INDIANA UNIVERSITY STUDIES ON HUNGARY
3

HUNGARY AND EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

EDITED BY
GYÖRGY RÁNKI

ASSISTANT EDITOR
ATTILA PÓK

AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ
BUDAPEST

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AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ · BUDAPEST 1989

507666

MAGYAR TUDOMÁNYOS AKADÉMIA KÖNYVTÁRA

M. TUD. AKADÉMIA KÖNYVTÁRA
Könyvleltár 6074/1989 sz.

ISBN 963 05 5502 6

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Printed in Hungary
by Akadémiai Kiadó és Nyomda Vállalat, Budapest

GYÖRGY RÁNKI
1930–1988

GYÖRGY RÁNKI

I got to know György Ránki in the late 1960s. He chose me as a close colleague when I was a young man and we became firm friends, in spite of the fact that he was ten years my senior. We worked alongside each other at international conferences, as well as in the editorial office. In private life, too, we spent much time in each other's company, on long walks and during weekends by the Danube. We played football together and helped each other to carry gravel and mortar to build a house. When, on 1 January, 1986, Ránki took over as director at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of History, the country's main body for historical research, I became his deputy. On 19 February, 1988 György Ránki died suddenly of cancer, after an illness of just six weeks. What follows is a personal and subjective appreciation of him, and I make no excuses for being partisan.

Ránki was born on 4 August, 1930. After finishing secondary school, he entered Budapest's University of Economics, where, in addition to his studies, he soon involved himself in the work of the department of economic history. In 1951 he transferred to the Loránd Eötvös University's Faculty of Arts, also in Budapest, where his main interest was history. In July 1953 he became an assistant researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' Institute of History. As a result of the reorganization of the Academy in 1949, the Institute had become an important research centre, and was independent of the university. Its director, Zsigmond Pál Pach, had taught Ránki (along with the latter's friend and former classmate, Iván T. Berend) at Budapest's Jewish secondary school and at the university. Ránki's first monograph, written jointly with Berend and dealing with the history of Hungarian manufacturing industry before 1914, developed out of a university thesis and was published in 1955.

In 1960 Ránki became a departmental head at the Institute, leading the research on the post-1918 period. It was at this time that he assembled a group of scholars who were later to become acknowledged experts on the political history of the interwar period and who were to gain an international reputation–among others, Miklós Laczkó, Mária Ormos, Gyula Juhász, Magda Ádám, Lajos Kerekes and Lóránt Tilkovszky. Two years later, in 1962, he became deputy director of the Institute but in the meantime, with Iván T. Berend, had been preparing a comprehensive work on Hungarian industry in the 1920s. During this early phase Ránki's hard work and wit made him a prominent figure among his contemporaries. It was now that he established his lifestyle: some swimming early in the morning and half an hour spent on learning languages (he maintained this last habit up to the age of forty-seven, passing state examinations in German, English, French, Russian and Italian). His gift for languages provided a firm basis for his later organization of scholarly activity. When he was young, Ránki inclined towards archive investigations, and, later, towards

universal history, although he was always an enthusiast for library-based research. It was while he was deputy director of the Institute that Ránki wrote the thesis that qualified him to become a university professor. (This dealt with the Hungarian economy during the period of the first Three Year Plan, 1947–49.) While we were doing research for our final theses, Ránki always arrived at the archives before everyone else, and was often to be found outside waiting for the doors to open.

In 1964 Ránki took up a part-time post as university professor at the Lajos Kossuth University in Debrecen. Until 1980 he regularly devoted a great deal of energy to teaching, and later gave lectures several times a year. He always encouraged young historians working with him, and helped obtain jobs and scholarships for them. During the 1970s he derived much pleasure from the company of the young people he supported. Although on the surface an invariably warm-hearted cultural diplomat, deep down Ránki was a very reserved man. However, among these young people he became surprisingly open and relaxed, be it at dinners or during excursions, football matches or just evenings spent in scholarly discussion at someone's flat. His work in the field of economic history reached its zenith in the 1970s. Again with Iván T. Berend, Ránki investigated the industrial and economic history of Hungary in the twentieth century, and the two men wrote monographs on this subject before turning their attention to comparative history and to Hungary's place in the world economy. In the 1950s their professor, Zsigmond Pál Pach, had attempted to explain the economic historical development of Eastern and Western Europe in modern times. A work by Immanuel Wallerstein, published in 1974, provides further explanation of the difference in the rate of development between core and peripheral areas. In their book *The European Periphery and Industrialization, 1780–1914* (1982), Ránki and Berend tried to explain the differences in European development in modern times. As far as methodology was concerned, Ránki's historiography now reached a new level. From that time onwards he constantly directed the attention of his students to international comparisons. I myself made an extended tour to West Germany, and also visited Paris, Rome, Austria and Moscow to study the development of European historiography and modern culture. However, Ránki eventually found economic history too limiting a field. His synthesis on the history of the Second World War was published in Hungarian in 1973 and many experts regard this to be the best comprehensive work of its kind. Ránki was very much interested in the Second World War, and especially in fascism, from the beginning of his career. This interest was not entirely academic: as a teenager he had been taken to Auschwitz, which had left an indelible impression on his memory. This he revealed only to a few of us in his immediate circle, otherwise shyly concealing it. It was not his personal suffering but rather his deep humanism that served as the basis for his critique of fascism. His work presenting the rivalry of the small states of the region–Slovakia, Hungary and Romania–for Hitler's favours, and which threw light on the universal historical background of the fascist movements in those countries, was a masterpiece of the comparative political history of the Central European region in the twentieth century. Ránki's interest in economic history and in the history of the Second World War were both reflected in his last major work, which deals with the economic history of that war. (He delivered a lecture on the topic at the Stuttgart World Congress of History in 1985, and this is due to be published soon.)

György Ránki's personality and work became inseparable. In his last ten years, and from the United States to Japan, no important conference on modern historical topics took place without his attendance, participation or even organization of the conference. He was one of the founders of the International Committee for the History of World War II, and was a member of the scientific council of the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz. From 1980 onwards he was a member of the Presidium of the International Committee of

Historical Sciences, and in 1985 was elected its first vice-president. Not long before he died he calculated that in one six month period spent in Hungary he had stayed in Budapest for just 1.7 days a week. The last decade of his life involved dedicated work for the organization of international scholarly life and for the recognition of Hungarian historiography. He knew the timetables of the major airlines by heart, and an excellent memory combined with mental agility enabled him to prepare the schedule of appointments and commitments for several months ahead. Naturally, the constant strain and tensions of work had an effect on his personality. He had virtually no time for relaxation and rest but was still able to feign interest for hours on end, and with no sign of impatience, if there was a dull dinner guest and the rest of the company were half asleep.

It was in 1981 that Ránki was appointed professor at the University of Indiana at Bloomington and five years later he claimed that his greatest achievement had been the setting up of the Department of Hungarian Studies there. A look at the schedule of this department, which he built up from practically nothing, shows that it was full of conferences on comparative history, literature, economics and even political science. He invited leading world authorities and won a reputation for Hungarian scholarly achievements. Everything that took place in connection with Hungary's international, political acceptance in the world in the 1970s and 1980s was reflected in Ránki's activity as a cultural diplomat. Seeing this wide-ranging activity, future generations will find it hard to believe that Ránki was a professor, an organizer, and, at times, his guests' chauffeur–with his wife beside him as a willing helper. The versatility of Ránki's character unfolded in all its richness at this time. He was respected by every group in the Hungarian intelligentsia, and managed to bring together people who would never normally have exchanged a word with each other. He was as well liked in Paris, Mainz, Bielefeld, Rome or New York as he was in Bloomington–and by his friends at conferences as well as by those at his regular card evenings. His work in Budapest and Bloomington and the beautiful home he created for his last years became the focal points of his life.

Not yet sixty and at the height of his powers, he had received every possible recognition: he had been made a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1976, had been given the highest state award, the Kossuth Prize, in 1961, was an honorary doctor of the Finnish Academy (he was especially proud of this), and was president of the Department of Philosophy and Historical Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences–as well as director of the Institute and a professor at Bloomington. György Ránki's untimely death deprived the Hungarian, and indeed the international, academic community of one of its outstanding members. He will be greatly missed by all those who were privileged to know him.

Ferenc Glatz

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DOMOKOS KOSÁRY

ENLIGHTENMENT AND LIBERALISM IN HUNGARY

The American historian Peter Gay once compared the Enlightenment to a gradual "recovery of nerve", a process giving new hope to humanity which had seemed, in the preceding centuries, almost condemned to stagnation, recurrent famines and ruinous wars.

Eighteenth-century Hungary was in particular need of this kind of recovery, and for two main reasons. First, she had suffered greatly in the wars which resulted from the Ottoman invasion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Her population had been decimated, a number of her towns and villages destroyed, and her economy seriously damaged. Her ancient capital, Buda, had been liberated only in 1686 and the last Turkish troops had been expelled from her territory only in 1718. Second, Hungary was situated in one of the less developed, peripheral, zones of Europe. We call this zone East-Central Europe. The socio-economic system in this zone was a particular version of what Jerome Blum has called "the old order". The main features of this "retarded feudalism" were extensive, traditional agriculture, very little industry, a society based on privileges and consisting mainly (more than 80 percent) of peasants and serfs strictly subordinated to feudal landlords; of a relatively numerous middle and lower nobility, and of a very modest bourgeoisie.

The historical structure of Europe has, of course, always consisted of several zones representing different levels of development. In any particular period, the more advanced epicentre was always surrounded by less developed lateral, peripheral

zones. These regions developed in more or less close interaction with each other, each forming a part of this model, and having a certain function in it. The more advanced countries offered a challenge to the less developed ones, but were themselves influenced by the latter. The model was dynamic, and therefore subject to changes. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this interaction resulted, unfavourably, in building up the system of late feudalism in the east-central zone. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, gave a new stimulus to the peripheral zones as well. The impact of the economic, social and political changes in England, France and the "epicentre" generally, the new political institutions and ideas, and the Enlightenment and liberalism, helped to bring about further changes in other parts of Europe. The long process of transition from feudalism to capitalism started in East-Central Europe as well. Here, both Enlightenment and liberalism served as an ideological arsenal in the prolonged efforts of these countries to catch up with the more advanced zone of the continent.

In England and France the age of the Enlightenment began at around the beginning of the eighteenth century, at the time of Newton and Locke. Rational, critical methods, the use of which had hitherto been limited to the relatively narrow field of the sciences, now began to be applied to the wider domain of religious, social, political and other problems. The new ideas rejected the traditional, static, biblical image of the world. In Hungary - in East-Central Europe - the same process began a little later, in the second half of the eighteenth century, and as a result of certain changes in traditional society. Some relatively advanced groups among the privileged nobility were trying to find their way out from the old, outdated, uncomfortable aspects of the feudal system which they proposed to modernize to a certain extent, without changing the system's essential structure. They were joined by the representatives of a slowly-emerging new intelligentsia. All this happened under the impact of the more advanced zone of the continent and with the help of Enlightenment ideas somewhat modified and adapted to local conditions. However, the greater part of the nobility,

and particularly of its broader simpler elements, had no wish to change its traditional outlook or to permit the introduction of enlightened reforms.

Enlightened politics were represented by three main successive tendencies:

(1) Enlightened absolutism was a specific feature of a number of states which, in the peripheral zones of Northern, Eastern and Southern Europe, tried to catch up with the modernizing process. The impact of the more advanced and better-organized states forced their rivals to reorganize their armies, their old-fashioned administrations, finances, economies and cultural institutions. In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was Prussian military pressure which forced the Viennese Court to introduce this new method of government, first in Austria, in the hereditary lands, and then, a little later, after 1765, in Hungary. In the last years of Maria Theresa and during the reign of Joseph II (1780-1790), a number of reforms were introduced by decree, without the convening of the feudal Diet. The government tried to raise the level of agricultural production, to improve the lot of the peasants, to place the educational system under state control and to modernize it (Ratio Educationis, 1777), and to introduce religious toleration (1781). A good number of these measures were welcomed by many enlightened Hungarian intellectuals and noblemen, although the introduction of German as the official language (to replace the traditional Latin), the suppression of local autonomy and – especially – Joseph II's plans to reform the tax system provoked growing discontent and resistance.

(2) In some peripheral countries where there was a particularly strong tradition of the Estates exerting political influence, for example Poland and Hungary, one finds another variant. This second political tendency can be called the national movement of the enlightened nobility. In Hungary, this started with a cultural program initiated in the early 1770s by the writer György Bessenyei. It proposed the cultivation of the national language and literature with the aim of spreading enlightened knowledge. By 1790-91, when – after the collapse of the absolutist regime – the feudal Diet was once more con-

vened, this became a complete political and economic program aiming at the modernization of the old feudal system of representation (at both Diet and county level), as well as at the ending of Hungary's subordinate status within the Habsburg Monarchy. Details were worked out between 1791 and 1793 by nine special commissions set up by the Diet and given the task of formulating the changes to be introduced. Young Hungarians who had studied at German universities, particularly Göttingen, and who began to regard England as a model, played an important role in introducing enlightened ideas. On the other hand, the majority of provincial noblemen still believed that "all change is dangerous" (*omnis mutatio periculosa*), to quote the title of a contemporary political pamphlet.

(3) While both of the two above-mentioned tendencies intended only to modernize the existing socio-political system without eliminating its essential features, the third tendency was represented by anti-feudal reformers prepared to abolish feudal privileges altogether and to emancipate the peasants. Their model was first the American Revolution and then the French Revolution. Mostly recruited from the ranks of intellectuals of noble – and partly non-noble – origin, they had no real political power of their own. Consequently, they supported first the enlightened absolutist government and, later on, the national program of the enlightened nobility. However, their reform projects went much deeper than any espoused by these other two tendencies.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century all three of these enlightened political tendencies failed. Enlightened absolutism collapsed in 1790 when, under the impact of the French Revolution, the Prussian menace and internal resistance, Joseph II revoked most of his decrees. The national Estates' program came to a halt when the nobles – even many of the enlightened ones – took fright during the radical phase of the French Revolution, and made an uneasy alliance with their former adversary, the Viennese Court. Isolated, the anti-feudal intellectuals became radicalized and tried to set up a secret "Jacobin" political organization. This movement, however, was suppressed

and its leaders executed in 1795. A long period of political reaction followed.

Enlightenment reached a crisis. Its political traditions survived only in the form of an undercurrent – for example among those who around 1809 expected Napoleon to overthrow the Habsburg Monarchy and even the Hungarian feudal system. The greater part of the nobility used the "national" motif for protection against "alien" French ideas. But, in spite of all this, several Enlightenment initiatives continued which did not directly threaten the privileges of the nobility. These initiatives, mainly of an economic and cultural nature, were politically neutral and were compatible with the nobility's interests (for example, "rational" methods in agriculture, language standardization and national literature). The economic prosperity and the inflation brought about by the long French wars created new requirements in urban construction and in the way of life. Because of the seemingly contradictory phenomena, this whole period has been judged in different ways. According to the liberal tradition of the nobility, articulated by Mihály Horváth, the renowned historian of the second half of the nineteenth century, the Hungarian nobility had always represented the cause of freedom and of the nation. Its efforts were merely hindered by the Viennese Court which, from 1812, even resorted to absolutism. But as a result of pressure from the nobility in 1823, Vienna was again forced to convene the Diet in 1825, thereby setting in motion the Age of Reform. The reality, however, was different. The Habsburg Empire was again willing to cooperate with the Hungarian Estates because of changes in the international situation and because it was trying to find in them an ally against liberalism. A further point is that, in 1825, no reforms were actually introduced. More recently, some authors have argued that the Enlightenment lasted until 1830. These writers proceed from the standpoint of art history – in spite of the fact that the Enlightenment is an ideological and not an artistic concept. Others would like to date liberalism from as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, all this can hardly be reconciled with the facts. Some individuals, as exceptions, may have advocated liberalism in

the 1820s, but one can only speak of a national liberal political reform movement after 1830.

Among the reasons for new orientation we should mention first that in the new international economic situation, the old, feudal socio-economic order was no longer competitive, and, because of the dissatisfaction among the peasants, it seemed increasingly dangerous to the nobility. A way out could only be found by switching over to capitalism in agriculture. This was coupled with the example offered by the social and political structure of the more developed Western bourgeois countries, and the ideas of liberalism as the means to modernization. The younger generation could familiarize itself with the necessary blueprint from its reading, from the press, as well as from ideas gained during study tours abroad and personal experience. Finally, the occasion for the manifestation of the movement was supplied by the international political crisis of 1830-31, the Italian, German, and other events which tied down Austria's forces and which allowed a new, opposition political tendency to gain ground. This linked the traditional claim for national autonomy with a demand for liberal reforms. In other words, to some extent, this tendency revived and developed further the achievements and aims of the Enlightenment.

The Hungarian Age of Reform, which both directly preceded the revolution and prepared the way for it between 1830-1848, coincided with the rising, dynamic period of European liberalism, although in the 1840s it was increasingly attacked by the more radical forces.

We know, of course, that liberalism, which was not completely homogeneous in the more developed Western countries either, produced more and more diverse versions and shades of itself as it spread to the different zones of Europe under the formative influence of local political and social conditions. In Hungary and in East-Central Europe in general, where the formation of the nation-state was hindered by a number of factors, national liberalism became prevalent. The national motif was present also in the classical liberalism of England or France, but in these countries it did not receive such great emphasis, as there the nation-state already existed in its com-

plete form. In East-Central Europe, however, several essential conditions were missing.

The Hungarian liberal reform movement manifested itself in several areas and in several phases. The political leaders of its different trends frequently engaged in heated debate with each other, as well as with their non-liberal opponents. What they had in common was that they all wanted to transform their feudal country into a liberal nation-state, and that they all came from the privileged classes, the magnates and the lesser nobility. They wished to "harmonize" the interests of the peasantry, the nobility and the bourgeoisie with the help of gradual reforms. Their differences showed themselves especially over the question of Hungary's relationship with the Habsburg monarchy, i.e. the government in Vienna. Count István Széchenyi, the pioneer of liberal reforms, attempted to avoid conflicts with Austria because, in his view, Austria's position in the international system was assured, whereas Hungary's power was weaker. His friend Baron Miklós Wesselényi, however, tried to bolster and develop the traditional opposition policy by linking it with the cause of reform, which appealed to a much larger group of the nobles. From 1836 onwards, Vienna tried to suppress this latter trend by means of lawsuits and imprisonments - but without success. A new compromise was reached in 1840 and the liberal movement was able to gather strength. The young lawyer Lajos Kossuth who, as a follower of Wesselényi, had been imprisoned for distributing his political paper issued in manuscript form and without permission, could now resume his activities. In 1841, Kossuth's new paper, the *Pesti Hírlap*, appeared and this became the main press organ of the reform movement. Kossuth soon became the political leader of the liberal opposition while getting involved in heated exchanges with Széchenyi who, fearing a new, more dangerous confrontation between Austria and the Hungarian opposition, attacked him violently. Following the French pattern, the theoretical preparations for the political structure of the liberal state were undertaken by the Centralists (Baron József Eötvös and his supporters). The emergence of other national movements (Croat, Serbian, Slovak, Romanian) which appeared in old multinational

Hungary presented a special problem. Generally speaking, the Hungarian liberal opposition considered the whole of historic Hungary to be its own nation-state and believed that the implementation of liberal reforms and the granting of personal rights would promote the cooperation and even the Magyarization of other ethnic groups. However, in 1842 Széchenyi warned his fellow patriots that Magyarization would create resistance and thus jeopardize the Hungarian national movement. In 1848, as is well known, the different nationality movements, each claiming a separate collective recognition, found themselves in conflict with the government of revolutionary Hungary. Although this government finally passed the first liberal nationality bill in 1849 – not long before its downfall – it was already too late. It was no longer able to resolve the problem.

The revolution of 1848-49 was actually carried out under the leadership of the liberal nobility although certain roles were played in it by the radical groups, including the young advocates of the "social republic". After the defeat of the revolution, the nobility began to turn away from the ideas of the movement. In the second half of the nineteenth century, after 1848 and especially after the Paris Commune, the Western liberal middle class also parted company with radicalism to an increasing extent and allied with the conservatives instead. Something similar also happened in the case of the Hungarian liberal nobility – mainly under the impact of the nationality movements among peasants. Disputes concerning the possibilities of and the chances for national liberalism were revived but emphasis was shifted more and more to the "national" aspect of the problem. In the social field, noblemen shrank from modifying the achievements of 1848 in the direction of democracy. As to the relationship with the Habsburg Empire, there was general protest against the vindictive, violent and absolutist methods employed in the 1850s, but more and more of the nobles were willing to make a compromise with Austria, provided that the terms were acceptable. In exile, Kossuth proposed a confederation of the peoples living in the Danube region but this could not be brought about because of the existence of the Habsburg Empire on the one hand, and the conflicting territorial claims,

for example, of the various movements of the nationalities on the other. Finally, in 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Compromise was agreed under the leadership of Ferenc Deák (minister of justice in 1848), as well as the Dual Monarchy system which survived until 1918. In Deák's view, Hungary, as a small nation, could not have continued to exist if left to fend for herself among Europe's larger states. He therefore sought a solution which, by means of alliance with Austria, would offer security to Hungary. In the decades to come there was much rather sterile political debate between the supporters of the Compromise and those of "independence". There were progressive liberal initiatives on both sides but these were pushed into the background by the more conservative elements of the nobility who were bent on defending their social positions and their roles as leaders of the nation.

Analysis of the contemporary press reveals that, towards the end of the nineteenth century, nationalism became prevalent in politics and that liberalism was subordinated to it in several respects (for example the new liberal nationality law of 1868 was never implemented). It should be emphasized, however, that even the anti-liberal elements manifested themselves within the framework of a liberal state. Furthermore, it should also be pointed out that the modern elements of the liberalism of the age also appeared and exerted their influence in such fields as the economy, culture and the regulation of law. After 1867, the press played an important role in popularizing the achievements of Western liberalism. At the turn of the twentieth century, the radical "bourgeois" democrats began a new battle against "feudal" remnants and the conservative forces. However, after the First World War and the two revolutions, liberalism entered a period of crisis.

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MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁK

ENLIGHTENMENT AND LIBERALISM IN THE WORKS OF SZÉCHENYI, KEMÉNY AND EÖTVÖS

ROMANTIC LIBERALISM

As in a brief paper it is hardly possible to give a detailed analysis of how the ideas of Széchenyi, Kemény, and Eötvös are related to the Enlightenment and to liberalism, I wish to concentrate on a single question, that of universal versus national progress. Besides the two concepts given in the title, two other systems of ideas will be mentioned: romanticism and positivism. Since my hypothesis is that historically these four movements constitute the philosophical context in which the thought of these writers should be examined, it will be useful to start with some general remarks.

To summarize the highly complex heritage of the Enlightenment is an almost impossible task. Still, it is not too much of an exaggeration to assert that its main historical function consisted in its antitheological epistemology: God was replaced by either human reason or by sensuous experience as the source of knowledge. Once we accept that the Enlightenment could be interpreted as a dialogue between rationalism and empiricism, it will become easy to see why romanticism with its cult of irrationalism and local values was both a reaction against the Enlightenment and a result of its internal conflict. Liberalism and positivism were even more closely related to the Enlightenment: the former could be called the political theory of bourgeois evolution, whereas the latter was characterized by an intention to establish facts in themselves by keeping phenomena free from interpretation,[1] and embodied a phenomenalist and

nominalist epistemology, a value-free approach to data and a unity of scientific method.[2]

"The individual is what he makes himself by assimilating his environment, and assimilates in proportion as he affirms himself by reacting to it. Liberalism is the belief that society can be constructed upon this self-directive power of personality."[3] If we accept this as a possible definition, we must regard Széchenyi as the first truly liberal thinker in Hungary. Although Wesselényi and even Kölcsey had a more specific political program, neither seemed to be so fully aware of the far-reaching philosophical implications of the liberal thesis that man should be self-governed and "valued not on the basis of his social rank and position but according to his intrinsic worth".[4] Paradoxically enough, Széchenyi's broader perspective may have been the result of the internal contradictions of his thought. While taking it for granted that unlimited self-development may be the goal of all, he considered the individual's relation to the community more problematic than most other disciples of the Enlightenment. His belief in the autonomy of personality and in national character made him somewhat sceptical about a uniform *Weltgeschichte*. His views exemplify both the continuity and the rupture between the Enlightenment and romanticism. Although he called the peasantry "the last support of the Hungarians",[5] and regarded "the well-being of the greatest number of people", "the civilized status of all the inhabitants of Hungary"[6] as the ultimate goal, he also valued creative imagination and originality in the individual. "Ich halte viel auf den inneren Werth des Menschen", he wrote in 1825;[7] his ideal was the autonomous individual, "the man whose soul is independent",[8] and he was aware of a possible conflict between these two orientations.

In sharp contrast with some 18th-century materialists – La Mettrie, for instance – Széchenyi viewed man not as a machine built after some model, but as an organism which had to develop itself according to its own inner resources. While advocating bourgeois evolution and technological civilization, he could not forget that the individual as such was respected more in a feudal than in a bourgeois society. His fear of col-

lective mediocrity and the triumph of bad quality brings him close to Tocqueville – whose *De la Démocratie en Amérique* he read "mit vielem Interesse" in 1842[9] – and to John Stuart Mill, whose treatise *On Liberty* (1859) was influenced by the same idea of organic *Bildung* which Széchenyi may have learned through his friendship with some of the leading German romantics.[10]

If Széchenyi's conception of human nature has to be described within the context of a dialogue between the Enlightenment and romanticism, the same is true of his interpretation of nationalism. According to him the *Bildung* of a nation is modelled upon that of the individual. His faith in progress is weakened, if not undermined, by a growing sense of historical relativism, which helps him to recognize each nation's right to self-determination and the necessity for religious tolerance. "Bin von der unbegrenztesten Toleranz, und würde, wie ich es wirklich glaube, wäre ich ein geborner Türke, mit derselben Gewissenhaftigkeit fünfmal des Tages meine Füsse waschen, mit der ich nun alle Sonntage regelmässig in die Kirche gehe, und alle übrigen Religions Gebräuche treulich beobachte, die in der meinen vorgeschrieben sind", he wrote in his second memorandum addressed to Metternich.[11]

Some believe that the ideals of universal and national progress had been in harmony until the fall of the revolution in 1849, when Habsburg absolutism turned capitalism into a means for the suppression of the Hungarian nation. Before we examine some works written by the two leading theoreticians of the post-revolutionary decade, it is worth considering at least one text by Széchenyi, not only because he was the first important writer to think of a possible conflict between the rival claims of universal and national progress, but also for the reason that this work seems to anticipate much of what the later writers would have to say.

Although this short book, *Hunnia*, was not published until 1858, it was written much earlier, between 1831 and 1835. It takes as its starting-point the fact that the population of Hungary speaks different languages and belongs to different religious denominations. In harmony with the rationalist

thinkers of the Enlightenment who seemed aware of the influence of irrational forces on history, Széchenyi is optimistic about the chances of mutual understanding, because "tolerance always breeds tolerance".[12]

Such an ahistorical assumption would suggest that Széchenyi had an unqualified admiration for the rationalism of the 18th century. This is far from being the case. His thought was unsystematic, and sometimes he seemed to hold extreme views, but these were in obvious contradiction with his most fundamental principles.

Such an inconsistency can be observed in *Hunnia*, which has a line of argument at variance with the initial hypothesis. The underlying intention is to make a compromise between universalist and conventionalist interpretations of culture. There may have been a special need for such a compromise in Hungary for at least two reasons: a) the *décalage* between the emergence of a cosmopolitan Enlightenment and a national romanticism was far less considerable, and b) the historical past rejected by the former and praised by the latter was more backward than in France or England.

It was by no means easy for Széchenyi to answer the question as to whether the Hungarian national character should be discovered in the past or created in the future. From the perspective of an enlightened liberal, Hungary's past was hardly more than a feudalism to be discarded, while a romantic would find national customs in that past which were to be preserved for the sake of the survival of the nation. In his attempt to solve this dilemma, Széchenyi draws upon Rousseau's idea of *l'état de nature*. Like the author of *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*, he distinguishes between three phases of human progress. The state of nature is followed by a loss in human values. The nostalgic view of the past brings Széchenyi close to romantic primitivism, but it also serves as a basis for his liberalism: he considers the peasant superior to the privileged, because "his life is more in conformity with the rules of nature".[13] Once this innocence has been lost for society as a whole, the future should bring a compensation for the fall

from *l'état de nature*. At this third stage "all the possibilities of both the soul and the body are realized".[14]

To arrive at this synthesis, the interests of universal and national progress must be compromised. There is no doubt that for Széchenyi, nationalism can never be oppressive; a supranational cause is of primary importance. "Let everyone preserve his mother-tongue. (...) But let this never turn anybody into an enemy of mankind."[15] Of the two dangers, cosmopolitanism and provincialism, the latter is the more serious. The lesser nobility, which Kossuth regarded as a partner of the bourgeoisie in the revolution of 1848, in Széchenyi's view embodied a narrow-minded parochialism. Those who belong to this class stayed in Hungary out of passivity and vanity rather than out of patriotism, while cosmopolitans left the country because they could find "more and better food for both the body and the mind"[16] in other parts of the world.

Since the Hungarian national character was bound up with feudal ideals in the past, it was to be transformed in the course of a bourgeois evolution. Yet the romantic notion of national character is an integral part of Széchenyi's line of argument. Unlike some universalist thinkers of the 18th century, he does not envisage the disappearance of smaller communities but advocates growing diversity as the necessary precondition for human progress. In his view, progress in the result not only of changing circumstances but also of education; it implies not only material but also spiritual values, and these latter are tied up with the diversity of fully developed cultures. In keeping with the romantic thesis formulated by Herder and Humboldt that language creates meaning, he associated the diversity of customs and beliefs with that of languages. If there are no universal rules in language and culture, "the survival of even the smallest and most primitive nation is of utmost importance"[17] for mankind, because each nation has the task of developing a unique culture.

For Széchenyi, liberalism implies not only bourgeois evolution, but also universal tolerance between nations. It is the second of these theses which makes him consider the survival of the Habsburg Empire to be almost indispensable. The popula-

tion of the Danube Basin was mixed in such a way and to such an extent, he argued, that no nation state could be created without violating the right of some other nation to create and maintain its own culture. Furthermore, the fall of the Habsburg Empire might prove to be a fatal blow to Hungarian culture, and one from which it could never recover. "All the nations of Hungary have relatives outside this country, except the Hungarians."[18] All these nations were backed by some great power. Because of this, the integrity of an independent Hungarian state could not be preserved after the disappearance of the Habsburg Empire, and so a liberal whose aim it was to transform Hungarian society would not wish to seek independence for his country.

SMALL NATIONS AND GREAT POWERS

This is the conclusion which both Kemény and Eötvös adopt from their predecessor.

It is somewhat surprising that recent scholarship has paid only scant attention to the religious traditions which may at least partly account for the difference between the *Weltanschauungen* of Széchenyi and Kemény. I admit that the significance of the fact that the former had had a Catholic education, whereas the latter had been a student in one of the best colleges of the Reformed Church should not be overemphasized. Kemény never entirely accepted fatalism and he struggled with the idea of predestination. Széchenyi much more often affirmed his belief in man's free will: "Stutzt man mir die Flügel", he wrote in 1832, "... so gehe ich auf den Füssen; – schneidet man die ab, so gehe ich auf den Händen; reisst man die aus – so krieche ich auf dem Bauch!"[19]

Such a great emphasis on self-will and freedom in creation may be related to romantic Titanism and as such is a far cry from Kemény's more ambiguous attitude. The title hero of his novel, *Gyulai Pál* (Pál Gyulai, 1847) certainly makes a serious mistake when he regards an individual as a means to an alleged political end, and even Elemér Komjáti can be reproached for his sense of superiority, in Kemény's last novel *Zord idők*

(Stormy times, 1857-62). In both cases the main character must fall, because he fails to respect individuality. Yet it would be misleading to consider Kemény as an unproblematic liberal writer. *Rajongók* (The enthusiasts, 1855-59), probably the most important work of fiction Kemény wrote, gives a different answer to the same question: Elemér Kassai is killed because he tries to assert his individuality and heartfelt conviction, in a world which does not tolerate diversity of opinion.

It is sometimes suggested that Protestantism paved the way for liberalism. The examples of Széchenyi and Kemény seem to weaken, if not to disprove, such a claim. Calvinism in general, and the Protestant colleges in particular, popularized a kind of fatalism. Kemény in Nagyenyed, the poet Arany in Debrecen, and the Utopian socialist Péter Tóth (1813-1878) in Sárospatak were all educated according to the principle that "my task is not to choose, but to take the role given to me",[20] and their whole lives could be interpreted as a struggle with that principle.

In any case, the different religious backgrounds of Széchenyi and Kemény cannot be ignored if one tries to explain why the author of *Hitel* (Credit) insisted that the Hungarians themselves were largely responsible for their backward state, and why the author of *Forradalom után* (After the revolution) was more inclined to the view that Hungary was a country under the influence of the great powers.

It is surely significant that two of Kemény's ancestors died in action, fighting the Turkish invaders. Simon Kemény fought in the army of Hunyadi and was killed at Szentimre, in 1440, while János Kemény became Prince of Transylvania and died at Nagyszőlős, in 1662. What is more, Zsigmond Kemény was born at Alvinc, in a village where Martinuzzi, a statesman whose goal was to preserve the independence of Transylvania from both the Habsburgs and the Turks, was murdered by the mercenaries of Austria in 1551. Kemény spent many years studying Martinuzzi's standpoint; his first and last novels focus on the aims of this highly intelligent politician.

It is not too difficult to explain this passionate and sustained interest. An avid reader of Montesquieu, Kemény was

convinced that large countries always tended to have despotic forms of government. For him Martinuzzi was a statesman whose ambition was to grant a degree of civil liberty to the population of Transylvania, a degree of civil liberty enjoyed by the subjects of neither the Habsburg nor the Turkish emperor, and to assess the limits of the freedom of a small country menaced by the great powers. He thus considered Martinuzzi's self-appointment to be a step which might inspire the leaders of small countries to emulation. In short, he viewed Martinuzzi as a champion of individual liberty and of the independence of small countries.

NATIONAL MINORITIES

It is of crucial importance that Kemény spoke of countries and states, not of nations. In his eyes the Principality of Transylvania had set an example for other states of how to resolve tensions between different ethnic and religious communities. Pursuing the analogy only insofar as it pertained to the situation of small states *vis-à vis* great powers, he compared the members of the Holy Alliance to the Austria and Turkey of the 16th century, without neglecting the important differences between the two periods. Accepting Montesquieu's thesis that "la propriété naturelle des petits États est d'être gouvernés en république; celle des médiocres, d'être soumis à un monarque; celle des grands empires, d'être dominés par un despote",[21] implying that individual freedom was greater in a small state than in a large Empire, he viewed the existence of small states as essential to human progress. However, he never ignored the historical fact that in the 16th century Transylvania had been one of the most enlightened regions of Europe, whereas at the beginning of the 19th century it was far more backward than the western half of the continent. Furthermore, he criticized even the Transylvania of Zsigmond János (1540-1571). The legal equalization of the three nations (Hungarians, Székelys, and Saxons) and of all the Protestant, including the Antitrinitarian, Churches was certainly a great step in the history of

civil rights because it diminished the privileges of the nobility, favored commercial interests and gave legal sanction to the civil rights of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, even this most tolerant ruler of the 16th century could be censured for not including the Wallachians and the Orthodox Church among the accepted nations and denominations.

The severity of this criticism becomes especially apparent if one remembers that, unlike most of his contemporaries, Kemény did not believe that the population of the Danube Basin had been more homogeneous before the Turkish occupation.[22] He even went as far as accepting the theory which postulated Daco-Roman continuity, considering it an important factor in the national self-consciousness of the Romanian population, without raising doubts as to its historical validity.[23]

Most Hungarians disagreed with such a radical revaluation of their attitude to the largest ethnic minority in their country. That is why he was unable to finish his speech in Kolozsvár, on 26 July, 1842. Tellingly enough, before he was interrupted by János Pálffy, in his last sentence he named liberalism as the guiding principle which might help to resolve tensions between different nationalities, and urged the Transylvanian nobles to grant legal rights to their serfs.[24]

BETWEEN ROMANTICISM AND POSITIVISM

Like Széchenyi, Kemény was a writer whose activity can be described as an attempt to combine the heritage of the Enlightenment with some romantic ideas. On the one hand, he adopted the romantic thesis that each nation's culture embodied specific values, on the other, he emphasized that national character could not be preserved without a bourgeois evolution, equal rights in court, the liberty of the press, and a compromise between the interests of the nobility and those of the peasantry.

In one respect, however, Kemény seems to be more critical of romantic ideals than his predecessor. His insistence that progress was the result of a change in public spirit rather than the work of individuals,[25] as well as his cult of "bal-

ance", clearly indicates a mistrust of the romantic cult of excess. While Széchenyi started his public life as a highly successful soldier in the Napoleonic wars, Kemény became a journalist in the much more provincial world of local politics in the early 1840s. In Transylvania, social problems were further complicated by ethnic and religious conflicts, and the complexity of the situation made Kemény a close analyst of economic conditions. For Széchenyi, Byron was an example to follow, whereas for Kemény it was Macaulay who served as a model. In 1853, Kemény wrote a review article on the first two volumes of the English writer's *History of England*, translated by his close friend Antal Csengery, and this essay served as a pretext for underlining the necessity of representative government.

Macaulay's influence in Hungary had never been stronger than it was in the post-revolutionary 1850s. The disillusion that followed the defeat of the revolution was favorable to a purely descriptive approach to society. Reviving the empiricism of the Enlightenment, Kemény developed a method of analyzing the mentality of different classes which heralded positivist sociology. His political theory was modelled upon English liberalism: Macaulay's thesis that hostile theories "correct each other"[26] may have inspired him to emphasize the necessity of a multiparty system.

The most appropriate way to describe Kemény's attitude is to call it mediatory liberalism, because his keyword "balance" indicates a middle position between opposite extremes. Condemning both conservativism and revolution, he advocated reforms but insisted on preserving continuity with the past. In his view the revolutionary is wrong because he intends to turn the country into a blank page,[27] and would therefore unconsciously flatter the Hungarians' inertia.[28] This argument recalls both Montesquieu's insistence that political systems should not ignore local traditions and the romantic concept of organic growth. More important is his objection to communism, for it testifies to his adherence to bourgeois liberalism: he regards inequality and the people's desire to have property as the *sine qua non* preconditions for progress.[29]

While József Eötvös, László Szalay, Ágoston Trefort, and Móricz Lukács called for centralization, and Kossuth aimed at the transformation of the decentralized county system into parliamentary democracy, Kemény expressed grave reservations about both orientations. Although he has been regarded by several scholars as an advocate of centralization,[30] the evidence contradicts such an interpretation: before 1848 he argued that centralization was a menace both to the liberty of the press and to the independence of public opinion, and made tyranny possible.[31] After the revolution he reiterated his belief that it was "in sharp contradiction" with the interests of the country, "irrespective of the ideas" it tried to spread.[32]

Kemény was no less critical of Kossuth's political program. Fully aware that Kossuth's intention was to create a representative system, in 1845 Kemény defended him against the charges of the conservative Emil Dessewffy,[33] although from the very beginning of his political career he was sceptical about the chances of using the lesser nobility and the county system as a basis for a bourgeois evolution.[34] His sociological bent made it easy for him to realize that liberalism was not only a system of ideas but also a matter of institutions, and this recognition never allowed him to accept the county system inherited from feudalism. In sharp contrast with some romantics who regarded local and feudal institutions as expressive of the national character, he was convinced that constitutional history had universal laws. He did not go as far as Madách, who identified the national character with "bad habits",[35] but local customs seemed to him only of secondary importance, and the only specificity he saw in traditional Hungarian institutions was backwardness.[36]

Some may suggest that Kemény's strength is in criticism rather than in originality. There may be a large measure of truth in such a statement. This negative attitude allowed him to understand the demands of the nationalities better than almost any of his contemporaries, but in political decision making, it resulted either in vacillation and inactivity, or in pragmatism – one remembers his reluctance to publish Petőfi's anti-monarchist article in May 1848, when there seemed to be

some hope for a reconciliation between the leaders of the Hungarian revolution and the king.[37] Scholars have found Kemény's post-1867 retirement somewhat puzzling, and have referred to his illness as the only possible reason for it. His sharp critical sense makes such a renunciation quite understandable. There is some reason for believing that he must have been tortured by doubts about the compromise he himself had helped to prepare. Kossuth's account of their meeting in 1859 may be regarded as faithful. His remark that Kemény was the first aristocrat from Hungary to visit him in ten years[38] is significant; it is quite possible that Kemény agreed with him on most if not on all the major issues,[39] for there are signs indicating his disapproval of the line of argument followed by his own party. His letters written to Miksa Falk in 1860, expressing his impatience with derogatory attitudes towards the Romanians, testify to his uneasiness.[40]

CENTRAL EUROPE

If we compare the political and historical ideas of Kemény and Eötvös, two differences seem to be fundamental. Kemény's conception of balance – mutual control exercised over one another by right- and left-wing forces,[41] and suggesting an opposition of parties transcending the opposition of classes and the idea that the absence of radicalism impairs the political education of the conservatives and vice versa, implies a civil and enlightened form of government, but may easily lead to stasis and even to sterility. Kemény seems to have been unaware of this possible danger – implicit in his negative or polemical notion of balance – while Eötvös never lost sight of it when writing *Der Einfluß der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat*.

The other important difference between the positions of the two writers lies in their definition of the international context in which Hungary's role should be circumscribed. Eötvös followed the main representatives of the Hungarian Enlightenment when he took it for granted that his country was an in-

tegral part of the Western world and therefore had to imitate the model provided by England and other Western countries.

Kemény's definition of the place of Hungary and Transylvania was far more cautious. Making a case for some kind of limited cultural relativism, he argued for the integrity of Central Europe and tried to claim a unique mission for the multilingual Habsburg Empire, insisting on the importance of preserving it intact against Germany on the one hand and Russia on the other.[42]

In Kemény's estimation the Danube Basin had never been part of the Western world, but it needed to be clearly distinguished from Eastern Europe as well for the following reasons: a) the absence of a linguistic majority in very many regions, which would make the establishment of nation-states impossible; b) the difference between Western and Eastern Christianity; c) the use of the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets; and d) the presence of the Reformation in the Danube Basin, and its absence in the East. Agreeing with some leading exponents of the Enlightenment, Kemény looked upon the Reformation as a movement which not only anticipated but even laid the necessary foundations for a bourgeois evolution. In 1844, in an essay entitled "Modest propositions", he went as far as to suggest that liberalism could emerge only in regions where the Reformation had created the necessary preconditions for it.[43]

When making any value judgement about Kemény's ideas, one must bear in mind that the liberal opposition – organized to bring about a compromise between the interests of the nobility and the peasantry and thus prepare the transition from feudalism to capitalism – was much weaker in Transylvania than in Hungary; and that he could not escape the influence of the backward circumstances which preconditioned his political activity. That is why his position seemed to be less radical after 1846, when he was forced to leave Transylvania. Still, it is important to insist that his opinions did not change, only the context in which they were interpreted. In general terms, his liberalism may have seemed to be less radical in Hungary; but in one respect his attitude not only preserved its integrity but perhaps even gained in significance. In the 1840s, in an editorial in

Erdélyi Hiradó (Transylvanian Herald) he and the poet Mihály Szentiváni urged not only classes but also nations to bring their interests into harmony and proposed a "friendly alliance" to the Romanians.[44] This proposal appeared to be as unusual in Hungary as it was in Transylvania and suggests that Kemény's definition of nations was based on Montesquieu's, rather than on the romantics', principles. Viewing national character as the product of three factors, he subordinated both ethnic and linguistic considerations to geographical conditions, thus showing his fundamental disagreement with Széchenyi and his great indebtedness to the English and French Enlightenments.

A RETURN TO THE UNIVERSALIST LEGACY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

What Kemény attempted to achieve was a synthesis of Enlightenment empiricism and romantic nationalism. The rejection of rationalistic and normative standards, and the sociological emphasis which characterize the series of articles entitled "Life and literature", "Reflections on drama and the novel", and "Intellectual horizon" (all published in 1853) are in harmony with Montesquieu's thesis that institutions are as different in various countries as the latters' morals, needs, and conditions, and they indicate his desire to bring the empirical tradition into synthesis with a conventionalist view of culture inherited from the romantic theorists of national character. Unlike most, if not all, of his contemporaries, he was aware that the extension of individual rights to all citizens of Hungary did not do justice to the right of each nation as an organic whole to govern itself. He realized that a Romanian peasant preferred to remain a poor Romanian peasant rather than join the more prosperous and civilized Hungarian community, because he hoped to enjoy more freedom, prosperity, and education as a Romanian in the more distant future.

This insight is missing from the *chef d'oeuvre* of Eötvös, *Der Einfluß der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat*. This monumental work presents a system of ideas which is

more homogeneous than those of either Széchenyi or Kemény. This is why its main arguments can be summed up in a few sentences.

The ideals of equality, liberty, and nationality mutually contradict each other. Progress is impossible without competition, and competition is based on individual freedom, which, in turn, involves inequality. To distinguish between more and less civilized nations is far from easy, because greater freedom is always won at the cost of greater inequality, as the examples of Ireland oppressed by the English, the Negroes exploited in North America and the Red Indians exterminated in the same place, clearly show. The concept of nation is relegated to an inferior level; it is a matter of public memory. While Széchenyi tended to regard any vernacular as an all-embracing semiotic system which to a certain extent preconditioned beliefs and traditions, Eötvös - whose mother tongue was German — approached language in a far more pragmatic manner. Viewing it as a means of expressing pre-existing meaning, he was unaware of the difficulties of translation. Characteristically, he never checked the Hungarian version of *Der Einfluß der herrschenden Ideen*, done by others for him, and so did not realize the inadequacy of the text read by many. For him, linguistic diversity was a matter of course, the significance of which should not be overemphasized.

In this respect he seems to be closer than Kemény to the pre-Herderian epoch of the Enlightenment. While Kemény regarded Pan-Slavism as a serious danger because of its connection with the Russian tsar's desire to conquer new territories,[45] Eötvös almost ignored the movement, because he tended to underestimate linguistic and religious affiliations. Thinking in terms of historical nationality, he favored Czechs, Hungarians, Austrians, and Croats, who had historic rights centered around a territorial unit, as against Romanians, Slovaks or Serbs, who had not been recognized as historic nationalities in the past.

National diversity exists everywhere, he argued, so historians should not make a special case for Central or Eastern Europe. The principles of bourgeois evolution are the same in the Western world, and there is not the slightest doubt about the Hungarians' belonging to it. "An Lage und Verhältnissen, an

Größe und Macht in ihrer Geschichte und gegenwärtigen Stellung gleicht keines der weltlichen Völker den andern. Die Grundlage ihrer Zivilisation ist ihnen allen gemeinsam, und wenn wir von Portugal bis Polen, von Siebenbürgen bis über den atlantischen Ozean bei Völkern, die auf ganz verschiedenen Kulturstufen stehen, und die sich oft Jahrhunderte lang angefeindet haben, überall eben was die wichtigsten Beziehungen des Lebens betrifft, dieselben Begriffe wiederfinden, so muß wohl auch dasjenige, was in den Verhältnissen dieser Völker identisch ist, in dem einzigen gesucht werden, worin sie nicht von einander abweichen, nämlich in gewissen *Begriffen*, die ihnen allen gemeinsam sind."[46]

The progress of mankind is uniform, as the Utopian thinkers of the Enlightenment suggested, believing "that a natural form of government can be discovered corresponding, in the social sphere, to Newton's great laws in the physical".[47] National identity in itself plays no important role in history; its significance is almost limited to exceptional situations in which to preserve one's national identity is the only possible means of preserving one's individual liberty *vis-à-vis* the tyranny of the state.

More than a decade after the publication of his most ambitious theoretical work, in the period just preceding the *Ausgleich*, Eötvös felt compelled to give a more detailed and separate analysis of the nationality question[48] in response to the criticism that he had unduly neglected the issues of national identity in his earlier work. This much shorter book is a telling example of the way a positivistic underestimation of national characteristics marks a return to the view held by Voltaire and Diderot that differences between nations are due mainly to uneven social development. Thinking in terms of historical rather than linguistic nationality, Eötvös took it for granted that historical considerations would unite all peoples in the common support of the Habsburg Empire, and thought it unlikely that they would press for the destruction of that multiethnic state.

Let us try to draw some kind of a conclusion from our brief and sketchy comparison of the positions taken by Széche-

nyi, Kemény, and Eötvös on the question of universal and/or national progress. There can be little doubt that the romantic overemphasis of national values involved an imminent danger for liberalism, because it could have brought international communication to a virtual standstill. Eötvös was clear-sighted enough to realize this danger, but he failed to learn a lesson romanticism might have taught him. Lacking the bitter Transylvanian experience of Wesselényi and Kemény, he did not recognize the right of each nation to self-determination, for he shared the *aufklärisch* belief that any human being would prefer to join another nation which stood for higher social values.

It would be out of place here to ask to what extent such an excessively rationalistic assumption underlies all liberal systems of ideas. What can be safely maintained is that it did not help the survival of historic Hungary, despite the fact that the most explicit intention of Eötvös was nothing other than the preservation of the old frontiers of his country.

NOTES

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Der Wille zur Macht. Versuch einer Umwertung aller Werte* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1980), p. 337.

2 Leszek Kolakowski, *Positivist Philosophy from Hume to the Vienna Circle* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 10-19.

3 Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 156.

4 Count István Széchenyi, *A Kelet népe* (People of the East), In: *Gróf Széchenyi István Munkái*, vol. II, series II (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1905), p. 22.

5 Széchenyi *Világ vagy is felvilágositó töredékek némi hiba 's előitélet eligazitására* (Light, or enlightening fragments for the remedying of certain mistakes and prejudices), (Pest: Landerer, 1831), p. 68.

6 Széchenyi *Stadium* (The [first] stage), In: *Gróf Széchenyi István Munkái*, vol. II, series II, pp. 69, 38.

7 *Gróf Széchenyi István Naplói* (The diaries of Count István Széchenyi), vol. II (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1926), p. 705.

8 Széchenyi, *Világ*, p. 73.

9 *Gróf Széchenyi István Naplói*, vol. V (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1937), p. 584.

10 Mill himself acknowledged his indebtedness to German romanticism. See *The Six Great Humanistic Essays of John Stuart Mill* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1970), pp. 181-182, 197, 228, 232.

11 *Széchenyi Naplói*, vol. II, p. 709.

12 Széchenyi, *Hunnia*, (Pest: Emich, 1858), p. 5.

13 Széchenyi, *Hunnia*, p. 10.

14 Széchenyi, *Hunnia*, p. 11.

15 Széchenyi, *Hunnia*, p. 105.

16 Széchenyi, *Hunnia*, p. 14.

17 Széchenyi, *Hunnia*, p. 205

18 Széchenyi, *Hunnia*, p. 98-99.

19 *Gróf Széchenyi István Naplói*, vol. IV (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1934), p. 273.

20 Péter Tóth, *Napló* (Diary), (Budapest: Magvető, 1984), p. 188.

21 Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois* (Paris: Garnier, 1922) vol. 1. p. 122.

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GEORGE BÁRÁNY

THE LIBERAL CHALLENGE AND ITS LIMITATIONS: THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION AT THE DIET OF 1843-1844*

Writing about "The Evolution of Democracy in Our Fatherland" in the periodical *Athenaeum* in 1841, the liberal historian Mihály Horváth quotes Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* on "a twofold revolution" that

> has taken place in the state of society. The noble has gone down the social ladder, and the commoner has gone up; the one descends as the other rises. Every half-century brings them nearer to each other, and they will soon meet. Nor is this peculiar to France. Wherever we look, we perceive the same revolution going on throughout the Christian World.
>
> The various occurrences of national existence have everywhere turned to the advantage of democracy....
>
> The gradual development of the principle of equality is, therefore, a providential fact.

Wondering whether Tocqueville's observation applied to Hungary where the aristocracy's power was still decisive in the legislature, which was the only source of lawful change, and where the clergy, the ally of the aristocracy, had lost none of its privileges, Horváth nevertheless concluded that

> the principle of egalitarianism has started to unfold even in our constitutional monarchy limited by the power of the nobility.
>
> I believe that the triumphs of democracy spread and grow proportionately to [the spread of] civilization and enlightenment.

A Catholic priest himself, Horváth also noted the increasing attacks on the Church, attributing them neither to the

spirit of the Enlightenment nor to the decline of religious sentiment but rather to the progress made on the road toward equality. He saw religion as closely interwoven with secular power, with the clergy as an integral part of the aristocracy exerting significant political influence in society and backing the monarchy which, in turn, supported the Church. Consequently, those wishing to weaken the monarchic principle and to strengthen the constitution and "the seed of equality" inherent in it, resented ecclesiastical power. "Are not the foremost liberals the most vehement attackers of the Church?.... This force emanates primarily from amidst the lower nobility, in clearest proof that this is where democracy has put down its strongest roots."[1]

Horváth's example also shows that like the Catholic leaders of Hungary's great "reform generation" such as Széchenyi, Deák and Eötvös, priests, too, were susceptible to the liberal trends of the larger European scene, trends perceptible within the Church itself during the 1830s. At the Diet of 1843-1844, the continuing conflict between liberal Catholicism and the ultramontanism prevailing under Pope Gregory XVI erupted during the discussions about religious affairs as liberal advocates of a secular constitutional state clashed with the supporters of authoritarian clerical government.

At the reform diets of the 1830s and 1840s, the lengthy and often bitter debates on religious affairs (*vallásügy, vallás dolga*) revolved essentially around the demand of the liberal-controlled Lower House that Protestants of the Lutheran and Calvinist faiths be granted equal rights and reciprocity with Roman Catholics. The requests and complaints of other denominations were also considered on occasion, but attracted less attention. At the Diet of 1839-1840, a bill drafted by the Lower House to remedy the grievances of the (Serbian) Orthodox Church failed to win the support of the Upper House. Another bill submitted by the deputies at the same Diet in favor of granting the Unitarian faith the status of a received religion in Hungary proper (in Transylvania, it had enjoyed that status since the end of the 16th century) was accepted by the magnates in principle, but its consideration was postponed until full dis-

cussion of the reincorporation of certain parts of Transylvania into Hungary. More successful was the Lower House's initiative aimed at improving the lot of the country's Jewish population: accepted, at least in part, by the Upper House, the bill obtained royal sanction in 1840. The new law allowed Jews to reside in any city except the mining towns, and constituted an important step toward full emancipation.[2]

Because of a variety of circumstances, personal, political and historical, the Protestant question played a crucial role in the development of the momentum of Hungarian liberal nationalism, a role perhaps equal in significance to the acceptance of Magyar as the official language of the kingdom. Some of the most revered and flamboyant champions of Hungarian liberalism, such as Ferenc Kölcsey, Miklós Wesselényi, Jr. and Lajos Kossuth, were Protestants. Calvinism was frequently dubbed the Magyar creed, and not without justification. Of the nearly 6 million Roman Catholics in the Kingdom (including Croatia but not Transylvania), less than half (2.5 million) were ethnically Magyar. Yet of the 1.6 million Calvinists, all but 10,000 were Magyar. The 6.8 million Catholics and Uniates (Greek Catholics) constituted an absolute majority in the combined kingdoms of Hungary and Croatia, but the 2.4 million Calvinists and Lutherans represented the backbone of the Hungarian opposition to the Catholic Habsburg dynasty.[3] Again and again, Catholic conservatives used the terms "Reform Party" and "Protestant Party" interchangeably when referring to the liberal opposition in dietal debates. A similar tendency can be observed in the reports of the secret police agents. Although there was a liberal majority in the Lower House since the Diet of 1832-36 favorably inclined toward the cause of Protestantism, the Upper House continued to be solidly controlled by conservative aristocrats whose ranks included, at the Diet of 1843-44, 25 high prelates of the established Roman Catholic Church and its affiliate Uniate counterpart. The 1.8 million strong Serbian Orthodox community, whose privileges were repeatedly confirmed by the Habsburgs during the 18th century, was represented by the Metropolitan of Carlowitz and four bishops in the Upper House which, however, contained no Protestant churchmen.[4]

The peace treaties of Vienna (1606) and Linz (1645), consequently incorporated into Hungarian law, stipulated that Protestants had a right to the free exercise of their religion (*liberum exercitium religionis* or *confessionis*) within the confines of the Kingdom of Hungary. Although the Vienna treaty does mention rural townships and villages in addition to noblemen, the inhabitants of the free cities, and soldiers, the Treaty of Linz is more specific in its emphasis on the peasants' freedom of religion.[5] While conceding to Protestants the free practice of their religion, the Vienna peace treaty nevertheless stated that religious freedom must be exercised "without prejudice to the Roman Catholic religion".[6] This was an important and ambiguous qualification because all Hungarian laws enacted before 1848 took as their point of departure the treaties of Vienna and Linz as guarantees of the principle of freedom of conscience; but while Protestants argued that they should be the equals of Catholics in every respect e.g. in case of mixed marriages, and in their children's religious upbringing, the Catholic clergy insisted that the Catholic partner in a marriage could not be forced to violate Catholic dogma determining rightful attitudes vis-à-vis "heretics".

After the concessions won on the battlefield in the first half of the 17th century by such champions of Protestantism as the Transylvanian princes István Bocskai and György Rákóczi I, the victorious Counter-Reformation ignored and frequently violated the rights of Protestants in all the Habsburg lands, including Hungary and Transylvania. A change was brought about only by Joseph II's Edict of Toleration (1781), which confirmed the rights of both Protestant and Greek Orthodox believers to exercise their religion freely, while, however, safeguarding the primacy of the established state religion, Roman Catholicism.[7] Although Protestants did not achieve full equality with Catholics in the religious sphere, the members of all Christian denominations became equal in the eyes of the law and politically, and could no longer be discriminated against in appointments to public office, in residential requirements or in property ownership.

The gains made by "non-Catholics" as a result of Joseph II's Edict of Toleration were enacted into public law at the Diet of 1790-91. In the face of strong objections from the Catholic clergy, but with the support of enlightened Catholic magnates, Act 26 of 1790 became the Magna Charta of Hungarian Protestantism, while Act 27 confirmed the royal privileges previously granted to the Greek Orthodox Church insofar as they did not conflict with the fundamental laws of the country. The Lutheran and Calvinist Churches received full autonomy in religious and educational affairs, an autonomy qualified only by the royal prerogative of "supreme inspection", a limitation which was used effectively for political purposes by the conservative administration of Count György Apponyi in the early 1840s. Act 26 of 1790 still followed those provisions of the Edict of Toleration which maintained the jurisdiction of Catholic authorities in litigation involving mixed marriages and also maintained Croatia's discriminatory anti-Protestant laws. Further, Catholic dogma prevented Catholics from embracing Protestantism and the Protestant spouse in mixed marriages was at a disadvantage in decisions affecting the religion of children born from such marriages. During the reform Diets, the debates on religious affairs focused on the issues left ambiguous by Act 26 of 1790.[8]

Although the Diet of 1825-27 delegated a special commission to draft new legislation on divorce cases in which one of the parties was a non-Catholic,[9] a full discussion of mixed marriages, conversion, and "voluntary" agreement to the children's Catholic education (*reversalis*) did not take place until the long Diet of 1832-36. Protestant complaints that many Catholic clergymen violated if not the letter, then the spirit, of Act 26 of 1790, and that in arbitrating disputes the Crown appeared to favor the Catholic Church, were vigorously supported by Deák and the majority of the deputies, who argued that "the power of creating, repealing, and interpreting laws" was one of the basic rights of the nation represented in the Diet. There was an element of truth in Kölcsey's poetic hyperbole that "the sons of Luther and Calvin looked on in silence, while the followers of [Cardinal] Pázmány's creed competed with each other

in speaking up on their behalf". Even in the Upper House, Széchenyi competed with Wesselényi in championing the deputies' resolution which, however, was rejected seven times by the overwhelmingly conservative magnates.[10]

The inconsiderate use of the "second veto" (the first one being that of the Crown) on the religious issue increased resentment against the Upper House. Public opinion was further inflamed on the eve of the Diet of 1839-40 by the pastoral letters of the bishops of Nagyvárad (Oradea) and Rozsnyó (Rosenau) forbidding their clergy to bless mixed marriages without adequate assurance that the children would be brought up in the Catholic faith. This attempt to reopen in Hungary the "Cologne Affair" of two years earlier, in which Archbishop Droste-Vischering was able to force the Prussian government to yield to the papal curia in the conflict over mixed marriages, meant a reversal of the practice followed by the Catholic clergy for almost half a century. It aroused the indignation of Protestants and liberal Catholics and several counties threatened legal action against clergymen disobeying the state authorities' orders to perform the traditional ceremony without demanding a *reversalis*. Yet after prolonged dietal debates, the new leader of the liberals in the Upper House, Count Lajos Batthyány, joined by Széchenyi and Eötvös, as well as by the talented organizer of the young neo-conservatives, Count Aurél Dessewffy, amanged to convince the majority of the magnates to accept most of the provisions of the deputies' bill favoring complete Protestant equality with Catholics in the name of national unity. But the bill, submitted to Vienna only at the end of the Diet due to the dilatory tactics of the clergy and the administration, failed to obtain royal sanction and the Court's reply was postponed until the next Diet which opened in mid-May, 1843.[11]

The spirit of reconciliation which prevailed in the final days of the Diet of 1839-40 for a variety of reasons (such as Metternich's preoccupation with the Eastern Question and Deák's prudent moderation), contributed to the passing of the first Jewish emancipation act as well as to the compromise between the two houses on Protestant religious affairs. It also led to

a political amnesty, which benefitted Kossuth, Wesselényi and some other young patriots imprisoned during the late 1830s. But by 1843 the political climate had again deteriorated. Deák refused to attend the Diet because of the violence and bloodshed of the preceding electoral campaign. Széchenyi had alienated most of the liberals because of his public attacks on Kossuth, and for all intents and purposes, was, in his own words, the "government's man", although he denied it in public. Still supportive of the principles of equality and reciprocity between Catholics and Protestants, at the Diet he would begin by speaking in favor of the Lower House's resolution, warning about the need to reach a compromise with the Court, and end by voting for the compromise motion of Count György Apponyi, the new leader of the young neo-conservatives after the death of Aurél Dessewffy in early 1842. It should be noted, however, that Apponyi and other neo-conservatives, who were determined to break liberal strength in the Diet and even in the counties and who stood for cooperation with Vienna, were not totally subservient to the episcopate, let alone Rome. The Vienna nuncio, who was shocked by the liberals' proposals to grant full citizenship to Unitarians and Jews and who identified liberal doctrines with anti-Catholic and democratic ideas, commented that while Protestants at times were moderate, the young Catholic magnates spoke like heretics.[12]

The uncompromising mood of the Catholic hierarchy was reflected in the pastoral letters of the Primate and the bishops in 1840 on the matter of mixed marriages. It was further reinforced by Pope Gregory XVI's *Breve* issued the following spring as a result of Bishop József Lonovics' mission to Rome undertaken on behalf of the Hungarian episcopate. The *Breve* did, in fact, suspend certain rules of the Council of Trent for Hungary, and permitted the passive assistance of priests at mixed marriages without a binding commitment regarding the Catholic upbringing of the children, in order to prevent the couple from taking their vows before a "servant of a heretical religion", and the Catholic partner from leaving the Church. But the instructions Papal Secretary of State Cardinal Lambruschini attached to the *Breve* stressed that given the special ecclesio-political

conditions in Hungary, a mixed marriage without a *reversalis*, or one contracted before a Protestant minister, "even though forbidden, was still valid" (*illicitum sed validium*) from the point of view of the Church. This crucial point, that if all deterrents fail, the Church would accept as valid a marriage contracted in the presence of a non-Catholic servant of God, was, however, omitted from the pastoral letter of the Primate which relayed the contents of the *Breve* to the clergy, and was ignored by the *placetum regium* which allowed its publication. The resulting uproar in county assemblies did not augur well for the Diet of 1843-44. Instead of one or two bishops challenging the liberal opposition, the entire Catholic hierarchy now seemed to be ready for battle. In fact, Prince Primate József Kopácsi and other members of the episcopate expressed severe reservations in the ensuing debates regarding Apponyi's motion and submitted their own.[13]

Still, the Diet's initial reaction to the royal propositions was not unfavorable. Even the opposition had to admit that for the first time, the administration had included in the legislative agenda important reform measures such as a new penal code, the regulation of the Danube, dietal representation for the towns, the improvement of transportation, a credit bank, etc.[14] In a conciliatory tone, the Estates' address to the Throne enumerated the nation's grievances, including the delays in the replies to bills previously submitted, such as the one on religious affairs, but also expressed readiness to consider the royal propositions. Parallel to the drafting of the address, the Lower House began to discuss two topics which were high on the list of grievances. The first was a bill establishing Magyar as the official language in the legislature, of administration and of education in Hungary proper, and as a required subject in Croatian schools. A storm erupted, however, when the Croatian deputies insisted on continuing to use the traditional Latin in their speeches, and on their right to repudiate any new laws enacted by the Magyar majority without their participation.

The "Croatian question" also thrust itself into the discussion on religious affairs because the liberals wanted to abol-

ish the Croat municipal law excluding Protestants from Croatia and Slavonia. Other stipulations called for by an overwhelming majority in the circuit siltings after four days of debate were the retrospective annullment of *reversales* given in the past; complete freedom of conversion from one Christian denomination to another, and the abolition of the six-week long and much-abused compulsory religious education requirement; permission for the Protestant partner in a mixed marriage to remarry after a divorce became final; and the enunciation of the principle of full reciprocity.

Just before the acceptance of the deputies' message (*nuntium*) to the magnates, the representative of the Győr chapter, Canon Károly Vurda, deplored the discussion of religious affairs at the Diet and took a stand favoring religious freedom for all and the separation of Church and state. Vurda also expressed preference for a Magyar national school system as against the existing denominational one. Although he was repudiated by the rest of the clergy and replaced soon afterwards by a more obedient priest, the episode illustrates the impact of liberal nationalism on Catholic thought.[15]

The Lower House considered separate resolutions on the papal *Breve* and the use of the *placetum regium* in the publication of such papal documents, insisting also that the Royal Chancery return to the counties the records it had requested of legal actions brought against priests who had refused to bless mixed marriages. But the receipt of the long-awaited royal rescript in reply to the previous Diet's bill on mixed marriages gave new direction to the discussions in early July.

The Court did not, in principle, reject the bill's provision that in order to allay the controversy regarding *reversales*, children of mixed marriages should always follow the father's religion. Yet the rescript suggested that in order to uphold the freedom of conscience and the parents' right of choice, the law should apply only when there was no voluntary parental agreement, which in any event should be regarded as a private contract outside the jurisdiction of the clergy. Although the rescript specifically accepted the principles of freedom of conscience and reciprocity in respect of Christian

denominations, it failed to satisfy either the Catholic hierarchy, which saw it as an intrusion upon church dogma, or the Protestants, who feared that it was intended to legalize the much hated *reversales* which had no foundation in Hungarian law. Some of the more radical deputies such as Móricz Perczel, Sabbas Vukovics and others expressed their indignation by suggesting that the Lower House suspend its discussion of the Magyar language bill which was almost ready at the time, and concentrate on the all-important religious issue. Yet other liberal leaders like Gábor Klauzál, Ödön Beöthy and Móricz Szentkirályi advised against undue haste.[16] In the Upper House where discussion on the royal rescript and on the deputies' reply went on for five days in September, Széchenyi stressed the positive aspects of the rescript as a basis on which a compromise could be reached, and Lajos Batthyány agreed with him. Eötvös made an eloquent plea for a comprehensive law proclaiming "the full equality of all religions, total reciprocity in all religious affairs, and the complete liberty of all religions". Pointing out that the Court's answer dealt only with one part of the Diet's bill, he nevertheless thought that the administration could no longer retract the principles of religious equality and reciprocity incorporated in the rescript. For the benefit of his liberal confrères, he also cited the authoritative opinion of Karl Rotteck whose pamphlet, written at the time of the Cologne affair, approved of legislative guidelines for the education of children of mixed marriages as long as the parents were free to choose an alternative solution incorporated in a marital contract. In this respect, Eötvös found the royal rescript superior to the Diet's earlier proposal.[17] In another interlocution, Eötvös gave a superb analysis of the dangers inherent in the lack of a distinct separation between the spiritual religious sphere and the worldly domain of the state. While condemning the Catholic clergy's violations of existing laws since 1838, he also rejected the deputies' proposal to use force against the clergy. Yet he agreed with the Lower House's *nuntium* that the autonomy of religious denominations in a modern state is impossible without the government's right to supreme supervision and to punish unlawful acts.[18]

Clearly, not all participants in the at times repetitious, long-winded and legalistic discussions were able to display the moderation, civility, and sophistication of Eötvös. However, there were some remarkable efforts at walking the tightrope between the touchy and conflicting relationship between Church and state. Even when tempers rose, the motivation was respectable and emotional outbursts frequently showed the frustrations of humanitarian, albeit perhaps misdirected, impulses. The superintendent of the Lutheran Church, Count Károly Zay, "born a Hungarian citizen first and baptized Protestant only second", saw no reason why the Hungarian legislature of the enlightened 19th century should not invalidate a municipal statute forbidding Protestants to settle in Croatia. Count József Pálffy added that among Hungarians, there should be no religious discrimination because "the Protestant is as good a Hungarian as is the Jew or the Catholic", and if Croats were free to move to Hungary, Hungarians could also live in Croatia. Count Otto Zichy condemned "ugly" intolerance and religious fanaticism, referred to Christian philanthropy, the examples of Holland, Great Britain and especially North America, and demanded that "in this day and age... evil laws and useless municipal rights" be voided and the freedom for Protestants to reside in Croatia and exercise their religion be allowed. However, Count János Majláth, the erudite editor of the Catholic *Nemzeti Ujság* (National Gazette), ironically reversed the argument concerning the spirit of the 19th century, alleged to be an age of sober reason and humaneness, by warning that in maintaining her municipal rights, Croatia was only imitating the anti-Catholic measures existing in several Protestant states such as Sweden, Norway or Denmark. He went on to say that tolerance was not the result of love and kindness but rather of necessity. Moreover, since Magyarism and Protestantism were said to go hand in hand in reinforcing each other, in protecting their municipal rights and Catholic Church unity against the introduction of a new religion, the Croats were also defending their nationality. With reference to Majláth's remarks, Bishop Lonovics noted that he considered the 19th century an age of tolerance, and hoped that Croatia would as soon as possible give up its discriminatory

municipal rights and cease to follow the example of Protestant lands that excluded Catholics.[19]

Space does not permit us to offer more examples. One will have to suffice to illustrate the heat generated in the debate over mixed marriages. Incensed by the papal *Breve* and the circular letter of the primate, Count Zay proposed the annullment of both, and the revocation of the *placetum regium* by the legislature if the administration were unwilling to act. An advocate of the union of the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches so that the latter's Slovak members might be Magyarized, Zay identified Magyardom with liberty and Protestantism, and as a shield against the Pan-Slavism promoted by the "Northern Colossus". Citing the circular according to which "a Catholic woman marrying a Protestant man and permitting their children to be brought up in her husband's faith commits a crime against God and nature", Zay launched a vehement attack against the clergy, ending by quoting an unidentified "distinguished man" who allegedly said "If our Saviour returned from heaven to earth, he would not be crucified by the Jews but rather by the hierarchy". Repudiated by the presiding Archduke Palatine, Zay's words were reported to Rome by a shocked nuncio as characteristic of the atmosphere prevailing in the Hungarian Diet.[20]

It is noteworthy that in the matter of mixed marriages and *reversales* as well as conversion, the Archbishop-Metropolitan of Carlowitz and the other four bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church voted consistently for the liberal proposals.[21] But those who, like László Teleki, warned the "aristocratic element" in the Upper House not to use its unlimited veto against the nation's wishes in the religious question, or who, like Lajos Batthyány, thought that the Upper House would not accept the principle of reciprocity unless forced to do so, received a caveat from Bishop Lonovics. This talented apologist of the Catholic standpoint, who rejected both the Lower House's resolution and Apponyi's intermediary proposal regarding the *reversales*, insisted that in matters of religion and conscience, neither the individual citizen nor the Church should be subject to the power of the state, lest all freedom disappear, as hap-

pened "in a certain northern land which oppresses Catholics and Protestants equally",[22] a clear allusion to tsarist Russia.

It was Lonovics, Széchenyi's confidant in his Döbling years, who was instrumental, according to Mihály Horváth, in drafting the law on religious affairs which was ultimately passed by both houses and which obtained royal sanction at the end of the Diet.[23] Second in significance only to the law on the Magyar official language, Act 3 of 1844 was one of the few pieces of legislation born as a result of eighteen months of often shrill rhetoric and futile Sisyphean labor. Silent on reversal contracts concerning children of mixed marriages or the admission of Protestants to Croatia, it legalized, *inter alia*, mixed marriages celebrated by a Protestant clergyman after the promulgation of the law, as well as retroactively for the period of March, 1839 to November, 1844. It also greatly simplified the conversion of Catholics to either of the two "received" branches of Protestantism by reducing the relevant requirements to two certificates separated by only four weeks, and by having the intent of conversion (*transitus*) declared in the presence of the would-be convert's pastor and two witnesses who could issue the certificates themselves in case of the clergyman's refusal. By producing the two certificates to the clergyman of the religion to which the person wished to adhere, the "transit" was completed. Half-yearly official reports on conversions were to be submitted by episcopal registries for the monarch's information through the Council of Lieutenancy.

There can be no doubt that this first major modification of Act 26 of 1790, which met Protestant grievances at least partially, was largely attributable to the inroads secular Magyar nationalism had made into the privileged preserves of both Church and royal authority. As shown in the dietal debates, Hungarian patriotism per se became a superior criterion to which a certain moral value began to be attached. In the archives of the abbey of Pannonhalma, there is a one-page document bearing the signatures of those who "were here on August 13, 1843, to pay their respects to the good patriot", namely Abbot Mihály Rimely, himself a participant in the Upper House's

debates. Széchenyi, Counts Béla Wenckheim and György Károlyi, the latter's wife, Caroline; and her sister, Antonia, Lajos Batthyány's spouse, all liberal "activists", signed the document. A month later, conservative Lord Chief Justice György Majláth and his wife added their signatures.[24]

Secular liberal Magyar nationalism was also the driving force behind the Diet's resumption of the consideration of the further extension of the civil rights of Hungary's quarter of a million Jews. The law passed by the previous Diet served as a point of departure, and the discussion developed in connection with the urban bill which proposed the granting of voting rights to Jews residing in cities. The ensuing debates, which went far beyond the question of religion and which cannot be analyzed here in detail, indicated that the representatives were divided on the issue; some even favored the withdrawing of the concessions granted earlier, while others suggested that Jews be given equal rights with those enjoyed by Christian nonnobles. After exchanging several messages, the two houses finally agreed on a bill which abolished the special "toleration tax" paid by Jews, allowed them to reside anywhere in the country without restrictions, opened the professions to them, and permitted them to lease noble property and engage in a variety of industrial and commercial enterprises. The bill's provisions and those favoring it made no secret of their belief that the assimilation of the Jews into the ranks of the Magyars was in the national interest. Although the bill failed to become law, its passage by both houses marked another step in the direction of full emancipation.[25]

The discussion of Jewish emancipation in the Diet confirmed again, as did the debate on the "religious question" of the relationship of Catholics and Protestants, that the issue of religion had become inseparable from that of nationality or ethnic affiliation in the multinational kingdom. Those who opposed emancipation often argued that Jews, especially in the urban areas, strengthened the German "element", as shown by their distorted German (i.e., Yiddish) speech, and that their full emancipation would result in massive Jewish immigration from Poland and Russia where Jews were severely persecuted.

The result would be the weakening of Magyar nationality.[26] Széchenyi took an essentially similar stand in his ambiguous and at times hypocritical remarks of October 1, 1844, quoted, in excerpt form, by generations of anti-Semites. While claiming to sympathize with "this unfortunate race expending so much industry in Hungary for some time" and acknowledging the merits of "a class" abounding in so many "respectable men", he nevertheless insisted that granting full equality to Jews would contaminate the Magyar nation. Disclaiming the least animosity against the Jews, Széchenyi mocked at Count Zay's fear of Pan-Slavism, and the latter's indifference to the danger posed by the Jewish "element, which has more intelligence and greater diligence" and hence should not be granted additional favors "at the expense of [those of Magyar] nationality". Two days later, Széchenyi again clashed with Zay in the general debate over the democratization of the town administrations, a proposal opposed by the aristocratic Upper House: linking the survival of the Magyars to the continued preeminence of the nobility and the aristocracy, he expressed the view that any extension of democracy would harm Magyar nationality.[27]

Ethnicity, fear of the German and Slavic "threat", proposals for the democratization of Hungary's constitution and social structure all intermingled with the religious question at the Diet of 1843-44, although the official label applied only to the relationship of Protestants and Catholics. The inherent Hungarocentricity of the religious issue, too, becomes clear if one scrutinizes the bitter dietal debate revolving around the municipal and linguistic rights of the Croats. The dispute, which can be traced back to the Diets of the 1830s, was further accentuated by the spread of Ljudevit Gaj's "Illyrian" movement aimed at the unification of all Southern Slavs, and by the foundation of the literary society, Illyrian Matica, in 1842. Liberal members of the Diet repeatedly accused Bishop György Haulik of Zagreb and young Croat seminarians of lending their support to the extremist anti-Magyar "Illyrian Party", which they described as a vehicle of tsarist Pan-Slavism.[28] Two years earlier, in the polemics following Széchenyi's attack on Kossuth in *A kelet népe* (The people of the Orient), Aurél Dessewffy

had reminded his compatriots of the centuries of internecine struggle among the various groups of Slavs and of their religious and historical differences; now, it was the president of the Upper House, Palatine Joseph, who in the interest of "the common weal of this fatherland", issued a caveat against the calls for separate nationality claimed as a right by "different fragments of this country's nation", insisting that "he who lives in the land of the Magyars, regardless of his linguistic background, is a Magyar, by virtue of availing himself of the rights, privileges and benefits offered by the country; there is no Illyrian, no other nation here but the Magyar.... our fatherland's well-being, to repeat, was founded hitherto on the unity and totality of Hungary's diverse nations, and I do not wish to abandon this principle in the future either..."[29] Amidst the charges of "Illyrism" and Russophilism hurled by Magyar nationalists against a high prelate of Croatia's Roman Catholic Church, it was, thus, an archduke of the House of Habsburg, the Lieutenant Governor of Hungary, who enunciated the principle to be echoed by Kossuth in December, 1847 in the course of another Croatian debate at the Diet, i.e. the negation of the claim that Croatians constituted a separate nationality because "there is but one *nation* here....I shall never recognize, under the Holy Crown of Hungary, more than one nation and nationality: the Magyar".[30] The formula that to the Magyar nation alone belonged the rights of full nationhood in the historic Kingdom of Hungary became the official creed of Magyar politicians for a century to come.

Aside from the linguistic intransigence manifest in the efforts to force the Croatian deputies to use Magyar instead of the customary Latin in addressing the Diet, the debate about the Croatian question revealed that national-ethnic rivalries had begun to create tensions even in the ranks of the theoretically supranational Roman Catholic Church, a tendency that was to become much more evident during the second half of the century.[31] With its references to allegedly Russian-inspired Pan-Slavism, the same debate also added an international dimension to the religious issue, the ecclesio-political significance of which went far beyond the dietal discussions, which

hardly touched on the problems of Eastern Christianity. Yet of the less than 9.7 million inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hungary, more than 1.1 million were followers of Eastern Orthodoxy and one-half of the Southern Military Frontier's population of 1.9 million belonged to the Orthodox Church. Of Transylvania's 1.5 million inhabitants, one-third was Orthodox. Uniates numbered 850,000 in Hungary proper, and over 400,000 in Transylvania. Of Hungary's total population of nearly 12.9 million around 1840, almost 2.3 million were Orthodox and 1.3 million were Uniates. These two groups of Christians of the Eastern rite constituted well over a quarter of the country's inhabitants. While Hungary's Ruthenians were all Uniates, two-thirds of the Serbs and more than half of the Romanians belonged to the Orthodox Church.[32]

Numbers alone do not tell the whole story. But without them our understanding of the religious debates at the Diet of 1843-44 would remain incomplete. As has been mentioned above, and noted emphatically by the nuncio in his reports to Rome, Serbian Orthodox high prelates voted rather consistently for the proposals of the liberal opposition, while the Ruthenian Uniate bishop of Munkács and the Romanian Uniate bishop of Nagyvárad defended the Catholic cause in the debate of the "religious question".[33] Yet even though Vienna traditionally favored the Uniate Church and promoted Uniate proselytizing among the Orthodox, forbidding the latter's clergy to oppose the union with the Roman Catholic Church,[34] rank-and-file Uniates often reverted to the Orthodox faith in the 1830s, especially in the Military Frontier region.[35] The spread of such practice, resented by both Rome and the Austrian and Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, was attributable not only to official reiterations of the right of the followers of Orthodoxy freely to exercise their religion. On occasion, converts to the Uniate Church were violently persecuted by their former Orthodox coreligionists and begged the Hungarian and Catholic authorities for protection.[36] The Orthodox Church of Hungary, controlled by a Serbian hierarchy since the time of Joseph II, also faced multiple challenges due to the growing self-awareness of the Romanians anxious to establish their own national Church.[37] The

possibility of an ethnically divided, polycentric and administratively multicephalous Orthodox world, however, each with its own independent momentum and consisting of different Church organizations was not something that papal and Habsburg officials or their liberal opponents could well imagine, because they were preoccupied with the existing reality of power concentrated in the hands of the Orthodox tsar of Russia.

Apprehension about Russian intentions, of course, was understandable. Liberals all over Europe abhorred tsarist absolutism, and Hungarians were in the forefront of those protesting against the harsh measures taken by Nicholas I against the Poles after their anti-Russian uprising of 1830-31 had been crushed.[38] But even Pope Gregory XVI and Metternich, two pillars of the "Age of Restoration", became increasingly concerned when the tsar, their partner in the European conservative alliance, restricted the activities of the Catholic Church in his realm in a series of steps culminating with the forced return of Uniates to the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1839. He also ordered the secularization of Catholic Church estates and interfered with Catholic liturgy and the editing of prayer books.[39] Although a modicum of controversy between tsardom and the Papacy enhanced the Austrian chancellor's stature as a mediator and was thus not entirely unwelcome in Vienna, the liquidation of the Uniate Church in Russia posed a potential challenge to the Habsburgs' traditional policy of strengthening the Uniate churches in their polyglot empire in order to weaken the anti-Catholic forces, and to exercise control over the Church-motivated budding ethnic-national movements. Tsarist expansionism combined with the Russification of cultural and religious life also threatened whatever faint hopes the Papacy may have had for the reunification of the eastern and western churches on Catholic premises. But neither the Russian government, nor the Holy See intended to cause irreparable damage to their relationship. As to Austria, her weak government could not afford to offend the Emperor-King's mighty patron in St. Petersburg; nor did the aging Metternich give up his belief in the need to maintain the Papacy's moral and political authority in the interest of protecting the counter-revolutionary order

established after the fall of Napoleon.[40] It is against the background of this precarious balance of the spiritual and secular powers dominating East-Central Europe in the early 1840s, and of the inseparability of ecclesio-political and religious issues that the debates of the Diet of 1843-44 must be evaluated.

A survey of the social, national, religious and international forces in Eastern Europe served as the point of departure for a book by Wesselényi, perhaps the most comprehensive Hungarian attempt to find a liberal solution to the nationality question in the *Vormärz*. Published in Halle to avoid censorship, the work appeared on the eve of the opening of the Diet of 1843 but attracted little attention.[41] In part a reaction to Széchenyi's Academy Address of the previous year, which cautioned against the excesses of Magyar superpatriotism,[42] Wesselényi's *Szózat a magyar és szláv nemzetiség ügyében* (1843) (An admonition on Magyar and Slav nationality) rejected the accusation that the Slavic, Romanian and other national movements in Hungary had been provoked by forcible Magyarization. Instead, he depicted tsarist expansion based on Russia's supremacy in Europe in the post-Napoleonic era as the greatest menace not only to the Habsburg Empire and the constitutional aspirations of its peoples but also to England, Prussia, France, the Ottoman Empire, and indeed to European peace.[43] As a Transylvanian landlord, the father of Hungarian liberalism was sensitive to the intertwined social and national oppression generating hatred against the ruling Magyar nobility. However, the remedy he proposed – the assimilation of non-Magyars by means of schooling and the extension of their civil rights, without, however, recognizing their separate nationhood (except for Croatia) failed to take into account the dynamism of awakening ethnic consciousness among the Monarchy's diverse national groups and grossly exaggerated the role of tsarist propaganda in the presumed coordination of revolutionary activities among Slavic and non-Slavic Orthodox peoples. Not unlike Nicholas Danilevskii, the apostle of Russian-led Pan-Slavism a quarter of a century later, Wesselényi anticipated the near-inevitability of a conflict between Europe and Russia, but to him, Rus-

sia, and not the West, was the single source of all evil. By way of countermeasures, he advocated the federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy and the forging of an English-French-German liberal alliance against both tsarist autocracy and revolutionary Slavism.[44]

In view of the existence of the Austrian-Prussian-Russian coalition, such plans were unrealistic. The idea put forward by this formerly unbending foe of Vienna's absolutism, broken by years of prison and illness, that Hungarian conservatives and liberals compromise on their differences and unite to face the Pan-Slav danger, proved to be untimely. Along with other political and economic reforms on the domestic scene, however, Wesselényi pleaded for granting the Eastern Orthodox Church a status equal with that enjoyed by the other "received" churches of Transylvania (i.e., the Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist and Unitarian). His purpose was to win the Romanians over from Pan-Slavism to the Hungarian side, since, he argued, Russian emissaries were able to rely everywhere on the Orthodox clergy working among the Slavic, Romanian and Greek common people. According to Wesselényi, even the Uniates of Transylvania regarded the Tsar as the head of their Church as a result of the policy of intolerance which forced them to accept the union with Catholicism. Full legalization and equal rights for the Orthodox would make it unnecessary for them to look to the Tsar for protection and the redressing of their grievances.[45] Aware of the resentment created by the tsarist persecution of Catholics, the Protestant Wesselényi pressed for overdue remedial action in a sensitive area of Orthodox religious rights, where the law enacted by the Diet remained silent; the concessions finally made regarding mixed marriages and conversion were not extended to the Orthodox but specifically confined to Lutherans and Calvinists.

This turn of events did not come to pass by chance. For an explanation one has to examine Vienna's attitude toward the "Orthodox Question", which may not have been clearly articulated but, as can be seen from the Austrian diplomatic correspondence with the Papacy, loomed very large behind the scenes. For even if a majority in the Hungarian Diet had been willing to

fight for the extension of complete religious equality and reciprocity to the Orthodox, as it had been willing to do in the case of the Protestants, the ultimate decision lay with the Court and was formulated by Metternich. The chancellor, however, preferred not to further weaken the authority of the Catholic Church, whose prelates were reliable supporters of the conservative cause even when concessions had to be made to the Protestants to keep the precarious loyalty of those willing to follow the directives of the Court.[46]

Metternich's decisive role in the formulation of Vienna's policies toward Hungary, especially in the years following the death of Francis I in 1835, has been well documented.[47] The chancellor actively participated in the preparations for the Diet of 1843, the opening of which he attended in person.[48] Detailed reports of the debates kept him up-to-date and engaged throughout the entire duration of the Diet, even when he was absent from Vienna on vacation.[49] The Austrian chancellor followed particularly closely the discussions regarding freedom of conscience and mixed marriages.[50] Essentially supportive of the Catholic point of view, he was nevertheless keenly aware of the debate's international implications; the tensions building up between Catholics and Protestants on the one hand, and between Catholics and the Greek Orthodox on the other. While pragmatic himself, he knew that at times the heads of the different Churches, including the pope, were bound by firmly set dogma and hence unable to accept a compromise, as shown by his comments on the contemplated marriage between Count Jozsef Esterházy and the Countess Elena Bezobrazova, widow of Count Alexander Apraksin.[51] That the chancellor was a past master in turning such situations to his own advantage the tsar himself was to experience.

It is well known that in Metternich's view, the Archduke Palatine Joseph bore a heavy responsibility for what he considered the state of near anarchy in Hungary. In the "religious question" too, the Palatine was the unwitting dupe of the "Protestant Party".[52] In spite of such rhetoric, it was Metternich who pushed through the new law on mixed marriages and conversion of Catholics to the Lutheran and Calvinist faiths on

grounds of *raison d'état*, which also compelled him to accept the legislation making Magyar the official language of the kingdom.[53] But inwardly Metternich resented the Diet's intrusion into domains which he held were matters of royal prerogative, areas such as education, commerce and trade and, of course, religion.[54] He was outraged that towns, and other corporate bodies and autonomous districts, even... "the non-united Greeks so numerous in the land and who have always depended exclusively on His Majesty's grace, suddenly changed course and turned, to the amazement of all, to the Diet....Protestant assemblies, the Israelites....in short, every class of inhabitants....courted favor with this Diet and ignored the government, just as the latter ignores the country".[55]

The chancellor's true feelings regarding Church and state relations in Austria are expressed in a memorandum to the monarch written less than two weeks after the royal resolution of March 25, 1844, which served as the basis for the Hungarian law on mixed marriages ultimately passed by the Diet. Departing from "the religious question raised in Hungary, solved forever ....by the measure taken in accord with my advice for Hungary", Metternich suggested the elimination in the Austrian half of the monarchy of practices which, in his opinion, endangered the good relationship between Austria and the Holy See. He specifically mentioned the Austrian laws on the marriage of minors and of military personnel, which conflicted with Catholic doctrine; state interference with the regular correspondence between religious orders and their superiors in Rome, and between bishops and the pope, as well as the interdiction of Catholics' theological studies in Rome at a time when Protestants were able to receive authorization to enroll at foreign universities on the recommendation of the Hungarian Diet. Abolition of such outdated relics of the Josephinian legacy, Metternich stressed, would guarantee friendly relations with Rome, whereas their continued existence could lead, under a Francophile pope, to "a European event of greater proportions than the Cologne affair", and to the unpleasant need to choose between belated and dishonorable concessions reluctantly made under the force of circumstances, or to a religious schism comparable to that in

Russia, something that was reprehensible both politically and morally.[56]

Metternich's repeated emphasis on Russia and the schism in the context of a memorandum considering not only Hungarian but also imperial and papal relations is of particular significance. As he himself said, the report to Ferdinand was written apropos of the royal rescript sent to the Hungarian Diet in reply to the latter's bill on the conversion of Roman Catholics to another Christian denomination recognized by law (a so-called "received religion") and of non-Catholics to Roman Catholicism. But whereas the preamble of the dietal bill of the previous September referred in general to "lawfully received religions", a term which included the Orthodox (non-united Greek) Church recognized as a "received" denomination by Act 27 of 1791, the royal rescript of March 25, 1844 took as its point of departure the previous rescript of July 5, 1843, which mentioned only Act 26 of 1791 and was confined to Protestants. Thus, followers of the Orthodox creed were *de facto* excluded. The royal rescripts also ignored the problem of mixed marriages and the upbringing of the children whenever one of the parties was Orthodox, maintaining, thereby, the *status quo* which favored the Catholic Church.[57] After bitter debates, the Diet gave in to obtain the royal sanction. Yet the compromise, which marked a great step in the direction of full reciprocity between Protestant and Catholic, left out the Orthodox, primarily as a result of Metternich's adroit maneuvering behind the scenes, and the pressures exerted on him and other members of the Court by Papal Nuncio Lodovico Altieri.

The Austrian chancellor had decided that short of dissolving the turbulent Diet, concessions would have to be made to the Protestants. But he yielded to the nuncio's objections regarding the "schismatic" Orthodox the more willingly because he himself considered "schismatic" attitudes as harmful to the cause of conservatism, and he needed the issue for political-dynastic reasons as well. It is clear from the nuncio's reports to Rome that once the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy and the papacy had resigned themselves to granting reciprocity to Lutherans and Calvinists in the matters of mixed marriages and

conversion, they were determined to limit the damage by refusing to accept the original dietal bill's language concerning conversion *ad aliam religionem lege receptam* or to give their blessing to a marriage contracted before an Orthodox pope. It is also evident that Metternich, the nuncio and Bishop Lonovics, who edited the final version of the law passed by the Diet, knew that they were violating the spirit of Act 27 of 1791 and the directive of Francis I which stipulated that the position of the Orthodox should be made equal to that of the Protestants. But Lonovics and Metternich agreed that in order to avoid greater harm, the "certainly not laudable act", as the nuncio called it, in which some members of the Hungarian episcopate did not wish to take a direct hand, would have to be implemented despite the sharp protest raised by the Metropolitan-Archbishop of Carlowitz on behalf of his two million followers. Since a substantial portion of the Diet mistrusted the Orthodox clergy, the Russophobe majority of the Lower House passed a resolution declaring that the Greek non-united Church must remain independent of any kind of foreign influence. Though it ultimately dropped this insinuation at the prodding of the Upper House the indignant objections of the Orthodox prelates to the new religious law fell on deaf ears.[58]

It is possible that in his adamant stand against making any concessions to the Orthodox Church in the religious question, Metternich was motivated primarily by the desire to nip in the bud any possible cooperation between Hungarian Protestants and other "Acatholics". The nuncio however may have been more concerned with protecting the Uniate Churches among the Ruthenians and Romanians of Hungary, because any measure enhancing the status of the "non-united Greeks" in the Habsburg realm might have added to the momentum of the dreaded process already developing in neighboring Russia, where Uniates were being completely separated from Catholicism and reincorporated into the world of Orthodoxy. In addition to these mutually shared concerns and anxieties, both the chancellor and the nuncio had another reason to take an uncompromising stand vis-à-vis the Orthodox faith: the renewal of Nicholas's plan to

marry his favorite third daughter, the Grand Duchess Olga, to Stephen, the son of the Archduke Palatine of Hungary.

The first initiative for a Romanov-Habsburg marriage alliance had originated in 1840 in Vienna rather than in St. Petersburg, and did not involve the Archduke Stephen. Nicholas embraced the idea two years later; his choice fell on the son of the same Hungarian Palatine whose late first wife, Anna Pavlovna, had been the tsar's sister.[59] The Archduke Palatine's marriage to the daughter of Paul I in 1798, which had made him the brother-in-law of the future emperors Alexander I and Nicholas I, was solemnized first in Gatchina in accordance with the Orthodox rite and afterwards in Lemberg (Lvov) in a Roman Catholic ceremony.[60] Aware of this precedent, Nicholas anticipated no problems; he also took at face value a written agreement between Paul I and Francis I according to which members of the two imperial families enjoyed complete reciprocity in matters of faith and could intermarry without the need for one of the partners to convert to the other's religion.[61] But the tsar miscalculated Metternich's influence over the members of the dynasty, as well as his resolve to prevent the proposed marriage, the political implications of which were unpredictable. For by the end of the summer of 1843, the Archduke Stephen was not only the designated heir of his father, the palatine of Hungary, but also the lieutenant governor of Bohemia.[62]

The Austrian chancellor was not about to enhance the stature of the Palatine, whom he detested, nor to assist his offspring in establishing a junior branch of the Habsburgs in Buda or Prague, or perhaps both, with the help of his prospective father-in-law, the autocrat of all the Russias. He also wanted to avoid further trouble with the Russophobe Magyars, who might, in case of a Russian marriage, oppose the Archduke Stephen's candidacy upon his father's death, although Metternich himself had mixed feelings about this same candidacy. Faced with an embarrassing situation, he declined Nicholas's invitation to meet with him in Warsaw in September 1843, pretending that, in view of the stormy sessions of the Hungarian Diet in neighboring Pressburg, his presence in Vienna was absolutely necessary. Instead of going himself, he sent the Austrian ambassador to

Russia, Count Ficquelmont, to meet with the tsar and to warn him that in order to marry the archduke, the Grand Duchess Olga would have to convert to Roman Catholicism.[63] In close cooperation with the nuncio in Vienna, and with the help of the devoutly Catholic dowager-empress, the reigning Empress Maria Anna, and the Archduchess Sophie, Metternich succeeded in transforming the issue of a dynastic marriage into a contest of wills between the head of Russian Orthodoxy and the spiritual leader of the Catholic world.

It has been suggested that, in view of the Papacy's total dependence on Austrian assistance in the *Vormärz*, the responsibility for the frustration of the tsar's marriage project was exclusively Metternich's. This opinion also tends to present the affair as another phase in the age-old rivalry of Habsburg and Romanov for control over the Slavic populations of Central and Eastern Europe.[64] This interpretation, however, underestimates the interest of the Catholic Church in preventing the Orthodox tsar from further strengthening his already menacing position in East-Central Europe, and also underestimates the superior skills of papal diplomacy. It was through the apostolic nuncio of Vienna that the Russian leaders of the Catholic and Uniate Churches in Russia threatened by Nicholas reported to Rome,[65] and Nuncio Altieri did not mince his words in describing the dangers inherent in the contemplated marriage between the son of the Palatine, who had married three times outside the Catholic fold, and the daughter of the "persecutor of Catholics" in Eastern Europe.

By the time the tsar revived his proposal for the Grand Duchess Olga's marriage to the Archduke Stephen in the autumn of 1843, the debate on the religious question in the Hungarian Diet had reached a critical point. The following February, Nicholas sent his confidant, Count Alexis Orlov, on a clandestine mission to Vienna to remind the Austrian Court of a secret convention of Paul I and Francis I, which recognized the principle of reciprocity in religious matters in the case of marriage between members of the Habsburg and Romanov dynasties. The agreement was unknown to Metternich, or at least this is what he told the nuncio, and the reminder coincided with the drafting of the controversial royal rescript which repudiated

the idea of reciprocity in mixed marriages involving a "schismatic" Orthodox partner. The coincidence of the Orlov mission with the Hungarian Orthodox clergy's demand for reciprocity with their Catholic and Protestant counterparts reinforced both Metternich's and Altieri's convinction that both endeavors must be frustrated in the interest of the Habsburg dynasty as well as of the Catholic Church. If there was any doubt of the need for joint efforts on this count, it was in the mind of the nuncio, who would have preferred to receive more explicit assurances from the chancellor concerning his determination to prevent the Habsburg-Romanov marriage alliance. Altieri even worried that Metternich might succumb to the blandishments of Nicholas when the tsar presented Princess Melanie with the Order of St. Catherine.[66]

As evidenced by the Viennese nuncio's at times emotional reports, usually marked top secret, the diplomatic tug-of-war concerning the marriage plan - which, in Altieri's opinion, was viewed with antipathy by both Germans and Magyars and would lead to the alienation of the Catholic dynasty from its peoples and to its "abandonment" of the Slavic "race" in Bohemia - continued for years after the Diet of 1843-44 had ended, so reluctant was the tsar to give up his favorite project. But although Nicholas went to Rome and saw Gregory XVI in person in an attempt to pave the way towards a concordat (ultimately signed in 1847), and to overcome Catholic objections to the grand duchess's marriage, his daughter did not become the Archduke Stephen's wife.[67]

Pertinent documents leave no doubt that the Austrian chancellor had the lion's share in this turn of events. It is clear from his instructions to Austrian envoys to St. Petersburg and Rome, as well as from his conversations with the Viennese nuncio and even the tsar's sister-in-law, the Grand Duchess Helen, that for tactical reasons he drew a sharp distinction between the "chimeric" autocratic system of government Nicholas adopted vis-à-vis the non-Orthodox Christian Churches in his empire, and the marriage plan involving his daughter and an Austrian archduke. He attributed the former to the tsar's profound ignorance of Catholicism, but nevertheless called it a historical

reality which the tsar and the pope would have to deal with to reach some mutual accommodation; after all, he said, seven million Catholics could be neither expelled from Russia, nor killed, nor converted to Orthodoxy. The Grand Duchess Olga's proposed marriage to the Archduke Stephen, however, belonged to the world of romance and was an illusion, although the tsar used it as *"une question de convenance politique"* according to Metternich. But as Nicholas wanted to go through with it "at any price", Metternich advised the nuncio to treat the affair as "a most valid stimulus" to obtaining concessions for the Catholic Church. He also thought that Nicholas would kiss the pope's hand at their coming encounter, and suggested that the Holy Father impress the tsar with a cordial reception and embrace him as a fellow-monarch, advice which was followed to the letter one month later in Rome.[68]

At the same time, Metternich assured the Archduke Stephen that he was in favor of the latter's marriage to the Grand Duchess Olga, warning him, however, that members of the imperial family including the two empresses and the Archduchess Sophie, were against it, as were the Hungarians. Széchenyi, who informs us about this, adds Melanie Metternich to the roster of imperial ladies, noting that he himself was in favor of the Archduke's Russian marriage. Yet Széchenyi's diary also reveals that leaders of the opposition in Hungary were ready to vote against Stephen's election as palatine if he married the tsar's daughter.[69]

Thus, Széchenyi's notes corroborate the nuncio's reports in some important aspects. Although the Diet of 1843-44 succeeded in dealing with a substantial portion of the Protestants' grievances, the "Orthodox Question" remained unanswered. Indeed, it was politicized as much as the Protestant problem used to be and also had serious international implications. While liberals saw in it a manifestation of Pan-Slavism, the most influential ladies at Court regarded it as a serious menace to basic Catholic doctrine. In the ultimate analysis, this, too, had political ramifications, evident in the prevention of the betrothal of the Archduke Stephen to Nicholas's daughter. Upon his return from a trip to Italy, the tsar was

confronted in Vienna by an irate Dowager Empress, blaming him for the destruction of Catholicism in Russia and demanding whether he would force an Austrian archduchess to change her religion if she were to marry a Russian grand duke.[70] Five months later, in May 1846, the Austrian Empress clashed with her Russian counterpart on the occasion of the latter's visit to Linz. Following a banquet given in her honor, Nicholas's wife touched on the subject of their daughter's marriage to the Archduke Stephen. The reigning Empress Maria Anna responded by saying that the Grand Duchess Olga would have been welcomed as a member of the Austrian dynasty had this not been made impossible by the tsar's refusal to desist from persecuting the Catholic Church.[71]

The altercations, intrigues and the atmosphere of mutual distrust pervading both the domestic and international aspects of the "religious question", especially as it applied to the Orthodox Church, are most instructive. They prove that even when the two chambers of the Diet, one dominated by the liberals and the other by the conservatives, managed to agree on the bills on the religious grievances of the Protestants and of the Greek Church, as well as on the admission of Unitarianism to the status of the "received religions",[72] this overdue progressive legislation stood to be sidetracked and considerably changed before it became the law of the land, as indeed it was. The Catholic Széchenyi's observation that the Diet had to wait for the royal rescript in the religious question because Rome's consent had not yet been received was essentially correct, although he was denounced for it to Metternich.[73] Széchenyi knew that Metternich not only manipulated the Papacy but also consulted it on important matters of faith.

