

György Spira

The Nationality Issue in the Hungary of 1848-49

Illustrirte politische
Karte von Österreich.
und den angränzenden Ländern.
(comp. v. C. Lapradelli.
[Eigenthum.]

Akadémiai Kiadó - Budapest



*The author outside the
former quarters
of the Rumanian
National Committee
in Nagyszeben*

György Spira (b. 1925) has worked at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' Institute of History since 1949. His main area of interest is the transformation of feudal Hungary into a bourgeois state. As a researcher into this field, he has contributed to many synthetic works, including the popular biography *Kossuth Lajos* (Budapest: 1952); volume III of the university textbook series *Magyarország története* [A History of Hungary] (Budapest: ¹1957, ²1961, ³1975); volume IV of *Budapest története* [A History of Budapest] (Budapest: 1978); volume VI of *Magyarország története tíz kötetben* [A History of Hungary in Ten Volumes] (Budapest: ¹1979, ²1987); and *One Thousand Years. A Concise History of Hungary* (Budapest: ¹1988, ²1991).

The author has also written a number of specialist works. These include *A magyar forradalom 1848–49-ben* [The Hungarian Revolution in 1848 and 1849] (Budapest: 1959), a synthetic treatment of the topic, and a monograph dealing with the activity of István Széchenyi in 1848. The latter came out in Budapest in 1964, and was afterwards published in English, as *A Hungarian Count in the Revolution of 1848* (Budapest: 1974). He has compiled (with György Rózsa) the book of documents and pictures *Negyvennyolc a kortársak szemével* [The Hungarian Revolution of 1848–49 through the Eyes of Contemporaries] (Budapest: 1973). He has also published the short monograph *Petőfi napja* [Petőfi's Day] (Budapest: ¹1975, ²1978, ³1984), as well as the Hungarian version of the present work (Budapest: 1980). His latest work, a study supplemented with texts of original documents, is *Kossuth és alkotmányterve* [Kossuth and his Plan for a Constitution] (Debrecen: 1989). So far, three volumes of Dr Spira's shorter writings have appeared: *A negyvennyolcas nemzedék nyomában* [On the Trail of the 1848 Generation] (Budapest: 1973); *Négy magyar sors* [Four Hungarians Lives] (Budapest: 1983), in Russian, *Четыре судьбы* (Moscow: 1986); *Jöttányit se a negyvennyolcból!* [No Retreat from the 1848 Demands!] (Budapest: 1989).

GYÖRGY SPIRA

*The Nationality Issue
in the Hungary of
1848-49*

A great number of scholars have addressed the evolution of former Hungary's nationality question in the year 1848-49 not only in Hungary itself but also in the neighbouring countries. However, the majority have been motivated not by the desire to give a truer picture of this exceptionally complicated subject, but to gloss over, or at least explain, the mistakes committed by one or other of the alienated parties. This is as unfortunate as it is understandable, since neither the participants in the developments of 1848-49 nor subsequent generations could solve the nationality question, and of the problems which surfaced in 1848, several even today have not been dealt with successfully—in spite of changes to state borders implemented in the meantime.

Because a settlement of the nationality question is still awaited and will certainly require clearheadedness of a high order, there is a burning need that we evolve for ourselves a more accurate picture than hitherto of the antecedents and the events of 1848-49. In this György Spira's book can render assistance. The work attempts to show, without distortion, how and why the greater part of Hungary's non-Magyar population turned against the Hungarian Revolution and became a tool of the counter-revolution, despite the fact that its primary interest was the same as that of the Hungarians—i. e. that the Hungarian Revolution should triumph and that Hungary should become a bourgeois state.


The author provides much food for thought not only in connection with the causes of a crisis which tragically pitched two sides against each other, which created enmity between different nationalities, and which compelled the Hungarians to fight those who should have been their natural comrades-in-arms. But he also writes interestingly about another side of the story: the attempts to overcome differences by those few individuals who came to understand in the course of 1848-49 that the disunity of the small peoples of the region could benefit only their common oppressors, and why these efforts ended in failure.



AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ, BUDAPEST

GYÖRGY SPIRA

*The Nationality Issue
in the Hungary of
1848–49*



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MAGYAR
TUDOMÁNYOS AKADÉMIA
KÖNYVTÁRA


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THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO THE
IMMORTAL MEMORY OF

LAJOS JORDÁKY

WHO, WITH UNSWERVING PURPOSE,
NEVER ABANDONED HIS STRUGGLE
IN TRANSYLVANIA

AGAINST NATIONALITY OPPRESSION
AND FOR SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE SMALL PEOPLES
LIVING THERE

...The past must be confessed.

Attila József

This book is the English language edition of a monograph I wrote in 1975, and which was first published in Hungarian in 1980 under the title *A nemzetiségi kérdés a negyvennyolcas forradalom Magyarországon* (The Nationality Issue in the Hungary of the 1848 Revolution).

In preparing the English edition, I have been compelled to make a number of changes to the original work.

1. I have supplemented the main body of the text in a number of places, in an attempt to provide foreign readers, less familiar with Hungarian history, with more information on the background to the events which led up to the Revolution and to explain some of the characteristic conditions obtaining in Hungary at the time.

2. I have also made a number of additions to the Notes, including details of some more recent publications, as well as details of older ones which became accessible to me only when the Hungarian edition had already been printed. To offset this, I have slightly shortened those passages which take issue with earlier works in the specialist literature.

3. I have omitted the Document Appendix which appeared in the Hungarian edition. The sole purpose of this had been to present Hungarian readers, in their mother tongue, with basic documents expressing nationality aspirations—documents which previously were largely inaccessible in Hungarian.

4. On the other hand, I have enlarged, and to some extent revised, the illustrative material accompanying the text.

I must, however, emphasize that these alterations have in no way affected the substance of the work. I saw no need to make any substantive changes—despite the fact that the Hungarian edition evoked an extremely mixed reception. As well as prompting enthusiastic reviews, it also gave rise to objections charged with emotion—and even to savage attacks. The fact that my book should cause such controversy—I must admit—really surprised me. For the Hungarian Revolution of 1848—as I say in my book—failed to resolve the nationalities issue for posterity, and even today the relationship between the Hungarians and some of their neighbours cannot be described as good. It is, therefore, perfectly understandable that there are still many Hungarians and members of other ethnic groups which used to inhabit the Habsburg Empire who are incapable of an unbiased assessment of the causes and consequences of the conflict which developed between their ancestors at that time. Such people—historians among them—will go to great lengths to cover up the errors of their forebears, thereby magnifying those of their forebears' opponents and enemies.

I am, however, firmly convinced that no historian worth the name can yield to pressure which calls for a one-sided portrayal of the past—no matter where this pressure comes from and how strong it is. The historian cannot yield to such pressure because the undistorted presentation of historical reality is a fundamental requirement of scholarship. Moreover, the duties of the historian towards his own age by no means conflict with his obligations to scholarship. On the contrary, they perfectly harmonize with them as it is only by giving an undistorted account of historical reality that the historian can truly serve his or her contemporaries. To face, in a sober way, the problems of the past—painful though this may be—is essential if the problems of the present are to be overcome. It is in this belief that I commend my book to the reader. The story will not make for pleasant reading. However, the work's intentions are honourable. It is intended for those who are interested in the somewhat turbulent history of the small nations of East-Central Europe—and in the future of these peoples.

Budapest, August 13, 1984

György Spira

Contents

THE PROBLEMS EMERGE 11

THE CONFLICTS GROW 61

ON THE ROAD TO ARMED STRUGGLE 109

THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION 151

THE END OF THE STRUGGLE 193

NOTES 205

ABBREVIATIONS 239

THE SCENES 241

THE PERSONS 245

LIST OF PLATES 249

The Problems Emerge

The outbreak of the revolution in Paris in February 1848 triggered a whole wave of similar upheavals across Europe. On March 13 revolution broke out in Vienna and the following day news of this reached Pest. Exploiting the favourable situation, the "March Youth"—young radical Hungarian intellectuals—joined forces with the liberal politicians of the nobility then attending the Diet of the Hungarian Estates in Pozsony. Their common goal was to steer feudal Hungary onto the road of capitalist development and to put an end to her subjugation within the Habsburg Empire. This set in motion a process of revolutionary transformation which inevitably caused justified alarm among some of the privileged in Hungary. This was especially true of the Habsburg dynasty which regarded the empire's feudal framework and absolutistic political order as bulwarks of its own power. However, for the vast majority of Hungary's people—the country's non-Magyar inhabitants included—the revolution meant a ray of hope, and not only in general terms. On March 15 a petition drawn up by the March Youth and entitled "What does the Hungarian Nation Demand?" was proclaimed as the programme of the Hungarian Revolution. Closer scrutiny of its more important sub-points, which were subsequently also enacted by the Diet, shows that the non-Magyars also stood to benefit.

The abolition of all feudal dues and services attaching to serf holdings and the renunciation by the Church of the tithe, for example, eased the oppressive burdens of all subjugated peasants, regardless of their nationality. After this, peasants of all nationalities had the opportunity to become freehold owners of their land. Similarly, the abolition of the

manorial courts deprived the landlords of both Magyar and non-Magyar peasants of their traditional right to administer justice. The creation of a National Guard meant that more people of all nationalities were now entitled to bear arms. The Catholic Church lost its privileged position. Religious equality was not, however, confined to Hungarian Protestants; their Slovak and Orthodox Rumanian brethren also benefited. The abolition of censorship enabled Magyars and non-Magyars alike to propagate their views through the medium of the printed word, although a restriction was placed on the freedom of non-Magyars to express their views in that the press law drafted in Pozsony threatened to impose serious punishment on anyone "agitating to actively undermine the perfect political unity of the territory set under the Holy Hungarian Crown..." (In actual fact, this restriction was never enforced as none of the national minority politicians in Hungary even considered adopting the idea of secession at this time.) One of the Twelve Points demanded union with Transylvania, a land of the Hungarian Crown treated by Austria as an entirely separate Crown Province. Accordingly, the Diet in Pozsony stated that the reunion of Transylvania with the Fatherland should be implemented—provided that the Transylvanian Diet, to be convoked as soon as possible, also agreed.

This, too, would have had a beneficial effect on all the people affected, regardless of nationality. This decision—and only this decision—made it possible for the advocates of bourgeois development in Hungary and Transylvania to join forces in an attempt to liberate both Hungary and Transylvania from their state of subjugation. Transylvania was even more backward than Hungary proper and therefore had an even smaller chance of freeing itself on its own.

The fact that the non-Magyar population of Hungary shared equally in the benefits of such changes also meant that, in the final analysis, a far greater number of non-Magyars than Magyars stood to gain from the Hungarian Revolution. Yet in March 1848 the non-Magyars had less cause for exhilaration. As for ethnic conditions in the lands of the Hungarian Crown it must be said here that a picture that had never been homogeneous was complicated still further by developments in the eighteenth century. The Ottoman occupation had inflicted enormous damage on Hungary, and the brunt of this was borne by the central plains, the strongholds of the Magyars. Large numbers of immigrants (primarily Serbs and Germans) had moved to Hungary to settle the vast depopulated areas. As a result, the foreign element was greatly

reinforced, with the Magyar element eventually being reduced to a minority. Since this state of affairs was to obtain for a long period, at the time of the 1848 Revolution the distribution of Hungary's (and Transylvania's) population according to nationality was as follows (the statistics date from 1846 and exclude persons completing military service):

	In Hungary		In Transylvania		Together	
	Total	Per 1,000	Total	Per 1,000	Total	Per 1,000
Magyars	4,774,801	389	606,026	284	5,380,827	373
Rumanians	1,270,824	103	1,206,787	564	2,477,611	172
Slovaks	1,842,320	150	—	—	1,842,320	128
Germans	1,237,737	101	250,000	117	1,487,737	103
Croats	1,236,308	100	—	—	1,236,308	86
Serbs	1,055,416	86	—	—	1,055,416	73
Ruthenians	478,310	39	—	—	478,310	33
Jews	270,166	22	5,991	3	276,157	19
Others (Gypsies, Slovenes, Bulgars, Armenians, etc.)	125,222	10	69,200	32	194,422	13
Total	12,291,104	1000	2,138,004	1000	14,429,108	1000

In short, the number of non-Magyars living in the lands of the Hungarian Crown at the time of the revolution was one-and-a-half times that of the Magyar population. This is the case even if the Jews (classified by contemporary records as a separate nationality and who mostly regarded themselves as Magyars) are grouped among the latter.

As we have seen, the changes brought about by the Hungarian Revolution benefited all the ethnic groups in Hungary. Yet it is also a fact that the non-Magyar beneficiaries of the Revolution were by no means imbued with the kind of enthusiasm that inspired the Magyars. For prior to 1848, they had to contend not only with the difficulties that also afflicted the Magyars and which they were now rid of, but also had to struggle against those which stemmed from their nationality status. Only some form of special legal protection, such as the granting of separate nationality rights by the revolution, could have provided a solution. However, this was not to be. Having embarked upon the path

of revolution in March, the liberal politicians of the Hungarian nobility gradually assumed control of its leadership. It did not even occur to them to grant separate rights to the non-Magyar population—and they had good reason for not doing so. This was afforded by the concept, unanimously adopted by Hungarian liberals, of the so-called state-nation. According to this, the subjects of the Hungarian Crown were all members of an indivisible Hungarian nation, regardless of their birth and mother tongue. (Croatia was the sole exception; although it had been under Hungarian domination since the Middle Ages, constitutionally Croatia was treated only as an associate country.) The Hungarian liberals' stance was rooted in their firm conviction that the Hungarian nobility should become the sole possessor of political power in Hungary.

Obviously, if the leaders of the revolution took the view that the concept of the Hungarian nation included both the Magyar and the non-Magyar population, then it could not even have occurred to them to grant separate ethnic rights to the non-Magyar nationalities. The granting of separate nationality rights would have meant putting an end to the hegemony of Hungarian as the country's sole official language. Introduced before 1848, this had placed people who did not speak Hungarian at a great disadvantage. Since, however, the Hungarian liberals considered the hegemony of Magyar as a guarantee of the political hegemony of the Hungarian nobility, the idea of extending language usage rights was quite unthinkable for them. On the contrary. In this respect the Hungarian nobility strove, even after the outbreak of the revolution, to take steps to further consolidate its linguistic hegemony. To this end it was even prepared to shelve the principle of equality—a principle it otherwise sincerely espoused and made a point of asserting in its legislative activity in Pozsony. For instance, as well as enacting legislation to the effect that thenceforth power in Hungary was to be exercised by a Parliament based on popular representation instead of the Diet of the Estates, the Pozsony Diet also passed legislation stating that only those who spoke Hungarian could become members. Also, in the future, control over the counties, the middle level state administrative organs, was to be the responsibility of committees comprising both nobles and non-nobles. However, the language of discussion, just as at the former county assemblies, was—with the exception of Croatia—to be "Hungarian only".

Although these stipulations admittedly violated the principle of equality, in practice they caused little difficulty because at the time the

vast majority of the leading national minority politicians did speak Hungarian. This said, it must be pointed out that the laws contained other restrictions. Strangely enough, some of these were not specifically aimed at the non-Magyar population, but at anyone in Hungary who was potentially capable of mounting a threat to the political predominance of the Hungarian nobility. The non-Magyar population was, nevertheless, hit harder by the new measures. Special mention must be given to those articles in the electoral law which based the franchise for non-nobles on the meeting of specific property qualifications. Peasants, for instance, were required to possess at least a quarter of a peasant holding (i.e., 3-4 hectares of arable land and pasture). The privileged were, however, allowed, regardless of financial circumstances, to retain their right to vote, a right they had previously monopolized. It is a fact that, in spite of the discrimination, the electorate almost quadrupled after the enactment of the electoral law. By means of this discrimination, the nobility was now in the position to have a far greater say in the choice of members of parliament than that warranted by their actual proportion within the total population. In addition, it is also true that the nobility in Hungary was a rather heterogeneous stratum as regards nationality, although the overwhelming majority of the nobles of non-Magyar origin (with the exception of most of the Croat nobles) had gradually become magyarized. Let us suppose that the distribution according to nationality of the new group of Hungarians now given the vote followed the national pattern. Even then, the unqualified maintenance of the right of the nobility to vote obviously made the non-Magyars a minority within the total electorate.

On the other hand, it must also be remembered that as a result of legislation enacted by the Pozsony Diet legislative power in Hungary was no conferred on a parliament dominated—despite the principle of popular representation—by the politicians of the Hungarian nobility. From this, as well as from the introduction of the principle of governmental responsibility, it followed that only a cabinet made up of politicians from the Hungarian nobility could assume power in the country. This in itself did not yet constitute a violation of the interests of the majority of Hungary's non-Magyar population. Indeed, Hungary's first parliamentary government was to be formed by Count Lajos Batthyány, chairman of the Hungarian nobility's liberal Opposition Party (cabinet ministers included Count István Széchenyi, Ferenc Deák, Gábor Klauzál, Lajos Kossuth, Baron József Eötvös and Bertalan Szemere). This development actually coincided with the interests

of the millions of non-Magyars who were still excluded from government as regards their chances of embourgeoisement. (Incidentally, it also expressly coincided with the interests of the Magyar masses, likewise still excluded from power, regarding their own chances of this.)

This was so partly because all the aforementioned politicians were professed advocates and experienced exponents of the cause of the bourgeois transformation of Hungarian society. Another, perhaps even more important, reason is that all members of the Cabinet represented the liberal majority in the Hungarian nobility. The validity of this statement is not undermined even by the fact that some people in Hungary—especially amongst the “March Youth”, but also a number of leftists in the nationalities movements—wished to expand the framework of embourgeoisement envisaged for Hungary by the Hungarian liberals. Neither is it debatable that the Hungarian liberals themselves acknowledged that to create the fundamental conditions for a bourgeois order was both necessary and desirable, despite the fact that they considered that only certain bourgeois reforms were compatible with the nobility’s interests. Throwing off the Viennese yoke was only one such condition. Others included even the emancipation of the serfs. (The Hungarian liberals were aware that this was the one measure on which embourgeoisement hinged. Moreover, this was a precondition for winning over the peasantry, the backing of which would be crucial for the nobility in its struggle to break away from Vienna.) Just as importantly, the Hungarian liberals were ready to use every means at their disposal for whatever they regarded as necessary. In point of fact, none of the abovementioned more radical groups could match the nobility’s strength and possibilities: these groups were backed by hundreds rather than by tens of thousands of people. Also, the liberals had the additional advantage of possessing firmly established positions of power—especially in the largely autonomous county authorities—even before the outbreak of the revolution. In short, even though the policy adopted by the Hungarian liberal nobility could not entirely satisfy the Hungarian radicals or the activists in the nationality movements, the Hungarian liberals were nevertheless in the best position to establish the preconditions for bourgeois transformation. It was under their leadership that the embourgeoisement itself had the best chance in Hungary. What is more, it was vitally important that embourgeoisement should occur in Hungary—and not only because this would benefit the majority of the Magyars, but also because this was crucially important to the overwhelming majority of non-Magyars living in

Hungary. That feudal backwardness and Hungary's subjugated position within the empire affected both the Hungarians and the national minorities more than anything else was not the sole reason for this. Until, for instance, the difficulties rooted in stagnating feudal conditions were overcome, which could possibly take many years, neither the Magyars nor the nationalities could produce a powerful middle-class leadership from among their own ranks. Yet genuine national equality hinged precisely on the existence of such a leadership—even if the Hungarian liberals had perhaps been willing to proclaim the constitutional equality of the minorities. On the other hand, gradual establishment of the bourgeois order would perhaps provide ample scope for the minorities to strengthen their own internal cohesion and thereby increase their chances of a successful struggle for genuine national independence.

Naturally, the followers of the national minority movements could not have been aware of such interconnections in the spring of 1848. Even so, many immediately sensed that the victory of the popular revolution in Pest on March 15 and, subsequently, the hectic legislative activity of the Pozsony Diet offered hope for historic and beneficial changes. This is borne out by the response in the early days of the revolution to reports of the developments in Pest and Pozsony in the non-Magyar regions of Hungary.

In the Serbian centres of Southern Hungary, for instance, there were a series of demonstrations in the second half of March expressing sympathy with the Hungarian Revolution. A rally called in Újvidék on March 21 (after news of the revolution had already arrived) was attended by Đorđe Stratimirović, a Kulpin landlord and one of the most enthusiastic leaders of the Serbian national movement who sported a rosette in the Hungarian national colours. Moreover, in an appeal Stratimirović expressed his conviction that as a result of the revolution "liberty... has erected its altars in our country as well". This was by no means, however, an isolated happening. On the day after the Újvidék rally a demonstration took place in Pancsova, the chief town of the German Banate Military Border. During this the masses sang the Hungarian national anthem as they drove the loyalist municipal leaders out of town. Here, too, the local people considered it necessary to hail the achievements of the revolution in a special resolution. Two days later, a similar fate befell the municipal politicians of Zimony. The demonstrators turned against them and expressed their support for the revolution by donning rosettes in the Hungarian national colours.



1. L'udovít Štúr

Soon the streets of Szenttamás were also filled with crowds cheering not only their newly-won liberty but also Lajos Kossuth, who had been playing a leading role at the Pozsony Diet since the revolution began.


The situation was similar in the Slovak-populated villages and towns of the northwestern region of Upper Hungary. Many Slovak clergymen and Slovak poets celebrated Lajos Kossuth and the liberation of the serfs in sermons and poems. In this they were joined by L'udovít Štúr, a leader of the liberal wing of the Slovak national movement, and who, as delegate of the town of Zólyom, had himself attended the Diet. In the March 31 edition of his

paper, *Slovenskje národňje novini*, Štúr wrote: "Our poor people will not be slaves anymore, ...the landlord will no longer sit in judgement over them...; all of this has ceased to be and has been abolished for ever. Our people are free, at last they will become citizens of the country and human beings!" The Slovak peasantry, who were the most affected, saluted their liberators in song:

Kossuth and Batthyány
Won liberty
May God protect them
Throughout the Hungarian land.

It has been proclaimed
Throughout Hungary
That Kossuth and Batthyány
Have given liberty to us.

Even the Croatian press, which had previously been staunchly anti-Hungarian, showed a certain degree of sympathy towards the Hungarian Revolution. Indeed, this was true even of the Rumanian papers of Transylvania—despite the fact that the legislation enacted at Pozsony did not apply to Transylvania for the time being. Timotei Cipariu, a liberal instructor at the Greek Catholic seminary of Balázsfalva, for instance, wrote enthusiastically in his paper, the *Organulu luminarei*, that “with one blow Hungary has crushed and totally destroyed all privileges” and that “equal rights and duties” had therefore been achieved in Hungary. Another prominent liberal, George Bariț, the editor of Brassó's *Gazeta de Transilvania*, declared that the Rumanians of Transylvania would also support the drafters of the Twelve Points because “through these points all barbaric, despotic and repressive privileges have been annihilated”. Admittedly, Bariț indicated that he would only be willing to accept the last of these points, the one concerning Hungary's proposed union with Transylvania, on the condition that the Rumanians of Transylvania were granted certain concessions regarding the use of their language. This notwithstanding, an anonymous Rumanian pamphlet published in Buda



2. George Bariț

(the first line ran "Fratilor Romani!") expressed unconditional support for the union of Transylvania and Hungary. It stressed that the Rumanians of Transylvania were bound to benefit from it as "the day of justice and liberty has already arrived" in Hungary, where "there are neither serfs, nor nobles, nor masters, nor servants anymore". The establishment of union with Hungary—and only this—would, it argued, bring about a similar state of affairs in Transylvania. Even some of those Transylvanian Saxons who abhorred the idea of bourgeois transformation regarded the legislation enacted in Pozsony as an unprecedented catalyst for development. Friedrich Hann, professor at Nagyszeben's academy of law, and Szászdyala Lutheran minister Karl Gooß were among those who also spoke out in April for the union of Transylvania with Hungary, in order that their own people, too, should benefit from the advantages of the new laws.

Nevertheless, massive national minority backing for the cause of bourgeois transformation in Hungary could not conceal the fact that the March Revolution had failed to tackle the nationalities issue. The resolution of other vitally important issues could not obscure this. Accordingly, from the very outset there were signs—despite widespread praise from the national minorities for the Twelve Points proclaimed in Pest and for the laws passed in Pozsony—which clearly pointed to an insistence on the part of Hungary's non-Magyar population that the nationalities question be settled, with the minorities being granted equal status with the Magyars. There was nothing unusual in this as the struggle for equality waged by all sizeable minorities in Hungary already enjoyed a considerable tradition.

Having said this, it must be stated that the nationalities' struggle was not so very old. This was because in previous centuries there had existed extremely powerful bonds between Hungary's Magyar and non-Magyar populations—bonds which proved to be stronger than any divisive factor. The Ottoman occupation provided the principal bond; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the country's entire population had been much affected by this. From the sixteenth century onwards, Habsburg expansionism, which hit the entire population regardless of nationality, also began to create a highly important bond. The Habsburgs wished to demote Hungary to the status of a mere province and to ensure the primacy of their own imperial or dynastic interests wherever those of Hungary ran contrary to them. Also, in the case of the peasantry, which constituted by far the largest part of the population, there was the common fate of subjugation, and, in the case

of the landlords, the common interest of preserving their feudal power over the peasantry. This last consideration, incidentally, may have been a not insignificant driving force behind the large-scale and incessant magyarization process which took place amongst the ranks of the non-Magyar nobility.

During the eighteenth century, however, the situation gradually changed. This was due, first and foremost, to the expulsion of the Turks, one important consequence of which was the disappearance of the powerful bond created by their presence. The impact of this was to some extent offset by the fact that in many ways Habsburg policy towards Hungary subsequently became harsher rather than more lenient. (For instance, during the reign of Maria Theresa the Crown introduced a tariffs system which gravely violated the interests of agricultural producers, artisans and merchants alike. Obviously, this narrowed the gulf between the landlords, the vast majority of whom were Magyar or had become magyarized, and the burghers who were overwhelmingly non-Magyar.) But now other factors surfaced which tended to broaden the rift—especially towards the end of Joseph II's reign. This was because Joseph made even greater efforts than previously to prevent the assertion of national interests which were irreconcilable with the interests of the empire. To this end he enforced a whole host of measures which were entirely unacceptable to the Hungarian nobility, while at the same time leaving the country's non-Magyar population indifferent. (A case in point was Joseph's introduction of government by decree. Others were his transfer of county administration out of the hands of the nobility's representatives and the establishment of German as the language of administration in Hungary in place of the traditional Latin.) Joseph II brought in many other reforms (i.e., greater scope for the non-Catholic Churches and the right of non-nobles to hold office) which also filled many Hungarian nobles with aversion, but which were received by the non-Magyar clergy and lay intellectuals with considerable satisfaction.

Thus, when the Hungarian nobility finally launched its impassioned struggle to destroy the Josephinian system and to achieve renewed recognition of its own curtailed privileges, it succeeded in making Joseph II, appealed by the outbreak of the French Revolution, revoke most of his edicts. This he did in 1790, just a few days before his death. The nobility failed, however, to win the backing of the commoner masses on the scale it managed during its earlier struggles against the Habsburgs. It failed to enlist the support of even the Magyar com-

moners, even though it now went beyond the slogan which cited the need to return to the old laws, but, for the first time in its history, formulated extreme nationalist slogans as well. It was inevitable that these would fail to win over the non-Magyar commoners, who became alienated instead. This is clearly shown by the fact that both the Serbs living in Hungary and the Transylvanian Rumanians first came forth with their specific national demands at precisely this time, in 1790–91. On this occasion the demands of the Rumanians, half of whom were Greek Orthodox and half Uniate (Greek Catholic), were formulated, jointly and unanimously, by the clergy and lay intellectuals (who had previously enjoyed almost no contact) of both Churches. The drafting of the Serbs' demands was a collective effort on the part of ecclesiastical and lay intellectuals, as well as of middle-class elements and military officers. More importantly, by this time the Hungarian nobility was no longer able to win over even the leaders of the Croatian nobility. The official language of the state was the main bone of contention because when the Hungarian nobility launched its struggle against the Josephinian system it had demanded, in accordance with the spirit of fledgling nationalism, that Hungarian be declared the official tongue in place of the traditional Latin. This aroused a fear in leading Croat politicians that, should the Hungarian nobility successfully achieve its goals, Croatia's autonomy, which still existed albeit in a somewhat limited form after her annexation by Hungary, would be restricted even more.

The Hungarian nobility soon came to realize that it had become rather isolated in its struggle. This realization was confirmed by the fact that Joseph's successors, Leopold II and, in 1792, the Emperor Francis, were apparently resigned to the abolition of government by decree and to the restoration of county autonomy—the principal demands of the nobility. This resulted in the rapid decline of the nobles' movement. Irrespective of this, however, the spread of nationalism in Hungarian nobility continued during the decades which followed—especially as the sudden emergence of nationality aspirations around 1790 turned out to be a shock from which it never recovered. Continued Hungarian nationalism naturally fuelled Croat, Serb, Romanian and, later, Slovak nationalism as well.

Possessing a rather narrow social base, the nationality movements were always, despite their incessant efforts, weaker than the Hungarian national movement. This eventually prompted a growing number of minority politicians to seek protection against Hungarian national

aspirations precisely from the Habsburgs, the common oppressors. Obviously, this further widened the gulf between the Hungarian national movement and the minority movements. Admittedly, as the crisis of feudal conditions deepened, prominent members of the Hungarian nobility saw that the internal feudal order needed to be replaced by capitalism. The mere elimination of the state of subjugation into which the country had been forced as part of the Habsburg empire was insufficient. The overthrow of Habsburg despotism was a precondition both for raising the country from its subjection and for the radical transformation of the domestic social order. This, however, required that the anti-Habsburg movement be revived. Gradually, there emerged within the leadership of the Hungarian nobility a liberal majority. The realization that bourgeois transformation was necessary produced growing liberal trends within the minority movements as well; indeed the liberals went on to attain majority status in the Rumanian and Slovak movements. Even so, the antagonism between the Magyar and non-Magyar nationalism by no means diminished even in the 1840s. In fact, the opposite was the case. The rift became deeper still, and this was inevitable.

From the 1830s onwards, the liberal grouping in the Hungarian nobility carried on a determined struggle for the abolition of serfdom, for the boosting of domestic industry and commerce, and for the creation of other similar preconditions for bourgeois transformation at home. Liberal politicians among the minorities sympathized with this struggle. However, since these politicians—because of the country's internal backwardness—still largely came from the ranks of the clergy and lay intelligentsia, most were far more interested in attaining national equality for the country's non-Magyar population than in the success of liberal efforts that held out prospects of material benefits for the peasantry or the middle class only. For their part, the Hungarian liberals were not only intent on protecting their earlier positions, but also agreed on ensuring the success of embourgeoisement. From the very beginning, therefore, they were firmly convinced that bourgeois transformation had to be accompanied by the consolidation, indeed extension, of the Hungarian nobility's positions of power. Accordingly, the Hungarian liberals made no attempt to frustrate efforts to improve the cultural life of the non-Magyar population in Hungary. Indeed, they repeatedly declared that they had no objection whatever to the use by Hungary's minorities of their mother tongue in private life. The Hungarian liberals did, however, firmly resist pressure to recognize the


national identity of Hungary's non-Magyar population, and rejected remonstrations against making Hungarian the country's sole official language. Even before 1848, they always took ruthless action against any such attempt, sometimes even branding the minorities' representatives as traitors. From this it directly followed that in the years leading up to the revolution the liberal Hungarian nobility failed to enlist the support of even those national minority politicians who otherwise looked favourably on their plans to modernize Hungary. After the outbreak of the revolution, the liberal Hungarian nobility was soon forced to face up to recurring, albeit initially rather moderate, minority demands. This was in spite of the considerable satisfaction with which the majority of Hungary's non-Magyar population responded to the revolutionary achievements which paved the way to bourgeois transformation.

The Serbs of Pest-Buda, for instance, organized a rally during the week the revolution broke out. This was attended by Serbs from the countryside who had travelled to Pest for the national fair to be held on St. Joseph's Day. At this rally, a petition was formulated to be submitted to Ferdinand V, who had succeeded to the throne in 1835, and to the Diet. The drafters of this petition stressed that the Serbs had no intention of loosening "that most sacred bond" which linked the Serbs of Hungary "to the common Hungarian homeland with filial affection...". Neither did they object to Hungarian remaining Hungary's only official language. They did, however, demand, among other things, that Hungary recognize the Serbs as a separate nation; that the Serbs of Hungary be allowed to conduct their own affairs in their mother tongue, and that their ecclesiastical and lay representatives be allowed to convene annually for a public national congress. These demands were, for the most part, also adopted and drafted into a petition by the March 27 assembly in Újvidék of the Serbs of Southern Hungary. Nevertheless, the Újvidék resolutions differed from those adopted in Pest in two respects. Firstly, the Pest petition mentioned need to reorganize the Military Border (which stretched along the southern part of the country) only in very general terms, whereas its Újvidék counterpart stated unequivocally that, like the serfs, the inhabitants of the area under military administration should be relieved not only of their obligation to perform military service but also of the oppressive burden of feudal dues. It also said that they should be given ownership of their lands with all the rights that this would entail. Also, whereas the Pest petition contained the demand that the Serb national

congresses, to be held annually, be allowed to submit their requests directly to the monarch (bypassing Parliament and the government responsible to it), the drafters of the Újvidék petition left out this point entirely, probably fearing that it would merely offend the Hungarian advocates of bourgeois transformation.

In the weeks directly following the outbreak of the revolution, the Slovak national movement was also characterized by a similar moderation and readiness to cooperate with the Hungarian national movement. Led by Michal Miloslav Hodža, a Lutheran minister from Verbice, the movement's supporters in Liptó county on March 28 turned out in force at the county assembly (which was

attended not only by the county nobility but also by representatives of the villages), at which they put in a request that henceforth the language of local county public administration and of tuition in elementary schools be Slovak. Jozef Miloslav Hurban, a Lutheran minister in Hluboka and the movement's principal organizer in Nyitra county, reiterated this demand in an anonymous proclamation (beginning "Bratia Slováci!") printed in Vienna by Štúr in early April. Hurban demanded that the use of the mother tongue be permitted in every county with a Slovak population and also called for the establishment of a Slovak Department at the University of Pest. After this the supporters of the Slovak national movement constantly raised similar demands, in Árva, Turóc



3. Jozef Miloslav Hurban

and Gömör counties as well, but nowhere did these manifestations assume an anti-Magyar or anti-revolutionary character. In the weeks that followed Hurban went slightly further. At a rally held in Brezova on April 28 he added to the Liptó Points the demand that Hungary recognize the existence of the Slovak nation, as well as its equality with the country's other nations. Apart from this, however, he raised no demands that could be said to have run contrary to the interests of the Hungarian nation or the Hungarian Revolution. Like the Serbs of Újvidék, Hurban also looked to the Hungarian government, and not to the instigators of counter-revolution, for the espousal of his demands.

Nevertheless, there were already signs that Hurban was inclined to attach excessive importance to the attainment of national equality, ascribing even greater weight to it than to the abolition of serfdom. In a speech to Slovak peasants attending market at Miava on April 26 Hurban said: "You have for several centuries been concerned only with forests, fields, manure and livestock" yet "the main thing is, nonetheless, nationality, in other words the right to be worth as much as any other nation in the country". Having already misjudged the situation at this point, Hurban was later, amidst more difficult circumstances, unable to find the right orientation towards revolution and the counter-revolution. Signs of a similar misjudgement of the situation were also, from the very beginning, discernible within the Rumanian national movement in Transylvania.

This was by no means, however, the case with everyone. Bariț, for instance, was firmly of the view that local public administration should be conducted in the mother tongue of the local population. Indeed, he made his support for the reunification of Hungary and Transylvania dependent on the implementation of this. Nevertheless, Bariț attributed the greatest importance to the emancipation of the serfs. He was clearly aware that cooperation between the Rumanian and Hungarian advocates of bourgeois transformation was a precondition for the toppling of the feudal order and for the realization of their goals. Initially, young intellectuals on the left of the Rumanian national movement in Transylvania also adopted a similar stance. The most prominent—among them Avram Iancu and Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian—were at this time apprentices-at-law to the highest tribunal in Transylvania, the Royal Court of Appeal.

In the third week of March, the Marosvásárhely apprentices-at-law met for a series of consultations. During these the Hungarians, who constituted a majority, proposed the acceptance of a petition to be

addressed jointly to the monarch. Among other things, this demanded freedom of the press, the proclamation of union between Hungary and Transylvania and the earliest possible convocation of the Transylvanian Diet. The proposal made no mention of the nationalities issue and, with regard to the peasant question, confined itself to the request that the people's burdens be lightened. To prevent a split, the young Rumanians attending the consultation accepted the petition but emphasized that it was absolutely necessary "to respect and guarantee the existence and language of each of



4. *Simion Bărnuț*

the various nationalities living in Transylvania and Hungary". They stressed even more firmly that in Transylvania, too, the total abolition of serfdom was to be accomplished "immediately and without delay". A similar approach to the issues characterized the demands formulated a few days later, on March 28, by Kolozsvár's radical Rumanian intellectuals under the leadership of Ioan Butteanu. Butteanu and his associates demanded that—even if the language of public administration at the national level was to remain Hungarian—in counties with a Rumanian population Rumanian should be made the official language. They demanded, moreover, the introduction of equality before the law, the ending of the nobility's exemption from taxes, and the abolition of serfdom. They also made it clear that they expected their demands to be met by the Transylvanian Diet which was to meet shortly.

In the meantime, however, Simion Bărnuț a former philosophy tutor at the Balázsfalva seminary, and who was now—at the age of forty—studying law at Nagyszeben, had issued his appeal to the Transylva-

nian Rumanians. This appeared on March 24, at around the same time as the Marosvásárhely petition. Although in a single, unobtrusive sentence Bărnaț's appeal did mention the need to request the abolition of serfdom (from the emperor himself), it contained no firm demand for the emancipation of the serfs and said nothing about the introduction of equality before the law, proportionate sharing of tax burdens, freedom of the press, or any other bourgeois achievement. The appeal merely confined itself to reiterating that "our national existence be recognized and guaranteed". Previously, Bărnaț had held the view that "liberty could not exist without nationality". Accordingly, he was now content to warn the Transylvanian Rumanians to reject union with Hungary and to refuse, for the time being, to enter into negotiations over other guarantees of bourgeois transformation. Talks with the Hungarians, even the most progressive ones, were ruled out until they "announced that they recognized the Rumanian nation as a nation", for "without the nation the republic, too, is only accursed tyranny", and "without it even heaven is hell". If the Rumanians "lost their nationality", then "they would lose everything"; if on the other hand, they achieved national equality then, subsequently, this would help them "attain everything". Accordingly, "the rest would follow as a matter of course".

Nevertheless, this standpoint was not yet shared by the majority of Transylvania's Rumanians at this time. Still less did it coincide with the views of Rumanians living in Hungary proper. The Rumanians of Hungary were led by men such as Ioan Drăgoș, a Bihar county sheriff, and Eftimie Murgu, a lawyer from Lugos, who realized that Habsburg despotism was the common enemy of the Rumanian and the Magyar peoples. As a result they were also therefore aware that the Hungarian advocates of bourgeois transformation could be their principal allies in the struggle against Habsburg despotism. (Dragoș had started out as a conservative, but eventually became disillusioned with the Habsburg dynasty because of its pro-Russian orientation; Murgu had been imprisoned in 1845 on a charge of inciting a peasant's revolt and was freed in April 1848 by the young radicals of Pest.) The Orthodox Rumanians living in Hungary had a special interest in maintaining good Hungarian—Rumanian relations because, of the Orthodox Church's six bishops in Hungary and one bishop in Transylvania, only the one in Transylvania and one in Hungary were actually Rumanian. The rest, including the head of this Church—the Metropolitan of Karlóca—were all Serbs. Thus, more than the Rumanians of Transylvania, the

Rumanians of Hungary were conscious of, and protested against, the subjugation they experienced within the Church at the hands of the Serb hierarchy. In wishing to change this state of affairs, some of their hopes lay precisely with the Hungarian government.

Accordingly, the Rumanians of Hungary also pressed for the recognition of the Rumanian nation as a nation. On May 21, the Rumanian students at Nagyvárad's college of arts and law addressed an appeal containing this demand to the Transylvanian Rumanians. On the same day the leaders of Orthodox Rumanians living in Hungary, who had gathered in Pest for consultations, handed over a petition to the Hungarian government. Both the Nagyvárad appeal and the Pest petition contained the demand that Church autonomy be respected, and the demand that young Rumanians receive tuition in their mother tongue. Nevertheless the leaders of the Rumanians living in Hungary carefully avoided taking any steps that might precipitate secession. On the contrary, these politicians made every effort to establish the closest possible alliance between Rumanians and Hungarians. Accordingly, they regarded the reunification of Hungary and Transylvania as desirable, believing that it would benefit all the Rumanians living under Habsburg rule.

The same cannot be said of the prominent Saxon politicians of Transylvania. (The Saxons had settled in Transylvania during the Middle Ages and the kings of Hungary had granted them extensive privileges.) It was primarily the middle class of Brassó, the principal Saxon commercial centre, which rallied behind Friedrich Hann, Karl Gooß, Elias Roth the famous lawyer, and Anton Kurz, who worked for the *Siebenbürger Wochenblatt*. This group expected bourgeois transformation to result in a broadening of their business opportunities. But the overwhelming majority of the leading officials of the Saxon Universality who governed the so-called *Királyföld* (inhabited by Transylvanian Saxons) staunchly opposed union from the outset. These included *comes* Franz Salmen, the principal of the Universality. Accordingly, immediately after the outbreak of the revolution the leaders of the Saxon Universality set up a committee to investigate the question of union. As early as April 22 they passed on the memorandum drafted by the committee to the Saxon *sedes* (administrative units corresponding to the county in Hungary) under their authority. The document explained how detrimental union would be to the Saxons of Transylvania. In the meantime, they also despatched a delegation to Vienna with a petition addressed to the monarch remonstrating against any enforcement of the union. Unlike that of Bărnauț, however, the Saxons' anti-union



5. *The Saxon and Rumanian inhabitants of the Királyföld lined up to greet comes Salmen*

stance stemmed not so much from a desire to safeguard national interests, real or imaginary, as from a deep-rooted concern for their utterly feudal privileges, which they now, of course, preferred to describe as "liberal". These feudal privileges guaranteed extraordinarily wide-ranging autonomy to the Saxon Universality. As one of the three "lawful" Transylvanian "nations", the Saxons were entitled, like the Magyar and Szekler "nations", to representation at the Transylvanian Diet. Therefore, for quite a while the Saxon patricians had been fully able to assert their own interests in the *Királyföld* (the population of which, incidentally, was predominantly Rumanian at this time) and at the Transylvanian Diets. As the threat of union loomed, however, the Saxons became seriously concerned for their privileged position. A bourgeois order would inevitably put an end to it; feudal privileges could only survive under feudal conditions.

The Transylvanian Saxon movements were not national in character, and the Saxon movement in the *Szepesség* (Northern Hungary) was similarly devoid of national traits. This notwithstanding, the attitude of the Saxons of this last-mentioned area was diametrically opposed to that of the majority of the Transylvanian Saxons. Most of the Saxons of the *Szepesség* joined the supporters of the Hungarian revolution with no reservations whatever. This was because the prominent merchant burghers of the towns of the *Szepesség* regarded Hungary's bourgeois transformation and the elimination of obstacles to the country's eco-

conomic prosperity as highly beneficial, just as the Saxons of Brassó had done. Moreover, a sizeable proportion of *Szepesség* Saxons actually regarded themselves as Magyars rather than as Germans, even though linguistic assimilation was not taking place at this stage. Not even the Hungarian leaders' insistence on making Hungarian the official language of the country could alienate the *Szepesség* Saxons from the Hungarian Revolution. Although legislation enacted by the Pozsony Diet contained an article to the effect that the language of consultation of the local authorities was to remain "Hungarian only", this was prudently omitted from the new laws dealing with the royal free towns and the market-towns—to prevent the arousal of antagonistic sentiment in other enclaves of the not yet fully assimilated urban German population. In any event, the Hungarian nobility had not previously enjoyed control of the German-inhabited towns.

The case of the Saxons of the *Szepesség* was by no means exceptional. The Ruthenian population of the villages and towns of Sub-Carpathia sympathized with the Hungarian Revolution. No demands of a national character were raised in this region during the summer months—for the simple reason that before 1848 the Ruthenians of Hungary had not yet begun to experience national awakening.

The representatives of the Croat national movement, which had already achieved a high degree of organization and determinedness before 1848, took steps in March which were indicative of a powerful national self-awareness. On receiving news of the outbreak of revolution in Vienna and Pest, the leaders of the Croat National Party immediately set up a "provisional national committee". The initiative had come from Ljudevit Gaj, the head of the party, a politician who had started out as a liberal but who subsequently ended up toeing the Viennese line. Mobilizing their supporters, the leaders of the Croat National Party also staged a big rally in Zagreb on March 25. At this a petition was adopted which gave expression partly to bourgeois and partly to national demands.

The points in the petition which aimed at internal bourgeois transformation were almost identical with



6. Scene of the 25th March 1848 meeting of the Croat National Party: the Zagreb headquarters of the *Matica hrvatska*



7. Ljudevit Gaj

similar demands voiced in Pest and Pozsony. The petition called for the abolition of serfdom; the introduction of proportionate taxation; the proclamation of equality before the law; the basing of the Croat legislative body, the *sabor* (hitherto made up, just like the Hungarian Diet, entirely of the privileged classes) on popular representation; freedom of assembly; freedom of speech; freedom of the press; and for the establishment of a national guard. To these demands was added another, namely that, like the urban serfs, the border guards, too, be exempted from feudal obligations. At this stage, however, the drafters of the petition requested the introduction of these reforms from the monarch directly, not from the Pozsony Diet, and without any reference to similar changes which were already emerging

in Hungary. In point of fact, this was inevitable since the leaders of the Croat national movement—as the petition itself clearly revealed—now not only set out to achieve the international transformation envisaged by the Hungarian liberals, but also aimed to free Croatia from its state of subordination to Hungary, just as the Hungarian liberals had wished to put an end to Austria's subjugation of Hungary at this time.

Therefore, like the legal code under preparation at Pozsony, the petition stated that its authors were loyal subjects of the Habsburg dynasty and respected the unity of the empire and of Hungary. Nevertheless, it also made it clear that the Croats were demanding unlimited administrative autonomy for themselves within the empire. First and foremost, the petition demanded that Croatia be united with Slavonia (Szerém, Pozsega and Verőce counties), a largely Croat-populated area which was administratively part of Hungary proper, and that Dalmatia (then part of Austria), as well as the Hungarian Littoral (the vicinity of Fiume, Buccari and Porto Re—then regarded in Zagreb as part of Croatia) be added, thus creating a single political unit. It also demanded that the Croat and Slavonian Military Border (which had, from the very beginning, been administered totally independently by the military authorities) be recognized as an integral part of the "Triune Kingdom" to be formed as the result of unification. Yet another of the petition's demands was that executive power in the Triune Kingdom be exercised by a national government free of intervention from external bodies (the Hungarian government included) and which would be responsible solely to the Croation *sabor*. Moreover, the petition also pointed out that thenceforth the *sabor*, too, would have to be totally independent of the Hungarian Parliament. Finally, the petition pressed for "the introduction of the national language in the internal and foreign affairs of these lands", thereby stressing the fact that henceforth the drafters wished to base communication between the Croat and Hungarian authorities on full reciprocity in the sphere of language usage, too. (Previously, there had been considerable imbalance in this respect; Act II of 1844, under which Hungarian became the sole official language, allowed the Croat authorities only one alternative in the event of unwillingness to reply in Hungarian to Hungarian-language official communications from the Hungarian authorities—that of replying in Latin.)

These were indeed important demands, as the petition had been drafted jointly by the representatives of the loyalist majority in the Croat National Party and by prominent politicians of the party's liberal minority. Despite their traditional and considerable conflicts, the two factions now succeeded, by means of concessions, in reaching agreement over the content of the petition. For their part the representatives of the loyalist majority accepted not only the inclusion in the petition of every major requirement for domestic bourgeois transformation, but also the demand that the members of the Croat government to be

formed "be men supporting the new course of liberty and progress". As for the liberals, they endorsed the demand that the petition should not only expressly insist on the filling of the post of *ban*, the highest Croat public office (which had then been vacant for nearly two and a half years), but also specifically and emphatically demanded that Baron Josip Jellačić, the staunchly loyalist commander of the Ban's 1st Border Guard Infantry Regiment, be appointed to it.

Without doubt, members of the Croat National Party could not remotely hope to assert Croat national aspirations until party unity was restored. This, however, required a considerable willingness to make concessions from both party fractions. Yet it was certainly true that by allowing Jellačić to become *ban*, the liberals would be taking a great risk. At this point, the liberals, unlike Gaj, could hardly have suspected that the Crown also had the greatest confidence in Jellačić and had, in fact, already appointed him *ban* two days earlier. Still less could they have guessed that, within two weeks, the monarch would also appoint Jellačić commander-in-chief in Croatia. Long known for his free use of Croat national slogans even before 1848, Jellačić thus became a firm and reliable element in what was to be a subsequent armed offensive against the Hungarian Revolution. Although the Croat liberals may not have been aware of this, they, too, could be sure that Jellačić—despite his frequent patriotic statements—would never jeopardize imperial and dynastic interests by subordinating them to Croat national ones and would, accordingly, support "the new course of liberty and progress" only in a half-hearted manner.

Nevertheless it remains a fact that the Croat liberals sanctioned the petition of March 25 and, in it, the point which pressed for Jellačić's appointment. Even contemporaries must have been aware of this: an article published on April 20 by Ivan Kukuljević, president of *Matica hrvatska*, the Croat cultural association, and the most prominent spokesman for the liberal group, had mentioned it and this had appeared precisely in one of Gaj's papers, the *Novine dalmatinsko-hèrvatsko-slavonske*. Whilst strongly emphasizing the author's fraternal feelings towards the Magyar people, the article demanded full governmental independence, as did the petition of March 25.

In any case, from the point of view of the Hungarian Revolution the identity of the drafters of the Croat and other demands which were raised in the second half of March was not of decisive importance. Actually, the crux of the matter was that these demands had already been made in March. As a result, the Hungarian forerunners of bour-


geois transformation were compelled to acknowledge at the very outset that the nationalities question was one of the key issues. Although most of them would have preferred to ignore this problem entirely, they had to face the fact that the Hungarian Revolution would sooner or later be obliged to tackle the problem—the more so as there was a very real threat that otherwise the leadership of the minority movements would pass to Jellačić-like counterrevolutionaries. Indeed, both the Hungarian liberals and the revolutionary Left now took steps to reassure the supporters of the minority movements. Even so, the Hungarian

Revolution failed to neutralize the minority movements, partly because the steps it took were inadequate and partly because they events onto a course conflicting with the goal to be accomplished.

