontation with military power and violence, but nonviolent action has never been, and never will be, a functional replacement for warfare against all-out warfare. This is because, in spite of the effectiveness of nonviolent sanctions in certain conditions, there exists a range of destructive functions in regard to which nonviolence cannot compete with organized violence.

Nonviolent liberation

Instead of trying to squeeze nonviolent action into an ill-fitting mold meant to compete with the military in its own realm, I suggest that we concentrate on developing nonviolent struggle for what it has always done best as a way of liberation from, and refusal to submit to, domination in certain circumstances. Even in this sense, however, we must not be naive. As Noam Chomsky wrote (*The Nation*, January 29, 1990) in reflecting on the events in Europe, 1989,

“throughout modern history, popular forces motivated by radical democratic ideals have sought to combat structures of hierarchy and domination. Sometimes they have succeeded in expanding the realm of freedom and justice.... Often they are simply crushed.”

Post-war East Europe clearly shows how the resources and conditions for outright struggle can be controlled and how masses of people can be coerced and manipulated. It took people there decades of indirect noncooperation, punctuated by uprisings, to undermine the social cohesion and economic power that maintained domination. Thus, although nonviolent mass movements catalyzed change in 1989, they certainly could have been suppressed, and it was the receding long-term sustained, mostly diffuse and indirect, resistance — not “nonviolent combat” against military forces — which made the price of a military crackdown too high (cf. Ash 1990, Holst 1990).

Perhaps the only realistic way to decisively reduce our dependence on military organizations, and even eventually render them insignificant, is through the development of international relations as cited above in the case of the Nordic countries and the CSCE process (cf. the discussion of democracy, war and peace in Gleditsch 1992 and accompanying articles). These could be bolstered by grassroots efforts for nonviolence in the broad sense (cf. Martin 1991a).

The narrow effort to translate the language of civilian struggle into military terms and to persuade military personnel to adopt CBD will only lead to its subordination to armed force. As the Norwegian Minister of Defense, Johan Jørgen Holst, puts it (Holst 1990, pp. 18–19):

“Impatient calls for a ‘comprehensive strategic approach,’ unified systems of command and control, detailed operational planning and contingency plans, could prove incompatible with the essence of civilian-based defense. There is also the danger that theoreticians of the technique will so retreat into the realm of abstract construction that their paradigms become conceptual and organizational straitjackets. The master plan may come to resemble a nostalgia for the armies of the military field commander.”

With the idea of transarmament not taken seriously, CBD simply constitutes a minor branch of military research and development.

Baltic security through civilian-based defense?

Theorists of CBD have understandably been focussing a great deal of attention on events in the newly independent Baltic states. Developments in the field of Baltic security policy may seem to challenge my above critique. Nevertheless, the present defense policies of the Baltic states strictly subordinate CBD to overall security arrangements; it will not replace military defense or be as significant as international agreements.

The role of nonviolent action

Nonviolent struggle played a prominent role in the Baltic political and cultural liberation process. Throughout Eastern Europe massive popular defiance to the old regime was the major catalyst of the "Revolution of 1989". The concurrent civilian struggle in the Baltic republics was of the same spirit as, and an integral part of, the primarily nonviolent European revolution. But the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were excluded at that time from the complete constitutional transformation carried out elsewhere. It was in 1991 that the long-term indirect and diffuse resistance and the related erosion and final collapse of Soviet power provided the prime conditions for Baltic liberation. Without nonviolent struggle the Balts would not have been prepared to take advantage of these conditions.

Decades of Soviet rule, including economic domination, socially destructive collectivization, mass deportation, forced military conscription, environmental devastation, Russification and in general the brutalization of civil society all but devastated the conditions for popular struggle and democracy. The resulting legacy of ethnic conflict is no doubt one of the most imposing obstacles to the future of nonviolence in Baltic societies. In spite of disadvantageous conditions, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a combined population of 8.8 million, were at the forefront of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the Soviet Union, taking these projects well beyond the boundaries envisioned by Gorbachev.

The preceding "era of stagnation" was visibly left behind by the Balts in 1987 with the breakdown of the credibility of the old leadership and the rapid collective mobilization which occurred through the multifarious demonstrations of the time. The breakdown of monolithic Party rule led in all three countries to the formation in the latter part of 1988 of umbrella popular front organizations accompanied by the emergence of numerous other groups, including incipient political parties, advocating independence and democratization. Early in 1990 the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic states underwent a democratic transformation through free elections.

Fundamental to the Baltic republics' struggle in the broad sense was the construction or re-creation of civil society and the reevaluation of history. More and more assertively the popular fronts of these countries rejected in unison the legitimacy of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939) and all other acts by which the Baltic states were annexed to the Soviet Union. The creation of elaborate programs for freeing the Baltic economies from dependence on and control by Moscow were followed by increasingly forthright declarations of the intention to achieve complete political independence.

The agitation of pro-Moscow International Fronts in all three republics, along with the fears otherwise expressed by minority groups concerning their human rights, gave rise to uncertainty concerning the justice and popular backing of the popular front-led independence movements. In January 1991, seeking to take

advantage of this uncertainty in the shadow of the Western coalition's preoccupation with the Kuwait crisis, Moscow and the Soviet military mobilized for a violent crackdown and coup d'état in the Baltic republics.

