

Ferenc Makk

THE ÁRPÁDS AND THE COMNENI

POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN HUNGARY
AND BYZANTIUM
IN THE 12TH CENTURY

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AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ BUDAPEST

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

Akadémiai Kiadó • Budapest 1989

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ISBN 963 05 5268 X

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Printed in Hungary
by Akadémiai Kiadó és Nyomda Vállalat, Budapest

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Preface

The present work investigates Hungarian-Byzantine relations between the end of the 11th and the end of the 12th centuries. Since all through this period the throne of Hungary was occupied by the Árpáds and, except for the last decade of the era under discussion, the imperial throne of Byzantium held by the members of the Comnenus dynasty, the political contacts of the two countries can be regarded as the connections between the two ruling dynasties. No attempt has so far been made to examine the question of the history of the political connections between Hungary and Byzantium in the 12th century monographically, though of all countries it was with Byzantium that Hungary had the closest and most wide-ranging connections at that time. The significance of the contemporary Hungarian-Byzantine contacts is shown by the fact that they were considered important by Byzantium, too. Hungarian-Byzantine relations were widespread especially in the fields of politics, economy (commerce and finance), religion, ideology, arts and language and appeared in the most diverse forms of state and popular contacts. A series of specialized disciplines, such as political history, economic history, numismatics, history of ideology and religion, history of arts, linguistics and ethnography, work on the totality of this system of connections.

From among these different connections we have chosen and studied the political links between Hungary and Byzantium in the 12th century, as these relations influenced the above connections in a decisive way. By political relations we mean, as it were, the bilateral interstate connections between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire and these, of course, include dynastic connections, trends of foreign policy reflected in the diplomacy of the two countries, military confrontations and generally all forms of manifestations of political history in the modern sense of the word.

The modern view of history has set up two basic requirements for the study of our subject. On the one hand, we could not be satisfied simply with giving an account (however precise this would be) of the events seen on the surface of the political relations between the state of the Árpáds and the empire of the Comneni, as primarily reflected in the sources, but we had to grasp, one after the other, those main trends of the internal politics of Hungary and Byzantium, which played a decisive role in shaping the foreign policy and, consequently, the mutual contacts of the two countries. This means we had to follow with the utmost attention the changes within the internal political scenes in Hungary and Byzantium and, especially in the case of Hungary, the social factors of the shifts in internal political conditions. On the other hand, knowing that movements of foreign policy have some sort of autonomy of their own and that

the relations of two given countries are affected by the aspirations of several other states, it would have been impossible to examine the problem of Hungarian-Byzantine connections without taking European (and in some cases even broader) international political relationships into consideration. For us it meant that we had to explore—in a range and depth determined by the relations between Hungary and Byzantium—the entire issue of the Hungarian and Byzantine foreign policies of the age.

As for Byzantium we have examined the political activities of the Greek Empire in the West (South Italian Normans, the Papacy, Italy, Germany), in the Balkans (mostly the Southern Slavs), in Russia and in the East (Asia Minor, the Holy Land). We have paid special attention to the problem of the Seljuqs and the Normans, who all through the 12th century, occupied the attention of Byzantium decisively. The dream of restoring the late Roman Empire was vividly alive during the time of the Comneni and especially influenced Emperor Manuel's policy. The two main objectives of Byzantine foreign policy in the 12th century were the efforts to drive the Seljuq Turks out of Asia Minor and to restore Byzantine rule over Southern Italy. In connection with this we followed those temporary shifts in the centre of gravity of Byzantine policy which were not independent of the political events in Europe and Asia. As to the main tendencies in the foreign policy of the 12th century Hungarian Kingdom we tried to trace the changes in the relationships between Hungary and the following: the Russian principalities, Poland, Bohemia, the Holy Roman Empire (and its different provinces), the Papacy, France, the Norman Kingdom in Southern Italy, Venice and the Dalmatian towns and Southern Slav territories. Studying the Hungarian foreign policy of the age is rendered difficult by the fact that modern Hungarian historiography has quite neglected this subject in the last few decades. That is why, in several respects, we had to attempt to solve some of the problems in this field.

We carried out the present monographic study of 12th century Hungarian-Byzantine political relations on the basis of written sources and we had to neglect making use of additional information from sources of different types (e.g. archeology, history of art). At the same time, however, we endeavoured to achieve completeness as far as written sources are concerned. The material we examined was mostly Byzantine Greek and Middle Latin but, to a lesser extent, we also studied Old Russian, Middle High German, Old French, Italian (Dalmatian) and Arabic sources.

Several indispensable Hungarian and foreign studies and papers made an up-to-date study of the subject easier. Most of the credit for research, in the investigated field, must go to Gyula Moravcsik, the eminent representative of Hungarian byzantinology. His work summarizing the whole of the history of Hungarian-Byzantine relations, along with his studies on more detailed questions and his invaluable source publications, serve as a starting point for all further research.

We hope that our attempt to draft the history of the political relations that influenced 12th century Hungarian-Byzantine connections *in toto* can be useful in several respects for students of the history of the 12th century. Besides treating the relations between Hungary and Byzantium in detail, the present work not only gives a picture of the foreign policies of the 12th century Hungarian state and the Byzantine Empire, but also provides a broad tableau of the most important foreign policy tendencies of Europe in the 12th century.

Chapter I

Relations at the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries

While a considerable amount of facts refer to Hungarian-Byzantine relations in different fields and of major importance during the early 1070s, direct connections between the two countries, according to the available sources, seem to have sunk to rather modest proportions during the reign of Ladislav (László) I (1077-1095).¹ This low ebb in relations can be attributed to the unfavourable circumstances in the internal and external situations of both countries.

In the last third of the 11th century the Byzantine Empire entered one of the most critical periods of its history and reached the brink of total collapse. The crisis in the central imperial authority went hand in hand with a grave economic decline. Following the defeat of Byzantium at Manzikert 1071, the Seljuqs, around 1081, established the Sultanate of Iconium, and Asia Minor which used to be the heart of the Empire, was lost to Byzantium save for a narrow coastal strip. Guiscard Robert occupied the town of Bari in 1071 and thus the Normans completely drove the Greeks out of Southern Italy. Later developments were to prove that this was the final loss of the Italian territories for Byzantium. In the spring of 1081 the Normans already attacked the empire in the Balkans, the ultimate goal of Robert Guiscard being the imperial crown itself. Alexius Comnenus (1081-1118) was able to drive off this attack only with the help of Venice, and by mobilizing the last resources of the empire and taking advantage of a favourable turn of events only as late as 1085. During the following century Norman expansion would be one of the central questions of Byzantine foreign policy. Meanwhile the situation in the North Balkan territories of the empire also changed for the worse: nomadic tribes (Pechenegs, Uzes, Cumans) kept raiding these parts proving themselves a thorn in the flesh to the rulers of Byzantium. Especially dangerous were the attacks of the Pechenegs between 1086 and 1091. Their invasion commencing in the spring of 1090 plunged the empire into a really perilous situation. During this attack the Pechenegs allied themselves with Tzachas, the Amir of Smyrna, who launched an action against Byzantium from Asia Minor. The main objective of this alliance was the occupation of Constantinople. Emperor Alexius I, however, inflicted a devastating defeat on the Pechenegs with the help of the Cumans in the battle of Levunium on April 29, 1091 and at the same time made a pact with the Amir of Nicaea against Tzachas.

Eventually, by the 1090s, Alexius I managed to defend the empire against the onslaughts of its enemies and even consolidate—though in a much smaller territory than before—the international position of Byzantium. The emperor's administrative, economic and military reforms cured, at least temporarily, the internal weaknesses of the empire.²

During these decades Hungary was preoccupied with its own internal problems. The development of the feudal relations of production reached a decisive stage which included, on the one hand, the suppression of the movements of the free population, who were trying to escape subordination, while on the other, the further strengthening of the monopoly of the private ownership of lands, the state apparatus and the organization of the church. Law codes drawn up during the reign of Ladislav I reflect the strictness and force used to make feudal relations complete. Besides all this, Ladislav, not wishing to lose his crown, had to follow with the greatest attention the constantly renewed attempts of Salomon (Salamon) (1063–1074) for a whole decade, who tried to regain his lost kingdom with help from abroad. Ladislav sided with the Pope in the investiture contest, while Salomon was supported by the German emperor. This social and political situation made it impossible for Ladislav to start a policy of major expansion before the early 1090s. But the internal consolidation of the country and Salomon's final disappearance from the scene created a favourable situation for conquests abroad.³

The Hungarian expansionist aspirations were most characteristic towards the Adriatic. As a first step, Ladislav I—interfering in the internal Croatian disputes—secured control over Croatia.⁴

In addition, Ladislav must have been planning the occupation of Dalmatia, but he was prevented from this undertaking by the Cumans, who launched an attack on Eastern Hungary and sacked it.⁵ Ladislav, having made his nephew Álmos, King of Croatia,⁶ led his army against the invading Cumans.⁷ The occupation of Croatia was not only against Byzantine claims, but also violated the interests of the Papacy in the first place, as Zvonimir, the ruling Prince of Croatia had received the title of king and a crown from Pope Gregory VII in 1076 and had gained possession of Croatia and Dalmatia as a fief from the hands of the papal legate.⁸ The conquest by Ladislav meant the end of the Pope's overlordship in Croatia. This clash of Hungarian and papal interests was one of the reasons why the King of Hungary turned away from Rome at this time and entered into alliance with Henry IV, the German emperor.⁹ It is a widely held opinion among Hungarian specialists that in 1091, after the battle of Levunium, it was the Byzantine emperor who set the Cumans against Hungary in retaliation for the Hungarian expansion towards the Adriatic.¹⁰ This possibility cannot be completely ruled out, but none of the sources really supports this view. Anna Comnena, who among all the contemporary sources describes most minutely the antecedents of the battle of Levunium, the battle itself, the performance of the Cumans and the circumstances of their departure, does not even mention a Byzantine–Cuman agreement against Hungary.¹¹ A Hungarian source also relates that the punitive campaign Ladislav conducted in 1092 in retaliation for the Cuman raid did not affect Byzantine territories.¹² It can be inferred, therefore, that the Cumans, who attacked Hungary in 1091 and kept breaking through into the country later on, were acting on their own initiative independently of Byzantium and their ultimate goal was to take possession of Eastern Hungary, especially Transylvania.¹³ The chief motive behind Ladislav's wars against the Cumans was to avert this danger.¹⁴ As a matter of fact, Byzantium was genuinely afraid of Hungarian territorial expansion, but, although not being very happy about the conquest of Croatia, which belonged to its own sphere of influence, it was first of all Dalmatia, a dependency considered to be a part of the

empire, that Byzantium did not want to lose to Hungary. In order to prevent the Hungarians from pushing further and to strengthen Byzantine rule over Dalmatia, Emperor Alexius I sent Norman mercenaries under Godfrey of Melfi, a Norman count and Byzantine *sebastos*, to the Dalmatian towns in 1091. The mercenary troops remained in Dalmatia until 1093 securing direct Byzantine rule over its towns and islands. This control was unbroken even after their withdrawal, which is proved by a charter in Zara (Zadar) from 1095 dated according to the reign of Alexius I.¹⁵

Ladislás did not even attempt to acquire Dalmatian territories. During the last few years of his reign his foreign policy was preoccupied with the fight against the Cumans, conducting a campaign in Russia (1092) and interfering in the Polish (1093) and Bohemian (1095) internal disputes.¹⁶ On the other hand, Álmos, as King of Croatia—according to a letter of Henry IV in 1096—intended to march against the Greeks, but gave up his plan for the sake of the German emperor.¹⁷ It is fairly justified to assume that Álmos—probably in 1095—was planning the occupation of the Dalmatian towns,¹⁸ which would have seriously hurt Venetian interests. In 1095 the German emperor, surrounded by his enemies and also hoping to get some help from the Doge, apparently had the claims of the Republic towards Dalmatia in mind when he dissuaded Álmos from taking action against Dalmatian territories under Greek rule.¹⁹ Be as it may, Hungarian expansion towards the Adriatic confronted Hungary with the Papacy, Byzantium and Venice.

King Ladislás died in the summer of 1095 and the Dalmatian conquest was left to his successor. The fact that Ladislás had made one of his nephews, Álmos, King of Croatia and wanted his other nephew, Coloman (Kálmán) to be a bishop²⁰ clearly indicates that the king designated Álmos as his successor. Coloman, however, did not accept Ladislás' decision and fled to Poland but returned around the time the king died (July 29, 1095).²¹ Recent research has proved that Coloman was crowned only in 1096.²² This signifies that Álmos and his brother had fought for supreme power almost for a year before the balance tilted in Coloman's favour. The struggle of the two claimants to the crown and the social forces behind them finally resolved itself in a compromise with the crown going to Coloman, while Álmos was given the duchy (*ducatus*) covering a third of the country.²³ The latter, in terms of actual political power, considerably surpassed that of the Croatian Kingdom, occupied and entrusted to Álmos by Ladislás. The dukedom made Álmos second only to the king in the country, as recorded by the sources.²⁴ Beside other factors, having gained the duchy also contributed to the struggle Álmos carried on for years in an effort to seize royal power. The first bout of this struggle between Álmos and Coloman was over by the summer of 1096, for several of the sources already regarded Coloman as king.²⁵ No information is available as to whether the two rivals sought foreign help. The most important foreign ally Álmos might have had was Henry IV—on the basis of their earlier relations—, but no help could have come from the emperor, surrounded by enemies in Northern Italy in 1094–1097 and expecting help from Álmos himself as seen in his letter of 1096.²⁶ On the other hand, Coloman, in the first place, might have hoped to get help from the ruling Prince of Poland, since he had once fled to his country. But from the fact—as is known from the letter of Henry IV—that in the first half of 1096 Władysław Herman had asked Álmos for help against Břetislav II, the sovereign of Bohemia and protégé of the emperor,²⁷ we may conjecture that Coloman could not possibly have counted on

Polish help against his brother. Anyhow, Álmos, who in the first half of 1096 had not helped the Polish ruling Prince purely for the sake of Henry IV, was offered friendship, alliance and future help by the German emperor in the late summer of the same year.²⁸ This, of course, determined the orientation of Coloman's foreign policy, who had intended to be a priest. The letter (July, 1096) the King of Hungary received from Pope Urban II also influenced his decision.²⁹ Coloman, unlike Álmos, held out firmly beside the Papacy in the investiture contest. This was to be one of the most constant elements in his foreign policy. This is proved, from among other facts, by his Norman marriage,³⁰ his declaration at Guastalla in 1106,³¹ the activities of Cardinal Kuno and the papal legate, Dietrich in Hungary in 1112 and 1115 and finally, by his opposition to Henry V, the German emperor.³²

The greatest problem for Hungary in the summer and autumn of 1096 was the march of the crusader armies across the country. Coloman opposed and cracked down on the troops that pillaged the country and after these bitter experiences he allowed the army of Godfrey of Bouillon to pass through the country only after sufficient securities had been received and precautions taken.³³ The crusaders were treated with deep mistrust both in Hungary and in Byzantium. Alexius I, who had not asked the West for crusaders, but mercenary troops,³⁴ was afraid—especially because of the Norman participants—that the crusaders were planning to occupy his empire.³⁵ There were moments in Hungary too, in the summer of 1096, when some crusader commanders were contemplating snatching the kingdom from Coloman³⁶ and this compelled the King of Hungary even to consider fleeing to Russia.³⁷ Although some sort of cooperation went on along the Hungarian-Byzantine frontier between the local Hungarian [at Semlin (Zemun, today a part of Belgrade)] and Byzantine (at Belgrade) authorities against the trespassing crusaders,³⁸ this did not lead to a rapprochement between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire at that time. On the contrary, the sources testify to Alexius I fearing that the Hungarians also might attack Byzantine territories in 1096 and at the turn of 1096–1097.³⁹ Besides the local skirmishes along the Danube it must have been Dalmatia that particularly caused headaches to the emperor, not entirely without cause, as, according to the sources, Coloman restored Hungarian sovereignty in Croatia at the turn of 1096–1097, a move, which the short reign of King Peter, taking advantage of the internal disputes in Hungary and the possibilities offered by the crusade, had rendered dubious earlier in 1096. After defeating Peter the Hungarian king conquered the coast in the spring of 1097⁴⁰ as indicated by the taking of Tengerfehérvár (Biograd).⁴¹ Unwilling to lose Dalmatia, Byzantium decided to take steps against Hungary, but incapable of action on its own due to the crusade. Alexius I committed the government and defence of the region to the charge of the Doge of Venice making him Duke (*dux*) of Dalmatia and Croatia and Imperial *protosebastos* in 1097. The Doge, Vitale Michiel I, assumed the title of Duke of Dalmatia and Croatia thus clearly indicating the Venetian claims to the Croatian and Dalmatian territories.⁴² Spalato (Split) and Trau (Trogir) also made oaths of allegiance to Venice.⁴³ Dalmatia—with the exception of Tengerfehérvár—actually remained under Venetian control between 1097 and 1103.⁴⁴

In the spring of 1097 Coloman married one of Roger's daughters with papal mediation. Roger, a Sicilian Norman count,⁴⁵ was one of the staunchest allies of Pope Urban II against the German emperor.⁴⁶ Thus the marriage of the King of Hungary

had obvious pro-papal anti-German implications⁴⁷ and, at the same time, it was directed against Venice—and, perhaps, Byzantium—the Normans being their potential enemies.⁴⁸ However, this dynastic connection with the Normans did not give Coloman immediate help in his efforts with the conquest of Dalmatia. He stopped occupying further territories and, around 1098, concluded a treaty of friendship—*conventio amicitiae*—with the Doge, based on the momentary status quo, although in this very treaty the Hungarian king disputed the Doge's right to the title of Duke of Dalmatia and Croatia.⁴⁹ This is conspicuously indicative of Hungary challenging the Byzantine and Venetian claims towards Dalmatia and Croatia.⁵⁰

Coloman was probably restrained from open confrontation with Venice by the approach of an internal crisis fomented by the activity of Álmos and his party.⁵¹ The following conflict between the king and the prince broke out in 1098⁵² and Álmos thought he had a good chance of winning supreme power. His ambitions had not been satisfied by becoming Duke, although the few available sources reveal that Álmos, as overlord of the duchy, had great enough powers to be taken into consideration even by Coloman. The laws of the time, for example, specifically mention the prince's territories and office-holders.⁵³ Furthermore, he played an important role in settling foreign affairs. Thus in 1096 the prince must have been covering the march of the crusaders across the country together with the king.⁵⁴ At the turn of 1096–1097, when dynastic relations were established between Hungary and the Normans, Álmos acted as one of the dignitaries undertaking a guarantee for Coloman to Count Roger's envoys.⁵⁵ Álmos was not alone in his overreaching ambitions, his discontented followers also cherished great expectations and contributed to the controversy flaring up with their counselling of the prince.⁵⁶ The armies of the *rex* and the *dux* were already facing each other at Várkony, by the river Tisza, when, instead of a showdown, the king and the prince eventually made an agreement.⁵⁷ The rivals were probably urged towards reconciliation by the equality of their forces, which promised neither party an easy victory.⁵⁸

In the spring of 1099 Coloman was busy again with questions of foreign policy first interfering in the disputes of the Russian ruling princes then in Bohemian struggles. Svyatopolk, Grand Duke of Kiev, moved against Vladimir of Volhynia and the rulers of Terebovl and Przemyśl in Halich. The Kievan sovereign dispossessed David, ruling Prince of Vladimir, of his territories but was defeated by the Princes of Przemyśl and Terebovl, Volodar and Vasilko.⁵⁹ Svyatopolk asked the Hungarian king for help against them but Coloman's army was defeated at Przemyśl by the army of David and his Cuman allies.⁶⁰ Coloman and Svyatopolk's failure at Przemyśl was to the advantage of the forces of disruption in Russia and contributed to the acceleration of the process of disintegration of the Kievan Russian state. Objectively, the King of Hungary, while supporting Prince Svyatopolk, was trying to re-establish the unity of the Kievan state against the minor princes representing the tendency of disruption,⁶¹ so the 1099 performance of Coloman in Russia should by no means be listed among the "useless, unjust and senseless" or "conquering" campaigns in Halich.⁶²

Soon after that Coloman wanted to interfere in the Bohemian succession disputes supporting the Moravian princes against Břetislav II and marched to the border river Olšava where, eventually, negotiations resulted in his concluding a treaty of peace and friendship with the Bohemian sovereign.⁶³

After the turn of the century, the attention of the King of Hungary turned to the Adriatic again. Having himself crowned King of Croatia at Tengerfehérvár in 1102 is certainly indicative of this.⁶⁴ The fact that during these years Coloman was rather isolated abroad has escaped the attention of scholars. The Hungarian expansion towards Dalmatia had alienated Byzantium and Venice from the start. The German emperor was the ally of Álmos, and Bořivoj, the new ruling Prince of Bohemia, was Henry IV's protégé. Álmos, in the summer of 1104, married Predslava, one of the daughters of Svyatopolk, Grand Duke of Kiev⁶⁵ and through this marriage he became a relative of Bolesław III, ruling Prince of Poland, who had married another daughter of Svyatopolk in 1103.⁶⁶ In 1105 Coloman again interfered in the Bohemian succession disputes, supporting the pretender, Svatopluk, but the latter's attempt failed temporarily⁶⁷ so Coloman's endeavour to break this diplomatic barrier was frustrated.