Still, Széchenyi's old friend the British ambassador, Sir Robert Gordon, rightly considered the Diet's act on religious affairs, even in its modified form, as one of the three laws which were "of real importance". (The other two were the law on substituting Magyar for Latin as the official language of the Kingdom's entire public administration, and the law enabling persons of non-noble birth to purchase land and to hold public office.) But Sir Robert was unimpressed, with some rea-

son, by the thirteen pieces of new legislation which received royal sanction after thirteen months of dietal deliberations. He attributed these meager results to the clumsy machinery of the feudal Diet,[74] although Metternich and the Viennese government were far from blameless in frustrating Hungarian initiatives for reform.[75] It is also worth noting that the vigorous debates of the Diet of 1843-44 constituted an important landmark on the road to reform, even though the "Reform Party" was unable to enact its progressive resolutions. The significance of the Diet's preparatory work became manifest in the relatively smooth and lawful transformation of the feudal system during the revolutionary spring of 1848.

But for the time being, the closing of the Diet in November 1844 resulted in a victory for Metternich. Even the experienced and well-informed British ambassador to Vienna tended on occasion to underestimate the Austrian chancellor's diplomatic skills. Reporting on Count Orlov's mission earlier in the year, Gordon quoted Metternich, who had assured him, as he had the nuncio, that the tsar's envoy "returned as he came, meaning.... without having fixed a betrothal". Registering the strong feeling "against the marriage throughout all classes of society in Vienna" including the imperial family, the British ambassador nevertheless added that the Austrians have attempted to decline the marriage proposed by Nicholas "on the score of religion only; many think the Imperial Court will ultimately yield to the urgent wishes of the Autocrat".[76]

No such reservations were expressed in Sir Robert Gordon's concluding report on the Diet. Relaying "the conviction", presumably articulated by Metternich, that "the Diet as at present constituted was not in a state to originate any measure whatever of benefit to the country", the ambassador indicated that the conservative party and the government were planning to convoke another Diet, "possibly....in the next year", relying on "a different class of deputies" to put "an end to the rule of anarchy under which Hungary is suffering".[77] To be sure, the hand submitting the report may have been Sir Robert's but the voice was Metternich's. Indeed, by the end of the Diet, the chancellor had decided that "Hungary was on the edge of the

abyss of revolution":[78] even before the Diet was over, a royal rescript was sent to the counties which introduced the so-called system of administrators.[79] This step was followed by György Apponyi's taking charge of the direction of the Hungarian chancery in Vienna. The cause of liberal reform was effectively postponed until 1848.

It was in this phase of Hungary's *Vormärz*, in February 1846, that the Court attempted to write a postscript to the religious legislation of the Diet of 1843-44. According to a communication sent under number 3962/182 by the Hungarian Royal Chancery in Vienna and received by the Lieutenancy in Buda on March 25, the king had granted the request of the non-united Greek Orthodox that all the stipulations of Act 3 of 1844 concerning the conversion of Catholics to Protestantism (articles 5 through 11) could also be applied to those of Orthodox faith. The royal decree of February 21 also expressed the hope, "to be communicated to the archbishop of Carlowitz", that his clergy would abstain from "forbidden ways of seduction" and warned governmental agencies to pay "the greatest attention to this matter" and to prevent excesses.[80]

Couched in somewhat ambiguous language, the royal decree avoided the thorny question of mixed marriages.[81] Even so, it reversed the Court's previous position and was a serious concession to the Orthodox hierarchy, which thus succeeded in reopening in the country at large the debates of the preceding Diet, with Vienna's and the Hungarian neo-conservative administration's assistance.

Aside from the intriguing coincidence of the royal ordinance and the Cracow uprising, Metternich and Apponyi may have had good foreign policy and domestic reasons for mending fences with Hungary's Serbian dominated Orthodox Church. The considerations included signs of a détente between St. Petersburg and Rome, the Austrian need for Russian cooperation in the Balkans, especially in the imbroglio over Serbia, and the fading "danger" of the tsar-autocrat's influence in the Habsburg lands by means of an undesirable marital link.

All this needs further elucidation and research which extends far beyond the scope of the present study. The implica-

tions of the royal decree for Hungary are perhaps clearer, and hence should be considered in brief. It can be argued that the decree constituted part of the administration's preparation for the next Diet: it was an effort to prevent potentially oppositionist forces from uniting on the sensitive religious issue. It was also an attempt to secure the support of the country's Orthodox population.

The counties' reaction to the royal decision relayed to them by the Lieutenancy at the end of March depended on the effectiveness of the royal administrator, on their ethnic and religious composition, on the strength of the liberal opposition, as well as on other local conditions. The assembly of Torontál county, an area which had a mixed population including a substantial number of articulate and well-to-do Serbs, took note of the royal ordinance aimed at clarifying the status of the Orthodox, and wished to have it enacted into law at the forthcoming Diet.[82] Komárom's county assembly saw the ordinance as a grievance because it dealt with a subject which was within the competence of the legislature but was handled outside the legislative process. However, the county wanted to see it codified; and since it was considered to be reasonable, it accepted the ordinance on a temporary basis and ordered its dissemination.[83] Pest county, in a similar vein, stipulated the enactment of the ordinance by the next Diet desiring that "all inhabitants of the fatherland should be under the protection of the law in matters of freedom of religion and of conscience". The ordinance was also brought to the attention of the county sheriffs.[84] The merits of the royal decree were also acknowledged by the estates of the Zala county assembly. But the liberal opposition led by Ferenc Deák regarded its form – a royal decision – as a grievance, though he agreed with the royal intention. Arguing that the Greek Orthodox was not simply a tolerated but a legally received religion, Deák maintained that changes affecting it, however beneficial they might be, should not come via executive fiat, but only through the legislative process.[85] The Latin language(!) report about the vigorous debate at the Veszprém county assembly in early July also indicated that while the religious equality of the Orthodox Church

was not denied in principle, the constitutionality of effectuating it administratively was hotly contested by the liberals. At the same time, ultra-conservatives such as Count János Cziráky cautioned that however benign, concessions which made the transference from one religion to another more easy promoted the spirit of irreligious propaganda. The estates were about to draft a petition to the Court complaining about their grievance when, in the midst of the discussions, the receipt of a second directive from the Lieutenancy modifying the previous one caused them to desist. But they instructed their delegates to the next Diet to settle the matter by new legislation.[86]

Indeed, county assemblies held later in the summer and fall reacted with "pleasure and gratitude" to the Lieutenancy's second ordinance issued on June 23, which warned against the mass conversion of Uniates to the non-united Greek Orthodox Church, and which asked the counties to investigate such cases and to discipline Orthodox priests' "seducing" people to pursue this course. Sáros county wanted to clear up some of the ambiguities of the ordinance at the next Diet with appropriate legislation. Mármaros county, where Uniates prevailed among the Romanian and Ruthenian parts of the population, directed the county sheriffs to watch the Orthodox priests' activities.[87] The full measure of resentment, confusion and anxiety provoked by the two, in part self-contradictory, royal decrees can be gauged from the report of the ironhanded administrator of Bihar county, Lajos Tisza.

The report, which describes in great detail the turbulent four-day county assembly held in late September, also includes an incomplete copy of the Lieutenancy's June ordinance and the resolution passed by the county in response to it.[88] Tisza, who wanted to break the liberal opposition in every possible way, had to admit that "in spite of all my efforts", he was unable to secure the acceptance of the ordinance.

Sent to the Lieutenancy on June 12 and signed by Hungarian Chancellor Apponyi, with copies dispatched to the Primate, the bishops of the Roman Catholic, the Uniate and the Orthodox Churches, as well as to the municipalities,[89] the second royal decree expressed consternation that the Orthodox metropolitan,

"without authorization, prematurely as well as with dubious and broad interpretations" had decided to circulate the contents of the previous decree among his clergy. Although the June decree did not invalidate the one of February 21, it stressed the desirability of the union between the Roman and Greek Catholic Churches, while also maintaining the principle of freedom of conscience for all subjects. The critical point was that, in case of mass conversions to Orthodoxy in Uniate villages, the decree assumed that external stimuli were at work, a circumstance warranting the notification of both the Lieutenancy and the Court, whose replies would have to be "cautiously awaited" to forestall the forcible seizure of churches, schools and other ecclesiastical buildings, or local disturbances of the peace. With reference to article 13 of Act 26 of 1791, the second royal decree instructed the authorities to severely punish those Orthodox priests who induced groups or individuals of the Uniate creed to convert.

Reminding the Lieutenancy of their support for the religious freedom of each lawfully received religion over several years and at several Diets, the estates of Bihar, like those of Zala and other counties, condemned and registered as a grievance the *modus operandi* chosen by the administration to effectuate an otherwise laudable goal, which should have been achieved through constitutional procedure at the Diet. They also questioned the relevance of Act 26 of 1791 which dealt with Protestants. The use of article 13 of that law as a tool to discipline the Greek Orthodox ran counter to the spirit of the peace treaties of Vienna and Linz underlying this act; those treaties had specifically permitted the conversion of entire communities to Protestantism. The royal authorities' registering of groups converting to another creed violated the free practice of religion, and was reminiscent of the anti-Protestant measures which had endured for over fifty years after the enactment of Act 26 of 1791.

The Bihar assembly also criticized the Metropolitan of Carlowitz for having publicized the royal decree, through his clergy, before it had reached the counties. Bihar's resolution referred to "many people in the county's numerous Romanian com-

munities, who desired to convert to the non-united Greek creed". While the county was willing to accept the validity of the conversions of those who had followed the procedures prescribed in Act 3 of 1844, it regarded as members of their previous Church those who had failed to do so, and also delegated a mixed commission to look into future controversies arising between the Uniates and the Orthodox. Fear of restiveness among ethnic Romanians, apprehension of another attack on Protestant rights, and the reluctance of both Roman and Greek Catholics to make conversion easier — all combined in motivating the majority of the Bihar county assembly to reject, on constitutional grounds, both the June and the February royal decrees.[90]

Thus, the maladroit handling of the "Orthodox Question" begun at the Diet of 1843-44 came full circle. Instead of confirming the much struggled-for rights of Protestants acknowledged in 1844, the vacillating extension of parts of Act 3 of 1844 to members of the Orthodox Church tended to call them into question. Though lip service was being paid in all quarters to the principles of freedom of religion and of conscience, the practical measures resorted to in the conflict between constitutional and absolutistic forms of government placed severe limitations on all liberal tendencies in the body politic. The religious struggle of the *Vormärz* was one of the preludes to the contest of wills at Hungary's last feudal Diet which opened in 1847. Its tangible intertwining with questions of ethnicity, nationality and foreign relations became a major factor in aggravating the conflicts during the revolutionary upheavals that were soon to follow.

NOTES

* Parts of this paper are based on research sponsored by the International Research and Exchanges Board in New York and the Fulbright-Hays Faculty Abroad Program of the U.S. Department of Education in Washington, D.C. in 1981 and 1984, respectively. Final revisions were made and a concluding section added during a research trip to Hungary in the summer of 1986, which was assisted by a Fulbright award of the Council for International Exchange of Scholars in Washington, D.C. and by a grant under the Cultural Exchange Agreement between

the governments of the United States of America and the Hungarian People's Republic. For her helpful suggestions, I am also in the debt of my wife, Ernestine.

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2 Manó Kónyi, ed., *Deák Ferencz beszédei* (The speeches of Ferenc Deák), 6 vols. (Budapest, 1903), vol. I, pp. 529-30, 538-39.

3 Elek Fényes, *Magyarország statistikája* (The statistics of Hungary), 3 vols. (in one, Pest, 1842-43), vol. I, pp. 90-91.

4 Ferenc Kovács, ed., *Az 1843/44-ik évi magyar országgyűlési alsó tábla kerületi üléseinek naplója* (The minutes of the circuit sittings of the 1843-44 Hungarian Diet's Lower House), 6 vols. (Budapest, 1894), vol. I, pp. 81-83.

5 Pro-Coronation Act I of 1608, art. 1; Act II of 1647, arts. 5-19.

6 *Pacificatio Viennensis anni 1606: "absque tamen praejudicio catholicae romanae religionis".*

7 Moritz Csáky, *Der Kulturkampf in Ungarn* (Graz-Wien-Köln, 1967), pp. 12-13.

8 Friedrich Gottas, *Die Frage der Protestanten in Ungarn in der Ära des Neoabsolutismus* (München, 1965), pp. 10-12.

9 Act XXX of 1827.

10 George Barany, *Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism, 1791-1841*, with a preface by Boyd C. Shafer (Princeton, N.J., 1968), pp. 293-94; Kónyi, ed., *Deák beszédei*, vol. I, pp. 272-73.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 527-29; Barany, *Stephen Széchenyi*, pp. 348, 360-62.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 363.

13 Johann Graf Mailáth, *Die Religionswirren in Ungarn*, 2 vols. (Regensburg, 1845), vol. I, 53-81; Gabriel Adriányi, *Fünfzig Jahre ungarischer Kirchengeschichte 1895-1945* (Mainz, 1974), pp. 15-16.

14 Károly Vörös, "A magyar reformellenzék harca a polgári átalakulásért (1840-1847)" (The struggle of the Hungarian reformist opposition for the bourgeois transformation [of society]) in Gyula Mérei, ed., *Magyarország története* (The history of Hungary), *1790-1848*, vol. 5 in 2 pts. (Budapest, 1980), pt. 2, pp. 898-99. This new ten-volume history of

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16 Mailáth, *Religionswirren*, Vol. I, pp. 182-93.

17 *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 202-211, 230-32, 263.

18 *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 196-207.

19 *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 18, 15-19, 24-26, 62.

20 *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 174-77; Bálint Hóman and Gyula Szekfű, eds., *Magyar történet* (Hungarian history), 7th ed., 5 vols. (Budapest, 1941-43), vol. V, pp. 370-71; Altieri to Lambruschini, Oct. 6, 1843: "Matrimoni misti in Ungheria", Segreteria di Stato Esteri (hereafter SSE), Anni 1843-45, Rubrica 247, Busta 411. *Archivio Segreto Vaticano.* (Vatican City.) Henceforth: *ASV.*

21 Mailáth, *Religionswirren*, vol. I, pp. 412-13, 535-37, 540; vol. II, pp. 376-77, 442-443, 450, 528c, 535, 598.

22 *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 94-95, 444-49; vol. I, pp. 345-52 (for the citation).

23 Horváth, *Huszonöt év*, vol. II, pp. 405-406.

24 "A jó hazafit üdvözölni, itt voltak, August 13ikán 1843." *Főapátsági Könyvtár, Pannonhalma.*

25 For a survey of the dietal debate on the Jewish question in 1843-44 and its repercussions in contemporary Hungarian and German pamphlets, see Imre Csetei, "Adalékok a magyar zsidóság reformkorszakbeli történetéhez" (Data on the history of Hungarian Jewry in the Age of Reform), offprint *Magyar Zsidó Szemle* (Hungarian Jewish Review, cited hereafter as *MZsSz.*), 1928, pp. 25-40. See also the same author's "A reformkor első felének konzervativ sajtója és a zsidókérdés" (The conservative press and the Jewish question in the first half of the Age of Reform), *MZsSz*, XLII (1925), pp. 141-57 and "A negyvenes évek liberális sajtója és a zsidókérdés" (The liberal press of the forties and the Jewish question), *ibid.*, LIII (1936), pp. 172-85. For details of the debate in the Lower Chamber, cf. Kovács, ed., *Az 1843/44-ik évi*, vol. IV, pp. 184-209, 304-305, 594; vol. VI, pp. 6-23, 120-27, 196-99, 204-205, 214-17, 272-73, 326-31, 366-67, 376-77, 386-87, 296-401. A summary of the Jewish bill agreed upon by the two houses is given in Vörös, "A magyar reformellenzék harca", pp. 905-906.

26 *Felséges Első Ferdinánd Austriai császár, Magyar- és Csehország e' néven ötödik, koronás királyától szabad királyi Pozsony városában 1843dik esztendei pünkösd hava 14ik napjára rendeltetett magyarországi*

közgyűlésének Naplója a tekintetes Karoknál és Rendeknél (Minutes of the Hungarian National Assembly held under the auspices of the honorable estates and called into session in the free royal city of Pozsony for May 14 of 1843 by His Majesty Ferdinand I, Emperor of Austria reigning under the same name as the Fifth Crowned King of Hungary and Bohemia), 5 vols. (Pest, 1844), vol. II, pp. 308-309 (Deputy of Komárom county, Dénes Pázmándy). Cited henceforth as *Rendi Napló*.

27 Antal Zichy, ed., *Gróf Széchenyi István beszédei* (Count István Széchenyi's speeches), (Budapest, 1887), pp. 352-62.

28 György Szabad, "Hungary's Recognition of Croatia's Self-Determination in 1848 and Its Immediate Antecedents", in Sándor Balogh, ed., *Gedenkschrift Endre Arató*, vol. XXI of *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae* (Budapest, 1981), pp. 24-29; Emil Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe* (Budapest, 1981), pp. 213-16. For examples, see the speeches of Bishop Haulik, Count János Erdődy and Baron Levin Rauch, see *Felséges Első Ferdinánd Austriai császár, Magyar- és Csehország e' néven ötödik koronás királyától szabad királyi Pozsony városában 1843-ik évi május 14-kén rendeltetett magyar-országgyűlésen a' méltóságos fő-rendeknél tartatott országos ülések Naplója* (Minutes of the sessions of the Hungarian National Assembly held under the auspices of the Magnates and called into session in the free royal city of Pozsony for May 14 of 1843 by His Majesty Ferdinand I, Emperor of Austria reigning under the same name as the fifth Crowned King of Hungary and Bohemia), 8 vols. (Pest, 1843-44), vol. I, pp. 29-34. Quoted hereafter as *Főrendi Napló*. For the changing concept of an "Illyrian nation", see Emanuel Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation* (Düsseldorf, 1976), pp. 198-201, 273-74.

29 *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 33. For the debate following the publication of "The People of the Orient", cf. Barany, *Stephen Széchenyi*, pp. 389-99.

30 Kossuth's emphasis. Speech to the Diet, Dec. 11, 1847 in István Barta, ed., *Kossuth Lajos az utolsó rendi országgyűlésen 1847/48* (Lajos Kossuth at the last feudal diet), (Budapest, 1951), p. 382. Cf. George Barany, "The Awakening of Magyar Nationalism before 1848", *Austrian History Yearbook*, vol. II (1966), pp. 41-42.

31 Friedrich Engel-Jánosi, "The Church and the Nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy" and Michael B. Petrovich, "Comments", in *The Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century: A Critical Appraisal*, pt. III; *Austrian History Yearbook*, vol. III, pt. 3 (1967), pp. 67-82 and 130-33, respectively.

32 Fényes, *Magyarország statistikája*, vol. I, 52b and pp. 90-91.

33 SSE, 1814-1850. Archivio della Nunziatura di Vienna (hereafter: ANV), vol. 280 F. No. 1787, Oct. 22, 1843 ("Dieta d'Ungheria") fol. 156-57; SSE, 1814-1850. Nunziatura di

Vienna (henceforth: NV), Anni 1844-45, Rubrica 247, Busta 412. Altieri to Lambruschini, no. 2014, Oct. 31, 1844 ("Affari Ecctici di Ungheria"). *ASV.*

34 Keith Hitchins, *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1790-1849* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 139-45.

35 Fényes, *Magyarország statistikája*, vol. II, p. 51.

36 See the Latin, Hungarian and German documents attached to the petition of the Greek Catholic community of Illadia in Krassó county of the Bánát of Temes, SSE, 1814-1850. NV, Anni 1842-43, Rubrica 247, Busta 410. Altieri to Lambrus-chini, Oct. 21, 1842 ("Cattolici del Comuna d'Illadia").

37 Emanuel Turczynski, "The National Movement in the Greek Orthodox Church in the Habsburg Monarchy", in *The Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy*, pt. III, *Austrian History Year-book*, vol. III, pt. 3 (1967), pp. 83-128 and Petrovich, "Comments", *ibid.*, pp. 133-35. Also, Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation*, pp. 244-47.

38 Endre Kovács, *A lengyel kérdés a reformkori Magyarországon* (The Polish question in Hungary during the Age of Reform), (Budapest, 1959), pp. 7-243.

39 Eduard Winter, *Russland und das Papsttum*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1960-61), vol. II, pp. 237-47; Antal Meszlényi, *A magyar katholikus egyház és az állam 1848/49-ben* (The Hungarian Catholic Church and the state in 1848-49), (Budapest, 1928), pp. 17-19. For Metternich's misgivings regarding the growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the "non-united Greeks" within the Austrian Monarchy, especially the Serb-ian population in the Military Frontier districts, the prayers offered for the tsar as the head of the Orthodox Church by the non-united Greek inhabitants of Pest and Vienna as well as the Russian intrigues (*Umtriebe*) in both ecclesiastic and political affairs in Serbia, see Gustav Roloff, "Fürst Metternich über die slavische und magyarische Gefahr im Jahre 1839", *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung*, LII (1938), pp. 69-70. The Austrian chancellor was also highly critical, in the circle of trusted friends, of the Russian pressure exerted on the Ro-man Catholic Church of Poland according to the same Prus-sian report. For the reaction of the Holy See to the Rus-sian persecution of the "Eastern Catholic Church in White Ruthenia and Ukraine" (*sic*) as well as in the Kingdom of Poland during the 1830s, cf. Wasyl Lencyk, *The Eastern Catho-lic Church and Czar Nicholas I* (Rome - New York, 1966), pp. 132-38.

40 Alan J. Reinerman, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich* (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 22; Friedrich Engel-Jánosi, *Österreich und der Vatikan*, 2 vols. (Graz-Wien-Köln, 1958-60), vol. I, pp. 7-8; Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Metternich*, 3 vols. (München, 1925-54, vol. II, pp. 40-42.

41 Zsolt Trócsányi, *Wesselényi Miklós* (Miklós Wesselényi), (Budapest, 1965), pp. 468-69.

42 Francis S. Wagner, "Széchenyi and the Nationality Problem", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XX (1960), pp. 302-307; George Barany, "Széchenyi, America, and Assimilation". *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, XXXVI (1983), pp. 191-92.

43 For a detailed analysis, see Trócsányi, *Wesselényi*, pp. 452-68.

44 *Ibid.*, pp. 457-58; Gyula Mérei, *Föderációs tervek Délkelet-Európában és a Habsburg Monarchia* (Federative plans in South-east Europe and the Habsburg Monarchy) *1840-1918* (Budapest, 1965), pp. 16-21.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 18; Trócsányi, *Wesselényi*, pp. 455-56, 460.

46 Ludwig von Wirkner, *Meine Erlebnisse* (Pressburg, 1879), pp. 180-81.

47 Erzsébet Andics, *Metternich und die Frage Ungarns* (Budapest, 1973), pp. 7-8 and *passim.*

48 Hanns Schlitter, *Aus Österreichs Vormärz. III. Ungarn* (Zurich-Leipzig-Vienna, 1920), pp. 5-8, *passim.*

49 Friedrich Walter, "Metternich und Gervay", *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, IX (1956), 209-11, *passim;* Andics, *Metternich...*, pp. 218, 405-408; *Mémoires, Documents et Ecrits Divers, Laissés par le Prince de Metternich, Chancelier de Cours et d'Etat.* Publiés par son fils, Le Prince Richard de Metternich. Classés et réunis par M. A. de Klinkowstroem. 8 vols. (Paris, 1880-84), vol. VI, p. 647 (Journal de la Princesse Mélanie, May 20, 1843); vol. VII, pp. 15-17 (Journal de la Princesse Mélanie, Oct. 16 and Nov. 10-20, 1844). Cited hereafter as Metternich, *Mémoires.*

50 Schlitter, *Aus Österreichs Vormärz, III, Ungarn*, pp. 7-9 and 81-84, notes 17-23; Walter, "Metternich und Gervay", pp. 216-17, 219, 221, 225-26, 230, 252, 257-58.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 209 (Metternich to Gervay, Sept. 23, 1842; SSE, 1814-1850. ANV, 280.G, folios 248-50. (Altieri to Lambruschini, no. 2123, June 27, 1845).

52 Walter, "Metternich und Gervay", p. 258 (Metternich to Gervay, Aug. 26, 1843). For the Austrian chancellor's "most intimate thoughts" about the Archduke Palatine when the latter's death was expected in 1837, cf. Andics, *Metternich ...*, pp. 387-88 (Metternich to Ficquelmont, Apr. 11, 1837). Subsequent years did not change this opinion: cf. Walter, "Metternich und Gervay", pp. 217-18 (Metternich to Gervay, July 11, 1843).

53 Schlitter, *Aus Österreichs Vormärz, III. Ungarn*, pp. 9-19 and notes 24-63, *ibid.*, pp. 84-100; Walter, "Metternich und Gervay", p. 219 (Metternich to Gervay, July 13, 1843); Andics, *Metternich...*, p. 218.

54 *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 422. (Metternich's memorandum from 1844 on Hungarian conditions.)

56 Metternich, *Mémoires*, VII, 32-37 and note, *ibid.*, pp. 37-39. (To Emperor Ferdinand, Apr. 6, 1844, and Metternich to Pilgram, May 12, 1837, respectively.)

57 The Latin texts of the royal rescripts of July 5, 1843 and March 25, 1844 (docs. no. 25 and 125, respectively), are in *Felséges Első Ferdinánd Austriai császár, Magyar- és Csehország e' néven ötödik apost. királya által szabad királyi Pozsony városába 1843/4 esztendei pünkösd hava 14-ik napjára rendeltetett magyarországi közgyülésnek Irásai* (Documents of the Hungarian national assembly called into session in the free royal town of Pozsony for May 14 of 1843 by His Majesty Ferdinand I, Emperor of Austria reigning under the same name as Fifth Apostolic King of Hungary and Bohemia), 5 vols. (Pozsony, 1844), vol. II, pp. 4-5 and pp. 226-227, respectively. Cited hereafter as *Irásai*. A German translation of the Lower House's bill of September 21, 1843, the royal rescript of March 25, 1844 and of the final law can be found in Mailáth, *Religionswirren* ..., vol. II, pp. 550-56. The royal resolution of July 5, 1844 is *ibid.*, vol. I, 82-83. Pertinent Hungarian documents are under numbers 145a and b, 147, 148, 149, 162 and 163 on pp. 428-29, 436-45 and 519-23, respectively, in *Irásai*, vol. II. The text of the final act is *ibid.*, vol. V, pp. 102-103.

58 For the protests of the Orthodox high prelates, cf. *Főrendi Napló*, vol. 208, 214-16, 330. Also, especially for Rajachich, Endre Arató, *A nemzetiségi kérdés története Magyarországon* (History of the question of nationalities in Hungary), 2 vols. (Budapest, 1960), vol. II, pp. 195-97, pp. 291-92, n. 7. The ambiguity of the Archduke Joseph's attitude is noteworthy and probably related to the events described below. Concluding the religious debate as presiding officer of the chamber after the final interlocution of the Metropolitan Joseph Rajachich, the palatine insisted that throughout the preceding dietal discussions, the interpretation of Act 26 of 1791 was at issue and hence the new law, "naturally, can deal only with the relationship of Protestants and Catholics". But "otherwise", the archduke found Rajachich's remarks "very equitable and just", expressed the hope that the demands of the Oriental Church would be granted by His Majesty in due time and promised to do his best to achieve this end. (Session of November 11, 1844.) Yet he knew very well that the problems of the Orthodox Church and the applicability of the principles of freedom of conscience and full reciprocity of all Christian religious denominations had been considered at length in the debates, but the main thrust of the debates had revolved around the relationship

of Catholics and Protestants. In fact, the two chambers exchanged special "messages" regarding the "non-united-Greeks". See *Irásai*, vol. II, pp. 443-45 and pp. 523-24 (Docs. 149 and 164, respectively.). Cf. also *Rendi Napló*, vol. 1, pp. 255-60; *Főrendi Napló*, vol. V, 89-109. It is clear from the pertinent documents that as late as July, 1844, a majority in both houses and the palatine himself were inclined to extend the rights to be granted to Protestants to the Greek Orthodox and the Unitarians as well. See note 72 below and the relevant text. To further complicate matters, one may add that the palatine also knew that, two days before the royal resolution which served as a basis for Act 3 of 1844, on March 23, 1844, another royal resolution, no. 5267, issued in reply to a petition submitted by the "Orthodox Communities" the previous year permitted the holding of an "Illyrian" national congress after the end of the Hungarian Diet. Sponsored by the Serbian hierarchy, the Congress was to deal with the training and financial situation of the Orthodox clergy, with Orthodox religious foundations, and questions of education and Orthodox-sponsored schools. Its final agenda was to be approved by a "narrower committee" *(engeres Comité)* including representatives of the *Hofskriegsrat* (given the significance of the Military Frontier region which was under the *Hofkriegsrat's* jurisdiction) and the Hungarian chancery. The committee was supposed to request the advisory opinions of both the Metropolitan of Carlowitz, i.e. Rajachich, and of the Archduke Palatine Joseph. Yet after a voluminous correspondence dragged out for years by the different agencies (but often marked *statim*, i.e., "very urgent"), the national congress failed to convene until the spring of 1848, when the revolutionary events gave its proceedings an unanticipated, and for the Hungarians, unfavorable, direction. Cf. *MOL*, M. Kir. Kancellária, A 45, Acta Praesidialia, 1847, 280 cs., no 583/Pp. Act 20 of 1848, "On the Matter of Religion", which granted the Unitarian religion (but not the Jewish faith) the status of that of a received church, and which recognized the "full equality and reciprocity" of all legally received religious denominations (i.e., Christian churches) in Hungary, consisted initially of five articles, built essentially on the foundations of Act 3 of 1844. It was upon Kossuth's initiative of April 1, 1848, and in his formulation, that Hungary's last feudal Diet appended three additional articles to the original bill all dealing with the "non-united Greek believers", which thus completed what had been intended four years earlier but was frustrated at the time. In addition to extending the provisions of Act 3 of 1844 to the Orthodox, Act 20 of 1848 also stipulated the convening, "in the shortest possible time", of an Orthodox national congress with the kind of representation suggested in the petition of 1843. See István Barta, ed., *Kossuth Lajos az utolsó rendi országgyűlésen* (Lajos Kossuth at the last feudal Diet) *1847/48*, vol. XI of *Kossuth Lajos Összes munkái* (The collected works of Lajos Kossuth), in *Fontes Historiae Hungaricae Aevi Recentioris* (Budapest, 1951), pp. 118 and notes under * and pp. 4, 151, 154-55, 705-706, 713, 726, 730. Since, however, the negotiations between Kossuth and repre-

sentatives of the Hungarian Serbs broke down over the issue of recognizing the Serbs as a separate nationality in Hungary, the national congress held in May, 1848 in Carlowitz, elected Rajachich as patriarch, combining Serbian national demands with the spirit of Orthodoxy and indicating that Hungarian liberal concessions in the realm of religion and culture which fell short of granting national administrative-political autonomy failed to satisfy the Serbs. Cf. György Spira, *A nemzetiségi kérdés a negyvennyolcas forradalom Magyarországán* (The nationality question in revolutionary Hungary in 1848) (Budapest, 1980), pp. 26-29, 167-69; József Thim, *A magyarországi 1848-49-iki szerb fölkelés története* (History of the Serbian uprising of 1848-49 in Hungary) in *Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez* (Documents on the history of the nationality question), *Fontes Historiae Hungaricae Aevi Recentioris*, 3 vols. (Budapest, 1930-40), vol. I, 34-41, 84-94; vol.II, 198-201, 206-213; also, for the broader context, Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia 1740-1881* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 143-47 and Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918*, 2 vols. (New York - London, 1976), vol. I, pp. 242-44. As to the the significance of the contacts between Vienna and Rome in the matter of the Hungarian *religionaria* and the Romanov-Habsburg marriage plans, cf. SSE, 1814-1850. ANV, 280.G, folios 159-61, 163-69 (Altieri to Lambruschini, no. 1030, Nov. 15, 1844 and no. 2034, Nov. 29, 1844.) For Altieri's role, and the publicistic debate on the *religionaria* in Hungary between the *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung* (#313, Nov. 8, 1844) and the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* (#352, Dec. 17, 1844), see also SSE, 1814-1850, NV, Rubrica 247, Anni 1844-45, Busta 412 (Altieri to Lambruschini, no. 2048, Dec. 22, 1844: "Affari Ecctici di Ungheria") *AVS.*

59 Egon Caesar Conte Corti, *Metternich und die Frauen*, 2 vols. (Zurich, 1948-49), vol. II, pp. 413-14.

60 Mihály Horváth, *Nádor-emlék József nádor élete* (Palatine memorial; The life of Palatine Joseph), (Pest, 1865), pp. 21-22.

61 SSE, 1814-1850. ANV, 280G, folio 39 (Altieri to Lambruschini, no. 1884. Feb. 23, 1844: "Progetto di Matrimonio fra Arcid^{a}. Stefano, a la Granduchessa Olga", also *ibid.*, NV, Rubrica 16, fasc. 6, Anno 1846 (Altieri to Lambruschini, no. 123, Nov. 29, 1843: "Statuto della famiglia imperiale d' Austria interno matrimonimisti") *ASV;* Constantin de Grunwald, *La vie de Nicholas Ier* (Paris, 1946), pp. 226-31.

62 Walter, "Metternich und Gervay", pp. 226-37. Cf. András Gergely, "István nádor és a magyarok" (Palatine Stephen and the Hungarians), *Jelenkor* (December, 1985), pp. 1072-1086, and the same author's forthcoming volume (in press).

63 SSE, 1814-1850, NV, Rubrica 247, Anni 1843-45, Busta 411. (Altieri to Lambruschini, Sep. 15, 1843: "Invito fatto dall'Imp'. di Russia al Principe di Metternich in Varsavia"); *ASV*; SSE, 1814-1850, ANV, 280.F, folio 164 (Altieri to Lambruschini, no. 1794, Oct. 6, 1843): "Matrim° della figlia dell' Impe di Russia, coll' Arcida Stefano") *ASV*; Corti, *Metternich und die Frauen*, vol. II, pp. 415-16.

64 Winter, *Russland und das Papsttum*, vol. II, pp. 257-58; Alan Palmer, *Metternich* (London, 1972), pp. 290-91.

65 See Lencyk, *The Eastern Catholic Church and Czar Nicholas I*, pp. 124, 131, 133-35, 137-38, 141-42.

66 SSE, 1814-1850, ANV, 280.G, folios 38-44, 122. (Feb. 23, March 6 and July 26, 1844. Altieri to Lambruschini, nos. 1884, 1887 and 1979, respectively: "Progetto di Matrimonio fra l'Arcida Stefano, a la Grandduchessa Olga"), *ASV*, Cf. Grunwald, *La Vie de Nicholas I*, pp. 227-28.

67 *Ibid.*, pp. 228-44; Corti, *Metternich und die Frauen*, vol. II, pp. 419-20; Winter, *Russland und das Papsttum*, vol. II, pp. 248-56.

68 SSE, 1814-1850, NV, Rubrica 247, Anni 1844-45, Busta 412. (Viale-Prela to Lambruschini, no. 103, Nov. 11, 1845: "Sull' Imperatore di Russia", with two enclosed copies of Metternich's letter of Nov. 2 to Count Lützow and of his conversation with the Grand Duchess Helen. *ASV*. Cf. Grunwald, *La Vie de Nicolas I*, pp. 237-38.

69 Gyula Viszota, ed., *Gróf Széchenyi István naplói* (The diaries of Count István Széchenyi), 6 vols. (Budapest, 1925-39), vol. VI, pp. 291, 294, 303, and 331, entries for Nov. 29, Dec. 3 and 21, 1845, and Feb. 21, 1846, respectively. For Széchenyi's, perhaps unrealistic, hopes regarding the Archduke Stephen's marriage to the Grand Duchess Olga, and the relevance of these ideas to his expectation of transforming Pest into a cultural center developing around a splendid palatinal court, see Lajos Kovács, *Gróf Széchenyi István közéletének három utolsó éve* (The last three years of Count István Széchenyi's public life) *1846-1848*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1889), vol. I, pp. 137-43.
After his nervous breakdown and the defeat of Hungary's anti-Habsburg uprising of 1848-1849, in the asylum at Döbling, Széchenyi's thoughts would turn on occasion to the mirage. In some of his self-tormenting letters, bemoaning his country's fate and blaming himself for it, he wrote: ".... What else remains to be done? To pray, or the pistol! How disgusting - [and] now Stephen could be sitting as Palatine in Buda, probably married to the [Grand] Duchess Olga, and the Magyar race could be setting the tune and the beat in Austria! nay, in [all of] Europe!" Béla Majláth, ed., *Gróf Széchenyi István levelei* (Letters of Count István Széchenyi), 3 vols. (Budapest, 1889-1891), III. 631. (Dateline: Madhouse, Döbling, September 7, 1850. Széchenyi to Tasner. Translation mine.)

70 Grunwald, *La Vie de Nicolas I*, pp. 241-42.

71 SSE, 1814-1850, NV, Rubrica 16, Busta 413, Anno 1846, fasc. 6, folios 143-44. Viale Prela to Lambruschini, no. 254, May 19, 1846: "L'Imperatrice di Russia a Linz".

72 F.O.7/316, Gordon to Aberdeen, No 29, May 13, 1844. *Public Record Office*, London. (Hereafter: *PRO*) Leaders of the oppositionist magnates in the Upper House, Lajos Batthyány, László Teleki, and even the "Slavophobe" Károly Zay voted consistently in favor of granting the Greek Orthodox Church reciprocity with other Christian denominations. In addition to the references indicated earlier, cf. *Főrendi Napló*, vol. IV, 387 for Zay. In its fourth *nuntium* to the magnates, as late as September 21, 1844, i.e. less than two months before the end of the Diet the Lower House spoke of "all received religions" when dealing with the question of conversion (*átmenet*) and not only of Protestants. Kovács, ed., *Az 1843/44-ik évi*, vol. VI, 82-84.

73 Viszota, ed., *Széchenyi naplói*, vol. VI, 18 (Jan. 30, 1844).

74 F.O. 7/317. Gordon to Aberdeen, No. 75, Nov. 19, 1844, *PRO*, London.

75 Andics, *Metternich...*, pp. 220-21, *passim*.

76 F.O.7/316. Gordon to Aberdeen, No. 20. March 15. 1844. *PRO*, London.

77 F.O.7/317. Gordon to Aberdeen, No. 75, Nov. 19, 1844. *PRO*, London.

78 Metternich, *Mémoires*, VII, 52. "Aphoristic Observations Concerning the Situation in Hungary", written at the end of 1844.

79 Andics, *Metternich...*, p. 225.

80 *Magyar Országos Levéltár* (hence forward: *MOL*), Budapest, M. Kir. Kancellária, C 13, Benigna mandata. forwarded by the Royal Lieutenancy to the counties, dated March 31, 1846; "helyhatósági intézvény" no. 12,955.

81 As pointed out repeatedly at the Diet of 1843-44, Greek Orthodox dogma, unlike the Protestant, insisted on the sacramental character, i.e., the indissolubility, of marital status and was essentially hostile to mixed marriages; in this respect, its stand resembled that of the Roman Catholic Church. But in areas of mixed religion, the Orthodox Church had to accept the existing state of affairs, which implied the loss of its jurisdiction in cases involving Catholic-Orthodox intermarriage due to the supremacy of Catholicism officially maintained in Act 27 of 1791 as well. For Metternich's effort to "explain" his policies toward the Orthodox Church in St. Petersburg, see his letter to Austria's ambassador to Russia, Count Colloredo, dated

March 7, 1846. Insisting that the Hungarian Diet had no jurisdiction over the religious affairs of the Orthodox and hence Act 3 of 1844 had to be confined to Catholics and "dissident" Protestants, the chancellor nevertheless wanted to reassure the tsar that, via the royal prerogative, as indicated by the pastoral letter addressed to his followers by the Metropolitan of Carlowitz(!), the status of the non-united Greek church had been elevated (*entierement assimilée*) to that of the Roman Catholic. Cf. Erzsébet Andics, ed., *A nagybirtokos arisztokrácia ellenforradalmi szerepe 1848-49-ben* (The counter-revolutionary role of the great landowning aristocracy in 1848-49), 3 vols. (Budapest, 1952-81), vol. I, pp. 194-95.

82 *MOL*, József nádor lt. N 22. Praesidialia, 1846. 100 cs. No. LXXXII/3 (May 26, 1846).

83 *Ibid.*, No. LXXXIV (May 25).

84 *Ibid.*, No. LXXXVIII (June 9-10).

85 *Ibid.*, No. XCIII (June 15-20). For Deák's two interlocutions, cf. Manó Kónyi, ed., *Deák Ferenc beszédei* (Speeches of Ferenc Deák), 6 vols. (Budapest: 1882-98), vol. I, pp. 587-89.

86 *MOL*, Józséf nádor lt., N 22, Praesidialia, 1846, 100 cs., No. C (July 6-9); the Hungarian report under no. CI.

87 *Ibid.*, No. CXXIII (Aug. 24-25) and No. CXXXVII (Sept. 1-12).

88 *Ibid.*, No. CXLV and CXLV/3 attached to it (Sept. 23-26).

89 *MOL*, M. Kir. Kancellária. C 13, Benigna mandata, P. 9727/447. Received by the Lieutenancy on June 20, the latter forwarded the ordinance to the counties under nr. 24,190. Missing from the copy attached to Tisza's report are references to its distribution, to the establishment of special committees for 16 counties, and to the construction of Uniate parsonages and schools in three villages. The counties in question were: Bihar, Szabolcs, Bács, Arad, Temes, Krassó, Torontál, Békés, Csanád, Csongor, Mármaros, Körös, Varasd, Verőcze, Pozsega and Szerém.

90 For opposite views regarding the impact of the two royal decrees of March and June, see the complaint of the Greek Catholic bishop of Eperjes dated June 25, 1846, regarding the dangers threatening his flock as a result of the extension of Act 3 of 1844 to Orthodox believers, and the October 27, 1846 report from Temes county indicating that the dissemination of the two decrees led to no trouble whatsoever. *MOL*, Consilium Locumtenentiale, C 77. Departementum religionare Graeci ritus non unitorum, 1846. Fons 43, 5-5a and 6a, respectively. In July of 1847, ten months after Bihar county's protests against the royal decisions in the previous autumn and literally on the eve of the

elections to the Diet, the administrator of Arad county reaffirmed Bihar's anxieties. Reporting on the county assembly at which 251 inhabitants of Galsa submitted a duly signed petition indicating their determination to convert to the Greek non-united church with reference to the Lieutenancy's decree no. 12,955 of March 1846, the administrator suggested the invalidation or immediate suspension of the March decree. He pointed out that the petitioners claimed to constitute the majority of the followers of the Oriental rite in the village and demanded the return of the church building transferred to the Uniates from the Orthodox on the same principle thirteen years earlier. To yield to such a demand, in the opinion of the administrator, would increase tension among the population and present a particular danger in view of the large number of the Orthodox among the lesser nobles: The same source reiterated the reminder of "the numerous non-united Greeks among the nobility" on another occasion as well (*"nagyszámu görög nem egyesültek a nemesség közt"*). *MOL*, M. Kir. Kancellária, A 45. Acta Praesidialia, 1847, 280 cs. Nos. 608 and 645/Pp., respectively. (County assembly held on July 1-9, 1847.) Clearly, the conflict cut across religious, ethnic and social lines and could become explosive given the breakdown of the established order, at least in parts of the country. The Hungarian chancery to which Administrator József Faschko submitted his reports, advised the administrator of Arad on Sep. 12, 1847, to turn to the Lieutenancy for guidance in the Galsa affair and abide by its directives. *Ibid.*, A 45, Acta Praesidialia, 1847, 282 cs., no. 759/Pp. Significantly, article 7 of Act 20 of 1848, drafted by Kossuth as mentioned above (cf. note 59), provided for the maintenance of the *status quo* of January 1, 1848, in the matter of church buildings, forbidding the retroactive repossession of such buildings even if the majority of a community's "inhabitants of the Greek rite" decided to change their religious affiliation. (See also Kossuth's interlocutions of April 4 and April 5, in the latter case in reply to the request of Bihar county's deputy, Ödön Beöthy. Barta, ed., *Kossuth az utolsó rendi országgyűlésen*, pp. 726 and 730.) The link between the hitherto ignored "invisible debate" concerning the "Orthodox question" which continued throughout the *Vormärz* and the events of the spring of 1848 is evident. Accordingly, the relevant incomplete information should be reevaluated: cf. e.g. Árpád Károlyi, *Az 1848-diki pozsonyi törvénycikkek az udvar előtt* (The laws of the 1848 Pozsony Diet before the Court), in *Fontes* (Budapest, 1936), pp. 141-42; Antal Meszlényi, *A magyar katholikus egyház és az állam 1848/49-ben* (The Hungarian Catholic Church and the state in 1848-49) (Budapest, 1928), pp. 78-79, 85; Béla Tillmann, *1848: XX. t.-cz.* (Act XX of 1848) (Esztergom, 1904), pp. 9, 28.

[illegible]

[illegible] such a demand, in the opinion of the [illegible] would increase tension among the population and create a particular danger [illegible] reminder of the numerous [illegible] Greeks [illegible] nobility [illegible] as well [illegible] Acta Praesidialia, 1847 [illegible]

[illegible] could become [illegible] established order, at least in parts of the country. [illegible]

[illegible] Acta Praesidialia, 1847 [illegible] maintenance of the [illegible] of January [illegible] 1848 [illegible] majority of a [illegible]

[illegible] August [illegible] 1848 [illegible]

Hungary and European Civilization
Gy. Ránki (ed.)

LÁSZLÓ PÉTER

HUNGARIAN LIBERALS AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS (1867-1900)[1]

EQUALITY (EGYENJOGÚSÁG) OF RELIGION IN LEGISLATION

Church-state relations more than any other issue have been the touchstone for identifying Hungarian liberals, as anticlericalism and calls for civil equality for the Jews were most closely associated with what liberals stood for, at least in the popular view.

Anticlericals - particularly of the Protestant liberal opposition - demanded after 1867 that the Catholic Church be stripped of its privileges, that its property should be secularized, or at least that Catholic funds[2] be absorbed into state revenues and be shared out equally among the other churches. But there were Catholic liberals - mostly on the government side - who, instead of antagonizing their church, hoped to reform it from the inside. Their aim was church autonomy; they wished to introduce lay participation in a church government which would then administer church funds. Jewish equality in 1867 had a more general appeal to the literate public and to parliament than anticlericalism. It concerned firstly the demand that the Jews' civil and political disabilities be removed, and in these respects Jews were emancipated in 1867.[3] Hungarian liberals also understood by the equality of the Jews that their religion should be recognized by law, and that anti-Semitism in politics should be resisted.

These attitudes were all rooted in principles which liberals cherished or at least paid lip service to: the freedom and the equality of religious denominations in law, the indi-

vidual's liberty of conscience and the protection of religion by the state. These principles came naturally to politicians in Hungary where Protestants had demanded freedom for their religion for well over two centuries before the liberal age. The Diet of 1790 reaffirmed the Protestants' "liberties"; it also established the civil and political rights of the Orthodox Christians and recognized the privileges of their church.[4] Law III of 1844 introduced a few rules on conversions between Catholics and Protestants. These and one or two other measures had been antecedents to the introduction of the liberal principle of religious freedom which was proclaimed (if, for the moment, one disregards the small print) by Law XX of 1848:

> Complete equality and reciprocity without any discrimination is hereby declared among all the lawfully received religious denominations of the fatherland (para 2).

The legislator also declared that the state bear the cost of the "religious and educational needs of the received churches" and instructed the ministry to introduce legislation (para 3). The clause aimed at the setting up of a state-controlled education system.[5]

Eighteen years later, in 1867, the Deák Party did not intend to establish a network of schools largely under the control of the government. In fact Eötvös, the minister in charge of educational reforms in 1867 as he had been in 1848, was more willing to rely on the churches than he had earlier been.[6] But parliament and the minister were as committed to religious freedom and equality after 1867 as they had been in 1848. The slogan which invariably won "general approval" in the House as we find from the Journal – perhaps because it was hardly ever used in any specific sense – was "free church in a free state".[7] The House on all sides expected the government to act "in the spirit of 1848" and Eötvös needed no urging. He had been a champion of liberty of conscience for decades insisting that the principle could be realized only through generally applicable principles enacted by statute.[8]

In June 1868, Eötvös, speaking in the House for the Cabinet, gave a commitment to introduce legislation to implement what Law XX of 1848 had already promulgated. He also said, however, that he could not do so straight away. This was partly because parliament's timetable was full, and partly because the consent of all the churches involved had to be secured first. Also, Eötvös went on, the Catholic Church, which used to be in a privileged position, did not yet have the security of autonomy ("Who prevented it?" – interjected an anticlerical deputy[9]), which the Protestant and the Orthodox churches already enjoyed.[10] In fact, Eötvös was saying that the reform of the Catholic Church had to come first; comprehensive legislation could come only afterwards. Meanwhile temporary measures would be introduced.

The Preamble of Law LIII of 1868 On Reciprocity Between the Lawfully Received Christian Religions declared that:

> Until the equal rights of religions[11] are regulated in general, as regards the reciprocity between Christian religions by virtue of Law XX of 1848, the following are enacted.[12]

The Law contained a few regulations dealing with the conversions normally attending mixed marriages.[13] The measure was trifling after the bold principles pronounced in 1848, and the House which passed the bill in one sitting in November 1868 without a general debate accepted the Central Committee's plea to instruct the ministry to bring in legislation during the following parliament in order to "establish the equal rights of religious denominations in general" and to "remove all the [legal] obstacles to the realization of the principle".[14] The Andrássy Cabinet and its successors, however, dodged this obligation partly because the attempt to reform the Catholic Church, as will be shown, ran into the sand. Legislation so far as it was introduced at all after the Settlement remained fragmentary until the 1890s.

Law XXXI of 1894 then established civil marriage and Law XLIII of 1895, On the Free Exercise of Religion, enacted a few

principles and tacitly allowed a citizen to adhere to no religious denomination.

All in all, the law after 1867 was, in many respects, moving towards the ideal of confessional *egyenjogúság* (equality). But Hungarian liberals neither established freedom of conscience at any time nor introduced comprehensive liberal church reform, and these failures were the more significant because most people in the nineteenth century were deeply religious. Moreover, unwittingly, for it was not quite understood at the time, liberals created a discriminatory class system of religion which was an affront to the very principles they professed. To be fair, on church legislation liberals faced insuperable problems in Hungary.

OBSTACLES TO CONFESSIONAL *EGYENJOGÚSÁG*

The country was multidenominational in addition to being polyglot. Because religion, language-based nationality and social class coincided sufficiently[15] to reinforce conflicts in all these areas, liberal legislation by a parliamentary oligarchy of Hungarian landowners was hampered by national and class interests. The partial overlapping of language, religion and social class produced the following kaleidoscopic pattern. About half of the population belonged to the dominant Catholic Church. The rest were split in more than one way.[16] The magnates in Hungary everywhere were Roman Catholics (there were a few Calvinists only in Transylvania); while the wealthy gentry of Western Hungary was also largely Catholic, their counterparts in eastern Hungary were mostly Calvinists. The German town burghers were largely Lutheran. Though the peasants were Roman Catholics or Calvinists, the Slovaks were Roman Catholics or Lutherans, and the Ruthenians were all Uniates. Croats of all classes were Catholic; the Serbs were Orthodox,[17] and the Romanians were split between the Orthodox and Uniate churches. The influx of Jews from Galicia to Hungary during the second half of the nineteenth century created another considerable denomination. In addition, the so-called "sects" had spread

among the urban lower classes and the peasantry: Nazarenes, Baptists, Methodists, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, and Jehovah's Witnesses.

Social support for liberalism, the product of urban culture in western Europe, was fragile in backward and largely agrarian Hungary. This weakness hindered liberal church reform. There were many liberal aristocrats, but the aristocracy as a class never championed liberalism, though it accepted what was done in the name of liberalism. The *backbone* of liberal progress in Hungary was the gentry whose leaders, by and large, were professedly liberal and actively pursued liberal aims. But the attitude of the gentry class as a whole to liberalism was more problematic. Not all gentry landowners did well after 1867; many lost or were losing land, which undermined their commitment to liberalism. One sign of this was the rapid rise of the avowedly antiliberal "agrarian movement", another was the growing anti-Semitism of the 1880s. In contrast, people in commerce, industry, banking and the professions – medicine, law and above all, the press – were solidly liberal. These groups were to a large extent Jewish. Hence the popular stereotype inexorably linking liberalism to urban capitalism and the Jews. This weakened the liberal cause; it was to the credit of gentry liberal leaders that at least on the issue of Jewish equality they lived up to their principles.[18]

The social power and political influence of the Catholic Church which worked against change also constituted major obstacles to liberal reform. On the one hand, the Catholic Church, which as the country's dominant church, had, since the Counter-Reformation, been firmly tied to the House of Habsburg, became ever more dependent on the government after 1867. But the government and its parliamentary supporters also became dependent on Catholic prelates whose support against the Opposition they could not do without. A large contingent of Catholic bishops sat in the Upper House constituting the first estate of the kingdom.[19] Parish priests and pastors were not shy to use their considerable influence with the electorate. The government party and even more the minister, had to handle religious issues with one hand tied behind their backs.

The Crown represented a formidable barrier to reforming the Catholic Church, though not the other churches. Since the seventeenth century, the Habsburgs had claimed *ius reformandi*. This right was later understood as the Crown's power to determine whether or not a new church should be permitted to form, and under what conditions. In the nineteenth century the monarch still had wide powers in religious affairs, powers that were partly outside parliament's control and, since they were customary, were largely undefined. Next to foreign policy and army affairs, it was in Catholic Church affairs that the monarch's autocratic rights were best preserved after 1867.[20] In addition, Francis Joseph, a deeply religious man, was prepared to confront the Catholic hierarchy only on rare occasions. His minister, Eötvös, had to negotiate his way through a maze of autocratic practices as well as the strong sectarian prejudices of the Court, parrying the intransigence of the hierarchy on the one hand, and pressure from the Protestant anticlericals in parliament, on the other. Even a stronger person than Eötvös would have proved unequal to the task, and Eötvös undoubtedly did.

History had left deep scars on inter-confessional relations which did not heal in the liberal era. This heritage militated against reform because it was linked to political issues. In contrast to the Catholic Church, which was firmly tied to the Crown through the monarch's *ius patronatus*,[21] the Protestant churches, though in the past hemmed in by restrictions, were self-governing communities whose pastors and elders were elected by the congregations. The Calvinist Church was closely associated with the national cause and there was plenty of truth in the claim that the Hungarians "were Protestant before they became Catholic".[22] The memory of Protestant persecutions by the government and the Catholic hierarchy during the Counter-Reformation[23] did not fade away. The conflict between the privileged, aristocratic, wealthy and *kaisertreu* Catholic hierarchy and the rebellious Calvinist county gentry of eastern Hungary persisted after 1790. Both the anticlericalism felt towards the alien, "Papist", Catholic Church, and the gentry's resentment of the aristocracy were elements of the nineteenth-

century liberal outlook.[24] But these attitudes obstructed rather than helped liberal reform. The programme of equality of status and in law (*egyenjogúság*) for all confessions put most Catholic believers on the defensive; how far, they wondered, was the liberal programme merely a disguise for Protestant retribution? The post-1867 decades, at any rate, revealed a familiar pattern: the stronghold of anticlericalism was the Opposition because the government party, the defender of the Settlement and the imperial link, was more Catholic in character, while Tisza's Left Centre and the '48ers – the defenders of Hungarian national rights – were more Protestant.

The obstacles to religious *egyenjogúság* were partly overcome by the liberals, whose record on this crucial issue is nevertheless uneven. I shall first discuss issues concerning the Catholic Church, which stood at the centre of the debate about freedom of worship and religious *egyenjogúság*. I then move on to discuss government policy towards other churches before considering the general character of church-state relations after 1867.

CATHOLIC AUTONOMY AND THE GOVERNMENT

Notwithstanding the reputation of the Catholic Church as a staunch supporter of the Habsburgs, the habitual charge that it was, at best, indifferent to the national cause was not well founded even during 1848-49. In fact a number of the prelates – including the Prince Primate – who were appointed by Ferdinand in June 1848, were forced to resign after Világos because of their political involvements and in some cases strong commitment to the national cause.[25] Nevertheless, the new hierarchy appointed in the early 1850s and the clergy even more continued to champion the national cause. The Papal Nuncio was concerned in his reports to Rome lest the Hungarian prelates' political involvement should hurt the interests of the church.[26] Prompted by the Austrian government, the Nuncio advised Rome in 1861 to reprimand Prince Primate Cardinal Scitovszky and two bishops.[27] Antonio De Luca's more flexible successor, appointed

in 1862, was less afraid of Hungarian constitutionalism, but he, too, complained to Rome about the indulgence Prince Primate Simor and the bishops showed towards parliamentarians. He was particularly dismayed in 1867 to see Hungarian bishops ally with the Austrian and Hungarian liberals to ensure the destruction of the 1855 Concordat.[28]

Although Catholic prelates cooperated with politicians to restore the constitution, an act from which the church – as the first estate – benefited, the hierarchy's allegiance to the new order was suspect to most parties and even more to the press in Pest. But the prelates, afraid of the secularization of church funds and perhaps of their land, were lucky. In 1867, the government did not want a *Kulturkampf*. There was no trace of anticlericalism in the policies of the two leading government liberals, both Catholic believers and men whose attitudes counted the most. Deák was an adherent of the principle of "free church in a free state", which he sometimes understood to mean the *egyenjogúság* of self-governing churches, at other times, as the complete separation of church and state, as in North America. But on a more practical level, Deák wished to operate through winning consent. He rejected the idea of taking privileges away from the church by legislation, and repeatedly warned against the dangers of confessional conflict which he found distasteful as well as anti-liberal. Deák did not think that the time had come to introduce civil marriage, which he favoured in principle, but held to be too divisive in practice. And he resolutely opposed the partial introduction of civil marriage, proposed in 1867, because that would have made the marriage law even more chaotic.[29] On church reform, Deák supported Eötvös.

Eötvös as Minister of Religion (*kultusz*) and Public Education in 1848 and in 1867 did his best to convince the Catholic prelates that it was up to them to ward off the danger of confiscatory legislation. He urged them to reform church government and accept lay participation in it in a way similar to the consistory system of the Protestant churches. The government, for its part, would be prepared to transfer church funds[30] to an elected, partly lay, and largely self-governing body which

would supervise schools, administer the funds and deal with many other matters that otherwise would continue to be, as they had been in the past, the responsibility of the *kultusz* ministry. Some of the powers of the hierarchy would have to devolve to a partly elected body, a sacrifice, Eötvös felt, the prelates should be prepared to make in their own interest. For Eötvös the plan was not merely one of political expediency. A pen friend of the French Catholic leader, Montalembert, he never believed that parliamentary government in itself could be the safeguard of individual freedom; independent, *egyenjogú* and self-governing churches were indispensable for curbing the omnipotence of the excessively centralized modern state.[31] Just as the feeling of nationality, Eötvös thought, should be harnessed to serve social progress, religious feeling and liberal society should be reconciled through the shared principle of self-government. For Eötvös, as has already been shown, the creation of a self-governing Catholic Church was a necessary step before comprehensive legislation to guarantee confessional *egyenjogúság* could be introduced.[32]

The Prince Primate, János Simor, and the prelates also saw advantages in Catholic autonomy.[33] For the church's position had become insecure during the nineteenth century. For centuries the monarch had exercised *ius patronatus* over the church in Hungary, which included "the right" to appoint bishops as well as general supervision over the church (parts of these claims, being in conflict with Canon Law, were never recognized by the Holy See). Conflicts in church-state relations were a legacy of Emperor Joseph II's ten-year rule, when a system of Erastian policies and administrative tutelage hamstrung the church. The introduction of a responsible ministry in 1848 further exacerbated these conflicts. After the defeat of the revolutions, however, the 1855 Concordat reached between the Emperor and the Holy See largely met the church's grievances. The agreement exorcised the "Josephist spirit" of the state by conferring rights on the church, particularly in education and in the administration of church funds. Unfortunately for the church, the Concordat (which appeared to regard the Hungarian church as being under an all-inclusive imperial church) was a

red rag to the Hungarians. After 1860, when the constitution was partly restored, the Concordat went into a limbo from which it never reemerged.

Moreover, the restoration of the constitution in 1867 restored the principle of ministerial responsibility. Once the appointments to episcopal sees had to be "countersigned by a responsible Hungarian minister", as para 7 of Law III of 1848 stipulated, politicians, indeed parliament, could interfere with the exercise of *ius patronatus* through the *kultusz* ministry. A constitutional government, the prelates feared, was likely to intervene in the affairs of the church, which was no longer protected by the Concordat, on an even more extensive scale than the absolutist system had ever dared to do before 1848. The acceptance in principle of self-government and the participation of laity in church government through elected lay officials seemed a price the Church could afford to pay for the protection of its interests.[34] The question was how much power the hierarchy was prepared to share.

Eötvös took a bold initiative after the coronation: he set out the case for Catholic autonomy in an open letter to Prince Primate Simor in July 1867.[35] The letter was as much the work of a Catholic intellectual concerned about the future of his church as of a minister of the Crown concerned with liberal reform. Eötvös' first argument involved historic rights. Transylvanian Catholics, he informed the Primate, had approached him to secure from the monarch the restoration of the rights of lay Catholics to participate in school and church government, rights which the Catholic Estates had enjoyed for centuries. He was supporting the request, and because of the union of Transylvania with Hungary, the question arose as to whether the same reform should not be implemented in the Hungarian dioceses as well. There were strong reasons for doing so. The church, Eötvös argued, had to cope with Catholics' growing indifference to the affairs of their church - indifference which was the product of their exclusion from its government. Anticlerical attacks, Eötvös maintained, were less of a threat to "our church" than the apathy of its members: the state compelled Catholics to pay for the maintenance of a church in whose gov-

ernment they had no say. But Law XX of 1848, which promulgated equality among the Christian confessions, offered a remedy. For the church, Eötvös argued, needed freedom rather than privileges. The history of France, England and Ireland showed that privileges hindered the church's influence on society rather than helped it. In declaring religious equality in 1848, the legislators had enabled the Catholic Church to acquire the independence and autonomy that the Protestant churches already enjoyed. As regards the scope of self-government, Eötvös noted that "according to the principles of our religion, the influence of the laity cannot extend to purely religious subjects". But neither church property nor public education were such. He pointed out that in the past the Hungarian church had not opposed the influence of the laity on church government: the former Catholic Estates in Transylvania and the *ius patronatus* of the Royal Free Towns were examples. The Church Conference in 1847-48 had also been in favour of lay participation and Catholic autonomy; this, however, could not be secured midst the revolutionary upheaval. Conditions since 1848 had become more propitious for reform. The lower clergy and the laity wanted to see church government reformed. Eötvös hoped that the Prince Primate and the prelates would give due consideration to the subject, for they understood the problems facing the church better than a "simple believer".[36]

The letter was well received and the prelates responded promptly. "Mixed" preparatory conferences - where both ecclesiastics and laymen participated - were held for the Transylvanian diocese in February, and for the dioceses of Hungary in October 1868. But the plan for Catholic autonomy foundered. Lay Catholics, including Deák, insisted that the elected lay element rather than the hierarchy should be in the dominant position in the organization, a principle which the prelates were reluctant to accept. A compromise might still have eventually been reached but for the attitude of Nuncio Falcinelli and the Roman Curia. They were not enthusiastic at the idea of introducing self-government into the affairs of the Hungarian church: the authority of the Holy See could be affected and such autonomy might be the first step towards the creation of a

"national church".[37] The crisis over the declaration of papal infallibility whipped up anticlericalism in the summer of 1870 and polarized attitudes, so that after the first Congress for Catholic autonomy held in October 1870, the plan was quietly dropped by the prelates as much as by the government.[38]

The proclamation of papal infallibility by the first Vatican Council in July 1870 could not have happened at a worse time for church reform. The Hungarian prelates, together with the Austrian hierarchy, had wisely been opposed to the proclamation. But once infallibility became a dogma the bishops were duty bound to obey the Pope's will. The Nuncio and the hierarchy closed ranks. The political storm that ensued in Pest over the proclamation impaired Eötvös' relations with Prince Primate Simor[39] and left permanent scars on church-state relations. The Cabinet took the view that the papal proclamation was an "attack on the state".[40] The government, under anticlerical parliamentary pressure, won the king's permission to obstruct publication of the bull. A moderate course might have been to connive at its publication, and then bring action against any priest whose adherence to the papal bull appeared to have infringed statute law. But this option would not have satisfied parliament. A radical response to the bull might have been to bring in legislation to assert the supremacy of civil law and subordinate the ecclesiastic courts to the civil judiciary. But the ministry, and Eötvös in particular, did their best to avoid any involvement of the legislature,[41] which, given a chance, would have demanded stiff anticlerical legislation for which the Cabinet could never have secured the monarch's preliminary sanction.

Instead, Eötvös, as *kultusz* minister, sent a rescript to the bishops which declared the *placetum regium* in force.[42] Papal bulls, by a customary "right" which the autocrat exercised before an 1850 patent and the Concordat rescinded it, had to acquire the monarch's *placet*. Invoked in 1870, the "right" was an administrative dinosaur,[43] but one which anticlericals, blind to the dangers of unbridled government power, were enthusiastic about even in the 1890s.[44] Far too many liberals in the late nineteenth century took for granted that the monarch's

theocratic *placet* was an essential part of the authority of a modern state, and held as axiomatic that the state represented "progress", whereas the church was the epitomy of "black reaction". Only a few liberals were concerned about the consequences of resolving the conflicts between parliament and the church by enlarging the ministry's discretionary powers.[45]

By the time the infallibility crisis subsided,[46] Eötvös had died, the decrepitude of the Deák Party had become painfully obvious, the moderate reformers had lost their fragile chance to adjust the Catholic Church to the liberal idea of self-government, and ministerial plans to put a comprehensive law on the statute book to protect freedom of worship and confessional *egyenjogúság* were as dead as the dodo.[47]

THE STALEMATE IN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS DURING THE TISZA ERA

The weakening of the Deák Party's hold on power after the fall of the Lónyay ministry in December 1872 enfeebled the defenders of the Catholic Church in the House. The rise of the Left Centre reinforced the Protestant gentry and improved the prospects for anticlerical policies. Moreover, the 48ers, who gained parliamentary ground in the 1870s, were either anticlerical or anti-Semitic (or occasionally both). At any rate, the different 48er factions were led mostly by radical anticlericals. Dániel Irányi demanded the introduction of civil marriage and the enactment of the freedom of worship at each parliamentary session.[48] He also agitated for state education and the secularization of church property. József Madarász, who outlived Irányi, spoke in favour of the state control of Catholic funds. Lajos Mocsáry was a sectarian Protestant. Gábor Ugron's group was distinctly Catholic, but they were no lovers of the hierarchy. The twinheaded Moderate Opposition was split between Apponyi's staunch defenders of Catholic interests and Szilágyi's robust anticlerical liberalism. The anticlericals, as a Catholic historian noted, hoped to "separate the state from the church, they would not allow the church to separate

from the state but wished to make it more subordinate than it had ever been before".[49]

Notwithstanding the shift of parliamentary balance towards anticlericalism, Tisza never openly challenged the Catholic Church on any question throughout his years in government between 1875 and 1890. On taking office, the Liberal ministry had to put state finance in order after years of the Deák Party's mismanagement. Tisza's government was bogged down in 1876-77 in futile attempts at renegotiating the economic *Ausgleich;* after this came the crises over the occupation of Bosnia in 1878 and 1879, and the following decade brought new issues to the fore, including the explosive army question. For fifteen years the Liberal government refrained from doing anything which would disturb, let alone undermine, the "truce" between Protestants and Catholics. While sectarian conflicts were simmering under the surface, the government was able to increase the Catholic Church's dependence on the state through episcopal appointments[50] and ministerial ordinances, rather than through legislation. This, whenever tried, opened up the possibility of sliding into a *Kulturkampf*. Attempts to legislate on mixed marriages between Christians and Jews invariably aborted in the 1880s. They polarized politics between anticlerical liberals, who demanded the introduction of compulsory civil marriage, and the defenders of the Catholic Church, particularly in the House of Magnates, who resisted change.[51] Tisza had to drop even moderate plans and steer clear of overtly anticlerical policies.

Nor did Tisza ever contemplate replacing the policy of *fortwursteln* (muddling through) with that of a settlement between church and state, whose relations remained precarious. The Catholic prelates, politically subservient towards the government, became resentful and aggrieved, and clung to their church's historic rights, or what was left of them, against a parliament and ministers ever more inclined to augment their administrative power in the name of liberal principles.

Episcopal appointments were a major source of conflict between the hierarchy, headed by Prince Primate János Simor (Archbishop of Esztergom from 1867 to 1891, and created Cardi-

nal in 1873), and Ágoston Trefort,[52] *kultusz* minister from 1872 to 1888, serving five governments without interruption. Even before the establishment of constitutional government, the issue of church appointments had given rise to conflicting interpretations. But the institution of ministerial countersignature in 1848, and the devolution of some of the royal prerogatives on the Hungarian ministry in 1867 turned the exercise of *ius patronatus* into a Chinese puzzle to which the Court, the Roman Curia, the Hungarian hierarchy and the government in Pest each had different solutions. The juridical nature of church funds and the supervision of the church schools were other sore points. But the issue which actually led to sectarian strife was the 1868 law on mixed marriages. It is easy to see why. The bargaining over the nomination of bishops was kept well under wraps; the juridical nature of church funds excited only some knowledgeable parliamentarians, but the law on matrimony between partners of different religions affected the lower clergy and indeed, the whole population.[53]

EÖTVÖS' LAW ON MIXED MARRIAGES

The law on mixed marriages between Christians had been a shambles for many years before legislation was brought in by Eötvös in 1868. What eventually went into the lawbook, against Eötvös' intentions, however, exacerbated rather than mitigated the chaos, especially as regards the religion of the children from mixed marriages. The 1868 law deprived the parents in a mixed marriage of the right to decide the religion in which their children were to be brought up, a statutory denial of liberty of conscience which brought the law into disrepute, as the will to enforce the new provisions was missing from the moment they were made. Even had it existed, it would have been unlikely to make much difference, since the enacted measures were in any case unenforceable. The executive branch of the government benefited from the ensuing chaos. Ministerial ordinances began to supersede statute law and the courts' at-

tempts to administer justice in an area generally regarded as a vital part of individual rights.

Mixed marriages became an issue in the nineteenth century because of a partial reform introduced by Joseph II. Until 1786, Catholic ecclesiastical courts exercised jurisdiction in the Habsburg Monarchy and applied Canon Law in all law suits involving Christian marriages. From 1786 on, marriage was a civil contract, in addition to being a sacrament for Catholics. However, between 1786 and 1894, when civil marriage was finally instituted,[54] the law on matrimony was administered in Hungary partly by various church courts and partly by civil courts. Although births, deaths and marriages were registered by the various Christian churches throughout the nineteenth century, and para 2 of Law III of 1844 legalized mixed marriages even when the partners married in a Protestant church, the Catholic ecclesiastical courts retained their exclusive competence in cases arising out of mixed marriages even after the 1844 law and the legislation carried out in 1848. The first of the two bills introduced by Eötvös in the autumn of 1868 restricted that privilege.

Law XLVIII of 1868 On Divorce Proceedings in the Case of Mixed Marriages[55] referred divorce cases to the court of the respondent's religion and after it passed judgment, to the court of the petitioner's religion. Each side was bound by the judgment brought by his or her own church court. Although this division of judicial competence created new problems, which lasted until civil marriage for all religions was introduced,[56] it at least accomplished reciprocity among the large Christian religions concerning divorce.[57]

The Pandora's Box of sectarian strife was opened by the second bill introduced by Eötvös, entitled On Reciprocity Between the Lawfully Received Christian Religions, and enacted as Law LIII of 1868. This was the law whose Preamble, as already mentioned, clearly stated it to be a provisional measure.[58] Its first eight paragraphs regulated conversions from one Christian religion to another. What Law III of 1844 had established only for Catholics converting to Protestantism[59] was now extended to other Christian churches. The would-be convert had to appear

before his parish priest twice within 30 days. He had to declare in the presence of two witnesses his intention to leave his church, receive a certificate on both occasions from the priest, and then had to present them to the clergyman of the church he had opted to join. This part of the bill went through the House after a debate in which Eötvös had to admit that the provisions of the bill required some moral courage from the convert, and that they were not intended to make conversions "too easy".[60]

The majority who supported Eötvös' measures on conversions opposed the minister on the question of the religion of the children from mixed marriages. Para 13 of Eötvös' bill declared that

> Married Christian partners of a mixed marriage through a concurrence of will expressed either in writing or orally in the presence of two trustworthy witnesses, [shall] freely decide the religious education of the children of both sexes.

The following paragraphs forbade both civil and church authorities to interfere with the parents' right of choice, and declared the *térítvények*, "assurances", exacted in the past as to the religion of the prospective children, to be null and void. If, for whatever reason, parents did not come to an agreement, the sons were to follow the father's, and the daughters the mother's, religion.

The "assurance" prohibited in the future by Eötvös' bill was the written promise habitually demanded by the Catholic priest before a marriage ceremony: the non-Catholic partner had to promise that all the children would be brought up in the Catholic faith. This was a condition without which the Catholic Church did not normally recognize mixed marriages. For while most of the other religions treated matrimony as a civil contract in the nineteenth century, for the Catholic Church matrimony was, as it had always been, a sacrament. The demand of an "assurance", or guarantee from the non-Catholic partner concerning the children's religion was already a compromise on the part of the church.[61] Protestants, however, deeply resented

this stipulation through which, they suspected, the married couple was subjected to undue moral pressure from the Catholic priest.

Eötvös' provisions, which asserted the parents' right of choice and protected it by banning "assurances" given beforehand, were an attempt to move towards the liberal ideal of liberty of conscience. The clauses also had some Catholic backing. The Protestants on the other hand, because of their past experiences with the "assurances" (which Eötvös' bill prohibited but could not have prevented) objected to the clauses. They were more concerned with the principle of *egyenjogúság* protected by the state than with free choice for the parents. The Protestant view prevailed in the Central Committee where Eötvös' clauses were replaced by the new para 12 which, borrowing the principle of *sexus sexum sequitur*, from Transylvanian law, declared that

> As regards the children of mixed marriages, sons follow their father's and daughters follow their mother's, religion.[62]

The new paragraph 12 also pronounced invalid, with retroactive force, "any contract assurance or disposition to this law".[63] Eötvös was dismayed by the Central Committee's amendment, which divested his bill of its essence. Yet his defence of parental choice on the floor of the House was hopelessly ineffective - he even apologized for being in a minority before the vote was taken.[64] The various shades of sectarian Protestants and anticlerical-liberals across the whole political spectrum easily outnumbered the combined libertarian and Catholic vote.[65] Resistance to the new para 12 in the Upper House collapsed after a sharp exchange.[66]

THE ISSUE OF MIXED MARRIAGES

A major omission of Law LIII of 1868 was that most of its measures, including para 12, lacked legal sanction.[67] The Cath-

olic Church overreacted to the passing of the new law.[68] It imposed a ban on mixed marriages and the clergy was ordered to give only *passiva assistentia* to couples of mixed religion, who then drifted to the church of the non-Catholic partner. The bishops soon changed tack and reverted to their earlier practice of allowing couples to marry within the Church once the non-Catholic partner promised to bring up all children in the Catholic faith. Children of both sexes were then baptized and registered by the Catholic priest. This practice was clearly contrary to para 12 of Law LIII of 1868 and therefore illegal.[69] Aggrieved Protestant churchmen soon flooded the *kultusz* ministry with complaints about *elkeresztelt*[70] children, those the Catholics had "baptized away". In such cases, Minister Trefort normally wrote to the Catholic bishop of the diocese asking him to request the priest involved to send the birth certificate to the Protestant pastor for registration. As often as not, the *kultusz* ministry did not even receive an answer.

In order to put teeth into the law, para 53 of Law XL of 1879, "On Offences", made it an act punishable by fines and imprisonment to "receive" a minor into a denomination in contravention of Law LIII of 1868.[71] Yet para 53 did not stop *elkeresztelés*. As it happened, the clause could be construed as applying only to conversions (as Catholics argued) or, under para 12 of the 1868 Law, as applying to birth registers as well (as Protestants claimed). When Tivadar Pauler, the Minister of Justice, was pressed by the bishops for an interpretation he said he would wait to see what judicial practice would bring. The first case was heard in Sopron, where the District Court in 1880 applied para 53 to para 12 of the 1868 Law, and fined a Catholic priest who had *elkeresztelt* a "Lutheran" child. The Appellate Court in Budapest, however, overturned the ruling on the grounds that through baptism a child was received into the company of Christians' community rather than into a particular religion. Although there was an uproar against this verdict when later the High Court (where Catholic interests were well preserved) gave an authoritative ruling that para 53 of Law XL of 1879 was not applicable to para 12 of Law LIII of 1868,[72] it was clear that the country's judges were not prepared to send

a priest to prison for carrying out his religious duties. But attitudes hardened on both sides. Protestant pastors sent bitter complaints to the *kultusz* ministry because Catholic clergymen could flout the law unpunished. The hierarchy, instructed by the Holy Office to apply Canon Law more strictly to mixed marriages, petitioned parliament to rescind para 12 of the 1868 law. The request was merely passed on to the *kultusz* ministry without comment – point for the Protestants. But dyed-in-the-wool Protestants, like Lajos Mocsáry, were dismayed to find in a bill on mixed marriages between Jews and Christians brought in by the government in 1883 (a bill which the Upper House later threw out) that parents were to be allowed to decide the religion of their children freely. In the following year, the Lutheran church petitioned the government to bring in legislation to put sharper teeth into para 12.

The Cabinet, anxious that something should at last be done – without, however, involving parliament – authorized *kultusz* minister Trefort to act.[73] On July 11, 1884, a *kultusz* ministry ordinance contradicting the earlier ruling of the High Court informed church authorities that the sanctions specified in para 53 of the 1879 law did apply to para 12.[74] When the courts, however, continued to prove reluctant to pass judgment against *elkeresztelő* priests, Trefort gave the impression that he had never meant to enforce the ordinance he himself had issued.[75] He allowed complaints to pile up in the *kultusz* ministry, and the chaos in interdenominational litigation to grow.

The truth was that the Liberal Party under Tisza, kept together largely by the constitutional issue, in spite of its unassailable parliamentary majority, could not afford to sustain a clear policy to resolve interconfessional conflicts, let alone to realize the idea of *egyenjogúság*. Yet the balance of church-state power did not remain unaltered: the Catholic Church was losing ground. The appointment of bishops pliable to intimations of the *kultusz* minister were pushed through in Rome, and the reform of the Upper House by Law VII of 1885 pruned the large representation of the Catholic prelates in the upper chamber, and created seats for Protestant church leaders. Above all, the ministry, bypassing parliament and the judici-

ary, decided to impose its own solutions on churches at loggerheads with one another. Trefort created the precedent of issuing *kultusz* ministry ordinances in order to settle disputes between Catholics and Protestants over conflicting rights. But he was as reluctant an arbiter as his opposite number, Prince Primate Simor, was cautious.

Trefort's successor in the *kultusz* ministry, Count Albin Csáky, who took over as minister in September 1888, was a different man: he was prepared to intervene in interconfessional relations in order to enforce the authority of the state. Csáky's attitude stiffened after Dezső Szilágyi, the most effective anticlerical liberal politician of the Dualist Era, took over as Minister of Justice in Tisza's last administration in April 1889. The Great Defence Debate in early 1889, which debilitated Tisza, and Szilágyi's inclusion in the Cabinet, tilted the balance in favour of change. The shattering effect of the army debate on most of the supporters of the '67 Settlement, including the monarch himself, created a political climate in which two internal reform issues came into prominence: the introduction of the appointments system to county offices (*államosítás*), and civil marriage. The system of county government was not changed for another half century, but civil marriage was introduced in 1895.

Csáky did not plan in 1889 to institute civil marriage; his aim was merely to stop *elkeresztelés*.[76] With the help of Szilágyi, he prepared a *kultusz* ministry ordinance that differed from Trefort's, which it replaced, in two significant respects. The minister himself set the penalties for the violation of para 12[77] and, more importantly, the cases were not to be heard in courts, but were transferred to the administrative authorities.[78] The Ministerial Council had approved the draft shortly before Tisza's leaving office,[79] but the ordinance was published in March 1890 after the Szapáry Cabinet had been appointed in which both Csáky and Szilágyi retained their portfolios. In contrast with Cisleithania, there were as yet no administrative courts in Hungary in which the legality of Csáky's ordinance could have been tested. But disputes concerning the finer points of the *kultusz* ministry's authority and its limits

abounded with the upsurge of sectarian antagonism. *Szolgabirók* and police chiefs brought proceedings against Catholic clergymen. Through the *alispánok,* the cases eventually reached a high official in the Ministry of the Interior, who pronounced the final verdict. If a priest refused to pay the fine, his property was auctioned off; later, he might even be sent to prison, from where he would emerge as a martyr for his faith.

Csáky's ordinance damaged constitutional procedure, and inflamed sectarian strife without stopping *elkeresztelés;* it also failed in its objective: to assert the authority of the state over the church. The Catholic lower clergy became more militant; the Vatican through the Nuncio approached the Monarchy's Foreign Minister to take steps against Csáky's ordinance; the bishops were split between those who did the government's bidding, and the intransigent prelates. The inexperienced new Prince Primate, Kolozs Vaszary, a compromise candidate succeeding Prince Primate Simor in October 1891, lacked both finesse and authority. But the church, cornered and prodded by the Vatican, became more united in opposing the implementation of para 12 whenever the parents decided to bring up all their children in the Catholic faith.

Elkeresztelés was the product of para 12, a measure which conflicted with custom; and the practice merely demonstrated that customary law could be stronger than the combined strength of statute law and ministerial ordinance. In the end, the conflict could be resolved only be rescinding para 12, and the only question left was how to do it. The Catholic Church had demanded its repeal all along, but the Protestant churches would have never allowed the *status quo ante* 1868 to be restored. The only way open was the introduction of state registration, of civil marriage, and the transference of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction on marriage to civil courts. This had a logic that even some of the defenders of the Catholic Church, like Apponyi, reluctantly came to accept.[80] But not Premier Szapáry, who was still looking for a compromise. The Liberal Party, however, led by the ex-premier, Tisza, deserted Szapáry – a colourless politician whose authority, never strong, had suffered irreparable damage in the summer of 1891

MAGYAR
TUDOMÁNYOS AKADÉMIA
KÖNYVTÁRA

when his bill to centralize county administration was filibustered by militant Independents in the House. In the following year the bulk of the Liberals followed Kálmán and István Tisza who, perhaps to undermine Szapáry's premiership, demanded the state registration of births, deaths and marriages, and the introduction of civil marriage.[81] When the king put his foot down against church reform, Szapáry resigned. Francis Joseph now understood that the Liberal Party could not be held together without church legislation; there was no parliamentary alternative to the Liberals,[82] and the maintenance of the '67 Settlement intact was more important to the monarch than the defence of the Catholic Church. In 1892, Francis Joseph could appoint the Wekerle Cabinet only on the understanding that he would not in principle oppose the introduction of civil marriage. There was still a long way to go before the laws on civil marriage, on the "reception" of the Jewish religion and on the "free exercise of religion" were enacted. This programme, carried through in 1894 and 1895, marked the last fling of liberal legislation. While church reform dominated politics, the constitutional issue was kept in the background and the Liberal Party showed cohesion and unity of purpose. But the reform package was put through at a political cost.[83] The Wekerle Cabinet was destroyed; the king became permanently disenchanted with the Liberals; the Catholic People's Party emerged as an independent political force, splitting the 67er camp; and the Catholic Church became an implacable opponent of all politicians of a liberal hue. Law XXXII of 1894 "On the Religion of Children", however, expressly rescinded para 12 of Law LIII of 1868.[84] Everybody, not excepting the anticlericals, had to pay a price.

Two striking facts emerge from this review of the political issues involving the Catholic Church. The first is the church's diminished ability to resist the government's intervention in its affairs. The separation of church and state, in principle a liberal idea, never had a chance to be put into practice. Instead, the liberal objective had been the creation of an autonomous Catholic Church. This policy failed, and by the end of the century, the church was more dependent on the

government than it had been in the 1860s. The second fact that has come to light is the limited role legislation played in shaping church-state relations except in the mid-1890s. Instead, the customary rights of the church and of the state appear to be the decisive factors. The growing importance of ministerial ordinances - the customary law of the ministry - was a significant part of this pattern. Whether these two features were confined to the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church or whether they had a more general application will be examined next.

THE SOURCES OF CHURCH LAW AND CHURCH REFORMS

Eötvös and his successors, as the Crown's *kultusz* ministers, were more successful with the non-Catholic churches in setting them on the course towards internal self-government. The degree of autonomy the various churches attained differed widely, although their ultimate control by the Crown - their supervision by the *kultusz* ministry - invariably set limits to their autonomy. For the monarch had, since the eighteenth century, claimed *ius supremae inspectionis* and *iura circa sacra* which, like the *ius supremae patronatus* exercised over the Catholic Church, amounted to a collection of autocratic practices vis-à-vis the "cults" in general.[85] Most of the church synods and congresses, called together either by the monarch himself or with his permission or, occasionally, as the Statutes specified, by the church leaders, deliberated in the presence of a royal commissar or an inspector, and their more important decisions were implemented only after they had been approved by the monarch or the *kultuszminiszter*. The monarch had to approve the appointments of the prelates in the Orthodox Church[86] and had to "confirm" the appointment of Transylvania's Calvinist bishop.[87] No church was ever separated from the state. The churches themselves did not want separation. They wished to be legally recognized, to be endowed with church statutes, to be entitled to legal and administrative protection by the state, including the right to seek help from the civil author-

ities to enforce their own regulations and to maintain internal discipline.[88] Above all, churches demanded subsidies from the government to pay their clergy and support their schools. The system, with its highly fragmented and *ad hoc* arrangements, was the product of the churches' evolving customary rights combined with direct ministerial intervention.

The powers were there in 1867 for Eötvös to use for liberal purposes; they were vested in the Crown by custom, and exercised through the *kultuszminiszter* who either countersigned the royal enactments or acted with the monarch's prior approval.[89] Only exceptionally did Eötvös turn to parliament in order to enact measures. Law IX of 1868 enabled the already disconnected Serbian and Romanian Orthodox metropolises, by reference to Law XX of 1848, to organize separate church governments through their respective National Church Congresses.[90] But parliament never saw most of the enactments and even the cabinet did not discuss many of them.

Some measures had been countersigned by the minister after consultations with the churches, and promulgated by the monarch as royal decrees. The Romanian Orthodox Church Statutes were enacted in this manner in 1869.[91] A royal decree - a kind of contract between the Crown and a church as distinct from statute law or ministerial ordinance - guaranteed security to the church. Other measures appeared as ministerial ordinances or rescripts, with express reference to the monarch's authorization in the Preamble. Eötvös' rescript of September 1867 to the Bishop of Transylvania concerning Catholic autonomy and the constitution of the Jewish religion in 1871 were issued in this form.[92] But frequently the *kultuszminiszter* introduced measures through ministerial ordinances after consultation with religious leaders and normally with the king's prior approval. Those issued in 1873 *inter alia* defined the competence of the Catholic *Status* in Transylvania, reminded the Serbian Metropolitan of his obligation to set up a church fund and bring church property into some order.[93] Later, the minister sent the same Metropolitan a terse reminder of his duty to impose church taxes, and set out rules concerning the management and auditing of church funds.[94] The minister specified detailed arrangements

for the parish council elections of the Serbian church in 1875,[95] issued instructions to the local authorities as regards the designations to be used for each of the three groups of Jewish congregations in 1877,[96] and settled innumerable other major and minor matters of church administration.

The legal framework for these paternalistic relations between the churches and the state evolved under Eötvös. He took care that church administration did not conflict with legislation and that the statutes and regulations were kept. Eötvös scrupulously refrained from interfering in what he saw as purely religious disputes, even when he was urged by (Jewish) church leaders to do so. The government's objective was to create self-governing churches under ministerial supervision and financial control. The state helped to pay the clergy and the teachers in confessional schools. Parliament in its deliberative capacity was not involved in making these arrangements, although the House occasionally discussed church government during budget debates and at question time.

The Protestant churches enjoyed a great degree of autonomy, especially the Calvinist Church. Even the Lutheran Church, whose position was less secure than that of the Calvinist, elected its bishops and superintendents without interference, and merely notified the government.[97] More effective government control was exercised over the newly established Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church. But under Metropolitan Saguna, a believer in self-government with lay participation, the Romanian church, too, acquired an unassailable position. It achieved this through the enactment of its Church Statutes after parliament had, in passing Law IX of 1868, taken cognizance[98] of the fact of its secession from the Serbian Orthodox metropolis, which had taken place under the Schmerling government.[99] The right of the monarch to approve the Metropolitan elected by the Congress, however, turned out to be an important restriction on its autonomy.[100]

In contrast with the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Serbian church never received its church statutes from the monarch, and its autonomy was correspondingly less effective. The minister could take the horse to water; he could not make it drink. The

Serbian hierarchy, staunch defenders of church autonomy, was opposed to the introduction of self-government with lay participation, although in the past they had gone some way toward recognizing it. This attitude, arguably, weakened the ability of the Serbian church, in contrast with the Romanian, to resist Magyarization through the schools, a policy on which the government embarked after 1875.[101] Another stumbling-block on which the enactment of the Serbian church's statutes foundered was the reluctance of the hierarchy to recognize the monarch's right to approve the archbishop-patriarch elected by the National Congress. In fact, Francis Joseph exercised the right unhindered. The National Congress elected Bishop Stojkovic[102] to the patriarchate in 1874. Instead of confirming him, however, the monarch ordered new elections, which produced a new archbishop-patriarch, whose appointment Francis Joseph approved in 1875.

The Jewish religion was something special. Liberal politicians from the 1840s set themselves the objective of helping to integrate Jews into Hungarian society.[103] In 1867 the government found parliamentary time to put through the brief Law XVII, which extended equality of rights to Jews, and was anxious to complement that law by conferring recognition on the Jewish religion. Instead of bringing in a bill, Eötvös called a Congress whose draft statutes were approved by the monarch in 1869.[104] For those congregations which did not participate in the Congress, a ministerial ordinance, signed by Eötvös' successor, Tivadar Pauler, was issued in late 1871.[105] Two parliamentary resolutions paved the way for the *kultusz* ministry's enactment, the issuing of which was authorized by the monarch and was approved in Cabinet. The Preamble expressly referred to these antecedents – a piece of constitutional decorum which became rare in later ministerial enactments. Notwithstanding its legal recognition, the status of the Jewish religion remained different from that of the large Christian churches.[106] In this, it was far from being an isolated case. A closer look at the legal position of Hungary's churches reveals that in spite of all the liberals' efforts to achieve confessional *egyenjogúság*, the law developed in the opposite direction, creating a

diversity of legal status for different churches. The process of change should be looked at more closely than either jurists or historians have done in the past, because it offers insights into the character of the social change in the country, and the liberals' hand in it.

THE MAKING OF A LEGAL HIERARCHY OF DENOMINATIONAL CLASSES

With one hand, the law began to remove the legal disabilities of the Lutheran, the Calvinist and the Orthodox Christian churches in 1790 and after, of the Unitarians in 1848, and of the Jews in 1867, and again in 1895. This was a process of equalization: it did not establish equality and reciprocity among the churches; it did, however, point in that direction. But with the other hand, the law introduced a graduated system of privileges. Inequalities between the churches before the nineteenth century had been created by Crown privilege, royal rescript, *decretum* and custom. In the nineteenth century, inequalities in the civil and political rights of churches were created by *kultusz* ministry ordinances and statute laws as well as by royal rescripts and by social custom - which remained a potent source of law.

The state offered the churches protection, recognized their old rights, conferred new rights on them, including that of self-government, and brought them under control by extending the scope of ministerial tutelage. Liberals justified ministerial tutelage over the churches on the grounds that they received subsidies in order to carry out "state tasks". Churches kept the birth, death and marriage registers after 1867. Some of the churches administered marriage law in their own courts, and churches ran most of the elementary and grammar schools in the country. Yet church-state relations were not brought within a common statutory framework after 1867 except in a sense so broad as to be meaningless. In fact, the churches fell, perforce, into a hierarchy of three legal classes as a consequence of the evolution of customary law and of independent executive

action – the customary law of the state. Subsequently, this process was, in part, recognized by statute law.

By the end of the nineteenth century, under the auspices of Liberal governments, an extraordinary system had come into existence which was founded on rigid legal classes of "received", "recognized" and "tolerated" religions.[107] Statutes nowhere defined these classes, at least not before 1895, but merely *recognized* them as the products of customary law, elements of which had appeared shortly before the nineteenth century.

(1) *RECEIVED RELIGIONS*

This class evolved under the influence of Transylvanian law and it was to an extent analogous to developments in Austrian law. The concept of "received religion" (in flat contradiction of the shibboleths of the dogmatic law school) was generated by nineteenth-century Hungarian customary law; statute law took cognizance of it, and used it for its own purposes.

The idea of received religion appeared after 1790 in references to historic rights: the principle of Protestant freedom of worship included in the "peace treaties" between the Crown and the Diet had been enacted in *decreta* in the seventeeth century.[108] Article XXVI of 1790 referred to the Lutheran and the Calvinist churches as *"in sensu pacificationum receptis"*.[109] The influence of the Transylvanian term *"recepta religio"* on this formulation is probable."Received religion" was, then, used by the legislator in the nineteenth century. The term did not figure in Law III of 1844 On Religious Matters[110] but appears in the statute book in significant contexts in Laws IV and V. Law IV ordered that non-nobles of "any of the lawfully received religions" must not be disturbed in their possession of acquired "noble property" (i.e. land) on the grounds of lacking noble status. Law V established the principle that being a non-noble could no longer hinder a person adhering to "any of the lawfully received religions" from holding public office. Significantly, the law did not say which religions belonged to the class of received religions. It was possible, for instance, to

construe these two laws as not applying to Catholics. But the implication of para 2 of Law V of 1848, which established parliamentary franchise for (male) persons of "the lawfully received religions without restriction", necessarily included members of the Catholic Church, as well as of some other churches. Yet again, the law did not say which churches. Law V of 1848 was restored in 1867, and until the 1874 franchise law, restricted the *pays legal* to members of the so-called "received churches".[111]

The above cases speak loudly of the prominent place which received religion as a legal class acquired in the Hungarian social system. Yet a search through the *Corpus Juris Hungarici* would fail to disclose either the meaning of the term, or the rights that belonging to a received religion conferred on a person, or provide a list of the churches to which the class applied.[112] There were only two cases in which statute law "received" a particular religion: the Unitarian Church was received by Law XX of 1848,[113] and the Jewish religion by law XLII of 1895. The Orthodox churches were habitually accorded the status of a received religion in the nineteenth century on the strength of the autonomous rights recognized by statute law in 1790 and 1792,[114] without, however, ever being declared by statute law to be "received". Yet the law operated on the assumption that the class of received religions was defined with sufficient precision. Law XX of 1848, as has already been mentioned, declared "complete equality" among "the lawfully received religious denominations"[115] without any explanation as to which religions were, in fact, meant. Nor did Eötvös feel any need to enlighten the House in this regard when in the autumn of 1868 he submitted the bill which became Law LIII of 1868 On Reciprocity between the Lawfully Received Christian Religions. It was common knowledge that at the time, Catholics of all rites, Orthodox Christians, the two large Protestant churches, and the Unitarians were meant (the last only since 1848). "Knowledge", however, may not be the right word. It was more a matter of a post-1790 norm based on custom, a norm whose existence statute law assumed, without ever listing the confessions. To do so would have unnecessarily hurt the sensibilities of the Catholic

Church which never expressly abandoned its claim to be the *avita* and *haereditaria religio* of Hungary, as opposed to being one of a number of received religions.[116]

Communis opinio, court rulings, and the *kultusz* ministry as makers of customary law determined the criteria of membership in the class of received religions. In a long-forgotten yet illuminating ministerial ordinance to the town of Pest as regards the official procedure to be adopted towards the Nazarenes, Eötvös pointed out that the Nazarenes had not been lawfully received, and that "our laws concede [*engednek*] rights only to received religious denominations; it is only with received religions that the government can communicate officially".[117] As will be shown in a moment, this "concessionary" view of rights had far-reaching implications for religious freedom. As to the rights of the received religions, an authoritative, if vacuous, definition was offered by Eötvös' successor, Trefort, in 1887. In order to insist that the Catholic Church *was* a received religion, the minister explained:

> ... the term "received religion" in public law means that the religion is placed under the protection of the law (*törvényes oltalom*); it receives legal protection and guarantee of its rights; furthermore it means that those professing that religion are endowed with certain religious and political rights.[118]

This definition was too loose. But, as we shall presently see, any other stipulative definition would have run into difficulties. Because of the customary character of the class, we might well say that a religion was "received" if the public and the authorities regarded it as such - something that the minister obviously would not state.

The received religions all enjoyed freedom of worship, yet other religions - the Jewish between 1871 and 1895 and the Muslim Church after Law XVII of 1916 was passed[119] - also lived in security without belonging to the class of received religions. Nor was internal self-government the distinguishing element. The Catholic Church, whose funds were administered by the *kultusz* ministry and which the law treated as a received

religion, did not have self-government, in contrast with the non-received Jewish religion, which did have self-government before 1895, and the Islamic religions, which had it after 1916. Recognition of a church's rights by statute law rather than by ordinance would be a strong contender for distinguishing the received churches from the rest. Yet it would be difficult to find statutory evidence that the Catholic Church's rights were ever recognized in the sense in which the Protestant or the Orthodox church's rights were. Moreover, the rights of the non-received Muslim church were recognized by statute.

A distinguishing mark of the class of received religions was the administrative assistance to which a received church was entitled from the state authorities in the collection of church taxes (frequently lumped together with the state tax), and in enforcing internal discipline in the church. The government supplemented the salaries of the clergy where this seemed necessary and provided subsidies to maintain schools.[120] The *kultusz* ministry handled all the disputes arising out of these arrangements, without the participation of the ordinary courts. But these privileges and practices were as much the consequences of a church's received status as the reasons for a particular religion being included in the class of received religions in the first place.

A received church was eligible for representation in the Upper House. Yet, in spite of what has been written on the subject by jurists and historians, the connection between received status and political representation was tenuous. The Catholic Church had been the first estate of the kingdom before 1848; after 1867, all its prelates retained their seats in the Upper House although the church itself did not wish to be regarded as "received". There was a general consensus as to the received status of the Lutheran and the Calvinist churches after 1790. Yet these churches had no seats at all before the 1885 law on the Upper House was passed. On the other hand, Art. 10 of 1792 ordered the representation of the Orthodox Church in the Upper House by reference to Article XXVII of 1790 which did not expressly pronounce it "received". The Unitarian Church had been *recepta religio* in Transylvania for centuries before Law XX of

1848 expressly "received" it in Hungary. Yet its bishop (or president) was given a seat only in 1885. The Jewish religion, received in 1895, was not granted representation before the collapse of the Monarchy.[121] For constitutional lawyers and historians, these discrepancies - so far as they noticed them at all - appeared as anomalies which were sooner or later rectified. But far from being the anomalies of a statutory system, they were the haphazard arrangements which one would expect to see in the operation of a partly customary legal system.

(2) *TOLERATED RELIGIONS*

Religions which the law did not treat as being received in 1867 were merely tolerated by the authorities, largely at their discretion. This was the obverse of the Hungarian liberal record, which Eötvös' ordinance on the Nazarenes exposed.

In the Monarchy, as elsewhere in central and eastern Europe, the presumption of the law was on the side of the state authorities rather than on that of the subject and the social group. In matters of religion, the monarch, as has been observed, traditionally claimed *ius reformandi*:[122] the right to permit or withhold permission to practice a particular religion. The remedy against autocratic restriction and interference was the growth of recognized religious privileges. Rights developed as concessions by the monarchic state in the form of decrees and statute laws which protected the subject. Customary law then consolidated the process by creating the class of "received religion". But the implication of the "concessionary" view of rights - in essence the autocratic principle - was that in areas where rights were not expressly recognized, the authorities could, without any statutory authorization, lawfully restrict the activities of any subject, association, or church.

The liberals' attitude to the autocratic principle was ambivalent. Eötvös and Deák sometimes clearly asserted the liberal principle that an executive order was lawful only if it was expressly authorized by statute law;[123] at other times, at least implicitly, they endorsed the autocratic principle. In

office, the liberals were flexible: they tried to mitigate the autocratic principle by conferring "recognition" on non-received religions.

But the class of recognized religion did not yet exist in 1867. Nor, as we have seen, did any general statutory enactment, such as fundamental laws, secure personal freedom in Hungary. There was not even a law of association that might have been applied to churches. The local authorities and the *kultusz* ministry issued, without any statutory authorization but on the basis of established administrative practice, the so-called *uzus*, ordinances which regulated and controlled associations, including religious ones. A different treatment was met out to each of the various religions.

In the case of Jews, whose religion was "merely tolerated"[124] in 1867, the registration of births, deaths and marriages followed earlier practice, and was left to the civil authorities. When the Nazarenes approached the town of Pest in 1868 to ask for their own registers, Eötvös issued the ordinance from which I have already quoted.[125] As "our laws concede rights only to received religious denominations" of which the Nazarene was not one, wrote Eötvös, the government could not recognize the actions as authoritative;[126] and they could not, therefore, keep their own registers "as yet". On the other hand, the government did not wish to compel anybody to register with one of the received religions against his convictions. Eötvös instructed the Nazarenes to report births and deaths to the civil authorities, who would arrange their registration on their behalf with the office of the received religion "to which the Nazarene had formerly belonged". Furthermore, until legislation was introduced, "the government and the authorities would be compelled" to treat children born into Nazarene marriages as illegitimate, with all its consequences for the inheritance of property.