In spite of the bloody takeover of the television tower in Vilnius and the Interior Ministry in Riga, the crackdown failed in the face of massive nonviolent defiance by the local populations. Apparently Moscow made a decisive miscalculation concerning the degree of local support it could muster for effective coups. It should also be mentioned that months earlier, on 15 May of 1990, Estonians made a very impressive display of mass people power when the radical pro-Moscow Inter-Movement group attempted to take over the Estonian Parliament. They were ward off by tens of thousands of civilians who were summoned through a radio broadcast by the Estonian Prime Minister, Edgar Savisaar.

It is widely believed that the Soviet crackdown had a backlash effect, delivering many of the hitherto vacillating into the pro-independence camp. At any rate a nation-wide referendum/opinion poll held in Lithuania on 9 February revealed that 90% of those who voted were in favour of the establishment a democratic and independent Lithuania. On 3 March similar referendums were held in Latvia and Estonia, with 73.68% and 77.83% respectively of all those who voted voting in favour of a democratic and independent republic separate from the Soviet Union.

Proto-CBD

It was experiences such as these that gave rise to what might be seen as proto-CBD defense preparations. During the time of the January crisis noncooperation programs to be initiated in the event of a systematic Soviet crackdown and declaration of martial law were issued. In Estonia certain people from governmental and Popular Front circles devised a program entitled "Civilian Disobedience" (*Kodanikuallumatuses*). This program was made known to the public at large (see for example "*Kodanikuallumatuses*" 1991) just before the Soviet takeover of the telecommunications complex in Vilnius on 13 January. Following a brief introduction to the current situation, the Civilian Disobedience program offers the Estonian people ten points to follow in case their own political institutions and laws are suppressed.

In essence the people are advised to treat all commands contradicting Estonian law as illegitimate; to carry out strict disobedience to and noncooperation with all Soviet attempts to strengthen control; to refuse to supply vital information to Soviet authorities and when appropriate to remove street names, traffic signs, house numbers etc.; to not be provoked into imprudent action; to document through writing and film Soviet activities and use all possible channels to preserve and internationally distribute such documentation; to preserve the functioning of

Estonia's political and social organizations, e.g., by creating backup organizations and hiding essential equipment; to implement mass actions when appropriate; and to undertake creative communication with potentially hostile forces.

This program was not officially issued by the Estonian government. In Lithuania, however, a corresponding program was promulgated by the parliament or Supreme Council (see "Text..." 1991).

Civilian resistance and general security

A significant section of the population of the Baltic states has through direct experience become convinced of the importance of popular nonviolent struggle in certain circumstances. Moreover, perhaps to an unprecedented degree people in key decision-making positions in society have been thinking about models, and preparing programs, of nonviolent defense. Christopher Kruegler, an American CBD expert, commenting on the official Lithuanian stance on nonviolent defense, writes:

"Not since the Franco-Belgian occupation of Germany's Ruhr region in 1923 has a government taken this stance, but the current policy is vastly more sophisticated at the outset than was the Weimar Republic's" (Kruegler 1991, p. 1).

Nevertheless, the careful observer of Baltic politics can already see that defense in these states will certainly not be exclusively civilian-based. In fact the idea of the incompatibility of conventional military, guerilla and nonviolent civilian struggle is foreign to most people concerned with the subject. Defense leaders who have a manifest understanding of civilian struggle have been working on incorporating it into a larger security system.

In all three Baltic countries national military institutions are being re-created. Although the designers of these national armies are for the time being realistically modest in their goals, they are all looking to their neighbours in Scandinavia and Western Europe for military models. Lithuania, for instance, has made high level contacts in at least Great Britain, Germany and Norway regarding the acquirement of military know-how now and of military equipment later. The structure of the military in Finland has been a prominent model for Estonia, and Estonians are receiving military training in Finland. Moreover, all three countries have received associate status in the North Atlantic Assembly.

Such developments support the thesis that CBD, even when its capacity is highly regarded, will not be accepted by communities as a complete replacement for military defense. To reiterate a conclusion expressed earlier, the only way to

significantly reduce, or even eliminate, the role of the military, is to achieve nonviolence in the broad sense. In the case of the Baltic countries this means the furthering of international common security through, *for example*, close participation in the UN and the CSCE process, close cooperation with other international bodies such as the Nordic Council and the Council of Europe, the establishment of peaceful relations with Russia and the creative resolution of the legacy of ethnic strife.

2. Methods of research used

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Research as a tool towards peace education

by

ALBERTO L'ABATE

The author used different methods to research into the relationships between young people and peace in Italian Schools: 1. questionnaires, 2. analyses of content of school compositions, 3. experimentation with cooperative games, 4. analysis of historical cases, in order to study the relationship between attitudes toward peace, *informations* on this item, and *behaviour*.

The research pointed out a gap between a pacifist and nonviolent attitude and a lack of active involvement, and traced its cause to a condition of "alienation", the feeling of not being able to do anything toward the solution of these problems. But this attitude indicates the feeling that external influences prevent an active participation of young people rather than their acceptance of this situation. In fact they steadily look for a sort of peace education that may involve them directly. This confirms the hypothesis of an "objective" but not a "subjective" alienation.

The studies also demonstrated that activities of peace education in schools stimulated in young people an active search for informations which had an influence on their nonviolent attitude and on their active participation even out of schools.

The author concludes by giving some suggestions how to use these different methods of research for peace education.