It was the alliance with Byzantium that saved the King of Hungary from this foreign policy fixture. Probably around the turn of 1104–1105 Emperor Alexius I proposed to Piroska, the daughter of King Ladislav I, for his son, John, whom he had made co-emperor. The Hungarian princess was taken to Constantinople by a Byzantine delegation headed by *sebastos* Eumathius Philocales, probably in the first half of 1105 and there, as Irene, she married the co-emperor.⁶⁸ The Norman question was likely to lurk in the background of this marriage. Although in 1097 the Norman crusader commanders had sworn fealty to the Emperor of Byzantium, a year later the Norman Bohemond laid his hand on Antioch also much coveted by Alexius. This incident sparked off a series of armed conflicts between Byzantium and the Principality of Antioch. At the end of 1104 Bohemond, Prince of Antioch left for the West in order to launch a major attack on Byzantium. His ultimate goal was the occupation of the empire.⁶⁹ Byzantium, obviously, wanted to prevent an anti-Byzantine alliance between Bohemond and Coloman, who already had Norman connections by way of his marriage.⁷⁰ Through Piroska's marriage to the Byzantine co-emperor Coloman became the ally of Alexius I. Thus the King of Hungary gave up his not very fruitful Norman connections for a Hungarian–Byzantine cooperation. This resulted, on the one hand, in breaking the ring of isolation, which had been choking Hungary while, on the other, Coloman could set out to subdue the Dalmatian territories which, since 1103, had been directly controlled by Byzantium.⁷¹ This move was, of course, understood by Byzantium and Venice reluctantly, the latter also being apprehensive of Norman expansion in the Adriatic.⁷² In 1105 Coloman took the Dalmatian towns [Zara, Trau, Sebenico (Sibenik), Spalato] and the islands.⁷³ He also managed to have the Papacy accept this change in the Dalmatian power constellation by giving up his right to appoint prelates in the declaration at Guastalla in October 1106.⁷⁴ In the wake of the successful conquest of Dalmatia, Coloman assumed the title of King of Hungary, Dalmatia and Croatia⁷⁵ and had his four-year-old son, Stephen (István), the heir apparent, crowned king.⁷⁶

The measures Coloman took to secure the succession for his son obviously crossed Álmos' ambitions. It cannot be a coincidence that the prince left Hungary for the court of Henry IV just around the turn of 1105–1106,⁷⁷ but the German emperor's position was too delicate, owing to his serious domestic struggles with his son, to support the case of Álmos.⁷⁸ The latter had to return from Germany empty handed in 1106,⁷⁹ but before long he was already looking for other foreign supporters. In 1106 he left for

Poland where eventually he got help from his brother-in-law, Bolesław III.⁸⁰ The motive behind the Polish sovereign's support—besides their being relatives—may have been the possibility of rallying Hungary, with Álmos as king, behind himself in his fight against the eastward expansion of the Holy Roman Empire. Álmos succeeded in breaking into Hungary from Poland with the military help of Bolesław III and he seized Abaújvár.⁸¹ After that, however, the ruling Prince of Poland and Coloman settled the conflict by negotiations and ended up concluding a treaty of peace, friendship and alliance directed against the expansionist efforts of the Germans explicitly.⁸² Bolesław no longer supported Álmos, who had no choice but to patch up the quarrel with Coloman again.⁸³ In 1107, when the Hungarian prince was away on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem by way of Constantinople,⁸⁴ it was already Coloman who helped the Polish sovereign in his struggle with the pretender Zbigniew. Finally Bolesław seized Zbigniew's province, Masovia.⁸⁵ This must have been inspiring for Coloman, who had been trying to cope with an analogous problem and he subsequently stripped his brother of the duchy (*ducatus*), probably in 1107, taking advantage of the Duke's absence, but he allowed Álmos, on his return home, to have every possibility of pursuing his favourite pastime, hunting.⁸⁶ The prince, had he still been a *dux*, would not have needed royal permission for doing so. Doing away with the territorial *ducatus* strengthened the central royal power⁸⁷ and dealt a heavy blow to Álmos. Hence it is no surprise that he plotted to have the king murdered around the turn of 1107–1108 at the consecration of the church (provostship) of Dömös.⁸⁸ On being discovered the prince wasted little time in running to the German court to solicit the help of Henry V against his brother. Álmos was with the German king at Easter 1108⁸⁹ and Henry V's army set out to attack Hungary in September of the same year. While Henry was besieging Pozsony (today Bratislava), his ally, Svatopluk, ruling Prince of Bohemia, was raiding the valley of the river Vág. Coloman was helped by his Polish ally, Bolesław III, who broke into Bohemia. In the end, the German sovereign had to give up his plans of Hungarian expansion, he withdrew his troops, but Coloman was once more obliged to restore Álmos to favour.⁹⁰

During the same period the King of Hungary was also paying attention to events in the Balkans. In 1106 Bohemond, sticking to his original plan, declared a crusade on Byzantium in France and in October 1107 his army launched a powerful attack on the Balkan territories of the empire. His ultimate goal was the seizure of Constantinople.⁹¹ It was the second time in a quarter of a century that Byzantium had been threatened by a Norman onslaught. Coloman and the Doge threw their support behind Alexius I and Hungarian troops, aided by the fleet of the Republic, took part in the manoeuvres against the Normans.⁹² The Byzantine–Venetian–Hungarian alliance saved Byzantium and Bohemond was forced into a humiliating peace treaty in September 1108.⁹³ Coloman's envoys were also among the signatories of the agreement.⁹⁴

Helping Byzantium did not go without affecting the future of Hungarian sovereignty in Dalmatia. In some respect Hungarian rule was favourable for the Dalmatian towns as the Hungarian Kingdom, unlike Venice, was never an economic rival for these towns with their developed commercial life.⁹⁵ In 1108 Coloman granted the citizens of Zara, Trau and Spalato privileges that did not hinder their economic growth.⁹⁶ Neither did the King of Hungary ever restrict the internal autonomy of the Dalmatian towns to any great extent.

Venice, on the other hand, would not tolerate the Hungarian domination of Dalmatia, since the political and economic subjugation of these towns was an important step in her eastward expansion (towards Byzantium and the Levant).⁹⁷ According to Andrea Dandolo's chronicle, the Doge asked the Byzantine emperor to help him regain Dalmatia around 1112. Alexius I did not oblige Venice—though theoretically he had no objections to this—and suggested that the war against Hungary be put off.⁹⁸ This attitude of Byzantium was determined by several factors. The emperor had other more pressing problems to attend to than the Venetian–Hungarian dispute over Dalmatia. During 1111 and 1112 Alexius I was negotiating the union of churches with Pope Pascal II and, in return for the proposed union, the emperor wanted the Holy Roman imperial crown of Henry V.⁹⁹ Affairs in the East proved even more significant. At this time Byzantium was preparing for the subjection of Antioch, while in 1111 the Seljuq Sultan of Iconium was planning to attack the empire. The armed hostilities that broke out in Asia Minor went on until 1116.¹⁰⁰ At the same time relations between Byzantium and Venice became markedly cooler during this period. Its origins reached back to the privileges of May 1082, which—in return for the military help the Republic lent Byzantium against the Normans—had granted Venice commercial favours, which gravely hurt the interests of Byzantine merchants. The privileges of 1082 practically opened the door for the economic entry of Venice into Byzantium and in order to counteract their effects the emperor approached Pisa, the rival of Venice. The pact between Byzantium and Pisa concluded in 1111 was thus directed against the privileged position of Venice.¹⁰¹ As a consequence of this it was fairly reasonable that the emperor was unwilling to play the Doge's game in Dalmatia at that time. Finally and obviously, the Hungarian participation in the Norman wars must also have influenced Alexius I when he was considering the Doge's suggestion.

So the showdown between Venice and Hungary was temporarily postponed, but Coloman, nevertheless, deemed it advisable to take steps to secure Hungarian control over Dalmatia. About 1111 the king visited Zara again and confirmed the ancient liberties of Dalmatia.¹⁰²

Nor were the last years of the reign of Coloman free from assorted difficulties at home and abroad. In 1112 the King of Hungary broke through into Austria devastating and looting the country along the border.¹⁰³ This may just have been a simple, cross-border raid for the sake of plunder, but it is also possible that Coloman was taking revenge on the Margrave of Austria, who had taken part in Henry V's Hungarian campaign in 1108.¹⁰⁴ In the summer of 1112 Coloman—his Norman wife having died—married Euphemia, the daughter of Vladimir Monomach, ruling Prince of Pereyaslavl and Suzdal, in order to improve his relationship with Russia.¹⁰⁵ This dynastic link, however, did not prove enduring as, around 1113–1114, the queen was caught in an act of adultery and Coloman promptly sent her home,¹⁰⁶ where his father-in-law had become overlord of the Principality of Kiev in 1113.¹⁰⁷ Sometime afterwards Euphemia's son, Boris, the pretender to be, was born in Russia.¹⁰⁸

These years also saw the last clash between Coloman and Álmos. The prince once more tried to seize the kingship around 1115, but his plans came to the attention of the king's followers, who put an end to them in time. According to the sources Coloman, taking the advice of his counsellors, had the captive Álmos and the prince's little son, Béla, blinded lest either should succeed him after his death.¹⁰⁹ Several other dignitaries

shared the fate of Álmos and Béla¹¹⁰, which indicates that Álmos' actions were supported by a large-scale conspiracy.¹¹¹

Simultaneously with these events Venice initiated military actions to reconquer Dalmatia. Previously the Republic had heeded the advice of the Byzantine emperor, but this time the Doge adopted new tactics. In August 1115 the Venetian fleet attacked the Dalmatian territories under Hungarian rule without consulting Byzantium and acting purely on her own initiative.¹¹² This time, however, she was only able to seize a part of Dalmatia and the Doge intended to complete his conquest in the following year.¹¹³ But those events already belong to another era, the reign of the new king, Stephen II.

Chapter II

The first clashes

Coloman died on February 3, 1116 and his fifteen-year-old son, Stephen, was crowned King of Hungary.¹ The takeover was smooth, since Álmos and his party were still unable to move as a result of the disaster of 1115. Besides the crown, however, the young king also inherited the main foreign policy problems from the reign of his father.

This is well demonstrated by the Dalmatian question. The Doge launched his second campaign to conquer the Dalmatian territories under Hungarian rule in 1116. This attack had also been well prepared in the field of diplomacy, since the Doge, Ordelaaffo Faliero, managed to secure not only Henry V, the German emperor's support for his plans in March 1116,² but even the approval of Alexius I of Byzantium. Though some sources report that the Venetian campaign was helped by the troops of Alexius and Henry,³ it seems more likely that the support of the two emperors meant only an endorsement in principle of the war.⁴ The German sovereign was conducting his second Italian campaign in 1116–1117,⁵ the Emperor of Byzantium was fighting the Seljuqs in Asia Minor and the Kievan Russians in 1116,⁶ so neither could have been anxious to open up a new front by directly participating in the Hungarian–Venetian conflict.

The conduct of the German emperor backing Venice is easy to understand with the antecedents in mind. It is much less clear what could have prompted the Byzantine emperor to take sides against the Hungarian control of Dalmatia. The opinion that considers Álmos to have been the cause of this cooling of relations between Byzantium and Hungary and explains Alexius I's actions in the Dalmatian question from this,⁷ would seem unacceptable because it is inferred that the blind prince fled to Byzantium not around the time Coloman died but only a decade later. The Byzantine emperor probably remembered that Venice, unlike Hungary, had always been ready to recognize the nominal sovereignty of Byzantium over Dalmatia.⁸ It is also possible that Alexius I deemed it more important to secure the alliance of Venice than that of Hungary.⁹ Be that as it may, it seems to have been a crucial factor that the 1115 attack of the Doge presented Alexius I with a *fait accompli* and the emperor chose the more convenient solution by giving his consent to a war that had been commenced earlier in 1115 without his opinion being asked for. This conduct of Alexius, of course, chilled relations between Hungary and Byzantium in the subsequent years considerably.

The Venetian fleet embarked in May 1116 and the Doge inflicted a crushing defeat on *ban* Kledin, who had come to help defend Zara and was trying to win the citizens of the town to his side.¹⁰ Afterwards the Doge took Tengerfahervár and Sebenico by force, Trau and Spalato surrendered without resistance¹¹ and by that time Venice was also

master of the islands.¹² Thus all of Dalmatia was under Venetian control again.¹³ It is possible that Hungary and Venice made a five-year truce after the hostilities.¹⁴ In June 1117, however, the Doge was once more in Dalmatia confirming the privileges of the citizens of Zara.¹⁵ Most of the specialists are of the opinion that 1117 saw renewed clashes between Hungary and Venice over Dalmatia. According to them the fighting was initiated by a counterattack of *ban* Kledin and, although the Doge, leading an army to Dalmatia to meet him, was defeated and killed in a battle at Zara, Venice retained the town. Then the new Doge, Domenico Michiel, marched against the Hungarians and managed to reconquer Spalato, Trau and Belgrade thus recovering the whole Dalmatia once more for the Republic. The Venetian restoration was followed by the signing of a five-year truce in 1117 or 1118.¹⁶ However, on the basis of a charter from Arbe dated to 1118—and containing the name of Ordelaaffo Faliero as Doge¹⁷—it can also be assumed that the last battle between Kledin and the Doge at Zara, in which the latter was killed, occurred as late as the spring of 1118; furthermore, according to a 12th century source, the peace treaty between Hungary and Venice was concluded in 1119.¹⁸ The fact not to be questioned is that Hungarian rule in Dalmatia came to an end on account of these wars.

During the time of the Venetian wars the foreign policy of Stephen II was also gravely frustrated in other fields. The relationship between Hungary and Bohemia had deteriorated during the reign of Coloman with the Bohemian ruling Prince, Svatopluk, taking part in Henry V's attack on Hungary in 1108 and again breaking through into Hungary at the beginning of 1109.¹⁹ Both countries regarded having a new sovereign on the Hungarian throne a good opportunity to mend fences between the two states and in the spring of 1116 both the ruling Prince of Bohemia and the Hungarian king marched to the river Olšava, on the border of Hungary and Moravia with their armies in order to negotiate personally. However, the mistrustfulness, on account of earlier events, was so deep between the two parties that in the end a bloody battle ensued between the armies of Vladislav I and Stephen II on May 13, 1116 in which a serious defeat was inflicted on the Hungarians.²⁰ Thus in the first decade of the reign of Stephen II relations between Bohemia and Hungary did not improve and the Hungarian king, in 1120 and also in 1123, provided refuge to emigrants from Bohemia who had left their country to flee from Vladislav I.²¹

In the first phase of Stephen II's reign Hungarian–Austrian relations continued in the same inimical fashion as they had during the reign of Coloman. Indicative of this is the fact that troops of the Hungarian king reached as far as the territory of the Margraviate of Austria and after devastating it returned to Hungary with great booty in 1118. In retaliation for this attack Leopold III, the Margrave of Austria, started a campaign against Hungarian territories along the border together with his Bohemian ally, ruling Prince Bořivoj the same year.²² In the light of the sources it seems fairly probable that both parties carried out (intermittent) raids for booty—as was the custom of the times²³—and the argument, according to which the Hungarian monarch took revenge on the German emperor for supporting Venice in the Dalmatian question by raiding Austria is quite untenable here.²⁴

What is fairly clear, however, is that Stephen II followed in his father's footsteps in his Russian policy. In 1118 Yaroslav, the son of Svyatopolk, ruling Prince of Kiev, the late ally of Coloman, fell out with the Grand Duke, Vladimir Monomach, who

opposed disintegration²⁵ and was forced to leave his principality, Vladimir in Volhinia. Monomach put his son, Andrei in his place. The tension in the relations between Kiev and Hungary, owing to Euphemia's return, acted in Yaroslav's favour when he asked Stephen II—besides the Bohemians and the Poles—to help him regain his principality. Other Russian princes, such as Volodar of Przemyśl and Vasilko of Terebovl, who were worried about the efforts to restore the Kievan Principality to its earlier might, also supported Yaroslav.²⁶ It was the king himself who led the Hungarian armies to Russia in 1123—to the advantage of the forces of disintegration. Stephen II also wanted to revenge his father's grievance of 1099.²⁷ Yaroslav died under the fortress of Vladimir at the beginning of the siege and the barons, deeming any further fighting unnecessary, persuaded Stephen II to return home. Thus his involvement in the disputes of the Russian princes proved a failure.²⁸

As to the struggle between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy, which ended in 1122 with the Concordat of Worms, Stephen very probably took the same side as his father had. He was obviously prompted to do so by Henry V's involvement in the Hungarian-Venetian conflict on the Doge's side. It is inferred that Stephen II's marriage to the daughter of Robert, Norman Duke of Capua, in the early 1120s²⁹ is evidence of his allegiance to the Papacy, since in their struggle against Henry V the most important allies and staunchest vassals of Popes Pascal II and Gelasius II were none other than Robert, Duke of Capua and his successor. It was probably the latter who gave the girl in marriage to Stephen³⁰ and papal mediation in the affair cannot be ruled out.

At the same time, it can be assumed—taking the hostile relations between Venice and the Normans into account³¹—that the Norman marriage of the King of Hungary, apart from its pro-Papal implications, was also directed at acquiring an ally against Venice. The clashes to follow between Hungary and Venice proved that the feudal ruling classes of Hungary did not give up the idea of conquering Dalmatia and were only waiting for a favourable opportunity to restore their control over it.

When the five-year armistice, concluded in 1119, was over Stephen II deemed the time of the Venetian-Byzantine conflict suitable for regaining Dalmatia. In his economic policy John II, Emperor of Byzantium, always kept the interests of the Byzantine merchants in mind and tried to protect them against foreigners. On realizing the damaging effect of the privileges of 1082 on the economy of Byzantium he would not renew the golden bull of Alexius I for Venice. The Republic, however, did not want to acquiesce to the loss of these remarkably advantageous privileges and decided to resort to violent means in order to extort the renewal of the charter. In the summer of 1122 a large Venetian fleet, commanded by the Doge, set out eastward to strengthen the shaken positions of the Republic in the Levant and Byzantium. Following a successful performance in the East the fleet turned homeward in 1124 and on its way back laid waste to the islands and the coastline of the empire. Since this campaign convinced John II that the Byzantine navy was incapable of defending the territories of Byzantium from the ravages of Venice, he was forced to give in and made an agreement with the Doge in 1126, renewing the privileges of 1082.³² It was this absence of the Venetian fleet in engagements in the East that Stephen II exploited in the execution of his Dalmatian plans. These were most probably put into action in the first half of 1124. The king's charter of July 1124, in which Stephen confirmed the privileges of the

citizens of Trau and Spalato that Coloman had granted them, testifies to this.³³ The occupation was successful because the Hungarian king now possessed Central Dalmatia with the possible exception of Zara and the islands.³⁴ But Hungarian rule did not prove lasting since, in the spring of 1125, the Venetian fleet commanded by the Doge, after returning from the East and devastating the Byzantine coastline, caused, one after the other, the surrender of Spalato, Trau and Sebenico, besieged and reconquered Tengerfehérvár³⁵ and thus in one swoop Dalmatia belonged to Venice again. Perhaps it should be pointed out that the sources do not support the supposition that the attempt to restore Hungarian control over Dalmatia was preceded by a Byzantine–Hungarian alliance against Venice³⁶ and that Stephen II had the approval of Byzantium when reconquering the Dalmatian territories.³⁷

In the middle of the 1120s—in the wake of the Dalmatian fiasco—a new period started in the foreign policy of Stephen II characterized, on the one hand, by his putting Hungary's relations with the West (primarily with Bohemia) in order and, on the other, by undertaking an open confrontation with Byzantium which was to last for years.