At the Pozsony Diet, the liberal politicians' conceptions regarding the nationalities question were—as was the case with most items on the agenda—expounded mainly by Lajos Kossuth, who focused his attention primarily on the Croats. This was understandable as even before 1848 the Croats' organizing activities had caused considerable problems for the Hungarian liberals. Now, however, it was not Kossuth's intention to recall earlier differences. On the contrary, speaking in the Lower Table on March 22, he called on the Croats "to lay aside all party affiliation and to join forces with their Magyar brethren in common love of the Fatherland". Like in company with most Hungarian liberals, Kossuth was ready to recognize the Croats as sons of



8. Ivan Kukuljević



9. *The lower table of the Pozsony Diet*

a separate nation, as opposed to Hungary's other non-Magyar inhabitants. Accordingly, Kossuth "declared that ... he would willingly agree that the Croats should be free to use the Croatian language in their internal affairs and that only the language of communication with Hungary should be Magyar". On April 4, Kossuth once again made "a most favourable statement concerning Croatia's national language". This was in spite of the fact that news of Jellačić's appointment had already reached Pozsony, as had news of the Zagreb demands of March 25. This meant that Kossuth still adhered to the position he had adopted two weeks earlier, albeit also indicating that he had still failed to move beyond it. Nevertheless, at this stage Kossuth must have been aware that the Croats could not be placated simply by means of concessions on the language issue, and, moreover, that, should the Magyars fail to grant them the kind of autonomy they had requested from the monarch in the Zagreb petition, they would have no hope of turning the liberals against Jellačić and the Court circles which backed him.

Kossuth, in fact, showed far greater tolerance towards the Croat national movement than towards any other nationality movement in

Hungary. This was already clear from the events of the closing days of the Pozsony Diet. On April 8 the delegation representing the Serbs of Southern Hungary appeared in Pozsony to submit to the Diet the petition adopted in Újvidék on March 27 and, at the same time, to assure the legislative body of sympathy towards, and confidence in, the Hungarian Revolution amongst the Serbian advocates of bourgeois transformation. Accordingly, Aleksandar Kostić, a junior notary in the town of Újvidék and the spokesman of the delegation, appeared before the Lower Table in Hungarian gala dress and delivered a short speech (in Hungarian) stressing the Serbs's unconditional readiness to cooperate. Kostić ended his address with an allusion to the *Szózat* (The Call) by the great nineteenth-century Hungarian poet Mihály Vörösmarty:

"...Receive us into your fraternal arms as the sons of one and the same Fatherland, and we shall make the sacred promise that henceforth we Serbs shall live and die only for Hungary, and only for the Hungarians."

These words were received with enthusiastic cheering. Kossuth replied in a similarly amicable vein declaring that "the Hungarian nation ... extends Hungarian liberty to every fellow citizen, without discrimination", and that it "respects the perfectly free development and use within its own circle of the individual languages". He also added that the interests of state unity demanded merely that "Magyar be the language of discourse in the public life of the Fatherland". Finally, Kossuth promised that the government and parliament which was to be convened on the basis of popular representation would redress all the grievances of the Serbs that the latest laws had failed to remedy. On the point in the Újvidék petition demanding recognition of the Serb nation as an independent nation, and which was totally unacceptable to him, Kossuth simply remained silent. More precisely, his utterances amounted to a covert rejection to the extent that in his address he used the term "nation" only in relation to the Magyars. However, when mentioning the country's non-Magyar population, he took good care to refer to them only as non-Magyar "speakers", or non-Magyar "peoples".

Obviously, the Serb delegation could not acquiesce in this covert rejection of its principal demand. Accordingly, when on the following day they paid a farewell visit to Kossuth's quarters Stratimirović, a member of the delegation, reiterated that the Serbs insisted on being recognized as a separate nation. This time Kossuth could not avoid



10. Lajos Kossuth

giving an answer. For want of anything better to say, he simply repeated what he had already said in an address to the Diet:

"...I shall never ever recognize any other nation and nationality under the Holy Hungarian Crown than the Hungarian. I know there are peoples and races who speak other languages, but there is only one nation here."

This forthright response immediately brought matters to a head. Moreover, to underline the truth of his words, Lajos Kossuth also added that were he to recognize the Serbs as a separate nation then they

could demand a separate government for themselves. To this one of his visitors quickly replied that the Serbs of Hungary were thinking of no such thing, indeed they took the stand that just as, for example, the German nation, which lacked unified statehood, could have many governments, in the same way a single government could rule several nations living in the same country. But not even this could persuade Kossuth to change his position. Accordingly, Stratimirović was finally compelled to conclude the argument by stating that if their demands were not met in Pozsony the Serbs would "turn elsewhere" for recognition, prompting Kossuth's reply: "In that case the sword shall decide."

In this way the Serb delegates, who had arrived in Pozsony in the hope that their offer of armed support would be duly appreciated, left two days later convinced that they could assert their national aspirations by opposing the Hungarian Revolution. That they had come to this conclusion soon became clear. At their April 14 meeting, for

instance, the inhabitants of Karlóca, the seat of the Orthodox Church in Hungary, raised an entirely new demand, one to which not even a passing mention had been made in the Újvidék petition. This was that a separate Serb Voivodate be formed from the *Bácska*, the *Temesköz*, the *Szerémség* and *Baranya*, and that this voivodate be united with the Triune Kingdom which was—in accordance with the Zagreb petition of March 25—to be governed entirely separately from Hungary. After hearing Kostić's disappointing account of the Pozsony mission, 2,000 Újvidék Serbs also marched to Karlóca on April 20. This had the desired effect even on the head of the Church, the staunchly reactionary metropolitan, Josif Rajačić. At heart, he, too, had supported the idea of a voivodate, although he was just as hostile to the idea of mobilizing the Serb masses as he was towards the Hungarian Revolution. At any rate, Rajačić had taken as few risks as possible and had, accordingly, refrained from adopting a clear position. Now, however, he realized that the demonstrators, who had pinned the Serb rather than the Hungarian national colours on their clothing, were determined. As a result he, too, openly joined the demands for a voivodate, and announced, in line with the wishes of the people of Újvidék, a Serb national assembly for May 13.

The intransigence shown by leading Hungarian circles towards the Serb demands of late March and early April 1848 was by no means untypical. The Batthyány government had responded in a similar way to Slovak demands voiced at the same time. This was in spite of the fact that the Slovak leaders were now, unlike the Croats, just as prepared as the Serbs to come to an agreement with the Hungarians. In fact, the Slovaks were treated in an even more



11. Josif Rajačić

peremptory manner than the Serbs. After the initial Slovak demands were announced, the government immediately put them on the agenda—at the very first Cabinet meeting, held on April 12, the day following the adjournment of the Diet. Its treatment of the demands was, however, summary—on the grounds that it would be unjustified to ascribe greater significance to Slovak claims since these were no more than the ideas of independent individuals entirely without mass backing from the Slovak people. In other words the demands were “merely expressions of Pan-Slavism”, that is, they were to be regarded simply as the product of subversion serving Russian expansionist aims. Thus, the Slovak issue—Cabinet ministers concluded—could be resolved quite simply: all that was needed was to keep its promoters at bay. Accordingly, government commissioners would need to be sent to Árva, Liptó, Turóc, Trencsén and Nyitra counties, and Vienna would have to be persuaded to redeploy a number of Hungarian regiments stationed in Galicia to Upper Hungary.

Another decision the government took at this point was immediately to hand out free seed to the needy of Upper Hungary, the area worst hit by drought in previous years. Contemporary Hungarian advocates of bourgeois transformation, including government ministers, were well aware in 1848 that embourgeoisement was the principal issue in Hungary, the one that overrode all others, even the granting of equal status to the nationalities. This was something that would serve the interests of even the million on non-Magyars living in Hungary. The Batthyány government's line of reasoning was as follows: Hungary's non-Magyar population would soon also enjoy the benefits of the bourgeois revolution's achievements, one of them being the abolition of serfdom. In addition, when they saw that the Hungarian government brought to power by the revolution intended to introduce further measures to improve, the living conditions of *all* Hungary's citizens, the non-Magyars would realize that the liberty they shared with the Magyars was more important than the national differences separating them from the Magyars. As Kossuth put it in an address to the Lower Table at the end of March: “...Common liberty will certainly offset national differences and antagonisms.” Accordingly, even the most unbridled “provocateurs” would fail to turn the non-Magyars against the Magyars and the Hungarian Revolution.

This was not, in point of fact, an unfounded calculation. Sizeable sections of Hungary's non-Magyar population—especially peasants

liberated from serf status—experienced a sudden improvement in their own situation and, as a result, were well aware of the crucial importance of the March achievements—all of which held out the promise of bourgeois transformation. The problem was that by no means everyone enjoyed the benefits of these achievements in such a direct way. Therefore it seemed certain that sizeable sections of Hungary's non-Magyar population would assess the March turn from a different point of view. Some were bound to regard the proclamation of the nationalities' equality before the law as indispensable to their goals. The appearance on the scene of minority politicians—such as Hurban or Bărnuț—who declared that nationality rights were more important than anything else, was an unmistakable indication of this. So was the emergence of those—for example the Pozsony delegates of the Serbs of Southern Hungary—who regarded such rights to be at least as important as the revolutionary measures paving the way for embourgeoisement.

Admittedly, the Hungarian liberals realized that the immediate emancipation of the serfs was a precondition for Hungary's governmental independence and of their assumption of power. This required the consistent subordination of the momentary interests of the Hungarian landowners who backed them. Emancipation would also prevent Vienna from turning the serfs against them. This notwithstanding, the Hungarian liberals stubbornly refused to admit that the discontent among the non-Magyars who regarded the achievement of their own goals to be at least as important as the achievements of the revolution, posed a threat no less serious than the possible discontent among the serfs should serfdom not be abolished. Neither Bărnuț's and Hurban's efforts, nor the confrontation between Stratimirović and Kossuth on April 9, changed the situation.

This duality was by no means characteristic of only those Hungarian liberals who—like the majority of Batthyány's cabinet ministers—had lived in the belief since early April that the Crown had finally come to consider the March achievements irreversible. For what they saw time and again was that the House of Habsburg, which at this point was under great pressure from the revolutionary movements not only in Hungary but also in Northern Italy and even in Vienna, offered no real resistance to the legislation enacted at Pozsony. It was also to be found in those, who, like Kossuth, entertained no such illusions. Kossuth himself did not wish to curtail the positions of power of the Hungarian nobility. On the contrary, he wanted to extend them still further.

Although satisfying the peasantry would require a great sacrifice on the part of the nobles concerned, this would merely be a temporary material one and one which would not require the nobility to give up any of its positions of power. Indeed, such a sacrifice seemed the only way in which the nobility would be able to increase its power, as was its fervent wish. On the other hand, only by ceding certain elements of state power could the Hungarian nobility have placated the nationalities. In other words, the Hungarian nobility could only have won over the nationalities by relinquishing some of the advantages it had hoped to secure by accepting the liberation of the serfs. In fact the nobility had agreed to the emancipation only because of this.

It is therefore perfectly understandable that, in accordance with their earlier policy, the Hungarian liberals were willing to meet fully nationality demands concerning cultural and Church affairs. This was, however, as far as they were prepared to go; and, with the exception of the Croats, they emphatically refused to recognize the country's non-Magyar inhabitants as belonging to separate nations. That they should have been so determined on precisely this (apparently merely theoretical) issue can come as no surprise. The Serbs who held talks with Kossuth on April 9 clearly stressed that, even though they insisted on the recognition of their own people as a nation, they did not intend to disrupt the country's administrative unity, and in fact their words authentically reflected the situation at that moment. Yet, from a logical point of view, Kossuth was right to conclude that if the Serbs were recognized as a separate nation, they *could*, with complete justification, demand a separate government, i.e. territorial autonomy. Accordingly, if the Serbs were granted recognition as a nation—even though they were not then actually demanding this—then at some time in the future they *would* probably demand autonomy. Being forced to ensure territorial autonomy for the nationalities living in Hungary was not the only factor regarded by the Hungarian liberals as a threat to the power of the Hungarian nobility. They considered ceding the administration of even one county with a non-Magyar population to representatives of the minority movements to be equally dangerous.

Consequently, the Hungarian liberals' aim was that the dependence of the country's non-Magyar districts on the country's central government should be no less than that of the Magyar-populated areas. Yet, this by itself did not mean that they should not demonstrate their good will towards the non-Magyars in other ways, without damaging the role of the central government. One thing they could have done was

to allow the representatives of the nationality movements a certain say in the country's central government. And on April 8, when the Serb delegation was officially accredited to the Diet, Kossuth did actually state that should persons suitable for ministerial office emerge from among the Serbs, they would be given portfolios. However, to grant the representatives of the nationality movements a real say in the country's central government would also have led to the infringement of the power positions of the Hungarian nobility. Therefore, it never seriously occurred to any of the Hungarian liberals—despite a certain amount of lip service on the part of some—to consider allocating at least one ministerial portfolio to a minority politician. In point of fact, it was only to the Croats' representatives that the Hungarian liberals intended to grant government posts. Even so, such things as the establishment of separate Croat departments within the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice remained out of the question.

Incidentally, this meanness on the part of the Hungarian liberals also reveals that it was only the force of circumstances that finally obliged the Hungarian liberals to afford special treatment to the Croats; in other words they wished to make the Hungarian nobility's claim to total possession of state power seem justified. They were therefore compelled to adhere to the somewhat forced theory that the citizens of a particular country were all part of one and the same nation. For lack of anything better, they produced historical arguments in support of the claim that Hungary's citizens were all to be considered sons of the Hungarian nation. The first was that Hungary possessed a historically-formed unitary statehood, and that the Magyar state was established at one time by the Magyars themselves. Under the circumstances the Hungarian liberals had to recognize at least the Croats' separate nationhood, since they could not deny that the kings of Hungary had earlier annexed to Hungary an area which at that time looked back on a considerable historical tradition and which already possessed independent statehood. Moreover, as victims of this historical line of reasoning, the Hungarian liberals were not only obliged to recognize the Croats' separate nationhood, but also the justice of Croat demands for control over Croatia's internal affairs. That Croatia had in the past always possessed internal self-government, even after its annexation by Hungary, was an indisputable fact.

The Hungarian liberals' special treatment of the Croats was therefore due entirely to the pressure of circumstances. As a result, it confined itself strictly to what was absolutely necessary. To recognize

the Croats as a separate nation and to hand over Croatia's internal public administration to them was as far as the Hungarian liberals were prepared to go. Allowing the Croat *sabor* to evolve eventually into a legislative body not subordinated to the Hungarian parliament but functioning on an entirely equal footing with it was out of the question for them. The idea that Croatia should possess an independent government responsible solely to the *sabor* was also something that they stubbornly refused even to consider. In the past only Croatia's domestic administration had been conducted independently, with legislation for Croatia being enacted by the Hungarian Diets. The *sabor's* scope of action had been confined to deciding on how this legislation should be applied to Croatia. In Croatia, too, executive power at the highest level was exercised by the central Hungarian government bodies. As for the Hungarian liberals, they would have considered it unwise to curtail the Croats' power positions, which were based on historical rights, as by doing so they would have given grounds for those who wished to curtail the hegemony of the Magyars in Hungary, a hegemony based on shaky historical arguments. The Hungarian liberals would, however, have regarded it as equally foolish to transfer to the Croats any of the positions of power the latter demanded merely on the grounds of national interests rather than those of historical rights.


The lack of generosity towards the minority movements left its mark not only on the behaviour of the Hungarian liberals, but on the policy of the left wing of the Hungarian revolutionaries as well. Admittedly, when on March 18 the young Serbs of Pest collectively reported to join the local National Guard they were given a most enthusiastic reception by the March Youth. And when, three weeks later, it became known that Murgu was still being held in a Pest prison, the latter revealed similar enthusiasm in demanding his release. However, when the March Youth got to know about the petition drafted by the Serbs of Pest-Buda the day after the revolution broke out, it were the first to denounce the Serbs in the press for "wanting to present themselves as a nation". The March Youth had also adopted the stand that in Hungary "there existed only one nation, the Magyar".

The fact that, like the Hungarian liberals, the March Youth also wanted the country's entire population, regardless of nationality, to share equally in the revolutionary achievements paving the way for bourgeois transformation could not compensate for their lack of generosity. Indeed, the March Youth—aiming at a slightly more far-reaching transformation—wished to see the country's population, non-

Magyars included, enjoy even more achievements of this kind. Like Kossuth, the March Youth staunchly adhered to this stance—despite the counter-revolutionary threat from the Habsburgs. Indeed, awareness of this threat convinced them still further that they were justified in opposing attempts by the minority movements to exact national rights. The March Youth did not consider the political interests of the Hungarian nobility to be of overriding importance. (This was, for instance, shown by the fact that when at the end of March they received news of the content of the electoral law being drafted in Pozsony they resolutely demanded the deletion from it of the article designed to secure special privileges for the nobility.)

Yet the March Youth realized how vital it was for the Hungarian nobility to preserve its power intact. Accordingly, it felt that the minority movements had to be confined within certain limits in order to ensure that the Hungarian liberals remained loyal to the cause of bourgeois transformation. Any threat to their loyalty would weaken the revolution disastrously—and at a time when the counter-revolutionary threat made it crucial that the revolution muster all its strength.

Under the circumstances, however, even the March Youth could not prevent the rift between the nationality movements and the Hungarian Revolution. In vain did Sándor Petőfi, the leader of the March Youth,



12. Sándor Petőfi

argue—during the debate on the electoral law—against those liberals who held that the granting of special privileges to the nobility constituted a Hungarian national interest, saying that “nationality is sacred, but liberty is even more sacred”. It was also in vain that the March Youth pointed to the indisputable truth in two proclamations addressed to the Croats that, just as the achievements of the Hungarian Revolution were commonly enjoyed by all inhabitants of the country, so all these inhabitants had a common enemy who posed the greatest threat to these achievements. This common enemy was “the tyrannical Austrian bureaucracy”, and, consequently, it was the paramount interest of the country’s population—regardless of mother tongue—to bury their differences and join forces in defence of what the revolution had brought them. The March Youth was similarly reluctant to recognize separate nationhood for the non-Magyars. This was a clear indication that it, too, strove to retain the privileged position of the Magyar *nation*—despite its intensive efforts to put an end to the privileged position of the Hungarian *nobility*. As a result, the activists of the nationality movements could not discern essential difference between the March Youth’s stance and that of the Hungarian liberals. Accordingly, just as he failed to convince the Hungarian liberals, Petőfi was also unable to win over even those non-Magyars who thought, like Bărnuț, or Hurban, that the cause of nationality must definitely be subordinated to the cause of liberty. Because of this, the Croats were also firm in their rejection of the March Youth’s appeal for cooperation.

Even so, the Hungarians failed to draw the proper conclusions from this failure. This was partly due to the fact that the Hungarian advocates of bourgeois transformation had—as shown by the Cabinet meeting of April 12—greatly underestimated the strength and significance of the minority movements. That they should do so, however, was not entirely surprising: in the spring of 1848 the minority movements were still very far from mobilizing the country’s entire non-Magyar population, or even the majority of non-Magyars.

The prominent activists of the Slovak national movement who rallied around Štúr were not, as described by the Battyhány government, isolated individuals. Nonetheless, it is clear that they were, even at this time, backed only by a narrow group of intellectuals. They failed to win the support of the magyarized Slovak nobles, and also failed to rally the Slovak urban middle class—to which bourgeois transformation was important and which therefore sympathized with the movement of the Hungarian liberal nobility. The same held true for the majority of



13. *The small nobility of Turopolje, towards whom Kossuth was partial*
 Caricature from 1845 expressing the stance of the supporters of the Croat National Party

Slovak clergymen who, generally speaking, did not wish to become alienated from their congregations. Later (in an address in early June), Hurban himself complained bitterly about this. The situation was different in the case of the Croat national movement. In one of his speeches to the Lower Table in March, Kossuth had also spoken disparagingly of the importance of this movement, although it was a fact that the large and organized Croat National Party had been behind it even before 1848. However, in Croatia—especially amongst the small nobles of Turopolje most of whom had plots of land little bigger than those of the serfs—in the 1840s the number of those who supported the Hungarians grew to exceed the number of those who followed the national party. The Hungarian liberals could now, as before 1848, seriously count on the cooperation of these Croats, in spite of the fact that they were, generally speaking, staunch opponents of the

cause of bourgeois transformation. Prior to 1848 they had been prompted to join forces with the Hungarian liberals primarily by their aversion to the Croat liberals' effort to prepare the way for embourgeoisement (and above all to the latter's demand that the nobility's exemption from tax be ended). As for the national movement of the Transylvanian Rumanians, since the union had not yet materialized the Hungarian leaders could not form an authentic picture either in Pozsony or in Pest of precisely how things stood. Whatever anxieties they may have had concerning any information they did receive were quickly dispelled by the pro-Hungarian stance of the Rumanians living in Hungary proper. Similarly, anti-Serb statements concerning Church matters by the Rumanians living in Hungary also encouraged the Hungarian leaders to proceed against the Serb national movement.

The Hungarian liberals and the March Youth, then, underestimated the nationality movements. There were primarily two reasons for this. Firstly, they knew that, like the Hungarian opposition nobility, the nationality movements had been unable, even before 1848, to win the backing of sizeable sections of the peasantry, which suffered far more from feudal oppression than from discrimination on grounds of nationality. Secondly—as we have already seen in the case of government ministers—they presumed that the peasants, not only the Magyar but also the non-Magyar, were certain to show gratitude to those who achieved the abolition of serfdom. From all this they inferred that—with the sons of the soil eventually showing interest in other matters following the resolution of the serf question—the non-Magyar peasants would be more likely to rally behind the Hungarian Revolution than the nationality movements which had turned against it.

The leadership of the Hungarian Revolution failed to realize that this expectation was, at best, only partly warranted. This was in spite of the fact that when the first wave of euphoria following the emancipation of the serfs had abated, the country—including regions with non-Magyar populations—had been suddenly swept by a wave of peasant movements. It soon became clear that for the time being the countryfolk did not consider the peasant question to be fully settled, despite the emancipation of the serfs in March. Moreover, this attitude was unlikely to change until the feudal services imposed on the peasants for the use of manorial plots (which some peasants cultivated owing to the inadequacy of serf holdings, sometimes even actually moving to and settling on manorial farms) were not abolished. There were also many other peasant grievances that were not remedied in March. However,

it is not surprising that the leadership of the Hungarian Revolution did not immediately realize that its expectations in relation to the non-Magyar peasant masses were somewhat misplaced. This was because initially the fledgling peasant movements, despite the large number of non-Magyars participating in them, possessed no national character whatever in most cases. In Transylvania, for instance, this explains why Rumanian and Magyar peasants fought shoulder to shoulder as comrades, entirely disregarding national differences. (Prior to the implementation of the union—due only months later, after endorsement by the Transylvanian Diet—serfdom remained in force in Transylvania. However, from April onwards peasants receiving news of the liberation of the serfs in Hungary proper began to demand that they, too, be immediately released from feudal bondage.) The situation was not much different in Hungary proper: generally speaking, in that country also those participating in the peasant movements in areas with mixed populations were of different nationalities.

To the peasants entering the struggle the nationality of the landlords with whom they were now forced to contend was as irrelevant as the nationality of their own comrades. At the end of March and in early April, for example, the Serb peasants living on the *Szerémség* estates of the Orthodox Church, just like their fellows oppressed by Hungarian landlords elsewhere, launched land-seizure movements, and attempted to shed the burdens imposed on them for the use of manorial land. In Croatia the laws passed in Pozsony were simply ignored and, as a result, the laws concerning the emancipation of the serfs were not implemented. Consequently, during the course of April, the Croat peasants—like their Transylvanian counterparts—began to demand the abolition of serfdom, to take effect immediately. They, too, started to disobey their landlords in many places, even though most of the latter unlike their counterparts in Transylvania, were not Magyars but Croats.

The leaders of the Hungarian Revolution were seriously mistaken when they thought that the non-Magyar movements would always remain independent of the nationality movements. Wishing to respect the interests of the landlords, who had already been hard-hit as a result of the emancipation of the serfs in March, for many months the Hungarian government did nothing to settle those peasant problems left unresolved in March. This presented the leaders of the nationality movements with an opportunity to create an image for themselves as enthusiastic espousers of peasant interests. The leaders of the minority movements jumped at this opportunity.



14. Andrei Șaguna

Admittedly, not all of them did, or at least not in the same way. For instance, Bishop Andrei Șaguna, the head of Transylvania's Orthodox Church (who opposed the Hungarian liberals, but not primarily as a Rumanian Bishop but as a loyal supporter of Habsburg absolutism) visited fifty-four Rumanian-populated villages within a single week in the first half of April—not to win the peasants (who were demanding the abolition of serfdom) for the Rumanian national movement, but only to calm them down. His Serb counterpart, however, Metropolitan Rajačić (another staunch opponent of bourgeois transformation and a man who definitely intended to prevent the curtailment of Church lands, but who would have welcomed the establishment of an autonomous Serb voivodate), immediately utilized the Hun-

garian government organs against the rebellious Serb peasants on the Church estates. Through appeals, he also attempted to calm Serb peasants who had turned against their landlords elsewhere. However, when asked from which quarter the peasants could expect redress for their grievances, Rajačić made no mention of either the government or Parliament, and not even of the monarch. After the announcement of the Serb national assembly he maintained that such redress would come from this national assembly which was shortly to convene...

Rajačić's intrigues were, however, no match for those of Jellačić, who had held office in Zagreb since April 18. Jellačić had resolutely maintained that legislation enacted in Pozsony was not valid for Croatia. Yet, fully aware of the strength of the peasant movements which had spread like wildfire through the areas under his authority, he quickly grasped that to wait until the *sabor* itself endorsed the liberation of Croatia's serfs could easily produce discontent amongst the peasant masses which would lead to the frustration of his plans. Accordingly, in a statement made on April 25 in his capacity as *ban*, Jellačić solved the problem by making an unexpected, and unilateral, announcement—that thenceforth the serfs of Croatia and Slavonia no longer owed any services to their landlords, and would no longer have to pay the Church tithe. Jellačić acted in the obvious—and justified—hope that the peasants of Croatia would not be interested in the actual legal basis of this move. All that would concern them was whether they would benefit, for after such a move the peasants of Croatia were sure to regard him as their long-awaited liberator.

Thus, in the race to win the backing of the peasant masses, the Hungarian government now suffered serious setbacks at the hands of nationality politicians, or counter-revolutionaries posing as nationality politicians and who previously had not even regarded the peasants as human beings. This was still more true of minority politicians who did not have to grapple with Jellačić's inner reservations, politicians who—like the Hungarian liberals—were committed advocates of bourgeois transformation. At the same time, however, these minority representatives



15. Josip Jellačić

did not have to contend with the inner reservation that beset the Hungarian liberals, since they—unlike the latter—not bound to landed interests at all. The discontented non-Magyar peasants could see that—unlike the Hungarian authorities—many nationality politicians were turning to them with compassion and understanding.

This phenomenon occurred especially among the Rumanian peasants of Transylvania. Neither the Rumanian apprentices-at-law at Marosvásárhely nor Kolozsvár's Rumanian intellectuals gathered around Butteanu were content to demand the immediate liberation of Transylvania's serfs merely in their own name. Together with the radical students of the Balázsfalva seminary, at the end of March they decided to give greater weight to their demand by staging a mass rally in Balázsfalva on April 30, a Sunday on which the Greek Churches evoked the memory of doubting Thomas. For this they would mobilize as many peasants as possible. In preparation for this big meeting they also organized a series of smaller ones at the beginning of April, primarily in the villages of the Transylvanian *Erzgebirge*, Iancu's homeland. Here they called on their listeners to be patient, but, at the same time, also made it plain that they regarded the liberation of the serfs as an issue more important and more pressing than any other.

The Slovak peasants of Alsópribel, too, experienced the benevolence of the radical minority politicians. The Hont county authorities were shocked when in the second half of March these peasants seized pastures and forests, while at the same time demanding the liberation of serfs who had moved to the manorial estates. Also, they began to call for the abolition of the grape tithe imposed on them for the use of their vineyards, which were manorial in character. It was without hesitation that a local elementary school teacher, Ján Rotarides, a known inciter of the peasants even before 1848, placed himself at their head. The outstanding young Slovak poet, Janko Král', who happened to be Rotarides's guest at the time, also fully identified with their aspirations. The many Croat and Serb peasants who served as border guards also saw evidence of the minority politicians' favourable disposition towards them. At the time the March achievements received codification, the Crown, anxious to keep the army intact, consented only with great reluctance to allowing each of the border guard regiments to send a representative to the future Parliament—a modification of the earlier practice. As a result, the Hungarian government, which was unwilling to jeopardize the Crown's presumed readiness to cooperate, for a long time gave no indication of intending to upset the internal order of the Military Border. However,

as we have seen, prominent activists in the Croat national movement, had very firmly demanded, at their Zagreb meeting on March 25, that the border guards' feudal obligations be abolished as soon as possible. Two days later, supporters of the Serb national movement meeting in Újvidék advanced the same demand, and, obviously, these initiatives were no secret to the border guards concerned.

As we have seen, the non-Magyar peasants felt that the abolition of serfdom in March had not solved all of their problems. Increasingly, they began to take the view that, unlike in the past, now even the most downtrodden in the country could find protectors, albeit only among the nationality politicians. There soon emerged signs of this—especially at the above-mentioned Balázsfalva rally, which was held on April 30. At least two thousand peasants attended the rally, despite the remonstrations of Ioan Lemény, the Balázsfalva-based Greek Catholic bishop of Fogaras, who adhered to Gubernium policies in every respect. These developments made even those minority politicians think again who had previously considered it entirely unnecessary to support actively the demands of the peasantry. This was because they had regarded the equality of the nationalities before the law as a unique panacea which, once secured, would, automatically as it were, solve all other difficulties as well.

On April 26, for instance, Hurban admonished the Slovak peasants who came to hear him at a sparsely attended meeting at Miava for attaching greater importance to the emancipation of the serfs than to the attainment of national equality. Two days later he addressed a far larger gathering at Brezova, which was attended by more than three thousand people. Here Hurban discovered not only that a much greater number of peasants were interested in hearing his views, but also that the seizure by the local landlords, the Count Erdődy family, of the forests and pastures previously in their use had caused considerable ill feeling. He now considered it timely to encourage the peasants to take back the land concerned, if necessary, even by force. This was merely the first sign of the sudden change now taking place in Hurban's policy. Henceforth, at every opportunity, he proposed that, like the serf holdings in the narrow sense of the term, other peasant holdings should also be transformed into land free of feudal service obligations, especially on the northwestern fringes of Nyitra county (the area Hurban knew best) where there were extensive cleared areas which, on account of their very size, decisively affected the lives of a great number of peasants. By ploughing pieces of land of manorial character the peas-



16. *Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian*

ants procured these holdings, which had remained in the possession of the landlords even after the abolition of serfdom. Of the leaders of the Slovak national movement it was Hurban who brought up this subject most often.

A similar turn-about could also be perceived at around this time in the case of Bărnuț. On April 30 Bărnuț himself appeared at Balázsfalva, even though he had not been involved in the preparations for the rally announced for that day. He, too, learned a great many things there. The peasants attending the rally were demanding no less than the immediate abolition of

serfdom. Although they gave an enthusiastic welcome to the rally's three principal speakers, Papiu-Ilarian, Iancu, and Butteanu, this was clearly due solely to the fact that the latter used the occasion to speak of the emancipation of the serfs as a top-priority issue, one that was at least as important as the acknowledgment of the Rumanian people as a nation in its own right. Thus, by the time Bărnuț came to speak (which was towards the end of the meeting), he had come to realize that he would have to broaden his original programme. Accordingly, in his address he not only stressed the need to win national equality but also emphasized that "the time has come to abolish serfdom". This statement not only won Bărnuț the confidence of the peasants, but also the immediate support of the radical youth who had initiated the calling of the rally without him. This enabled Bărnuț—who also exploited the advantages afforded by his seniority—to assume the role of the principal and only competent director of the Rumanian national movement.

It was therefore in vain that the nationality movements in Hungary had lacked the backing of the peasant masses right up to the outbreak of the revolution. In the weeks immediately following March 15 interest in and sympathy for the minority movements quickly permeated the ranks of the non-Magyar peasantry. Now not only the more prominent minority politicians had a chance of winning those peasants who looked to the nationality movements, but also national counter-revolutionary fanatics of the Hurban, the Bărnui or even the Jellačić type. Admittedly, the nationality movements were still unable to mobilize the support of the entire non-Magyar peasantry—especially those of its members whose circumstances had already radically improved since the March revolution. But even though the minority movements failed to win over a majority of the Slovak, Ruthenian and Rumanian peasants living in Hungary proper even after the March events, national slogans were now all the more effective among peasants who had not directly benefited from the law passed in Pozsony concerning serf emancipation. To this group belonged not only the Rumanian serfs of Transylvania, who were awaiting with impatience the abolition of the feudal order, but also the Serb and Croat border guards, as well as the Croat serfs who attributed their emancipation to Jellačić. Also in this category were the Serb peasants living in the villages of the Tisza and Kikinda district who had been granted special privileges after part of the Military Border had been reorganized in the middle of the eighteenth century, and who, prior to 1848, had been obliged to pay only a moderate money rent (from which they revolution



17. Ioan Butteanu



18. *Members of the Batthyány government gathered for a Cabinet meeting: (sitting) Prime Minister Count Lajos Batthyány, Public Works and Transport Minister Count István Széchenyi, Minister for Agriculture, Industry and Trade Gábor Klauzál, Minister in Attendance on the King's Person Prince Pál Esterházy (who worked far from Pest and therefore remained without a head in the picture), and (standing) Minister of the Interior Bertalan Szemere, Minister for Religion and Public Education Baron József Eötvös, Finance Minister Lajos Kossuth, Justice Minister Ferenc Deák, and Minister of Defence General Lázár Mészáros*

had not, however, exempted them). Many Rumanian, Ruthenian and Slovak peasants living in Hungary who, before 1848, had no serf holdings (or only inadequate serf holdings) also formed part of this group.

Eventually, the Hungarian authorities attempted to prevent the establishment of closer ties between the non-Magyar peasant masses and the nationality movements. However, the measures they introduced to this end were not only belated but also insufficient in themselves, producing the very opposite of the effects that had been intended. By the end of May, the Batthyány government—which had been evading the issue up until then—also realized that it had to do something about the situation of the Serb border guards. The Cabinet meeting of May 30 decided that thenceforth the three *Temesköz* border

guard regiments, as well as the Serb border guards serving in the boatman battalion, were no longer obliged to carry out any form of unpaid labour service for the Treasury. In addition, where they did not possess sufficient pastures they would now be entitled to use Treasury forests as well (provided that this "can be done without injury to the forests"). The government also promised that it would ask Parliament to adopt further measures concerning the curtailment of public works and high price of salt. By the time these decisions were made, however, the minority politicians, who demanded both the emancipation of the Serb border guards and the establishment of a voivodate, had already convinced these soldiers that they could only expect a radical improvement of their situation from the creation of this voivodate. Not only would this entail the abolition of the unpaid labour service obligation to the Treasury but there would "no longer be a military treasury functioning as a landlord" at all. As a result, all feudal *regale* rights would disappear for ever, as would all obligations to pay bridge-tolls and ferriage. The people would no longer need to graze their livestock in the forests, since "they would have as much pasture as they wished".

Accordingly, the concessions offered by the government could no longer win over those concerned to the side of the Hungarian Revolution, and the disposition of the Hungarian authorities to take retaliatory and intimidatory measures alienated them still further. A case in point was Hont county where the Hungarian authorities, angered by the Pribel peasant movement, immediately issued orders for the arrest of Rotarides and Král', a step even the government subsequently endorsed—despite the failure of the Hungarian authorities to crown its action by getting them sentenced in a court of law.

It was therefore in vain that the government showed, alternately, intransigence and sympathy to the nationalities. It failed entirely to impede the increasing appeal of the minority movements amongst the non-Magyar peasant masses of the minority movements with the former, and, in fact, speeded up the process with the latter. This was true not only for Hungary proper but even more so for Transylvania, where, for the time being, the Hungarian government was unable to take charge. The Transylvanian Gubernium and the Transylvanian General Command were to remain in control until the enactment of the law on the union which was to be drafted by the Transylvanian Diet. To safeguard the interests of local landowners, the authorities, which were directed by staunch supporters of the old order, strove to keep the peasant movements at bay. The methods they employed, however,

drove into the arms of the minority movement even those Rumanian peasants who had previously been undecided as to which side they should support—the Hungarian Revolution or the Rumanian national grouping.

On receiving news, for example, of peasant unrest in a particular locality, the Transylvanian authorities usually despatched not only the county officials, but also armed law and order forces, taking good care to send, if possible, either Székler border guards or Magyar National Guardsmen against villages with Rumanian populations. But even this was not enough. With permission from the Gubernium, most of the counties also introduced martial law at the end of April or the beginning of May to overawe the agitated peasantry. In addition, most of the officials who announced the introduction of martial law in the villages obstinately insisted on the ancient Transylvanian custom whereby gallows were erected on the outskirts of every village when it was declared. On top of it all, in the meantime the Gubernium also issued warrants for the arrest of Butteanu, Papiu-Ilarian and other radical Rumanian politicians whom, by this time, the Rumanian peasant masses regarded as genuine friends of the people.

The first large national assemblies of the minorities living in Hungary began their work in mid-May. By this time, however, the Hungarians had succeeded in alienating many minority politicians who two months earlier had received news of the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution with enthusiasm. But this was not all. A sizeable proportion of non-Magyar people had also become alienated. At the same time, the nationality movements were, increasingly, entertaining illusions about the Crown. These stemmed primarily on the provisional constitution which the monarch had issued, on the basis of proposals from the Austrian government, for Austria on April 25. On paper at least, this created a situation in Cis-Leithenia diametrically opposed to that which obtained in Hungary proper in that it proclaimed the inviolability of the language and nationality of all the peoples of Austria.

The spread of such illusions concerning the Crown not only intensified alienation from the Hungarian Revolution still further, but was now potentially capable of kindling a sentiment which was expressly anti-Magyar, especially amongst those minority politicians who regarded the attainment of national equality to be much more important than bourgeois transformation and who therefore could not acquiesce in the stubborn ignoring of their national demands. Another consequence of these illusions was that subsequently such minority politicians

consolidated their positions still further within the minority movements. Obviously, this was also true of those minority leaders who had always been loyal supporters of the Crown and who had, therefore, regarded the Hungarian Revolution with the greatest distrust from the very beginning. Meanwhile, as the minority movements steadily built up a large-scale peasant backing, so the determination of the minority politicians, some of whom were anti-Magyar to begin with while others were in the process of adopting an anti-Magyar stance, also substantially increased. Obviously, this development was bound to further impair any chances—however slight—that may have existed for a peaceful settlement between the Hungarian Revolution and the minority movements.

The Conflicts Grow

Not all the nationality movements, however, had turned against the Hungarian Revolution, even by mid-May. A good example was the Slovak national movement. Despite the events of the previous weeks, this had still not finally given up the hope of reaching an agreement with the Hungarians; indeed, on account of special circumstances, it could not very easily do so. In March the proportion of dissatisfied peasants was, as we have seen, lower amongst the Slovaks than was the case among the other minorities, and consequently the Slovak national movement had a weaker peasant backing than the other minority movements. The Slovak minority politicians faced not inconsiderable difficulties on account of this, difficulties which were compounded by the fact that the Slovak movement had no armed support on which to rely. In this it differed from the Croat and Serb movements which, by winning over the border guards, created an armed backing for themselves which would have to be taken seriously. Also, whereas the Serbs and Rumanians under Hungarian rule could look to the Serbs and Rumanians beyond Hungary's borders for sympathy and encouragement, Štúr and his associates could look only to the Czechs for external assistance. Such help, however, was something they preferred to do without since there was a real danger that, should it be given, Magyar rule would simply be replaced by Czech domination.

A case in point is the meeting which took place on May 10 in Liptószentmiklós, which was attended by some forty leaders of the Slovak national movement from various parts of Upper Hungary. The aim of the meeting was to put into writing, for the sake of greater



19. *Michal Miloslav Hodža*

emphasis, the demands hitherto raised (albeit ineffectively, sporadically, and on a county basis) in the name of the entire Slovak people. The participants were unanimous concerning the need to put demands more far-reaching than hitherto, although they also agreed that it would still not be wise to present these demands in the form of a resolution which would rule out the possibility of any further negotiations. Instead, they decided to draft a petition which would only serve as a basis for negotiations, and to send copies of it not only to the monarch, but also to the Hungarian government and Hungarian Parliament.

Some of the points in the petition drafted at Liptószentmiklós—and those who formulated them were fully aware of this—were bound to be entirely unacceptable to the

Hungarians. In addition to the demands already voiced by the “Bratia Slováci!” proclamation, the petition called for the setting up of a Slovak university and required that launching of newspapers and the establishment of printing presses should not—as the new press law stipulated—be made conditional on the downpayment of a large sum of caution money. Other demands included the abolition of property qualifications for voting, the release of Rotarides and Král, the recog-

nition of the Slovak people as a nation, and the right of every ethnic group in the country to set up its own national legislative body. Moreover, the country's Parliament should comprise representatives of the individual nations, and the language of every nation in the country should be recognized as a language of discussion in it. To these points the petition also added the demand that in areas with a Slovak population an independent National Guard should be set up under Slovak commanders and with Slovak as the language of command. Obviously, however, even those gathered at Liptószentmiklós were aware that quite a few of these demands were included only for the sake of ensuring a better negotiating position. They knew that later, in the course of talks with the Hungarian government, they would have to drop the more extreme claims—a price they would have to pay in order to win acceptance for their more moderate demands.

It can therefore be said of the participants of the Liptószentmiklós meeting that they by no means aimed to raise insurmountable obstacles to an agreement with the Hungarian Revolution. Similarly, it can even be said of some of those who attended that they actually made every effort to eliminate the difficulties which, as they saw it, constituted the greatest barriers. Indeed, this was so much the case that it was only after only a bitter debate that the meeting was able to formulate Point Eleven (one of the most important of the petition) which dealt with the peasant issue. Hurban had proposed that this point demand the returning of cleared woodland and other land holdings arbitrarily taken away from the peasants before 1848, as well as the emancipation of serfs living on manorial lands and the abolition of seigniorial *regale* rights (the exclusive right enjoyed by landlords over fishing, hunting, and the running of taverns and butcher's shops). Hodža, on the other hand, opposed Hurban in this, arguing that to include such demands in the petition "would alienate the gentlefolk still further". In the end, Hurban emerged victorious from the debate because the presiding Štúr and the majority of those present decided to back him. In spite of this, the defeat Hodža suffered was not humiliating.

The petition complete, Hurban now proposed that a large rally be staged the following day in the market place in front of the county hall, where the contents of the petition would be made public. This would require the mobilization of the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. Afterwards, the petition would need to be circulated in those counties with a Slovak population, and only after as many people as possible had



20. *The announcement of the Liptószentmiklós demands and the pinning up of the Slovak national colours—as they would have taken place on May 11, 1848 in accordance with Hurban's ideas*

signed it should it be finally handed in. Hodža flatly rejected the idea of the rally, despite the fact that he approved of collecting the maximum number of signatures for the petition. He was convinced that the rally would only serve to enrage the Magyars, or in other words, do damage to the Slovak national movement. He also believed that the marked indifference of the local people to the movement would endanger the success of such a rally, and finally the majority supported Hodža on this issue. Accordingly, the ceremonial announcement of the petition on the following day did not take place at a mass rally, but before an impromptu gathering at Andrásfalva spa, adjacent to Liptószentmiklós.

To put it briefly, the way to a Hungarian–Slovak rapprochement was still open even after May 10, despite the fact that the Liptószentmiklós rally had made it abundantly plain that the leaders of the Slovak movement firmly adhered to their own national demands. By this time, however, the rift between the Hungarian Revolution and the Croat national movement had become even greater, notwithstanding the fact

that Court circles were just as hostile to those points in the Zagreb petition of March 25 which pressed for internal bourgeois transformation as to similar aspirations on the part of the Hungarian Revolution. However, these circles did everything possible to avoid an open break with the Hungarian Revolution as long as the revolutionary movements in Vienna and Northern Italy remained outside official control. Accordingly, on March 30 the monarch gave an evasive answer to the proposals of the Croat delegation which had hastened to Vienna with the petition. This was unlikely to encourage any advocates of the Croat national movement to seek closer contacts with the Hungarian Revolution; at most it would stir up discontent against the Crown not amongst the loyalist majority in the Croat national movement but only among its liberal minority. Moreover, even though the monarch had eschewed substantive discussion of the petition, the fact that Jellačić had, after all, been appointed *ban* (which was one of the main demands of the petition) helped reduce discontent against the Crown. Obviously, the Croat liberals were not completely satisfied. Jellačić was, however, able to handle this single-handed. He was fully aware of what he needed to do in order to prevent the disappointed liberals from attributing some of the blame to him. He wanted to rally the Croat liberals behind him, just as he had rallied the Croat loyalists. He knew that the liberals could not be persuaded to support the Crown, but if they supported him they, too, could eventually be counted on to further the Crown's counter-revolutionary schemes.

The first thing Jellačić did after his arrival in Zagreb was solemnly to state in a proclamation that "my desire, my principal goal is the prosperity of nation and country". To this he immediately added



21. Ferdinand V.

that until the relationship between Croatia and Hungary was put on an entirely new basis in full accordance with the spirit of independence and equality, he would establish no form of contact with the Hungarian government. In his manifesto Jellačić emphasized—in line with the petition of March 25—not only that he regarded the earliest possible convening of the Croat *sabor* as extremely important, but also that the *sabor* must be the embodiment “of the genuine national will of the entire nation”, and, accordingly, that it must be based on a non-feudal suffrage. This policy statement satisfied not only the right wing of the Croat national movement but was also highly likely to please the Croat liberals.

Jellačić soon scored his second success. His next step, the issuing on April 25 of his *ban*'s statement on the emancipation of the serfs, was certain to please both the peasantry and the Croat liberals. In preparation for the *sabor* Jellačić called a *ban*'s conference—it began on May 8—to which he invited selected representatives of the Croat Estates. This, too, was calculated to increase the Croat liberals' sympathy for Jellačić, who also ensured that none of the pro-Magyar and anti-Croat National Party politicians attended. Jellačić took good care that the prominent politicians of the national party's liberal minority participated in sufficient numbers. At the conference Jellačić had electoral rules accepted which, at long last, guaranteed a real say for non-nobles in electing the representatives of the municipalities, albeit only indirectly. (These electoral rules differed substantially from those he had promised in his policy proclamations, and enabled the Croat aristocrats and public dignitaries to retain their places in the *sabor*.)

It was therefore in vain that Batthyány, who travelled to Vienna in early May, succeeded in persuading the monarch to order the commanders-general in Hungary to obey the Hungarian government and to send the same instructions to Jellačić as well. By the time these instructions were issued, the leaders of the Croat national movement—and the liberals also—who were then attending the *ban*'s conference had unanimously decided to appeal against them. On May 11 the *ban*'s conference drafted a petition addressed to the monarch which on the one hand contained a lengthy account of Jellačić's merits, and on the other declared in the name of the conference's participants that the Croats could not subordinate themselves to the Hungarian government. Not only would such a development violate Croat national interest, but the fact that the Magyars were striving to establish a Hungarian state totally independent of Austria also posed a serious threat to the power

of the dynasty and "to the integrity of the Austrian state bond". Liberals attending the *ban's* conference not only agreed that this should be given special emphasis, but also that, in conclusion, the petition should offer the Croat nation's "unshakeable loyalty" for "the consolidation of the throne" and for the protection of the empire's unity.

The Croat liberals acted in this way merely because the petition committed its signatories not simply to participation in restoring the old order, but also to a struggle for a new "free" and "organically structured empire" (i.e. one which would ensure autonomy to the indi-

vidual provinces, among them Croatia). Also, by this time Jellačić's apparently liberal measures and the appealing words of the provisional Austrian constitution announced on April 25 had fostered a (vain) hope in the Croat liberals that the Habsburgs were ready to restructure the empire along these lines in exchange for their services as allies. Even in May the Croat liberals were motivated solely by the desire to assert Croat national interests rather than to assist the triumph of any counter-revolutionary scheme. (Jellačić could only succeed, despite this, in winning the full backing of the liberals for himself—and, indirectly, for the Crown—because in the meantime they had been overwhelmed by illusions.) Disputable as this may seem, the fact remains that the liberals, too, offered their assistance to the Crown and by doing so entered into the service of the counter-revolution.

Reaction scored another success at the Serb national assembly which was held in Karlova on May 13-15. Some of those attending the



22. Lajos Batthyány



23. Teodor Pavlović



24. Jovan Hadžić

meeting—among them Teodor Pavlović, the editor of the liberal *Sveobšteg jugoslavenske i serbske narodne novine* published in Pest; Jakov Ignjatović, the young Szentendre writer; and Jovan Hadžić, Újvidék's municipal alderman—suspected that if the Serbs now opened a front against the Magyars, this would only harm the interests of both peoples. For this reason they were still willing to work towards an agreement with the Hungarians, in spite of their previous intransigence. However, the voices of these men were literally drowned in the roar of the crowd—largely from the villages of the Military Border and numbering some six to eight thousand people by the end of the meeting—which had flooded into the town. Stratimirović, however, scored a resounding success at Karlóca. Like Hadžić and his associates, he entertained no illusions concerning the Habsburgs, and since his return from Pozsony had been convinced that the extraction of satisfactory con-

cessions from the Hungarians would require resolute action. Consequently, Stratimirović was no longer averse to the idea of an anti-Hungarian uprising. The majority of those attending the assembly—including clergymen, border guard officers and even most of the simple village people—who had turned up—rallied behind Rajačić, whose hatred of revolutionary movements was unrivalled at the time.

But even Rajačić himself was not as subservient to the Crown as Jellačić turned out to be. When on April 20 Rajačić gave his backing to the demand for a voivodate and began to mobilize the Serb masses against the Hungarian Revolution, he launched a struggle whose primary aim was not to sharpen Serb–Hungarian conflicts and thereby enable the Habsburgs to again consolidate their already badly-shaken imperial system. His main aim was to conduct a successful struggle for an autonomous voivodate, which he would then lead. To the power he enjoyed as head of a Church Rajačić then wished to add the kind of political power possessed at one time by his great predecessor, the patriarch Arsenije Crnojević and by the prince-bishops of Crna Gora.



25. On May 13, 1848 Rajačić opens the first national assembly of the Serbs living in Hungary in the courtyard, decked in Serbian and imperial colours before the Karlóca cathedral

He believed that a spirited struggle at the side of the Habsburgs against the Hungarian Revolution was the only way to achieve this power. Rajačić also thought that by rendering this type of service to the Habsburgs he would be able to extract appropriate services in return. Accordingly, the central theme of his opening address to the Karlóca assembly was that the Serbs must immediately enter into a struggle against the Hungarians for their national rights. In this they should not hesitate, if only because even external circumstances now favoured their aspirations. (In fact, in his draft constitution of April 25 the monarch had promised full equality of rights to the peoples of his empire.)