1. Premise

My professional activity within the University (first in Ferrara and now in Florence) is that of professor of "Methodology of Social Research". To teach this material validly, it is necessary not only to study various methods of research but also to actually apply them to real behaviour in our society. For this reason, aside from teaching theory, for many years now I have organized various research seminars, among which one of the most important and which draws most interest is that of peace research.¹ The objective of this study was to see how social research can supply us with useful or indispensable components for valid peace education within public schools of every kind and at every level. The four methods are: 1. use

of questionnaires; 2. analysis of text contents in class; 3. experimentation with cooperative games in some classes; 4. analysis of historical cases. Let us examine in which spheres each of these four methods has been used and the principal results obtained. At that point we can try to draw a general conclusion about this type of activity.

2. Methods of research used

2.1. Use of questionnaire

It was the first method used. With a colleague in Pedagogics from the University of Ferrara, with several professors from the local committee for peace, and with students from the course we worked on several hypotheses that were linked to the relationship between a) *attitudes* towards peace; b) *information* regarding problems of peace and of war; c) *behaviour* regarding problems of peace and of war. Our first questionnaire was designed to test these hypotheses. After a preliminary test given to my students from the Teachers Training College the questionnaire was given to a) a representative sample of students in the last year of middle school in Ferrara; b) all of the 4th year high school students in the province of Lecco; c) all of the final year high school students in Casalecchio. The students involved in the study were, altogether, more than a thousand; since some of the questions from the questionnaire were also used in another study that took place in various parts of Italy, we could compare answers from 4,997 young people. We were struck by the fact that in spite of great (geographical) diversity and the fact that the research was done in different years (1988 and 1989) the results obtained were very similar. The hypothesis of our investigation dealt with the concept of alienation seen as "a sense of incapacity and impotence to change one's surroundings". This came to be considered the principal cause of the difference between declared pacifism and active pacifist involvement.


Our research confirmed a considerable difference between attitudes and behaviour in all of the geographical areas. In fact, the answers tend to show young people as pacifists (for example, about 85% partially or totally agreed with the phrase "In principle, violence should always be rejected"). Yet the activists were a minority, less than 30%. Our hypothesis was that this distinction was indeed tied to a sense of alienation in young people. This hypothesis was fully substantiated through questions made to the same group as to the basis of their differences. The inquiry also allowed us to distinguish between *objective alienation* and *subjective alienation*. The former is linked to objective conditions that seem to be tolerated rather than desired by young people, like the ever increasing importance given to individualism in today's society, or their social isolation (be it amongst themselves

or more often in regard to their families); and, finally, their sense of impotence to change the reality that surrounds them. But the research also showed a great demand on the part of young people for more information in participatory educative form (i.e. exhibitions, inquiries, debates, dramatizations) and their rejection of passive forms of education (classes, lectures by experts, etc.). This shows that the objective alienation in which they feel imprisoned does not correspond totally with subjective alienation.² Perhaps the outbreak of a new cycle of student protest several years after this study can be linked to this distinction. The failure of these protests and their incapacity to oppose the Gulf War and thwart a mostly private interest University reform threw them once again into a behaviour centered around objective alienation. This alienation probably explains (a hypothesis yet to verify) why a generation that several years ago declared itself pacifist, now have, according to recent surveys, a majority in favour of armed intervention. Path analysis, a form of data elaboration which was used for the results from Lecco, enabled us to make the interconnections between information, attitude and behaviour. The results, prepared with the collaboration of Laura Grassini from the Statistics Department of the University of Florence, are illustrated in *Table 1*. The analysis lets us see how women are from the start (by nature?)³ more nonviolent, while males become nonviolent through information and active inquiry, and how this nonviolent attitude is associated with greater involvement. An important factor emerged from this analysis: that offering peace education within the schools stimulates active study on the part of the students who attend them. This in turn leads to better, objective information, a nonviolent attitude, and, consequently, participation in activities for peace outside the school. Unfortunately, the schools that carried out peace education were very few and those that did often used passive methods that the students rejected. This can at least partially explain the "Gulf War effect" mentioned above, and the inconsistency of young people on this matter.

2.2. Content analysis of class essays

The theme "What Does the Word Peace Mean to You?" was given to students in the 5th year of elementary school, in two classes of the 3rd year of middle school, and in one class of the 3rd year of high school, all of these in the province of Ferrara. The essays were then subjected to content analysis by two groups that worked autonomously with different methodologies. The first group used a predominantly qualitative methodology to compile the major themes that are associated with the concept of peace (for example: with a pessimistic concept of peace as something beautiful — utopian — but unattainable). The second group used a predominantly quantitative methodology, calculating precisely what synonyms for peace were used (for example, peace as "love" or "tranquillity" or "utopia", etc.).