In April 1125, after the death of Vladislav I, Soběslav succeeded him on the throne of Bohemia. He was the husband of Adelheid, one of the daughters of the blinded prince, Álmos. Soběslav consolidated his power by defending his crown from his rival, Otto, Prince of Olomouc, in February 1126 and then recognizing King Lothar III as overlord of Bohemia.³⁸ The ruling Prince of Bohemia and the King of Hungary met in October 1126. The two monarchs struck up a friendly relationship, thus bringing the period of hostilities between Hungary and Bohemia to an end.³⁹ The maintenance of a friendly contact with Bohemia was one of the crucial points and most solid elements not only in the foreign policy of Stephen II, but also in that of Béla II and this was to prove especially fruitful for the Hungarian monarchs. Stephen II settled his affairs in a similar fashion with Conrad, Archbishop of Salzburg, who, besides owning large estates in Carinthia, was also the metropolite of the Margraviate of Austria. The peace made with the archbishop, most probably around 1125–1127, was also instrumental in normalizing the relations between Hungary and Austria.⁴⁰

While relations with the Bohemian principality and the Archbishopric of Salzburg were improving the attentions of the Hungarian king and the ruling classes gradually turned towards Byzantium. The reason for this was that Hungarian–Byzantine relations had, by that time, sunk to a new low and in the summer of 1127 this extremely tense situation exploded in open hostilities resulting in wars that lasted for years.

The differences between Hungary and Byzantium had already arisen during the Hungarian–Venetian wars of 1115–1118, when Emperor Alexius I supported the Doge's Dalmatian conquest against Hungary. Further on, when the disputes between Byzantium and Venice became more settled in the summer of 1126, Hungary regarded it as the Byzantine recognition of the control over Dalmatia, which Venice had restored in 1125.

At the same time, certain commercial disputes were also trying the relations of the two countries. Nicetas Choniates, the Byzantine historian, provides the following information: the cause of the hostilities, much talked about by the public, was that the inhabitants of the Byzantine town, Braničevo, attacked Hungarian merchants and abused them most abominably.⁴¹ It is, of course, well known that the land route to the Levant led from Hungary through Belgrade, Braničevo, Sofia and Philippopolis

(today Plovdiv) to Constantinople. Hungarian merchants founded colonies at some of the important stations on this road, thus in Braničevo and Philippopolis, and they were present at the fairs of Constantinople, one of the most important commercial centres of the Mediterranean. It has been mentioned that Emperor John II, in trying to revive the economic life of Byzantium, became involved in a severe conflict with Venice at this time as he tried to protect the interests of Byzantine merchants. It cannot be ruled out that certain aspects of Byzantine trade may have been behind the unhappy events that befell the Hungarian merchants in Braničevo.⁴²

However, the decisive push towards the wars of 1127–1129 between Hungary and Byzantium was provided by Prince Álmos' flight together with his followers to Byzantium.

Specialists are of widely different opinions about the time of Álmos' emigration to Byzantium.⁴³ The cause of the differences is the fact that none of the sources, either Hungarian or other, provide the exact date of the emigration. It is a fact, though, that Álmos was in Byzantium on September 1, 1127 since, according to western sources, he died there on that day.⁴⁴ The 14th century Hungarian chronicle-composition dates the emigration to the reign of Stephen II when it says, "Álmos, fearing death, fled from King Stephen to Greece".⁴⁵ The Byzantine historiographers, John Cinnamus and Nicetas Choniates, on the other hand, unanimously place the blind prince's flight to the time of the reign of Emperor John Comnenus (1118–1143).⁴⁶ So, according to these data the emigration took place sometime between 1118 and September 1127. A report from the Bohemian Cosmas of Prague may be useful in narrowing this wide time span. He relates an incident when Prince Soběslav ran away from the Bohemian ruling Prince, Vladislav I and the prince's wife, Adelheid, that is "the daughter of Prince Álmos was well received by Stephen, King of Pannonia, as he regarded her as a relative."⁴⁷ It is reasonable to assume that Stephen II could receive the daughter of Álmos well only if Álmos himself was staying in Hungary in 1123 and was a harmless relative of the king. Furthermore it should not be forgotten that, according to Nicetas Choniates, the enmities breaking out in 1127 "had one secret cause, namely, that Álmos... came to the emperor [i.e. John II], who received him very amiably." Cinnamus is even clearer: "So Álmos also came... to the emperor. And he was glad to see this man and received him benevolently... But the King of the Huns [i.e. Stephen II], learning about the events concerning his brother [i.e. Álmos], sent envoys to the emperor to have him [i.e. Álmos] expelled from the land of the Romans. But because he could not have the emperor do it he crossed the Istros [i.e. the Danube]."⁴⁸ With these Byzantine sources in mind, it is justified to wonder what might have caused an emigration, assumedly in 1113–1116, to come to the surface in 1127. It is obvious that the procedure of having a dangerous political refugee extradited or expelled generally starts much sooner than ten or fifteen years after he has emigrated.⁴⁹ Below it will be demonstrated that Prince Álmos really was a dangerous rival of Stephen II around 1125–1127. Hence, it is concluded that Álmos' flight to Byzantium can with a fair probability be dated to somewhere in 1125.⁵⁰

The sources relate that Álmos was received very favourably in Byzantium by Emperor John II, who gave the prince a town in Macedonia to settle down in.⁵¹ This came to be called Constantinia after the name Constantine, which Álmos assumed in Byzantium.⁵² Presumably, this was also the town that became the centre for the

Hungarian emigrants, partisans of Álmos, who followed the prince.⁵³ For the Hungarian Chronicle tells us that "many a Hungarian ran [to Álmos] on account of the cruelty of King Stephen."⁵⁴ The fact that Prince Álmos had to "flee from King Stephen to Byzantium fearing death" and that his partisans left for Byzantium "on account of the cruelty of the King", obviously implies that they were threatened in Hungary. Neither Hungarian nor other sources ever mention with what activities they had provoked the royal wrath. The assumption that this was the consequence of a controversy over power is supported, on the one hand, by the graveness of the impending retaliation against Álmos and his party and, on the other, by the well known past of the prince. The fact that after his request for the expulsion of Álmos through diplomatic channels had been turned down Stephen II resorted to arms and decided on a war against Byzantium, also points in that direction. His aim was to lend emphasis to his refused request and also to take revenge on the emperor for the aid and comfort the latter was giving to his enemies.

Coloman, by blinding Álmos, Béla and their chief followers around 1115, was able to nip the attempts of Álmos to seize power in the bud and thus he ensured the succession of his own son, Stephen. It is presumed that during the first decade of Stephen's reign, Prince Álmos was a recluse in the monastery of Dömös, which he had founded,⁵⁵ where he was waiting for the favourable moment to go into action. It would seem that the time around 1125 appeared suitable for the realization of his plans, as the failures of Stephen II in Russia (1123) and Dalmatia (1125) had cast a damaging shadow on his reign. The fact that even the king's party showed signs of serious discontent in 1123, is indicative of the correctness of Álmos' expectations. For the Hungarian Chronicle relates that when Stephen II, during his campaign in Russia, wanted to continue fighting, even after his protégé, Yaroslav had died, the barons in his retinue firmly opposed his will threatening him that they would install a new king and, in the end, forcing him to end the campaign and return home.⁵⁶ The opposition grouping around Álmos probably wanted to exploit this feeling of discontent over Stephen's foreign policy in order to seize power. The king and those around him, however, noticed the increasing activity of Álmos and his party in time and cracked down on them before the murmurings of rebellion were able to grow to full proportions. The king and his supporters showed no mercy towards those endangering their power. Thus Álmos and many of his men fled to Byzantium in the face of the gravest reprisals.

No data are available as to why the blind prince particularly sought refuge in Byzantium, though it is possible to conjecture at the motives that directed Álmos to the Greek emperor. Among the neighbouring countries Stephen II maintained good relations with Russia⁵⁷ and, at the same time, the party in opposition to his Russian allies was headed by Kiev where at this time Boris was probably still in residence with his mother.⁵⁸ In all events, with the anarchy and disruption tearing Russia apart, there did not seem much hope for the badly needed help Álmos wanted from any of the ruling princes there. In Poland the throne was occupied by Bolesław III, who had once already seriously disappointed Álmos.⁵⁹ In Bohemia and in the German Empire new sovereigns were in the process of ascending their thrones, the successions being followed by grave inner strifes in both countries.⁶⁰ The experiences of 1105-1106 must have been a good lesson for Álmos anyway. At the same time several motives may have

urged him to flee to Byzantium. He was familiar with the conditions there since he had already been in Constantinople once in 1107 during his pilgrimage to the Holy Land.⁶¹ His being a close relative of the Empress Piroska-Irene might also have bent him in favour of an emigration to Byzantium. Finally, the controversy between Hungary and Byzantium promised a safe refuge and protection for the prince in the land of the Greeks. These facts provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the prince and a group of his supporters fled to Byzantium, where they really found asylum and efficient protection under the Byzantine emperor. Thus Álmos was the first pretender in Hungarian history who left for exile in Byzantium, setting an example for nearly all the Hungarian pretenders in the 12th century.

Stephen and his followers must have deemed the Byzantine support for Álmos and his retainers as being immensely dangerous to themselves. A passage in the Hungarian Chronicle seems to support this view, where it says that Stephen II went to war with Byzantium because the basileus called the King of Hungary his vassal.⁶² What becomes clear from this otherwise rather naive and confused story in the *Chronicon Pictum* is that the royal court in Hungary was afraid that the blind prince—who had just shown that only the crown would satisfy him—might, as in his earlier attempts with foreign (Polish and German) help, seize the first opportunity and try to carry off Stephen II's crown with support, this time from Byzantium, even at the price of Byzantine vassalage. Understandably, the king, wishing to negate any further threat from Álmos and with a final showdown in mind, demanded the expulsion of the prince from Byzantium.

The rejection of this demand was the most important cause in bringing about the war between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire.

Before the king's troops entered the territory of the empire, however, important events had taken place in Stephen's court. Chapter 158 of the Hungarian Chronicle says, "Before indeed the king learned about Béla, the nation decided that after the king's death Saul, the son of his sister, Sophia, should reign".⁶³ What this seems to amount to is that after the flight of Álmos the king's supporters—with Stephen II's knowledge—having considered all the possible consequences of the coming war, designated Saul, the child of Sophia, Coloman's daughter, to be heir apparent in case the king, who was somewhat delicate of health, died, since the monarch still had no offspring from his Norman marriage.⁶⁴ The chronicle does not directly record the date of Saul's designation. It is inferred that, in all probability, it was in the first half of 1127 that the king and his party deemed it of utmost importance to have an heir apparent of their own and thus to be able to regard both the future development of power and that of the crown as provided for and settled against all kinds of attempts, including the one Álmos might have been plotting in Byzantium, even in case the king died.

In the summer of 1127⁶⁵ the troops of Stephen II, under his personal command, penetrated deep into the Balkan territories of the Byzantine Empire. During the attack they occupied, looted and wreaked havoc in Belgrade, Braničevo, Niš and Sofia, advancing as far as Philippopolis. This unexpected, devastating onslaught by the Hungarians found Emperor John II in Philippopolis, where he forced them to retreat from under the town before spending the rest of the year preparing a counteroffensive.⁶⁶ The clashes to come were not to be stopped even by the death of Prince Álmos on September 1, 1127.⁶⁷ Some scholars associate the 1127 attack of Stephen II with

the removal of the relics of St. Ivan of Rila from Sofia to Esztergom.⁶⁸ It is, however, more likely that this happened later during Béla III's reign along with the return of the same relics.⁶⁹

In 1128, the Byzantine war-machine commanded by the emperor—the army reinforced by Lombardians and Seljuqs was also supported by the Greek navy on the Danube—marched on Hungary.⁷⁰ The objective of the attack was to retaliate for the Hungarian raid of the previous year. A Byzantine source also refers to the retaliatory character of the campaign.⁷¹ The royal army of the Hungarians entrenched itself around Sirmium and Temesköz, defending the line of the Danube. At the king's command, who was not able to be there in person owing to his illness, they were led by a commander called Setephel.⁷² Following the victory of the Byzantine navy the emperor's army crossed the Danube near the fort of Haram and inflicted a great defeat on the Hungarians in a bloody battle near the river Karaso.⁷³ In the wake of this victory the Byzantine army occupied Sirmium, Semlin and the fort of Haram, taking plenty of plunder in the process, then withdrew to Byzantine territory. Having fortified Braničevo, the Byzantine counterpart of Hungarian Haram, the emperor and his army returned to Constantinople.⁷⁴ It seems that the description of these events would reasonably suggest that during this campaign the emperor did not intend to take permanent possession of Haram, Semlin or Sirmium, that is, it was not the goal of the attack to occupy and annex Hungarian territories to Byzantium. In the sources there are no traces of the Byzantines' settling down, and, moreover, Cinnamus also reports the immediate withdrawal of the Byzantine army.⁷⁵

The victorious campaign of the emperor, however, seriously affected Hungarian internal politics. Apparently, part of the leading group of the ruling classes did not think it was reasonable to plunge the kingdom into a military confrontation with Byzantium, a situation which would only mean further tribulations—all because of Álmos, who had fled the country. The great defeat at Haram could only increase the general dissatisfaction voiced at the Byzantine policy of Stephen II, thus narrowing the king's social basis. For this is what the Hungarian Chronicle says: "It happened that the king fell so ill in Eger that all thought he was dying. And then traitors, cherishing vain hopes, elected *comes* Bors and Ivan kings. When, by the grace of God, the king recovered he had Ivan beheaded and *comes* Bors was ignobly cast out from the court to Byzantium."⁷⁶ Adhering to our opinion expressed elsewhere we believe that *comes* Bors and Ivan were elected kings around 1128 following the defeat at Haram. The fact that Bors was a *comes* and that he and his family were driven out of the royal court indicates that Bors, and Ivan as well, just like their followers, whom the source refers to as traitors, belonged to the closest circle surrounding the king, that is, they had formerly been loyal followers of Stephen II. The failure of the attempt of Bors and Ivan also shows that the supporters of the king, though weakened by the separation of the claimants to the throne, their followers and some of their families, were still stronger than their enemies. At the same time, the drastic removal of the rivals is also reflective of the fact that the king's followers obviously would not support the claims of any other aspirants than those of their own designate, the official heir apparent Saul.⁷⁷

In any case with his departure to Byzantium Bors became the second Hungarian pretender seeking refuge in the empire at this time. The available sources relate nothing whatever about his fate. Some of the specialists identify *comes* Bors with the son of

Coloman, Boris, who was born in Russia after his mother, Euphemia, had been sent home and who must have been brought up in the court of the Grand Duke of Kiev. According to this view Boris had already arrived in Hungary during the reign of Stephen II, but started plotting against the king, the outcome of which was his escape to Byzantium.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, this undoubtedly clever combination cannot be accepted due to lack of sufficient evidence from contemporary sources.

The only palpable argument for the identification of Bors with Boris can be the obvious similarity of their names. It should be remembered, however, that the two names are only similar not identical. There are further, more serious arguments against the view supporting the identification of *comes* Bors with Boris. It must be noticed, first of all, that the Hungarian Chronicle, which mentions Boris and refers to him and his activities three times—these being his birth, his advance into Hungary in 1132 and his performance in 1147—on each of the three occasions relates the person of Boris, in one way or another, closely with that of King Coloman.⁷⁹ In this respect it is totally irrelevant that the authors writing the Hungarian Chronicle at different times,⁸⁰ twice refer to Boris openly as a bastard, the illegitimate son of Coloman,⁸¹ and once let the context imply the same view.⁸² When writing about Bors, however, the chronicler does not even hint at Coloman. This would obviously indicate that the author of chapter 158 of the chronicle did not consider the *comes* identical with Boris.

There is one more element that rules out the identification of these two persons, namely Bors' title. In the chronicle-composition and elsewhere the male members of the Hungarian royal family, the Árpáds, are mentioned either only by their first names or together with the word *dux* indicating their high rank. But a single case has never been encountered where any of the Árpáds are mentioned with the title *comes*.⁸³ Thus around 1128 Bors' title *comes* rules out any identity with Boris. Most probably Bors was an illustrious *comes* belonging to the Miskolc-clan, a *genus* with a grand history⁸⁴ and he may have been associated with the Árpáds like *comes* Lampert.⁸⁵ In other respects the figure of Bors is similar to the person of Vid, *comes* of Bács, who had attempted to seize the crown of a prince in Salomon's time.⁸⁶ What is more important is that the action of Ivan and Bors tells something of the increasing crisis and decay within the ruling party, the first signs of which had been manifested in the events in Russia in 1123. Later it will be seen that Coloman's illegitimate son did not go to Emperor John's court in Constantinople as early as 1128, but in 1130–1131.

Having radically put an end to the attempt by Ivan and Bors to seize power, Stephen II could start organizing a counterstrike against Byzantium, and the clashes between Hungary and Byzantium went on with unabating fervour. In the first half of 1129 Stephen was the initiating party driving his forces into the Byzantine Empire once more. That year the Hungarian army had Bohemian–Moravian auxiliaries—sent by the Bohemian ruling Prince, Soběslav, under the command of Václav, Moravian prince of Olomouc—against the Byzantines.⁸⁷ This is unquestionable evidence for the Bohemian–Hungarian treaty of 1126. The allies besieged and took Braničevo and burnt down the town.⁸⁸ The fact that the Hungarians directed their 1129 assault on Byzantine territory against the town of Braničevo and not against Sirmium convincingly proves the contention that following the battle of Haram in 1128 Byzantium had not held on to the devastated and occupied Sirmium. Some are of the opinion that this attack of Stephen II took place in 1128.⁸⁹ While not completely ruling

out this possibility, a different explanation can, however, be offered. Cinnamus is the only author writing about the Hungarian attack on Braničevo. According to him, after the great clash of 1128, following the return of Emperor John to Constantinople, "before long the Huns [i.e. Hungarians] laid siege to Braničevo".⁹⁰ This rather loose dating by the Byzantine author is obviously a very uncertain way of determining the time of the attack on Braničevo and can be used to justify any kind of dating. A significant fact should, however, be taken into consideration, namely, that in 1128 the complete royal army suffered a serious defeat.⁹¹ This, on the one hand, may have been responsible for an atmosphere in the country which could hardly be very favourable for any immediate counteraction. On the other hand, because of the serious losses described in detail in Hungarian and Byzantine sources,⁹² the preparation for the counterstrike itself must have taken a long time. The diplomatic steps that resulted in the Bohemian-Moravian auxiliaries coming to Hungary probably also formed an important element of the preparations. Furthermore remembering that—most likely—the conspiracy of *comes* Bors and Ivan occurred after the disaster of Haram, one is left only the first half of 1129 as the time of Stephen II's counterattack against Braničevo.

Cinnamus records that, roughly simultaneously with the Hungarian attack, the Serbs of Rascia, who were a dependency of Byzantium, revolted against Byzantine domination.⁹³ No data are available as to whether the King of Hungary and Uroš I, Serbian Grand *Župan* of Rascia, had earlier concerted their actions of 1129 against Byzantium, but it seems very probable that Stephen II and Uroš I were in touch sometime during 1129. The Hungarian Chronicle relates that when Stephen II received word that Béla was alive he immediately proposed to Elena, the daughter of Uroš I, Grand *Župan* of Serbia, for Álmos' son the blind Béla.⁹⁴ It is inferred that the marriage was concluded probably in 1129.⁹⁵

As a result of the Hungarian attack and the revolt of the Serbs, the Byzantine army went on the offensive under the leadership of the emperor. First John defeated the Serbs forcing them to make peace and pay homage to him.⁹⁶ Then he marched into Braničevo and rebuilt the destroyed fortifications of the town.⁹⁷ At this time Stephen II crossed the Danube and launched a new attack on the emperor, who was still biding his time in the neighbourhood of Braničevo. On account of the wintry weather and the deficiencies in the equipment of his army, John did not take up battle, but started to withdraw. The Hungarian army attacked the retreating Byzantine troops, who were able to escape a really serious defeat only by exploiting a betrayal.⁹⁸

In the wake of this clash the envoys of Stephen II and John II concluded a peace treaty on an island in the Danube near Braničevo at the end of 1129.⁹⁹ The treaty brought several years of warring to an end and was based on the territorial *status quo ante*.¹⁰⁰ We can establish the date of the peace treaty with the help of Bohemian sources, which relate that Prince Václav having returned from the Hungarian-Byzantine war died four months later on February 28, 1130. Thus the peace made near Braničevo can be dated to October 1129.¹⁰¹ It was Byzantium that especially was in need of this treaty since fighting sprang up again in Asia Minor in 1129, where the Armenians from Cilicia were attacking important eastern territories of the empire with the aim of conquest.¹⁰²

These three years of strife between Hungary and Byzantium, in terms of proportions, can obviously be regarded as a prelude to the clashes in the later decades of the 12th century, since such a large scale conflict between the two countries was unprecedented. At the same time, however, this confrontation cannot in any way be regarded either as "the first attack of Byzantium, the world power",¹⁰³ or as the first manifestation of some "Greek peril" towards Hungary,¹⁰⁴ or as an introduction to the "struggle against the imperialist aspirations of Byzantium in the mid-12th century".¹⁰⁵ In judging these events it should be realized as significant that it was the Hungarian Kingdom and not the Byzantine Empire that started the war in 1127 and 1129. Byzantium had no intention of conquering Hungary, neither of setting up a vassal king, nor even of territorial expansion. All the empire wanted was to maintain the *status quo*, the security of the Danube frontier and later to retaliate for Hungarian attacks and avert further ones. The sources do not say one word about Emperor John having the acquisition of any political advantage in this war in mind. It is well known that Prince Álmos died on September 1, 1127, but the size and vehemence of the struggle reached its climax after his death; nor is there any information about any Hungarian pretender supported by Byzantium—like, for example, *comes* Bors—playing even but the slightest of roles in the continuing encounters. The assumption that Boris, the alleged son of Coloman, took part in these clashes on the side of Byzantium is totally unsupported by the sources.¹⁰⁶ Be as it may, by undertaking the war against Byzantium Hungarian foreign policy opened up a new front, which gained its real significance in the later decades of the 12th century. Although the revolt of the Serbs of Rascia was put down in 1129 and Byzantium made peace with Hungary as well, the marriage of Elena, the daughter of Uroš, Grand *Župan* of Rascia and the Hungarian prince, Béla, was in the long run to strengthen the cooperation between the Serbs and Hungarians. This dynastic connection considerably affected Serbian and Hungarian history for decades.