The assembly adopted these rallying cries with great enthusiasm. Rajačić was proclaimed patriarch of the Serbs and then the assembly also elected a voivode to act as commander of the armed forces of the would-be voivodate, namely Colonel Stevan Šupljikac, commander of the 3rd (Ogulin) Border Guard Regiment, which was then serving in Northern Italy. By May 15 the assembly had drafted resolutions proclaiming that the Serbs regarded themselves as a "politically free and independent nation", that they wanted to establish their own autonomous Serb voivodate out of the areas specified at Karlóca one month earlier (i.e. out of *Bácska*, the *Temesköz*, the *Szerémség* and *Baranya*). This voivodate would enter into a political alliance with the Croats' Triune Kingdom and did not desire to begin negotiations with the Hungarian government. It would, however, despatch a delegation to the monarch to submit the requests of the national assembly and to convey to him the "affection" and "loyalty" felt by the Serb people towards the dynasty.

One resolution, however, was conspicuous by its absence. This resolution should have addressed the peasant issue and the problems of the border guards. But the fact that no such resolution was adopted could not really come as a surprise to anyone. Even to the most anxious Serb national politician it must have been completely obvious since the opening of the assembly that by now even the Serb masses saw the establishment of a voivodate as fundamental to the solution of all their problems. Obviously, the drafters of the resolutions *had* to exploit the favourable situation and *had* to remove immediately such social problems (which were so embarrassing for Rajačić and his kind) from the agenda.

In point of fact, the drafters of the resolutions were also obliged to tackle other rather complicated issues. One major problem was that whereas hardly one-third of the population of the would-be voivodate

was Serb, over a quarter were Rumanians who objected to their subordinate position in the Church organization. As a result, even if the peasant issue could be ignored at this stage, the drafters of the resolutions were compelled to devote special attention to the Rumanians over one of their points, namely that, if nothing else, they at least demand recognition for the Rumanians, too, as the sons of a separate nation. It was just as obvious that the architects of the resolutions should decide to establish a high command for the planned uprising. Finally, they set up the Serb national chief *odbor* with Rajačić as its first chairman. Not wishing to go too far until the Court circles gave some tangible (and expected) proof of their satisfaction with his offer of friendship, Rajačić thought it wise to withdraw from the limelight for a while, at least to some extent. Accordingly, a few days later this office of chairman was transferred to Stratimirović.

The national assembly of the Transylvanian Rumanian opened at Balázsfalva on May 15, the closing day of the consultations in Karlóca, with an attendance—at between thirty and forty thousand—five times that of the latter. Largely on account of the vast crowds gathered there, the Balázsfalva assembly was somewhat different from its counterpart in Karlóca. But there was another difference: the Rumanian peasants of Transylvania did not at this stage see their future with the same confidence as that felt by the Serbs, who hoped that the establishment of the voivodate would provide a lasting solution to all their troubles. In other words, they were still seeking an answer to the questions principally concerning them and this explains why they flocked to Balázsfalva—again accompanied by a small number of Magyar peasants—in their tens of thousands. They did this in the hope that they would finally be told what they wanted to hear. This in itself made it impossible for Šaguna, who professed almost the same views as Rajačić, although he handled the peasant issue even more cautiously than the latter, to become the sole, unchallenged leader of the national movement, as Rajačić had done at Karlóca.

Admittedly, however, this restriction of the role played by the conservative wing of the national movement did not especially enhance the chances of a Rumanian-Hungarian agreement. Just like the Karlóca meeting, the Balázsfalva assembly also had its pro-Hungarian participants—indeed all the signs indicate that their numbers were considerable. These people, however, were also totally pushed into the background, and in any case, they could not have paved the way for



26. Ioan Lemény

a *rapprochement* between the Rumanian national movement and the Hungarian Revolution. The pro-Hungarians concerned, Bishop Lemény and his followers, were, unlike Teodor Pavlović and his associates, no friends of bourgeois transformation. Indeed, they were at least as hostile to bourgeois transformation as they were to the possibility of a break between the Rumanian national movement and leading Hungarian circles. And within the Rumanian national movement they were also confronted by a similarly determined and powerful radical group, the only one of its kind among the minority movements in Hungary. Although their aspirations were almost

identical to those of the Hungarian Revolution, the representatives of this Rumanian left wing, the young people rallying around Iancu and Papiu-Ilarian, could now no longer facilitate Hungarian-Rumanian *rapprochement* because at the assembly held on the occasion of the Balázsfalva rally of April 30, they had come under Bărnău's influence. Accordingly, although they had done most of the organizational work for the new Balázsfalva meeting they considered it simply unimaginable that either they or others should dispute Bărnău's role as the assembly's leading figure.

Not only Iancu and his associates, however, supported Bărnău at the subsequent Balázsfalva assembly, but most of the serfs attending the meeting—i.e. the vast majority of those who appeared at Balázsfalva—also rallied behind him. As a result, Bărnău was now suddenly

possessed of such sweeping power that, finally, the Rumanian liberals also succumbed. They did this on May 14, the day before the assembly opened, when, of the Rumanian intellectuals who had arrived in Balázsfalva, about one thousand convened in the local cathedral for a preliminary discussion of what was to be done. Bărnauț, the first to speak at this meeting, was aware that a crowd of peasants had already surrounded the cathedral and that this would impart a special emphasis to what he had to say. On the other hand, there were no peasants inside the cathedral itself and he could therefore speak openly for the moment, just as he had done at the Balázsfalva rally of April 30. Bărnauț stated his views bluntly and what he had to say probably made it clear that his stance in many respects differed considerably from those of other participants in the discussion. Initially, Bărnauț spoke with unequivocal praise, indeed admiration for the draft constitution issued for Austria in the name of the monarch on April 25. He also admitted that the Hungarian Revolution had introduced liberties of fundamental significance and that the Hungarians had offered these liberties to the country's non-Magyar inhabitants, among them the non-Magyars of Transylvania (provided that the union between Hungary and Transylvania actually materialized). Bărnauț was quick to add, however, that the union would not bring liberty for the Rumanian nation, but in fact would push it into even further into slavery. In reality, the non-Magyars could not enjoy equal liberty so long as the Hungarians insisted on the strict centralization of the state apparatus and as long as they maintained that Hungarian as the country's sole official language was an indispensable guarantee of state unity. This was tantamount to saying that such liberty would be impossible until non-Magyars were allowed to organize separate national assemblies to discuss their own national issues, until they were permitted to elect their own officials from their own ranks in the regions they inhabited, and until they were allowed to express their opinion in their own mother tongue in Parliament or at the county assembly, as, for example, in Belgium or Switzerland.

In actual fact—noted Bărnauț—the Hungarians had not only achieved political liberties, but had also abolished serfdom and offered to extend the emancipation to the serfs of Transylvania, provided that the union came through. He continued that even this could not be a telling argument in favour of the union since even in Transylvania, which had preserved its separate status, feudalism would inevitably be destroyed “by the frightful and invisible force which everywhere works

against tyranny". Consequently, said Bărnuz in conclusion, to join forces with the Hungarian Revolution and to implement the union would bring no benefits to the Rumanians, only harm. Therefore, those who wished to serve the Rumanian people could not but raise the cry: "Let us not sit at the table of Hungarian liberty, because every morsel on it is poisoned."


It is unlikely that these arguments could have been received with unanimous assent. Also present in the Balázsfalva cathedral on this day was George Bariț, who was fully aware that the people of Transylvania would not be freed from the bonds of feudalism by some "invisible force", nor even by imperial favour, but only through the joint struggle of the Rumanian and Hungarian advocates of bourgeois transformation. (Bariț also regarded it an untenable state of affairs that Hungarian was the country's sole official language.) Also present at the meeting was August Treboniu Laurian, who, since 1845, had co-edited the *Magazinu istoriku pentru Dacia* with Nicolae Bălcescu, the greatest liberal of Wallachia, and who now hurried back to his homeland from exile in Bucharest to persuade the Rumanians of Transylvania "to stand up for the Rumanians' rights". They should not, however, "break with the Hungarians", but should strive to make the latter understand that it was also in their basic interest to appease the Rumanians because "their union with the Rumanians signifies the survival of both nationalities". However, speaking after Bărnuz, Bariț and Laurian were unable to make a decisive impact on the meeting. By this time there had developed in the cathedral an atmosphere in which the most they could have hoped for was to exercise a slightly moderating influence. They were, however, no longer able to speak out effectively against the substance of Bărnuz's message.

The following day the national assembly was officially opened, this time in the presence of all the participants. Again, Bărnuz was the first to speak. In accordance with what he had said the previous day, he now tabled a motion that the assembly proclaim that the Rumanian people is a separate nation and that it swear eternal allegiance to the monarch. He immediately obliged his audience to take an oath of loyalty to the monarch and to Rumanian national interests. Out of special consideration for the status of the majority of those attending, Bărnuz incorporated into the text of the oath a sentence binding the oath-takers to work towards "the abolition of serfdom" "in accordance with the possibilities". The resolution adopted by the assembly on May 16 was also characterized by the intention to reconcile nationalist criteria and anti-feudal aspirations in this way.

Above all, this text enumerated the principal national demands—that the Rumanian nation be recognized as a separate nation, that the Rumanians be granted proportional parliamentary representation, that they be allowed to hold a national assembly annually, that they be permitted to elect officials freely and from their own number, that they be given the unrestricted right to use their mother tongue in public life, that their children be taught in their mother tongue, and that a university be established for them in which Rumanian would be the language of tuition. Afterwards, the resolution proceeded to the most important requirements of domestic bourgeois transformation, and in some instances in a substantially more radical spirit than that which had characterized the Pozsony laws. For instance, it not only pressed for the abolition of the serfs' feudal services and the tithe (without compensation having to be paid by the peasantry), but also demanded the return to the peasants of



27. *A. Treboniu Laurian*



28. *The ceremonial opening of the Transylvanian Rumanians' First National Assembly on May 15, 1848 in front of Balázsfalva cathedral adorned with both Rumanian and imperial flags*

land earlier seized from them by the landlords, the abolition of the guilds and the introduction of complete industrial freedom. Similarly, the resolution did not confine itself to demanding equality before the law, proportionate taxation personal liberty and freedom of assembly, but, among other things, called for the general introduction of trial by jury and freedom of the press, along with the abolition of caution money.

It is true, however, that the value of these manifestations was considerably impaired by the last point of the resolution. This contained the demand that the Transylvanian Diet should not decide on the issue of union with Hungary until the representatives of the Rumanian nation could participate in the debate on the subject. This point did not actually call for the issue of union to be decided by a legislative body based on popular representation (in which the Rumanians would probably have constituted a majority) instead of by another feudal Diet. It merely raised the demand that the Rumanian people in Transylvania now be recognized as a "constitutional nation" in the same feudal sense as the Hungarian, Szekler and Saxon "nations" (or more precisely the privileged minorities within these three ethnic groups) had been recognized hitherto. Accordingly, the deputies of the Rumanian *recepta natio* should also be allowed to attend the next feudal Diet in Transylvania. It was as though the authors of this point had absolutely nothing in common with the formulators of the resolution's other, consistently anti-feudal points...

The truth, however, is that the same set of people drafted the entire resolution. Therefore the demands raised by the last point can only be explained by the immaturity of the ideas adopted by the drafters. Otherwise it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the drafters of this point had absolutely no intention of endorsing the union, not even if many of their other demands were needed, and that therefore they wished to break even with those supporters of the Hungarian Revolution who would perhaps have shown understanding towards those Rumanian national demands—or at least some of them—which did not pose a threat to bourgeois transformation. On the other hand of course, they firmly rejected the idea that steps be taken to extend the circle of those who enjoyed feudal privileges—instead of abolishing the system of privileges altogether—on the pretext that Rumanian national demands had now been met.

It is, however, possible for us to adhere to this conjecture. The final events of the Balázsfalva assembly, as well as what happened immediately after it ended, also seem to confirm this. At the closing session

of the consultations on May 17 the resolution adopted the previous day was transformed into a petition. Although it was decided that this petition should be forwarded not only to the monarch but also to the Transylvanian Diet which was to be convened later, the task of the delegation that was to attend the Diet was strictly limited to the handling over of this petition. Indeed, the delegates were specifically forbidden from entering into any form of bargaining as regards the petition's contents. After the election of the members of the two delegations the Rumanian National Committee was formed as a permanent body, under Şaguna's chairmanship but with Bărnăuţ actually pulling the strings. Whilst several members of the radical youth already under his influence—among them Iancu, Papiu-Ilarian and Butteanu—were allocated places on

the committee, good care was taken to exclude liberals such as Bariţ, Cipariu and Laurian. This was to ensure the full assertion of Bărnăuţ's will. The town of Nagyszeben was chosen as the committee's headquarters—obviously not only because it was the seat of the Orthodox bishopric of Transylvania, but also because the Saxon Universality and especially the General Command of Transylvania had based them-



29. Rumanian design for adding elements symbolizing the Rumanian nation to Transylvania's coat-of-arms

selves there. Finally, at the end of the discussion a proclamation worded by Bărnăuș was released on behalf of the national committee. In this the elaboration of the national demands adopted by the assembly were complemented with the following appeal: "Rumanians ... to arms!"

On May 21 the appeal of the Rumanian youth of Nagyvárad to the Rumanians of Transylvania was issued. This pressed for Hungarian recognition of the Rumanian people as a separate nation and called for Rumanian officials in areas which had a Rumanian population. It also demanded that tuition for Rumanian students be in their mother tongue and called for unrestricted Church autonomy for Rumanians. At the same time it also urged close co-operation between Rumanian and Hungarian advocates of bourgeois transformation, and for union between Transylvania and Hungary to accomplish the latter fully. In response, Bărnăuș and his associates quickly issued another proclamation in which they stated, more firmly than ever before, that they strongly opposed union and that they would remain staunch supporters of the monarch. As for the argument advanced by the Nagyvárad youth to the effect that bourgeois transformation was the top-priority issue, they could only answer that "the abolition of serfdom and the tithe will only liberate you physically but spiritually you will still be slaves, more so than previously", because "liberty without nationality is like a body without a soul".

Thus, by May it had become clear that there existed almost no chance of a *rapprochement* between the Hungarian Revolution and the nationality movements. The Croat, Serb and Transylvanian Rumanian movements now looked primarily to the Crown for support. Obviously, the Crown, preoccupied with its counter-revolutionary machinations, welcomed these developments. Even at this stage, Court circles were reluctant to give their full backing to the minority movements. This was partly because they rejected some of the minority movements' demands, and especially because the Crown, unable to take appropriate measures on account of the revolutionary movements in other provinces of the empire, still considered that the time was not ripe to take overt action against the Hungarian Revolution. This notwithstanding, even in the situation then existing the organizers of the counter-revolution did everything in their power to fuel the animosity of the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary towards the Hungarians and to reinforce their loyalty to the Crown.

Thus, for appearances' sake, during the weeks that followed the monarch rejected the demands of the Transylvanian Saxons, those of

the Serbs of Southern Hungary, and those of the Transylvanian Rumanians in the same way that he had dismissed those of the Croats at the end of March. For the same reason, he now prohibited Jellačić from convoking the Croat *sabor*. On the other hand, however, to demonstrate, for instance, that the Crown was far more concerned with the rise of the Rumanians than with the Hungarian nobility, the Court included a point among the royal *propositiones* determining the agenda of the soon-to-be convoked Transylvanian Diet to the effect that it was the monarch's wish that at the Diet "the condition of the Vlachs, who inhabit most of Transylvania, be guaranteed by new legislation, in respect of both civic and religious rights". To appease the Serbs, on May 22 the Court promoted Colonel Šupljikac to the rank of general. For the time being this was all they could do; Šupljikac's election as voivode could not yet be officially endorsed and as a result his return from the Italian theatre of war was not permitted at this stage.

In the meantime the Transylvanian authorities, which were still under the control of counter-revolutionary elements, continued their earlier policy, namely, using Szekler border guards or Hungarian National Guards to suppress peasant movements in the Rumanian villages, thereby giving the impression among many Rumanian peasants that not only the Hungarian landlords, but also the Hungarians generally were the enemies of the Rumanian people. This held true especially after the Balázsfalva assembly, which succeeded in sparking off the peasant movements. On June 2, for instance, Szekler troops dispatched to Mihálcfalva, Lower Fehér county (where the Rumanian serfs had refused to fulfil their feudal service obligations and had recovered the lands forcefully taken from them by the Esterházy counts), even fired on the villagers, who received them with pitchforks and scythes. Twelve villagers were fatally wounded in this incident.

In short, although the plotters of counter-revolution were obliged to refrain from laying their cards on the table, even now they had the opportunity to exploit the minority movements. Under the circumstances, the leadership of the Hungarian Revolution had to act with the utmost firmness and responsibility. For example, as soon as the Hungarian government received news of the resolutions of the Serb national assembly in Karlóca, it immediately declared them null and void and issued orders to Rajačić to dissolve the Serb chief *odbor*. Then, when it became obvious that Rajačić was not in the least concerned with such instructions, on August 2 the Hungarian government suspended him from his position as archbishop. In the meantime it became



30. "Hands off the Hungarians!"

The causes of the aggravation of the nationality issue and the best way of settling it in the eyes of a graphic artist sharing the official Hungarian stand

clear that Jellačić still intended to convoke the Croat *sabor* despite the monarch's prohibition. On this pretext Batthyány managed to have him suspended from his post of *ban* by means of a royal rescript. These measures did not, however, prevent either Jellačić or Rajačić from continuing with their activities. As for Batthyány and his associates, they, too, were aware that much more needed to be done than merely issuing orders and decrees. Accordingly, from the end of April onwards, they sent a whole host of government commissioners to Southern Hungary and the Drave region. Martial law was introduced in several counties. By mid-May, they had started to organize an army to suppress the Serbs' imminent uprising. Similar measures were also taken to avert any possible threat from Jellačić.

Hungarian cabinet ministers were perfectly aware that armed attack launched from Zagreb or Karlóca would only impede the process of bourgeois transformation in Hungary. Accordingly, such an attack would have to be dealt with in the same way as any other counter-revolutionary threat. Even at this time, however, they failed to under-

stand (or did not want to understand) that not all the nationality politicians now actually preparing for armed action against the Revolution had originally intended to play a counter-revolutionary role. The fact that Kukuljević and Stratimirović and their kind ultimately ended up as champions of the counter-revolution was, above all, due to the lack of generosity the Hungarian Revolution had displayed towards minority aspirations. Even at this stage, the Hungarian government still omitted to make those—at least partial—concessions which could perhaps have facilitated attempts to drive a wedge between the likes of Kukuljević and Stratimirović and the likes of Jellačić and Rajačić. This was not, however, the most obvious example of their failure to comprehend the situation accurately (as the situation at around this time did not favour such attempts at all). The way in which the Hungarian authorities dealt with the Slovak national movement best illustrates this lack of understanding. Although the Slovak leaders had not dropped the idea of coming to an agreement with the Hungarian Revolution even at Liptószentmiklós, the Hungarian authorities did not so much as allow them the time to hand in their petition to the government, but on receiving news of what had happened at Liptószentmiklós instantly issued arrest warrants on the most trivial grounds—not only for Hurban, but also for Štúr and even Hodža. These men were thereby compelled—for want of a different way out—to flee to Bohemia and to relinquish the hope of a quick settlement.

This was not all. The Hungarian leaders refused to listen even to minority proposals from those who had no intention of breaking with the Hungarian Revolution (as they clearly saw that its success was vital for their peoples as well). When, for instance, the petition of the Breznóbánya Slovaks, which reiterated Hodža's late-March demands, reached Pest at the same time as news of the Liptószentmiklós assembly, it still only asked that the public administration in counties with a Slovak population and the language of tuition in the schools of Slovak-populated towns and villages be Slovak. This petition was simply filed away in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior. The petition addressed by the representatives of the Orthodox Rumanians of Hungary to the government on May 21 also failed to evoke a response, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that those drafting it not only put forth national demands, but also assured the Hungarian Revolution of their loyalty and support. On June 27 Murgu—commissioned by the government itself—held a public rally at Lugos. The aim of this was to call on the Rumanian population of the *Temesköz* to

take up arms against the Serb separatists in defence of the Hungarian Revolution. The large number of Rumanians who turned up at the meeting enthusiastically offered to fight—on condition that their commander be appointed among their own ranks (they were actually thinking of Murgu) and that the *Temesköz* be organized into an autonomous province with Rumanians as its official language. The government's response was to immediately brand these demands as manifestations of anti-Hungarian separatism. Rather than make even partial concessions, it dropped the idea of mobilizing the Rumanians of the *Temesköz* forthwith.


This short-sighted policy was not, however, advocated solely by Hungarian liberals in the government: Transylvania's liberals, for instance, also fully supported it. The activities of the Transylvanian Diet, which began its work on May 29 (and which was in session until July 18) fully demonstrated this. The Transylvanian Estates incorporated the recognition of equality before the law "for the entire population of the country regardless of nationality, language and religion, as a perpetual and immutable principle" into the law (passed at the first session of the Diet on May 30) which confirmed the union on behalf of Transylvania. They did not, however, consider it necessary to ensure separate national rights for the nationalities. The reason for this was perhaps that on March 30 the Saxon delegates had also endorsed the codification of the union. It must be noted that the Saxon delegates did this with no sign of enthusiasm and were only persuaded to do so by Lieutenant-General Baron Antal Puchner, the chief organizer of the counter-revolution. Head of the Transylvanian General Command, Puchner had been sent to attend the Diet as royal commissioner. Puchner had previously intimated to the Saxons that it was useless to offer any resistance because the Crown, then in a difficult position, would endorse the reunion of Hungary and Transylvania in spite of its antipathy towards it.

It remains a fact that the Transylvanian Diet showed the same reluctance to ensure the minorities' national rights as its Hungarian counterpart had displayed earlier. Moreover, the Transylvanian Estates tried to avoid even discussing the problem—despite the Balázsfalva events of a fortnight previously. The petition drafted at the Balázsfalva assembly was submitted to the Diet soon after the latter convened but instead of discussing it immediately the Estates, in order to gain time, passed it on to the committee of petitions. This action prompted Alexandru Bohățel (a member of the delegation chosen to present the

petition and, as a nobleman and member of the Hungarian "constitutional nation", a participant in the Diet) to speak out in support of the petition's most important demand, namely that the Rumanian nation be recognized as one of the *receptae nationes* of Transylvania and that no decision be made on the issue of union until the representatives of the fourth "nation" could attend the Diet. As expected, his motion was rejected on the grounds that the new order engendered by the Revolution was based on the equality of citizens, and that the maintenance of the system of feudal

"nations" was incompatible with it. (This objection was, of course, justified, despite the fact that it was made by individuals who were representatives not of the people but of the traditional three "constitutional nations"—a difference of which these individuals were very well aware.)

Three weeks after the decision had been made concerning the union, the committee of petitions finally submitted the Balázsfalva petition to a plenary meeting. Once again the Estates eschewed detailed discussion of its contents. They argued that legislation already passed by the Diet had met some of the demands in the petition, and that those which remained would be dealt with by Parliament in Pest. This, again, was pure sophistry. Admittedly, the Diet had in the meantime enacted legislation relating to the emancipation of the serfs, proportionate taxation, popular representation, freedom of the press, religious equality, etc. This therefore meant that some of the anti-feudal demands in the Balázsfalva petition had been granted. However, none of the national demands put forth by the Rumanians was met, and some of the legislation enacted merely stated that a similar bill passed in Pozsony



31. Eftimie Murgu



32. Avram Iancu

for Hungary would henceforth also apply to Transylvania. Yet this followed almost automatically from the enactment of the union. Accordingly, the Diet ought to have devoted its precious time to the passage of legislation in areas which as yet were uncovered. Wherever Transylvanian legislation happened to differ from that passed in Hungary, the difference usually meant a step backwards rather than forwards. This was especially the case with regard to the franchise, the issue on which the Rumanian population felt most sensitively.

In Transylvania, too, the privileged were allowed, without exception, to retain the franchise by the Kolozsvár Diet. From among the nobility, however, only those were now declared enfranchised who paid at least eight gulden annual tax, and not those who met the property qualifications stipulated in Pozsony. And since the Kolozsvár Estates were themselves well aware that very few people in Transylvania paid such a lot of tax, the Diet considered it necessary to state that the electorate should be supplemented with other non-nobles—to the effect that the tax-paying non-nobles of smaller settlements add one, and larger settlements two, extra voters to the electorate from their own ranks. Even under the new provisions, however, less than eleven thousand people (in other words an average of only five per settlement) acquired the right to vote in Transylvania. As a result, the size of the electorate rose, at most to one and a half times its previous figure, as against a fourfold increase in Hungary proper.

In short, the Transylvanian Estates were even more zealous in their efforts to protect the power of the nobility. This did not, of course, alter

the fact that by enacting the union they rendered a tremendous service to the cause of bourgeois transformation, which was bound to benefit the non-Magyars of Transylvania as well. They thereby created an opportunity for the actual implementation of the union, which in turn substantially strengthened the Revolution and considerably weakened the positions of those who were now preparing to crush it. Nevertheless it is indisputable that when the Transylvanian Estates refused even to listen to the Rumanian national demands, they damaged the cause of the Revolution. Obviously, this attitude merely widened the rift existing between the Revolution and the Transylvanian Rumanian national movement.

Similarly, the Hungarian radicals were also unable to bridge the gulf between the Revolution and the nationality movements. These radicals were slightly more aware than the liberals that by no means every supporter of the nationality movements could be regarded as an implacable enemy of the Revolution (at least in relation to the Croat national movement and especially in relation to the latter's Rumanian counterpart). At this stage even the radicals made only one attempt to enter into talks with the representatives of the left-wing elements in the minority movements: headed by Pál Vasvári, a promising young historian, a small group of the March Youth visited Transylvania during the first half of June, and called on Iancu. However, these discussions bore no fruit. Even Vasvári was unable to hold out a promise to Iancu of anything more than redress of the Rumanians' outstanding



33. Pál Vasvári



34. Mihály Táncsics

grievances by the Parliament in Pest *after* the implementation of the union. For his part, Avram Iancu now insisted that the settlement of the Rumanian question could not be made dependent on the *prior* enforcement of the union. Since these differences of opinion were irreconcilable, the talks inevitably ended in failure despite the mutual sympathy of the negotiating parties. Afterwards, the Hungarian radicals, too, confined themselves to repeatedly drawing attention in the press to the counter-revolutionary threat emanating from the nationality movements. This they did even more emphatically than those liberals who for the time being failed to understand that Vienna, not Zagreb, Karlóca nor Nagyszeben, was the principal counter-revolutionary centre.

Admittedly, the Hungarian radicals were more aware of the fact that the minority movements which had turned against the Hungarian Revolution constituted a threat not primarily in themselves but rather as potential allies of the Crown. As a result, these radicals regarded the scale of the threat posed by the now anti-Hungarian minority movements as far greater than that posed by the liberals, and in fact gave expression to this view. However, even they were unable to see clearly the cause which turned the minority movements in question against the Hungarian Revolution. From the realization, still disputed by most liberals, that the

Crown was preparing for a counter-revolutionary offensive, the radicals drew one correct conclusion, namely that the Crown *would* do everything to exploit the anti-Hungarian minority movements. However, they also erroneously inferred that, at bottom, it had been the Crown which had turned the minority movements against the Hungarians. Therefore, the nationalities question would probably never have become a serious issue “had not external politics and scheming incited feelings and had not bribed *agents provocateurs* deluded the gullible”, in the words of the plebeian Mihály Táncsics, one of the great figures of the Hungarian left. Thus, the radicals were just as incapable of facing the real causes for the aggravation of the nationalities issue as the liberals. Accordingly, they were unable to better the liberals in finding suitable ways of resolving the conflicts between Hungarians and non-Magyars.

A KAMARILLÁNAK EGYIK ÁLDOZATJA.



1. Birt. Á. 1. 1. Da Sie weder serbisch, weder wallachisch noch Ungarisch verstehen so sind Sie vielleicht ein Deutscher?
Der Gefangene. Ah! - ich bin ein Wiener - ein Kommer.
1. Birt. Á. 2. Wie sind Sie hierher gekommen?
Der Gefangene. Sie haben mich herabgeschickt den Russen zu schiessen zu lernen.
1. Birt. Á. 3. Wer hat Sie hierher geschickt, um den Russen das Schiessen zu lehren?
Der Gefangene. Das Kamarilla.

35. The role of the Kamarilla in the aggravation of the nationality question as a Hungarian graphic artist saw it

looking to the Habsburgs for support. At this stage, though, they regarded resorting to purely peaceful means against the Hungarians as utterly impracticable. Whilst representatives of the radical wing of the Czech national movement also backed the plan for a federation, their views differed not only from those of the Czech liberals (in that they, also, considered military action to be the sole effective response), but also from those of the Croats and the Serbs in that they wished to take up arms not only against the Hungarians but also against the Germans of Austria and even the dynasty itself.

On the other hand, the Poles attending the congress (these came partly from Galicia, and partly—although uninvited—from Prussian Poland) dissociated themselves from all those who called solely for internal restructuring, wishing to leave the framework of the Habsburg empire intact. This was because they regarded the European balance of power as the chief obstacle in the way of their principal goal, the reconstitution of Poland, which had been partitioned by the Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns and Romanovs. Thus, the Poles, too, declared it necessary that the Hungarians meet the justified demands of the Slavs living in Hungary, albeit stressing emphatically that the former needed to be persuaded by means of negotiations and not force because the Slavs had an account to settle with the Habsburgs and other reactionary powers and not with the Hungarians. A similar stance was adopted by Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin, the sole—also uninvited—Russian attending the congress. Bakunin also expressed the view that the common struggle against tsarist Russia and its allies was the most powerful bond uniting the revolutionary peoples of Europe.

However, not even the Slovenes attending the congress approved of the Czech liberals' federal ideas. Obviously, they feared that, should the latter be realized, the Slovene people would find itself under the heel of the Croats and the Serbs. However, the Slovenes were too weak politically even to consider shaking off the Habsburg yoke. Accordingly, they demanded that a separate Crown province under Habsburg rule be established from the Slovene-populated areas of the empire. The Slovak leaders at the congress adopted a similar position, and their stance was probably largely due to the fact that they had similar qualms in relation to the Czechs as those entertained by the Slovenes in relation to the Croats and the Serbs. Moreover, their anxieties were now intensified by the fear that the Czech liberals would ultimately succeed in having their own plans accepted by the Habsburgs. Accordingly, Štúr and Hurban were also firmly opposed to the idea that the



37. *Those who do not see the greatest danger threatening all of us*
Austrian caricature on the antagonistic peoples of the Habsburg Empire

Slav peoples of the empire should look to the Habsburgs for support. They both stated that it was not the intention of the Slovaks to break with Hungary and form a union with the Czechs in order to solve their problems, but that they would do this within the framework of the bond linking them to the Hungarian state.

Štúr and his associates were, however, unable to come up with a similarly resolute answer to the problem of how, ultimately, the Slovak

issue could be resolved within Hungary's borders. They first stated that should the Hungarians still refuse to accept their demands, then, joining forces with the Croats and the Serbs, they, too, would take up arms. However, despite their deep disappointment, they quickly added that, for their part, insurrection had, at this stage, only been decided on in principle. If possible they would want to avoid having to resort to it (partly because they lacked the adequate military backing of the kind the Croat and the Serb national movement could rely on, and, partly, because they, as Štúr himself admitted, had so far failed to win mass backing even from their own people—if "we revealed our anti-Magyar attitude, thousands would turn against us", even Slovaks). Accordingly, as Hurban, the most vehement of the anti-Hungarians also emphasized, should the up-to-now intractable Hungarians see reason and "grant us those things to which we are entitled, then we cannot take up arms against them", just as the Serbs would refrain from such action "if they grant the Serbs what they want".

In sum, the differences of opinion which surfaced at the Slav congress in Prague were so serious that even lengthy debates would have failed



38. Prague in June 1848 under fire from the canons of the imperial army

to remove them. Moreover, the congress was forced to break off deliberations in the middle of its work. The person responsible for this was Lieutenant-General Prince Alfred Windisch-Grätz, commandant-general of the imperial army in Bohemia. (The general had personally noticed the differences of opinion that existed, and, by aggravating these, would have liked to precipitate a complete break between the pro-Habsburg liberal and the anti-Habsburg radical wings of the Czech national movement.) Windisch-Grätz provoked the radicals into mobilizing the people of Prague, who launched an anti-Habsburg uprising on June 12. This resulted in the immediate dissolution of the congress: fearing street fighting, the majority of delegates to the congress immediately packed their bags and left the city. Other delegates, including Štúr and Hurban, joined the insurrection and fought with the insurgents until, after five days of desperate resistance, it was crushed, forcing them to flee.

The Hungarian Revolution benefited neither from the Prague congress debates nor from the Prague uprising. Indeed, it was unable to do so, as leading Hungarian circles made no attempt to obtain accurate information concerning what was happening at the congress. Consequently, those attending the Prague congress were, without exception, regarded in Pest as accomplices in a Pan-Slav conspiracy with counter-revolutionary objectives. Accordingly, both the breaking up of the congress and the defeat of the Prague uprising were received in the Hungarian capital with the greatest satisfaction. It did not even occur to leading Hungarian circles to make a last minute attempt to save the situation by entering into negotiations with those nationality politicians who, even in Prague, had still not called for a final break with the Hungarian Revolution.

It was therefore in vain that some of the Slovak leaders took up arms in Prague against the main enemy of the Hungarian Revolution, the Habsburg dynasty. It was also in vain that Štúr and Hurban (and Hodža a month later) stated in the days leading up to the insurrection that they were prepared to overlook unfair treatment and were still ready to reach an agreement with the Magyars. On Hungary's part, there was no response to these offers. These three men were given absolutely no encouragement, not even a promise of safety should they decide to return home. Thus, compelled to leave Prague, Hodža, for want of anything better, went to Vienna, whilst Štúr and Hurban headed for Zagreb. Left with no other alternative, they then began to make preparations for a future insurrection. For support they turned



39. Jellačić marches into Zagreb on June 4, 1848 after hurrying back from his tour of the countryside for the opening of the *sabor*

to Jellačić—the Jellačić who had been the closest associate of Windisch-Grätz, their principal enemy in Prague. Unlike Windisch-Grätz, however, Jellačić was still not obliged to lay his cards on the table. Indeed, when the monarch objected to the holding of the *sabor* convoked by him, Jellačić was again given an opportunity to foster illusions concerning his own person and policy.

The fact that the monarch had, for appearances' sake, banned the *sabor* could, at best, have served to keep the pro-Hungarian Croat politicians and the Dalmatians away from Zagreb. (These had been called on to join Croatia and, accordingly, had to sent representatives to the Croatian capital.) To Jellačić, though, it did not seriously occur for a moment that the Crown would genuinely disapprove of the holding of the *sabor*. He therefore simply disregarded the prohibition, and his apparent insubordination seemed to confirm illusions that Jellačić was in fact a genuine Croat patriot. Jellačić's clever machinations yielded results. This was borne out by Štur and Hurban's visit to

Zagreb and especially by the conspicuous zeal with which the *sabor*, which finally opened on June 5 thanks to his efforts, attempted to win him over.

The *sabor* opened with the ceremonial inauguration of Jellačić as *ban*. He was also elected captain-general of the Triune Kingdom. Less ceremoniously, the *sabor* then endorsed legislation which Jellačić had thought necessary to enact before his inauguration. After this conspicuous show of satisfaction with Jellačić's previous moves, the *sabor* drafted two petitions addressed to the monarch and which contained a general programme, to be handed over to him in person by the *ban*. In this way the *sabor* moved on to serious business. On the one hand the two petitions simply reiterated the Croat national demands, and, on the other, went slightly further in that they stated that the *ban's* sphere of authority as commandant-general should also be extended to Slavonia and Dalmatia. It also informed the monarch that the *sabor*



40. On June 5, 1848 Rajačić inaugurates Jellačić as *ban* at the *sabor's* public opening session in Zagreb's Cathleen Square

wished to send a permanent representative to the Court with a view to protecting Croat interests effectively (this was also the task of the Hungarian minister *a latere*). The person unanimously elected to this office was Baron Franjo Kulmer, lord-lieutenant of Szerém county and an absolutely loyal supporter of the Habsburg dynasty. The Croat demands had been put previously. These were that Slavonia, Dalmatia, the Hungarian Littoral and Croatia be formed into a union; that executive power in the Triune Kingdom be exercised by a government organ entirely independent of the Hungarian government; and that Croat be made the official language of this kingdom.

At around this time the leading Croat politicians—including the liberals—were already convinced that the Croat movement could not finalize Croatia's total secession from Hungary on its own, not even in close alliance with the other nationality movements in Hungary. It needed the Crown's support as well. However, at this point the Crown showed almost no sign of benevolence in this matter. As a result, if the Croat movement wished to accomplish its goal then those who had gathered to attend the *sabor* in spite of the monarch's veto would quickly have to confirm their respect for common imperial interests and their determination to serve them. Accordingly, the two petitions not only added to the earlier national demands, but in some



41. Franjo Kulmer



42. Jellačić's celebration on June 28, 1848 in Zagreb on his return from a deputation to the court

cases also made drastic curtailments, in that they declared that the Croats were by no means demanding full autonomy for the Triune Kingdom. All they wanted was *internal* autonomy in the strictest meaning of the term. Otherwise they held that common ministers should be responsible for the empire's foreign, defence, financial and commercial affairs, with their spheres of authority extending throughout the whole empire (including Croatia and Hungary). These ministers would be responsible solely to the common imperial Diet of the countries ruled by the Habsburg dynasty rather than to the legislative bodies of the individual provinces.

News of the monarch's suspension of Jellačić, on June 10, from the office of *ban* naturally dampened the spirits of the Croat legislators. The next session of the *sabor*, on June 21, was marked by a storm of unprecedented severity. (This session was held in the absence of Jellačić, who had left Zagreb to submit the petitions to the monarch and who did not yet know of his suspension.) Joining the debate, the zealous liberals (who had adopted the majority pro-Habsburg line out of political considerations rather than unconditional loyalty to the dynasty) were now quick to declare their absolute distrust of the "Swabian traitor" king. Yet, even though their confidence in the Crown had been shaken—unlike the confidence of the majority group of deputies—their trust in Jellačić naturally remained unimpaired, indeed it became deeper still. As a result, at the first session of the *sabor*, on June 28 and

held after Jellačić had apparently been sent home empty-handed by the monarch, they, too, joined the politicians loyal to the dynasty in their enthusiastic support for the motion that preparations should immediately begin for an insurrection against the Hungarians, and that the *ban* should be given powers which would, in future, grant him unlimited power over all Croatia's civilian and military authorities. The liberals thus enhanced the process whereby Jellačić became dictator of Croatia, a dictator whose sole objective was to maintain, at any cost, "the indissoluble unity which forges the countries and peoples of the Apostolic Crown with and to the supreme Monarchy".

The liberals' attitude also helped to seal the fate of the *sabor*. Obviously, it had been extremely important for Jellačić that the *sabor* grant full powers to the *ban* and thereby lend the seal of legality to all his subsequent moves. Having achieved this, the *sabor* posed a threat to Jellačić's interests only in that it could at any time revoke the powers it had bestowed upon him. Indeed, a real chance of this happening had existed since June 21. The events of the June 21 session had shown that there were quite a few deputies at the *sabor* who were, for the time being, willing to give him their full backing, but nevertheless refused to subordinate Croat national interests to the interests of the dynasty on every issue. It was therefore obvious that these deputies would be willing even to break with Jellačić as soon as they realized—as indeed they were sooner or later bound to—that he consistently subordinated Croat national interests to those of the dynasty.


Accordingly, after June 29, Jellačić merely waited for the *sabor* to accomplish a few other vital tasks. A case in point was the enactment of legislation favourable to the peasants to win the backing of the Croat masses for the cause he represented. Also, the *sabor* offered to raise money for the planned anti-Hungarian insurrection. Finally, it raised insurmountable obstacles in the path of any possible *rapprochement* between the Croat national movement and the Hungarian Revolution.

Eager to please Jellačić, the *sabor* first enacted legislation concerning the Croat-Slovene Military Border. This law changed the situation of the border guards substantially—albeit not to the extent envisaged by the liberal minority of *sabor* deputies. (Among other things, the liberals had called for the Military Border to be placed under civilian administration.) Not wishing to antagonize either the Crown or the Batthyány government, the majority of *sabor* deputies staunchly opposed this idea. Those elements in the *sabor* which were loyal to the Habsburg dynasty—and they constituted the majority of deputies—

were still less inclined to exempt the inhabitants of the Military Border from military service. They did, however, regard it vital that the *sabor* should pass legislation that would, in some other way, improve the morale of the Croat border guards. Accordingly, they did not oppose the abolition of the border guards' feudal obligations. Consequently, the *sabor* now ensured, despite the retention of the military system, far more privileges for the border guards of Croatia and Slovenia than the package the Batthyány government had offered to the border guards of the *Temesköz*. Not only did the *sabor* abolish labour service duty to the Crown and permit the pasturing of animals, but it also abolished all haulage obligations. Similarly, it permitted firebote free of charge. The *sabor* also took immediate steps to abolish unpaid public works service and the reduction of high salt prices. In addition, it did not hesitate to proclaim quickly that with the cessation of the state's monopoly of ownership the population of the Military Border would become the actual owners of all their possessions.

The *sabor* also addressed itself to the problems of those peasants who had previously been serfs. Above all, it confirmed the *ban*'s statement of April 25 (i.e. the abolition of the serfs' feudal obligations and the tithe). It then worked out ways of resolving the problems arising from the liberation of the serfs—largely along the lines laid down by the relevant measures passed in Pozsony. In two respects, however, the *sabor* went beyond the Pozsony legislation, on the one hand stating that henceforth, as in the case of the border guards, former serfs would also become full owners of their land holdings (the Estates in Pozsony had likewise recognized this right in March, but had failed to encode it formally) and, on the other, the *sabor*—unlike the Pozsony Diet—complemented the abolition of the serfs' feudal services with the abolition of seigniorial *regale* rights, placing the burden of landowner compensation on the state treasury, just as it had done in the case of feudal services.

The aim of the *sabor* to win the support of the peasant masses was, however, by no means confined to this aforementioned legislation. It also played a part in its decision to vote the quarter of a million guildens (the equivalent of £ 27,000 or \$ 120,000 at this time) in emergency taxation for military expenses which Jellačić had requested. Under the terms of this law the local authorities were to levy the tax, as far as possible, on the nobility and on the inhabitants of towns, whilst the peasants were merely exhorted to follow the example of those legislators who had offered voluntary donations during the debate on the bill.



43. At the session of the *sabor* on July 4, 1848 Croat legislators make voluntary offers for military expenditure

Having done its utmost to rally the Croat masses under Jellačić's banner, the *sabor's* principal task was accomplished. Twenty *sabor* deputies were now selected to form a special committee, with Jellačić as its chairman. The composition of the committee, which later referred to itself as the *ban's* council, mirrored the balance of power within the *sabor*, with one-third of committee members being liberal and two-thirds Habsburg loyalists. Formally, the committee was given the task of deciding the "conditions for reconciliation with Hungary". In reality, however, it had an entirely different function. This was obvious from the guidelines laid down for it during a plenary session of the *sabor*. For the *sabor* not only commissioned the *ban's* council to reiterate the Croat national demands to date, but also to make additional ones. One such demand, backed by the liberals, was that not only the liberty and equality of the Croats, but also those of "all nations and languages under the Hungarian Crown" be recognized, and that "political institutions guaranteeing these" be established in Hungary also. Another demand, supported by the Crown, was that the "present dualism" between Hungary and Austria should cease totally, and that the all

countries under Habsburg rule be subordinated to a central government and a common legislative body.

The *ban's* council adhered loyally to these guidelines. It did not, however, confine its activities to elaborating and drafting into an ultimatum the *sabor's* "peace conditions", but also extended it to the investigation of the issue of how fledgling Croat-Serb co-operation could be consolidated. On account of mutual claims to the *Szerém-ség*—which was part of Slavonia but which had a two-thirds Serb population—there was considerable friction between Serbs and Croats. (Gaj was especially eager to improve the situation and Jellačić also had an interest in improved relations between the two peoples, in order that the Serbs could subsequently be persuaded to join the counter-revolutionary effort.) Indeed, the *ban's* council soon tackled this problem, stating that the Triune Kingdom was ready to cede the disputed county to the Serb Voivodate, provided that the Serbs would be satisfied with local autonomy within the voivodate, whilst the legislative power they were entitled to within the empire would be vested in a legislative body to be composed jointly of the representatives of the voivodate and the Triune Kingdom. In a matter of days the *sabor* granted Jellačić all that he had wanted from it. After this it ceased to be of any use to him and, on the contrary, posed a potential threat to his plans. Jellačić therefore announced that another plenary session would be held on July 9. At this session he first ceremoniously proclaimed the *sabor* permanent, and afterwards immediately adjourned it for an indefinite period. He never convoked it again.

That Jellačić was a shrewd tactician was borne out by other developments also. He managed to cast suspicion on Gaj who, Jellačić insinuated, had attempted to bribe him into joining a conspiracy against the Karađorđević dynasty, with a view to overthrowing Alexander, the prince of Serbia. By means of this clever move Jellačić succeeded in eliminating his greatest possible rival in Croatia, who was now finished from the political point of view. This was especially reassuring for Jellačić because even though Gaj had hitherto given him his full backing, he did not intend to subordinate entirely the goals of the Croat national movement to the goals of the Crown, wishing merely to reconcile them. Thus, Jellačić had cause to fear that one day his unconditional loyalty to the Crown would be exposed in which case Gaj, like the liberals, would break with him posthaste, becoming not only a determined opponent, but—as the most renowned leader of the Croat National Party's majority faction—his most dangerous enemy

also. His political career in ruins, Gaj immediately lost the opportunity of ever adopting a successful stand against Jellačić. Moreover, Jellačić eliminated Gaj from the political scene at the best possible moment. For by this time Jellačić had already prepared the troops under his command, as well as the National Guards and militiamen who volunteered for service, for the offensive against Hungary. The success of the attack would have been threatened had his troops—especially the volunteers—been convinced by distinguished figures even before the offensive was launched that Jellačić's main concern was not to score a decisive victory for Croat national aspirations (which he always referred to as his most sacred goal)

but purely to restore the power of the dynasty which had been badly shaken during the spring of 1848. The successful undermining of confidence in Gaj eliminated this threat almost completely, and consequently, by early summer, conditions were ripe for the Crown to involve the masses in the struggle to destroy the Hungarian Revolution.

At around this time it also became clear that in its struggle against the Hungarian Revolution the Crown would be able to rely on large-scale support from other minorities living in Hungary. As a result of the events in Mihálcfalva, Iancu began, in the course of June, to organize those Rumanians who were willing to join an insurrection in the Transylvanian *Erzgebirge* against the Hungarian Revolution. In the



44. Jellačić up to the situation as a contemporary caricaturist saw it



45. *A group of Jellačić's armed men preparing for attack*

1. border guard from the Lika (first) border guard infantry regiment, 2. hussar from the banderial hussar regiment newly organized by Jellačić, 3. national guard from Varasd county, 4. artilleryman from the third (Augustin) artillery regiment, 5. border guard from the Vtoločac (second) border guard infantry regiment, 6. szerezásán and 7. border guard from the Gradiska (eighth) border guard infantry regiment

Mezőség Papiu-Ilarian, and in mid-August Bărnau, extended organizing activity to the Rumanian border guard villages of the Orlát area, so that by the time the Transylvanian General Command (with which they could quickly establish relations in Nagyszeben) launched its counter-revolutionary offensive the Rumanian insurrectionist army should also be ready for action. However, the Serbs of Southern Hungary did not even wait for the signal from the imperial troops. In no doubt that "sacred right is on our side and imperial justice will be on our side", the chief *odbor* of Karlóca issued several proclamations in late May and early June in which it announced an immediate uprising "for the protection of the throne of Ferdinand, emperor and king, and for the defence of the Serb nation". On June 12 the first shots were fired on the outskirts of Karlóca.

In sum, the dominant factions in the most important of the minority movements in Hungary decided to fight for equality for the nationalities by joining the struggle against the Hungarian Revolution rather than to achieve their goals by joining forces with it. This not only meant that these movements now became the enemies of the Hungarian Revolution, but also that they became the allies of the Habsburg counter-revolution. In fact, this was almost inevitable, not merely because right-wing politicians (who were absolutely loyal to the dynasty) had played an important role in most of these movements from the outset, but also—and this was the main reason—because none of these movements could have conducted a successful struggle against the Hungarian Revolution by relying purely on its own resources. These movements were even less capable of combining a struggle against the Hungarian Revolution with a simultaneous struggle against Habsburg counter-revolution—indeed the Crown was the only source from which these movements could expect substantial assistance.

The nationality movements had actually made attempts to find backing for their struggle elsewhere and during these weeks they began to co-ordinate their actions. This was true not only for co-operation between the Slovaks and Croats and between the Croats and Serbs, but also between the Serbs and the Rumanians. Inevitably, however, these movements failed to act in complete unison. For one thing, the conflict between the Rumanians and Serbs over Church government



46. *Rajačić calling on sacred war the southern Serbs in the spirit of the double-headed eagle and the cross*



47. Mikhail A. Bakunin



48. Miloš Obrenović

still persisted, whilst the Croat-Serb wrangling over the *Szerémség* continued, albeit to a lesser extent, even after the *ban*'s council had produced a conciliatory proposal. Yet even a full elimination of their differences would not have been sufficient for a successful struggle against the Hungarian Revolution and, accordingly, the nationality movements sought outside assistance as well. In point of fact, however, their opportunities for this were rather limited, even for those minority movements which—like the Serb and Rumanian movements—represented peoples the majority of whom lived beyond Hungary's (and the empire's) frontiers. The Rumanians of Wallachia and Moldavia, still under Ottoman domination, were at this time totally preoccupied with organizing against their own oppressors. Indeed, a revolution erupted in Bucharest in the course of June, and we have already seen that many Rumanians living beyond the Carpathians did not approve of the antagonism

of their Transylvanian brothers towards the Hungarian Revolution. What is more, although the Serbs of Southern Hungary could obtain military help from volunteers from Serbia, even they were unable to accomplish their principal goal—i.e. to win the open support of the Principality of Serbia. Belgrade was fully aware that such a step would arouse great suspicion in the Habsburgs, suspicion which the Serb government was simply unable to countenance on account of its weakness.

In short, the weakness of their own forces made it impossible for the nationality movements in Hungary to launch a simultaneous struggle against the Hungarian Revolution and the Habsburg counter-revolution. Moreover, in order to wage a successful struggle solely against the Hungarian Revolution they were compelled to enter into an alliance with the Habsburg counter-revolution. Yet not even the dangers inherent in their joining forces with the Habsburgs could now deter them from making the final break with the Hungarians. It was not just the latter who warned the minority politicians, now confronted by the ultimate decision, that by tilting the balance in favour of counter-revolution they would harm not only the Hungarian cause, but their own causes as well, and that this would be tantamount to suicide. Others—people who could certainly not be accused of hostility towards the minorities' aspirations, also saw the future clearly. Bakunin, for instance, stated: "I know many of you put faith in support from the dynasty. The dynasty is now promising the earth to you



49. István Széchenyi



50. Széchenyi and Deák looking helplessly on Croat and Russian preparations threatening with the partition of Hungary as a Hungarian graphic artist of the radical camp saw it

because it vitally needs you..., but will it keep its promises...? ... I am convinced that it will not." Bakunin continued: "You will see that the Austrian dynasty will not only forget your services, but will take revenge on you for its own shameful weakness..."