Table 1: Determinants for participation in initiatives for peace (outside the schools)*



- SESS = sex (0:female; 1:male)
 LDIR = index of social status
 LDIP = index of social status
 TSCU = type of school (1: Humanistic; 0: Non-humanistic)
 ASCU = activities for peace education in school
 INFO = level of objective information
 RICE = active search for peace information
 NVIO = index of nonviolent attitude
 PART = index of participation in peace initiatives outside school

* Path analysis of Lecco data (N = 677)

Comparing the results of the two types of analysis, it was evident that positive interpretations of the word “peace” prevailed. But another tendency made itself evident: that of living peace in an interior subjective way, rather than by political involvement. There is a clear split between these two aspects (internal peace and peace as a political commitment). It is so noticeable that the former may be considered less as mature behaviour (personal and political) than as an escape in the face of an involvement considered futile and/or difficult.⁴ In addition, the

comparative analysis of the essays of the 5th elementary, the 3rd year of middle school and the 3rd year of high school students shows that the youngest children are more open than the young adults — who become more pessimistic as they grow older — to searching for a pacifistic solution to conflict, and less inclined than the older ones to accept war and violence as a natural phenomenon. This is in keeping with the thesis advanced by several Marxist scholars and other peace researchers of the “reproductive” function of schools.⁵

2.3. Experiments with cooperative games

This work was carried out in several classes in which the teachers were students in my course. A research group was formed around them, which helped them in their observations and with the analysis of their results. The research was carried out in three different grades in several kindergarten and elementary schools in the province of Ferrara and in a nursery school in the town of Sesto Fiorentino. It evolved in four distinct phases.

The first was the initial testing. It generally included observation of the children's free-play time to identify the attitudes underlying their normal behaviour — whether they tended to be aggressive, assertive, or passive. It continued with the Animal Test, then with some drawings of war and of their favourite animals. The elementary school students were assigned an essay in class, “What Does War Mean to You?”. At the school in Sesto Fiorentino a sociometric test was also used.

In the second phase some cooperative games were introduced that had five intermediate objectives: 1. knowledge of one's own self and of others; 2. faith in oneself and in others; 3. the ability to communicate; 4. the ability to work together; 5. the ability to resolve conflicts.

In the first year a variation was introduced. The class that showed itself to be the most competitive was given cooperative games, while the class that proved to be the most cooperative was instead given competitive games. On other occasions, it was preferable to monitor classes in which no stimulus whatsoever had been introduced.

The third phase was that of final tests. These too were varied: observation of free-play; a second Animal Test (using a different technique from the first one); and drawings of peace and of their favourite animals. The elementary school students were assigned an essay “If I Want Peace...”. There was a questionnaire in which they chose their favourite games and explained why; a test in which phrases were completed; and, finally, a new sociometric test in Sesto Fiorentino.

The fourth phase was that of evaluations and conclusions. The principal results of this research can be thus summarized:

- Cooperative games, if carried out for a prolonged period (at least 2 or 3 months) have a positive influence on assertive behaviour while diminishing aggressive and passive behaviour.
- Competitive games, on the contrary, diminish assertive behaviour and augment aggressive and passive behaviour.
- Cooperative games tend to open groups that showed themselves initially closed, and to reinforce the neutral groups in connection with possible conflicts among the groups.
- On the other hand, competitive games tend to close the groups, polarizing conflicts, and reduce the number of those who have not taken sides.

2.4. Analysis of historical cases

The fourth method of research was used with students from the Teachers Training College in Florence. We analyzed⁶ the four following historical cases: 1. The nonviolent struggle in the *Philippines* that brought about the downfall of the Marcos regime; 2. the nonviolent struggle of the *Chinese students* that finished tragically with the massacre in Tienanmen Square; 3. the struggle between *Israel and Palestine* in the territories occupied by Israel. In particular we have analysed the Intifada Struggle (seen as a struggle with a low intensity of violence compared with the preceding terrorist strategy); 4. the post-war struggle in *Italy*, be it through violent (red brigades, "prima linea") or nonviolent confrontation (in particular the conscientious objectors against military spending). The basic hypothesis of the research was the following:

A nonviolent response in a situation that would tend to evoke a violent reaction might involve much more complex and variegated intervention (not only as regards the confrontation of their power relations but also on an informative and formative level). This could influence the adversary in a more stable way, facilitating internal development of dissent and therefore inducing a change in the initial balance.

The hypothesis claims that the *nonviolent response* may therefore tend to help to create some identification between at least a part of one of the contenders, the one who persists in using a form of armed violent action, and the other contender who has chosen nonviolence, thus breaking down the initial positions of friend/enemy and creating more open processes that allow for the anticipation of alternative possibilities for resolving the conflict.

We furthermore analyzed other sub-hypotheses regarding escalation and de-escalation of conflict, taken from sociologists and social psychologists that have studied in depth the process of conflict. By process analysis, a particular analytical methodology, we have been able to show that the four cases analyzed amply confirm the basic hypothesis mentioned above. In fact, the use of violence on the

part of the opposition to a regime legitimizes violent repressive reactions by the regime, making it easy for it to overcome internal splits. The use of nonviolence tends instead to expose as illegitimate the harsh repression by a regime and to gather consent and support not only from internal public opinion, but from international opinion as well, facilitating the disintegration of the components of the regime. The analysis must however take into account not only the internal institutional aspects of the regime, but also its capacity, or lack of it, to involve the support of the civil society as a whole.