Certain data in the Hungarian Chronicle reveal that in the last phase of Stephen II's reign, approximately from the mid-1120s, the central problem of internal politics was the destiny of the crown, the question of who would have supreme power. In this period, before and after Álmos, the 14th century chronicle-composition mentions the appearance of four pretenders in one chapter. They were Saul, Bors, Ivan and the blind Béla.¹⁰⁷ This, obviously, can be regarded as a sign of the larger division and polarization within the Hungarian ruling classes. The struggle for power became extremely intense. A number of the barons previously supporting Coloman and Stephen II turned their backs on Stephen II by electing *comes* Bors and Ivan anti-kings. This signified the narrowing of the social basis of the sovereign. Besides the above-mentioned factors in foreign politics certain internal causes also contributed to this change. In the first place, it is a fact that—apart from confirming other lords' endowments to the churches, returning earlier endowments and estates, and apart from the dubious founding of the monastery at Váradhegyfok—Stephen II apparently did not make any foundations of his own to the churches.¹⁰⁸ Obviously his parsimony in this respect did not render his policies very popular among the ecclesiastical dignitaries. It is also known that Coloman's provisions about the recovery of certain ecclesiastical possessions were in operation during Stephen II's reign.¹⁰⁹

The king, while making merciless showdowns an almost general political practice in the settling of disputes with his opponents, was obliged to take measures to counteract the narrowing of his social basis. Such a step was for example that during the wars against Byzantium he gave an increasing political and military role to the Pechenegs, who were admitted to Hungary after 1122,¹¹⁰ but there is also evidence of other foreign elements—of French¹¹¹ and perhaps, German¹¹² origin—coming to the foreground during his reign. All this probably added to the discontent of the Hungarian barons, pushed out of their positions.¹¹³ However, from the point of view of the future of royal power, one decision of the king proved very important. Stephen II—most probably in 1129—raised the blind Béla to himself, married him to Elena, the daughter of the Serbian ruling Prince of Rascia, and had him royally provided for in Tolna.¹¹⁴

The literature on the subject is divided as to where Prince Béla was staying after his father, Álmos had emigrated to Byzantium.¹¹⁵ Contrary to our earlier view,¹¹⁶ it seems that the blind prince did not go to Byzantium, but was hiding in Hungary, probably at Pécsvárad.¹¹⁷ The viewpoint of the narrative of the Hungarian Chronicle, namely, that Stephen II designated Béla his heir,¹¹⁸ seems merely to be a fiction of the historiography favouring the Álmos branch, professing the concept of legitimacy, which includes the designation of the heir by the king.¹¹⁹ The fact that when Béla was recovered Stephen II already had Saul as heir designate, qualifies Béla's designation as fiction. Apart from this, inner motifs also question the credibility of the information of the chronicle. So, it seems surprising today—if Stephen really meant to make Béla his heir—that he selected the remote Tolna for his place of residence and did not take him into the royal court where the prince could have acquired the necessary experience for his future reign. The fact that Béla received royal provision from Stephen does not unambiguously imply his being heir designate. Ladislav is also known to have provided royally for the dethroned Salomon,¹²⁰ but this did not mean that Ladislav considered him his successor. With all this taken into consideration it is contended that Stephen II's support for the blind prince, hiding from the wrath of the king, was meant to win those of the party of Álmos who remained in Hungary. Doubtlessly, this considerably strengthened the positions of Álmos' party around Béla in the following struggle for royal power. After the rise of the blind prince Stephen II's dignitaries had to share their power with Béla's followers, who were enjoying royal support and this, obviously, may have caused further discord within the party of the king's supporters.

No precise information is available about how the party of Álmos seized power and the way the blind prince obtained the throne. The main point must have been that around the time Stephen II died in the spring of 1131¹²¹ the power relationships within the different groups of the ruling classes—partly as a result of Coloman's and Stephen's party having been in decay for years, with some of them joining Béla's followers¹²²—changed in favour of Álmos' party which had rallied round the blind prince after his father's death. The result of all this—perhaps after Saul's death¹²³—was that the blind Béla was crowned King of Hungary on April 28, 1131.¹²⁴ In the spring of 1131 the fate of the crown—like in 1095–1096—was decided without the interference of foreign powers, by the internal struggle of the baronial factions. There is no evidence concerning the interference by any foreign power, including Byzantium. The view which contends that the peace treaty ending the Hungarian–Byzantine wars

had guaranteed the ascent of the blind Béla to the throne in 1131 is absolutely untenable.¹²⁵

Now, a survey of the main events in the Hungarian-Byzantine relations during the half century just reviewed will show that in this period, unlike during the low ebb in the age of Ladislas, contacts between Hungary and Byzantium had grown to a considerable extent and of the two countries Hungary was the more active party, usually taking the initiative. This is demonstrated by the renewed attempts at expansion towards the Adriatic, the military help given to Byzantium against the Normans and the Hungarian attacks on Byzantium in 1127 and 1129. True, the marriage of Piroska-Irene to John was initiated by Byzantium, but while Alexius had the possibility of averting a Hungarian-Norman alliance directed against him in mind, this dynastic connection made the occupation of Dalmatia considerably easier for Coloman. At the same time, the initiative of Byzantium against Hungary can be detected only in its theoretical approval of the Venetian invasion aimed at seizing Dalmatia, in the admission of Prince Álmos—and, perhaps, that of *comes* Bors—and in the retaliatory campaign of 1128.

Chapter III

The loosening of connections

The struggle for power between the supporters of Coloman and those of Álmos was not brought to an end with the coronation of Béla the Blind. The followers of Béla II were preparing to deliver a sensitive blow against the leaders in Coloman's party in order to make the power they had just gained secure. Personal revenge, which they considered justified, was the means employed by Béla's party as a pretext for the showdown with their rivals. Chapter 160 of the Hungarian Chronicle (which was interpolated at several places and hence has been a basis for diverse conjectures) relates that at the assembly in Arad, in the spring and summer of 1131, around the time Béla II was crowned,¹ the followers of the king, at the instigation of Queen Elena, attacked the old leading group of Coloman's party which could be accused of and condemned for blinding Álmos and Béla.² The massacre, in which 68 magnates lost their lives, clearly indicates that the fate of the royal crown was not to be decided by the peaceful reconciliation of these rivals, but by a merciless struggle between the opposing powers. The former followers of Coloman and Stephen II did not give up despite the failures they suffered, but launched a large-scale counteroffensive by setting up a pretender against Béla. Their man was Boris, the alleged son of Coloman.

According to the records, Boris was after his father's kingdom so he went to Greece, where he was cordially received by Emperor John II, who married him to his own niece.³ The sources do not provide the exact time of Boris' arrival in Byzantium and the literature on the subject gives different dates.⁴ It appears that the pretender, whom the sources do not mention at all in connection with the wars of 1127–1129 and who, on the other hand, was already in Poland in the first half of 1132, had left the court of his uncle, Mstislav, Grand Duke of Kiev, for Byzantium most probably in the years of 1130–1131.⁵ Boris, who is also mentioned as Kalamanos in Byzantium,⁶ hoped to rally the emperor's support to realize his plans.⁷ John II, however, refused to help him acquire the crown of Hungary.

This conduct of Byzantium was also motivated by the fact—as demonstrated by the lessons of the war of 1127–1129—that at this time her interests in Hungary were limited to maintaining the *status quo* and the security of the Danube frontier of the empire. The reluctance of the emperor to meddle in the dispute over the crown of Hungary was natural because the central questions of Byzantine foreign policy were posed by the problems in the East and in Italy these years. Two important enemies of the empire had already arisen in Asia Minor during the Hungarian–Byzantine war. The Armenians of Cilicia, under the leadership of Thoros I and his successor, Leo and the Seljuqs of the Emirate of Melitene, led by the Dānishmend Ghazi III, turned on Byzantium nearly

simultaneously, occupying Byzantine territories. Constantinople deemed Amir Ghazi's aggressive policy especially dangerous and John II himself conducted a Byzantine attack on the emirate as early as 1130. The fighting continued until 1135 with the emperor leading five campaigns during this time with the purpose of forcing the Dānishmend amir back.⁸ At the same time, the Norman Kingdom of Southern Italy came into existence in 1130 and its consolidation dealt a heavy blow to the Byzantine plans concerning the recovery of the lost territories in Southern Italy.⁹ Finally, these foreign policy problems were further aggravated by the difficulties that the conspiracies of *sebastocrator* Isaac posed for the Emperor of Byzantium. For it was precisely in these years—1130 and 1132—that the brother of John II repeatedly attempted to gain the imperial crown.¹⁰ It is inferred that the reason why the Emperor of Byzantium did not support Boris in his quest for the crown of Hungary lay more in these facts of home and foreign affairs than in the family relationship that existed between John II and Béla II.¹¹ At the same time the contention that John II helped Boris against Béla because he wanted to make Hungary the vassal kingdom of Byzantium is entirely groundless.¹²

Disappointed, Boris left Byzantium looking for a patron who would be willing to support his aspirations for the crown of Hungary with weapons. It is recorded that he went to Poland and managed to win its ruling prince for his cause.¹³ Bolesław III threw all his weight beside the pretender indeed. The reason was that he wished to restore the alliance between Hungary and Poland of Coloman's time, which had been most fruitful for both countries against the expansion of the German Empire. Poland was still opposing the German expansion, a menace to Polish independence, and a serious tension also sprang up between the two countries because of Western Pomerania.¹⁴

It was in Poland that a great number of Hungarian magnates went to see Boris, recognizing him not only as King Coloman's son, but also as their king. They joined and implored him to come and take the kingdom.¹⁵ This information, taken from Hungarian and foreign sources, testifies that at that time Boris had managed to attract a significant part of the Hungarian ruling class to his side. Thus it was possible that in the summer of 1132 Boris, accompanied by Bolesław III and Polish and Russian troops, augmented by Hungarian baron-refugees, advanced into Hungary from Poland.¹⁶ The events at the royal council near the river Sajó unanimously point to the fact that the ambition of Boris in this action met with the efforts of the remnants of Coloman's former party to regain power. At this gathering of the magnates the followers of Béla II fell upon and mercilessly massacred those barons who were undecided about taking sides against Boris. The murdered lords included *comes* Lampert, his son, *comes* Nicholas (Miklós), Moynolth¹⁷ from the Ákos genus, all of whom had been politically active as members of Coloman's party in support of Stephen II.¹⁸ This bloody showdown with the barons, sympathetic to the pretender, by the faithful of Béla II was most instrumental in preventing the lords, whom the Hungarian Chronicle called traitors, from supporting Boris with their troops—a liability much expected by Boris and his retinue, according to a Polish chronicler.¹⁹

Béla the Blind and the leading group of the ruling class did their best to protect their power in the field of foreign politics as well. The position of the King of Hungary was considerably strengthened against Boris by the fact that Béla II, through the Austrian marriage of his sister, had secured the alliance and military support of Leopold III,

Margrave of Austria for himself against Boris and his party.²⁰ In the battle near the river Sajó, Boris and his allies suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Hungarian–Austrian army on July 22, 1132.²¹ Soon after this the Bohemian and Russian allies of Béla took the offensive against the King of Poland, who was supporting Boris. The advances of Soběslav I of Bohemia into Poland in October 1132, in January 1133, and in February 1134 and those of Volodimerko, ruling Prince of Przemyśl, in 1135, also served the interests of Béla II against Boris.²² The mediation of the Bohemian monarch in 1134 even won Emperor Lothar for Béla against Bolesław III in the Polish–Hungarian conflict caused by Boris.²³ Eventually, in August 1135, at the Diet of Merseburg, the Polish monarch paid homage to the emperor, swore fealty to him and also promised, among other things, to abandon hostilities against Hungary,²⁴ which meant the end of his support for Boris. During Béla II's reign Boris never again attempted to seize the crown.

The ruling class, having successfully defended the power they had gained in the spring of 1131 against the last attempt of Coloman's party grouping around Boris, now under the leadership of Béla II, set out on the way of expansion and the defensive tactics of the first years were replaced by an offensive, aggressive foreign policy.

The first step of the expansion during Béla II's time was the acquisition of a part of Dalmatia, most probably in 1136,²⁵ since it was in this year that with the help of Felician, Archbishop of Esztergom, Gaudius became Archbishop of Spalato.²⁶ The view that this Hungarian conquest of Dalmatia took place around 1133²⁷ is unacceptable because in that case it would be inexplicable why it took the Hungarians nearly three years to fill in the archiepiscopal see of Spalato, which had been vacant for some time.²⁸ The Hungarian occupation of some of the Dalmatian towns divided Dalmatia into three parts for a long time. Venice continued to dominate the northern part: Zara and the isles. The central part, Spalato, Trau and Sebenico²⁹ was ruled by Hungary, while the southern part with Ragusa (Dubrovnik) as the centre, belonged, as earlier, to Byzantium.³⁰ The next leg in the Hungarian advance southward was the voluntary submission of Bosnia³¹ and the occupation of the territory around the river Rama.³² Bosnia had joined the Hungarian Kingdom by the spring of 1137.³³ Rama was probably conquered only after this.³⁴ Following the conquest the Hungarian monarch assumed the title of King of Rama,³⁵ while the nominal dependence of Bosnia during the reign of Béla II was to be guaranteed by the Bosnian dukedom of his son, Ladislav (László) from 1137.³⁶ Bosnia was governed by the Bosnian *bans* in practice.³⁷

Thus the King of Hungary was considerably successful in extending his suzerainty over foreign lands without getting involved in military conflict with any of his neighbours. These achievements can be attributed to the strength of Hungary on the one hand and, on the other, to the international situation, which was remarkably favourable for expansion at this time. Undoubtedly, the conquest of Dalmatia hurt the influence of Venice over the Adriatic and was, at the same time, contrary to Byzantine interests, as in the neighbourhood of Rascia, which had been forced under the rule of the emperor, the power constellation took a disadvantageous turn for Byzantium.³⁸ The international situation in the mid-1130s forced Venice and Byzantium to accept, for better or for worse, these changes in the power relations in the Balkans. In 1129 Roger II, Count of Sicily, Duke of Apulia and Calabria, had united all the territories in

Sicily and Southern Italy, occupied by the Normans, under his rule and at Christmas 1130 he was crowned king in Palermo by favour of the anti-Pope Anacletus II. These events hurt the Italian interests of the German emperor, Pope Innocent II and the Byzantine basileus.³⁹ In 1130 Roger II announced his claim to the Principality of Antioch, a crusading state founded by the Normans.⁴⁰ With the earlier efforts of the Normans to occupy the eastern coast of the Adriatic and seize the imperial crown of Byzantium taken into consideration, the emperor's apprehension of a Norman attack from two sides is easier to understand. At the same time, the expansionist efforts and the pirating activities of the Normans gravely injured the basic economic and political interests of the merchant republics, Venice and Pisa. In 1135 Roger II also gained a foothold in North Africa. The rulers of the Mediterranean were seriously worried by the possibility of Norman hegemony over the region.⁴¹ It was not a coincidence then that in August 1135 the German Empire, Byzantium and Venice entered into an alliance against Roger in Merseburg. Before long, Pope Innocent II, Pisa and most of the cities in Northern Italy joined the coalition.⁴² Emperor Lothar and his host set out in August 1136 in order to take possession of Rome and restore Innocent to the papal throne and also to occupy the country of Roger II, i.e. to crush the Normans for good and subjugate the southern territories of Italy once more to the Holy Roman Empire. The campaign, in which Byzantium was also interested and Venice took an active part, after initial successes, petered out by the autumn of 1137 and finally ended inconclusively.⁴³ Roger II managed to prevent the destruction of his kingdom. In any case, it was at this time that Hungarian rule over a part of the Dalmatian coastline was restored and Venice, busy with the much more important Norman war, had to accept the fact reluctantly.⁴⁴ This time any possibility of a "peaceful sharing taking place" between Hungary and Venice must be ruled out.⁴⁵ The fact, though, that the northern part of Dalmatia with Zara as its centre and the isles remained in the Doge's hand, somewhat alleviated the graveness of the loss to the Republic.

In 1135 Byzantium, in order to counteract the expansionist ambitions of the Normans, allied with the Holy Roman Empire. For Byzantium the most important aim of this alliance was to keep Roger at bay with the help of the Germans, while in the meantime, the Greek Empire itself was trying to cope with its enemies in the east⁴⁶ mainly with the different Seljuq emirates, which were threatening the empire in the same way with their expansionist efforts. As early as these years the objective Emperor John wanted to achieve was the restoration of the ancient borders of the empire in the East and having his suzerainty extended as far as the Euphrates.⁴⁷ These objectives and considerations formed the most important principles of the foreign policy of Byzantium up to the time of the Second Crusade, or, more precisely, the summer of 1147, when the Normans attacked Corfu. It was in the spirit of these foreign policy conceptions that, during the Italian campaign of Lothar III in 1136-1137, Emperor John II conquered Cilicia, then subdued Antioch in the summer of 1137 and was conducting a campaign against one of his most dangerous enemies, Zengi, Amir of Mosul in the first half of 1138.⁴⁸ In such circumstances the fact that Bosnia and Rama came to be controlled by Hungary could hardly affect relations between Hungary and Byzantium seriously. This is also proved by the fact that it was at this time, in 1137, that the corpse of Prince Álmos was brought back from Byzantium,⁴⁹ an event that obviously would not have taken place in a tense situation.

The Papacy, which had always been interested in the fate of Dalmatia, also accepted Hungarian suzerainty over some of the Dalmatian cities. This is indicated by the fact that Pope Innocent II, in 1139, having been repeatedly asked to do so by King Béla not only pardoned Gaudius, Archbishop of Spalato for taking consecration from the Archbishop of Esztergom, thus infringing papal authority, but—sending him the pallium, symbol of complete archiepiscopal authority—bound all the other suffragan bishops of Dalmatia to obey Archbishop Gaudius, Metropolitane of Dalmatia.⁵⁰ It is inferred that Béla II won Innocent II to his side—the Pope being in an extremely difficult situation, unable to take possession of Rome between 1133–1138 on account of the anti-Pope supported by the Normans—by recognizing him as the rightful Pope.⁵¹ This is, by the way, the first available information about direct contacts between the King of Hungary and the Pope after more than two decades.⁵²

These years, practically those of Béla II's reign, were the first period after several decades when Hungary was not in confrontation with any of the three great powers of Europe, but maintained peaceful relations with the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy and Byzantium, as well.

The increased activity of the Hungarian ruling class in the field of foreign politics is indicated by the fact that after an interval of more than fifteen years the Hungarian king once more interfered in the disputes among the Russian principalities. In 1139 Hungarian units, together with troops from Halich, took part in the campaign of Yaropolk, Grand Duke of Kiev, against Vsevolod, ruling Prince of Chernigov.⁵³

During the reign of Béla II both parties maintained a successful alliance between Hungary and Bohemia. The ruling Prince of Bohemia came to see Béla II regularly (in 1133, 1134, 1137, and 1139).⁵⁴ After their talks in 1143, at the initiative of ruling Prince Soběslav, Conrad, Prince of Znoimo, married a relative of Béla's wife, thus cementing the alliance.⁵⁵ The connections between the German Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom were to be strengthened, on the one hand, by the support that Otto, Bishop of Bamberg, who was representing the interests of the German expansionist politics of Pomerania, received from Béla for his missionary activities in April 1139⁵⁶ and, on the other, by the engagement of Henry, son of the German king, Conrad III, who ascended the throne in 1138, and Béla II's daughter, Sophia, in June 1139.⁵⁷ This dynastic connection was primarily meant to ensure the continuity of good German–Hungarian relations, which had begun in 1134–1135 and was also expressive of the fact that in the rekindled struggle between the Welf and the Hohenstaufen houses⁵⁸ the King of Hungary backed Conrad III of the Hohenstaufen.⁵⁹

During the first years of the reign of Béla II the foreign affairs of the country were most closely related with internal politics, since the foreign policy of this period first and foremost protected the power of Béla the Blind and his supporters. After the complete failure of Boris' attempt territorial expansion came to the foreground of Hungarian foreign policy and its most serious results were achieved—by exploiting the favourable changes in international relations, chiefly the fact that Venice and Byzantium were engaged in other directions—without Béla II having to face an open confrontation with the countries involved.