This tied in perfectly with the stance expressed by a man with an entirely different outlook. Miloš, the former (and future) prince of Serbia and the head of the Obrenović dynasty, who had been living in exile since 1839, stated that: "The Serbs should come to a compromise with the Hungarians otherwise Austria will cheat both the Serbs and the Hungarians."

Admonitions of this kind could only have been effective had the Hungarian Revolution shown the slightest sign at this stage that it was willing to make certain concessions. This it was not prepared to do, however. During these weeks, Széchenyi was the only minister in the Batthyány government who repeatedly pressed for the conciliation of the minorities (even before 1848 Széchenyi had frequently pointed out the dangers inherent in antagonizing them). For the time being, though, the rest of the Cabinet firmly insisted on a strong-arm policy. This was true not only of Kossuth, but even of—the otherwise far more moderate—Eötvös and Deák. The Habsburgs, on the other hand, still declined to show their colours, in spite of the fact that the minorities' aspirations, which posed a threat to the unity of the empire, aroused in them an antipathy just as intense as that felt in leading Hungarian political circles. Under the circumstances even those minority politi-

cians who were against the subordination of minority objectives to the interests of the empire could only ignore such warnings. Doing precisely the opposite of what they had been advised to, they convinced themselves that whatever the Hungarians had failed to grant to the minorities could—to some extent at least—be extorted from the Habsburgs, provided that they helped them to victory. The situation therefore became hopeless. It became apparent that in the future large numbers of the non-Magyars living in Hungary would fight against the Hungarian Revolution—even those whose basic interests should have led them to side with the revolutionary cause.

On the Road to Armed Struggle

The growing antagonism between the Magyars and the non-Magyars living in Hungary made Southern Hungary the first theatre of war, and the scene of very bitter fighting. In a short space of time this fighting unleashed wild animosity on both sides. After only a few weeks, not only were the opposing armies slaughtering each other but the villagers, scythes in hand, were also joining in the butchery. Earlier the village population, despite the different nationalities of its members, had seemed to be held together by the indissoluble bond of a common fate. There was no hope of any change for the time being. For want of reconciliation based on mutual concessions, only a clear victory by one of the warring parties could have put an end to the bloodshed. However, neither side possessed the means for a quick knock-out blow.



51. Stevan Knitćanin




52. *A meeting of Hungarian and Serb companions in distress with the assistance of imperial officers in summer 1848 somewhere in Southern Hungary*

After the Karlóca assembly three insurrectionist camps were rapidly established under Stratimirović's command (one in the vicinity of Karlóca itself, another on the south-western edge of the *Temesköz*, near Perlasz, on the German-Banate Military Border and a third behind the Roman fortifications in the south-east corner of the Bácska). Some twenty thousand armed men—recruited mostly from the border guard regiments—were mustered in these camps. Stratimirović's army was quickly strengthened by the arrival of between ten and twelve thousand volunteers from the Principality of Serbia under the command of Colonel Stevan Knićanin. In this was the insurrectionist army soon grew to

five times the size of the regular forces stationed in Southern Hungary, forces which were at the disposal of the Hungarian government when the uprising broke out. However, the insurgents were unable satisfactorily to exploit their numerical superiority as for some considerable time they confined their operations to small-scale surprise attacks against accessible villages and towns with Magyar (and German) populations. On the other hand, the Hungarians failed to exploit the advantages arising from this situation. Secretly conspiring with the rebels, the commandant-general of the *Temesköz*, Lieutenant-General Baron Louis Piret, deployed his troops over a wide area in an apparent attempt to defend the threatened settlements, instead of concentrating his forces in attacks against individual groups of insurgents.

There was no change in the situation even when the Hungarian government began to reinforce its troops in the south of the country. Newly-organized *honvéd* battalions, which were not part of the imperial army, were sent to the area, as were National Guard units detailed for army service. Lieutenant-General Baron Fülöp Bechtold, the officer commanding Kassa Division, was appointed as independent commander of this force. Bechtold's zeal was a perfect match for Piret's. On July 14 he finally launched an offensive against the rebels' main stronghold, Szenttamás, which was situated in the privileged Tisza district. However, before the attack could really develop, Bechtold ordered a retreat and afterwards stood idly by for weeks while the insurrection spread. This was the state of affairs until General Lázár Mészáros, defence minister in the Batthyány government, arrived at the camp for a few days' visit. But Mészáros's presence also failed to bring about a substantial improvement in the conduct of operations, despite the fact that he ordered the offensive against Szenttamás to be renewed as soon as



53. Szenttamás in the encirclement of Hungarian troops—on a contemporary map



54. On August 19, 1848 Kničanin's volunteers launch a surprise attack against the German and Rumanian inhabitants of Fehértemplom

possibly, and despite the fact that, on his return to the capital, he sent additional reinforcements to Southern Hungary. However, even Mészáros was unable to win over Bechtold to the cause of the Revolution, although, in compliance with the defence minister's orders, Bechtold launched a second attack against Szenttamás on August 19. Owing to gross negligence on Bechtold's part (negligence which was tantamount to treason) this attempt also ended in failure. As a result, inconclusive fighting in Southern Hungary continued, causing increasing losses in property and lives to both Magyars and Serbs, with the Habsburgs being the sole beneficiaries.

Nevertheless, perhaps the inconclusive and senseless fighting in Southern Hungary played a part in prompting the Batthyány government to seek a political settlement at least with regard to the Hungarian-Croat conflict. It remains a fact, however, that at the end of August the Hungarian government finally decided to take an important step forward in relation to the Croats. The Cabinet meeting of August 27 adopted a bill based on a motion by Deák, on the subject of Croatian autonomy, which was to be submitted to Parliament. Instead of the head of department posts formerly reserved for Croat deputies at the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice the bill now proposed the posts of under-secretary of state at the Hungarian Defence Ministry, Finance Ministry, and Ministry of Commerce, as well as a post alongside the minister *a latere*. A separate Croat

minister was to be responsible for handling Croat affairs relating to the spheres of authority of the other portfolios. In addition, the bill intended to invest the Croat *sabor* with the right to regulate legally those affairs handled by the Croat minister. For their part, the Croat border guards would be granted (besides the abolition of haulage and public works services) privileges which the *sabor* itself had voted in early July. To this the government now added that "should reconciliation fail to materialize on this basis, it would then accept separation and a purely federal relationship, with Hungary retaining possession of Fiume and the Hungarian Littoral, and the free communications and trading possibilities which these afforded". This idea had been mooted by Kossuth a good many years earlier, although even he did not bring it up again until now.


In short, at this point the government would have been willing—as an alternative course of action—radically to redefine



55. A soldier of the ninth honvéd battalion ordered to defend Fehértemplom after the retaliation



56. Ferenc Deák



57. *Jellačić's troops crossing the Drave on September 11, 1848*

the constitutional bond between Hungary and Croatia in a way that would have fully satisfied the true advocates of the Croat national movement, especially the liberals. (Admittedly, the latter had rejected yielding to the Hungarians from the very beginning, as had their loyalist associates. Yet they did not strive to attain independence from the Hungarian government at the cost of subjugation to the Austrian government, and when, finally, they accepted this, they did so only because they wished to procure Vienna's support in the face of Hungary's apparent intransigence on the issue of Croatian independence.) Nevertheless, the Hungarian government's initiative was bound to fail, partly because the decisions of August 27 were not made public, but more importantly because by the time the Batthyány government realized that it must place its Croatian policy on an entirely new footing all power in Croatia was already in Jellačić's hands. Obviously, no promise of compliance with Croat national demands could now have persuaded the latter to desert the counter-revolutionary camp.

Moreover, it was precisely at this time that Jellačić became convinced that he could soon aspire to the honour of being regarded as the saviour of the empire. By early August the imperial troops fighting in Lombardy had succeeded in suppressing the local independence movement. This turn of events prompted Vienna to consider the idea of turning openly against the Hungarian Revolution as well, and to assign the task of precipitating a showdown with the Hungarians to Jellačić himself. Thus, as early as August 26, the day before the Hungarian Cabinet met in Pest to discuss the Croatian issue, Jellačić had already received a confidential message from Vienna to the effect that within a few days the monarch would rescind the decree of June 10 suspending him from his post as *ban*. Rightly interpreting this as an order to attack, five days later Jellačić sent one of his detachments to Fiume, demonstrating that the Triune Kingdom still refused to relinquish its claim to the Hungarian Littoral.

Then, on September 11—less than a week after the June 10 decree was annulled—the main body of Jellačić's army also set out, under the *ban*'s personal command. After crossing the river Drave, it advanced towards Buda. Ten days after this, a Slavonian detachment, despatched to back up Jellačić, also crossed the Drave. This force was commanded by General Karl Roth (formerly the Pancsova brigadier-general who had been forced by the local popular movements to flee to Slavonia at the end of March).

In September Transdanubia became a theatre of military operations.



58. A Croat camp on the outskirts of a Transdanubian village

Although the Hungarian corps concentrated here retreated without resistance from the enemy almost to the neighbourhood of the Lake Velence, the people of Transdanubia also suffered from the outset of the military operations. Jellačić wanted to provide his army with food by means therefore he requisitioned it from unprotected villages which were thrown open to the troops and looted and robbed unscrupulously. The more so if they were semi-regular "szerezsán" troops who were formed to prevent smuggling on the outskirts of Bosnia. These soldiers according to ancient customs did not get any pay, only maintained themselves from the loot acquired during border service, and therefore considered everything they could lay their hands on as booty. Thus the inhabitants of the villages in the war zone became desperate and took up their scythes and within a few days masses of Hungarians and Croats who had lived in peace became deadly enemies.

Unlike the hostilities in Southern Hungary, the fighting in Transdanubia lasted less than a month. On September 29 the Hungarian



59. Szerezsán

army, finally facing up to the challenge, scored a splendid victory over Jellačić at Pákozd, forcing him immediately to shelve his plans for an all-out offensive and to flee with the main body of his army to Vienna. Roth was not so lucky: on October 7 he was forced to capitulate with his entire army corps to the Hungarian troops and insurgents who had surrounded him at Ozora. However, the national hatred which had become established so quickly in the Magyar and Croat masses could no longer be eradicated, even after the fighting had died down. In addition, Jellačić's main forces had with-



60. Hungarian insurrectionists escort the Slavonian insurrectionists forced to capitulate at Ozora to the prisoner-of-war camp

drawn from Hungary only temporarily. Under the command of Windisch-Grätz, who was now commander-in-chief of the imperial army, a far stronger counter-revolutionary force would soon launch a new offensive against the Hungarian Revolution in mid-December.

Fierce fighting continued in Southern Hungary and it was impossible to predict when and how it would end. As August drew to its close Bechtold resigned his command, his post being temporarily taken by Lázár Mészáros himself. Mészáros launched a third attack on the defenders of Szenttamás on September 21 but this was beaten off. In the ensuing weeks the garrisons of both the Arad and Temesvár fortresses openly turned against the Hungarian cause. As a result, the counter-revolution suddenly gained two important bases to the rear of the Hungarian troops fighting in Southern Hungary. In mid-October the Serbian rebels went on the offensive in three places at once. The Hungarian troops successfully frustrated these moves, and Colonel János Damjanich (a Serb who steadfastly supported the Hungarian



61. Lázár Mészáros



62. János Damjanich

Revolution) launched a counter-offensive in the *Temesköz* early in December, capturing the rebel positions at Alibunár. However, since, in the main theatre of war, Windisch-Grätz launched his own offensive at this very moment, the *honvéd* army simply had no time to exploit its Alibunár success. As a result, those parts of Southern Hungary which



63. Serb insurrectionists hold up the advancing Temesköz honvéd troops at Pancsova on January 3, 1849

had earlier been occupied by the Serbs remained in the insurgents' hands.

During these months the Hungarian Revolution was locked in armed struggle not only with Serbs and Croats, but also with Slovaks and Rumanians. For this it had largely itself to blame. Yet even at this stage it never even occurred to the Batthyány government to offer substantial concessions to the other minorities, despite the fact that there was still a slim chance that by doing so, it could reassure the Rumanians of Transylvania. In order to do this it should have made it known, after the union came into effect, that it dissociated itself from the measures introduced during the previous months by the *gubernium* controlled by loyalist elements in Transylvania. But the *gubernium* received no instructions to change its policy towards the Rumanians from either the government or the national commissioner (the conservative Baron Miklós Vay, an unfortunate choice) who had been sent to Transylvania in June. Indeed, the *gubernium* was repeatedly encouraged in its existing policy. For example, it became known in Pest that two months



64. Miklós Vay

previously the *gubernium* had ordered the dissolution of the Rumanian National Committee formed in Balázsfalva but had failed to implement its ruling. On hearing this, Szemere, the minister of the interior, immediately ordered the *gubernium* to act more firmly. As a result, the *gubernium* now tried to detain Bărnuz and his associates. The attempt was unsuccessful and obviously, and while it patently failed to put an end to anti-Hungarian organizing, it was most effective in inciting anti-Hungarian sentiment.


The government's earlier nationalities policy did not, then, undergo fundamental change during the summer months, although on certain points there were moves to improve it. However, even these efforts bore no fruit. It was in vain that the Hungarian government

occasionally planned to introduce measures which would have evoked a favourable response from Hungary's non-Magyar population: at such times the new Parliament which opened on June 5 (the House of Deputies was now based on popular representation, although, like the Lower Table of the last feudal Diet, it was largely composed of liberal politicians from the ranks of the nobility) was always on the alert. Far more narrow-minded than the government, this body always succeeded in frustrating the intended measures.

An example of such interference occurred at the beginning of August, when the House of Deputies dealt with the education bill submitted by József Eötvös, the minister of culture. There was an article in this which proposed that thenceforth the language of tuition in elementary schools everywhere be the mother tongue of the majority of the local inhabitants—in other words an article which, if passed, would have granted one of the principal demands of the minority movements in Hungary. The difficulty was that the majority of deputies regarded the proposal as profoundly damaging to Hungarian interests (despite the fact that under the proposal Hungarian would also have been taught as a subject wherever the language of tuition would have been a language other than Hungarian). They therefore decided that the opportunity to study in one's mother tongue would, contrary to the proposal, be guaranteed solely to non-Magyars "who did not understand the Hungarian language". This resolution was not, however, enacted because the Upper House subsequently removed the bill from its agenda (without proper discussion) on account of some of its other proposals (which were detrimental to the interests of the Catholic Church). This did not, however, rectify the situation as the majority decision of the House of Deputies was in itself capable of eloquently demonstrating that the country's non-Magyar inhabitants could expect even less fairness from Parliament than from the government. As a result, it was capable of dealing a serious blow to the most important Hungarian national interest (and, of course, at the same time to those of the non-Magyars living in Hungary)—the national interest attached to strengthening the position of the Revolution.



65. József Eötvös




66. *Parliament's House of Deputies in Pest*

Even after the counter-revolution had shown its true colours in September, Hungarian politicians failed to adapt their nationalities policy. At its closed session of September 2, the House of Deputies heard Kossuth's account of the government's August 27 resolutions concerning the settlement of the Croatian question and of the bill on Croatian autonomy drafted by Deák and accepted by the Cabinet. However, it seems that by this time the deputies saw no point in putting Deák's bill on their agenda (indeed they would have been unable to do this as even the concessions envisaged by Deák would have failed to satisfy the Croats). Accordingly, two days later the House of Deputies appointed a committee to draw up more far-reaching proposals. This committee did in fact produce a draft proposal in which it consistently referred to the Croatian people as the "Croatian-Slavonian nation", and tacitly acknowledged that Slavonia should be annexed to Croatia. The proposal made no mention, however, of the possibility of Croatia's total secession. What is more, precisely instead of this it stated that the Hungarian Parliament was ready "to guarantee full rights and liberties" to the Croats, but with the proviso that these must not violate Hungary's territorial integrity. In other words, this formula contained less than the government's alternative decision of August 27. In the

end, the plenary session of the House of Deputies failed to put even this draft resolution on its agenda. After Jellačić launched his offensive, the text of the proposal was published as a proclamation. However, in this form it had no effect whatever on those for whom it was intended.

A similar fate befell the recommendations of the committee set up by the Transylvanian Diet to submit proposals to Parliament for the legal regulation of issues still requiring clarification in connection with implementation of the union. By the end of August the committee had drafted twenty bills, of which Parliament passed eight in the course of September. The debating of the other twelve was, however, postponed by the House of Deputies to a later date, which in effect meant that these bills were shelved for ever. The latter included a proposal which would have reassured the Transylvanian Saxons concerning the continued existence of the Saxon Universality and which would have confirmed that the language of public administration in the *Királyföld* would remain German. For the time being the bill designed to pacify the Transylvanian Rumanians. Transylvania was neither enacted nor shelved: indeed, the union committee formulated the bill dealing with the Rumanians only subsequently, during the last week of September. Some consolation for the delay could have been provided by the fact that this bill (drafted, in addition to the three Rumanian members of the thirty-member committee, by five other Rumanian politicians, among them Cipariu, invited by the government) contained many points which, if accepted, could have paved the way to reassurance for the Transylvanian Rumanians. The bill recommended that "the Rumanians' nationality and language be recognized and guaranteed". Furthermore, it wished to point out that the Rumanians were to enjoy full freedom to use their mother tongue in their schools and in connection with Church matters. Even though it did not propose that henceforth the official language of the local authorities in areas with Rumanian majorities be Rumanian, it did recommend that participants be permitted to use Rumanian when addressing local authority meetings. In spite of everything, though, Parliament was unable, even after many months, to find the time to debate this proposed arrangement.

In short, the non-Magyars of Hungary received little encouragement from the Hungarians during the periods directly preceding and following open counter-revolutionary action with regard to consideration of their national demands. At the same time, however, considerable inducements were forthcoming from the counter-revolutionary circles. It was hardly surprising that, under the circumstances, the Serb and



67. *Timotei Cipariu*

Croat example was very soon followed by the Slovaks and Rumanians as well.

With a letter of recommendation addressed to the Austrian Ministry of Defence and with money in hand, Štúr and Hurban, who had been somewhat provoked in Zagreb, hastened to Vienna at the end of August. They did so in the hope—justified as it turned out—that the Austrian ruling circles would now be compelled to join forces against the Hungarians with the participants of the June uprising in Prague. In Vienna, Štúr and Hurban, along with Hodža, immediately began recruiting a Slovak legion. Their idea was that, when Jellačić launched his attack, this force would invade Hungary and thereby spark off a large-scale Slovak uprising in the rear of the Hungarian Revolution, which would also have to contend with Jellačić's onslaught. In mid-September the Slovak National Council was formed with Hurban as president, and the task of this was to lead the uprising.



68. *The seal of the Slovak National Council*

Yet, despite Hurban's efforts, the organization of the Slovak uprising did not proceed smoothly. The main difficulty stemmed from a lack of interest in the legion. This meant that the detachment could leave Vienna only on September 17, when it was still little more than three hundred strong. Another problem was that among the three hundred legionaries (who had been recruited with considerable difficulty) there were at best some fifty Slovaks. In the end, the force became a Czech rather than a Slovak affair. Because of this, Hurban, Štúr and Hodža (for want of Slovaks with adequate experience of military command) were obliged to take in three Czechs who had seen active service into the six-member national council. This development sowed the seeds of further difficulties: of the three Czech council members, only Bernard Janeček belonged to the radical camp, and the other two—Bedřich Bloudek and František Aleksander Zach—were confidants of Jellačić and the Austrian High Command. Accordingly, Hurban and his associates were compelled—partly out of consideration for the Bloudek group—to summon the Slovak people to arms in a proclamation which was unable to describe the purpose of the uprising merely as the attainment of national equality, but which also had to declare that the restoration of the empire's unity, destroyed by the Hungarians, was one of the goals of the Slovak movement. This in itself made a favourable response to the legion on the part of the Slovak masses questionable.

The chief difficulty was that the reception of the legion in Hungary did not match up to the expectations of the national council's members. It was in



69. A fighter and an officer of the Slovak legion



70. *Slovak legionary standing guard*

vain that Hurban and his associates so carefully selected the northwestern edges of Nyitra county as the starting point for the uprising. It was also in vain that their armed supporters crossed the border at Miava on September 19. During the days that followed, discontented peasants living on cleared woodland nearby joined them in large numbers, but the greater part of the Slovak population did not

rally to their aid, in spite of the fact that the ground had been painstakingly prepared by Hurban. On the contrary, the Slovaks sided against the insurgents and supported the Hungarian Revolution, and the fact that few Slovaks were overjoyed at the thought of Austrian domination replacing Hungarian supremacy was only one reason for this. A more important explanation was that, as elsewhere, a good many of the Slovaks had benefited from the measures introduced by the Hungarian Revolution to emancipate the serfs and they therefore continued to identify their own interests with those of the Revolution. Moreover, in religion the Slovaks were divided in their allegiance between the Lutheran and the Catholic Churches, whereas the leaders of the campaign were all Lutherans. (Because of this the Catholic section of the Slovak population regarded the whole undertaking with inbred suspicion.) Thus, after the launching of the insurrection more the Slovaks in Upper Hungary took up arms against the "Slovak" legion than joined it. This was partly why, by September 29, Hurban had been obliged pull out of Hungary. In their disappointment Hodža and Janeček soon left the Slovak National Council.

The Hungarian Revolution thereby acquired another opportunity to settle Hungarian-Slovak relations. The reason for this was that after their early setbacks Hodža and Janeček had come to the conclusion that the Hungarians ought to be persuaded to meet Slovak national demands by means of negotiations rather than by force of arms. In Pest, the idea of establishing contact with Hodža was still not contemplated by anyone. Neither did the Hungarian politicians seriously consider

listening to those Slovaks who had steadfastly supported the Revolution. As they had done previously in Breznóbánya, in Turóc, Árva, Liptó, and Gömör counties, the Slovaks now repeatedly asserted that they would continue to support the Revolution, and the only thing they asked for was that the Slovak language still be allowed at the county assemblies for Slovak-populated areas. The Hungarian leadership seemed to have derived confidence from the fact that in September the majority of the Slovaks in that part of Hungary threatened by Hurbán sided with it without being granted any concessions whatever...

Under the circumstances, however, Hodža's wavering could only have been temporary, and a few weeks later both Hodža and Janeček again started to organize for armed struggle, just as Hurbán and Štúr had done. Despite this, it did not even occur to Hodža and Janeček, who had earlier become irremediably locked in conflict with their fellows, to ask to be taken back by the Slovak National Council. Still mulling over the September failure, they, too, now came to the same



71. The Hungarian situation in autumn 1848—in the eyes of an Austrian caricaturist concerned over the fate of the European revolution: with their heads in the clouds, the Hungarians want to make it on Kossuth's phrasemongering and the support of the Slovak masses, whilst the Croats and Serbs do not realize that when they are trying to frustrate the Hungarian revolution then they are doing a service not for themselves but for the Russians



72. The officers of the Slovak legion searching of a way out

conclusion as Hurban and his associates, namely that next time they should not begin such an undertaking entirely by themselves, but should launch their next offensive as a part of the imperial army. In early December, therefore, Hodža and Janeček's detachment of legionaries, one hundred strong, again entered Hungary as a unit of one of Windisch-Grätz's divisions (operating at the lower reaches of the river Morva). At the same time, the 170-strong legion of the incomplete

national council returned to Hungary as part of another imperial army division—invading the country via the Jablunka Pass—under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Karl Frischeisen. This made it much easier for the Slovak invaders to move about in Upper Hungary than had been the case in September. Yet it gave rise to some serious difficulties as well. Obviously by fighting alongside the imperial army, the legionaries were unlikely to win the sympathy of large numbers of Slovaks, and, despite zealous efforts at recruitment, the national council was unable to increase the strength of its legion beyond the 1,700



73. Slovak legionaries hanging on the words and on the black-and-yellow rosette of their commander at the time of the winter camping

mark. Janeček recruited barely 800 men, whilst a far larger number of Slovak volunteers joined the Hungarian *honvéd* army.

On the other hand, the Rumanian uprising, which broke out in Transylvania in October, was able to gather momentum. One reason for this was that conditions in Transylvania were far more favourable for a national uprising than they were in Upper Hungary. The Rumanian leaders were not obliged to organize an armed struggle on foreign territory but, thanks to the imperial troops stationed in Transylvania, could do so on the spot. Moreover, like their Serb and Croat comrades-in-arms, they were not forced to rely solely on untrained insurrectionists, but, to some extent at least, could utilize a pre-existing and experienced armed force—the two Transylvanian Rumanian border guard infantry regiments. This was especially true during the first half of September when the rank and file of the two border guard regiments formally declared (after encouragement from its imperial officers, not least Lieutenant-Colonel Karl Urban who commanded the Naszód regiment) that it opposed the Hungarian government in its attempts to undermine the unity of the empire. In addition, on every issue the men wished to abide by the resolutions of the May Balázsfalva assembly and intended to follow the instructions of the Rumanian National Committee established by it.

The task of the leaders of the Rumanian movement was also easier on account of the fact that even the emancipation of the serfs had failed to win the sympathy of the Rumanian peasants for the Hungarian Revolution. This was partly because the liberation of the serfs in Transylvania took place at a far later date than in Hungary, and because, by the time it was in fact carried out, suspicion engendered by the delay had already become firmly established among the peasantry. A thousand other signs also helped to make it clear to the Transylvanian peasants that even in June the majority of their landlords had agreed to the abolition of serfdom only involuntarily and solely on account of force of circumstances. Also, the laws on the emancipation of the serfs, which were finally passed—amidst considerable difficulties—in Kolozsvár in June, contained far fewer concessions than the peasants had previously been demanding, especially since the Balázsfalva assembly in May which had called for a great deal more. Possessing even smaller serf holdings than their counterparts in Hungary proper, the Transylvanian peasants had even more pressing reasons for demanding more far-reaching concessions than the mere abolition of the serfs' feudal services in the strictest sense of the term.

In short, even the emancipation of the serfs failed to win over the Rumanian peasantry to the Hungarian Revolution. The Rumanian masses were, however, estranged from the Revolution at the beginning of September, when the authorities began recruitment in both Hungary and Transylvania. They did this on the basis of a recruitment bill which was passed in August by an overwhelming majority in the Pest Parliament, but which had failed to win the royal assent and was therefore to be regarded as totally invalid. News of the veto was readily available from the delegates of the Ruma-



74. Karl Urban

nian National Committee who travelled to the villages. The authorities again everywhere used force to break peasant resistance to recruitment. In one instance, on September 12 in Aranyoslóna, Torda county, soldiers fired into the crowd which gathered on their arrival—just as they had done three months earlier in Mihálcfalva, when thirteen people had been killed. The general situation went from bad to worse and suddenly the rift became unbridgeable. The Rumanian peasants of Transylvania were now convinced that there remained only one course open to them: to respond to force with force.

Obviously, the leaders of the Rumanian national movement were quick to exploit this state of affairs. On September 16 they convened another assembly at Balázsfalva. Again, tens of thousands of peasants, many of them now armed, attended the meeting, which continued its sessions until September 28. Here it was repeated that the Rumanian national movement still refused to recognize the union and the suprem-

acy of the Hungarian government. On the contrary, they demanded the convening of the Transylvanian Diet and the formation of a separate Transylvanian government in which the Rumanians would enjoy proportional representation. To increase their popularity amongst the peasantry still further, as in May, the leaders of the Rumanian national movement produced new demands which directly affected the people on the land. One of these was that not only the serfs' obligatory unpaid labour duty in the strict sense of the term be abolished, but that "all forms and types of unpaid labour", i.e. those levied on peasant holdings carved out of manorial land be done away with as well. They also demanded that disputes between peasants and landlords be settled by an arbitration committee in which every nation and social class in Transylvania would be represented proportionally. Indeed, by this time the Rumanian leaders had received a certain amount of encouragement from the Transylvanian representatives of Court circles, primarily from the Transylvanian General Command, although action would have been more acceptable than the sympathetic words they received. Moreover, they also took great care to draft the resolutions of the second national assembly in a way that would please Vienna even more than the resolutions of the previous national assembly had done. It was therefore also stated that the Rumanians requested that the imperial constitution patent issued for Austria on April 25 be extended to Transylvania; that they wanted Transylvania to be placed under the control of the Austrian government; and that until this was done they would only accept authority of the Transylvanian General Command. At the same time, the leaders of the Rumanian national movement also announced the kind of support they expected in return from the organizers of the counter-revolution, declaring that by mobilizing all Transylvanian Rumanian men aged between seventeen and fifty, they could create their own separate national guard, which they expected the General Command to issue with arms. Finally, they framed their resolutions into a petition addressed to the monarch, again turning to the General Command to forward this to Vienna.

Naturally, these resolutions profoundly shocked the more moderate Rumanians. For instance, several leaders of the Wallachian revolution—suppressed by Turkish troops at this very time—also condemned the approaches made to the imperial side. They declared that, as a result of them, now an "eternal wall separates the Rumanians of Wallachia and Transylvania", Rumanians "who for the sake of nationality are willing ... to come to terms with tyranny". But even among those

attending the September Balázsfalva assembly there existed a minority incapable of approving the majority stance. A number of deputies from this group—they did not reveal their identity—addressed a petition to Batthyány the day the assembly was opened, in which they strongly condemned the oppressive measures employed by the Hungarians against the Transylvanian Rumanians. Demanding guarantees for Rumanian nationality and equality, they also declared that if the Hungarians eventually modified their nationalities policy then “internal peace” would be “guaranteed” in Transylvania. With this the foundations would be “laid for mutual affection”, and, within a month, at least twenty thousand Rumanians would voluntarily enlist in the *honvéd* army.

These developments could not, however, halt the process whereby Transylvania’s Rumanian national movement acquired a counter-revolutionary character. For the time being the admonitions of the Rumanians of Wallachia were completely ineffective, indeed these could not really have influenced the Rumanians of Transylvania, who, up until now, had regarded the dynasty as being far more understanding than the Hungarians. The minority at the second Balázsfalva assembly still tried to negotiate with the Hungarians but the response their initiative evoked in Pest dealt them a humiliating blow. Batthyány had immediately forwarded the petition of this group to Parliament, and the House of Deputies put it on its agenda on September 26. However, the deputies then decided to postpone detailed discussion of the demands made in the petition until the bill on the Transylvanian Rumanians came up for debate, a bill they were still awaiting from the union committee. As it turned out, the matter never re-emerged. After this, those submitting the petition had to face the fact that—no matter how hard they tried—it was impossible to negotiate with the Hungarians. Now even those who trusted the Habsburgs least were compelled to discard their previous reservations and, like most of their fellows, sided with Bărnauț.

In any event this was what the events immediately after the adop-



75. The seal of the Rumanian National Committee reorganized in autumn 1848



76. *Baron Antal Puchner, Transylvania's commandant-general*

tion of the September Balázsfalva resolutions seem to indicate: before their departure from Balázsfalva the leaders of the Rumanian movement re-formed (and, a few day later, enlarged) the Rumanian National Committee established in May. On the one hand, the chairmanship of the committee was now formally given to Bărnau, while on the other those Rumanian leaders who had been pushed into the background in May—Laurian, Bariț and Cipariu—were now also included in the committee. Indeed when the latest national assembly was being opened, Cipariu had been in Pest attempting—as a guest of the union committee—to formulate

a bill designed to settle the Rumanian issue to be passed by the Hungarian Parliament. Obviously, these anti-Habsburg politicians would not have been regarded any more favourably even had they not revealed a radical shift at the end of September.

With this shift the final obstacle was removed from the path of the Habsburgs, who strove to exploit Transylvania's Rumanian national movement. The organizers of counter-revolution in Transylvania did not fail to act. The Transylvanian General Command, for example, issued general orders on October 10, even though it was only on October 18 that it openly turned against the Hungarian Revolution. These orders called for the immediate disarming of the Transylvanian Hungarian National Guard units—on the pretext that the Hungarians were preparing to exterminate the Rumanians and the Saxons. A week



77. Iancu and his soldiers, going into battle for the double-headed eagle



78. A group of Rumanian insurgents massacres the Hungarians it had forced to leave Zalatna at Preszáka on October 24, 1848



79. One of Iancu's deputies


later, the same General Command issued an appeal to the Rumanian population of Transylvania. In accordance with the latest Balázsfalva decisions it called on them to take up arms and, in consort with the imperial troops, to turn against those who intended to annihilate them. By this time, however, the Rumanian masses needed little encouragement. Special appeals were no longer necessary: abject poverty, promises of land distribution by Bărnuf's more radical followers, and the especially rapid spread of Rumanian nationalism were sufficient in themselves. Thus, the October 17 appeal already found tens of thousands of Rumanians preparing for the uprising. A few days later the insurrectionist forces

were able to launch their campaign of extermination against the townsfolk living at the foot of the mountains. The massacre they perpetrated amongst the Hungarian burghers there was compared even by some Saxon supporters of the counter-revolution to the devastation caused by the Tatar invasion of the thirteenth century.

Yet in other respects the Saxon leaders still adhered to the anti-Hungarian policy which had determined their actions from the very outset, and which, after the royal assent to the Transylvanian law on the union, they had seemingly abandoned. In reality, however, they did this merely for appearances' sake, wishing to hide behind feigned loyalty until the time was ripe for overt counter-revolutionary action against the Hungarian Revolution. Accordingly, in July the Saxon *sedes*

also sent their deputies to the Parliament in Pest. When, however, it became known that on September 11 Jellačić had invaded Hungary and that Parliament had adopted a resolution which confirmed government measures concerning the immediate enforcement of the recruitment law, they immediately recalled their deputies. Some, for example, Elias Roth, who was elected in the Brassó *sedes*, refused to comply with this order and were consequently branded traitors. In the following weeks the Saxon local authorities—with the sole exception of Szászváros *sedes*—declared, one after the other, that they no longer recognized the authority of the Hungarian government and that they were placing themselves under the rule of the Austrian government. In October, the Saxon Universality despatched another delegation to the monarch with the request that the *Királyföld* be declared a province of a unitary and indivisible Austria—and entirely independent of Hungary.

In this way the gulf between the Hungarian Revolution and the Slovak national movement—together with the majority of the Transylvanian Rumanians and Saxons—became as great in the autumn of 1848 as the rift separating the Croat and the Serb national movement from the Hungarian Revolution had become during the previous months. Yet, there were certain signs that the seeds of suspicion had already been sown within the Croat and Serb movements. An instance of this was that the adjournment of the *sabor* had not yet



80. Elias Roth



81. Croats fighting for the honour of the imperial banner against the Hungarians
in the eyes of a radical Austrian caricaturist

opened the eyes of the Croat liberals, although Jellačić's offensive against Hungary during the course of September had precisely this effect. After all, even though the Hungarian leadership had not formally endorsed the complete secession of Croatia and Hungary up by the end of August, the real separation of the two countries had already become an accomplished fact in March. Thenceforth, there was absolutely no threat on the part of the Hungarians to Croatia's *de facto* separation. Thus, when, despite this, Jellačić invaded Hungary in the September it was not difficult for those with any common sense at all to realize that this attack, while seriously damaging the Hungarian Revolution, held out no promise of benefit to the Croatian movement. As a result, this military adventure could only serve the interests of the Crown and the cause of imperial unity. As for the Croat liberals, their main concern was still to assert fully Croatian national interests rather than to protect the dynasty and the unity of the empire.

In early August, Baron Dragojlo Kušljan launched the *Slavenski jug*, the Croatian liberals' principal newspaper. From September onwards this paper carried an increasing number of articles containing covert criticism of Jellačić's action. In mid-December, Kušljan and his associates decided to air their oppositionist views more openly. In all likelihood they were prompted to do so by the accession to the throne of Francis Joseph, who now replaced the Emperor Ferdinand forced to abdicate on December 2. The new monarch thought it expedient to present himself to Hungary's minorities—including the Croats—as a gracious patron. Accordingly, on the very day he came to the throne he appointed Baron Kulmer as minister without portfolio in the Austrian government. At the same time he made Jellačić the civilian and military governor of Dalmatia and the Hungarian Littoral—without dismissing him from any of the posts he already held. Seemingly based on the *sabor* demands of June, these steps were, in reality, bound to have an effect on the Croat liberals precisely the opposite of the one which was intended.

As a matter of fact the *sabor* had not yet requested a portfolio in the Austrian government for Kulmer, but merely that he be recognized as the Triune Kingdom's representative in Vienna. Neither did it ask for Jellačić's appointment as governor of Dalmatia, but only that the monarch declare the governance of this province to be an integral part of the duties of the *ban*, and, accordingly, incorporate it into the sphere of authority of the Croat *ban* of the day. When, therefore, Francis Joseph's measures of December 2 seemingly met two of the *sabor*'s requests, this convinced the Croat liberals



82. Francis Joseph riding on a high horse



83. Kušljan in the company of Viennese revolutionists

sabor and which—even three months after Jellačić's rehabilitation—continued to render the *sabor's* measures legally null and void.

There was only one conclusion the Croat liberals could draw, provided they gave serious consideration to the events of December 2. On December 12 a newspaper article reflecting the collective opinion of the liberal leaders stated explicitly that the Croats should not have taken military action against the Hungarian Revolution, and that a change of policy was most certainly needed because their reward for participating in the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution "will be gross ingratitude on Vienna's part". (Besides Kušljan, Kukuljević and the renowned poet Ivan Mažuranić were among those contributing to the article, which, for the sake of even greater effect, was published in the semi-official *Novine dalmatinsko-hèrvatsko-slavonske* rather than in the *Slavenski jug*.)

In their realistic assessment of the situation the prominent Croat liberals were ahead of the Serb, Rumanian and Slovak minority politicians (who, including Rajačić, Bărnuz and Štúr, still blithely took the view that—voluntarily or under duress—the Crown would amply

that he was unwilling to meet the *sabor's* real demands—obviously because this would, according to the Court at least, give Croatia too much independence. They became confirmed in this belief by the fact that Francis Joseph for the time being gave no indication as to whether he would ever sanction the *sabor's* bills, bills which had been awaiting the royal assent for months. Indeed, Francis Joseph was not forthcoming even on the issue of whether he would annul the edict, issued by Ferdinand at the end of May, which had prohibited Jellačić from convening the

reward them for their services). Yet the Croat liberals' new appraisal of the situation did not, for the time being, benefit the cause of the Revolution. Indeed, it could not, partly because the liberals still constituted a minority and, apart from the press, possessed no effective weapon, and partly because even they failed to appreciate that a break with the counter-revolutionary camp would need to be followed up by a policy of *rapprochement* with the Hungarian Revolution. Consequently, the Croat liberals took no constructive steps. Neither did leading Hungarian circles think that the time had come to enter into negotiations with them, especially since, under the circumstances, the members of these circles could not even have been aware that a group of Croats had embarked upon a course leading to opposition. The latter were similarly ignorant of the kind of concessions the Batthyány government had intended to offer the Croats in the final days of August.

The fermentation which was now beginning to occur within the Serb national movement was, however, of far greater practical significance, even though the Serb liberals also occupied a minority position. Since the chairmanship of the chief *odbor* as well as the leadership of the Serbian insurgents who were to fight against the Hungarian Revolution had been conferred on Stratimirović (owing to the absence of Šupljikac, who had been elected voivode at the May national assembly), the Serb liberals occupied considerable positions of power in spite of their minority status. Consequently, the appearance of differences of opinion



84. Ivan Mažuranić



85. *Stratimirović in the uniform designed for the generals of the Serb insurrectionist army*

separating them from Rajačić's supporters was bound immediately to transform the resulting conflict of views into a power struggle. Immediately prior to Jellačić's attack on Hungary these hitherto latent differences of opinion had already surfaced—primarily because Stratimirović made no secret of the fact that he would be sorry if Jellačić succeeded in suppressing the Hungarian Revolution since in that case the Habsburgs would no longer depend on the Serb uprising.

It was therefore inevitable that, by September at the latest, such a power struggle would develop within the Serb national movement. The main bone of contention was

the issue of who should lead the insurrectionist army and whether or not overall control should stay in the hands of Stratimirović. Understandably, it was Jellačić who precipitated the conflict. His initial move was to appoint Colonel Ferdinand Mayerhofer, the Austrian consul in Belgrade, as "chief of staff" of the insurrectionist army at the very beginning of the month—with a view to guaranteeing Austrian control. On September 18, however, Rajačić's supporters in the chief *odbor* themselves began to take action. Utilizing their majority, they obliged the chief *odbor* formally to remove Stratimirović from his position of commander-in-chief.

The matter was by no means settled, however, Stratimirović, who had become highly popular among the rebels on account of his military feats during the summer, refused to comply with the resolutions passed on September 18. Moreover, a sizeable number of insurgents now

openly took his side. To avert the threat of an irreparable split within the national movement, Rajačić reinstated Stratimirović as commander-in-chief on October 4. Yet even this concession failed to produce unity, for, as Rajačić clearly pointed out, Stratimirović's reinstatement was valid only for the period of Šupljikac's absence. In addition, the Austrian Ministry of Defence—and this was known to Rajačić—had, a few days before, given permission for Šupljikac finally to return home from the Italian theatre of war. Thus, the issue of who was to lead the insurrectionist army was finally resolved on the day Šupljikac arrived at Karlóca (October 6). This represented a victory for the Rajačić faction after all, since Stratimirović was not in a position to disobey the voivode elected by the national assembly.

Rajačić was, naturally, carried away by this momentary success. He obliged the new national assembly, held at Karlóca between October 7 and October 14, to pass a resolution empowering him to reorganize the chief *odbor* completely and in accordance with his own wishes. By November 4 Rajačić had managed to create a new chief *odbor* under his own chairmanship and almost entirely from his own supporters. The new chief *odbor* was now given full executive powers: only the approval of the Crown was now needed for Rajačić to regard himself as absolute master of the Serbs living in Hungary.

For their part, though, the Court, whose main



86. Ferdinand Mayerhofer



87. Stevan Šupljikac

objective was to suppress those aspirations which threatened the unity of the empire, saw just as little need for the establishment of an autonomous voivodate at this time as for the extension of Croatian autonomy. Rajačić and his associates therefore had to wait right up until December for the first visible sign of monarchic favour. At last, on December 15, Francis Joseph confirmed Šupljikac in his office as voivode, an office originally conferred on him by the Karlóca assembly in May, and personally bestowed the title of patriarch on Rajačić. However, the emperor no longer justified this by saying that

he wished to whom consideration for the May national assembly's demand but emphasized that he was acting on his own initiative. With regard to the question of autonomy: in a patent issued on December 15 Francis Joseph merely promised "national internal government" for the Serbs of Hungary, but "only after the restoration of peace". Obviously, this was unsatisfactory even to Rajačić, and amounted to a rebuff for the majority of the supporters of the Serbian national movement.

Thus enraged, even the reorganized chief *odbor* considered it necessary to demand the convocation of a third—"constitutional"—assembly. Since the Crown's hostility to the setting up of an autonomous voivodate had become abundantly clear, this assembly was to proclaim, in the name of the Serb nation, its immediate establishment. In point of fact, there was no need for Rajačić to respond anxiously to this initiative, as he could utilize it to serve his own purposes against the Crown. But the chief *odbor* went further, simultaneously starting to

address declarations of confidence to Stratimirović (this was a clear sign that it held Rajačić, so far the most prominent Serb advocate of loyalty to the Habsburgs, responsible for what had happened). All this must have affected Rajačić rather unpleasantly, particularly now. General Šupljikac died unexpectedly on December 27 and this inevitably meant that the issue of who should succeed him as voivode would have to be dealt with at the next session of the national assembly. Moreover, since even a majority in the chief *odbor*, the members of which had been chosen by Rajačić, suddenly turned to Stratimirović, it now seemed certain that the majority of those attending the national assembly would also vote in favour of Stratimirović. Consequently, Stratimirović would not only recover command of the insurrectionist army from the national assembly, but would also be appointed to the office of voivode.

By the end of December Rajačić found himself in an extremely difficult position, and one from which he could only escape by making partial concessions. To placate Stratimirović and his associates, he agreed to the establishment of a committee to draft a constitution for the voivodate. In addition, he himself suggested that Stratimirović be the chairman of this committee. However, Rajačić did not fail to exploit the opportunities afforded by his own conciliatory approach. He therefore firmly rejected the motion calling for the convocation of another national assembly. Admittedly, he remained silent over his worries concerning the election of the voivode, merely saying that a national assembly could not carry out its task before the committee drafting the constitution had completed its work and finalized its proposals. In the meantime, however, Rajačić lost no time in asking General Kuzman Todorović the brigadier of Karlovac, one of Jellačić's Serb associates and a staunchly loyal supporter of the Habsburg dynasty, to take Šupljikac's place as commander-in-chief. Thus, on January 6, in other words before anyone could object to this arbitrary step, Todorović took up the post. Again, Rajačić succeeded in escaping serious difficulties.

That the sharpening of the power struggle within the Serb national movement did not lead to a final split even at this time was not due solely, or even primarily, to Rajačić's machinations, but principally to the fact that the Serb movement continued to conduct an armed struggle against the Hungarian Revolution and was actually forced to devote all its energies to this. Under the circumstances both Rajačić and Stratimirović had to face up to the reality that worsening internal conflicts would very soon lead to the collapse of the Serb uprising—

unless some kind of Hungarian-Serb *rapprochement* put an end to it even before that. Dissatisfied as he was with the Crown, Rajačić was still just as hostile to the idea of possible conciliation with the Hungarians as he had been previously. (Rajačić's stance derived not just from his innate conservatism, but also from his belief that in a test of strength between the Hungarian Revolution and the counter-revolution, the Revolution was bound to emerge the loser.) For his part, Stratimirović would not have opposed the idea of concluding peace with the Hungarians, provided that the Hungarian authorities were willing to make substantial concessions—concessions that continued to be denied.

In November, the leadership of the Hungarian Revolution did at last decide to grant some of the Serb demands, despite the fact that for the time being it refused to renounce the use of power politics against all the other nationality movements. But even in this exceptional case, the Hungarian leadership was not motivated by an incipient spirit of consideration towards the minority demands, but primarily by a prevelant—and justified—fear that Windisch-Grätz would shortly launch an attack against Hungary. In the event of such a development most of the Hungarian troops then deployed in Southern Hungary would have to be transferred to Transdanubia, which—unless the Serbs were quickly conciliated—would inevitably bring about the final ruin of the Magyars of Southern Hungary. That the Hungarian leadership was acting under duress was clearly borne out by the peace terms. These were put forward by Ödön Beöthy, the government commissioner of Southern Hungary, on behalf of the National Defence Committee, which exercised executive power under Kossuth's leadership after the Batthyány government resigned in September.

The peace terms reveal that the National Defence Committee was now ready to acknowledge the existence of the Serb nation, and was, in addition, prepared to allow the inhabitants of Serb settlements to make their mother tongue the language of public administration there. What is more, it was even ready to allow the head of the Serbian Church in Hungary to use the title of patriarch, as well as to abolish totally the internal military structure of the Military Border. In short, it was now willing to grant everything the Serbs had demanded in the first few weeks of the Revolution. On the other hand, the National Defence Committee still refused to take account of subsequent developments, especially the new demands raised by the Karlóca assembly in May. Moreover, not only did it still refuse to entertain the idea of an autonomous voivodate but it also declined to consider allowing the

Serbs of Hungary to discuss political issues—together with ecclesiastical and educational affairs—at their future annual congresses.

In short, the concessions offered by the National Defence Committee, which would have placated the Serbs in the early days of April, now failed to satisfy even Stratimirović. In addition, Beöthy had approached Rajačić with his peace offer and not Stratimirović. Naturally, it did not even occur to Rajačić to give serious consideration to it. Accordingly, Rajačić rejected the offer in its entirety and, instead of being prompted to turn to Stratimirović or to make further concessions, the National Defence



88. Ödön Beöthy

Committee now concluded that it was impossible to negotiate with the Serbs. Consequently, when Windisch-Grätz finally began his campaign against Hungary in December 1848 the *honvéd* army was already tied down in a struggle not only against the Croat, Slovak and Rumanian enemies of the Revolution, but against the Serb insurrectionists as well.

Admittedly, not only Magyars fought for the Revolution after September 1848. As we know, during the autumn of that year Slovak peasants had enlisted in the new *honvéd* battalions, their example being followed by many former serfs from the Ruthenian, Rumanian and Serb villages of Hungary proper. This had also been the case during the popular uprising against Jellačić in Transdanubia, which, in addition to the Magyars, was also joined by the Croat and Slovenian population of the areas affected by the attack. Subsequently, hundreds



89. Pressing ahead during the winter months, Serb insurrectionists occupy the town of Zombor on February 11, 1849



90. Selmec miners

of Slovak and German volunteers from the mining towns on the river Garam also participated in the struggles against the Hurbanists. In mid-December, the German and Rumanian iron workers took up arms to a man to help the local National Guard to repel an attack mounted against Resica by Rumanian border guards and rebels. As time passed, there were many additional indications that a not insignificant proportion of the non-Magyars of Hungary continued to identify with the Revolution, despite the narrow-minded nationalities policy adopted by the leading Hungarian circles, and felt that it was a matter of honour to participate in the military struggle in defence of the revolutionary achievements. Yet even this could not alter the indisputable fact that the majority of Hungary's non-Magyars was still hostile to the Revolution.

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that the study of the history of the United States is essential for a full understanding of the country and its people. The paper then discusses the various methods used by historians to study the past, including the use of primary and secondary sources, and the importance of critical thinking in the study of history.

2. The second part of the paper discusses the role of the federal government in the development of the United States. It is argued that the federal government has played a central role in the development of the country, and that its actions have shaped the course of American history. The paper then discusses the various policies and programs of the federal government, and the impact of these policies and programs on the country and its people.

The Search for a Solution

In the early weeks of 1849 the situation seemed even more desperate than at the end of the previous year. By this time the *honvéd* army had been forced to give up not only Southern Hungary but also the whole of Transylvania (with the exception of Háromszék), all of Transdanubia, and the capital along with area surrounding it. By early January the main forces of the *honvéd* army had been pushed back as far as the *Tiszántúl*. The National Defence Committee and Parliament were obliged to remove to Debrecen. Therefore, at the beginning of 1849 it seemed almost certain that the fate of the Revolution was sealed. Under the circumstances the attitude of the minority movements could not seriously be expected to change.

Yet this is exactly what happened. Supporters of the Serb and Croat national movement experienced their first disappointment in December when it became clear that the Crown still did not think it opportune to meet the demands formulated almost six months earlier at Karlóca and Zagreb respectively. This disappointment was not to be their last: henceforth both they and their comrades-in-arms in the other minorities experienced a growing number of similar ones. Indeed, this was inevitable since, as time went by, the representatives of the nationality movements began to press for remuneration for their services. However, the Court, whose chief concern was to preserve the unity of the empire at all costs, had no intention of rewarding such services by granting what the minorities most earnestly desired—extensive autonomy. Accordingly, the minority politicians never received satisfactory responses to their demands for this. As a result, the suspicion that, in the end, the

Crown would simply cheat them became established among a growing number of the minority politicians.