3. General considerations

According to an information theorist (Von Foster), there are two types of questions: legitimate and illegitimate. Legitimate questions are those in which the person who formulates the question does not yet know the answer. Illegitimate questions are, conversely, questions formulated by those who already know the answers. At an international conference on peace education in Bologna,⁷ it became clear that legitimate questions stimulate creativity, innovation and the critical ability of students. Illegitimate questions stimulate passivity, mechanical fact-learning, and an inadequate critical sense. At the Bologna conference it was emphasized that valid peace education within the schools requires schools based on legitimate questions. In reality, Italian schools (although the conference showed that the problem exists in other countries as well) are based on illegitimate questions. Teachers don't enter areas where they don't feel competent, for fear that the students will perceive that they "don't know" and that their authority and prestige will diminish. Therefore, they limit themselves to teaching that which they have learned and to verifying that the students, in turn, have learned the same. All of the innovative pedagogical experience in our country (stimulated also by the teaching of Freire in Latin America and in other countries where it was diffused) has used "research as anti-pedagogy" (De Bartolomeis).⁸ The use of research in didactic activity stimulates a more balanced relationship between teacher and student and the acquisition on the part of the students of an innovative critical capacity, overcoming passivity and mechanical learning of facts. This is true of Lodi, of Bernardini at Petralata, and of Don Milani both at Calenzano and at Barbiana.

Moreover, research has showed that nursery and elementary school children have a great readiness to learn about peace⁹ and that this readiness diminishes with the passage to higher levels of study. It seems that children, as they grow, gradually learn to turn their critical capacity not towards the external world, but the internal one, towards themselves. They tend to adapt themselves (violent rebellion is often the other face of adaptation) to external society as it stands without ever trying to change it.

In addition, the research showed that by using correct educational tools in the schools (cooperative games, active inquiry and study, exhibitions, role playing, dramatizations etc.) at the request of the students themselves, one can noticeably influence (without risk of plagiarism) the *attitude* and *behaviour* of the students, while of course increasing the very low present level of information. It also became clear that cooperative games tend to open the groups and develop assertive attitudes (of respect for others, but also of self-respect) as compared to aggressive and passive attitudes. A fundamental point in peace education therefore seems to be the development of these kind of attitudes in young people, which are in turn linked to nonviolence and the ability to resolve conflicts in a nonviolent way. The utilization of the four research methods in fields other than those in which they were originally used deserves some final consideration.

The questionnaire, aptly modified, can be used with students of the elementary or lower middle schools, and can also be used outside the school to observe information, attitudes and behaviour of adults, or of the elderly, and possibly to develop educational activities for adults.

Like the others, the second educational tool, content analysis of school essays, can be used at various scholastic levels. This method can also be very useful to train teachers to use essays in class as a research tool. Few, if any, teachers are familiar with research methods in general and content analysis in particular. They normally use the essays written in class only as a means of evaluating the children's ability to write or to reason. From the latter point of view their judgment is predominantly subjective. Essays that mirror the ideas of the teacher are judged positively while the others are judged negatively. The use of essays in the research allowed us to make a very notable qualitative leap. In fact, the most interesting moment in our research was when our seminar went to present the results to all of the classes that had supplied us with essays, and to their teachers. A heated discussion arose after the presentation, in which the children who had presented original but unpopular ideas (like the necessity for civil disobedience) could explain the reasoning behind their ideas. These explanations even brought others to support their theses. Used in this way, the essay form became a tool of learning and of dynamic rather than static research.

The third model, experimentation with cooperative games, used in kindergarten and elementary schools, is the most difficult one to extend to high schools because of the number of teachers and the difficulty of getting them all to agree. But if this idea is adopted by university professors, inserted in their scholastic program and extended to various training techniques (brainstorming, taking sides, role playing, etc.)¹⁰ it can be utilized at the high school level and outside the school as well. This then allows for the development of comprehensive learning, based not only on cognitive aspects but on emotional and behavioural aspects as well.

Our last method, that of historical case analysis, can be utilized in elementary schools (particularly with middle and upper grade history students), or with adults

involved in political struggles, who use the method to critically analyze the methods used and the results obtained, and to plan future activities. On the whole, one can say that introducing research can notably contribute to the development of a better approach to activities of peace education inside and outside schools, being in itself a dynamic rather than static tool of peace education and active involvement. It permits the overcoming of that state of alienation we have seen to be one of the principal causes of the difference between attitude and behaviour. It can, in addition, allow monitoring of the kind of alternative experimentation that tends towards the development of assertiveness and the overcoming of aggression and passivity. In conclusion, research is not only useful but absolutely indispensable for valid peace education.

Notes and references

1. This activity has brought about several publications, in particular in A. L'Abate (ed.) (1989), *Ricerche per la pace: Educazione ed alternative alla difesa armata*. Bologna: Cappelli, and A. L'Abate, Images of Peace in Young Italian Students. Paper presented at the 16th meeting of the Association for a Humanistic Sociology, Washington D.C., 1–5 November 1989.
2. The distinction between objective and subjective alienation is discussed by M. Olson in Two Categories of Political Alienation. *Social Forces*, 1967, Vol. 47, 288–299.
3. The idea of nonviolence as part of women's nature is a large and important subject in female literature. In particular, see: E. Boulding (1976), *The Underside of History: A View of Women Through Time*. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, and B. Brock-Utne (1985), *Educating for Peace, A Feminist Perspective*. New York: Pergamon Press. A question is raised by the results of research done by O. Zur and A. Morrison (1989), Gender and War: Re-examining Attitudes. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, Vol. 59, No. 4, Oct. 528–533, which concludes that pacifism and non-violence in women vanish when they see their children threatened, and that prior research doesn't tend to take into account the female way of reasoning: less abstract and more tied to actual human relationships than that of men.
4. This has also been confirmed by the results of an important study on young people and peace by R. Mion (1986), *Per un futuro di pace*. Roma: LAS. From this research we have used several questions that have allowed us to broaden our study. In general, the two studies led to the same conclusions.
5. See L. Althusser (1972), Ideologia ed apparati ideologici di stato. In M. Barbagli (ed.), *Scuola, potere, ed ideologia*. Bologna: Il Mulino; T. Harris (1988), *Peace Education*. Jefferson, N. C.: McFarland & Co. Publ.; and D. Hicks (1988), *Education for Peace: Issues, Principles and Practice in the Classroom*. London: Routledge.
6. See A. L'Abate (1992), Violenza e non-violenza: una analisi dei Processi di Scalata e Descalata dei Conflitti. In his *Nonviolenza come strategia di mutamento sociale*. Padova: CEDAM.
7. G. Catti (ed.) (1988), *Studiare per pace*. Bologna: Thema, 2 vols.