On February 16, 1141 Géza II succeeded his father, who had died three days before, to the Hungarian throne.⁶⁰ At the beginning of the reign of the new king the foreign policy of Hungary continued in the direction essentially marked by his direct

predecessors, Stephen II and Béla II. This was indicated by the confirmation of the earlier privileges of Spalato by Géza II in 1141 in return for the loyalty shown by the citizens of the town.⁶¹ The continuation of Béla II's policies towards Halich is indicated by the fact that in 1144 *ban* Beloš, the brother of the king's mother, playing an ever-increasing role in the court and in the life of the country, led a Hungarian army to help Volodimerko, ruler of Halich since 1141 and ally of Béla II against Boris, in his fight against Vsevolod, Grand Duke of Kiev.⁶²

However, the events that took place in German and Austrian territories at the beginning of 1146 seriously affected the foreign policy of Hungary and prompted the Hungarian ruling class to reappraise their western (German, Austrian and Bohemian) policies up to that time. 1146 introduced a new period in Hungarian foreign policy and during this new phase the events of European politics, which started sizzling with the Second Crusade, considerably influenced the changes in the international relations of Hungary including, of course, its relations with Byzantium.

Otto of Freising relates that after Christmas 1145 Conrad III, the German king went to Bavaria where the pretender Boris came to see him accompanied by the king's brother-in-law, Vladislav II, ruling Prince of Bohemia. He complained to Conrad about having been deprived of the kingdom of his father and implored him for help using his imperial power responsible for the protection of the world.⁶³ The bishop-historian in another work of his is clearer about the purpose of the pretender in the same case: "Boris, son of Coloman, the late King of Hungary, demanding for himself by hereditary right . . . the Kingdom of Hungary, in order to get his way . . . often turns to both princes, that is, to the monarch of the Romans and that of the Greeks . . ."⁶⁴ In the beginning of 1146, following the mediation of the Bohemian ruling prince and his consort, the German king indeed promised to aid the Hungarian pretender.⁶⁵ Apart from moral and political support, this help meant that the German sovereign and his relative and faithful ally, Henry of Babenberg (Jasomirgott), Margrave of Austria and Duke of Bavaria—while themselves not participating directly in the events—on the one hand, allowed Boris to recruit a mercenary army from his own money on Austrian and Bavarian soil mostly from among the *miles* and *ministeriales* of Henry, while, on the other, made it possible for the pretender to use their countries as base of operations and launch a large-scale military action against Géza II's kingdom.⁶⁶ Early in April 1146 Boris' mercenary army advanced into Hungary, laid siege to and took the castle of Pozsony. Géza and his army immediately marched to meet them there, set up a blockade and finally managed to regain Pozsony for a certain sum of money without a fight.⁶⁷ The sources make it quite clear that Géza II held the German king and the Margrave of Austria responsible for these events and, consequently, regarded them as his enemies.⁶⁸ It must have been obvious to him that Boris would not have had any chance to attack the country in order to seize the crown without the support of Conrad and Henry.

There had been earlier signs indicative of the deterioration in the relations with the West (Germany, Bohemia and Austria), but these states became hostile only at this time. It had been a blow to the formerly remarkably close Hungarian-Bohemian alliance that—despite the previous agreement in 1138—the Bohemian barons in 1140, after the death of Soběslav I, who had always faithfully supported Béla II, did not elect his son, but another Vladislav, the son of his rival and predecessor, Vladislav I, ruling

Prince of Bohemia. Soon after his election, Vladislav II married Gertrude, the sister of Conrad III, securing the support of the German king with this dynastic connection. Prince Vladislav, the slighted son of Soběslav I, fled to Hungary with his partisans at Christmas 1140, but soon returned to his country and joined the large-scale rebellion led by Conrad, Prince of Znoimo, a relative of Géza II's family. Their aim was to overthrow Vladislav II. The throne of the latter was saved only by the intervention of the German army led by Conrad III in the spring of 1142. Nevertheless, these succession disputes continued in Bohemia and were brought to an end in 1146 with the defeat of Prince Conrad.⁶⁹ The close Hungarian connections of the son of Soběslav I and Prince Conrad of Znoimo obviously did not endear Géza II to ruling Prince Vladislav II.⁷⁰ This would explain why the Bohemian monarch promoted Boris's cause with Conrad III. The chronicle of Otto of Freising is quite clear about the German king being considerably influenced, when forming his opinion, by the conduct of his sister and his faithful Bohemian ally.⁷¹

At the same time Hungarian-German relations, which had hitherto been cordial, changed for the worse. An indisputable indication of this is the fact that Sophia, the elder sister of the Hungarian king, having had enough of the ignoble treatment she had had to put up with in Germany, took the veil in the Benedictine monastery of Admont around 1145-1146.⁷² The reason for the breaking off of the engagement between Sophia and Henry probably was that in the wake of the settlement of Frankfurt in May 1142, the tension between the Welfs and the Hohenstaufen had slackened⁷³ and, consequently, Conrad III must have deemed the establishment of a Hungarian-German marital connection unnecessary.⁷⁴ The most significant factor in his backing Boris' cause that is, in the change of Conrad's attitude towards Géza II's rule, seems to be that Conrad was inclined to conduct a more aggressive foreign policy than that of his predecessor, Emperor Lothar III. In certain points—primarily regarding his conception of the restoration of the former imperial power and grandeur—he was preparing the way for the foreign policy of his successor, Frederick Barbarossa. In 1140-1141, with the position of Roger II strengthened in Italy after the capitulation of Pope Innocent II in 1139 (settlement of Mignano), Conrad III was considering launching a campaign against the Normans, but his plans came to nothing on account of the struggle between the Welfs and the Hohenstaufen.⁷⁵ In the spring of 1146 he was pondering over the idea of occupying Rome, then in the hands of the movement led by Arnold of Brescia.⁷⁶ In August 1146 he interfered in the Polish internal disputes and with his Bohemian ally, Vladislav II at his side he conducted a campaign in Poland to restore its vassalage.⁷⁷ At Christmas 1146 he committed himself to take part in the Second Crusade.⁷⁸ From the point of view of Conrad's great-power ambitions it is also characteristic that—while having himself styled *imperator Romanorum* in 1145—he allowed the Byzantine basileus only the title of *rex Graecorum*,⁷⁹ wishing to express his own superiority clearly as against Emperor Manuel. There is an even more important aspect to his foreign policy expectations, which is manifested in his 1142 letter to Emperor John, in which Conrad III assessing his own international position saw France, Hispania, England, Denmark and the other kingdoms along the border of his realm as belonging to the orbit of the Holy Roman Empire and their rulers as ready to obey his orders.⁸⁰ In this light it is probable that in the spirit of such a foreign policy conception Conrad would have preferred Hungary as a vassal kingdom with Boris,

who wanted to seize power with his help, on the throne, to a Hungary actually ruled by Géza II independently of him.⁸¹ Henry of Babenberg, Margrave of Austria and Duke of Bavaria, who, besides family connections was also tied to Conrad by strong political links,⁸² this time also wanted to play into the German king's hand by supporting the cause of Boris.

It cannot be proved, however attractive the idea may seem, that Conrad III, by supporting Boris, wanted to serve anti-Hungarian, German-Byzantine political interests and promoted some kind of German-Byzantine cooperation in Boris' interest.⁸³ No source proves it but it is a fact that in January 1146, after years of wrangling, Manuel, Emperor of Byzantium, married the German princess, Bertha of Sulzbach and this dynastic connection established a political alliance between Conrad and Manuel. Undoubtedly, as a result of the German-Byzantine coalition the Hungarian Kingdom found itself caught in a most disturbing international pair of pincers, but the alliance of the two empires was not aimed directly against Hungary, as it was established explicitly against the Normans.⁸⁴ For that matter, even the supposition that it was from Byzantium that Boris went to Conrad at the beginning of 1146 cannot be proven. From this point of view the court of Poland and those of the different Russian principalities can be regarded, with the same probability as the Byzantine capital, as the starting point of the pretender on his way to Germany.⁸⁵ Byzantium, as during the events in 1132, kept aloof from this manoeuvre of Boris to acquire the Hungarian crown.

The Byzantine Empire's foreign policy, at this time, like it had earlier, focussed on the problems in the East. Emperor John, whose aim lay in extending the borders of the empire to the Euphrates, was also planning the conquest and thus the forced vassalage of the crusader states in the East. It was in the spirit of this conception that the Byzantine ruler launched a campaign against the Seljuq Emirate of the Dānishmends in Asia Minor and this war lasted until the end of 1140. In the spring of 1142 Emperor John was leading his troops to the East to conquer Antioch, and the reduction of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the most important of the crusader states, to vassalage already figured among his plans at that time.⁸⁶ After he died on April 8, 1143 his son, Manuel succeeded him. The new emperor, in the first years of his reign, followed the foreign policy ideas of his father. In the west he expected the help of the Holy Roman Empire to contain and reduce the increasing power of King Roger II, who, during the negotiations with Emperor Manuel in 1143-1144, demanded a position equal to the dignity of that of a basileus. The Byzantine emperor rejected the Norman proposal to establish dynastic connections between Byzantium and the Normans and in January 1146, married a German princess. This was a direct move against the Normans, since the chief goal of the German-Byzantine alliance, thus restored, was the launching of a war on Roger II. At the same time, the most immediate aim of the Byzantines in the German-Byzantine pact was to have their back covered by the Holy Roman Empire against the Normans, while they themselves were expanding in the East,⁸⁷ for Manuel was continuing his father's eastern policies. At the very beginning of his reign he attacked Antioch, whose ruling prince—soliciting the help of Byzantium against the Seljuqs—was forced to recognize Emperor Manuel as his overlord in 1146. In the meantime, Masud, the Sultan of Iconium, while expanding at the expense of other Seljuq amirs, began to occupy Byzantine territories one after the other. Manuel,

unable to ignore this, conducted his first campaign against Masud in 1144–1145. In the spring of 1146 the emperor launched an attack on the sultan with the ultimate goal of taking Iconium, the capital of the realm. The Byzantine hosts, however, withdrew unexpectedly from Iconium probably prompted to do so by the news of the preparations for the Second Crusade.⁸⁸ It would have been definitely contrary to the foreign policy strategy of Byzantium just outlined if Manuel had wasted the power of the empire meddling in Hungarian affairs on account of Boris. With this in mind it is understandable why Boris sought the protection and help of the German monarch for his plans concerning the Hungarian Kingdom.

Géza II and those around him were not satisfied by the recapture of Pozsony and prepared a counterstrike in retaliation against the German king and the Margrave of Austria. From the summer of 1146 the retaliatory measures against Conrad III took the form of Géza's establishing connections with Welf VI, who was struggling to acquire Bavaria,⁸⁹ and supported him with an annual allowance in his efforts against the German king.⁹⁰ Towards Henry (Jasomirgott), Margrave of Austria, however, Géza II resorted to arms. The royal army of Hungary under the leadership of the 16-year-old king and *ban* Beloš advanced into Austrian territory on September 11, 1146 and inflicted a serious defeat on Henry's army between the rivers Leitha and Fischa.⁹¹ The German and Austrian knights, who had taken Pozsony, also fought in the battle.⁹² These events, of course, made German–Hungarian and Austrian–Hungarian relationships inimical and very tense for long years.

In spite of his failure in 1146 Boris persevered in his efforts to gain the Hungarian crown. In 1147 the political life of Europe was enlivened by the Second Crusade. The direct cause of the crusade was that at Christmas 1144, Zengi, the Muslim ruler of Mosul seized Edessa, the capital of the County of Edessa, one of the crusader states. Through this conquest Muslim expansion became a direct threat to the Principality of Antioch. The danger was made all the more serious by the fact that the Latin crusaders, even if united, would have been unable to resist the onslaught of the Muslims. The crusader states then, in 1145, turned to Byzantium, the Pope and the West, for help. On December 1, 1145, Pope Eugene III proclaimed a crusade against the Muslims. At Christmas 1145, Louis VII was already considering joining the campaign. Next March he announced in Vézelay that he would take the cross and lead a crusade against the infidels. At Christmas 1146 Conrad III made a similar announcement. In February 1147, at the meeting in Étampes, where, besides the King of France, the participants included the envoys of Conrad III, Roger II and Manuel, the time of the commencement and the route of the crusading armies were agreed upon. It was Conrad III who set out for the Holy Land first with his great army at Easter 1147 and on June 8th, Louis VII's similarly large army also departed.⁹³ The Second Crusade, like the First, did not arouse particular interest in Hungary. Neither the people nor the members of the ruling class joined it. Boris, however, believed that the march of the crusaders through Hungary would provide him with an excellent opportunity to seize Géza II's crown. A Hungarian source reveals that a few Hungarians invited Boris to enter the country, saying that many would rally round him and—deserting the king—recognize him as their overlord.⁹⁴ This chronicle passage is also indicative of the existence of a power base, not large, though of some size, that Boris could rely on. The obstinate pretender, as it is related in the work of a monk, Odo of Deuil, chronicler of

Louis VII's crusade, wanted to join the German crusaders first and enter the country with their support. It seems that in the beginning Conrad III did not turn down Boris' request, but when Géza II learnt about the plans of the pretender he also went into action and, by bribing the German lords, he was able to prevent Boris from coming to Hungary in the company of the German crusaders.⁹⁵ It is probable that while Conrad III eventually would not jeopardize the whole crusading enterprise because of Boris, he did not want to expose his empire to a conflict following his march to the East, either. The feelings towards him through Hungary in June 1147 must have been rather unfriendly, anyway.⁹⁶ Boris then pinned his hopes on the French and after his letter to Louis VII, in which he solicited the king's help stating his (Boris') hereditary rights concerning Hungary, had gone unanswered he managed to slip into Hungary among Louis VII's crusaders with the help of two French dignitaries.⁹⁷ Géza II and Louis VII made peace and became friends when they met in person.⁹⁸ The freshly born rapprochement between France and Hungary laid the foundations for the political connections between the two monarchs in later years. Géza II, on hearing that his mortal enemy was in the camp of the crusaders, immediately demanded his extradition. Although the firm stand of the Hungarian king frustrated the hopes Boris cherished about laying his hands on the crown, Géza II could not have the pretender extradited.⁹⁹ The reason why Louis and those around him would not hand the Hungarian pretender over was obviously that they regarded Boris' person, a close relative of the Byzantine emperor,¹⁰⁰ as a suitable means of influencing favourably the relations between the French crusaders and Manuel, who had deep suspicions about the Second Crusade.¹⁰¹ Be as it may, Boris left for Byzantium in the company of the French,¹⁰² a fact that was to affect future development of Hungarian-Byzantine relations.

The events of 1146–1147 concerning Boris clearly demonstrated that the pretender, apart from the permanent negligible element of the discontented,¹⁰³ was not able to have a considerable part of the Hungarian ruling class rally round him, unlike in 1132. This is explained by the fact that the accession to power of the Álmos branch was not followed by an agreement, a peaceful compromise between the rivals, like the one, for example, concluded (in 1095–1096) by Coloman and Álmos regarding the sharing of power. On the contrary, Béla II and his retainers aimed at the complete elimination, the physical liquidation of Coloman's party. The events at the meeting of Arad in 1131 and those in connection with Boris' move in 1132 were decisive steps towards the collapse and radical dispensation of Coloman's party. In other words in these years Béla II radically broke with the opposing party, a part of which had previously joined his side, and thus the king, from the aspect of power constellations, started his reign with a *tabula rasa*. During the following years Béla II and Géza II successfully created a new set of leaders, who proved their loyalty to the king in critical moments—for example, in 1146. The king and his party, sparing no financial and military means, not only opposed the pretender's aspirations immediately and firmly in all cases, but also demonstrated the essential unity of the ruling class with powerful counterstrikes. It was the result of the internal consolidation following the complete elimination of the opposition that Boris' attempts to seize power in 1146–1147 did not provoke any substantial response within the country.

At the same time, on account of Boris' appearance and activities, Hungarian relations with the Holy Roman Empire, the Bohemian Principality and the Margraviate of Austria, respectively, touched bedrock. The unfolding of the Second Crusade, however, prevented new conflicts from breaking out between Hungary and the above-mentioned countries.¹⁰⁴

In 1146, on account of the deterioration of relations with its western neighbours and because of the German-Byzantine rapprochement, the Hungarian Kingdom was rather isolated internationally. Géza II, to improve the international position of the country, made an alliance with ruling Prince Iziaslav, besides cultivating the already existing connections with Halich. It was probably in the second half of 1146 that Géza II married Euphrosyne,¹⁰⁵ the sister of Iziaslav. The latter was ruling Prince of Volhinia and he also gained the throne of Kiev, thus this dynastic link restored the political alliance between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kievan Principality.

Hungary against Byzantium

During the Second Crusade, which eclipsed several political problems of European significance—the controversies between the Papacy and the Normans, the Germans and the Normans and the English and the French, to name but a few—the relationship between Byzantium and the Normans of Southern Italy grew extremely strained, eventually erupting in another war four decades after the last one.

The confrontation between the Byzantines and the Normans was apparent in their attitudes to the crusade. Roger II supported the idea of the campaign because—in a way similar to Bohemond's in 1104—he intended to exploit the crusade against Byzantium and achieve his own goals in this way. The king of the Normans, aspiring to hegemony in the Mediterranean, deemed the crusade an excellent opportunity to become the ruler of the Principality of Antioch,¹ the ruler of which had, in 1145, become a vassal of Manuel.² At the same time, Roger II, whose ultimate goal was the imperial crown of Byzantium, wished to turn the crusade against the empire and wanted to start by defeating the Greeks.³ This is why, at the meeting of Étampes in February 1147, he offered to participate in the crusade provided that the crusaders would take the sea route to the Holy Land. This meant that the Sicilian fleet would have carried them to the East. This, on the other hand, would have resulted in a decisive Norman influence over the conduct and the outcome of the whole crusade. The crusaders, however—precisely because of the Norman-Byzantine controversy—did not accept Roger's offer and chose the land route through Germany, Hungary and Byzantium, whereupon the Norman king refrained from taking part in the enterprise. This was put down as a success of Byzantine diplomacy.⁴

From the beginning, Emperor Manuel disliked the idea of the crusade. His attitude was identical with that of his predecessors, who, since the end of the 11th century, had regarded crusades as a potential menace to their empire.⁵ According to Cinnamus, the contemporary Byzantine historian, those in Constantinople were worried that the real aim of the crusaders going to the Holy Land was “the occupation of the country of the *Rhomaioi* [i.e. Byzantines]”.⁶ This was evidently expressive of the fears of Manuel and the Byzantine ruling circles. The crusade, at the same time, was also disadvantageous as regards the political aims of Byzantium in the East and West. Manuel, who had achieved considerable successes in the East during the previous years, found he had to abandon his offensive policies to be able to concentrate his forces on watching the crusaders. He also had to consider the probability that the possible successes of the crusaders might strengthen the positions of the crusader states against the expansionist efforts of Byzantium.⁷ Thus it was advantageous for Manuel that Louis

VII and Conrad III had decided to take the land route since it meant, on the one hand, the absence of his most dangerous enemy, Roger II, from the campaign, while on the other hand, he could have some control over the crusaders marching through his empire. The progress of the undisciplined band of crusaders across Byzantium, however, was a serious trial for the empire. Manuel concentrated significant material and military resources of his country in order to cover, control and contain within limits, the march of the crusaders.⁸ As to the western policy of Byzantium, Conrad's joining the crusade resulted in the danger that the German-Byzantine alliance, which had threatened Roger II since the beginning of 1146, would no longer be a threat to the Normans. The German monarch's eastern journey made a joint German-Byzantine campaign against the Normans simply impossible and, what is more, Byzantium was now left completely alone against the ravenous might of the Normans.⁹