This was especially true of the liberal minority politicians whose fears must surely have been compounded by the fact that, even though the right-wing minority politicians had also pressed for the meeting of the nationalities' demands in the early months of 1849, they, too, had failed to accomplish much more. For instance, in January the *ban's* council, formed by the Croat *sabor*, two-thirds of which was loyal to the dynasty (it continued to function even after the adjournment of the *sabor*), drafted a number of bills designed to regulate Croatia's constitutional status. (Presiding over the proceedings was Mirko Lentulay, a former substitute lord-lieutenant who had been vested with full powers in Jellačić's absence.) In these bills it was repeatedly stated that the Croat regarded foreign affairs, defence, finance, and commerce to be the common affairs of the empire and therefore the responsibility of the empire's central government. It was also stated, however, that the situation was entirely different in the other areas of government and that the conduct of other matters within the Triune Kingdom should be entrusted to a provincial council of state responsible solely to the *sabor*. It was, of course, in vain that those formulating these ideas, which constituted a serious threat to the unity of the empire, awaited the royal assent to their legislation. A similar fate befell those groups of pro-Habsburg Ruthenian intellectuals who gathered together in Eperjes (already captured by the imperial army) in January, from where they moved on to Olmütz, in Moravia, the Court's provisional seat. On January 29 they handed in a petition to Francis Joseph on behalf of the anti-revolutionary minority of the Ruthenian people, requesting that an autonomous Ruthenian Crown Province be organized from Galicia and the north-eastern part of Upper Hungary (which were to be united). A few friendly, albeit meaningless, words were all Șaguna received from Francis Joseph in Olmütz in response to his own petition of February 25. The latter contained a similar request, namely that union be effected between Transylvania, the Bukovina and the Rumanian-populated areas of Hungary proper. The Rumanian Crown Province thus established would then be headed by a national chief—to be elected by the Rumanians from among their own ranks—and, for the sake of his greater glory, the emperor would assume the additional title "Grand Duke of the Rumanians".

Those who did not confine themselves to besieging the Court with petitions of this kind, preferring arbitrarily to take active steps to realize



91. *Todorović takes an emotional farewell from the volunteers from Serbia ordered home at Törökkanizsa on March 5, 1849*

their dreams, suffered an even gloomier fate. For on January 13, on the occasion of the Orthodox New Year, Rajačić and the Serb chief *odbor* informed Francis Joseph in a formal petition that the Serb people, trusting the emperor's word, would patiently await the restoration of peace and the establishment afterwards of the promised "national internal government". In the meantime, however, local and district *odbors* proliferated in areas occupied by the insurgent Serb army, which immediately took over the running of the public administration. In response, the Court, using diplomatic channels, compelled the government of the Principality of Serbia to recall Knićanin's volunteers (who could hardly have been thought in Olmütz to have taken up arms to protect the unity of the empire). In an even worse position were the Slovak leaders, who had become totally isolated from their people. Up to this point they had relied entirely on the emperor's favour and, for the time being, did not even attempt to make their wishes known to him, although, owing to inadequate mass backing, they had rendered only the slightest service to the counter-revolution. Hodža, for example,

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was shocked to learn in February that since the legionaries recruited by him had failed to win the sympathy of the population, the imperial army had refused to allow his men into Slovak-populated areas. Accordingly, his unit was ordered to the fortress at Komárom, which had remained in Hungarian hands even after the retreat of the main forces of the *honvéd* army, but which had been blockaded on Windisch-Grätz instructions. Disenchanted, Janeček, the legion's commander, quit his post, handing over command to Ján Francisci, a man of letters with no military experience whatever. As far as Janeček was concerned, this was the end of his army days.

Yet, what happened in January and February was nothing compared with the blow delivered to the nationality politicians early in March. To everyone's surprise, Francis Joseph promulgated a new "constitution". Dated March 4, this document seemingly granted many of the demands made by the minority movements in Hungary. In actual fact, however, it dashed the hopes of those minority politicians who had trusted the Habsburgs.

The "constitution" apparently met the demands of the minority movements in that it established a number of totally separate Crown



92. Slovak legionaries under the fortress at Komárom

Provinces. These areas were: Transylvania; Croatia—Slavonia and the Hungarian Littoral (to be united with each other and subsequently with Dalmatia as well); the Serb voivodate to be set up in the *Bácska* and *Temesköz* area; and the Military Border. It declared all of these provinces, as well as the rest of the "Kingdom of Hungary", to be parts of the "one and indivisible" "Empire of Austria". The octroided—or "imposed"—constitution apparently also met minority demands in that it empowered the individual provinces henceforth to conduct independently those affairs of state which did not constitute the common affairs of the empire.



93. *Francisci and his legionaries*

In point of fact, however, the "constitution" inevitably came as a disappointment to the minority politicians, especially to the Slovaks, who had hoped, albeit without actually requesting it, that they, too, would be given territorial autonomy, but who now received nothing. The others were equally put out—and with reason. The Transylvanian Saxons, for instance, were disillusioned because the "constitution" did not declare the *Királyföld* a separate Crown Province. As far as the Rumanians were concerned, although the "constitution" again declared Transylvania a separate province, it did not—perhaps in order to avoid disappointing the Saxons still more—proclaim it a solely Rumanian one. Moreover, even though the "constitution" had stipulated that the four Hungarian counties (the so-called *Partium*, the population of which was 72 per cent Rumanian) which had earlier been put under Transylvanian public administration but which were again detached in spring 1848, be re-annexed to Transylvania, it made no



94. *The equality ensured for the peoples of the empire within the framework of the octroied constitution as a Czech caricaturist saw it*

provision for annexing additional Hungarian territories with Rumanian populations to Transylvania. The Serbs were also disappointed. Firstly, the voivodate was spoken of only as something for the future. Secondly, although the document said nothing specific concerning the boundaries of the province which was envisaged, it made it clear that the territory of the Serb border regiments would in no event form part of the voivodate. Similarly, the Croats must also have been deeply

disillusioned by the retention of the separate status of the Military Border.

Other possible sources of disappointment included the manner in which the "constitution" defined the sphere of public affairs allocated to the individual provinces and the way in which these affairs were to be conducted. The reason for this was that the "constitution" did not confine the "affairs of the Empire" to the foreign, defence, financial and commercial affairs of the countries under Habsburg rule, but extended it to cover their industry, transportation, police affairs, Church affairs and higher education. Only those areas which could not be included in this wide sphere were to be left to the competence of the provinces. In respect of the conduct of the "affairs of the Empire", the "constitution" laid down that the individual provinces may send their representatives to the Reichstag, which was shortly to be convened. However, the Reichstag was not to exercise legislative power on its own, but was to act together with the emperor. To this a further stipulation was added, namely that henceforth executive power was to be "exclusively in the hands of the Emperor". It was in a similar fashion that the "constitution" then went on to regulate the way in which the affairs left in the hands of the provinces were to be conducted. The new

provincial assemblies were to exercise legislative power at the local level together with the monarch, whilst in the provinces the possessor of executive power was to be "exclusively ... the Emperor".

It is therefore understandable that Rajačić, and not just the Croat *ban's* council, preferred not to announce the octroied constitution officially. It was nevertheless with profound indignation that the nationality movements responded to the provisions of the "constitution". Dragojlo Kušljan, for example, expressed the view that what had happened was simply "treachery on the part of the government" and that therefore "the people's eyes must be opened; let them see in its full extent the kind of injustice that has befallen us". His paper, *Slavenski jug*, did in fact argue that the octroied constitution provided even less autonomy for the Croats than they enjoyed under Hungarian rule. Moreover, readers of the paper began to express the view freely that after what had happened they would be only too happy if the Hungarian *honvéd* army were to emerge victorious on the battlefield, as they now believed that only "this would make possible the assertion of their federalist aspirations". The Serb liberals responded in similar vein to the constitution. *Napredak*, Danilo Medaković's paper (Medaković supported Stratimirović's policy), concluded that just as "there has never been liberty in Austria", so now "there never will be", because Austria and liberty "are perpetual enemies". Based in Belgrade at this time, Jakov Ignjatović wrote in *Srbske novine*—regarded as the semi-official paper of the Principality of Serbia—that since it had become unequivocally clear that the Habsburgs wanted centralization and not a voivodate "in this comedy the Serbs will come to a sticky end".

However, this was by no means the only opinion of the liberals. In *Vjestnik*, the official paper of the Serbian chief *odbor*, one could read that "the Austrian government is mistaken if it thinks that it can buy us off with the



95. Jakov Ignjatović



96. Francis Joseph received the delegation of the Slovak National Council on March 20, 1849

octroied constitution", since it was abundantly clear that, through the constitutional reform, it wished to reduce the voivodate "to the level of a French *département*". Gaj's German-language newspaper, the *Agramer Zeitung* reported that "identical reports are coming in from every part of Croatia on the most unfavourable reception possible shown towards the Olmütz Constitution". This, the paper added, was not surprising since "Austria's charter of liberty" "holds out for us the promise of annihilation and the fate of stepchildren". It went on to declare: "This is the final outcome of the relentless, single-minded and bloody struggle we have been waging since last year..." It continued: "We have been fools..."

Despite the extent of the indignation, however, the minority movements, owing to the lack of a third option, still had no alternative but to side with either the Hungarian Revolution or with the counter-revolution. For various reasons, most of those minority politicians who had turned against the Revolution still refused to entertain the idea of *rapprochement* with the Hungarians. From the fact that the Crown had, for the time being, failed to satisfy their hopes, some concluded merely that in future Vienna would have to be put under even greater pressure.

The Slovak leaders were a good example. Ending their silence at this very time, on March 20 they submitted a request to Francis Joseph to the effect that a separate Crown province be subsequently formed from Hungary's Slovak-populated areas, and that this be granted the kind of autonomy already possessed by the other Crown provinces. The same was true for the majority of the chief *odbor's* members. Accordingly, delegates from this body travelled to Vienna, where on April 25 they submitted a further petition to the Austrian government requesting that the voivodate be, after all, established without delay and that the territory of the Serb border guard regiments be, after all, annexed to it. Naturally, most members of the *ban's* council in Croatia adopted a similar position, as a result of which it now despatched a delegation of its own to Vienna—this time composed entirely of liberal politicians—as an unambiguous sign of its dissatisfaction. On May 6 the delegation submitted a request to the emperor (who had in the meantime had returned to Vienna) that—if he had not yet done so—he should immediately grant his assent to the bills already passed by the *sabor*. Furthermore, he should modify the octroied constitution and, declare the Croatian-Slavonian Military Border to be an integral part of the Triune Kingdom.



97. The Slovak leaders calling on Francis Joseph before the camera of an Olmütz photographer

Naturally, these attempts also failed to produce tangible results—and failure inevitably fuelled discontent. Since this entailed more serious grumbling from the opposition, the Court, rapidly losing its patience, came to the conclusion around March and April that the nationality movements should be taught a lesson they would not easily forget. Vienna decided that the Serbs should be put in their place first. Aware that Rajačić wanted to complement his power as head of the Church with political power as well, and that the Serb populace regarded him as the would-be leader of the voivodate they hoped for, the Crown now gave the ambitious Serb a political office, although not of the kind he had coveted. Instead of being appointed all-powerful governor, Rajačić was merely made (with effect from April 2) imperial commissioner for Southern Hungary. His power was confined to areas under civilian administration, and considering that imperial commissioners were subordinated to the military authorities, in real terms the appointment represented demotion for Rajačić, who was now under the army's thumb. Moreover, to teach the Serbs another lesson, the Crown now organized a seventh military district in Hungary from the Southern Hungarian counties and the Serb Military Border along the lines of the six previously established by Windisch-Grätz on territory it already occupied. On April 8, Mayerhofer, promoted general only a few days before, was appointed to head this. Overnight, this officer, who had previously been subordinated to Rajačić, was made the latter's superior. He was also the superior of General Todorović (who, unlike Rajačić, never dared to act on his own initiative, but, like Rajačić, was a Serb).

The Court was also determined to bring the Croats to heel, especially the Croat press, which had been causing irritation for some time. Accordingly, on May 9 Jellačić—availing himself of the dictatorial powers obtained from the *sabor* the previous summer—issued a press regulation (which he actually referred to as a law). This stated that from now on imprisonment and, in more serious cases, permanent exclusion from newspaper editing awaited all those charged with high treason, incitement with a view to changing the laws by force, propaganda activity aimed at undermining the unity of the empire, or even the spreading of false rumours. After the introduction of this regulation the Court decided the time had come finally to rid their Slovak comrades-in-arms of any inclination to discontent they may have had. On the Crown's part this was more of a precautionary measure than retaliation for anything the Slovaks had actually done.

Accordingly, during the course of May it reorganized the remnants of the Slovak units into a single troop—after the latter had been forced by the *honvéd* troops—who had launched a large-scale counter-offensive in the main theatre of war in April—to flee for a second time. Instead of placing either a Czech or a Slovak commander at the head of the new formation, the Crown appointed Captain Baron Henryk Lewartowski, a Pole by nationality and in every respect a seemingly reliable imperial officer.

These and other similar measures proved to be only partially effective: whilst retaliation com-

pelled some to yield, it actually turned others against the Court. Some of these recalcitrants gradually began to nurture the idea of *rapprochement* with the Hungarians precisely when a recognition had finally begun to strike root within the Hungarian revolutionary camp that its policy towards the minorities needed to be urgently reconsidered.

Radicals were the first to press for the re-appraisal of the Hungarian nationalities policy. Concerned about the fate of the Revolution, some radicals had previously shown even greater intolerance than the liberals towards those nationality movements which had turned against the Revolution. However, precisely because these individuals had the welfare of the Revolution at heart, they were also the first to recognize the pointlessness and danger of an intolerant minorities policy. As in the case of many minority politicians, the octroied constitution served as the direct motivation for such radicals to make their move. On the



98. Henryk Lewartowski



99. Albert Pálfi

one hand, the octroied constitution had certainly caused great disappointment to minority politicians. On the other hand, however, it had again confirmed the principle of the equality of the minorities, a principle already proclaimed by the provisional Austria constitution inaugurated in the April of the previous year. This compelled the Hungarian Revolution again to declare whether or not it was at last prepared to recognize the validity of this principle.

In short, a growing number of Hungarians now understood that the Revolution should change its minorities policy and that it would have to cease to oppose the principle of nationality equality if it

wished to turn the disappointment caused by the octroied constitution to its advantage. Indeed, it needed to go further than this, as it was obvious that—as stated a few days later by *Marczius Tizenötödike*, a paper run by Albert Pálfi, one of the March Youth—the Revolution could only win over those non-Magyars presently fighting against it if promised more than the Crown was offering by holding out hope of “nationality based on greater liberty and more obvious foundations”.

It was therefore with bitter words that *Marczius Tizenötödike* referred to the impossible situation in which most of the nationalities living in Hungary found themselves when—with the exception of “the Slovaks of the Upper Hungarian counties”—they drifted into the arms of the counter-revolution. In spite of the fact that they wished to serve a good cause, these non-Magyars were embarking on course of action which was bound to result in serious harm both to the Hungarian Revolution

and to themselves. It was therefore imperative, the paper stated, that a way out be found from this internecine strife, of which the counter-revolution would be the sole beneficiary. This could not, however, happen until the Hungarians accepted the fact that "it is no longer possible for us to ignore the separate nationalities living in this country", and that to make Hungary a country "based purely on the Hungarian nationality" was "no longer a long-term possibility". If, on the other hand, it was recognized that the non-Magyars of Hungary constituted separate nationalities then steps would need to be taken to create the institutional guarantees indispensable for their protection. The best such guarantee would be a declaration to the effect that henceforth "Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia, indeed, if they wanted it, the Slavs of Upper Hungary", each constituted a part of a "federal republic". Hungary's actual federalization, however—the paper was quick to add this to preempt the indignation of the Hungarian liberals—was "only a task for the future" and not for the present. Nevertheless, it opined that "we must now, at a very early stage, lay down the foundations upon which the constituent republics united in the Pest government shall eventually be built". It was therefore indispensable at least to "inaugurate a community system, the result of which will be that settlements will conduct their own affairs in the language of their choice". To progress in this way—commented the paper in conclusion—was vitally necessary. Even if "we could perhaps succeed in forcibly suppressing" the minority movements, it argued, national self-awareness could not be suppressed and for this reason "such a victory would not be of much use".

The initiative of *Marczius Tizenötödike* did not, however, have a beneficial impact on the liberals steering the Revolution—probably because in the following weeks they again succumbed to the belief that military force could, after all, solve the problems caused by the minority movements. By this time, the situation on the battlefield had changed dramatically. General Józef Bem, the great Polish commander who had been fighting in Hungary since November, drove Puchner's main forces into Wallachia and his secondary forces, under Urban's command, into the Bukovina. Therefore, by the second half of March, Transylvania, with the exception of the imperial garrisons at Gyulafehérvár and Déva and the insurrectionist army which had been pushed back to the *Erzgebirge* by *honvéd* troops, was cleared of enemy forces. The Bácska *honvéd* units under General Mór Perczel's command which had been withdrawn to the vicinity of Szeged during the winter also launched



100. *A Transylvanian Saxon peasant family fleeing towards Wallachia from the advancing honvéd troops*

a powerful offensive. On April 3 they took the Szenttamás redoubt and on April 7 they penetrated the Roman fortifications, thereby forcing the Serb insurrectionists to evacuate the whole of the Bácska with the exception of the Titel Plateau. As we have already mentioned, at the same time *honvéd* troops deployed in the main theatre of war also began a counter-attack. In less than a month, they drove the main enemy forces back as far as the western frontier. These military successes aroused provoked excessive self-confidence in a number of Hungarian liberals—especially Kossuth. (Kossuth stuck adamantly to his nationalities policy at this stage. Yet he decided to take a step of very great significance in connection with another matter: acting as though the revolutionary cause was no longer threatened by anything, on April 14 he had Parliament proclaim the dethronement of the House of Habsburg and the complete secession of Hungary from the Habsburg empire.)

Despite the *honvéd* army's succession of spring victories and the dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty, *Marczius Tizenötödike's* initia-

tive did not entirely fade into oblivion. During the second half of April, for instance, Vasvári also put pen to paper (in fact he was compelled to, having taken part operations in Transylvania against the Rumanian insurrectionists). Vasvári expounded his views on the subject in the pages of *Esti Lapok*, a paper which advocated the views of the so-called Peace Party—the latter comprising the most right-wing elements of liberal nobility which deluded themselves into thinking that a compromise agreement with the Habsburgs was possible—and which for this reason was extremely popular amongst the parliamentary deputies from Transylvania. It was at these right-wing liberals that Vasvári aimed his message. Admittedly, he did not come up with proposals of a programme character, and still less did he suggest, for example, that those continuing to wage an armed struggle against the Revolution should be treated with mercy. Indeed, Vasvári clearly emphasized that in future, too, it would remain vital that Revolution fought against all its enemies. However, he also pointed out that “the suppression of the Transylvanian rebels is a cruel victory”—for the reason that the Hungarian nobility was solely responsible for driving them into the counter-revolutionary camp. Before the Revolution, the Transylvanian nobility “despised, and looked down upon them ... and treated them like animals”. The situation remained much the same even after the outbreak of the Revolution, as the nobility in Transylvania still wished to remain “the tyrant of the Vlach serfs”. Accordingly, “when the abolition of serfdom had already been proclaimed in Hungary, the Transylvanian landlords still ruthlessly demanded unpaid labour service”. It was no mean feat to put all this in writing when the would-be readers of the article had been hearing it since September, not only from Táncsics, but from others as well. In addition, even more recently, in the proclamation of independence adopted on Kossuth’s initiative on April 19, they were again confronted with the assertion that the machinations of the Court were solely responsible for turning the minority masses against the Revolution. Yet at this time it occurred only to very few of the would-be readers that even if it were the case that the minorities had been incited by the camarilla then the question inevitably arose as to whether this would have been possible had not hostility against the Hungarians already become established in them.

Importantly, the unbiased handling of the minorities issue could not really be expected to win the approval of the Hungarian liberals, or even of the left-wing revolutionaries. The radicals, who, in spite of this, felt that it was their responsibility to press for the rectifying of the



101. László Újházi

Hungarian nationalities policy, often elicited disapproval from even their closest supporters. The editors of *Marczius Tizenötödike* were fully aware of this. Entering into an argument with them in the pages of *Debreczeni Lapok* was László Újházi, the lord-lieutenant of Sáros county and an eminent representative of the group of radical nobles which emerged from the left wing of the former Opposition Party after the outbreak of the Revolution. Újházi continued to stress that the unity of the state was more paramount and that therefore "all we can share with our

brethren ... of a different mother tongue is liberty, equality and affection". These, in all probability, would amply satisfy them, were it not for "counter-revolutionary intrigues of the dynasty..."

It remains a fact, however, that at this stage such narrowmindedness was alien not only to the March Youth, but generally speaking, to the members of the radical nobility as well. A case in point was Mór Perczel, who, during the second half of April, crossed over to the left bank of the river Tisza, reached Pancsova by May 9, and completely cleared the *Temesköz* of Serb rebels. Yet, despite his military successes, Perczel agreed with *Marczius Tizenötödike* that military action constituted no more than treatment of the symptoms. Only political concessions could provide a lasting remedy for the disease. Thus, when, during the final days of his military campaign, Perczel learned that there were those in the enemy camp also sought a peaceful solution, he hastened to avail himself of the opportunity this presented. In a message to Ilija Garašanin, minister of the interior in the Principality of Serbia, he stated that he would be ready to enter into peace negotiations with the insurrectionists. At the same time, though—learning

from Beöthy's earlier failure—he also stated that he wished to establish contact with Stratimirović, who seemed the most suitable Serb negotiator. Dealing with him might ensure a fruitful outcome for the talks.

That, ultimately, this attempt also proved futile was by no means Perczel's fault. The individuals responsible were Garašanin and Kossuth. Like Rajačić, Garašanin was convinced throughout that the Hungarians would be unable to triumph over the Habsburgs—in spite of the spring victories of the *honvéd* army. Consequently, when Garašanin agreed to begin talks, he did so only to gain time, appointing as the Serb negotiator Knićanin—who did not for a moment consider agreement with the Hungarians to be a serious possibility—instead of Stratimirović. For his part Kossuth (elected governor-president of Hungary on April 14) did not empower Perczel to make concessions greater than those permitted to Beöthy back in November. This meant that Perczel was still obliged to reject the Serbs' principal claim, the establishment of an autonomous voivodate. Instead, he had to propose the preposterous idea (which Kossuth had also suggested in November) that the Serbs accept Slavonia (which contained more Croats than Serbs) as their autonomous territory, although he was probably aware that the Serbs could only regard this as an attempt by the Hungarians to create perpetual enmity between them and the Croats. All Perczel could



102. Mór Perczel

now add to this offer was that if an agreement were reached the *Temesköz* Military Border and the territory of the boatman battalion would be reorganized into a separate unit under Serb public administration. The voivode (whose authority would extend to Slavonia) and the patriarch would be invested with the same rights as those enjoyed by the Croat *ban* and the bishop of Zagreb. Predictably, the negotiations quickly ran into difficulties; it was not even revealed that the other party lacked the willingness to reach an agreement in the first place. Garašanin and his representatives could, without their dishonesty becoming apparent, state that an agreement was out of the question as long as the Hungarians refused to accept the idea of an autonomous voivodate.

By this time, though the spirit of leniency towards the minorities already imbued other radical nobles. This was especially true of the finest radical noble politician, Count László Teleki, who had been directing the Revolution's diplomatic activity since the late summer of 1848 in Paris. Initially, in the spring of 1848, all Teleki—in company with other radicals—demanded was that the revolutionary government immediately begin preparations for the suppression, by military means, of counter-revolutionary organizing in nationality areas. However, by summer 1848 Teleki realized that the counter-revolution's chances of success were improving not just because the Revolution lacked adequate military strength, but also because of minority discontent. Thus, during the second half of July Teleki was already stating—a whole month ahead of the Batthyány government—that if, for instance, the Croat people wanted Croatia to secede from Hungary, then this should be immediately made possible. Teleki took this view despite his belief that the organization of an army to defend the Revolution was the most pressing task of the moment.

On his arrival in Paris, Teleki quickly realized that the governments of the Great Powers regarded all revolutionary movements (including the Hungarian Revolution) which posed a threat to the balance of power in Europe with, at best, indifference, and, at worst, profound hostility. This held true not only in St. Petersburg, where there was concern over revolutionary developments on Russian territory—especially in Russian Poland, but also in London, where the Habsburg empire was traditionally regarded as a bulwark against Russian expansionism. Paris was also worried about the possible collapse of the Habsburg empire as this could have enhanced the emergence, to the


detriment of French interests, of powerful German and Italian nation-states. At the same time, Teleki could also see that the intention to co-operate with the Hungarian Revolution was growing daily amongst those representatives of the suppressed revolutionary movements of the countries bordering on Hungary who were flooding into Paris at this time. The only obstacle to such co-operation was that the nationalities issue in Hungary remained unsettled. Despite the increasing sympathy towards the Hungarian Revolution, this was, for the time being, an insurmountable obstacle. Taking stock of the situation, Teleki finally concluded that the settling of the nationalities



103. *Ilija Garašanin*

issue in Hungary would not only deprive the Habsburg counter-revolution of a trump card but would, simultaneously, also end the isolation which had hitherto characterized the revolutionary movements of the small peoples in Eastern Europe. Indeed, such a move could also lay the foundations for one enormous revolutionary camp in which they would all join forces. In other words, this would create an opportunity for broad-based co-operation amongst the forces of these movements, without which they stood no chance whatever against the great European powers already rallying to each other's support.

Accordingly, in a letter to Kossuth dated March 7, Teleki was already firmly convinced that—instead of following the unrealistic




104. Adam Czartoryski

Peace Party ideas concerning *rapprochement* with the Habsburgs based on mutual concessions—"an agreement should be reached not so much with the Austrians, but with the Serbs, Croats and Vlachs". Indeed, this would not be a "difficult thing", "only ... give them everything possible". "Should it be impossible to topple Austria and destroy her", then the recommendation, that "Hungary be reconstructed on the basis of a confederation", made by so many of the foreign revolutionaries in France—especially those Poles forced to flee abroad and now rallying around Prince Adam Czartoryski in Paris—should definitely be accepted. In such an

event, "our future will be guaranteed", indeed, "our power will extend as far as the Black Sea".

Teleki's initiative produced no tangible results. He therefore addressed another letter, dated May 14, to Kossuth. In this he not only drew the governor-president's attention to the potential advantages of *rapprochement* with the minorities, but also to the fact that if conciliation did not take place, then the Hungarian Revolution would need to prepare for the worst. "France's role in [17]89, the emancipation of Europe, has fallen to us; we must either undertake this task or be defeated. Our destiny will be the most glorious in the world, or death. Hungary has two alternatives: either ... she attempts to retain her present boundaries as they are now, disregarding the jealousy of the minorities, which would entail ... enormous sacrifices in both life and



Wagner Josef tulajdona Pesten

Teleki László

105. László Teleki

property, and which would bring a few years of uncertain respite ... The other alternative ... is to sacrifice something ... And what does such a course require? Overcoming oneself a little, the reward for which would be unparalleled glory and life. No, the choice between these two paths cannot be difficult—the more we give the minorities, the less we shall have to give to Austria and to absolutism.”

This time Teleki also outlined the practical measures he thought necessary. The Revolution, he pointed out, could not confine itself to placating only the Croats. It was no less indispensable “to accept the idea of a voivodate with a general assembly, as well as a separate public administration for the Vlach race, statutory rights, and municipal guarantees in the broad sense, always ensuring that, as far as possible, ethnic Magyars and Germans should not be placed under Vlach or Serb jurisdiction, and on condition that at the highest level of government and in Parliament they would belong to Hungary, with the language of our Parliament being Hungarian”. “And if, in addition to these things ... we declare the principle of perfect nationality, we have then, from Hungary’s point of view, established the foundations of a most splendid future; all races, not only in Hungary, but those which up to now have rejected our requirements, will look to us with longing and will gladly accept Hungary as the centre and mistress of a future Danubian confederation, the power of which would destroy for ever the monster of absolutism extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea.” Teleki then went on to enumerate the elements of which the confederation—as he saw it—would consist. “The peoples who have belonged to us up to now would be the first [to join] ... Wallachia, Serbia and Bulgaria would subsequently constitute that part whose bonds with Hungary were looser, Bohemia and Moravia would be linked to Hungary by means of perhaps an even looser tie, while the loosest tie of all [with Poland, which was to be reconstituted] would be that which provided for the co-ordination of foreign policy.” Finally, aware that his proposals would arouse considerable anxiety at home, Teleki also added in conclusion: “Hungary will not be diminished if she adopts this course, but will grow, more so than if she were to adopt any other.”

Accordingly, before Teleki’s eyes there now emerged the outlines of a democratic confederation, which, had it been brought into existence would have created a two-fold opportunity for those small peoples of East-Central Europe which joined it. On the one hand, they would end their earlier subordination to the region’s Great Powers which had oppressed them, and, on the other, they would retain the advantages

of belonging to a larger community. Even this broad conception, however, contained inconsistencies. Indicative of these was the fact that, for the time being, even Teleki insisted that Magyar be the sole official language of the Hungarian Parliament and the Hungarian central government. He wished to offer the Slovaks, who were fighting on the side of the Revolution, autonomy at county level but not autonomy for the Slovak districts. This was a considerably smaller concession than he had intended to offer the Croats, Serbs and Rumanians who for the most part, were fighting against the Revolution. Nevertheless, even in its original form Teleki's scheme would have been suitable for breaking the ice, had leading Hungarian circles chosen to accept it as the basis of their subsequent nationalities policy. Furthermore, it might still have won over the majority of non-Magyars who up to then had been fighting against the Revolution.

Teleki failed to convince the Hungarian liberals, as did *Marczius Tizenötödike*. He failed to win over those—for example the Peace Party supporters—who took the view that, since the struggle for self-defence seemed hopeless, an attempt should be made to bring about peaceful conciliation with the Habsburgs and to this end some of the March achievements would need to be sacrificed. Teleki was similarly unsuccessful in convincing liberals who rejected bargaining with the Habsburgs outright. The latter—even those who did believe that a compromise with the dynasty was possible—opposed this primarily precisely because they refused to relinquish even a fragment of the governmental power the Hungarian nobility had acquired in March 1848. As a result, they would have seen such a concession to the Habsburgs as proof that “we fought in vain”. However, according to a testimony dated November of the previous year by Bertalan Szemere, they would feel the same way if, in order to avoid capitulation to the Habsburgs, they were compelled to make similar concessions to the nationalities.

It was therefore to no avail that Teleki stressed in his letter dated May 14 that “not only is Austria dead, but so is Saint Stephen's Hungary”. The liberal leaders of the Revolution continued to insist forcefully on the state unity formula, and they did not think for a moment that not only would they be unable to prevent the growth of those forces working towards the disintegration of Hungary, but that, on the contrary, they would actually accelerate the process. Accordingly, the May 19 cabinet meeting (a new parliamentary Hungarian government, with Szemere as prime minister, had been formed after the dethronement of the House of Habsburg) stated only that “Hun-



106. Kázmér Batthyány

gary was ready, as before, to share in the future all *civil* rights with the separate *races* living on her territory". Beyond this, however, it was willing to recognize only that "every race possessed full liberty to cultivate, manage and ensure its own religion, national language and children's education in Church, village, school and family". This position was reiterated at the cabinet meeting of June 6, held in newly-liberated Pest (the only change in the text was the deletion of the adjective "national" which was obviously placed before the word "language" as a result of carelessness). Four

days later, Count Kázmér Batthyány, foreign minister in the new government, communicated this stance (in a more sharply-worded form) to the Hungarian diplomatic representatives working abroad and to the military commanders serving along the country's frontiers.

The liberal leaders of the Revolution, then, still strongly rejected the idea of granting territorial autonomy to the minorities living in Hungary. At the same time, however, when the same liberal leaders saw a glimmer of hope that the Revolution could perhaps resolve its conflicts with the minority movements by means of modest concessions, they mostly strove to exploit the opportunity. The more obvious it became, with the passage of time, that even after the military victories of April the Revolution could only hope for a temporary easing of the situation, the more this held true. Furthermore, another counter-revolutionary offensive now seemed imminent. Indeed, the threat was even more serious than it had been before as massive Russian forces would now fight alongside the imperial army.

Indicative of the endeavours at this time was that launched by Count Gyula Andrásy, whom the new Hungarian government appointed as Hungary's ambassador to Constantinople at the end of May. On his journey to the Ottoman capital he passed through Belgrade, and, on learning that Kušljan was in the city, he immediately began negotiations with him—not without some success. For his part, Kušljan undertook to conduct an even more vigorous anti-Habsburg propaganda campaign in his paper, and to organize a pro-Hungarian league from among those Croats no longer willing to support the counter-revolution. All he demanded in exchange was that the Hungarian government, in general terms, recognize minority rights and announce an end to the unilingualism of the Hungarian Parliament. (Andrásy strongly recommended that the Hungarian government accept Kušljan's conditions, adding that, by doing so, the Hungarians would not be taking any undue risks, as a victorious party could subsequently still change everything, while the vanquished would lose everything anyway...)

The Hungarian government did not, however, heed Andrásy's words. It did, on the other hand, take note of the news reaching Pest at the beginning of June that Stratimirović, now determined to make a fundamental change of course (in all probability prompted to do so not only by the blows dealt to the Serbs by the Habsburgs, but also by Perczel's May



107. Gyula Andrásy

peace initiative), was ready to go over to the Revolution with five border guard battalions, provided that the government left him in command of the battalions, gave him the rank of *honvéd* general, and at the same time agreed to establish a Serb voivodate. The cabinet meeting of June 14 accepted Stratimirović's first condition but rejected the second. It did, however, offer the Serbs the concessions that the National Defence Committee had proposed the previous November (refraining, nevertheless, from recognizing the Serbs' national existence). Negotiations produced no agreement—and not only because the Hungarian offer was unacceptable to Stratimirović and his associates, but also because the bargaining was protracted and in mid-June the imperial troops, together with their Russian allies, began to inundate Hungary. Consequently, the Revolution's prospects became very bleak in a matter of just a few days. Yet, the reviving of the possibility of conciliation with some of the Serbs was in a way useful in spite of this, inasmuch as it—together with the talks between Andrassy and Kušljan—prompted the government now to devote the appropriate attention to the nationalities issue.


Negotiations aiming at the settling of the Rumanian question also helped to keep the nationalities issue on the agenda. These started in mid-April, and, ultimately, proved to be far more fruitful than talks conducted with the prominent Croat and Serb opposition politicians, despite the fact that initially they seemed to hold out little promise of success and at one point appeared as though they might break down completely. This success was partly due to the fact that mediators in the form of the Rumanian politicians in Hungary and the exiled leaders of the Wallachian revolution helped to pave the way for Hungarian–Rumanian conciliation. (The Hungarian–Croat and Hungarian–Serb negotiations, by contrast, only involved representatives of the opposing parties.) The differing circumstances of the Transylvanian Rumanian insurrectionist army also, however, played a part in this.

The direct command of the Transylvanian Rumanian insurrectionist forces never passed into the hands of officers belonging to the imperial army. This remained with the advocates of the national movement, specifically Iancu and his radical associates. After Bem drove the imperial troops from Transylvania in March, when the members of the Rumanian National Committee were also forced to flee, neither the imperial forces nor Bărnuț and his associates were able to exert direct influence over the rebels, who had retreated to the *Erzgebirge* where they were subsequently surrounded. The impact of a gradually deteriorating military situation on Iancu and his group was

even greater, and the octroied constitution exerted a still more powerful influence. The latter suddenly made it perfectly clear to Iancu and his associates how unfounded their hopes of Crown support had been. Bem's intention not to retaliate for the earlier pillaging committed by the Rumanian insurgents also had a beneficial effect. In fact, Bem did not tolerate the spirit of revenge in others, either. Even László Csány, who took over as national commissioner at the end of January, did not hesitate to take action against Hungarian landlords who, exaggerating their losses, now tried to

place excessive burdens on the peasants, in spite of the fact that he had sometimes accused Bem of excessive leniency, and, among other things, had even issued orders to the effect that anyone who had damaged another's property during the course of the uprising was obliged to make full restitution to the owner.

It was after such preliminaries that a number of Rumanian members of Parliament in Hungary turned to Kossuth in mid-April with the idea that the leaders of the insurgent army ought to be approached with peace proposals. In fact, Kossuth authorized one of them, Drágoş, to take up the thread of negotiations. Drágoş set off immediately, and a week later could already inform Kossuth of promising developments. Although some of the leaders in the *Erzgebirge* were still opposed to the idea of an agreement, the majority—including Butteanu, and even Iancu at the head of the insurrectionist army—were inclined to accept it, despite Kossuth's continuing refusal to promise any form of autonomy to the Rumanians or indeed even to recognize the Rumanians of Transylvania and Hungary as belonging to a Rumanian nation. Again, all he offered was the free conduct of their ecclesiastical and educational



108. Józef Bem



109. László Csány

affairs, and the introduction of Rumanian as the language of public administration in Rumanian-populated villages.


After an auspicious start, the negotiations with the Rumanians nevertheless ended in failure. To attain proof of the sincerity of the Hungarian party's willingness to negotiate, Iancu and his group requested a ceasefire for the duration of the talks already under way. Ostensibly still influenced by the spring victories of the *honvéd* army, Kossuth would not hear of this, and on May 10 he even issued instructions that the Hungarian forces surrounding the *Erzgebirge*

continue their operations "in the firmest possible manner, allowing no respite to the marauders in the mountains". Imre Hatvani, the commander of one of the Hungarian irregular units sent against the Rumanian rebels, launched an attack on Abrudbánya, which served as the scene of the negotiations, even before Kossuth had issued the above instructions. One of the March Youth, Hatvani, who, incidentally, became famous in 1848 for a pamphlet in which he pressed for the amelioration of the condition of the Rumanians, acted in this way to demonstrate his unrelenting enmity to the counter-revolution. On May 6 he marched into the town—disregarding Drágoş's remonstrations.


This senseless move not only led to an immediate breakdown in negotiations, but simultaneously also rekindled hostile emotions. In fact, Iancu managed to escape in time and subsequently launched a counter-attack against Hatvani with vastly superior forces. On the other hand, Butteanu, whom Drágoş had reassured in good faith, remained in Abrudbánya and was captured by Hatvani. When Iancu finally retook the town on the May 9, Hatvani, forced to flee, took

Butteanu with him. A fortnight later Hatvani had his prisoner hanged in a fit of impotent rage totally disregarding the fact that this young man, who was ready to go to any lengths to attain equality for his people, would have preferred to it in co-operation with the Hungarians. In the meantime, the insurgents, now back in Abrudbánya, cruelly murdered Drăgoș, who had been stranded there. In doing so they were guided by the unfounded suspicion that the latter had conspired with Hatvani and, accordingly, had adopted the role of mediator only to deceive them. The insurrectionists also staged a massacre of the town's Magyar population. These incidents were complemented in the following weeks by fiercer than ever fighting between the insurgent army and the Hungarian troops deployed against it. The scene of the new battle was not far from the place where a year earlier Iancu and Vasvári had discussed the possibilities of reconciliation. In fact, Vasvári himself was one of the many victims of this mindless internecine strife.

Yet even these serious developments did not destroy the cause of Hungarian-Rumanian conciliation, and for this credit must primarily go to the Wallachian exiles. After the issuing of the octroied constitution some of these exiles increasingly came to realize that the time had come to do more than just make their dissatisfaction known to the Transylvanian Rumanians fighting on the side of the Habsburgs. Accordingly, they now strove actively to foster the conciliation between the Hungarians and their Rumanian foes. Even repeated failures could not



110. *Hatvani's pamphlet in support of the Rumanians*



111. Gheorghe Magheru

dampen their efforts for peace.

One of the military commanders of the Wallachian revolution, General Gheorge Magheru was the first to come forth with such a peace initiative. In the middle of March, he despatched a letter to Kossuth, requesting that the Rumanians' "nationality and political rights" be recognized in Hungary and Transylvania. In exchange, he offered the establishment of a Hungarian-Rumanian confederal state, promising that subsequent to this the Rumanians of the Danubian Principalities would set up a legion to support the Hungarian Revolution. However, this initiative was


entirely without result. In-

deed, this was inevitable since Magheru, in connection with the would-be confederal state, spoke not of union between Wallachia, Moldavia and Hungary, but of union between the Hungarian nation and the "nine million Rumanians". In other words, among the Rumanians who were to form a confederal state with the Hungarians he also included, besides the Rumanians living beyond the Carpathians, the Rumanians of Transylvania and Hungary as well. In view of this, Kossuth could only regard Magheru's proposal as just another attempt to undermine Hungarian state unity, which he wished to preserve at all costs.

The next initiative came from another exiled Rumanian, Cezar Bolliak, who wished to implant the spirit of conciliation primarily into the Transylvanian Rumanians. Bolliak belonged to Bălcescu's circle and had fled to Transylvania when the Wallachian revolution was defeated. After the liberation of Brassó, Bolliak—taking over from Bariț who was now in exile abroad—launched a paper entitled *Espatriatul*.

In it he persuasively argued again and again that (as Bariț himself had earlier advocated) "only Tyranny ..., the common enemy" can take comfort from "the lack of understanding and hatred between peoples". As a result, Bolliak explained, those Rumanians who had taken up arms against the Hungarians not realizing "what the real national interest would have been" fought, albeit unwittingly, "to retain the old subjugation of their people ... for a monarch, who later, when he was victorious, would oppress his peoples even more". From this tragic situation, he pointed out, "there was no escape except through union with the Hungarians...". By constantly reiterating this line of argument Bolliak was able to advance the cause of conciliation.

In the end, it was Bălcescu himself who rendered the greatest service to the cause of conciliation. A man of deep feelings and great logic, Bălcescu was more grieved than anyone at the thought of "the most base and stupid role" the Transylvanian Rumanians were playing in waging war against the Hungarian Revolution. Reviewing the situation, he concluded that "it is not true... that in this terrible war the Rumanians are not imbued with and inspired by national sentiment and a love of liberty". In spite of this though, it could not be said of them that they really "were fighting for liberty". On the contrary, they resembled the slave, "who rises upon orders from and in fear of his master". Having allowed "themselves to be deceived by the Austrians" in support of liberty, they had, in fact, rallied behind the banner of "the cruellest, vilest and most primitive tyranny", in other




112. Cezar Bolliak

words, precisely behind liberty's principal enemies. Naturally, Bălcescu was aware that not only the Habsburgs, but also the Hungarians were blocking the assertion of Rumanian national interests on Hungarian soil. However, he also knew aware that Hungarian rule afflicted the Rumanians less than Habsburg oppression hit them, the Hungarians, and the other peoples of the Habsburg empire. From this it obviously followed that since the peoples of the empire could not grapple simultaneously with all their oppressors, they "ought first to achieve jointly their liberation from Habsburg rule, and only then consider their own particular liberation". In other words, for the time being "all those who love liberty must necessarily support the Hungarians" in their struggle against Vienna and postpone the settlement of issues of minor importance.

Thus, by the spring of 1849, Bălcescu regarded it as urgent that another attempt be made to bring the Transylvanian Rumanians and the Hungarians together. In point of fact, he wished the former to rally behind the latter. Bălcescu, however, thought that his chances of success hinged on securing preliminary guarantees for the Transylvanian Rumanians that their national demands would, at least, be partially met. Accordingly, as a first step he intended to persuade the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution to offer greater concessions to the Rumanians than they had previously. This notwithstanding, it never occurred to Bălcescu, even at the very beginning, to call on the Hungarian leaders to immediately grant all the demands of the Transylvanian Rumanians. Bălcescu was also convinced that transforming Hungary into a federal republic was a precondition for the long-term settlement of the nationalities question in the country. But at the end of May when he arrived in Debrecen to begin negotiations with Kossuth and Kázmér Batthyány, he neglected even to raise the idea of a federation or, indeed, that the Hungarians abandon the unilingualism of the Hungarian parliament. In point of fact he took it for granted that his negotiating partners would respond to such proposals by immediately adopting an intransigent stance. In any case, Bălcescu's line of reasoning was that if the Hungarians kept their promises and guaranteed the same civic liberties to the Magyar and non-Magyar populations of Hungary, then, because 60 per cent of the country's population was non-Magyar the Hungarian Parliament would in future be largely "composed of Rumanians and Slavs". Under these circumstances the Hungarians would eventually be compelled to "accept the federation". As a man who thought in practical terms, Bălcescu was, for the time

being, quite prepared to shelve the demand for multilingualism in Parliament: he knew all too well that the overwhelming majority of the nationality politicians spoke Hungarian.

Bălcescu was, accordingly, very careful not to alienate his Hungarian negotiating partners with by making they might consider excessive. He also took great pains to point out to the Hungarians that a Hungarian-Rumanian agreement would also be of considerable advantage to the Hungarians. He emphasized, therefore, that Hungary had only two options for the future: "She can either be monarcho-



113. Nicolae Bălcescu

aristocratic, bound to Austria, or democratic, united with the Rumanians". Bălcescu also stressed that the Hungarians "must, regardless of the cost, conciliate" the minorities, "otherwise they will become for Hungary what Poland and Ireland became for Russia and England". For his part, Kossuth stated that had the Rumanians taken up arms to fight "for their independence and union with Wallachia", he would have understood their action (although not, of course, approved it). However, the Rumanians' aim was ostensibly merely to consolidate the unity of the empire, which was something he, Kossuth, was unable to fathom. In response, Bălcescu not only denied that the Transylvanian Rumanians were striving for union with Wallachia, but also pointed out that the other politicians in Wallachia had no intention of separating Transylvania from Hungary. On the contrary, they wanted union between them, "indeed even more than that", namely a confederation comprising Hungary and the Danubian Principalities.

Despite the circumspection of his diplomacy, Bălcescu had to wait four full weeks for a serious reply to his proposals. Even then, the answer

was not reassuring. Kossuth's offer was the same as two months earlier, at the time of the Drágoş endeavour. All he would do was guarantee the Rumanians the right to conduct their Church and educational affairs as they wished, as well as making Rumanian the language of public administration in Rumanian-populated villages. Then, during the first half of July, the government's policy changed dramatically. (Threatened by the approach of the enemy, the government was again forced to leave Pest, this time moving to Szeged.) This was primarily due to the sudden and rapid deterioration of the military situation, but a gesture by Iancu also contributed to it. Even though Iancu was still very put out concerning Hatvani's attack on Abrudbánya in early May, he was also worried that the Court circles only wanted to use the nationality politicians who sided with them "as their creatures". At the end of June he therefore sent two letters to the representatives of the Hungarian Revolution. In both he stated explicitly that if the Hungarians were finally willing to change their minds, then he would still be ready to end the struggle against them, since he shared the view that just as "in the two fraternal lands Hungarians cannot speak of an existence and a future without Rumanians", so "Rumanians cannot without Hungarians". These statements quickly aroused hope in government circles that if the Hungarians were ready to make a few more concessions then the Revolution could remove the pressure it had been under on account of the Rumanian uprising.

With the obstacles in the path of successful negotiations between the Hungarian politicians and Bălcescu now removed, two documents reflecting the outcome of the bargaining could now be drafted. These were ready by July 14. One was the draft of a peace agreement to be concluded between Hungary and the Rumanians of Transylvania. This stipulated that the Rumanian insurgents were to lay down their arms within two weeks (from the date the agreement was signed), after which they were all to take an oath to support "the independence of Hungary". For its part, the Hungarian government was to recognize that the Rumanians constituted a separate nation (*une nationalité à part*—according to the draft's official French text), and was to endorse not only the freedom of the Rumanians to manage their own religious and educational affairs and to introduce the Rumanian language in public administration, but also to make Rumanian the National Guard's language of command in Rumanian communities, and to make public administration bilingual (i.e. using Hungarian and Rumanian) in counties with Rumanian majorities. It was also to permit the Ruma-

nian Orthodox Church to split completely from the Serbian and to allow the head of the Rumanian Church to bear the title "patriarch". In addition, the Rumanians were to be given the right to hold national assemblies annually (albeit only to discuss religious and educational problems), and the Orthodox Rumanians were to get a separate theological faculty at the University of Pest. As for the Transylvanian peasants living on manorial lands, all their feudal obligations were to be abolished once and for all. The other agreement (which came into effect immediately the parties to the agreement, Kossuth, on the one hand, and Bălcescu and Bolliak on the other, had signed it) empowered the Wallachian exiles to organize a Rumanian legion on Hungarian territory. For the time being, this legion was to provide military backing for the Hungarian Revolution, but could subsequently be used to fight for Wallachia's liberty. Under the agreement, Transylvanian insurgents could also freely join the legion (in which the language of command was Rumanian, albeit at the highest level orders were given by the Hungarians).

Regardless of the great steps forward, the Hungarian government by no means committed itself to all the demands of the Transylvanian Rumanians. The Rumanians were still not allowed to hold national assemblies to debate political issues and were still denied territorial autonomy. In short, the concessions the Hungarian government offered on July 14 clearly fell short even of those granted by the octroied constitution, which regarded Transylvania as an autonomous Crown Province. In reality, however, the government was now guaranteeing far more liberty for the Rumanians than that proposed by the octroied constitution, with its promises of autonomy for Transylvania (and the other Crown provinces) which in real terms amounted to nothing. The July 14 agreement, on the other hand, created an opportunity for the Rumanians to henceforth acquire positions of real power, since the abolition of the hegemony of the Hungarian language in county public administration now enabled the Rumanians in counties with Rumanian majorities (not only in Transylvania but also in Hungary itself) to enjoy extensive autonomy, the kind enjoyed by the county authorities in Hungary proper.

In this way the bitter experiences of the previous months at last aroused a spirit of compliance both in the Hungarian politicians and in the leaders of the Rumanian uprising in Transylvania. Aware of this, Bălcescu set off, after the conclusion of the July 14 agreement, for the Transylvanian *Erzgebirge* in the belief that Iancu and his associates

would regard the concessions offered by the Hungarians as reassuring and acceptable. In point of fact, subsequent developments confirmed his expectations. By the time he was able to present the leaders of the insurrectionist army with the draft peace agreement (August 3) the advance of the invading Russian armies had made the finalizing and implementation of the agreement quite impossible. Nevertheless, Iancu issued orders for an immediate ceasefire, which was to have been the first step if the agreement could have been finalized. He regarded this move as vitally necessary—despite the hopelessness of the military situation. By giving these orders, he wrote to Kossuth, he wished at least to give a symbolic indication of “fraternal sentiment towards the Hungarian nation”.

The events of July 14 inspired not only Bălcescu but also his Hungarian negotiating partners with hope. The fact that Hungarian-Rumanian conciliation was at hand prompted the Hungarian leaders to make further efforts to reconcile the other minorities as well. Lacking direct contact with the representatives of the other minorities at this juncture, they issued a unilateral proclamation—an idea initially suggested by Kušljan during his talks with Andrassy in Belgrade. Acutely short of time, the government was unable even to contemplate drafting a bill and putting it on the Parliamentary agenda. For the moment it seemed enough that Parliament (which had also moved to Szeged) formulate the rights destined to ensure the elevation of the minorities in a statutory resolution. Such a resolution—which could be adopted fairly quickly—was suitable for laying the foundations of a subsequent legal settlement of the nationalities issue, and could thereby pave the way for *rapprochement*. At the House of Deputies' first meeting in Szeged on July 21 Szemere had the government's seventeen-point draft resolution put on the agenda. This resolution contained roughly the same concessions which had been offered to the Rumanians a week earlier—but now extended them to all the country's minorities. A week later the House of Deputies made its decision.