But legislation was not forthcoming from the government. Instead, the *uzus* towards the Nazarenes and other "sects" was developed further by the authorities. Minister Trefort drew the anti-liberal conclusions implicit in Eötvös' 1868 ordinance. In 1875, in an ordinance sent to all the municipalities, Trefort

applied Eötvös' ordinance to the whole country, extending its scope to other religions and supplementing it with new measures.[127] There was a need, the minister thought, to extend "police supervision" to religions "which are not regularly organized". Also, the Nazarenes, "and other similar sects not lawfully received, whatever they called themselves" were to fulfil their legal obligations towards the received religions.

Trefort's ordinance took the "concessionary" view of religious rights to extreme lengths in order to argue that members of the Nazarene church and other sects were in law still members of the lawfully received religion from which they (or their parents) had defected. Once again, the liberal minister (indirectly) resorted to Eötvös' authority. Because – argued Trefort – Law LIII of 1868 (one of Eötvös' pieces of legislation) "permitted"[128] conversions only between lawfully received religions, members of the Nazarene and other sects were not regarded as having lawfully left their former church. Repeating Eötvös' order, Trefort instructed the authorities to arrange registration with the received churches and to treat marriages made outside as invalid. A new provision was that members of sects were to pay all the church taxes due to the received religion that they had left. The minister even instructed the civil authorities to collect arrears forthwith, and if necessary, to issue writs of execution. The *uzus* in the municipalities filled in on other points which the ministerial enactments failed to deal with. For instance, the authorities allowed the sects to practise their religion only in private, not in public.[129]

In 1881, Trefort qualified his sweepingly anti-liberal ordinance in some respects. A Nazarene of Mokrin lodged a complaint against the Orthodox parish priest with the *alispán* of Torontál County, who asked the minister for a ruling. The priest had "forcibly" buried a child of the Nazarene according to Orthodox rites, and had confiscated one bushel of wheat as his fee. Trefort ruled that Nazarenes may not be compelled to christen and bury their children according to the rites of the religion to which they had "formerly belonged". Nor did their obligation to pay church tax extend to christening and burial

fees. The minister upheld the complaint, and ordered the Nazarene's reimbursement for the fee unlawfully exacted.[130] The case offers glimpses into the oppressive conditions in which members of the non-received religions found themselves, as well as the extent to which religious obligations and discipline were enforced on the population at the time.[131]

(3) *RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS*

Because the presumption of the law was on the side of state authority and because of the strength of custom in Hungary, conferring privileges on particular churches could, arguably, secure freedom of worship more effectively than statutory declarations of general principles. The monarch's approval was also easier to obtain for conferring particular privileges than for blanket legislation of freedom of worship. But in 1867, the government could not arrange the legislative "reception" of particular religions without opening the door to sectarian strife. It could, however, "recognize" the rights of particular religions by ordinance. Just as the class of received religion was a product of customary law, the class of recognized religion was generated by the *kultusz* ministry after 1867 to fill the gap between the received churches and the tolerated sects. After the enactment of Law LIII of 1868 which coordinated the lawfully received Christian religions,[132] there was growing political support in parliament for some form of recognition for the Jewish religion, which in law was still "merely tolerated". Immigration from Galicia was swelling the country's Jewish population. A growing proportion of the professions had become "Jewish", especially in the capital. Jews were rapidly "Magyarizing", and accepted the gentry's leadership of society, as well as the programme of building a national (Magyarized) society, more easily than did the intelligentsia of the nationalities.[133]

Eötvös held discussions with Jewish leaders in February 1868. A Congress convened by royal rescript in December 1868 drafted statutes which, although approved by the monarch in June 1869, failed to win the approval of the "orthodox" congre-

gations, which formed their own committee to draft the statutes which were approved and eventually issued as a ministerial ordinance by Eötvös' successor in 1871.[134] The position of the Jewish religion still differed from that of the received Christian religions: there was no reciprocity in matters of marriage, and conversions, for instance. But while such recognition was denied "the sects", the Jewish communities' registrations of births, deaths and marriages were recognized by civil law, and the Jewish religion acquired security and a limited protection from the authorities.[135]

Statute law soon took cognizance of this change. Whenever a statutory provision was meant to apply to the Jewish as well as to the received religions, the term "recognized religion" was used.[136] The Penal Code listed the offences against recognized religions in paras 190-192 of Law V of 1878.[137] Para 10 of Law XXXVI of 1879 exempted from the obligation of billeting the military in the offices and living quarters of the priests of "the lawfully recognized religious denominations". Para 31 of Law VI of 1889 established immunities for the novices of "the lawfully recognized churches and religious denominations". Two other religions attained recognition during the Dualist era: the Baptist Church was recognized by ministerial ordinance in 1905,[138] and the Islamic religion was, unconventionally, recognized by statute law in 1916.[139]

Recognition of religions by ministerial ordinance was standardized in 1895 as part of the last fling of liberal legislation which, as has been shown, was the outcome of the *elkeresztelés* crisis. Law XXXI of 1894 introduced civil marriage. Law XXXIII of 1894 allowed what Eötvös had failed to see through parliament in 1868: parental choice in the religion of the children in marriages between partners who belonged to "different received or lawfully recognized religions".[140] Law XXXIII of 1894 instituted the compulsory state registration of births, deaths and marriages, and Law XLII of 1895 declared the Jewish religion to be a received religion. Law XLIII of 1895 On the Free Exercise of Religion – which should have been the crowning achievement of liberal legislation – was instead rather incongruous. The first paragraph clearly proclaimed the liberty

of conscience with great aplomb: everyone was free to profess and follow any creed or religion, and practise it within the limits of the law and of public morality: no one was to be obstructed in practising his religion so far as it did not contravene the law, or public morality. And no one was to be compelled to perform religious acts against his beliefs.

The rest of the law, however, instead of establishing the statutory framework of church-state relations, whittled away at the very principles the first paragraph had been at pains to establish: it systematized the hierarchy of received, recognized and tolerated religions – the motley collection of privileges based on customary law, royal decree and ministerial ordinance. The law was contradictory because it rested on a compromise between irreconcilable principles. It was put through parliament amidst acute political conflict between the Lower House majority, which insisted on asserting "the rights of the state", and the Upper House dominated by Catholics who fought the bill tooth and nail. The ministerial bill went through a number of revisions.[141] Paragraph 5 "allowed" the individual to change his religion in accordance with the "stipulations of the law" and the following paragraph "maintained intact the laws and rules" concerning the received religions.[142] These two paragraphs emasculated the liberal principles of the first paragraph.

In its second chapter, the law established the standard rules "On Religious Denominations to Be Lawfully Recognized in the Future".[143] Applicants wishing to form a recognized religion were to submit all the regulations of their proposed church to the *kultusz* minister for approval.[144] The minister would have to refuse approval if the applicants represented "anti-state or anti-national tendencies", if the doctrines submitted contravened either civil laws or public morality, if the applicants had seceded from a "lawfully received or recognized religion" only because they wished to use a different language, and also if the name of the proposed denomination was either "racial or national"[145] in character, or "damaged a religion which has already been received or lawfully recognized".[146] The grounds on which the minister could refuse recognition were so

vague that the law might as well have left the matter entirely to the discretion of the minister. Recognized churches, under the protection of the state, were to enjoy limited autonomy. In contrast with the received churches, they were not entitled to administrative help in collecting church taxes which they did, however, have the right to impose. They were under the administrative tutelage of the municipal authorities, to whom they had to submit the minutes of all church meetings and whose permission they had to obtain to acquire property.[147] The civil authorities approved the appointments of their clergy and church officials "if their moral conduct and attitude as citizens of the state did not give rise to objections".[148] If the conduct of an appointed clergyman was "inimical to the state", the *kultusz* minister could demand his removal from office.[149] The law on the "Free Exercise of Religion" in fact gave statutory recognition to the wide discretionary powers already exercised by the municipalities and the *kultusz* minister in connection with all non-received religious denominations.

Chapter III of the Statute dealt with leaving and joining churches.[150] The law did not establish the individual's right to belong to no church at all but implicitly tolerated it in the case of adults. It extended the procedure laid down in Law LIII of 1868 for conversions between the received Christian religions to Jews and to the class of recognized religions (there had been none at the time). Anyone wishing to leave his or her church had to pay a church tax and submit to the civil authorities, who took over the administration of all lawful conversions,[151] the two "certificates" which the 1868 law required the convert to obtain from the priest whose church he had decided to leave.[152] If someone merely withdrew from a received church without joining another received or recognized religion, the law obliged him to pay his former church taxes for five more years.[153] Children born into marriages in which either one partner or both were non-denominational had to be brought up in one of the received or recognized religions. These cases were handled by the civil authorities and were regulated by ordinance and *ad hoc* local arrangements. To be without religious affiliation in a large town was still incom-

parably easier than to belong to an unrecognized sect in a village, although the introduction of civil marriage improved the position of both groups.

THE BALANCE SHEET OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

A sectarian conflict as much as a liberal issue of central importance, church-state relations produced political convulsions in late nineteenth-century Hungarian politics. "Freedom of worship"[154] had been professed in the country long before liberals secured it for the major churches after 1867 in a rather unexpected institutional setting. Liberals failed to establish confessional *egyenjogúság* and liberty of conscience, however, except in a rather loose sense, but not for want of trying. Between 1790 and the First World War, the Journal of parliament and the statute book were strewn with ringing declarations on religious freedom and denominational *egyenjogúság*. The laws of the 1790 Diet, the proclamations of Law XX of 1848 during the revolution, the Preamble of Law LIII of 1868 following the Settlement, and the first paragraph of the law on the "free exercise of religion" passed in 1895 all witnessed the liberal spirit of Hungarian parliamentarians. Yet this was only one side of the picture.

Notwithstanding the egalitarian liberal rhetoric of statute law, the twin agency of Hungarian society's customary law and Crown (and ministerial) ordinances generated a motley collection of privileges and practices within a hierarchy of three broad classes of religions. In fact one could not find two churches in Hungary whose position with respect to civil law and the state authorities was identical.[155] Statute law all too frequently was merely the recognition of the changes that had already come about in the legal position of the various churches and had acquired social acceptance. Custom proved stronger than the laws made by parliament when the latter tried to settle contentious points of the sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants. This is demonstrated by the long saga of para 12 of Law LIII of 1868 on the religion of children born to parents in mixed marriages.

The liberals, unwittingly, drifted towards a system of church-state relations based on privileges that had evolved higgledy-piggledy and were recognized by statute law, rather than one based on statutory provisions applied equally to all religions. This system, however, might still have been the best remedy available against the Erastian policies governments had pursued earlier and, in particular, against the inherited autocratic principle which controlled the relationship between religious rights and state authority. Because the presumption of the law was on the side of the state and because religious rights existed only insofar as the state made concessions, it was a considerable achievement that the large majority of the citizens belonged to received churches most of which enjoyed either influence or self-government and, occasionally, both. Furthermore, the system was such that the individual was able to surmount the difficulties he faced in changing religions.

But the system as such had little in common with the ideals that liberals, including Hungarian liberals, cherished. Quite plainly, it was not based on the liberal conception of civil society every member of which had some basic rights. The limitations of a graduated system of privileges conferred on each religion by the state, as opposed to a system based on a statutory framework common for all, were obvious. Under a system in which rights and privileges generated a hierarchy, rights could also, without much trouble, regress. The Jewish religion, merely tolerated before 1869, became recognized in 1871. It was moving up in the hierarchy, and was received in 1895 by statute law, but was demoted in 1942 to the rank of a recognized religion by another statute law.[156] As long as religious freedoms were based on privileges and immunities, viewed as concessions or authorizations by the state, society's sense of justice was not violated when the state withdrew some privileges.[157] Under a liberal statutory system, a right taken away from one is an attack on all; under a hierarchy of privileges, it is not.

The system made all religions more dependent on the goodwill of the civil authorities than they would have been under a liberal statutory system. Churches coexisted on the basis of a

variety of different, insufficiently defined, rights. Imbued with an envious sectarian spirit, they were competing with each other for government favours. They queued up for "state benefits" (*állami juttatások*),[158] that is, for financial help, and for administrative support from the civil authorities. The mentality such a system encouraged was not conducive to the growth of independent, critical social attitudes.[159] Such independent social attitudes as did develop among the leaders of the received churches did so in spite of the general conditions.

The system could not cope with social change. The hallmark of a Western liberal system is its ability to tolerate dissent and secession from established social institutions. The Hungarian system never developed that ability. Religious freedoms were confined to a "closed shop", a rigid set of received religions. The class of recognized religion, a product of ministerial *uzus*, turned out to be a failure. The security it offered was insufficient. Created by an ordinance, a recognized church could lose its status by another ordinance. A recognized church's dependence on the local authorities, without any compensating *állami juttatás*, was nearly complete. Apart from the Jewish and the Islamic religions, both special cases, only the Baptist religion ever attained legal recognition. Society was deprived of an essential source of moral inspiration, and of an important seedbed of critical social attitude.

All in all, it was the government which turned out to be the true beneficiary of the system of privileges, and of the sectarian strife which the system exacerbated. The spectacular increase in the discretionary powers of the ministry shifted the balance of power further towards the overweening authority of the state at the expense of the received and non-received churches, whose ability to act as foci of independent social centres of power had diminished by the end of the nineteenth century.

NOTES

1 The text forms a part of a larger study on Hungarian nineteenth century liberalism. Mr.D. Mervyn Jones (London) and Mr. Neville Masterman (Mumbles) have kindly read the manuscript. I am grateful to both for their critical comments and suggestions from which I have greatly benefited.

2 The religious fund (*fundus religionis*) and the "education fund" (the confiscated property of the Jesuit Order abolished in 1773) formed two largest Catholic funds. They accrued from the *intercalaris* revenues of episcopal sees, private donations as well as from the confiscated properties of former religious orders. The funds were administered, under *ius patronatus* (see footnote 86), by the government as a trustee, so to speak, for the purposes of paying the clergy and for the maintenance of Catholic schools. Although the funds' origins went back to the sixteenth century, their administration was regulated in and after 1780. After 1867, the funds were managed, in cooperation with the hierarchy, by the Ministry of Religion (the *kultusz* ministry) and Public Education. Some of the funds did not appear in the state budget. Time and again unresolved disputes flared up in the House concerning the juridical nature of the funds; on their background and their connections with the issue of Catholic autonomy; see Csáky, *Kirche*, pp. 272-5.

3 See p. 105 below.

4 Arts XXVI and XXVII of 1790.

5 Eötvös' bill on primary schools, passed by the Lower House but blocked by the Upper House in August 1848, aimed at the State's establishment of a school network, although the recognized churches were to retain the right to run their own schools; see Felkai, pp. 83-99 and Weber, pp. 86-8.

6 In the 1850s Eötvös, like many other liberals, regarded the churches as essential safeguards against the state's omnipotence. See below and footnote 31. After 1867, Eötvös repeatedly criticized in the House the prescriptions of Law XX of 1848 on education, e.g. on 24 February, 1870; Eötvös, *Kultúra*, p. 242.

7 The House's Journal recorded *általános helyeslés* (general approval) when Eötvös noted on 24 June 1868 that the churches well understood that the principle offered a better guarantee of the existence of religion in society than anything else; *Képv. napló* VIII, p. 139. When Deák declared that "Free church in a free state – this is my slogan" the House responded with *élénk helyeslés* (Hear! Hear!); *ibid.*, X, p. 170. Pál Nyári, a leading Left Centre politician, warned the House on 30 November, 1868 that the dictum had nearly become commonplace although it was neither vacuous nor had it been accomplished as yet; *ibid*, XI. p. 192. But the famous liberal slogan was equivocal; some understood by it the church's freedom from the state, others, the state's freedom from the church. Charles de Montalembert was the probable source of the Hungarian references to the slogan in the 1860s. He did not invent it, though. However, just as Montalembert and Cavour could not agree on its proper meaning in a debate in 1860-61, neither could the parliament in Budapest; see Concha, *Montalembert*, pp. 144-59. The slogan appeared in the 1840s, see Horváth, *Roger*, p. 5.

8 In 1843, Eötvös was already an ardent promoter of a *general* enactment on religious freedom; "I think that ... it is our most important task to settle once and for all the religious question not through particular laws, but in such a form as would prevent controversy here in the future over the principles on which the settlement was based ... and this form could be obtained only if the complete equality, reciprocity and the freedom of all religions in general are established by [statute] law" Speech in the Upper House on 11 July, 1843; Eötvös, *Kultúra*, p. 85 and cf. p. 512.

9 A dig at the Catholic hierarchy.

10 Eötvös' answer to an interpellation of 4 June, 1868 by Sándor Csanády, (Extreme Left), who had demanded legislation during the session, *ibid.*, VII, p. 363. Eötvös' answer set out government policy on 24 June, *Képv. napló*, VIII, pp. 137-9.

11 *"a vallásfelekezetek egyenjogúsága"*

12 The Preamble of the bill submitted by Eötvös laconically stated that concerning the reciprocity of religious denominations, Laws III of 1844 and XX of 1848 are augmented and revised respectively; *Képv. irom.*, VI, p. 4.

13 Cf. pp. 94-96.

14 The Central Committee's report (rapporteur: Imre Csengery), disappointed over the lack of first principles in the ministerial bill, clearly stated that it would have preferred to see a bill "based on the general principle of religious freedom" rather than one "restricted to the reciprocity of the Christian religions". The Committee also redrafted the Preamble, revised a crucial provision (of which more later: p. 96 below) and asked the House to instruct the ministry to introduce legislation of a wider scope to replace the bill, which was to be passed as a temporary measure; *ibid.*, VII, pp. 3-7.

15 In many districts elements of a "plural society" in J.S. Furniwall's sense of the term, existed. For instance, in the *Felvidék* (Slovakia), Slovak-speaking Catholic peasants, German Lutheran town burghers and Hungarian Calvinist gentry lived together. Cf. Furniwall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, Cambridge, 1948, pp. 117-8 and esp. 303-6.

16 For the distribution of religions in the Monarchy, see Urbanitsch's Appendix in Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, IV; and Csáky, *Kirche*, pp. 302-3. Because of birth rate differentials, the ratio of Catholics steadily grew, while that of the Protestants, particularly of the Lutherans, decreased during the Dualist Era. This fact reinforced sectarian attitudes.

17 Called "Greek-Eastern Church" in Hungarian laws.

18 Cf. Gottas, *Ungarn*, p. 185.

19 Para 2, Art. I 1608 *post cor.*

20 See note 86, and the comments on the *placetum regium* below.

21 Cf. Werbőczi's *Tripartitum* para 1, Tit. XI. Pt. I, and see note 86.

22 Quoted by Macartney, *Hungary*, p. 150; on the Counter-Reformation and on Protestantism in Hungary, see the general points in Evans, esp. pp. 253ff., 272-4 and 448-50; for the 1850s, see Gottas, *Protestantismus*, pp. 498ff.

23 See Kosáry, *Művelődés* pp. 78ff.

24 Well described by Horváth in *Polgárosodás*, pp. 36-7.

25 The Curia connived in the "voluntary" resignations because in the chaotic conditions of the years, the *praesentatio* papers had never been sent to Rome, and thus the new incumbents functioned without *praeconisatio*; Eckhart, *Püsp. székek*, pp. 25-31; Lukács, pp. 72ff. and Csáky *Kirche*, pp. 259ff.; cf. note 34.

26 The report of Antonio De Luca, Papal Nuncio accredited to the Court of Vienna from 1856 to 1862; see Lukács, Nos. 175ff.

27 Bishop Haynald of Transylvania, and Bishop Strossmayer of Diakovo (Croatia); see the Nuncio's report on 29 November, 1861: *ibid.*, doc. No. 209. Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State did not share the views of the Nuncio: *ibid.*, No. 210.

28 Nuncio Falcinelli's reports: *ibid.*, Nos. 267 and 273. In 1870, the Concordat fell into abeyance in Cisleithania although it was formally annulled by the Holy See only after the dissolution of the Monarchy in 1918.

29 A moderate on church-state relations even in 1848 (e.g. his speech made on 9 Aug., 1848 on the issue of the "common schools", in Kónyi II, pp. 290ff.), Deák did not shy away from civil marriage and other radical reforms merely because he needed the Catholic Church's support for the 1867 Settlement. He had been sceptical about instituting civil marriage even before the Settlement was concluded; see his speeches on 23 February 1866, and later on 20 October, 1868, and 28 June, 1873 (in fact, his last speech in the House) in Kónyi, esp. III, p. 600, VI pp. 51ff., 56, 411-5; see also *ibid.*, p. 404 and Csizmadia, *Deák*, pp. 39-40.

30 Cf. note 2.

31 On Eötvös' preoccupation with the "evils of excessive centralization", see his *Uralkodó eszméi*; his argument is summarized in Jones, *Eötvös*, esp. p. 591; Eötvös' letters to Charles de Montalembert in Eötvös, *Levelek*, esp. pp. 241-4, 410-1 and 434.

32 See p. 81 and note 10 above.

33 See Salacz, *Egyház*, pp. 28ff.

34 Csáky, *Kirche*, p. 266. The Prelates' Conference demanded Catholic autonomy already in April 1848. This was a reaction to Law XX of 1848, which the prelates had tried and failed to block. In 1848, the issue of Catholic autonomy became tainted with the political plan to create a "national church". Moderate autonomists, including Eötvös, did not in 1867 regard the autonomists of 1848 as their predecessors. Cf. H. Egyed, pp. 422-5; for a less sympathetic treatment see Lukács, pp. 58ff. and Halász, pp. 306ff.

35 Eötvös, *Levelek*, pp. 493-500.

36 *"egyházunk egyszerű híve"*

37 It was true that ever since 1848, the creation of a national Catholic Church had been an aspiration of radical Catholic liberals. Lukács, pp. 166-9, blames the Nuncio and the Holy See for its failure; Salacz, *Egyház*, pp. 30-31, puts the blame on the radical trends among liberal lay Catholics.

38 On Deák's role in the events, see Csizmadia, *Deák*, pp. 40-52. The limited autonomy of the Catholic *Status* of Transylvania survived after 1867. A second, again unsuccessful, attempt was made to introduce Catholic autonomy at a church congress held from 1897 to 1902, a reaction to the church laws of 1894-95.

39 Even in 1870, Eötvös did not turn against the church. He wrote in his diary that although the claim to infallibility by one person was absurd, the dictum used by "the enemies of our church" that "the voice of the people was the voice of God" was more absurd; Eötvös, *Vallomások*, p. 797.

40 See Eötvös' letter to the Prince Primate, 1 Aug. 1870, *Levelek*, pp. 659-60 and 656. For a lively account of the crisis by an anticlerical old hand, see Halász, pp. 327-36.

41 Eötvös, *Levelek*, p. 659.

42 10 Aug. 1870. The draft was prepared by Eötvös who took responsibility on behalf of the government; see Kónyi, VI, pp. 383ff., documents and debate in the House; see also Boncz II, p. 292. A concise account of the revival of *placetum* in Salacz, *Egyház*, pp. 34-40.

43 On 28 June, 1873, Deák said in the House that he could not find any definition of the *placetum* in the *Corpus Juris Hung.* and that the "right" itself was not specifically the Hungarian monarch's, but followed from the "concept of the state". He also held that the enforcement of the right lacked sanction in penal law, Kónyi, VI, pp. 408-9; his position was very moderate in a House where many demanded retribution against the bishops who had published the bull.

Deák's constitutionalism was, however, compatible with the autocratic principle of the state: as the state had the "right" to permit the publication of the bull without any specific authorization, the presumption of the law was on its side, not on the bishops'; cf. p. 111 below.

44 E.g. Vázsonyi, pp. 104-7. In 1893, the future apostle of general suffrage complained that "the state stood unprotected against the churches" as much as he complained that religious freedoms were incomplete: p. 46.

45 Eötvös was apparently distressed to find in Beust's Note to the Nuncio a reference to the *placetum* – to be revived in Hungary – as inappropriate for Cisleithania because a claim of that kind would be in conflict with the "liberal spirit of the *Staatsgrundgesetze*"; Eötvös to Andrássy on 16 August 1870, *Levelek*, pp. 666-7.

46 The crisis flared up once again in January 1873 over Géza Lükő's interpellation concerning the "publication" of the papal bull by the Bishop of Rozsonyó. It took over five months for Minister Trefort to prepare an answer to Lükő, and although the minister had "reproved" the bishop, the government, ambushed in the House, lost the vote by 83 against 71. In the debate that followed, Deák, making his last speech in the House, surveyed church-state relations on 28 June 1873. Parliament eventually sent out a committee to report on church-state relations, one of the many of the House's inconsequential moves; for a good summary, see Kónyi, VI, pp. 401-16.

47 Eötvös himself never abandoned the plan to secure religious freedoms by the enactment of a comprehensive statute law. He said so repeatedly in the House in November 1869: *Képv. napló*, III, pp. 181-2, 187-8 and 198; and on 7 April 1870 he brought in a new bill which, however, never got further, *ibid.*, VII, p. 388; see also his letter to Prince Primate Simor on 19 December 1869 in: Eötvös, *Levelek*, esp. p. 634; also Csizmadia, *Állam*, p. 84.

48 See Irányi's 12 paragraph bill (6 July 1869) in: *Képv. irom.*, I, pp. 292-3.

49 Salacz, *Egyház*, pp. 53-4.

50 Minister Trefort used political muscle in the 1880s to hoist government supporters into episcopal see especially in dioceses in the nationalities' districts; see cases discussed in Eckhart, *Püsp. székek*, pp. 55-9. *"Episcopi hungarici sunt magis politici quam catholici"* was, apparently, the Curia's opinion of the Hungarian prelates in the late nineteenth century: quoted by Salacz, *Egyház*, p. 75; see also Szekfü *Magyar tört.* V, pp. 522-3.

51 Salacz, *Egyház*, pp. 72-4; Apponyi, *Ötven év*, pp. 136-7.

52 Ágoston Trefort, Eötvös' brother-in-law was the longest-serving minister of *kultusz* and education since 1848. On the appointment of Simor's successor, see Salacz, *A primási szék*, pp. 311-19.

53 The number of mixed marriages was high; Csáky, *Kirche*, 294n 100

54 In force from 1 October 1895. On the question of mixed marriages in Hungarian politics in the 1840s, see Csizmadia, *Deák*, pp. 17-31.

55 Eötvös' bill in *Képv. irom.*, VI, pp. 265-6. The report of the House's Central Committee (rapporteur: Imre Csengery) revised here and there the three paragraph bill, leaving its substance intact: *ibid.*, VII, pp. 7-8. The House passed the bill on 30 November 1868 after a short debate: *Képv. napló*, XI, pp. 192-200.

56 E.g. before 1 October 1895, a civil marriage made abroad was not necessarily recognized in Hungary. The ministry "of its own authority" began to produce rules and empowered the *kultusz* minister to take decision in particular cases: Dárday, II, pp. 7-8.

57 Eötvös argued in the House that as long as ecclesiastical courts were competent to rule in cases of Catholic marriages, the principle of reciprocity established in 1848 required that the Protestants have the same right. It was up to them to create their own courts or to recognize the competence of the civil courts (they mostly followed the latter course): *Képv. napló*, XI, p. 193. The imperial administration after 1849 failed to tackle any of the interconfessional problems. The Rechberg government was conspicuously rebuffed when in September 1859 it tried to regulate Protestant autonomy by an imperial patent which ordered the creation of an ecclesiastical high court: Berzeviczy, II, p. 251. Nuncio De Luca was apparently reassured by the government in 1859 that the principle of religious equality was not new: it did not mean substantive rights but only the equal protection of the religious denominations by the state: Lukács, p. 132.

58 Cf. Eötvös' bill above: *Képv. irom.*, VI, pp. 4-7.

59 Paras 5-11 Law III of 1844. The last para of this law ordered a deterrent which Eötvös did not include in his bill, namely that the conversions should be reported every year by the Catholic bishops to His Majesty.

60 *Képv. napló*, XI, pp. 204-5. Eötvös argued against Tisza's proposed amendment, which would have obliged the convert to declare his intentions twice in the presence of the priest, whose church he had decided to join, rather than to the priest whose church he was about to desert. Tisza argued that the stipulations in Law III of 1844 had led to unpleasant encounters and even scandals in the past; *ibid.*, p. 201.

61 The common Hungarian term for this guarantee is *reverzális*, from *reversales* (Latin) and *Reverse* (German); Konek considered the different cases concerning the religion of the children, para 239.

62 The Committee report (rapporteur: Imre Csengery) argued strongly against the parents' free choice: the "assurances" had caused discord and conflicts even though in the past the law had not authorized parents to bargain; also, free choice would only increase the scope for unlawful external influences. In recommending the revised para 12, the report referred to the Transylvanian practice, *Képv. irom.*, VII, pp. 3-4. As paragraph 12 was declaratory rather than imperative in form, and because the Law had no penal sanction, Catholic jurists had a field day. See also note 67.

63 Para 12 implied that these had been invalid in the past – a contention without any support in statute law. This provision was yet another examle of legislative innovation by reference to pre-existing ("historic", that is, customary) right. Protestants had always protested against the practice of the letters of "assurance".

64 30 November 1868, *Képv. napló*, XI, pp. 211-2. The House was restless and did not want debate, as if the issue had already been settled (which it was).

65 Kálmán Tisza and the staunch Deákist Károly Szász, both leading Protestants, combined against the minister and Ernő Simonyi, (Extreme Left), *ibid.*, pp. 210, 213-4. Deák did not speak in the debate but, as Salacz has pointed out (*Kulturharc*, p. 13, n.5), earlier he had supported Eötvös' draft, but then backed down.

66 The hierarchy, led by Prince Primate Simor and the Catholic magnates, put up resistance to para 12 in the Upper House where the bill was debated on 5 December. The Committee report (rapporteur: Count János Cziráky) restored the "unfettered right" of the parents as regards the religion of the children in mixed marriages. Many argued that as the interest of the state was not involved, the law should leave the decision to the parents. But the amendment was defeated by 61 to 25 votes, *Főrendi napló*, pp. 601-16.

67 There is some evidence that Deák in order to avoid a "sectarian war" put his foot down in the matter of attaching any penal clause to the law, Salacz, *Kulturharc*, p. 13, n.5.

68 On the chequered history of the law, I have drawn heavily on the classic work on the subject: Salacz, *Kulturharc*; see also the more recent work by Csáky, *Kulturkampf*, Ch. II.

69 The issue was whether the practice constituted an offence: cf. note 62, and see Salacz, *ibid.*, pp. 15ff.

70 Coined on *wegtaufen*. The Protestants themselves practised *elkeresztelés*, which, however, the Catholic Church tolerated.

71 According to para 53 Law XI of 1879, a fine of up to 300 forints and a prison sentence of up to two months could be imposed.

72 After the Sopron case, there were other court cases, and the High Court's ruling of 24 March 1882 was made in a case which had been tried in Tata; Salacz *ibid.*, pp. 22-4.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 25-6.

74 The legality of Trefort's ordinance was based on Law XL of 1879 On Offences, which was, according to its own provisions, applicable to local statutes and ministerial decrees as well as statute law. The text of Trefort's decree in Beksics, *Harminc év*, p. 771.

75 As Trefort's biographer remarked, he failed to "exploit the potential" of his own sphere of authority: Mann, p. 131.

76 The substantive provisions of Csáky's ordinance followed Trefort's: it allowed the baptism of a child by either of the two churches involved in the mixed marriage, but whenever the child, by virtue of para 12 Law LIII of 1868, "belonged" to the other religion, the baptizing churchman had to notify the other church, for it was there that the birth was to be offically registered; see the text in Beksics, *Harminc év*, p. 772.

77 A fine of 10 to 50 forints was set, and up to 100 forints for the recidivist.

78 Before 1896, there had been no administrative courts in Hungary (excepting for appeals against tax assessments, for which courts were set up in 1883). Paras 41-45 of the statutory instrument of Law XXXVII of 1880 which implemented the Penal Code, Law V of 1878, and Law XL of 1879 On Offences enabled the ministry to bypass the courts in administering justice for offences.

79 26 February 1890; the Szapáry Cabinet was appointed on 15 March. On the political circumstances and Csáky' consultations with the prelates, see Csáky, *Kulturkampf*, pp. 43-7.

80 Apponyi, *Ötven év*, pp. 192-3. Catholics who accepted the reform of the marriage law in return usually demanded support for Catholic autonomy (whose institution at the turn of the century again met with no success); cf. note 38.

81 Salacz, *Kulturharc*, esp. pp. 202-4.

82 *Ibid.*, pp. 209-10. Apponyi's National party and Szapáry could, of course, have created a new majority in the House on the basis of army concessions but the king would have none of it; Apponyi, *Ötven év*, pp. 204-5.

83 Apponyi described the civil marriage issue as an astounding liberal success, *Ötven év*, pp. 212ff.; Beksics regretted its

disruptive effect on the existing party structure. *Harminc év*, pp. 788ff.; and Szekfű deplored Beksics' regrets, *Három nemz.*, p. 306; see also Péter Hanák's general points in *MT* VII, pp. 102-6 and 153-4.

84 Para 9. Para 1 of the Law allowed parents of mixed marriages, before the marriage ceremony, "once and for all" to enter into a formal agreement in the presence of the civil authorities concerning the bringing up of all their children either in the father's or in the mother's religion. The agreement could be altered subsequently only if one parent converted to the religion of the other. Para 6, perfunctorily, declared any agreement and "assurance" contrary to the terms of the law invalid. If there was no formal agreement the religion of the children followed the religion of the parents according to sex. The provisions of the 10-paragraph law applied to all the "received" and the "recognized" religions. Csáky's ordinance on *elkeresztelés* was rescinded by another *kultusz* ordinance when the law came into force. From then onwards, the "assurance" demanded by the Catholic Church from the non-Catholic partner in a mixed marriage ceased to be regarded as unlawful. See Salacz, *Kulturharc*, p. 377.

85 The customary rights of the Crown over churches were nowhere defined, but were without elaboration "recognized", by statute laws, e.g. para 4 Art. XXVI of 1790 concerning the Protestants and Art XXVII of 1790 concerning the Orthodox church; see also the Statutes of the Calvinist Church, para 4, in Dárday, II, p. 174ff., and para 2 of the Lutheran's Statutes, *ibid.*, p. 175.

86 The appointment of Catholic prelates was the very first item on the list of subjects compiled in 1867 which required Francis Joseph's approval before the *kultusz* minister, or the Cabinet, could act (this was the so-called preliminary sanction, which applied, among others to all government legislation). The list also covered other aspects of *ius patronatus*, but interestingly, only fragments of *iura circa sacra*, Iványi, pp. 531-2. Para 3 Law IX of 1868 "maintained" over the Romanian and the Serbian churches "His Majesty's constitutionally exercised right of supreme supervision". The epithet "constitutional" did not involve parliamentary control; it meant countersignature by a minister, and the obligation his coronation Oath imposed on the monarch not to enact decrees in contravention of statute law or the Church Statutes enacted by the Crown.

87 Also, the Bishop of the Calvinist Church of Transylvania had to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown: Church Statutes, para 178, Dárday, p. 174 (30).

88 The *ius advocatiae* applied to the Protestant churches was comparable to the *brachium* applied to the Catholic (and to the Eastern Orthodox?) Church; see para 4 of the Statutes of the Calvinist Church, Dárday, II, p. 174 (1).

89 Eötvös, in responding to a question, frankly admitted in the House on 23 February 1869 that, authorized by the monarch, he had settled a large number of important matters without any instruction from parliament on the sole authority of the monarch: Eötvös, *Kultúra*, 229-36. On the background of the distinction between those enactments which were signed by the king (rescripts) and those which were not (decrees), see Cziráky, para 656.

90 Para 8 Law XX of 1848 which guaranteed the autonomy of the Orthodox church in religious and school matters was partly rescinded by para 10 Law IX of 1868. Eötvös, in seeing the bill through the House, was given a rough time by the Opposition because of the use of the term "Romanian National Church Congress" in para 6 of the Law: 8 May, 1868, *Képv. napló*, VII, pp. 202-6. Law XXV of 1881 supplemented the 1868 Law on a single point.

91 The 176-paragraph Church Statutes had been drafted by Metropolitan Saguna, were revised by the Romanian National Church Congress in September 1868, and were subsequently amended, on the advice of the *kultusz* minister, by the monarch, whose decree listed the seven revised provisions (A to G) in the Preamble of the Statutes, enacted on 28 May 1869: Dárday, II, pp. 97-119. An account on the making of the Statutes in Hitchins, pp. 244-7.

92 12 September 1867, and 15 November 1871; Dárday, II, pp. 82ff and 298ff. Eötvös' rescript on the *placetum* was also in this category.

93 Dárday, II, pp. 86 and 127-8. On the three different types of enactments see Molnár, p. 20.

94 Dárday, II, pp. 171ff.

95 *Ibid.*, pp. 132-3.

96 *Ibid.*, p. 303. The *kultusz* distinguished the Jewish Congress congregations, the Orthodox Jewish congregations, and the *status quo* congregations.

97 Lutheran Church Statues, paras 141 and 162, *ibid.*, pp. 193 and 197.

98 See the wording of para 3 of the Law.

99 The emperor's rescript of 24 December 1864 to Bishop Andreiu Saguna approved the establishment of a Romanian Orthodox metropolis, and appointed him as its Metropolitan: Hitchins, p. 243; see also Lukács, p. 132, for Nuncio Falcinelli's anxieties as regards the reform.

100 This right of the monarch was no formality. When the monarch, on the advice of the government, refushed to approve the elected prelate, Congress was forced to select another one instead. See Katus in *MT*, VI, p. 1339.

101 Cf. Hitchins, p. 244, and see Bödy's comments, pp. 118-9.

102 See Katus, *op. cit.*

103 For the attitudes to Jewish emancipation and Magyarization in 1860-61, see Szabad, pp. 359-68.

104 Cf. Eötvös explanation given to the House in the 1870 budget debate on 18 February 1870, in: Eötvös, *Kultúra*, pp. 224-6.

105 15 November 1871, Dárday, II, pp. 298-304; see also Kónyi, VI, pp. 275-7.

106 See section on "Recognized religions" below.

107 *bevett (recepta religio), elismert* and *megtűrt*.

108 In particular, the Vienna Peace of 1606 *(Ad primum art.)*; *Art* 1 of 1608 *ante cor.*; and para 5 *Art* of 1647.

109 Para 13; the context implies the Lutheran and the Calvinist churches, which are contrasted with the Catholic Church.

110 The law extended Protestant rights in the matter of conversions.

111 Law XXXIII of 1874 on parliamentary franchise abandoned religious qualifications altogether; see also note 115.

112 But para 6 Law XLIII of 1895 on the Free Exercise of Religion declared intact all the laws and rules applying to a list of churches which, in fact, included only those that were at the time regarded as the received churches; however the Law never specified them as such; see note 142.

113 Para I. In Transylvania the Unitarian Church was already *recepta religio* in the seventeenth century.

114 *Art.* 27 of 1790 and *Art.* 10 of 1792.

115 Cf. p. 80 above. Opposition to the emancipation of the Jews (the *Judenkrawalle* in the larger towns) was probably the chief reason why *egyenjogúság* was confined to the received religions.

116 Sándor Konek, a leading jurist on church law, claimed in 1867 that the Catholic Church "could be described as the state church", which he distinguished from the "received religions"; Konek, para 52. A decanal meeting in Veszprém County passed a resolution in October 1887 to the effect that the Catholic Church was still *avita religio* rather than *recepta religio*, and other districts expressed support for the resolution. To remove uncertainty, Trefort issued an ordinance on 28 December 1887 which insisted that the

Catholic Church was one of the received religions: Ernő Nagy, *Közjog*, 1891, pp. 100-01.

117 On 13 August 1868, Dárday, II, p. 27. For more of this important ordinance, below on p. 112 and note 125.

118 See note 116.

119 The law conferred "recognized" status on the Muslim church in 1916. See note 139.

120 These rights and practices developed out of the ancient *brachium saeculare* and the *ius advocatiae* and were, to a different extent in each case, extended to the received churches in the nineteenth century.

121 The Jewish religion was given representation in the Upper House, restored by Law XXII of 1926. But Jewish church leaders had been personally appointed members of the Upper House after 1895. Law XXVII of 1940 rescinded the provision of Jewish representation in the Upper House; the Jewish religion was deprived of its received status two years later by Law VI of 1942.

122 Cf. p. 84.

123 Eötvös used the liberal statutory argument in the House on 9 December 1869 in his answer to Miletič, who had complained that the government had allowed the Patriarch to dissolve the Congress of the Serbian Orthodox church. The government, Eötvös said, had proceded on the basis of Law IX of 1868, and had refrained from interfering in the matter "because it is not called upon and authorized to do so by law", *Képv. napló*, IV, pp. 63-5. For another example, see Eötvös' letter to Primate Simor on 19 Dec. 1869 in Eötvös, *Levelek*, p. 630. Moreover, Eötvös was a firm adherent of the liberal principle that the minister could not lawfully *impose* a legal obligation on the citizen without being authorized by statute law; e.g. his attitude to compulsory education: speech in the House on 23 June 1868, *ibid.*, VIII, p. 128. As regards the property of the subject, Eötvös unequivocally rejected the idea that the minister had administrative power at his disposal without statute law, although he himself had to arbitrate sometimes between the rival claims of townships and churches over school property; see his answers to questions in the House on 28 October 1869 and on 14 March 1870: Eötvös, *Kultúra*, pp. 418-24.

124 *"blos tolerirt, oder geduldet"*, wrote Virozsil in 1865; *Staats-Recht*, I, p. 225.

125 See note 117. The VKM *rendelet* No. 12548 was issued on 13 August 1868. The Nazarenes appeared in Hungary in 1840 and spread among the Calvinist Hungarian peasants and urban poor. Eötvös sent the ordinance to Pest, which had passed on to the *kultusz* ministry an application by József Sol-

larsch, a cobbler, in which he had asked whether the Nazarene church would be permitted to run its own register of births, etc., or whether the authorities would administer it.

126 The word used was *"hiteleseknek"*, Dárday, II, p. 27.

127 On 13 June 1875; see Dárday, II, pp. 27-8. Trefort expressly invoked Eötvös' authority in his 1875 and also in his 1881 ordinance (see further on).

128 *"engedi meg"*

129 Nagy, *Közjoga*, 1891, p. 102.

130 Dárday, II, pp. 28-9.

131 See Csizmadia, *Staat*, pp. 35ff. I am not aware of any critical historical study written on the existence of sects in late nineteenth-century Hungary. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they were spreading in many parts of the country.

132 Cf. p. 81 and note 12.

133 Liberals in all political parties resisted popular pressure to restrict the advance of Jews in public life. The government in Hungary, unlike in Austria, could stem the anti-Semitic tide's spilling over into parliamentary politics. Győző Istóczy's Anti-Semitic Party established in 1883 was driven out of parliament by government pressure within a decade. On the Anti-Semitic Party, see Mérei, pp. 149-55.

134 15 November 1871, VKM *rendelet* No. 26915, in Dárday, II, pp. 298-303. Internal divisions among the congregations allowed civil authorities to exercise power over many aspects fo Jewish relations even after the Jewish religion was declared received in 1895. The creation of administrative courts in 1896 did not help: they were hardly given any competence in religious matters.

135 The leading jurist of the period argued in 1907, however, that the recognized status of a religion could be cancelled by ministerial ordinance because recognition was attained by ministerial ordinance in the first place; Nagy, *Közjoga*, 1907, p. 148.

136 *"elismert vallás"*, coined on the German *"anerkannte Religion"*.

137 Para 51 Law XL of 1879 On Offences referred to "any confession recognized by the state". For other examples, see Csizmadia, *Állam*, p. 95.

138 VKM *rendelet*: 77092/1905, Nagy *Közjoga*, 1907, p. 141.

139 Law XVII of 1916. See Csizmadia on possible reasons for the statutory rather than ministerial recognition, *Állam*, p. 90 n 33.

140 On the Religion of the Children Para I. See p. 101 and note 84.

141 See Ch. V of Salacz, *Kultúrharc*, esp. pp. 362ff., and general points in Csáky, *Kulturkampf*, pp. 99ff.

142 Para 6 of the Law listed religions which in fact comprised the class regarded as "received" at the time: Catholics of all rites, the three Protestant churches, the Serbian and the Romanian Orthodox churches and, by virtue of the preceding law, the Jewish religion.

143 The title of Chapter 2, which runs from para 7 to para 21 of the Law.

144 Para 7.

145 *"faji vagy nemzetiségi"*

146 Para 8.

147 Paras 9-12 and 19.

148 Para 13: *"erkölcsi és állampolgári magatartása kifogás alá nem esik"*

149 Para 15: *"államellenes magatartást tanusit"*.

150 Paras 22-32.

151 The law, as in many other comparable cases, did not establish procedural rules. Those were later laid down by ministerial ordinances.

152 Cf. pp. 94-95 above.

153 Para 25. The Law, logically, did not impose this obligation on members of recognized churches, whose tax the civil authorities did not help to collect.

154 As in other countries, "freedom of worship" was demanded in Hungary before the nineteenth century by religions in a minority position, namely by the Protestants. The demand did not necessarily involve tolerant attitudes; see Kosáry, *Művelődés*, pp. 77-80.

155 In October 1905, the Fejérváry government promised, with qualifications, that "complete equality and reciprocity among the received religions would be made effective in every respect" , Lányi, p. 118.

156 Law VIII of 1942 On the Regulation of the Legal Status of the Jewish Religion. Paragraph 1 rescinded Law XLII of 1895 and declared the "recognition" of the Jewish religion.

157 In order to justify the demotion of the Jewish religion in 1942, a leading jurist pointed out that even after 1895, the rights of the Jewish religion, had remained less extensive than those of the Christian received religions: I. Egyed, p. 158; see also Csizmadia, *Staat*, p. 24.

158 A key word of modern Hungarian social history, which would deserve a separate study, *juttatások*, is mentioned occasionally in the literature. E.g. Csizmadia, Állam, p. 93.

159 Szekfű, himself a pious Roman Catholic, criticized the churches for their lack of interest either in social work or even in pastoral work; Catholic prelates did not want to know of the existence of social problems and opposed reforms of any kind, *Magyar tört.*, V, pp. 521-6.

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JAMES NIESSEN

FORMS AND SOURCES OF LIBERALISM IN TRANSYLVANIA

During the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century Transylvania experienced a major administrative and economic transformation, but an even more profound one in terms of political outlook. In the traditional, hierarchical society at the beginning of this period, political culture and even literacy were restricted to a small elite within each of the province's three nationalities.[1] In all three groups, however – among Magyars, Saxons and Romanians – reform ideas that were loosely referred to as liberalism gained increasing influence. In a most general sense liberalism was a political movement striving to restrict an alien and bureaucratic absolutism through the rule of law and representative institutions. Liberals also tended to advocate the abolition of restrictions on free economic activity and of those on free expression. Finally, a major goal of liberals in Hungary was the free development of nationality through education (replacing the schools' Latin language of instruction with the national languages) and through other national institutions. In all three of these spheres, political, economic, and cultural, liberals theoretically encouraged the involvement of all segments of society, although they never lost sight of their own class interests. The considerable success of liberal ideology by 1867 was reflected in the phenomenon of secularization, as a result of which the authority of religion and of the clergy in public life declined in relation to the more worldly concerns of the lay intelligentsia.[2] Yet a special trait of liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy was the strong influence of the Catholic En-

lightenment and Reform Catholicism both within and outside the Church, so that secularism represented only one trend in liberalism within the Monarchy.[3] In Transylvania, lay activism and ecclesiastical reform found theological expression not only among Roman Catholics (Jansenism), but also among Greek Catholics and Orthodox (synodal and separatist movements) and Protestants (Pietism and electoral reform). Social and cultural realities, it will be seen, determined both the overall traits of liberalism in Transylvania and also its national variants. We will also see how these variants had crystallized in the views of prominent representatives of the generation of 1848 by the time of the Compromise of 1867.

In many respects conditions for the development of a liberal movement were less favorable in Transylvania than in Hungary proper. Transylvanian society lacked Hungary's large middle nobility, which provided a coherent and effective base for liberal agitation and substituted for the small, ethnically heterogeneous and conservative middle class. A small but very cultivated class of magnates dominated liberal politics in the Magyar counties, while the counties were much more influential in the Diet than the Saxon or Szekler districts. The relatively poor mass of the nobility, on the other hand, frequently depended on the government for employment.[4] The lesser nobility of Transylvania was often even more suspicious of reform than that of Hungary because of the unregulated state of landholding. The act of regulation (*urbarium*) was a prerequisite of peasant emancipation, but the lower nobility derived much of its limited social security from the flexibility of land tenure.[5] The traditional economy offered only limited opportunity for intellectual employment. As a result, the clergy constituted a considerable proportion of the intelligentsia of all three nationalities, but particularly of that of the Romanians.[6] This clergy was frequently the bearer of liberal ideas, in spite of the basic conservatism of most of its members.

The administrative and ethnic diversity of Transylvania also militated against a coherent liberal movement. The Magyar counties were the stronghold of the nobility's economic and political power, but also of the most oppressive serfdom

in Hungary. In the Szekler district, the combative traditions of the Szekler nobles made them the most dedicated supporters of the radical leader Wesselényi, but the peculiarities of land tenure there complicated the process of emancipating the serfs.[7] There were few noblemen in the Saxon district, a predominantly free peasantry, and a broader participation in municipal life than elsewhere in Transylvania. Numerically Romanians dominated the counties – the stronghold of seigneurial agriculture – and, to a lesser extent, the Saxon district, yet exercised little political influence. Transylvanian Romanian society presented yet another pattern: there was a large but impoverished Romanian merchant class in the Saxon towns, but 90 percent of the Romanians were peasants.[8] At mid-century, about 57 percent of the population of Transylvania lived in the counties, and 70 percent of these were Romanians; the rest of the total population was equally divided between the Szekler district (80 percent Magyar) and the Saxon district (54 percent Romanian and 37 percent German).[9]

Finally, the position of the government was considerably stronger in Transylvania than in Hungary. Some opposition leaders even wondered whether liberalism had any realistic chance for success in Transylvania. Noble county officials (the core of the liberal opposition in Hungary) did not draw their salaries from taxes under their own control as in Hungary, but from the provincial treasury controlled by the government.[10] The Diet was unicameral and represented chiefly the nobility, and as many as three-quarters of its members were not elected but appointed by the Court. The manipulation of these and of the various social interests of the deputies usually enabled the Court to frustrate liberal measures in the Diet.

Liberalism as a critique of traditional society drew its inspiration from the Enlightenment. Enlightenment doctrines of individualism, particularly those of Herder and Kant, penetrated into Transylvania through the teaching and manuscripts of Saxon Lutherans, Magyar Calvinists and Romanian Greek Catholics who had studied at Austrian and German universities. Most Saxon clergy and prominent officials studied at the German universities of Göttingen (the home of Schlözer), Halle (the

center of Pietism), Tübingen, Jena and Leipzig; there they became familiar with the ideology of the German Enlightenment, even if they did not always embrace it.[11] Especially important for the thinking of the Saxons were the ideas of the German historian August Schlözer. In his history of the Saxons, written at the end of the eighteenth century, he referred to the Saxon district as the "free German state in Transylvania", contrasting Saxon constitutionalism favorably with the aristocratic "oligarchic parasitism" of the counties.[12] The idea of traditional institutions as a bulwark against absolutist intrusions, which was already strong in the Magyar opposition, inspired the Saxons' leading national historian, Friedrich Teutsch, to write that "liberalism is the determining factor of Saxon national character".[13] In Schlözer's view the Saxon constitution provided for a freer, more equitable society, but some Saxons cited his arguments not in defense of liberty but of their own privileges.

Among the Magyars, many Protestant professors and ministers studied in Germany and in Holland, and enjoyed surprising liberty to introduce the ideas of Kant and Voltaire on the dignity of the individual and on religious toleration in the courses and sermons they gave in Transylvania.[14] The influence of the Austrian Enlightenment was especially strong on the Romanians, because of its criticism of aristocratic domination and historical institutions, emphasis on natural law, and the solicitude shown by Joseph II for the Romanians' welfare.[15] In all three national groups, there was a strong emphasis on historical research as a service to the nation, a flourishing of Romantic literature, and confidence that liberalism was in the interest of all nations.

All three nationalities established reading circles in the high schools that propagated patriotic and increasingly liberal values among the youth.[16] The adult reading circles – called "Casinos" – stimulated political life by making newspapers available to members. The German Casino of Brașov (Kronstadt/Brassó), for instance, subscribed at its refounding in 1839 to 28 German, 18 Hungarian, two Romanian and two Croatian-language

periodicals.[17] The Hungarian Casino of Cluj (Kolozsvár) was established in 1833, and the Romanian Casino of Brașov in 1835.

When liberalism emerged in Transylvanian politics in the 1830s, it was at first an exclusively Magyar phenomenon. This is not surprising when one considers that four-fifths of the deputies at the Diet of 1834-35, the first in forty years, were Magyars: it was chiefly the Magyars who had the option of political activity. It is worth noting that the feudal Hungarian "nation" or nobility whose representatives dominated the Diet was one-fifth ethnic Romanian, and even a majority in some counties.[18] Some Romanians complained that their nobility was too "conservative" to provide national leadership, meaning that it often placed its feudal corporate interest above the Romanian national cause. Sporadic attempts to enlist it in this cause were unsuccessful.[19] But the meaning of the term "conservative" is ambiguous because sometimes the Romanian nobility supported liberal Magyars, such as the radical leader László Teleki sent to the Diet by the district of Făgăraș.[20] Some members of the Romanian gentry became prominent clergymen, like Alexandru Sterca-Șuluțiu, and most of the other bishops of the Greek Catholic Church were also of gentry origin. In general, however, this nobility was poor and dominated, like the rest of the lesser nobility in the counties, by the local magnates. The electoral law of 1863, by stipulating a minimum tax assessment, eliminated most noblemen from the electorate, even in the areas where most of them were Romanians. Yet their exclusion helped produce an electorate more favorable to the Romanian national cause.[21] As will be shown, Saxon politics were overwhelmingly conservative. This derived in part from traditional Saxon loyalty to the Viennese Court but also from restrictions on the electorate introduced in the nineteenth century. Thus the liberals within each national group had to overcome the resistance of influential co-nationals as well as of the government.

The beginning of the Hungarian Age of Reform is usually dated from 1825 and Széchenyi's spectacular donation to found the Hungarian Academy. The act, as well as Széchenyi's books, *Lovakrul* (On horses) and *Hitel* (Credit) had a great impact in

Transylvania. In these, he demanded the abolition of serfdom and the restriction of the guilds. The Transylvanian magnate Miklós Wesselényi was at this time a close associate of Széchenyi's, having travelled to Western Europe with him in the 1820s. Wesselényi's first two books up to 1833, concerning horse-breeding and the goals of the liberal opposition, closely parallel the ideas of Széchenyi's first two books, but with more attention devoted to practical politics. Wesselényi demonstrated his Anglophile dedication to constitutionalism by converting his entire stud farm to British breeds. John Paget, a British traveller in Transylvania at this time, wrote, perhaps with some exaggeration, that the raising of British horses had become a mark of liberal politics; native breeds were scorned as reactionary.[22] Paget found the Transylvanian aristocracy so much to his liking that he decided to make his home among its members.

The second major figure among the early liberals of Transylvania was Sándor Bölöni Farkas. He was a social activist and the leading ally of Wesselényi's in Transylvanian politics in the 1830s, but his chief contribution was a book published in 1834-35: *Utazás észak-amerikában* (Travels in North America). The book enthusiastically praised Jacksonian democracy, with which the author had become acquainted during his six-month journey. The work describes American conditions with great care and not always uncritically; the central theme is that free institutions create unlimited possibilities for cultural and economic growth. The book was popular among the Magyar liberal opposition in both Hungary and Transylvania and was praised warmly by both Széchenyi and Wesselényi.

Magnates and urban noblemen such as Wesselényi and Farkas dominated Magyar intellectual life and politics. Roughly half of the literate Romanians in Transylvania during the Age of Reform were clergy, and half of the smaller group of intelligentsia as well.[23] This circumstance arose chiefly due to the feudal economy and aristocratic domination. Romanians who attained the status and prestige of nobles or urban citizens frequently sided with the dominant nation even if they did not assimilate linguistically. By default, national leadership

rested in the hands of the clergy, and the Romanian bishops were their nation's most important leaders until the second half of the nineteenth century. The clergy's proportion of politically active Romanians certainly declined throughout the nineteenth century, but it is indicative of their continuing influence that one-third of the 1493 signatories to the Romanian petition to the Emperor in 1866 were clergymen.[24] The institutional goals of the Church increasingly clashed with those of the emerging liberal intelligentsia, but never completely; both groups agreed that education was a requirement of the first order, and education was under the administration of the Church.

The emergence of a secular Romanian intelligentsia was proof that society itself was changing, as the economy was finally producing lay employment for an educated Romanian elite. Many of these had studied at the best Hungarian schools, which does not mean they were totally indebted to Hungarian culture but should remind us, once again, of the interdependence of cultures in Transylvania. For instance, George Bariţiu, to whom we shall turn shortly, studied in Unitarian and Roman Catholic schools before moving on to the Romanian high school in Blaj. The liberal generation emerged later than that of the Magyars and partly in emulation of it. Bariţiu praised the moderate liberal reform program of Széchenyi in one of the first issues of his newspaper *Gazeta Transilvaniei* in 1838, and repeated this endorsement in 1841.[25] According to later recollections by Bariţiu, the travelogue of Bölöni Farkas also made a great impression on the Romanian students in Blaj.[26]

As we have noted, there was no large middle class in Transylvania to provide the core of a liberal movement as in Western Europe. The bulk of the Magyar liberal journalists and politicians were noblemen, while Romanian and Saxon liberal activists were either urban intellectuals or clergy. It must be stressed that these origins exercised a strong influence on the thought and actions of the liberals.

Romanian liberal intellectuals were of more humble origin than were the Magyars and Saxons. Many were sons of priests, some of peasants, and very few of noblemen. The Aus-

trian Enlightenment and Magyar, German and French liberal thinkers stimulated their thought in much the same way as that of the other nationalities. By far their most influential writer was Bariţiu. Cultivating strong ties with Romanian and Saxon commercial circles is Braşov, he argued consistently for free trade, the abolition of guilds, for the undermining of aristocratic influence, and even for British constitutionalism. Such views stirred up not only the Romanians of Transylvania, but those of the more conservative Danubian Principalities, who provided half of his journals' subscribers.[27] Perhaps exploiting Austrian officials' hopes of gaining sympathy in the Principalities for the Monarchy, Bariţiu was able to establish the first and only Romanian journals to be widely read in all the lands inhabited by Romanians until after 1918, and which had great influence south of the Carpathians until they were outlawed there under Russian pressure.[28] Like the Magyar liberals and Wesselényi in particular,[29] Bariţiu had a strong anti-Russian tendency. Many of his articles bitterly denounced tsarist despotism and the alleged servility of the Russian people, and denied Magyar claims that the Romanians might appeal for Russian support against their adversaries.[30]

Bariţiu was muted in his support for peasant emancipation until 1848. Memories of the bloody peasant revolt of 1784 caused Magyar politicians to be suspicious of any Romanian writers' complaints about the conditions of the potentially explosive serf class, although most Romanian writers themselves originated in the village. Thus while Bariţiu supported most of the demands of the Magyar liberal opposition, he generally limited his discussion of peasant emancipation to quotations from Magyar liberals.[31] Bariţiu and the church leaders were also inhibited by their dependence on Court circles for the support of their Church-related demands which the Court viewed as a means of sobering the Magyar and Saxon opposition. Numerous leading Romanian intellectuals, frustrated by this conservative imperative, emigrated to the Danubian Principalities. Emigré intellectuals provided many of the ideas for the liberal-democratic movement in the Principalities, and peasant immigrants from Transylvania added to the social ferment there.[32]

Two of the leading liberals in Saxon politics, by contrast, were immigrants from Germany.[33]

The social milieu of the Saxons differed from that of both the Magyars and the Romanians. About half of the merchants and craftsmen in Transylvania were in the Saxon district; there were few feudal estates there, and the condition of the peasantry was far better than in the counties.[34] Another index for the relative well-being in the Saxon district is that 55.9 percent of the electors to the Diet according to the new electoral law of 1848 based on tax assessment were in this region, although it comprised only 23 percent of the population according to the census of 1850.[35] It may therefore seem paradoxical that liberalism had little influence among the Saxons until the early 1840s. The Saxon urban patriciate accepted the lead of the Court in opposing liberal tendencies and maintaining its own oligarchic interests. The most influential liberal was a Lutheran minister, Stephan Ludwig Roth, who attacked the Saxon oligarchy and proposed measures for the amelioration of the condition of the peasants, yet also advocated the retention of the guild system.[36] The teacher and future bishop Georg Daniel Teutsch was also among the vocal critics of the establishment. The city of Braşov, with its large Romanian and Magyar population, became the center of the Saxon reform party, and its newspaper engaged in a running debate over the whole spectrum of reform problems with the Saxon press of Sibiu. The Braşov reformers often sided with the Magyar liberals as well, as did those in towns bordering on the Hungarian region, such as Mediaş and Sighişoara.[37]

Whatever possibilities existed for cooperation among the Transylvanian liberals were undermined, not by the exclusiveness of their overall goals, but by three specifically Transylvanian problems: the administrative structure, the language question, and land reform. Offices in the Saxon district were controlled even more closely by the Viennese Court than was the case in the counties. Fearful of Magyar domination, the Saxon leadership looked to Vienna for support. The Court therefore had reliable allies in the Saxon deputies to the Diet; the Saxon veto was rarely used there, but it was an effective

threat. The Romanians were the majority population yet were excluded from political power in both regions. What constitutional recourse did they have? First they appealed, with Hungarian support, against Saxon oppression of the Romanian Orthodox in the petitions of 1837 and 1842;[38] in the Revolution of 1848-49, they sided with the Saxons in order to satify their grievances in the counties.

The Magyar liberals' language policy undermined liberal solidarity. Wesselényi had already proposed in his 1833 book that peasant emancipation be conditional upon learning Hungarian.[39] This was hardly a realistic basis for a mass emancipation; still, we should bear in mind that few Romanians confused learning Hungarian with denationalization. Most Romanian intellectuals and politicians in the counties were bilingual. Romanian leaders were indeed willing to accept Hungarian as the official language in the counties; they hardly had access to the offices, anyway. More disturbing was the requirement in the same language bill of 1842 that the Romanian high schools operate in Hungarian within ten years. The mistaken Magyar optimism about the assimilating power of liberal reform can be laid in part at the door of Bölöni Farkas, who was so eager to follow the American model of linguistic uniformity and democracy that his opponents in the Diet retorted "We are not in America!"[40]

Peasant emancipation had national implications that disturbed even Wesselényi, who remarked in a letter to Kossuth in 1846 that emancipation might endanger Magyar aristocratic leadership in Transylvania.[41] Wesselényi's activity and social program were much less radical in Transylvania than in Hungary (where he also led the liberal opposition for a while) not only because of the strong position of the government in Transylvania, but because of his fears for Magyar hegemony there. Regarding the need for a reform which would not create a new national danger to replace that of Austrian absolutism, he wrote, "Wisely spare the nation by sparing the nobility, and spare the nobility for the sake of the nation".[42] But the real misfortune for the liberals in Transylvania was the absence of an urbarium regulating land ownership such as had been enacted for Hungary in the eighteenth century. Liberals debated among

themselves as to whether an urbarium was necessary before an emancipation, and if so on what basis land ownership should be determined. Many of the nobles on whose support the reform depended were reluctant to support any urbarium, which would reduce their freedom to usurp peasant lands at will. The bill finally passed in 1848 was more generous to the peasants than that of the previous year's Diet, but created more difficulty by its vagueness.[43]

The events of the 1840s undermined liberal solidarity, but it seemed to revive in 1848 with the victory of the revolution. All liberals welcomed the victory of the revolution in Vienna and Pest, with the accompanying freedom of speech and of the press. The union with Hungary was also revived at this time and, at first, was welcomed by Barițiu.[44] Karl Gooss, a Saxon minister in Sighișoara, wrote in welcoming the union:

> The spirit of rational civil liberty is victorious; this is a guarantee of our freedom. The constitutional spirit of Hungary can best serve to suppress the fondness for bureaucratic prerogative which still exists.[45]

Most of the leading Saxon liberals died in the struggle of 1848-49, fighting for the Hungarian revolution or against it. Purely national criteria soon came to predominate over liberal ones, manipulated, to be sure, by conservative elements at the Viennese Court and the respective national groups. Typical of the new attitude toward liberalism was the statement by the Romanian revolutionary leader, Simion Bărnuțiu: "True freedom, for any nation, can only be national freedom".[46]

The greatest tragedy of the Transylvanian civil war of 1848-49 was that it seemed to confirm the nationalities' worst images of each other. The Magyar liberals imagined that there was a link between the movements of the nationalities, supported by the Court, and a supposedly "Pan-Slavic" Russian autocracy. Tactically, these three did indeed combine to suppress the revolution. Magyar application of the liberal program in Transylvania was selective, and Saxons and Romanians found their antipathy to "aristocratic arbitrariness" confirmed. Henceforth, liberals of each nationality felt justified in re-

ferring to their opponents of other nationalities as "reactionaries".[47] The change in general attitudes can be illustrated by the story by the Transylvanian writer Pál Gyulai, *Egy régi udvarház utolsó gazdája* (The last proprietor of an old manor house), written in the 1850s. When the landlord returns to his home after the revolution, he thinks to himself that:

> [In the 1840s] he didn't talk much, he read little, but he was an active official, a patriot ready to make sacrifices, who with full optimism believed in his nation's future. Now he had become a pessimist... His good will toward the masses had vanished, his own Romanian serfs, for whom he had done so many good deeds as a private citizen, for whose interests he had struggled in public affairs, had laid waste his manor house...[48]

This attitude can be contrasted with the activity and attitudes of Alexandru Sterca-Şuluţiu. He was known as a Magyarophile during the early years of the Age of Reform, favored liberalization and lay participation in the Church, initially supported the Union in 1848, and afterward became the Greek Catholic Bishop in Blaj. Writing in the 1850s, he referred resentfully to the "murders" committed by the aristocratic "rebels" against the Crown.[49] While these writers were more moderate liberals than the liberal leaders we have mentioned, the disillusionment they experienced was a widespread phenomenon.

The years preceding the Compromise of 1867 provided the last good chance for cooperation between Transylvania's liberals, but it appears that they had already drifted too far apart. Their movements had begun with similar goals, but by this time the very different cultural frame of reference of each was dominant: the Saxons centered their attention on the liberal transformation of Austria and also on its struggle to unite Germany before Prussia could; the Magyar politicians regarded Pest as their cultural center and coordinated their actions with the politicians there; the Romanians turned their attention to the unification of the Danubian Principalities and the liberal regime of Cuza. The change of system in the early 1860s offered new constitutional opportunities to Romanians and Saxons, but the new Transylvanian John Paget referred to

it derisively in 1861 as a "régime absolut et illégal".[50] If *Vormärz* political thought in Transylvania was to some extent international, following the Revolution the nations went their separate ways.

László Kővári, the editor of the newspaper *Korunk* in Cluj, recognized the limitations of the Magyar aristocracy as the basis for a liberal movement and sought the alliance of the urban citizenry.[51] He was the only Transylvanian Magyar liberal who criticized the recalcitrancy of the national leaders toward the Romanians in the 1860s, at the cost of great unpopularity among his co-nationals.[52] Other Magyar leaders like Wesselényi's protegé Domokos Teleki demanded the restoration of the Union and other laws of 1848, and declared the administrative and electoral reforms in Transylvania unconstitutional.[53] Bariţiu, who remained the most important voice of the Romanian liberals, insisted on the responsibility of the Transylvanian Diet to renegotiate all of the laws of 1848.[54] The earnest, well-intentioned correspondence of Bariţiu with Magyar politicians during these years reveals the small possibility for compromise between the nationalities by this time.[55]

The dominant Saxon position on the Union was similar to that of the Romanians, but stressed more strongly the benefits of a close link with Vienna. The Saxon businessman Johann Hintz, who had been a supporter of the union with Hungary in 1848, wrote in 1863:

> Look at the fruits of autonomy in the turbulent counties [in der turbulenten Comitatswirtschaft], in the hundred courts of every so-called city, in nationality above all else [in der Nationalität über alles]!.... Union with Austria - not the loose, fragile one of the Vormärz, nor that of the Bachian outrage; no, that of an identical fate, of an identical legal life with a constitutional, progressive Austria - this is the true salvation for this forsaken Transylvania.[56]

Another Saxon liberal of the 1840s, Georg Daniel Teutch, now supported the Austrian government in the Transylvanian government and the imperial parliament. It is true that, as in 1848, a Saxon minority sided with the Magyar constitutionalists and their Union. The two Saxon deputies of the city of Braşov in

1863 even joined the Magyar boycott of the Diet in that year. The Lutheran minister Franz Obert and Barițiu demonstrated their liberal principles by their behavior in the imperial parliament in 1863-64. While nationalist motives inspired grateful loyalty to the central government in many of their co-nationals, both deputies sided with the parliamentary opposition and attacked the government for its arbitrary methods.[57] The dominant Saxon view was reflected, however, in the high hopes that Teutsch and Hintz now held for centralist Austrian liberalism.

In 1867 the tables were turned when the legislation of the Diet was annulled and the Union proclaimed. The Compromise was a victory for the Magyar generation of 1848, restoring its independent government and parliament, press and assembly freedoms, and territorial integrity. For the other nationalities of Transylvania, the "Austria" of 1863 was a different one from that of 1847, and the elderly and middle-aged Magyar forty-eighters' insistence on the union seemed to be motivated primarily by aristocratic hegemony. The political settlement within Transylvania after 1867 was an imperfect application of liberalism: a special electoral law for Transylvania provided for a permanent Magyar majority there,[58] the autonomy of the Saxon district was abolished in 1876, and the accursed urbarial question was not fully resolved until 1896.

Was this all that Transylvanian liberalism amounted to? Not if one compares the condition of Transylvania at the end of the century to that at the beginning. The guilds and seigneurial agriculture had been abolished. Although the economy was not flourishing, urban industry had greatly expanded. Through both natural evolution and the freedom to organize financially, the Romanians had made great strides in land ownership.[59] The cultural and economic progress of the Romanians and the continued vitality of the Saxon community did not derive from the active goodwill of Dualist governments. Still, the Dualist regime was a moderately liberal one, which tolerated, albeit increasingly reluctantly, the existence of minority cultural and economic institutions. The minorities also had the possibility to maintain a national press, political parties, and cultural associations.

This cultural vitality had a lot to do with with the nature of the various Churches in Transylvania as national institutions. We have had occasion to refer to the frequent participation of lower clergy in the liberal movements of Transylvania. During the Age of Reform the Reformed Church organization actually served briefly as a framework for popular political expression. Between 1834 and 1836, the liberal leadership packed the consistory with its supporters and used it to protest against government actions.[60] In the 1840s, the Romanian movement to call a synod with the participation of the laity for the expression of political desires gained strength.[61] In neither of these cases was the activity of the lay politicians specifically fostered by the Church leadership. But they reflect a liberal Christian movement in Transylvania, complementing the traditional attitude toward the Churches as national institutions that strove to more than simply use Church bodies for political purposes. This developed in part out of the traditional Protestant attitude toward lay participation and the lay activism of eighteenth-century Pietism, in part out of Gallican and Jansenist ideas that had spread into Transylvania in the eighteenth century and were now revived,[62] and in part out of the Liberal Catholicism of Lamennais which was influential among Magyars and Romanians during the Age of Reform in Transylvania.[63] Through attendance at the various Church-run secondary schools of Transylvania the leading intellectuals of the land were exposed to all of these currents.

This liberal movement attained many of its goals in the 1860s. The Romanians had demanded Church autonomy (Greek Catholic and Orthodox Metropolitanates) at the popular assembly of Blaj in 1848; this was granted by the Austrian authorities to the Greek Catholics in 1855, and to the Orthodox in 1864. Next, the Saxon Church reform championed by Georg Daniel Teutsch gained the sanction of the Court under the Schmerling government in 1861. The new statute featured a strong lay element.[64] The synodal movement among the Romanian Greek Catholics was very active during the 1860s, although it did not achieve its goal of lay participation in diocesan synods. The Catholic Autonomy Movement achieved its most notable success in Hungary

in 1866 when all Transylvanian Roman Catholic schools were turned over to the administration of a primarily lay body.[65] Two years later, in 1868, the very democratic Church statute of the Orthodox Church was approved by the new Hungarian government. Finally, the new statute of the Reformed Church in 1870 reflected much the same tendency toward elective, lay bodies and popular participation on a regular basis in the organization of what were considered the most important national institutions, the schools.

The concessions granted to the various Churches depended on a variety of political vicissitudes: the ultramontanism and Concordat of the 1850s encouraged the establishment of the Greek Catholic Metropolitanate in 1855 in order to proselytize the Romanian Orthodox; Schmerling desired to strengthen the liberal and organizational basis of the Saxons *qua* Germans; the Court wished to reward the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Bishops Şaguna and Fogarassy for their loyal actions in the 1860s. After 1867, the Dualist Hungarian government felt similarly well-disposed toward the patriotic Magyar Reformed leadership. The net result was the same in each case: the popular and national nature of the Churches was strengthened, and, most importantly, the possibility of a national educational policy for the respective groups and considerable autonomy from state intervention was given. The Romanian historian of education and co-founder of the Romanian University of Cluj, Onisifor Ghibu, noted approvingly in 1915 that three-quarters of the schools in Hungary were in the hands of the Churches, and that these Churches were administered in an unusually "democratic and constitutional" manner, with beneficial effects for education itself.[66] Certainly this administration was conservative, but it safeguarded the cultural interests of the respective national groups.

These movements for popular participation ought to be considered in the context of European liberalism as well as in light of the structure of the intelligentsia in Transylvania, which enhanced the importance of the clergy. The conventional identification of Enlightenment thought with proto-liberalism should not obscure the fact that the liberal movements emerged

in opposition to the petrified Josephinian state of the early nineteenth century; each of these was in its own way the heir of the Enlightenment. The Catholic Enlightenment in Austria inspired a Jansenist and Church constitutional tendency with a certain social conscience but not unfavorable to princely absolutism, to which we have referred; but also a Romantic individualism that resisted state tutelage of the Church and of society.[67] It is interesting to note that the anticlerical strain of liberalism witnessed in such countries as France, Spain and Italy was relatively weak in Transylvania among both Catholics and non-Catholics. The intellectuals frequently objected to the influence of the bishops and clergy, but recognized them as a positive national force. The perpetuation of the national role of the churches took place at the same time, however, as the secularization process continued. The proportion of the clergy in the national intelligentsias continued to decline, as did their role in politics. By the 1870s, the leadership of Romanian politics had passed from the bishops to the laity.[68] Meanwhile, lay involvement in educational and even ecclesiastical administration led to an increasing emphasis on secular criteria of effectiveness within each Church. The dominant theological trend of the period was rationalist, which meant in effect that clergymen increasingly conceived their function as much in terms of the social betterment of their flock as they did in terms of the latter's salvation. Surveying his parish archives for the turbulent nineteenth century, a Roman Catholic priest lamented during the interwar period that politics had been decisive in the cases of religious conversions. Churches became identified in the popular consciousness with the nation they represented, and for religious identification, spirituality was less important than nationalism.[69]

Liberalism in Transylvania was a complex of forces undermining traditional society and deriving its support from political forces both inside and outside Transylvania. It has been shown that the three national movements eventually developed versions of liberalism that were ultimately incompatible, though it would be an oversimplification to say that nationalism was solely responsible for this. The dominant liberal Ma-

gyar trend in 1867 was liberal constitutionalism under aristocratic leadership, a more moderate variety than that of 1848. Its leaders, Domokos Teleki in Transylvania and Ferenc Deák in Hungary proper, championed a constitutional nation-state with freedom of the press, assembly and economic activity. The ideology of Saxon leaders such as Georg Daniel Teutsch and Johann Hintz can be called liberal statism. Their approach resembled that of Anton von Schmerling in Austria and of moderate liberals in Prussia who advocated the alliance of a strong state and the middle class to foster economic progress, and rejected both absolutism and popular sovereignty.[70] The liberalism of the Romanians George Bariţiu and Ioan Raţiu – the proponent of peasant legislation in the 1860s – reflected the broadest social base and more populist themes, and as the only one of the three varieties to call for majority rule it can be called democratic liberalism. Finally, ecclesiastical liberalism emerged as a more moderate reflection of these trends within the clergy and religious life. Liberalism in Transylvania was to some extent a corollary of secularization, as in Western Europe, but liberals and churchmen collaborated and even overlapped to a much greater extent.

NOTES

1 According to Austrian statistics for 1850, the population of Transylvania in that year was 59% Romanian, 26% Magyar, and 10% German; socioeconomic conditions and constitutional provisions greatly reduced the political weight of the Romanians, however.

2 The term secularization derived its original meaning in the seventeenth century from the act of state expropriation of Catholic Church lands. In the course of the nineteenth century the term gained broader theological, philosophical, cultural and legal senses. We are concerned here with the cultural sense of the term. See Martin Heckel, *Korollarien zur Säkularisierung* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1981) for a thoughtful exposition of these various meanings.

3 Eduard Winter, *Frühliberalismus in der Donaumonarchie. Religiöse, nationale und wissenschaftliche Strömungen von 1790-1868* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), passim.; Nicolae Bocşan, "Liberial-

ismul timpuriu în mişcareă naţională din Banat", *Stat, Societate Naţiune. Interpretări istorice* [Prodan Festschrift] (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1982), pp. 290-91.

4 Ambrus Miskolczy, "Társadalom, nemzetiség és ellenzékiség kérdései az erdélyi magyar reformmozgalomban (1830-1843)" (Society, nationality, and oppositionism in the Magyar reform movement of Transylvania, 1830-1843), *Századok* 117,5 (1983), pp.1063-6; David Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum. The Political Struggle of the Romanians of Transylvania in the Eighteenth Century* (Bucharest: Academy, 1971), pp. 376-79.

5 Miskolczy, "Társadalmi és nemzeti kérdés az utolsó erdélyi rendi országgyűlésen" (Social and national issues at the last Transylvanian Diet) *Századok* 113 (1979), p. 855.

6 Victor Cheresteşiu, *Adunarea naţională de la Blaj* (Bucureşti: Editura politica, 1966), p. 64; Samu Benkő, *A helyzettudat változásai* (Changes in awareness), (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1977), pp. 63-83.

7 Miskolczy, 1983, pp. 1066-71.

8 Keith Hitchins, "Romanian Intellectuals in Transylvania: The West and National Consciousness, 1830-1848", *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Européennes* 22,4 (1984), p. 311.

9 Rolf Kutschera, *Landtag und Gubernium in Siebenbürgen 1688-1869*, Studia Transylvanica vol. 11 (Köln: Böhlau, 1985), pp. 27-28.

10 Miskolczy, 1983, pp. 1063-4; *ibid.*, "Az erdélyi magyar liberális ellenzék társadalmi reformtörekvései" (The social reform ambitions of the Magyar liberal opposition in Transylvania) *Jogtudományi Közlöny* (1980), p. 655.

11 Richard Schuller, "Der evangelisch-sächsische Pfarrer in seiner kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung," *Bilder aus der Kulturgeschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen*, vol. 1 (Hermannstadt: Krafft, 1928), pp. 285-8.

12 Endre Arató, *A magyarországi nemzetiségek nemzeti ideológiája* (The national ideologies of Hungary's nationalities), (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1983), p. 10, 30; Jósef Wolf, "Cerinţele luptei nationale româneşti şi reflectarea lor in tematica scrierilor istorice", *Stat, Societate, Naţiune*, pp. 284-85.

13 Carl Göllner, "Betrachtungen zum fortschrittlichen Denken der Siebenbürger Sachsen im 19. Jahrhundert", *Forschungen zur Volks- und Landeskunde* 1 (1959), p. 10; he does not cite the source of this passage, but similar ones are frequent in the works of Teutsch, for instance in his *Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen für das sächsische Volk*, vol. 4 (Hermannstadt: Krafft, 1926), p. 372.

14 Benkő, *op. cit.*; Zsigmond Vita, *Művelődés és népszolgálat* (Culture and public education), (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1983), pp. 59-64, 88-98.

15 Pompiliu Teodor, ed., *Enlightenment and Romanian Society* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1980), esp. pp. 78-90, 117-42.

16 Vita, pp. 114-32.

17 The periodicals are listed in Heinrich Polonyi, "Das 'Deutsche Kasino' in Kronstadt", *Siebenbürgisch-Sächsischer Hauskalender. Jahrbuch 1971* (München: Hilfskomitee der Siebenbürger Sachsen, 1971), p. 104.

18 Simion Retegan, *Dieta românească a Transilvaniei* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1979), pp. 198-200. According to a Romanian estimate there were 16,000 Romanian noblemen in Transylvania in 1861; the Austrian authorities calculated 57,003 Transylvanian nobles in 1863, while the Hungarians calculated 74,134 in 1868. Scholars have paid almost no attention to the Romanian nobility.

19 "Unu cuvîntu seriosu mai vîrtosu cătrâ nobilii români", *Gazeta Transilvaniei* March 15, 1861, p. 86.

20 Miskolczy, 1983, p. 1082.

21 Kutschera, pp. 120-22.

22 John Paget, *Hungary and Transylvania* (London: John Murray, 1850) (2nd ed.) vol. 2, pp. 217-18. The book was first published in 1839. Paget married a Wesselényi, was an adjutant of General Bem in 1848-49, and then spent six years in exile before returning to Transylvania in 1855.

23 Hitchins, p. 310

24 Retegan, p. 11.

25 Károly Köllő, *Két irodalom mezsgyéjén. Tanulmányok a román-magyar irodalmi kapcsolatok történetéből* (In the borderland of two literatures. Studies on the history of Romanian-Hungarian literary relations), (Bukarest:Kriterion, 1984), pp. 136-7; Hitchins, p. 319.

26 George Em. Marica *et al.*, *Ideologia generației române de la 1848 din Transilvania* (București: Editura politicâ, 1968), p. 41.

27 Marica, *Studii de istoria si sociologia culturii române ardelene din secolul al XIX-lea* vol. 1. (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1977), table after p. 32; but many of the multiple subscribers in the Principalities passed their copies on to poorer Romanians in Transylvania.

28 *Ibid.*, *Ideologia*, p. 180.

29 The classic statement of nineteenth-century Magyar Russophobia, which posited an alliance between Russian reaction and the national minorities, was Wesselényi's *Szózat a magyar és szláv nemzetiség ügyében* (Manifesto concerning the Hungarian and the Slav nationalities), (Leipzig, 1843); the key passage on the Romanians is printed in the original and in Romanian translation in Cornelia Bodea, ed., *1848 la români* vol. 1 (Bucureşti: Editura stiinţifică şi enciclopedică, 1982), pp. 240-48.

30 Cheresteşiu, *A magyarországi román sajtó politikai vezéreszméi és munkája a szabadságelőtti évtizedben* (The work and the leading political ideas of the Romanian press in Hungary in the decade before freedom), (Budapest: Donáth és Vágó, 1917), in translation "Activitiatea şi ideile politice conducătoare ale presei române din Ungaria în deceniul premergător revoluţiei paşoptiste", *Scrieri istorice* (Bucureşti: Editura politică, 1979), pp. 108-13. The 1979 edition omits many of Bariţiu's strongest statements about the Russians.

31 *Ibid.*, 1979, pp. 85-87.

32 Stefan Metes, *Emigrări româneşti din Transilvanie în secolele XIII-XX* (Bucureşti: Editura stiintifică şi enciclopedică, 1977), pp. 179-250; Béla Borsi-Kálmán, "La naissance de la génération des réformes roumaine", *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae. Sectio historica* 23 (1983), pp. 85-86; Emmanuel Turczynski, "Zur Kulturgeographie Nationalbewegung im Südosten", in *Beiträge zur Südost-Forschung* (München: Trofenik, 1966), pp. 416-17.

33 I.e., Maximilian Moltke, composer of the Transylvanian "national anthem", *Siebenbürgen-Lied*, and Johann Gött, the publisher of Bariţiu's newspaper.

34 Thomas Nägler, "Contribuţia saşilor la dezvoltarea economică a Transilvaniei in a doua jumătate a secolului al XVIII-lea si prima jumatate a secolului al XIX-lea", in *Studii de istorie a naţionalităţilor conlocuitoare din România şi a înfrătirii lor cu naţiunea româna. Naţionalitatea germană* vol. 2 (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1981), pp. 93-110.

35 Retegan, p. 259.

36 Alfred Roth, "Die Publizistik und politische Denkwelt des Pfarrers Stephan Ludwig Roth bestimmt von der 'konservativen Revolution' bis 1847", *Zeitschrift für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 6,1 (1983), pp. 10-24.

37 Michael Kroner, "Sprechsaal des Volkswillens". Die siebenbürgisch-sächsische Presse während des Vormärz und in der bürgerlich-demokratischen Revolution von 1848/49", in Eduard Eisenburger and Kroner, ed., *Die Zeit in der Zeitung. Beiträge zur rumäniendeutschen Publizistik* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1977), pp. 38-67; Teutsch, *op. cit.*, v. 3, p. 130.

38 László Gyémánt, "Contribuţii privind mişcarea natională românească în deceniul premergător revoluţiei de la 1848", I *Studia Universitatis Babeş Bolyai. Series Historia* 23,2 (1978), pp. 39-53.

39 Miskolczy, 1983, p. 1086.

40 Miskolczy, 1983, p. 1076; Farkas' thoughts on the liberal consequences of forcibly introducing Hungarian: p. 1086.

41 Reprinted in Bodea, v. 1, pp. 302-6; Prodan, pp. 383-84.

42 Quotation in János Varga, *Helyét kereső Magyarország* (Hungary seeking her place), (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1982), p. 45.

43 Miskolczy, 1979, pp. 866-73.

44 Hitchins, *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 187-8.

45 Göllner, "Betrachtungen", pp. 33-4.

46 Hitchins, *ibid.*, pp. 212-13.

47 Bariţiu rejected such a Hungarian accusation in his review of the 1848 events in an article in 1861: George Bariţiu, *Scrieri social-politice* (Bucureşti: Editura Politica, 1962), pp. 178-81.

48 Pál Gyulai, *Egy régi udvarház utolsó gazdája* (The last proprietor of an old manor house), [1857], in *Gyulai Pál Munkái*, vol. 2 (Budapest: Franklin, no date), p. 19.

49 Alexandru Sterca-Şuluţiu *Istoria Horii şi a poporului romănesc din Munţii Apuseni ai Ardealului, in Izvoarele răscoalei lui Horea. Seria B. Izvoare Narative* (Bucureşti: Editura Academiei, 1983), pp. 424-7.

50 Letter to Governor Imre Mikó, November 1, 1861. Cluj. Arhivele Statului. Muzeul Ardelean. Fondul Mikó-Rhédey. Corespondenţa Mikó Imre. 1861/217.

51 Kővári, "A nemesség és a magyar kérdés Erdélyben" (The nobility and the Hungarian question in Transylvania) *Korunk* January 7, 1863; Miskolczy 1983, p. 1065.

52 Retegan, p. 85.

53 [Domokos Teleki], *Siebenbürgen und die österreichische Regierung in den letzten vier Jahren* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1865), pp. 1-23, 73-76.

54 Bariţiu, p. 176, in an article from 1861.

55 Ioan Chindris, ed., *George Barit magyar levelezése* (The Hungarian correspondence of George Bariţiu), (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1975), pp. 37-98.

56 [Johann Hintz], *Anregungen und Bilder von einer Geschäftsreise in Siebenbürgen* (Hermannstadt: Steinhaussen, 1863), pp. 12-13.

57 Eduard Morres, *Dr. Franz Obert. Sein Leben und Wirken* (Kronstadt: Selbstverlag des Siebenbürger-sächsischen Lehrertages), pp. 40-44; Bariţiu, *Părţi alese din istoria Transilvaniei* (Sibiu: Krafft, 1891), pp. 231-34. Obert had participated as a student in the revolution of 1848-49 in Leipzig, and anonymously published poetry attacking the absolutist regime in Transylvania during the 1850s.

58 András Gerő, "Die Rolle Siebenbürgens und der Nationalitäten gelegentlich der Wahlen vom Jahre 1869 und in der allgemeinen Debatte über das Wahlrecht im Jahre 1872", in *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae, Sectio Historica*, 21 (1981), pp. 117-46.

59 Antal Dániel, "A magyar liberalizmus és a nemzetiségi mozgalmak történetének közös útjai" (The common paths of the history of Hungarian liberalism and the nationality movements), II, *Magyar Kisebbség* 15, 5 (1936), pp. 107-13; Retegan, p. 31.

60 Teutsch, vol. 3, pp. 91-2; Miskolczy, 1983, pp. 1069-70.

61 Gyémánt, p. 37.

62 Pompiliu Teodor, *Interferenţe iluministe europene* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1984), pp. 83-104. In political matters, the Jansenists confirmed Josephinian regulations concerning the Church, but also advocated increased diocesan authority and the regular convocation of synods. Teodor discusses their influence among the Romanian Greek Catholics. The Roman Catholic bishop of Transylvania in the 1820s, Ignác Szepesy, was a Jansenist, and held a very controversial diocesan synod in 1822; Egyed Hermann, "Az 1822-i erdélyi egyház megyei zsinat" (The Transylvanian diocesan synod of 1822), *Gróf Klebelsberg Kunó Bécsi Magyar Történetkutató Intézet Évkönyve* 1936, pp. 243-69. Szepesy's influence on Magyar and Romanian Catholics could not be documented, but was probably significant.

63 Benkő, *A helyzettudat változásai*, pp. 171-9; Hitchins, "Romanian Intellectuals", p. 318.

64 Friedrich Teutsch, *Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Siebenbürgen*, vol. 1 (Hermannstadt: Krafft, 1921), pp. 365-95.

65 Catholic autonomy in Transylvania provided a major stimulus for the heavy public debate and autonomy congresses in Hungary in the next several years concerning lay participation in Catholic church administration; cf. János Török, *A katolikus autonómia-mozgalom 1848-1871* (The Catholic autonomy movement 1848-1871), (Budapest: Stephaneum, 1941), pp. 65, 95-103; Béla Bellér, "A katolikus autonómia. A liberális katolicizmus viszontagságai Magyarországon" (Catholic

autonomy. The tribulations of liberal Catholicism in Hungary) *Világosság* 9,2 (1968), p. 95.

66 Onisifor Ghibu, *Viaţa şi organizaţia bisericească şi şcolară în Transilvania şi Ungaria* (Bucureşti: Nicolae Stroilă, 1915), pp. xi-xiv.

67 Karl Eder, *Der Liberalismus in Altösterreich. Geisteshaltung, Politik und Kultur* (Wien: Herold, 1955), pp. 40-1, 63-9.

68 János Mazsu, "Der Veränderungsprozess der sozialen Struktur der Beamten-Intelligenz in Ungarn während des Dualismus", pp. 7-8, and Tabelle 2; paper presented at the Conference on Bureaucracy in Central Europe, Institute of History, Budapest, May 3, 1984. An excellent portrayal of this transformation among the Romanians is the chapter "Secularism" in Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality. Andreiu Şaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 199-223.

69 Sibiu, Romania. Arhiva Parohială Romano-Catolica. Adolf Vorbuchner, *Historia Domus*, vol. 2, p. 159.

70 The final phrase is part of Otto Pflanze's definition of "moderate liberalism" as one of his four categories of German liberalism, bureaucratic, moderate, radical and democratic: *Bismarck and the Development of Germany. The Period of Unification, 1815-1871* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 24-28, 47.

GYÖRGY RÁNKI

THE ROLE OF BUDAPEST IN HUNGARY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

For anyone wishing to understand the economic significance of a country's capital, the adoption of a historical perspective is almost an essential prerequisite. It is well known that underdeveloped, traditional or feudal economies, in which agriculture is still the leading sector, are not really able to contribute to the formation of a significant capital. On the other hand, the process of industrialization – because of its inherent economic consequences – can be decisive in shaping the process of urbanization and the development of a significant capital. There is certainly a two-way relationship between the level of economic development in a given country and the role and significance of its capital. Nevertheless, we can hardly look upon this relationship in a mechanical way: as in the case of all types of economic trends, its operational field has wide boundaries, and the relationship between economy and urbanization might include cases when the country's capital has reached a higher level than the country's economy, or has remained far behind it.

At the time of the Peace of Szatmár (1711), Buda and Pest were hardly larger than the ordinary villages of that time.[1] However, by the end of the eighteenth century Pest was already being called the Hungarian London.[2]

Although at this time no more than 1,416 craftsmen were working in the city, and, including journeymen and apprentices, only 5,862 individuals were employed by the local industrial sector, the fairs in Pest had become increasingly important. What is more, Pest – situated in the middle of Hungary – was

fast becoming the most important commercial and communications centre of the country.

But the official capital of the country was still Pozsony (now Bratislava), and some towns along the western border of Hungary may have enjoyed much more commercial traffic than the future capital did. The idea that Pest – experiencing rapid growth without help from outside – should be united with Buda, and that the two together should then emerge as the centre of the country in all respects, administrative, political, cultural and economic, came from Count István Széchenyi. Széchenyi even created a new name: Budapest. In this sense one can say the birth of the capital was an organic part of the requirement of bourgeois transformation, and at the same time its main vehicle and source of encouragement.

The enormous economic development of Budapest actually started during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Budapest's population growth became very rapid during this time, and it soon clearly emerged as different from the other cities of the country. During the 1830s and 1840s, modern economic developments – whether in the wheat, wool or wine trades, in communications, for example, the Danube Steamship Company, the first commercial banks or saving banks, or industry's first steam-mill – are all connected with Pest. The twin city on both sides of the Danube emerged as the economic, political and cultural centre of modern Hungary. In this respect, Budapest is the result of a historical process, of three interconnected, profound historical and economic trends: These are firstly the emergence of the modern state; secondly, the transformation of a traditional economic system into a modern capitalist one; and thirdly, technological changes which helped to overcome distance and promote migration, thereby speeding up the urbanization processes.[3]

To understand the development of the city, the phenomenon must be viewed from the outside rather than from the inside. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the evolution of Buda and Pest was only loosely connected with the history of the country, but from the nineteenth century onwards, the growth of the city was primarily the result of economic, social and

political changes in the country. Later, the growth of the city became the decisive cause in the transformation of Hungary.

When in 1873, with the unification of Pest, Buda and Óbuda, Budapest was formally born this was nothing more than the official acknowledgement of a process which had already reached completion a few years earlier. By that time Buda-Pest was already the seat of an independent Hungarian government; and during the last two decades of the century it became the country's most important urban area in all respects – from the total number of its inhabitants to its role in the national economy.

No particular explanation seems to be necessary for us to see that, although the development of agriculture and industry and the progress of towns or rural areas are sometimes looked upon as antithetical, the real roots of the development of Budapest should nevertheless be traced back to agriculture.[4] The rural or agricultural character of the country made the rapid progress of the capital possible: during the two decades preceding the unification of Budapest, the population of the city almost doubled, growing by 135,000, of which not more than 14 percent was the result of natural increase. In the next decade, out of a population increase of 227,000, only 67,000 were actually born in the city. Consequently, one would certainly not underestimate the natural increase between 1850-70[5] if one were to assume that it could not have accounted for more than 30 percent of the total increase. In other words, during these two decades around 100,000 people came to Budapest from the countryside. Could this have been possible if the revolution of 1848 had not abolished the legal obstacles to the free movement of the peasantry? Would it have been feasible had the productivity of agriculture not developed in such a way that a part of its former labor force had become superfluous, and that, even with relatively less labor, agricultural production was still high enough to satisfy the needs of the growing urban population?

However, the growth of the labor supply was not the only phenomenon attributable to the growth of agricultural production. The rise in the demand for labor was also partly due to it. The accumulation of capital during the period 1850-1870

mainly took place in Budapest, but the origin of this capital was actually the agricultural sector. Those mainly responsible for this capital accumulation, the families who ranked among the most important industrial entrepreneurs and owners of apartment blocks, had amassed their initial wealth mainly through trading in agricultural commodities. The industry of Budapest was also based on the processing of agricultural products, and the world-famous Hungarian milling industry was the actual beginning of modern large-scale industry in the city.[6]

Besides a suitable agricultural basis, centrepetal forces can be regarded as being another important element in the city's development. A mutual interaction process began to take place. The contribution of agriculture and the countryside was abundantly reimbursed by the creativeness and the spin-off effect of the capital.

The development of Budapest was certainly aided by the opportunities created by growing social mobility, which had gathered increasing momentum with the growing division of labor. On the other hand, Budapest established the real possibilities for social mobility in the country and this extended far beyond the much-needed division of labor. By absorbing, within four decades, half a million people from the different regions of the country (of the 880,000 inhabitants of the city in 1910, around 520,000, i.e. 59 percent, had been born in the countryside and another 50,000 came from foreign countries),[7] Budapest offered tremendous opportunities for social mobility, and was the main destination for people moving away from rural areas and other towns. The absorption capacity of the city and its impact upon social mobility were not as yet determinants regulating the form and the scope of the city's development, nor could this development have been shaped merely by politics. We can find a number of cases in nineteenth and twentieth century history where the support for a nation's capital was a part of a growing national consciousness. This might certainly have been the case in Hungary, where the country, after a long period of absolutist rule, had become once again more or less the mistress of her fate, and it may have been felt that there was a need to expand Budapest merely to counterbalance the role and image

of Vienna. Had the development of Budapest stemmed either primarily or predominantly from these political considerations, the road to this type of evolution might theoretically have been open to it. There are a number of instances among European capitals where significant numbers of people from the countryside were absorbed. Although these capitals maintained the continuity in their social structure, they became merely administrative – and perhaps cultural – centres, carrying on a somewhat artificial way of life, functioning more as consumer than as producer communities.

Let me refer, for instance, to Rome and to the development of the capital of newly-united Italy. This city continued to keep its administrative and service character.[8]

The dominant sectors in Rome's population were the old service sector, partly isolated as in some of the overpopulated cities of Ancient Asia or present-day Latin America, and the new service sector, which also included trade, administrative and financial services. It would be unwarranted to assume that it makes no substantial difference to the impact of the growth of a city whether the old or new service sector is the dominant one; nevertheless, this type of development implies more a one-directional character, because of which its impact and feedback effect on the development of the whole country are more or less limited.[9]

We can see a different type of urbanization in colonies, or in developing countries (as in Latin America at the present time). Here we encounter an enclave-type urbanization, with a number of cities becoming unquestionably modern in comparison with the industrially-backward provinces and countryside, but without making any substantial impact upon the latter. This is mainly the consequence of partial economic development based on the wealth from plantations, mines and so on, and has very little to do with the dominant economic sector of the country, agriculture geared to the production of food.

The growth of Budapest was certainly different from both of these, and belonged to a third type, displaying all the characteristics of industrial city growth. However, Budapest consistently combined industrial growth with the basic ele-

ments of an administrative center, and with significant features of the most important service sectors. The development of Budapest was pushed in the direction of industrial growth by three major factors:

a) the significant presence of artisans in the city as early as the first half of the nineteenth century;[10]

b) the fact that the level of the Hungarian economy in the 1850s and 1860s had reached the point at which the formation of a large city became economically necessary;

c) as a communications center, Budapest was most suited to the establishment of the necessary links between agriculture and industry, and to the promotion of some industrialization in agriculture as well.

Industry was the leading social and economic factor giving Budapest its particular character around the turn of the century. This trend is clearly shown by the fact that 33 percent of the gainfully-employed population was working in this sector in 1869, and this proportion increased to 45 percent by 1910.

If we disregard the presence of craftsmen, which dates back a long way in the history of Budapest, then the establishment of milling industry can be regarded as the decisive component in the formation of industrial Budapest. At the same time the milling industry also represented the first step toward overcoming under-development for the whole country. As a result of the economic boom of the second half of the 1860s, Pest could boast 9 steam mills by as early as 1867, with this number increasing to 14 by 1870. It is true that the 3,000 laborers who worked in the steam mills did not constitute a particularly important group among the 50,000 industrial employees in the city, as 30 steam engines, with a total of 7,400 HP,[11] made up a small part of the 100,000 HP being utilized in the Hungarian economy at this time. On the other hand, the 600,000 metric tons grinding capacity of these mills clearly indicates the significance of the process. The Budapest mills were already grinding one-seventh of the total capacity of Hungarian mills. As a result of this, the amount of grain coming into the capital was nearly 600,000 metric tons annually between 1865-74, almost half of it being transported further and sold

on the world market. The rise of the milling industry had its impact on the trading of goods in Budapest, and substantially contributed to the development of the railway system. On the one hand, it necessitated the construction of railway lines, and on the other it made these lines profitable. By the middle of the 1870s about 1,200,000 - 1,400,000 metric tons of goods were being delivered to the capital (by train or ship). The extraordinarily high profits yielded by the mills contributed significantly to capital accumulation as well, and part of the income from milling exports became an important source of finance for the rapid expansion of the city. In the space of a few years, more than 1,000 new houses were erected in Budapest, around 40 percent of which were 2 or more storeys high. The housing boom encouraged the building materials industry in and around the city, and pushed transportation and trade to new peaks. Profits from the milling industry stimulated investment by Budapest's corn merchants in another branch of industry, engineering. The engineering industry soon became the second largest industrial sector in the capital.

In this sense, although the development of the milling industry was a form of export-led growth, it did not belong to those enclave-type cases in which the modernization of a small sector had little or no impact on the economy as a whole. The spin-off effect of the development of the milling industry can be rightly seen as one of the major elements in economic growth after 1867. It contributed to the extension of the application of modern capitalist methods among the landowners, and to the rapid growth of agricultural production, and at the same time had a positive impact on trade, communications and industry as well. It was not an enclave, but a leading sector with linkages both forward and backward.[12] It did not block further economic growth, but, on the contrary, stimulated it.

As has already been mentioned the other major branch of industry in Budapest, the engineering industry, was strongly connected to the milling industry. Engineering and the iron industry played an important role in the industrial development of the city even during the first stage immediately after the Compromise. However, with regard to the number of workers and

the level of production, it became even more important after the beginning of the twentieth century. According to the steam engine census taken in 1875, 1,500 HP of the 15,000 HP located in Budapest was to be found in this branch (with 10,000 HP being utilized in the food industry). The rise of the iron and engineering industries produced some important technological innovations such as roller milling, which actually connected these branches with the milling industry, or new wheels for railway wagons which promoted the building up of the railway network in Hungary, which was initially concentrated mainly in the wheat and corn producing regions of the country.[13] The rise of the engineering industry in agriculture cannot be limited to the question of origin; the demands of agriculture contributed substantially to its expansion. The first machine-building factories in Budapest, the Ganz, the Röck, the Schlick, and the MÁVAG factories – along with the railway repair shops – laid the foundations for the Hungarian engineering industry. The main stimulus for the establishment of these factories came primarily from railway construction, but even the largest factories performed work for agriculture as well, and the smaller factories and workshops produced mainly for agriculture or for the food industry. As engineering is a labor intensive production process, this branch engaged around 10,000 workers in Pest around 1873. These workers had a big effect on the development of the city in general, and on the beginnings of the Hungarian labor movement in particular.