Roger II, who had not given up his expansionist plans in spite of his failure in connection with the crusade, exploited the favourable moment for action against Byzantium when Manuel's attention was totally concentrated on Conrad's crusaders advancing towards the Byzantine capital. Geared into the offensive, the fleet of the Norman king carried out a surprise attack on the empire seizing the island of Corfu in August 1147 and making it the base for further operations.¹⁰ Conrad III, having crossed to Asia Minor with the help of the Byzantine fleet, rejected Manuel's plea for help against the Normans.¹¹ After the incident, the German king began his offensive against the realm of Masud, Sultan of Iconium.¹² Meanwhile, the situation was becoming worse and worse for Byzantium, as Manuel was informed of the negotiations between some of the commanders of the French crusaders, who had been in Byzantium since September, and Roger II. The objective of these negotiations was to launch, within a joint French-Norman venture, a concentrated attack with the aim of occupying Constantinople. According to the plan the Byzantine capital would have been besieged by the French army on land and by the Norman navy from the sea. The talks were still under way when Roger II, in order to create more favourable circumstances for his proposed French-Norman cooperation, directed his fleet towards Constantinople after the capture of Corfu. The French crusaders approached the Byzantine capital early in October and Godefroy, Bishop of Langres, the leader of the pro-Norman faction, repeatedly advised Louis VII to enter into alliance with Roger and lay siege to Constantinople hand in hand with the approaching Norman fleet.¹³ Byzantium was in a critical situation. The basileus turned to Louis VII asking him for help against the Normans, but the French king, like Conrad before him, refused to help.¹⁴ Manuel, however, in his efforts to master this critical situation, concluded a twelve-year peace treaty with the Sultan of Iconium, thus securing his position in Asia Minor¹⁵ and at the same time—in the autumn of 1147—by renewing and augmenting earlier commercial privileges, he secured the alliance of Venice against the Normans.¹⁶ The Doge was also drawn towards Byzantium by the fact that the Republic was a natural enemy of every power that intended exercising a foothold on both sides of the Adriatic, as this jeopardized the freedom of the Levantine sea routes in the Adriatic and thus threatened the basic economic interests of Venice. This was why one of the crucial points of Venetian foreign policy was to secure the freedom of navigation in the Adriatic at all costs in the 12th century.¹⁷ However, the imminent danger looming over Byzantium was averted by the attitude of the French king, who,

not wishing to risk his objectives in the East, finally turned down the idea of a Norman–French alliance directed against Byzantium. Thereupon the fleet of Roger II turned back, but on the way home ransacked and looted important Byzantine cities, such as Thebes and Corinth.¹⁸ These latter events also indicate that in spite of his serious efforts, Manuel still did not have a navy that could serve the interests of the empire in several places simultaneously. This fact emphasizes that Byzantium was in great need of the help of Venice, which possessed a strong fleet, against the considerable maritime forces of the Normans.¹⁹

The Norman attack of 1147 fundamentally influenced the foreign policy of Byzantium in the following decade. It was this that made Manuel realize that the threat to the existence of his empire from the west came first and foremost from the expansionist efforts of the Normans. The Byzantines woke up to the fact that it was not enough to keep the Normans in check by a third party. So, regarding the security of the Byzantine Empire, the elimination of the Norman kingdom seemed to be the only solution. Hence, in the wake of the Norman attack in 1147, the most important foreign policy objective of Byzantium—after the liberation of Corfu—was the launching of an offensive against the country of Roger II, putting an end to the Norman kingdom in Southern Italy, and reconquering Sicily and Southern Italy.²⁰ In addition, this objective was an organic part of the efforts of Byzantium in aiming at world power and the restoration of Justinian's empire. Thus Manuel linked the Norman question to his unrealistic and outdated ideas of creating a universal empire.²¹

As early as the spring of 1148, Manuel, in alliance with Venice, set out to recapture Corfu, but he was thwarted by a large-scale attack from the Cumans in the region of the Lower Danube. Driving the Cuman invasion back took a long time, so the emperor abandoned his plans of reconquering the isle of Corfu from the Normans in 1148.²² On the other hand, in the autumn of 1148, significant diplomatic events took place in Thessalonica and Constantinople between the Byzantine emperor and the German monarch, who had returned from the East.

By this time the Second Crusade had proved to be a complete failure. Conrad himself had suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Sultan of Iconium near Dorylaeum on October 26, 1147. Furthermore, in the summer of 1148, the King of Jerusalem, the ruling Prince of Antioch, together with Conrad III and Louis VII had launched a concentrated attack on Damascus, but the siege failed and this forestalled any further attempts by the crusaders.²³ In the autumn of 1148 Conrad returned to Thessalonica from the East and started negotiations with the Emperor of Byzantium. The German monarch was once more preoccupied with Italy and at this point the Italian plans of Conrad and Manuel coincided again. The German king and the Byzantine emperor concluded a treaty of great importance in Thessalonica—this was the so-called “alliance of two emperors”—which was also endorsed by the marriage between Henry of Babenberg, a relative of Conrad and the niece of Manuel, Theodora. In the treaty of Thessalonica, Manuel and Conrad agreed upon starting a joint campaign against the Normans in 1149, occupying and dividing Roger II's country between themselves.²⁴ The coalition against the Normans also included Venice.²⁵ With the cooperation of the Venetian fleet, the Byzantines, under the direct command of Manuel, managed to recapture Corfu in August 1149 and then the Byzantine emperor, in compliance with the treaty of Thessalonica, started the preparations for the Italian

invasion against the Normans.²⁶ However, the joint German-Byzantine campaign against Roger II came to nothing since by this time their opponents had also formed their own alliances and their manoeuvres in Germany and in the Balkans frustrated the realization of Manuel and Conrad's plans for the Italian campaign.

At approximately the same time as the Byzantine emperor and the German king were concluding their alliance, Welf VI, who had just returned from the East and Roger II entered into an alliance against Conrad III. Roger and Welf decided that in order to prevent Conrad's manoeuvres against the Normans, Welf, who had been trying to seize the Duchy of Bavaria, should incite a rebellion in Germany against the king. This plan was carried out and the revolt of Welf VI, which had broken out at the turn of 1148-1149, occupied Conrad for a long time and kept him at home until he finally defeated the armed revolt of the Welfs at the beginning of 1150. After this, however, hostilities broke out between Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony, nephew of Welf VI, and Conrad III, which again engaged the latter for some time.²⁷ Louis VII, who had returned from the East in 1149 and negotiated with Roger in Southern Italy joined the alliance of the Welfs and Roger II against Conrad. The French king put the blame primarily on Byzantium for the failure of the Second Crusade accusing Manuel of betrayal for the peace the latter had made with Masud. It was on account of the fiasco in the East and the wish to retaliate against Byzantium that Louis VII embraced Roger's idea of organizing and launching a new crusade with the conquest of the Byzantine Empire as its first step.²⁸ Pope Eugene III, whose international prestige had also suffered from the failure of the crusade, which he had proclaimed, and who, therefore, like Louis VII, owed Manuel a grudge, also welcomed the French-Norman plans for the new crusade and thus became a member of the coalition against Byzantium.²⁹ Finally, the alliance was completed by the admission of Géza II, King of Hungary, Iziaslav, Grand Duke of Kiev and Uroš II, Grand *Župan* of the Serbs under Byzantine rule.³⁰ The existence of these two coalitions practically divided Europe for a few years in the middle of the 12th century.

However, the conflicting interests of the individual parties within the alliances eventually thwarted the realization of the basic goals of either side. Roger II, though he managed to forge a mighty allied front against the German-Byzantine-Venetian coalition, could not achieve his main objective. His cherished dream of the elimination of Byzantium by the crusade did not come true. The main reason for this was that Pope Eugenius, afraid that the probable success of the crusade in question might disproportionately enhance the power of the Southern Italian Normans and would endanger the papal aspirations, in order to counterbalance Roger II, wanted to sell the idea of the crusade to Conrad III. The German king, however, persevered beside Manuel, as he himself would not have been happy to see any further increase of Roger II's power in Italy, either. Following this, Pope Eugene III turned his back on his Norman ally and the rift became final in the spring of 1151.³¹ The King of France also abandoned plans for the crusade at the beginning of 1152.³² The Normans, however, managed to keep Manuel and Conrad from carrying out a joint military operation against them. The treaty of Thessalonica, as it were, was never put into practice. In 1149-1151 Conrad was forced to stay in his own country by the revolt of Welf VI—also financed by Roger II and Géza II—, the activities of Henry the Lion and the plans for the French-Norman crusade, so it was impossible for him to start a campaign in Italy

against Roger II. During the same years, his ally, Manuel, was hindered from mounting an offensive against the Normans by the situation in the Balkans and along the Danube frontier.

The events to be discussed below will show that in the French-Norman coalition against the two emperors' alliance, the Kingdom of Hungary was one of the most active members and consequently, one of those that suffered most of the burdens, although the treaty of Thessalonica in expressing the essence of the alliance between Manuel and Conrad was not directed against Hungary.³³ What was the reason for this? The Hungarian Kingdom was pitted against countries that the Normans also opposed. Hungarian-German relations had been extraordinarily hostile since 1146. The King of Hungary continued to support the struggle of Welf VI against the German king even after the Second Crusade, as he was deeply concerned to avoid retaliation for the clash on September 11, 1146 by the Germans and the Austrians.³⁴ The Dalmatian question inclined the kingdom of Géza II against Venice, while the conflicts between Hungary and Byzantium were aggravated by Hungarian relations with Volhinia and Kiev, by the Hungarian rapprochement with the Serbs of Rascia and by the connections Géza had established with the French in 1147. Moreover, while drawing up their stance towards Byzantium, Géza II and those around him were significantly influenced—apart from the conclusion of the treaty of the two emperors—by the fact that Boris, the pretender, following the failure of his repeated attempts to seize power, had found refuge again in Byzantium. If it is remembered that during the reign of Stephen II Hungary and Byzantium had gone to war on account of the Greeks' sheltering Prince Álmos, the pretender, it will seem quite natural that Boris' repeated sojourn in Byzantium rendered Hungarian-Byzantine relations rather strained. Between the late 1140s and the mid-1150s, Hungary, motivated partly by her own interests and partly by her international commitments, vigorously plunged herself into military, political and diplomatic struggles on the international scene.

This remarkably active phase in Hungarian foreign politics was opened by an involvement in the affairs of the Russian principalities. In the 1140s some Russian princes had joined one of the two great blocks opposing each other for different internal reasons. The rest of the principalities were divided between these two groups during the clashes. One of the coalitions was formed by Suzdal and Halich, while the other grouped around Volhinia and Smolensk. The ruling Prince of Suzdal, Yuri Dolgoruki, son of Vladimir Monomach and the overlord of Volhinia, Iziaslav Mstislavich, grandson of Vladimir Monomach rivalled each other for the Principality of Kiev. On the other hand, Volodimerko Volodarevich, who in 1141 had united Halich, which had earlier consisted of several parts, started to expand at the expense of both Volhinia and Kiev, thus coming up against Iziaslav, who, in his turn, was supported by Rostislav of Smolensk. In August 1146, Iziaslav ascended the throne of Kiev, superseding Igor Olgovich, and this pushed the Olgoviches of Chernigov to the side of the Suzdal-Halich group. Grand Duke Iziaslav soon became involved in a conflict with Byzantium too, since in order to put an end to his ecclesiastical dependency on the Patriarch of Constantinople, he expelled the metropolite, appointed by the patriarch, from Kiev and in the summer of 1147, had a Russian bishop elected in his place. In this significant question of ecclesiastical policy, Suzdal

and Halich—in accordance with their earlier policies—took the side of Byzantium, and did not recognize the new Metropolit of Kiev. The different groups, according to earlier practice, tried to secure foreign—Bohemian, Polish, German, Hungarian, Byzantine and other (such as Pecheneg, Uz, Cuman, Berend, etc.)—allies in their fight against one another. While the Suzdal–Halich group of princes was supported primarily by Byzantium, the Smoleńsk–Volhinia coalition rallied Hungary as its chief foreign ally. Apart from the obviously close dynastic connections, Géza II was prompted to side with Iziaslav by the fact that the latter opposed the Byzantine Empire, which was sheltering Boris at that time.³⁵

Between 1148–1152 Géza II lent armed aid to his brother-in-law, Iziaslav on six occasions. The course and chronology of these events can be established with a fair accuracy with the help of the Russian annals. It was in the spring of 1148 that, among others, the Hungarians went to war for Iziaslav, when the Grand Duke of Kiev marched on Chernigov against the Olgoviches.³⁶ On August 23, 1149, Yuri Dolgoruki defeated Iziaslav, who was then forced to abandon Kiev for Vladimir in Volhinia and from there he solicited the monarchs of Bohemia, Poland and Hungary for their help to regain Kiev. At the turn of 1149–1150, a joint Hungarian, Bohemian and Polish army arrived in Vladimir, but instead of fighting they started negotiations and the foreign allies of Iziaslav returned home in January 1150.³⁷ After this the ruling Princes of Suzdal and Halich forced Iziaslav to renounce his claim on Kiev officially. Before long, however, Iziaslav, with the help of his nomad allies, successfully drove the Prince of Suzdal out of Kiev and thus regained the throne of the Grand Duchy. But as early as in the summer of 1150, Dolgoruki, aided by Volodimerko of Halich, recaptured Kiev and Iziaslav, driven to Vladimir, turned to Géza II again.

In the autumn the King of Hungary marched with the royal army against Volodimerko of Halich. Géza advanced into Halich, took the town, of Shanok and several other places around Przemyśl. On hearing the news of Géza's attack, the ruling Prince of Halich shut himself up in the castle of Przemyśl and from there he managed to bribe some of the dignitaries around the Hungarian king into persuading Géza, at the end of October, to return to Hungary.³⁸ Géza was also presumably influenced by the news he received about the clashes between the Hungarians and their Serbian and Byzantine neighbours. It was after this campaign that, in order to endorse the alliance between Géza II and Iziaslav, Vladimir Mstislavich, the brother of the ruling Prince of Volhinia, married the daughter of *ban* Beloš.³⁹ In the first months of 1151, the King of Hungary again sent an army of 10,000 men to Iziaslav's aid, who—in February 1151—with the help of the Hungarians, Berends and Kievans, who had switched to his side, managed to take possession of Kiev. Yuri Dolgoruki fled from the city.⁴⁰ Before long, the ruling Prince of Suzdal—allied with Volodimerko—endeavoured to recapture Kiev for himself, but was defeated by Iziaslav in June 1151. Thereupon Volodimerko of Halich marched home and on the way he defeated and dispersed an auxiliary detachment recently sent by Géza and led by the son of Iziaslav.⁴¹ Then the Grand Duke of Kiev once more sent his son, Mstislav Iziaslavich, to Géza to ask the Hungarian king to join battle so that they could take revenge on Volodimerko.

Led by Géza II, it was the royal army that in the first half of 1152 started marching against Halich. The armies of Géza and Iziaslav met near the river Šan and not far from Przemyśl, inflicted a defeat on Volodimerko, who, seriously wounded, retired to

his castle in Przemyśl. The ruler of Halich, who was in an extremely difficult situation, however, escaped complete defeat again because Géza II—heeding the advice of his magnates bribed once more by Volodimerko—arranged a compromise peace between the ruling Prince of Halich and the Grand Duke of Kiev. According to the peace treaty, Volodimerko could keep his principality in spite of being defeated, but had to give up the territories he had occupied from Iziaslav and he also had to promise to be Iziaslav's ally in the future.⁴² Masterminding this peace treaty was the last act in the intensive phase of Géza II's Russian policy.

The literature on the subject assesses the Russian policies of Géza II between 1146–1152 in diverse ways. According to earlier historiography these policies of Géza were directed by “family feelings”⁴³ and can be defined as “significantly dynastic, familial.” The campaigns he conducted for Iziaslav lacked “any higher political goals”⁴⁴ and these wars “were of no real political importance.”⁴⁵ Modern Hungarian historiography, on the other hand, sees Géza II's involvement in Russian politics as a “policy of conquest” towards Russian territories.⁴⁶ It seems, however, that in the former case the assessment of Géza's Russian policies is distorted by an overemphasis of the dynastic aspect, while, in the latter, it is set off balance by the unjustifiable label of “conquering”. In Hungarian historiography it has long been recognized that in these times “political alliances were expressed by family connections”,⁴⁷ or, in other words, “dynastic ties are the feudal way of sealing alliances”.⁴⁸ This means that when judging these events both political and dynastic connections should be considered. Behind the Russian policies of Géza II there were both political and dynastic aspects, of which, naturally, the former were the more decisive. As it has been pointed out the basic objective of the Hungarian king's Russian policies after 1146 was to counteract the extraordinary deterioration of western—German, Austrian, Bohemian—relations⁴⁹ and to find new allies to replace those that had been lost. In the light of the antecedents it is natural that in the internal strife among the Russian princes the King of Hungary took the side of those who were opposed to both the ally of the German Empire, which supported Boris, and to Byzantium, which was sheltering the ever persistent pretender. By embracing the cause of Iziaslav Géza II significantly contributed to the weakening of Byzantine influence in Russia.

The alliance of the Hungarian king and the ruling Prince of Volhinia was advantageous primarily for the latter, since but for Géza's support, Iziaslav would never have been able to retain Kiev. But the cooperation of the two monarchs was founded on the desire for mutual help, to which Iziaslav himself also referred,⁵⁰ and very probably on one occasion—at the end of 1150—Iziaslav also aided Géza in his campaign against Byzantium.⁵¹ It is also obvious that this cannot be regarded as expansionist policy towards Hungary by the Russian prince, as was not the case in the 1160s, when Yaroslav, ruling Prince of Halich, would help King Stephen III.⁵² Naturally, this Europe-wide custom of interventionist policy enhanced the authority and the political weight of the Hungarian Kingdom for some of the Russian principalities. Thus, for example, it must have been due—among other factors—partly to the skilful, ready-to-compromise policies of Géza II that, in the period after 1152, Halich, which was gaining importance among the Russian principalities, again began to draw close to Hungary⁵³ and that in 1159, the envoy of the Hungarian king in Kiev represented the interests of Yaroslav of Halich before the Grand Duke in a case

concerning some lands around the Lower Danube.⁵⁴ Although it is undeniable that the frequent appearances of Hungarian hosts in Russia must have been a serious burden for the population, even these circumstances cannot modify the conclusion that in the events between 1146 and 1152 it is still impossible to discern any signs of a Hungarian intention to force Russian princes into feudal dependency, or either to occupy or to conquer Russian territories.⁵⁵ Such intentions will appear first during the reign of Béla III and be directed, ironically, towards Halich.⁵⁶

Be as it may, Géza II, although continuing to maintain his Russian connections, no longer involved himself militarily in the conflicts of the Russian princes after 1152, though he had several chances to do so during the rest of his reign.⁵⁷ This can be explained partly by the fact that, aware of the plans of Frederick Barbarossa to attack in June 1152,⁵⁸ the King of Hungary was trying to concentrate his forces by reducing his multidirectional commitments, and also partly by the fact that Géza was at that time busy preparing a counterstrike against Byzantium at the Danube.

Hungarian-Byzantine hostilities in the Balkans and along the line of the Danube and the Sava commenced during the Russian campaigns of Géza II. While the entanglement in the disputes of the Russian principalities led Hungary into indirect conflict with Byzantium, along the southern borders of the country Géza entered into an open and direct confrontation with the Byzantine Empire.

The clashes erupted in the autumn of 1149, when Emperor Manuel—in accordance with his earlier plans and the treaty of Thessalonica—having reconquered Corfu in August of the same year, started preparations for an Italian invasion against the Normans.⁵⁹ In the work of Cinnamus the main objective of Byzantine foreign policy can clearly be discerned. The historian relates that on taking Corfu the emperor considered the various ways he could seize Sicily together with the land of the Italians.⁶⁰ Stormy weather, however, twice prevented the Byzantine navy from crossing to Italy. In the meantime the emperor was informed that the Serbs of Rascia under the Byzantine government had revolted and made devastating raids on Byzantine territories along the border.⁶¹ According to Cinnamus, the emperor regarded the move of the Serbs as the result of an agreement among the “Alamans” [Germans, i.e. the Welfs], the “Dalmates” [Serbs] and the “Paiones” [Hungarians].⁶² On account of these events, the emperor decided that he himself would march against the rebellious Serbs around the end of September, after he had dispatched the fleet commanded by John Axuch to Ancona, the Italian town they had chosen as a base of operations for the Italian manoeuvres.⁶³

According to Cinnamus and Nicetas, Manuel and the pick of his army rushed from the Adriatic coast across Pelagonia⁶⁴ to the country of Uroš II, Grand *Župan* of Serbia.⁶⁵ The goal of the Byzantine monarch was to put down the Serbs in reply to their anti-Byzantine move.⁶⁶ Uroš II, however, hearing that the emperor was on his way and seeing that his own army was no match for the much stronger Byzantine host, withdrew from the plain to the mountains where he went into hiding. Manuel gave chase, but was unable to catch the Serbian prince. The Byzantine army, however, destroyed everything in its way, devastated the Serbian towns they occupied taking plenty of prisoners and carrying them off into captivity. Manuel subsequently arranged for the captives to be settled in different parts of the Byzantine Empire. While the emperor was laying waste to the Serbian countryside, Uroš II attacked part of the

Byzantine army, whereupon Manuel again marched against the grand *župan*, who once more withdrew into the mountains. During the pursuit the Byzantines again ravaged large territories with Serbian population, but still found it impossible to capture the grand *župan*. More important, this time again they were unable to inflict a military defeat on the Serbs either. The harsh, wintry weather finally forced the emperor and his army to return home from Serbia.⁶⁷ Following this, Manuel celebrated his victories of 1149 with a dazzling triumphal march in Constantinople.⁶⁸

According to Cinnamus, it was known in Byzantium that the attack of Grand *Župan* Uroš on the empire, when Manuel was preparing for the Italian campaign against the Normans,⁶⁹ was in accordance with an agreement among the Welfs, the Hungarians and the Rascian Serbs. However, neither Cinnamus, nor Nicetas—though they give remarkably detailed accounts of the Serbian–Byzantine clashes in the autumn of 1149—mention Hungarians fighting against Byzantium at this time. Due to this silence of the Byzantine historians most scholars agree that Hungarians did not directly participate in these military events of 1149. This view is very often implied in the work of modern historians who, like their Greek predecessors, simply omit references to any Hungarian participation in connection with the events in Serbia.⁷⁰ According to a much less widespread view, however, Hungary and Byzantium were already at war in 1149.⁷¹ Those who assert this opinion base their argument on a passage in the Russian annals. These reliable documents state that after Iziaslav had been defeated on August 23, 1149 by Yuri Dolgoruki and Kiev had passed into the hands of the latter, Iziaslav, after retreating to Vladimir in Volhinia, asked the rulers of Hungary, Poland and Bohemia for help in the autumn of 1149, but “the King [i.e. Géza II]... excused himself saying, I am engaged in war with the emperor [i.e. Manuel]”.⁷² Those who deny direct Hungarian participation in the Serbian–Byzantine clashes in the autumn of 1149 interpret these words of Géza in such a way that the Hungarian king then regarded Byzantium as his enemy because of his own commitment to the French–Norman–Serbian coalition.⁷³ However, since the information in the Russian annal is acceptable, it can be presumed that the reference is to a real military encounter between Hungary and Byzantium. There is a contemporary Byzantine source, which, in perfect accordance with the Russian annals, unequivocally testifies to the fact that as early as 1149 the Hungarian Kingdom helped the Serbs of Rascia in their armed struggle against Byzantium and that Hungarians directly and actively participated in these events.