Having the draft resolution accepted was, however, no easy task. Even during these critical days some deputies still believed, as had Szemere until not long before, that if the Hungarian nobility had to give up some of the governmental power it had attained in March to the minorities, then it would have “fought in vain”. It was therefore to no avail that Szemere, who, in a critical situation for the Revolution, at last drew the right conclusion, stated: “It is the fate of small nations that, if they neglect to join forces, they will either be forgotten by the

greater nations or crushed by them." It was also to no avail that the minister of justice, Sebő Vukovics, coming to Szemere's assistance, added that if the proposal were rejected and the Revolution defeated then the country's government would indeed be unilingual—but German and not Hungarian. When the proposal came up for debate on July 28, several deputies—from Pál Nyáry, a Peace Party supporter, to the radical József Madarász—spoke out against it, their objections being received by many others with "considerable enthusiasm". It remains a fact, however, that, regardless of the intensity of the attack against the government's stance, the opposition was insufficiently powerful to have the proposal rejected. By this time the large-scale offensive launched by the imperial armies and their Russian allies in June had sobered even some of those deputies who in the spring months had still seriously believed in the possibility of *rapprochement* with the Habsburgs. Like Szemere, the



114. Bertalan Szemere



115. Sebő Vukovics



116. József Irányi

majority of deputies had, by now, realized that it was vital that the Revolution settle the nationalities question. Many from József Irányi and Dániel Irányi both radicals, through Imre Szacsuvay, a left-wing liberal, to István Bezerédj, a Peace Party supporter also supported this view. After the debate the nationality bill was voted through.

In sum, on July 28 the House of Deputies finally declared that "the free national development of all peoples living within the Hungarian empire ... is guaranteed". While the language of communication in government was to remain Hungarian, henceforth "at community assemblies everyone is allowed to speak in either Hungarian or their mother tongue, and the mi-

minutes ... will be kept in the language decided by free choice". A similar situation was to obtain in the counties, in that in future "anyone entitled to speak at any local authority meeting is permitted to speak either in Hungarian or their mother tongue", and "in those counties where one ethnic group amounts to more than half of the total population, the minutes—if desired—are to be kept in that language also". Furthermore in some communities the local National Guard was to be commanded, elementary education was to be given, and the records of births, marriages and deaths kept, in the language decided by the local population to be the language of public administration for that particular community. Also confirmed was the right of members of the Orthodox Church to make free decisions concerning religious and

educational matters, and that "a separate theology faculty would be set up for them at the University of Budapest". In the introduction to the resolution the House of Deputies also stated that until a law was passed to regulate the legal status of the minorities in greater detail, "the Government, in its provisional measures", should adhere closely to these guidelines. It did so with a view to emphasizing that these guidelines already possessed the force of law, even though for the time being they were only incorporated into a resolution.


Even this the House of Deputies resolution did not, however, promise territorial autonomy for the nationalities, in conformity with the government's earlier denial of this to the Transylvanian Rumanians in the course of negotiations with Bălcescu. Consequently, even this resolution must have failed to reassure minority politicians as a whole; indeed it had no effect whatever on those of them whose actions were guided primarily by the Habsburgs' imperial and dynastic interests as opposed to the interests of their own peoples. Despite its deficiencies, the resolution almost fully satisfied the demands raised by the nationality movements in the spring of 1848. Also, it unequivocally confirmed that leading Hungarian circles were now prepared to go far beyond the measures already conceded by the Habsburgs in the octroied constitution and elsewhere. It is almost certain that a number of Serb, Croat and Slovak politicians would have responded to these resolutions just as favourably as Iancu and his associates had responded a fortnight earlier to the concessions offered them had the resolution been passed slightly earlier,



117. *Dániel Irányi*



118. Imre Szacsuvay




119. István Bezéredj

and not only at the end of July 1849 when time was already running out.

As it was, those concerned were unable even to learn of the House of Deputies' decision. The *honvéd* armies could not secure Szeged beyond August 1. Therefore, after the July 28 session the deputies and members of the government were compelled to move on—this time to Arad, a fortress town liberated with considerable difficulty some six weeks earlier. However, even Arad could only offer them a few days respite. On August 6 the Battle of Nagycsűr took place, which triggered off the disintegration of the Army of Transylvania. This was followed on August 9 by the Battle of Temesvár, in which the main forces of the *honvéd* army concentrated in the *Temesköz* area suffered a crushing defeat. This sealed the fate of the Revolution. On August 11, therefore, both Parliament and the government broke up, and two days later the three army corps covering Arad from the north—the only remaining

honvéd army formation of real military value—capitulated without further fighting at Világos. In the weeks that followed the remnants of the army either disbanded or capitulated, and by the end of September only a few guerilla bands organized from among the Slovak workers of the mining towns were attempting to continue the struggle in the mountains around Selmezbánya. However, realizing that resistance was now hopeless, these also split up. By October, therefore the last corner of Hungary had also fallen into the hands of the counter-revolutionary forces.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITIES IN THE HUNGARY OF 1848



The End of the Struggle

By the autumn of 1849 the Habsburgs were again the masters of Hungary. The restoration of their power had been achieved with considerable difficulty, and it was obvious even to them that, despite all their efforts and despite the services rendered by the nationalities, it was only Russian intervention that had enabled them emerge victorious. Consequently, they felt it all the more necessary that they should now take bloody revenge on the supporters of the Revolution, and thereby deter their subjects from ever again voicing their discontent. The long and brutal campaign that followed did not, however, prevent the Habsburgs from also turning their attention to those who had fought on the imperial side.

The Habsburgs were especially keen to reward those high-ranking imperial officers who had made a really big effort to rally the nationality masses behind the black-and-yellow Habsburg banner. The Crown was not ungrateful: it awarded these men numerous decorations. Titles of baron were also bestowed, and Jellačić, who was already a baron, was made a count. Comes Salmen was created baron. Vienna also showed its gratitude towards Rajačić and Šaguna, awarding the former the Order of the Iron Crown as early as December 1848. Admittedly, in July 1848 Rajačić was removed from his post as imperial commissioner, although less than twelve years afterwards he was made a baron and awarded additional honours. Šaguna had to wait another fifteen years—the time it took for the Crown to decide to separate the Rumanian Orthodox Church from the Serbian—for the coveted post of metropolitan. Even so, he received a decoration in 1850, was made



120. Šaguna decorated with the Order of Leopold



121. Francisci, the former insurrection leader, as lord-lieutenant of Liptó county.

a baron, and then, two years later, was appointed privy counselor. (In the meantime, his Greek Catholic counterpart, the pro-Hungarian Ioan Lemény, whom Puchner had suspended from office as early as November 1848, was made formally to resign as bishop eighteen months later and was then interned in a Vienna monastery.)

The victors were equally magnanimous towards the liberal minority politicians. For instance, Hodža was awarded an imperial pension and given the Knight's Cross of the newly-created Order of Francis Joseph. Francisci was appointed to increasingly important posts, until, in 1864, he was made lord-lieutenant of Liptó county. Probably Štúr and Hurban would have received similar treatment had they not taken the liberty, even as late as the autumn of 1849, of suggesting to the Crown that it establish a separate Slovak Crown Province. As it happened, they were duly placed under police surveillance. Bariš fared rather better; he was merely banned from editing his paper, revived at the end

of 1849, after only three months. This was an understandable move on the part of the authorities: in the *Gazeta Bariŕ* was willing to publish writings by Iancu, who, like Hodža, had been offered a decoration and a pension, but who, unlike the latter, had rejected them. Anyone who had not committed such dastardly acts could, on the other hand, rely on the monarch's grace. A good example was Stratimirović, who had not been particularly popular in Vienna. Since, however, Court circles had not apparently known of his attempts to establish contact with the Szemere government, they took no retaliatory measures against Stratimirović. In point of fact, they were even willing to accept him into the officer corps of the imperial army, albeit not, for the time being, as a general, but only as a lieutenant-colonel. Mažuranić was also forgiven for his occasional dissensions and was appointed the chief public prosecutor of Croatia after the crushing of the Revolution.

This was not all, however. The Crown's supporters were well aware that they would be making a serious error if they merely attempted to reward services rendered by highly-placed persons. Accordingly, in the summer of 1849 it was announced that in those parts of the country again under Habsburg rule Church affairs and elementary education was now to be conducted in the language of the majority of the local population, and the same was to apply in the lower echelons of the



122. Stratimirović in the emperor's coat



123. *Total national equality won by the Hungarians and the non-Hungarians of Hungary after the victory of the counter-revolution in the eyes of a Hungarian caricaturist*

counties with non-Magyar populations remained inaccessible to them, as by the fact that after the collapse of the Revolution they were unable to retain even those which they had already secured for themselves. The Crown not only abolished the autonomy of the Magyar counties, but that of the Croats and the Saxon *sedes* as well. In particular, the Crown lost no time in disbanding the Serb *odvors* set up during the Revolution. Later, in February 1850, the Croatian *ban's* council was also summarily dissolved.

Despite these losses, the few who had not been completely disillusioned by the imposed constitution still attached expectations to the implementation of the Crown Provinces system referred to in the latter. This was especially the case—even though the Crown adamantly refused to hear of a Slovak Crown Province—when a province called the “Serb Voivodate and Banate of Temes” was indeed set up in November 1849. This comprised Bács, Torontál, Temes and Krassó counties, as

public administration, “including the counties”. Those in the nationality movements who were ignorant of the important concessions made by the Hungarian Parliament were undoubtedly pleased with this development—at least until it became clear that in practice the measure concerning the language of county administration failed to open the doors of the county halls to them. (The victors regarded the total abolition of county autonomy as a top-priority issue.) Yet those involved in the nationality movements were disappointed not so much by the fact that the positions of power hitherto possessed by the Hungarian nobility even in

well as the greater part of Szerém county (albeit not Baranya). (To compensate the Croats, the *Muraköz*—that section of Zala county on the right bank of the river Mura—was attached, together with the Hungarian Littoral, to the Triune Kingdom, in accordance with the Croats' wishes.) In the long run, however, the hopes springing from such measures were bound to be disappointed. For example, the Crown was in no hurry to unite Dalmatia with Croatia and an imperial patent issued in April 1850 stipulated that this union be prepared in negotiations between the Croat *sabor* and the representatives of Dalmatia. To prevent the Croats from acting too hastily, the patent also decreed the immediate dissolution of the *sabor*, despite the fact that for the past twenty-one months this had existed on paper only. In provinces where there had previously been no *sabor*-type legislative body—even on paper—none was to be established. Similarly, the Crown never for a moment seriously contemplated convoking the Reichstag called for in the imposed constitution. Another imperial patent was issued on New Year's Eve, 1851, which at last formally invalidated the provisions of the "constitution". In short, the minorities were not granted even the somewhat limited territorial autonomy hinted at in Francis Joseph's "charter of liberty". Under this they would finally have attained equality with the Hungarians, albeit only in the complete lack of rights affecting every citizen of the empire irrespective of nationality.

In 1848–49, many non-Magyars in Hungary took up arms to support Austria against the Hungarian Revolution—primarily in the hope of achieving national equality. Now that all the peoples of Hungary had been made equal in that all now lacked rights, many of these non-Magyars were probably greatly dissatisfied. The Crown made sure that they would be unable to use the arms given to them before the collapse of the Revolution to express their discontent. Accordingly, the Serb insurrectionists who had been stranded on the Titel plateau and in the *Szerémség* after Perczel's victories in Bácska and the *Temesköz* were placed under the command of Jellačić (in Slavonia since the end of April), and subjected to strict military discipline. When the fighting died down these Serbs were quickly disarmed and sent home. A similar fate befell the insurrectionist army of the Transylvanian Rumanians, which, incidentally, remained a separate force throughout. This army was disbanded overnight—on September 2, 1849—with a curt message of thanks "for all their good services". As for Lewartowski's Slovak legion, this was tolerated by the Crown for a while on account of its indispensability in operations against the Slovak guerillas of the mining



124. The ceremonial disbanding of the Slovak legion on Pozsony's military drill-ground on November 21, 1849

region. In November 1849, however, even this unit was disarmed and disbanded.

Fear that their former allies might turn against them on realizing that the nationalities' demands would not be met was only one reason why the Habsburgs lost no time in disarming them. Another was to prevent them using the weapons to press their demands as peasants. This was understandable in view of the fact that the vast majority of the insurgents were peasants who had not risen in arms solely in support of nationality rights. A more important factor had been a desire for better living conditions, an easing of burdens, and larger holdings, and now that the struggle was over, many began to call for the granting of such demands. Others—not an insignificant number—went even further and took matters into their own hands. As early as the autumn of 1849, reports were coming in to the counter-revolutionary authorities to the effect that neither the Slovaks of Nyitra county who were living on cleared woodland, nor the mass of Szatmár Rumanians who had settled on manorial lands respected the “sanctity of property”. Confusion was especially great in Transylvania, where “damage and destruction in the woods, and unlawful grazing on meadows and pas-

tures" became widespread, as "certain individuals employed in the bisbanded uprising were hoping to receive grants of woodland and other property, which they had been promised, without authorization, by their leaders as a means of spurring them on". The Crown was firm in its resolve to halt the increase in trespassing.

All this happened in spite of the fact that previously Vienna had not objected to the idea of encouraging recruitment through promises of land distribution. The fact that such promises were now declared null and void shocked not only the peasants concerned, but also a number of nationality politicians. This was especially true of Iancu, who for a long time nurtured the belief that the peasants he had taken to war would be rewarded with extensive Crown forests. In fact, Iancu rejected the decoration and pension offered him precisely because by the end of 1849 he had come to realize that he had been deceived, and, even worse, that he had participated in the deception of those who had trusted him. Iancu soon became almost totally insane, and in a year or two the man, formerly known as the "King of the Mountains" aroused profound pity even amongst his one-time opponents. The same was true of his similarly unfortunate Slovak comrade in misfortune, Rotarides. Charged with inciting peasants to revolt, the latter was imprisoned for a long period—a development approved by both the Hungarian and the imperial authorities. When in the autumn of 1849 he was finally permitted to return home, his mind was deranged. Even amongst his kith and kin he felt himself to be still a captive.



125. *A shadow of his former self, Iancu in the year of his death in a photograph taken in 1872*



126. *The crushed Rotarides and his family*

The cases of Iancu and Rotarides were, of course, exceptional. In spite of this, quite a number of the nationality leaders became completely embittered. A few months after the defeat of the Revolution, Štúr, Bariš, Kukuljević and others gave up all forms of political activity, either for good or for many years. Taking stock of the situation, they apparently came to the disappointing conclusion that their actions in 1848–49 had done serious harm to the Hungarian Revolution, had greatly helped the Habsburg counter-revolution, but had not taken them one step nearer to the realization of their dearly-held national

aspirations. Moreover, if 1848–49 had failed to bring about the triumph of these aspirations despite all their efforts, then the future was even less likely to do so. This was undoubtedly a logical, albeit somewhat exaggerated, conclusion.

It is a fact, however, that the struggle that they and their followers waged as allies of the Habsburgs had made things easier for Vienna and very difficult for the Revolution. Yet despite this Struggle the latter was capable of dealing serious blows to the counter-revolution, blows from which the latter could not recover despite its victory in the summer of 1849. Thus, by the time they succeeded in crushing the Revolution, the Habsburgs lacked sufficient strength even to attempt to wipe out the Revolution's achievements concerning the liberation of the serfs. At best, they could attempt to suppress local peasant disturbances aiming at further measures in this regard. They could not, however, risk a complete break with the country's peasant population and were

therefore compelled to leave intact the March 1848 provisions relating to the liberation of the serfs. As for the positions of power taken away from them in the spring of 1848, these they able to recover at the moment of victory (when, incidentally, they could now push out the Hungarian nobility from the positions traditionally held by it). However, by the mid-1860s it had become obvious that even though Austria had escaped disaster in 1849, she had emerged from the conflict in a dishevelled condition and as a second-rate power. Consequently, to rid themselves of at least some of their domestic difficulties, the Habsburgs were forced (within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867) to return most of these positions of power to the Hungarian nobility which had, not long before, fought against them. For Hungary this meant that the country could embark upon the path of capitalist development despite the fact that the Revolution of 1848 had been defeated. As the capitalist order gradually established itself, so the non-Magyar societies grew in strength, thereby broadening the bases of the nationality movements.

The struggle which took place on Hungarian soil in 1848-49 had another lasting consequence as well, one capable of subsequently boosting the nationality movements. Nationalism, which became a mass phenomenon only in 1848, did not decline with the ending of the struggle, but remained the staple of millions of Magyars and non-Magys in the country—despite the fact that the Habsburgs themselves castigated nationality hatred in the years following the defeat of the Revolution (during which they had benefited considerably from the intensification of nationality feeling), regarding it as a serious threat to the unity of the empire. It was in vain that representatives of the counter-revolution argued that *mutual* “lack of confidence and ... hostile emotions” could only exacerbate “the consequences of revolution and internecine war, and delay the healing of wounds”. In reality, however, it was not nationality hatred that hindered the healing of the wounds which burst open in 1848, but rather the depth of these wounds. Those who had experienced the events of 1848 could not—regardless of the side on which they fought—simply blot out their memories of the revolutionary months. They were unable to forget that in 1848 compatriots belonging to other nationalities—who up until then had supported them through thick and thin—had turned into furious enemies intent on blocking their aspirations. Especially memorable were the bloodbaths staged at the time—at least those perpetrated by opponents within their ranks...

To put it briefly, the conflicts which divided Magyars and non-Magys living in Hungary—and which in the spring of 1848 had only turned relatively small, politically-active groups against each other—led just a few months later, to clashes involving tens of thousands of people. Moreover, these conflicts continued to inflame large numbers even after the Revolution was over, and, as capitalist development progressed, more and more were affected. In this way, László Teleki's prophesy of May 1849 that "not only Austria is dead, but Saint Stephen's Hungary also" was fulfilled. The fact that nationalism became deeply engrained in broad sections of the Magyar population obviously made life easier for those Hungarian politicians who had embarked upon the path of compromise with the Habsburgs. (They did this not least in order to avoid having to reach a settlement—a less favourable settlement as they saw it—with the nationalities on the issue of political power.) On the other hand, the fact that nationalism took root in the non-Magyar masses not only meant that they continued to demand that the non-Magys of Hungary be granted equal status with the Magyar population, but later also called for the unification of ethnic groups divided by the boundaries of the country (and the empire). It was not possible to postpone the meeting of this demand indefinitely, neither was it possible to meet it within the framework of historic Hungary (or of the Habsburg empire).

In theory, there were two likely scenarios. The first was the one which actually materialized—around the turn of the twentieth century—that the nationality movements would embark upon an increasingly violent struggle to take those they represented out of historic Hungary (and the empire) and to establish independent nation-states with Hungary's political leadership, in alliance with the Habsburgs and backed by the nationalistic Magyar masses defending, more stubbornly and aggressively than ever, the feudalistic political framework until the break finally occurred. Historic Hungary (and the empire) would then split into small independent states (although to describe these as nation-states would be something of an exaggeration). The new states would certainly raise their creators from a condition of subjugation, but at the same time would find themselves in a rather unfavourable situation in that they would furnish only marginal possibilities for further internal development and would also deny effective protection against Great Power expansionism. The second scenario was a solution along the lines suggested by Teleki in the spring of 1849: historic Hungary would break away from Austria and be transformed into a democratic federa-

tion of the peoples living on her territory. As Teleki envisaged it, this federation would have served as the basis for a larger East-Central European confederation. This—undoubtedly more fortunate—alternative, existed only on paper, however. It would have been unrealistic even if the first precondition for it, Hungary's secession from the Habsburg empire (which was out of the question given the situation in Europe at this time) could have been met. Moreover, the Hungarian liberal nobility was reluctant to offer even the concessions formulated in Szeged during the final days of the Revolution (these were far more modest than those proposed by Teleki)—concessions which were originally granted only under intense pressure from the Habsburgs and their allies.

It is a fact that in 1848–49 the situation did not require that the Hungarian nobility make the kind of concessions already suggested by László Teleki. For their part, the nationality movements themselves did not call for a complete and final break with Hungary at the time of the Revolution. Thus, during the Revolution, even modest concessions could obviously have paved the way for a temporary solution (Iancu, for instance, thought the concessions formulated in Szeged to be satisfactory). A temporary patching up of conflicts could also have served as a point of departure for a subsequent, more lasting settlement. The problem was that, as long as it did not consider the danger to be sufficiently serious, the Hungarian liberal leadership tried to avoid granting even minor concessions. Accordingly, even though the Hungarian liberals revealed in Szeged a degree of compliance previously, in Bertalan Szemere's words, "not shown ... by any government", in practice the gulf could not be bridged even in the short term.

As a result, the Revolution of 1848 failed to prepare the way for a healthy settlement of the nationalities question in Hungary. This failure was, ultimately, rooted deep in special social conditions obtaining in Hungary. From these conditions it followed that only the liberal wing of the Hungarian nobility could provide a leadership for the Hungarian Revolution. This section of the Hungarian nobility was capable of identifying itself with the emancipation of the serfs and could therefore secure the backing of the populace for the Revolution. Moreover, being already possessed of a share of political power, it was able to strengthen the Revolution. However, the Hungarian nobility attributed the greatest importance to its own political interests, and, accordingly, showed a willingness to yield a share of its political power to the other nationalities only when it was too late. Taken from another angle, it

also followed from Hungary's particular social conditions that in 1848 the leadership of the non-Magyar movements inevitably fell partly into the hands of elements totally opposed to bourgeois transformation, and partly into the hands of (ecclesiastical or lay) intellectuals who supported bourgeois transformation, but who regarded the attainment of national equality to be more important than the establishment of a bourgeois order. Since the Revolution refused to listen to them, they were therefore ready to enter the fray even on the side of the counter-revolution.

That the leaders of nationality movements did side with the enemies of bourgeois transformation in the struggle of 1848 certainly made things difficult for its advocates, indeed it actually contributed to their defeat. However, it must again be emphasized that even this could not frustrate such transformation in Hungary. Similarly, the fact that the nationalities question was not settled in 1848 did not deprive the country's non-Magyar population of a share of the fruits of post-revolutionary capitalist development. In short, 1848 did not prevent the further growth of the nationality movements, although subsequent developments did push the possibility of a *healthy* settlement of the issue beyond the foreseeable future. As soon as the opportunity arose, the Hungarian nobility retrieved at least some of the positions of power it had lost in 1849 by striking a deal with the Habsburgs, and thereafter refused even to hear of the modest concessions it had offered to the nationalities in Szeged. At the same time, within the space of a single generation the view became established among the non-Magyars that equality for the nationalities could only be attained by dividing historic Hungary into small, independent nation-states. Afterwards, a large-scale struggle did in fact begin for the establishment of such states. Since these developments were a direct consequence of the events which occurred in Hungary in 1848-49, this meant that the country's inhabitants had lost for ever the opportunity to hammer out during the Revolution a satisfactory settlement of the nationalities issue.

Whilst the Hungarian revolution of 1848 can be seen as a shining example to posterity of man's ambition to improve his lot, the struggle that took place between Magyars and non-Magyars in Hungary in 1848-49 can merely exemplify the great damage that peoples can inflict not only to each other, but also to themselves—peoples which, instead of taking common interest as the basis of their actions, focus on other, minor, interests, and then pursue these to each other's detriment.

Notes

A comprehensive picture of earlier specialist literature is given by Gábor G. Kemény and László Katus. Only the first half of this has been published to date, in *Magyar történeti bibliográfia 1825–1867* (Hungarian Historical Bibliography), IV, Budapest: 1959. More recent literature published in Hungary is presented in “Bibliographie d’œuvres choisies de la science historique hongroise, 1959–1963”, in *Nouvelles Etudes Historiques*, II, Budapest: 1965; “Bibliographie d’œuvres choisies de la science historique hongroise, 1964–1968”, in *Etudes Historiques* 1970, Budapest: 1970; “Bibliographie d’œuvres choisies de la science historique hongroise, 1969–1973”, in *Etudes Historiques Hongroises* 1975, II, Budapest: 1975; and “Bibliographie d’œuvres choisies de la science historique hongroise, 1974–1983”, in *Etudes Historiques Hongroises* 1985, II, Budapest: 1985. For more recent Yugoslav specialist literature, see *Historiographie yougoslave, 1955–1965*, edited by Jorjo Tadić, Beograd: 1965. More recent specialist literature published in Rumania is presented by P. Simionescu (ed.), “Contribuții ale istorigrafiei românești privind anul revoluționar 1848 în țările române (Contributions to Rumanian Historiography with Reference to the Revolutionary Year 1848 in the Rumanian Territories), *Studii*, 1968; *Bibliografia istorică a României* (Historical Biography of Rumania), I (1949–1969), edited by Ștefan Pascu, Ioachim Crăciun and Bujor Surdu, București: 1970; Vasile Curticăpeanu, “Istoriografia revoluției române de la 1848–1849” (The Historiography of the Rumanian Revolution of 1848–49), in *Revoluția de la 1848 în țările române* (The 1848 Revolution in the Rumanian Territories), București: 1974; and Dionisie Gher-

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For a general selection of source texts pertaining to the minority movements in Hungary in the period under investigation, see *1848–1849. évi iratok a nemzetiségi megbékélésről* (Documents from 1848–1849 on Minority Conciliation), [edited by Gábor G. Kemény], n.p. and n.d. [Budapest: 1948]. Of the recollections presenting an overall picture of the nationalities policy of the Hungarian Revolution the most important are *Szemere Bertalan miniszterelnök emlékiratai az 1848–49-i magyar kormányzat nemzetiségi politikájáról* (Prime Minister Bertalan Szemere's Memoirs on the Nationalities Policy of the Hungarian Government of 1848–49), edited by Iván Szüts, Budapest: 1941. For comprehensive studies of the nationalities question in Hungary in 1848–49 see, in order of publication, Jenő Horváth's brief survey (in the traditional nationalist spirit) "A magyar kormány nemzetiségi politikája 1848–49-ben" (The Hungarian Government's Nationalities Policy in 1848–49), *A Háborús Felelősség* (War Responsibility), 1930. A much less biased approach to the subject will be found in two studies by Zoltán I. Tóth—"Kossuth és a nemzetiségi kérdés 1848–1849-ben" (Kossuth and the Nationalities Issue in 1848–1849), in *Emlékkönyv Kossuth Lajos születésének 150. évfordulójára* (Memorial Volume on the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Lajos Kossuth), II, Budapest: 1952, and "The Nationality Problem in Hungary in 1848–1849", AH, 1955; and in Endre Arató's overview in Volume Three of the university textbook *Magyarország története* (A History of Hungary), Budapest: 1975 (the last-mentioned survey strives to follow in their footsteps). On the other hand, the spirit of the reasoning is radically different—branding the candid discussion of problems as an unhistorical procedure—in Endre Kovács, "A forradalom és a nemzetiségek" (The Revolution and the Minorities), in *A negyvennyolcas forradalom kérdései* (The Questions of the '48 Revolution), Budapest: 1976. The same holds true for Kovács's more detailed synthesis (which fails to shed light on the most serious problems) *Szemben a történelemmel: A nemzetiségi kérdés a régi Magyarországon* (Against History: The Nationalities Question in Old Hungary), Budapest: 1977.

The most important source publications and monographs to deal comprehensively with the aspirations and movements of the individual minorities in Hungary in 1848–49 (although they need to be read critically on account of their marked nationalist bias) are the following: [Siegfried Kapper], *Die serbische Bewegung in Südungarn: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der ungarischen Revolution*, Berlin: 1851; József Thim (ed. and intr.), *A magyarországi 1848–49-iki szerb fölkelés története* (The History of the 1848–49 Serbian Uprising in Hungary), I, Budapest: 1940 (with a detailed bibliography of earlier specialist literature in the Appendix); II, Budapest: 1930; III, Budapest: 1935; Радослав Перовић (ed. and intr.), *Грађа за историју српског покрета у Војводини, 1848–1849* (Material Concerning the 1848–49 Serb Movement in the Voivodina), I/1, Београд: 1952; Васа Богданов, *Устанак Срба у Војводини и мађарска револуција, 1848 и 1849* (The Serb Uprising in the Voivodina and the 1848–49 Hungarian Revolution), Суботица: 1929; Vaso Bogdanov, *Nacionalni i socijalni sukobi Vojvodjana i Madžara 1848–49* (National and Social Conflicts between the Hungarians and the Inhabitants of the Voivodina in 1848–49), Zagreb: n.d. [1936]; Vaso Bogdanov, “O revolucionarnosti i kontrarevolucionarnosti nacionalnih pokreta u Podunavlju 1848/49” (On the Revolutionary or Counterrevolutionary Character of the National Movements along the Danube in 1848–49), in Vaso Bogdanov, *Živa prošlost* (Living Past), Zagreb: 1957; Slavko Gavrilović, “Srbi u revoluciji 1848–1849” (Serbs in the 1848–49 Revolution), in *Istraživanja* (Researches), V, Novi Sad: 1976; Андрија Раденић, “О проблемима периодизације и оцењивања српског покрета у Угарској, 1848–1849” (On Problems of Periodization with Regard to the Serb Movement in Hungary in 1848–49), *Историјски часопис* 1980; Slavko Gavrilović: “1848 néhány problémája a Vajdaságban” (Some Problems of 1848 in the Voivodina), in *Szerbek és magyarok a Duna mentén* (Serbs and Hungarians along the Danube), II, Budapest: 1987; György Spira, “A szerb–magyar viszony vitatott kérdéseiről — a józan önismeret jegyében” (On Disputed Issues in Serb–Hungarian Relations — without Prejudice), *ibid.*; Андрија Раденић, “Суштинска спорна питања српског покрета 1848–1849. године” (Some Important Vexed Issues Concerning the Serb Movement in 1848–49), *Срби и Мађари у револуцију 1848–1849. године* (Serbs and Hungarians in the 1848–49 Revolution), Београд: 1983; Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten, 1830–1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie*, München: 1980; Gjuro [Ђуро] Šurmin, “A horvátok és magyarok 1848-ban és 1849-ben” (The Croats and the Hungarians in 1848 and

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Important publications containing the papers and memoirs of leading minority politicians: *Pisma Ljudevitu Gaju* (The Letters of Ljudevit Gaj), ed. by Josip Horvat and Jakša Ravlić, Zagreb: 1956; Rudolf Maixner, Tomislav Jakić and Ivan Esih (eds.), “Korespondencija Dragojla Kušlana” (The Correspondence of Dragojlo Kušlan) in *Grada za povijest književnosti Hrvatske* (Material Relating to the History of Croatian Literature), XIX, Zagreb: 1950; Ivan Mažuranić, *Hèrvati Magjarom: Odgovor na proglase njihove od ožujka mieseca i travnja 1848* (Croatians for the Hungarians: A Reply to their Manifesto of March and April 1848), Karlovac: 1848; M.M. Hodža, *Der Slowak: Beiträge zur Beleuchtung der slawischen Frage in Ungarn*, Prag: 1848; Ludovít Štúr, *Politické state a prejavy* (Political Articles and Statements), ed. by Jozef Ambruš, Bratislava: 1954; *Listy Ludovíta Štúra* (The Letters of Ludovít Štúr), ed. by Jozef Ambruš, II, Bratislava: 1956; III, Bratislava: 1960; Eftimie Murgu, *Scrieri* (Writings), ed. and intr. by I. D. Suciu, București: 1969; George Bariț, *Scrieri social-politice* (Social-political Writings), ed. and intr. by Victor Cheresteșiu, Camil Mureșan and George Em. Marica, București: 1962; Marina Vlasiu L[upaș] (ed.), “Din corespondența lui Avram Iancu în anii 1848–1849” (From the 1848–49 Correspondence of Avram Iancu), in *Studii și materiale de istorie modernă* (Studies and Material on Modern History), III, București: 1963; Simion Bărnuțiu, *Românii și ungurii: Discurs rostit în catedrala Blajului 2 (14) maiu 1848* (Rumanians and Hungarians: The Speech Given in Balázsfalva Cathedral on May 2 [14], 1848), ed. and intr. by George Bogdan-Duică, Cluj: 1924; [A. T. Laurian], *Die Rumänen der österreichischen Monarchie*, I, Wien: 1849; II, Wien: 1850; III, Wien: 1851; and Gy[örgy] Spira, “Ein Selbstporträt von Jellačić”, SS, 1986; [Georg] Stratimirović, *Was ich erlebte*, ed. by Ljuba Stratimirović, Wien—Leipzig: 1911; Јаков Игњатовић, *Мемоари: Репсодије из прошлог живота* (Memoirs: Selections from a Past Life), Београд: 1966; Jozef Miloslav Hurban, *Ludovít Štúr: Rozpomienky* (Ludovít Štúr: Recollections), ed. by Jozef Štolc, Bratislava: 1959; Georgie Barițiu, *Parti alese din istori'a Transilvaniei* (Selected Chapters from the History of Transylvania), II, Sibiu: 1890; A[lexandru] Papiu Ilarianu, *Istori'a romaniloru din Daci'a*

Superiore (The History of the Rumanians in Dacia Superior), II, Viena: 1852; Andrei Şaguna, *Memorii din anii 1846–1871* (Reflections on the Years 1846–1871), Sibiu: 1923; *Memorialistica revoluţiei de la 1848 în Transilvania* (The Memoir Literature of the 1848 Revolution in Transylvania), ed. and intr. Nicolae Bocşan and Valeriu Leu, Cluj—Napoca: 1988. For a brief overview of Serbian memoir literature, see Василије Крстић, “Српска мемоарска литература о револусији 1848–1849. године” (Serbian Memoir Literature Concerning the 1848–49 Revolution) in *Срби у Мађару*.

Monographs devoted to the activity of the leading minority politicians: Јован Радонић, *Аутобиографија патријарха Јосифа Рајачића* (A Self-portrait of Patriarch Josif Rajačić), Београд: 1951; Јован Савковић, *Патријарх Јосиф Рајачић у Српском Покрету, 1848–1849* (Patriarch Josif Rajačić in the Serb Movement of 1848–49), Нови Сад: 1954; Марко Малетин, “Теодор Павловић,” *Гласник Историског друштва*, 1936; Миодраг Поповић, *Јаков Игњатовић у Четрдесетосмој* (Jakov Ignjatović in 1848), Београд: 1955; M. Hartley, *The Man who Saved Austria: The Life and Times of Baron Jellačić*, London: n. d. [1912]; Ernest Bauer, *Joseph Graf Jellachich de Buzim, Banus von Kroatien: Schicksal und Legende des kroatischen Helden von 1848*, Wien–München: n. d. [1975]; Velimir Dezelić, *Dr. Ljudevit Gaj*, Zagreb: 1910; Josip Horvat, *Ljudevit Gaj*, Zagreb: 1975; Elinor Murray-Despalatović, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement*, Boulder: 1975; Tadija Smičiklas, “Život i djela Ivana Kukuljevića Sakcinskog” (The Life and Works of Ivan Kukuljević-Sakcinski), in *Rad Jugoslavenske akademije* (Proceedings of the Yugoslav Academy), CX, Zagreb: 1892; Jaroslav Šidak, “Politička djelatnost Ivana Kukuljevića Sakcinskoga” (The Political Activity of Ivan Kukuljević-Sakcinski), in Jaroslav Šidak, *Studije iz hrvatske povijesti XIX stoljeća* (Studies in Nineteenth-century Croatian History), Zagreb: 1973; Antun Barac, *Mažuranić*, Zagreb: 1946; Jaroslav Šidak, “Ivan Mažuranić kao političar” (Ivan Mažuranić as Politician), in Šidak, *Studije*, 1973; H[élène] Tourtzer [Helena Turcerová-Devečková], *Louis Štúr et l'idée de l'indépendance slovaque, 1815–1856*, Paris: 1913; Karol Golán, *Ludovít Štúr, 1856–1956*, Bratislava: 1956; Vl[adimír] Matula, *Ludovít Štúr, 1815–1856*, Bratislava: 1956; *Ludovít Štúr: Život a dielo, 1815–1856* (*Žborník materiálov z konferencie Historického ústavu Slovenskej akademie vied*) (Ludovít Štúr: His Life and Activity, 1815–1856. A Collection of Material from a Conference of the Slovak Academy of Sciences' Institute of History), Bratislava: 1956; Ján Juriček, *Ludovít Štúr*, Bratislava: 1971; Andrej Mráz, *Ludovít Štúr*, Bratislava: 1971;

Fraňo Ruttkay, *Ludovít Štúr ako publicista a tvorca slovenskej politickej žurnalistiky* (Ludovít Štúr as Publicist and Creator of Slovak Political Journalism), Martin: 1982; Július Bodnár, *Dr. Jozef Miloslav Hurban, 1817–1888: Jeho život a dielo* (Dr. Jozef Miloslav Hurban, 1817–1888: His Life and Activity), Bratislava: 1925; Ivan Kusý, *Jozef Miloslav Hurban*, Bratislava: 1948; Ondrej Mrlian, *Jozef Miloslav Hurban*, Martin: 1959; Ján Hučko, *Michal Miloslav Hodža*, Bratislava: 1970; Gy[örgy] Spira, “Ján Rotarides’ unvergleichliche Begegnung mit der Revolution und Konterrevolution”, in *Etudes Historiques Hongroises* 1985, II, Budapest: 1985; Karol Golán, “Janko Král’ ako politický radikál” (Janko Král’ as Radical Politician), *Politika*, 1940; Milan Pišút, *Janko Král: Život a básnické dielo* (Janko Král: His Life and Poetical Works), Bratislava: 1957; R. Roško, “Janko Král—revolucionar a utopický socialista” (Janko Král—Revolutionary and Utopian Socialist), *Filozofický časopis slovenský*, 1957; Pavol Vongrej, *Janko Král’ básnik-burľivak* (Janko Král, Poet and Storm-bird), Bratislava: 1966; Rudo Brtáň, *Život básnika Janka Krála* (The Life of the Poet Janko Král’), Martin: 1972; Zoltán I. Tóth, “Kossuth, Dragoş és Papfalvi” (Kossuth, Dragoş and Papfalvi), in Zoltán I. Tóth, *Magyarok és románok* (Hungarians and Rumanians), Budapest: 1966; G[eorge] Bogdan-Duică, *Eftimie Murgu*, Bucureşti: 1937; Traian Topliceanu, *Eftimie Murgu*, Caransebeş–Timişoara: 1948; Iosif Jivan, *Eftimie Murgu, luptător al ţărănimii bănăţene pentru pământ, 1848–1849* (Eftimie Murgu, Fighter of the Banat Peasantry for the Land, 1848–1849), Deva: 1948; Ioan Raţiu, *Timotei Cipariu: Viaţa şi activitatea lui* (Timotei Cipariu: His Life and Activity), Blaj: 1905; Vasile Netea, *George Bariţiu: Viaţa şi activitatea sa* (George Bariţ: His Life and Activity), Bucureşti: 1966; Ambrus Miskolczy, “George Bariţ a román—magyar szövetségért 1848-ban” (George Bariţ in Support of the Rumanian—Hungarian Alliance in 1848), *Tiszatáj*, 1974; Iosif Sterca Şuluţiu, *Biografia lui Avram Iancu* (A Biography of Avram Iancu), Sibiiu: 1897; Silviu Dragomir, *Avram Iancu*, Bucureşti: 1968; Marin Mihalache, *Avram Iancu, 1824–1872*, Bucureşti: 1968; Ştefan Pascu, *Avram Iancu: Viaţa şi faptele unui erou şi martir* (Avram Iancu: The Life and Activity of a Hero and Martyr), Bucureşti: 1972; *In memoriam Avram Iancu, 1872–1972: Comunicări ştiinţifice despre Avram Iancu şi epoca sa* (In Memoriam Avram Iancu, 1872–1972: Scholarly Papers on Avram Iancu and his Era), Tîrgu Mureş: 1972; Pompiliu Teodor, *Avram Iancu în memorialistică* (Avram Iancu in Memoir Literature), Cluj: 1972; Géza Kovách, *Avram Iancu a haladó magyar történetírásban* (Avram Iancu in Progressive Hungarian Historiography), Bukarest: 1972; Géza Ko-

vách, "Avram Iancu és 1848 tanulságai" (Avram Iancu and the Lessons of 1848), in *1848: Arcok, eszmék, tettek* (1848: Faces, Ideas, Deeds), Bukarest: 1974; Silviu Dragomir, *Ioan Buteanu, prefectul Zarandului în anii 1848-49* (Ioan Buteanu, Prefect of Zaránd County in the Years 1848 and 1849), Bucureşti: 1928 G[eorge] Bogdan-Duică, *Viaţa şi ideile lui Simion Bărnuţiu* (Life and Ideas of Simion Bărnuţiu), Bucureşti: 1924; Radu Pantazi, *Simion Bărnuţiu: Opera şi gândirea* (Simion Bărnuţiu: Lifework and Thinking), Bucureşti: 1967; Ioan Lupaş, *Mitropolitul Andreiu Şaguna* (Metropolitan Andreiu Şaguna), Sibiu: 1911; Keith Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality: Andreiu Şaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873*, Cambridge/Mass.—London: 1977; Ilie Popescu Teiuşan and Vasile Netea, *August Treboniu Laurian: Viaţa şi activitatea sa* (August Treboniu Laurian: His Life and Activity), Bucureşti: 1970; Carl Göllner, "Anton Kurz: Leben und Werk", FVLK, 1967 and Carl Göllner, "Anton Kurz az 1848-49-es forradalomban" (Anton Kurz in the 1848-49 Revolution), in *1848: Arcok, eszmék, tettek*.

The text of the Twelve Points of the March Youth of Pest is published in German translation by Joh[ann] Janotyckh von Adlerstein (ed.), *Archiv des ungarischen Ministeriums und Landesvertheidigungsausschusses*, I, Altenburg: 1851, p. 1. For the German translation of the text of legislation enacted by the Pozsony Diet in the course of March and April, see *Gesetzartikel des ungarischen Reichstages 1847/8*, Pest: 1848. A brief English-language description of all the laws is given in a compilation by Joseph Andrew Blackwell, an English diplomatic agent, "Acts passed by the Hungarian Diet", n. d. [Pozsony, April 1848], in *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Hungary, 1847-1849*, London: n. d. [1850], pp. 65-70. The quotations are from article 6 of Act XVIII/1848 and from paragraph *e* of article 2 of Act XVI. In connection with Act XVI—which regulated the county system—it should be noted that in its final form, established only after heated debates, it allowed a much more limited say for non-nobles in county administration than the original draft bill (drawn up by Kossuth) had envisaged. However, the stipulation that the language of consultation in the counties—with the exception of those in Croatia—could only be Hungarian was included in Kossuth's original draft (OL RL AR Lad. XX21. Fasc. C. No. 56).

For 1846 data on the national distribution of the country's population, see Joseph Hain, *Handbuch der Statistik des Österreichischen Kaiserstaates*, I, Wien: 1852, pp. 205-264. This data is reproduced by Elek Fényes, *Az Ausztriai Birodalom statistikája és földrajzi leírása* (The Statistics

and Geographical Description of the Austrian Empire), Pest: 1857, pp. 34–44. As regards the grouping of the data, I have departed from the procedure followed by these authors on one point, namely that I have incorporated data pertaining to the Partium (in accordance with the 1848 situation) into the data on Hungary proper rather than into the data on Transylvania. To this end I have used as my point of departure the series of figures published by Elek Fényes in another work, *Magyarország leírása* (A Description of Hungary), II, Pest: 1847, pp. 430–440. It should also be noted that besides the data published by Hain (which may have been deliberately scaled down), Fényes also publishes other, more optimistic, figures relating to the Hungarians, and based on the latter group of Fényes's statistics are the calculations of Endre Arató, *A nemzetiségi kérdés története Magyarországon* (A History of the Minorities Issue in Hungary), I, Budapest, 1960, pp. 299–300. I have not, however, regarded Arató's example as one to follow, since the information assembled by Fényes dates from a later period.

For the size of the electorate, see Andor Csizmadia's monograph on the subject, *A magyar választási rendszer 1848–1849-ben: Az első népképviselési választások* (The Hungarian Electoral System in 1848–49: The First Parliamentary Elections), Budapest: 1963, p. 252, in which the author peremptorily asserts that after the inauguration of popular representation the electorate increased fivefold. However, Csizmadia's figures, (pp. 252 and 329), show that 6.07% of the population could vote in 1848, as against 1.6–1.7% earlier, which means that the increase was less than fourfold. Accordingly, Csizmadia subsequently corrected his earlier statement in Andor Csizmadia, Kálmán Kovács and László Asztalos, *Magyar állam- és jogtörténet* (Hungarian Constitutional and Legal History), Budapest: 1972, p. 344. This notwithstanding, the belief that the electorate multiplied fivefold has persisted in the specialist literature ever since.

In addition to the aforementioned syntheses, the developments of the early months of the Revolution are also discussed in В. И. Фрейдзон (ed.), *Освободительные движения народов Австрийской империи: Возникновение и развитие, конец XVIII в.—1849 г.*, Москва: 1980; [Rudolf Horvat], *Hrvatski pokret u proljeću godine 1848* (Croat Movement in the Spring of 1848), Zagreb: 1898; V[asile] Netea, "Cu privire la poziția democraților burghezi și a democraților revoluționari români din Transilvania în 1848: Convocarea și organizarea adunării de la 18/30 aprilie" (On the Stance of the Transylvanian Rumanian Bourgeois Democrats and Revolutionary Democrats in 1848: The Summoning

and Organization of the Assembly of April 18 [30]), *Studii*, 1965; Victor Chereșteșiu, *Adunarea națională de la Blaj, 3–5 (15–17) mai 1848: Începuturile și alcătuirea programului revoluției din 1848 din Transilvania* (The Balázsfalva National Assembly, May 3–5 [15–17], 1848: The Beginnings and Implementation of the Transylvanian Revolution of 1848), București: 1966; Samu Benkő, “Eszmék és tettek 1848 tavaszán Erdélyben” (Ideas and Deeds in Transylvania in Spring 1848), in Samu Benkő, *A helyzettudat változásai* (Changes in Situation Awareness), Bukarest: 1977; Liviu Botezan, “Avram Iancu, exponent al dreptului poporului la înarmare în primăvera anului 1848” (Avram Iancu, Spokesman for the Right of the People to Arm in the Spring of 1848), in *Apulum: Acta Musei Apulensis*, XVI, Alba Iulia: 1978; István Deák, “The Revolution in Transylvania and the Polarization of National Destinies”, in *Transylvania: The Roots of Ethnic Conflict*, Kent/Ohio: n.d. [1983]; and Ambrus Miskolczy, “Az Erdélyi Nagyfejedelemség ‘birodalompolitikai’ jelentősége az 1848. májusi válságban” (The ‘Empire Policy’ Significance of the Grand Principality of Transylvania in the May 1848 Crisis), in *A magyar polgári átalakulás kérdései* (Questions of Hungarian Bourgeois Transformation), Budapest: 1984. The sources of references reflecting the initial, favourable, reception of the Hungarian Revolution: the proclamation addressed by Đorđe Stratimirović and his fourteen associates to the people of Újvidék, Újvidék, March 21, 1848, published by Thim, II, p. 36.; [Ludovít Štúr], “Nový vek” (New Era), published by Rapant, *Slovenské povstanie*, I/2, p. 57.; Steier, *A tót nemzetiségi kérdés*, I, p. 21.; *Organulu luminarei*, March 31 [April 12], 1848, No. 66, p. 371; FMIL, April 12 [24], 1848, No. 15, pp. 114–115; *Fratilor Romani!* (Rumanian Brothers!), OL Erdélyi levéltárak (Transylvanian Archives), Gubernium Transylvanicum, Præsidentialia 1848 : 993. The original lyrics of the Slovak folk song published by Steier are as follows:

Kossuth a Batthyány
Slobodu nám dali,
Nech im pán Boh dopomáha
V tom uhorskom kraji.

V tom uhorskom kraji
Tambur vibubňuje,
Že nám Kossuth s Batthyánym
Slobodu daruje.