Two remarks are called for in this respect:

1. It is obvious that the development of factory industry was an organic part of the first stage of Hungarian economic development; this process was not a direct result of Austrian influence, although this influence may have had some modifying effect upon it. Even so, this modification can hardly be identified with either colonial or semi-colonial enclave-type development.
2. Because it was a part of an organic process, it constantly maintained its relationship with the economic circumstances contributing to its creation and even more so with its generative effects, significantly con-

tributing to the extension of the domestic market, to the widening of the division of labor, to export-led growth and, as a result, to domestic capital accumulation.

In the first stage of Budapest's development, which lasted roughly until 1890, the milling and engineering industries had a dominant and decisive impact. In 1875, factory workers in Budapest totalled 22,000, 30 percent of the national figure. By 1890, the figure was 137,000, 35 percent of the factory workers nationally.[14] Their distribution, however, had become partly modified: the iron and machine-building factories of Kőbánya and Angyalföld employed many more workers than before, while the number of employees in the mills had stagnated at its old level. In 1873, the two branches each employed a third of the industrial workers in the capital. Their combined share was still altogether around 66 percent in 1890; however at this time the iron and machine-building industry employed twice as many workers as did the food industry.

Between 1869 and 1890 more than 3,500 new houses were erected in the capital. Of these 200 had more than one storey. In 1890 Budapest had 13,000 houses of which 4,833 were apartment-houses with 11 to 50 rooms, and 659 with more than 60 rooms. The average number of inhabitants per house was 34.[15]

The 100,000 apartments in Budapest provided homes for more than half a million people, although the majority lived in one-room apartments, and the number of sub-tenants was as high as 70,000. Although the factory-type industry may have been the most important contributor to the rapid growth of the city, without the significant rise in the other sectors, development of such magnitude would hardly have been possible. The 2,000 to 3,000 trade licences which were granted indicate that craftsmanship also benefited. The important structural changes which had taken place in small-scale industry coincided with a general increase in the number of people working in this area.

In 1890, small-scale industry actually offered more jobs to workers than did the factories: 35,000 industrial workers were employed by the small workshops, and another 30,000 were regarded as employers or as self-employed persons. The differ-

ent types of industry provided 40 percent of all jobs in Budapest: of the quarter of a million gainfully employed, more than 100,000 were engaged in it. Trade and transportation were of secondary importance.[16]

One may wonder what the reasons were for the fact that industry played such a decisive role in the growth process of Budapest – the capital's rate of growth was not only unique in Hungary, but was also one of the highest in the whole of Europe. Around the turn of the century, Hungarian industry was increasingly being concentrated in the capital and a large proportion of the industrial working class lived there. One of the specific features of the Hungarian capital can be found in the fact that it was simultaneously the administrative and cultural center of the country, as well as the center of economic growth. These factors did not coincide in a number of other cases: Prague, Bern, Warsaw and probably Berlin never became leading industrial cities, or even if they had some industries, as did Berlin, they did not figure as the focal points of economic activity. Administrative and cultural centers usually served as a powerful attraction to the population of the countryside, and this may have been even stronger in Hungary since towns in the countryside were very provincial and usually had absorbed little of modern urban or European culture. Its economic attraction probably increased Budapest's impact. All the important government offices and organizations – including the Ministry of Commerce which dealt with industrial support and which provided sites for factories – were located in the capital, which was also the home of the stock and grain exchanges and almost all the important companies. Even mining companies felt it almost essential to maintain an office in the capital. However, the most important pulling effect of the capital was still the growing number of its factories, shaping the mutual interaction of various physical, economic and social factors in the development of the city. It is hardly possible to single out any one of the various factors as the most important. Since their impacts were so closely intertwined, one cannot separate them.[17] One need hardly mention that Budapest's geographical location was extremely favorable to the development of the city.

Its location on the banks of the Danube at what is almost the geographical center of the country, where the various regions of Hungary meet, made Budapest the most suitable town for development as an industrial center. The central location of Budapest was further underlined by the organization of the Hungarian communications system. The capital lay at the heart of road and railway networks, as all international routes passed through the city. Situated as it was on the banks of the Danube, Budapest was also a major link in the shipping network. Due to these circumstances all the necessary industrial and agricultural raw materials arrived in the city relatively easily and rapidly and facilities existed both for their distribution or their forwarding to other places. Through this communications network Budapest was closer to the sources of raw materials than any other large town in the countryside. The main coal producing area, where mining had started at around the turn of the century, was not more than 15 to 35 miles away.

The proximity of the Danube contributed to Budapest's development (in addition to being a cheap water communications route) by creating more favorable conditions for the development of industries such as the electricity generation industry, the chemical industry and the leather, paper and beer industries – i.e., industries where a proper water supply was considered a necessary precondition for the production process.[18]

As a result of the economic growth of the country, Budapest became Hungary's most important marketplace. Here all new factories could rely on a good supply of labor. The constant migration to the capital of large numbers of people from the countryside kept the labor market active and well supplied. In direct contrast to the provincial towns, any factories established in the capital could be sure of finding skilled workers with the necessary training, and also the necessary cheap, unskilled labor. Entrepreneurs investing their capital in Budapest could save the expense of bringing in their own workers, which seemed to be inevitable in the provincial cities.

Budapest was not only the major labor market but was the major market for merchandise as well. Besides the consumer demands of almost a million inhabitants, industrial consumption,

the construction and development of public utilities, public transportation, and, of course, local industries created an impressive market for all types of products. A prominent feature of Hungary's economic development was Budapest's role as the most important market for capital. Through the leading banks and credit institutions the greater part of Hungarian capital accumulated in Budapest – the dominant intermediary of foreign capital by virtue of its decisive role in the Hungarian economy. This capital became mobile within the country through joint-stock companies which were proportionately more common in the Hungarian economy than in most Western European countries. Even so, owners of capital in the provinces were likely to look for investment opportunities in Budapest.[19]

Obviously, all these factors contributed to the extremely rapid industrial development of Budapest. Around the turn of the century, Budapest achieved a level comparable with that of any Western European metropolis. Its impact and attraction were felt very strongly in its immediate hinterland, which became in an economic sense more and more a part of the capital itself.

The area in which the proximity of the capital may be considered decisive embraced the region within a 30-mile radius of the city centre, and included some 40 villages and towns.[20]

It is a fundamental precept of economics that the acceleration of economic development usually promotes the urbanization process. The Hungarian figures, the growth rate of 3 percent in the national income and the 5 percent yearly growth rate for industry, are well known.[21] In the case of Budapest, the growing separation of industry from agriculture was only one of the contributing factors serving the growing population, and in order to support productive activity, a strong infrastructure and service sector were needed. Mutual interactions in the infrastructure made the service sector an important stimulus for further industrial activity: the new stage in the industrialization of Budapest began around the turn of the century when the processing industry – in spite of Austrian competition – began to take hold in the capital. Here the labor supply and consumer demands of the local population were far more important.[22]

This process more or less coincided with technological modernization, including the provision of further public utilities for the supply of water and gas, and, immediately prior to the First World War, the application of electricity in the economy.

The main economic indicators of the city at this time already reflected the new development trends and the significance of the capital's growth for the country's economic life as a whole. During the two decades preceding the First World War, the population of the city increased by 300,000, reaching 900,000 by 1914, and over a million for the entire metropolitan area. While in 1880 not more than 56 percent of the population declared itself to be Magyar, by 1910 86 percent of the population specified Hungarian as its mother tongue. Of these 300,000 extra people, more than 250,000 constituted a migration surplus in that a large part of the rural population surplus was absorbed by the city.

The growth of housing provision could not keep pace with the increase of the population, in spite of the fact that the demand for housing promoted the construction of 5,000 new houses. Since only 20 percent of these houses were one-storeyed, and another 20 percent two-storeyed buildings, the new multi-storeyed houses, particularly in the inner city, promoted the development of a modern downtown. There were 40,000 rooms available for habitation. Water pipelines were extended: while in 1880 only 25 percent of houses were provided with running water, by 1910 this figure had reached almost 85 percent. Paved roads had been extended from 470 hectares to 700; 200 km of new sewers and 400 km of new water pipes, a three-fold increase in gas consumption, new tram lines and a number of new and beautiful public buildings (administrative, educational and cultural) completely changed the city's appearance. The lively life of Budapest is perhaps best characterized by the fact that in 1890, 24 million q of goods were brought to the city and 13 million q were taken out, while in 1900, 41 million q was brought in and 21 million q sent out. Finally, in 1911 Budapest demand reached a pre-1914 peak of 86 million q with 35 million q taken out. During these two decades the trade in merchandise

more than trebled. Seven hundred new joint-stock companies were established, 200 of which were industrial. The capital of these companies increased sixfold, from 200 million to 1,200 million crowns.

That industry was the leading sector is clearly indicated by the fact that whereas in 1869 33 percent of the population worked in industry, in 1910 the figure was 45 percent. This included 35,000 artisans, 62,000 workers who found jobs in small industry, and 128,000 workers in the factories.[23]

For industrial workers in Budapest, engineering became even more dominant after 1900. Every third worker was engaged in the iron or engineering industries, and only 12 percent in the food industry. The textile industry and other light industries employed another 22 percent of the Budapest working class.

An indication of the extent to which large industry prevailed in the capital is the fact that while the national work force was almost equally distributed between small and big industries, in Budapest the ratio was 2:1 in favor of the large factories. The territorial distribution of the factories shows the following picture for 1910:[24]

	Industrial factories	Horsepower	Workers	Inhabitants
	in percentages		in percentages	
Budapest	22.7	25.4	27.7	5.1
Towns	20.6	17.6	19.4	6.3
Countryside	56.7	57.0	52.9	88.6

According to this data Budapest with 5 percent of the country's population contained nearly a quarter of all factories, a quarter of all power (measured in HP), and more than a quarter of all industrial workers. Budapest's share increases even more if we look at the largest factories. Its share in the smaller factories was 22 percent, but for factories of more than 2,000 workers, the figure was 28 percent and for more than

3000 workers, 33 percent.[25] Of the 37 industrial enterprises with more than 1,000 workers, 17 were located in the capital. Almost half of the workers in the engineering industry could b found there.

To summarize, the capital, by undertaking around half of the trade, by producing one-third of the industrial output and by controlling about 40 percent of the national wealth, was not just the center of the country's economic life. In a certain sense Budapest was actually the main agent of its economic pro· gress.

Looking through the relevant literature, we encounter frequent and bitter complaints about the one-sided development of the capital, observers finding fault with the city for absorbing all the country's resources, while the price of its development was being paid by other towns and the countryside generally. The dominant role of Budapest was just one side of the picture; the other side was the absence or delay of urbanization. There is little reason to believe that the Budapest phenomenon should be regarded as unique: the capitalist economic process usually incorporates a certain element of spontaneity, supported by profit maximization.

The transition from underdevelopment to development usually has to contend with an initial scarcity of resources. During this period, the most economic utilization of resources implies their concentration in the most economic way, even if this means the creation of one large city without a wider basis of urbanization. It would seem that in countries small both in size and in population, this is more often the rule than the exception, since it assures the optimal use of the given amount of resources. However, even in larger countries, we can find cases where the capital city has a dominant role. By implication, the development of Budapest had its disadvantages as well. The relationship between the urban and rural areas was hindered by the remnants of feudalism in the country. This relationship never became sufficiently organic, and a very strong division between the rural and the urban (Budapest) world emerged. It is hardly enough to speak in terms of discrepancy or divergence: the modern metropolis of Budapest was quite unique

among East European cities in the way it contrasted with an underdeveloped countryside entirely agrarian in its economy, provincial in its mentality and hierarchical in its social structure. The city constituted an entirely different type of world, one in which this divergence was easily converted into controversy to be used for various political purposes. Nevertheless, two common views to be found in the literature hostile to the capital should be refuted. First, as we have tried to show, it is not true that the rise of Budapest was something other than the result of the organic development of the country; it was not something artificial imposed on Hungary by outside forces. Second, it is ahistorical and false to assume that the underdevelopment of the rural areas had any direct connections with the growth of the city, which was allegedly taking resources away from the countryside.

NOTES

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GARY B. COHEN

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF PRAGUE, VIENNA, AND BUDAPEST IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

It is highly tempting for historians to compare society, politics, and culture in Prague, Vienna, and Budapest during the second half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, in the early 1970s a session was organized for the annual meeting of the American Historical Association on the theme, "Three Cities – One Empire." These, after all, were the capitals and principal urban centers of the Bohemian, Alpine, and Hungarian heartlands of the Habsburg Monarchy; and a comparison of developments in these three cities should elucidate both the common tendencies and the diversity of the major segments of the Monarchy. In contrast, the principal cities of Galicia – Cracow and Lemberg (Lvov) – were considerably smaller than these three great metropolitan centers and were tied to the much less developed Galician economic and social structures. Attractive as the comparison of Prague, Vienna, and Budapest may be, though, one must be careful not to lump the three together too much nor to overestimate the degree to which they can usefully be compared.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Prague differed from Vienna and Budapest in fundamental ways: the magnitude and sources of its population growth, the nature of its economic base, and the character of its public life and chief political concerns. The most obvious difference between the Bohemian capital and the two great cities of the Danube was the key to far-reaching variations in the social and economic characters of these cities. Put simply, Vienna and Budapest each came to serve all the administrative, economic and cultural

functions of the capital city and central place of a large, multinational political entity, one or the other half of the Monarchy; and these two cities grew accordingly in the late nineteenth century. Prague for all its glorious history and the vigor of its commercial and industrial activity was no more than the capital and central place of a single crown land, Bohemia. Because of this, its population grew significantly less than that of each of the twin capitals, and the socio-economic composition of the Prague population as well as its political life befitted an important but smaller provincial capital. The differences between Prague, Vienna, and Budapest merit closer examination.

THE GROWTH OF THE THREE CITIES

In the late nineteenth century, both the magnitude and rate of population growth in Vienna and Budapest greatly exceeded those of Prague. During the late medieval and Renaissance periods Prague was one of the largest European cities in terms of population and spatial extent; at the end of the fourteenth century the space enclosed in the city's walls made Prague the largest walled city north of the Alps. In 1800, Vienna already had 247,000 residents, but Prague with around 75,000 exceeded the population of what later became Budapest (54,000).[1] In 1850 the five historic sections of Prague held 118,405 civilian residents, but the territory of Budapest already accommodated 156,000, and Vienna dwarfed both with 444,000 residents.[2] Each of the three cities nearly doubled its population between 1850 and the 1869 census, but for most of the period between 1869 and 1910 the populations of Vienna and Budapest grew faster than that of Prague (see Table I).[3] The belated but rapid industrial growth in Budapest at the very end of the century caused the Hungarian capital's population to grow by 46 percent in the 1890s alone. In contrast, Prague and its inner suburbs, which were integral parts of the developed urban area, increased by only 25 percent in the 1890s. By 1910, Prague and its inner suburbs represented a respectably large European city of

Table I. Population Growth in Prague, Vienna, and Budapest, 1869-1910

	1869	1880	1890	1900	1910
PRAGUE I-VII & INNER SUBURBS	204,488	255,928	314,158	394,030	442,017
(% increase)		(+25%)	(+23%)	(+25%)	(+12%)
VIENNA I-XIX	834,000	1,104,000	1,364,548	1,674,957	2,031,498
(%increase)		(+32%)	(+24%)	(+23%)	(+21%)
BUDAPEST	270,685	360,551	491,938	716,476	863,735
(% increase)		(+33%)	(+36%)	(+46%)	(+21%)

442,017 civilian residents, but the city of Budapest had nearly double this number with 863,735. Vienna overshadowed both with 2,031,498 (in districts I-XIX). Like all nineteenth century Western cities, these three grew largely through in-migration as their expanding administrative, manufacturing, commercial, and service functions attracted migrants from the surrounding areas. Prague's industry and central-place functions expanded, but on a significantly smaller scale than Vienna's and Budapest's and tended to attract in-migrants from a much narrower hinterland than either Vienna or Budapest.

Vienna and Budapest were each able to draw significantly larger numbers of migrants and from more widely dispersed regions than could Prague. Vienna attracted immigrants from nearly all parts of the Monarchy and from elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Budapest, too, drew on most of the Kingdom of Hungary and also on Galicia, Bukovina, and Moldavia-Wallachia. In 1900, 40 percent of the civilian residents of Prague I-VIII and the four inner suburbs were native to the Prague area, and fully 95 percent of all the civilian residents of Prague and the inner suburbs had been born somewhere in Bohemia, including Prague. In 1900 only 3,411 of the nearly 400,000 in Prague and the inner suburbs were native to Galicia, Bukovina, and Hungary; and only 4,556 were native to the Austrian Alpine prov-

inces.[4] Fully 85 percent of the non-native residents of Prague and the inner suburbs in 1900 had been born in regions of Bohemia with Czech majorities, and the strength of migration from the Czech areas of Bohemia was one of the most important contributing factors in the growth of Prague's Czech majority. Although Prague was the historic capital of the Bohemian Crown Lands and the center of the Czech national movement, in most of Moravia and Austrian Silesia it was Vienna that exerted a stronger attraction on migrants. In 1900 less than 2 percent of Prague's civilian population had been born in the other two Bohemian Crown Lands. The German towns of northern Bohemia also sent far more migrants to Vienna than to Prague.[5]

The different migration patterns to the three cities were particularly apparent in the origins and growth of the Jewish populations in each metropolis. Of the three, Prague's Jewish population, which dated back to the tenth century, was the oldest and best established before the legal emancipation of Jews in the Habsburg lands in the mid-nineteenth century. The Jewish population of Prague and the inner suburbs grew from 14,928 (7.3% of the total population) in 1869 to 26,342 (6.7% of the total population) in 1900.[6] Nevertheless, the Jewish residents, like the Christian, came overwhelmingly from Bohemia itself. Ninety-two percent of Prague Jews in 1900 had been born in Bohemia (44% in Prague I-VIII and the inner suburbs); about 2 percent had been born in Moravia and Austrian Silesia, and less than 3 percent had come from Galicia, Bukovina, Hungary, and Russia.[7] Vienna, by comparison, had fewer than 16,000 Jewish residents in the mid-1850s, but their number reached 73,000 (10% of the city's total population) by 1880 and 146,926 (8.8% of the total) in 1900.[8] Yiddish-speaking East European Jews were a more important factor in the Jewish populations of Vienna and Budapest than they were in Prague. Marsha Rozenblit reports that throughout the period from 1867 to World War I, Viennese Jews were about evenly divided between those born in Vienna itself and those native to the Bohemian lands, to Hungary, and to Galicia.[9] Buda, Óbuda, and Pest had only around 10,000 Jewish residents in the mid-1830s, but the large influx of Jewish migrants during the late nineteenth century increased

the total to 70,900 in 1880 (nearly 20% of the city's total population) and to 203,687 in 1910 (nearly 24%).[10] This migration derived from other parts of Hungary, Galicia, Bukovina, Moldavia-Wallachia, and some from the Bohemian lands. Many of the Jewish migrants to Budapest from northern and eastern Hungary, in fact, belonged to families which had come a generation or so previously from Galicia, Bukovina, and Moldavia-Wallachia.

The growth of the Vienna and Budapest populations in the late nineteenth century exceeded that of Prague because the urban economies and central place functions of the first two cities developed on a significantly larger scale than Prague's. Between the 1840s and World War I, Prague developed the manufacturing, commercial, administrative and educational apparatus of a modern industrial city with important central place functions, but it did so as a large provincial capital with a more limited hinterland than those commanded by either Vienna or Budapest. The occupational structure of the Prague population in the half century before World War I reflected the growth of a modern industrial economy as well as the expansion of Prague's older administrative and service functions as capital of Bohemia, but the overall scale was smaller than in Vienna and Budapest.

Of the larger Habsburg crown lands, Bohemia industrialized the earliest and the most intensively, and its capital city developed a significant mechanized cotton-spinning and printing industry in the 1820s and 1830s. A larger machine-building industry, which produced engines, machinery, and rolling stock for other factories, for agriculture, and for transportation, began to develop in the 1840s and 1850s. This branch of industry took advantage of the existing supplies of skilled labor in Prague itself and also drew on skilled labor from the other old craft centers of Bohemia and unskilled labor from the agricultural areas of central and eastern Bohemia. Compared to the machine-building industry which developed in Budapest in the late nineteenth century, Prague manufactured a greater range of products and found a geographically wider market. After 1860 machine-building became the single most important mechanized industry in Prague both in terms of the value of its production

and in terms of the numbers of skilled workers employed. Next came a growing sugar-refining, distilling, and food-processing sector; the now declining local textile industry; and metal-working.[11]

Historians have tended to emphasize the continuing numerical importance of small producers and small businessmen in the economies of Vienna and Budapest during the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly in the latter city, where the biggest spurt of industrialization occurred only in the final decades of the century. In Prague, too, although it was the capital of a thoroughly industrialized Bohemia, much small-scale manufacturing and small-scale commercial enterprise survived beyond the turn of the century. In 1902, for instance, Prague's heavily concentrated machine-building industry employed nearly 13,000 people, but a lot of other manufacturing continued in the city outside of large factory settings. Nineteen-thousand worked in firms which produced clothing and fancy goods and which employed fewer than twenty people each, compared to only 4,000 in large mechanized clothing factories. Seventeen-thousand were employed in construction firms, and 6,264 in non-mechanized foodstuff production, compared to 3,796 in mechanized foodstuff production.[12] Pavla Horská-Vrbová has pointed out that, outside of the machine-building industry and cotton textile production, manufacturing in Prague in the late nineteenth century was characterized by its great diversity and by the *absence* of large-scale factory production.[13] In Prague as in Vienna, while modern manufacturing expanded between the 1840s and the 1890s, a number of the traditional crafts, particularly some of those connected to construction, furniture making, and foodstuffs, were also able to grow.

The Austrian and Hungarian census statistics from 1890, 1900, and 1910 dealing with occupational rank or status of employment confirm Horská-Vrbová's point about the continued importance of small production in Prague and suggest that small manufacturers played a greater role in the Prague economy at the turn of the century than they did in Vienna or even in Budapest. In 1890 in Prague and the inner suburbs as many as 224 out of every 1,000 persons engaged in industry and crafts

were self-employed (*selbständig* in the Central Statistical Commissions's terminology). Only 749 per 1,000 were wage-workers, apprentices or day-laborers, while in Vienna 167 out of every 1,000 persons engaged in industry and crafts were self-employed and 807 wage-workers, apprentices, or day-laborers. If one assumes the basic comparability of the Austrian and Hungarian census procedures and of occupational categories, the statistics available for Budapest from 1900 show that 194 out of every 1,000 persons engaged in industry and the crafts were self-employed with 662 being wage-workers, apprentices, or day-laborers and 66 per 1,000 engaged in industry and in those activities classified according to the Hungarian custom as contributing to enterprises (i.e., not household servants).[14] By 1910 economic development had reduced the relative number of the self-employed in industry and crafts in all three cities, but the relative number in Prague still exceeded the proportions in the other two cities: 169 per 1,000 engaged in this economic sector in the Bohemian capital as opposed to 148 per 1,000 in Vienna and 161 per 1,000 in Budapest.[15] The census summaries for 1910 distinguished between apprentices and wage-workers in both halves of the Monarchy, and the numbers of wage-workers were still impressive in all three cities: 102 out of every 1,000 engaged in industry and crafts in Prague and its suburbs, 87 per 1,000 in Vienna, and 91 per 1,000 in Budapest.[16]

In addition, large numbers of the self-employed or independents remained in commerce and transportation in Prague, Vienna, and Budapest at the end of the century. As in manufacturing, the relative numbers of self-employed persons among all those engaged in commerce and transportation in Prague in 1890 exceeded the proportion in Vienna: 411 out of every 1,000 were engaged in this sector in Prague and its inner suburbs compared to 371 per 1,000 in Vienna. Both cities experienced a relative decline in the number of the self-employed in commerce and transportation between 1890 and 1910, as the numbers of qualified employees and wage-earners grew much faster than the numbers of independents and the self-employed. In 1910 this second group accounted for roughly equal shares of all those engaged in commerce and transportation in the two cities: down to 318

per 1,000 in Prague and 317 per 1,000 in Vienna.[17] Reflecting the different traditions and structures of Budapest commerce and the different methods of reporting and classifying occupational statistics for commerce and transportation, the Hungarian census of 1900 indicated that 250 out of every 1,000 people engaged in this sector (including servants in the enterprises) in Budapest were self-employed or independents. Here, too, the trend was toward a relative decline in the numbers of self-employed: in 1910, 225 per 1,000 in commerce and transportation were self-employed or independent.[18] Although small entrepreneurs in manufacturing and commerce were declining as a percentage of the economically active population in all three cities around the turn of the century, they remained numerous and constituted important social and political forces. Much more research is needed on the small entrepreneurs in each of the three cities to understand how much they contributed to the economic, social, and political development of each metropolis.

The differing character of economic development in each city and the differing set of functions each served with respect to its hinterland resulted in some important divergence in the distribution of each city's active population according to economic sectors and individual branches. Private white-collar employment, the service occupations, and public employment grew disproportionately in all European cities during the late nineteenth century, but here again developments in Prague reflected that city's role as capital of Bohemia as compared to the larger scale and broader functions of Vienna and Budapest. Prague did not perform on the same scale the diverse manufacturing, financial, governmental, and long-distance trading functions that Vienna performed for Cisleithania or Budapest for Hungary; but it still provided central administrative, educational, commercial, and manufacturing services as the central place of an economically developed crown land, albeit within the limitations imposed by a much smaller urban population than existed in either Vienna or Budapest. The distributions of the economically active (*berufstätig*) population by economic sector and selected branches for the three cities in 1910 indicate some of the differences (see Table II).[19]

A smaller share of Prague's active population was engaged in manufacturing than was the case in Vienna or Budapest. Nonetheless, while Vienna's industry and crafts developed on a larger scale than industry in Prague, the distribution of Prague's manufacturing work force in individual branches was, in broad terms, much the same as in Vienna. Almost equal proportions of the total work forces in Vienna and Prague were engaged in machine building (4.1% of all workers active in each city), in metallurgy (5.0% of workers in Prague, 5.7% of those in Vienna), in construction (4.2% and 4.5% respectively), and in clothing and cleaning (13.8% and 14.1% respectively). Textile production was proportionately stronger in Vienna, employing 2.3 percent of the economically active workforce as opposed to 1.5 percent in Prague, as was wood and rubber working as well (4.3% as compared to 3.1%). On the other hand, the manufacture of foodstuffs and beverages employed relatively more in Prague (4.5% of the economically active workforce), which retained its historic ties to Bohemia's productive agriculture, than it did in Vienna (3.5%).

The speed and intensity of industrialization in Budapest at the very end of the nineteenth century and the degree of Budapest's domination of manufacturing and trade in Hungary are reflected in the fact that the share of Budapest's economically active population which was engaged in industry and crafts in 1910 (51.7%) significantly exceeded the proportions of those similarly employed in Prague (42.7%) and Vienna (46.6%). Metallurgy was weaker in Budapest proper than it was in the other two cities, but the concentration of Hungarian machine manufacturing and the strength of beverage production and food processing, especially milling, in the Hungarian capital are readily apparent from the statistics for the individual branches (see Table II).

Whatever the differences in industrial and commercial development in Prague, Vienna, and Budapest and whatever the differences in the characters of their respective hinterlands, the growth of public employment and the free professions during the second half of the nineteenth century strongly affected all three cities. In 1910 what the Austrian census authorities re-

Table II. Distribution of the Active (*berufstätig*) Populations 1910, in %

	Agric. A)	Metal.	Machine manu.	Constr.	Textile
Prague & subs.	*0.64%*	5.0	4.1	4.2	1.5
Vienna I-XIX	*0.85%*	5.7	4.1	4.5	2.3
Budapest	*1.25%*	2.2	7.6	4.6	1.3

	Comm. in goods	Financ.	Rail.	Other Trans.	*All Commer.* C)
Prague & subs.	11.3	2.3	3.0	3.1	*27.0%*
Vienna I-XIX	10.0	1.8	2.8	4.0	*27.1%*
Budapest	12.1	2.3	2.8	4.1	*22.5%*

ferred to as the "D" sector, all those engaged in the military, government service, education and the free professions, as well as rentiers, pensioners, those without occupations, and those with unknown occupations, accounted for 25.4% of Vienna's active population and 24.5% of Budapest's (see Table II). It might seem surprising at first that the "D" sector accounted for as much as 29.7 percent of the active population in Prague, which lacked, of course, the ministerial apparatus and military command structures of Vienna and Budapest. The oft-noted expansion of the state bureaucracy and related occupations was a major factor in Budapest society in the late nineteenth century, but as Table II shows, the military, government employees, educational personnel, and members of the free professions comprised almost as large a share of the economically active population in Prague (14.2%) in 1910 as they did in Budapest (14.3%).[20]

The aggregate occupational statistics published by the Royal Hungarian Statistical Office with the 1910 census returns

of Prague, Vienna, and Budapest by Sector and Selected Branches,

Wood/rubber	Food/bev.	Clothing	*B) All industr./ crafts*
3.1	4.5	13.8	*42.7%*
4.3	3.5	14.1	*46.7%*
2.9	5.4	13.8	*51.7%*

Milit.	Govt.	Educ.	Free Prof.	Inst./ Prep.	*"D" Sector*
3.2	7.4	2.1	1.5	4.9	*29.7%*
2.4	5.3	1.4	1.4	4.0	*25.4%*
3.9*		10.4		N.A[x]	*24.5%*

*Active military and gendarmerie

[x]Statistics for each branch not available here

in the *Statisztikai Közlemények* do not permit a more detailed analysis of the various occupations within the governmental, professional, and rentier sector, but a comparison between the 1910 occupational statistics for Prague and those for Vienna is instructive. Those in public employment in Prague actually exceeded their Viennese counterparts as a proportion of the total work force in each city: civilian government employees constituted 7.4 percent of active workers in Prague as opposed to 5.3 percent in Vienna; serving military personnel made up 3.2 percent in Prague and 2.4 percent in Vienna; educators 2.1 percent in Prague and 1.4 percent in Vienna. The Imperial Court, the Cisleithanian ministries, and the central Austrian military installations were, of course, major presences in Vienna and important employers, but Prague as a major provincial capital also had a large public sector consisting of the offices of the Bohemian Statthalter/místodržitel, the highest provincial courts, the central Bohemian medical facilities, the dual systems of Czech and Bohemian German higher education, local military installations, and a sizable municipal government. Prague

was a much smaller city and, of course, a less important administrative center than Vienna or Budapest, but in Prague all the provincial and municipal administrative and educational bodies actually accounted for an even larger share of the economically active population.

POLITICS AND THE NATIONALITY CONFLICTS

The major social and political questions which concerned Prague's residents in the late nineteenth century also reflected the city's smaller size and its specifically Bohemian character. Prague, like nearly all the larger cities of the Monarchy in the 1880s and 1890s, saw the emergence and development of new mass-based political movements which voiced the political aims of the common man and which demanded direct representation of lower-middle-class and working-class interests. The new forces, the radical young Czechs, the Czech National Socialists, the Social Democrats, the radical German nationalists, and the small social Catholic groups, forced the older conservative and national liberal movements, Czech and German alike, either to retreat into a narrow defense of property interests and deferential politics or to broaden their popular appeal.

As in Hungary, the advent of mass politics in Prague and in Bohemia as a whole, together with the increasingly open conflict between various social and economic interest groups, more often compounded than supplanted the conflicts between different nationalities. In Bohemia the conflicts between the Czech majority and the German minority over representation, as well as over administrative and educational questions, became increasingly explosive after the early 1890s as most of the new mass-based groups combined impatient calls for concessions to national claims with their own specific economic demands, while the older national liberal formations radicalized their own nationalist programs to keep or win support. As in Hungary, complex broader issues involving social and economic interests were at stake in Bohemia, but they were still frequently linked

to the nationality issue; and in Prague in particular these political conflicts led to outbreaks of violence. The Czech-German conflict repeatedly paralyzed the Bohemian Diet after the mid-1890s and spilled over into the Reichsrat. In 1897 and again in 1904-1905 and 1908, this conflict sparked mass violence on the streets of Prague.[21]

Per se nationality differences among the populations of Vienna and Budapest during the late nineteenth century were less explosive than they were in Prague. Although numerous, the Czech, Slovak, and Magyar immigrants to Vienna were mostly too poor, too powerless politically and economically, and too eager for social acceptance and upward mobility to resist for any length of time acculturation and assimilation in Vienna's German-speaking environment.[22] In Hungary non-Magyar elements, particularly German-speakers, had a special role as craftsmen and businessmen in the traditional corporate structures of the early modern cities and towns. Laszlo Katus estimates that in 1850 perhaps only one-third of the population of Buda and Pest had Magyar as their mother tongue.[23] However, Hungarian government's determined Magyarizing efforts and the decline of Hungary's corporate social traditions during the second half of the nineteenth century had a strong impact on the language question in Budapest: in 1880, 57 percent of the population declared Magyar to be its mother tongue, but by 1900 the proportion had risen to 79 percent. In 1919, 86 percent of the Budapest population declared Magyar to be its mother tongue.[24] Even larger percentages probably used Magyar in everyday transactions. It was obvious enough which social elements were in charge in Budapest politically and culturally and the segment of the local population with German mother tongue declined from 123,308 (34% of the total) in 1880 to 78,882 (only 9% of the the total) in 1910.[25] Most of Hungary's Jews had been German or Yiddish-speaking at mid-century, but by the 1880 census, 57 percent of them in the country as a whole declared Magyar to be their mother tongue, and only 35 percent German. In 1910, 76 percent declared Magyar to be their mother tongue and 22% German.[26] The Jews of Budapest had become overwhelmingly Magyar speaking by the turn of the century.

In Prague also, the German-speaking element declined steadily in the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, as long as around 37 percent of the total Bohemian population continued to be German-speaking and as long as Germans remained politically and economically the single most powerful group in Cisleithania, some chose to remain as Germans in Prague. The German minority continued to be a significant factor in Prague's economic and cultural life during the second half of the nineteenth century. Prague's German population derived primarily from the Germanization, after the Thirty Years War, of the local officialdom, of educated elements, and of the more prosperous businessmen and manufacturers. Some German-speakers were the descendants of people who had migrated to Prague from German-speaking regions, but more were people of diverse origins who had come to adopt the German language and eventually a German ethnic identity in response to the Germanizing trends in government, education, and in more important commercial activity. An unreliable count taken in 1846 claimed 66,046 German-speakers and 36,687 Czech-speakers among the Christian population of the historic inner city, with the 6,400 Jewish residents being overwhelmingly German-speaking at this time.[27]

After the mid-nineteenth century, strong migration to Prague from the surrounding Czech countryside, weak migration from German Bohemia, and the growing national consciousness of Czech-speakers in the Bohemian lands all helped to change Prague's population figures strongly in favor of the Czechs. The 1880 census revealed 38,591 German-speakers of all religions, 15.3 percent of the total population of 256,000 in the city and inner suburbs. However, in 1910 there were only 32,332 German-speakers, 7 percent of the total population of 442,000.[28] Germanization of the upwardly mobile elements in Prague gradually diminished, and a significant number of lower-class German elements assimilated with the Czechs. By the turn of the century, the German element had declined to a small but opulent minority, more than 60 percent of whom belonged to the middle class in terms of property and education, or to the more respectable lower-middle-class strata. Nearly half (46%) of the German-speakers in the municipality reported in the 1890 and 1900 censuses were German-speaking Jews.[29]

The social experience and politics of the Prague Jews during the late nineteenth century reflected the somewhat insular, specifically Bohemian, character of Prague's social, political, and cultural development. Compared to Vienna and Budapest, the Jewish population in Prague was much smaller and, as noted above, was recruited from a much smaller geographical area, overwhelmingly from Bohemia. Compared to the Jews of Vienna, those of Prague were more heavily engaged in commerce, the free professions, and public employment, but in manufacturing less so (see Table III).[30] Wage-workers and day-laborers amounted to 27.5 percent of the economically-active Jews in Prague and its inner suburbs in 1900, but few were engaged in manufacturing. Jewish wage-workers in commerce in the Bohemian capital outnumbered those in manufacturing by 2.5 to 1. In Vienna in 1910, Jewish wage-workers, day-laborers, and apprentices accounted for a little more than one-quarter of all self-supporting Jews, and Jewish workers in manufacturing comprised 12.7 percent of all self-supporting Jews in Vienna, compared to 10.8 percent who were wage-workers in commerce. This suggests that the poorer elements of Prague's population – a population that was much smaller and more narrowly recruited from a single crown land than Vienna's – were much more heavily concentrated in the more traditionally Jewish commercial pursuits at the turn of the century than were the Jews of Vienna.

While facing many of the same basic political and cultural difficulties as their fellows in Vienna and Budapest, the Jews of Prague displayed overall somewhat greater homogeneity and less pluralism. Up to the end of the century, the great majority of Prague Jews continued to seek some degree of assimilation with the surrounding society, to find acceptance both as citizens and as Jews, and to escape from any of the disadvantages still lingering on from their old ghetto life. As a product of circumstances in Bohemia, most Prague Jews saw the crucial social and political question as whether to find places in society as Czech or as German Jews. Until the late 1880s and 1890s the great majority of Prague's Jews chose the German option; in 1890, 74 percent of all Jews in Prague's districts I-VII declared German to be their language in the census. After

Table III. Distribution of the Active Jewish Residents of Prague (1900) and Vienna (1910) by Occupational Sector

Active Jews	Industry & Crafts	Commerce	Govt., free prof., rent., without	Total
Prague & subs. (12,507) *1900*	21.8%	46.7%	31.2%	100%
Vienna (94,838) *1910*	28.4%	44.0%	27.5%	100%

the mid-1880s, though, the pressure of the Czech majority and of Czech nationalist politics proved ever harder to resist, particularly for the poorer Jewish elements. In the 1900 census, held after the 1897 nationalist disturbances, only 45 percent of the Jews in the municipality declared German to be their everyday language (*Umgangssprache, obcovací rec*).[31] Even so, many of the Prague Jews were ambivalent about adopting Czech political loyalties, and in 1910 they continued to prefer German primary schools to Czech ones for nearly 90 percent of their children.[32] Under such circumstances, Jewish nationalism and Zionism developed slowly in Prague and won only limited support there before World War I. The Society of Jewish University Students *Bar Kochba* and a local chapter of the Jewish People's Society *Zion* were first organized in 1899, and neither had many more than 200 members at any time before 1914.[33] In Vienna and Budapest, by contrast, the much larger Jewish populations showed much greater ideological and political diversity in the last years before World War I.

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There is no doubt that comparisons between Prague, Vienna, and Budapest can tell us much about trends in the Habsburg Monarchy in the late nineteenth century and about the emergence of twentieth-century politics and social structures among the Czechs, Austrians, and Hungarians. These comparisons can be fruitful, but they must be made with close attention to the

specific context of each city, both the conditions within each metropolis and in each city's own hinterland. Vienna's economic and demographic hinterland may have been, for all intents and purposes, the whole Austrian half of the Monarchy and a portion of western Hungary, but important elements of Viennese social structure such as the gradations of social status and the Baroque Catholic strains in the city's popular culture can only be understood in light of the special traditions of the Lower Austrian countryside, of the Austrian aristocracy, and of the Habsburg imperial court. Budapest grew to be the great administrative, commercial, and industrial metropolis of the Kingdom of Hungary and in 1910 had a population nearly eight times that of the next largest Hungarian city, Szeged. Yet the political orientation of Hungary's noble landowners as well as many of their traditional social attitudes still enjoyed a decisive influence in Budapest society. Although much smaller than either Vienna or Budapest, Prague nevertheless had become a great industrial city by the end of the nineteenth century. Prague achieved that level of development by serving as capital and central place of the Kingdom of Bohemia, whose distinctive political, social, and economic problems continued to condition life in the city.

NOTES

1 B.R. Mitchell, ed., *European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970*, abridged ed. (New York, 1978), pp. 12-15.

2 *Ibid.*; Jan Havránek, "Demograficky vyvoj Prahy v druhé plovine 19. století", *Prazsky sborník historicky 1969-70*, p. 73; and Laszlo Katus, "Die Magyaren", in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918*, vol. III, p. 457.

3 Statistics for Vienna from Mitchell, ed., *European Historical Statistics*, abridged ed., pp. 12-15; for Budapest from *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Uj sorozat, XLII (1912), p. 806.

4 Jan Srb, ed., *Scítání lidu v král, hlav, meste Praze a obcech sousendních provendené 31. prosince 1900*, 3 vols. (Prague, 1902-08), vol. III, p. 476. See the discussion in Gary B. Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914* (Princeton, 1981), p. 95.

5 Cohen, *The Politics ...*, pp. 95-97.

6 Srb, ed., *Scítání lidu v Praze 1900*, vol. I, pp. 92-95.

7 Srb, ed., *Scítání lidu v Praze 1900*, vol. III, p. 750.

8 John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement 1848-1897* (Chicago and London, 1981), p. 79; Marsha L. Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867-1914: Assimilation and Identity* (Albany, 1983), p. 17.

9 Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna ...*, pp. 19-21.

10 Ernő László, "Hungarian Jewry: Settlement and Demography, 1735-38 to 1910", in Randolph L. Braham, ed., *Hungarian-Jewish Studies*, 2 vols. (New York, 1966-69), vol. I, pp. 85-92; and *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Uj sorozat, XLII, p. 43*.

11 See F.W. Carter, "The Industrial Development of Prague 1800-1850", *Slavonic and East European Review*, LI (1973), pp. 243-75; idem, "C-K-D Employees, Prague 1870-1920: Some aspects of their geographical distribution", *Journal of Historical Geography*, I (1975), pp. 69-97; and Pavla Horská-Vrbová, "Prazsky prumysl v druhé polovine 19. století", *Prazsky sborník historicky 1969-70*, pp. 52-69.

12 Horská-Vrbová, in *Prazsky sborník historicky 1969-70*, pp. 66-67.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

14 *Österreichische Statistik*, N.F., III, 1, Heft, p. 50* and *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Uj sorozat, LII (Budapest, 1914), p. 199.

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

18 *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Uj sorozat, LII, p. 199.

19 *Österreichische Statistik*, N.F., III, 1. Heft, pp. 138-39; *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Uj sorozat, LII, pp. 199, 452-57.

20 *Österreichische Statistik*, N.F., III, 1. Heft, pp. 138-39, and *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Uj sorozat, LII, pp. 452-57.

21 See Cohen, *The Politics ...* pp. 233-44.

22 See Monika Glettler, *Die Wiener Tschechen um 1900* (Munich and Vienna, 1972), and Karl M. Brousek, *Wien und seine Tschechen* (Vienna, 1980).

23 Katus, in *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, vol. III, p. 457.

24 *Ibid.; Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Uj sorozat, XLII (Budapest, 1912), p. 35*.

25 E.V. Windisch, "Die Entstehung der Voraussetzungen für die deutsche Nationalitätenbewegung in Ungarn in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts", *Acta Historica Hung.*, XI (1965), p. 27.

26 Wolfdieter Bihl, "Die Juden", in Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, vol. III, p. 907.

27 Georg Norbert Schnabel, *Tafeln zur Statistik von Böhmen* (Prague, 1848), Table 8.

28 See Cohen, *The Politics* ... . Chapter 3.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 102.

30 Data for Prague derive from Heinrich Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1905), vol. II, p. 368; for Vienna from *Österreichische Statistik*, N.F., III, 2. Heft, p. 132.

31 Cohen, *The Politics* ... , pp. 101-106.

32 Cohen, *The Politics* ... , pp. 224-25.

33 Cohen, *The Politics* ... , p. 227.

PÉTER HANÁK

THE GARDEN AND THE WORKSHOP
(REFLECTIONS ON THE FIN-DE-SIÈCLE CULTURE OF VIENNA AND BUDAPEST)

How Vienna served as the hothouse of European culture, how Budapest, as it grew into a big city, caught up with her, and how culture thrived in the Monarchy as a whole - all this has proved to be a revealing subject for cultural history over the last 25 years. Many have wondered how so lush a garden could have thrived in the somewhat arid soil of a decrepit, crumbling empire. Were Impressionism, the *Sezession*, psychoanalysis, and the new school of music merely *fleurs du mal*, the flowers of the Monarchy's decomposition? Was this culture really the slight giddiness of the end? To put it somewhat differently, had the foundation of the whole structure ceased to exist, leaving only a phantom of itself?[1] These are reflections after the event. Though contemporaries may have perceived the problems and sensed the decay, they were unaware that collapse was imminent and inevitable.[2] Stefan Zweig in his memoirs describes the pre-war years as the "golden age of security", when all in the thousand-year-old Monarchy was still made for eternity, "and the state itself was the chief guarantor of this permanence".[3] The stability of life and livelihood and the durability of objects and institutions were self-evident to people of the day.

A writer need not be a prophet, of course, least of all in Austria a good quarter of a century *after* the world of peace had vanished. The *reminiscences* of Zweig and many of his contemporaries do not contradict the *premonitions* of writers and other members of the intelligentsia with sensitive nerves, the causes of which around the turn of the 20th century are

so sedulously sought after today. A writer is a sensitive barometer of the intellectual climate in which he lives, and his heuristic device lies in the freedom of his intuition. What the sensitive (one might even say neurotic) intellectual sages of the Monarchy, particularly of Vienna, sensed intuitively was an increasingly oppressive distress. The outside world had become increasingly forbidding and the liberal, rational world-view substantially fainter, as a century-old scale of European values became debased. As Carl Schorske aptly remarked, the colorful Viennese cultural scene was stamped with "the crisis and dissolution of the liberal Ego". A consideration of late 19th century Vienna and today's interpretations of it soon convinces one that this magnificent culture was founded upon the repeated defeat of the Austrian bourgeoisie, its exclusion from public life, and its withdrawal into its real or spiritual garden.[4]

This is certainly the case if one looks at Vienna itself. Yet there were also "the provinces": Budapest, Prague and Cracow. There, too, the decline of liberalism and the critical symptoms of a turning point between two eras had their influence. There, also, sensitive artists were similarly subject to a general malaise, and the attitude towards life known as decadence was spreading. Yet Budapest in the 1890s witnessed a new flaring up of liberalism, and as in France, which was taken as a model, there was an upsurge at the beginning of the 20th century of political radicalism. One may call it retardation, a feverish "catching-up complex" of an underdeveloped agrarian country, and even find arguments to support this thesis. Certainly, at a time when Hofmannsthal's *Jung-Wien* circle was appearing in Vienna, only a moderate, loyal literary periodical *A Hét* (The Week) was knocking on the door in Budapest, and when Klimt and his friends in Vienna launched the *Ver Sacrum* with provocative boldness and created the representative edifice of the *Sezession*, all that happened in Hungary was that a group of young painters settled down quietly in faraway Nagybánya, and in the solitude of the countryside tried to commit to canvas *plein-air* and the passing image.

Certainly Budapest lagged ten or twenty years behind Vienna, but to attribute the essential differences to this would

be too easy and one-sided an explanation, not least because phenomena and trends similar to what was known as "monarchical decadence" were also emerging in Munich and Berlin. And if one looks beyond Germany it becomes clear that the *Sezession*, symbolism, the search among intellectuals for new forms to express the new feeling for life, the crisis of traditions, and the cultural turbulence were all phenomena which were not confined to the Monarchy or even to Central Europe. They appeared throughout the Continent, and this universality makes it clear that one cannot consider the cultural prosperity at the end of the 19th century to be a product of the Monarchy's decay or attribute it chiefly or primarily to the failures, withdrawals and identity crises of the Austrian bourgeoisie, just as one ought not to conclude that there was a complex, epoch-making historical phenomenon stemming from one isolated factor or dominant tendency but rather from the specific concurrence of several factors that are difficult to arrange hierarchically.

THE INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND THE UPSTART METROPOLIS

Confining oneself to Austria, one can approach the roots of the problem by asking why Austrian liberalism was so weak and why it was defeated in so short a time. How did the social and political nature of Austrian liberalism differ, for instance, from that of Hungarian liberalism? The weakness of Austrian liberalism's foundations is not explained by the cultural insignificance of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals in Austria (or to use the more expressive German terms, the *Besitz*- and the *Bildungsbürgertum*), but by the fact that this bourgeoisie had no real national community to rely on, and was linked not to nationalism, the ruling idea of the age, but to a traditional, dynastic patriotism focused on the state. Therefore, it could never fight a consistent battle against absolutism, the *Hausmacht* of the Habsburgs. Instead it yielded to the scarcely restricted sovereignty of the ruling house so as to maintain the unity of the supranational empire and its own advantageous economic and administrative position.[5] Fur-

thermore, this subordination was not merely motivated by a community of interest or by opportunism. The stratum that set its stamp on the character of the Austrian bourgeoisie – the entrepreneurs and bankers, the core of the bourgeois intelligentsia, the bureaucrats, and the representatives of the sciences and arts – largely consisted of immigrant, assimilated elements in society, Slavs, Jews and, to a lesser extent, Hungarians and Italians. These elements, irrespective of the degree to which they had become impregnated with German culture, did not identify with German nationalism.[6] For them the awareness of identity most conveniently to hand was some kind of cosmopolitan liberalism and dynastic, state patriotism.

Certainly this special power position and social formula explain how Austrian liberals came to stress the fullest assurance of the *autonomous individual's* right to freedom, and not the Western type of parliamentarianism that excluded the monarch from government, nor the absolute possession of formally divided power, nor even the acquisition of collective rights by the community. Hardly any other bourgeois constitution in contemporary Europe so greatly curtailed Parliament's sphere of authority while on the other hand granting and defining bourgeois rights of freedom so clearly as did the Austrian.[7]

This kind of liberalism, tailored to the individual and to a supranational, cosmopolitan humanism, might have sufficed in the age of Grillparzer, under the naive Viennese universalism of the Austrian *Vormärz*. What proud awareness is reflected in the following lines: "Mir steht der Mensch und sein Geist höher als alles, und der kennt keine nationale Richtungen.."[8] "Das beste, was der Mensch sein kann, eben ist ein Mensch zu sein, ob er nun einen Attila trägt und ungarisch spricht, oder trotz seiner deutschen Sprache in einem englischen Frack und einem französischen Hut einhergeht."[9] But this pure humanism had succumbed as early as 1848-9 to imperial and tsarist reaction, and in spite of all its enchanting rhetoric, it had then proved impotent in the days when Bismarck was taking steps to lay the foundations of the German Empire, which in Austria evoked an imperial nationalism that renewed the demand for monarchical German hegemony. So there was a double stimulus – nationalist

and socialist reasons – why the middle strata in Austria and Germany turned against the haute bourgeoisie with its state patriotism and liberalism. It was not in 1879 and afterwards in the *Reichsrat* that this latter leading stratum (and the liberalism associated with it) suffered its political defeat. The battle was lost on the field of social and intellectual influence against these middle strata, the majority of whose members in the 1880s veered off into anti-Semitism and nationalism.

But this opposition among the middle strata, this doubly motivated struggle between the strata, cannot fully account for the rapid decline of liberalism, or for the traumatic sense of defeat, the mood of crisis, and the withdrawal of the Austrian bourgeoisie specifically. For power remained (even though the bourgeoisie was excluded from its magic circle) and so did "high society", which had already extended its patronage to the parvenu bourgeoisie even though it had not admitted it to its salons. Nor were protection, even protectionism, lacking at the end of the 19th century, although in the meantime the state had undergone a curious metamorphosis. In the course of time the patriarchal power attached to the person of the emperor, in other words to the dynasty, had changed into a paternalist absolutism of the bureaucracy which now embraced the emperor himself, changing later into *étatist* rule that annexed an increasing proportion of power. The Habsburg Monarchy provides the classic example of such a historical metamorphosis, since it changed by steady, almost imperceptible, degrees from a "*gemütlich*" imperial bureaucracy into the master of an invisible and anonymous *castle*.[10] Not even the rich bourgeoisie could fully identify itself with modern *étatist* bureaucracy, while the intellectuals, the *Bildungsbürgertum*, felt equal anxiety about the growing domination of the bureaucracy and about the rebellion of the nationalist or socialist masses.

It had several reasons for doing so.

The backbone of the traditional *Bildungsbürgertum* in Germany and Austria consisted of the "free intelligentsia", graduates pursuing academic careers. This stratum played an enormous role in the modernization of Germany and Austria and in the intellectual and political life of the two countries from

the age of romanticism and national awakening until the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 and German unification. Afterwards its prestige and influence declined rapidly.[11] The club-like *honoracior* party was superseded by a mass party organized on bureaucratic lines; the *"Lateiner"* of the humanities, the professors and lawyers, gave way to the technical intelligentsia and the officials in the administrative apparatus. For the creative intellectual elements among the Austrian bourgeoisie (who were largely Viennese) there was nothing left to identify with – not the hotblooded nationalist and demagogical propaganda of the Christian socialists, nor the socialist movements, nor ghostly technical civilization nor the dominion of *étatist* bureaucracy.[12] The substance of their liberal creed was the freedom and security of the autonomous individual, and when threatened by vast, mysterious and uncontrollable forces from all sides, their only course was to retreat (to "secede" in a wider sense) into the material gardens of their villas or into their spiritual gardens, where they surrounded themselves with the cultural flora of the classical *hortus conclusus*, the harmony of beauty that might be defended from the chaos of the outside world, and the illusion that autonomy was preserved.

The general political and cultural currents at the end of the 19th century made their influence felt in Budapest as well. The rapid increase in forebodings and in social and national-minority conflicts in Hungary was perhaps even more conspicuous than it was on the other side of the River Leitha. The majority of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals were assimilated Germans, Jews and other non-Magyars. Nationalism ran wild and anti-Semitism spread, while liberalism grew weaker and came to represent the idea of the existing system of law and order. The sudden surge of nationalist and socialist mass movements provided ample cause for the intelligentsia, with their sensitive dispositions, to take fright and escape into a garden either inherited from their ancestors or bought with their fathers' money, or into a garden of dreams. But desires of this kind, although they took shape in sensitive souls and even found artistic expression, did not become the major, determining factor in the intellectual character of the age.

For there remained at least three relevant distinctions between the social structures and intellectual makeups of Austria and Hungary. First, awareness of national identity in Austria, at the zenith of nationalism and in the shadow of the German Reich, had become wholly uncertain, losing its patriotic binding force and consequently its original meaning, whereas in Hungary this feeling of national identity had become an evident factor of existence, a dogma of "national religion", and a prime condition for social integration. Secondly, Hungarian society still contained very strong and perceptible signs of petrification, a product of its feudal past. The Hungarian castle was never so mystical, symbolic or impersonally alienated as Kafka's. It was to be found not far from villages, all over the country, and although it was screened from outsiders it was easily perceived as a hard reality of everyday life. It was principally this outmoded past, symbolized by the feudal mansion, which the sensitive intelligentsia among the rising Hungarian bourgeoisie opposed. They construed the decay of liberalism to be the crisis of the nobility's liberalism, all the more because the Hungarian bourgeoisie had remained outside the circle of political power and had endorsed the traditional leading role of the aristocracy and gentry. Since the Hungarian bourgeoisie never had a "citizens' ministry" (*Bürgerministerium*) in the shape of a constitutional party and since it had never possessed any weight in public life, as had its Austrian equivalent, it never had a position from which to withdraw.

The third distinction was that, unlike the Austrian *Bildungsbürgertum*, which had fled into its garden while threatened from all sides and struggling with an insoluble crisis of identity, the political realization of legal emancipation in Hungary and the entirety of national identity among the bourgeois intelligentsia was achieved through participation in public life, through a kind of *accession.*[13] The arts and sciences were seen as public concerns, something which bound the intelligentsia to public life. No esoteric garden would do for such an active culture, it had to be a workshop, a home of collective work, whether it happened to be a society, a café, or the offices of a newspaper. Whereas Vienna's high intelligen-

tsia experienced the crisis at the end of the 19th century as something internal, as a specifically Austrian crisis and additional to the crisis of mankind, this crisis was viewed in Pest as the eagerly awaited decline of an alien, hostile, retrograde world.

THE GARDEN: THE PLAY OF ILLUSION AND REALITY

This sketch of differences in social structure, however, serves merely as the background to a comparison of cultural history. The specific aim of this study is to display the favored themes, the experiences, distinctions and conjunctions of the various forms of expression.

What did the garden mean in Viennese culture?

Its primary meaning was an enclosed piece of land containing flowers, a little meadow which impelled one towards the beauty of nature by means of its bright colours and scents, or which put one in mind of eternal life with its dying flowers and withering leaves. There is scarcely any reference to the Garden of Eden, the golden age of prehistoric innocence.[14] In Hofmannsthal the garden is largely the scene of loneliness, in Rilke it represents the chaotic metropolis's polar opposite.[15] In this latter interpretation it gains a symbolic meaning as the scene of quiet meditation, inward soliloquy and occurrence, the unity of man as nature's creation and of the work of art as man's. The final consequence of this interpretation is identified by Leopold Andrian-Werburg, in whose psychological novel the garden is the scene of self-discovery and of the soul's hidden depths.[16] Garden and solitude, solitude and the narcissistic ego are metaphorical equations that can easily be conceived. More obscure is the link between the garden and the theatre, which was, however, another determining experience for those young Viennese (*Jungen*) who brought cultural renewal.

To these people the garden was often a theater or stage. The best-known example of this comes in the prologue Hofmannsthal wrote to Schnitzler's cycle *Anatol*. "A leafy bower is our stage, / The summer sun our spotlight, / This is how we play

theater, / How we play our ego plays". Many, among them even such a connoisseur of the arts as Hermann Broch, saw in this garden-theatre, this bower-drama, the motifs of Rococo and a nostalgia for the 18th century.[17] Certainly the Baroque theatrical heritage was strong in Vienna, but Viennese *fin-de-siècle "Welttheater"* was actually Baroque in its inspiration only insofar as it respected tradition. The plays were neither moral in tone nor pastorals but rather a minute, broken-off, emphasized part of the cycle of life and death. But let us return to the Hofmannsthal prologue: "This is how we play theatre, / How we play our ego plays, / Everything is early in bloom, soft, sad, / The comedies of our souls, / The varied mood of yesterday and today, / The pretty reserve of our vile fate, / Smooth words and gaudy pictures, / False feeling, dire bleeding, / Death throes, episodes..." The same thought crops up in another prologue of his: "We have made a play of life / That we live, so that our truth / Bounces here and there along with our work, / Like a conjuror's empty glass..."[18]

The *fin-de-siècle* theatre of Vienna was no gallant Rococo phenomenon, it was a sad reflection on life. We play the parts we choose in life, we simulate, we feign, and only on the stage do we play out the tragicomedy of our lives and display our true selves. Such a correlation between life and theatre probably reflects the ideas of Kierkegaard or Nietzsche: we must live as if our lives were an artistic creation, for the work of art is the true reality. And if so, illusion and reality turn out not to be opposites of one another but substitutes for one another, two states of one and the same reality. This is the philosophical fabric of several Schnitzler plays, emerging most clearly in *The Green Cockatoo*. The scene is an inn somewhere near Paris, where a play is being performed on the eve of the Revolution. The protagonist, Henri, slays Prince Cadignan, and the actor's brilliant performance coupled with the circumstances convinces everyone at the inn that the killing has actually happened. Later he really does kill the prince, in what the audience at first believes to be a play. Is this a play or is it reality? someone in the audience asks. To which Rollin, the narrator, replies, "To be... to play... Can you define the

difference so precisely, sir? I can't... And precisely what I find so curious here is that all the apparent differences have been dissolved. Reality has turned into a play, and the play into reality."[19] Moreover, actual deeds have no value *per se*, only value in their place value, since the people who have destroyed the Bastille acquit Henri, the murderer of the prince, and laud him as a hero. Illusion and reality are made all the more interchangeable since both are qualified and made relative by the situation, by the *historical situation*, which is in perpetual motion.

To the garden and the theatre is closely linked the third basic experience, the continuity and relationship of life and death as symbolized by dreams and love, Eros and Psyche. Wherein lies the objectiveness of the world, wherein the palaces and poems? "They are the dreamlike images of reality". "We are the stuff as dreams are made on": Hofmannsthal borrows this thought of Shakespeare's for one of his terzinas.[20]

There is no need to demonstrate the central part dreams played in Viennese art, and after Freud, in Viennese science as well. To Freud, dreams are on the one hand fulfillments of the desires concealed and suppressed in everyday life (and, at the same time, the repression and distortion of them),[21] while on the other hand they are a transitional state between wakeful consciousness and the unknown unconscious, between being and non-being. This same ambiguous transitional nature of dreams appears (probably through the influence of deep psychology) in Klimt's great *Sezession* works. In *Medizine* (1901), one of the symbolic murals he did for Vienna University, Hygeia stands in the foreground holding up the symbols of healing, the snake and the glass filled with the water of the Lethe, while in the background nascent and dying figures float half awake and half asleep.[22] Another picture, *Death and Life*, is more expressive, still: Death stands on one side dressed in a robe adorned with crosses, and directs the circulation of the sleeping figures (nascent, relaxing and dying). But in other pictures by Klimt (*Danaë*, *The Kiss*, *Judith-Salome*, etc.) and in the pictures of other Viennese masters of the *Sezession* another interpretation of dreams appears. The dream, or, rather, closed eyes

expresses the timelessness of sexual ecstasy. A special meaning was also attached by the European *Sezession* to death. Theirs differed substantially from the heroic death of Romanticism and from the redeeming, glorifying death of congenial Baroque. Death for the *Sezession* is nothing fearful, nothing hostile and nothing glorious; it does not constitute a principle beyond or above man. Instead it is the partner and companion of life, warning one during conceit or pleasure and enfolding one during trouble and pain. Remaining in Vienna, let us mention Egon Schiele's wonderful picture, *Death and the Girl*, in which Death, appearing as a wise old Franciscan friar, like a true friend gently embraces the girl whose life, like her clothing, has been rent.

The same idea is reflected in Rilke's angel of death or in the gentle fiddler of the young Hofmannsthal, leading Claudio, the fool, by the hand, while he follows with the resignation of enlightenment:"Let thou, Death, be Life!"[23] And let me quote another soft Hofmannsthal terzina as evidence, or maybe just to evoke empathy: "The hours! When we are gazing at the sea's / Bright blue and comprehend death / With solemn ease and without fear, / Like pale, chilled little girls when with eyes / Wide open, dumbly, pensively, they stare thus / Before them, around eventide, / For their drowsy bodies have woken to learn / That the life now flows from them / Over to the trees and the grass – and they gaze, smiling / In the looking glass, like bleeding, cleansed saints".[24]

The beauty of death, this refined (one might say, decadent) pleasure, is the reason why in Schnitzler's *Agony* Anatole is unable to break with his lover. To live together with the past, he says, is an illness that leads to the beauty of death. In the Viennese *Sezession*, the *aesthetics of death* are transformed, by strict logic, into the eroticism of death, which lends a peculiar, exciting attraction to its beauty.

Writers (and also scholars) discovered long, long ago that death is not just aesthetic but erotic (in other words associated with love) and how Eros and Thanatos substitute for one another. We all know about the renaissance of Salome at the turn of the century, of Wilde's highly influential play, of

Beardsley's frighteningly erotic drawings, of Richard Strauss's *Salome* (composed in Vienna but because of its provocative death-eroticism first performed in Dresden),[25] and of the great popularity of Tristan and Isolde. Less is known (at least in Hungary) of Schnitzler's variations on love and death in short stories and plays, of the erotic dance of death in *Das Reigen* or of ecstatic agony which is the source of conflict in *Professor Bernardi*.[26] The similar motif in Hofmannsthal's plays on classical themes is little known today. So is his serene short poem telling of his grandmother's death.[27] The grandchild visits his dying grandmother who confides to him in her final hour that she is about to enter the grave with the same feeling with which she once entered her husband's arms as a young girl in love.

Solitude, the garden, illusion and reality, and the play of life and death can clearly be discerned in the works of the young *fin-de-siècle* rebels. But it was precisely the instigators of the *Sezession* – more precisely, a socially more engaged group in the secessionist movement – that opposed this thesis: *Sezession* meant a marching *out*, not a marching *away:* it not only tended a garden, it built a real and famous workshop. This serious counter-argument cannot be ignored, primarily because of the renaissance of the *Wiener Werkstätte*. Undeniably, the Viennese *Sezession* was launched with the militant slogan *Der Zeit ihre Kunst, der Kunst ihre Freiheit*, and sought to address the man of the age, or as Hermann Bahr put it "the man of nerves".[28] It acknowledged no difference between "high art" and "mass art". It sought to make the arts a public preserve. The artist, it claimed, "must stand with both feet in the thick of life" and teach the people to love and cultivate beauty.[29]

Can a current of this kind be introspective and withdrawing; can it create an esoteric garden culture?

However paradoxical it may seem, the answer is yes. One rarely encounters so profound a gulf between intent and realization as one does in the case of the rebellious generation of the *Sezession*. The ornamentation they used was indeed fascinating and might have captivated even the man in the street, but the means of expression in their paintings, their archaism and

reliance on subconscious symbolism, certainly remained alien to the general public. There was another insurmountable barrier: the refined ornamentation with which they invested every article of use and the whole environment, and the amount of craftsmanship they included, made their works incredibly expensive. In vain did they seek to redeem man through their cult of beauty – the clean, hygienic villas with their modern layout, their handmade wallpaper, furniture, door handles and dishes, were only available to the rich bourgeois with refined tastes, and their pictures, jewellery, silks and fabrics could only be afforded by select connoisseurs of a narrow upper stratum. The Viennese *Sezession* failed to demolish the barriers between high culture and mass culture and make the arts a public preserve and its most characteristic workshop, the *Wiener Werkstätte*, could not move away from the garden. It remained a special variant of the garden culture, a *glasshouse culture* operating like a workshop. And that was how it failed.

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Any classification by type contains the inherent danger that one will select from the embarrassing wealth of phenomena the features that best correspond to one's own intellectual disposition and presuppositions. In setting up types it is difficult to avoid arbitrariness or at least the reflex of simplification and skimping. In the intellectual life of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna we have taken aesthetically oriented culture as typical, although we know (ignoring operetta and other light arts) that naturalism, the social drama so popular on German soil, or the journalism and literature that revealed the bewilderment in Austrian national awareness, were also influential.

Nor have we listed so typical a phenomenon as Karl Kraus, that remorseless, destructively ironical critic of the Monarchy's society and state system, and of the literature of his time. This omission is not only because the latter was consciously an outsider who said that Vienna's 2,030,834 inhabi-

tants consisted of 2,030,833 persons and Karl Kraus,[30] and not only because he never joined the Social Democrats, with whom he sympathized, with the result that they attacked him and called him an ivory-tower aesthete. The omission follows from the reason why he was an outsider. "If I only have the possibility of choosing the lesser of two evils, I should rather choose neither", was his reply to one critic.[31] Kraus strongly criticized *Sezession* youth which had escaped to the illusory world of the garden, and he warned of the inevitable catastrophe for the Monarchy and then for mankind. This "therapeutic nihilism"[32] of his connects him to the avant-garde trends of the period that followed, even though he was born in the same year (1874) as Hofmannsthal.

Despite the existence of parallel and contrasting trends, we have taken the Young Vienna group of artists as typical, since this represented most completely the unity of tradition and innovation, of safeguarding and of breaking away, i.e. the ability of the Austrian spirit to compromise.

But is there such a thing as the "Austrian spirit", and if so, in what can it be identified?

Thomas Mann saw it in the "life-blessed mediator", the compensator between lack of and excess of form, while Rudolf Kaßner claimed that it was the *moderation* wedged between life and death that holds them both together.[33] Hermann Bahr considered that the most characteristic feature of the Austrian spirit was its inability to choose between opposites; unable to say no to anything, it arrived at a compensation of extremes. It found everything true and everything uniform, so that everything became interchangeable. From the greatest joy fall tears and from the depths of suffering radiates a kind of joy; life and art blur joy and pain, illusion and reality.[34]

As a matter of fact, this modern reinterpretation of the relation between illusion and reality was the most typical and lasting achievement Vienna produced at the end of the 19th century. Having established the illusoriness of the real world and the realism of the invented world, this culture demonstrated the *relative nature* of illusion and reality. The illusory nature of reality and the relevance of illusion (or

play) to reality are determined by the socio-historical situation and by the spiritual inner world of man. The originator of this idea was certainly Ernst Mach,[35] from whom it was taken on both by the young rebels and by Einstein.[36] But the parent and tutor of the idea, even in Mach's case, was the Monarchy, the blank future of a declining empire which was "the experimental station for the end of the world" (Kraus) or the "symbol of vacuum" (Broch).[37]

THE WORKSHOP: THE AFFINITY BETWEEN LIFE AND PUBLIC LIFE

Viewing things from Vienna, the impulse and tutor was indeed the Monarchy. The decline of the old world was sensed and expressed in Budapest in a different way. The younger generation in Budapest, a newly-forming generation grouping, was growing up, living and working not in villas but for the most part in the offices of newspapers and periodicals, and in cafés. One is immediately confronted with the question of whether the cultures of the two capital cities can be compared at all. Can a garden be compared with a workshop? Certainly, such a comparison is somewhat problematic as there is little prospect of finding exotic flora amid the constant bustle and vibration of a newspaper office, or in other words of discerning the Viennese themes of experience in Budapest. One might start out from the autonomous works of the Budapest workshop and its own Utopias, but these would be difficult to compare with the aestheticism of Viennese youth, which had lost its Utopias. But one thing such a comparison can reveal is the difference in social bonding and orientation.

Cultural renewal in Budapest was launched by the staff of the periodical *A Hét* (The Week) in 1890. Characteristically, it was originally intended to call the paper *Az ifjú Magyarország* (Young Hungary); apart from editor József Kiss, who was almost 50, those employed there were all in their twenties.[38] *A Hét* bears no trace of *fin-de-siècle* lassitude and melancholy. Fresh, ingenuous and open in all directions, it saw its main

purpose in developing bourgeois taste and freedom, and its main subject in describing social problems and inequalities. *A Hét* had a passionate interest in all that was going on in Hungarian public life and in the public life of the wider world. And it could not have been otherwise. The philosopher Bernát Alexander wrote: "To us literature for many a year signified a great deal more than merely a source of aesthetic pleasure... Our writers only worked for aesthetics with one hand, and with the other they defended the national spirit. To us our literature was not entertainment, it was a creed".[39] This bond could certainly be damaging from the point of view of aesthetic values. So literature had to be artistic in such a way that it remained sensitive to the reality of life and the cause of the public. With such an artistic creed, life and public life became commingled: life was only relevant from the artist's point of view if it was an integral part of public life.

The central theme of the new Hungarian culture was the country's backwardness (which may have been thought more severe than it actually was), its medieval character and its outrageous social injustices. The same sensitivity as existed in journalism appeared in literature and in works of art theory. For example the lonely, isolated painter László Mednyánszky, with his penchant for mysticism, was praised for "revealing the world of pain and the wounds of life, and for teaching us the creed of alleviation".[40]

A young writer disturbed by misery might have been found anywhere, even in Vienna. "Amidst the almost enervating welfare of the happy city, I could not help thinking of the big city's poverty", wrote the young Sándor Bródy. It was also quite normal that a young writer in love should be prepared to face death for his lady or to write an aestheticized piece of "thanatology". But to be inspired by the Muse to write a whole volume on misery must be considered a Pest speciality. "But could one have refrained from writing it when She desired it too?" Bródy said later in his own defence.[41]

The young Pest artists were particularly enthusiastic about the *Sezession*, but perhaps not so much about its means of expression as about the spirit of rebellion emanating from

it. "My secession is the struggle of progress against prudery",[42] wrote Endre Ady, and what the latter accepted in the fashionable philosophy of life was not the irrational *élan vital* but *love of life* and belief in the progress of mankind. "The *Sezession* is not a style; it is freedom, the artist's rebellion against the kind of art that directs him instead of being created by him", wrote one critic about Ödön Lechner, a pioneer of Hungarian *Sezession*, who saw Lechner's greatness in his being a real "hero of freedom who helps pull down barriers and dethrone tyrants".[43]

In this sense the young painters who followed their master, Simon Hollósy, to Nagybánya were the warriors of freedom. Although they were far from the bustle of the capital and public life, they developed a bourgeois style of painting opposed to the traditional noble, national, historic painting and opposed to petrified academicism.[44] In the same sense the foundation of the *Vígszinház* (Comedy Theatre) at the end of the 19th century meant renewal. Unlike the National Theatre which grew more and more hidebound, the *Vígszinház* cast a fresh eye on Europe and popularized Ibsen, Chekhov, German social drama and French society plays, thus creating a real workshop of modern theatre.[45] The *Thalia* company formed ten years later was an avant-garde guerrilla troupe bent on propagating decidedly progressive ideas; its activity symbolized the meeting of the radical intelligentsia and the socialist workers.[46]

The figure of the lonely superfluous man, the kind who was the repository of realistic historical and social drama, was also present in the literature and theatre of Hungary at this time. Tamás Kóbor wrote about one such lonely writer, László Arany, and his disillusioned hero: "In our recent history it is an almost customary tragedy of really outstanding characters" that by rising above the masses they want, with all their hearts, to make the country great, but are doomed by incomprehension and indifference to failure and to death. "Their fate is that of the albatross which has been cast ashore and which tumbles helplessly in the sand to the great amusement of the coast dwellers".[47] No mysticism, mystery plays or episodes of individuals and death agonies were presented on

the Hungarian stage. "Glorious death" was the due of the nation only. The man in the street could not aspire to die his ordinary death before the audience, i.e. the country. "Death is vulgar, smelly and altogether devoid of poetry", wrote Ignotus, an eminent figure among the younger generation.[48]

The new elite of Hungarian culture staged its ideas instead of its way of life, and showed reality in easily comprehensible naturalism. Of course love-death often cropped up in the news columns and *feuilletons* of newspapers, and occasionally in literature as well, but in these cases it was not a secessionist death, but the customary Romantic or sometimes Biedermeier reproduction of it. Dezső Szomory, young writer on *A Hét* wrote a touching drama of love-death, although he was not among the Romantic patriots, and Biedermeier was quite alien to him. The sick husband gets up from his sickbed on his wedding anniversary to buy a present for his beloved wife. This causes his death, and thereby unhinges the loving wife's mind.[49] A *feuilleton* with a promising title, "Fatal Love", causes an even greater disappointment to those seeking traces of the *Sezession:* the death of the mating roebuck is caused by a hunter's gun.[50]

Lyricism, daydreaming and dream can also be identified in the workshop of *A Hét*. A touching short story by Zoltán Ambrus is based on distressing dreams. A young man gets into the power of a lovely but wicked fairy; he is chilled with terror and wants to escape, but cannot. This fairy of his dream often turns up in his real life as a friend or lover, and one might almost think of her as the death symbol of the *Sezession*, except that the opposite turns out to be true at the end of the story. She snatches him from his sweet dream of dying and reminds him of shoddy reality; when he was young, love sought to monopolize him,[51] while in old age and decline into death, love lets him down.

A comparison of the cultures of Vienna and Budapest at the end of the century in fact offers negative parallels. Budapest's culture, as has been seen, was strongly committed artistically and politically, and was imbued with public life. Men of intellect, instead of erecting their own theatre in the

bower, acted out their parts in the forum, and suffered and conventionalized not their own lives but public life. This feature grew still more striking and gained a more political and artistic impetus during the first decade of the 20th century, when the evident experience of the younger generation became more unanimous and conscious. It was backwardness, or to use Ady's metaphor, the Hungarian fallow, that reeked of death and was the graveyard of souls. The feeling of backwardness, humiliation and national peril was as deep as existential loneliness and the Viennese pain at having lost touch with public life. The same pain filled Ady too, but he dropped out in company with a whole nation, "through the merciless, giant riddle, for not having fulfilled the mood of the time".[52]

Ady wrote in an article: "Socially, we live in prehistoric times". Ady's society was "immature, uncultured, superstitious and sick... Only the magnate, the priest and the ass can exist in this country. And those who court their favour"...[53] We are oppressed and backward, we are beggars... Our people will be lost, as Fate wishes to lose them". But fate can easily be labelled: "Class society, class state, gendarme".[54] The leading figure among radical youth, Oszkár Jászi, listed the same reasons: the system of great landed estates, the landlord's rule over the village, the infancy of the towns and of industrialization.

The experience of backwardness and being doomed to destruction arose from the structure of a society interwoven with feudal elements and from the strong awareness of national identity felt by the Hungarian intellectual élite. So the slogan of the latter was not Vienna's "freedom to the arts" but "freedom to the people", and their intention was not to redeem man with the pure arts but to use the arts (as well) to mobilize the people in the struggle for social freedom. In Vienna modern political analysis was a substitute for a subjective, relativist philosophy, while in Budapest this analyis was based on positivist sociology.

Literature and the new drama which was developing were in full accord with the science and journalism of the period. The protagonist of Sándor Bródy's highly effective play *The School-*

mistress undertakes a mission, having come under the spell of social reform. The pretty and educated Flóra leaves the capital for a village school situated in the back of beyond. When she is questioned about her views she proudly tells the petty lords of the village: "I am a socialist... on a basis of feeling. Just as I have composed by own prayer, I have in the same way composed a political creed for myself, separately. Rich people who are honest should not be disturbed. For the poets... palaces should be built. And the notion of homeland is beautiful, no one should do it any harm... My dream: I should like a great big school for all the peasant children. I love peasant children. Have you ever seen an ugly one? Each is more beautiful than the last".[55]

"Magyardom is in the reforms", Ady said at about this time.[56] If anything did, belief in reforms kept this unfortunate "ferry-country" moving between two worlds, two cultures: from Asia to Europe – and back. A few thousand Hungarians ("sacred couriers") have progressed forward, but the masses are not following.[57] The people are held back by tradition, order and helplessness. Where does this helplessness come from? Why can the Hungarian people not come to anchor in Europe? Why do the leaders turn the ferry back towards Asia? Because the magnates, the gentry, the upper classes are afraid Europe, of progress, of the towns, of industry, of schools and of the people's becoming aware. Apart from oppressing the national minorities, Hungarian nationalism will ruin the Hungarians themselves. Let us continue the earlier quotation from Ady: "We are oppressed and backward, we are beggars. But this is not the greatest curse upon us... The people of Gog and Magog were thrust behind iron gates, but at least they could hammer upon them. Our people cannot even do that. Their arms have been cut off, so that they cannot hammer on the gate of Hell and so that they can be rolled into the grave like gangrened cripples".[58]

This tragic state of affairs might lead to disillusion, to secession from the nation, and to assuredly severe identity crises. In the case of many, such secession and crisis did occur. The rebellion among Hungarian intellectuals at this time

was by no means unanimous, and its revolutionary development was neither unbroken nor linear.

ILLUSION AND TRANCE: THE SELF-DECEPTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The picture would be incomplete and distorted if one merely tried to list the members of the creative intelligentsia in workshops and omitted the outsiders, wanderers and homebodies. In the great cultural ferment the secessionist attitude of the individual who had dropped out of the community and public life, who was, in other words, fleeing from empty and fearful reality and from the bitterness of belonging nowhere, also found expression in Budapest. Those who set the fashion did not belong to the assimilated wealthy bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, but were the sensitive members of the declining gentry and petty nobility, who were undergoing the same tribulations of lost identity as were the "free floating" bourgeois intellectuals in the West. Secession from the paling present of the nobility was just as voluntary and conscious as was secession in Vienna from a prosperous bourgeois existence. The remaining strength and the bonds of kinship among gentry families reduced to tending smallholdings or working in offices would have allowed a promising young scion to be squeezed into a post in the country or state administration. But the youngsters marched, on their own initiative, into the offices of newspapers, from there to the cafés and theatres, and then to the arts, to a self-created world of dreams.

Here we shall introduce two marked personalities, two real artists among these secessionist figures: the writer Gyula Krudy, and the painter Lajos Gulácsy. Both came from gentry families, and neither of them inherited wealth or rank, only traditions, indulgences and gestures. Krudy's career had a customary beginning, in the offices of provincial and then Budapest newspapers, in other words in the workshop. Neither night revelry and sprees nor the literary attempts at short-story writing after the manner of Mikszáth attracted any attention

in his Bohemian surroundings. However, it soon became clear that Krudy was connected to his old community only by gestures and to his new friends by debts at cards, that he would join neither the radical reformers nor the guardians of tradition – that he did not belong to the present. Krudy's real self lived outside society; like his dreamy, voluptuous heroes, he lived in a dream world transplanted into the past, or more precisely, into illusions.[59]

Krudy transplanted *Sinbad* from the world of fairy tales onto Hungarian soil. He made this sailor of the seven seas "wander the dead waters of the past" in this small country which has no sea, in small towns floating in the night, among lovely women craving for love, in friendly pubs and inns and among scented memories.[60] For him, the present was just a background, a surface that gradually reveals the ever more attractive and realistic layers of past sunk deep. This dreamy existence needs no explanation since it is the natural form of life, whereas wakefulness needs freeing from the countless troubles of neurosis. This is not an exact Hungarian copy of the Viennese play of illusion and reality. In Krudy's works *vision* and trance are opposed to everyday *sight*, to external sensation; self-love turns inwards to loneliness in the outside world, and there is only a thin strand of self-irony connecting them.

Such heroes, wandering outside society, could only be created by someone whose own social status could not be elucidated, somebody "who is in a constant state of floating between being a clerk paid by the day and being God", as Ady put it.[61] In this accomplished marginality there is neither present nor future, and since there is no meaningful future, the experience of life that lies behind the work is not of the backward but of the transitory. So Krudy battled with dreamless death instead of the Hungarian fallow.[62] Yet the two were interrelated somewhere, very deeply, in a way imperceptible to common sense. This was felt at the time of great insults and great inebriations, and became clear in the revolutionary autumn of 1918.

On the intellectual scene at the beginning of the century, the spiritual counterpart to Krudy was Lajos Gulácsy, who around 1900 introduced the influence of the pre-Raphaelites into

the country. D.G. Rosetti (who died in 1882, the same year that Gulácsy was born), the stylistic elements and characteristic themes of the Western European *Sezession*, the garden, solitude, escapism, aestheticized eroticism, fine drawing and mysticism – none had antecedents and none caused any particular sensation. Although sharp-eyed art experts harkened to the new phenomenon and praised Gulácsy's lyricism, his "sacred lassitude" and his "languid colours of autumn", they related him to symbolism.[63] In fact only a few understood him, and he was rejected even by the majority of painters.

Like Krudy, Gulácsy belonged nowhere, not even to any workshop. He did not frequent public houses either; nor he did stay up until dawn or behave like the Sinbad of the small Hungarian towns. In reality he, too, was a wanderer, a lover of faraway Italian and French lands, and of past, though still living, ages. It was to the contemporary *Sezession* that this painter in search of himself stood closest. He wished himself out of the alien present and irrational distresses and interrogations into non-existent loves, Dante's Italy, *quattrocento* Florence, the garden of the magician, where sad, languid, sensual lovers met and might be found. Love of beauty, sensuality, and the imbuing of life with art are indeed secessionist feelings and ideas.[64] His symbols, like the modest and moderate decorativeness of his paintings, are simple and transparent. There is no murderous love or erotic death in them, and dream is not a transition between existence and non-existence or between conscious and unconscious, but a quiet daydreaming, sometimes a *visionary state* in which imagination is free to create, dissolve and then reconstitute time. He was right in believing that a world of illusions created by imagination knows no interests, that "lovely sacred lies are great noble dreams that mark the value of reality and of life..."[65]

If "sacred lies" are accepted as the noblest dreams and have the value of reality, they are obviously no different in quality from the unconscious dream that shuts out wakefulness, and no different from poetic fiction. What one encounters here is special aptitude of mind, free ramblings of vivid imagination which are able to grasp non-existent, inconceivable, in-

visible, i.e. *imaginary*, substances, and to express them in pictures or perhaps in formulae. This is no arbitrary interpretation of Gulácsy's work (which suggests just such an interpretation), his paintings depicting imaginary beings and places, and the realm of his self-created Utopia, *Naconxypan*. It was he who thought the reality value of illusion to be that strong. Deeply submerged in the spell of female sensuality, he wrote that this sensation was worth more than life. "This is not Impression. You have never seen it – as she never existed. You have not dreamt it – because it is not imagination. You cannot carve it into marble – as it is assembled from disembodied, bodily desires: yet you still bethink to hear every throb of its heart. Its lips are hot as fire".[66]

Gulácsy's is an important perception characteristic of the age, or perhaps just a presentiment from which the artistic and scientific view of substance leads in two directions: towards a new psychoanalytical anthropology, and towards an abstraction that penetrates the structure of material. The first interprets the phenomena created by imagination as psychological realities, while the other searches for order and structure under the changing, contingent surface, and provides the basis for Cubism, Constructivism and today's physical view of the world. Gulácsy belongs among the creators of an imaginary world, and this may explain why he adopted secessionist elements and stuck to them all along. But at the same time, he could easily identify himself with the world of Baroque and Rococo, and his late paintings show Surrealistic elements as well. This again may explain how his similar view of substance, or perhaps his confessed identification with Hungarian progressive trends, led him to form a community with the activist group during the war.

I do not think that a painter's whole work could be (or should be) explained on the basis of a single organizing principle. Let it suffice to say that Gulácsy's work is mainly and most lastingly characterized by this visionary depiction of reality – a little lyrical, a little grotesque.[67] The majority of his figures are imaginary, but they are nonetheless of our reality: clowns, fools, or fools dressed in clown's clothes, Rococoesque old women, figures which have dropped out of time

and life; crippled, distorted, lunatic figures, eccentrics, all of them daydreamers, like Hofmannsthal's pensive girls who understood death so easily.

To illustrate all this with a simple painting, let me choose the *The Dream of the Opium Addict*, a panel painting done during the First World War. In the upper part there are the heads of a clown and of a Negress, blowing bubbles; in the middle there is an attractive young woman, a Rococo figure who leans back in an armchair, while her feet which have turned into fins, stretch into a lake full of seaweed and water lilies. In the painting every small detail – the heads, flowers and jewels – are realistic, but the whole is fantastic – maybe it really is an opium vision. What holds it together, its *atmosphere*, is so evocative that one can sense it and maybe even comprehend it.

Life and art were in harmony in Gulácsy's case: he too was an eccentric, a fantast whose mind became deranged at an early age. All through his career he consciously identified with modern trends in painting and with the progressive team of radical reformers. To Krudy and Gulácsy one can add another painter of illusions, Tivadar Csontváry,[68] and another writer, little known both in his own time and afterwards: Géza Csáth. In Csáth's short stories and diaries and in his few plays, there appeared a Viennese type of death-aesthetics and death-eroticism. Csáth remembered the garden, that magician's garden full of strange, imaginary flowers, replete with secrets and tales. He knows of the death of the magician who smoked so much opium that not even the most devoted and most sensual love could help him. Csáth himself was a morphine addict.[69] He was well acquainted with the euphoria and pain of the drug and of loneliness. Csontváry and Gulácsy died in lunatic asylums, while Csáth, having killed his wife, committed suicide.

Ady also died young, at 40. His death was caused by a syphilis, and maybe by the dissolution of his evolutionary Utopia. His belief in progress had occasionally diminished earlier on, too. In the summer of 1903, amidst the greatest battles, he was filled all of a sudden with a vehement disgust that urged him to flee from public life. "My whole self is an

almost morbidly fierce and feverish desire for Paris and to flee from the dirt of this country", he wrote to a friend of his.[70] "I have completed the first great phase. I was the knight of the holy spirit, an honest journalist".[71] He had three ways of escaping: by wandering, through love and by turning to the soul: art. In the autumn of 1903 these all opened up for him together in Paris in his ecstatic love for Léda. He was filled with characteristically secessionist feeling and with rapture for French symbolism. The result was that he grew into a great poet.

He cried when he had to take the train home from Paris at the beginning of 1905. "...I was filled with disgust, anger and bitterness when I arrived in this impossible, rotten city".[72] Even a year later he felt as though he were drowning, in spite of the great political whirl and the battles of championship he was involved in. "I don't even want to die in this country"; he felt like fleeing again.[73] A few days later he wrote the introductory poem to his famous volume: "I am the son of Gog and Magog... pour hot lead in my ears... Trample on me roughly, like a villain. But till then weeping, in pain, awaiting naught, Yet after all the song flies on new wings... After all it is triumphant, after all new and Hungarian".[74]

What was the reason for this helpless resignation at not being able to escape? And of the disillusionment and depression which cropped up again in 1909 and 1913? Was it really helplessness, or was it indissoluble bondage?

THE BUDAPEST AVANT-GARDE: A SYNTHESIS OF HUNGARY AND MANKIND

During this analysis I have disregarded chronology in favor of tracing the logic of thought, and by jumping over an important division between periods, I have probably exposed myself to reproach. The last 25 years before the First World War were divided, both in politics and cultural history, by a pronounced caesura: the crisis of 1905-6. This division was no fortuitous one. In the middle of the first decade of this cen-

tury, new signs and phenomena (the first revolution in Russia and the huge consequent upswing of social movements in Europe, the establishment of the Entente bloc and the growing pace of direct preparation for war) showed that the times were getting out of joint. In a few years new trends had also appeared in the arts: Picasso, Braque, Leger and Cubism, the German *Die Brücke* circle, and Kandinsky's *Der Blaue Reiter* group. With Marinetti's manifesto came Italian Futurism, and somewhat later there arrived Russian Constructivism. In literature the change of period was indicated by the works of Apollinaire, Proust and Gide, for instance.

In Hungary the change of periods was marked by Ady's volume *New Poems* (1905), the publication of Bartók's and Kodály's first folksong collection (1906), the appearance of the literary periodical *Nyugat* (West - 1908) and the foundation of a group of painters called the "Eights" (1908). But the break was not a clean one and the change of steps was continuous. These men were the representatives of various arts and forms of expression, and their creative intellects differed greatly even within one and the same group. What joined them, apart from the fact that they were all against the petrified rule of the upper classes and the fact that they advocated Hungarian progress? Was there any deeper social and artistic community that bound them together?

There was a social tie, in that they all, despite coming from different directions, either dropped out or abandoned their original community or class, to become members of a new, slowly-developing intelligentsia, a leaven of a new middle class. Well before 1905 they began to realize two things: that they did not belong to the nation of the nobility, and that one reason for their alienation was the national hegemony of the leading stratum of magnates and gentry. At the same time they sensed, with growing distress, that in the most recent decades the traditional national ideal and social progress had become separated and opposed to one another. Ady criticized the members of his class as early as the beginning of the century for their rejection of social reform, while castigating the socialists for belittling and methodically weakening na-

tional feeling. In 1904 Jászi entertained the idea of forming a patriotic socialist party.[75]

The young intelligentsia solved their identity problems through the radicalization processes of belonging to the national community (and not through withdrawing from it) and of identity awareness, and through the creation of a new national ideal. This new ideal was decidedly anti-feudal, self-examining and critical, and it was based on the people. Elaboration of it had been started, as István Király put it, "with the revolutionary's view of the landscape"; what Ady and his associates saw in this backward country was not a flowery meadow nor a fairy garden, but villages sunk in mud, quagmire and marshland, greyness, and "Hunnia's dunghill". The historical view of the nobility – praise of the conquering leaders of old and their descendents who formed the national backbone of the country – could not be the basis for the new national ideal. Ady erected – by contrast to the blood contract of the leaders, Pusztaszer and the rule of lucky foreign *Ritter* – the serfs, the wandering students, and, at an early date with increasing decidedness, György Dózsa, Dózsa's people, the Hungarian Jacobins, and Petőfi and Táncsics.[76] Around 1910 it was an excellent idea to discover the metres of 18th century Kuruts poetry to accompany the newly relived Kuruts fate. The figure of the Kuruts who rose up in arms "for the country and freedom", and who was often betrayed and forced into hiding, was the popular antithesis of the empty patriotism and feigned Kuruts feelings of the magnate and gentry leaders.[77] Much more than political or historical oppositionism was involved. Ady went back to the 16th and 17th centuries for metrical forms, language, rhythm and images that had been submerged by the language reform and the journalese of the late 19th century.

"In my grave penury / In no Lord God in Vienna, / No Christ in Pozsony / No Holy Ghost in Torda / Could I truly believe, / In this orphaned country / The gods have been evil / For centuries long... / There is nothing more here / And Budapest even forbids / Going to rack and ruin, / Torda, Pozsony, Vienna / And every assembly, / No wind-blown god / Or tamer

replica / Can extend me a hand... / There is no room for the Kuruts / And woe to him who remains".

The poem *The Last Kuruts*, written in September 1910, was followed by still bitterer ones during the war, but by then the language and the form were ready: it was the Biblical, archaic language of the Protestant preacher, of the complaints of the Kuruts warriors. Language, image and awareness of life, i.e. the fear of losing the way, expressed Ady's identification with the people of Hungary.

The motive for seeking identity in music came from the same source as Ady's. Bartók and Kodály set out to search for the ancient source by turning away from popular Gypsy music, the songs born on the stage and in cafés, and by running counter to the musical tastes of a gentry given to tearful merry-making. They discovered in Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian villages a layer older than "sham-Hungarian" singing and *verbunkos* which had become assimilated into Romanticism. They discovered the pentatonic music brought from the East, the real folk rhythms, melodies and stock of songs.[78] The folksong arrangements of Bartók, Kodály and Leó Weiner, and the piano études of Bartók, were (like József Huszka's collection of ornamental folk motifs,[79] the architectural designs of Ödön Lechner and Lechner's students, Béla Lajta's application of decorative folk elements,[80] and the use of the structural and decorative elements of the Székely peasant house in modern architecture) the creative elements and propagators of a new national ideal.[81]

The radical intellectual elite at the beginning of the century corrected the course along which Hungarian national awareness was developing. Unlike the national development of the French and some neighbouring peoples, where the "third estate", the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, declared themselves to be the nation and swept away, eliminated or assimilated the nobility, here the borders of the nobility's *natio Hungarica* had been extended to admit the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. This admission, however positive a step it might have been in 1848, had serious effects on awareness in the subsequent phase of bourgeois development. So the intellectual avant-garde at-

tempted to bring Hungarian national awareness closer to a more clearly bourgeois model.

The assimilation of the archaic and still extant folk culture, the "pure source" which had been discovered, was only one branch of a cultural synthesis which could even have led to a romantic idealization of the people. The other branch, the other cultural historical deed in this synthesis, complemented and counterbalanced the first: it expressed folk traditions in the language of the 20th century *Sezession*, Symbolism and avant-garde that sought the forms concealed under the surface and in the modern language of music that dissolved tonality. One can here refer to the literary modernism of *Nyugat* and the group of the "Eights", who declared themselves advocates of nature, but who refused to look at it in the manner of the old schools, and instead of copying nature filled it with meaning. Their paintings were inspired by the European avant-garde and were composed in a Constructivist way. Or, in the field of music (to mention the most widely known example) Bartók's significance lies not in his use of folk motifs and rhythms in *Allegro barbaro* or *Bluebeard's Castle* but in the basic reformation of the harmony and tonality of the music of late Romanticism.[82] Bartók, Ady and their associates in the arts dissolved the dilemma of Hungarian provincialism and European foreignness. The new popular national ideal was East-Central European, at one and the same time Danubian and European.

This new Hungarian identity was born by keeping its own best essentials and by assimilating European influences. It accepted and understood the age, and foresaw with growing distress the barbarity that threatened the Hungarian people and all mankind.

THE AUSTRIAN AVANT-GARDE: THE FULLNESS OF ABSURDITY

Not for long did the Viennese garden provide security for those who sought solitude. To use the apt phrase of Carl Schorske, the garden "exploded". This metaphor was suggested by a childhood freak of Oscar Kokoschka: having been thrown

out of an illustrious garden, he actually caused an explosion in it.[83] The artistic explosion took place a good ten years later, when Kokoschka at the 1908 *Kunstschau*, Schoenberg in music, Loos in architecture and Musil in literature broke out of the garden of the *Sezession*.

The Austrian avant-garde that appeared in the first decade of this century very decidedly rejected the Narcissistic cult of beauty. The majority of the younger generation had been born in the 1880s and grew up amidst repeated crises. For them what Hofmannsthal and his friends had learned by serious shock and bewilderment was evident: that "everything fell to pieces, and the pieces split into pieces again, and nothing wanted to stay behind a notion", and that the chance of meaningful communication had been lost. It is true that the masters of the *Sezession* did not dig themselves into the garden, as is shown by the words just quoted from Hofmannsthal's so called *Chandos Brief*.[84] When their own insecure existence and indisposition came to take social effect and met with the growing obscurity of the Monarchy, the members of *Jung Wien*, having reached manhood, also took notice of the symptoms of decay. The change is probably marked by Hofmannsthal's play *Venice Preserved* (1905) and by Schnitzler's novel, *The Way into the Open* (1907). It became clear that it was not the arts that had imbued life, but that life had broken in upon the arts.

The avant-garde generation sensed more deeply than the previous generation the disintegration of the old unity, notions, institutions and scale of values, and the mutual relativity of illusion and reality, the existing and the possible, i.e. the absurdity of the world. It was distinguishable from the garden culture of the *fin-de-siècle* through other differences as well. The distressing and threatening danger for the avant-garde at the beginning of the century was not the rebellion of the nationalist or socialist masses, for in the course of time these movements also grew into institutions and became parts of the establishment. The distressing feeling of defencelessness was caused by the establishment itself, that mysterious and ineffable power.

Another major difference was that for this generation the scene of illusion and reality was not the theatre but the village, the town, and the imaginary Mansion that ruled over all, the imaginary court that administered justice to the autonomous individual, and most of all the *prison*, even if it took the shape of a school, a barracks or a bourgeois home. It seemed as if he was going home, said Kafka to his young friend Janouch, but he only hid in the prison established for him. This was the more difficult to bear since it resembled an ordinary bourgeois apartment, and for that very reason it was impossible to break out of. "Everything sails under false colours, there is not a single word to cover reality".[85] Instead of voluntary solitude, the determining experience of avant-garde literature and arts was confinement – claustrophobia. That is why breaking out, escaping and fleeing were so often depicted.

Closely related to that experience is the different interpretation of aesthetics. The Austrian avant-garde rejected the *Sezession's* concept of beauty, and its Expressionist aesthetics identified the task of the arts in the projection of spiritual reality, desires, fears and pains. So death-aesthetics faded, but the motif of the link between death and eroticism became stronger and gained tones of brutality and aggression. The decorative beauty of the garden was replaced by aestheticized sorrow, distortion, mythicized perversion, and accomplished absurdity.[86]

The identity crisis, the loss of self and the lack of home became complete in this absurd world, as is shown by Schiele's and Kokoschka's paintings and by the music of Schoenberg and his followers. The distressing experience of the young Törleß, Musil's hero, was that in viewing objects, people and himself, the sensation of ultimate incomprehensibility was coupled with a feeling of some faint kinship. If occasionally something seemed to be understandable, he was not able to express it fully in words; in thoughts between his own self and the outside world, and even more between his own feelings and his most ininner self, "there was an indelible dividing line".[87] The incomprehensibility of the outside world grew inside him into horror when he discovered the theft by one of his companions,

the effeminate Basini, and he himself became, almost unintentionally, an accessory to the sadistic torments in the "dark chamber". If all these underworld plays were possible, *"then everything is possible"*. It is also possible that "all of a sudden one steps over from the bright daytime world known as the only world to another world, a stuffy, wild, passionate, naked and annihilating world". And not only can the threshold between the ordinary, transparent daytime world and the bloody, dirty, dark world loud with debauchery be stepped over, the two worlds are so near to each other that "we can cross their invisible dividing at any minute".[88] Finally, Karl Kraus arrived at the same conclusion: In the empire of Francis Joseph the demons of mediocrity gained the upper hand and produced a regular frontier traffic between the ordinary, rational constitutional state and the world of loose, bloody and aggressive passions. The last day of the Monarchy, symbolic of mankind, had to come.

The First World War, which was thought to be an absurd impossibility by the greater part of the Budapest intelligentsia right up until that fateful summer night at the end of July,1914 proved to the clearsighted that in their age absurdity could easily become reality. Again Ady was among the first to recognize this and he went the furthest in his recognition. He knew right from the start that it was the war of the Prussian Junkers, the Habsburgs and of Hungarian upper-class roguery.[89] "I'm very, very much afraid", he wrote to Jászi soon after the outbreak of the war, "that I won't bear for long what must be borne... The ingenuity of horror is endless; man is more disgusting and more hopelessly pitiable than anyone could ever have imagined".[90] He doubted whether there would be a place left for him or the Hungarians in the future.

"For me, pal, it's all the same / If we're eaten by a wolf or by the Devil, / But we shall be eaten. / A bear eats us, it's all the same, / The sad, age-old thing is: / It's a matter of chance who eats us".[91]

The final word, which is similar to Kraus's, is even more painful because of its quiet tone; it tells of the destruction of the Hungarians and of mankind, the only consolation being that "it is very good now for it cannot be worse" and the sub-

mission is: "The Devil will lead us". "If there had been need of man or Magyar / There would have been one to wish it otherwise. / If it wasn't wished, then it wasn't wished. / Come, pal, the sentry's called".[92] What was left of his old revolutionary beliefs was preservation, not even in the form of belief but only as a defensive reflex: to stay as seed under the snow, a seed in which mankind and Hungarians superfluous in the world of absurdity might potentially live on.

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The self-awareness, ties, themes and forms of the intellectual life in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna and Budapest differed substantially. The intellectual peaks of Vienna and Budapest in decay approached one another and almost met. Behind them was a magnificent golden age lasting a quarter of a century. I have tried to analyse several characteristic and abiding features, novelties and representatives of that golden age. Description, even if it attempts interpretation, does not equal explanation. I have not given a full and comprehensive answer to the question I posed in the introduction: What caused that unprecedented cultural blossoming in Central Europe? And now, by way of conclusion, I shall say only that I should like to avoid the temptation of arriving at a quick and easy answer.

NOTES

1 These opinions are developed in István Király, *Ady Endre* (Bp., 1970), vol. I, p. 471; László Mátrai, *Alapját vesztett felépitmény* (Superstructure without foundation), (Bp. 1976).

2 Hermann Bahr, *Austriaca* (Berlin, 1911), p. 33.

3 Stefan Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern. Erinnerungen eines Europäers* (Stockholm, 1942).

4 E. Carl Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna. Politics and Culture* (New York, 1980), xxvi-xxvii, xxix, pp. 8-10.