It is known from Nicetas' work that at the end of 1149 Manuel held a magnificent triumphal march in the Byzantine capital.⁷⁴ A contemporary Byzantine poet, Theodore Prodromus, in a panegyric written specially for the occasion, relates that with this triumphal march Manuel celebrated the victories he had won over his enemies at sea, on the islands and on land.⁷⁵ The victory at sea had been won in the first half of 1149, when the imperial fleet inflicted two minor defeats on the Normans. The triumph on the islands is a reference to the recapture of Corfu, while the success on land relates to the punishment of the rebellious Serbian grand *župan*.⁷⁶ That part of the poem which is most interesting in the present argument is translated as follows:

“Because mindless audacity drives the barbarous Serbian chief *župan*, this boar of the mountains, this triple slave by birth, together with his Hungarian allied forces, against us and his Lord, after the dragon of Sicily secretly persuaded them, flattered

them with gifts and also made an agreement [i.e. with them] so as to stop the emperor amid his attack against himself [i.e. Sicily], whereupon looting along a part of our territories he retired to his den with speedy haste. But the mind of the great emperor learned about these events, he understood the reason [i.e. the motive of the war that had just started], and who had incited this Serbian–Hungarian fight, therefore, so as to quench the flame kindled against him and to prove the vanity of these barbarous machinations and to be able to wage war both on land and at sea and raise arms against the Sicilians and the Serbs simultaneously, that is to say, against all those serving them, he puts his fleet in order. First he equips the horse-transporting ships . . .”.⁷⁷ After he had overseen the embarkation of the greatest part of the Byzantine army and put excellent commanders in charge of the ships, Manuel ordered the fleet to sail against Sicily.⁷⁸ The poem then continues:

“He himself, gathering and bringing with him enough well-armed soldiers, a choice auxiliary and *Rhomaïos* force and wishing to swoop down unexpectedly on the barbarians with great speed and loose reins, set out against the villains intent on capturing the chief leader of the drunken mindlessness, lest he should find escape by running away.”⁷⁹ The poem then goes on to relate that the Serbian *župan* learned about the approach of the Byzantine emperor in time and at his behest his men withdrew and hid among the mountains. The prince himself takes shelter in one of his castles. The emperor follows them, and although he searches the mountains and captures several Serbs, in the process he fails to catch the grand *župan*. Therefore Manuel undertakes a second attempt to take the Serbian prince prisoner, but the latter once more manages to escape. Meanwhile, the Byzantines again take many Serbian prisoners, whom they send to Constantinople.⁸⁰

The literature on the subject is of the opinion that Theodore Prodromus composed this poem for Emperor Manuel to mark the occasion of the triumphal march at Christmas, 1149.⁸¹ This is clearly indicated by the fact that while praising Manuel in the poem, Prodromus does not even allude to either the victorious battle near the Tara later on in 1150, or the feudal homage that Uroš II paid Manuel after the battle, which resulted in Serbia again becoming the vassal country of Byzantium. Obviously, had the panegyric been written in 1150, Theodore Prodromus would not have kept silent about these significant events, which were particularly suitable for praising the emperor. The picture that Prodromus paints of Manuel’s Serbian campaign of 1149 is, except for a few details, entirely in keeping with the one painted of the same offensive in 1149 by the Byzantine historians. However, the differences that do exist between Prodromus’ picture of the 1149 campaign and its rendering by the historians opens the way for a few relevant conclusions to be drawn.

As to Hungarian–Serbian–Byzantine relations, it will have been observed that the Serbs, who, after 1129, made their first revolt against Byzantium in 1149 to regain independence,⁸² were provided by the Hungarian–Serbian alliance not only with the moral and political support of the Hungarian Kingdom, but from the beginning, as early as the autumn of 1149, with armed help as well.⁸³ It can be taken for granted, however, that the Hungarian military help was of rather modest dimensions and in the battles of the autumn of 1149 it was Uroš II and the Serbs who played the major roles. So it was for these two reasons, it seems, that the Byzantine historians kept silent about the participation of Hungary.

This poem of Prodromus also contributes significant details to our knowledge of Serbian-Norman and, presumably, Hungarian-Norman relations. Until now we had only indirect information through one of the passages of Cinnamus referred to above, of the existing cooperation against Byzantium among the Hungarians, the Serbs and the Sicilian Normans.⁸⁴ Now, from the work of the Byzantine poet it is unequivocally clear that in 1149 the Normans made a pact⁸⁵ with the Serbs and, perhaps, with the Hungarians as well, which was directed against Byzantium. For the Normans the main purpose of this was to have the Serbs, supported by certain Hungarian auxiliaries, carry out raids on Byzantine territory thus forcing Manuel to abandon his plans of attacking the Normans.⁸⁶ The events show that Roger II's plan worked perfectly, since on account of the situation in the Balkans, the Byzantine emperor had to march against the Serbs instead of Sicily and Italy.

Thus the poem of Prodromus supplies proof that the Russian annals are entirely correct. This case also draws attention to the problems in connection with the chronological order of the military, political and diplomatic events in the Hungarian-Byzantine confrontation during the reign of Géza II. The chronology of the Hungarian-Byzantine relations in the late 1140s and the early 1150s is rather uncertain. To say that there are no two studies on the subject which describe these events using exactly the same chronology, would not be too much of an exaggeration. The cause of this lies basically in the nature of the sources. These events are discussed by a relatively great number of diverse types of sources (Byzantine, Russian, Western and Muslim) and, moreover, to different extents. Most of these sources, however, use relative chronologies, which contradict even each other and seldom give exact dates by the year, and even proving problematic when they do. Trying to incorporate new sources or new aspects into the research has not infrequently made scholars modify earlier chronologies. In the present attempt to establish the chronological order of the history of Hungarian-Byzantine confrontation in this period, while using the most up-to-date results of the literature on the subject, it must be added that precisely because of the above-mentioned problems, several points of the chronology presented here are to be regarded as hypothetical. Further research is still necessary to establish a completely reliable and final chronology.

Manuel probably thought that with his devastating attack of 1149 he had not only avenged the raid of Uroš II on Byzantium, but had also managed to pacify the Serbian territories. That is why in the spring of 1150 he again began attending to preparations for another invasion against the Normans.⁸⁷ Furthermore, it seemed for a short time that the hand of his ally, Conrad III, would also be free for the Italian campaign, as in February 1150, the rebellious prince, Welf VI had suffered a serious defeat.⁸⁸ In 1150 the German monarch, however, felt threatened by plans for the French-Norman crusade and would not risk a military involvement against Roger II that year either. What is more, he even bade Manuel to be careful.⁸⁹ Thus the cause of the Italian campaign was again delayed.

In the meantime, the Emperor of Byzantium received unnerving news of the Serbian prince's hostile activities,⁹⁰ which indicated that the Serbs, allied with Hungary, had not yet abandoned their anti-Byzantine stance despite the Byzantine campaign in the previous year. So, in the autumn of 1150, Manuel once more led the Byzantine army against the Serbs,⁹¹ who this time, with a change of tactics, chose to encounter the

Byzantines openly.⁹² An inducement to this must have been the fact that King Géza, in accordance with the Serbo-Hungarian pact, sent a much stronger military detachment to aid the Serbs than in the year before.⁹³ The allied Hungarian detachment consisted of troops of diverse ethnic origins, Hungarians, Pechenegs and Kalizes.⁹⁴ The Hungarian-Serbian alliance had been created by Hungary's participation in the French-Norman coalition on account of the efforts to enhance Hungarian influence in the Balkans, of the close family ties between the Hungarian and Serbian ruling dynasties, and also of the activities of *ban* Beloš, the king's Serbian uncle. The alliance was regarded in Byzantium as evidence of Géza's efforts to subdue the Serbs, who were under Byzantine suzerainty.⁹⁵ That is to say, Hungarian-Serbian cooperation was deemed extremely dangerous by Constantinople as regards the interests of Byzantium in the Balkans. A successful Serbian war of independence would undoubtedly have been a severe blow to Byzantium.

Manuel's army was already encamped at Niš, when word was passed on to the emperor that a Hungarian detachment of considerable size was coming to the aid of the Serbs. The basileus marched towards the Sava in order to strike first at the Hungarians⁹⁶ led by Bágyon (Bacchinus),⁹⁷ trying to prevent the union of the Hungarian and Serbian troops.⁹⁸ Although the Byzantine plan failed, after a few minor skirmishes Manuel won a great victory over the united Hungarian-Serbian army near the small river Tara.⁹⁹ After the battle Uroš II went to the Byzantine camp, swore fealty to the emperor¹⁰⁰ and thus, after two years of fighting, Serbia once more became the vassal of Byzantium.¹⁰¹

It was in these years, in 1149-1150 that an armed conflict took place between Hungary and Byzantium, the first one since the peace treaty at Braničevo in 1129. For Hungary, supporting the struggle for independence of the Rascian Serbs meant braving an open confrontation with Byzantium. As it is known, all this occurred simultaneously with the successive campaigns in Russia. It is obviously an indication of the greater strength of the country, mainly on account of the internal prosperity due to the political, social and economic consolidation under the kings of the Álmós branch, that Géza II's kingdom was able to carry on wars on two fronts for several years.¹⁰²

It was essential for Byzantium to secure its positions in the Balkans and along the Danube-Sava frontier if it wanted to realize its main foreign policy objective undisturbed: the expansion in Southern Italy. It has to be remembered that the foreign policy of Byzantium was affected by the fact that in this century the empire was no longer capable of waging war on several fronts simultaneously. That is why Manuel, having defeated the Serbs, led his next campaign directly against Hungary.

The Byzantine authors, using relative chronologies, do not give the actual time of this attack. Cinnamus relates that following the victory near the Tara and the subjection of the Grand *Župan* of Serbia, the Byzantine emperor and his army returned to Constantinople, starting war against Hungary only afterwards.¹⁰³ According to the other Byzantine historian, Nicetas Choniates, the emperor, after the triumph over the Serbian-Hungarian army, "set out against the Hungarians, although he had not even wiped the dust of the battlefield from his face, covered with warm drops of perspiration."¹⁰⁴ That is to say, in the writings of Nicetas, the offensive against the Hungarians commenced directly after Uroš II's defeat. Nicetas also relates that at the

time of Manuel's attack "the king of the Hungarians was not staying at home because he was warring with his Russian neighbours".¹⁰⁵ The same, in fact, appears to be conveyed in Cinnamus' story, according to which, after the raid on Hungary Manuel was on the point of withdrawing when he was informed that Géza II had successfully concluded his war against ruling Prince Volodimerko, the ally of Byzantium in Halich, and was already marching to engage the emperor.¹⁰⁶ The credibility of these congruent pieces of information is entirely confirmed by a passage from the German chronicler—writing independently of the Byzantine historians—Henry Mügelin, which says that "at the same time while King Géza was in Russia, Emanuel, the Greek emperor, came to Hungary".¹⁰⁷ From the Russian annals it is common knowledge that the Hungarian monarch waged war on Russian soil in person twice, both times fighting in Halich. It was first in the autumn of 1150,¹⁰⁸ then in 1152¹⁰⁹ that Géza II conducted campaigns against Volodimerko of Halich, trying to advance the interests of Iziaslav. The question is, which of these two campaigns in Halich are Cinnamus, Nicetas and Mügelin referring to, or, in other words, when did Manuel attack Hungary?

The literature on the subject provides several answers to this question of chronology. According to one opinion, the Emperor of Byzantium advanced into Hungarian Sirmium in the spring of 1151.¹¹⁰ This dating, however, cannot be made to correspond with the statements of the three sources, namely, that during Manuel's attack King Géza was away in Russia, because the Hungarian king was not in Russia in the spring of 1151. The dominant view asserts that it was in the autumn of 1151 that the basileus led his army against the Hungarian Kingdom.¹¹¹ According to this opinion, based on certain chronological considerations, the campaign to Halich which was registered in the Russian annals as in the year 1152 actually took place in the autumn of 1151.¹¹² The chronological examination of the passages of the Russian annals in question has already revealed that there is no reason to transpose the events occurring in 1152 to 1151.¹¹³ The author of the latest Soviet monograph on the chronological aspects of the Russian annals also refers to the second campaign of Géza II to Halich as taking place in 1152.¹¹⁴ Thus, all things considered, 1151 can be ruled out as the year of Manuel's war on Hungary. That is why a third group of specialists date the time of the Byzantine attack to 1152.¹¹⁵

This date is not acceptable either and the argument for this is based on a passage in one of the speeches of rhetor Michael of Constantinople. In his oration delivered at Christmas, 1155, rhetor Michael exalting Emperor Manuel¹¹⁶ makes the following remark in connection with the attack the basileus led against Hungary: "The Gepid [i.e. Géza II] remembered the looting and pillaging that had left Pannonia [i.e. Hungary] nearly empty and desolate, as indicated by the tens of thousands of prisoners of war in iron collars and he [the king] had spent the time since then, four years, that is, preparing for war."¹¹⁷ This means that Géza II for four years had prepared for the attack, which can be placed, according to the information drawn from Cinnamus, Nicetas and rhetor Michael, in the autumn of 1154. Thus—counting the four years backward—Manuel's Hungarian campaign, together with the armistice negotiations, falls in the period including the end of 1150 and the beginning of 1151. Such dating of the campaign confirms Nicetas on the one hand, by whose account the emperor led his army against the Hungarian Kingdom directly after the defeat of Uroš II, in the autumn of 1150,¹¹⁸ while, on the other hand, it easily harmonizes with the statements

of Cinnamus, Nicetas and Mügeln which speak of Géza's fighting in Russia at the time of Manuel's attack.¹¹⁹ Thirdly, it explains chronologically Cinnamus' remark, namely, that Géza II was already back from Halich when the Byzantine army started to withdraw from Sirmium,¹²⁰ as it is known from the Russian annals that the King of Hungary was indeed on his way back from Russia by the end of October, 1150.¹²¹ The chronology proposed here is supported by the information from the Russian annals according to which the Hungarian monarch, once back home from Halich around the end of 1150, sent the following message to Iziaslav: "The Greek Emperor is marching against me with his host, so I cannot ride during this winter or spring."¹²²

Under the emperor's command, the Byzantine army marched against Hungary late in the autumn of 1150, after the victory in Serbia and Uroš II's subjection.¹²³ At that time Géza II was in Halich at the head of the royal army. The absence of the Hungarian monarch and his army was, of course, favourable for the aggressive plans of the basileus and Manuel indeed did his best to exploit these circumstances as soon as he could.¹²⁴ The Byzantine sources list the causes of the war against Hungary. One of these—according to Cinnamus, Nicetas and rhetor Michael—was that the Hungarians were military allies of the Serbs, whom they had lent armed help for their struggle against Byzantium.¹²⁵ At the same time, Cinnamus also blamed the Hungarians for having attacked the ally of Byzantium, Volodimerko, ruling Prince of Halich.¹²⁶ This unequivocally proves that Byzantium also assessed the manoeuvres of Géza II in Halich as being indirectly aimed at Byzantium. Finally, the third cause of the campaign against Hungary, according to Byzantium, was the military alliance between the King of Hungary and the "tyrant of the sea" [i.e. Roger II].¹²⁷ All this would suggest that the war that broke out between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire had a very wide international background.

At the same time, details from Byzantine sources shed light on the fact that Manuel's campaign had a retaliatory, avenging character as well.¹²⁸ The emperor wanted to punish and teach a stern lesson to the Hungarians because they had been acting contrary to the interests of his empire in several important respects. This is why the views, asserting that this was an overture to the era of Greek interference, must remain unacceptable. It was then, as is further asserted, that the geopolitical efforts of Byzantium began to materialize in a military way against Hungary, Manuel aiming to conquer the Hungarian Kingdom and make the Hungarian king a vassal of his empire.¹²⁹ However, at this time, it was Italy and not Hungary that Byzantium was making efforts to conquer. The events of Manuel's campaign also support this latter assertion. The Byzantines crossed the Sava and overran the rich province of Sirmium, where they laid siege to Semlin, the military counterpart of Byzantine Belgrade in Hungary.¹³⁰ While the siege of Semlin was at its height, Manuel, with the larger part of his army laid waste to the whole of Sirmium, mercilessly ransacking and destroying everything in their way. After the Hungarian army, which had marched to meet them, surrendered, the Byzantines savagely pillaged the area carrying off masses of the population, whom they later settled on Byzantine territory. As the defenders of Semlin received no relief, they were finally forced to surrender against heavy odds and handed over the fortress, whereupon the Byzantine soldiers thoroughly ransacked the helpless town.¹³¹ After the looting and pillaging of Sirmium, Manuel abandoned Semlin and started withdrawing his troops from the province, a fact which unequivocally points to

the lack of the emperor's determination towards territorial expansion.¹³² There is no sign of the Byzantines intending to settle down for a period of indefinite occupation. The Byzantine army was already withdrawing when news spread that Géza II had returned from Halich and was marching to encounter them.¹³³ It was, however, only *ban* Beloš who arrived with his army, but he refrained from engaging Manuel, who subsequently retreated to Braničevo.¹³⁴ Afterwards, Prince Boris raided Hungary at the behest of Manuel, looting and devastating the country along the river Temes with a Byzantine detachment, even causing a small Hungarian unit to flee.¹³⁵ But when Géza arrived with his troops Boris fled back to Manuel's encampment.¹³⁶ The emperor, once he had reinforced the fortifications of the Byzantine towns along the Danube, concluded a truce¹³⁷ with the Hungarian king by way of envoys and returned to Constantinople with his army to celebrate his recent successes with a magnificent triumphal march. This truce was probably concluded very early in 1151.¹³⁸

In the course of Hungarian history this was the first time that a pretender marched against Hungary with a Byzantine army. It would appear, however, contrary to other opinions,¹³⁹ that at this time Byzantium did not regard the realization of Boris' claims as a task of her own. None of the sources claim that Manuel resorted to arms in order to help Boris to power. By using the pretender in the game, the purpose of Byzantium was to warn Géza II that he should change his anti-Byzantine attitudes. The effects of Boris' march and Manuel's retaliatory campaign made an impression in several respects on King Géza's home and foreign policies. The internal effects were that the king—not later than 1152—took his eldest son, Stephen, beside himself on the throne as a sort of co-ruler¹⁴⁰ and at the same time gave his own brothers, Ladislav and Stephen (István), princely provisions.¹⁴¹ With these measures he intended to secure the unity of the ruling class when it came to the question of the succession and thus to weaken the chances of Boris' designs against his throne.