That the leadership of the nationality movements in Hungary was, even on the eve of 1848, still recruited from amongst the ranks of the intelligentsia is verified by statistical data relating to the Slovak movement given in Miroslav Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas*, Praha: 1968. For erroneous comparisons stemming from the leading role of the intelligentsia, see György Spira's contribution to the *XV^e Congrès International des Sciences Historiques, Bucarest, 10-17 août 1980*, IV, Bucarest: 1982, pp. 647-649. For the Serbs' Pest petition, see the minutes of the March 5/17-7/19 1848 meeting of the Serbs of Pest-Buda, published by Thim, II, pp. 26-31. The excerpt stressing the pro-Hungarian orientation of those attending the meeting is from a statement by the leaders of Budapest's Serbs published on March 31, 1848 (*1848-1849. évi iratok a nemzetiségi megbékélésről*, pp. 14-15). The Újvidék petition of 15/27 March 1848 is published by Thim, II, pp. 49-53. Two further petitions in a similar spirit were published by István Péter Varsányi, "Az 1848-as nemzetiségi mozgalmak ismeretlen dokumentumaiból" (From the Unknown Documents of the 1848 Minority Movements), in *Tanulmányok Csongrád megye történetéből* (Studies in the History of Csongrád County), V, Szeged: 1981. The proclamation which starts with the exclamation *Bratia Slovaci!* (Slovak Brothers!) was published by Rapant, *Slovenské povstanie*, I/2, pp. 73-80. Hurban's Miava speech of April 26, 1848 is cited by Steier, *A tót nemzetiségi kérdés*, I, p. 34. For the stance of the Rumanian apprentices-at-law of Marosvásárhely, see György Bözödi's fine study, "1848 márciusa Marosvásárhelyen" (March 1848 in Marosvásárhely), *Korunk*, 1958; and a paper by Grigore Ploșteanu, "Canceliștii români târgumureșeni în revoluția de la 1848" (Marosvásárhely's Rumanian Apprentices-at-law in the Revolution of 1848), in *Studii și cercetări de științe sociale* (Studies and Research into the Social Sciences), București: 1977. The source of the citations is Papiu-Ilarian's report of March 25, 1848, published by Pascu and Cheres-teșiu, I, pp. 104-106. The petition of Butteanu and his associates is published by Gelu Neamțu, "Az 1848. május 3/15-5/17-i balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés forradalmi programjának alapidokumentumai" (The Basic Documents of the Revolutionary Programme of the Balázsfalva National Assembly of May 3/15-5/17, 1848), in *1848: Arcok, eszmék, tettek*, pp. 39-40., and Pascu and Cheres-teșiu, I, pp. 150-152; for Bărnăț's March 24, 1848 appeal, see *ibid.*, I, pp. 90-92. An outline of Bărnăț's earlier views is given by Cheres-teșiu, *Adunarea națională*, p. 111. The conflicts between the Rumanians and the Serbs of Hungary in Church government are presented by

Imre Hatvani, *Szózat az oláh faj ügyében* (An Appeal in the Cause of the Vlach Race), Pest: n. d. [1848]; Arató, *A nemzetiségi kérdés története*, II, Budapest: 1960; and Varsányi, "Az 1848-as nemzetiségi mozgalmak", *loc. cit.* The May 9–21, 1848 appeal of the Rumanian youth of Nagyvárád was published, in abridged form, in *Organu național*, May 26 [June 7], 1848, No. 3, p. 12. The petition of the Orthodox Rumanians of Hungary, dated the same day, is published by Dénes Pap (ed.), *Okmánytár Magyarország függetlenségi harczának történetéhez, 1848–1849* (A Collection of Documents on the Hungary's Independence Struggle, 1848–1849), I, Pest: 1868, pp. 146–149, and János Beér and Andor Csizmadia (eds. and intr.), *Az 1848/49. évi népképviselési országgyűlés* (The Parliament of 1848/49), Budapest: 1954, pp. 864–867. The anti-union memorandum wanted by the Saxon Universality is published in Pascu and Chereteșiu, II, pp. 222–224; for the Saxon's April address to the sovereign, see Friedrich Sachsenheim, "Aus Briefwechsel und Aufzeichnungen des siebenbürgischen Hofagenten Friedrich Soterius v. Sachsenheim (1821–1856) besonders über das Jahr 1848", *Siebenbürgische Vierteljahrschrift*, 1936, pp. 95–96. For the words describing the "liberal" character of Saxon privileges, see the appeal addressed by comes Salmen to the Saxons of Nagyszeben on April 14, 1848, published in reprint by Karl Nehring (ed.), *Flugblätter und Flugschriften der ungarischen Revolution von 1848/49*, München: 1977, pp. 9–10. Informative data is furnished on the ethnic population distribution of the Királyföld in "Levelek a szászságból" (Letters from the Saxons), *Pesti Hírlap*, July 12, 1848, No. 105, p. 644; and the petition of the deputies of the Rumanian National Committee submitted to the Austrian government in Vienna on March 23, 1849, published by Nicolae Popea (ed.), *Memorialul Archiepiscopului și Metropolitului Andreiu baron de Șaguna sau luptele naționale-politice ale Românilor, 1848–1873* (The Memoirs of Archbishop and Metropolitan Baron Andreiu Șaguna, or the National Political Struggles of the Rumanians), I, Sibiu, 1889, p. 267. For proof of the sympathy of the *Szepesség* Saxons towards the Hungarian Revolution, see Rezső Tirts, *1848–49-iki élményeim különös tekintettel a Cornides-féle szepesi guerillavadászok szereplésére a szabadságharcban* (My 1848–49 Experiences with Special Regard to the Participation of the *Szepesség* Guerilla Forces in the War of Independence), Késmárk: 1903. The text of the Zagreb petition of March 25, 1848 is published and analysed by Jaroslav Šidak, "Narodna zahtijevanja' od 25. ožujka—program hrvatske Četdesetosme" (The "National Demands" of March 25—The Programme of the Croatian '48), in Jaroslav Šidak, *Studije iz hrvatske povijesti*

za revolucije 1848–49 (Studies Concerning the 1848–49 Revolution in Croatian History), Zagreb: 1979. An English translation of the text of the petition can be found in *Correspondence*, pp. 49–50. The Croat liberals' stance is amply documented—although with some left-wing bias—by Vaso Bogdanov (ed. and intr.), *Hrvatska ljevica u godinama revolucije 1848–49: U svijetlu naše četrdesetosmaške štampe* (The Croatian Left during the 1848–49 Revolution, as Seen by our own Press), Zagreb: 1949.

Kossuth's views are presented not only in Zoltán I. Tóth's aforementioned study, but also in Istvan Deak, "Lajos Kossuth's Nationalism and Internationalism", *AHY*, 1976–1977; Istvan Deak, *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849*, New York: 1979; and—giving a somewhat rosy picture of Kossuth's policy—György Szabad, *Kossuth politikai pályája ismert és ismeretlen megnyilatkozásai tükrében* (Kossuth's Political Career in the Light of Known and Previously Unknown Statements), Budapest: 1977. For a contemporary press report on what Kossuth said at the March 22, 1848 district session of the Lower Table of the Diet, see KLÖM, XI, ed. and intr. by István Barta, Budapest: 1951, pp. 686–687, and for an account of his address at the district session of April 4, see KLÖM, XI, p. 726. The speech delivered by Kostić at the April 8, 1848 district session of the Lower Table is published by Thim, I, p. 35. For Kossuth's reply, see, KLÖM, XI, pp. 732–734. Kossuth's aforementioned earlier address was delivered at the December 11, 1847 district session of the Lower Table; for its text, see KLÖM, XI, p. 382. For a detailed account of the discussion at Kossuth's Pozsony lodgings on April 9, 1848 and of the threats Kossuth made there, see, Kapper, pp. 57–59 (the quotes are taken from this). Numerous other—Serb and Hungarian—contemporary accounts also report the events of this day (an enumeration is given by Thim, I, pp. 38–39). Kossuth, however, subsequently described the charges against him as groundless. That his excuses do not merit belief is clear even from his own remonstrances: he not only denied having uttered the provocative words attributed to him, but denied also ever having met with Stratimirović and his associates (cf. KLI, XI, ed. by Ferencz Kossuth, Budapest: 1905, p. 170), even though it was indisputable that the meeting had taken place. Incidentally, it should be noted that Kossuth subsequently repeated almost verbatim what he had said on April 9 at the August 26, 1848 session of the House of Deputies, where he stated that if the "separate ethnic races demand a separate status for themselves", then "Hungary will either disintegrate, or the

thrust of the sword shall decide" (KLÖM, XII, ed. by István Sinkovics, Budapest: 1957, p. 803).

The April 14, 1848 Karlóca demands are published by Thim, II, pp. 100–104. For the minutes of the Cabinet meeting of April 12, 1848 see KLÖM, XII, pp. 22–24. The work of the government commissioners despatched under the Cabinet resolution is briefly described by Sebestyén Szócs, *A kormánybiztosi intézmény kialakulása 1848-ban* (The Emergence of the Institution of Government Commissioner in 1848), Budapest: 1972; light is shed on the work of the most important person to occupy this post by Lajos Steier (ed. and intr.) in *Beniczky Lajos bányavidéki kormánybiztos... visszaemlékezései és jelentései az 1848/49-iki szabadságharcról és a tót mozgalomról* (The Recollections and Reports of Mining Region Government Commissioner Lajos Beniczky on the War of Independence of 1848/49 and on the Slovak Movement), Budapest: 1924. Kossuth's late March address, which has already been referred to, was delivered at the Lower Table's March 28 district session; for its text see KLI, XI, p. 153. Contrary to earlier assertions (in Árpád Károlyi, *Németújvári gróf Batthyány Lajos első magyar miniszterelnök főbenjáró pöre* [The Capital Trial of Count Lajos Batthyány of Németújvár, the First Hungarian Prime Minister], I, Budapest: 1932, p. 373), the Batthyány government intended to guarantee only separate departments for the Croats and not under-secretary posts. This is borne out by the minutes of the Cabinet meeting of April 26, 1848: KLÖM, XII, p. 72.

The nationalities policy of the March Youth is analysed by Gy[örgy] Spira, "The National Minorities Policy of the Pest Revolution's Left in March 1848", SS, 1970; Endre Arató, "Die Wirkung des Nationalismus auf die Politik der Kräfte der Linken in Österreich und in Ungarn im Frühjahr und im Sommer 1848", in AUREÖSH, XIII, Budapest: 1972; Pál Pándi, *Petőfi és a nacionalizmus* (Petőfi and Nationalism), Budapest: 1974; and László Deme, "Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism among the Hungarian Radicals", AHY, 1976–1977. The position of the March Youth on the belonging of Hungary's inhabitants to a single nation was formulated by P[ál] K[irályi], "Pest, martius 21-kén" (Pest on March 21), *Jelenkor*, March 23, 1848, No. 36, p. 145. The efforts of the March Youth to modify the electoral bill are described by György Spira (ed. and intr.) "A vezérmegye forradalmi választmánya 1848 tavaszán" (The Pest County Revolutionary Committee in Spring 1848), *Századok*, 1964. Petőfi's remarks in connection with this are recorded in *Szemere Bertalan miniszterelnök emlékiratai*, p. 28. For a

reproduction of one of the two proclamations addressed to the Croats, see *Valóság*, 1948, p. 171 (hence the citation). The other is also published in reproduction by György Rózsa and György Spira (eds), *Negyvennyolc a kortársak szemével* (Forty-eight through the Eyes of Contemporaries), Budapest: n. d. [1973], No. 271. The Croat response to the proclamations was given in Mažuranić's already-cited pamphlet. The limited scope of the Slovak national movement was discussed by Hurban at the July 2, 1848 session of the Croat *sabor*; the text of the address is published by Rapant, *Slovenské povstanie*, II/2, pp. 75–76. That Hungary's confidence in the pro-Hungarians of Croatia was unfounded and is aptly revealed by Šurmin, *loc. cit.*

The initial indifference of the peasant masses towards national aspirations and the factors contributing to the gradual dissipation of this indifference are discussed by Waclaw Felczak, "Wpływ problemu narodowościowego na społeczne oblicze rewolucji węgierskiej 1848 r." (The Influence of the Nationality Problem on the Social Aspect of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution), *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 1963; Gy[örgy] Spira, "Beitrag zum Referat von J. Droz", AH, 1971; and György Spira *Bauernbefreiung und Revolution in Ungarn 1848/49*, in *Bauern und bürgerliche Revolution*, Berlin: 1985. A comprehensive picture of the fledgling movements of the non-Magyar peasants after the outbreak of the Revolution is given by Endre Arató, "Die Bauernbewegungen und der Nationalismus in Ungarn im Frühling und Sommer 1848", I, in AUREöSH, IX, Budapest: 1967; II, in AUREöSH, XI, Budapest: 1970. The Rumanian peasant movements are presented by Victor Cheresesteşiu, "Contributions à l'histoire des mouvements paysans de Transylvanie au cours de l'année révolutionnaire 1848", in *Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire*, [I], Bucarest: 1955; and a detailed account is given by Zsolt Trócsányi, *Az erdélyi parasztság története, 1790–1849* (The History of Transylvania's Peasantry, 1790–1849), Budapest: 1956. The emancipation of the Serb and Croat peasants and the movements which served them are dealt with by Péter Lőrincz, *Adalék a vajdasági agrárkérdés történetéhez* (Contribution to the History of the Agrarian Issue in the Voivodina), Novi Sad: 1956; Лазар Ракић, "Стари Бечеј револуционарне 1848–1849. године" (Óbecse in the Revolutionary Years 1848–1849), *Зборник за историју*, 16/1977; Славко Гавриловић, *Срем у револуцији, 1848–1849* (Szerémség in the 1848–49 Revolution) Београд: 1963; Aleksije Jelačić, *Seljački pokret u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji godine 1848–1849* (Peasant Movements in Croatia and Slavonia in the Years 1848–1849), Zagreb: 1925; Rudolf Bičanić, "Oslobodenje kmetova u Hrvatskoj godine 1848" (The

Liberation of the Serfs in Croatia in 1848), in Rudolf Bićanić, *Počeci kapitalizma u Hrvatskoj ekonomici i politici* (The Beginnings of Capitalism in the Economy and Politics of Croatia), Zagreb: 1952; Slavko Gavrilović, "Virovitička županija u revoluciji 1848–49" (Verőce County during the 1848–49 Revolution), HZ, 1961; Slavko Gavrilović, "Agrarno-socijalna zbivanja u Požeškoj županiji, 1848–1849" (Agrarian-social Clashes in Pozsega County, 1848–1849), in *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu* (Annual of the Philosophical Faculty of Újvidék), V, Hobu lag: 1960; Slavko Gavrilović, "Agrarni nemiri u Križevačkoj i Varaždinskoj županiji, 1848–1850" (Agrarian Unrest in Körös and Varasd Counties, 1848–1850), HZ, 1960; and Jaroslav Šidak, "The Peasant Question in Croatian Politics of 1848", in *Acta Iugoslaviae Historica* I, Beograd: 1970.

The *ban*'s statement of April 25, 1848 is published in German translation by Stephan [Stevan] Pejaković (ed.), *Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des kroatisch-slavonischen Landtages und der nationalen Bewegung vom Jahre 1848*, Wien: 1861, p. 4. An account of what had happened at Pribel is given by Spira, "Ján Rotarides' unvergleichliche Begegnung", *loc. cit.* Hurban's Brezova move is described by Steier, *A tót nemzetiségi kérdés*, I, pp. 35–37. For Bărnuț's Balázsfalva address of April 30, 1848, see Papiu Ilarianu, *Istori'a*, II, p. 145. Persuasive evidence demonstrating that the nationality movements failed to win over the majority of the non-Magyar peasants living in Hungary proper and therefore benefiting from the emancipation of the serfs is provided by László Szita, "A Délkelet-Dunántúl nemzetiségi struktúrája 1848–1868 között" (The Nationality Structure of South-east Transdanubia between 1848 and 1868), in *A Dunántúl településtörténete* (The History of Settlement in Transdanubia), III, Székesfehérvár: 1978. The conditions obtaining amongst peasants who lived in the privileged districts of Southern Hungary are described by István Péter Varsányi, "Nagykikinda és környéke 1848 tavaszán" (Nagykikinda and its Environs in Spring 1848), *Századok*, 1982. The situation of the border guards is dealt with by Душан М. Берић, *Славонска војна граница у револуцији 1848–1849* (The Slavonian Border-guard Region during the 1848–1849 Revolution), Загреб—Сарајево: 1984; and Lazar Rakić, "Šajkaški bataljon 1848–1849. godine" (The Boatman Battalion in 1848–1849), in *Vojna krajina* (Military Border), ed. by Dragutin Pavličević, Zagreb: 1984. For the minutes of the Cabinet meeting of May 30, 1848, see KLÖM, XII, pp. 206–207. The source of what was said concerning the Serb border guards' hopes concerning the establishment of a Voivodate is

Игњатовић, p. 157. The text of the provisional Austrian Constitution was also published by Bariš, among others: FMIL, May 3 [15], 1848, No. 18, pp. 137–140.

The Liptószentmiklós Slovak petition of May is published in reproduction by Rózsa and Spira, Nos. 277–278. Hodža's contribution to the debate on the peasant issue at Liptószentmiklós is recorded in the testimony of Peter Vozárik, dated Liptószentmiklós, June 8–9, 1848, published by Rapant, *Slovenské povstanie*, I/2, p. 321. Jellačić's introductory proclamation, the electoral regulations drawn up for Croatia in May, and the address to the sovereign of the *ban*'s conference of May 11, 1848 are published by Pejaković, pp. 1–3, 9–13, and 14–18. Rajačić's Karlóca speech of May 13, 1848 and the resolutions of the May Karlóca rally are published by Thim, II, pp. 198–200 and 206–209. For statistics on the distribution according to nationality of the population of the area the Serbs wished to mark out for the Voivodate, see Mihály Horváth, *Magyarország függetlenségi harcának története 1848 és 1849-ben* (The History of Hungary's Independence Struggle in 1848 and 1849), I, Pest: 1871, p. 157. A detailed account of what happened at Balázsfalva is given by Cheresteșiu, *Adunarea națională*. Bărnut's Balázsfalva speech of May 14, 1848 (*Românii și Ungurii*) is also given by Gelu Neamțu (*loc. cit.*, pp. 36–38, 48). By arbitrarily removing a few sentences, Neamțu creates the impression that the speech did not express the intention of dissociating from the Hungarian revolutionary movement at all, but, on the contrary, expressed an intention to co-operate with it. Bălcescu's notes concerning Laurian's mission, Bărnut's speech of May 15, and the text of the oath the latter was compelled to take are published by Cheresteșiu, *Adunarea națională*, pp. 411–412, 443–444, and 444–445. For the resolution of the Balázsfalva rally, see the minutes of it, published by Papiu Ilarianu, *Istori'a*, II, pp. 294–298. The proclamation which concluded the rally and the counter-statement issued in response to the call of the youth of Nagyvárad are cited by Cheresteșiu, *Adunarea națională*, pp. 482 and 521.

The royal rescript sent to Jellačić from Innsbruck on May 29, 1848—prohibiting the convocation of the Croat *sabor*—is published by Pejaković, pp. 21–22. For the royal rescript containing the *propositiones* of the Transylvanian Diet—sent to the Transylvanian Estates from Vienna on May 5 1848—see László Kővári (ed.), *Okmánytár az 1848–9-ki erdélyi eseményekhez* (Documents Pertaining to Events in Transylvania in 1848–9), Kolozsvár: 1861, pp. 7–9. Insight into the Mihálcfalva

events is given by a contemporary bulletin published in reprint form by Rózsa and Spira, Nos 286–288. Eötvös's rescript addressed to Rajačić on June 3, 1848 concerning the invalidation of the Karlóca resolutions, as well as Palatine Stephen's decree of August 2, 1848 providing for Rajačić's suspension, are published by Thim, II, pp. 328–329, and pp. 589–590. A comprehensive picture of the work of the government commissioners sent to Southern Hungary and the Drave area is given by Szócs. In addition, a more detailed account of the activity of the most important among them can be found in the memoir literature, including *Vukovics Sebő emlékiratai Magyarországon való bujdosása és száműzetésének idejéből* (The Memoirs of Sebő Vukovics Concerning the Time of His Hiding in Hungary and His Banishment), ed. by Ferencz Bessenyei, Budapest: 1894; see also a study by István Barta, "Kossuth és Csányi" (Kossuth and Csányi), *Századok*, 1952; and Аладар Урбан, "Баћањева влада, српски национални покрет и јужноугарски владини повереници лета 1848" (The Batthyány Government, the Serb National Movement, and the Government Commissioners of Southern Hungary in Summer 1848), in *Србу и Мађару*. A comprehensive picture of the early organizing of the armed force destined to defend the Revolution is dealt with by Aladár Urbán, *A nemzetőrség és honvédség szervezése 1848 nyarán* (The Organizing of the National Guard and the Honvéd Army in Summer 1848), Budapest: 1973.

The early May petition of the Breznóbánya Slovaks is published by Rapant, *Slovenské povstanie*, I/2, p. 185. The Breznóbánya Slovaks' backing of the Hungarian Revolution is pointed out by György Spira, "A szlovákok és a negyvennyolcas forradalom" (The Slovaks and the 1848 Revolution), in György Spira, *A negyvennyolcas nemzedék nyomában* (On the Trail of the 1848 Generation), Budapest: 1973. Documents on the Lugos rally are published by Thim, II, p. 471, pp. 490–491; and István Péter Varsányi, "Adalékok az 1848-as délvidéki harcokhoz: Csernovics Péter—Vukovics Sebő—Kiss Ernő ismeretlen levelei" (Data on the Fighting in Southern Hungary in 1848: the Hitherto-unknown letters of Péter Csernovics, Sebő Vukovics, and Ernő Kiss), *Századok*, 1977, p. 741. For the government's stance on the resolutions of the rally, see Kossuth's (already cited) address of August 26, 1848 in the House of Deputies, KLÖM, XII, pp. 801–804. Further data on the narrow-mindedness of the Batthyány government towards the minorities is furnished by Ödön Both, *Szemere Bertalan belügyminiszter nemzetiségi politikája 1848 nyarán* (The Nationalities Policy of Minister of

the Interior Bertalan Szemere in Summer 1848), Szeged: 1958; Wacław Felczak, "Slowianie węgierscy wobec sprawy rewolucji i kontrrewolucji w 1848 roku" (Hungary's Slavs and the Revolution and Counter-revolution of 1848), *Przegląd Historyczny*, 1963; and Victor Chereșteșiu, "Bestrebungen zur revolutionären Einheit der Völker Siebenbürgens während der Jahre 1848–49", FVLK, 1970.

A concise account of the Transylvanian Diet of 1848 is given by László Kővári, *Erdély története 1848–49-ben* (The History of Transylvania in 1848–49), Pest: 1861. For the most important documents of the Diet, see *Erdély nagyfejedelemség 1848 május 30-ára hirdetett s július 18-án bezárt országgyűlésének jegyző- és irománycönyve* (The Minutes and Papers of the Diet of the Grand Principality of Transylvania Convoked for May 30 1848 and Closed on July 18), Kolozsvár: 1861. The text of the legislation enacted by the Diet is published in the Hungarian original by Kővári, *Okmánytár*; and in German translation in *Siebenbürgische Landtags-Artikel vom 7. 1848*, ed. by Friedrich Schuler, Hermannstadt: 1861. The quotation is from the introduction to the Transylvanian Act I of 1848. The statements of the Estates in relation to the Rumanian national demands is discussed in detail, but without sufficient emphasis on the fact that they were bound to aggravate the situation further, by Ambrus Miskolczy, "Társadalmi és nemzeti kérdés az utolsó erdélyi rendi országgyűlésen" (The Social and Nationality Question at the Last Transylvanian Feudal Diet), *Századok*, 1979. The number of new voters in Transylvania is given in a duplicated report compiled in 1861: *1848 beli állapot szerénti számítás hány szózatot nyertek a választási törvény után a haza új polgárai* (A Calculation of How Many Votes Were Won by the New Citizens of the Country Through the Electoral Law of 1848), a copy of which is in the author's possession. That the number of new voters was, at best, only half that of the old ones is clear from Ambrus Miskolczy's data (Miskolczy, "Társadalmi és nemzeti kérdés", *loc. cit.*, pp. 864–865). For a report on the June meeting of Iancu and Vasvári, see Iosifu Sterca Siulutiu, "O lacrima ferbinte" (A hot tear), *Transylvani'a*, 1877. That some radical papers (which for the most part showed a total lack of understanding of the nationalities issue) did actually grasp its intricacies is pointed out by Márta S. Lengyel, *Egy tévelygő Habsburg-alattvaló a 19. század derekán* (A Roving Habsburg Subject in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century), Budapest: 1985. For the supposed conspiracies which led to the sharpening of the nationalities issue, see Mihál Táncsics, *Hunnia függetlensége* (Hungary's Independence), Buda: 1848, pp. x–xi.

The most important source publication documenting the debates of the Prague Slav congress is *Slovanský sjezd v Praze roku 1848: Sbíрка dokumentů* (The 1848 Slav Congress in Prague: A Collection of Documents), ed. by Václav Žáček, Praha: 1958. The latest monograph on the history of the congress is Lawrence D. Orton, *The Prague Slav Congress of 1848*, Boulder: 1978. The best summary of the events in Bohemia in 1848: Arnošt Klíma, *Revoluce 1848 v českých zemích* (The 1848 Revolution in the Czech Lands), Praha: 1974. The pro-Hungarian and anti-Habsburg attitudes at the Prague congress (and subsequently) are surveyed by Endre Arató, *Egykorú demokratikus nézetek az 1848–1849. évi magyarországi forradalomról és ellenforradalomról: Az 1848–1849. évi szlovák nemzeti mozgalom értékeléséről folytatott vitához* (Contemporary Democratic Views on the Hungarian Revolution and Counter-revolution of 1848–1849: The Debate on the Evaluation of the Slovak National Movement in 1848–1849), Budapest: 1971. Bakunin's views are presented by Václav Čejchan, "Bakunin und Štúr", in *Ludovít Štúr und die slawische Wechelseitigkeit*, ed. by Ludovít Holotík, Bratislava–Wien–Köln–Graz: n. d. [1969]; and Miklós Kun, "M. A. Бакунин и венгерское национально-освободительное движение, 1847–1864", *SS*, 1973. Light is shed on Slovene aspirations by Josip Apih, *Die Slovenen und das Jarh 1848*, Wien: 1896. The Slovak–Czech relationship is discussed by Jan Novotný, "Příspěvek k vzájemným vztahům Čechů a Slováků v první etapě revoluce roku 1848" (Data towards Czech–Slovak Relations in the Early Stages of the 1848 Revolution), *HČ*, 1963. For Štúr and Hurban's already-cited Prague address, see the minutes of the June 7, 1848 plenary session of the congress, *Slovanský sjezd*, pp. 317–318. The Bohemian policy of the Austrian ruling circles is analysed by Friedrich Prinz, *Prag und Wien, 1848: Probleme der nationalen und sozialen Revolution im Spiegel der Wiener Ministerratsprotokolle*, München: 1968. The Hungarian response to the Prague developments is described with the help of abundant source material by Arató, "Die Wirkung des Nationalismus", *loc. cit.* Hodža's willingness to reach an agreement, which was still discernable in July, is demonstrated by Steier, *A tót nemzetiségi kérdés*, I, p. 182.

A comprehensive picture of the summer developments in Croatia is given by [Rudolf Horvat], *Hrvatski pokret u ljetu godine 1848* (The Croatian Movement in the Summer of 1848), Zagreb: 1899. The Croat–Hungarian relationship at this time is discussed by Jaroslav Šidak, "Hrvatsko–mađarski odnosi u ljeto i ranu jesen 1848" (Croat–Hungarian Relations in the Summer and Early Autumn of 1848), in Šidak,

Studije, 1979. The most important documents of the Croat *sabor* of 1848 are published in the original Croat in *Zapisnik sabora trojedne kraljevine Dalmatinske, Hrvatske i Slavonske 5. i sledećih meseca lipnja i srpnja danah godine 1848 dëržanog* (The Minutes of the Diet of the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia Held on July 5, 1848 and, Later on, in August), Zagreb: 1848. For the German translation, see Pejaković. A report on the June 21 session of the *sabor* was published by *Kossuth Hirlapja*, July 5, 1848, No. 4., pp. 15–16. (Hence the quotation also.) A similar report on the session appeared in the Lucca *La Riforma* entitled “Quistione Magiario–Croata” (July 29, 1848, No. 236, p. 452). It is possible, however, that the writer of this article drew upon *Kossuth Hirlapja*. Jellačić’s testimony is contained in his statement dated Zagreb, August 6, 1848 and is published by Pejaković, p. 124. The border guards’ ownership rights were regulated by article 6. of the *sabor*’s Act XXVI. The already-quoted conditions of “the reconciliation with Hungary” were circumscribed by article 2. of Act XX of the *sabor*. The ethnic composition of the population of the *Szerémség* (Szerém county and the Pétervárad Military Border) can be derived from 1846 figures on the population’s religious distribution (Fényes, *Magyarország letrása*, II, pp. 452–453, 491). Figures pertaining to military preparations in Croatia are furnished by Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Jelačić, the Croatian Military Border, and the Intervention against Hungary in 1848”, *AHY*, 1965; and Ferdinand Hauptmann, *Jelačić’s Kriegszug nach Ungarn, 1848*, I–II, Graz: 1975. The cited statements of the Karlóca chief *odbor* calling for an uprising are from its proclamation of May 10/22, 1848 addressed to the Catholic Slavs of Southern Hungary, and from its proclamation of May 29/June 10, 1848 addressed to the Serb border guard companies. The text of these is published by Thim, II, pp. 271 and 371.

The history of the Wallachian revolution and of the Moldavian revolutionary movements is presented by Н.В. Березняков, *Революционное и национально-освободительное движение в Дунайских княжествах в 1848–1849 гг.*, Кишинев: 1955; Gheorghe Georgescu-Buzău, *La révolution de 1848 dans les pays roumains*, Bucarest: 1965; and Dan Berindei, *L’an 1848 dans les pays roumains*, Bucarest: 1984. The attempts by the Rumanians of Wallachia to establish contact with the Hungarian Revolution are finely documented by Zoltán I. Tóth, “A magyar–román szövetség kérdése 1848-ban” (The Question of a Hungarian–Rumanian Alliance in 1848), *Századok*, 1948. The policy of the Principality of Serbia in relation to the Serb uprising in Hungary is discussed by

Јов[ан] Ристић, *Србија и Српски покрет у Угарској, 1848 до 1849* (Serbia and Serb Movement in Hungary, 1848–1849), Београд: 1884; Драгољуб Павловић, *Србија и српски покрет у Јужној Угарској, 1848 и 1849* (Serbia and Serb Movement in Southern Hungary), Београд: 1904; and Славно Гавриловић, “Илија Гарашанин и Мађари револуционарне 1848/49. године” (Ilija Garašanin and the Hungarians of the Revolutionary Year 1848/49), in *Илија Гарашанин, 1812–1874*, Београд: 1991. For Bakunin’s warning see, М. А. Бакунин, *Исповедь*, ed. by Э. Л. Гуревич, Москва: 1921, pp. 79–80. Miloš Obrenović’s warning is quoted by Thim, I, p. 141. The debates between members of the Batthyány government on the nationalities issue are presented by György Spira, *A Hungarian Count in the Revolution of 1848*, Budapest: 1974. The tragedy of the conflict between revolutionary and national aspirations is analysed, within a broad European context, by Hans Bach, “Die nationale Frage in der europäischen Revolution von 1848/49”, in *Rolle und Formen der Volksbewegung im bürgerlichen Revolutionszyklus*, Berlin: 1976.

Besides the aforementioned syntheses, the developments of the second half of 1848 are also dealt with by Karol Golán, *Za svobodu: Slovenské povstanie, 1848–1849* (For Freedom: The Slovak Uprising of 1848–1849), Praha: 1932; Jozef Butvin, “Slovenské povstanie v rokoch 1848–49” (The Slovak Uprising of 1848–49), in *Nehaňte ľud môj* (Don’t Mock my People), Bratislava: 1968; Dušan Škvarna, “Priebeh a výsledki septembrového ozbrojeného povstania roku 1848” (The Course and Consequences of the Armed Uprising of September 1848), HČ, 1989; František Bokes, “Slovenská národná rada z rokov 1848–1849” (The Slovak National Council of 1848–1849), HČ, 1965; Jan Novotný, “Češi a Slováci v národne politických bojích od Slovanského sjezdu do porážky revoluce 1848–1849” (Czechs and Slovaks in the National Political Struggles from the Slav Congress to the Defeat of the 1848–1849 Revolution), HČ, 1968; Ioan Chiorean, “Din activitatea Comitetului național român de la Sibiu în timpul revoluției de la 1848–1849” (On the Activity of the Nagyszeben Rumanian National Committee at the Time of the 1848–1849 Revolution), in *Studii și cercetari de științe sociale*; [Rudolf Horvat], *Hrvatski pokret u jeseni godine 1848* (The Croat Movement in the Autumn of 1848), Zagreb: 1898; [Rudolf Horvat], *Hrvatski pokret u zimi godine 1848* (The Croat Movement in the Winter of 1848), Zagreb: 1899; György Spira, “Eine gegenrevolutionäre Geheimab-sprache im Spätsommer 1848”, *Österreichische Osthefte*, 1987; Ђорђе Бекић (ed.), “Архив главног народног одбора ex 1848–1849” (The Ar-

chives of the National Chief *Odbor* of 1848–1849), *Бранково коло*, 1905; Миховил Томандл, “Војвода Стеван Шунљикац као главнокомандујући српских војних снага у Војводини 1848. године” (Stevan Šupljikas as Commander-in-chief of the Serb Forces in the Voivodina in 1848), *Зборник за друштвене науке*, 27/1960; and Endre Kovács, *Magyar–délsláv megbékélési törekvések 1848/49-ben* (Attempts at Hungarian–South Slav Conciliation in 1848/49), Budapest: 1958.

The fighting in Southern Hungary is described by József Balázs, “A délvidéki hadműveletek 1848 nyarán és őszén” (Operations in Southern Hungary in Summer and Autumn 1848), HK, 1960. The history of the Transdanubian military operations of September and October and of the *levée en masse* there is discussed in detail by János Varga, *Népfelkelő és gerillaharcok Jellasics ellen 1848 őszén* (Franc-tireurs and Guerilla Warfare against Jellačić in Autumn 1848), Budapest: 1953. The military history of the Transylvanian Rumanian uprising is dealt with by Leonida Loghin and Constantin Ucrain, *Aspecte militare ale revoluției din 1848–1849 în Transilvania* (Military Aspects of the 1848–1849 Revolution in Transylvania), București: 1970. Damjanich is presented by Kálmán Nagy, “Damjanich, a forradalmi hadvezér” (Damjanich, the Revolutionary War Leader), HK, 1954. Deák’s draft bill for the settlement of the Croat issue is published by Beér and Csizmadia, pp. 681–683. Light is shed on Kossuth’s earlier ideas on the separation of Croatia by Domokos Kosáry, *Kossuth Lajos a reformkorban* (Lajos Kossuth in the Age of Reform), Budapest: 1946, p. 218. The minutes of the cited government resolution of August 27, 1848 are published by Beér and Csizmadia, p. 683. The circumstances of how the resolution came to be adopted are discussed by György Szabad, “Hungary’s Recognition of Croatia’s Self-determination in 1848 and Its Immediate Antecedents”, in AUREÖSH, XXI, Budapest: 1981. The message delivered to Jellačić on August 26, 1848 is reported in a letter written by the baron to Rajačić two days later. An abridged version of this letter is published by Thim, II, pp. 651–652.

Vay’s Transylvanian activity is discussed in detail by Szöcs. The fate of the draft bill on education is dealt with by Endre Arató, “Az 1848. évi elemi oktatásról szóló törvényjavaslat és a magyar nacionalizmus” (Hungarian Nationalism and the 1848 Draft Bill on Elementary Education), *Pedagógiai Szemle*, 1965; Johann Weber, *Eötvös und die ungarische Nationalitätenfrage*, München: 1966; and László Felkai, *Eötvös József közoktatásügyi tevékenysége* (József Eötvös’s Activity in Education), Budapest: 1979. The original text of the proposals, as well as that of

the cited modified version (it was modified by the House of Deputies) is published by Beér and Csizmadia, pp. 613–620. For the minutes containing the House of Deputies' September 4, 1848 decision, as well as for the cited text of the draft resolution formulated in the wake of the decision pertaining to the Croatia matter, see *ibid.*, pp. 214 and 683–684. The functioning of the union committee is presented by Sándor Márki, "Az erdélyi unió-bizottság" (The Transylvanian Union Committee), *Budapesti Szemle*, 1898; the texts of the bills it drafted are published by Beér and Csizmadia, pp. 576–591. (For the text of the bill on "the Guaranteeing of the Civil Rights of the Rumanian Nation on the Basis of Equality", see pp. 583–585.)

The (undated) introductory proclamation of the Slovak National Council, issued in the middle of September, is published by Steier, *A tót nemzetiségi kérdés*, II, pp. 88–91. For a German translation of the publication, see Karol Rebro, *Der Weg der Slowaken zur nationalen Souveränität*, Bratislava: 1969, pp. 83–86. That the liberation of the serfs made the Slovak masses "the greatest friends" of the Hungarians had already been pointed out by the Naples *La Stampa*, May 14, 1849, No. 22. The linguistic demands of those Slovaks who were loyal to the Revolution were revealed in the October 4, 1848 report addressed from Pozsony to the Hungarian government (this report was received by Kossuth as the Hungarian government had already stood down) by Sámuel Ferenc Stromszky, the Danube region Lutheran superintendent, as well as in the petition of four Rozsnyó citizens which they addressed to Kossuth on October 14, 1848; for both, see Steier, *A tót nemzetiségi kérdés*, II, pp. 118–122 and 159–162. The September 11, 1848 petition of the Rumanian border guards of Orlát and the Naszód's September 7, 1848 resolutions are published (dated September 13–14) by Popea, I, pp. 167–174. The deficiencies of the Serf emancipation in Transylvania are surveyed by Ákos Egyed, "A jobbágyfelszabadítás az 1848-as kolozsvári országgyűlésen" (The Liberation of the Serfs at the 1848 Kolozsvár Diet), in *1848: Arcok, eszmék, tettek*; and Ákos Egyed, "A jobbágyrendszer megszüntetése 1848-ban Erdélyben" (The Abolition of the Serf System in Transylvania in 1848), in Ákos Egyed, *Falu, város, civilizáció: Tanulmányok a jobbágyfelszabadítás és a kapitalizmus történetéből Erdélyben, 1848–1914* (Village, Town, Civilization: Studies in the History of the Liberation of the Serfs and Capitalism in Transylvania, 1848–1914), Bukarest: 1981. The cited petition of the second Balázsfalva national assembly is published by Popea, I, pp. 174–176. The statements expressing the opinion of the Rumanians of Wallachia

—which originated from Petre Teulescu and Ion Eliade-Rădulescu—are cited by Zoltán I. Tóth, *Bălcescu Miklós élete, 1819–1852* (The Life of Nicholas Bălcescu, 1819–1852), Budapest: 1958, pp. 114 and 117. The anonymous petition addressed to Batthyány from Balázsfalva on September 16, 1848 is kept at OL RL AR Lad. XX22. Fasc. 2A. No. 485. For the House of Deputies' September 26, 1848 resolution pertaining to it, see the minutes of the House of Deputies's session of that day—published by Beér and Csizmadia, p. 253. The October 10 and October 17 statements of the Transylvanian General Command are presented by Jancsó, *A román nemzetiségi törekvések*, II, pp. 606 and 610–612. For the promises of land distribution made to the Rumanian peasants, see Lieutenant-General Wohlgemuth's announcement of November 23, 1849, cited below. The Saxon view of the devastation caused by the Rumanian insurrectionists was formulated by Eugen Friedenfels, *Joseph Bedeus von Scharberg*, II, Wien: 1877, pp. 81–82.

Published on December 12, 1848, the Croat liberals' article is cited by Šurmin, *loc. cit.*, p. 40. Francis Joseph's cited patent—issued on December 15, 1848 in Olmütz—is published in reprint by Rózsa and Spira, No. 551. For the documents of Beöthy's Southern Hungary peace attempt, see KLÖM, XIII, ed. by István Barta, Budapest: 1952, pp. 352–353, 433–434, and 439–442; and Thim, III, pp. 207–208 and 211–215. The Serbs who fought in the *honvéd* army are discussed by Габор Бона, “Српски војници у хонведској војсци 1848/49” (Serb Soldiers in the *Honvéd* Army in 1848–49), in *Срби и мађари*; the stance of the workers of the Upper Hungarian mining towns is depicted by György Spira, “Szlovák bányászok az 1848–49-i magyar szabadságharcban” (Slovak Miners in the 1848–49 Hungarian War of Independence), in *Magyar Történész Kongresszus, 1953 június 6–13* (A Congress of Hungarian Historians, June 6–13 1953), Budapest: 1954; for an account of the fighting spirit of the workers of Resica, see MT, December 23, 1848, No. 242, p. 973.

The text of the bills drafted by the Croat *ban*'s council by January 1849 is published in German translation by Pejaković, pp. 153–184. The Ruthenian petition addressed to Francis Joseph in January is presented by Мельникова, *loc. cit.*, p. 272. Şaguna himself published his petition of February 25, 1849: *Petition der romanischen Nation aus dem österreichischen Staate, welche Seiner Majestät Kaiser Franz Josef I. am 25. Februar 1849 überreicht wurde*, n. p. and n. d. [Olmütz: 1849). The Serb address to the sovereign dated Karlóca, January 1/13, 1849 is published by Thim, III, pp. 307–309. Literature on the organizing of the district *odbors* is surveyed by Лазар Ракић, “Наша историографија о окружним одбори-

ма у Војводини, 1848–1849” (Our Historiography Concerning the District *Odbors* in the Voivodina in 1848–1849), in *Срби у Мађару*. The Slovak leaders’ attempts are dealt with by Jan Novotný, “Zu den Beziehungen der slawischen Politiker zur Wiener Regierung während der Revolution 1848–1849”, in *Ludovít Štúr und die slawische Wechselseitigkeit*. For Francisci’s part, see his own recollections: Ján Francisci, *Vlastný životopis* (An Autobiography), Turčianský Sv. Martin: 1909. The octroied constitution was published in the *Sammlung der für Ungarn erlassenen allerhöchsten Manifeste und Proklamationen, dann der Kundmachungen der Oberbefehlshaber der kaiserlichen Armee in Ungarn*, Ofen: 1849–1850, pp. 52–71. An English translation of the text of the “constitution” can be found in *Correspondence*, pp. 152–160. The quotations are from articles 1 and 84 of the “constitution”.

For Kušljan’s cited opinion, see his letter addressed to his parents from Zagreb on March, 10, 1849, Nacionalna i sveučilišna biblioteka (National and University Library), Zagreb, Zbirka rukopisa (Manuscript Collection) R 5867: Korespondencija Dr. Kušlana (The Correspondence of Dr Kuslan). The aforementioned article from *Slavenski jug*, (published on August 23, 1849) is published in abridged form by Bogdanov, *Hrvatska ljevica*, pp. 259–260. The statements of Croats who desired the victory of the *honvéd* army were recorded by Kulmer in a letter addressed to Jellačić from Vienna on April 4, 1849, published by Krešimir Nemeth (ed.), “Nekoliko neobjavljenih pisama iz korespondencije Kulmer–Jelačić, 19. III.–5. V. 1849” (Some Unpublished Letters from the Kulmer–Jellačić Correspondence, March 19–May 5, 1849), *Arhivski vjesnik*, 1958, p. 345. Excerpts from the Serb press are cited by Thim, I, pp. 345–346. For the cited assertions of *Agramerica*, see *Agramer Zeitung*, March 29, 1849, No. 38, p. 159. That the octroied constitution was not received any more favourably in the Croat Military Border was also underlined by the *Südslawische Zeitung*, April 2, 1849, No. 39., p. 153, which was also published in Zagreb. Also, it should be noted here that the disappointment and indignation caused by the octroied constitution amongst the Croats and Serbs was extensively discussed by a whole host of contemporary Italian newspapers, which, understandably, showed great interest in the relationship between the Hungarians and the South Slavs: e. g. Palermo’s *La Democrazia*, March 13 [1849], No. 4; Naples’ *L’Indipendente*, March 16, 1849, No. 72, p. 298; Venice’s *Il Precursore*, March 18, 1849, No. 20, p. 317; Florence’s *La Costituente Italiana*, March 21, 1849, No. 81; Turin’s *Il Risorgimento*, March 28, 1849, No. 387; Venice’s *La Fratellanza de’ Popoli*

April 8, 1849, No. 3, p. 24; Rome's *L'Italia del Popolo*, April 24, 1849, No. 9, p. 36; Florence's *Rivista Indipendente*, May 18, 1849, No. 64, p. 4; Venice's *Il Popolo Italiano*, July 22, 1849, No. 12, p. 101; Florence's *Il Nazionale* August 17, 1849, No. 169, p. 654, etc. The Slovak petition handed to Francis Joseph on March 20, 1849 (dated Olmütz the previous day) is published by Steier, *A tót nemzetiségi kérdés*, II, pp. 335–337; for the Serb petition dated Vienna, April 13/25 (and addressed to the Austrian minister of the interior), see Thim, III, pp. 660–671; for the Croat petition submitted on May 6 (and incidentally also dated Vienna, April 25), as well as Jellačić's press "law", see Pejaković, pp. 195–199 and 210–214.

The conciliation attempts are overviewed by Gy[ula] Mérei, "Über die Möglichkeiten eines Zusammenschlusses der in Ungarn lebenden Völker in den Jahren 1848–1849", AH, 1969. Albert Pálfi's ideas on the settlement of the nationalities issue were expounded in two articles: MT, March 6, 1849, No. 18, pp. 69–70, and MT, March 10, 1849, No. 22, pp. 85–86, both are published in abridged form by György Spira, *A nemzetiségi kérdés a negyvennyolcas forradalom Magyarországon* (The Nationality Question in the Hungary of the 1848–49 Revolution), Budapest: 1980, pp. 197–200. For Vasvári's cited article entitled "A lázongó oláhok" (The Rebellious Vlachs), see *Esti Lapok*, April 23, 1849, No. 51; for Újházi's open letter taking issue with Pálfi, see *Debreczeni Lapok*, March 10, 1849, No. 6, p. 22. A more detailed account of Perczel's peace attempt is given by György Spira, "Perczel próbálkozása a délvidéki szerbek megbékítésére 1849 tavaszán" (Perczel's Attempt to Conciliate the Serbs of Southern Hungary in Spring 1849), in György Spira, *Jöttányit se a negyvennyolcból!*, Budapest: 1989; and György Spira, "Покушаји генерала Перцела у пролеће 1849. да се умире Срби у Угарској", *Зборник за историју*, 21/1980. Milorad Ekmečić describes Garašanin's policy in "Garašanin, Czartoryski köre és a magyarok 1848–1849-ben", (Garašanin, the Czartoryski Circle, and the Hungarians in 1848–1849), in *Szerbek és magyarok*, II.

The most important publications dealing with László Teleki's activities are: *Teleki László Válogatott Munkái* (The Selected Works of László Teleki), ed. and intr. by Gábor G. Kemény, I–II, Budapest: 1961; Tamás Lengyel, *Gróf Teleki László* (Count László Teleki), Budapest: 1942; Zoltán Horváth, *Teleki László, 1810–1861* (László Teleki, 1810–1861), I–II, Budapest: 1964; and Eszter Waldapfel, *A független magyar külpolitika, 1848–1849* (Independent Hungarian Foreign Policy,

1848–1849), Budapest: 1962. Teleki's early calls for the establishment of a revolutionary army are discussed by György Spira, "A pesti forradalom baloldalának harca a kormánnyal meg a polgársággal 1848 májusában" (The Struggle of the Leftists of the Pest Revolution with the Government and the Bourgeoisie in May 1848), TSz, 1971. Teleki expounded his opinion on the separation of Croatia at the July 22, 1848 session of the House of Deputies; for his address, see the diary of the session, *Közlöny*, July 25, 1848, No. 46, p. 210. His Paris connections and experiences are also discussed by Péter Hanák, *Угнетенные народы Австрийской империи и венгерская революция, 1848–1849 гг.*, Budapest: 1953. For his letter addressed to Kossuth from Paris on March 7, 1849, see: *Teleki László Válogatott Munkái*, II, p. 19; for the letter of May 14: OL Gy KGY II. V. 1. b. 371. Part of the letter is published in reprint by Rózsa and Spira, No. 753. Teleki expounded his position concerning the Slovaks at a discussion held at Czartoryski's on May 18, 1849; in connection with this, see the memorandum of the discussion, published by Zoltán Horváth, II, pp. 177–179. Teleki's federalist ideas are discussed by Lajos Pásztor, *La Confederazione Danubiana nel pensiero degli italiani ed ungheresi nel Risorgimento*, Roma: 1949; György Spira's address at the *XII^e Congrès International des Sciences Historiques*, Vienne, 29 août–5 septembre 1965, V, Horn–Wien: n. d. [1968], pp. 137–140; and Gy[örgy] Spira, "Auf der Suche nach dem besseren Verstehen des ungarischen Achtundvierzig", AH, 1967.

The nationality policy of Hungarian government circles in the spring and summer of 1849 is analysed by Zoltán I. Tóth, "A Szemere-kormány nemzetiségi politikája" (The Szemere Government's Nationality Policy), in *A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Társadalmi–Történeti Tudományok Osztályának Közleményei* (Publications of the Department of Social and Historical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), II, Budapest: 1952. The view that the struggle would become meaningless if the minorities were granted greater concessions appears in an instruction Szemere issued to Beöthy on November 13, 1848 (KLÖM, XIII, p. 441). According to György Szabad, conciliation between the Hungarians and the minorities was not so much hindered by the persistence of this view even in spring 1849 as by the fact that "the majority of the nationality politicians were still under the influence of the promises of the imperial octroied constitution which ordered the division of Hungary into provinces" (Szabad, *Kossuth*, p. 163). This assertion, however, does not—as we have seen—tally with the facts. For the cited and presented resolution of the Cabinet meetings of May 19

and of June 6, 1849, see: KLÖM, XV, ed. by István Barta, Budapest: 1955, pp. 348–349 and 475–476. (In the excerpts cited from the former the italics are mine—Gy. S.) Kázmér Batthyány's circular of June 10, 1849 and the report—dated Pancsova, June 11, 1849—compiled by Andrassy on his Belgrade negotiations for Kázmér Batthyány is published by Thim, III, pp. 783–786 and 787–791. For Szemere's draft resolution, submitted to the Cabinet meeting of June 14, 1849, and his resolution bearing witness to the government's acceptance of the proposal, see: KLÖM, XV, pp. 518–521.

Besides the works already mentioned, the Hungarian–Rumanian negotiations of spring 1849 are also dealt with by John C. Campbell, "The Transylvanian Question in 1849", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, II (1942–1943); Silviu Dragomir, *Tratatulele româno-maghiare din vara anului 1849: Interventia lui Simonffy* (Rumanian–Hungarian Negotiations in the Spring of 1849: Simonffy's Intervention) Cluj–Kolozsvár: 1947; Steliana Piksová, "Buržoáznodemokratická revolúcia v rokoch 1848–1849 a problémy rumunsko-maďarskej spolupráce" (The 1848–1849 Bourgeois Democratic Revolution and Rumanian–Hungarian Co-operation), HČ, 1968; Ambrus Miskolczy, "Rumanian–Hungarian Attempts at Reconciliation in the Spring of 1849 in Transylvania: Ioan Drăgoș' Mission" in AUREÖSH, XXI, Budapest: 1981; and György Spira, "Ioan Drăgoș qui se fait de nouveau entendre de l'autre bord", in *Forschungen über Siebenbürgen und seine Nachbarn: Festschrift für Attila T. Szabó und Zsigmond Jakó*, II, München: 1988. Bem's Transylvanian activities are dealt with by Endre Kovács, *Bem a magyar szabadságharcban* (Bem in the Hungarian War of Independence), Budapest: 1979; and Eligiusz Kozłowski, *Generał Józef Bem*, Warszawa: 1958. For Csány's decree issued on April 10, 1849 in Kolozsvár concerning the matter of compensation, see OL Gy '48Ny; his decree, issued on April 23, 1849 in Kolozsvár, against demands for compensation he regarded as excessive is published in reprint by Rózsa and Spira, No. 618. That Drăgoș's negotiations with the Rumanian rebels initially seemed promising is borne out in a report Drăgoș sent to Kossuth from Brád on May 2, 1849 (published by Spira, "Ioan Drăgoș," *loc. cit.*, II, pp. 67–69) and Drăgoș' letter to Iancu from Abrudbánya dated April 25/May 7, 1849 (*ibid.*, II, p. 72). Kossuth outlined his own peace proposals in Debrecen on April 26, 1849 in a statement drafted for Drăgoș (1848–1849. *évi iratok a nemzetiségi megbékélésről*, pp. 165–168). For Kossuth's letter addressed to Drăgoș on May 10, which he rejected the armistice, and for his communication

addressed to the defence ministry on the same day, in which he issued the cited order for the continuation of military operations, see Spira, "Ioan Drăgoș," *loc. cit.*, II, pp. 75–76 and KLÖM XV, pp. 265 and 261–262. Hatvani's pamphlet can be found in the aforementioned *Szózat az oláh faj ügyében*.