5 Josef Redlich, *Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem* (Leipzig, 1920), vol. I/1, pp. 38-55; Péter Hanák, "Österreichischer Staatspatriotismus im Zeitalter des aufsteigenden Nationalismus". In: *Wien und Europa zwischen den Revolutionen (1789-1848)*, Wiener Europagespräch, 15 (Vienna-Munich, 1978) pp. 318-320.

6 Peter Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen in Österreich". In: *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918*, ed. by Adam Wandrushka and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. III/1 (Vienna, 1980) pp. 47-56, 71-73, 124-153; L. Marsha Rosenblit: *The Jews of Vienna 1867-1914. Assimilation and Identity* (Albany, N.Y., 1983) pp. 13-45, 127-146. Ernst Bruckmüller, *Sozialgeschichte Österreichs* (Vienna-Munich, 1985) pp. 319-321, 329-333, 395-398.

7 See the text of the Act in: Edmund Bernatzik, *Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze* (Vienna, 1911), pp. 422-427. Gerald Stourzh, "Die Gleichberechtigung der Volksstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848-1918". In: Die Habsburgermonarchie, *op. cit.*, vol. III/2 1011 ff; Stourzh, "Die österreichische Verfassung von 1867". In: *Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur* (Vienna, 1968); p. 12; Éva Somogyi, *A birodalmi centralizációtól a dualizmusig. Az osztrák-német liberálisok útja a kiegyezéshez* (From imperial centralization to Dualism. The road of the Austro-German liberals to the Compromise of 1867) (Bp., 1976) pp. 213-214.

8 *Grillparzers Gespräche und die Charakteristiken seiner Persönlichkeit durch die Zeitgenossen*, ed. by August Sauer, vol. XV (Vienna, 1911), p. 110.

9 *Grillparzers politisches Vermächtnis*, ed. Hugo Hofmannsthal (Leipzig, 1917), p. 48.

10 Péter Hanák, "Schein und Wirklichkeit in der Monarchie der Jahrhundertwende". In: *Ungarn in der Donaumonarchie* (Vienna-Munich-Bp., 1984), pp. 449-451.

11 *Das wilhelminische Bildungsbürgertum. Zur Sozialgeschichte seiner Ideen*, ed. Klaus Vondung (Göttingen, 1976), pp. 29-31.

12 Friedrich Heer, *Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität* (Vienna-Cologne-Graz, 1981), pp. 262-280.
Let me recall a few sentences from Hermann Bahr on this point. "It comes to pass that the middle class fails to succeed in incorporating its own intellectuals into the middle class order, and in its midst the number of the disillusioned.... increases. Of these disillusioned and dream-drunk members of the middle class, some go into the proletariat which sets about destroying the middle class world in order to replace it with a human one. Others of these disillusioned or dream-drunk ones... see in art that life of the whole man denied them in the reductions of the middle class world order". Quoted by J. William Mc Grath, *Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in Austria* (New Haven - London, 1974), p. 85. On the opinion of H. Freiedjung *ibid.* pp. 206-207. Schorske, *op. cit.* xxv-xxviii, pp. 8-10 and

E. Carl Schorske, Generational Tension and Cultural Change: Reflections on the Case of Vienna, *Daedalus*, Fall 1978, pp. 114-116.

13 Zoltán Horváth, *A magyar századforduló* (The turn of the century in Hungary) (Bp., 1961) pp. 114-118; *Ignotus válogatott írásai* (Selected papers of Ignotus), ed. by Aladár Komlós, (Bp., 1969) pp. 11-12, 615-621.

14 The poems of Hofmannsthal are quoted from *H. v. Hofmannsthal Gedichte und lyrische Dramen*, Collected Works, ed. by Herbert Steiner (Fischer: Hamburg, 1952) (Further: *Gedichte*).

15 Rainer Maria Rilke, *Das Stunden-Buch* (Insel paperback: Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 92-93, 99.

16 Leopold Andrian-Werburg, *Der Garten der Erkenntnis* (Vienna, 1985). Quoted by Schorske *op. cit.* pp. 306-311.

17 Hermann Broch, *Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit. Eine Studie*, Nachwort v. Hannah Arendt (Munich, 1964). Quoted also by Werner Volke, *Hugo von Hofmannsthal* (Rowohlt paperback: Hamburg, 1969), p. 175.

18 Hofmannsthal, *Gedichte*. Prolog, pp. 45-46.

19 Arthur Schnitzler, *Der grüne Kakadu. Gesammelte Werke in Einzelausgaben. Das dramatische Werk*, vol. 3 (Fischer paperback: Frankfurt 1978), p. 33.

20 Hofmannsthal, *Gedichte*, *Terzinen*, p. 18.

21 "Wenn mein Traum in Vergleiche zu seinem latenten Inhalt in diesem Punkte entstellt, und zwar im Gegensätzlichen entstellt ist, so dient die im Traume manifeste Zärtlichkeit dieser Entstellung oder, mit anderen Worten, die Entstellung erweist sich hier als absichtlich, als ein Mittel der Verstellung". Sigmund Freud, *Traumdeutung* (Leipzig-Vienna, 1911) p. 103.

22 Schorske, *op. cit.* pp. 140-141.

23 Hofmannsthal, *Gedichte*, p. 219.

24 *Ibid.* pp. 17-18.

25 András Batta, *Richard Strauss* (Bp., 1981) pp. 159-165.

26 Schnitzler, *Gesammelte Werke. Das dramatische Werk* (Fischer: Frankfurt), vol. 6, pp. 145 ff.

27 Hofmannsthal, *Gedichte*, *Großmutter und Enkel*, pp. 33-34.

28 *Kulturprofil der Jahrhundertwende. Essays von Hermann Bahr*, ed. by Heinz Kindermann (Vienna, 1962), "Überwindung des Naturalismus", p. 153.

29 *Ver Sacrum.* No. 1. 1898 ("Why do we publish the review?").

30 Harry Zohn, *Karl Kraus* (New York, 1971) p. 125.

31 *Ibid.* p. 125.

32 William Johnston, *The Austrian Mind. An Intellectual and Social History 1848-1938* (Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, 1972) pp. 202-206, 212, 216, 223, 316, 402.

33 Gerhart Baumann, *Franz Grillparzer* (Freiburg - Vienna, 1954), p. 169.

34 *Kulturprofil der Jahrhundertwende. Essays von H. Bahr, op. cit.* "Klimt", pp. 289-290.

35 Kristóf Nyíri, *A Monarchia szellemi életéről* (On the intellectual life of the Monarchy) (Bp., 1980).

36 Albert Einstein, "On the Theory of Relativity. A Speech in London", *Selected Essays* ed. by Róbert Tőrös (in Hungarian), (Bp., 1971) pp. 241-242, 275; P.A. Schlipp, *Albert Einstein: Philosopher - Scientist* (New York, 1949), "Autobiographical Notes".

37 Karl Kraus, *Untergang der Welt durch schwarze Magie* (Vienna - Leipzig, 1922) p. 418. Hermann Broch, *Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit, op. cit.*

38 *A Hét* (The week). *A Political and Literary Review. Selected Articles 1890-1899* ed. by Anna Tábori and Ágota Steinert (Bp. 1978), p. 5. (Further: *A Hét*).

39 Bernát Alexander, "Irodalmi bajok" (Literary problems). In: *A Hét*, vol. 1, p. 22.

40 Zsigmond Justh, *Báró Mednyánszky Lászlóról, ibid.*, p. 56.

41 Sándor Bródy, *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

42 Endre Ady, "Sezessio". In: *Ady Endre összes prózai művei* (Endre Ady's collected prose works, further EACPW), vol. 1 (Bp., 1955), pp. 119-120.

43 "Lechner Ödön" (Ödön Lechner). In: *A Hét, op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 498-499.

44 *Magyar Művészet 1890-1919* (Hungarian fine art 1890-1919) ed. by Lajos Németh, vol. I, (Bp., 1981), pp. 262-266.

45 Bálint Magyar *A Vígszínház története. Alapitásától az államositásig. 1896-1949* (A history of the Comedy Theater. From its foundation to nationalization, 1896-1949), (Bp., 1979).

46 Ferenc Katona - Tibor Dénes, *A Thália története* (A history of the Thalia Theater), (Bp., 1954) p. 175.

47 Tamás Kóbor, *A délibábok hőse* (The hero of the mirage). In: *A Hét*, vol. 1, p. 391.

48 Ignotus, *Bródy Sándor* (Sándor Bródy). In: *Ignotus válogatott írásai* (Selected works of Ignotus) (Bp., 1969) p. 348.

49 Dezső Szomory, *Séta a temetőben* (A walk in the cemetery). In: *A Hét*, vol. 1, pp. 110-113.

50 István Bársony, *Halálos szerelem* (Fatal love). *Ibid.*, pp. 380-382.

51 Zoltán Ambrus, *Pókháló kisasszony* (Miss Cobweb). *Ibid.*, pp. 393-399.

52 "Az Idő rostájában" (In the riddle of time). In: *Ady Endre összes versei* (Collected Poems of Endre Ady), (Bp. 1969).

53 Endre Ady, *Societas lenonina*. In: EACPW, vol. III, (Bp. 1964), pp. 192-193.

54 Ady, "Bilek". *Ibid.*, vol. IV (Bp., 1964), pp. 132-133.

55 *Bródy Sándor Válogatott drámái. A tanitónő* (Selected plays of Sándor Bródy. The schoolmistress), (Bp., 1908).

56 Ady, *Az Ige veszedelme* (The danger for the word). In: EACPW (Bp., 1968), vol. VII, p. 31.

57 Ady, *Ismeretlen Korvin-kódex margójára* (To the margin of the unknown Corvin codex), *ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

58 See note 54.

59 *Krudy világa* (The world of Krudy), ed. by Áron Tóbiás (Bp., 1964). "A műhelyből" (From the workshop), p. 114.

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61 Ady, *Krudy Gyula könyve* (The book of Gyula Krudy). In EACPW, vol. XI (Bp., 1982), p. 34.

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VIENNA AND BUDAPEST AROUND 1900: THE PROBLEM OF JEWISH INFLUENCE

1

For a century and more there has been active discussion of the Jewish impact on the Habsburg Empire, or "Jewish influence" as it has been called. One is struck, however, by how little has been defined. We have passed through the stage where Jews were found everywhere, and blamed for everything; and the stage where the Jews were not mentioned at all. We are now at a stage, as it were, of numbers, where elaborate statistics and long lists of names purport to define the Jewish impact.[1] This approach has considerable promise; it is a vast improvement on past methods. But it stops at defining parameters: it tells us in great detail where in society Jews were to be found, but eschews the suggestion of just what their alleged influence was, much less how it was wielded and what was Jewish about it.

This essay compares and contrasts two closely related Jewish communities in the Habsburg lands, that of Vienna and that of Budapest. It begins with structural considerations: with the profiles of the two big cities themselves, with Jewish demography, and with the organization of the two Jewish communities. Then it attempts to associate these basic forms with conspicuous developments in the public life of the Monarchy, thus suggesting what consequences the Jewish presence may actually have had.

Let us start by examining two graphs that reflect the demographic material. They tell first that Vienna was throughout the 19th century a much larger city than Budapest, but that nevertheless, as cities, the two grew in tandem. At the beginning of the 19th century, Vienna had about 231,000 inhabitants, and was the largest urban center in the German-speaking lands, about the fifth largest in Europe, and was certainly one of Europe's fastest-growing towns.[2] By mid-century the city had nearly half a million inhabitants, and was overflowing its old limits. By 1869 there were about 607,514 people living inside today's Gürtel; by 1890 (with new suburbs incorporated) the city had 1,364,548 residents and by 1910 2,031,498 – a 334 per cent increase in forty years. Turning now to Budapest, we observe first, of course, that in 1800 the city did not exist as such: it was then foreshadowed by the three separate smallish towns of Pest, Buda and Óbuda, with a combined population of perhaps 48,000, a fifth the number of people living in Vienna.[3] By mid-century the combined population of Pest, Buda and Óbuda had gone up to about 156,000, about a third of the mid-century population of Vienna. Then in the second half of the 19th century Budapest, like Vienna, grew enormously fast – faster, in fact, than the Austrian capital. Unified in 1873, the city swelled from 270,000 people in 1869 to 491,938 in 1890, and to 1,029,246 in 1910. In forty years it had grown from one-third of the size to over one half of the size of the mushrooming Austrian metropolis (and the figures do not include outer suburbs, which are included in the Vienna statistics).

The relatively tandem general population growth of the two cities was matched by the irregular growth of their Jewish populations. At the beginning of the century, the number of Jews living in Vienna was, relatively speaking, tiny – standing officially at 310 individuals – and this state of affairs continued until after mid-century.[4] The explanation, of course, was legislation. The Habsburgs had expelled all Jews from Vienna in 1670, and over the years had readmitted only small numbers of wealthy men and their household members. Not until after

1848 could Jews live legally in Vienna without purchasing an expensive "tolerance". (One must note that the official statistics give no intimation of exactly how many Jews were actually in Vienna, especially in the 1830s and 1840s. One eyewitness claims that in the years before 1848 some 8,000-10,000 Jews were illegally "commuting" to Vienna from Pressburg and from the Burgenland, which was then just over the Hungarian frontier.[5] Even so, Vienna's Jewish population was until mid-century very small compared to that of the city generally.) After mid-century Vienna's Jewish population increased very much faster than the city's overall population but, after 1890, grew at about the same pace. In twelve years between 1857 and 1869, the official growth rate of Vienna's Jewish community (which must be taken with a grain of salt) was about 600 per cent and in the 21 years between 1869 and 1890 the increase (now statistically more reliable) was about 300 per cent. In the 30 years between 1890 and 1920 it was 50 per cent.

The development of Budapest Jewry began from a higher level. In 1800 the three towns which would eventually comprise Budapest already held a Jewish population of some 1,700, almost six times the number of Jews officially tolerated in Vienna.[6] By mid-century this Jewish population had soared to about 17,000 — a 900 per cent increase in half a century. This growth of Budapest Jewry of course reflected the extraordinary growth of Hungarian Jewry as a whole. Because of immigration primarily from the Bohemian Crown Lands, and secondly from Galicia, Hungary's total Jewish population quadrupled during the first half of the 19th century, from about 80,000 to about 366,000.[7] It is almost surprising, given this fact, that even larger numbers of Jews did not settle in Pest-Buda.

After mid-century Budapest's Jewish population mushroomed just as the city itself did, more than doubling (from 44,890 to 103,317) in the twenty-one years between 1869 and 1890, and then almost doubling again to 203,687 in the twenty years between 1890 and 1910. This growth boosted the Jewish proportion of Budapest's population from 16.1 per cent of the total in 1869 to 23.1 per cent in 1910. In Vienna the size of the Jewish population rose from only 6.6 per cent to 8.6 per cent of the

city's total. But as may be seen on the graphs, despite the great head start achieved early in the century, from about 1870 until about 1895 Budapest Jewry actually lagged behind Viennese Jewry in point of numbers. It was only after 1890 that Budapest Jewry recovered its numerical advantage.

From this statistical data we can see that despite their similarity in point of size in the final decades of the Habsburg Monarchy, these two important Jewish communities were quite different, and not only in their relationships to the general populations amongst which they lived. Vienna Jewry, having grown very rapidly in the 1860s and 1870s, was falling behind in point of growth after 1900. Budapest Jewry, on the other hand, was achieving in 1900 the same massive growth that had taken place in the Vienna Jewish community thirty years earlier. This dissimilarity is the first building block in our attempt to assess how Jewish influence took place.

3

So much for the quantitative comparison of the Jewish communities of the twin cities. Now let us turn to a second comparison — a qualitative one. Once more our attention will be called to instances of similarity, as well as to striking contrasts.

Who were the Jews of Vienna? Initially, they were remarkably homogeneous. The "tolerated" Jews came from all over the Monarchy and from abroad; but all had to make a show of wealth before they were admitted to the imperial capital. Beggars were strictly excluded. There were a lot of poor Jewish students in the city, and probably a lot of not-very-wealthy converts. But these people tended to be modern, and therefore much more like the wealthy "tolerees" than the religiously-traditional masses of Habsburg Jewry. In the period of massive growth after 1850, geographical cohorts came to characterize Viennese Jewry. In particular the one-time commuters from Hungary came to settle in the city. In 1869 the Hungarian-origin contingent in the Vienna Jewish community was 43 per cent of the total.[8]

Large groups came also from Bohemia, and especially from Moravia, where by 1900 (because of emigration to Vienna) the Jewish population was falling rapidly both in absolute numbers and relative to the general population.[9] On the whole, however, these first immigrant cohorts were probably not too different from the earlier immigrants. Generally there was a continued influx of wealthy and middle-class Jews, and there continued to be a high proportion of unmarried males in the Vienna community, a fact which suggests literacy, mobility and careerism. Though the poverty of some Leopoldstadt Jews was now notorious, Jewish Orthodoxy did not become particularly strong in Vienna.

Then in the years just after the Jewish emancipation of 1867, and more especially after 1900, large numbers of Jews moved directly from Galicia to Vienna. This regional cohort provided the city's Jewish society with a desperately poor and, if not an illiterate, then a distinctly "un-modern" bottom stratum.[10] And one may surmise that after the period of spurt-like growth in the 1860s, the Jewish community in Vienna lost in homogeneity. By 1900 it was characterized above all by the glaring contrast between the very rich and very poor.

Budapest Jewry's composition was different: at the start it was rather less homogeneous than Vienna's, but at the end it was probably more so. Above all the wealth contrasts were less striking in Budapest than they were in Vienna. Neither in 1800 nor in 1848 nor in 1900 did Budapest have nearly so many very wealthy Jews as did Vienna, and Budapest did not benefit from the immigration of wealthy Jews from cities like Prague and Lemberg (Lwow) or Cracow, and from abroad. At the other extreme, Budapest Jewry doubtless developed a very poor stratum even earlier than did Vienna. But in the main the Jews of Budapest, poor and rich alike, came from the Hungarian countryside, and not directly from abroad. Perhaps as a result of this, particularly towards the end, one gets the impression that Budapest's Dob utca did not seem so "Galizianer" – so almost barbarian and clearly "foreign" – as did Vienna's Leopoldstadt. In Budapest, as in Prague, when Jews actually from Galicia did appear in the years before 1914, and above all when refugees from there arrived in 1914-1915, they caused a sensation.[11] Budapest Jewry

was admittedly fissured because of an instituted split between reform Conservative, or *Neolog*, Jewry and traditionalist, Orthodox Jewry in post-1868 Hungary. As will be seen in greater detail below there was open hostility between these groups until the 1940s. In Budapest, nonetheless, though Orthodoxy existed, the *Neologs* were dominant and their propaganda created to a remarkable extent the illusion that Budapest Jewry was a single entity. In addition, there was a genuine homogeneity in Budapest's Jewish community during its period of great growth after 1880 when Vienna Jewry was falling apart, a homogeneity which derived from the almost universal attempt at Magyarization. Between 1880 and 1910 the German-speaking part of Budapest's population fell from 34.3 per cent to 9.0 per cent of the whole (numerically from 122,000 to 78,000).[12] This simply could not have happened if the 100,000 odd Jewish immigrants of that period – 10 per cent of the 1910 population – had remained Yiddish speaking. The statistics mean that these immigrant Jews were making the same great cultural change in this period of growth as the older Jews of Budapest.

4

Quantitative and qualitative comparisons between the Jewish communities of Vienna and Budapest have drawn our attention to significant differences existing in the year 1900, but also to significant similarities in the periods of great community growth which in Vienna took place during the 1860s and in Budapest after 1890. Now let us make a third, less familiar, comparison and one which is even more suggestive. This concerns the communal organization of the Jews in the two cities under discussion.

By the 20th century, Jewry's communal organizations – once the very backbone of Jewish life – had ceased to be conspicuous in the Western world.[13] But they were by no means forgotten. Moreover in Central Europe, despite the great weakening of Jewish community cohesion during the 19th century, all citizens were bound by law to belong to some religious community, to pay

taxes to it, and to receive religious education. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to aver that the Jewish communities played, right up until the First World War, a role in Jewish life that was at least as significant as the role of the peasant village, or the parliaments of the nobility in Christian national societies.

What was a Jewish communal institution like in the late 19th century in Central Europe? One may generalize and say that it consisted of a leadership, of an administrative apparatus and of affiliate organizations. In charge were a "president" and an executive council of five or six men, chosen for their considerable piety, great personal dignity and seriousness. These men met weekly or more frequently. They were supported by an elective consultive council (or councils) comprised of dignitaries, usually men of considerable wealth and public status, who had committee responsibilities for matters of finance, the synagogue, the school(s) and ritual buildings, the hospital and cemetery, but who convened far less frequently. Elections by taxpayer curiae renewed a large part of the leadership each year, but the voters seldom toppled the slate proposed by the presidium, and the leadership was therefore fundamentally oligarchical.

In this first respect – in point of prestige and reputation – one may say that the communities were strong. In point of social-contact organizations and propaganda instruments they were also notably strong and effective. Each Jewish community was the center of a nexus of private charitable organizations, usually very active; and big city Jewish communities usually possessed press organs: weekly newspapers, and monthly, quarterly and annual literary and cultural instruments. In their actual administration, on the other hand, the communities were notably weak. Apart from the rabbi(s) and the often poorly-paid school teachers and ritual attendants, there was minimal bureaucracy. The apparatus of Jewry in no way compared to the structures of the Catholic and Protestant Churches, not to speak of the national and nationality political institutions that mushroomed in the later 19th century all over Europe.

In Vienna, a Jewish community officially appeared only on the morrow of the emancipation in 1848, and officially its history is one of steady erosion and disintegration during the following seventy years.[14] During the 150 years after the expulsion of 1670, the Habsburgs had made it a point of Catholic virtue and imperial honor not to tolerate the public practice of the Jewish religion in their capital. Even after 1826, when in the interests of morality and control Emperor Francis permitted public practice of the Jewish religion, he insisted that the newly-built synagogue be referred to only as a "House of Prayer", that the rabbi be labelled only "teacher" or preacher", and that the words "Jewish community" not be used at all.

Yet in actual fact the story is much more complex and interesting, for in the Metternich era Vienna Jewry was far more organized than its legal status might have suggested. Let us broach the matter as follows: in the 1790s, while denying the Vienna Jews a community – a *Gemeinde* – the Hofburg acknowledged the legality of something called a *"Vertretung der Wiener Judenschaft"* – in other words a Presidium of sorts. At the start this "Representation" comprised only two men who were allowed to meet only under the watchful eyes of the police. By 1830, however, the *Vertretung* consisted of a group of notably strong-minded individuals – one of them the first ennobled von Hofmannsthal, the poet's ancestor. It supervised the governance of a large prayer house, known internationally for its preaching and music, and that of numerous communal institutions; and it was in no small measure a behavioral model for Jewish communities all over Central Europe. Subsequently its prestige increased when there was a changing of the guard. Though Hofmannsthal remained, some of his colleagues were replaced by the secretaries of Salomon, the first Viennese Rothschild – by Leopold von Wertheimstein, by Josef Wertheimer, and a little later by Heinrich Sichrowsky. This Rothschild involvement (which existed from the mid-1830s until 1909),[15] brought the still not legally-extant Vienna Jewish community very great political and economic weight to compound its earlier cultural eminence.

For practical purposes the *Vertretung* functioned in mid-century as something very close to a supreme council for all the Habsburg Monarchy's Jewry. It thought of itself as the "premier Austrian Jewish representation", and was regarded as such both by the Court and by other Jewish communities.[16] In the 1860s and 1870s of course it turned out that in point of law under the new constitutional arrangements there was no such supreme all-Empire Jewish organization, nor would there be any: the Jewry of each of the Crown lands, and Hungary's first of all, were each sent their own separate ways. But the illusion of Vienna's "primacy" was sustained by the presence in its Jewish community leadership of some of the greatest contemporary Austro-Hungarian Jewish names - not just the Rothschild secretaries from Vienna, but Ignaz Kuranda, Gustav von Epstein, Philip von Mauthner and Simon von Winterstein from Prague; Friedrich von Schey and Eduard von Todesco from Hungary; and Wilhelm von Gutmann from Silesia. The folksy Jewish writer, Leopold Kompert from Moravia, was a leadership member; the community secretary was L. A. Frankl, a well-known poet and antiquarian from Bohemia. For some years the President of the Community was Jonas von Königswarter, whose cousin of similar name was president of the supranational *Alliance Israelite* in Paris. No other central European Jewish institution had leadership prestige and glitter comparable to that of Vienna in those decades. Though the institutional body of the community was small and powerless, the head was formidable.

In Budapest, of course, prior to 1868 there was nothing to compare with this. From the days of Joseph II, Pest, Buda and Óbuda each possessed the legally recognized community Vienna then lacked. The community in Pest gained increasing prominence as that city became Hungary's commercial center, and after 1848 her capital.[17] But until the 1860s, Vienna, with its strong contingent of Hungarian Jews, could and did speak for the Jews in Habsburg civic affairs with more authority than did the Pest community.[18] Further, before 1860 there was a Jewish "national" authority of sorts in Hungary to diminish the status of the Pest community. In the first half of the 19th century, under the aegis of the famous rabbi Moses Sofer/Schreiber and his

sons, there thrived in Pozsony (Pressburg) a school of traditional Judaism which fulminated against Jewish modernism and change.[19]

In and after mid-century, however, the well-known polarization of Jewish traditionalism and Jewish reform in Hungary led to a decided increase in the prominence and the institutional power of one Pest congregation, eventually giving it far more political clout than Jewish Vienna. The polarization crystalized during the *Vormärz* in the context of the struggle to establish some sort of all-Hungarian Jewish Council.[20] It culminated in the most decisive event in 19th century Hungarian Jewish history: the great religious split between the two camps at an all-Hungarian Jewish Congress in 1868.[21]

The split gave the *Neolog*, or reformed, Jewish congregation in Pest an organizational advantage which the community at Vienna did not have, for in the wake of the Congress the Hungarian state felt bound to give legal recognition to three all-Hungarian Jewish organizations – the Orthodox, *Neolog*, and "status quo ante". The state left the door open to unity by refusing to acknowledge any of the three as the central organization of Hungarian Jewry, something to which the Congress had aspired.[22] But it did recognize all three as national in scope. Because the Pest *Neolog* congregation was large and wealthy, it soon presumed to speak for all the *Neologs* in Hungary.

In the half century after 1868, the Vienna and Budapest Jewish community organizations exchanged roles. In 1868 the Jewish community in Vienna seemed immensely authoritative, and organizationally very powerful. Yet immobility, not vigor, characterized the behavior of the knightly gallants on the Ringstrasse, and step by step they simply let slip their claims to the leadership of all Habsburg Jews.[23] Jewish religious unity remained intact in the imperial capital. But the price was the wholesale abandonment of control. By 1900 Prague, not Vienna, spoke for Jewish Bohemia; Brno for Jewish Moravia; and Trieste for Jewish Trieste; and no Jewish organization at all spoke for Jewish Galicia or for the Jews of Bukovina, where total disunity prevailed. In Vienna meanwhile, despite the official unity and the wealth of the great downtown synagogues, individ-

ual Jews practiced their religion more or less according to their choice – there was no uniformity in rite. And in the 1880s the rise of political anti-Semitism shattered the community's glittering crown. By 1900 most of the rich Viennese Jews had withdrawn from publicity, refusing, like the Rothschilds, to hold community office. Many of the older prestigious families had actually converted. And secular Zionism was contesting the very principle upon which the *Kultusgemeinde*'s authority was built – the principle of assimilation in exchange for civic rights.

In Budapest by contrast the decades of Dualism witnessed a major buildup of the Pest *Neolog* Congregation. Because the Hungarian state legally acknowledged the disunity of the Jews, the Pest *Neologs* could make their own decisions in a way the Viennese could not. Further, anti-Semitism was kept at bay in Hungary by the liberal state, so there was no outside pressure to intimidate the Jews. Finally, though on an all-Hungarian scale, the *Neologs* were smaller in numbers,[24] they had much better contacts in the government than the Orthodox did, and the tides of the times worked for them. The more modern education spread among the nation's Jews, and the more the "little Jews" flocked to dynamic, capitalist, metropolitan Budapest, the more the *Neolog* community's membership grew.

Symbolic of the dynamism of the Budapest reformed Jews was their political initiative in the mid-1890s, while Vienna Jews were trembling under the impact of anti-Semitism. Boldly they then launched a struggle for the final stage of emancipation – the so-called legal "reception" of the Jewish religion alongside Catholicism and the two great strains of Protestantism.[25] Meanwhile they began to acquire the very sheen that Viennese Jewry was losing: 23 of the 29 Jewish new nobles created between 1887 and 1896 belonged to this congregation.[26] The onetime congregational leader, Zsigmond Schossberger, was made a baron in 1890. Meanwhile Ignác Hirschler, Károly Svab and Zsigmond Bródy, all leaders of the *Neolog* community, won seats in the Upper House. Soon after 1900 Zsigmond Kornfeld and Sándor Hatvany-Deutsch entered the Upper House, and were made barons.

Nothing betrayed the changes in the Vienna and Budapest Jewish communities more than the way they treated the idea of struggling for Jewish "autonomy" during the last decade before the war. This idea was indigenous in Vienna: it originated in the socialist theses of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer for the constitutional restructuring of Central Europe along national lines.[27] But the Jewish community in Vienna had let Jewish communal affairs pass out of its own hands to such an extent that the struggle for Jewish autonomy became a matter of secular party politics in that city. The idea of Jewish autonomy caught on because it appealed to Jewish intellectuals in the Russian Empire, far from Vienna – notably to the historian Simon Dubnow. In 1908 it came back to Vienna as part of the political program of a small group of delegates elected to the Austrian Reichsrat from Galicia and Bukovina. The *Kultusgemeinde* treated the idea as pure poison – as a negation of assimilationism which could only worsen the already beleaguered position of Austria's Jews. By 1912, with the aid of outside political forces (Polish anti-Semites not least of all) they managed to have the issue quashed.[28] In Budapest, by contrast, the Pest *Neolog* congregation took the idea of autonomy to its bosom. Its leaders had no use whatsoever, of course, for Jewish "national" autonomy, but around 1908 they perceived in the striving for formal "religious" autonomy the means of finally crushing the independence of Orthodoxy.[29] The congregation turned out its full array of newly created barons and nobles to petition the government on this "religious" issue. The patriotism of Jewish Hungary at the time was such that there were practically no native Zionists to suggest that it might be better to have the Jews recognized not as an autonomous religious group, but as a nationality like the rest. Though the Orthodox Jews refused to cooperate in the autonomy struggle, they did not oppose it, perhaps because their leader Moses Freudiger had, like the *Neolog* eminences, been ennobled in 1908. The autonomy bid failed in the end because the Hungarian government felt that official acquiescence might lead to complications.

To sum up: whereas in Vienna, by the turn of the century, the demographically polarized Jewish community was politically

leaderless, and Jewish communal politics had become secular politics, in Budapest the socially more homogeneous *Neolog* community possessed a glittering official leadership very much in control, and Jewish politics were still solidly religious. Budapest was where Vienna had been in 1867.

5

Now for the crux of our investigation. We are examining the problem of measuring the extent of Jewish influence in Austria-Hungary. So far, we have found that in 1900, the Jewish community in Vienna was very different from that in Budapest; it was the Viennese Jewish community of the 1860s that Budapest Jewry was reminiscent of around the turn of the century. Is there any way of correlating this with significant features of the lives of the host societies?

It does not take long to notice some remarkable correlations: for Vienna in the middle years of the 19th century was the scene of epic economic and cultural developments in which Jews – and specifically the Jews of the *Kultusgemeinde* – played an essential role. These developments were first the *Volkswirtschaftliche Aufschwung*, the near hysterical economic boom that took off after the defeat of 1866 and culminated in the great crash of May 1873;[30] and secondly the Ringstrasse craze, which turned into Hans Makart's *Farbenrauch* – mass intoxication with theatricality and social strutting that distracted the capital's middle classes from high politics until the collapse of 1918.[31]

Central private sector figures in the economic boom were Anselm, the new Vienna Rothschild of the 1850s, and his "prokurators" von Wertheimstein, Goldschmidt and Sichrowsky, along with such Stock Exchange speculators as Jonas Königswarter, Friedrich Schey and the Todesco brothers. They, alongside the teams of great aristocrats, manned the new Creditanstalt, the Nordbahn, the Südbahn and even the "State Railroad Company" founded by the French bankers, the Pereire brothers. It was they who provided the leadership at the Stock Exchange all

through the sixties during the great boom.[32] This same leadership (though without Rothschild's direct participation) meanwhile figured prominently in the "second society" that flocked to the Ringstrasse, and then, with ebullient enthusiasm, followed Makart.[33] And as is adequately clear from recent Austrian historiography, both the creditor optimism that led to the Stock Exchange crash, and the *Schwärmerei* of the Ringstrasse were boosted by the not-so-rich middle class elements among the Jews.

Did the *Kultusgemeinde* itself play a role in what happened? In response, one may point to the situation within it. At the bottom, the stream of immigrant Jews from the provinces was at full flood — predominantly young males, people of some education, with great ambition but little money, people just come from the mud of Moravian and Hungarian small towns to the splendor — real splendor — of Vienna's great new Ring, and who had nowhere to go but up. Meanwhile, at the top a glittering new nobility of Stock Exchange speculators and palace builders on the Ring was encouraging behavioral imitation, as movie stars do today. There was even a celebrated libel trial in 1868 in which Paul Schiff, a Jewish community leader, convinced a jury that he was neither a *"Piratenschiff auf der Börse"* nor a *"Strauchritter"* by calling in his fellow Jewish community leaders to testify under oath that the principal kinds of robbery and piracy then practiced on the Stock Exchange were quite all right because they were not specifically against the law. One by one, from von Königswarter to von Goldschmidt and von Schey, these Jewish "religious" leaders thus sanctioned the new Ringstrasse morality.[34]

One may even be fairly specific, through an analogy with the Stock Exchange, about how the *Kultusgemeinde* may have contributed to the crazes of the day. The Exchange had been modernized in 1854, and in the 1860s seemed to be as modern a financial organization as Europe possessed. But actually, its institutional structure was simply too archaic to handle the tidal wave of business that emerged during the boom. Today, one can see that the Exchange had all the mechanisms needed to encourage trading, but was grossly inadequate for actually han-

dling it.[35] May one not say the same of the Jewish *Kultusgemeinde?* Was it not a wonderful vehicle for stirring up the madness of the crowds while absolutely lacking the teeth to handle the madness once it got out of hand?

One can certainly perceive several clearly non-Jewish inputs to what happened in Vienna in the 1860s. For example, a generally unreal and theatrical atmosphere reigned in the city because of the cruelty of Habsburg absolutism after 1848. It seems obvious that this had something to do with the public aberrations. Likewise, the Government's military defeats in 1859 and 1866, and the ensuing loss of parts of the empire, no doubt psychologically inclined the middle classes to search for spiritual compensation. One may point also to the general speculative atmosphere in Europe in the 1860s, and to the special availability of foreign, Franco-German, capital in large quantities after 1871. But central to any calculation of the causes of the Viennese madness preceding 1873 must surely be the peculiar state of the Jewish *Kultusgemeinde* at that time.

Were the conditions of the Vienna and Budapest Jewish communities at the turn of the century comparable? In this paper, we can merely hint at the answers. First, in Vienna in 1900, we discover an economy perhaps not in disarray, but certainly not throbbing with excitement, certainly not "taking off" in a great leap into modernity. Without accepting the polemical stance of Gerschenkron, one may share his suspicion that somehow in Vienna a "great spurt failed".[36] It is tempting to associate all this with the disunity and loss of authority that had come to characterize the city's Jewish community by then. Unlike in the 1860s, the *Kultusgemeinde* was no longer in the slightest degree channelling enthusiasm from the top to the bottom and back again. On the contrary, it was doing everything in its power to negate the anti-Semites' suspicions of multi-level Jewish economic collaboration. It was smothering identifiably Jewish enthusiasms, rather than fanning them as it had done earlier.

On the Budapest economic scene in 1900, on the other hand, there was excitement just as there had been in Vienna in the 1860s. Here, late in the 1890s, and again after a recovery of

confidence around 1905, there were forward movements that could qualify as great spurts. Indeed the last one, the boom before the war, brought with it a mighty result that could hardly have been achieved without coordination at the center – the reversal of the historic pattern of Hungary's colonial-type subjection to foreign capital, and the assertion of Hungarian capital as an imperialistic force.[37]

In associating such economic achievements with the condition of the Jewish community in Pest, one must exercise caution. This was a boom rather different from that of Vienna's *Gründerzeit*. It was based far more on actual production increases in the factories of the capital and the provinces than in Stock Exchange speculation. Indicatively, the catastrophe at the end was not the pricking of a financial bubble, but the war and the bursting of the great political bubble represented by the Magyarizer state.

Nonetheless, the parallels are impressive. As in Vienna in the 1860s, in prewar Budapest there was a heavy overlap between the inner (and one may note, the increasingly narrow) economic leadership and the leadership of the Jewish community organization.[38] In both cases, the said leadership could not resist the temptation to show off: with its newly-ennobled members and newly-created barons it was theatrically setting a behavioral model for people lower down the social scale, one inviting imitation. In both periods, there was an influx into the lower strata of the Jewish community. But the influx into turn-of-the-century *Neolog* Budapest was no longer just made up of indigent and ambitious single young men flowing from provincial traditionalism into the cosmopolitan big city. Now there was also a stream of wedded middle-class couples, the socially ambitious wives eager to pass from the Orthodox world into the *Neolog* community. And the vigorous patriotic political activity of the Pest *Neolog* congregation provided a sterling vehicle for the transmission of mood from top to bottom and back again.

Were there cultural similarities between the Viennese and Budapest Jewish communities in 1900? Admittedly this whole question was blurred by the ongoing Ringstrasse craze, which deeply affected the middle classes of both cities, and made

them seem deceptively similar.[39] But in the *coulisses* of the Ring, as is well known, Vienna had by 1900 developed a culture of twentieth-century frustration and despair. Surely it is tempting to associate this with the withering of the *Kultusgemeinde*, which no longer possessed the graces of the Gomperz ladies, or house poets such as Adolf von Mosenthal and L. A. Frankl, or resistance heroes such as Adolf Fischhof and Ignac Kuranda to keep it in touch with the young. The situation was quite different in Budapest after 1900.[40] No doubt one could hear expressions of cultural despair here and there, reminiscent of the Jewish self-hatred of Otto Weininger in Vienna. But it was being voiced not by Budapest Jews as much as by déclassé Magyars. In Budapest the younger generation of Jewish intellectuals were as optimistic at the turn of the century as their enthusiastically philistine fathers, and this was true even of the socialists. Oszkár Jászi, for example, was wholly confident in his book of 1912 if the government would only be fair, the Hungarian nationalities would flock to a Great Magyar standard. The younger generation congregated around Lajos Hatvany, close both to the *Neolog* religious community and to the country's economic citadel. Only after the catastrophe of 1914 did Hatvany reject his parentage after the fashion of his Vienna opposite number, the sad convert Ludwig Wittgenstein.

6

We might end this study with some concrete conclusions about Jewish influence on Austro-Hungarian society. We can state, for example, that around 1900 Jewish influence lacked dynamic force in Vienna because that city's Jewish community had by then both withdrawn from public life and had become atomized. It no longer had a homogeneous leadership. The transmission belts conveyed doom, gloom and fear. The immigrant Jewish mass had slowed down and now kept to itself. Jews were numerous in Vienna around 1900. Individual Jews wielded great political, economic, and cultural power. But in any group sense, the Jews were not then determining events.

On the other hand, we can say that Jewish influence had been exceedingly dynamic in Vienna from the 1850s through the 1870s, and was such in Budapest during the decades before and after the turn of the century. The Jewish communities of the two cities at these times were led by exceptionally ostentatious role models who were thoroughly involved in national economic and cultural enterprises. Both communities also commanded extraordinarily large immigrant Jewish audiences, who contributed importantly to the growing urban middle classes. As institutions, the communities served to transmit to a receptive middle-class mass the mood of optimism and trendy behavior of the social elite. Conversely, they brought confirmation of mood and behavior from down below to the higher echelons. As a result, in both periods the Jewish communities of Budapest and Vienna substantially (albeit by no means exclusively) provided the mechanism for public aberrations: in Vienna in the sixties they contributed to the Stock Exchange bubble and the Ringstrasse craze; in Budapest at the turn of the century to the victories of Hungarian capital and to the madness of Magyarization. In these periods, then, Jewish community organization significantly affected the Monarchy's public life.

Yet, our main conclusion in this study lies in two suggestions for future work. The first suggestion is quite general: would it not be useful to study the whole latter-day history of the Habsburg Monarchy more in terms of middle-class moods and enthusiasms than has been done in the past? The topic is studded with eruptions of such enthusiasm: one thinks of 1848, as well as of the various economic booms and busts, the Ringstrasse and the Budapest coronation, and the "Gay Apocalypse". The Empire ended up to the tune of Karl Kraus' *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*, and of Jászi's strictures against bourgeois pomposity. We would not propose that such enthusiasms – fads, indeed – were in any way more important than the events conventionally described by economic or political history. But the evidence reviewed here suggests that, far more than is conventionally recognized, they affected the economy and all middle class life, and bound it together. They seem to be a set of phenomena well worth investigation.

Secondly, would it not be useful to study the legitimate question of Jewish influence especially within this framework? Again, we are not suggesting that the older approaches be abandoned. The statistics on Jewish demography, and the names of Jewish individuals in positions of power, are undoubtedly important. But it seems from the evidence reviewed here that the institutional character of Jewish society should also be scrutinized, and that the "whole picture" should be examined, not just the pieces. One might recognize that the Jews, more than most of the Austro-Hungarian national groups, both contributed to the fads and enthusiasms of the Central European middle classes, and were subject to them. And one might recognize that this Jewish involvement with fads stemmed from a specific cause: the conspicuous underdevelopment and bureaucratic weakness during the late nineteenth century of Jewish national institutions, which contrasted with the "overdevelopment" of such institutions among other nationalities.

NOTES

1 For background see Wolf-Dieter Bihl, "Die Juden" in Wandruszka-Urbanitsch, *Die Habsburger Monarchie, 1848-1918* (Vienna: Akademie, 1980), vol. III/2, ch. 13.

2 See for the following Felix Olegnik, "Historisch-statistische Übersichten von Wien", *Mitteilungen aus Statistik und Verwaltung der Stadt Wien, Sonderheft* I (1956), pp. 88-94.

3 For the following, see Károly Vörös and Lajos Nagy (eds.) *Budapest története* (A history of Budapest), 5 vols (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1970ff), esp. vol. III.

4 See for the following Jakob Thon, *Die Juden in Österreich* (Berlin: L. Lamm, 1908); Leo Goldhammer, *Die Juden Wiens* (Berlin: 1927); Marsha Rosenblitt, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867-1914* (Albany: SUNY, 1983), esp. p. 17; and Ivar Oxaal, "The Jews of Pre-1914 Vienna: Two Working Papers" (mimeograph: University of Hull, 1981), p. 60.

5 See S. Mayer, *Die Wiener Juden* (Vienna: Löwit, 1917), book II. Comp. Wolfgang Häusler, "Der Weg des Wiener Judentums von der Toleranz zur Emanzipation" in *Jahrbuch des Vereines für Geschichte der Stadt Wien*, vol. 30/31 (1974-1975), pp. 84-124.

6 See for the following Alajos Kovács, *A zsidóság térfoglalása Magyarországon* (The growth of Jewry in Hungary), (Budapest: E. Kellner, 1922); and *Budapest Statisztikai Évkönyv*, vol. 12 (1913), pp. 30-31.

7 See apart from Kovács, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Ernő László, "Hungarian Jewry: Settlement and Demography, 1735-38 to 1910" in *Hungarian Jewish Studies*, vol. I (1966), pp. 61ff.

8 See Israel Jeitteles, *Die Kultusgemeinde der Israeliten in Wien* (Vienna: L. Rosner, 1873), p. 55.

9 See the statistics conveniently summarized in Bihl, "Die Juden", pp. 882, 889; also Thon, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

10 The Galician Jewish immigration to Vienna has been subject to debate between Anson G. Rabinbach and E. Scott Eddie in *Austrian History Yearbook*, vol. XI (1975), pp. 44-54. Rabinbach claimed that the bulk of the Vienna Jewish community's growth after 1860 came from Galicia, and was poor, thus justifying his theory that the establishment of Zionism was a "bourgeois" response to a lower class "challenge". As Eddie guessed, and as Rosenblitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 18ff and 215-216 establishes, that position is simply untenable.

11 Prague's surprise can be adduced from Franz Kafka's well-known discovery of the Yiddish theatrical troupe. I infer Budapest's surprise from the frequent horrified references in turn of the century literature to "Kazars" in the north-east frontier region. Had the "Kazars" been visible in Budapest, I doubt there would have been such consternation.

12 *Budapest Statisztikai Évkönyv*, vol. 12 (1913), p. 32.

13 On the Jewish community institution, see Jacob Katz, *Tradition and Crisis* (New York: Free Press, 1961), chs. 5,16,17; and Lajos Venetianer, *A zsidóság szervezete az európai államokban* (The organization of Jewry in the European states) (Budapest: Franklin, 1901). I depend in the following also on my own examination of the Vienna Jewish Community archive now housed at Jerusalem.

14 See for the following Gerson Wolf, *Geschichte der Juden in Wien* (Vienna: Holder, 1976); and Hans Tietze, *Die Juden Wiens* (Leipzig: E. Tal, 1933).

15 For the personnel of the leadership, see S. Husserl's list in the Jerusalem Archive, A/W 732.13, pp. 280ff.

16 On 3 April, 1849, when Francis Joseph received representatives of the Vienna Jews, he indicated that through them he wished to address all the Jews of the Empire: see the record of the *Vorstand* meeting of 7 May, 1849 in A/W 69.1; and von Wertheimstein's statement at the 20 April, 1859 meeting in A/W 70, pp. 229-230. For the provincial Jewish attitudes, see M. Teller, *Die Juden in Böhmen und ihre Stellung in der Gegenwart* (Prague: Silber und Schenk, 1863), p. 81.

17 For the history of the Budapest communities, see Sándor Büchler, *A zsidók története Budapesten* (A history of the Jews in Budapest), (Budapest: Franklin, 1901).

18 In 1848 the Vienna Community issued a newspaper that presumed to speak for all Habsburg Jewry: the *Österreichiches Central-Organ für Glaubensfreiheit, Kultur, Geschichte und Literatur der Juden.* Again in the 1860s it came forward with an all-Empire journal, *Die Neuzeit*, which abandoned its Hungarian pretensions with reluctance after 1867. *Die Neuzeit* even had a Hungarian Jewish editor, Simon Szantó.

19 On the "Chatam Sofer", see Shlomo Spitzer, "Der Einfluss des Chatam Sofer und seiner Pressburger Schule" in *Studia Judaica Austriaca*, vol. VIII (1980), pp. 111-121.

20 For this struggle, see Lajos Venetianer, *A magyar zsidóság története* (A history of Hungarian Jewry), (Budapest: Fővárosi ny. rt., 1922), pt. II, chs. 2,3.

21 For the Congress see apart from Venetianer's general account, Nathaniel Katzburg, "The Jewish Congress of Hungary, 1868-1869" in *Hungarian Jewish Studies*, vol. II (1969), pp. 1-35; and Thomas Domjan, "Der Kampf der ungarischen Israeliten, 1868-1869" in *Ungarn Jahrbuch*, vol. I (1969), pp. 139-162.

22 See Venetianer, *Magyar Zsidóság*, pt. II, ch. 8.

23 See Wolfgang Häusler, "'Orthodoxie' und 'Reform' im Wiener Judentum" in *Studia Judaica Austriaca*, vol. VI (1978), pp. 29-56. I will deal with this subject at greater length in my forthcoming book, *Assimilation on the Danube. A History of Habsburg Jewry, 1670-1918*.

24 As late as 1911 the Neologs were quite willing to admit that 400,000 out of the 955,452 Hungarian Jews were Orthodox; they quibbled only about the additional 300,000 that the Orthodox claimed. At that time (in 1911), there were 1671 Orthodox communities and branch communities to the Neolog 489; and 1222 Orthodox rabbis and assistant rabbis to the 381 reform rabbis. Legitimate questions could be asked, however, about how many people belonged to all these Orthodox branch communities, and about what exactly the qualifications of all the assistant rabbis were. See *Magyar Zsidó Szemle* (1911), pp. 1-2; (1912), p. 1. After the war a large portion of Orthodox Hungarian Jewry was lost to Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In 1920, as a result, out of 444,567 Jews in Trianon Hungary, 292,155 (65.5%) were Neologs, 130,373 (29.2%) were Orthodox and 22,373 (5.3%) were "status quo". Questions remained even then, however, about exactly what "Orthodox" might in practice mean. See Ernő László, "Hungary's Jewry: A Demographic Overview, 1918-1945" in *Hungarian Jewish Studies*, vol. II (1969), p. 150.

25 See Venetianer, *Magyar Zsidóság*, pt. III, ch. 5.

26 See McCagg, *Jewish Nobles and Geniuses in Modern Hungary* (New York and Boulder, Colo.: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 89.

27 See for the following Kurt Stillschweig, "Nationalism and Autonomy among Eastern European Jewry" in *Historia Judaica*, vol. VI, no. 1 (Apr. 1944), pp. 27-68.

28 See Max Rosenfeld, *Die Polnische Judenfrage* (Vienna: Löwit, 1918), pp. 155ff; and Rosenblitt, *The Jews of Vienna*, ch. 8.

29 For the following see Venetianer, *Magyar Zsidóság*, pp. 431ff.

30 Good accounts of the boom occur in Heinrich Benedikt, *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der Franz-Joseph-Zeit* (Munich: Herold, 1958), pp. 55ff; Gustav Franz, *Der Liberalismus* (Munich: Callwey, 1955); Walter Rogge, *Oesterreich von Vilagos bis zur Gegenwart* (Vienna-Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1872); and Wilhelm Angerstein, *Volkswirtschaftliche Zustände in Oesterreich* (Leipzig: Luckhardt, 1871).

31 See Elizabeth Springer, *Geschichte und Kulturleben der Wiener Ringstrasse* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1979).

32 For the precise record see Annalies Rohrer, "Die Wiener Effektenbörse und seine Besucher" (unpublished dissertation, Vienna, 1970).

33 See the record in Franz Baltzarek et al., *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft der Wiener Stadterweiterung* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1975), Table 4.

34 The Schiff-Scharf trial may be followed in *Die Presse*, 12-21 July, 1869.

35 This is the thesis of Rohrer's brilliant dissertation, where the details are spelled out. Comp. Franz Baltzarek, *Die Geschichte der Wiener Börse* (Vienna: Akademie, 1973), pp. 65ff.

36 See Alexander Gerschenkron's highly polemical *An Economic Spurt That Failed* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); and the more moderate presentation by David Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), chs. 6 and 7.

37 See Iván Berend and György Ránki, "Ungarns wirtschaftliche Entwicklung" in Wandruszka/Urbanitsch, *Die Habsburger Monarchie*, vol. I, pp. 514ff.

38 See McCagg, *Jewish Nobles and Geniuses*, pp. 39ff, 152ff.

39 See Gyula Szekfü, *Három Nemzedék* (Three generations) (Budapest: Fővárosi Nyomda, 1920), pp. 242-47; and McCagg, "The Role of the Magyar Nobility in Modern Jewish History", *East European Quarterly*, Vol.XX (Spring 1986), no.1, pp. 41-53.

40 For a review of this subject, see Zoltán Horváth, *Magyar Századforduló* (The turn of the century in Hungary) (Budapest: Gondolat, 1961).

Hungary and European Civilization
Gy. Ránki (ed.)

ATTILA PÓK

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF SOCIOLOGY IN FIN-DE-SIÈCLE BUDAPEST

The anaesthetized patient on an operating table (however much he may have read about the subject) hardly ever doubts the skill of the surgeon who is operating upon him, or knocks the scalpel from the hand of a doctor he feels to be incompetent. Precisely the opposite applies in the case of the politician or sociologist who operates, or experiments, on the body of society. His statements, and particularly his deeds trigger immediate reactions from those concerned: they may knock him from his chair, or dash the pen from his hand. This was particularly true in Hungary and the neighbouring region of Central and Eastern Europe, where social scientists (including representatives of both the "hard" and the "soft" disciplines, and ranging from economists to historians) usually took part directly in politics, or to remain with the initial metaphor, operated on and treated the sick body of society. On the other hand, politicians (at least those who were intellectually inquisitive) sought the broad correlations of their activity in the results of social science research.

The body of Hungarian society at the turn of the century suffered from countless illnesses which demanded intervention. The problems at the centre of day-to-day political battles stemmed from the country's constitutional position within the Habsburg Empire and concerned national sovereignty, but the most serious illnesses were internal social tensions (to mention only the most important ones: the question of the national minorities, the problems arising from the preponderance of feudal latifundia, the miserable living conditions of large sec-

tions of the peasantry, and the emergence of industrial workers' movements). This was sensed by many, and quite a number of mainly political solutions were thought out.[1] But at the beginning of this century scientific social analysis which had in fact started to develop in the early 19th century Reform Age, also reached its first high point with the birth of Hungarian sociology.[2]

The principal framework and forum for the development of sociology was provided by a new periodical that bore the suggestive title *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth century). It was launched as the century began, in January 1900. From the outset the most important problem for the editors and staff, and for those who grouped themselves around the new paper, was the relationship between science and politics, between thought and action. How could the achievements of modern theory and social analysis that aimed at objectivity be utilized in everyday social and political practice? Was a science of politics a pipe-dream of dry scholars in ivory towers, or was it the justified aspiration of serious social scientists? How could the latter become respected surgeons of society, surgeons whose incisions cured instead of aggravated society's wounds? The subject of this paper is the social function of sociology in *fin-de-siècle* Budapest as seen through the history of the review *Huszadik Század*, or more precisely through one aspect of its history: the conflicts between thought and action in the circle of young intellectuals gathered around it.

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In the late 1890s a handful of young people of enormous vitality and immense energy and industry, and filled with a desire to penetrate the laws of social development, came together in the Faculty of Law at Budapest University. Their meeting places were the lectures and seminars of Ágost Pulszky, and later of Gyula Pikler, both professors of the philosophy of law.[3]

That these students attended the lectures of these two professors was no mere matter of chance. Those interested in questions of state, law, power and society could hear about them in these lectures on the philosophy of law. At the lectures given by Pulszky, who accepted the chair of philosophy of law in 1875, and at those of Gyula Pikler, who studied under Pulszky and then succeeded him as professor, students could also learn about Western European sociology. Under Pulszky and Pikler these trainee scholars became convinced that the development of society did indeed have its laws and that these could be discovered. Of course teachers and students did not necessarily agree on what these laws actually were, how general their validity was, or how much they coincided with the regularities of nature. The various theories, points of view and ideas entertained by these students were later expounded in the pages of *Huszadik Század*.

The idea of launching a new periodical first emerged among these, by now former, students of law in the autumn of 1898. The actual organizational process quickened in the summer of 1899, the key figure in this being Gusztáv Gratz, a young but by this time quite experienced publicist, who later had rather a chequered career.[4] The stages in this preparatory work can easily be followed in the organizers' correspondence with each other.[5] Even in the preparatory period the problem that would eventually lead to a split in the editorial board was already manifest. Gratz, the main organizer, wrote, "... I think the paper should be of current concern. The point of view according to which various subjects are discussed should be more practical than that of scholarly studies. But of course, it will be at a far higher level than the point of view put forward in the daily press".[6] Of course it was not difficult to accept this view in general terms, but in the course of day-to-day work a series of conflicts arose concerning the interpretation of this "higher-level" point of view. Even while the very first number was being edited, Gratz and Oszkár Jászi, later the leader of bourgeois radicalism in Hungary, were unable to agree about the place in which to publish the letter the great British sociologist Herbert Spencer had written to them. (In those days they

regarded Spencer as their model.) Jászi wanted to publish the letter on the first page, to emphasize the fact that they intended to create a theoretical forum for sociology, i.e. that their intention was to launch a purely scientific periodical, while Gratz wanted to place it somewhere among the articles, arguing that under the agreement existing among the members of the editorial board the periodical was not to be an exclusively scientific forum. Jászi finally won, but this conflict presaged further differences of opinion on the editorial board that explain the various phases in the journal's history. The emergence of differences was inevitable, since those who gathered around *Huszadik Század* and the Sociological Society *(Társadalomtudományi Társaság)* which was founded a year later, came from a variety of social backgrounds, entertained a variety of political ideas and social demands, and included a variety of types of people. What bound them together was a conviction that behind day-to-day politics the general laws of social development operated, and that the recognition of these was a precondition of successful politics to any purpose. But less clear to them was who could make use of social research findings and in what form. A landowner or a capitalist, an employed or freelance member of the intelligentsia (lawyer, university professor, or journalist), someone embarking upon his career or someone more or less integrated into society already, provided that he respected thought and the strength of the printed word, would all undoubtedly wish to use sociology as the foundation for substantially different political ideas. In those days sociology and socialism did not seem so near to each other as they did later, nor did the idea or illusion that the state apparatus could be the means not only of tyranny and oppression but also of the "scientifically based" management of society seem to be totally unfounded. In this embryonic phase Hungarian sociology was more prone to require a rising above politics than an identification with a particular political trend. As Lóránt Hegedüs put it, "No kind of individual, political tendency of ours should be injected into sociology, for sociology is an objective science".[7]

In the first phase of Hungarian sociology, the greatest influence was exerted by Herbert Spencer's organic evolutionist doctrines. Quite a few articles on Spencer were published in the early years of *Huszadik Század* and, in the eyes of the editors, he was the greatest of all masters. Spencer was primarily respected because (to quote Jászi) "he was the first ... to express and explain the development of the inorganic, organic and intellectual world in terms of the mechanical laws of matter and movement".[8] To the heterogenous staff of *Huszadik Század* at this time the most attractive idea was that of evolution and irresistible development: they thought that however serious the illnesses (the *morbus latifundii*, the problems of national minorities, emigration and clerical reaction) which gnawed at the body of Hungarian society, the organization of society based on knowledge of society's nature, i.e. making the natural evolution of social forces possible, would necessarily overcome it.

Very soon the attention of the staff and contributors turned in other directions as well: Bódog Somló, Ervin Szabó and Oszkár Jászi all wrote about historical materialism, and Jászi and Rusztem Vámbéry wrote about French sociology. Studies by Simmel and Sergi were published, as were articles on Henry George's ground rent theory; on the ideological trends in the international labour movement; and on Allen Grant, Guyau and Ernst Grosse, who espoused sociological views in aesthetics, and others. Whatever the subject - literature, history, economics or everyday political concerns - the requirement was always to trace back the phenomena to the objective rules of social development.

What linked the founders of the *Huszadik Század* was the acceptance of rules valid for social development and the idea of evolution, but the differences of opinions which later split them into groups were perceptible from the very beginning. The nationalist and clerical attacks on Gyula Pikler and Bódog Somló, two outstanding figures of the circle, also contributed substantially to this differentiation.[9] Nevertheless, the two main things that finally factionalized the intellectuals who gathered around the *Huszadik Század* and the Sociological Soci-

ety were the reaction of the latter to political trends that urged democratic transformation, and their relation to national interests, i.e. to the question of patriotism.

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The subject of Oszkár Jászi's introductory article[10] was the relation between science and day-to-day politics. For Jászi distancing oneself from day-to-day politics did not imply being apolitical, but recognition of the fact that none of the country's political parties served the actual interests of society. This was why there was a need, as Jászi wrote, for a new, effective tool in public life – scientific journalism that could transmit the developments of sociology to society. However sincere the intention to remain impartial may have been, in practice this transmitting activity made taking sides in political conflicts inevitable, and this naturally led to discord. As early as 1901, the editorial board distanced itself in a footnote from Oszkár Jászi's study on Count István Tisza, since Jászi sharply attacked that leading conservative political figure for considering "science a second-rate assistant in day-to-day politics".[11]

By and large, three elements can be distinguished in the periodical during the early years. The first was publication of studies and other writings on aspects of public law, i.e. the study of dogmas in law, which discussed traditional problems in traditional ways. The second was the cautious liberalism of the editor, Gusztáv Gratz; and the third the publication of articles by Oszkár Jászi, Bódog Somló, Ödön Wildner and Zoltán Zigány, which contained elements of what was subsequently radical ideology. (At the time this mainly took the form of attacks on clericalism and on the agrarian pressure group that represented the interests of the great landowners.) The differences of opinion matured into a conflict which, by 1903, led to a change of editor. On the editorial board the representatives of a fairly radical policy grew more numerous and decided to exclude

traditional day-to-day politics from the paper altogether. As a result, Gusztáv Gratz resigned.

The final split took place in the summer of 1906. In a letter he sent to the editorial board in the summer of 1905,[12] Gratz's main objection was that the paper was "under the influence of foreign idealist parties". Also, leaving the social question aside, it ignored Hungary's specific characteristics, and instead of discussing the day-to-day problems of Hungarian reality, it dealt with theoretical questions that held no interest for the reading public and were academic from the point of view of local circumstances. In a long letter the editorial board refuted Gratz's charges,[13] pointing out that the journal could not strive to rally all "the elements responsive to progress" (which had been the aim at the time the periodical had been launched). That would be too wide a task. The editorial board condemned Gratz for dealing only with the problems of immediate progress, since the purpose of the periodical could only be to discuss great principles and trends and not what "is included in our sad politics of today". Nevertheless, it argued, it was a fact that the paper often dealt with domestic affairs, but the board did not want the paper to be a forum for petty daily skirmishing. The debate went on, and finally the problem no longer continued to be the publication or non-publication of articles on topical subjects, since writings of this kind regularly appeared in the periodical. The real cause of the debate was a fundamental difference in views. Jászi and his associates concerned themselves with theoretical questions that seemed too abstract, with analyses of Spencerianism, historical materialism and with the achievements of French sociology - since they thought that a real and effective solution of day-to-day problems could only be carried out in the knowledge of the general rules of social development. Bódog Somló expressed this as follows: "We are not seeking what can be realized today, we can only seek scientific guiding principles".[14] The increasingly radical group within the editorial board concluded from their research that, irrespective of the change in day-to-day politics, "in a short while victorious socialism, having made a *tabula rasa* of our feudal state of af-

fairs, will lead us straight to the wealthy, cultured and free fraternal alliance of peoples under communist economic management".[15] It naturally followed from this conviction and hope that the possible partners in eliminating the system of great landed estates and the nobility's nationalism, i.e. the feudal elements in the Hungarian economy and society, were the socialist and organized workers, and the main task was to work out the necessary and possible concrete programme that would make possible a transition to a new, democratic Hungary.

The programme contained tasks which were fundamentally social, and in 1906, when the "national coalition" that had temporarily gained power described the universal suffrage component as a betrayal of the nation's cause, the advocates of the programme found themselves in a very delicate situation. At that particular historical moment it seemed that defence of national interests and the democratic transformation of society could scarcely be reconciled.[16] Still, the extraordinary general meeting of the Sociological Society in August 1906 brought a victory for the radical line of Jászi and his associates. From then onwards *Huszadik Század* and the Sociological Society became their forum.

This opened a new and militant phase in the history of *Huszadik Század*. The article outlining the programme, entitled "New Hungary", was written by Oszkár Jászi.[17] (This article and Pál Szende's study, "Independent Customs Areas and Class Relations",[18] laid the theoretical foundation for bourgeois radicalism in Hungary.) The aim was an independent and democratic Hungary, since "modern socialism ... cannot be conceived of without the modern capitalist economy and bourgeois democracy upon which it is based". The institutions of bourgeois democracy would allow the attainment of economic and cultural independence, which would certainly lead to political and military independence as well. Jászi, now editor of the *Huszadik Század*, dwelt in detail on the connection between democratic and independence ideas, which was the central concept in the radical programme that was taking shape. The change was also marked by external signs. The subtitle "Sociological Review" was replaced by "Sociological and Social Policy Review", and

a photo of Rodin's "Thinker", an apt symbol of the meditating, over-anxious attitude of the bourgeois radicals, now adorned the title page.

A period of feverish activity and daily tasks ensued: universal, equal suffrage and the secret ballot; social policy; the agrarian question and the problems of the national minorities, of demography and of public education were among the issues discussed in numerous articles, lectures and debates. Where did this varied activity lead? Ervin Szabó, looking back in 1912 on the activity of the Sociological Society, wrote that the only reporters of the accomplishments of Western sociology were still the *Huszadik Század* and the Sociological Society, and although quite a few members had produced results of their own "...from the qualitative point of view their activity is really divided unequally between research work and the work that precedes research and then disseminates its results. One might also say that too much activity seems to prevent us from thinking".[19] However, what Szabó, the greatest figure in socialist thinking in Hungary, demanded was not a full withdrawal from politics but the separation of the scientific and political functions, i.e. a reasonable division of labour. He argued that the realization of an idea necessarily leads to a distortion of it. If one were to counterbalance the "inevitable deficit of materializing truth" with "new, additional truths", theoretical recognitions should be kept under constant review by raising them above everyday politics, so as to have "new, additional truths" at one's disposal at the right moment.[20]

But what were those "new, additional truths" and what was their political significance? The search for them - among other things - produced one of the most distinguished works of contemporary Hungarian sociology, *The Formation of Nation States and the Question of Ethnic Minorities*, written by Oszkár Jászi and published in 1912. Some time later, at the end of 1916, when the need for transplanting new perceptions into political practice was at its height, Jászi enclosed a copy of this book with his first letter to Mihály Károlyi. He warned Károlyi who, as the leader of the newly formed Independence Party, had a democratic programme: "Today you are probably the only man who

could lead the country towards modern democracy. But your noble struggle will be lacking in strength as long as your allies and party colleagues knock the sword of democracy out of your hand with the dagger of impatience on the question of the national minorities. It seems that the war is drawing to an end. We have to prepare for the final battle after peace has been achieved. You must be in command of both the infantry of universal suffrage and the artillery of the emancipation of the national minorities. Otherwise it will be impossible to defeat Tisza and forces of feudal-plutocratic reaction".[21]

Throughout the First World War, the whole activity of *Huszadik Század* was concentrated on the search for those "new, additional truths". The debates, studies and commentaries analysed the fundamental question of the social and economic structure of Hungary and of Central Europe: the possibilities of reorganizing Central Europe, Germany's relationship with the region, the agrarian question, the Jewish question, the national minorities problem and a great many other things.

Huszadik Század and the Sociological Society provided a very important forum right up until 1918. But the immense increase in the pace of events in 1918 and 1919 forced the members of the circle to make political decisions and to undertake individual tasks. The various ideas for reforming Hungarian society and the Central European region could no longer be reconciled, and the common platform essential for a debate in which opponents listen to the opinions of the other side and are therefore able to further the cause being debated had vanished. The last number of the *Huszadik Század*, dated August 1919, was published in November 1919.

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After this short outline of the review's history, let us briefly look at the people who belonged to the *Huszadik Század* circle, noting some similarities and differences during this phase of their careers.

In the beginnings of their careers and in their family and social backgrounds these figures show many similarities. They were born in the mid 1870s to middle-class or lower middle-class families, most of which lived in Upper Hungary or Transylvania. Quite a few of them were Jews. They studied law, and their scholarly or artistic talents became apparent at an early age. Their ambition was to find jobs giving independence and a good livelihood, but initially they had little success. Partly because of family pressure and the need to earn a living, they took posts around the turn of the century in some ministry or other office. (At this point let me refer briefly to this group's relationship with the state: after the *Ausgleich* the members of the younger generation who were filled with a desire to reform society considered the various posts in the civil service as safe starting points for their future activity. One might suspect that the same idea may have induced the *Huszadik Század* generation to accept jobs in public offices. In any event, illusions of this kind were dispelled by the political crisis of 1905-6. From then onwards those seeking reforms hoped to find the organizational framework not in state bodies but in the various social organizations, societies and parties which were then forming.) From an early stage they began to pursue scientific and literary activities as well as their official work. In the very first years of the century, many of them published something significant. Their life-styles were bourgeois, and they were faced with the contradictions and problems of the social, political and economic structure that then existed. Their crisis of conscience stemmed from an inescapable choice between science and politics as well as between consistent expression of their opinions and security of livelihood. Nor were they spared neurasthenic restlessness and storms in their private lives. Some of them were bound together in classically beautiful friendships, while others were divided by unrestrained anger. Many of them were connected through family ties.

Their careers, which had begun so similarly, continued in ways that were divergent in many respects. Some managed to become university lecturers (Bódog Somló), while some others con-

tinued in official positions (Pál Szende, Ödön Wildner). Some free-lanced (Ede Harkányi), others were able to remain independent through family wealth (Lajos Leopold), while others devoted all their energies to scholarly and political activities (Oszkár Jászi), which often involved financial worries, since the payment for translations, articles and lectures was not very high. From the political and ideological points of view, the 1905-6 political crisis acted as a dividing line. Since the coalition put hardly any of its national slogans into practice, as has been mentioned, the electoral reform propagated by Vienna came into a seemingly insoluble conflict with the national demands. Some broke faith completely with the *Huszadik Század* circle at this time and later went into Parliament, where they attacked their former friends from a conservative nationalist standpoint (Pál Wolfner). Others gradually withdrew and concentrated on scholarly research, but in times of severe crisis (when freedom of research was threatened) they raised their voices again (Gyula Pikler, Bódog Somló).

Those who remained loyal to the *Huszadik Század* circle after 1906-7 were consistent and faithful adherents of the various trends of social democracy and of bourgeois radicalism, which was developing into a political trend at this time. The relations between socialism and radicalism, socialists and radicals, and between Oszkár Jászi and Ervin Szabó personally, exerted a decisive influence on the political and intellectual outlook of the circle, so much so that in Hungary reactionary public opinion often identified sociology, "the science of opposition", with socialism.

From 1904 onwards Oszkár Jászi, the leading figure in Hungarian bourgeois radical ideology, often dealt in letters, articles and studies with the possibilities of achieving socialism in Hungary and with the chances of forming a Hungarian socialist party. What separated Jászi and the radicals from the Social Democratic Party was that the Social Democrats did not find it important to emphasize their "Hungarianness" or the national question in general.[22] The Social Democratic leadership was also somewhat opposed to the intelligentsia as a whole. It reacted with suspicion to the initiatives aimed at reforming

the party's ideological and practical activity and even considered such initiatives to be hostile. One result of this attitude was that socialists who found the ideological and organizational discipline of the party cumbersome often chose the forums of the radicals, where the practice of stating opinions openly made it possible for them to express their ideas. (To complete the picture let me mention a contrary example: in 1911, when Oszkár Jászi became involved in a conflict with the editors of the radical paper *Világ* [World], he was allowed to express his views in *Népszava* [People's voice], the paper of the Social Democrats.) Nevertheless, despite all the differences in views, the cooperation between the circle of sociologists and the Social Democratic movement in the battle for the universal, secret ballot was enduring. Effective coordination was also required to achieve success for the various workers' courses organized by the Sociological Society. The radical and socialist views on both abstract, theoretical questions and on concrete, practical tasks developed through mutual influence, sometimes converging almost totally and sometimes diverging considerably within the framework of the common workshop: the circle of the Sociological Society and *Huszadik Század* and the other organizations that grew out of them.

In analysing the social and psychological characteristics of the circle around *Huszadik Század*, a few words should also be said about freemasonry in Hungary during this period.[23]

The development of freemasonry, following 18th century antecedents, was a phenomenon of Hungarian bourgeois transformation after the *Ausgleich*. Lodges of both rites were formed. (Given the conditions in Hungary, it was significant that the number of Masons who intended to make use of this freemasonry in the fight to achieve national cultural aims was higher in the lodges that followed the Scottish rite.) The Symbolic Great Lodge was established on March 20, 1886. From the very onset, more or less conspicuously, two tendencies were discernible in Hungarian freemasonry (as was the case in the circle of *Huszadik Század*). One was withdrawal from the daily problems of society, which was similar to the stance of the English lodges, while the other resembled the situation in France, where Free-

masons in general were active supporters of consistently anti-clerical and anti-militarist policies.

During the First World War the 126 operative lodges had about 13,000 members. The majority of Masons (who were fairly mixed from a social point of view, comprising members of the Hungarian, Jewish and German petty and middle bourgeoisie; civil servants; privately employed office workers from impoverished gentry or bourgeois families; self-employed lawyers and physicians, as well as a few aristocrats and members of the *haute bourgeoisie*) were far from advocating democratic and radical principles. However, public opinion took notice of the few lodges which displayed a definitely political character and which made themselves heard, and regarded Freemasonry as a forum for progress.

This view had a basis in reality. Radical bourgeois and socialist elements in the early years of the century were ready to cooperate with Freemasonry. Their motive for doing so was to make use of Freemasonry's advantages of a national network, international connections and considerable funds. An important part in the utilization of Freemasonry in Hungary as the forum for progress was played by Oszkár Jászi. His opinion was that Freemasonry "can only regain its former splendour if it considers the cause of the working class as its own, as it once did the cause of the bourgeoisie".[24] Accordingly, in 1905, Jászi urged the formation of a new, decidedly socialist lodge, in the hope that "by exercising sufficient pressure we can soon gain a dominant position, and be backed by an immense organization".[25] The idea was followed up, and in March 1906 Jászi and seven of his friends joined the Democracy Lodge. However, since they found difficulty in having their programme and working methods accepted within the framework already established, they founded a new lodge - the "Martinovics Lodge" - in May 1908. The call issued to those wishing to join was one of the detailed programmes of Hungarian bourgeois radicalism, and later the Masonic campaigns organized by the lodge's 70-80 members and the coordination of the work of certain other lodges were among the greatest achievements of progressive trends at the turn of the century. Let me mention just a few of these: campaigns were or-

ganized for universal suffrage and the secret ballot; the Free School of Sociology, the Hungarian Association of Freethinkers, and the Galileo Circle, which united radical and socialist youth, were all founded, as was the daily paper *Világ*, and, in 1914, the Citizens' Radical Party. But fearing bourgeois influence at the beginning of 1918, the Social Democratic Party banned its members from taking part in the work of the lodges. Up to then freemasonry had played a very important, decisive role in bringing together those who wished, however differently, to improve Hungarian society.

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Finally, let me conclude this paper with a question. What were this circle's political and scientific achievements and what influence did it have on Hungary at the turn of the century and in later years?

To give a full answer would be out of place here, so I shall only refer to the salient facts.

In the years before the First World War the influence of the *Huszadik Század* circle on daily politics was not substantial, but neither can it be overlooked. Considering the conditions in Hungary its circulation (about 3,000 copies per issue) was very large and, as a result, so was its sphere of influence. This influence was further increased by the numerous lectures that the staff of *Huszadik Század* delivered to the Sociological Society and elsewhere.

Of course one cannot say exactly how many people, in a backward Hungary, had their thinking turned by *Huszadik Század* towards social progress, social reform, and political, and occasionally revolutionary, action. Hungarian historians consider that the mentality, thinking, logic and ethics of the leading thinkers and politicians of the bourgeois revolution of 1918, and of the socialist revolution of 1919, were largely shaped by the work carried out by the *Huszadik Század* circle.

For this group to have founded Hungarian social self-recognition by means of its first sociographies was also an act

of historical significance. A generation later the sociographies written within the framework of the Hungarian populist movement, which had a great influence on the thinking of the new generation that assumed important political and social roles after 1945, were modelled on those written by the *Huszadik Század* circle. Like these early sociographies they were imbued with the moral obligation of social self-recognition, and they also aimed at scientific reliability.

Finally, the intellectual level and moral integrity of the scholars and journalists who first experienced the great conflicts of thought and social activity in the intellectual workshop that was *Huszadik Század* created an almost inexhaustible reservoir of inspiration. This inspiration helped succeeding generations in their fight against Hungarian social backwardness and on behalf of social progress.

After 1919 the members of the *Huszadik Század* circle who were forced into external or internal exile lost all chance of political activity. This was the way in which history resolved the main problem of the *Huszadik Század* workshop: the conflict between thought and action. Moreover, their intellectual heritage was far more of a stimulus for disturbing thoughts denoting new directions than it was an engine for political actions intended to shape history directly.

NOTES

1 For a comprehensive introduction to the problems of *fin-de-siècle* Hungary cf.: Péter Hanák, "Hungary in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Preponderancy or Dependency?" *Austrian History Yearbook* (1967), III, 1, pp 260-302; Zoltán Horváth, *Die Jahrhundertwende in Ungarn. Geschichte der zweiten Reformgeneration* (Budapest, 1966); *Magyarország története, 1890-1918* (A history of Hungary, 1890-1918) (Budapest, 1978).

2 For the earliest beginnings of Hungarian sociology cf.: Imre Szabó, *A burzsoá állam- és jogbölcselet Magyarországon* (Bourgeois constitutional and legal theory in Hungary), (Budapest, 1980[2]); Gábor Zsigmond, *A magyar társadalomnéprajz kezdetei. Beöthy Leó (1839-1886)*, (The beginnings of Hungarian social ethnography. Leó Beöthy [1839-1886]) (Budapest, 1984); G. Béla Németh, "Az 'irodalmi' értelmiség felső rétegének ideológiájához 1867 után" (On the ideology of the upper

layer of "literary" intellectuals). In: *Létharc és nemzetiség* (Nationality and the struggle for existence), (Budapest, 1976) pp. 7-41; Ágnes Várkonyi, *A pozitivista szemlélet a magyar történetírásban* (Positivism in Hungarian historiography), (Budapest, 1973), vol. 2; Róbert Horváth, *A statisztikai módszer és elmélet kérdései Berzeviczy Gergely műveiben* (The problems of statistical method and theory in the works of Gergely Berzeviczy), (Budapest, 1972); Tibor Huszár, *Az értelmiség-szociológia és -szociográfia hazai történetéhez* (On the history of the sociology and sociography of the intelligentsia in Hungary). In: *Nemzetlét – nemzettudat – értelmiség* (National being – national consciousness – intelligentsia) (Budapest, 1984), p. 109.

3 Ágost Pulszky (1846-1900). Professor at the University of Budapest from 1874. The author of the first comprehensive Hungarian work on the philosophy of law. A critic of natural law, he translated and edited Henry J. Sumner Maine's *Ancient Law*, the translation being published in Budapest in 1875. In his lengthy notes he praises the English scholar for adopting a historical approach to the study of law. Pulszky's most important work has been translated into English (*The Theory of Law and Civil Society*, London, 1888; reprinted London, 1979).
Gyula Pikler (1864-1947) taught at the University of Budapest from 1886 onwards. Pikler was the most significant representative of the positivist philosophy of law in Hungary. For him, his discipline was not a branch of philosophy – it was called a branch of philosophy only because it was still imperfect – its proper name being the *science* of law. First a follower of Spencer, Pikler later tried to build up a sociology of law on the basis of psychological and psycho-physiological regularities. He was compelled to resign his university chair in 1920 when the right-wing Horthy regime came to power in Hungary. Some of his works were also published in German and English, including: *Der Ursprung des Totemismus. Ein Beitrag zur materialistischen Geschichtstheorie* (co-author Bódog Somló), (Berlin, 1900); *Das Grundgesetz alles neuro-psychischen Lebens* (Leipzig, 1900); *Sinnesphysiologische Untersuchungen* (Leipzig, 1917); *Schriften zur Anpassungstheorie des Empfindungsvorganges* (Leipzig, 1919 and afterwards); *The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence* Part I, *Objectiva Capable at Presentation* (London – Edinburgh, 1890).

4 Gusztáv Gratz (1875-1946). A law graduate, Gratz was a member of the Hungarian Parliament from 1906, belonging to the ruling "Party of Work" from 1910. Director of the National Association of Industrialists from 1912, Minister of Finance in 1917, Ambassador to Vienna (November 1919 – January 1921), and Foreign Minister (January – April 1921). Gratz participated in the attempt to bring about a Habsburg restoration in Hungary. From 1924 Gratz was one of the leaders of the Cultural Organization of Germans in Hungary. He was also a historian of some importance, writing *A dualizmus kora* (The age of Dualism), (Budapest, 1934).

5 The letters are now in the Manuscript Collection of the National Széchenyi Library in Budapest.

6 Gratz to Somló, July 18, 1899.

7 Lóránt Hegedüs, "Spencer és a szociológia" (Spencer and sociology) *Huszadik Század* (hereafter *H.Sz.*), 1904, vol. I, p. 88.

8 Oszkár Jászi, "Herbert Spencer és jövő feladataink" (Herbert Spencer and our future tasks) *H.Sz.* 1904, vol. I, p. 4.

9 Gyula Pikler (cf. Note 3) was attacked in 1901 on the grounds that his teachings – according to his opponents – did not respect national and religious values. Groups of Catholic students organized large-scale demonstrations against Pikler, and fights between followers and enemies of Pikler were common at the University of Budapest. He was attacked in Parliament also, by an MP of the Catholic People's Party, although finally his position was stabilized. However, Pikler's subject, the philosophy of law, was abolished as a compulsory subject for law students. The case of Bódog Somló (1873-1922) was similar. In 1903, while he was teaching at the Academy of Law in Nagyvárad, his colleagues demanded his dismissal because of his "anti-monarchist" and "anti-religious" stance. Well-known foreign scholars (among them Ferri, Lombroso, Loria, Labriola, Sergi, Croce, and Sidney Webb) expressed support for Somló, and numerous articles in the Hungarian press emphasized the need for the liberty of thought. Somló was able to keep his job.

10 *Tudományos publicisztika* (Scientific journalism). *H.Sz.* 1900 vol. I, pp. 2-12.

11 *H.Sz.* 1901 vol. I, p. 276.

12 National Széchényi Library, Manuscript Collection An/2408/3.

13 *Ibid.* An 2408/5.

14 Somló's remark concerning his copy of Gratz's letter to the members of the editorial board. *Ibid.* An/2408/3.

15 Jászi, Oszkár: "Tiz év" (Ten years) *H.Sz.* 1910, vol. I, p. 6.

16 At the January 1905 elections the Liberal Party, which had been in power for 30 years, was defeated. The king was unwilling to appoint a new government made up of members of the opposition "national coalition". The temporary government which now took power attempted to turn the (rather formidable) mass-movements against the national coalition and offered to introduce universal suffrage. Jászi and his circle backed this proposal and as a result the coali-

tion called them traitors to the national cause. The coalition eventually assumed office in April 1906.

17 *H.Sz.* 1907 vol. I, pp. 1-15.

18 "Önálló vámterület és az osztályok erőviszonyai" (An independent customs area and the balance of power between the classes). *H.Sz.* 1906, vol. II, pp. 27-50.

19 *H.Sz.* 1912, vol. II, p. 466.

20 *Ibid.* p. 469.

21 Jászi to Károlyi, Budapest, December 1916. I would like to thank György Litván and János F. Varga for giving me a chance to study the manuscripts in their selection of Oszkár Jászi's correspondence, a selection which includes this letter. The letter is in full published in György Litván (ed.), *Károlyi Mihály levelezése* (Mihály Károlyi's correspondence), (Budapest, 1978), vol. I, pp. 157-8.

22 György Litván gives a thorough analysis of the problem in his *Magyar gondolat – szabad gondolat* (Hungarian thought – free thought), (Budapest, 1978).

23 Cf. Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *Szabadkőművesség a XX. században* (Freemasonry in the 20th century), (Budapest, 1977); György Fukász, *Szabadkőművesség, radikalizmus és szocializmus az 1918 előtti Magyarországon* (Freemasonry, radicalism and socialism in pre-1918 Hungary), *Párttörténeti Közlemények*, 1961 pp. 55-84.

24 Jászi's letter to Bódog Somló, Budapest, 27 September, 1905, National Széchényi Library, Manuscript Collection.

25 *Ibid.*

that called themselves the national causes. The coali-
tion eventually [illegible] outside the capital (1906).

17 H.Sz. 1907 vol. I, pp. 1-15.

18 "[illegible]" [illegible] and the balance of power between the
classes). H.Sz. 1906, vol. II, pp. 27-50.

19 H.Sz. 1911, vol. I, p. 466.

20 Ibid. p. 469.

21 Jászi to Károlyi, Budapest, December 1914: I would like to
[illegible] the [illegible] in their selection of
[illegible] correspondence [illegible]
[illegible] letter [illegible] published in [illegible]
[illegible] (Károlyi Mihály [illegible] cor-
respondence), Budapest, 1978, vol. I, pp. 91-94.

22 [illegible] a [illegible]
[illegible] thoughts - from
1900 to 1967, Budapest, 1978.

23 Cf. [illegible]
[illegible] 20th century [illegible], Budapest, 1972.
[illegible]
[illegible] and [illegible]
[illegible] pp. 58-84.

24 Jászi's letter to Bódog Somló, Budapest, 27 September
1905, National Széchényi Library, Manuscript Collection.

25 Ibid.

VICTOR KARADY

ASSIMILATION AND SCHOOLING: NATIONAL AND DENOMINATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF BUDAPEST AROUND 1900

The problem of national minorities was a major social issue in nineteenth-century Hungary not only because, of the emerging European nation-states, the country, ruled by a militantly nationalist gentry, contained the largest proportion of ethnic groups of foreign extraction[1] but also because the growing part played by immigrant or native Jews, Germans and Slavs in the ever-quickening process of economic and social modernization gradually changed the balance of power within the new elite. On the one hand, the Magyar gentry, rapidly losing its landed property, was obliged to enter into a class alliance with the new industrial and commercial bourgeoisie of mostly foreign origin in order to maintain its political hegemony. On the other hand, the rising middle strata made up by people of non-Magyar background, whose social legitimation rested essentially upon acquired assets such as industrial and commercial capital or educational qualifications and not upon birth, eagerly sought a measure of cultural assimilation which would make them eligible for admittance to the prestigious historic elite.[2] Nationalist education policies pursued at a primary and secondary level during the Liberal Era (1867-1918) were part and parcel of assimilationist policies designed to strengthen the dominant ethnic group, especially within the social groupings in control of the state and of the economy. These policies resulted in the building up of a modern, efficient and sizable school system which was instrumental in the rapid reduction of illiteracy and which achieved a relative aggregate over-education of the middle classes.[3] The university system - with two

traditional universities as well as a technical one – was complemented by several law schools and training institutions of lower academic rank. Strongly centered on the capital[4] and thoroughly upgraded by the end of the century, this system catered to the vocational training, socialization and legitimation of the new elite whether originating from upwardly mobile, downwardly mobile or established social clusters.

This paper, drawing upon an empirical survey,[5] cannot tackle in all its complexity the problem of the social functions of the Hungarian universities during the Liberal Era. It will instead deal with the more limited issue of the participation in higher education of the national and denominational minorities. The paper has three aims: 1) to measure their global weight and their relative (group-specific) representation among students and graduates of the two main universities of the country, both of which were located in Budapest; 2) to appraise their disciplinary distribution among the faculties and branches of study; and 3) to assess the impact of the degree of Magyarization they had undergone on their academic chances and career choices. The evidence gathered under these headings will help to shed light on the uses of higher education in the selection and social reproduction of the service elite in a society still rigidly stratified along inherited status lines, notably where ethnicity and denomination (together with noble versus common descent and the nature, as well as the quantity of inherited wealth) belonged to the ordinary criteria defining a person's position in society.

There are three important stumbling blocks in any such study. First, criteria that determine social status, however accurate they may be, are never independent of those that define class positions as delineated by other categories of economic power (accumulated wealth, market position) and social authority (alliances with families in other status groups), as well as by other assets such as education or inherited symbolic patrimony (according to position of the family – ascendant or descendant – on the class and status ladder). Nationality and denomination are in a way, therefore, abstract and atomized categories which contribute to the circumscription of

operationally social positions without conveying self-sufficiently their own full intelligibility. Unfortunately, at the present state of research, we cannot but keep in mind the complexity of social relationships of which nationality and denomination were a part in old Hungary. Empirically, it seems impossible to demonstrate their interdependence (except in extreme cases which will be dealt with below). They must be used here as independent variables only in an explicitly qualified manner.

Secondly and more specifically, the statistical distribution of the national and denominational minorities itself followed, during the Liberal Era, a complex global and regional pattern. Geographic distance from school facilities and urban or rural residence were themselves not negligible factors in determining educational opportunities. The nationwide relevance of our data, which is limited to Budapest,[6] is somewhat precarious. Beyond this restriction, one must also remember the heavy (if only partial) interdependence of the occurrence of the different national and denominational groups. Let us sum up some of the basic facts. Jews (5.0 percent of the Hungarian population outside Croatia[7] in 1900) and Calvinists (14.4 percent) offer examples of relatively clear opposite types, the first being considered for all practical purposes (even if historically wrongly) as being of purely alien extraction and the latter as being purely Magyar. Catholics (48.7 percent) were half Magyar by stock, with strong German and Slovak minorities. Lutherans (7.5 percent) were made up almost equally by Magyars, Germans and Slovaks. Of the other religious groups represented, Greek Catholics (11.0 percent) and Greek Oriental Christians (13.1 percent) were almost exclusively of non-Magyar, mostly Romanian and Serbian, background, but their weight in higher education – together with that of the smaller Protestant congregations – proved to be negligible. For this reason, they will not specifically be dealt with here.

A third and even more considerable difficulty arises when one attempts to give a working definition of nationality. Census data grounded on indications of mother tongue became less and less significant as linguistic Magyarization proceeded –

as part of the assimilationist move. Our data is based on the national character of family name which, in its own right, offers some advantages as rather clear, hard evidence, although this, too, is not without its difficulties. Contrary to what one might think, the significance of family name is not always obvious. Many names of Slav or German origin were by the end of the last century considered to be Hungarian, even without formal modification. More importantly, the movement to *Magyarize* family names had been for most of the nineteenth century an element in assimilationist self-assertion on the part of socially-ascendant sections of the middle classes, most conspicuously among Jews and Germans. Furthermore, there is no data on the distribution of Magyar and non-Magyar names within denominational groups, let alone in the population as a whole. Our data cannot therefore support rigorous comparisons of denominational group-specific or nationwide education frequencies between nationalities. For all these reasons, our indicator of national identity, family name, must be interpreted as only an approximation of national status. This means, practically, that for those cited as Magyars on the basis of surname, we ignore their real national status but can reliably assume that they were either of truly Magyar extraction or at an advanced stage of conscious assimilation. For those cited as aliens on the basis of surname we can only assume that their families originated in alien groups, whatever stage of assimilation they themselves had reached by the time they entered the ambit of our survey. Even if the family name proves *in abstracto* a poor indicator of national status, we will see that its explanatory power remains considerable as regards educational behavior and opportunity. Indeed, one could state that the statistical artefacts defined by family names can be approximated to meaningful analytical categories because they help to account for observed differences in the use of the university system.

INEQUALITIES OF ACCESS

National statistics on higher education offer an overall assessment of the general disparities that prevailed at the

turn of the century in the access probabilities of denominational and national groups. Relative over-education was apparent among Hungarians and Germans as against the other nationalities, when national status was measured by mother tongue.[8] Similarly, Jewish and – to a much lesser degree – Protestant over-education as against a substantial under-representation of Catholics and other Christians in the student population appears to be a major feature of the academic scene. The education propensity of the Jews is particularly striking since this quantitatively marginal denominational group filled one quarter of all places in the universities. (Cf. Table 1.) Given these marked differences of frequencies, it seems worth exploring whether these indeed significant correlations refer directly to denominational and national group-specific trends of education or rather exhibit the impact of other variables of social status – socio-economic position and degree of assimilation are cases in point – with which denomination and nationality were themselves correlated. The issue is crucial inasmuch as it helps to clarify the much-discussed problem of the extent to which achieved or desired national status (as indicated by family name) and denomination are independent factors of education propensity.

Table 2 offers some clues about the effect of assimilation and also about the total presence of the national minorities in higher education. If half of the student population bore Hungarian names, it must be assumed that many members of it came from families of "alien" extraction. This is obvious in the case of Jewish and Lutheran students who display a proportion of Magyar names – two-fifths and almost one half respectively – out of scale with the proportion of Magyar stock in their related sub-groups in the country. The case of the former is illuminating as it is well known that the overwhelming majority of Jews belonged either to immigrant families proper, or to descendants of such families, or to families forced to take German names in the late eighteenth century. The high proportion of Magyars by name among Jewish students indicates the strength of the assimilationist drive in the socially-ascending Hungarian Jewry[9] but also its heavy inter-relation with

Table 1 Disciplinary choices of Hungarian students by denomination, 1900/1901*

	Arts and Sciences	Medicine	Pharmacy	Polytechnic (Engineering)	Theology	Law	Creative Arts	Total	Total number	Percent of total
Catholics	13.3	4.4	1.9	13.7	14.6	47.7	4.3	100	4,460	41,4
Lutherans	12.2	7.2	2.7	24.2	17.4	41.1	5.1	100	956	8.9
Calvinists	12.3	3.7	1.5	12.8	16.0	51.6	2.0	100	1,694	15.7
Jews	8.7	11.2	0.7	29.2	2.3	42.3	5.6	100	2,689	25.0
Unitarians	22	6	1	2	15	53	1	100	99	0.8
Other Christians	7.0	5.6	1.5	6.3	30.7	48.0	0.8	100	881	8.2
Total Number of Students	1,240	683	168	1,807	1,434	5,002	434		10,768	
Percent of All Places	11.5	6.3	1.6	16.8	46.5	4.0				100

*Source: *Magyar statisztikai évkönyv* 1901, *passim*.

propensities for over-education. Even if linguistic Magyarization by far preceded and exceeded the exchange of alien-sounding family names for Magyar ones - a trend which lacked any reason to be fully completed, especially as this voluntary change in public identity was not consistent with important collective values stressing the formal expression of continuity in family identity along the male line - the large number of Magyars by name among Jewish students suggests that the change in family name and schooling was part of the same assimilationist strategy, the one entailing the other. The case of the Lutherans is conclusive in the same sense. Of composite ethnic stock, the Lutherans of alien descent had, by the end of the century, not gone the whole way towards linguistic Magyarization. The fact that the proportion of Magyars by name among Lutheran students was almost double the proportion of Magyars by mother tongue in the population at large appears to be hard evidence in support of the assumption that linguistic assimilation and over-education were again strongly inter-connected. The relatively high proportion of aliens by name (one-fifth of the total) among Calvinist students could, paradoxically, highlight the same phenomenon, even if we allow for a number of coding errors. Adopting the faith regarded as "the most Magyar denomination" was, for families of alien origin, an act of veritable assimilation, even when it was not followed by Magyarization of the family name. The remarkably frequent occurrence of Calvinist students with alien names can thus be interpreted as confirmation of propensities for over-schooling observed among other groups of assimilated "aliens".

The overall sociological meaning of the preceding discussion can be summarized as follows. The bulk of the new educated elite trained in universities came from families of non-Magyar background. Indeed, if we add the proportions of all students with alien names to those of all Jewish students, a proportion almost two-thirds of the total (65 percent)[10] is formally reached. However, since we know that a considerable number of students with Magyar names were born to assimilated families (which had changed their names), the real proportion of students of non-Magyar ancestry must be set much higher, probably

Table 2 Ethnic and denominational status of Budapest university graduates and students around 1900

a) Percent of students with Magyar names within each discipline and denomination

	Doctors of Political Science	Doctors of Law	Doctors of Science	Doctors of Arts	Engineers	Holders of Teacher's Degree in Science	Holders of Teacher's Degree in Arts	Doctors of Medicine	Total**
Catholics	54	57	54	64	36	?	?	46	51.1
Lutherans	65*	26	45	59	49	?	?	51	47.4
Calvinists	91	83	57	70	80	?	?	93	80.1
Jews	40	39	60	55	54	?	?	40	39.0
Others	22*	27	-*	8	38	?	?	10	20.7
Together	55.5	45.8	53.6	59.4	38.4	50.1	52.1	40	47.9

* N = less than 10

** All except theology students but including holders of teacher's degrees (for which denominational distribution in unknown).

Source: Survey data

b) Disciplinary choices of students, %

	Doctors of Political Science	Doctors of Law	Doctors of Science	Doctors of Arts	Doctors of Medicine	Engineers	Total	Number	Percent
Jews with Hungarian names	3.3	26.8	5.0	16.2	26.2	22.5	100	302	16.4
Other Jews	4.0	34.6	2.7	10.7	32.2	15.8	100	372	20.2
Non-Jews with German names	10.4	14.4	4.4	19.3	22.2	29.2	100	270	14.7
Non-Jews with other (Slav) names	12.1	23.9	8.2	15.0	19.6	21.1	100	280	15.2
Non-Jews with Hungarian names	14.0	19.2	6.0	23.9	18.3	18.5	100	615	33.4
Number	173	434	97	330	427	379		1,840	100
Percent	9.4	23.6	5.3	17.9	23.2	20.6	100		

Source: Survey data

at 75-80 percent. The implications of this evidence cannot be discussed in this brief article. It is enough to suggest that the overwhelming presence of ethnically-assimilated alien members in the educated middle classes provides an essential explanatory principle to account for their social and intellectual "openness" and innovative potential. However, it also helps account for the fragmented nature of the emerging Hungarian intelligentsia and professional elite, as well as for the grave internal tensions it has experienced during this century in the form of anti-Semitism,[11] xenophobia (directed against German assimilates above all), and in milder but correlated forms of anti-modernist, anti-cosmopolitan or "anti-urban" trends. Most of these were indeed directed against assimilated clusters producing modern symbolic culture.[12]

It is important at this juncture to establish exactly what the high schooling propensity of groups of alien background owed to group-specific investment strategies in education and how much of it should be considered the simple outflow of attitudes towards education common in those social classes to which they happened to belong. Socio-economic class position is a well-documented factor of differential chances of access to universities. The Hungarian academic statistics on the social selection of students – available since the academic year 1898-99 – show, for example, a notable over-representation of students with fathers in the liberal professions and the civil service but much less that of those whose fathers belonged to the bourgeoisie proper or even that of those whose fathers were teachers and clerics.[13] With some statistical ingenuity it is easy to compare an expected theoretical number of students belonging to each denomination – once the effect of class stratification on schooling is neutralized – with the observed numbers. Such comparison for the academic year 1900-1901 yields a net denomination-specific over-representation of 2.0 for Jewish and 1.25 for Lutheran students as well as a net under-representation of 0.88 for Catholic and 0.75 for Calvinist students.[14] Over-education can thus be statistically demonstrated for the two denominational groups which contained the largest proportions of assimilated members.

The Jewish case seems paradigmatic since virtually the whole Hungarian Jewish community can be regarded as being on the way to assimilation around 1900. The great efforts Jews made to secure higher educational qualifications – on average at least twice those of fellow members of their various classes[15] – must be interpreted not only as a thrust towards social ascent but, more generally, as an endeavor to gain compensation for deprivation suffered as regards other social assets linked to dominant nationality status. The pursuit of certified knowledge and the search for formal qualifications were aimed partly at the same social distinction and security to which members of the national majority could accede by birthright of a kind, thanks to their social alliance and their first-hand socialization within the dominant culture. Magyar higher education – the only higher education available in Hungary outside Croatia – offered itself as a formal certification of cultural assimilation, especially valuable for a status group exposed to widespread discrimination on grounds of its "alien" cultural status. Higher vocational training – leading to the liberal professions – helped to make up for the tacit exclusion of Jews from the political bureaucracy and more generally, from careers in the civil service.[16]

The case of Lutheran over-education is more difficult to account for because of the more heterogeneous character of the group. Even so, analogies with the situation of the Jews are too numerous to be discarded as common explanatory factors. A sizable section of the Lutherans, as of the Jews, was either German or had German cultural references (linguistic skills, literacy and aspirations to links with German high culture).[17] They had the lowest proportions of illiterates, due partly to high standards of religious literacy.[18] Bilingualism or multilingualism was widespread, much more than in the other denominations, especially those of Magyar background.[19] General similarities were significant also in terms of socio-economic stratification. Lutherans and Jews not only had the lowest proportion of unskilled employees and workers among their active population[20] but also had the highest proportions of educated middle class staff – the "intelligent class" in contemporary sta-

tistics[21] – and of propertied "independents".[22] Within the urban middle classes and bourgeoisie proper, as exemplified in the capital city, Lutherans and Jews together formed the best-off economic brackets.[23] More importantly, those Lutherans who remained in agriculture – still the majority at the turn of the century – belonged overwhelmingly to the landed peasantry, especially those of German stock.[24] Like Jews, Lutherans experienced, simultaneously, a large measure of geographic dispersion and some residential segregation owing to their marginal minority position almost everywhere in the country.[25] In spite of this, and notwithstanding the fact that the Lutheran community was not more concentrated in cities than the other Christian groups on the whole, substantial sections of German Lutherans formed the core of the traditional trading and industrial bourgeoisie in the economically more developed – and fast developing – West Hungarian towns (including Budapest), and in the mining cities. On the strength of their remaining family ties as often relatively recent immigrants, their linguistic skills facilitating trading relations beyond the frontiers and their minority status, German Lutherans in many ways behaved like a diaspora. Their consciousness of a separate identity which, if not actually threatened, still bore the traces and the recollections of an existence which in the past had been hardly[26] tolerated, now contributed to maintaining in influential sections of the Lutheran community a defensive attitude which found expression in an active policy of denominational schooling among other things.[27]

Therefore, for all the lack of directly demonstrative evidence in this matter (especially on non-Jewish groups), the indirect evidence suggests that high schooling frequencies were typical of mobile ethnic minorities, especially those which were not based substantially in the poor, servile peasantry. These mobile ethnic minorities were Jews, Germans and some of the Slavs. The balance of national groups present in Hungary in 1842 (see note 1) can well be used as a rough estimate of the primitive distribution of Magyars and non-Magyars in the country, before the movement to Magyarize family names got properly underway. If we disregard later migratory and demographic

changes which, for all practical purposes, were unable to change the basic balance between ethnic groups, nationality data in 1842 can be compared with the distribution of students by family name around 1900. Magyars, representing some 38 percent of the population in 1842, make up a smaller proportion of students with Magyar names in 1900, although it is obvious that the latter include a significant proportion of alien stock. Conversely, Germans represented about 10 percent of the population in 1842 but provided more than 18 percent of students in 1900 (excluding Jewish students with German family names), in spite of the process of nominal Magyarization. As for Slavs and Romanians who, in 1842, amounted to more than one-third of the population, these ethnic groups remained clearly under-represented among students at the turn of the century, with their proportion hardly exceeding that provided by those of German stock. Thanks to these approximations the notable over-education of local Germans and the relative under-education of the Magyars can be reasonably substantiated, in addition to Jewish over-education, established above. Students of Jewish and German stock made up the bulk of young graduates in Budapest around 1900 (some 52 percent in all), while Jews and Germans taken together can be put at a mere 15 percent of the national population. Detailed evidence is lacking to attempt an other than general appreciation of schooling frequencies typical for the Romanians and the Slavs in the Hungary of this time.