8. F. De Bartolomeis (1970), *La ricerca come anti-pedagogia*. Milano: Feltrinelli.
9. The concept of *Readiness for Learning* was presented by E. Boulding in her study *Learning Peace*, in W.F. Hanreider (ed.) (1987), *Global Peace and Security, Trends and Challenges*. Boulder and London: Westview Press.
10. For more on these techniques, see, in particular, A. L'Abate (ed.) (1985), *Addestramento alla nonviolenza: Introduzione teorico-pratica ai metodi*. Torino: Satyagraha; M. Jelf (1986), *Tecniche di animazione sociale*. Torino: L.D.C.; and the series of books on peace education edited by D. Novara for "Gruppo Abele" editions, Torino.

Visions for education of environmental responsibility and peace

by

RIITTA WAHLSTRÖM

The article reflects the importance of a paradigm shift in education and science. The previous paradigms of reductionism, anthropocentrism, positivism and dualistic separation of people and nature has led to a mechanistic understanding of the world. Education for environmental responsibility and peace rests on the imperative of ecocentrism and holistic science.

The complexity of global problems creates the need to develop critical thinking and problem-solving skills. The environmentally responsible and peace-minded citizen can continuously critically reflect on her or his activities and their consequences for global survival and intergenerational equity. He or she has learned a systemic thinking model. In the holistic systemic thinking model there is a possibility to identify real problems involving reified power relationships rooted in institutionalized ideologies.

Education for environmental responsibility and peace involves different kinds of practical methods e.g. role-taking, drama, problem-solving, value clarifications, cooperative learning. Experiential learning, moral discussions and other methods of promoting reflective thinking are ingredients of peace and environmental education. Ideally environment and peace education would be an obligatory course and integrative element at the same time at all levels of education.

1. Global crisis and education as a social action

Human activity has caused the current global crisis which is a combination of military, ecological, economical and human rights problems. Particularly in the First world countries, the Newtonian separation of people and nature led to the growth of positivist, mechanistic science: the belief that nature has to be mastered and is free to be exploited. Despite technological advances, however, humanity is confronted with global environmental problems. The arms industry and war are among the greatest pollutants of the earth. Mining for uranium and producing plutonium are major sources of the deadliest toxic pollutants humanity has learned

to dump into our environment (Heinrichs and Macintosh 1990). Peace and environment are thus intertwined.

Today there is an increasingly ambiguous attitude towards the mastery of nature doctrine. It is this anthropocentric ethic, unfortunately, that has been dominant over the ages, and that has necessarily led to the current predicament (Bowen 1992).

Existing social structures and beliefs are socially constructed. This means that they are also changeable through social action (Habermas 1984). One area of social action is education. It is leading to a change of the social structures and beliefs, values and even traditions. Nowadays we are bound to create a new concept: environmental and peace education for promoting our global responsibility. Environmental and peace education rests on the imperative of ecocentrism and holistic science and the aims of respect for human rights, justice and nature. It critically evaluates the previous paradigms of reductionism and anthropocentrism.

Environmental and peace education must embrace the environment in its totality, material and human-made, ecological, political, economic, technological, social, legislative, cultural and aesthetic.

2. Environmental responsibility

An environmentally responsible human being understands that she or he is only one of the organisms in the complex and vulnerable ecosystem. Environmentally responsible and nonviolent behaviour means that a person has:

- a) an awareness of, and sensitivity to the total environment and its related problems and/or issues,
- b) a basic understanding of the environment and its related problems and/or issues,
- c) feelings of concern for the environment and motivation for actively participating in environmental improvement and protection and opposing violence,
- d) skills for identifying and solving global problems and/or issues, and
- e) active involvement at all levels in working towards resolution of global problems and/or issues (Hungerford and Volk 1990, p. 8).

Responsibility is connected to values and attitudes. Values and attitudes are combined with knowledge, beliefs, myths, concepts and social consensus. Values and attitudes are not only cognitive but also emotional and they are learned in a social process. As Habermas (1990, p. 112) says:

"Feelings form the basis of our perception that something is moral. Anyone who is blind to moral phenomena has blind feelings. She or he lacks the sensor, as we would say, for suffering of a vulnerable creature which has a right to the protection of both its physical self and its identity. And this sensitivity is clearly closely related to sympathy and empathy."

Skolimowski (1984) has outlined new imperatives and moral principles concerning the relationship between nature and human beings:

- behave so that you care for evolution and its richness,
- behave so that you care for and empower life,
- behave so that you care for and empower those skills which are the highest found in the cosmos: consciousness, creativity and empathy.