Magheru is presented by Apostol Stan and Constantin Vlăduț, *Georghe Magheru*, București: 1969. His cited letter addressed to Kossuth—dated Baden, March 4/16, 1849—is kept at BAR Manuscrise românești (Rumanian Manuscripts), 1060. Magheru's peace initiative is presented and the French original of the letter is published in abridged form by Miron Constantinescu, "Un document de mars 1849 d'une importance européenne", in *Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire*, IV, Bucarest: 1970. The full text of the letter is published in Hungarian translation by Spira, *A nemzetiségi kérdés*, pp. 201–205. Bolliak is presented by Ovidiu Papadima, *Cezar Bolliac*, București: 1966; his Brassó paper is described by S[imion] Retegan, "*Espatriatul*—ziar militant pentru înfrățirea popoarelor" (*Espatriatul*—A Militant Paper for the Brotherhood of Peoples), in *Anuarul Institutului de istorie din Cluj* (Annual of the Institute of History of Kolozsvár), VII, Cluj: 1964. The articles cited by this work were published in the March 25, No 1 and May 28, 1849 No 10 issues of *Espatriatul*.

The most important syntheses devoted to Bălcesu and his 1849 activity in Hungary are—besides Zoltán I. Tóth's already mentioned biographical work—: Gh[eorghe] Georgescu-Buzău, *Nicolae Bălcescu*, București: 1956; Dumitru Almaș, *Bălcescu, democrat-revoluționar* (Bălcescu, Revolutionary Democrat), București: 1962; Dan Berindei, *Nicolae Bălcescu*, Bucarest: 1966; István Imreh, "Bălcescu és Kossuth" (Bălcescu and Kossuth), in *Irodalmi Almanach* (Literary Almanac), III, Kolozsvár: 1952; Edgár Balogh, "Politika és irodalom egybehangzása Nicolae Bălcescu életében" (The Consonance of Politics and Literature in the Life of Nicolae Bălcescu), in *1848: Arcok, eszmék, tettek*; and Dan Berindei, "Die Idee der Völkerunion bei Nicolae Bălcescu", in *Friedenssicherung in Südosteuropa: Föderationsprojekte und Allianzen seit dem Beginn der nationalen Eigenstaatlichkeit*, München: 1985. For the sources of the citations taken from Bălcescu (in order of their appearance), see: Bălcescu's letter to Ion Ghica, Pancsova, May 12, 1849, published by Ion Ghica, *Amintiri din pribegia după 1848: Noue scrisori către V. Alexandri* (Recollections from Post-1848 Exile: New Letters to V. Alexandri), Bucuresci: 1889, p. 264; Bălcescu's speech on the third anniversary of the first

Balázsfalva national assembly—entitled “Mișcarea Românilor din Ardeal la 1848” (The Transylvanian Rumanians’ Movement in 1848)—in N. Bălcescu, *Opere* (Works), ed. and intr. by G. Zane, I/II, București: 1940, p. 128; Bălcescu’s letter to Ghica, Pest, June 6, 1849, published by Ghica, *Amintiri*, pp. 285, 288; *idem* to *idem*, Debrecen, June 3, 1849, *ibid.*, p. 278; *idem* to *idem*, Pest, June 13/25, *ibid.* p. 318; *idem* to *idem*, Pest, June 6, 1849, *ibid.*, p. 286; and *idem* to *idem*, Debrecen, May 17/29, 1849, *ibid.*, p. 274. For the first reply Bălcescu received from Kázmér Batthyány to his propositions, see his letter written to Ghica on June 13/25 (*ibid.*, pp. 316–317).

That the favourable change in Hungarian nationality policy after the Russian intervention was primarily due to the deterioration of the military situation is expounded in depth by György Spira, “Die ungarische Revolution von 1848/49 im Spiegel der Geschichtsschreibung”, *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock, Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe*, 1974. Iancu’s anxieties in relation to the Habsburgs are cited by Jancsó, *A román nemzetiségi törekvések*, II, p. 760. Of his two already mentioned letters—both dated Topánfalva, June 15/27, 1849—Iancu addressed one (from which we have quoted) to Lieutenant-Colonel József Simonffy, a *honvéd* officer, the other to Ioan Gozman, a Rumanian deputy of the Hungarian Parliament elected in Bihar county; both are published by Alesandru Romanu (ed.), “Documente la istoria revoluțiunei ungur. din an. 1848/9: Corespondenție relative la luptele romanilor din Transilvania cu ungurii” (Documents Relating to the History of the 1848–49 Hungarian Revolution: Correspondence Concerning the Struggles of the Rumanians against the Hungarians), *Transilvani’a*, 1877, pp. 54–56 and 64–65. For the draft Hungarian–Rumanian peace treaty, worked out in Szeged on July 14, 1849, and for the text of the agreement reached simultaneously in the matter of the Rumanian legion, see KLÖM, XV, pp. 723–725 and 725–727. For the Iancu letter—dated Topánfalva, August 3, 1849—informing Kossuth of the ceasefire ordered for the insurrectionist Rumanian army, see *1848–1849. évi iratok a nemzetiségi megbékélésről*, p. 210.

The discussion of the minority question at the July 21 and July 28, 1849 open session of the House of Deputies is presented in the relevant sections of the minutes of the two sessions, which are published by Beér and Csizmadia, pp. 453–455 and 468–476. For the resolution adopted on the July 28, see *ibid.*, pp. 868–869. Using a new approach, this resolution is compared with similar statutes in other countries by

Endre Arató, "Az 1849. évi júliusi nemzetiségi törvény és helye Európában" (The Nationality Act of July 1849 and its Place in Europe), *Kortárs*, 1975. Incidentally, the House of Deputies dealt with the nationality question during closed sessions on July 25 and 26. Of the radical deputies, on the first day only those rose to speak who opposed the granting of equality to the minorities. As a result of this, all radicals were branded opponents of equality by Szemere on July 25 in a letter addressed to Kossuth after the debate of that day, and many have used this letter as a source (*1848–1849. évi iratok a nemzetiségi megbékélésről*, pp. 203–205). In point of fact the radicals' views on the nationalities question were at this time just as divided as those of the liberals, as is clearly revealed by the (already cited) minutes which recorded the words of the different radical speakers at the open session of July 28.

The continued resistance of the guerillas of the mining region even after the collapse is dealt with by Spira, "Szlovák bányászok", *loc. cit.*, p. 306. That these guerillas—at least most—were of Slovak nationality is borne out by the Slovak language proclamation calling for their surrender. This was issued on September 15, 1849 by Lewartowski, who had been sent against them, and is published in reprint by Rózsa and Spira, No. 789.

The structure established by the victorious counter-revolution (including its minority policy) is described by Albert Berzeviczy, *Az absolutizmus kora Magyarországon, 1849–1865* (The Era of Absolutism in Hungary, 1849–1865), I, Budapest: 1922; and György Szabad, "Az önkényuralom kora, 1849–1867" (The Era of Despotism, 1849–1867), in *Magyarország története tíz kötetben* (A History of Hungary in Ten Volumes), VI, Budapest: 1979. Data on the rewarding of the leading nationality politicians can also be found in the better-known biographical encyclopædias. For the fact that in areas with non-Hungarian populations the language of county administration was to be the language spoken by the majority of the population, see the announcement issued on July 24, 1849 in Nagyszeben by Colonel Ferenc Dorsner, Transylvania's imperial commissioner, OL Gy '48Ny. The imperial patent—issued on April 7, 1850 in Vienna—which regulated Croatia's affairs and the dissolution of the *sabor* is published by Pejaković, pp. 229–233. For the cited proclamation issued on September 2, 1849 in the name of Lieutenant-General Baron Ludwig von Wohlgemuth, Transylvania's civilian and military governor, which announced the disbanding of the

Transylvanian Rumanian insurrectionist army, see OSzK Kisnyomtatványtár (Small Document Collection). The peasant movements of Nyitra (and Trencsén) county are described by Steier, *A tót nemzetiségi kérdés*, I, pp. 607–610. For the Szatmár county movements, see the threatening notice issued in Rumanian by Bálint Uray, chief imperial commissioner of the Debrecen district, in Debrecen on October 31, 1849, AIFCAR Törzsanyag (Basic Material). The source of the citation on the seizures in Transylvania is Wohlgemuth's notice of September 20, 1849 (AIFCAR The Collection of the former Kolozsvár Museum of Relics, Proclamations), and the assertion that these seizures could be traced back to the earlier promises of land distribution are from his announcement of November 23, 1849; the latter is published in reprint by Rózsa and Spira, No 823.

Rotarides's insanity is mentioned in a petition handed in to the Pest's municipal council by Szilárd Terczy, municipal commissioner of police, on October 5, 1849, Budapest Főváros Levéltára, Pest városának levéltára, Rendőri iratok (Budapest's Municipal Archives, Archives of the Town of Pest, Police Papers) 235. Light is shed on the causes which induced the Habsburgs to accept the measures providing for the emancipation of the serfs by György Spira, "Engels és a magyar negyvennyolc" (Engels and the '48 in Hungary), in Spira, *A negyvennyolcas nemzedék*. The citation of a complaint concerning the persistence of national hatred is from an announcement issued in Nagyszeben on May 25, 1851 by Lieutenant-General Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg, who replaced Wohlgemuth at the head of the Transylvanian administration, OL Gy '48Ny and AIFCAR Nyomtatott oklevelek gyűjteménye (Collection of Printed Documents). The unprecedented nature of the House of Deputies' Szeged resolutions is discussed by Szemere in a circular addressed to the government commissioners on July 29, 1849; it is cited by I. Tóth, "A Szemere-kormány", *loc. cit.*, p. 89. The nationality dimension of the Compromise of 1867 is discussed in depth by György Spira's contribution, in *Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich, 1867*, Bratislava: 1971, pp. 419–421; and Gy[örgy] Spira, *Kossuth and Posterity*, Budapest: 1980.

As regards the map supplement, our point of departure in compiling it has been the detailed description of the linguistic boundaries and language blocs within the Habsburg Empire given by Karl Czœrnig, *Ethnographie der österreichischen Monarchie*, I, Wien: 1857.

Abbreviations

AB	= <i>Armee-Bulletin</i> series
AH	= <i>Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
AHY	= <i>Austrian History Yearbook</i>
AHZ	= Arhiv Hrvatske u Zagrebu (Croatian Archives, Zagreb)
AIFCAR	= Arhiva Istorică a Filialei din Cluj a Academiei Române (History Archives, Branch of the Rumanian Academy), (presently run by the Arhivele Statului din Cluj [State Archives of Kolozsvár])
AR	= Archivum Regni
AUREÖSH	= <i>Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatæ, Sectio Historica</i>
BAR	= Biblioteca Academiei Române (Library of the Rumanian Academy), Bucureşti
FMIL	= <i>Foaie pentru minte, inimă şi literatură</i>
FVLK	= <i>Forschungen zur Volks- und Landeskunde</i>
Gy	= Gyűjtemények (Collections)
GZ	= Grafička zbirka (Collection of Graphic Art)
HČ	= <i>Historický časopis</i>
HK	= <i>Hadtörténelmi Közlemények</i>
HMSStW	= Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien
HtIM	= Hadtörténeti Intézet és Múzeum (Institute and Museum of Military History), Budapest
HZ	= <i>Historijski zbornik</i>
KGy	= Kossuth-gyűjtemény (Kossuth Collection)
KLI	= <i>Kossuth Lajos iratai</i> (The Papers of Lajos Kossuth)
KLÖM	= <i>Kossuth Lajos Összes Munkái</i> (The Collected Works of Lajos Kossuth)
KrA	= Kriegsarchiv, Wien

MAR	= Muzeul de Artă al Republicii România (Fine Arts Museum of the Rumanian Republic), Bucureşti
MNG	= Magyar Nemzeti Galéria (Hungarian National Gallery), Budapest
MT	= <i>Marczius Tizenötödike</i>
'48Ny	= 1848–49-i és emigrációs nyomtatványok (Printed Papers from 1848–49 and from Exile)
OL	= Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives), Budapest
OSzK	= Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (National Széchényi Library), Budapest
ÖStA	= Österreichisches Staatsarchiv
PMH	= Povijesni muzej Hrvatske (Historical Museum of Croatia), Zagreb
RL	= Regnicolaris levéltár (Regnicolar Archives)
SINGBr	= Slovenská národná galéria v Bratislave (Slovak National Gallery, Bratislava)
SINMM	= Slovenské národné múzeum v Martine (Slovak National Museum, Martin)
SS	= <i>Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
TKCs	= A Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum Történelmi Képcsarnoka (The Historical Picture Gallery of the Hungarian National Museum), Budapest
TSz	= <i>Történelmi Szemle</i>

*The scenes**

- Abrudbánya (Auraria Major, Abrud, Großschlatten, *now R.*) 178–179 184
 Alibunár (Alibunar, Alisbrunn, *now Y.*) 118
 Alsópribel (Dolné Příbelce, Unterpribel, *now CS.*) 52 221
 Andrásfalva (Andrašova, *now CS.*) 64
 Arad (Aradinum, *now R.*) 117 190
 Aranyoslóna (Luna, *now R.*) 131
 Árva county 25 40 127
 Austria (Austrian Empire) 32 46 58 66–67 89 99–100 132 137 154–159 162 168 170 172–173
 Bács-Bodrog county 196
 Bácska (Bács county and the Boatman district) 39 70 110–112 163
 Balázsfalva (Blaj, Blasendorf, *now R.*) 19 27 53–54 71–79 75²⁸ 82–83 120 130–136 215 222 229–230
 Baltic provinces 172
 Baranya county 39 70 197
 Belgium 73
 Belgrade (Beograd) 104 142 157 175 186
 Bihar county 28
 Black Sea 170 172
 Boatman district, the 57 221
 Bohemia 81 172 225
 Bosnia 116
 Brassó (Corona, Kronstadt, Braşov, *now R.*) 19 29 31
 Brassó region 137
 Breznóbánya (Brezno, Briesen, *now CS.*) 81 127 223
 Brezova (Brezová, *now Brezová pod Bradlom, CS.*) 26 53 221
 Buccari (Bakar, *now Cr.*) 33
 Bucharest (Bucureşti) 104
 Buda (Ofen, Budim, Budín) 20 24 44 115 151 216
 Budapest – *see Buda and Pest*
 Bukovina 152 163 208
 Bulgaria 172
 Carpathians, the 104 180
 Constantinople (Istanbul) 175
 Croat border-guard region 33 97–98 159 226
 Croatia 14 19 22 31–36 43–44 49 51 55 65–67 93–101 112–115 122–123 138–141 151–152 155–160 163 168 170 172 195–197 207–208 211 220–221 225–227 233 237
 Crna Gora (Montenegro) 69
 Dalmatia 33 93 139 155 197
 Danube, river 172
 Danubian principalities – *see Moldavia and Wallachia*
 Debrecen (Debrecinum, Debreczin) 151 164 166 182
 Debrecen district 238
 Déva (Deva, Dimrich, *now R.*) 163
 Drava, river 80 114⁵⁷ 115 223

* The settlements listed are indicated on the attached map. The superscripts at the page numbers refer to the pictures.

- Eperjes (Fragopolis, Prešov, Preshiv, *now* CS.) 152
- Fehértemplom (Weißkirchen, Biserica Alba, Bela Crkva, *now* Y.) 112⁵⁴ 113⁵⁵
- Fiume (Flumen Sancti Viti, Rijeka, Sankt Veit am Flaumen, *now* Cr.) 33 113 115
- France 170
- Galicja 40 89 152 208
- Garam, river 149
- German Banat border-guard region 17 110
- Gömör and Kishont county 26 127
- Gradiska border-guard region 102⁴⁵
- Great Britain 183
- Gyulafehérvár (Károlyfehérvár, Alba Iulia, Alba Carolina, Bălgrad, Weissenburg, Karlsburg, *now* R.) 163
- Háromszék 151
- Hluboka (Hlboké, *now* CS.) 25
- Hont county 52 57
- Hungarian Littoral 33 95 113 115 139 155 197
- Ireland 183
- Jablunka Pass 129
- Karlóca (Carlovicium, Karlovci, Karlowitz, *now* Sremski Karlovci, Y.) 28 38–39 67–71 69²⁵ 79–80 86 102 110 143 146 151 219 222–223
- Karlovac (Károlyváros, Karlstadt, Cr.) 145
- Kikinda district 55
- Királyföld, the 29–30, 30⁵ 123 136–137 155 164¹⁰⁰ 209–210 217
- Kolozsvár (Claudiopolis, Klausenburg, Cluj, *now* R.) 27 52 82–84 130 222 224 229
- Komárom (Comaromium, Komárno, Komorn, *now* CS.) 154⁹²
- Körös county 221
- Krassó county 196
- Kulpin (*now* Y.) 17
- Lika border-guard region 102⁴⁵
- Liptó county 25–26 40 127 194¹²¹
- Liptószentmiklós (Sanctus Nicolaus, Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, Sankt Nikolaus, *now* Liptovský Mikuláš, CS.) 61–64 81 222
- Lombardy 115
- London 168
- Lower Fehér county 79
- Lugos (Lugoj, *now* R.) 28 81–82 223
- Marosvásárhely (Forum Siculorum, Neumarkt, Oşorhei, *now* Tirgu Mureş, R.) 26–28 52 216
- Mezőség, the 102
- Miava (Myjava, *now* CS.) 26 53 126 216
- Mihálcfalva (Mihalt, *now* R.) 79 101 131 222–223
- Military Border, the (generally) 24 52–53 55–57 68–69 146 155–156 159–160 221
- Moldavia 104 180 183 205 226
- Moravia 152 172
- Morva, river 128
- Mura, river 197
- Muraköz, the 197
- Nagycsűr (Magnum Horreum, Großscheuern, Şura Mare, *now* R.) 190
- Nagyszeben (Cibinium, Hermannstadt, Sibiu, *now* R.) 20 27 30⁵ 77 86 102
- Nagyvárad (Magnovaradinum, Oradea, Großwardein, Veliki Varadin, *now* R.) 29 78 217
- Naszód (Näsäud, Nußdorf, *now* R.) 130 229
- Northern Italy 41 65 70 79 143 (*see also* Lombardy)
- Nyitra county 25 40 53 126 198 238
- Óbecse (Vetus Becse, Stari Bečej, Altbetsche, *now* Becse, Bečej, Y.) 220
- Ogulin border-guard region 70
- Olmütz (Olomouc) 152–159 158⁹⁶ 159⁹⁷
- Orlát (Orlat, Ortenbach, *now* R.) 102 130 229
- Otocsác border-guard region 102⁴⁵
- Ozora 116
- Pancsova (Pančevo, *now* Y.) 17 115 119⁶³ 166
- Pákozd 116
- Paris 11 168–172 233
- Partium 155 214
- Perlasz (Perlez, *now* Y.) 110
- Pest (Pestinum) 11 17 20 24–25 28–29 31–32 44–46 48 56¹⁸ 68 80–83 92 114–115 119–123 122⁶⁶ 126–127 131 133–134 137 151 163 174–176 184–185 189 213 216 218–220 223–224 227–229 233–234 238
- Pest–Pilis–Solt county 219
- Poland 89 172 183 (*see also* Galicia, Prussian Poland and Russian Poland)
- Porto Re (Portus Regius, Kraljevica, *now* Cr.) 33

- Pozsega county 33
 Pozsony (Posonium, Preßburg, Prešporek, *now* Bratislava, CS.) 11–12 14–15 17–18 20 31–33 35–42 36⁹ 44–45 48 51 68 84 98 198¹²⁴ 213 218–219
 Prague (Praha) 88–93 88³⁶ 91³⁸ 124 225
 Preszáka (Presaca, Prebendorf, *now* Ompoly-preszáka, Presaca Ampoiului, R.) 135⁷⁸
 Prussian Poland 89
- Resica (Reșița, *now* R.) 149 230
 Rozsnyó (Rosnavia, Rosenau, Rožňava, *now* CS.) 229
 Roman fortifications 110 164
 Russia 183
 Russian Poland 168
- Sáros county 166
 Selmechánya (Schemnicium, Štiavnica, Schemnitz, *now* Banská Štiavnica, CS.) 148⁹⁰ 191
 Serbia 105 110 153⁹¹ 157 166–168 172 226–227
 Slavonia 33 51 94–95 100 115 117⁶⁰ 122 155 168 197 220–221
 Slavonian border-guard region 33 97–98 159 221
 Southern Hungary 17 24 37–39 41 80 102 105 109–112 110⁵² 116 141–147 153 160 207 218–220 222–223 227–228 230 232
 St. Petersburg 168
 Sub-Carpathia (Upper Hungary, northeastern part) 31 152 208
 Switzerland 73
 Szászdálya (Denndorf, Daia, *now* R.) 20
 Szászváros *sedes* 137
 Szatmár county 198 238
 Szeged (Szegedinum, Szegedin) 163 184–190 196 203 238
 Szentendre (Sanctus Andreas, Sent-Andrej, Sankt Andrä) 68
 Szenttamás (Sent-Tomaš, Sankt Thomas, *now* Srbobran, Y.) 18 111⁵³–112 117 164
 Szepesség, the (Szepes county and the Sixteen Szepes towns) 30–31 217
 Szerém county 33 95 197
 Szerémség, the (Szerém county and the Pétervárad border-guard region) 39 49–50 70 100 104 197 220 226
- Temes county 196
 Temesköz (the “Banat”) 39 70 81–82 110 118 119⁶³ 155 166 190 196–197 209 212
 Temesköz border-guard region 56–67 98 168
 Temesvár (Temesvarinum, Temišvar, Timișoara, *now* R.) 117 190
 Tisza, river 151 166
 Tisza district 55 111
 Titel plateau, the 164 197
 Torda county 131
 Törökkanizsa (Nova Kanjiža, Türkisch-Kanizsa, *now* Novi Kneževac, Y.) 153⁹¹
 Torontál county 196
 Transdanubia 115⁵⁸–117 146–147 151 221 228
 Transylvania 5 12–13 19–20 22 26–30 48–50 52–55 57–58 71–79 82–86 104–105 119–120 123 130–137 151–152 155–156 163 165 176–186 189–190 196¹²³–199 205–206 208–217 220 222 224 226–230 234–238
 Transylvanian *Erzgebirge* 52 101 135^{77–78}
 163 176–179 185–186
 Trencsén county 40 238
 Triune Kingdom (Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia) 33 39 70 95–96 100 115 139 152 159 197 226
 Turkish empire 104
 Túrmező (Turopolje) district 47¹³
 Turóc county 25 40 127
- Újvidék (Neoplanta, Novi Sad, Neusatz, *now* Y.) 17 24–26 37–39 53 68 215–216
 Upper Hungary, northeastern part – *see* Sub-Carpathia
 Upper Hungary, northwestern part 18 40 61–62 64²⁰ 125–130 153–154 159 162–163
- Varasd county 102⁴⁵ 221
 Velence, lake 116
 Verbice (Vrbica, *now* CS.) 25
 Verőce county 33 221
 Vienna (Wien) 25 31 40–41 58 65–66 86–87³⁵ 92 114–116 124–125 132 140⁸³ 158–160 182 193 195 225
 Világos (Șiria, *now* R.) 191

Wallachia 74 104 132-133 163-164¹⁰⁰ 172
 176 179-185 205 226 229-230 235-236

Zagreb (Zágráb, Zagrabia, Agram, *now* Cr.)
 31⁶-34 36 51 53 65-67 80 86 92-101
 93³⁹ 94⁴⁰ 96⁴² 99⁴³ 124 151 168
 217-218 221 226 230-231

Zala county 197

Zalatna (Zlatna, *now* R.) 135⁷⁸

Zaránd county 213

Zimony (Semlinum, Zemun, Semlin, *now* Y.)
 17

Zólyom (Veterosolium, Zvolen, Altsohl, *now*
 CS.) 18

Zombor (Sombor, *now* Y.) 148⁸⁹

Abbreviations

Cr. = Croatia
 CS. = Czecho-Slovakia

R. = Rumania
 Y. = Yugoslavia

*The persons**

-
- Alexander, Prince of Serbia 100
 Andrassy, Gyula, count 175¹⁰⁷–176 186 234
 Apponyi, György, count 127⁷¹
- Bakunin, Mihail Aleksandrovitch 89
 104⁴⁷–106 225 227
 Bălcescu, Nicolae 74 180–186 183¹¹³ 189
 222 230 235–236
 Bariš, George 19² 26 74 77 134 180–181
 194–195 200 210 212 222
 Bărnui, Simion 27⁴–29 41 46 54–55 72–74
 77–78 102 120 134 136 140 176 210
 213 216 222
 Batthyány, Kázmér, count 174¹⁰⁶ 182 184
 234 236
 Batthyány, Lajos, count 15 18–19 56¹⁸
 66–67²² 80 133 215 230
 Bechtold, Fülöp, baron 111–112 117
 Bem, József 163 176–177¹⁰⁸ 234
 Beniczky, Lajos 219
 Beöthy, Ödön 146–147⁸⁸ 167 230
 Bezerédj, István 188 190¹¹⁹
 Blackwell, Joseph Andrew 213
 Bloudek, Bedřich 125
 Bohățel, Alexandru 82–83
 Bolliak, Cezar 180–181¹¹² 185 235
 Butteanu, Ioan 27 52 54¹⁶ 58 77 178–179
 213 216
- Chownitz, Julian 224
 Cipariu, Timotei 19 77 123–124⁶⁷ 134 212
- Cornides, Ludwig 217
 Crnojević, Arsenije 69
 Csány, László 177–178¹⁰⁹ 223 234
 Csernovits, Péter (Čarnojević, Petar) 223
 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, prince 170¹⁰⁴
 232–233
- Damjanich, János (Damjanić, Jovan) 117–118⁶²
 228
 Deák, Ferenc 15 56¹⁸ 106⁵⁰ 112–113³⁶ 122
 228
 Dorsner, Ferenc 237
 Drăgoș, Ioan 28 177–179 184 212
 234–235
- Eliade-Rădulescu, Ion 230
 Eötvös, József, baron 15 56¹⁸ 106 121⁶⁵
 223 228–229
 Erdődy, count, family 53
 Esterházy, count, family 79
 Esterházy, Pál, prince 56¹⁸
- Ferdinand I (V), emperor-king 24 28–29 32
 34 36 58 62 65²¹–66 70 73–74 77 79
 93–94 96 102 115 131 137 139–140
 181 222
 Francis, emperor-king 22
 Francis Joseph, emperor 139⁸²–140 144
 152–159 158⁹⁶ 194 197 230–231 237
 Francisci, Ján 154–155⁹³ 194¹²¹
 Friedenfels, Eugen 230
 Frischeisen, Karl 129

* The superscripts at the page numbers refer to the pictures.

- Gaj, Ljudevit 31-32⁷ 34 93³⁹ 99⁴³-101 158
210-211
- Garašanin, Ilija 166-167 169¹⁰³ 232
- Gooß, Karl 20 29
- Gozman, Ioan 236
- Habsburg-Lorraine, House of 20-23 28-29
33 41 67-70 78-79 87-89 96 100
105-107 112 140-141 154 156-157
164-165 167 169 173 179 182 187
189 193 200-202 204 236
- Hadžić, Jovan 68²⁴
- Hann, Friedrich 20 29
- Hatvani, Imre 178-179¹¹⁰ 184 217 235
- Hodža, Michal Miloslav 25 62¹⁹-64 81 92
124-128 153-154 159⁹⁷ 194 210 212
222
- Hohenzollern, House of 89
- Hurban, Jozef Miloslav 25³-26 41 47
53-55 63-64²⁰ 81 89 91-93 124-129
159⁹⁷ 194 210 212 216 220-221 225
- Iancu, Avram 26 52 54 72 77 84³²-86
101 135⁷⁷ 136⁷⁹ 176-179 184-186 189
195 199¹²⁵-200 203 210 212-213 224
234 236
- Ignjatović, Jakov 68 157⁹⁵ 210-211
221-222
- Irányi, Dániel 188-189¹¹⁷
- Irinýi, József 188¹¹⁶
- Janeček, Bernard 125-128 130 154
- Jellačić, Josip, baron (*later* count) 34-36 51¹⁵
55 65-67 79-81 93³⁹-94⁴⁰ 96⁴²-101
99⁴³ 101⁴⁴ 102⁴⁵ 114⁵⁷-116 123-125
137-140 142 145 147 152 160 193
197 221-222 226 228 232
- Joseph II, emperor 21-22
- Karadorđević, House of 100
- Királyi, Pál 219
- Kiss, Ernő 223
- Klauzál, Gábor 15 56¹⁸
- Kničanin, Stevan 109⁵¹-110 153 167
- Kossuth, Lajos 15 18-19 35-38¹⁰ 40-43
47¹³ 56¹⁸ 80³⁰ 106 113 122 127⁷¹ 146
164 167 169-170 177-178 180 182-186
206 213 215 218-219 223 228
233-238
- Kostić, Aleksandar 37 39 218
- Kralj, Janko 52 57 62 212
- Kukuljević, Ivan 34-35⁸ 81 88 99⁴³ 140
200 211
- Kulmer, Franjo, baron 95⁴¹ 99⁴³ 139 231
- Kurz, Anton 29 213
- Kušljan, Dragojlo, baron 88³⁶ 99⁴³
139-140⁸³ 157 175-176 186 210 231
- Laurian, August Treboniu 74-75²⁷ 77 134
210 213 222
- Lemény, Ioan 53 72²⁶ 194
- Lentulay, Mirko 152
- Leopold II, emperor-king 22
- Lewartowski, Henryk, baron 161⁹³
197-198¹²⁴
- Madarász, József 187
- Magheru, Gheorghe 180¹¹¹ 235
- Maniu, Petre 77²⁹
- Maria Theresa, queen 21
- Mayerhofer, Ferdinand (*later* baron)
142-143⁸⁶ 160
- Mažuranić, Ivan 99⁴³ 140-141⁸⁴ 195
210-211 220
- Medaković, Danilo 157
- Mészáros, Lázár 56¹⁸ 111-112 117-118⁶¹
- Miloš, former prince of Serbia 104⁴⁸ 106 227
- Murgu, Eftimie 28 44 81-83³¹ 212
- Nyáry, Pál 187
- Obrenović, House of 106
- Pálfi, Albert 162⁹⁹-163 232
- Papfalvi, Constantin 212
- Papiu-Ilarian, Alexandru 26 54-55¹⁷ 58 72
77 102 210-211 216 222
- Pavlović, Teodor 68²³ 72 211
- Perczel, Mór 163-164 166-168 167¹⁰²
175-176 197 232
- Petőfi, Sándor 45¹²-46 219
- Piret, Louis, baron 110-111
- Puchner, Antal, baron 82 134⁷⁶ 163 194
- Rajačić, Josif (*later* baron) 39¹¹ 50-51
69²⁵-71 79-81 94⁴⁰ 99⁴³ 103⁴⁶ 140-147
153 157 160 167 193 211 222-223
228
- Romanov, House of 89
- Rotarides, Ján 52 57 62 199-200¹²⁶ 212
221 238
- Roth, Elias 29 137⁸⁰
- Roth, Karl 115-116
- Rusu (Orosz), Ioan 209

- Sachsenheim, Friedrich Soterius von 217
- Şaguna, Andrei (*later* baron) 50¹⁴ 71 77 152
193 194¹²⁰ 211 213 217 230
- Salmen, Franz (*later* baron) 29–30⁵ 193 217
- Schwarzenberg, Karl, prince 238
- Simonffy, József 234 236
- Stephen I, Saint, king 173 202
- Stephen, Archduke 223
- Sterca-Şuluţ, Iosif 224
- Stratimirović, Đorđe 17 37–38 41 68–69
71 81 110 142⁸⁵–147 157 167 175–176
195¹²² 210 215 218
- Stromszky, Sámuel Ferenc 229
- Štúr, Ľudovít 18¹ 25 46 61 63 81 88³⁶
90–94 124–125 127 140 159⁹⁷ 194 200
208 210–212 215 225
- Šupljikac, Stevan 70 79 141 143–145 144⁸⁷
228
- Szacsvay, Imre 188 190¹¹⁸
- Széchenyi, István, count 15 56¹⁸ 105⁴⁹–106⁵⁰
227
- Szemere, Bertalan 15 56¹⁸ 120 173
186–187¹¹⁴ 203 206 219 223–224
233–234 237–238
- Táncsics, Mihály 86³⁴–87 165 224
- Teleki, László, count 168–173 171¹⁰³
202–203 232–233
- Terczy, Szilárd 238
- Teulescu, Petre 230
- Tirts, Rezső 217
- Todorović, Kuzman 145 153⁹¹ 160
- Újházi, László 166¹⁰¹ 232
- Uray, Bálint 238
- Urban, Karl (*later* baron) 130–131⁷⁴ 163
- Vasvári, Pál 85³³–86 165 179 224 232
- Vay, Miklós, baron 119–120⁶⁴ 228
- Vörösmarty, Mihály 37
- Vozárik, Peter 222
- Vukovics, Sebő 187¹¹⁵ 223
- Windisch-Grätz, Alfred, prince 92–93 117
128 146–147 154 160
- Wohlgemuth, Ludwig, baron 230 237–238
- Zach, František Aleksander 125

List of plates

1. Ľudovít Štúr. By František Kolář. Lithograph, Galeria mesta Bratislavy (Bratislava Town Gallery).
2. George Bariț. By Károly Ruzs. Woodcut, in Iosifu Vulcanu, *Panteonulu Romanu* (The Rumanian Pantheon), I, Pest: 1869, p. 39.
3. Jozef Miloslav Hurban in 1849. By Eduard Kaiser. Lithograph, TKCs
4. Simion Bărnuț. Photograph, BAR
5. "Festzug der siebenbürgischen Sachsen zu Hermannstadt bei Installation des sächsischen Nationsgrafen." A woodcut by X. A. v. E. Kreztschmar, after a drawing by Theodor Glatz, *Illustrierte Zeitung*, January 15, 1848, No. 237, pp. 40-41.
6. The Zagreb headquarters of the *Matica hrvatska*. By Josip Bäck. Coloured copper engraving on a tarok card, 1847, PMH
7. Ljudevit Gaj in 1848. By Franz Eybl. Lithograph, TKCs
8. Ivan Kukuljević in 1847. Lithograph, in the possession of Marijana Schneider, Zagreb
9. The Lower Table of the Pozsony Diet. Woodcut, *Ábrázolt Folyóirat*, January 15, 1848, No. 3, p. 20.
10. Lajos Kossuth in 1848. By August Prinzhofer. Lithograph, TKCs
11. Josif Rajačić in 1849. By Schloßbark. Lithograph, TKCs
12. Sándor Petőfi in 1848. By Soma Orlai Petrich. Oils, in the possession of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
13. Kossuth, Full of Zeal for the small nobles of Turopolje. Lithograph, 1845, TKCs
14. Andrei Șaguna. A pencil drawing by János Petrichevich Horváth, AIFCAR The archives of the Count Bánffy family, Caricatures by János Petrichevich Horváth
15. Josip Jellačić. A copper engraving by Fromböck and Leybold, after a photograph by Koberwein, AHZ GZ
16. Ioan Butteanu in 1848. By E. Barbu Iscovescu. Oils, MAR
17. Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian. Woodcut, in Vulcanu, I, p. 125.
18. A Meeting of the Batthyány Cabinet. Unfinished Lithograph, 1848, TKCs
19. Michal Miloslav Hodža in 1846, By Jozef Božetech Klemens. Oils, SINGBr

20. Allegorical depiction of the public announcement of the Liptószentmiklós demands of the Slovaks. Unfinished oil painting by Peter Michal Bohúň, SINGBr

The picture attempts to depict the theoretical presence of the actually absent masses by lining up numerous figures in the local costume of the different Slovak-populated regions.

21. Ferdinand V. By Friedrich Lieder and Saar. Lithograph, TKCs
 22. Lajos Batthyány in 1842. By Franz Eybl. Lithograph, TKCs
 23. Teodor Pavlović. By Johann Baptist Clarot. Lithograph, TKCs
 24. Jovan Hadžić, By Alajos Fuchsthaller. Copper engraving, AHZ GZ
 25. The Opening Session of the First Serb National Assembly in Karlóca on May 13, 1848. By Pavle Simić. Oils, Galerija Matice srpske (*Matica srpska* Gallery), Novi Sad
 26. Ioan Lemény in 1842. By Károly Szathmáry-Papp. Lithograph, TKCs
 27. August Treboniu Laurian. By Károly Ruzs. Woodcut, in Vulcanu, I, p. 27.
 28. The Opening Session of the first Rumanian National Assembly at Balázsfalva on May 15, 1848. Aquarelle, Muzeul Regional (Regional Museum), Alba Iulia
 29. A Rumanian design dating from 1850 for expanding Transylvania's coat of arms. Published in reprint by Popescu, p. 315.

The upper and the lower field repeats the elements symbolizing the Magyar, Szekler and Saxon "nations" of Transylvania's traditional coat of arms, while the newly-added central field (which its designers claimed was based on an old Roman memorial coin) is supposed to symbolize the Rumanian "nation". Of its elements the figure of the genius was intended to be the symbol of the Rumanian people, with a flag held in its left hand, bearing the initials of the Latin *Deo favent* and with a sickle in the right symbolizing fertility, the lion representing courage, and the eagle and the wreath in its beak symbolizing the Rumanians' supposed Roman origin. (For all this, see a letter written by Petre Maniu, a former secretary of the Balázsfalva national assembly, and his three associates to Eduard Bach, Transylvania's imperial commissioner, Vienna, November 30, 1850, published *ibid.*, p. 153.)

30. "Ne bántsd a magyart!" (Hands off the Hungarians!). By János Vidéky. Copper engraving, 1848, TKCs

The translations of the inscriptions in the picture are as follows:

Kossuth standing guard: Halt! Who are you? What do you want?

The Croat (1): Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, the *Szerémség* and the rest, then that there be no Hungarian government; nothing more.

The Serb (3): I want the Bácska, the *Temesköz*, the Military Border and the rest; nothing more.

The Camarilla (2): First of all I side with my friends, for myself I want 200 million forints and 100,000 Habsburg soldiers; nothing more.

The Serb and the Croat (talking to each other): The Camarilla is stupid enough to think we'll share the booty! Ha, ha!

The angel: Hands off the Hungarians!

(On the flag:) The patriot is ready to die for the country if need be.

31. Eftimie Murgu. Photograph, BAR
 32. Avram Iancu in 1849. By E. Barbu Iscovescu. Oils, MAR
 33. Pál Vasvári in 1848, By Alajos Rohn. Lithograph, TKCs
 34. Mihály Táncsics in 1848. By Miklós Barabás. Lithograph, TKCs
 35. "A kamarillának egyik áldozatja" (A Victim of the Camarilla). By Frigyes Ágost Walzel. Lithograph, 1848, TKCs

The translation of the text under the picture runs:

First judge: Since you understand neither Serb, nor Rumanian, nor Hungarian, could it be that you're German?

The prisoner: Of course!... I'm Viennese, an artilleryman.
 Second judge: How did you get here?
 The prisoner: They sent me down to teach the Serbs to shoot.
 Third judge: Who sent you here to teach the Serbs to shoot?
 The prisoner: The Camarilla.

36. "Slovanský sjezd v Praze" (The Slav Congress of Prague). By Josef A. Hellích. Lithograph, 1849, PMH

The bespectacled figure in the foreground of the picture on the right is Kušljan, the figure on the left Štúr.

37. "Oestreich's politische Lage." By Josef Lanzedelli. Colour lithograph, 1848, TKCs
 38. The bombardment of Prague at the time of the uprising of June 1848. Lithograph coloured with oils, 1848, HMStW
 39. Jellačić marches into Zagreb on June 4, 1848. By Anastas Jovanović. Lithograph, 1849, TKCs

Gaj can be seen on the right in the foreground of the picture.

40. Rajačić inaugurates Jellačić as *ban* on June 5, 1848. By Anastas Jovanović. Pencil drawing, Muzej grada Beograda (City Museum, Belgrade)
 41. Franjo Kulmer in 1848. By Josef Kriehuber. Lithograph, PMH
 42. Jellačić marches into Zagreb on June 28, 1848. By Vincenz Katzler. Lithograph, 1850, AHZ GZ
 43. The July 4, 1848 session of the Croat *sabor*. Oil copy of Carl Weingartner's oil painting, ÖStA KrA Bildersammlung, Weiß-Starkenfels-Sammlung

Sitting in the middle in front of the negotiating table is a downcast Kukuljević, with Rajačić at the head of the table on the left. Behind him (on the platform) stands Jellačić. Of the people to the right of Jellačić the third is Kulmer, the figure under the chandelier holding his right arm aloft is Gaj, to his left stands Mažuranić, and the person leaning over the right edge of the table (his head turned away from Jellačić) is Kušljan.

44. Josip Jellačić. Woodcut printed by J. F. Kaiser, Nacionalna i sveučilišna biblioteka (National and University Library), Zagreb, GZ
 45. Jellačić's armed men. Coloured lithograph by Girolamo Franceschini, TKCs
 46. Rajačić on a recruiting trip. Heinrich Gerhart's colour lithograph, TKCs
 47. Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin. Photograph made from a lithograph, Legújabbkori Történeti Múzeum (Museum for Contemporary History), Budapest
 48. Miloš Obrenović in 1842. By Josef Kriehuber. Lithograph after a painting by Moritz Michael Daffinger, TKCs
 49. István Széchenyi in 1842. By Franz Eybl. Lithograph, TKCs
 50. Croat separatism as viewed by Széchenyi and Deák. By Miklós Szerelmey. Lithograph, *Charivari*, July 5, 1848, No. 2, p. 11.

The translation of the text below the picture: Don't whet your razor so much, *bratko Kosakilloff*, it cuts far more easily than we thought.

51. Stevan Knjčanin in 1847. By Katarina Ivanović. Oils, Narodni muzej (National Museum), Beograd
 52. Scene from the fighting in Southern Hungary. By Vincenz Katzler. Lithograph, TKCs
 53. "A Sz. Tamási sánczok s tájéka környézve csapataink által..." (The Szenttamás Redoubt and Its Vicinity Surrounded by Our Troops...) By Károly Vidéky. Copper engraving, 1848, TKCs

54. The Fehértemplom massacre of August 19, 1848. By Vincenz Katzler. Lithograph, 1850, TKCs
55. A red caped. By Mihály Kovács. Oils, 1848, HtIM
56. Ferenc Deák in 1842. By Franz Eybl. Lithograph, TKCs
57. Jellačić's troops crossing the Drave on September 11, 1848. By Franz Xaver Zalder. Coloured lithograph, ÖStA KrA Bildersammlung, Weiß-Starkenfels-Sammlung
58. Croats bivouacked in Transdanubia. By Vincenz Katzler. Lithograph, TKCs
59. Szerezsán. Colour lithograph, marked NL, PMH
60. Croat prisoners of war in October 1848. Pencil drawing, 1848, TKCs
61. Lázár Mészáros. Aquarelle, TKCs
62. János Damjanich in 1849. By Miklós Barabás. Pen and wash chalk drawing, MNG
63. Scene from the Battle of Pancsova on January 3, 1849. By Vincenz Katzler. Lithograph, 1849, AB XIII, TKCs
64. Miklós Vay in 1843. By Franz Eybl. Lithograph, TKCs
65. József Eötvös in 1845. By Miklós Barabás. Oils, TKCs
66. Parliament's House of Deputies in the Pest Redout. By Frigyes Ágost Walzel, Lithograph, 1848, TKCs
67. Timotei Cipariu, Oils. Published in reproduction by Ioan Rațiu.
68. The seal of the Slovak National Council. Published in reproduction by György Gracza, *Az 1848–49-iki magyar szabadságharcz története* (A History of the 1848–49 War of Independence), II, Budapest: n. d., p. 329.
69. Slovak legionary and his officer. By Josef Heicke. Coloured lithograph, SINMM
70. Slovak legionary standing guard. By August Strixner. Lithograph after a drawing by Fritz L'Allemand, TKCs
71. "Ungarns Zustand." Lithograph printed by Franz Werner, 1848, TKCs

The translation of the inscriptions in the picture:

(Below the figure of the German revolutionary:)

United Germany is a comet—with thirty-eight tails.

(At the rear of the cart carrying the Hungarians:) Kossuth's eloquence captivates Hungary.

(Kossuth:) Here there is sufficient space for the free soaring of our soul.

(The song of the Hungarians' music band:)

Hungary is not yet lost:

She has many loyal Slovak sons

To the joy of the Habsburg loyalists

(Count György Apponyi, the Hungarian chancellor who fell in March:) Kossuth, Kossuth, you astound Hungary.

(Underneath the cart:) The Croats invasion of Hungary.

(The words of Pallas Athene:)

I spare neither enemy, nor friend,

Until our soul will be one again

72. Insurrectionist Slovak officers. By Fülöp Félix Kanitz. Pencil drawing with white colouring, 1849, TKCs
73. Bivouacked Slovak legionaries. By Fülöp Félix Kanitz. Pencil drawing with white colouring, 1849, TKCs
74. Karl Urban in 1851. By Johann Stadler. Lithograph, TKCs
75. The seal of the Rumanian National Committee, dated October 10, 1848, published in reprint in *1848 în Principatele române* (Eighteen forty-eight in the Rumanian Principalities), București: 1948, p. 9.

76. Antal Puchner in 1849. By Johann Stadler. Lithograph, TKCs
77. Iancu and his lancers. Woodcut, 1857, published in reprint by Iosif Sterca Șuluțiu, *Biografia lui Avram Iancu*
78. The Preszáka massacre of October 24, 1848. By Ferdinand Noel. Lithograph after a drawing by Miklós Szerelmey, Keresztény Múzeum (Christian Museum), Esztergom
79. "Einer der rum. siebenb. Bandenführer Janku's." Pencil drawing marked LB, TKCs
80. Elias Roth. Lithograph published in reprint by *Vasárnapi Újság*, May 29, 1898, No. 22, p. 369.
81. The Hungarian-Croat struggle. Woodcut, 1848, OL Gy '48Ny
82. Francis Joseph in 1849. By Carl Gæbel. Lithograph, TKCs
83. Dragojlo Kušljan in 1848. Detail from František Kolář's colour lithograph "Die slavische Barricade", PMH
84. Ivan Mažuranić. Lithograph based on a drawing by Joseph Anton Bauer, TKCs
85. Đorđe Stratimirović in 1848. Lithograph, AHZ GZ
86. Ferdinand Mayerhofer in 1849. By Josef Krichuber. Lithograph, HtIM
87. Stevan Šupljikac in 1848. By Anastas Jovanović. Lithograph, AHZ GZ
88. Ödön Beöthy in 1842. By Franz Eybl. Lithograph, TKCs
89. Scene from the Battle of Zombor, February 11, 1849. By Vincenz Katzler. Lithograph, 1849, AB XXII, TKCs
90. Selmečbánya miners. Detail from Franz Wolf's lithograph, published in reprint by Josef Markov (ed. and intr.), *Slowakische Volkskleidung der Vergangenheit*, n. p. and n. d. [Prag: 1956], No. 135.
91. Todorović bids farewell on March 5, 1849 to the Serbian volunteers returning home. By Vincenz Katzler. Lithograph, 1849, AB XXVIII, HtIM
92. Hodža's legionaries outside Komárom. Aquarelle, published in reproduction by *Slovenská jar*, Appendix
93. Jan Francisci in 1849. By Peter Michal Bohúň. Oils, SINGBr
94. Czech caricature on the equality ensured by the octroied constitution. Woodcut, *Šotek*, 2/1849, p. 7.
95. Jakov Ignjatović. By József Marastoni the Elder. Lithograph, *Az Ország Tükre*, April 15, 1862, No. 8, p. 120.
96. Slovak delegation before Francis Joseph on March 20, 1849. Lithograph, 1849, AB XVI, TKCs
97. Leaders of the Slovak delegation calling on Francis Joseph. Photograph, 1849. Published in reproduction by *Dejiny Slovenska*, (History of Slovakia), II, edited by Ľudovít Holotík and Július Mésároš, Bratislava: 1968, p. 71.
In the middle of the standing row is Hodža, with Štúr on his left, and leaning on his shoulder is Hurban.
98. Henryk Lewartowski. By František Kolář. Lithograph in the possession of the author, Budapest
99. Albert Pálfi in 1848. Detail from a lithograph by József Borsos and August Pettenkofen depicting the opening session of Parliament in Pest on June 5, 1848, TKCs
100. Transylvanian Saxon peasants fleeing from the *honvéd* troops. Coloured lithograph, HMStW

101. László Újházi. By Frigyes Ágost Walzel. Lithograph, TKCs
102. Mór Perczel. By Waldow. Lithograph after a drawing by "Szilagh", TKCs
103. Ilija Garašanin in 1852. By Anastas Jovanović. Lithograph, Galerija Matice srpske, Novi Sad
104. Adam Czartoryski. By Paul Delaroche. Oils, Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie (National Museum, Cracow)
105. László Teleki in 1843. By Franz Eybl. Lithograph, TKCs
106. Kázmér Batthyány in 1847. Miniature by Miklós Barabás, TKCs
107. Gyula Andrassy in 1848. By August Prinzhofer. Lithograph, TKCs
108. Józef Bem in 1849. By Miklós Barabás. Chalk drawing, TKCs
109. László Csány in 1836. Edouard Morin and Antal Országh's 1851. lithograph, based on an older aquarelle, TKCs
110. Title page of Imre Hatvani's pamphlet entitled *Szózat az oláh faj ügyében* (Appeal in the Cause of the Vlach Race)
111. Gheorghe Magheru in 1851. By Gheorghe Tattarescu. Oils, MAR
112. Cezar Bolliak in 1854. By Theodor Aman. Oils, MAR
113. Nicolae Bălcescu in 1851. By Gheorghe Tattarescu. Oils, MAR
114. Bertalan Szemere in 1849. Oil painting by Sándor Kozina, 1851, TKCs
115. Sebő Vukovics. By Károly Ruzs. Woodcut, after a drawing by József Marastoni the Elder, *Hazánk s a Külföld*, June 10, 1866, No. 23, p. 353.
116. József Irinyi in 1846. By Miklós Szerelmey. Lithograph, TKCs
117. Dániel Irányi. Detail from a woodcut, *Magyarország és a Nagyvilág*, June 13, 1869, No. 24, p. 277.
118. Imre Szacs vay. By Elek Szamosy. Lithograph, 1873, TKCs
119. István Bezerédj. Oils, Wosinsky Mór Megyei Múzeum (Mór Wosinsky County Museum), Szekszárd
120. Andrei Șaguna in 1851. By Petre Mateescu. Lithograph, TKCs
121. Ján Francisci in the mind-1860s. By Peter Michal Bohúň. Oils, SINGBr
122. Đorđe Stratimirović in 1849. By Eduard Kaiser. Lithograph, TKCs
123. The peoples of Transylvania in chains. By Károly Ruzs. Woodcut, after a drawing by János Jankó, *Bolond Miska*, January 14, 1866, No. 2, p. 8.
124. The final inspection of the Slovak legion in Pozsony on November 21, 1849. By Vilmos Paulínyi-Tóth. Woodcut, *Sokol*, 11/1862, p. 413.
125. Avram Iancu in 1872. Photograph from the Beszterce studio of Alexandru Rosu, BAR
126. Ján Rotarides and his family. Photograph, SINMM

On the cover: "Illustrierte politische Karte von Österreich und den angrenzenden Ländern." Lithograph published by Carl Lanzedelli, 1848, TKCs

The picture depicts the political conditions in Europe in July 1848.

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452

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