Some regional disparities can also be observed within the study of inequalities of access to universities in Budapest. Relevant data is set out in Table 3.

This reveals the extent to which the urban or rural nature of the place of birth – acting as an objectivation of social and spatial proximity to opportunities for schooling – governed the probability of receiving higher education around the turn of the century. For each denominational group, students born in cities enjoyed a very much higher chance of getting into universities than those born in small towns or in rural areas. These disparities are linked, of course, not only to the spatial distribution of educational provisions in the country but also to the residential distribution of social classes. Large

Table 3 Number of graduates and students of Budapest universities around 1900 by denomination and per 100,000 inhabitants of their birthplace*

	Catholics	Calvinists	Lutherans	Jews
Budapest	62	112	170	179
Pest County	3	5	11	41
Towns with academic institutions**	27	24	135	259
Towns with secondary schools	7	7	13	108
All	9.0	8.8	17.3	120

*Number of inhabitants in 1880 compared with the number of students observed in the survey around 1900 by birthplace.

**Except Miskolc where population distribution by denomination is not available for 1880 since, at that time, the town did not have yet the status of an autonomous municipality.

Source: The survey data for students; *Publications statistiques hongroises* 27, pp. 86-89 (in French) for population data.

sections of city dwellers of all denominations belonged to the mobile lower middle classes or even to the educated elite, and their propensity to seek, and capacity to secure, higher education for their children were obviously much greater than those of the rural masses. This is also the reason why residential disparities of this kind are smaller among Jewish students, whose parent population contained no poor peasantry, unlike the other groups. Jewish over-schooling happened to be the greatest in the cities outside Budapest, which can be interpreted as a sign of the concentration of relatively under-privileged settlers in the capital, a major target for assetless Jewish families on the move in the nineteenth century.[28] For all other denominations educational scores in Budapest are the very highest, greatly exceeding even those of other urban groups. This is particularly striking for Calvinists who constitute the gen-

erally less well-educated denomination. The reason for such a disparity is explicable in socio-historical terms. Very few Calvinists came to live in Budapest during the nineteenth century,[29] and those who did so during the Liberal Era included several representatives of the ruling bureaucracy and intelligentsia, whose educational investments were incomparably greater than those of their provincial co-religionists.[30] Whatever their regional background, Jewish and Lutheran students were always better represented at the universities than Catholics and Calvinists. The relative privilege of Lutherans was quite considerable when they belonged to urban groups. Among students born in the capital, their presence per population unit reached the frequency of Jewish students and, among other students of urban extraction, their presence exceeded by five to six times that of Catholics or Calvinists. Specific over-representation of Lutheran students of urban background cannot be explained except by the general strength of the Lutheran bourgeoisie and by its particular educational propensity in the cities.

Geographic disparities in the distribution of students by place of birth cannot, unfortunately, be interpreted here in more detail, because there is not enough statistical evidence on the ethnic and denominational distribution of the population by geographic criteria to allow the working out of reliable indicators in this matter. Let us say simply that the traditional historical claim that Western Hungary was more developed than the Central and Eastern regions is not supported by our survey data. Educational indicators for Transdanubia (outside Budapest) are no better than the national average, except for Jews.[31] They are, indeed, much below the average for Catholics. This fact should be examined more closely in a regional study of relationships between economic and educational processes.

CURRICULUM AND DISCIPLINARY CHOICES

Ethnic and religious groups, whatever their chances may have been to complete higher studies, behaved differently once

they were admitted to the universities. The survey offers two indicators of curricular differentials, age of graduation and disciplinary options. Both are essential conditions of the social efficiency of graduation in a career, the former delaying or advancing its beginning, the latter being instrumental in steering it towards a wide range of social roles and targets.

Evidence concerning the age of graduation, as shown in Table 4, carries, of course, at least two meanings since it measures academic success as well as reflecting the material difficulties students had to face to achieve timely graduation. On the whole, it conveys a general indication of the social conditions – favorable or unfavorable – under which students completed their studies. Age differentials cannot be expected to display such variations by ethnic and denominational groups as observed in probabilities of access. The social obstacles to overcome before admittance to university were obviously much greater than those awaiting students before graduation. Nevertheless, the pattern of ethnic and denominational dissimilarities is remarkably similar in the two cases. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the nature of social obstacles or hindrances acting in the ethnic-denominational selection of students and during their courses was the same.

General differences among denominations are rather limited but the hierarchy of excellence as expressed by age of graduation descends clearly from Jews at the top, with only one-quarter of mature graduates, to Catholics with one-third of them, Protestants being in between. On closer scrutiny, however, the relative advantage enjoyed by Lutherans of German and Hungarian (or assimilated) stock becomes manifest with a comparably small proportion of mature graduates similar to that among the Jews. The rank order is indeed exactly the same as that analysed for access probabilities. Age scores of those belonging to other denominations (mostly Greek Orthodox and Uniates) were, of course, much worse, in the same way that their chances of admission were poor. As for the category "unknown", this refers mostly to holders of teacher's degrees among whom, other sources suggest, Christians and notably Catholics were over-represented in relation to other gradu-

Table 4 Percentage of Budapest students around 1900* reaching graduation before 27 years of age by ethnic and denominational status

Family name	Catholics	Lutherans	Calvinists	Jews	Others	Unknown+	All
Magyar	56	75.3	69	72.5	53**	39	60.5
German	70	73.3	64++	75.4	49++	44.4	72.1
Other	70	53.5		72.7		42	59.3
All	63.7	67.2	67.8	74.1	50.0	41.2	65.4

*Age of registration as found at random in registers for students of engineering (Polytechnic); age of graduation for all others.

**N = less than 10.

+Mostly holders of teacher's degrees (State Certificate for Teachers) in Arts and in Science (for whom denominational data were not available).

++Germans and non-German aliens are combined because of the rarity of cases.

Source: Survey data.

ates.[32] The low percentage of those graduating before 26 years of age attests to not only to the difficulty of obtaining a degree but also to the under-representation of the academically most able Jewish students.

Ethnic differences appear to be even more striking. Students of German stock graduated, on average, at a much younger age than those with Magyar names and students of other backgrounds – such differences being especially marked among Catholics and also Lutherans (when Lutheran Slavs are compared to the others). Clearly the very discriminatory principles at work in the selection of students affect those admitted during their actual courses.

Disciplinary choices are liable to be presented and conceived of as individual options related to tastes, personal interests and dispositions with are exempt from any outside determination. In fact, one can see that disciplinary choices

are in close conformity with important family strategies to optimize the social profitability of educational investments for their children either by minimizing its relative intellectual and economic cost (short studies utilizing the family's "cultural capital", for example, when a clergyman's son studies theology), or by maximizing the social career expectations resulting from a degree (long and academically difficult studies leading to socially-dominant positions) or various combinations of the two. Obviously, the availability of options and their specific desirability depend closely on the actual social assets students are endowed with and the structure of the educational facilities themselves (proximity of schools, availability of scholarships, the academic hierarchy among disciplines, the social hierarchy of teaching institutions, etc.). They cannot be analysed in terms of abstract ideal-typical patterns. All we can attempt here is to indicate, each time it is obvious, how identifiable collective interests could affect disciplinary choices among Budapest students in the early twentieth century.

Our survey, unfortunately, does not embrace the whole range of existing options and those which it does deal with are only broadly distinguished. Table 1, which contains the overall denominational distribution of students among the main faculties and branches of study, offers a good introduction to the interpretation of our survey data in this matter, limited as they are to four major options (as in Table 5).

One has to begin by remarking that the student corps was virtually divided into two halves at the beginning of the century – law students (the majority among Calvinists and Unitarians) and the others. Jews and Lutherans sent relatively few students to law schools but even these groups took up a disproportionate share (over two-fifths) of the law places available. It is well known that in Hungary, as in many other European countries during the early period of industrialization and modernization, law schools were instrumental in training, and in granting academic legitimation to, the ruling elite, in particular to members of the State bureaucracy. This largely explains the enormous popularity of Hungarian legal colleges and faculties[33] especially among Christians who, whether of noble

or non-noble extraction, could use a law degree to join the higher civil service. For Jews and other less-assimilated aliens who, if not formally excluded from it, had little practical hope of gaining an administrative position (and, even less, a position carrying political power), interest in law degrees was linked to the growing market for legal services (barristers, solicitors, clerks), enabling members of this, the most lucrative liberal profession, to prosper.

Besides law, theology offered the second most popular choice in general if, for once, we disregard the Jews for whom it was only a very rare option. Some 17 percent of Christian students were enrolled in divinity courses (and as much as one-third of Oriental and Orthodox Christians). The reasons for the popularity of this most traditional disciplinary option were many, and yet rather easy to account for. The social demand for priests, teaching staff in denominational schools (especially Catholic schools) and ministers was undiminished in a society which was incompletely secularized, under-urbanized and still partly traditional. Church careers offered not only the most secure but also one of the most promising social prospects open to secondary school leavers. In addition, individual Churches were among the few social agencies which could fully finance the training of their staff, often from secondary studies onwards. Theology therefore continued to exert a considerable attraction for many candidates for the learned professions and, most conspicuously, to prospective newcomers to the middle classes, that is to mobile and gifted children of the lower social brackets.[34]

The bulk of all students being taken up by law and divinity schools, the rest of the students were scattered very unequally among the vocational branches of study (medicine, engineering) and the philosophical faculties. The intake of each was indeed strongly patterned along denominational lines. The main differences lay, of course, between the career choices of Jews and Christians, the former being considerably over-represented in the Polytechnic (the second best choice for Jewish students after law) and in medicine, while the latter were equally divided between engineering and the arts and sciences,

Table 5 Estimated disciplinary choices of students in the academic year 1900-1901 by denomination and ethnic background*

		Law		Arts and Sciences		Engin- eering		Medicine		Total	Number	% with Hungarian name
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%			
Catholics	with Hungarian names	646	64.6	334	18.4	220	12.1	89	4.9	100	1,289	51.5
	with non-Hungarian names	951	55.5	264	15.4	392	22.9	107	6.2	100	1,714	
Lutherans	with Hungarian names	136	45.5	63	21.1	67	22.4	34	11.4	100	298	41.7
	with non-Hungarian names	259	62.1	54	12.9	69	16.5	35	8.4	100	417	
Calvinists	with Hungarian names	752	68.1	122	11.0	172	15.6	59	5.3	100	1,105	81.1
	with non-Hungarian names	122	47.3	88	34.1	44	17.0	4	1.6	100	258	

Other Christians	with Hungarian names	121	78.6	6	3.9	22	14.3	5	3.2	100	154	23.2
	with non-Hungarian names	349	68.6	75	14.7	36	7.1	49	9.6	100	509	
Jews	with Hungarian names	440	40.2	116	10.6	419	38.3	119	10.9	100	1,094	44.5
	with non-Hungarian names	697	51.1	119	8.7	365	26.8	182	13.4	100	1,363	
Total	with Hungarian names	2095	53.1	641	16.3	900	22.8	306	7.8	100	3,942	48.1
	with non-Hungarian names	2378	55.8	600	14.1	906	21.3	377	8.8	100	4,261	

*The estimation is based upon the observed distribution of students by family name and disciplinary choice in the survey (%). These percentages were applied to the student population of national statistics broken up according to denomination and branches of study. The result (in %) offers an estimation of the real size in one year of the student population by family name and denomination (while the survey sample was relative to graduates and students of one or more years, varying with the disciplines).

Sources: Survey data and as in Table 1 (without Pharmacy, Theology and Creative Arts).

medicine being only a marginal option for them. It is interesting, however, to note some secondary differences that oppose Lutherans to other Christians, differences which distinguish Jewish students from Christian students generally. Indeed, Lutherans displayed a limited measure of over-representation among students of medicine, pharmacy and engineering, compared with Catholics and Calvinists.

Thus, a broad pattern of disciplinary choices show a general, if only relative, over-presence of Jewish and Lutheran students in the vocational educational paths, which can be identified as the more "modern" and academically most demanding disciplinary options, while the preference of Calvinists and Catholics was clearly more often for traditional paths. The same was also true of the numerically marginal (Unitarians) or ethnically mostly alien (Orthodox, Uniates) denominational groups. Our survey data helps to complete and shade this picture by reference to the disciplinary distribution of students among nominal ethnic groups. (Cf. Tables 5 and 6.)

Once again, Jewish and non-Jewish career options were the most strikingly divergent. Christians were largely over-represented among doctors of political science while Jews tended to avoid this degree, since it normally led to positions in the State apparatus, where anti-Semitic and xenophobic forces were active (even during the Liberal Era) and where sons of the traditional ruling elite and, more generally, Magyars, enjoyed considerable advantages. The existence of differentials in political career opportunities among Magyars and non-Magyars is clearly reflected in the increased eagerness with which Christians with Magyar names chose political science (half of all doctors in the field) as against other legal professions (where they remained a good deal under-represented). Conversely, Jewish graduates, especially those with alien family names, were much more numerous among doctors of law, a degree leading to the liberal professions where Christians in general were more rarely employed, when compared with their overall frequency among graduates. If we relate alien family names to a lower measure of assimilation, then it becomes obvious that Magyar status to a great extent governed preferential options for

political science against private law. One can easily compare the relative representation of the two options both by denomination and nominal ethnic status if we calculate, in each status group, the number of political scientists in proportion to the number of other doctors of law. Among Jews with Hungarian names there were 8.1 doctors of law for each doctor of political science as against 8.6 among Jews with alien names. Among Christians similar proportions were, of course, much smaller and the numerical relationship between the two options was more balanced. However, at the same time, differences between those with Magyar and those with alien names were much more marked: 1.4 for the former and 1.8 for the latter. (A comparable difference was as much as 2.1 among Christians with Slav names.) If this is followed to its logical (and sociological) conclusion, implying that the observed difference between Magyars by name and others must exist in some measure among assimilated Magyars (whose family had Magyarized its name), and those of ancient Magyar stock, it appears reasonable to argue that course choices of law students were fundamentally determined by their ethnic status to the effect that ethnic Hungarians opted indifferently for the political or the civil legal professions, while the others tended to avoid or to be excluded from the former disciplinary and social path. This proposition is important. It proves that the most popular branch of higher education performed basically different functions for students according to their ethnic background, even if social origins proper (wealth, income, noble or non-noble civil status, formal education of father, etc.) are disregarded.

A similar hierarchy of preferential course options can be detected among graduates of the Philosophical Faculty. Jewish graduates were for all practical purposes under-represented there, but those with Magyar names much less than those with alien names. Christians, on the contrary, are tendentially over-represented – but those with Magyar names strongly, those with German names slightly and those with Slav names not at all. It is indeed understandable that degrees from the Philosophical Faculty, whether in the Arts or the Sciences section, which all led to one of the "cultural" professions – most

Table 6 Graduates and students of Budapest faculties and universities by denomination and ethnic background around 1900

		Dr. of Political Science	Dr. of Law	Dr. of Science	Dr. of the Arts	Dr. of Medicine	Students at Polytechnic	All*	Total number*
Jews	With Hungarian name	5.8	18.7	15.5	14.8	18.5	17.9	16.4	302
	With non-Hungarian name	8.7	29.7	10.3	12.1	28.1	15.6	20.3	373
Non-Jews	With Hungarian name	49.7	27.2	38.1	44.5	26.5	30.1	14.7	270
	With German name	16.2	9.0	12.4	15.8	14.1	20.8	15.2	280
	With Slav or other name	19.7	15.4	23.7	12.7	12.9	15.6	33.4	615
All		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Total number		173	434	97	330	427	379		1,840

*Except holders of teacher's degree (State certificate for teachers) from the Philosophical Faculty.

Source: Survey data.

often to teaching but also to publishing, creative writing, journalism, librarianship, etc. - were preferentially sought by graduates of Magyar stock or of assimilated Magyar identity. Aspiration to such degrees, which more or less fell within the spiritual province of national culture, presupposed a measure of assimilation. Graduates of the Philosophical Faculty were indeed the only group (together with doctors of political science) of whom the greater part held Magyar names (cf. Table 6). Differences between the Arts and the Sciences were not very significant, except for those with Magyar names who tended to opt for the humanities more often than the others.

Vocational studies clearly constitute the "other pole" of the course ladder. Trends here confirm fully the analysis presented above on preferential choices. In medicine, Jewish graduates were systematically over-represented, particularly those with alien names, while Christians were regularly under-represented, especially those with Magyar names. The hierarchy of relative probabilities to read medicine varied greatly from Jews to non-Jews and from those with alien to those with Magyar names. The trend was very similar among graduates in engineering (except among Jews). One should notice the high relative frequency of those with German names in this branch.[35]

CONCLUSION

The empirical survey data examined in the paper is intended to serve purposes which, in a way, were experimental. In other words, the paper attempted to test the hypothesis of the non-indifference in early twentieth century Hungary of the ethnic and denominational background of candidates for higher education for otherwise-established inequalities of birth, social position of the family, place of residence, etc. For reasons of method and of scarcity of evidence (in particular of evidence on control groups by residence, economic position or a combination of these and other criteria of contemporary social stratification) such a test could not be carried out as systematically as could have been desired. Further research is

certainly needed to clarify the historical dynamics before and after 1900,[36] and to qualify the regional and social class-specific relevance of our observations. (If, for example, a measure of independence of denomination relative to social class could be demonstrated, the same could not be – for lack of data – concerning ethnic background.) Detailed work on these issues is much needed, especially monographs on historical ethnology capable of exemplifying local educational strategies in different ethnic and denominational groups. Only such grass roots scholarship can lead to a theory of ethnic assimilation which appears to be one of the major sociological principles upon which rested the whole process of modernization (upheld as it was largely by "alien"-born new urban middle strata)[37] in Hungary as in most other countries in East-Central Europe.

All this said, our evidence strongly suggests that the pattern of educational inequalities in the early era of industrialization responded not only to the fast-changing class structure but also to the shifting status system of Hungarian society. Higher (and, for that matter, also secondary) education operated both as a lever of social mobility (or assertion of class position acquired by the family) and – inseparably – as a lever of cultural assimilation or assertion of "assimilated" status. In both of its functions – as a purveyor of intellectual and social capital – education provided assets for class and status which were obviously more attractive to upwardly-mobile groups and aliens – because it helped them to "get established" within, or just outside, the ruling elite – than to already-established members of the latter or to their social allies. This was, practically, conducive to a considerable measure of education among mobile groups with an alien or minority background, most conspicuously among Jews and Germans who became quite clearly the suppliers of the bulk of the modern Hungarian intelligentsia. At the same time, compensation for a degree of social deprivation (which was common for ethnic aliens and mobile newcomers in the educated bracket) was also instrumental in strategies of over-investment in education. Jews and Germans proved to be better performers in university studies[38] and, more importantly, tended to opt for those – academically more

demanding – professions where the competition (and the established privileges) of the gentroid elite were not felt.

The new elite of alien and minority background therefore emerged on the whole as more numerous, academically better trained and filling mostly the fast-growing new professions.One can easily see the far-reaching historical impact of this state of affairs. The new elites were better equipped, comparatively, than members of the traditional ruling groups which belonged to the ethnic majority to face the tasks of modernization. They were also more liable to survive socially the coming destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which staged the dramatic *déclassement* of vast sections of the hitherto dominant administrative elites which were of mostly Magyar composition. Educational opportunities and options along denominational and ethnic lines, as observed in the early industrial period, led later to a notable re-stratification of the middle classes, the sequels of which – in the form of anti-Semitism, differential emigration trends, patterns of political polarization, etc. – have left their mark on contemporary Hungary.

NOTES

1 In 1842 the distribution of national groups in Hungary was as follows: 4.8 million Magyars (37 percent); 1.6 million Slovaks (20 percent); 1.3 million Germans (10 percent); 2.2 million Romanians (17 percent); 0.9 million Croatians (6.9 percent); 1.2 million Serbians (9.2 percent); 0.44 million Ruthenians (3.4 percent) and 0.24 million Jews (1.8 percent). Cf. Gy. Szekfü, *Három nemzedék* (Three generations), (Budapest, 1920), p. 102. The balance of national groups, defined here by mother tongue, developed later sharply in favor of the Magyars during the course of the 19th and the 20th centuries. According to the 1900 census, the share of Magyars in the population of Hungary, Croatia excluded, was by that time 51.4 percent as against 11.9 percent for Germans. Cf. *Publications statistiques hongroises* 27, 1924, p. 132.

2 For an overview of the process of assimilation, see V. Karády and I. Kemény, "Les juifs dans la structure des classes en Hongrie, essai sur les antécédants historiques des crises d'antisémitisme au XX. siècle", *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 22, juin 1978, pp. 25-59.

3 For example, the proportion of secondary school graduates in Hungary reached, by the end of the Liberal Era, one of the highest in Europe. It was 28 per 100,000 inhabitants, as against only 18 for 100,000 in France in 1914. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 54.

4 Besides the old classical university (with faculties of philosophy, law, medicine, pharmacy and theology) and the Polytechnic School of university status (with faculties of general engineering, architecture, chemistry, civil and mechanical engineering) founded earlier in Budapest, a new classical university was established in Kolozsvár in 1872, right at the beginning of the Liberal Era. A dozen provincial junior law colleges, several theological training seminaries and some special institutions of vocational higher learning (for agriculture, forestry and mining), as well as military and art academies, completed the system of higher education at the end of the 19th century. Over two-thirds of all students of this period attended courses in the capital city.

5 All data cited in this study, except if otherwise indicated, is the result of a survey carried out in 1978 and 1979 in the Budapest university archives, in the archives of the Philosophical Faculty and in the registrar's office at the Polytechnic. Data was collected and coded either in semestral registration papers of students (Polytechnic) or in the sets of diplomas (degrees) issued on graduation (University). The survey aimed at the collection of specific information relative to individual students or graduates: denomination, place of birth, character of family name and age of graduation or of registration as a student. Data could be gathered in such quantity that it could be treated separately for each branch of study with some statistical relevance. Since the number of students or graduates by year was different in various faculties, the survey covers a variable number of years for each of them: 1899-1900 for holders of teacher's degrees in the arts and sciences of the Philosophical Faculty; 1900-1908 for doctors of the same faculty, 1900-1903 for doctors of law; 1900-1904 for doctors of medicine and degree holders in pharmacy; 1900-1903 for engineers (registered students of the faculties of general and civil engineering only). This data is therefore not strictly comparable for all purposes, especially not for a measure of relative frequencies of graduation or of enrollment in various faculties and academic paths.

6 But excluding the theological faculties and seminaries.

7 The Hungarian statistical services distinguished between data relating to the Hungarian lands, of which Croatia was a part, and data relating to Hungary proper, from which Croatia was excluded for constitutional reasons. Croatia possessed an independent university at Zagreb, as well as a network of Croatian schools.

8 A detailed statistical study is doomed to irrelevance since, by the year 1900, the quasi-totality of students at the various universities in Budapest declared Hungarian (87 percent) or German (6.1 percent) to be their mother tongue as against only 50.7 percent and 11.9 percent respectively in the entire population (cf. note 1 above) and 77.1 percent and 9.6 percent respectively in the active population engaged in professional or intellectual activities (liberal professions, civil servants, cults, executives). Cf. *Magyar statisztikai közlemények* 56, p. 209. The under-representation of Germans is only apparent, since German mother tongue was much rarer in the younger than in the older age bracket.

9 In the 1900 census over 70 percent of Jews declared their mother tongue to be Magyar. By that time, besides the Calvinists and members of the small Unitarian denomination (both almost completely Magyar by mother tongue), Jewish Hungarians formed the most magyarized denominational community in the country. Indeed the proportion of Magyars was only 51 percent among Catholics and as low as 28 percent among Lutherans, 13 percent among Greek Catholics and a mere 1 percent among Greek Oriental Christians (Orthodox faith). Cf. *Magyar statisztikai közlemények* 64, p. 74.

10 If we lump together all students and graduates bearing German names (805), Slav names (297) or other alien-sounding names (135) with those Jews bearing Magyar names (302), adding up to a total of 1,539, and compare this with the sample of 2,378 observed in the survey, the proportion of those of alien extraction (in one way or in another) is 64.7 percent. But the observed total includes 225 other graduates, mostly of the Philosophical Faculty holding teacher's degrees, of which an unknown, even though small, number was Jewish. Thus the overall proportion of graduates of formally alien background can be estimated at as high as 70 percent.

11 The problem of academic anti-Semitism in the interwar years is discussed in V. Karády and I. Kemény, "Antisémitism universitaire et concurrence de classe. La loi de *numerus clausus* entre les deux guerres", *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 34, septembre 1980, pp. 67ff.

12 However important it appears, it is obvious that ethnic background or descent was not the only, and certainly not a self-sufficient or exclusive explanatory, factor in the intellectual, let alone the ideological, stratification of the emerging educated elites in the early twentieth century. It is much rather a variable representing an overdetermination of a kind, modifying the effect of other sociological variables of lesser scope. If, for instance, it is relatively easy to find strong correlations between membership of social, political and intellectual circles such as freemasonry, the Free School of the Social Sciences, the Society of Social Studies, the Thalia Theater, the Psychoanalytical Movement, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, subsidizers of the liberal press or of

reviews of the literary or artistic *avant-garde* on the one side, and between Jewish or alien background on the other, this does not mean at all that middle class Jewry and other assimilated social clusters universally supported efforts at modernization. Nonetheless, in specific cases Jewish background did actually exclude intellectual or ideological options associated with anti-Semitic trends and thus could also serve directly as a major principle of division in the ideological and intellectual field in the years after 1900.

13 A detailed study of the representation of various social groups and classes in contemporary higher education exceeds the scope of this paper, all the more so because the relevant data is either non-existent or dubious, since categories used in national statistics of the active population are not always identical to those used in academic surveys. It is possible, though, to approximate the statistical representation of students for some key groups, even if such calculations are subject to the unverifiable assumption that in each social cluster so distinguished the statistical distribution of young people liable to attend universities (and dependant upon earlier group-specific birth rates, death rates and migratory trends) is exactly the same as the statistical weight of the cluster as a whole. The findings indicate 636 students for 10,000 active persons belonging to the liberal professions, 320 per 10,000 among civil servants, 164 per 10,000 among teachers and clerics as against only 60 per 10,000 among private employees and executives and 53 per 10,000 among "independents" in trade and industry. However crude these categories are for a meaningful sociological analysis, they attest to some major social class-bound patterns of inequality in higher education around 1900. Cf. *Magyar statisztikai közlemények* 64, *passim* and *Magyar statisztikai évkönyv* 1900, *passim*.

14 For similar indicators of denomination-specific schooling frequencies relative to later dates and for the details of the methods of calculations see V. Karady, "Jewish enrollment patterns in classical secondary education in Old Regime and Inter-war Hungary", *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* I, 1984, pp. 225-252.

15 It is for the moment impossible to arrive at a combined class and denomination specific measure of over-education for lack of such combined data (simultaneous indication of denomination and father's social status among students). But real Jewish and Lutheran over-schooling must have been even more considerable than suggested above. The measure referred to in note 14 is indeed based on a comparison between Jewish and Lutheran schooling frequencies and the nationwide average by class in which the weight of Jewish and Lutheran overschooling is implied. If we could succeed in calculating a similar indicator based on a comparison of observed and expected Jewish frequencies with those typical for Christian groups only, the differences demonstrating Jewish over-schooling would be much larger.

16 Lack of space prevents a detailed discussion of other group-specific factors of Jewish over-schooling in Hungary, such as the secularization of skills linked to religious literacy, urban residence, absence of statutory obstacles to employment in liberal "service" professions (medicine, engineering) necessitating difficult advanced studies, the structure of economic patrimony – essentially mobile – admitting heavy educational investments, and general acquisitive dispositions fostering long-term investment ventures (dispositions completely lacking in the landed gentry).

17 According to the 1900 census the mother tongue of 32.6 percent of Lutherans was German, as against 36.7 percent Slovak and 28.5 percent Magyar. At that date only 25 percent of Jews declared that their mother tongue was German as against as many as 71.1 percent Magyar. Cf. *Publications statistiques hongroises* No 27, p. 132 (French edition). Data on Hungary, Croatia excluded.

18 The general rate of literacy was in 1900 the same among Jewish and Lutheran men (74 percent) and women (66 percent), as against only 62 percent and 52 percent respectively among Catholic men and women, 68 percent and 60 percent respectively among Calvinists, 66 percent and 48 percent among Unitarians and as low as 25 percent and 15 percent among Greek Catholics and 35 percent and 18 percent among Greek Orthodox Christians. Cf. *Ibid.* p. 164.

19 Only small proportions of Lutherans (17 percent) and Jews (26 percent) were unilingual Magyar speakers in 1900, as against 49 percent of Catholics, 89 percent of Calvinists and 82 percent of Unitarians. In the other denominations, recruited essentially from Slavs and Romanians, knowledge of Hungarian was negligible. But even among Magyars by mother tongue, 39 percent of Lutherans and 63 percent of Jews also knew one other language or more as against only 19 percent of Catholics, 9.5% of Calvinists and 16% of Unitarians. In Budapest, a linguistic melting pot with a sizable German-speaking bourgeoisie, although the large majority of Lutherans (72 percent) and Jews (85 percent) were already Magyar by mother tongue, among them the proportion of unilingual Magyar speakers was in 1900 still the lowest of all, 31 percent and 27 percent respectively as against 39 percent among Catholics and 75 percent among Calvinists, to mention only the denominations present in the capital city in significant numbers. Cf. *Ibid.*

20 36 percent of Lutherans and 25 percent of Jews as against 46 percent of Catholics and 48 percent of Calvinists in 1910. Cf. *Publications statistiques hongroises* 64, p. 178. (French edition.)

21 4.6 percent and 17.9 percent respectively among Lutherans and Jews as against only 3.6 percent among Catholics and Calvinists in 1910. Cf. *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

22 58.6 percent and 57.8 percent respectively among Lutherans and Jews as against 50.3 percent and 48.4 percent among Catholics and Calvinists in 1910. Cf. *Ibid., loc. cit.*

23 Housing data for Budapest offers a good indication of social inequalities among denominational groups. The proportion of those living in large flats (3 rooms and more) was, in 1906, 58 percent of Jews and 38.5 percent of Lutherans as against only 23 percent of Catholics and Calvinists. Cf. *Budapest Székesfőváros statisztikai közleményei* 70/3, p. 198.

24 In Transdanubia (Western Hungary) for example, the mean size of peasant properties was 3 hectares in German-Lutheran villages, 2 hectares in German-Catholic villages and only 1.5 hectares in Magyar-Catholic villages. (Cf. A. Keken, *A magyarországi evangélikusság történelmi statisztikája* (Historical statistics of Hungarian Lutherans), (Pécs, 1937), p. 75. In the agricultural population in 1910, the proportion owning land was 73 percent of Lutherans, 70 percent of Jews and only 56 percent of Catholics and Calvinists. [Calculated according to data in K. Karner, *A felekezetek Magyarországon a statisztika megvilágításában* (Denominations in Hungary in the light of statistics), (Debrecen, 1931), p. 55.]

25 During the Liberal Era, before 1918, Lutherans only exceptionally achieved majority position in administrative districts (5 out of several hundred). Much less concentrated in urban centres than Jews, the Lutherans' geographic dispersion generally exceeded that of Hungarian Jewry. Residential segregation was clearly observable in many villages, especially when combined with ethnic segregation which, in rural areas, was perpetuated through the exclusively unilingual practice of religious faith. In 1900, 41 percent of Lutheran clerics were of German mother tongue as against 46 percent of Magyar and only 13 percent of Slovak mother tongue. Cf. *Publications statistiques hongroises* 27, p. 207.

26 With the forceful drive for re-Catholicization during the Counter-Reformation in the 18th century, religious freedom was granted only in 1780 in the Habsburg Empire, to which Hungary belonged. The eligibility of Protestants to hold public office was recognized only in 1791. Even afterwards the Protestant Churches completely lacked the power necessary to balance the Catholic Church, which enjoyed not only majority status in the Hungarian population (especially among ethnic Magyars and Germans, the two historically-dominant ethnic groups) but which was also the denomination of the Imperial family and of the bulk of the landed aristocracy. It also retained its enormous holdings of land. Even as late as in the interwar years the Catholic Church owned some 850,000 hectares as against the Calvinist Church's 50,000 hectares and the Lutheran Church's mere 10,000 hectares. (Data for 1928, cited from K. Karner, *op. cit.*, p. 59.)

27 Indeed, Lutheran schooling policy deliberately aimed at offsetting Catholic proselytism and at strengthening Lutheran socialization. In the Liberal Era, there was one Lutheran primary school for 781 children of the same denomination, one Catholic school for 878 children and one Calvinist one for 1,106 children. The relative scarcity of Jewish schools was due to the fact that Jewish children were usually sent to public schools (run either by the State or by municipal authorities) as part of what were obviously "assimilationist" educational strategies. (Cf. A. Keken, *op. cit.*, p. 59.) As for secondary education, Lutheran *gymnasia* catered for as many as 11.4 percent of all secondary pupils in the country in 1899-1900 and, with 25 *gymnasia* out of 197 (14 percent of the total), they formed one of the strongest denominational networks of teaching institutions, as against 49 Catholic and 27 Calvinist secondary schools. Cf. J. Asztalos, *La statistique des écoles secondaires hongroises jusqu'à l'année scolaire 1932-33* (Budapest, 1934), p. 14.

28 This phenomenon cannot be proven directly for lack of sufficiently detailed information concerning the social status of immigrants in the capital city. An indirect indication is supplied by the relatively small proportion of Jews belonging to the educated middle strata in Budapest in 1890 (1.1 percent) as compared with Calvinists (2.8 percent), Lutherans (2.0 percent) and Catholics (1.4 percent). These proportions are calculated according to the global size of denominational groups, for lack of relevant data concerning the active population. Cf. *Budapest Székesfőváros statisztikai közleményei* 53, pp. 18-19 and *Magyar statisztikai közlemények* 16, pp. 135-259, *passim*. This data is striking indeed since in the population of Hungary generally Jewry was already over-represented at that time within the same educated middle classes with 0.8 percent of all Jews as against 0.6 percent of Calvinists and Lutherans and 0.4 percent of Catholics. (Same sources.)

29 In 1880, Calvinists made up only 6.2 percent of the population of Budapest, as against 13 percent in Hungary. At that time only 1.1 percent of Calvinists lived in the capital city then housing 2.3 percent of the Hungarian population. Cf. V. Karády, I. Kemény, "Les juifs dans la structure des classes..." *op. cit.* p. 29.

30 Cf. note 28 above for an indirect proof of this fact. In 1890, for example, 7.5 percent of the Calvinist educated middle strata lived in Budapest but only 1.7 percent of all Hungarian Calvinists, an over-representation of these strata of 4.4 as against only 3.1 among Lutherans, 3.4 among Catholics and 1.4 among Jews. (Calculations made according the sources referred to in note 28.)

31 This result is consistent with other regional schooling data, in particular with the well-documented residential distribution of secondary school graduates in 1910. (Cf. *Magyar statisztikai közlemények* 61, Népszámlálás V., pp. 528-541

passim.) Here are the proportions of graduates of 8 secondary classes among denominational groups in some major regions:

	Transdanubia	Transylvania	Hungary as a whole
Catholics	1.7%	1.4%	2.6%
Calvinists	2.0%	3.2%	2.6%
Lutherans	2.3%	4.1%	3.6%
Jews	10.2%	7.4%	11.7%

Thus, even if basic literacy data was usually better in the west of the country, this by no means implied a higher proportion of educated people there.

32 Among graduates of the Philosophical Faculty who took the State exam for teaching in 1899, 1900 and 1901, 53 percent were Catholics, 20 percent were Lutherans and 11 percent were Calvinists – with only 13 percent Jews (a relatively low proportion). Cf. *Magyar statisztikai évkönyv* 1900, 1901 and 1902.

33 Besides the two faculties of law in Budapest and Kolozsvár, there were not less than 10 more colleges of law in the country around 1900. Institutions of legal studies were thus not only the largest but also the most decentralized (both geographically and denominationally) network of establishments of higher education in the country. The State controlled three colleges of law, the Catholics two, the Calvinists four and the Lutherans one, all outside Budapest.

34 Theological faculties and training seminaries for clerics drew heavily on rural and lower-middle class clienteles. Sons of farmers and of agricultural workers made up, between 1898-99 and 1900-1901, 29% of students of theology; 16 percent of students in the arts and sciences; 10 percent of students in medicine; 9 percent of students in law and pharmacy and only 3.3 percent of students in engineering. Cf. *Magyar statisztikai évkönyvek* 1899-1902, *passim*.

35 This observation is consistent with the long-established tradition of engineering studies among Germans in Hungary which can be clearly observed in the regular over-representation of students of German extraction at the vocational College of Mining at Selmecbánya throughout the 19th century.

36 I will attempt a contribution to such a clarification in a secondary analysis of higher educational statistics for 1930 which combine data on fathers' social status with denomination, a unique case in Hungarian (or, for that matter, other European) educational statistics at that time.

37 The importance of members of "alien" background in most modern professions bearing the burden of intellectual, scientific and social innovation is well demonstrated in other data by the high proportion of Jews. Without the Jewish contribution the country would have had, in 1910, 34 percent fewer solicitors; 34 percent fewer private teachers; 48 percent fewer physicians; 42 percent fewer journalists; and 38 percent fewer chemists and engineers. Similarly high proportions of Jews and other people of alien background were to be found among business executives (44 percent); printers (57 percent); and financiers (85 percent) – even if we disregard converted Jews or those of German extraction who, by that time, had magyarized their names or declared themselves to be Magyar by mother tongue. In Hungary it is indisputable that magyarized aliens bore the brunt of economic and social modernization. Cf. V. Karady, I. Kemény, "Les juifs dans la structure des classes..." *op. cit.* pp. 41-42.

38 Such conclusions are confirmed by nationwide statistics concerning the levels of achievement of secondary school graduates as well. Between 1908/9 and 1914/15 for example the proportion of those obtaining "honours" degrees at graduation (the best of four grades) was 23 percent among Lutheran and Jewish graduates as against 18.6 percent of Catholic, 18.2 percent of Calvinist and 13 percent of other Christian graduates. (Cf. *Magyar statisztikai évkönyvek* 1909-1915, *passim.*) Thus the hierarchy of academic excellence proved to be the same among secondary school and university graduates.

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GÉZA BUZINKAY

A CHALLENGE FOR INTELLECTUALS: AUSTRO-HUNGARIANS WITH TWO LANGUAGES

In 1971, Gyula Illyés, the greatest Hungarian poet of his day, addressed an open letter to György Lukács, the greatest living Hungarian philosopher. At the beginning, the poet suggested, not without malice, that Lukács had remained in Hungary by "mere chance", as a result of developments in his career during the final years of the First World War and during the revolution.[1] Although the term "mere chance" represents something of a distortion, such an accusation has a familiar ring for Hungarian historians.

Since the emergence of an independent Magyar culture during the Age of Enlightenment, Hungarians have been faced with the dilemma of whether or not an individual can have two mother tongues and belong to two or more national cultures. Even as early as the first half of the 19th century, most members of the aristocracy were denounced as unpatriotic on the grounds that they preferred refined European languages to Hungarian in their conversation, lived in more than one part of the Habsburg Empire if they could afford to, and imitated Western European manners and styles. During the period of dualism, the bourgeoisie and a large part of the intelligentsia were similarly attacked by nationalistic critics, since these two strata generally possessed two mother tongues and were quite capable of living and working outside Hungary.

Were these simply the natural problems of a multilingual state like the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy? Or did deeper problems lie behind these linguistic issues: problems of national consciousness, mentality, identity and culture?

One of the great writers of our century, the Austrian Robert Musil, satirized the problem of national identity as it had emerged in the Monarchy. "Die Bewohner dieser kaiserlich und königlichen kaiserlich königlichen Doppelmonarchie fanden sich vor eine schwere Aufgabe gestellt", wrote Musil, "sie hatten sich als kaiserlich und königlich österreichisch-ungarische Patrioten zu fühlen, zugleich aber auch als königlich ungarische oder kaiserlich königlich österreichische. Ihr begreiflicher Wahlspruch angesichts solcher Schwierigkeiten war 'Mit vereinten Kräften!' Das hieβ viribus unitis. Die Österreicher brauchten aber dazu weit gröβere Kräfte als die Ungarn. Denn die Ungarn waren zuerst und zuletzt nur Ungarn, und bloβ nebenbei galten sie bei anderen Leuten, die ihre Sprache nicht verstanden, auch für Österreich-Ungarn; die Österreicher dagegen waren zuerst und ursprünglich nichts und sollten sich nach Ansicht ihrer Oberen gleich als Österreich-Ungarn oder Österreicher-Ungarn fühlen, – es gab nicht einmal ein richtiges Wort dafür. Es gab auch Österreich nicht. (...) Fragte man darum einen Österreicher, was er sei, so konnte er natürlich nicht antworten: Ich bin einer aus den im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern, die es nicht gab, – und er zog es schon aus diesem Grunde vor, zu sagen: Ich bin ein Pole, Tscheche, Italiener, Friauler, Ladiner, Slowene, Kroate, Serbe, Slowake, Ruthene oder Wallache, und das war der sogenannte Nationalismus. (...) die Kakanier (...) betrachteten sich mit dem panischen Schreck von Gliedern, die einander mit vereinten Kräften hindern, etwas zu sein. Seit Bestehen der Erde ist noch kein Wesen an einem Sprachfehler gestorben, aber man muβ wohl hinzufügen, der österreichischen und ungarischen österreichisch-ungarischen Doppelmonarchie widerfuhr es trotzdem, daβ sie an ihrer Unaussprechlichkeit zugrunde gegangen ist".[2]

This decay was not a rapid one: it must have been foreseen. By the 1840s, Magyar culture had produced institutions, authors, and a public of its own, and (although it lagged somewhat behind them)had become competitive with the great European national cultures. The sense of awareness that could shape and unify a nation arose earlier than the economic and political conditions essential for the creation of an independent na-

tional state, but the birth of the latter was simply a matter of time. Defeat in the War of Independence (1848-49) did not result in the "death of the nation", as had been feared, but rather, in terms of national culture and national identity, produced the opposite effect: 1848-49 represented a formative common experience which turned Magyar culture against the Monarchy. In a spiritual sense, the Austrian Monarchy was dissolved in 1849, as a result of the cultural secession of its largest national component, Hungary. The final break took another lifetime, a period which, despite the delay resulting from illusions of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, can be regarded as a relatively short one.

From the last third of the 18th century to the revolution of 1848, Hungarian men of letters and the institutions they were associated with not only created a national culture but also participated in the intellectual life of the Habsburg Monarchy. I am not speaking here of the many Hungarian writers, scholars, and scientists who achieved prominence in Austro-German literature at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, and who made the culture of Hungary so well known that contemporaries such as Kotzebue, Körner, Collin, Grillparzer, and Stifter became deeply interested in Hungarian topics.[3] I speak rather of those notable novelists and poets who were both Hungarian writers and German writers at the same time, men such as György Bessenyei or János Batsányi, or indeed János Mailáth, the bulk of whose work sought to make Hungarian culture, literature, and history known to a German-speaking public, and who, in 1839, established the yearbook *Iris* in Pest, a journal which served as one of the most important forums for Austro-German literature during the *Vormärz* period. It is also significant that two of the five presses and publishing houses which exercised a great influence on Austro-German literary life during the period were also located in Pest. One of them, the press of Gusztáv Heckenast, published the works of A. Stifter up to the end of the 1860s.[4]

I have enumerated these examples to make clear the characteristics of this first period. Before the March revolution, Magyar culture, through translation, formed an integral part

of the culture of the Monarchy as a whole: Hungarian cultural institutions and Hungarian literature in German were respected in all of the Habsburg lands. Writing in two languages caused no identity problems for Hungarian men of letters since neither Hungarian nor German was as yet closely connected with one particular nation. This situation changed in 1849.

The attraction exerted by Vienna, however, did not diminish. Stefan Zweig correctly recognized the significance of the Monarchy's capital. As he noted, albeit in an excessively ecstatic and sentimental fashion: "Denn das Genie Wiens – ein spezifisch musikalisches – war von je gewesen, daβ es alle volkhaften, alle sprachlichen Gegensätze in sich harmonisierte, seine Kultur eine Synthese aller abendländischen Kulturen war; wer dort lebte und wirkte, fühlte sich frei von Enge und Vorurteil. Nirgends war es leichter, Europäer zu sein (...)".[5] As a matter of fact, the cultural life of Vienna, based on the leading role of the *"Bildungsbürgertum"* which attained its socially organized form as early as the 1850s, brought into existence an aristocracy of spirit in opposition to the aristocracy of birth.[6]

However, to Hungarian intellectuals during the Bach period Vienna meant something different. As a busy metropolis, it could serve as a kind of hiding place, and it offered better job opportunities than did Pest. For Miksa Falk, for example, the capital, where press policy was slightly more tolerant than it was in Pest, was a place where he could publish many newspaper articles dealing with questions of great importance for Hungarian political aspirations. For whatever reason a Hungarian man of letters chose Vienna, the decision to work there for an extended period confronted him with an identity crisis – he had to choose between a nationalist Magyar culture and the supranational culture which Vienna represented. Of course, the problem arose in this form only when it was not oversimplified into a mere political judgement on absolutism. It was difficult, however, to separate the two questions. One could not close one's eyes to the fact that Magyar culture as an independent national culture was a relatively small and, because of

its language, isolated culture – even a somewhat backward one. Special efforts had to be made to avoid provincialism.

"(...) Es gibt viele unerklärliche Dinge, aber wenn man seine Nationalhymne singt, so fühlt man sie nicht", wrote Robert Musil.[7] This was the case for most Hungarian men of letters after the defeat of the War of Independence. Even Zsigmond Kemény, who delved into the question, stopped short of answering it because he believed that his primary responsibility was to paint an encouraging picture of the nation's future. When great programs are being drawn up, sceptical realism appears to be cynicism. One of the outstanding Hungarian journalists of the 1850s and 1860s, Aurél Kecskeméthy, was denounced as a cynic, even though he was merely a sceptic and the real founder of Hungarian literary satire. In 1855, Kecskeméthy expressed the fundamental problem in his diary: "The tension between my national and civic senses, which can be balanced only through an impartiality which is difficult to arrive at, has brought me much nearer to the desired equilibrium; ... I am first of all a citizen of the Austrian Empire, and only as such am I a Hungarian".[8] This was a very uncharacteristic position. Kecskeméthy had tried to develop the kind of sense of state-patriotic identity that Musil's sharp satire would characterize as impossible some 70 years later.

Kecskeméthy was an important figure in the middle of the 1860s and in some respects he was the spiritual father of a group of young literati. Known as the Coffee Fountain group, this group derived its name from its meeting place in a coffee house. Its members, young men aged about 20, had similar social and cultural backgrounds. Most of them came from Jewish or German families, in which they represented the first generation of intellectuals. Born in rural areas, they settled in Pest after school years spent partly in Vienna. Although they had two mother tongues, they adopted Hungarian names and considered themselves to be Hungarian liberal intellectuals. They had grown up during the heyday of Hungarian liberalism, and their commitment to liberalism was strengthened by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, by the emancipation of the Jews which followed soon after it, and by the continuing development of

Hungarian culture. They believed that a liberal government could create a liberal society, and they had faith in the future of Hungarian culture. These individuals were convinced that the Compromise had removed all obstacles to the process of civilizing their country, and that it had pacified the nation, which was no longer forced to be on the defensive or to maintain its aloofness, and which could now devote itself entirely to becoming a fully-fledged member of the European cultural community. This optimism was to be put to the test by the domestic crisis that ended with the appointment of Kálmán Tisza as prime minister in 1875. In the period that followed, the activity of the Coffee Fountain group began to diminish. Until then, however, they wrote for and published *Reform*, a newspaper of the highest quality, and they established the first Hungarian journal of political satire, *Borsszem Jankó*.

Here I should like to mention only some of the leading members of this group.[9] Adolf Ágai, who founded *Borsszem Jankó*, was the best-loved essayist in Hungary during the last quarter of the 19th century. L. Dóczy, who began his career as a talented political journalist, became the press chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna at the turn of the century. In addition, Dóczy was a prolific poet, translator, playwright, and operetta librettist in both Hungarian and German. The only member of the group who was of noble background, J. Asbóth, became an eminent essayist and historian of conservative liberalism.

Though the writers mentioned above had quite varied careers, perhaps J.Rákosi and L.Hevesi provide the best example of how widely the individuals who collaborated with one another in the Coffee Fountain group came to differ from each other. Rákosi, on one hand, as influential editor-in-chief of *Budapesti Hirlap* and a member of the Upper House became the leading figure of the aggressive and extreme nationalist movement between the 1880s and 1920s. Hevesi, on the other hand, who lived in Vienna after 1876, became a citizen of the world. He was one of the editors of, and a prolific feuilletonist for, the Viennese *Fremdenblatt*, the first great art critic of the Vien-

nese *Sezession*, and additionally a notable figure in the city's cultural life at the turn of the century.

In the mid-1870s, liberalism, with its rational, enlightened principles, underwent a crisis, and nationalism came to prevail over rationalism in liberal politics and in liberal ideology. A complex political, economic, and intellectual crisis confronted those with an attachment to two languages and two cultures. They were faced with the dilemma of choosing between complete assimilation or disassimilation.[10] This dilemma confronted the members of the Coffee Fountain group as well. Those who remained in Budapest, that is, those who chose assimilation, moved towards nationalism, the precise extent being determined by their personal character, culture, and social background. Those who chose Vienna became Austro-German writers and critics and severed their relations with Hungarian cultural life. Only a very few private contacts remained between these former friends; L. Hevesi, for example, even at the height of his career, was not accepted in Budapest at all.[11] A rare exception was L. Dóczy, who had a successful career as a government officer, who moved back and forth between Budapest and Vienna several times, and who remained a bilingual writer throughout his life.

In the early and mid-1870s, the members of this group were forced to choose between a national culture and a supranational one. Just one decade later, however, the situation changed. Austro-German literary and cultural life began to break with its own traditions. Austrian literature began to compare itself with that of Germany and a German national movement arose in Austria.[12] From the 1880s onwards, intellectuals, scholars and men of letters of the different nations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were faced with a choice between their own nationalism and a German one, or at least between their own culture and a culture whose most important questions derived from its struggle with an awareness of German identity.[13] From that time onwards, Vienna's cosmopolitan magnetism persisted only in those fields that were not directly connected to national ideologies, such as music, art, and the sciences. Hungarian

poets and writers who wished to breathe the air of Europe, however, had to travel somewhat further, to Paris.

At the beginning of this century, a group of scholars comparable to the Coffee Fountain group, again came into existence in Budapest. These intellectuals – young philosophers and aesthetes - founded the so-called Sunday group around 1910. Most of them belonged to the second generation of the assimilated Jewish bourgeoisie. They used two or more languages with equal fluency and were excellently educated, and therefore able to enjoy a successful career anywhere in the world. Nevertheless they considered themselves to be Hungarian scholars and Vienna exercised no attraction for them. The only one of these scholars to live abroad was György Lukács, who was active in Heidelberg for a time. The members of this group left Hungary only under the pressure of changed political circumstances after 1919,[14] and this was why K. Mannheim, A. Hauser, Ch. de Tolnay, F. Antal or Ch. Polányi became English, American or Italian professors.

Like the other small cultures of East-Central Europe, Magyar culture has evolved as the result of nationalism. This accounts for its simultaneous aggressiveness and defensiveness. The character of these cultures made it difficult or even impossible for their representatives to accept the existence of a supranational culture or to choose between various national ones. The possibility of a real choice for Hungarian scholars and men of letters with a double cultural identity existed only for a short period around the time of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Whether the cultural spirit of Vienna or the cultural spirit of Budapest could have produced works of greater stature or of more universal value is a question that would lead us far beyond the range of this discussion. And such a question, perhaps, is not a proper one for historians.*

NOTES

1 Illyés, Gy., A "sorsproblémák"-ról (On "fate problems"), *Népszabadság*, Sunday suppl. Feb. 14, 1971, p. 6.

2 Musil, R., *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (Wiesbaden, Rowohlt, 1970), pp. 450-451.

3 Cf. Csáky, M., "Der Stellenwert Wiens im Prozess des kulturellen Austauschs zwischen West- und Südosteuropa um 1800". In: *Wegenetz europäischen Geistes* (Wien, 1983), pp. 356-369.

4 Cf. Zeman, H., "Die österreichische Literatur – ihr Aufstieg zu europäischem Format". In: *Das Zeitalter Kaiser Franz Josephs*, 1 Teil. "Von der Revolution zur Gründerzeit, 1848-1880", Bd. 1 (Wien, 1984), pp. 338-339, 343.

5 Zweig, S., *Die Welt von Gestern* (Frankfurt a.M., Fischer, 1980), pp. 29-30.

6 Cf. Edelmayer, F., "Das Bildungsbürgertum". In: *Das Zeitalter Kaiser Franz Josephs, ibid*, pp. 197-201.

7 Musil, *ibid*, p. 529.

8 Kecskeméthy, A., *Naplója 1851-1878* (His diary), ed. by Rózsa, M. (Budapest, 1909), p. 82.

9 Cf. Németh, G.B., *A magyar irodalomkritikai gondolkodás a pozitivizmus korában* (Hungarian thinking on literary criticism in the Age of Positivism), (Budapest, 1981), pp. 21-136; Buzinkay, G.: *Borsszem Jankó és társai* ("Borsszem Jankó" and his companions), (Budapest, 1983), pp. 35-36.

10 Cf. Hanák, P.: A lezáratlan per. A zsidóság asszimilációja a Monarchiában (The unclosed trial. Jewish assimilation in the Monarchy). In: *Zsidókérdés, asszimiláció, antiszemitizmus* (The Jewish question, assimilation, anti-Semitism), (Budapest, 1984), pp. 357-379.

11 Cf. Hanák, P.: "Wandlungen der österreichisch-ungarischen wissenschaftlichen Beziehungen im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts". In: *Wegenetz europäischen Geistes, ibid.*, pp. 353-355.

12 Zeman, *ibid.*, pp. 344-345.

13 Cf. Nyiri, K.: *A Monarchia szellemi élete* (Intellectual life in the Monarchy), (Budapest, 1980), pp. 11-34.

14 Karádi, É., Vezér, E.: *A Vasárnapi kör* (The Sunday group), (Budapest, 1980), pp. 7-23.

* *ACKNOWLEDGEMENT*

The author wishes to thank R. Scott from the Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University, N.Y.C. for making corrections in the style of this paper.

2 Musil, R., Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (Wiesbaden, Rowohlt, (1970), pp. 450-471.

3 Cf. Csáky, M., "Der Stellenwert Wiens im Prozess des kulturellen Austausches zwischen West- und Südosteuropa um 1900", in: Wegenetz europäischen Geistes (Wien, 1983), pp. 356-369.

4 Cf. Kann, R.A., "Die österreichische Literatur und die Assimilation an europäische Formen", in: Das Zeitalter Franz Josephs. 1. Teil. "Von der Revolution zur Gründerzeit, 1848-1880", (Wien, 1984), pp. 338-339.

5 Zweig, S., Die Welt von Gestern (Frankfurt a.M., Fischer, 1980), pp. 25-30.

6 Cf. Edelmayer, F., "Das Bildungsbürgertum", in: Das Zeitalter Franz Josephs, (ed.), pp. 197-204.

7 Musil, 1970, p. 529.

8 Kecskeméthy, A., Napló 1851-1878 (His diary) ed. by Rózsa, M. (Budapest, 1989), p. 82.

9 Cf. Németh, G.B., A magyar irodalomkritikai gondolkodás a pozitivizmus korában (Hungarian thinking on literary criticism in the Age of Positivism) (Budapest, 1981), pp. 413-455; Buzinkay, G.: Borsszem Jankó és társai ("Borsszem Jankó" and his companions), (Budapest, 1983), pp. 35-36.

10 Cf. Hanák, P.: A lezáratlan per. A zsidóság asszimilációja a Monarchiában (The unclosed trial. Jewish assimilation in the Monarchy) in: Zsidókérdés, asszimiláció, antiszemitizmus (The Jewish question, assimilation, anti-Semitism) (Budapest, 1984), pp. 357-373.

11 Cf. Hanák, P.: "Wandlungen der österreichisch-ungarischen wissenschaftlichen Beziehungen im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts", in: Wegenetz ... (1983), pp. 330-336.

12 Hanák, 1984, pp. 344-355.

13 Cf. Nyiri, K.: A Monarchia szellemi életéről (Intellectual life in the Monarchy) (Budapest, 1980), pp. 11-14.

14 Karádi, E., Vezér, E.: A Vasárnapi Kör (The Sunday group) (Budapest, 1980), pp. 7-21.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to thank R. Scott from the Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University, N.Y.C. for making corrections in the style of the paper.

Hungary and European Civilization
Gy. Ránki (ed.)

MARIANNA BIRNBAUM

BUDAPEST IN THE LITERATURE OF THE FIN-DE-SIÈCLE

"Die Zeit ist sonderbar, und sonderbare Kinder hat sie – uns", said Hugo von Hofmannsthal about his generation in Austria.[1] As is well known, the *fin-de-siècle* in the artistic life of Hungary was even more muddled and eclectic than it was in Austria. The passionate battle that the representatives of *art nouveau* (or *Sezession*) fought against neoromanticism and nationalism had to remain inconsistent in Hungary. The country's desire for independence from Austria could not fully dispense with "patriotic" art, therefore hindering a genuine *Sezession*. Frequently, stylization and arbitrary accentuation rather than content were the most obvious features of the artistic revolution which aimed at expressing modern, urban concepts and emotions.

Just as in the industrial sphere, Hungary was also experiencing a delayed development of the literary and artistic movements predominant in Western Europe by the turn of the century. The Hungarian *fin-de-siècle*, therefore, outlasted its Western European counterparts not ending, for all practical purposes, until 1914.

The discussion of symbolist elements in the literature of the period falls outside the scope of this paper, although it should be remembered that among all the numerous "-isms" that had invaded the artistic scene of the epoch, symbolism had deep and long lasting effects. Its concomitant features, such as synesthesia, allegory, obscurism, and visions mixed with reality, were fundamental building blocks of the literature of the

fin-de-siècle. And so was the notion of life imitating dreams (Calderon in reverse).

While in the West Dumas *fils*, Sardou and Ibsen were being staged, in Hungary, Gergely Csiky (1842-91) was still the most celebrated playwright, and Mór Jókai (1825-1904) and Kálmán Mikszáth (1847-1910) the most popular novelists. The Hungarian village and the Hungarian provincial town long remained the chosen topics of poetry and fiction.

Few native sons of Budapest wrote about their city with any warmth. The capital's image appeared mostly in the writings of those who were frightened and intimidated by their initial experiences there. These criticized Budapest from the point of view of outsiders, intolerant, frustrated and, frequently, ill at ease.

But even those who were born in Budapest had to face the fact that their metropolitan attitudes were only skin deep: their family ties and family loyalties remained in the countryside. If we examine the roster of Hungarian authors at around the turn of the century, we arrive at a fascinating dichotomy: those who focus on the capital were indeed born in Budapest, while those writers in whose work the Hungarian countryside predominates, were born in the provinces. They remain attached to their early experiences even if, having moved to Budapest, they themselves helped create what was to become the capital's cultural elite.

Kiss, Bródy, Ady, Babits, Ambrus, Thury, Csáth, Kosztolányi, Móricz, Szép, Juhász and Tóth were all born in the country, and displayed attitudes toward Budapest markedly different to those revealed by Heltai, Molnár, Füst, Hatvany, Ignotus, Karinthy and Szomory.[2] It is, of course, no accident that almost all those writers who were born in Budapest were of Jewish origin - members of the new middle class. This is also significant because the very same middle class, which formed the core of the reading public, was often more urbane than the authors themselves. In turn, this was also the first time that Hungary's middle class functioned both as author and reading public.

One is frequently brought to the realization that the cultural life of a given society is dominated by a few hundred individuals, and it makes little difference whether that society has ten million or a hundred million members. Modern cultural development is strictly an urban process, and therefore a densely populated capital such as Budapest could function as a cultural center just as well as Berlin or Chicago. Not only the *Civitas Dei*, but also the secular city was a leading fountainhead and depository of change. The palisades of each had to be stormed by the new arrivals. These individuals had to establish their role in the face of the traditions of high culture and also of popular culture (which frequently represented no culture at all).

Therefore, all its idiosyncratic features notwithstanding, the literatures of Vienna and Budapest, and also of Paris and London, share the common qualities of urban literature, brought forth by the experiences of urban existence. Urban pleasures and urban poverty in Budapest differed more from those of the Hungarian countryside than they did, shall we say, from those of Munich.

The following excerpt should illustrate how the new cityscape influenced or even imposed itself upon the writer:

> There are indeed people who are determined to spend this night on the street, despite the fierce snowstorm. They are shovelling snow, piling it onto huge carts. Whatever rags they own, these men are wearing them. Threadbare blankets, potato sacks are tied to their waists, their caps fastened under their chins with tattered kerchiefs... their feet look like shapeless giant bulbs, wrapped in shreds of torn blankets and pieces of clothing.[3]

The author of these lines is not Emile Zola but Mór Jókai, Hungary's great romantic writer, who became a detailed naturalist, *malgré lui* in this episode of *A gazdag szegények* (The rich poor), (1890), a novel in which the poverty of the capital's outskirts is described for the first time.

As a whole, *A gazdag szegények* is a romantic narrative. A true 'insider's report' on the Budapest proletariat did not come until much later, in works like Lajos Kassák's *Angyalföld* (1929).[4] It should also be mentioned that Kálmán Mikszáth (with the exception of his *Parliamentary Sketches)* left the

capital practically untouched in his work. Pieces such as Andrej Bely's *Petersburg* (1912), or Aleksandr Blok's poems about the same city, did not appear about Budapest during a period when many Hungarian authors chose to write about Rome or Paris instead.

Budapest slowly became an *incidental* background, primarily with the timely flowering of the short story, which evolved as one of the most popular literary genres of the Hungarian *fin-de-siècle*. Structurally, its essential characteristic, the *one event* that changes the hero's or heroine's life for ever, fits in excellently with the bustling capital – anything could have happened at the hub.

Among the first to move his characters to Budapest was Sándor Bródy (1863-1924). Yet Bródy is still a representative of naturalism (namely of romantic naturalism à la Zola). This is shown in *Nyomor* (Poverty), (1884); *A bölény* (The buffalo), (1893); and in *Kaál Samu* (Samu Kaál), (1894).

The conflicting desires of the turn of the century are perhaps best expressed in the rise and fall of Aurél Asztalos, in Bródy's *A nap lovagja* (Knight of the day), (1902). His *Erzsébet dajka* (Nursemaid Erzsébet), (1900-1) is part of a cycle designed to present the decadent, immoral life of the Budapest middle class, and the suffering of those who moved to the capital from the countryside. The same *topos* is carried over to *A dada* (The nanny), (1902), but by then Bródy could be credited with the creation of a new literary language for both fiction and drama, a language reflecting the speech patterns of Budapest. But the capital remains, depicted as the spoiler of innocence and decency, and unambiguously so.

The first to feel truly comfortable as a Budapest author was Jenő Heltai (1871-1957). Even his first published volume, *Modern Dalok* (Contemporary songs), (1892) is an obvious departure from the patriotic poetry of the provinces. His poems are urban, a combination of the charming arrogance of the French chanson and the disarming wit and irony of Heinrich Heine. In *Kató* (1894), and in his collection of short stories *Lou* (1900), as well as in *Írók, színésznők és más csirkefogók* (Writers, actresses and other imposters), (1910), and in *Tündérlaki*

lányok (Tündérlak girls), (1914) Heltai treats the mundane – and demi-mondaine – society of Budapest with the unruffled amusement and tolerance of an habitué.

Like Bródy, Heltai also acculturates words and creates a new vocabulary to describe the new concepts encountered in city life. Heltai's language is natural in a new way, reflecting actual speech situations – often from the streets. And, indeed, one could have met his characters in the streets of Budapest at this time. Unlike Bródy, Heltai never moralizes, he merely flashes a friendly, malicious smile at the reader. He has an intimate relationship with Budapest, and a great deal of love for the city:

Szeretlek édes Budapestem, Te pajkos kis kokott, Mint kacér lányt, kit bolondos Szivünk már megszokott.	I love you Budapest, my darling, You flirtatious girl, charming Little cocotte, who became a part Of my foolish, silly heart.[5]

In his eyes Budapest was *home*, and the family residence at Baja seemed to be alien (cf. *Odahaza*). In *Pro Domo* he made it clear that the idyll of the provinces was not for him:

Ha kihűlőben lesz szivem, S tisztelt agyam lágyulni fog, Én is a családi gyönyörökről, S a nagymosásról dalolok.	When my heart is turning cold, And my brain becomes a mould, I too shall sing of simple leisure, And about a washday's pleasures.
Tisztelt vidéki kollégáim, Majd akkor adjanak kezet És iktassanak be a céhbe, Ha én is impotens leszek.	Then, dear colleagues of the provinces, I shall join your guild of romances. As charter member, and permanent – As soon as I turn impotent.[6]

Géza Hegedűs pointed out that, when referring to Heltai, his contemporaries were at a loss for adjectives in the Hungarian language. He was called a "charmeur", a "causeur", and as if this type were still alien, too foreign for the taste of the Hungarians.[7]

Heltai's work indeed shows that this transitory period in the life of Budapest was best sensed by his kind of hero, "bohemians" who lived on the periphery of middle-class respectability.

Sentiments more similar to Bródy's were expressed in the poems of József Kiss (1843-1921). Yet, while the latter's poetry still draws on conservative Jewish traditions, *A Hét* (The week), (1890-1924), a journal he founded, was the first urban periodical to represent the aspirations of the modern

capital. As a matter of curiosity, it should be mentioned that, owing to financial need, Kiss wrote an eight-volume dime novel, *Budapesti rejtelmek* (Budapest mysteries), (1874), under the pseudonym Rudolf Szentesi.

The distinctive effect of Budapest is depicted in Ferenc Molnár's (1878-1952) novel, *Éhes város* (Hungry city), (1901). Molnár, who at the beginning of his career followed the style of Bródy, soon became a uniquely acute observer of the Budapest social scene. Interesting enough, *Éhes város*, an immediate success, was written abroad.[8]

The hero of the book, Paul Orsovai, an ambitious bank clerk, is the prototype of the young Hungarian Jew fighting for a place in Budapest society. After his marriage to an American heiress, the capital's money-grabbing scoundrels try to get their hands on Paul's new wealth. The naked immorality of the city and his own compromises finally drive the hero to suicide — a complete indictment of Budapest. It should be noted that as a bonus, the novel contains a biting satire of the Budapest literary scene, especially of the Kisfaludy Society. The *Liget*, the future backdrop of *Liliom* (My Lilian), also appears in *Éhes város*, complete with its servant girls, soldiers and vagrants.

Molnár's *Liliom* (1909) is the story par excellence of naiveté and simple faithfulness destroyed in the cold and brutal city. *Liliom* is often described as a pioneering experiment in Hungarian drama, and so it was in terms of using the stage, but not for its "modernity". *Liliom*'s grotesque heaven, a recognizable replica of the Budapest suburbs, but presented in a golden light, had little to do with the lives of the Budapest poor. Its closest counterparts can be found in the work of the Symbolists, especially in Maurice Maeterlinck.[9]

It is curious that *A Pál-utcai fiúk* (The boys from Pál Street), (1907), with the exception of the *grund*, contains no description of Budapest. It could have been set in any growing European city where new construction was swallowing up the last islands of an earlier, more bucolic lifestyle. It was precisely for this reason that the novel became the favorite reading of youngsters not only in Budapest, Warsaw and Riga, but also in Zagreb and Stockholm.

Pain over the lost idyll of a *locus amenus* is in the forefront of the Hungarian *fin-de-siècle*, but it can no longer be pacified by Mikszáth's anecdotes.[10] In addition to exotic landscapes, so popular in the period, Budapest becomes simply the *locus* of the new fiction, the background of the novels of several writers, among them Zoltán Ambrus (1861-1932).[11] Ambrus's *Midás király* (King Midas), (1906) is perhaps the most typical novel of the Hungarian *Sezession*.[12] Both Paris and Budapest are depicted in it, and social stratification is given a great deal of attention. The backdrop is a Budapest tenement house in which representatives of "upward mobility" encounter the *declassé* (Jenő and Bella). The hero, a painter, brings home new ideas from Paris. In *Midás király* the image of Budapest is that of a mushrooming metropolis, dragging along some of her provincial past. As is known, the ending of the novel bears a suspicious resemblance to the long/short story of Georges Rodenbach, *Bruges-la-Morte* (1892). This caused a minor scandal in Budapest literary circles.[13]

Géza Csáth (1887-1919), a fascinating figure of the Hungarian *fin-de-siècle*, had no interest in his natural surroundings. He used the milieu in which his stories were acted out as moveable props – in the fashion of Edgar Allan Poe.[14] However in the *Figyelő* (Observer) section of the periodical *Nyugat*, Csáth wrote about the new type of song and music reflecting the sounds encountered in a large city, and delivered by the new media, the *orpheum* and the cabaret.[15] Csáth emphasized that the lyrics of these new musical compositions were equally new, and called attention to the spoken language of the capital, stressing the fact that it differed from any dialect. Csáth referred to the novel sentence structures appearing in colloquial Hungarian, and credited Bródy, Heltai and Molnár with making contemporaries aware of these changes through their writings.

Indeed, Budapest also became a city of cabarets, similar to the *Elf Scharfrichter* in Munich, but 'reduced' to the demands of Vienna, and to local Hungarian needs. *Fővárosi Orfeum*, *Folies Caprices*, and *Bonbonnière* added a more sophisticated touch to Budapest nightlife than the previously favored *Népszinház* programs and operettas.[16] In 1907 the owner of the

Bonbonnière, Ernő Kondor, asked Endre Nagy (1877-1938), the actual founder of the Hungarian literary cabaret, to read his short stories in his establishment, "in order to bring in serious literature".[17] Although later the Budapest cabaret attracted such illustrious contributors as Heltai and Molnár, and such composers as Kálmán and Jacobi, when Bródy heard that Nagy had accepted the offer, he declared in disgust that Nagy had been born to become a servant. Yet, it was this featherweight character – first experimented with at the *Modern Szinpad* (Contemporary stage), and the like – that enabled Hungarian plays to travel to Berlin, New York and later to Hollywood.

Naturally the elitists were not attracted by the cabaret. They congregated around the *Nyugat* (West), the most sophisticated publication of the period.[18] Therefore it is even more surprising that in its first volumes (1908-10) Budapest is rarely mentioned, and when it is, the capital's image conforms to the provincial stereotype of the 'wicked city'.

Ady, the most modern and yet the most archaic Hungarian poet, never became a poet of the capital. He wrote about Paris instead. In his *Miért is tettem?* (Why did I ever do it?) he curses Pest for "ruining those who don't belong".[19] The poem, first published in the *Nyugat* in 1908, appeared juxtaposed to his *Kis, falusi ház* (Little village house).[20] A similar message is broached in *Visszamegyek a falumba* (I'm going back to my village).[21] In his *A Duna vallomása* (The Danube's confession), the old river looks contemptuously at parvenu Budapest,[22] while in *Zeng-zug a jégcimbalom*, the dirty grey waves of the Danube are metaphors for the city's decadence and decay:

... Odakünn az utcán	Outside, in the streets,
Ködbe bűnbe hullva,	Big boys are brawling,
Nagy rosz fiuk bomlanak,	Broken and orphaned,
Mint a Duna árján	Like dirty ice floes
Csörömpölve árván,	Drifting
Ezer, mocskos jégdarab.	On the Danube's face.[23]

Of course, for Ady even these few allusions were unusual: his natural habitat was his soul-space, everything else was a projection.

Of the other famed authors of the period, the young Zsigmond Móricz (1899-1942) had nothing important to say about

Budapest in his first volume, *Hét krajcár* (Seven kreutzers).[24] Mihály Babits (1883-1941), who off and on spent time in Budapest during the first decade of the century, also felt alien and uncomfortable there. *A világosság udvara* (The courtyard of light), which appeared in his volume *Levelek Iris koszorújából* (Leaves from Iris's wreath), (1908), is about a Budapest tenement house. The closing lines clearly echo his feelings: "Mi van benne? Mi bánt úgy engem benne?" (What's in it? What's in it that hurts me so much?)[25] His next poem in the same volume entitled *Édes az otthon* (There's no place like home) is a small-town idyll; the joys of a petit bourgeois.[26] Babits' *Régi szálloda* (Old hotel) has obvious affinities with János Arany's *Hidavatás* (Bridge inauguration). It is as macabre, and as old fashioned, especially when compared to his *Páris, fantázia* (Paris, fantasy), written in the same year.[27]

Of the somewhat lesser-known figures of the *Nyugat*, Ákos Dutka (1881-1972) referred to the buildings of Budapest as "a mirage carved in fog", and to the trains as "bloody-eyed monsters", declaring that the "city was made up of alcohol, gold, and epidemics".[28] István Peterdi (1888-1944), in his poem, *Budapesthez* (To Budapest), (1908), predicted the destruction of the "sinful city", and in an apocalyptic scene showed "all the people whose hearts it had tortured" dancing on its ruins.[29]

In the stories of Lajos Biró (1880-1948), Gyula Hegedűs (1887-1953), and Dezső Szomory (1869-1944), Budapest always equals the spoiler, especially when their plots touch on the fate of young country girls, trying their luck in the big city. This had long been a *topos* in Western literature and, as in many instances, here too, we should be considering not just the imitation of genres and styles, but also the imitation of feelings.

In fact, the real background of Hungarian literature at this time was not Budapest at all but the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, creating a decadent, suffocating atmosphere in which a gigantic bureaucratic machine is engaged in patching over the megalomaniac dreams of the Empire and the glum reality, pointing toward an unavoidable end. This fake grandeur is expressed by the eclecticism of the architecture of

the Austrian capital with its fake Romanesque, fake Gothic, and fake Baroque.[30]

The last moments of a way of life, which disappeared irretrievably after the First World War, coincide with the explosive growth of Budapest. This is the true conflict, this is the great contradiction. And to witnesses such as Ady and Csáth, there could be no lasting make-believe harmony in literature either. Yet, this was the last attempt at harmony, an escapist one, into the dreams and death-dreams of the *Sezession*. Thereafter all breaks up into a menacing world of disjointedness, and the secure order of the cosmos vanishes forever.

In conclusion, in a very brief period Budapest turned, in the mirror of the literature dealing with it, from a promising, exciting metropolis into a city of sin and moral decay.

As Bertrand Russell put it, "Happiness is not experience, happiness is memories". This dictum seems to be even more true when the memories are secondhand. Budapest, *"the city of lights"*, a rather self-assured and cocky allusion to Paris, does not occur in the literature of the time. This image comes out in works written several decades later. In these the Hungarian capital of the *fin-de-siècle* appears, however, in the golden light of nostalgia - the result of a craving for the grandeur of pre-1914 Budapest, a grandeur yearned for by those who could have hardly experienced it.

NOTES

My selection from a very large body of literature is necessarily arbitrary, but, I believe, representative nonetheless. The crosscurrents of ideas cannot be investigated within the limited scope of this paper.

1 "Zu einem Buch ähnlicher Art", *Gedichte und lyrische Dramen* (Steiner), p. 45, lines 1-2.

2 Endre Ady (Érmindszent), Mihály Babits (Szekszárd), Gyula Juhász (Szeged), Árpád Tóth (Arad), Dezső Kosztolányi (Szabadka), Géza Csáth (Szabadka), József Kiss (Mezőcsát), Sándor Bródy (Eger), Ernő Szép (Huszt), Zoltán Ambrus

(Debrecen), Zoltán Thury (Kolozsvár), Zsigmond Móricz (Tiszacsécse), Gyula Hegedűs (Szeged), Ákos Dutka (Nagyvárad). Ferenc Molnár, Lajos Hatvany, Ignotus, Frigyes Karinthy, Milán Füst, Jenő Heltai, Oszkár Gellért, István Peterdi and Dezső Szomory were all born in Budapest. Of the typically urban authors Miksa Fenyő (1877-1972) alone was not born in the capital but at Mélykut. By 1904, however, he was the secretary of *GYOSZ* (National Association of Hungarian Industrialists).

3 I used the 1970 Budapest edition (p. 14). Henceforth translations of poetry and prose in the text are mine.

4 It is worth mentioning that there is a great deal of structural affinity between the two works. Jókai's plot is acted out primarily in the kitchen of the Kapor family, and the action of Kassák's, for the most part, limited to one tenement house.

5 "A Kerepesi út", *Heltai Jenő versei* (The poems of Jenő Heltai), (Budapest: *Nyugat*, 1911), p. 45. This part of Kerepesi út later became Rákóczi út, the main business street in Budapest.

6 Last stanza of "Pro Domo", *ibid.*, p. 63.

7 Géza Hegedűs, *Heltai Jenő* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1971), p. 118, and passim. *Arcok és Vallomások* (Portraits and recollections).

8 This was pointed out by Clara Györgyey, *Ferenc Molnár* (Boston: Twayne, 1980), p. 63.

9 Maurice Maeterlinck (1862-1949), had many fans in Hungary, among them Endre Ady and Artur Elek.

10 Cf. Artur Elek's sharp attack on Kálmán Mikszáth in his review of "Ne okoskodj, Pista!" *Figyelő*, 1 (1905), 8: pp. 532-4.

11 Zoltán Thury (1870-1906). Gyula Szini (1876-1932) could also be included here although the majority of his short stories were set in the country. In her fiction Cecile Tormay (1876-1937), especially in *A régi ház* (The old house), (1914), dealt with Budapest's transformation from a German city into a Hungarian one. The same author later blamed the Jews for the negative phenomena in the capital's life, referring to "sinful, Jewish Budapest".

12 It first appeared serialized in *Magyar Hirlap* (1891-2 issues), and as Korek rightly remarks, the specific properties of that genre are easily identifiable in *Midás Király* (Valéria Korek, *Hangulat és valóság; Ambrus Zoltánról* (München: Aurora, 1976), p. 107). The best analysis of *Midas* to date is by István Faludi, "Ambrus Zoltán elbeszélő művészete", *Értekezések a Magyar Tudomány Egyetem Irodalomtörténeti Intézetéből* (Szeged, 1941).

13 Cf. *Ambrus Zoltán levelezése* (The correspondence of Zoltán Ambrus), (Budapest, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1963), pp. 217-33).

14 For more on the style of Géza Csáth, and his connection with European *art nouveau*, cf. my Introduction to Géza Csáth, *The Magician's Garden* (New York – Budapest: Columbia University Press – Corvina, 1980), pp. 7-32.

15 *Nyugat*, 1 (1908), p. 391.

16 The *Népszinház* opened in 1875.

17 For more on this subject cf. Endre Nagy *A kabaré regénye* (The cabaret novel), (Budapest, *Nyugat*, 1935).

18 *Nyugat* (1908-41) was the most important literary and cultural journal of twentieth-century Hungary.

19 *Nyugat*, 1908, II, p. 407.

20 *Ibid.*

21 *Ibid.*

22 Published in 1907.

23 *Nyugat*, 1909, II, pp. 101-2.

24 Even as one of the editors of the *Nyugat* (1929-33; sharing the work with Mihály Babits and Oszkár Gellért), Móricz stuck to his principal topic: the critical depiction of semi-feudal Hungary.

25 "A világosság udvara" (1904) referred to what was colloquially known as *Lichthof*, even in Hungarian). *Nyugat*, 1.

26 1904.

27 János Arany (1817-82) expressed his dismay at industrial, modern Budapest, in a ballad, "Hid-avatás" (1877). Babits wrote these poems in 1904.

28 "November est" (November evening).

29 *Nyugat*, 1908, II, p. 212.

30 For more on this detail cf. Herman Broch, *Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit, Eine Studie* (Zürich: Rhein Verlag, 1955).

TIBOR FRANK

LISZT, BRAHMS, MAHLER: MUSIC IN LATE 19TH CENTURY BUDAPEST

Budapest, or Pest-Buda as it was called prior to the 1873 unification of its three parts, was a very small city at the time of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. There were about 200,000 inhabitants in Pest, 54,000 in Buda and 16,000 in Óbuda, a total of some 280,000 people in what was to become the future capital. This figure doubled over the next thirty years, but the capital at the time of the Millennium (1896), the 1000th anniversary of the Hungarian tribes' conquest of the country, could boast no more than 620,000 inhabitants.[1]

This period saw not only the transformation of Budapest into a capital city, the real centre of the country's economic, political and social life, but it was also the period that changed a musically-insignificant, provincial town into a centre of European importance, daring to compete even with Vienna. There was a kind of duality in the musical life of the capital. On the one hand, there were the state-supported institutions for higher musical education and also high standards of musical performance; on the other hand, there were the institutionalized forms of amateur musical performance which survived and even flourished in different forms among the various social layers.[2]

There was a great tradition of classical musical education in the capital, a tradition going back to the 18th century and to a lasting and living cult of the great composers of the Habsburg Monarchy and contemporary Germany. Some of these composers, such as Joseph Haydn, had worked in Hungary for a considerable time or, as was the case of Ludwig van Beethoven, had

intimate contacts with the aristocracy of the country. Pest and Buda, just like Hungary as a whole, belonged to the magic circle of Austro-German music and it was this heritage that was handed down from generation to generation.

Franz Liszt (1811-1886) the famous composer and virtuoso of Hungarian origin, played an important part in establishing the institutional framework for music in Hungary.

At the same time, he also laid down certain particularly national musical foundations. When for patriotic reasons he came home for a time, Liszt's prestige and influence helped to bring into existence the "National Royal Hungarian" Academy of Music, of which he became the first president. The Academy opened its doors in 1875, at first in Liszt's rented apartment in Pest. It was typical of the age that both Liszt and his fellow professor, the first internationally recognized Hungarian opera composer Ferenc Erkel (1810-1893), had apartments in the building that housed the Academy of Music for decades. This building was located on the recently built avenue later named after Gyula Andrássy, one of the leading statesmen of the day. The actual location of the Academy of Music emphasized the significance of the new institution.[3]

The independent Hungarian Opera became another cornerstone of musical life. Its building was erected on the same avenue between 1873 and 1884. The Opera company became completely independent of the Hungarian National Theatre and before long it established its own internationally acknowledged repertoire, partly through the use of foreign conductors and singers.

Concerts in Budapest centered around the Philharmonic Society which was established in 1853 and supported by some two thousand members of the aristocracy and well-to-do upper middle class. A general problem of the time was the musically educated public, or that section of it which was willing to spend money on music, was very much a minority group. Lovers of opera were not even sufficiently numerous to fill the only Opera house.[4] Those interested in serious music for the most part came from three major social groups. The topmost layer came from the cosmopolitan Hungarian aristocracy and from the educated sections of the landed gentry whose members, whether out of a real interest in serious music or out of a desire to imitate their friends in Paris or Vienna, frequented the Opera and the concerts in Budapest. A probably much larger section of the public came from the capital's German or Jewish haute-bourgeoisie. These people had been brought up in the Austrian musical tradition and transplanted Viennese culture to Budapest. But we should not overlook those other educated Hungarians – civil servants, university professors, teachers, doctors, lawyers, journalists and artists – who were also attracted by and interested in serious music.

This relatively narrow social base, however, proved to be adequate as the foundation for a particularly colorful and lively musical life – a musical life capable of attracting the musical few but which also provided an appropriate number of "events" for an aristocracy and haute-bourgeoisie ever ready to celebrate. Even if we bear in mind the high standards of Hungarian musical life today, it is astonishing to see the impact made at that time by a performance or a concert of major importance. Ten or twelve Hungarian or German newspapers published musical criticism, usually of high quality, the day after the concert or performance in question. In many cases this pointed to the social function of the event as well. There were, for example, ten reviews of a concert given on 12th February, 1889 by the violin virtuoso Joseph Joachim and these, apart from assessing the achievement of the artists, took care to list all the celebrities present on the occasion, and to comment on their family connections.[5]

The intricate relationship between Liszt and Budapest, as well as the Austro-German traditions in Hungary, set the scene for musical taste for decades to come. The professors of the Academy of Music were invited to that institution – at the direct or indirect instigation of Franz Liszt – by Ágoston Trefort, Minister of Religion and Education. The first of those invited, in 1887, was Ödön Mihalovich (1842-1929), the Wagnerian composer. "Once he breathed the same air as Liszt and Wagner and this strengthened his lungs", wrote Professor Antal Molnár of Mihalovich, "he was a planet composed of great stars, his course gained its self-confidence from this very fact. Profane uproar could not reach him as he was baptized in Liszt's sanctuary. It was in this sense that he built a Wagnerian bastion in the East. ... It was the work of Liszt and Wagner which prescribed the timely form of humanity for Mihalovich."[6]

Nevertheless, it was typical of both Liszt and the Minister of Education that they gave positions at the Budapest Academy of Music not just to representatives of the Liszt-Wagner school. Although there was a gulf between Johannes Brahms and the Liszt-Wagner camp, a gulf constituted by real and imagined differences and made even wider by eminent and prestigious Viennese critics such as Eduard Hanslick,[7] the aged Liszt could not, or perhaps did not wish to, block Brahms's influence in Budapest. The Bavarian composer Hans Koessler (1853-1926) was in every sense a steadfast disciple of Brahms and it was he who became *the* influential professor of composition at the Budapest Academy of Music between 1883 and 1908, and again from 1920 to 1924.[8] Even though he became quite at home in Budapest, Koessler never learned Hungarian and was often "attacked for spreading the German spirit at the Academy and for compelling his pupils to study German tunes and German forms".[9] Nevertheless, Koessler was a sincere admirer of the Hungarian musical spirit also, and the Hungarian composers Béla Bartók, Zoltán Kodály, Ernő Dohnányi and Leó Weiner all attended his classes, as did the internationally-appreciated composer of operettas Imre Kálmán.[10]

It was also Franz Liszt's advice that led to Jenő Hubay's and David Popper's being invited to the Budapest Academy. Jenő



Hubay (1858-1937) became the actual founder of the celebrated Hungarian school of violinists; David Popper (1843-1913) was *the* great cello maestro before Pablo Casals. On the occasion of Popper's death Hubay wrote: "In Vienna he was celebrated for years as the cellist of the Hellmesberger Quartet. ... It was Brahms whom he liked most in modern composition and whose work he interpreted with affection... Our own quartet (the Hubay-Popper Quartet) ... rehearsed in the corner-salon of his apartment on Andrássy út. It was there that virtually all the great pianists of the world came to take part at rehearsals, before participating in our chamber evenings. Among them were many famous people, including Brahms. Seated in an adjoining room, many of Popper's friends listened to the first performance of Brahms' work, played direct from the manuscript."[11]

Particularly important, indeed typical, features of musical life were *salons* of the Budapest haute-bourgeoisie and the music that was enjoyed there. Many amateurs of middle-class or upper-middle-class background were inspired to play clas-

sical and modern compositions at these, and the houses where they were held also served as homes for visiting professional musicians from abroad. The links between the musical life of Budapest and that of Vienna or Prague were at this time still very strong, and dated back to the most creative decades of classical Austrian music. It was the aim of Hubay and his friends and colleagues to have the musical life of Budapest follow the lead of Austro-German musical culture, an aim directly inspired by Franz Liszt. It was this group of musicians which played a decisive part in making Budapest one of the musical capitals of Europe in only a few decades. The growing metropolis thus became a suitable place in which to continue the best of European musical traditions. It is in this context that we can understand how and why Johannes Brahms (1833-1897) exerted his influence in Budapest.

The German master felt very much at home in the Hungarian capital, which he frequently visited from 1867 onwards. Brahms gave concerts in Pest in 1867 and in Transylvania in 1879, appearing with Joseph Joachim, the great violinist of Hungarian origin who was related to, and brought up in, the Wittgenstein family. Later on, Brahms repeatedly returned to Budapest, where many of the first performances of his works were given.[12]

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3. Suite (E-Dur) ... Bach
4. a) Változatok (F moll) ... Schumann
   b) Etude ... Chopin
5. Hegedű kettős verseny ... Spohr
   előadják JOACHIM J. és HUBAY J.
6. a) »Gartenmelodie« b) »Am Springbrunnen« c) »Abendlied« ... Schumann
7. a) Arie ... Pergolcse
   b) Chants polonais ... Chopin Liszt
   c) Etude mignonne ... Schütt
8. a) Romance a magy. hegedüversenyből ... Joachim
   b) Magyar tánczok ... Joachim - Brahms

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IX.

A növendékek beosztása és érdemsorozata.

1902—1903.

Az érdemjegyek fokozata: **Magaviselet:** dicséretes (1), jó (2), tűrhető (3). – Előmenetel: kitűnő (1), jeles (2), jó (3), elégséges (4), elégtelen (5). — *a)* **Összjátékon alapuló tantárgyak** (karének, kamarazene, fuvó együttes, zenekari gyakorlat, táncz) előmeneteli jegyei: kitűnő (1), jeles (2), jó (3), elégséges (4), hanyag (5). — *b)* **Zongora-melléktárgy és olasz nyelv előmeneteli jegyei:** jó (1), megfelelő (2), gyenge (3), elégtelen (4).

A) ELŐKÉSZITŐ ÉS AKADÉMIAI TANFOLYAM.

I.

Tisztán akadémiai tanszakok.

1. Zeneszerzés.

Tanára: *Koessler János.*

Folyó szám	Név	Főtanszak	Karének	Zongora	Poetika	Zene-történet	Zene-aesthetika	Hangszerelés és partitura-olvasás	Liturgika	Magyar zeneelmélet	Magyar zene-irodalom
		Kötelező tantárgyak									
		Koessler		Szabados	Moravcsik	Herzfeld		Szabó	Szautner	Dr. Molnár	
	I. osztály.										
1	Antalffy Zsiros Dezső	1	1	1	flm.	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	Chován Rikárd	1	1	—	flm.	—	—	—	—	—	—
3	Graber Lajos	3	3	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
4	Horvát Gyula	2	2	2	flm.	—	—	—	—	—	—
5	Kövér Dezső	2	2	3	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
6	Regéczi Margit	1	1	flm.	1	1	—	—	—	—	—
7	Schmidthauer Lajos	1	flm.	flm.	flm.	—	—	—	—	—	—
8	Szmrecsányi Imre	n. v.	1	2	flm.	—	—	—	—	—	—
	II. osztály.										
9	Grosz Ernő	nem vzsg.		flm.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10	Huszka Ernő	2	flm.	2	flm.	—	—	—	—	—	—

Folyó szám	Név	Főtanszak	Karének	Zongora	Poetika	Zene-történet	Zene-aesthetika	Hangszerelés	partitura-olvasás	Liturgika	Magyar zeneelmélet	Magyar zene-irodalom
		Kötelező tantárgyak										
		Koessler		Szabados	Moravcsik	Herzfeld		Szabó		Szautner	Dr. Molnár	
11	Lendvai Ervin	2	2	4	—	3	—	—	—	—		—
12	Loschdorfer János	2	1	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
13	Müller Károly	2	1	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
14	**Szirmai Albert**	2	1	flm.	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
15	**Weiner Leo**	1	2	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
	III. osztály.											
16	Feszler Géza	3	1	—	—	1	—	3	3	—	—	—
17	**Kodály Zoltán**	1	flm.	2	—	1	—	2	2	—	—	—
18	Meszlényi Róbert	n. v.	flm.	flm.	—	nem vizsg.				—	—	—
19	Schatz Aladár	2	flm.	—	—	2	—	1	2	—	—	—
20	Sebestyén Ilona	2	1	—	—	2	—	2	2	—	—	—
	IV. osztály.											
21	**Bartók Béla**			önként ismétlő								
22	Cséka Aladár			nem vizsgázott								
23	Heidlberg Albert	2	2	—	—	—	2	2	2	2	—	n. v.
24	Dr. Kasics Ozmán	2	1	—	—	—	1	1	1	1	—	1
25	**Kálmán Imre**	2	1	—	—	—	1	2	2	1	—	1
26	Lavotta Rezső			önként ismétlő								
27	Radó Elek	2	flm.	—	—	—	1	3	2	2		2
28	Redl Pál	2	1	—	—	—	2	1	1	2	—	3
29	ifj. Toldy László			önként ismétlő								

Kimaradtak: gróf Csáky Géza. Csányi Mátyás, Földes Jenő, Revere Gyula. Stroke Henrik és csikfalvi Vagyon Géza.

From the annual report of the Academy of Music for the year 1902-1903

Brahms had many Hungarian friends and admirers. In his younger years he accompanied the famous Hungarian violinist Ede Reményi at the piano. In Vienna he was in close, though occasionally unharmonious, contact with that great figure of Hungarian opera, Károly Goldmark. "When he [Brahms] came to perform his works in Pest (later Budapest), he soon saw that the musicians here got to know each other in German, that the best music critics wrote in German papers, that the head of our leading chamber group was Jenő Huber (Hubay), the cellist of the quartet was the Prague-born David Popper, that the second violinist was the Viennese Victor Ritter von Herzfeld, and that the viola player was the Austrian of peasant origin, József Waldbauer. But it was not only in our opera- (and, incidentally, philharmonic) orchestra that the German language reigned supreme: German was the language in which János (Hans) Koessler taught composition and Xavér Ferenc Szabó orchestration in the country's first music institute. If Brahms was in downtown Budapest and went into Rózsavölgyi & Co's music shop, he was received by the German-speaking Herr Siebreich who handed over to him, at his request, the Hungarian folk pieces which had just been published. These formed the basis of Brahms' four-hand *Ungarische Tänze* (Hungarian Dances), which he later orchestrated, at the suggestion of a Viennese publisher. There was no reason for the strongly *Gesamtdeutsch* (All-German) oriented Brahms to doubt the 'deep German embedment' of Hungarian culture. This is why his Hungarian pieces and parts were composed as though they represented a particular, Eastern, branch of German music. They jump about, as it were, in a pair of German trousers, the 'mádjárosch Hopsassa'. They are close to the intellectual products of the province called 'Schwabische Türkey'."[13]

Bearing this in mind, it is particularly interesting that Brahms the composer enjoyed an all-but-overwhelming success in many quarters of Budapest. When a whole evening was dedicated to his chamber compositions in 1893, critics protested: "...if anywhere, it is in music that liberty of taste is completely justified. ... Such a lot from one and the same table was perhaps a little too much of a good thing... To listen to

Hétfőn, 1893. november hó 27-én, esti 7½ órakor

a fővárosi vigadó kis termében

ADLER-GOLDSTEIN VILMA

asszony,

HERZFELD VIKTOR

és

GRÜTZMACHER FRIGYES

tanár urak

HIEKISCH J. H. ÉS RIEDL NÁNDOR

(clarinett) (viola)

urak, a m. kir. opera tagjai és * úr (II-ik hegedü) szives közremüködésével.

MŰSOR.

1. **Brahms.** *Hármas, H-Dur, 8-ik mű (uj átdolgozás)*
   I. Allegro con brio. II. Scherzo. Allegro con brio. III. Adagio. IV. Allegro.
2. **Brahms.** *Zongora-Sonáta, C-Dur. 1-ső mű.*
   I. Allegro. II. Andante. III. Scherzo. Allegro molto con fuoco. IV. Finale. Allegro con fuoco.
3. **Brahms.** *Clarinett-ötös. 115. mű.*
   I. Allegro. II. Adagio. III. Andantino. Presto non assai, ma con sentimento. IV. Con moto.

A **Bösendorfer**-féle hangverseny-zongora **Chmel és fia** csász. és kir. udvari szállitó urak raktárából való.

the same combination of harmony and rhythm for two hours, even if it is very clever, is just as tiring as it is to look at the same color for a similar period. Yet this can hardly be said of all three of these long and seemingly endless works. Interesting parts and sublime spirit can be found in all of them, but to get to these oases one has to cross large deserts first, as the music of Brahms is based either on arithmetic or on metaphysics. With him it is the brain which plays the leading role and it very rarely associates itself with the heart and the inspiration".[14] A year before, the Budapest press had attacked Brahms' "mercilessly empty and barren" piano quintet which, according to another critic, "leaves an uncertain gloomy cloud behind".[15] When his "Trio in A-minor" was first performed in Budapest in the same year, it was only the Adagio which was praised, as "a product of inspiration. In the other movements a

Budapest, 1892. évi márczius 9-én szerdán, este 7½ órakor,

a föv. vigadó kis termében

4-ik Kamara-estély

rendezik:

HUBAY, BLOCH, GRÜNFELD ÉS POPPER.

Dr. ADLER GOLDSTEIN VILMA

urnő zongoraművésznő és

NAGEL BERTA

k. a., dalénekesnő szives közreműködésével.

MŰSOR:

1. Zongora-ötös (F-moll) ... ... Brahms.
   a) Allegro non troppo, b) Andante, un poco Adagio, c) Scherzo (Allegro), d) Finale (Poco sostenuto, Allegro non troppo, Presto, non troppo).
2. a) „Am Grabe Anselmos") ... ... Schubert.
   b) „Der Tod u. d. Mädchen")
   c) „Gute Nacht" ... ... Franz.
3. Vonós-négyes (D-moll) ... ... Schubert.
   a) Allegro, b) Andante con moto, c) Scherzo (Allegro molto), d) Presto.
4. a) „Wenn ich in deine Augen seh'" ... ... Schumann.
   b) „Von ewiger Liebe" ... ... Brahms.
   c) „Habanera". „Carmen" dalműből ... ... Bizet.

few bleak commonplaces attract attention and everything else is not new".[16] Budapest critics, however, unanimously paid tribute to the great composer after the 1898 commemoration concert held on the death of the German master. Also, Budapest's upper-middle class contributed handsomely to the costs of the monument to the maestro which was erected in Vienna.[17]

Nor did the young Gustav Mahler (1860-1911) enjoy better luck with the demanding Budapest audiences. He was invited to direct the Budapest Opera for a short time (1888-1891), during which he was frequently attacked, despite the fact that his energy, courage, and "workaholism" were appreciated and even admired. In fact, Mahler did inspire a relatively divided company to perform new and important duties.[18] It was Mahler the

Hétfőn, 1892 november hó 7., esti 7½ órakor
a vigadó kis termében

I. KAMARA-ZENEESTÉLY

(bérletben) rendezik

Adler-Goldstein Vilma asszony, Herzfeld Victor,
Grützmacher Frigyes urak
Hiekisch Henrik tanár úr
szives közreműködése mellett.

Műsor.

1. **Beethoven.** *Trio (Es-Dur),* I. Poco sostenuto, Allegro ma non troppo. II. Allegretto. III. Allegro ma non troppo. IV. Allegro.
2. **Bach.** *Sonáta (E-Dur),* zongora és hegedűre. I. Adagio. II. Allegro. III. Adagio ma non tanto. IV. Allegro.
3. **Brahms.** *Trio (A-moll),* zongora, clarinett és gordonkára (clarinett: Hiekisch H. tanár úr). I. Allegro. II. Adagio. III. Andantino grazioso. IV. Allegro. (Első előadás).

Herrn Prof. Herzfeld
K. Musikakademie

Director Mahler
In aller Eile geschlossen
Druck!

conductor who scored the greatest success in Budapest: "His ascetic head, sculptured by the greatest master of the day, Rodin, his flashing eyes, and his commandingly compressed lips made the concert or the opera performance a festive occasion right from the first moment. The rows of chairs and the boxes disappeared, everything temporary vanished, gossip and criticism subsided into silence. It was anything but curiosity,

BUDAPESTI KAMARAZENE EGYESÜLET.

Vasárnap, 1898. április hó 3.-án esti ½8 órakor

a ROYAL szálloda disztermében

RENDKIVÜLI KAMARAZENE-ESTÉLY

BRAHMS EMLÉKÉRE

HUBAY JENŐ tanár, (I. hegedű) WALDBAUER JÓZSEF tanár, (mélyhegedű)

HERZFELD VICTOR tanár, (II. hegedű) POPPER DÁVID tanár, (gordonka)

urak vonósnégyestársulata

ADLER MIHÁLYNÉ,

ZILAHYNÉ-SINGHOFFER VILMA

úrnők,

HIEKISCH HENRIK tanár úr, BELLOVITS IMRE igazgató úr

szives közremüködésével.

MŰSOR:

I. ***Brahms.*** *115. mű, klarinettötös.*

Klarinett: ***Hiekisch Henrik*** *tanár úr.*

I. Allegro. — II. Adagio. — III. Andantino, Presto non assai, ma con sentimento. — IV. Con moto.

II. ***Brahms.*** *Változatok magyar dal felett zongorára:*

Adler Mihályné *úrnő*

III. ***Brahms.*** *Dalok:* ***Zilahyné-Singhoffer Vilma*** *úrnő.*

Zongorakiséret: ***Bellovits Imre*** *úr.*

a) Liebestreu.

b) Bölcsődal.

c) Románcz (33. mű, 5. sz.)