Skolimowski has an anthroposophic perspective, but in a manner which is useful in defining environmental responsibility.

The following components are important in objects of environmental responsibility:

- a) awareness of environmental issues,
- b) sensitivity to nature,
- c) understanding environmental issues,
- d) commitment,
- f) problem-solving skills and
- g) motivation and an ability to act.

a) Awareness of environmental issues

Environmental issues are so many that it is impossible to grasp them all. Emmelin (1986, pp. 58–59) introduces three dimensions of the content of environmental issues in higher education. The three main dimensions to which any problem needs to be related can be defined as follows:

1. Ecological, i.e. defining and describing the relationship between the human being and nature; defining, describing and analyzing the natural systems under study, their components and processes,
2. Socio-economic, including the level of development, the technological set-up, the use of natural resources in the economy, the legal, administrative framework within which measures are to be taken,

3. Value systems or the sociocultural dimension of a society, i.e. the values and attitudes which govern or rationalize the mode of use of natural resources and the relationship between human beings and nature.

Interdependence of all living things is a principle and a part of understanding the holistic system in the whole biosphere. Environmental awareness means that students learn to analyze problems, find causes and their effects, and make clear what are the conditions under which certain processes take place and what effect these have on society and nature.

The environmentally responsible citizen understands that future generations should have equal rights of having a "healthy" environment and enough natural resources to survive. We have to understand that we have borrowed nature from our children.

If the awareness and knowledge of environmental issues does not lead to an environmental ethic, it is not worthwhile to offer that knowledge. The teacher's sensitivity for taking care of the ethical component is important. Promoting an environmental ethic means developing a code of ethics as a part of an education which promotes attitudes and behaviour for individuals and societies consonant with humanity's place within the biosphere (Emmelin 1986).

b) Sensitivity to nature

According to Hungerford and Volk (1990) it is important to evoke *sensitivity to nature*. Sensitivity to nature means that human beings understand and experience emotionally that they are dependent on nature and are a part of nature. The main purpose is for students to get a personal, emotional affection for nature. Real research projects, such as assessing the changes of pollution of water, give experience and knowledge about the results of human impacts on nature. Responsible attitudes and values grow up from real experience and understanding; investigating pollution and changes of nature are good practices. In recent years there has been a movement within the field of environmental education towards a stronger emphasis on developing the pupils' emotional, intuitive, and aesthetic appreciation for the environment. Environmental education uses a lot of practices developed for outdoor education. Those practices include real, emotionally influenced experiences in nature (Caduto 1983a, b). Van Matre's (1991) ideas in his book "Sunship Earth" are among the best examples of that orientation. Important knowledge of nature can be acquired little by little as associated with real experiences within nature.

A personal commitment is the second important base in environmental education. A personal commitment to care for nature and to take nature into account means that the real choices in life are based on this personal commitment. It means personal investment or ownership.

c) Commitment and empowerment

Commitment means that one is prepared to do something to promote values in reality. Many research findings tell us that people who have positive attitudes concerning environmental care do not necessarily behave accordingly (e.g. Hines et al. 1986/87, Uusitalo 1986). Gigliotti (1991) says that there are ecologically concerned citizens infused with ecological myths, lacking the knowledge and conviction of their own role in environmental problems. Even though their attitudes are for environmental care, the feeling of being powerless is hindering people to act and take real responsibility.

The important step in education for peace and environmental responsibility is to promote commitment. That means that environmental issues are experienced very personally. If we try to affect somebody's attitudes, values and commitment through education we have to be conscious of the importance of emotions, feelings and socially constructed images and interpretations. Even the social process we are learning affects us. As Kohlberg (1976) has mentioned, the learning process itself mediates values. Equality and justice are difficult to learn in authoritarian learning climate.

According to Hungerford and Volk (1990, p. 12) it appears that before individuals can engage in responsible behaviour they must understand the nature of the issues and their ecological and human implications.

By empowerment we promote commitment. Empowerment means that a person has knowledge and skills in using environmental action strategies and an intention to act. Hungerford and Volk (1990, p. 10) analyze the role of knowledge. Before an individual can intentionally act on a particular environmental problem, that individual must be cognizant of the existence of the issue. Thus, knowledge of the issue appears to be a prerequisite to action.

The individual must also possess knowledge of those courses of action which are available and which will be most effective in a given situation. Another critical component is the skill in appropriately applying this knowledge of action strategies to a given issue (see Novak 1992).

In addition, the individual must possess a desire to act. One's desire to act appears to be affected by a host of personality factors, for example locus of control, attitudes (towards the environment and towards taking action), and personal responsibility (towards the environment). Situation factors, such as economic constraints, social pressures and opportunities to choose different actions may either counteract or strengthen the variables in the model.

It is possible to create a many-sided reward system concerning responsible and nonviolent behaviour. There could for instance be special themes, weeks, and competitions in environmentally responsible behaviour or in resisting violence in society. In the light of the follow-up study, it seems obvious that there is a need

for reinforcing positive environmental behaviour over time. By rewarding students you reduce their feelings of insignificance (Hungerford and Volk 1990).

Dialogue and a decision-making approach can form the foundations of active and environmentally responsible citizenship. Clarification of personal values and opinions in an open dialogue helps students to channel their emotions in a constructive way.

It is important to let students take local initiatives. They can together find one local environmental problem and plan various strategies to solve that problem. Supporting practical local activity is an example of "theory into practice" learning. To find solutions to a local environmental problem students have to know a lot of theoretical things facts, etc. How to solve it is another task of learning.

d) Understanding environmental issues and problem-solving

Environmental issues are so complex that an ability to understand them demands an ability of critical thinking or critical reflection or critical system-thinking. Different authors (e.g. Dewey 1938, Garrison 1991, Jarvis 1987 and Mezirov 1981) use different concepts for the same kind of cognitive process. All those concepts include reflection as part of the thinking process. Reflectivity is the core of the ability of understanding complex phenomena. We cannot change the social structures of our beliefs, values and actions, if we are not able to reflect on those. Jarvis (1987) defines reflection as an essential phase in the learning process whereby people explore their experiences in a conscious manner in order to arrive at new understandings and new behaviours.

Reflection on the future is one important ingredient of environmental education. It is important to include into the education process the image of a better future. In critical reflection on the future there must be three aspects of imaging. The future has to be imagined as predictable, and it has to have a desirable image in it. Third, there has to be a feeling that we can affect the future. The aim is to plan the desired future, where the people-environment relationship is different and where the technical-rational future image is deeply evaluated (Matthies 1992). It means that students understand that we have to consciously oppose the existing exploitative values and mechanisms in our present culture, e.g. consumerism and militarism and violence.

The following are important contents to be discussed in creating the image of a better future: conflict, war, environment, justice, gender and equity. In that process there is imagined "the open future" where students can express their own utopian plans for the future. To become conscious of one's own belief systems is a way to change oneself. To create a better future we need to develop the capacity to reconcile not only the political differences in the world, but also many of the

other elements now in a conflictual, destructive relationship to each other and to the environment.

Mezirov's (1981) concept of perspective transformation seems to be valuable in environmental and peace education. He describes perspective transformation as "the emancipatory process" of becoming critically aware of how and why the structure of psycho-cultural assumptions has come to constrain the way we see ourselves and our relationships, reconstituting this structure to permit a more inclusive and discriminating integration of experience and acting upon these new understandings (p. 6).

Schön (1987, p. 4) writes that in the real world problems do not present themselves to practitioners as well-defined structures; rather, they are messy, indeterminate and ambiguous situations which have to be made sense of in the first place. His view is suitable for thinking about global problems. They are many-sided and complex and sometimes it is even important to make visible some hidden phenomena. It means that we have to see problems which are not seen as a problem, e.g. some of our traditions, values and life habits. Once the problem is recognized it is easier to think of possible ways of solving it.

The reflective ability develops in the following educational climate and practice: there has to be an open, emotionally free psychological climate in the classroom or lecture hall. There are various techniques to promote reflective ability, e.g. using pair or group discussions, art, sociodrama, value clarifications, experiential learning and cooperative learning methods.

Experience needs to be processed consciously by reflecting on it. Learning is seen as a cyclical process integrating immediate experience, reflection, abstract conceptualization and action. It can be even argued, in fact, that theoretical concepts will not become part of the individual's frame of reference until they have been experienced meaningfully on a subjective emotional level. Reflection plays an important role in this process by providing a bridge, as it were, between experience and theoretical conceptualization. The process of learning is seen as the recycling of experience at deeper levels of understanding and interpretation.

Järvinen et al. (1992) write that in the decision-making approach the teacher requests students to ask questions only to further their own understanding of the speakers' premises. A teacher can ask students to tell to each other in cooperative learning groups about an experience where they faced an environmental problem. After the discussion they are asked to reflect on whether they have done something about the problem and what was the result. After reflecting on their experience of what they did about the problem, they continue reflecting on what was possible to do and what they wanted to do.

3. Conclusions and future perspectives

Different kinds of practical solutions of structuring environmental and peace education in schools and universities have been discussed. The main questions have been: Should there be a special environmental and peace education course? If so, should it be optional or obligatory? Ideally, it would be obligatory for all students at all levels of education. If not, it should be obligatory for all students who can be expected to come directly in contact with e.g. environmental concerns, and optional for all others.

Among the models suggested by curriculum professionals for environmental (and peace) education, four common components can be identified (Keiny and Shachak 1987, p. 450):

- a) interdisciplinary approach,
- b) integrative learning processes,
- c) problem-solving approach and
- d) use of the environment as a learning resource.

The interdisciplinary environmental questions focussing on the human being-environment relationship create a problem-solving approach in the learning process.

Education for environmental responsibility aims at promoting a belief that one can affect society and a responsibility to act and work for global survival.

An interdisciplinary team of teachers is one idea in offering environmental courses or programmes for students.

Promotion of environmental responsibility even seems to mean changing the traditions in education and a deep understanding of cultural impacts (Wahlström 1991 and 1992a, b). One of the most difficult tasks is to reflect on your own culture. It means a perspective transformation where adults come to recognize their culturally induced roles and relationships and the reasons for them and take action to overcome them.

Transformation involves helping students to identify real problems involving reified power relationships rooted in institutionalized ideologies (Mezirov 1981). It is a deep understanding of a human being taking a responsibility as an emotional, cognitive and active agent of this vulnerable world.

The formation of the new ecocentric ethic as a basic paradigm for education and science is a challenge to whole education system. The teacher can be deeply conscious of sexist, racist and polluting attitudes and how to reorganize one's relationship to these. The world needs a new way of understanding and education, because global destruction has gone too far.

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
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