IV. ***Brahms*** *25. mű, zongoranégyes.*

Zongora: ***Adler Mihályné*** *úrnő.*

I. Allegro. — II. Intermezzo, Allegro ma non troppo. — III. Andante con moto. — IV. Rondo alla Zingarese, Presto.

interest, thirst for knowledge, dilettantism or snobbery that filled the concert hall or theatre: it was the spirit of Mozart, the soul of Beethoven, the magic of Wagner. Musicians and listeners alike were submerged in the irresistible impulse of the vast genius. While the music continued, everybody became, and was ennobled into, what he always should have been. It was the tension stemming from his high culture that captured Mahler's army of listeners and it was this unutterable electric wire which produced something of which the fame still survives: the unparalleled frenzy of celebration."[19]

Celebrated as the *interpreter* of classic German masters was, the *opera director* received unreasonably scant appreciation from Budapest critics and audiences. This was all the more regrettable in view of the fact that he began his work in Budapest with immense zeal: his programme included the presentation of some of Wagner's musical dramas as well as contemporary foreign and Hungarian operas. It was Mahler and the Budapest Opera Company that produced Pietro Mascagni's *Cavalleria rusticana* for the first time outside Italy, thus outdoing even Vienna.[20] His prestige at the Opera was enhanced by the fact that he was willing and attempting to learn even Hungarian: some of his speeches were delivered in this language and, according to contemporaries, with quite a tolerable accent.[21] He also knew very well that it was only the vernacular that made the riches of international opera an integral part of national culture and therefore he performed most operas in Hungarian. Mahler revived some of the great Hungarian achievements in opera, for example works by Ferenc Erkel. On the whole, however, critics remained fastidious and this became even more obvious when Mahler performed his own work in Budapest. It was in this city that his Symphony No. 1 was first performed – to complete incomprehension. The rehearsal went off well, but the performance itself failed utterly. The paper *Egyetértés* called the Symphony an "immature product" and added: "A bunch of sound-effects which may collectively be called – noise! Listening to the work makes one annoyed. Its original sin is its endless length. Tedious organ points, disharmonies, cacophony..."[22] Critics now praised Mahler the conductor and the opera director

only to damn the music of the *composer* as tiring to musicians and members of the public alike. The chief mistake was committed, a sarcastic critic argued, when Mahler forgot to distribute a programme before the performance in order to help the understanding of his work. "He left his audience in the dark as to what he actually intended". "Thus started the long period of suffering for the creative Mahler..."[23]

Mahler left Budapest, although not for good, and later he often considered returning to the Hungarian capital.[24] Even Hungarians realized what they had lost: "Pest is actually in revolt" — young Bruno Walter explained to his parents in a letter dated 1896 — "as it wants to get Mahler back; all the Austrian papers are full of this..."[25] Nevertheless, the great composer never returned to the Budapest Opera. The foundation of the grand epoch of Hungarian musical life, together with the establishment of its institutional and amateur forms, was carried out in German as far as its actual language, musical language, its spirit and its traditions were concerned. In the Budapest of the post-Compromise era there was an enthusiastic and prosperous middle class and upper-middle class to back, inspire and demand this sort of music, which was very much in vogue in practically all the larger cities of Central Europe. There was no significant difference between Budapest and Vienna up to the end of the 19th century in terms of high musical culture and musical taste. The differences began to be shaped at the beginning of the new century by a cultural awakening which, in Hungary, was attached to the quest for national identity and not, as in the capital of a disintegrating Austria, to a supranational or even "pan-human" cultural ideal. The first decade of the 20th century saw the making of modern Hungarian music and the coming of age of its grand practitioners, Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály. It was their appearance which, although not without strife, put an end to the alien character of Budapest's musical life in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.[26] It seems, nevertheless, that for the emergence of modern Hungarian national music, and for the musical revolution especially created by Béla Bartók, it was the active support of Austro-German masters, transmitting in a way the musical heritage of the 19th

century in theory, content, and form, that constituted an indispensable artistic precondition.

NOTES

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8 -k-a, "Koessler János". in: *Az Országos M. Kir. Zeneakadémia Évkönyve, 1908-1909* (The annals of the Nat. Hung. Royal Music Academy 1908-1909), (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1909), pp. V-XIII.; Siklós Albert, "Koessler János", in: *Az Orsz. M. Kir. Liszt Ferenc Zeneművészeti Főiskola Évkönyve, 1936/37* (Budapest: O.M.K.Z.F., 1937), pp. 21-26.; Fischer Péter: "Emlékezés Koessler Jánosra" (Memories of János Koessler), *Muzsika*, August 1966, pp. 16-17.

9 Siklós, *op. cit.* p. 24.

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11 Hubay Jenő, "Popper Dávid 1843-1913", in: *Az Országos M. Kir. Zeneakadémia Évkönyve, 1913-1914* (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1914), p. 4.; Frank Tibor, "A Hubay-Popper vonósnégyes", (The Hubay-Popper Quartet) *Uj Tükör*, 5 December 1982, p. 17.

12 Molnár Antal, *Brahms* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1983), p. 56.

13 Molnár Antal, *Eretnek gondolatok a muzsikáról* (Heretical thoughts on music), (Budapest: Gondolat, 1976), pp. 27-28. Cf. Goldmark, *op. cit.* pp. 74-83.

14 Vilma Adler-Goldstein collection, concert on 27 November, 1893.

15 *Ibid.*, concert on 9 March, 1892

16 *Ibid.*, concert on 7 November, 1892

17 *Ibid.*, concert on 3 April 1898; see also *Zur Enthüllung des Brahms-Denkmals in Wien*, 7 Mai 1908 (Wien, 1908), pp. 36-63.

18 Gedeon Tibor – Máthé Miklós, "The Budapest Years", in: *Gustav Mahler* (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1965), pp. 61-244.

19 Molnár Antal, *Romantikus zeneszerzők* (Romantic composers), (Budapest: Magvető, 1980), pp. 167-168.

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25 Bruno Walter to his parents, Steinbach, 6 August 1896. *Bruno Walter levelei 1894-1962* (The Letters of Bruno Walter 1894-1962), (Budapest: Gondolat, 1972), p. 40.

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21 Ibid., op. cit. pp. 55, 124-125.

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J. C. NYIRI

FIN-DE-SIÈCLE AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY: QUALITIES WITHOUT A MAN

In the course of the nineteenth century, and especially in the early years of the twentieth, there emerged in Austria a number of philosophical trends which, important internal differences notwithstanding, displayed certain fundamental common traits – traits rarely appearing in English or French philosophy, and certainly not dominant in German thought. These traits can conveniently be summarized in a *negative* form to the effect that in Austrian philosophy the middle-class values of *individual rationality* and of the sovereign *self-determining person* were neither taken for granted, nor indeed glorified. Thus both the isolated epistemological subject of Descartes and Locke on the one hand, and the pure ego of Kant on the other, failed to play a role in Austria. Rather than concentrating on the experiencing self, Austrian philosophers assigned ontological primacy to the *contents* and *objects* of experience, to those "qualities without a man", of which, as Robert Musil came to note, a "man without qualities" – depersonalized modern man, or perhaps man as such – typically consists.[1]

The aversion to the idea of a pure ego is, to be sure, not confined to Austrians; David Hume and Edmund Burke certainly shared it, as did G.C. Lichtenberg, and to some extent even Hegel and a number of German and British Hegelians. And T.S. Eliot gave a memorable expression to the same aversion when he wrote:

> The point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is that the

> poet has, not a 'personality' to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. [...] The emotion of art is impersonal.[2]

Only in Austrian philosophy however did this attitude become dominant, indeed omnipresent. Kant's view, according to which "I am [...] conscious of my identical self, [...] of a necessary *a priori* synthesis of my representations, which is called the original synthetical unity of apperception",[3] held no attraction for Austrians.[4] This state of affairs is only very partially explained by the fact that in the Habsburg Monarchy the emergence of an autonomous middle class was belated and remained incomplete. The same was, after all, true of Kant's East Prussia, and north-eastern Germany as well. Yet the social and political histories of the two realms were fundamentally different, and so were the resulting cultural frameworks into which the middle classes of Prussia on the one hand, and those of Austria on the other, were placed. Of the many treatises describing these differences, that by Franz Borkenau is perhaps the most forcible.[5] In north-eastern Germany, Borkenau points out, the old Germanic idea of individual liberty was only seemingly revived in *Lutheranism:* a religion which combined actual submission to any temporal authority with an aggressive assertion of *inner spiritual freedom.*

It is against this background, then, that Grillparzer, the most Austrian of all Austrian poets, could write: "How remarkable that antiquity conceived what the new Germany characterizes as the highest end of man: the *free spirit* as a sign of idiocy".[6] But of course the German, Grillparzer says, "is accustomed from his school days onwards to show disdain for healthy human understanding by being satisfied with words that have been elevated up to the noble standing of concepts".[7] Grillparzer specifically criticizes the concept of *liberty* as a "natural right" of man:

> It is of course ridiculous to speak of natural (inborn) rights. A right is nothing other than this, that I am not allowed to be hindered by others in one or other expression of my power. How, then, should there belong to the nature of man that which lies not in him, but in others.[8]

And with an obvious allusion to Protestant Germany he writes: "The Catholic faith has something of foolishness about it; Protestantism, in contrast, something impertinent".[9] By the expression "foolishness" Grillparzer here means: a willingness to accept what is given *without* its being subjected to the judgment of individual reason; a willingness to take the objects and relations in one's environment at their face value, to acquiesce in what is handed down, to bow to authority. This attitude Grillparzer contrasts with "German thinking", the basic fault of which is that it

> can hold on to nothing that is ultimate, for there is nothing that makes so strong an impression upon him [the German] that he becomes convinced of it for its own sake. Thus German philosophy is to all intents and purposes atheistic, and if in recent times there has been much talk of God, that is merely an arbitrarily imposed thought-barrier, that he should not completely fall into the bottomless chasm which threatens to open up beneath him. The Germans adopt a God – as a substitute for being convinced of His existence. He has no reality for them; and they respect Him as their own work, not themselves as His.[10]

I am putting forward, then, the following interpretation: It is the specific makeup of the Austrian middle class which, in the last analysis and often quite indirectly, forms the background of the most conspicuous trait of Austrian philosophy, namely the absence of a metaphysical self; *directly* this trait is rooted in the Catholic world view, in particular in the Catholic image of man.

It is of course obvious that this interpretation will not cover each and every case, aspect, or phase in the history of Austrian philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Still, the presence of the Catholic element at many of the crucial junctures of the story we are about to sketch is overwhelming. Thus both Bernard Bolzano and Franz Brentano, the two key figures in the development of what might be called *Austrian logical objectivism*, were Catholic priests, even if the former was dismissed, in 1819, from the chair of theology he held at the Philosophical Faculty in Prague, and the latter left the Church in 1873, in protest against the dogma of Papal Infallibility. István Széchenyi and József Eötvös, political thinkers whose influence was very considerable not only in

Hungary but in Austria also, were both devout Catholics. Ernst Mach of course became an atheist, but the milieu in which he grew up, of decisive importance in his case, was markedly Catholic. T.G. Masaryk was an ardent Catholic when young, and although he later converted to Protestantism he always preserved a nostalgic yearning for the bonds provided by his earlier religion. Alexius von Meinong, a leading representative of the Brentano school, came from an old Catholic family, as did the economist Carl Menger, as well as his adherant F.A. von Hayek, Wittgenstein's distant cousin. Ludwig Wittgenstein himself was of three-quarters Jewish origin, but was baptized in the Catholic faith, the faith of his mother, and he can be said to have harbored a life-long hostility against the liberal values of his Lutheran father.

***

Bolzano's great achievements belong to the the domain of logic and mathematics, but what interested him most were the basic questions of ethics. His supreme moral imperative was: "Always choose from among the actions possible to you those which, when all the consequences are weighed, will best promote the good of the whole, no matter in which parts".[11] Bolzano was certainly not the first to formulate a maxim of this sort, but he realized what his predecessors did not, namely that such a maxim has as its necessary presupposition an *objectivistic ontology*. This is because the weighing of consequences is impossible unless they can be *known*, and is meaningless if what is known is not somehow *there* already, is not *given*, independently of any knowing subject. Deeds can be assigned a definite ethical value *only* if truths are objective. In an early manuscript, written in 1816, a section entitled "Zur Deduktion des obersten Sittengesetzes" – on the deduction of the highest moral law – is immediately followed by a passage on "Logical Pre-Notions", *Logische Vorbegriffe* – the first such *Vorbegriff* being that of *truth*. "The concept which I associate with the word truth", writes Bolzano, "implies that there is no division of truth into the *objective* and the *subjective;* it is only that

which one very pleonastically calls objective truth which is for me *truth in the strict sense*."[12]

In the four-volume *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1837, Bolzano's major work, the notion of objective truth is captured by the term "truth-in-itself", *Wahrheit an sich*, and defined as follows:

> I understand [...] by a truth-in-itself any one proposition which asserts something thus as it is, whereby I leave undetermined whether this proposition is really thought or whether it is expressed by anybody or not. [...] Thus for example the number of blossoms which a certain tree standing in a certain place has borne forth last spring is a definite number even if no one knows what it is; and hence a proposition which gives this number is called by me an objective truth even if no one is familiar with it, and so on.[13]

Bolzano's notion of the "in-itself", the *an sich*, is diametrically opposed to that of Kant, and consciously so:[14] indeed criticisms directed against Kant, attempts to refute him, are a constantly recurring feature in Bolzano's writings.[15] In his last will he enjoins his favourite pupil, Robert Zimmermann, to make it "one of the tasks of his life to eliminate, *through the spreading of clear concepts*, the detrimental confusions which Kant, without himself realizing it, had brought about in Germany".[16]

Now Bolzano's truth-in-itself is separated not only from the knowing subject but also – as Palágyi was the first to observe[17] – from *language*. The epistemological ego is, in Bolzano's interpretation, certainly not "pure"; the rules, logic, and reason of this ego are not rooted in the ego itself, they have their source, rather, in an objective order, an *external context*. However, this context is a merely abstract one, the eternal, unchanging system of representations, propositions and truths *in themselves*. The outlines of a more concrete contextualism emerge, at roughly the same time, from the political writings of Count István Széchenyi. Called a "progressive conservative" by Iványi-Grünwald,[18] Széchenyi did not share the characteristic liberal faith in the powers of autonomous reason. Indeed there is a characteristic passage in his major work *Hitel* (Credit) where he forcefully rejects the abstract concept

of rationality. "Now if we endeavour to explain what reason is", Széchenyi writes,

> no three men out of ten will give it the same meaning. What amount of brains U has, has he not acquired a lot of money?" – "Wonderful intellect this H is, he knows ten thousand lines by heart" – "Who can doubt that O is endowed with reason, is not his house in good order, do not his wife and children look smart, does he not lead a pleasant life" – "Now this is intelligence, he knows twenty-four languages", and so on. – But what is, then, reason? For the mental faculties of those we mentioned are far from being similar, indeed they are quite different; since he who has a good memory might not have enough money; the well-to-do doesn't know a line by heart; the happy husband might not know more than one or two languages; whereas the linguist has no one to love him and to embellish his life's path.[19]

Not some abstract, general mental faculty, but the individual logic of particular situations and roles will thus serve as the standard of rationality; rational is what *corresponds to*, *is appropriate under*, *the given conditions*. Translated into more political terms, this view of rationality is of course tantamount to a *depreciation of any theory dissociated from practice*. As Széchenyi will put it in his *A Kelet Népe* (The people of the East, 1841):

> To indulge in rhetoric and endless writing is fine in itself – if it *is* fine. It is not, however, a *deed*, and it increases the spiritual and material wealth, and thus the power of the nation, only insofar as it induces useful deeds and prevents useless and harmful ones, since words and letters are but *tools*, and by themselves *nothing*. They become useful or harmful only by their application; and so often the most applauded speech and declamation, or a book in the greatest vogue, if it is not usefully translated into deed and life, is of lesser value than an hour's unwitnessed and unapplauded ploughing by a ploughman.[20]

On the other hand, this view implies the appreciation of cultural *plurality*, of the unequalized multiformity that is given, and handed down, in human society. As Széchenyi wrote in his posthumously published *Hunnia:*

> All those properties, particular characteristics, and domestic virtues, with which even the smallest families contribute to the glorification of the universe, are the filling in of an earlier moral gap, however tiny, and thus a step towards perfection. The cultivation of all

> those hundreds and hundreds of original qualities, properties and virtues, which lie hidden in an infinite variety of shades in the individual spirits of particular nations will, then, lead to perfection even more.[21]

The same high regard for cultural plurality as handed down in social institutions informs the two-volume treatise *The Influence of the Ruling Ideas of the 19th Century on the State*,[22] by Baron József Eötvös. Eötvös stresses that "instead of philosophising about the opinion of the people in general", one should rather "turn one's attention to the desires and prospects of the individuals out of which 'the people' are constituted".[23] It will then turn out that the striving for, say, absolute freedom, exists only in philosophical speculation – and in the minds of those who, as Eötvös says, belong in a mental asylum.[24] Society cannot be changed in accordance with abstract ideals.

> A society in which – in order to set it up anew in a preconceived form – all the mortar holding together the individual parts has been dissolved away, in which everything that had seemed too firm and not amenable to every realignment has been broken into pieces, can just as little achieve durability through its form alone, as a heap of rubble – whether heaped up like ninepins or as a pyramid – can withstand the storms and the rains.[25]

Only a *social and institutional pluralism* will defend, according to Eötvös, the organic continuity of *historically given structures* against radical-utopian alterations, brought about either, most notably, by a central government, or by a radical movement against which such a government is, in the long run, defenceless.

> There are many who believe that that which exists can only be preserved through the influence of a powerful central political force, and the fact that the system of centralisation finds so many defenders amongst politicians is for the most part attributable to this belief. Yet it is a point of view which rests on an error. That which exists cannot be protected against changes by the state; it is much rather the immutability of a host of other relationships through which the state itself must be protected against upheavals. Every perfectly ordinary house which a citizen erects on the territory of the state is not just a means by which a whole series of citizens will step up to superior habits. It is at the same time a protective bastion for civil society. Every right whose possession is guaranteed to the individual by the state is a guarantee

> of civil society. And every securely organized municipality is a stone by means of which the larger structure will be secured. The better one understands how to insert these stones into the building, the more one will understand how to use the particular as an essential part of the whole, and the more unshakeable will stand the state.[26]

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One could hardly conceive of a more blatant divergence than that between the ideas of the conservative-liberal Hungarian political thinker Eötvös and the proto-anarchist Austrian physicist-cum-philosopher Ernst Mach. Still, common to both was the conviction that the faculty of judgement of the isolated individual could not possibly serve as the sole standard of right and wrong, true and false. Thus Mach does indeed concede that the *handed down*, as a basis for *hic et nunc* personal discovery, fulfils indispensable functions. In his 1883 Inaugural Address he refers to the "fixed habitudes of thought"[27] without which new problems will not become perceivable, and to the "importance and utility" of "habitual judgment" and of "prejudice". "No one could exist intellectually", he writes,

> if he had to form judgments on every passing experience, instead of allowing himself to be controlled by the judgments he has already formed. [...] On prejudices, that is, on habitual judgments not tested in every case to which they are applied, reposes a goodly portion of the thought and work of the natural scientist. On prejudices reposes most of the conduct of society. Which the sudden disappearance of prejudice society would hopelessly dissolve.[28]

But even where individual judgment and personal discovery do indeed occur, it would be an error to suppose, according to Mach, that the cognizing subject possesses some absolute personal identity. In Mach's universe no essential distinction can be made between the objective and the subjective: "Das *Ich* ist unrettbar",[29] the self is an arbitrary construct lacking inherent unity.

> The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements [...] The elements constitute the I. *I* have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). [...] The ego is not a definite, unalterable, sharply-bounded unity. None of these attributes are important; for all vary even within

> the sphere of individual life; in fact their alteration is even sought after by the individual.[30]

Mach had an extraordinarily broad, and lasting, impact on Austrian thought. It was under his influence that Fritz Mauthner denied the reality of the self, dissolving the latter in fleeting linguistic experiences;[31] and it was partly under Mauthner's influence that the early Wittgenstein abandoned the notion of a metaphysical subject,[32] equating the limits of the self with the limits of its language, and postulating a point-by-point correspondence between this language and the world. Furthermore, Mach's impact on Robert Musil is quite conspicuous. True, the latter's doctoral dissertation of 1908, *Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Lehren Machs*,[33] was of a rather critical nature (even if, according to Musil's *Doktorvater* Stumpf, that criticism did not go far enough). But the later Musil, the author of *The Man Without Qualities*, might be said to have changed, in a number of respects, from professed foe to covert disciple, accepting many of Mach's suspicions about the merely *possible* character of what is called "reality". He especially accepted Mach's view of the *ego:* namely, that there is no such thing. As J.T. Blackmore plausibly maintains, the very title of Musil's novel echoes Mach.[34] Previously we have, by way of introduction, alluded to the famous passage in *The Man Without Qualities* where Musil suggests:

> In earlier times one could be an individual with a better conscience than one can today. [...] Today [...] responsibility's point of gravity lies not in the individual but in the relations between things. Has one not noticed that experiences have made themselves independent of man? [...] Who today can still say that his anger is really his own anger, with so many people butting in and knowing so much more about it than he does? There has arisen a world of qualities without a man to them, of experiences without anyone to experience them, and it almost looks as though under ideal conditions man would no longer experience anything at all privately...[35]

Here the lack of a center of gravity within the individual is depicted as an historical *loss*, as a typically *modern* phenomenon. In his key essay "Der deutsche Mensch als Symptom" (1923) however Musil holds a different, generalized view, according to which man *as such*, at all times, is but a resultant

of the historico-cultural context in which he is enmeshed. "The very shapelessness of his natural make-up", Musil writes,

> forces man to adapt himself to forms and to assume the characters, customs, morals, styles of life and the whole apparatus of an organisation. [...] For one can say that man becomes man only through expression, and this forms itself in the forms of society.[36]

And in a draft chapter to *The Man Without Qualities*, written in the mid-twenties, this is what the protagonist has to say to his sister:

> There can be no love between two isolated human beings! [...] We have followed an impulse against order... A love can grow out of spite, but it cannot consist of spite. It can endure only as interwoven in a society. It cannot be the meaning of life, but a negation, an exception from the meanings of life. An exception however needs something from which it is an exception. Man cannot live by negation alone.[37]

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The dominant philosophical school in Austria at the turn of the century was of course that of Brentano. Franz Brentano himself had been born and educated in Germany – he was a native of the Rhineland – but he always harbored an intense dislike for Prussia, for Kant, and for German philosophy in general. He became a professor of philosophy at Vienna University in 1874. Although a subjectivist of sorts,[38] Brentano started a line of development which very soon led to philosophies offering no recess whatsoever for the metaphysical self. His student Alexius von Meinong created a strange kind of objectivistic ontology, in which the contents of mental acts – like, e.g., those of *presuppositions* – were markedly independent of the subjective acts themselves;[39] his student Edmund Husserl saw no reason to believe that mental acts had, as it were, a subjective *focus*;[40] his student T.G. Masaryk had misgivings about the strained rationality, the excess freedom, that Protestant convictions forced upon the individual;[41] while his student, the frustrated liberal Sigmund Freud,[42] doubted whether inner freedom and rationality were possible at all. Liberal politics, Freud in

fact showed, could not possibly have triumphed since they were based on a false picture of the human mind. "Properly speaking", Freud wrote towards the end of *The Interpretation of Dreams*,

> the unconscious is the real psychic; *its inner nature is just as unknown to us as the reality of the external world*... What part now remains in our description of the once all-powerful and all-overshadowing consciousness? None other than that of a sensory organ for the perception of psychic qualities.

Or as he put it in an essay, written as late as 1917 but still in full harmony with the views expressed in *The Interpretation of Dreams:*

> The human being, even when of lowly status in the outside world, feels himself sovereign in his own soul. [...] But the two-fold recognition, that the life of sexual drives in ourselves is not fully to be brought under control, and that psychic processes are, as such, unconscious and accessible to and capable of coming under the dominion of the self only through an incomplete and unreliable perception, becomes equivalent to the assertion that *the ego is not master in its own house.*[43]

Incidentally, if Freud's psychoanalytic ideas amounted, as they obviously did, to a proof of the impossibility of liberal politics, those of his Hungarian disciple Sándor Ferenczi had, by contrast, activist overtones[44] — a further illustration of the close relationship between politics and the content of philosophy in Austria.

The closeness of that relationship is very obvious in the case of Carl Menger. The inaugurator of the trend that has become known as the Austrian School of Economics, Menger had a markedly liberal background; and markedly liberal was the so-called *methodological individualism* that permeated his subjectivist theory of economic needs.[45] But at the same time, reflecting the specific condition of the Austrian middle class, Menger definitely displays strong sympathies towards views such as those expressed by Burke and Savigny, views focussing on the historico-social *context* of the individual rather than on the individual himself. As Menger writes:

> Burke was probably the first, who, trained for it by the spirit of English jurisprudence, emphasized with full

awareness the significance of the organic structures of social life and the partly unintended origin of these.[46]

Burke taught that numerous institutions of his country

> were not the result of positive legislation or of the conscious common will of society directed toward establishing these, but the unintended result of historical development. He first taught that what existed and had stood the test, what had developed historically, was again to be respected, in contrast to the the projects of immature desire for innovation. Herewith he made the first breach in the one-sided rationalism and pragmatism of the Anglo-French Age of Enlightenment.[47]

Menger comes close to agreeing with the Savigny school, too, when maintaining that there is a "subconscious wisdom" manifested in those institutions that come about organically, that the meddlesome advocates of reform "would do well less to trust their own insight and energy than to leave the reshaping of society to the 'historical process of development'".[48]

In a similar spirit, to-day's leading exponent of the Austrian School, F.A. von Hayek stresses that "since we owe the order of our society to a tradition of rules which we only imperfectly understand, *all progress must be based on tradition*".[49] Hayek argues for a "true" – as contrasted with the "false", excessively rationalist – individualism. The former, he writes,

> is a product of an acute consciousness of the limitations of the individual mind which induces an attitude of humility toward the impersonal and anonymous social processes by which individuals help to create things greater than they know, while the latter is the product of an exaggerated belief in the powers of individual reason and of a consequent contempt for anything which has not been consciously designed by it or is not fully intelligible to it.[50]

True individualism, Hayek writes, "affirms the value of the family and all the common efforts of the small community and group",[51] and indeed recognizes "the family as a legitimate unit as much as the individual".[52] For Hayek, too, the qualities of the self do not belong to it alone.

Hayek's theory of "true" individualism is basically a political one, but it does not lack epistemological foundations[53] – even if these are not worked out in an entirely systematic or

coherent manner. The philosopher in whose writings the Austrian epistemological tradition is truly synthesized is Ludwig Wittgenstein. His early treatise *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* shows the impact not only of Mach and Mauthner but quite decidedly of the Brentano school as well; while in his later work – a critical but organic development of the earlier one – influences of Grillparzer and of Freud are traceable, and formulations strikingly parallel to those of Musil appear. Wittgenstein's posthumously published volume *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) – a basic contribution to twentieth-century philosophy – represents, as it were, a final dissolving of all classical, egocentered epistemologies. Wittgenstein's crucial new concept is that of *rule-following*. Now the idea that human behaviour, human speech, and human thought are constrained by rules is in itself not a novel one. Wittgenstein's philosophical achievement was that he essentially changed the *conceptual framework* surrounding the notions of obeying, following, or conforming to, a rule. The basic concepts of the new framework are: training and behavior, use, custom, institution, practice, technique, agreement. The following of a rule is not, in any interesting sense, an "inner", mental event: on the contrary, it is a custom, an institution, embedded in the agreements within society. And Wittgenstein emphasizes that the agreements which constitute a necessary precondition of *communication*, and indeed of any *logic*, are "not an agreement of *beliefs*",[54] but agreements, regularities in the *foundations of judgement*,[55] in the "common behavior of mankind".[56] *Mankind*, not the individual mind, should be regarded as the basic unit of epistemology. A rather Catholic idea, this; and – as the foregoing sketches surely suggest – a very Austrian one.

NOTES

1 Cf. Musil. *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (1930), book I, ch. 39.

2 Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1917). Here quoted from T.S. Eliot, *The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism* (1920), (London: Methuen, 1960), pp. 56-59.

3 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 135.

4 This is the strong impression one retains even after the publication of Werner Sauer's *Österreichische Philosophie zwischen Aufklärung und Restauration: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Frühkantianismus in der Donaumonarchie* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982). According to Sauer, the absence of Kantianism in Austria in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is simply a result of the repressive cultural policy under Emperor Francis. However, Sauer's excellently researched book itself contains ample material to refute its author's thesis.

5 "Deutschland zwischen Ost und West", *Wort und Wahrheit* 1949/1. For further references, see e.g. my *Am Rande Europas* (Wien: Böhlau, 1986).

6 Franz Grillparzer, *Werke*, ed. by August Sauer, sect. II, vol. XI, p. 68.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 103.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 120.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

10 *Ibid.*, sect. II, vol. IX, pp. 156f. Written in 1834.

11 B. Bolzano, *Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft* (Sulzbach: 1834), vol. I, p. 236. I here use the translation given by William M. Johnston in his *The Austrian Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 277.

12 Cf. E. Winter, *Die Deduktion des obersten Sittengesetzes B. Bolzanos* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), p. 32.

13 B. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre: Versuch einer ausführlichen und größtentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter* (Sulzbach: Seidelsche Buchhandlung, 1837), vol. I, p. 112.

14 As Hungarian-born Melchior Palágyi puts it: "I believe that Bolzano could hardly have worked out the concept of a truth in itself had he not been driven to it through his opposition to the critical philosophy [gegen den Kritizismus]. When Kant asserts that the objects have to observe an order conferred upon them by our cognition, Bolzano sets against this another formula, namely that our knowledge has to adjust itself to the truth..." Palágyi, *Kant und Bolzano: Eine kritische Parallele* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1902), pp. 3f.

15 A summary of these criticisms is given in his *Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, ein Abdruck der Vorlesungshefte eines ehemaligen Religionslehrers an einer katholischen Universität, von einigen seiner Schüler gesammelt und herausgegeben*, Erster Teil (Sulzbach: Seidelsche Buchhandlung, 1834), §§60-62.

16 Quoted in Edgar Morscher, *Das logische An-sich bei Bernard Bolzano* (Salzburg: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1973), p. 33.

17 Cf. Palágyi, pp. 75f: "Erst bei der Lehre von den 'Vorstellungen an sich' tritt es deutlich hervor daß Bolzano es auf ein *übersprachliches Denken* abgesehen hat. Nun könnte man wohl bei einem Menschen von einem untersprachlichen Denken sprechen...; ein übersprachliches Denken jedoch besitzen wir nicht..."

18 Cf. Béla Iványi-Grünwald, "Gróf Széchenyi István *Hitel* címü munkája. Történeti bevezetés" (Count István Széchenyi's *Credit*. A historical introduction), in *Gróf Széchenyi István Összes Munkái*, vol. 2, (Budapest: 1930, p. 141). I have argued for the appropriateness of Iványi-Grünwald's term in my paper "Intellectual Foundations of Austrian Liberalism", in W. Grassl and B. Smith, eds., *Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1986).

19 *Hitel* (1830). *Gróf Széchenyi István Összes Munkái*, vol. 2, (Budapest, 1930), p. 335. In the Hungarian original the relevant term is in each case *ész*, i.e. "reason".

20 *A Kelet Népe* (1841), *Gróf Széchenyi István Összes Munkái*, vol. 5, (Budapest, 1925), p. 392.

21 Gróf Széchenyi István, *Hunnia* (1835), (Pest: Heckenast, 1858), p. 204.

22 *Der Einfluß der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat*, vols. 1-2, (Wien, 1851 and Leipzig, 1854). Although Eötvös tried to create the impression that the book was originally written in Hungarian, in fact it has been composed in German, the Hungarian text being a – not very good – translation. Eötvös has been characterized as the most important political theorist of 19th century Austria and Hungary (by Gerald Stourzh, in his "Die politischen Ideen Josef von Eötvös' und das österreichische Staatsproblem", *Der Donauraum*, vol. 11, 1966, p. 205). According to Josef Redlich, the *Ruling Ideas* made its author "one of the most respected proponents of European liberalism at its height, and even today it [i.e. this work] could still be described as one of the most singular and intellectually rich writings on the modern state". *Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem*, vol. I/1, (Leipzig, 1920), p. 547. This passage by Redlich is quoted with approval in Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918*, vol. II, (New York, 1950), pp. 93f. As Kann puts it, great as the influence of Eötvös was "on Hungarian political life and Magyar political doctrine", it "was of even greater significance in the development of European political philosophy in the nineteenth century in general". *Ibid.*, p. 93.

23 Eötvös, *Die herrschenden Ideen*, part II, p. 33.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 274.

25 *Ibid.*, part I, p. 244.

26 *Ibid.*, part II, p. 505.

27 Ernst Mach, *Popular Scientific Lectures* (1895), transl. by Thomas J. McCormack (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1943), p. 227.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 232.

29 Ernst Mach, *Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen* (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1886), p. 18.

30 Ernst Mach, *The Analysis of Sensations* (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), pp. 23f.

31 See Fritz Mauthner, *Erinnerungen I. Prager Jugendjahre* (München: Georg Müller, 1918). Cf. also Joachim Thiele, "Zur 'Kritik der Sprache'. Briefe von Fritz Mauthner an Ernst Mach", *Muttersprache* 1966, p. 84.

32 Cf. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), esp. pp. 298ff. See also, in particular, Gershon Weiler's earlier essay "On Fritz Mauthner's Critique of Language", *Mind* 67 (1958), pp. 80-87.

33 The dissertation has now been translated into English, under the title *On Mach's Theories*, intr. by G.H. von Wright (München: Philosophia Verlag), 1982.

34 John T. Blackmore, *Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and Influence* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972), p. 189.

35 Cf. note 1 above. Translation by Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser.

36 Compare Robert Musil, "The German Personality as a Symptom", in J.C. Nyiri, ed., *Austrian Philosophy: Studies and Texts* (München: Philosophia Verlag, 1981), p. 178. For a similar, striking formulation see "Der deutsche Mensch als Symptom", in Robert Musil, *Gesammelte Werke in neun Bänden*, ed. A. Frisé (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1978), vol. 8, p. 1370: "Versuchen wir von uns abzuziehen, was zeitbedingtes Convenu ist, so bleibt etwas ganz Ungestaltetes, denn auch unser Persönlichstes ist als Abweichung auf das System der Umwelt bezogen. Der Mensch existiert nur in Formen, die ihm von aussen geliefert werden. [...] Die gesellschaftliche Organisation gibt dem Einzelnen überhaupt erst die Form des Ausdrucks und durch den Ausdruck wird erst der Mensch".

37 *Gesammelte Werke in neun Bänden*, vol. 5, p. 1673.

38 He stressed that *all* mental acts have an *object*, but at the same time made it plain that the location of these objects was *within* the boundaries of the subjective self.

"Every mental phenomenon includes", he wrote in his major work *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874), "something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on". (Quoted after the 1973 Routledge & Kegan Paul translation.)

39 Cf. esp. his *Über Annahmen* (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1902).

40 The *ego*, writes Husserl, is "nichts Eigenartiges, das über den mannigfaltigen Erlebnissen schwebte, sondern [ist] einfach mit ihrer eigenen Verknüpfungseinheit identisch". *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 2 (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1901), p. 331.

41 Although Masaryk, subsequently the founder of Czechoslovakia, was of Slovakian-Moravian origin, it is certainly proper to regard him, at least until about the mid-1880s, as an Austrian. In 1881, at that time still a *Privatdozent* of philosophy at Vienna, Masaryk published his book on suicide, *Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung der modernen Civilisation*. Intent on demonstrating the possibility of a religious-ethical individualism, Masaryk on the other hand was repelled by the idea of a society where every norm is open to criticism, where no institution is viewed with a feeling of its ultimate necessity, and in his book actually strived for a conceptual unification of the Protestant belief in *personal autonomy* with the Catholic belief in *authority*.

42 "Freud", wrote Paul Roazen, "represents an aspect of liberalism's self-examination. [...] In Freud's quest for an understanding of human feelings he transcended liberalism and joined hands with thinkers usually associated with traditions alien to it. Along with Burke he recognized the intensity of destructive urges and the sense in which societal coercions can be psychologically necessary". (Freud: *Political and Social Thought* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968] pp. 248f.)

43 S. Freud, "Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse", *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. xii (London: Imago, 1947), pp. 8 and 11.

44 As can be seen, e.g., from his "Psychoanalysis és paedagogia" (1908). Significantly, the social-political direction of this essay is much less conspicuous in the German version, cf. the editorial remark on p. 9 of Ferenczi, *Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse*, vol. 3 (Bern: Verlag Hans Huber, 1964).

45 As set forth in his *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre* (Wien: Braumüller, 1871).

46 Carl Menger, *Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften* (1883), in *The Collected Works of Carl Menger*, ed. F.A. von Hayek, vol. 2, (London: The London School of Economics, 1934), p. 173.

47 *Ibid.*

48 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

49 F.A. von Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, vol. 3, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 167.

50 "Individualism: *True and False*", in F.A. von Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order* (London: Routledge, 1949), p. 8.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

53 See e.g. the essays collected in his volume *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).

54 L. Wittgenstein, *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), p. 353. The remarks published in this volume originally formed part of earlier versions of *Philosophical Investigations*.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 350.

56 *Philosophical Investigations*, I, §206.

JUDITH MARCUS

THOMAS MANN AND GEORG LUKÁCS: REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARTIST AND 'HIS' CRITIC

> "Nicht das Richtige oder Falsche an ... Ideen ist es, was uns hier in erster Linie interessiert, sondern das Charakteristische daran."
>
> THOMAS MANN

> "... I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because I was a Jew. [Thus] I was made familiar with the fate of being in the Opposition.... The foundations were thus laid for a certain degree of independence of judgment."
>
> SIGMUND FREUD

> "The stranger is ... being discussed here ... as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. ...to be a stranger is naturally a very positive relation; it is a specific form of interaction."
>
> GEORG SIMMEL

INTRODUCTION

In 1925, Walter Benjamin informed his friend Gershom Scholem that he had just finished reading two books both of which were extraordinary and which made for exciting reading. [1] The two books, singled out as the best products of the time, were Thomas Mann's novel, *The Magic Mountain*, and Georg Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*. To the best of my knowledge this was the first time that a perceptive reader established a connection of sorts between the works of two towering figures of twentieth century European cultural life. It was not to be the last. For a number of reasons, however, prominent among which were the political and social upheavals that eventually landed Mann in sunny California and Lukács in Stalin's Moscow, it took almost four decades before anybody

took a second and closer look at the possibility of a certain connection between the two men and their work. In the meantime, there has grown up an immense literature around Mann and Lukács, who died in 1955 and 1971 respectively. Even though a number of critics and scholars have begun to pay attention to the relation between the two men, they seldom go beyond the "fact" that Lukács's physique and/or revolutionary career inspired Thomas Mann's portrait of Leo Naphta, the Jewish-Jesuit-Communist protagonist of *The Magic Mountain.*[2] (To this Lukács responded with his good-humored "So what if I lent him my nose? He gave so much to me – I am happy I could do that little for him in return!") This is not to imply that focussing on that *one* aspect would need justification: even if it could be proven that Lukács served as the model for one of the most interesting, most strange, and most complex figures in Mann's *oeuvre*, this alone would be worth a separate study. I myself felt the fascinating ambivalence emanating from this fictional character; moreover, my previous acquaintance with Lukács's work (and person) made me wary of accepting *in toto* the (mostly Marxist) interpretation of those – among them, Hans Mayer and Lukács himself – who saw in the character the prototype of the Fascist intellectual.[3]

Be that as it may, there was in the past considerable scepticism even among literary scholars that Thomas Mann and Georg Lukács may have had anything in common, that a case could be made for interaction, influence and congruence, indeed for a relationship. The fact that the focus on some selected problem of such a relationship has a lot to do with both sociology of literature and the exploration of the interaction of two men who are representative polar opposites in a common time provides sufficient rationale to explore this specific relationship in the first place. The linkage can be proven in more ways than one – as I found out in the course of my investigation.

Here and now, I wish to limit myself to the summary discussion of one aspect of the Lukács-Mann relationship: Thomas Mann's perception of Georg Lukács in juxtaposition with his narrative method, the *Anlehnung* (borrowing), and Mann's conception of the modern novel as "that stage of 'criticism' that im-

mediately follows the 'poetic' one",[4] or as Harry Levin put it, "an act of evocation, peculiarly saturated with reminiscences".[5] Even within the limitations of this short paper, some important points will be highlighted because we are dealing here with a constellation of two eminent cultural representatives of twentieth-century Europe, a constellation which has come to be recognized by now as one of the most remarkable critic-author relationships in recent times.[6] For one, both the literary and ideological issues involved here go a long way towards explaining some central characteristics of the modern novel; secondly, the analysis of this constellation is bound to illuminate part of the inner history of an epoch.

THE ARTIST AND THE PHILOSOPHER-CRITIC

The definition of a correct stratagem for the sociological approach to literature was at one time offered by Harry Levin; it was addressed to Lucien Goldmann and was meant as a corrective for Goldmann's interpretation of André Malraux's work in 1963. Levin wrote:

> Rigor must be achieved empirically, through a substantive acquaintance with the relevant texts... and with the exact relations between imaginative fiction and the socio-cultural facts – not by the imposition of vague absolutes from on high or the importation of categorical sanctions from the east.[7]

By substituting an imaginative recreation of perception, feelings, attitudes and thoughts for "imaginative fiction", the stratagem recommends itself for an investigation of the relationship between the great twentieth century German novelist, Thomas Mann, and the Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic, Georg Lukács. (The irony of the matter is that Lukács was made responsible by scholars for most of the import of "categorical sanctions" that had come "from the east".) However, a substantial degree of incompatibility has to be assumed between these two men, one a thoroughly bourgeois man and artist, and the other just as thoroughly a communist philosopher, whose representativeness as polar opposites in a common time is rec-

ognized by all. Common sense would suggest sharp distinctions that are biographically grounded and these should briefly be outlined.

Thomas Mann (1875-1955), one of the greatest European novelists of the twentieth century, is also considered to have been the most representative of German writers and as such, in the words of Georg Lukács, symbolized "all that is best in the German bourgeoisie".[8] Through his work, Mann succeeded in giving a complete picture of the *bürgerliche* life and its predicament in a certain stage of development. Although the emerging picture was of a critical kind, he treated the spiritual and moral problems of the *Bürger* as his own, stressing the significance of his social and cultural inheritance. His philosophical foundations were in Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Wagner, as was the case for a large segment of the German intelligentsia of his time. This is not the sole reason for his being called a thoroughly German writer and a very conservative one. It is not even for the reason that he passionately pleaded for the just cause of Wilhelminian Germany's going to war in 1914 (especially in his early work, *Reflections of a Non-Political Man*) for imperialistic and expansionist purposes. After all, many liberal Germans, Max Weber and Georg Simmel among them, were equally enthusiastic, if only for a time.[9] Nor was it the young Mann's slightly anti-Semitic inclinations, clearly discernible in his early writings and private utterances. It is partly because, among the German writers of his generation, few have been as conscious of tradition and have stressed so insistently their relations to tradition. "I am a man of the nineteenth century", Mann said on many occasions, thinking more likely of Goethe and of the Romantic School (especially of Novalis) than of the Germany which was then industrializing. But then again, there was also in Thomas Mann an almost Faustian urge to experiment, to explore; as Henry Hatfield put it, "The cautious bourgeois is an explorer, as bourgeois often are".[10] Mann also possessed the conscious thoroughness of the bourgeois (he did "research" for his artistic task at hand in the strict meaning of the word), a trait attributed to the Germans in general. For him, only the thor-

ough was truly interesting, as he remarked in the introduction to *The Magic Mountain.*[11]

Finally, and more importantly, a consistency runs through Mann's literary career. Students of Mann's artistry often emphasize the break in his lifework; it is pointed out time and again that although he confined himself almost exclusively to ingenious variations on the theme of the artist in his early writings, there was later a move away to novels of ideas on a grand scale. An argument for such a case can be made if we put on the scale works like the novelette *Tonio Kröger*, or *Death in Venice*, the story *Tristan* – or even the novel *Buddenbrooks*, in which the solid bourgeois degenerates into an artistic one – and then weigh them against the series of grand novels of ideas starting with *The Magic Mountain*. However, to the discerning eye there appears a continuity: these variations on the artistic theme are played out against the socio-political, cultural, or intellectual background of their times. Whether we think again of *Buddenbrooks*, written at the turn of the century, of the short story *Mario and the Magician*, set in Mussolini's Italy, or of *Doctor Faustus*, written in the 1940s and depicting Germany's slide into Nazism, the need for "much full-blooded reality" was always there, supplied in part by "concrete observation".[12] On the other hand, the artistic variation is played out as late as the *Joseph* tetralogy, *Doctor Faustus*, and *Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man*, as the other aspect of that consistency. Last but not least, there was the very element of German *bürgerliche* artistry, the transferring of the "ethical characteristics of the burgherly way of life: order, sequence, rest, 'diligence' ... in the sense ... of faithful workmanship – to the exercise of art", in Mann's apt summation.[13] This "primacy of ethics over esthetics", says Mann, was the main characteristic first recognized by Lukács.[14]

At the opposite pole is Georg Lukács (1885-1971), born in Budapest as György Bernát Löwinger into an assimilated, wealthy Jewish family. His father was a self-made millionaire banker who changed his name to Lukács in 1891 and became ennobled in 1901; after this, the "von" was attached to the name. Lukács received his education, including his two doctoral

degrees in Hungary; therefore he seems to be situated in an entirely different social, cultural and intellectual context from that of Mann. But again, Lukács not only grew up bilingual (his Viennese mother, Adele Wertheimer, never quite mastered the Hungarian language), but also received a cosmopolitan education. At the age of eighty-six, Lukács still fondly recalled his Gymnasium graduation present from his father: a trip to Norway to visit the ailing Ibsen, the admired artist of his childhood.

Lukács chose German at an early age as a medium for his public discourse and often for his private one. He pursued his postdoctoral studies in Germany in the same Wilhelminian era that formed the background for Mann's early works, including *The Magic Mountain*. He came under the influence first of Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel and then, more importantly, the influence of the neo-Kantian Emil Lask and the sociologist Max Weber, both in Heidelberg. This meant a change in general orientation from pure aestheticism to philosophy and social science, followed by a change in philosophical orientation from Kant to Hegel and, finally, to Marx. But the definitive change in Lukács's life and intellectual career came with his change in political orientation, his embracing of Marxism and Communism, moving, as George Steiner put it, "into the Marxist promise of social justice or rather, into the Marxist promise of method".[15] Thus, Lukács became less and less compatible with everything that Thomas Mann stood for; after all, Lukács is thought of today as the most original and important Marxist thinker of the twentieth century, and as one of the most controversial figures in its cultural history. These twists and turns in Lukács's career gave rise to the notion of the "enigmatic Lukács",[16] and the search for the "real" one which seems to go on unabated. (A 1975 article tried to sum up the "real" Lukács with the somewhat sensational title, "Orthodox Heretic, Stalinist Romantic".[17])

It is true that many of Lukács's studies on realism, his pursuit of dogmatic Marxist doctrine on the social relevance of art, not to mention his treatment of the development of modern philosophy in his book, *Destruction of Reason* (1954), provoked

derision (cf. T.W. Adorno, G. Lichtheim, S. Sontag, et al.). It is equally true that the influence of his first major Marxist treatise, *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), stretches from the Frankfurt theorists to Sartre and the New Left. The interest in the young Lukács, that is, in his pre-Marxist writings, is of more recent vintage; since the late 1960s, the notion has been widely held that the "real" Lukács would not emerge until his early phase was explored. My first attempt to explore the Lukács-Naphta linkage dates back to 1968; it was based on the conviction that despite the apparent discontinuity – meaning a turning from bourgeois aestheticism to Bolshevism in 1918 – Lukács's lifework shows a certain unity and continuity. As Lukács himself said: "Each and every thought and action of my life grew out of another; they are organically related".[18] This notion of organic development and the interrelatedness of everything that follows is, by the way, a central one for Thomas Mann and can be a good starting point in the pursuit of a possible linkage of the two men. Just as Thomas Mann's solid anchorage in German cultural tradition and high-bourgeois values is stressed, so is Lukács's "homelessness", the fact that "exile was his natural habitat" in several respects. This is not so clear cut an issue, though. George Steiner, one of the most insightful critics of Lukács, perceives certain factors which went unnoticed by others or are dismissed as irrelevant:

> Yet, in another sense, Lukács was deep-rooted. He was curtly dismissive in reference to his own Judaism, but a Jew to the tip of his fingers. Unhoused, peregrine, he is one of the tragic constellation (Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, Adorno, Herbert Marcuse) of Jewish abstractionists,possessed by a messianic rage for logic, for systematic order in the social condition of man. Lukács's Marxism, is, in essence, a refusal of the world's incoherence ... Like the other Jewish self-exiles whose radicalism out of Central Europe has so incisively marked the century, Lukács is an heir in immanence to the transcendent absolute of Spinoza.[19]

This statement contains some truth and can be considered important in the sense that, as will be shown, Thomas Mann's perception of Lukács partly corresponds to the description offered by Steiner.

When I visited Georg Lukács on May 7, 1971, four weeks before his death, I carried with me my findings from the Thomas Mann Archiv at Zurich, including some of Mann's transcribed notes to his work. My research had uncovered the existence of extensive cross-fertilization of ideas, and even the use of the same language and certain terms in the early work of both Mann and Lukács.[20] That both of them spoke of the problem of the artist and art in a quasi-religious tone, evoking Ibsen's dictum that "to write means to pass the last judgment upon oneself", might have meant only that both of them reacted to their heightened awareness of the crisis of culture, and that there was a dominant ethical element in their lives and work. But there was the additional evidence of *direct influence* in that Thomas Mann verbally transposed some of Lukács's reflections in the latter's youthful essay collection, *Die Seele und die Formen* (1911) and incorporated them structurally, thematically and even verbally into his story-in-the-making, *Der Tod in Venedig*. I venture to say that without Lukács's special sensibility displayed in his essays of that time, Mann's story would be a vastly different work. Gustav von Aschenbach's problem in transcending his love for a beautiful boy into art at the end of the novella in particular, and the problem of the modern artist in general, were based on Lukács's musings on Socratic love, namely, that "it will always be denied to men and poets to soar as high as [Socrates]. ... Their soaring is always tragic, and in tragedy hero and destiny must become form. ... In life, longing must remain love: that is its happiness and its tragedy".[21] Lukács accepted these revelations as a "great gift", and stated that his relationship to Thomas Mann remained the one mystery in his life to which he truly desired an explanation before his death. What are the reasons, he wanted to know, for Thomas Mann's lifelong distance, his refusal even to answer Lukács's letters and his personal aloofness in spite of the intellectual compatibility at one time which amounted to a "geistige Symbiose" (spiritual affinity)? Even today, only a tentative answer can be offered. I could convey to Lukács only

my (at that time vague) notion that it was *not* the Marxist Lukács specifically and primarily but the "young Lukács" endowed with specific personal and intellectual characteristics that effected Mann's aloofness – and rubbed off on the fictional character of Leo Naphta in *The Magic Mountain*.

This last aspect was the first one to which scholars and critics had begun to pay attention when contemplating the possibility of real-life models for the fictional figure of Leo Naphta, the Jewish-Communist-Jesuit of *The Magic Mountain*. Most of them commented on the "fact" that Lukács's "physique and/or revolutionary career" inspired Mann's portrayal of this "enigmatic" fictional character. Pierre Paul Sagave, the French literary historian, was among the first to "establish" the identity by comparing photos of Lukács from what he thought were the 1920s. To complicate matters, two Marxist critics of Mann, Hans Mayer and Lukács himself, chose to emphasize the Fascist – not the Communist – prototype in Naphta. The view also surfaced that the "great patrician author" and the "social revolutionary were life-long friends".[22] It was time to take a second look at these literary rumors and theses and either prove or disprove them. It is fairly obvious to the discerning eye that there are traces of the Marxist Lukács in Naphta, that is, in the fictional character's argumentation and in his "intellectual duels": Lukács's Hegelianism, his damnation of the capitalist system, the concept of totality, and, of course, the belief in the redemptive role of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But there are other equally important characteristic traits to consider that set them apart: Naphta's rejection of the Enlightenment, of faith in humanity and of progress, and his adherence to romanticism and irrationalism. Further exploration was therefore called for, which could be done only by a Lukácsian analysis, if you will, meaning the category of totality, exploring all facets of the question in their sociohistorical anchorage.

Leo Naphta, as a Jewish-Jesuit-Communist combination is certainly one of the most intriguing, complex and strange figures in Mann's *oeuvre*. The following two points have to be made, somewhat forestalling the conclusion: first, Lukács is

not Naphta, but he contributed to Mann's portrayal of Naphta to a large extent; second, as stated unequivocally by the author himself, Mann had "not read anything by Lukács of a political nature, not in the 1920s or ever, just his literary criticism", and consequently, "*Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* was and remained unfamiliar" to him.[23] Thus, Mann's assessment of Lukács is based on Lukács's early writings, that is, his pre-Marxist period, and on a one-off meeting that lasted about two hours.

Thomas Mann's novel, *The Magic Mountain*, marks the end of his early period: he started writing the novel in 1915, abandoned the project until after World War One and eventually had it published in 1924. Mann spoke of the genesis and nature of his novel at a Princeton lecture in 1939 and characterized it as a "document of the European state of mind and spiritual problematic in the first quarter of the twentieth century". Its setting in the enclosed and self-sufficient world of illness does not detract from its validity and potency. On the contrary! The TB sanatorium of Davos itself is conceived as a symbol for certain social institutions of that time, which "represented a typical phenomenon of the pre-WWI era that is conceivable only in the case of a still-intact capitalistic economic formation". Indeed, as Mann said, *The Magic Mountain* "has become the swan-song of that existence".[24] It neither could have been written at any other time nor would it have found as receptive an audience as it then did. It is not only a *Zeitroman*, though. It is also a *Bildungsroman* (novel of development and education), in which all elements, action, character and environment, act primarily to form the hero's character. Any such novel also records its author's growth in understanding life; it tells about his personal history linked with its time. As Mann stated: "A man lives not only his personal life as an individual, but also, consciously or unconsciously, the life of his epoch and his contemporaries".[25] (This is one of the reasons why Mann's novels lend themselves so well to a sociological approach.) Space does not permit me to elaborate here on the epoch that forms this background; it is a familiar one to students of European history and culture. A good way to summarize it is to

mention the works that came out of it, such as Oswald Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes*, Ernst Bloch's *Geist der Utopie*, Lukács's *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein*, Karl Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie* – and I might add Julien Benda's *The Treason of the Intellectuals* and Jose Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the Masses*.

As to what would explain the strangeness and complexity of the Naphta combination, Mann's only clue was his favorite remark *"Es lag einfach in der Luft"* (It was all in the air), meaning that he was alert to the undercurrents, ideas and events around him and captured them; while he was doing so, he, of course, transformed and transcended them. Beside the textual analysis, it is thus prudent to investigate in Mann's case what "lag in der Luft" and also how his method made use of it. Apart from his imaginative and combinatory skills, Mann was also a thorough researcher of the facts he needed for a solid foundation. He studied and used physical environment, customs and manners carefully and never denied his reliance on real-life models. He emphasized that the writer "never creates *ex nihilio*". In complete accord with an important tendency in aesthetics around 1910, Mann already then mentions the term "construction", which was the watchword in painting and music. He praised those who found the "constructive element" in his *Königliche Hoheit* which "comprises the new aspiration of the novel".[26] Mann used the realistic details in a special way that partly explains the Naphta combination. He himself stated that although he might have the idea of a figure and its setting in composition, he needed "to see, to hear and to understand" such a real person before the fictional character could be born. He spoke of his "daemonic urge to observe, to notice small details that in a literary sense were *typical*, characteristic and showed perspectives and/or significant *racial*, social and psychological traits".[27] Since his figures often stood for certain spiritual, intellectual spheres, principles and *Weltanschauung*, all the elements that made up a (fictional) character had to complement each other: the biography, the physique, and intellectual personality had to typify what it represented. Equally important is the organic nature of Mann's creative pro-

cess, the relatedness of everything to everything else that follows, just as in Lukács's case. It means that motives, concepts, characters, et al., do not just appear and disappear in Mann's lifework; they may surface in other variations, may be refined or changed in certain respects, indicating an abundance of *"Möglichkeiten"* (possibilities) as he called it. Nothing gets lost in the process, everything is used prudently, redefined or expanded. Thus, to say that Naphta came out of nowhere, was an entirely new fictional character on the basis of acquaintance with Georg Lukács, is not to understand the nature of Mann's creative process. In this connection, mention should be made of an important trait of Mann that Hans Mayer first noted when he spoke of the "idealtypical" manifestations of currents and movements through the fictional characters. Mann, of course, was unaware of Max Weber's conception of the "idealtype". He did, however, come close to Weber's formulations when he spoke of his own literary approach (as in the case of Lukács, there are similarities in the use of terms even). In the essay, *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, Mann stated that his *Königliche Hoheit* is a book thoroughly formed, guided by an idea, an intellectual formula, that comes alive by a one-sided accentuation of details the synthesis of which resembles, but is not, the real. It is only "the illusion" of it. (Weber calls it "utopia".) Here one has to think of Mann's boasting about having done a better job than some sociologists when portraying bourgeois man in *Buddenbrooks*, well before Werner Sombart wrote his book entitled *The Bourgeois*.

Leo Naphta can be considered as the idealtypical presentation of one way out of the historical malaise. He also stands in for the concept and role of the "Stranger" (Simmel) who is a potential wanderer, whose position "within a spatial group" is determined "by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself", and consequently, he acquires an objectivity but any relation to him has to be of "an abstract nature".[28] Thus, all the details of Naphta's makeup, such as his biography, physique and personality, should add up to a conceptual construct *(Gedankenbild)* – and they do.

Naphta appears late in the novel, at the point when Settembrini has exhausted his repertoire of ideas and the novel's hero, Hans Castorp, feels that he can learn nothing more from him. What strikes one first in the introduction of the character (in the sub-chapter *"Noch Jemand"*) is that "Everything about him was sharp". The sharpness of his physical appearance presages the story of his life and culminates in the sharpness of his intellectual makeup, his mind and argumentation and then, finally, the extreme nature of the solutions he offers both for the redemption of the world and for his own fate. At the same time, in each of Naphta's aspects, I first eliminated those elements that could not have come from Lukács and/or were recurring traits or attributes in a redefined form.

As to the life story of Leo Naphta, two facts stand out: first, both Lukács and Naphta are "aus dem Osten" – the Eastern European sphere; second, they both are of Jewish origin. Otherwise, as Sagave noted, there is not much similarity between the son of a banker in Budapest and a Galician kosher butcher's son, whose father fell victim to a pogrom and who was first the student of a rabbi and later a respected novice at a Jesuitic institute. The main idea about Naphta is that his biographical data has to match Mann's concept of the kind of life *an outsider* must have. Mann's fictional prototype of the "exceptional case of life" *(Sonderfall)* was one of the most persistent and varied in his *oeuvre*. These *Sonderfälle des Lebens* have to have had a certain fate assigned to them: illness, deformity, artistic or intellectual exceptionality and so on. Those traits were present in order to separate them from the "ordinary burgher". Whether it is exceptionality in a positive or negative sense was always of secondary importance. Thus, Naphta has his forerunners, that is, the kind of life Naphta had to have. For example, as early as in the novel *Königliche Hoheit* we have the life story of a Dr. Raoul Überbein: no father, origins unknown, starving, but determined to overcome these tremendous handicaps, a self-educated intellectual; and in most cases they belong to a certain racial group: Jewish. I cannot explain here the way in which I developed and illustrated the necessary ingredients in the biography of an outsider in Mann's lifework.

Suffice it to say that this prototype did not disappear with Naphta: it reappeared in the figure of Dr. Chaim Breisacher, for example, in *Doctor Faustus*. As far as I could ascertain, Ernst Bloch's work, *Thomas Münzer als der Theologe der Revolution*, contributed a few direct biographical snippets to Naphta's life story. Thus, the conclusion can be reached that without having met Lukács, Mann could have set up Naphta in the same way. There is a point at which Mann may have "smuggled" in Lukács's father as Elia, Naphta's father and the relationship between father and son, which included respect and understanding. Similarly, the description of the relationship between mother and son has some resemblance to the situation pertaining in the Lukács household: Mann knew the parents of Lukács as he was a guest several times in the house of the banker, Joseph von Lukács, and must have been attuned to the family dynamics. It is now a well-publicized fact that Lukács once remarked that if there could be a psychological explanation for his rejection of the old world order, it would be in his relationship with his mother, one of unmitigated contempt. Lukács himself related the following story: when he wrote a friendly letter to his mother, she concluded that she must be gravely ill – which she was – otherwise her son would not have been persuaded to be so attentive and nice to her.[29]

Concerning the physical appearance and attributes of Leo Naphta, Sagave made the most of the "nose" issue, also the sharpness of features, even that of the glasses. To be sure, both Naphta and Lukács could be called small and frail-looking; the young Lukács certainly was not "extremely ugly", as Naphta was. Moreover, the typical outsider – and the Jewish outsider to boot – was there in some form or another in Mann's early works, starting with the Hagenström children in *Buddenbrooks* (e.g., the "nose", small body, ugly, reddish blond hair, and so on). If Lukács's personal appearance when Mann met him contributed to Naphta's physiognomy, it was only in that sense that the image Mann had was finally "seen, heard, and comprehended"; and it was also in tune with Mann's ideas about the intellectual personality of that specific type. Interestingly, Thomas Mann did not write to anybody about his meeting with Lukács and his

impressions during those two hours in a Viennese hotel in January 1922. He reported to Ernst Bertram in June 1922 that "Leo Naphta is found; as a half-Jewish pupil of the Jesuits, he has an ongoing sharp debate with Settembrini".[30] The discovery of the so-called "symbolic physique" was first mentioned by Arthur Eloesser, the first and only authorized biographer of Thomas Mann. Eloesser made the remark in 1925 that Naphta was supplied by the "geniality of real life" in the form of a "little ugly Jew, who was a rabbinical theoretician with a steely logic, defending during a discussion all forms of absolutism and anti-individualism, from counter-reformation and Jesuitism up to the Communist revolution and Leninism".[31] And thus, we have arrived at the most significant aspect of Naphta in relation to Lukács, his intellectual personality. I cannot go into a discussion of Mann's preoccupation and fascination with the problem of "personality-formation" here and now. One only has to go to his essays on "personalities at the end of a cultural era", ranging from Dante to Dostoevsky and Karl Kraus. Mann was very much in tune with the dominant currents of his time: he was an avid reader of Nietzsche, Kretschmer, Lombroso, Klages and so on. Physical attributes are everywhere a clue to personality. And thus, when Hans Castorp and Joachim first meet Naphta, they immediately notice his being a "stranger". Joachim goes no further than noticing the figure and nose; he is distrustful. Hans Castorp sees the perspectives this stranger can reveal for him as his next "teacher": Naphta, after all, comes from a sphere that Castorp has never explored and can offer him new insights. Admittedly, it is impossible to describe Naphta's personality in a few words, but a most concise summary can be provided here. First of all, he has a sharp mind, and he is logical to the point of becoming inhuman in his argumentation; he is fanatical when it comes to ideas and ideologies; he has the intellectual courage to go to the bottom of problems and then suffer the consequences; he is deeply apodictical and thoroughly ascetic. In short: Naphta represents a *radical repudiation of the whole liberal tradition*. There is some irony involved here in that Thomas Mann took many of his reflections from the pages of his *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, mean-

ing that he incorporated his own earlier views into Naphta's position. Much is made of Naphta's instincts that were both "revolutionary and aristocratic at the same time, as is the case with many Jewish intellectuals".[32] Equally emphasized are Naphta's elitist inclinations and his achievement-oriented characteristics. And again, we find traces in the concept of the compatibility of the religious and the ideological in one person, which may have partly been suggested by Bloch's *Münzer* book. In addition, we have the Jesuits with many of the above-mentioned traits. There is ample evidence that Mann studied biographies and interpretations of Loyola and of Jesuitism. Jesuit-Jew as a combination was not as uniquely his own as Mann liked to believe: Harry Graf Kessler's diaries, for example, describe Hugo Haase, famed politician of the Weimar Republic, as "a small man, a somewhat Jesuitic Jew".[33] It was one of those things "in the air".

That Lukács represented the "stranger" for Thomas Mann is a fact; many ideas presented by Naphta can be found in the conclusions of some of Lukács's early writings, mainly in the essays of *Die Seele und die Formen*. Just as important is another little-known work of Lukács, published in German in 1912 in the journal *Neue Blätter*: the work, entitled, *"Von der Armut am Geiste"* (On Poverty of Spirit), was both confessional and autobiographical. One can perceive the line of argumentation that is woven into Naphta's discourses already in such Lukács essays as the Kierkegaard essay with its partiality for dogmatism and the Theodor Storm essay for the statement on manifestations of asceticism when work – even artistic work – is called "forced labor" against which our instincts might rebel and have to be restrained by the cruellest means possible. The Lukácsian dialogue, *"Von der Armut ..."*, contains the following statements which I developed in my book in relation to Naphta: first, the cement that binds the work is "fashioned out of human blood"; second, "I believe in the quality of remaining pure [meaning ethical purity] through sin, deception and horror" [a statement that finds an echo in the 1918 writing "Bolshevism as a Moral Problem"]; and, finally, Christ after all said: "He who comes to me ... and hates not his father, ... cannot be my disciple".

This represents only a sample. The work also contains a defense of the Middle Ages and, as the final act, the hero's suicide: just as Naphta in *The Magic Mountain*, the hero of Lukács's dialogue shoots himself in the head. Thomas Mann was acquainted with this Lukácsian work, as he was with the essay collection, *Die Seele und die Formen*. Several of the passages mentioned above were underlined and noted in Mann's own copies that are to be found in the Thomas-Mann-Archiv. So far we have discussed asceticism and the achievement of ends through violent means, also the necessity of inhumanity in certain cases. We may also find examples of those "things that do not rhyme", as Naphta is wont to say. It is interesting to note in this connection that Lukács wrote an essay in 1913 entitled, "Aesthetic Culture", in which he explicitly brings together "things that do not rhyme": he writes, for example, that "form is a judgment that forces salvation on everything by a holy terror".[34] This Hungarian-language Lukács manuscript has never been translated into any other tongue and the creator of Leo Naphta was unaware of such combinations of the young Lukács. Yet, Thomas Mann uncannily perceived the radicalism of Lukács's standpoint in ethical and aesthetic questions that not only pointed to Lukács's later decision to embrace the cause of revolution, in which ends justify all means, but also adapted very well to the strange and often contradictory ideological disputations of the stranger in the novel, Leo Naphta. That Lukács, the quintessential Jewish intellectual in Thomas Mann's eyes, builds his argumentation by citing Christ, Meister Eckhart or Francis of Assisi, and finally depicts Abraham's willingness to perform the ultimate sacrifice, completes the picture.

CONCLUSION

Just as the fictional figure, Leo Naphta, is the prototype of the *irregular*, the *other*, because he is irregular as a Jew, as a Jesuit, and as a Communist, so was Lukács perceived by Mann as irregular on account of his bourgeois aestheticism which permitted the use of terms such as "violence and dogma"

and "holy terror", and on account of his religiosity and concept of terror. The tendencies presumably perceived in Lukács, such as the one for "extremes", for being "absolute", and also "fanaticism" and "asceticism" not only helped to shape the totalitarian personality of Naphta but also deterred the establishment of a meaningful personal relationship between Thomas Mann and Lukács. Not only did Lukács possess characteristics that Mann disliked, despised or simply was afraid of, but, first and foremost, he came from the "non-German sphere", from the sphere of a Dostoevsky, of the Jewish literati – in sum, from the "East". The Eastern sphere had a well-documented fascination for the type of artist Thomas Mann was but could never be on intimate terms with. Thus, the *Distanz* could not be bridged.

NOTES

1 See Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem, eds, *Walter Benjamin. Briefe*, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966).

2 For one of the best and/or most extensive treatments of the Lukács-Naphta problem see Ehrhard Bahr, *Georg Lukács* (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag Otto H. Hess, 1970); Pierre-Paul Sagave, *Réalité sociale et idéologie religieuse dans les romans de Thomas Mann*, Publications de la faculté des lettres de l'université de Strasbourg, Fasc. 124. (Paris, 1954).

3 See Hans Mayer, *Thomas Mann. Werk und Entwicklung* (Berlin: Verlag Volk und Welt, 1950).

4 Mann's reflections on the state and nature of the modern novel appear in his unfinished – and unpublished – notes to a planned large-scale essay with the title "Geist und Kunst" (Intellect and art). See chapter one in my book, *Georg Lukács and Thomas Mann. A Study in the Sociology of Literature* (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987).

5 Harry Levin, "Toward a Sociology of the Novel", in *Refractions. Essays in Comparative Literature* (London-Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 248.

6 See Hans Vaget, "Georg Lukács und Thomas Mann", in *Die Neue Rundschau*, vol. 88, 4 (1977), pp. 656-663.

7 Levin, *Refractions*, *ibid.*

8 Georg Lukács, "In Search of Bourgeois Man", in *Essays on Thomas Mann* (London: Merlin Press, 1964), p. 45.

9 For an account of differing views concerning this "great and wonderful war" as Max Weber put it, see Zoltán Tar and Judith Marcus, "The Weber-Lukács Encounter", in R. M. Glassman and V. Murvar, *Max Weber's Political Sociology: A Pessimistic Vision of a Rationalized World* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 125-26. See also Marianne Weber, *Max Weber. A Biography*, ed. and transl. by Harry Zohn (New York: Wiley Interscience, 1975). Both the Webers and Georg Simmel discussed Lukács's "inability" to understand the "just cause". In response, Lukács had started to write an essay on "The German Intellectuals and the War", which was never completed.

10 Henry Hatfield, *Thomas Mann*, revised edition (New York: a New Direction Paperback, 1962).

11 Thomas Mann, "Foreword", in *The Magic Mountain*, transl. by H.T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Modern Library, 1955), p. x.

12 Thomas Mann, *The Story of a Novel. The Genesis of Doctor Faustus*, transl. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 25.

13 Mann's remarks follow his reflections on the critical sensibilities of the "young" Lukács. In *Reflections of a Non-Political Man*, transl. by W. D. Morris (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1983), p. 73.

14 *Ibid.*

15 See George Steiner's review of Lukács's *Gelebtes Denken*, "Making a Homeland for the Mind", in *Times Literary Supplement* (January 22, 1982), p. 67.

16 The definition used by several Lukács critics and reviewers.

17 See Henry Pachter, "Lukács Revisited: Orthodox heretic, Stalinist Romantic", in *Dissent* (Spring 1975), pp. 177ff.

18 See Georg Lukács, *Record of a Life. An Autobiographical Sketch*, ed. by István Eőrsi, transl. by Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso Editions, 1983), p. 81.

19 See George Steiner, "Homeland...," p. 67.

20 For the report on the visit to Lukács, see Judith Tar, "Georg Lukács, Thomas Mann und 'Der Tod in Venedig'", in *Die Weltwoche* (July 2, 1971), p. 31.

21 Passage is from Lukács's essay, "Longing and Form. Charles Louis Philippe", in *Soul and Form.* Transl. by Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1974), p. 94. For discussion and transcription of Mann's original note see Judith Marcus, *Georg Lukács and Thomas Mann*, chapter one.

22 The statement appears on the jacket of Ehrhard Bahr's book, *Georg Lukács.*

23 Unpublished letter to Pierre-Paul Sagave of February 18, 1952, which is at the Thomas Mann Archiv, Zurich. My translation.

24 See Thomas Mann, *The Magic Mountain*, pp. 328-29.

25 *Ibid.*

26 Mann's letter to Hugo von Hofmannsthal, in *Thomas Mann. Briefe 1889-1936*, ed. by Erika Mann (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1962), p. 76. My translation.

27 Thomas Mann, "Goethe and Tolstoy". *Three Essays*, transl. by H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), p. 90.

28 See the essay by Georg Simmel, "The Stranger", in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, ed. by Kurt H. Wolff (New York: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 402ff.

29 Georg Lukács's own recollections in *Record of a Life...*, p. 35.

30 See *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram. Briefe aus den Jahren 1910-1955*, ed. by Inge Jens (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1960), p. 109.

31 See Arthur Eloesser, *Thomas Mann: Sein Leben und seine Werke* (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1925), p. 193.

32 See the chapter "Operationes Spirituales", in *The Magic Mountain*, p. 443.

33 See Harry (Count) Kessler, *In the Twenties. The Diaries of Harry Kessler*, transl. by Charles Kessler (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 36.

34 See György Lukács, *Esztétikai kultúra. Tanulmányok* (Aesthetic Culture. Studies), (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1913), p. 27.

IVAN SANDERS

LUKÁCS AND HUNGARIAN LITERATURE

It is somewhat awkward to discuss, in English, György Lukács's relationship to Hungarian literature, if only because his writings on this subject seem to be the least important chapter of his *oeuvre*. Even though the volume containing Lukács's collected essays and studies on Hungarian writers and literary problems runs to over 600 pages, he never became a specialist in Hungarian literary history; most of these writings were the by-products of his other scholarly activities. They were incidental, rather than central, to his preoccupations as critic, philosopher, and ideologue. As Lukács himself points out in his introduction to this volume of essays on Hungarian literature, published one year before his death, he did not attempt to capture in them the truly significant "objective essence" of certain literary trends and phenomena – something he did try to do in his studies in world literature. "The motivating impulse behind this chronological selection", he writes, "is subjective; it tries to show how I had turned intellectually from a protester imbued with a sense of alienation to an active oppositionist".[1]

Most of these essays, then, are occasional pieces, more or less improvised forays into Hungarian culture, not organically connected to Lukács's main literary and theoretical concerns. Indeed, from the beginning of his career Lukács considered Hungarian literature as lying somewhat outside the mainstream of Western literary developments. For example in *A modern dráma fejlődésének története* (A history of the development of modern drama), his first major work of literary criticism, he treats

Hungarian drama in a separate chapter and does not hesitate to point out that Hungarian dramatists have not made an original contribution to Western dramatic literature. What is more, he predicts (in 1911) a rather bleak future for Hungarian drama.[2] Non-Hungarian readers of Lukács can find out next to nothing about Hungarian writers and literature from his many literary essays and theoretical writings, because in them he hardly ever refers to Hungarian writers – not even in passing. As is well known, Lukács wrote most of his works in German, and very little of what was originally written in Hungarian has been translated into other languages.

This brings us to the question not only of Lukács's relationship to Hungarian literature but to the question of how Hungarian writers view Lukács and his work. Hungarian intellectuals always had a hard time with Lukács. Their reaction ranged from distant respect to open hostility. Because of his extraordinary intellectual gifts which were in evidence from the beginning; and later, because of his stature as a critic and thinker of international importance, and still later because his work represented, for a while, the officially-sanctioned Marxist approach to literature, they could not dismiss him. But he had always been seen as an outsider, an alien phenomenon on the Hungarian turf – too abstract, too philosophical, too German, too one-sided, or simply a bad writer. In an ironic and rather caustic story published not so long ago, the writer Ferenc Karinthy, who often takes a provocatively anti-intellectual stance in his fiction but who is no philistine, presents a satirical portrait of a narrow-minded and pompous Marxist philosopher, an ideological enemy, it so happens, of Lukács. In this connection Karinthy reflects on Lukács's role as a critic of Hungarian literature, considering this role "unfortunate". "I am ashamed to admit", he writes, "that although I can read, well and not so well, some eight or ten languages, have a doctorate in linguistics, and what is more, have made a conscientious effort more than once to master his works, still I have great difficulty following what Lukács and his disciples and adversaries are saying. It's no doubt my fault, but their polemics seem so removed, as though they were taking place on the

moon, in some strange bird language".[3] Karinthy's attitude is not at all atypical. Other Hungarian writers with different backgrounds and orientation have shared this view and indeed expressed similar sentiments over the years.

A little volume entitled *Lukács György és a magyar kultúra* (György Lukács and Hungarian culture), published in Budapest in 1982, contains a number of brief essays on various aspects of Lukács's connections with Hungarian writers and Hungarian literature; and even though most of the essays tactfully tone down the more troubling and acrimonious aspects of this relationship, the unhappiness or dissatisfaction over Lukács's activities with regard to modern Hungarian culture does come through. For example, in his comments on Lukács's postwar presence in Hungarian cultural affairs, the literary historian István Sőtér points out the "regrettable" omissions and distortions in Lukács's literary views, but agrees, almost dutifully it seems, that Lukács's very different perspective did have a galvanizing effect on postwar Hungarian criticism.[4]

Yet, when one examines Lukács's various autobiographical fragments, especially the last one, *Gelebtes Denken*, and the long interview based on these notes, it becomes clear that he was much more than a guest, a curious loner in Hungarian literary life; that for all his gestures of denial, for all his estrangement, he did have deep roots in that culture. It *is* true that he spent almost one-third of his life outside of Hungary and several times in his career contemplated accepting a university post abroad, and he did speak and write in a rather graceless, convoluted Hungarian that was as much affected by the high abstractions of the German philosophical tradition as it was by the careless colloquialisms of his early upper-class Budapest environment. But from each of his sojourns abroad he returned to his native Budapest and considered himself a Hungarian writer throughout his life. Of his contemporaries the man who had the greatest impact on him by far was the poet Endre Ady. As a literary critic, it was with Ady's work that Lukács dealt most extensively; it was Ady's genuine radicalism, his totally uncompromising stance toward the established Hungarian order, that appealed most to the young Lukács. Compared

to him even the German philosophers he was reading at the time seemed conservative. In the interview recorded by István Eörsi and Erzsébet Vezér, this is what Lukács had to say about his encounter with Ady: "[His] *Új versek* (New poems, 1906) had an absolutely overwhelming impact on me; to put it bluntly, this was the first work in Hungarian literature which enabled me to find my way back to Hungary and which I thought of as a part of myself... It could be said... that in my mind Hungary itself simply meant Ady's poetry... My encounter with Ady's poems, quite apart from their literary significance, was one of the turning points of my life".[5]

We could say that Lukács's attitude toward Hungarian culture began with almost total rejection. Along with his family and class he rejected as provincial and conservative almost an entire cultural tradition, for all of it seemed to him tainted by a social order he despised. Then he went through the process of rediscovering individual writers – those whom he could situate in his emerging system of values. The aesthetic and intellectual criteria and categories changed, but as far as his likes and dislikes were concerned, he remained surprisingly consistent. The Hungarian literary figures he admired most, the ones he considered truly revolutionary, were, besides Ady, Petőfi and Attila József, and really no one else. And he saw these poets as isolated figures with no real backing or supporters, no real movement behind them. He felt for instance that Ady, although *the* leading poet of the *Nyugat* (West) generation, was isolated even within the *Nyugat* circle which didn't understand, or didn't pay attention to, Ady's thoroughgoing radicalism. Lukács didn't think too highly of the journal *Nyugat* and the whole *Nyugat* movement; he felt it was too limited, too eclectic. He liked to quote one of its founders, Ignotus, who said he wanted to ensure a place for *Nyugat beside* the dominant Hungarian culture of the day – he didn't intend to replace that culture. (Ironically enough, the other Hungarian writer who held similar views about *Nyugat* was László Németh, who was different from Lukács in every conceivable way. Németh also felt that *Nyugat* produced outstanding personalities but not a coherent cultural tradition.)

An important thesis of the Marxist Lukács about Hungarian literature, which he elaborated on in a number of articles and to which he adhered to the end of his life, was that after 1849 Hungarian culture declined and did so even more after 1867, with the advent of capitalism in Hungary, which followed the Prussian path, i.e., it was based on an alliance or an accommodation between the remaining feudal system and the rapidly rising, coopted and gentrified bourgeois classes. The political compromise of 1867, according to Lukács, was also a cultural compromise, and literature remained essentially conservative even after the turn of the century, and did not give rise to a genuine, indigenous philosophical tradition. In Lukács's view no one apart from Ady really repudiated this compromise, and what characterizes even the best literature of this period is *"machtgeschützte Innerlichkeit"* – power-protected intimateness. (Lukács borrowed the phrase from Thomas Mann who used it in his essay on Richard Wagner.)

We need not emphasize here that this thesis, though perhaps neat as a general scheme, is a vast oversimplification. It does not take into account a number of other factors shaping literary development, and it ignores individual writers and works that do not fit into it. We know that Lukács, an original thinker and a man of awesome erudition, could be indifferent or insensitive to purely literary values – he did not always have an eye for literary quality. In searching, at first, for ethnical-spiritual essence, and as a Marxist for ideological content, he saw *through* works of art, often missing the art itself. It is also undeniable that because of his own background and origins he couldn't relate to certain Hungarian writers and to the world they evoked. And if as a Marxist critic he did respond positively to others – to Tibor Déry's works, for example – he did so not only because he agreed with their politics but also because – as in the case of Déry – he understood and felt close to the world they depicted.

In some ways Lukács was aware of his limitations and realized from very early on that the right ethical conduct in a writer does not necessarily give rise to great works. For example, in *Gelebtes Denken* he talks about the writer Marcel

Benedek who was a classmate of his. He also mentions Elek Benedek, Marcel's father, a folklorist and a well-known writer of children's stories. Lukács greatly admired the elder Benedek's moral integrity and unassuming lifestyle, but he admits that the latter's works meant absolutely nothing to him.[6] As we said, Lukács's disdain for most Hungarian intellectuals of his day; his aversion to what he saw as pseudo-liberal political values and superficial cultural values didn't change – didn't have to change – with his Communist conversion. He simply found more concrete ideological justifications for this disdain and aversion. It is interesting to note that his negative appraisal of specific writers and works didn't change either. For example, an article he wrote about Imre Madách's *Az ember tragédiája* (The tragedy of man) in 1955, in which he calls the celebrated Hungarian drama an inorganic, storybook-like illustration of Madách's pessimistic world view, echoes comments he made about the play in his 1911 monograph, *A modern dráma fejlődésének története* (The development of modern drama). His 1947 article on Ferenc Molnár harks back to his 1918 appraisal, and so forth.

There is no question that Lukács alienated a great many of his contemporaries with his strictures and his often dissenting opinions on Hungarian literature, but it is not true that he had no friends or contacts in turn-of-the-century Budapest, and that the culture of that city had nothing to offer him. He himself stresses in *Gelebtes Denken* that he was nothing like a lone wolf.[7] He contributed to *Nyugat* and to *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth century). In fact, his early activity in Hungary – his association with the Thália theater, his membership of various intellectual groupings – was a way of reaching out, of finding allies, and of forming friendships. Among his early Hungarian literary connections his close friendship with Béla Balázs stands out. Lukács's championing of Balázs's poetry and plays,[8] his overestimation of Balázs's importance for Hungarian literature, is usually cited as the most glaring example of Lukács's misjudgment. Most other Hungarian critics agree that Béla Balázs was a minor poet at best. It *is* quite clear that Lukács's writings on Balázs are an expression of a spiritual

kinship and not just a literary critic's preference for a body of work. Significantly enough, after 1918, when the two of them parted ways, Lukács had almost nothing further to say about Balázs. But with other writers, as we said, there was continuity. Lukács never really lost interest in Hungarian literary affairs. Indeed, when he had the chance – as he did between 1945 and 1949 – he was actively present in Hungarian literary life – as an editor, teacher and critic. Perhaps his most interesting – and certainly his liveliest – studies and articles about Hungarian writers and literature date from this period. But even some of the polemical articles he wrote in Moscow in the thirties and early forties, for the émigré journal *Új Hang*, reveal how closely he followed literary developments in his native country, and how carefully he read the literary journals published in Budapest at the time.

Today, although lip service is paid to his major ideas, György Lukács's influence on contemporary Hungarian literature and literary criticism cannot be said to be very great, although interest in Lukács the man, in his dramatic and eventful life, and especially in his early biography, runs high. This interest has been intensified by the posthumous discovery of his diaries and other manuscripts which shed light on his intellectual and moral development before 1918. In many ways the young Lukács remains a fascinating subject, an enigma, for both foreign and Hungarian students of his career. As a young Hungarian critic recently put it: "The fact that the son of a Jewish banker in turn-of-the-century Hungary becomes a philosopher and an aesthetician is not that unusual... But the story of how this promising historian of ideas, a philosopher busying himself with exquisite metaphoric-idealist lace making turns within a few years into one of the leaders of a proletarian dictatorship and then, for the rest of his life, into a theoretician of the Communist movement – that really is a mystery and a sensation".[9]

Actually, we may speak today not only about Lukács *on* Hungarian literature but Lukács *in* Hungarian literature. He has already appeared in fiction, and not only in Thomas Mann's *Der Zauberberg*,[10] but also in Hungarian novels, or rather, fic-

tionalized autobiographies, by such writers as Béla Balázs, Anna Lesznai and Ervin Sinkó.[11] I shall mention just two recent examples: István Eörsi's highly irreverent but also touching play about Lukács, *His Master's Voice*,[12] András Nagy's essay-novel *Kedves Lukács* (Dear Lukács) whose subject is Lukács's relationship – his tentative, ill-fated love affair – with Irma Seidler.[13]

The later Lukács himself was extremely reticent about his early life. Forever preoccupied with "objective reality", the thing in itself, purely personal matters never seemed important enough. His reluctance to elaborate, even when pressed, on his feelings about his family or his Jewish origins is so conspicuous so as to make it suspect. Lukács liked to boast that he never experienced frustrations or any sort of complex in his life.[14] "I am lucky in that I have no inner life", he liked to say.[15] A statement such as this is as disarming as it is disingenuous. Only robots have no inner life. One doesn't have to be a Freudian to sense profound traumas and repressions behind such reticence. Lukács, of course, hated Freud and had no use for psychoanalysis either in his literary criticism or in his theoretical writings. When dealing with a writer who is not introspective, we can turn to the works which may reveal a great deal about his character. In general, Lukács, as a critic, was attracted to literary works whose heroes are usually from a doomed social class and who experience profoundly the rifts, disruptions and social tensions of their day. According to his own admission, the two literary works that had the greatest impact on him as a child were *The Iliad* and *The Last of the Mohicans*. And in the *Iliad* he identified with Hector, not Achilles.[16]

The critic Gyula Hellenbart comments in one of his Lukács essays, what a shame it is that Lukács never seriously examined, never offered a systematic critique of, the culture, the social reality of his despised turn-of-the-century, early-twentieth-century Budapest.[17] It is indeed a shame, all the more so as there is nowadays so much interest – sympathetic interest – in that time and place. If Lukács didn't subject his immediate environment to any kind of rigorous analysis, either philosophi-

cal or sociological, he did have some devastating things to say about some of his contemporaries who felt closer to, and were more forgiving towards, Budapest than he was. About no other Hungarian writer did Lukács write quite so contemptuously as he did about Ferenc Molnár – not even about some of the right-wing populists whom, one would think, he had much more reason to dislike. Lukács considered Molnár a mediocre naturalist, a playwright of cheap tricks. In both of his Molnár essays he examines lesser-known or unsuccessful works by the famous Hungarian writer – a long-winded and pretentious early novel, *Andor*,[18] and a totally insignificant late novel, *Isten veled szívem* (Farewell my heart).[19] In his specific criticism of these works, Lukács is right on target, but what is remarkable about these essays is the sheer contempt and the patrician hauteur with which he dismisses a writer who, he felt, catered exclusively to petit-bourgeois tastes.

In his essays, other Budapest writers of Jewish origin fared no better, especially if they dealt with Jewish themes in their works. In an interview with Péter Nagy, conducted in the late sixties, Lukács said: "You can believe me that I am not motivated by anti-Semitism when I say that the novels of Tamás Kóbor that were considered important in my youth, are Jewish novels and not Hungarian novels".[20] It is as if Lukács couldn't conceive of a Hungarian writer dealing with the Jewish, the *Hungarian* Jewish experience. But in the case of Lukács the questions posed, and the choices made, had to be radical. For him it was always either/or, all or nothing.[21] During his idealist, utopian period, he was very much attracted to Martin Buber's reinterpretation of the Hasidic tradition, and he was ready at one point to embrace a kind of messianic Judaism.[22] But in later life Lukács didn't much allude to this phase of his development. On one of the rare occasions when he did talk about Jews and Jewishness – in a long interview he gave to three German university professors in the 1960s – he cautioned against the fetishizing of the Holocaust which, he said, was just one aspect of Fascism. In this interview he quotes admiringly a character from a Jorge Semprun novel, a German-Jewish

Communist who falls as a partisan and says: "I will not die a Jewish death".[23]

Yet, paradoxically enough, the thing that has struck so many people about Lukács is that whatever he was involved in, he was never in the mainstream; he remained an outsider, a solitary figure. He suffered from this, but he also made the best of it and relished the role – relished the fact that no one was ever quite satisfied with him. Gábor Bonyhai sums up well this characteristic of Lukács in his essay, "Lukács mint közvetítő" (Lukács as mediator):

> For an essayist he was too scientific and philosophical; for a scholar he was too essayistic. For an aesthetician he was too historical and concrete, but for a literary critic he was too much of a theoretical aesthetician with schemes that were too contrived. He didn't make a good ideologue or politician in charge of art: for that his aesthetic sense was too refined; but he wasn't an ideal critic, either, because for that he was not sensitive enough to living art. He couldn't very well be called a bourgeois philosopher because he was a Marxist. But he wasn't a perfect Marxist either – for that he was too bourgeois. For a cosmopolitan he was too Hungarian, for a Hungarian he was too international, etc., etc.[24]

"In my case everything is a continuation of something else", Lukács said late in life. "There aren't any non-organic elements in my development".[25] Not everyone would agree with this estimation of his career. But one can discern recurring patterns in both his life and works; important leitmotifs run through his writings on Hungarian literature as well. The intellectual dramas of his life are played out, in minor key perhaps, on the pages of these essays, too. In a sense, then, these writings may not be such a modest chapter of Lukács's lifework after all.

NOTES

1 György Lukács, *Magyar irodalom – magyar kultúra* (Hungarian literature – Hungarian culture), (Budapest: Gondolat, 1970) p. 5.

2 György Lukács, *A modern dráma fejlődésének története* (A history of the development of modern drama), (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1911), vol. 2, pp. 494-531.

3 Ferenc Karinthy, "Vaskor" (Age of iron) In his: *Mi van a Dunában?* (What's in the Danube?), (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1980), p. 240.

4 István Sőtér, "Realizmus és demokrácia; Lukács György a felszabadulás után" (Realism and democracy; György Lukács after the Liberation), In: István Szerdahelyi, ed., *Lukács György és a magyar kultúra* (György Lukács and Hungarian culture), (Budapest: Kossuth, 1982), pp. 109-119.

5 Georg Lukács, *Record of a Life – An Autobiographical Sketch* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 39.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

8 See György Lukács, *Balázs Béla és akinek nem kell* (Béla Balázs and those who don't want him), (Gyoma, 1918).

9 Péter Sz. Nagy, "Proust vagy Mann?" (Proust or Mann?) *Új Írás*, vol. 25, January 1985, p. 123.

10 See Judit Marcus-Tar, *Thomas Mann und Georg Lukács* (Köln-Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1982).

11 See Béla Balázs, *Unmögliche Menschen* (Frankfurt, 1930); Anna Lesznai, *Kezdetben volt a kert* (In the beginning was the garden), (Budapest, 1966), Ervin Sinkó, *Optimisták* (Optimists), (Novi Sad, 1965), 2 vols.

12 See Emery George's recent English translation of István Eörsi's play in *Cross Currents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture* (Ann Arbor, Mich.), No. 4, 1985, pp. 209-275.

13 See András Nagy, *Kedves Lukács* (Dear Lukács), (Budapest: Magvető, 1984).

14 Georg Lukács, *Record of a Life*, p. 181.

15 See Gyula Illyés, *In Charons Nachen* (Berlin: Aufbau, 1983), p. 215.

16 Georg Lukács, *Record of a Life*, p. 28.

17 Gyula Hellenbart, "Lukács György és a magyarok" (György Lukács and the Hungarians), *Új Látóhatár*, vol. 26, no. 6, 1975, pp. 503-513.

18 György Lukács, *Magyar irodalom – magyar kultúra*, p. 143.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 433

20 *Ibid.*, p. 639.

21 See Zoltán Kenyeres, "Lukács György és a magyar kultúra" (György Lukács and Hungarian culture), *Kritika*, vol. 7, December 1970, pp. 1-10.

22 See Lee Congdon, *The Young Lukács* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 78.

23 Theo Pinkus, ed., *Gespräche mit Georg Lukács* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1967), p. 54.

24 Gábor Bonyhai, "Lukács mint közvetítő" (Lukács as mediator), In: István Szerdahelyi, ed., *Lukács György és a magyar kultúra*, pp. 20-21.

25 Georg Lukács, *Record of a Life*, p. 81.

LAURENT STERN

GEORG LUKÁCS ON NARRATING AND DESCRIBING

We praise our teachers only if we want to forget them. Unqualified praise must yield to criticism if we want to explain what our teachers taught us and what we have learned from them. Lukács was a rather conservative thinker, yet he taught generations of rebels. We must confront an even deeper paradox. If he is judged only by what he wrote in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy or literary criticism, he will be found wanting. According to his critics, Lukács's judgments in literature are not informed by great sensitivity and his contributions to philosophy do not indicate penetrating insight. He did not have a good ear for music and poetry, or a good eye for art. By today's standards he wasn't even a close reader of literature or philosophy. Yet, generations of gifted philosophers, aestheticians and literary critics have learned from him. Even his most severe critics have learned from him. What did they learn? An answer to this question requires that we become clear about the matters that concerned Lukács throughout his whole literary career.

1

"Let us begin *in medias res!* A race is related in two famous, newer novels [neuere Romane]: in Zola's *Nana* and in Tolstoi's *Anna Karenina*." These are the first two sentences of Lukács's 1936 essay "Erzählen oder Beschreiben?"[1] These novels may have been "newer novels" in 1880, but they certainly did

not remain so up until 1936. The newer novels during the first fifty years of Lukács's life were written by Joyce, Kafka, Musil and Proust. From among American novelists Lukács chose to write in this essay on Dos Passos and Sinclair Lewis, rather than on Faulkner. Throughout his life he ignored the unprecedented creativity displayed in works of literary art from Joyce to Beckett. Yet, Lukács found his audience primarily among the readers of these novels rather than among those who shared his judgments and preferences. Why did his informed readers ignore these judgments? What did they understand him to be saying?

Almost any paragraph selected from Lukács's early writings contains answers to these questions. We read at the beginning of his essay "Metaphysik der Tragödie":[2]

> Ein Spiel ist das Drama; ein Spiel vom Menschen und vom Schicksal; ein Spiel wo Gott der Zuschauer ist. Zuschauer ist er nur und nie mischt sich sein Wort oder seine Gebärde in die Worte oder Gebärden der Spielenden. Nur seine Augen ruhen auf ihnen. "Wer Gott schaut stirbt", schrieb Ibsen einmal; aber kann der leben auf den sein Blick gefallen ist?
>
> [The drama is a play; a play of man and of destiny; a play in which God is the spectator. He is only spectator and his word or gesture never mingles with the words or gestures of the players. Only his eyes rest on them. "He who sees God dies," Ibsen once wrote; but can he live on whom God's glance has been cast?]

Early readers of this essay printed with wide margins in the 1911 edition of *Die Seele und die Formen* must have been struck by the elevated tone, compact style and questionable word order. The essays in this book require slow and repeated reading. Against a highly developed poetic sensitivity in the foreground, in the background native speakers are confronted by an insensitivity to idiom and word order. In the 1960s Hans-Georg Gadamer found Lukács's romantic and sentimental German alien to contemporary readers. Earlier, Mihály Babits detected a German accent in his Hungarian. Yet even these failings were insignificant when compared to what his readers found in his writings.

What they found was neither literary criticism nor aesthetics nor social theory. Since they were not looking for guidance in conventional intellectual pursuits, Lukács did not

lose them even after they judged him to be severely misguided. According to Adorno, Lukács's book of 1954, *The Destruction of Reason*, reveals the destruction of his own reason.[3] Yet there is no evidence that he lost readers, even among those who had no sympathy for the political or philosophical views expressed in this book. His readers, revolutionaries in politics and modernists in art, disregarded his limitations and failings. Despite a very long and productive literary career in these fields, this conservative thinker was not interested in conventional literary criticism, aesthetics or social theory. His search was primarily for the normative and formative principles that provide groundwork for creativity in literature and philosophy. Works of art of philosophical doctrines were not in the forefront of his interests. According to the first essay of *Die Seele und die Formen:*[4]

> Jedes Bild ist aus unserer Welt und die Freude dieses Daseins leuchtet von seinem Antlitz; doch es erinnert sich und es erinnert uns an etwas, das irgendwann da war, an ein Irgendwo, an seine Heimat, an das Einzige, das im Grunde der Seele wichtig und bedeutungsvoll ist... Und die, die sich am entschlossensten von den Bildern abwenden, die am heftigsten hinter den Bildern greifen, sind die Schriften der Kritiker, der Platoniker und Mystiker.
>
> [Every image is from our world and the joy of this existence shines from its physiognomy; yet it reminds itself and it reminds us about something that was here sometime, about somewhere, about its home, about the unique that is important and significant in the soul's depth... And those, who most resolutely turn away from images, who reach most vehemently behind the images are the writings of critics, Platonists and mystics.]

There are works of art, how are they possible? There are philosophical doctrines, why are they necessary? What values inform works of art or philosophical doctrines? Lukács aimed to provide a glimpse behind the graven images: what made these images possible? Why did they become necessary? There are no ultimate answers to these questions. There is nothing but another image behind every graven image. He admitted this and his readers agreed. But at the same time they hoped for admission to a promised land behind the images in the company of those he called Platonists and mystics. Ostensibly Lukács wrote about literary works of art and about solutions to philosophical

problems. Few critics, aestheticians or philosophers wrote more on these subjects. What he said about them does not pass critical examination, but what he implied or intimated warrants very close scrutiny. His views deserve a hearing primarily for the questions he raised concerning the formative principles that are at the foundation of literary art works.

The epos-novel answers the question *"Wie kann das Leben wesenhaft werden?"*[5] [How can life become significant?] and tragedy provides an answer to the question *"Wie kann das Wesen lebendig werden?"*[6] [How can what is significant become alive?] The formulation of both questions has two presuppositions. Forms of literature are forms of life and the central concern of every literary form is an answer to the question *how to live?* Lukács did not clearly formulate these presuppositions. They are not stated, yet they are fundamental principles in all his writings. What is implied in his writings has a greater claim upon close scrutiny than what he actually wrote. His philosophy of art was a philosophy of life and his philosophy of life a moral philosophy.

Lukács's readers heard Rimbaud's call "Il faut être absolument moderne". They neither came for guidance about literary art works nor for instruction on political issues. Concerning both matters his judgments and preferences were embarrassments to his modernist readers who rejected his political illusions. His Western European or North American readers did not share his enthusiasm for minor figures in twentieth century literature or for what has become known as "socialism in one country". Lukács was deaf to the great works of art of his own time and blind to the political realities of his own period, but his conservative answers were prompted by radical questions. His readers adopted the radical questions but arrived at answers that contradicted his own conservative preferences. For any period that has a style Lukács's question about significance will be answered differently. The question "how to live?" leads not only to a moral quest, but also to a search for a just society that rejects past or present illusions.

2

In his essay "Narrate or describe?" Lukács's argues for the claim that in literature narration is preferable to description. In support of this claim he first discusses the distinction between narration and description. *Descriptions* rely on observation. The speaker or writer leaves the foreground: anyone in his position and with his knowledge could in principle offer the same description of a given state of affairs. Characters are primarily spectators rather than participants in the events described. Readers are more or less interested spectators of a series of pictures. Finally, incidents that occurred in the past often appear as if they were occurring in the present. *Narrations*, however, depend primarily on experience rather than on observation. Characters participate in significant events and readers are presented with experiences. The narrator is in the foreground, he tells us about his experiences from his viewpoint. Since what is significant among all experiences is known only with hindsight, significant experiences are narrated as past events.

Lukács introduces the distinction between narration and description to support the claim that what he calls "realism" is superior to "naturalism": the art of Scott, Balzac or Tolstoi is preferable to the art of Flaubert and Zola. No doubt, the examples of great story tellers are well chosen. But these examples will support his claim that the art of these writers is preferable to that of Flaubert and Zola, only if we are convinced on independent grounds that other concerns are of secondary importance when compared with the art of story telling. Scott certainly is a very good storyteller, but a well told story may appeal only to what is primitive in the reader. Scott's stories should be read aloud, according to E. M. Forster:[7]

> What the story does do in this particular capacity, all it can do, is to transform us from readers into listeners, to whom "a" voice speaks, the voice of the tribal narrator, squatting in the middle of the cave, and saying one thing after another until the audience falls asleep among their offal and bones. The story is primitive, it reaches back

to the origins of literature, before reading was discovered, and it appeals to what is primitive in us.

Readers may not agree with Forster's harsh, or with Lukács's favorable, judgement of Scott's novels. In either case Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* will remind them that Scott's stories contributed more to Emma's downfall than to her development. A major theme of this novel is that life is neither a novel nor even like a novel. Readers of *Madame Bovary* cannot possibly be passive listeners as readers of Scott's novels can be. Considerable work is required on their part to understand and appreciate the various aspects of this novel which make it more than a story about provincial morality. Attention to Flaubert's language rather than to character or plot is a precondition for the readers' appreciation of *Madame Bovary*. In this case at least, insensitivity to language cannot be replaced by a search for what is behind the graven images. Lukács's judgements about Flaubert fail to convince his readers.

Contrary to Lukács's judgement, descriptions need not reduce the value of literary art works. The novels of Joyce and Beckett provide evidence for this claim. In speaking about literary art works we must remember that language is used here primarily to create fictional characters and to talk about them. In judging such art works we must hold in view their overall purpose: to provide aesthetic delight or to entertain. Descriptions as well as narrations can achieve this purpose. Yet Lukács's distinction between narration and description survives its use in this essay. Its importance can be appreciated when we attend to writings on history.

But before examining the value of the distinction we must remember the important role of descriptions beyond the confines of literature. Students of art history will remember St. Bernard's often quoted letter to the Abbot William of Saint Thierry:[8]

> In the cloister, under the eyes of the brethren who read there, what profit is there in those ridiculous monsters, in that marvellous and deformed beauty, in that beautiful deformity? To what purpose are those unclean apes, those fierce lions, those monstrous centaurs, those half-men, those striped tigers, those fighting knights, those hunters blowing their horns? Many bodies there are seen under

> one head, or again, there are many heads to a single body. Here is a four-footed beast with a serpent's tail; there a fish with a beast's head. Here again the forepart of a horse trails half a goat behind it, or a horned beast bears the hind-quarters of a horse. In short, so many and so marvellous are the varieties of shapes on every hand, that we are more tempted to read in the marble than in our books, and to spend the whole day wondering at these things rather than in meditating the law of God. For God's sake, if men are not ashamed of these follies, why at least do they not shrink from the expense?

Art historians are unanimous in their praise of St. Bernard's description. Meyer Schapiro[9] appreciated the vivid inventory of the subjects of these sculptures and their precise characterization. Erwin Panofsky[10] wrote about this letter: "A modern art historian would thank God on his knees for the ability to write so minute, so graphic, so truly evocatory a description of a decorative ensemble in the 'Cluniac manner'; the one phrase *deformis formositas ac formosa deformitas* tells us more about the Spirit of Romanesque sculpture than many pages of stylistic analysis".

Both Panofsky and Schapiro contrast Bernard's gift for observation and description with his complete disinterest in his physical surroundings. Reminded of this contrast, we can no longer claim that Bernard was a detached observer of these sculptures. His words provide us with a precise drawing of these objects, they tell us about profound experiences. He could be indifferent to the landscape on the shores of Lake Geneva, but he was responsive to these sculptures. Because he was responsive to them, he considered them dangerous. Free of context, we could appreciate his description. But greater value is assigned to descriptions that are integrated within narrations. The interpretive comments of Panofsky and Schapiro prompt our understanding of Bernard's description as an account of his deeply felt experiences. We marvel at his gifts because they are integral parts of a story, whose elements are provided by his beliefs, desires, and biography.

Detailed descriptions integrated within narrations are highly valued. In medical literature, the case histories of Freud or A. R. Luria[11] or Oliver Sacks[12] are good examples. The finely observed details are connected with biographical ele-

ments; together they provide descriptions that are constituent parts of a narrative. Here description plays a subordinate role to narration. However, Lukács's distinction between description and narration is fully vindicated only in the context of writings on history.

3

Texts are judged correctly by most readers as narrations or descriptions, yet it is difficult to provide criteria distinguishing between them. *Narrations* have a point. They not only tell us about events in history or in a story, they also tell us why they happened from the viewpoint of a historian or narrator. Two witnesses may offer different descriptions of a given event. Only the causal history of that event can serve as evidence that their different descriptions are about one and the same event. Time and space coordinata permit the identification and reidentification of objects. Causal histories warrant the identification and reidentification of events. *Descriptions* need not have a point. They merely tell us about what a witness has observed. References to a causal history in descriptions of events are limited to what has been seen by a witness. Witnesses are often admonished in legal contexts to refrain from interpretation and speculation. The ascription of unobserved intentions, motives, reasons, causes and effects is discouraged. Witnesses unwilling or unable to distinguish between what is observable and what is unobservable are considered incompetent witnesses.

Descriptions of events brought about by human agents can be given as if they were natural events. But if we had only such descriptions at our disposal, an important link between events and those who brought them about or made them happen would be missing. Three questions arise that cannot be answered by descriptions. How were these events seen by those who brought them about? How were they seen by their contemporaries who knew about the purposes, goals, beliefs and desires of those who made them happen? Finally, given what we know about

these events, the goals of those who brought them about, and our predecessors' judgement about them — how do we see these events now? Only a narrative about the agents, their contemporaries and the world surrounding them can provide answers to these questions.

In his first book,[13] written in 1909, Lukács suggested that acceptance of the Humean analysis of causality would have more untoward consequences in literary than in real life contexts. Succeeding events in drama and tragedy would become disconnected incidents: a necessary connection between the incidents can be established only by a causal connection. Such claims cannot be defended. Samuel Beckett's plays and Robert Musil's *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* provide evidence that great literary artworks can be created even if the Humean analysis of causality is accepted. The acceptance of Hume's analysis is in fact at the center of Musil's great novel.

Description need not assume a subsidiary role to narration in literary texts. Also, readers of such texts need not be induced to believe that the events described are part of a grand design or that they occur because agents or circumstances have brought them about. Events may be described as they happen one after another and they may be connected only because they occur in a given sequence. There is no difference in principle between events so described and natural events. Medieval chronicles[14] and twentieth century insurance companies do not discriminate between earthquakes, floods, civil wars and revolutions; these are called "acts of God". If we wish to introduce a distinction between natural disasters and public commotions we must tell a story. That story cannot be limited to a description of observable events.

As soon as we introduce the agents' aims and contemporary judgements of them, we are telling a story about these agents. We provide a connection between the events and those who brought them about by telling that story within a historical narrative. In that narrative a causal connection is established between the agents' actions and their aims, beliefs and desires. Evidence about such matters would not be admitted in legal contexts for the evidence reaches beyond the limits of what can be

observed. Given such a historical narrative, we can distinguish between natural disasters and civil disturbances. However, as soon as we leave the limits of what can be observed and admit a historical narrative about the agents and what they have brought about, we admit speculation and interpretation.

Historical narratives become fictional narratives unless they obey constraints in interpreting. What are these constraints? It has been suggested that interpretations must be rejected, if we assume that the agents could not be persuaded to agree with them. According to Quentin Skinner "no agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done".[15] Skinner's suggestion presupposes that we can always distinguish between what an agent had meant or done and what he had brought about. But from a historical perspective, what had been meant or done is always seen in the light of what had been brought about. Historians believe Kaiser Wilhelm's protest that he did not mean to bring about the suffering and slaughter of his soldiers in World War I, yet blame him for that suffering. Also, it is up to us to decide whether our ancestors could be brought to accept our story of what they brought about. Since we ascribe to them the beliefs, purposes and desires that brought about the events that occurred, an additional claim that they would agree to our speculations and interpretations is an empty gesture.

There are only two candidates for providing the required constraint for historical narratives. Obviously, the narrative must be compatible with the available evidence. Also, wherever no evidence is available the narrative must establish a probable connection between the events related. The narrative will serve as an explanation of these events only if the probable connection is a causal connection. There are no theoretically satisfactory constraints on the beginning or ending of historical narratives. A narrative's beginning, the conceptual framework that provides for a causal connection between related events, and a narrative's end depend on a given historian's viewpoint and perspective. What happened becomes a historical event only if it plays a role within a narrative. Its place in

the historical narrative provides an explanation for that event. In ordinary contexts the connection between an agent's aims and what he did or brought about is provided by a story about the agent. Historical narratives offer causal explanations of events by assigning a role to agents, facts, accidents and other events within narratives.

The agents' purposes, beliefs and desires in doing what they did may have been known by their contemporaries. But the agents and their contemporaries were ignorant of what they were bringing about. Later historians know more of what was brought about, but they may be ignorant about their forefathers' aims, beliefs and desires in doing what they did. The gaps in the narrative are filled by claims about the causal role of events that are only partially supported by the available evidence. Accordingly, the causal connection suggested between events reported in historical narratives serves three different purposes. It permits the identification and reidentification of a given event under different descriptions. It also offers an explanation for the occurrence of a given event. Finally, in case there is doubt about the occurrence of a given event, it supports claims about that event by indicating its causal role for later events. Historical narratives permit the 'retrodiction'[16] of events.

Lukács wrote in "Erzählen oder Beschreiben?":[17]

> Man kann ohne Weltanschauung nicht richtig erzählen, keine richtige, gegliederte, abwechslungsreiche und vollständige epische Komposition aufbauen. Die Beobachtung, das Beschreiben ist aber gerade ein Ersatzmittel für die fehlende bewegte Ordnung des Lebens im Kopfe des Schriftstellers.
>
> [Without a world-view one cannot narrate well, one cannot construct a well articulated, complete epic composition that is rich in reversal of circumstances. Observation and description are means of replacement for the missing dynamic organization of life in the writer's head.]

Long before Lukács wrote these lines, great twentieth century novelists turned away from writing narratives that bring out the causal connection between events imagined. However, even if causal connections between imagined events in a given novel are not shown, the episodes in that novel need not

appear disconnected. They can be connected in many other ways. Examples are the stream of consciousness technique, a correspondence to related episodes in Homer, or reliance on speculative philosophical views about memory. Critics, historians or theoreticians of literature engage in a futile exercise if they offer suggestions about methods of connecting incidents in an epic composition. Novelists will disregard these suggestions as empty legislation.

In historical narratives there are no substitutes for the causal connection between the events related. In addition to a narrative, historians may offer descriptions and even suggest moral or political lessons to be learned from their narratives, but these tasks are quite secondary to their major task in showing the causal connection between the events related. What Lukács had to say about narration applies more to historiography than to literature. "Without a world-view, one cannot narrate well" — for historians must select from the available evidence those events that can be fitted within their narrative. Whether an event is fitted to the *Haupt- und Staatsaktion* dear to German historians or to the *histoire des mentalités* of French historians, the principles of selection among events depend primarily on the historians writing about them. Geographical features, climatic conditions and demographic changes are described in a given historical narrative only if a historian assigns them a causal role in that narrative. Even the search for documentary evidence is guided by the questions historians ask. These questions depend on their own world-view, conceptual framework and what Lukács called "the dynamic organization of life in the writer's head". Medieval chroniclers may have written about the death of kings, miracles and the plague. These writings provide twentieth century historians with evidence about class struggle, social mobility, conspicuous consumption, or lifestyle.[18]

The new questions historians ask in every generation prompt not only the rewriting of history, but also the discovery of new evidence. But that very evidence depends on contemporaries understanding events that they witnessed, on other historians including them in their narrative, and on the pres-

ervation of the recording of these events by archives and institutions. According to Paul Veyne, matters of fact are known to historians only within an interpretation. Also, the history of a sequence of events is only available through the construction and understanding of a narrative.[19] This does not imply freedom from the constraints of the available evidence. But there are additional constraints. Historians must decide on both matters of fact and matters of interpretation. Since they are not confronted with bare facts independent of interpretations, they must decide simultaneously about two different questions: What happened? How it is understood? Answers to both questions are given within historical narratives. For an event is a historical event only if a historian assigns a causal role to that event within his narrative; but he assigns a causal role to that event only within a given conceptual framework. His narrative relies on what witnesses recorded about these events, how other historians understood and interpreted them, and on his own understanding and interpretation of witnesses and historians.

Historical narratives are subject to constraints, but they are underdetermined by the available evidence. Any account of events that ventures beyond the limits set to eyewitness testimony in legal contexts can be said to rely on 'retrodiction', interpretation and speculation. We may wish to substitute for the historian's work the Ideal Chronicler's eyewitness report, but as Arthur Danto[20] has demonstrated, the Ideal Chronicler is merely an incomplete and rather ignorant historian. He is ignorant of the later significance of events and he cannot appreciate the difference between what agents did and what they brought about. But the underdetermination of a narrative by the available evidence need not discredit that narrative. Of course, it may be replaced by better supported narratives or by narratives that offer better explanations of the events related from the viewpoint of our purposes, beliefs, and desires.

Much of what has been said here about historical narratives would have been acceptable to Lukács in 1914, when he wrote Part I of *Die Theorie des Romans*, but was certainly unacceptable twenty years later, when he wrote "Kunst und objektive Wahrheit". In the opening paragraph of this essay he wrote what became a guiding principle for all his later writings:[21]

> Jede Auffassung der Außenwelt ist nichts anderes als eine Widerspiegelung der unabhängig vom Bewußtsein existierenden Welt durch das menschliche Bewußtsein. Diese grundlegende Tatsache der Beziehung vom Bewußtsein zum Sein gilt selbstverständlich auch für die künstlerische Widerspiegelung der Wirklichkeit.
>
> [Every conception of the external world is nothing but a reflection of the world that exists independently of consciousness by human consciousness. This fundamental fact of the relation between consciousness and being applies also for the artistic reflection of reality.]

Lukács credits Lenin's epistemology with this insight. But the credit belongs neither to Lenin, nor to Marx, Engels and Stalin, who are also mentioned in this context. This insight originates in an older view that regarded the mind as a passive mirror of the world. By the end of the nineteenth century this view was discredited in science as well as in art. The claim that science and art are reflections of reality implies a further claim that reality can have only one adequate reflection. In the sciences this claim has been discredited at least since the publication of Heinrich Hertz's *Die Prinzipien der Mechanik* in 1894. Hertz found that even in the best understood science of his time there were three different ways of representing the available knowledge of the motion of bodies. In 1906, when Pierre Duhem published *La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure*, philosophers of science understood that there may be several incompatible yet adequate representations of the motion of bodies. The development of twentieth century science becomes incomprehensible unless we accept the view that scientists make choices among different representations of reality and that scientific theories are underdetermined by the available evidence.

The great achievements of modern art, music and literature since the late nineteenth century become incomprehensible if we accept as a guiding principle that art is a reflection of reality. Other aestheticians, historians or critics of art, music and literature have judged past art in the light of these new developments. But when Lukács compared impressionist or cubist masters with their great realist predecessors, he found them wanting. His preference for the realism of a bygone age was a consequence of his acceptance of a discredited view in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of art.

Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach - "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it" - contains a firmer guiding principle for the philosophy of science or the philosophy of art than any reflection theory. Conceptions of reality are not reflections of the external world. But as Ian Hacking wrote, "our notions of reality are formed from our abilities to change the world".[22] Our conceptions of reality are dependent on what we use in bringing about a change in our world and on what can be used in bringing about a change in us. We become convinced about the reality of entities conjectured in physics when we bring about a change in nature by using the causal properties of these entities. Only if we reject the view that art is a reflection of reality can we appreciate the profound changes brought about in us and our world by modern art, music and literature. Modern art has shaped at least a part of our world and has illuminated our experience of that world.

5

Theories of literature need not prejudice practical literary criticism. The young Lukács taught his readers about principles of literary forms. These principles guided them in interpreting those modern and classical literary works that the later Lukács excluded from the canon. The notion of reflection of reality plays a predominant role in his later work and it provides limits to what he admitted to the canon, but it does

not facilitate practical criticism. However, once he admitted a literary work to the canon, was Lukács's practical criticism informed by his theory of literature? Wherever he provided successful models in interpreting, his results were not influenced by theory, and conversely, wherever his results were influenced by theory, he did not provide successful models in interpreting. His readers have inherited the task of providing applications in practical criticism for his successful theories and the task of providing theories for his successful critical interpretations.

NOTES

1 Georg Lukács, *Probleme des Realismus* (Berlin, 1955), p. 103.

2 Lukács, *Die Seele und die Formen* (Berlin, 1911), p. 325.

3 Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, *Noten zur Literatur II* (Frankfurt am Main, 1961), p. 153.

4 Lukács, *Die Seele und die Formen*, pp. 12-13.

5 Lukács, *Die Theorie des Romans*, 2nd ed. (Neuwied am Rhein, Berlin-Spandau, 1963), p. 23. First edition Berlin, 1920.

6 Lukács, *Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 335.

7 E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1954), p. 40. First edition 1927.

8 See Meyer Schapiro, "On the Aesthetic Attitude in Romanesque Art", reprinted in *Romanesque Art* (New York, 1977), p. 6. First publication in 1947.

9 Schapiro, p. 8.

10 Erwin Panofsky, Abbot Suger, *On the Abbey Church of St.- Denis and its Art Treasures*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, 1979), p. 25. First edition 1946.

11 See for example, A. R. Luria, *The Man with a Shattered World* (New York, 1972) and *The Mind of a Mnemonist* (New York, 1968).

12 Oliver Sacks, *Awakenings* (first edition 1973, newly revised edition, New York, 1983). See also an account of his own accident and recovery in *A Leg to Stand On* (New York: Summit Books, 1984).

13 Lukács, *A modern dráma fejlődésének története* (A history of the development of modern drama) (Budapest, 1911), p. 23 and *passim*.

14 See for example Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality", *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1980), p. 11.

15 Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", *History and Theory* 8 (1969), p. 28.

16 Paul Ricoeur, *Temps et récit*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1983), vol. I, p. 191.

17 Lukács, *Probleme des Realismus*, p. 134.

18 Paul Veyne, "L'histoire conceptualisant", in *Faire de l'histoire*, ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora, 3 vols. (Paris, 1974), vol. I, p. 67.

19 Paul Veyne, *Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes?* (Paris, 1983), p. 117.

20 Arthur Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge, 1965), Chapter VIII, "Narrative Sentences", pp. 143-181.

21 Lukács, *Probleme des Realismus*, p. 5.

22 Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening* (Cambridge, 1983), p. 146.

13 Lukács, *A modern dráma fejlődésének története* (A history of the development of modern drama) (Budapest, 1911), p. 25 and passim.

14 See for example Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality", *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1980), p. 14.

15 Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", *History and Theory* 8 (1969), p. 28.

16 Paul Ricoeur, *Temps et récit*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1983), vol. I, p. 191.

17 Lukács, *Probleme des Realismus*, p. 134.

18 Paul Veyne, "L'histoire conceptualisante", in *Faire de l'histoire*, ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora, 3 vols. (Paris, 1974), vol. I, p. 67.

19 Paul Veyne, *Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes?* (Paris, 1983), p. 117.

20 Arthur Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge, 1965), Chapter VIII: "Narrative Sentences", pp. 143-181.

21 Lukács, *Probleme des Realismus*, p. [illegible].

22 Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening* (Cambridge, 1983), p. 146.

TOM ROCKMORE

LUKÁCS AND MARXIST HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

This paper concerns the Marxist character of Lukács's reading of the history of philosophy, with special attention to this interpretation of German idealism. Although his thought has been the topic of much discussion, and has attained almost the status of a cottage industry, culminating in the recent publication of a Lukács bibliography,[1] at least in the West this aspect of his position has not received adequate attention. In fact, for various reasons, in part due to its unattractive character, Marxist history of philosophy in general has long languished since its creation by the *Urvater des Marxismus*, Friedrich Engels.

The unattractiveness of much Marxist history of philosophy is not due only to the fact that since its inception Marxists have in the main had little good to say about the philosophical tradition. Obviously, it is not necessary to be laudatory; nor is it requisite that one hold compatible opinions to be interesting. But that is not the problem. Rather, with rare exceptions Marxists since Engels have seemed to know little about a rich intellectual tradition, which they have been mainly content to weigh in an abstract balance in order to find wanting. For the most part Marxists have appeared unconcerned about making more than a superficial acquaintance with a field which they already 'know', through an apriori analysis sharply divergent from the Marxist stress on practice, to be intellectually bankrupt. Now it would be hasty to deny the conceptual ties which bind Lukács to orthodox Marxism, whose extent has often been incorrectly underestimated. Yet it is precisely from that

perspective that we can best appreciate the specific character of his own reading of the history of philosophy, which differs from other forms of Marxism less in intent than in the detailed nature of his knowledge of the topic.

In view of the dimensions of Lukács's corpus, it will be wise to limit the present inquiry. The general interpretation of the history of philosophy is a continuing feature of Lukács's lengthy Marxist period in all its phases, beginning roughly with *History and Class Consciousness*. In the present context, I shall concentrate mainly on Lukács's approach to so-called classical German philosophy, his term for German idealism including Kant's position, as elaborated in HCC. But in my opinion it would be an error to regard Lukács's later writings as the source of a distinctly different perspective. Although there is indeed an important elaboration of the argument in his later thought in various ways, the basic Marxist insight remains unchanged. For Lukács never abandons, or even restricts, the view that Marx's thought is the truth of idealism, even if he finds different ways to make this argument. The points I shall raise in the discussion to follow will mainly concern the initial form of that argument. But to the extent that they count against it as such, and not its specific form, they are pertinent to Lukács's later thought as well.

In order to evaluate Lukács's particular approach to the history of philosophy, it will be convenient to relate it to other approaches, including other forms of Marxism. It is obvious that the concept of the history of philosophy is related to a concept of philosophy; it is equally obvious that there are many different views of the nature of philosophy as well as of its relation to history and to the history of philosophy.

In the nineteenth century German philosophical tradition there is a clear dispute about the relevance of the history of philosophy for philosophy. This dispute opposes Kant and Hegel. Kant's well-known distinction between apriori and aposteriori forms of knowledge clearly suggests that epistemology concerns the former only. In fact, he explicitly draws this inference in the *Critique of Pure Reason* at B 864 when he distinguishes between *cognito ex datiis* and *cognito ex principiis*. Certainly,

the critical philosophy was intended by him as an example of the latter type, since the transcendental approach deals only with the conditions of the possibility of knowledge whatsoever in total abstraction from experience. Kant's negative attitude towards the relevance of historical considerations was widely influential in later thought. Two examples will suffice to make this point: Husserl's assertion of the need to start over again from the beginning, for although much has been attempted nothing has in fact been accomplished;[2] and Quine's reported distinction between those interested in the history of philosophy and those interested in philosophy.[3] Hegel, on the contrary, denied sharply that philosophy as such could successfully be isolated from its previous forms, upon which it must build, and whose task it was to complete, however imperfectly it might be aware of its own past. A clear illustration of Hegel's view is found in Kant's position. Despite its systematic intent, the critical philosophy clearly presupposes as an integral part of the argument – as its existential reason so to speak – interpretations of the positions of relevant predecessors.

The dependency of Marxism on Hegel is difficult to overestimate. In particular, Marxism shares with Hegel the belief that thought is inseparable from time, in fact indivisibly related to the social context in which it appears. But there is a cardinal difference. For Hegel thought remains partially true because of its link to its historical moment; but for Marxism, which here follows Marx, it is because of that link, as analyzed in terms of the concept of ideology, that thought is false. The result is a difference in attitude towards the history of philosophy, which from both perspectives remains relevant. For Hegel philosophy is concerned with the completion of an ongoing task within the philosophical tradition, through the elaboration of an allegedly highest form of philosophy which takes up in a single synthesis all that is of value in the preceding tradition. On the contrary, Marxism, at least on one prominent interpretation, is concerned to complete the philosophical task from an extra-philosophical perspective, that is, from a vantage point outside the philosophical tradition. On the latter

view, philosophy is held to concern real problems, of which it is symptomatic, but which it is incapable of resolving, since it, namely philosophy, is part of the problem. In short, for Hegel the correct theory that resolves the problems of philosophy differs from its predecessors merely in degree; for Marxism it must further differ in kind.

In Lukács's initial interpretation of classical German philosophy, the Marxist theory of philosophy presupposes as an integral element the Marxian view of ideology. Although not often noted, the concept of ideology has its roots in the philosophic tradition as early as the Greek view of nonbeing. In modern times this view was restated on the basis of presuppositions which hinder the subject's apprehension of the object. This analysis was initially formulated by Francis Bacon in his theory of the *idolae tribu;* it was later restated by the French sensualists and materialists. Marx's reformulation of the concept of ideology breaks significantly with the line of thought initiated by Bacon. According to Marx, the misapprehension of the object of knowledge is due, not to the subject, but to the object's effect upon it. Marx's view of ideology can be said to rest upon a causal theory of perception. In simplest terms, the object, or social context, which is distorted with respect to the realization of human potential, causes a distorted apprehension of itself on the level of conscious thought.[4]

Since Lukács proposes a theory of consciousness with a clearly epistemological intent, it should be noted that Marx's view of ideology has an epistemological thrust. More precisely, it can be regarded as a contribution to what Hegel understood as the traditional epistemological concern, present throughout the history of philosophy, to grasp the relation between thought and being. Marx's theory presupposes a distinction between the economic base and the cultural superstructure, in Hegelian terms the *Bildung*, from whose perspective society can be known. According to Marx, in a society whose economy is based on commodity exchange, awareness of that society is distorted in a manner which tends to support the existing state of affairs. From an epistemological perspective, this view can be expressed in terms of three related propositions: (1) being de-

termines thought, not thought being; (2) distorted social being distorts thought about it, impeding its apprehension and resulting in false consciousness; (3) thought can correctly grasp or know being.

The difficulty lies in the application of this perspective to the history of philosophy. Marx does not provide a detailed reading of the history of philosophy and his own view of philosophy is at least ambiguous. His writings, especially the early "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction", can be read as suggesting that it is not philosophy as such, but a form of it, which is ideological; this way of interpreting his attitude leaves open the question of the relation of his own position to the philosophical tradition. On this interpretation, it is at least consistent to regard Marx's own position as a form of philosophy while noting that he rejects some types of philosophy as ideological. In practice, however, since Engels most commentators have tended to read Marx as rejecting all philosophy as such as non-scientific ideology. This in turn suggests that his own view must be some form of non-philosophic science, and hence external to the philosophic tradition, whose problems it resolves on an extra-philosophic plane.

The latter interpretation, which is widely favored in the Marxist tradition, has traditionally functioned as the basis for a Marxist reading of the history of philosophy. Engels' pioneer Marxist reading of philosophy as ideology, which in basic ways diverges from Marx's thought, presupposes both the Marxian concept and his own early defense of Hegel against Schelling, prior to his encounter with Marx. Engels's polemic with Schelling, which developed after his attendance of the latter's lectures in Berlin, resulted in a series of three articles. In the second article, "Schelling und die Offenbarung. Kritik des neuesten Reaktionsversuchs gegen die freie Philosophie" (March 1842), Engels maintained that philosophy must be monistic. Here he attempted through a simple *reductio ad absurdum* to refute Schelling's basic distinction between positive and negative forms of philosophy. He further argued, on this point following Hegel's students, notably Heine, that philoso-

phy reaches a peak in Hegel's view, which brings to a close the Protestant approach to philosophy set in motion by Luther.[5]

This simplistic reading of Hegel's position as the highest and final form of philosophy was combined with the suggestion that as ideology philosophy must be superseded on the plane of science. Engels developed this suggestion in a series of writings. In *Anti-Dühring*, he argued that Hegel brought philosophy to an end in his system, which has since been superseded by modern materialism; and he further argued that to Marx we owe the discovery of historical materialism, or the science of society. Engels later repeated this point in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*. Here he maintained that historical materialism puts an end to philosophy in the realm of history. A similar point emerges from the posthumously published, incomplete *Philosophy of Nature*.

Within Marxism, Engels's approach to the history of philosophy is widely influential, but not universally followed. Despite its stress on orthodoxy, Marxism is in many ways pluralistic. Engels's reading of the history of philosophy is extreme. By equating philosophy with ideology, he denied any positive epistemological content to philosophy. This same point has recently been restated forcefully in the French discussion by Althusser.[6] But there are also weaker forms of orthodox Marxism – that maintain the quasi-Hegelian claim for Hegel's thought as the peak of classical German philosophy and adopt a materialist perspective – which avoid a reductive approach to philosophy as mere ideology. An excellent example of a non-reductive form of orthodox Marxism is furnished by Manfred Buhr's recent survey of classical German thought.[7] Buhr's discussion is directed towards the clarification of the social-historical presuppositions of classical bourgeois philosophy. The basic assumption of this form of thought is that reason rules the world. According to Buhr, Marx's insight is not to move to an extra-philosophic plane, as Engels suggests and Lukács, following him, asserts. Rather, Marx's insight is to argue that history must be consciously made by man.

The difference between the two Marxist readings of the history of philosophy proposed by Engels and Buhr are as inter-

esting as they are illustrative of the range of opinion found in orthodox Marxist circles. In simplest terms, Engels proposes an apriori, reductionist schema, based on little knowledge of philosophy. According to Engels, philosophy must give way to historical materialism, which differs from it in kind. On the contrary, Buhr offers a non-reductionist, deeply-informed reading of classical German philosophy. Rather than a demonstration of the ideological status of philosophy as such, Buhr is interested in eliciting the roots of the various positions in the social context and in arguing for the relative preeminence of the Marxist approach.

The range of Marxism from Engels to Buhr provides an appropriate framework to understand Lukács's own reading of the history of philosophy. Lukács's approach to classical German thought combines elements characteristic of both Engels and Buhr. They include the former's reductionist concern to treat philosophy as a mere superstructural phenomenon and the latter's deep acquaintance with the entire range of German idealism. Despite Lukács's later, perhaps tactical, self-criticism for an alleged neglect of labor in *History and Class Consciousness*, he considered bourgeois philosophy there and elsewhere from the classical Marxist standpoint as a form of ideology, or at least as basically flawed by its bourgeois perspective. From this angle of vision, the conceptual impotence of bourgeois philosophy is due to the neglect, or at least the incomplete appreciation, of the economic basis of capitalism. In this sense, Lukács follows classical Marxism and does not break new ground. But in another sense, Lukács's approach to classical German thought is highly original. Its outstanding trait, which distinguishes it from all other Marxist approaches with which I am familiar, is the informed concern to demonstrate through specific interpretation, as opposed to mere assertion, the truth of the Marxist claim that philosophy is ideology. In a word, although otherwise original, the main thrust of Lukács's interpretation of German idealism, especially in *History and Class Consciousness*, is to provide a demonstration of Engels's asserted, but unsubstantiated view of philosophy.

At this point, some obvious objections to my reading of Lukács's approach to the history of philosophy can be considered. I have stressed the continuity between Lukács's approach, despite some important innovations, and classical Marxism, since I believe that an appreciation of this relation is crucial to the comprehension of Lukács's efforts in this domain. This controversial claim appears to contradict numerous contrary indications, some of which are due to Lukács himself. They include: the significance of his early criticism of Engels; Lukács's reputation as the founder of so-called Western Marxism; and the widely remarked evolution of his position, which is often described in terms of pre-Stalinist, Stalinist, and post-Stalinist phases.

I believe that none of these objections is well founded. In fact, when we examine the situation more closely, a somewhat different image, less flattering to Lukács, begins to emerge. To begin with, the early criticism of Engels for the extension of dialectic to nature and for his inadequate remarks on the thing-in-itself — the concept upon which Lukács's own reading of classical German philosophy turns — is significantly relativized by him in the new Preface written for the second edition of his *magnum opus*. To put the point in Kantian terms, although there is clearly a difference as regards the interpretation of the letter of Kant's view, there is none at all as concerns the spirit of the response which needs to be given. In fact, in later writings Lukács aligns his position ever more closely on Engels's thought. This reappraisal of his attitude towards Engels results finally in the abandonment of every significant criticism initially raised. It is accordingly significant that in the uncompleted, posthumously published *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins* Lukács explicitly presupposes a dialectic of nature as the foundation of a Marxist ontology.

Second, despite the obvious differences in various phases of his position, the widespread grasp of them as discontinuous, widely represented in the secondary literature, is highly exaggerated. For no thinker of any stature simply abandons his previous thought; and all changes in orientation are always car-

ried out on the basis of a deeper continuity. As concerns Lukács's position, the general continuity of the pre-Marxist and Marxist phases, whose relation had been unintelligible, has been clearly shown by Congdon recently.[8] Further, the specific continuity of the Marxist phase, throughout its complicated evolution, is revealed in the lengthy, unvarying commitment to orthodox Marxism, already evident in "Bolshevism as a Moral Problem", published in December 1918 at the time of his adherence to the Hungarian Communist Party. Lukács never wavered from this commitment, which he maintained until the end of an exceptionally lengthy intellectual career.

Third, I am sceptical about the concept of Western Marxism. The influence of Lukács on the evolution of the later Marxist debate is enormous, and probably even greater than has yet been realized. But the concept of Western Marxism propagated by Merleau-Ponty[9] and taken up again by Arato and Breines[10] is meaningful only as a geographical designation, roughly in P. Anderson's sense.[11] If it is meant to refer to a non-doctrinaire form of Marxism, distinct either from its classical or later Soviet varieties, it is clearly mythological.

The general continuity mentioned here is specifically evident in the reading of classical and post-classical European philosophy. Lukács stressed the formulation of the so-called "Blum Theses", written in 1928, as signaling a significant change in his outlook. But as concerns the history of philosophy, no such change can be detected in his later writings. After the original reading of classical German thought takes shape, it never undergoes basic alteration. Both early and late, Lukács varies the form of the argument, but never modifies the fundamental claim, that is, that Marx is the truth of German idealism.

The basic Marxist reading of the history of philosophy takes shape in *History and Class Consciousness*, especially in the celebrated central essay, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat". The essay is divided into three parts, including: a discussion of reification, a related description of the antinomies of bourgeois thought, and a statement of the proletarian standpoint. Simply stated, classical

German philosophy is analyzed from a closely Marxist perspective, which then provides the key to an interpretation of Marx's position.[12]

In later writings, Lukács demonstrated wide acquaintance with the entire German idealist tradition. In this essay, classical German philosophy is described mainly through the positions of Kant and Hegel as a form of bourgeois ideology. I stress this latter point, since the reductive nature of Lukács's interpretation of idealism as ideology has on occasion been overlooked in the secondary literature. But Lukács's approach to German idealism as ideology is clear, for instance in contrast to his view of Marxism as the objective alternative to a merely subjective stance. In a description of his discussion, he writes:[13]

> Our intention here is to *base* ourselves on Marx's economic analysis and to proceed from there to a discussion of the problems growing out of the fetish character of commodities, both as an objective form and also as a subjective stance corresponding to it. Only by understanding this can we obtain a clear insight into the ideological problems of capitalism and its downfall.

Lukács's claim for the ideological nature of bourgeois thought, as reflected in internal antinomies, is restated by him in a series of later writings. In each case these texts further elaborate, but do not basically alter, themes already sounded in *History and Class Consciousness*. Since Engels there was a pronounced tendency within Marxism to interpret Marx's thought as arising through the 'negation' of Hegel's position. Prior to Lukács, there was as yet no substantive Marxist study of the Hegelian view. In *Der junge Hegel* Lukács provided the initial Marxist reading of Hegel's position, focussing on the relation of dialectic and economics, in order to locate the roots of the Marxian concept of alienation in Hegel's thought. In a discussion of existentialism, entitled *Existentialisme ou Marxisme?*, he defended Engels's view of the exclusive alternative between idealism and materialism through an attempt refutation of the existentialist endeavor to define a third position. In an often scurrilous work from his so-called Stalinist period, he described the rise of irrationalism in German

thought, beginning with the later Schelling, as contributing to National Socialism. Finally, in his monumental, unfinished study, *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins*, he returned again to the theme of the contradictions in bourgeois thought, especially in Hegel's position, before elaborating a Marxist theory of ontology, based on the concept of work.

As concerns German idealism, I have already noted that Lukács's specific contribution lies in a perhaps unprecedented effort to go beyond a mere assertion through a concrete demonstration of its ideological nature. His demonstration of what he calls[14] "the antinomy of bourgeois thought" is based on an interpretation of the relation between the problem of system and the Kantian concept of the thing-in-itself. According to Lukács, classical German philosophy is characterized by the discovery of the principle of complete system, which results in an antinomy between the drive towards system and the recognition of facticity. As he writes in an important passage:[15]

> The greatness, the paradox and the tragedy of classical German philosophy lie in the fact that – unlike Spinoza – it no longer dismisses every *donné* as non-existent, causing it to vanish behind the monumental architecture of the rational forms produced by the understanding. Instead, while grasping and holding on to the irrational character of the actual contents of the concepts it strives to go beyond this, to overcome it and to erect a system.

The antinomy, then, lies in the tension between the demand for universal system and the impossibility of its fulfillment.

The proposed demonstration of the ideological character of classical German philosophy rests on an analysis of Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself. Lukács links this concept to the idealist tendency towards system. Common to the various aspects of this Kantian concept, which Lukács considers to be[16] "the fundamental problem of bourgeois thought", is the designation of a limit, that is, an irrational content which cannot be known.[17] The consequence is an incompatibility in Kant's thought between form and content, which Lukács interprets from a neo-Kantian perspective as an incommensurability between the categorial structure of thought and the given which is not cognizable. Nor does Hegel's concept of the absolute as a concrete totality of the historical world provide a satisfactory

resolution of the problem, even if he perceives the need to construct an identical subject/object. For in the effort to discover the unity of rational form and irrational content in an extra-historical concept of the absolute, Hegel is driven beyond history to mythology.[18]

Lukács later attributed the insight into the antinomic structure of classical German thought to classical Marxism, especially to Engels. In fact, the source of this approach lies elsewhere. It is no accident that Lukács's demonstration strongly resembles German neo-Kantianism. It is well known that Lukács studied in Heidelberg, where he was close to a number of neo-Kantians, above all to Emil Lask.[19] The efforts of such thinkers as Windelband, Rickert and Lask to analyze the duality of fact and value, content and form, universal and particular, culminated in the latter's brilliant discussion of Fichte's position. According to Lask, Fichte's thought combined an analytic method and a speculative, or synthetic, approach which were obviously incompatible. Lukács's demonstration of the antinomy of bourgeois philosophy is not borrowed from Engels at all; rather, it is an extension of Lask's reading of Fichte to classical German philosophy as a whole. This extension is based on the conviction that the idealist drive for system fails in the recognition that the object is not cognizable, that is, in the incompatibility between rational form and irrational content.

In virtue of the antinomic structure, bourgeois thought cannot provide a solution to the problem posed by the irrationality of the thing-in-itself, which is its central concern. A satisfactory analysis, which reveals the rationality, and hence cognizability, of the only apparently irrational given is available only from the perspective of commodity analysis. This perspective is further adequate for the solution of any and all contemporary problems.[20] In a word, the difficulty with which classical German thought is centrally concerned, and which reflects the real structure of the social context, cannot be resolved within philosophy; rather, it can be resolved only on the economic plane of historical materialism. For it is only when the proletarian class transcends German philosophy in the

awareness that it produces its own social reality that it will be able, through consciousness of this fact, to abolish commodity fetishism.

The novelty, depth and significance of Lukács's reading of Marx's position have often been celebrated in the secondary literature; they need not be mentioned again here. I have already stressed the continuity between his reading of classical German thought and classical Marxism. I should now like to mention briefly an important departure from classical Marxism as concerns Lukács's specific understanding of Marx's thought as historical materialism. Lukács here considered materialism as an inverted Platonism, which denies the idealist separation of thought from reality.[21] According to Lukács, thought and reality are interrelated in what parenthetically is a quasi-Spinozistic form of Marxism as aspects of a deeper, dialectical process. Although this quasi-Spinozistic form of Marxism is better known in the French discussion, particularly in Merleau-Ponty's writings, its origin is in Lukács's approach to Marx.[22]

The obvious result is to contradict two basic Marxist dogmas concerning the relation of thought and being. On the one hand, thought cannot be dependent on being, which is independent of it, as the reflection theory of knowledge holds, since in that case knowledge would be impossible; for in virtue of its independence from thought, there would be no conceptual link to being, which accordingly could not be known. On the other hand, being cannot determine thought, as the theory of ideology holds, since thought must also be able to determine being. The paper understanding is as an interaction, in which each determines the other. This is similar, it can be noted, to Fichte's interactionist view *(Wechselbeziehung)*. For it is only on this hypothesis that a conscious awareness of social conditions can be effective in bringing about social change.

There is little doubt that the kind of reading of Marx which Lukács here adumbrates is more interesting than most forms of Marxist orthodoxy. But it would be an error to overestimate the significance of Lukács's insight into Marx's thought for his own writings. For he never drew the consequences which follow from that insight. The limited differences

between Lukács and classical Marxism indicate more the acuteness of his intellect, which is obvious, but not an inclination, which was never present, to renounce basic orthodoxy. Unfortunately, in a profound sense Lukács's reading of Marx and philosophy in general remained Marxist. In *History and Class Consciousness*, the Marxist perspective is clearly evident in the explicit intent to show that: classical German philosophy is ideologically incapable of resolving its central problem, which is, however, solved by Marx on the plane of economic science.

In that book, Lukács's approach to Marx's position as a form of political economy, which is widespread in the secondary literature, is based on the view that commodity fetishism underlies reification. Although he continued to believe that Marx's view was the truth of idealism, in later writings Lukács softened the original sharp opposition between philosophy and economics. Obviously, it is well that he did so, since an opposition of this kind is not an accurate description of Marx's position. Perhaps it is this that Lukács had in mind when, in the new Preface to this work, he conceded that intellectual genesis and historical genesis do not coincide, even in Marx's view. The reason, of course, is clear, as a glance at Marx's thought will show. For even if in practice reification results from commodity exchange, in theory the concept of the commodity presupposes the labor theory of value, which in turn rests on the theory of alienation. To put the point simply, Marxian political economy is not separable, but conceptually inseparable, from Marxian philosophy.

Althusser notwithstanding, there is no break between the earlier philosophical and later economic aspects of Marx's thought. For were such a break to exist, then its cost would be to render Marxian political economy unintelligible by depriving it of its conceptual basis in Marxian philosophy. Beyond the significance for the interpretation of Marx's position, which cannot fairly be interpreted through one of its parts, this point is further significant for Lukács's reading of German idealism. For his approach to bourgeois philosophy as ideology in terms of a constitutive antinomy requires that its problem

be resolved on the extra-philosophic plane of science; but the interpretation of Marx's position indicates that its claim to that exalted status is not pure, but rooted in a philosophical anthropology.

There is, further, an irony to be noted in view of Lukács's obvious lack of sympathy concerning idealism. For his pretended demonstration of an antinomy in German thought consists mainly in the assertion of the widely criticized idealist doctrine – whose roots lie in Plato's thought – of the unlimited character of knowledge. This point is significant; it means that Marxism, at least on this reading, is as idealist as any form of idealism. In fact, it is more idealist than all forms of German idealism. For although German representatives of this tendency are routinely and frequently reproached for their exaggerated epistemological claims – which are also held to mark the divide between Kant and later thought – none of the so-called German idealists, including Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, ever held that knowledge is in principle limitless.

Moreover, Lukács's criticism of classical German philosophy in terms of the thing-in-itself invokes a questionable reading of this controversial concept. Here several points need to be distinguished. Lukács appears to conflate the cognizability of the given with the thing-in-itself. But this is a clear misunderstanding of Kant's position. For the thing-in-itself, which does not appear in experience, is hence not a given at all. It is further not cognizable since, according to Kant, cognition is limited to objects of experience. And by the same token it is not irrational, but arational, that is, beyond the sphere of the proper application of the categorial framework, which according to Kant is confined to the contents of experience only.

Lukács is further in error as concerns the centrality of the thing-in-itself in classical German thought. It is correct that this problem reappears in different ways in later German idealism. But it is not clear that this is the central problem of the period. Lukács offers no argument on this point, which is crucial to his interpretation, other than the bare assertion. Yet if this point is not demonstrated, then the proposed

reading of the thought of this period in terms of it as the central problem must fail.

Lukács further confuses Kant's doctrine of the limits of knowledge with Marx's concern to pierce the ideological veil of illusion through a theory of commodity analysis. He correctly notes that in all its forms the thing-in-itself refers to a limit. But it is a mistake to interpret what in Kant's terminology is mere appearance, and hence fully cognizable, with its putative source in the thing-in-itself, that does not itself appear, is uncognizable, and cannot be known. I believe that there is no contradiction on this point between Kant and Marx, as a closer look will show. It is perfectly compatible to assert with Kant that the thing-in-itself is uncognizable, since it does not appear, although not therefore irrational, and further to recognize the importance of Marx's efforts to penetrate beyond ideological appearance to social reality.

I am also doubtful about the accuracy of Lukács's description of classical German philosophy as a tendency towards system blocked by a recognition of the irrationality of the given. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between the concept of system and its intended use. The latter is, of course, meant to result in knowledge of the content of experience against the framework of a categorial structure. Although the aim of the framework is to provide for knowledge of being as given in experience, the extent to which system is elaborated, or whether it can be completed, or even whether that is the intent, is not related to the status of its possible content.

To avoid the charge of substituting one assertion for another, some illustration, which should not be confused with a sketch of the history of German idealism, even in outline, will be useful. In general terms, the entire post-Kantian phase of what Lukács, in Marxist language, refers to as classical German philosophy, is concerned with the restatement of the results of the critical philosophy in systematic form. Kant's view of system, which is evoked briefly in the chapter on the "Architectonic of Pure Reason", towards the end of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*, contains an important ambiguity. This ambiguity can be described in Kantian language, as a distinction between con-

stitutive or regulative views of system as a requirement for philosophy.

From this perspective, the post-Kantian reaction to the critical philosophy can be divided into two opposing camps. Each of these two camps claimed to continue the critical philosophy in an orthodox manner; but they disagreed about the correct interpretation of the concept of system and hence further disagreed about the proper manner in which to reformulate the critical philosophy. This point is easy to illustrate. Reinhold, who argued for a quasi-rationalist, foundationalist view of system, was opposed by Fichte, and later Hegel, both of whom argued for a quasi-rationalist, but antifoundationalist interpretation of the same concept. It is only if the concept of system is interpreted constitutively, not regulatively, that it becomes problematic. But it should be noted that the arguments for the latter interpretation made by Fichte, and later by Hegel, concern the problem of the presuppositionless status of theory, and in no sense depend on the alleged cognizability of a possible or actual given of experience.

This closes my brief discussion of Lukács's Marxist reading of the history of philosophy, with particular attention to classical German thought. It is obvious that there are many issues which could not be explored in such brief compass. I shall conclude with a comment about the usefulness of the Marxist reading of the history of philosophy. Lukács's own discussion is ambivalent on this point. For he suggests in *History and Class Consciousness* that he is only interested in the basis of thought in existence, although he in fact endeavors to reduce the former to the latter.

In my opinion, it is the second tendency which must be resisted. For to argue that thought is nothing but the expression of its social context is to miss the way in which ideas are determined by preceding ideas and to abandon the concept of truth. But the weaker claim, that is, that ideas are also influenced by social being, or the social context in which they emerge, is not to be neglected. It should further be stressed against the widespread, but rarely challenged, and indemonstrable assumption that thought appears in, but is unlimited by,

time. In this weaker sense, as recently developed by Buhr, a Marxist reading of the history of philosophy is useful, provided that the limits of its lack of attention to the manner in which thought is also determined by other thought is acknowledged. A full reading of the history of philosophy would need to perform both tasks, including the Marxist concern to relate thought to social being and the so-called bourgeois desire to grasp thought in respect to prior thought, in the context of a single analysis.

NOTES

1 See Francois H. Lapointe, *Georg Lukács and his Critics. An International Bibliography (1910-1982)* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983).

2 See esp. E. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965).

3 This *boutade* is reported by Richard Rorty. See his *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 211.

4 For a discussion of Marx's concept of ideology from this perspective, see my "Idéologie et herméneutique", in *Laval théologique et philosophique*, June 1984, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 161-173.

5 For a brilliant statement of this interpretation, see Heinrich Heine, *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland*, vol. 7, in *Werke und Briefe*, ed. Hans Kaufmann (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1961).

6 For a classic example, see Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Vintage Books, 1970).

7 See Manfred Buhr, *Vernunft, Mensch, Geschichte. Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der klassischen bürgerlichen Philosophie* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1977).

8 See Lee Congdon, *The Young Lukács* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).

9 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Les aventures de la dialectique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), chap. 2: "Le marxisme 'occidental'".

10 For a sympathetic development of Merleau-Ponty's point, see Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism* (New York: Seabury Press, 1979).

11 See Perry Anderson, *Sur le marxisme occidental*, trans. Dominique Letellier and Serge Niémetz (Paris: Maspero, 1977).

12 On the circularity of Lukács's reading of the relation of Marx and classical German philosophy, see my "La philosophie classique allemande et Marx selon Lukács", *Archives de philosophie*, vol. 41, no. 4 (1978), pp. 569-597; cf. "Lukács on Marx and Classical German Philosophy", in *Idealistic Studies*, Sept. 1980, pp. 209-231.

13 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. 84.

14 *Op. cit.*, p. 113.

15 *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

16 *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

17 See *op. cit.*, pp.113-114.

18 See *op. cit.*, p. 147; cf. p. 187.

19 For an indication of Lask's influence on Lukács, see his important article, "Emil Lask. Ein Nachruf", in *Kant-Studien* 22 (1918), pp. 349-370.

20 See Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 83.

21 See *op. cit.*, p. 202.

22 For a quasi-Spinozistic approach to Marx, obviously dependent on Lukács' suggestion in *History and Class Consciousness*, see especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Les aventures de la dialectique*, pp. 56-57: "Les deux rapports, l'un selon lequel la conscience est un produit de l'histoire, l'autre selon lequel l'histoire est un produit de la conscience, doivent être maintenus ensemble."

10 [illegible] Andrew Arato and Paul Piccone [illegible] Marxist Studies (New York: Seabury Press, 1979).

11 See Perry Anderson, [illegible], trans. Dominique Letellier and Serge Niemetz (Paris: Maspero, 1977).

12 On the circularity of Lukács's reading of the relation of Marx and classical German philosophy, see my [illegible] vol. 41, no. 4 (1978), pp. 569-587; cf. "Lukács, Marx and Classical German Philosophy," [illegible] Studies, Sept. 1980, pp. 209-231.

13 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. 84.

14 Op. cit., p. 110.

15 Op. cit., p. 117.

16 Op. cit., p. 150.

17 See op. cit., p. 114.

18 See op. cit., p. 147; cf. p. 162.

19 For an [illegible] Lask's influence on Lukács, see his important article, "Emil Lask, ein Nachruf," Kant-Studien 22 (1918), pp. 349-370.

20 See Lukács, [illegible]

21 See op. cit., p. 163.

22 For a quasi-Lukácsian approach to Marx, obviously dependent on [illegible], see especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty, [illegible] pp. [illegible]: "Les deux rapports: l'un selon lequel la conscience est un produit de l'histoire, l'autre selon lequel l'histoire est un produit de la conscience, doivent être [illegible]"

GEORGE L. KLINE

CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE WORLD-HISTORICAL FUTURE: SOME CRITICAL COMMENTS ON LUKÁCS'S "WILL TO THE FUTURE"

In 1923, when he published *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács had read and pondered every word of Marx's that had then seen the light of print. He was both adroit and resourceful in finding the most appropriate Marxian text to support the point he was making at any given moment. And he had a better understanding of the thought of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel than any other twentieth-century Marxist with whose work I am familiar.

At the same time, despite the impressive erudition and the marked theoretical power of *History and Class Consciousness* and other works of the 1920s, Lukács's theoretical position is beset by a number of tensions and contradictions.

I

First, there is what I would call the tension between the "Hegelian" and "scientistic" strands in Lukács's thought.[1] Lukács was one of the first theorists to attempt to waken Marxists from the "Hegel-amnesia" or forgetfulness of Hegel and the "dialectical principle", as Karl Korsch had called it.[2] This forgetfulness had been induced by Engels but continued, and deepened, in different ways by Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautsky, and the Lenin of 1909 (of whom more below).

The "Hegelian" strand is expressed in a series of concepts, among them:

(1) Consciousness *(Bewusstsein)*, self-consciousness *(Selbstbewusstsein)*, and a series of related concepts – which

take their origin from Kant and Fichte as much as from Hegel himself: activity, creativity, purposiveness, freedom. But Lukács's central concept of "objective, imputed class consciousness" *(objektives, zugerechnetes Klassenbewusstsein)*, which stems from *Lenin* rather than either Hegel or Marx, involves a deliberate neglect of the "merely empirical" consciousness (as Lukács scornfully calls it) of particular factory workers: their feelings, wishes, attitudes, and values. (Cf. HCC 493/325.) Lukács explicitly denies that the Communist Party should display an "unconditional willingness to implement the momentary desires of the masses", asserting that "it is sometimes forced to adopt a stance opposed to that of the masses" (HCC 498/328-29).

As a recent commentator aptly puts it: "Proletarian class consciousness in the *subjunctive mood* serves as a substitute for Hegel's notion of the cunning of reason. If the proletariat *were* fully aware of its role, it *would* become the subject of history".[3]

Sometimes Lukács appears to "out-Hegel Hegel" – he himself uses the expression *Ueberhegeln Hegels* in his self-critical 1967 preface to *History and Class Consciousness* (HCC 25/xxiii) – by treating proletarian class consciousness as a kind of supraindividual class *self*.[4] Thus he speaks of the "becoming conscious of proletarian class consciousness" *(Bewusstwerden des proletarischen Klassenbewusstseins)*, an expression which makes sense, though sense of a mythological kind, only when interpreted to mean the "becoming conscious of the (collective) proletarian class *self*". This in turn looks suspiciously like a hypostatization, even a reification *(Verdinglichung)* of proletarian class consciousness, something which Lukács, a sworn enemy of all "bourgeois" reification, would presumably be committed to avoiding at all costs.

I shall return briefly to this question in Section V, in connection with my scrutiny of Lukács's account of the "world-historical" role of the Communist Party and its leadership.

(2) Lukács's distinctive notion of the "identical subject-object" which is realizing itself in the historical process *(das im Geschichtsprozess sich realisierende identische Subjekt-*

Objekt) (HCC 24/xxii [from the 1967 Preface]) is, strictly speaking, more Fichtean than Hegelian: "self-creation" of and by the "proletarian class self" is identified with "world-transformation" where, of course, the "world" in question is social and historical rather than natural.[5]

As Lukács puts it in a key passage: "Only when the consciousness of the proletariat is in a position to point out the step to which the dialectic of [historical] development objectively compels it,. . .will the consciousness of the proletariat grow into a consciousness of the [historical] process itself, and only then will the proletariat appear as the identical subject-object of history whose praxis will change [historical] reality" (HCC 339/197; translation revised).[6]

This posited, or projected, subject-object identity is intended, in a broadly "Hegelian", or at least post-Kantian, way, to overcome the (non-dialectical) epistemological and ontological dualism which, in the Marxist tradition, springs mainly from the later writings of Engels, especially *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* (1888) and the *Anti-Dühring* (periodical publication 1877; first book publication 1878). Engels's position is in fact much closer to that of Locke than to that of either Hegel or the young Marx. It involves a primitive copy-theory of knowledge, an equally primitive materialist ontology, and a clumsy generalization of the dialectic from human history to the whole of nature. All three of these points were notoriously taken up and dogmatically defended by Lenin in *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (1909).

Difficult as it is for us in 1985 to imagine a time when Lenin's book had not yet become a household item, translated into all the world's tongues, from Armenian to Yakut, there *was* such a time and in fact it lasted for *eighteen* years: from 1909 until 1927. It the latter year the *first* translation into a foreign language appeared: the German version in Lenin's *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 13, published in Vienna.[7] Thus, as of 1923, when he published *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács remained in blissful ignorance of the painful fact that his political and ideological hero, the leader and thinker whom he viewed as infallible in both theory and practice, had accepted

and defended precisely those naive and undialectical positions in epistemology and ontology which Lukács himself impatiently (and quite justifiably, from his "Hegelian-Marxist" point of view) rejected when he encountered them in the works of Engels. However, the bliss was short lived. As soon as he read *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* in the 1927 German translation, Lukács made a 180° doctrinal shift in both epistemology and ontology. But that melancholy story must be reserved for another occasion.

(3) A related Hegelian term is "concrete totality" (*=konkrete Totalität*), where Lukács uses the much abused adjective "concrete" in Hegel's speculative sense, to mean "many-sided, fully-related, complexly mediated".[8] Even more explicitly and clearly than for Hegel himself, "totality" for Lukács – as Lucien Goldmann has emphasized – means a "*process* of *totalization*". The stress on process is Hegelian enough, but Lukács's use of this concept – with its powerful orientation toward the world-historical *future* – is wholly contrary to the spirit of Hegel's philosophy. (See Section IV below.)

In any case, Lukács leaves no doubt as to the centrality of the category of totality (or totalization) in his philosophy of history. He insists that historical reality *(Wirklichkeit)* "can only be understood [*erfasst*] and penetrated as a [concrete] totality, and only a subject which is itself [such a] totality [viz., the collective proletarian self] is capable of this penetration" (HCC 111/39).

(4) Although it was Hegel who introduced, or at least made philosophically current, the notion of historical transition *(Uebergang/Uebergehen)* and of "transitional periods" or "times of transition" *(Uebergangsperiode, Uebergangszeit[en])*, Hegel was always scrupulously careful to locate such transitions in the historical *past*. For example, the end of the Fifth Century B.C., according to Hegel, was a time of transition in Athens; Socrates was a transitional – and tragic – figure. In sharpest contrast, Lukács follows Marx in locating the historical transitions and periods of transition with which his works are

crowded between the historical *present* and the historical *future*.[9]

II

Yet, there is in this, Lukács's most "Hegelian" work, a countervailing "Engelsian" strand, both reductionist and "scientistic". As we have seen, traces of this have penetrated even into his most Hegelian terms and concepts. In at least three respects Lukács attaches himself unapologetically to the Marxist tradition which springs from Engels and runs through Dietzgen and Plekhanov to (relatively early) Lenin.

(1) Although Lukács makes it abundantly clear that he is aware of the sharp doctrinal differences which separate Marx from Engels on such questions as the universalization of the dialectic and the cognitive grasp of the *Ding an sich* through technology and industry, he nevertheless speaks repeatedly of the position of "Marx *and* Engels". He thus takes a long step on that fateful path which, in the late 1920s, became a King's Highway (or rather, a Commissar's Freeway), institutionalizing the fusion of Marx and Engels into a single hyphenated authority.

(2) In a related terminological move, Lukács frequently refers to Marx's own philosophical position as "dialectical materialism" and more than once implies that Marx himself used this expression to characterize his own position.[10] Of course, Marx did no such thing; the expression "dialectical materialism" *(=der dialektische Materialismus)* was first used by Joseph Dietzgen four years after Marx's death.[11] This is more than a matter of careless terminology; anyone who calls Marx's position "dialectical materialism" is tacitly equating it with that of Engels. This in turn amounts to tacitly attributing to Marx the three-pronged Engelsian doctrine: the copy theory of knowledge, a materialist ontology, and the universalized dialectic ("of nature", as Engels would have it). Yet it is a matter of

record that neither Marx nor the Lukács of 1923 accepted *any* of these three positions.

Lukács's unfortunate usage cannot, as of 1923, be blamed on the bad example of Lenin. As we have just seen (Section I), Lukács was, during the entire period in which *History and Class Consciousness* was being written, in the enviable position of not yet having read *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, the work in which Lenin stated flatly, and quite falsely, that both Marx and Engels "scores of times" referred to their (allegedly common) philosophical position as "dialectical materialism".[12] In fact, neither Marx nor Engels *ever* used that expression, although it was indeed Engels who laid the doctrinal foundation for what Dietzgen, Plekhanov, Lenin, and later Soviet Marxist-Leninists came standardly to refer to as "dialectical materialism".

(3) Somewhat less serious, but still terminologically and conceptually misleading, is Lukács's repeated use of the expression "historical materialism" to characterize Marx's own "unadulterated" and "unfalsified" method of historical investigation and explanation (cf. e.g., HCC 103/33). In fact, Marx himself did not use this expression either; it was introduced by Engels nine years after Marx's death.[13] To be sure, Marx did use the expression *"die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung"* ("the materialist conception of history"), and Engels considered this a synonym for "historical materialism". Perhaps, in a sense, it is; but such "materialism" does not – as Engels claimed – have anything to do with a materialist ontology (="philosophical materialism"). In the expression *"die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung"* the term *"materialistisch"* means simply "economic", not "physical" or "spatiotemporal". Such "materialism" has nothing whatever to do with "matter in motion" or "atoms in the void".[14]

It must be said that Lukács is dismayingly lax when it comes to distinguishing the various distinct senses of the term *materiell* as used by Marx. Elsewhere I have distinguished seven of them.[15] The details are not appropriate in the present discussion, but I wish to stress that, *pace* Marx, Engels, Lenin,

and most Marxists, emphatically including Lukács, there is nothing peculiarly "material" in the sense relevant to a materialist ontology about the forces and relations of economic production.

III

Although the terminology and rhetoric of heresy-hunting is not unique to Engels — there is a fair amount of it in Marx and an overabundance in Lenin — it belongs, in my judgment, on the anti-Hegelian side of the tension which I have been attempting to adumbrate. Following the Lenin of the political pamphlets, Lukács makes copious use of such terms as "revisionist", "opportunist", and "renegade" in strongly pejorative senses.[16]

But all independent philosophical thought involves "revision" in the double sense of *critical scrutiny* and *doctrinal modification* of received theoretical positions. Engels and Lenin were revisionists of Marx; indeed their revisionism merged into eclecticism and even syncretism. That is, they attempted to combine incompatible elements: on the one hand, a materialist ontology and copy theory of knowledge; on the other, Marx's Fichtean stress on activity and self-creativity and his Hegelian stress on the central role of consciousness and self-consciousness in social praxis.

It seems tolerably clear that what Lukács really objects to is not revisionism as such but "revisionism from below".[17] He has no objection to "revisionism from above", that, namely, which is initiated by what he likes to call the "classics [i.e., classical authors] of Marxism-Leninism". With respect to political rather than philosophical revisionism, Lukács made this point crisply and without qualification in 1963:

> Khrushchev's 1956 speech breaks with Lenin's thesis, now overtaken [and made obsolete] [=*überholten*] by history, that world war is inevitable, as sharply as Lenin in his time had broken with Marx's thesis that proletarian revolutions can start only in developed countries and can succeed only on an international scale.[18]

In other words, Khrushchev was justified in "revising" Lenin's doctrine of the inevitability of world war, just as Lenin was justified in revising Marx's doctrine of worldwide proletarian revolution and substituting the doctrine of "socialism in one country". The alert reader will have noticed that in this essay, published at the high point of Khrushchev's power, Lukács is an orthodox Khrushchevian in two respects: first, in endorsing Khrushchev's "revision" of Lenin's doctrine concerning the inevitability of world war and, second, in following Khrushchev's lead in falsely attributing to Lenin the doctrine of "socialism in one country". That was a Stalinist doctrine, as both Khrushchev and Lukács well knew, and it was forged in the face of bitter resistance from such good Leninists as Leon Trotsky. Indeed, in his pre-Stalinist period, Lukács made it clear that Lenin was an orthodox, not a revisionist, Marxist on this point, holding that the "revolution can only be victorious *on a world scale*" and "it is only as a *world proletariat* that the working class can truly become a class".[19]

IV

But what is most un-Hegelian, theoretically problematic, and politically dangerous about Lukács's position – although it is entirely in the spirit of Marx – is his powerful orientation toward the world-historical *future*, his "will to the future". This is a complete reversal of Hegel's position. The task of the speculative philosopher of history, according to Hegel, is to discern and exhibit the rational, "dialectical" pattern of *past* historical develoment, that development which has brought world history to this *present* (the "rose in the cross" of the present), and *not* to predict, or to advocate, how the historical *future* will or should develop.[20] Lukács joins Marx in heaping scorn on Hegel's *post festum* ("after-the-party-is-over") historical consciousness.[21] And in two specific respects he joins Marx in "standing Hegel on his head":

(1) As I have already indicated (Section I above), Lukács shares Hegel's fascination with transitions and times of transition, but reverses Hegel's treatment, shifting such transitions from the historical *past* to the historical *future*.

(2) Like Marx, but rather more explicitly, Lukács treats the future as actual, knowable, determinate, and structured. In a word, he follows Marx in committing what I have elsewhere called "the fallacy of the actual future".[22] Like Marx, he holds that his projected historical future is in some queer sense "already there" – that, in effect, *future* communities, cultures, practices, and, especially, persons are (in the tenseless sense of "are") just as actual *(wirklich)*, determinate, and valuable as *present* communities, cultures, practices, and, especially, persons. Indeed, in an important sense, those future entities are (again, tenseless 'are') significantly *more* valuable than their present counterparts in the alienated, reified, commodity-ridden historical present, because they will have been perfected and purged of the failings, distortions, and weaknesses which plague everything in this historical present.

Moreover Lukács goes on – again quite in the spirit of Marx – to commit, in effect, the related "fallacy of deferred, or historically displaced, value". That is, he defers all positive social, political, personal value to an "actual future" – hundreds or even thousands of years hence – and correspondingly devalues and instrumentalizes *present* communities, cultures, practices, and – especially – persons. This position has two unacceptable corollaries: (1) the claim – which Lukács has made publicly – that "the worst socialist state is better than the best capitalist state"; and (2) that present *actual* living individuals may justifiably be instrumentalized, sacrificed for the sake of future, merely *possible*, individuals.

Echoing Marx, Lukács expresses hatred and contempt for the historical present (HCC 8/xi), a present mutilated and dehumanized by the system of capitalist production and exchange. Echoing Nietzsche, who preached the "overcoming of [present] mankind", Lukács preaches the "overcoming of the [historical]

present" *(das Ueberwinden der Gegenwart)* (HCC 481/316). With respect to the specific question of freedom and its attainment, he declares bluntly:

> In order to achieve the social preconditions necessary for real freedom battles must be fought in the course of which present-day society will disappear [or 'go under'=*untergehen*], *together with the race of men it has produced.* '*The present generation*', says Marx, 'resembles the Jews whom Moses led through the wilderness. It must not only conquer a new world, *it must also perish* in order to make room for people who will be equal to a new world *(einer neuen Welt gewachsen sind)*. For the 'freedom' of the men who are alive now *(die 'Freiheit' des gegenwärtig lebenden Menschen)* is the freedom of the individual isolated by the fact of property which both reifies and is itself reified *(den verdinglichten und verdinglichenden Besitz)*. . . .To wish to breathe life into this [present, abstract, mutilated] freedom means in practice the renunciation of real [i.e., future, socialist] freedom. (HCC 479-480/315; italics added.)

Much of what Lukács has to say about the *actually* and *knowability* of the future is contained in a 1926 article in which August von Cieszkowski and Moses Hess are set in opposition to Hegel and in (partial) parallel to Fichte. Since much of the article is expository, it is not always easy to discern precisely what Lukács's own position on a given question is. However, I take him to be making *all* of the following claims:

The historical future is "there" as an "object of dialectical thought", which can be "grasped concretely". As "knowable", the future is the "concrete intentional object of the philosophy of history". The future is "an epoch which is just as concrete [i.e., determinate and actual] as the epochs of the past".[23] But is seems unlikely that Lukács would claim that we can, in the present, discern or construct the "narrative of the future".[24] At least, such a claim would fall of its own weight.

For Lukács, "objectivity must. . .be comprehensible as a constant factor mediating between past and future"; and the "series of mediations" must be a "movement of mediations advancing from the present to the future" (HCC 282/159; 311/179). In his book on Lenin he singled out for praise Lenin's "relationship to the present whole and to the question of development central for the *future* – to *the future in its practical*

and tangible totality [in ihrer praktisch-ergreifbaren Ganzheit]".[25]

"Becoming [*das Werden*]", Lukács insists, "is. . .the mediation between past and future. But it is the mediation between the concrete, i.e., historical past and the *equally concrete*, i.e., *historical future*" (HCC 348/203; italics added). This bizarre claim appears to be a consequence of Lukács's attachment to the notion of "concrete totality": if world history is to be grasped as a totality, *all* of it must be included — not just the past and present, but, especially, the *future*, in which the transition to socialism and communism will have been completed.

> Man must be able [Lukács continues] to comprehend the present as a becoming. He can do this by seeing in it the tendencies out of whose dialectial opposition he can *make* the future. Only when he does this will the present be a process of becoming that belongs to *him*. Only he who is willing and whose mission it is to create the future can see the present in its concrete truth *(Nur wer die Zukunft herbeizuführen berufen und gewillt ist, kann die konkrete Wahrheit der Gegenwart sehen)*. (HCC 348/204.)

The joint stress which Lukács places upon transition, totality, totalization, and the world-historical future, together with his contempt and hatred for the historical present, opens the Marxist door to the theory and practice of what I have elsewhere called "transitional totalitarianism". It is no accident that Lukács in 1923 defended Trotsky's defense of Bolshevik terror against the probing and, to my mind, convincing objections of both Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg. And by the 1930s and 1940s Lukács was extending his full intellectual and (so far as one can judge by the available evidence) emotional embrace to the "transitional terrors" of high Stalinism.

V

For Lukács the "creation of the world-historical future" is not a spontaneous or undirected process; it is closely and powerfully guided by the leadership of the Communist Party.

It is noteworthy that, in his detailed discussions of both the Russian and Hungarian Parties, and in particular of Lenin, Lukács the ironist, the acerbic critic of the bourgeois present, reveals not the least trace of irony, not the least hint of criticism. One might detect a kind of "meta-irony" in the fact that in his pre-Marxist days Lukács had written knowledgeably and sensitively about those two master ironists, Søren Kierkegaard and Thomas Mann.

For Lukács, Lenin is quite literally "the *Weltgeist* in a sealed train", to borrow the apt phrase of Arato and Breines.[26] As we have already seen (Section I and n. 4), he characterizes the Communist Party as a "conscious collective will" (HCC 480/315). The essence of that Party is defined in grandiose terms as the "concrete principal of mediation between man and history" (HCC 488/321; cf. also 484/318). It inspires and directs the proletariat (sometimes, as we have seen, opposing the masses' "wishes of the moment") in carrying out the latter's "world-historical mission" *(weltgeschichtliche Sendung)*, (HCC 493/325). Echoing the interpretation, suggested above, that proletarian class consciousness is a kind of collective class *self*, Lukács insists that Party members must "enter with their whole personalities into a living relationship with the whole of the life of the party" *(mit ihrer Gesamtpersönlichkeit in eine lebendige Beziehung zu der Totalität des Parteilebens)*, (HCC 508/336).

It is in his treatment of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin, its "world-historical leader", that Lukács lapses most obviously and painfully into the "conceptual mythology" *(Begriffsmythologie)* of which, in another connection, he had accused Hegel.

NOTES

1 I do not disagree with Kilminster's claim that, for Lukács, in the period before World War I, "scientism and irrationalism formed the twin horns of an intellectual dilemma, the solution to which he sought in a new totalizing perspective with the aid of the philosophy of Hegel" (Richard Kilminster, *Praxis and Method: A Sociological Dialogue with Lukács*,

Gramsci and the Early Frankfurt School [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979], p. 29). But I see the Marxist Lukács of the interwar period as wavering between this "totalizing [Hegelian] perspective" and a position which, on key points, is strikingly close to scientism.

2 Korsch's terms are *Vergessen* and *Vergessenheit*. See Karl Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie* [periodical publication 1923; book publication 1924] (Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1930[2]), pp. 54-55. Cf. Lukács's own comments in the course of his severe 1967 critique of *History and Class Consciousness:* "[T]he revival of Hegel's dialectics struck a hard blow at the revisionist tradition. Already [Eduard] Bernstein had wished to eliminate everything reminiscent of Hegel's dialectics in the name of 'science' [*Wissenschaftlichkeit*]. And nothing was further from the mind of his philosophical opponents, and above all Kautsky, than the wish to undertake the defense of this [Hegelian] tradition" (HCC 21/xxi). In this and subsequent references in the body of this paper 'HCC' will stand for *History and Class Consciousness* and the first page number will refer to the German edition (*Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* [Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1970]) and the second page number, following a diagonal, to the English translation by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971).

3 Laurent Stern, "On the Frankfurt School", *History of European Ideas*, vol. 4 (1983), 87f; italics added. In this connection Stern goes on to quote Connerton, who had written that, for the present and the (indefinitely extensible) future, "the party undertakes the administration of [the proletariat's] class consciousness, [thus] guaranteeing that identity of the subject of history with itself which does not yet empirically exist" (Paul Connerton, *The Tragedy of Enlightenment* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980], p. 118).

4 Lukács appears to extend this hypostatization to the Communist Party, defined as "a conscious collective will" *(ein bewusster Gesamtwille)* (HCC 480/315) when he refers to individual Party members as the "members of a collective will" *(Glieder eines Gesamtwillens)* (HCC 511/337). The use of *Glied*, rather than the more usual *Mitglied*, for 'member [of an organization]', strongly suggests that the relation of Party member to Party is like that of organ to organism or perhaps of (microcosmic) self to (macrocosmic) Self!

5 Lukács follows Marx uncritically in treating the Hegelian idea as a "disembodied spirit-subject" standing over against the (social and historical) world. In fact, as another commentator has emphasized: "The very core of Hegel's mediations, the pith and marrow of his whole philosophy, is that it is embodied in and articulates the self-changing [social] world in its historical development" (Kilminster, *op. cit.*, p. 57). The same author pointedly adds that Hegel rarely speaks of "subject-object", but often of subjectivity and objectivity, and characteristically of the reconciling of substance and subject (*ibid.*, pp. 61-62). Hegel

"certainly never. . .tried to search for the identical subject-object in history. It was not an issue for him" (*ibid.*, p. 64).

6 Livingstone's version of this passage is uncharacteristically inaccurate: he appears to have mistaken the verb *erwächst* ('grows' or 'develops') for *erweckt* ('wakens'), and thus renders the expression *erwächst das Bewusstsein des Proletariats zum Bewusstsein des Prozesses selbst* as 'will the consciousness of the proletariat *awaken* to a consciousness of the process' (italics added).

7 The editors of this edition express their intense regret that this important work has hitherto remained unknown outside Russia, together with their satisfaction that its appearance in German will now make it available for the first time to West European readers. Here is the opening paragraph of the *Vorwort zur deutschen Ausgabe:* "Das vorliegende Buch W. I. Lenins bildet einen ausserordentlich wertvollen Beitrag zur Geschichte der philosophischen Begründung des russischen Marxismus und Leninismus. Es ist aufs lebhafteste zu bedauern, dass diese Arbeit Lenins ausserhalb Russlands bisher unbekannt geblieben ist. Allein besser spät als nie. Lenins 'Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus' erscheint nun in deutscher Sprache und wird dadurch auch den westeuropäischen Lesern zugänglich gemacht" (Lenin, *Sämtliche Werke* [Vienna: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1927], Bd. 13, p. ix).

8 However, even here Lukács is inconsistent, repeatedly using 'concrete' in the quite un-Hegelian "ordinary" sense of 'particular' or 'down-to-earth' in such expressions as 'concrete situation' and 'concrete analysis'. In a number of passages both the Hegelian and the un-Hegelian senses appear, confusingly, in a single passage. 'Concrete' in the "ordinary" non-Hegelian sense appears, e.g., at HCC 55/xlvi, 189/97, 194/100, 200/104, 225/121, 231/125, 245/134, 264/146, 269/150, 305/175, 309/178, 310/179, 331/192. This careless usage continues in Lukács's book on Lenin. Cf. *Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought* [1924] (trans. by Nicholas Jacobs), (London: N[ew]L[eft]B[ooks], 1970), e.g., pp. 79, 83, 84, 85, 88.

9 References to transitions or periods of transition occur at HCC 9/xi, 33/xxix, 61/3, 381/240, 389/246, 390/246, 393/249, 399/253, 427/276, 467/306, 475/312, 476/313, 509/336. During our conversations in Budapest (in 1960, 1964, and 1967) I was struck by the number of times that Lukács referred to the 1960s as an *Uebergangszeit* or *Uebergangsperiode*.

10 By 1933 Lukács was referring flatly and unequivocally to *der dialektische Materialismus* as *die Lehre von Marx* ("Mein Weg zu Marx" in *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik: Werkauswahl*, Bd. 2, selected and introduced by Peter Ludz [Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1967], p. 328).

11 Cf. Joseph Dietzgen, "Streifzüge eines Sozialisten in das Gebiet der Erkenntnistheorie" in *Schriften in drei Bänden* (East Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1965), Bd. 3, pp. 61, 75, 79. The expression *dialektischer Materialismus* occurs on each of these pages; the expression *dialektischer Materialist* occurs on p. 62. This work, written in Chicago in 1886, was first published in Zürich in 1887. In a much better known work, Plekhanov, four years later, used the expression *dialektischer Materialismus* (cf. his "Zu Hegels sechzigstem Todestag", *Die neue Zeit*, 1891; English translation in G. V. Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works in Five Volumes* [Moscow, 1961], vol. 1, pp. 478, 741). However, Engels had come fairly close to using the expression a decade before Dietzgen, characterizing what he called *der moderne Materialismus* as *wesentlich dialektisch* (cf. *Anti-Dühring* [periodical publ., 1877; book publication 1878] in *Marx-Engels Werke* [hereafter 'MEW'], [East Berlin, 1957-68], vol. 20, p. 24). It seems likely, though the evidence is only circumstantial, that Dietzgen's 1887 use of the expression *dialektischer Materialismus* was inspired by Engels's 1877 characterization of modern materialism as *wesentlich dialektisch;* and that Plekhanov in 1891 was (perhaps unconsciously) echoing the usage which he had found in Dietzgen (certainly *not* in either Marx or Engels) in 1887).

12 *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* [1909] (New York: International Publishers, 1927), p. 9.

13 See the Preface to the English translation (1892) of Engels's *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* (Chicago, 1903, p. ix); German text in MEW, vol. 22, p. 292. In private correspondence Engels had used the expression *historischer Materialismus* at least as early as 1890; but that was still seven years after Marx's death. For his 1859 use of the expression *die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung* see MEW, vol. 13, p. 469.

14 For details see my essay, "The Myth of Marx's Materialism", *Annals of Scholarship*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1984), pp. 1-38, esp. pp. 1-11.

15 See *ibid.*, esp. pp. 3-4.

16 In this connection Lukács in 1945 even had recourse to the ugly Stalinist term 'liquidation', urging upon the Hungarian Communist Party the "liquidation of sectarianism [within the Party]" ("Pártköltészet" [Party poetry], German trans. in *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik*, p. 397).

17 See my article, "Leszek Kolakowski and the Revision of Marxism" in *European Philosophy Today*, ed. G. L. Kline (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1965), esp. pp. 113-122.

18 G. Lukács, "Zur Debatte zwischen China und der Sowjetunion. Theoretisch-philosophische Bemerkungen" (periodical publication, 1963), reprinted in *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik*, p. 683.

19 Lukács, *Lenin*, p. 86; italics added. In fairness to Lukács we should note that in his 1963 article he attributed *two* distinct "revisions from above" to Lenin and that only *one* of them ("socialism in one country") was Stalin's. The other revisionist thesis — that *proletarian* revolutions can after all take place in *underdeveloped* countries like Russia in 1917 — was indeed Lenin's own.

20 G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Preface. In this connection it should be noted that Livingstone's readable and tolerably accurate translation of *History and Class Consciousness* is marred by a striking error in the rendering of a celebrated passage from this same Preface (the "Owl of Minerva" passage), which Lukács quotes (HCC 138/59). Lukács obviously assumed that his readers would recognize the passage without a citation of chapter and verse. Equally obviously, Livingstone failed to recognize it; if he had, he would surely have used the perfectly adequate Knox translation. Instead, when Hegel describes the speculative philosopher of history as painting his *Grau in Grau*, Livingstone renders the expression quite arbitrarily and quite wrongly as 'gloomy picture'. In fact, as Hegel scholars well know, the first "gray" is the "gray-hairedness", i.e., the *old age*, of a culture or *Gestalt des Lebens* which has passed its historical prime; the second "gray" is the gray of *theory* — an allusion to Goethe's celebrated line: "Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie".

21 In 1926 Lukács branded as "reactionary" Hegel's "Stehenbleiben. . .bei der Gegenwart als Sich-Selbst-Erreichthaben des Geistes" (*Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik*, p. 245; italics added).

22 Cf. my articles: "Was Marx an Ethical Humanist?" *Studies in Soviet Thought*, vol. 9 (1969), pp. 91-103, and "Was Marx von Hegel hätte lernen können. . .und sollen" in *Stuttgarter Hegeltage 1970* (Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 11), ed. H.-G. Gadamer (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), pp. 497-502.

23 "Moses Hess und die Probleme der idealistischen Dialektik" (periodical publication 1926), reprinted in *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik*, pp. 243, 244. English translation of this essay by Michael McColgan is *Tactics and Ethics: Political Essays 1919-1929*, ed. and intro. by Rodney Livingstone (London: N[ew]L[eft]B[ooks], 1972; New York: Harper, Torchbooks, 1975), pp. 181-223.

24 Cf. János Kelemen, "Philosophy of Science and its Critique in Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*" (typescript, 1985), p. 16. The same author adds: "Historical knowledge is knowledge *post festum* and. . .no fact will attain its final form until the end of history, i.e., until the totality of history becomes actual. . . .The present is therefore always in need of the future dimension in order to provide the suitable context of knowing historical facts. . . .[T]his means that the totality in which we incorporate the partial phenomena of history is always virtual [i.e., potential],

not actual" (*ibid.*, pp. 17-18). The last point is a sensible revision of Lukács's position, but I doubt that Lukács himself would have accepted it.

25 Lukács, *Lenin*, p. 85; italics added.

26 Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism* (New York, 1979), p. 196. This is, of course, an allusion to Hegel's notorious postcard which referred to Napoleon entering Jena in triumph in 1806 as the "*Weltgeist* on horseback". I suspect that there was at least a tinge of irony in Hegel's remark. In any case, it appeared in no work published by Hegel himself, but only in that one overinterpreted postcard.

obviously assumed that his readers would recognize the passage without a citation of chapter and verse. Equally obviously, Livingstone failed to recognize it; if he had, he would surely have used the perfectly adequate Knox translation. Instead, when Hegel describes the speculative philosopher of history as painting his gray in gray, Livingstone renders the expression quite arbitrarily and quite wrongly as 'gloomy picture'. In fact, as Hegel scholars well know, the first "gray" in the "gray-in-grayness", i.e., the old age, of a culture or Gestalt des Lebens which has passed its historical prime; the second "gray" is the gray of theory - an allusion to Goethe's celebrated line: "Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie".

31 In 1926 Lukács branded as "reactionary" Hegel's "Stufenbildner ... bei der Gegenwart als sich-selbst-Erziehenden des Geistes" (Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik, p. 247; italics added).

32 Cf. my articles: "Was Marx an Ethical Humanist?" Studies in Soviet Thought, vol. 9 (1969), pp. 91-103, and "Was Marx vom Hegel hätte lernen können ... und sollen" in Stuttgarter Hegeltage 1970 (Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 11), ed. H.-G. Gadamer (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), pp. 497-502.

33 "Moses Hess und die Probleme der idealistischen Dialektik" (periodical publication 1926), reprinted in Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik, pp. 243, 244. English translation of this essay by Michael McColgan in Tactics and Ethics: Political Essays 1919-1929, ed. and intro. by Rodney Livingstone (London: New Left Books, 1972; New York: Harper, Torchbooks, 1975), pp. 181-223.

34 Cf. János Kelemen, "Philosophy of Science and its Critique in Lukács's History and Class Consciousness" (typescript, 1983), p. 16. The same author adds: "Historical knowledge is knowledge post festum and... no fact will attain its final form until the end of history, i.e., until the totality of history becomes actual. ... The present is therefore always in need of the future dimension in order to provide the suitable context of knowing historical facts.... [T]his means that the totality in which he incorporates the partial phenomena of history is always virtual (i.e., potential).

MIKLÓS ALMÁSI

GYÖRGY LUKÁCS AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN CULTURE

The crisis of European culture manifested itself in different ways between the turn of the century and the Second World War. György Lukács was a major philosophical witness and intellectual analyst of the pseudo-stability of the 1900s, of the war and the period of revolutions, and later of the turbulent 1930s. In this paper, I would like to consider these three periods of world history and Lukács's diagnoses of them. More specifically, I intend to address the following questions: 1) How is the latent crisis of the pre-First World War period formulated in Lukács's principal early work *The Theory of the Novel*? 2) How did the historical and philosophical thoughts, systematized in *History and Class Consciousness*, become a summary of the post-1918 period and of the leftist movements? and, finally, 3) How did the effect of the anti-fascist popular front movements affect Lukács's later conception of democracy?

The three periods selected cannot be precisely delineated in history, but in Lukács's life and oeuvre they are clearly distinct. Moreover, the politico-philosophical answers Lukács provided to the questions raised by them have become absorbed in European intellectual life – chiefly in German and East European thinking – and the critical assessment of these ideas has continued virtually to this day.

UTOPIAN CRISIS PROGNOSIS

In 1971 in the last longer taped conversation for his autobiography – recorded by István Eörsi and Erzsébet Vezér –

Lukács said of *The Theory of the Novel* (the first work of his youth to achieve world success): "*The Theory of the Novel* calls this entire era – to quote Fichte – 'an era of perfect sinfulness'. My book about the novel.... is methodologically a book in the line of *Geistesgeschichte*, but I think it is the only work on intellectual history that is not rightist. Morally I regard this entire era as one to be rejected and I think art is good inasmuch as it opposed its development. Therein lies the significance of Russian realism for my own development: Tolstoy and Dostoevski taught us how an entire regime can be condemned in literature. What they say is not that capitalism has certain faults; Tolstoy and Dostoevski say that the entire system is completely inhuman". This is a summing up of the pre-war mood and the entire climate engendered by the war. (Lukács wrote the text of the book in 1914-15 and it first appeared in 1916 in *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*. It was finally published as a separate volume in 1920 in Berlin.) The complete rejection of bourgeois society was Lukács's goal and it is this which gives the book its fundamental tone.

But why did Lukács think in 1914 that all bourgeois society was to be rejected when he himself was the son of a prosperous banker and a *privat-docent* at Heidelberg? In the same interview he answered this question in the following terms: "Fichte's 'era of perfect sinfulness' means that from the pseudo-consolidation in which people bathed until 1914, Europe plunged into the depths in which it is now. Consequently the era of perfect sinfulness was a perfect definition, except that it lacked what Lenin said about this, namely that all society had to be radically transformed. This was also missing from *The Theory of the Novel*".[1]

The point of departure is, then, the pseudo-consolidation of European societies, below the surface of which tensions had already built up almost in readiness for their later explosion. Lukács sensed the contradiction between the surface calm and the volcanic abyss – the essence of the system – and considered this contradiction, the false appearances it covered, to be the basic life of the system. The lie was then exposed in the

summer of 1914, when halcyon days turned into a holocaust almost overnight...

In this period Lukács sensed the European crisis chiefly in its intellectual aspects: he was troubled about the "inadequate" character of culture. After all – as his above quoted sentences reveal – he considered the genuine intellectual elite of the period to be only those thinkers who would have rejected the entire bourgeois world. Lukács treated liberal literature and conservative intellectual history with reservations – and at one time he listed Georg Simmel (who had been his teacher) and Max Weber (to whose circle he had belonged) under this heading – because none of them had noticed the catch in pseudo-consolidation. (At the same time Lukács had the highest esteem for the intellectual standards of these two men and he himself used their categories.) This was a strange kind of protest and conflict: Lukács wanted a radical abnegation of the system, but the act of negation could not go beyond a utopian statement at that time. True, he did have a vague notion of the disaster near at hand but his prognostication of it was in a utopian guise which was akin to his sympathy for Dostoevski. (It was in this period that he outlined plans for a monograph on Dostoevski; the notes for this were found in Lukács's papers after his death.) This partly religious, partly ethical, historico-philosophic doomsday apocalypse obviously left him dissatisfied. He was confident only in his diagnosis of an intellectual crisis, in the prognosis of crisis.

At the same time many important elements of Lukács's philosophy and aesthetics took shape in these years, as has been pointed out by the analysts of this period of his.[2] It was in this period that totality and the inner world of works of art – the well-known categories of his later Aesthetics – first arose.

But this utopian approach also proved fruitful for the cultural history of the novel and for the description of its artistic essence. Lukács characterized the hero of the novel, modern man, with the concept of "transcendental homelessness", with restlessness, lack of internal essence, and the human con-

sequences of this incompleteness which he was later to denote by the concept of "alienation".

Later on "homelessness" became a similarly accepted term following research done by Lucien Goldmann – so much so that some people, Goldmann included, thought that the concept suggested Lukács's kinship with existentialism. This was a wrong statement of the relationship, for Lukács disagreed with existentialism right up to the end of his life, although he tried to integrate some of its key concepts into his Marxist philosophy, for example, his *Ontology*. Whatever the case, "homelessness" became one with the crisis idea of the novel of development and of adventure respectively, the *Bildungsroman* and the romantic novel, because with Lukács the protagonist became homeless as a result of the "general world situation" (Hegel). He broke away from the homely atmosphere of communal societies, and found himself in the impersonal communications jungle typical of big cities and there lost his sense of security. The plot of the novel is man's search for himself, a search nourished by nostalgia for this lost sense of security. At the same time the *form* of the novel – because of its hold-all structure – was able to become a satisfactory genre for constant crisis. In this way, for Lukács, the European intellectual crisis went beyond the historical definition of the period; he regarded bourgeois existence as a process of ever-renewing crises. The novel is the artistic *Lebensraum* for this ambivalent, insecure world system.

In this period Lukács senses latent crisis but the response he offers is primarily ethical: he approaches both the historical era and its artistic presentation from the standpoint of ethics, or, more precisely from Kant's radicalism of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In this way he derives both the philosophy of history and of aesthetics from ethics, formulating both of them as part of a moral picture of the world. The common platform is the Great Rejection.

The basic approach in his theory of the novel is the search for utopia. In 1962, in the preface written when the book was re-edited, he said about this: *"The Theory of the Novel* is a work not of preservation but of condemnation – on

the basis of the most naive and most unfounded utopianism, of course. It was written in the hope that from the collapse of capitalism a natural life worthy of man could spring... All this shows that this was not a matter of a new literary form but the expectation of a 'new world'".[3] For Lukács the novel is the product of a crisis and the quest for solving the crisis. This is how his book was to become a work parallel to Ernst Bloch's *Der Geist der Utopie* (1918). The difference between Lukács's and the other crisis theories of the period lies in the former's orientation toward abstract future. This is why I think that the writings of the young Lukács (e.g. his article entitled "The Metaphysics of Tragedy") and the inspiring effect of "great moments" in his *The Theory of the Novel* reveal some kind of relationship with Heidegger's philosophy, with the distinction between "authentic and non-authentic man" and chiefly with the tragic image of the world.[4] Indeed, the existence of some kind of distant relationship is easy to show. It is a fact that the first works by Husserl had a formative effect on the young Lukács, just as they had on Heidegger, and we also know that Marcuse was originally a student of Heidegger's and became a Marxist after reading *History and Class Consciousness*. It can also be supposed that the distinction between authentic and non-authentic man was almost in the air. It is also a fact, however, that Lukács was, right from the outset, opposed to a negative and tragic philosophy of crisis and his conceptual apparatus also points in a different direction.

ALIENATION AND REDEMPTION

The era of the revolutions which occurred at the end of the First World War was the second great period of Lukács's life and at the same time was the second great period in the crisis of European culture. With it, Lukács's political and ideological outlook changed. This was when his Marxist period began. He left Heidelberg, along with the impedimenta of his entire past, including his wife Yelena Grabenko. His manuscripts, correspondence, and his unfinished *Aesthetics* were

all put into a case before he travelled to Budapest. Lukács's departure from Heidelberg marked such a decisive end to his youth that he later forgot about this case, which was found in the safe of a German bank just before his death. Again in Budapest, Lukács sympathized with the bourgeois revolution of 1918 and joined the Communist Party. Lukács entered the party without being a Marxist, although he was already familiar with the works of Marx. During the 1919 revolution, which established the Republic of Councils, he occupied important posts, becoming People's Commissar for Culture and the Political Commissar of the Fifth Army. After the defeat of the Commune he emigrated to Vienna. This period was, however, not only the "age of consequences", as he called it, but it also prompted him to think over the problems of society, crisis and the possibility of revolution more comprehensively. His concern was, what made the emergence of socialism inevitable in European culture. The answer is given in his famous work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923).

The most enduring discovery of this book was the reconstruction – or partial reconstruction, as we now know – of Marxian alienation; his description of the phenomena of reification and fetishization. Here Lukács's theory of crisis already became distanced from a direct evaluation of the historical and political situation; here his ambition was to expose the deepest conflicts of bourgeois culture, and to describe the laws that govern the movements of an objectified world and alienated consciousness.

We know today that in the concept of reification Lukács combined two distinct philosophical categories, namely alienation, which in Marx is the special feature of capitalist commodity relations, and objectification, which is the basis of all human activity. (In the course of our activity, whatever we set as our aim is objectified, in other words, for instance, matter is shaped into sculpture by the hands of the artist; in friendship one person remoulds the character of the other, etc.) Lukács disowned this work on more than one occasion but, beyond the inevitability of political compulsion and compromise, his combination of alienation and objectification is the only

point in his essays in self-criticism where he actually condemned the work for its scholarly weakness. The rest was political and tactical necessity. (Let us think, for example, of the long-protracted debate which began in the mid-twenties and which involved Ernst Bloch, Marcuse and Walter Benjamin on the one side and Deborin and Zinoviev on the other. This debate, in which the philosophical and political elite of the period participated, had the result that the relationship between Lukács and the Communist movement became questionable: self-criticism appeared inevitable.[5])

Lukács, when he described the philosophical phenomenon of alienation, considered it to be the deepest source of social, as well as intellectual and cultural, crisis. He was not alone in this discovery. The "Frankfurt school" which started to establish itself later – around the *Grünberg Archives* – based its "critical theory" on this line of thought. Then, in the sixties, it was rediscovered again. Merleau Ponty and Lucien Goldmann were intermediaries in this, and today Jürgen Habermas provides a precise analysis of the inner relationship and the conceptional differences, affirming the interrelationship which was earlier only suggested.[6]

How was it possible to regard the phenomenon of alienation as the root of European crisis? To answer this, let me emphasize three points in the reification theory:

1) Bourgeois society created the kind of world in which things substitute for human relations. More precisely, it created a ready-made system of things, in which a ready-made world surrounds man and the individual is left to confront this world without being able to discover the essential driving force of society. The partial systems are rational enough, but the total process seems to be irrational. In this way reification puts its stamp not only on the objective world and on human relations, but reason itself also assumes a particular form, the shape of alienated rationality. Lukács considered alienation as the Great Evil, governing man, mind and society. Alienation outlined in this way was to be rejected, not only philosophically but also morally. On the surface this is what Lukács – building on Max Weber's analysis – calls the "calcu-

lative mind". This concept of reason is able to consider things only as a combination of quantities and forms, for its aim is treatability, manipulability and computability – predictability. What gets lost is the qualitative aspect of phenomena, and of human relations. This formalistic mind would later – with Horkheimer – become "instrumental reason", and in *Dialectics and Enlightenment* (1947), the book written together with Adorno, would become the basis for the criticism of the identification of reason with power.

In other words, Lukács combines the phenomenon of reification with the categories of bourgeois thinking: we see the world through spectacles which distort interrelationships, without noticing that the trouble lies with our "spectacles"; we see the distorted image gained through the "glasses" as the attributes of the world.

This idea had far-reaching consequences, for, after all, mistrust of the scientific mind today derives from alienated reason against which bourgeois philosophy proposes a more down-to-earth, more flexible mind. (Let us consider the attempts at compromise between the traditional antonyms in intellectual history of "understanding" [Verstehen] and "explanation" [Erklären] by Habermas and K.O. Apel in present-day German philosophy.[7] Another elaboration of alienated reason appears as the complete negation of reason, for example, with Glucksmann and Bernard Lévy in French "new philosophy".)

2) Lukács's second thesis – reification and the fetishization of reality – explains why the total operation of bourgeois society is impossible to comprehend. *Totality*, the whole, disappears from view. Lukács, finding support in Marx, shows that this happens not only because of the "blindness" of science and philosophy, but because totality also becomes fragmented in the very existence of bourgeois society. Bourgeois existence (economy) becomes fragmented just as consciousness is only able to register partial laws. Facts alone are in evidence, and the circumstance that facts are the results of processes is obscured, as are the guiding motives in operation beyond the processes. The task of philosophy is the reconstruction of the Great Entity. Here Lukács strives to reanimate the categories of

Hegelian philosophy – which is by no means identical with a "totalitarian" way of thinking as, for example, Karl Popper thought (in his book *The Open Society and Its Enemies*). The idea of totality became, then, very deeply assimilated in European culture, and criticism of culture, became, for example, an important tool for Adorno and Sartre. Here Lukács merely mentions the link between the categories of totality and being, the idea returns later in his *The Ontology of Social Being*, but there only in a fragmentary form.

3) Finally, on the philosophical plane, Lukács also traces back the basic problem of classical German philosophy to the dialectics of bourgeois being, treating the separation of subject and object as a product of bourgeois culture. The subject is the human soul, thinking and consciousness; and the object is the world of being, of objects. The two, however, meet again and again in reality: human practice creates the unity of the external and the internal, of theory and reality, of subject and object – a unity which Hegelian philosophy merely postulated. Bourgeois consciousness, on the other hand, moves between two false extremes: on one side it offers abstract objectivity (empiricism and positivism are the philosophical expressions of this); on the other side a likewise abstract subjectivity – romantic consciousness. Of course, the Lukácsian utopia in which practice – above all revolutionary practice – would restore the unity of the two and realize them as culture did not materialize. The triumph of fascism swept away this perspective. But human practice remained as a theoretical and philosophical possibility, and as the main concept of social being it became a central idea in Lukács's later philosophy, too.

The therapy suggested in *History and Class Consciousness* links up with this diagnosis of the crisis of European culture: a real solution to the crisis would be provided by the proletariat and its revolutionary practice. This is a utopia which was swept away for good by the thirties and forties. The suggested treatment was much too abstract and messianic a solution in comparison to the accuracy of the diagnosis. The criticism of messianic utopias is today a well-known critical argu-

ment against this work. In my opinion, the real Achilles' heel of the book – above and beyond this utopianism – is its lack of democratic approach: this messianism is actually the expression of an elitist approach which followed from the sectarian character of the movement in the period. This would be challenged by the danger of fascism and the new crisis it brought, and it was to be superseded as a result of the radical educational effect of the new theory.

THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRATIZATION

As fascism was preparing to make its onslaught, a long crisis process occurred in Lukács's political and theoretical work. His hope that the proletariat would overthrow capitalism at a stroke and solve the European crisis was not realized. In fact, in Germany and Eastern Europe consolidation on a capitalist basis occurred with the beginnings of fascism. This crisis in Lukács's work cannot be deducted simply from the phenomenon of Stalinism. Lukács was faced with two challenges, the had to provide theoretical answers to two problems of the crisis: there was need for his understanding of a new phase in European development, and he had to analyse the practice of socialism, the Stalinist period included. In my opinion, this process started with the debate on *History and Class Consciousness*, but the possibility of a political solution was hit upon in the *Blum Theses* (1928). At the request of the Hungarian Communist Party, Lukács was to draw up the strategic theses for the second congress and, instead of proletarian dictatorship, he designated the political aim to be a "revolutionary democratic" dictatorship mentioned by Lenin, that is the perspective of a transition.

In other words, Lukács responded to the challenge of the period with a democratism concept of his own. That year (1928) marked his attempt to revive and find acceptance for this democratic tradition. Later, after his return to Hungary in 1946, he pursued the same ambition until 1949, but expressed

this idea in the form of a guiding motive only after Stalin's death, in his post-1953 writings.

At the end of the twenties, however, for the time being Lukács was forced to abandon his political activities – in the shadow of political self-criticism, as he himself put it in an autobiographical essay written at the end of his life – and to retire to the area of ideology and art theory. This was a defeat – which again he had to transform into a theoretical achievement.

As a result, the theoretical implications of this democratic concept appeared chiefly in his essays on literature. As against the outlook of *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács now discovered the individual, the history-making role of man, and together with him, the uniqueness of works of art or, to use his later term, their individuality. While in the twenties Lukács was only concerned with class and class consciousness, now – after his study of Marx and the Paris manuscripts – his primary interest was the difference between man's real and man's alienated self. Thus again his analysis of works of art came to focus on ethical elements – for example, the concept of catharsis at once ethical and aesthetic – and this is how Lukács reached the point where he transformed the Marxist concept of "man's nature". He wanted to arrive at a democratic image of man not in general terms – as against the demonic image represented by fascism – but rather to measure the nature of man, the human quality, against the yardstick of the totality of human development. To use his own terminology, Lukács rates man according to his generic character (Gattungsmässigkeit). Thus, art becomes a companion and helper in efforts to find release from alienation and in the struggle against the power of alienation. I could also express this by saying that, as against his earlier abstract humanism which was remote from individual men, he now came closer to the life alternatives of individuals. I am thinking here of such studies in *Essays on Realism* as "Tribune or Bureaucrat?" where Lukács described not only the sources of the bureaucratic plague, but also its various everyday and intellectual types of incidence; and his treatment, in the essay "Reportage or Portrayal?", of the Marxist distinc-

tion between *citoyen* and *bourgeois* – which leads him to the concept of *everyday life* and the difference between the picture of the world and the ethics the revolutionary carries in himself and the picture of the world and the ethics of the average person – without the slightest disparagement of the latter. In these studies he already criticizes GI naturalism and socialist bureaucratism, although only through hidden allusions and suggestion. His essays on *Faust* and his papers on Hölderlin and Tolstoy presented an analysis of the specific world of artistic creation and the borderline situations of intellectual capacity on the same level, a level close to man and theoretical at the same time.

In general terms culture itself is divided: on the one hand, it can be a means of human liberation, and on the other hand it can be a weapon of manipulation. Lukács worked out a model of a liberating culture in his theory of realism in which he reconstructed Marx's aesthetic conception. The extent to which a work is able to respond to mankind's present, to the "generic nature" of its receivers, and how it can help in their – unconscious – struggle against alienation then became a yardstick of cultural heritage. At the same time this broadly interpreted culture concept also corresponded to the Popular Front policy adopted at the seventh congress of the International, which finally verified the point of view Lukács expressed in 1928 in his *Blum Theses*.

By now we know very well the limits of this concept of realism and interpretation of art. Lukács adopted a stance of rejection against a number of fine works of modern art (by Kafka, Joyce, Schönberg, Musil, etc.) and on what basis he puts a given trend or work within the realm of realism or condemns it as "anti-realist" is not always clear. His concept was a deductive category, starting out from an a priori, to fit in all the requirements of his time and those of an outlined future. It is easy to reject it now, and I personally believe that this part of Lukács's aesthetic theory – namely the realism/anti-realism antagonism – is the most obsolete one. Nevertheless, in the thirties this struggle was certainly a progressive opening toward the Western European leftist and anti-fascist

intelligentsia and philosophy, and assisted the foremost endeavours of Soviet artistic development. Culture that elevates man was formulated as an objective which not only supported this worldwide struggle, but which could also have become the starting point for later democratic development. Thus, Lukács carried on a partisan struggle against the Stalinist principle of socialist development – for the time being exiled to the area of culture, i.e., of art. In fact, this guerilla war – as he put it – did not go unpunished: in 1940 the periodicals *Literaturny Kritik* and *Internationale Literatur*, which published Lukács's internationally-oriented work, were terminated, and for a time Lukács was subjected to personal attack as well. A year later the Soviet-Nazi war broke out and in this way history made him confront a new situation. But this marks a new chapter of the European crisis, and a new chapter of Lukács's life and oeuvre.

It was in these years that Lukács's real, and not tactical, criticism of *History and Class Consciousness* came into being. This involved a concept of a society that is closer to life and which is also concerned with the individual and a more humanistic theory of art – elements of Lukács's philosophy which he was to bring to fruition toward the end of his life in his *Aesthetics* and *Ontology*, at last without internal and external constraints.

NOTES

1 *Gelebtes Denken. Eine Autobiographie* (Hrsg. I. Eörsi), (Frankfurt am Main, 1981), p. 83. The quotation from Fichte was a common one for the young Lukács and for his circle, for Emil Lask – who was working on a book about Fichte; and Ernst Bloch, writing his essays about the need for utopia. The quotation is from Fichte, *Die Gründlage des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* (1806), (ed. Fritz Medicus), (Hamburg, 1956), p. 24.

2 A. Heller, F. Fehér, G. Márkus and S. Radnóti, *Die Seele und das Leben* (Frankfurt am Main, 1977); A. Arató and P. Breines, *The Young Lukács and the Origin of Western Marxism* (New York, 1979); A. Heller (ed.), *Lukács Revalued* (London, 1983).

3 *Gelebtes Denken. Eine Autobiographie, op. cit.*, p. 84.

4 Cf. Lucien Goldmann, *Le Dieu caché* (Paris, 1956).

5 The whole debate about *History and Class Consciousness* was published by the *Lukács Archive* (Budapest) in four volumes *(A történelem és osztálytudat a 20-as évek vitáiban)*, (History and class consciousness in the debates of the 20s) in 1981. The most interesting personalities and contributions are: Gustav Mayer, Siegfried Marck, Karl August Wittfogel, C. Brinkmann, Herbert Marcuse ("Transzendentaler Marxismus"), Walter Benjamin ("Bücher, die lebendig geblieben sind"), Ernst Bloch ("Aktualität und Utopie"), Karl Lőwith ("Max Weber und Karl Marx").

6 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), Bd. 1. Also on the links between the Frankfurt School and the early Lukács, see: Andrew Feenberg, *Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory* (Oxford, 1981).

7 An analytical overview on the phases of this discussion see: K.O. Apel, *Die Erklären: Verstehen-Kontroverse in transzendentalpragmatischer Sicht* (Frankfurt am Main, 1979).

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

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



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