The effects of the 1150–1151 Byzantine attack on Hungarian foreign policy can be discerned primarily in the fact that Géza II, for some time after the event, would refrain from military actions against Byzantium. The Hungarian campaign of the *basileus* paralysed, as it were, the Balkanic-Danubian front of the anti-Byzantine coalition and this, ultimately, was the result Manuel had wanted to achieve most. Other members of the coalition, like Prince Iziaslav and Roger II, were well aware of this. Rhetor Michael relates that after the news of the disaster that had befallen Hungary at the hands of Byzantium reached Russia and Sicily, Prince Iziaslav "bowed his head in sorrow, and the islander's [i.e. Roger's] hand fell down, and he would sail no more".¹⁴² In any case, Hungarian–Norman contacts suffered a break after the Byzantine campaign and only the Sicilian trip of Adalbertus, as an envoy—probably around 1152—marks the revival of relations.¹⁴³ It can be presumed that Manuel's Hungarian war in 1150 also influenced Géza II's conduct in Halich in 1152. The king in spite of Iziaslav's advice would not deprive Volodimerko of his principality and pass it to the Kievan ruler.¹⁴⁴ Had he done so he would have changed the *status quo* in Russia rather unfavourably for Byzantium and this might have provoked further actions by the Byzantine emperor.

In the wake of the Serbian and Hungarian campaigns, Emperor Manuel, assessing his position, believed he had managed to pacify both the Serbs and the Hungarians thus restoring the security of the Danube–Sava frontier of the empire. It is easy to

conceive that Manuel saw no obstacles in his way to the long-planned war in Italy at that time. So, in March 1151, the basileus sent a message to his German ally saying he was ready for the invasion against the Normans.¹⁴⁵ Since by the spring of 1151 the rift between Pope Eugene III and Roger II was complete, the former siding with the German king in June 1151, Conrad III and the German princes embraced the idea of the Italian campaign and in September 1151 at the Diet of Würzburg they decided to begin the invasion in the autumn of 1152.¹⁴⁶ In February 1152, however, Conrad III died unexpectedly, and early in March Frederick I Barbarossa was elected king.¹⁴⁷ The accession of Barbarossa meant a turning point in German-Byzantine relations, and this caused further delay of the Italian campaign.

Barbarossa's election brought about a significant change in the imperial German foreign policy,¹⁴⁸ increasing German expansionism in all directions. After interfering as arbitrator in the succession disputes of Denmark in May 1152,¹⁴⁹ Barbarossa, at the Diet of Regensburg in June, put forward his plan to attack Hungary and reduce it to vassalage. But the king's proposal—"on account of secret reasons", according to Otto of Freising—was rejected by the princes of Germany.¹⁵⁰ The princes most probably rejected the proposal because of the Welf question, which was still tense.¹⁵¹ Another reason must have been the fact that at this time Géza II maintained friendly relations with some important German princes. So, presumably, the King of Hungary around 1151 managed to settle relations between Hungary and Henry Jasomirgott¹⁵² Margrave of Austria. The Margrave of Austria and Duke of Bavaria was also interested in normalizing his relationship with Hungary, for with the death of Conrad III his position had become precarious within the empire, and the support he had enjoyed in the dispute between the Welfs and the Hohenstaufen from the German king had also come to an end. Finally, it has to be taken into account that Frederick Barbarossa, in the struggle between the Welfs and the Hohenstaufen, wanted to favour the former—partly at the expense of Henry Jasomirgott—who had very close ties with Géza II since 1146.¹⁵³ Hence, these princes were not interested in backing the cause of the attack against Hungary.¹⁵⁴ As it turned out no conflict ensued between the German Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom, though their relations remained unfriendly for a few more years.¹⁵⁵

During this period relations between Hungary and Venice were also strained on account of the Dalmatian question.¹⁵⁶ The Dalmatian policies of the Republic, which had for some time been independent of Byzantium, were most closely related with the Republic's policies concerning the Adriatic, which had been formulated in the 1140s. The essence of this was that Venice regarded the parts of the Adriatic north of the Ancona-Zara and the Ancona-Ragusa lines as her own sphere of interest.¹⁵⁷ The efforts of Byzantium to gain control of the city of Ancona¹⁵⁸ were diametrically opposed to the Venetian conception of affairs in this area and fundamentally hurt the interests of the Republic in the Adriatic.¹⁵⁹ This became the cornerstone in the cooling of Venetian-Byzantine relations in the 1150s. At the same time, the Pope in Rome also supported the policies of the Doge, Domenico Morosini. This was indicated by the fact that Pope Anastasius IV declared the Hungarian rule in Dalmatia to be illegal usurpation.¹⁶⁰ The position taken by the Pope is explained, among other things, by the extraordinary deterioration of relations between the *Curia Romana* and the royal court of Hungary at that time. In the controversy between the Papacy and Hungary it was

significant that Géza II would not allow the legates of the Pope into the country. The envoys wanted to travel to the "barbarous land of Hungary"¹⁶¹ in order to strengthen the "faith and discipline of the church" at the behest of Pope Eugene III.¹⁶² It is understandable, therefore, that at the Doge's initiative Pope Adrian IV made efforts to reinforce canonically the rule of Venice over the territories in her possession. That is why, in February 1155, he subordinated the Archbishopric of Zara, founded in the autumn of 1154,¹⁶³ to the Patriarch of Grado (Venice).¹⁶⁴ Thus the Adriatic territories under the suzerainty of Venice became ecclesiastically united.

During the reign of Géza II the years between 1153 and 1155 constituted the next and final phase of Hungarian-Byzantine confrontation. Hungary took the initiative as King Géza started the hostilities with Byzantium. Cinnamus relates that the Hungarian king, irritated by the earlier events, marched his army to the Danube. The historian also mentions that Géza II planned to launch a surprise attack on the Byzantine towns along the Danube.¹⁶⁵ Obviously, the Hungarian monarch wished to retaliate for Manuel's devastating raid in 1150. The basileus, however, was informed about Géza's designs in time and before the latter could start his unexpected attack on the Byzantine territories the army of the emperor also appeared at the Danube, where, eventually, at the initiative of the Hungarian king they made peace. Under the terms of the peace treaty, Géza II was to pay ransom for 10,000 Hungarian prisoners of war, while the rest of the captives could return home without a ransom having to be paid.¹⁶⁶ According to Cinnamus these events took place after the death of Roger II, King of Sicily (February 26, 1154), when negotiations between Manuel and William I, the new King of Sicily, were broken off.¹⁶⁷

Some scholars, on the strength of Cinnamus' narrative, date the march of the armies of Géza and Manuel to the Danube and the peace treaty to 1154.¹⁶⁸ Others are of the opinion that these events occurred in 1152.¹⁶⁹ On the basis of a passage in the work of Abu Hamid, Moor merchant of Granada, the 1154 dating can be ruled out. Abu Hamid spent three years in Hungary between 1150 and 1153.¹⁷⁰ The Muslim traveller relates that the Emperor of Byzantium and the Hungarian king concluded a peace treaty and, as a result, many Hungarian prisoners of war were released from Byzantine captivity. The author even interviewed one of them about his experiences in Byzantium.¹⁷¹ Of all the Byzantine sources only Cinnamus is aware of a peace treaty during the Hungarian-Byzantine wars that resulted in the release of masses of Hungarian prisoners of war from Byzantium. He says this happened at the beginning of 1154.¹⁷² Since, however, Abū Hamid left Hungary in 1153 to spend the winter of 1153-1154 in Russia,¹⁷³ the peace treaty could obviously only have occurred before 1154. The date 1152 seems unacceptable as the time of the peace treaty described by both Cinnamus and Abu Hamid, since 1152 was not suitable for the Hungarian king to prepare and launch a large-scale attack against Byzantium. It was in the first half of 1152 that Géza II led the royal army on a campaign to Halich. The Hungarian monarch, at the same time, was well aware of the dangers that the bellicose designs of Frederick Barbarossa were threatening Hungary within the summer of 1152. It would seem likely that Géza II would have considered attacking Byzantium without fear of interference probably only after he had wound up his obligations within the Hungarian-Kievan alliance and also after the German danger was no longer imminent. This is why it can be inferred that it was in 1153, when Abu Hamid was still

in Hungary, that the Hungarian and Byzantine armies marched to meet each other and the two monarchs signed the peace treaty. The mission of Adalbertus, whom the king sent to Roger II around 1152, may have been the diplomatic preparation of Géza II's military move, or an overture to the events that followed.

From a legal point of view, it was the treaty of 1153 which also brought the armed encounters of 1150 to an end. According to the Byzantine historian, in the peace treaty Géza promised to act, throughout his life, in the interests of Byzantium.¹⁷⁴ This point in the treaty, which was composed in the refined language of Byzantine diplomacy, reflected Manuel's wishes more than Géza II's actual intentions. The sequence of events, rapidly following each other, seems to bear this out.

After Emperor Manuel, putting his faith in the cooperation of Frederick I, had broken off the peace talks with William I's envoys,¹⁷⁵ he dispatched the Byzantine fleet, commanded by Constantine Angelus, against the Normans. The fleet, however, suffered a disastrous defeat by the Normans in the early spring of 1154.¹⁷⁶ According to Cinnamus' account the basileus was informed that the king of the "Paiones" [i.e. Hungarians] was on the move again organizing an attack on Byzantium.¹⁷⁷ This time Géza II again took the initiative and, in addition, he was in alliance with the Prince of Serbia.¹⁷⁸ Manuel took the appropriate military measures in preparation for a march to the Danube, but eventually a settlement was reached with the envoys of King Géza in Sofia and the war was once more avoided.¹⁷⁹ Following this the Byzantine ruler marched against Uroš II, the ruler of the Serbs¹⁸⁰ and persuaded him to give up his alliance with Hungary. On the basis of the date of the defeat of the Byzantine fleet the Hungarian-Byzantine agreement in Sofia occurred in the spring of 1154.¹⁸¹

By the end of 1154 all the countries concerned had their diplomatic and military leadership in full gear. The most important events took place in Italy and in the Balkans. The events in both areas were of paramount significance for Byzantium. In Italy the autumn of 1154 saw the start of the race between the Holy Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire for the hegemony over the peninsula, rivalry replacing former cooperation. The reason behind this was that Frederick I, since his first minute in power, had been setting German foreign policy on a new political course. He combined the expansionist ambitions of the German magnates with his own unrealistic plans of dominating the world. The German king, who—like Manuel—regarded himself as the successor of the Roman emperors, set the restoration of the empires of Justinian, Charlemagne and the Ottos as his ultimate goal. In order to achieve this he was bent on a much more aggressive foreign policy than his immediate predecessors. This new trend in his foreign policy, called *honor imperii*, was naturally manifest also in his relationship with Byzantium.¹⁸² Barbarossa radically broke with the Byzantine policies of his predecessor, Conrad III, and refused to grant territorial concessions to the Byzantines in Italy. This, on the other hand, was blatantly contrary to Byzantine claims as recognized in the treaty of Thessalonica. This, i.e. the problem of territorial concession, became the basis of the controversy between Frederick I and Manuel.

The new international aspirations of Frederick Barbarossa were abundantly demonstrated by the treaty of Constance, which he concluded with Pope Eugene III in March 1153 and which was simultaneously directed against the movement of Arnold of Brescia, who had Rome at that time, the Southern Italian Normans and the Byzantines. Frederick I and the Pope pledged in this bilateral treaty that they would

not concede any territories of Italy to Byzantium and in case Manuel endeavoured to start new conquests there they would, with combined forces, drive him out.¹⁸³ At the same time, Frederick I—without territorial concessions—would readily have accepted Manuel's aid against the Normans. The Emperor of Byzantium, however, insisted on his territorial claims in Southern Italy in return for his military cooperation. Thus the Italian expansionist aspirations of Manuel and Frederick I crossed each other's paths from the beginning and this is why the two monarchs were unable to come to an agreement on the question of a joint enterprise they planned against the Normans. In September 1154 Barbarossa commenced his Italian campaign alone, the ultimate goal of which, in the spirit of the *renovatio imperii Romani*, was, apart from having himself crowned Holy Roman Emperor, the elimination of the Norman kingdom and the recognition of Frederick's imperial power throughout Italy.¹⁸⁴ The achievement of all this was to prove impossible during the campaign, which lasted till the summer of 1155. Nevertheless, the prospect of Frederick I's Italian invasion completely frustrating his own plans to restore Byzantine power in Southern Italy, considerably scared Manuel. That is why he observed the events in Italy with doubled attention from the autumn of 1154 and he also began to make preparations for a Byzantine strike against the Normans.¹⁸⁵

In the midst of these preparations Manuel was caught off guard by Géza II's attack at the end of 1154. The agreement between Andronicus, Manuel's cousin and the Hungarian king, was the background to this move. Andronicus, who was the son of the sister of Volodimerko of Halich, and *sebastocrator* Isaac, Emperor John's brother, had been severely defeated by the Prince of Armenia, Thoros I, in Cilicia in 1152 and, in addition, maintained, from Manuel's viewpoint, suspicious connections with foreign rulers. Thus the emperor deemed it advisable to remove his cousin from Cilicia and made him sometime in 1153 governor of the *theme* of Niš.¹⁸⁶ Andronicus, however, as *dux* of the towns of Belgrade, Braničevo and Niš began clandestine negotiations with the King of Hungary and also made contact with Frederick Barbarossa. Géza and Andronicus reached an understanding that, in return for Belgrade, Braničevo and Niš, the Hungarian king would help Andronicus to seize the imperial crown of Byzantium.¹⁸⁷ It may have been part of the agreement that, simultaneously with the attack of the Hungarian monarch, Andronicus would assassinate the emperor.¹⁸⁸ This, however, failed despite two attempts and Andronicus was captured and imprisoned after his efforts to kill Manuel.¹⁸⁹ In the meantime Géza II and his army—reinforced by Bohemians, Saxons and mercenaries of other nationalities¹⁹⁰—with the troops of Borič, *ban* of Bosnia marching with them¹⁹¹ crossed the Danube and laid siege to Braničevo and raided Byzantine territories in the vicinity.¹⁹²

Emperor Manuel, who was attending to Sicilian affairs in Pelagonia,¹⁹³ was surprised by the Hungarian attack after the peace treaty of 1153 and the settlement in Sofia.¹⁹⁴ He could not mobilize any Byzantine army of significance¹⁹⁵ so the forces he dispatched against Géza II were rather small while the king was leading the royal army—reinforced by foreign mercenaries and allies—against Byzantium.¹⁹⁶ The King of Hungary, however, having understood that the agreement he had made with Andronicus would be impossible to realize, abandoned the siege of Braničevo and began to retreat. On the way home he inflicted a great defeat on a Byzantine detachment that had attacked them.¹⁹⁷ A prince at the head of a unit of Hungarians

fighting in Byzantine pay from the Árpád dynasty, called Stephen (Stephanos) was also wielding his sword in this battle.¹⁹⁸ On hearing of the Byzantine defeat, the citizens of Belgrade wanted to join the Hungarians.¹⁹⁹ This was prevented by another Byzantine detachment,²⁰⁰ whereupon King Géza embarked at Belgrade and returned to Hungary.²⁰¹ Thus the attempt of the Hungarian king, either to occupy Byzantine lands or to meddle openly in the Byzantine succession disputes, was frustrated.

In the spring of 1155 both monarchs marched to meet at the Danube.²⁰² At that time the Hungarian king was in touch with William I, King of the Normans. Besides a reference by rhetor Michael,²⁰³ the mission to Sicily of the Tuscan Gentilis, King Géza's Italian-born envoy, in 1154–1155 also testifies to this fact.²⁰⁴ It would appear from this that the Hungarian–Norman alliance was restored against Byzantium. The Serbs of Rascia probably also joined it, as at the end of 1154, in the wake of the Hungarian attack, Géza II's protégé, Dessa, occupied the Serbian throne. Manuel, however, marching against the Hungarians in the spring of 1155, removed Dessa and reinstalled Uroš II as a ruling prince.²⁰⁵ During the negotiations with the Normans Géza had to understand that he could not count on William's support against Byzantium, since the position of the latter was jeopardized, on the one hand, by Pope Adrian IV, who had left him and made reconciliatory gestures towards Frederick I in the first weeks of 1155, and, on the other hand, by the revolt of his own barons in the spring of 1155.²⁰⁶ Finally, Géza II's plans of war against Byzantium also met with opposition from a part of his own supporters.²⁰⁷ In these circumstances the king decided not to risk a military conflict and after lengthy negotiations²⁰⁸ concluded—probably a five-year²⁰⁹—peace with Manuel.²¹⁰ The Byzantine emperor was inclined towards this solution because he was occupied primarily with the Italian manoeuvres he had commenced at the turn of 1154–1155²¹¹ and he was also worried by certain problems in the East.²¹² The peace treaty concluded by the Emperor of Byzantium and the King of Hungary on the banks of the Danube was, therefore, based on the territorial and political *status quo* prior to the wars.

The conspiracy of Andronicus and Géza II, the latter's attack, the march to the Danube, which was closely related to the previous two and the conclusion of the peace between the two monarchs are rather problematic to date. Some scholars presume that Géza and Andronicus entered into alliance in 1153, the first half of 1154 saw the Hungarian attack, and it was in the first half of 1155 that Géza and Manuel marched their armies to the Danube and concluded the peace treaty.²¹³ According to others, the conspiracy of the Hungarian king and the Byzantine pretender in 1154 accounts for the advance of Géza into Byzantine territory in the spring of 1155 and it was in the first half of 1156 that the two monarchs marched to the Danube to make peace.²¹⁴

With the help of the sources it is possible to solve this chronological problem backwards, that is, by determining first the date of the events that happened later. Besides the Byzantine historians—Cinnamus and Nicetas—to different extents Theodore Prodromus, Henry Mügelin and rhetor Michael also dwell upon these events. In establishing a chronology it helps if it is remembered that at the Council of Constantinople, which opened on January 26, 1156, rhetor Michael—besides the Patriarch of Antioch, Sothericus Panteugenus—was also condemned and excommunicated for heretic interpretations of eucharistic dogmas.²¹⁵ Consequently, the rhetor could not have delivered his speech before Manuel on Géza II's attack and the peace

treaty between the two monarchs later than 1155.²¹⁶ This obviously implies that Géza and Manuel marched to the Danube and concluded their peace treaty in 1155 and not in 1156. As Cinnamus relates that Manuel marched to the Danube in spring,²¹⁷ these events must have occurred in the first half of 1155. That is, the previous events took place in 1154.

The following factors should be taken into consideration for the dating of the events in 1154. It is known from Cinnamus that Manuel made an agreement with Géza's envoys in the spring of 1154²¹⁸ and Nicetas relates that, after the talks in Sofia, the Byzantine emperor marched against the Serbian prince, whom he was able to persuade to dissolve his alliance with the Hungarians. Then the emperor returned to Constantinople.²¹⁹ Géza II attacked after the above events. To date it more precisely, from Cinnamus' information it can be ascertained that directly after the Hungarians had withdrawn. Emperor Manuel left for Berroea to winter there.²²⁰ All points considered, the most probable interpretation is that Géza II, in accordance with the agreement he had made with Andronicus in the first half of 1154, commenced his campaign against Byzantium late in the autumn, towards the end of 1154 and returned to Hungary before the year was out.²²¹

The peace treaty following the Hungarian attack in 1154 and concluded in the first half of 1155 marked the end of Hungarian-Byzantine confrontations during the reign of Géza II. The years from 1148 to 1155 were one of the most turbulent periods in the relationship between Hungary and Byzantium in the 12th century. The two states encountered one another on several fronts during this period. They supported opposing parties in the internal struggles in Russia, thus confronting each other indirectly. The climax in this relationship was, undoubtedly, the direct confrontation between the two countries. According to the opinion unanimously shared by the literature on the subject both in Hungary and abroad, it was Manuel's wish to acquire world hegemony which was behind his manoeuvres aiming at the subjection of Hungary and which led to this confrontation. However, the events discussed in detail above would not seem to support an interpretation of this sort. The Hungarian Kingdom became embroiled in open military clashes with Byzantium on her own initiative and, indeed, did not even refrain from meddling in internal power struggles and attempting to occupy Byzantine territories. All this seems to necessitate a profound reappraisal of relations between Hungary and Byzantium and the political and military conditions in Hungary during this period. It is an altogether different question that Hungary, which was playing such an active and initiative role in several fields of European politics, was able to meet her manifold commitments only for a short time. These years that stand out for their activity in foreign politics were necessarily followed by ones of internal hardships.

Chapter V

Hungarian pretender princes in Byzantium

Emperor Manuel sent his emissaries to Italy, probably at the turn of 1154–1155, to organize the campaign against the Normans.¹ In the spring of 1155 Byzantine troops also made their appearance in the Apennine peninsula. The Byzantine emperor had not given up the idea of resuscitating the treaty of Thessalonica and of launching an attack with Barbarossa on the kingdom of William I.²

In the meantime, the first Italian campaign of Barbarossa was drawing near its end. Frederick I, once he had renewed the treaty of Constance with Pope Adrian IV, marched into Rome in June 1155, and the Pope, in accordance with their agreement, crowned him emperor on June 18th. The Holy Roman Emperor, in return, suppressed the anti-Papal republican movement in Rome and handed Arnold of Brescia over to the Pope, who had the people's tribune immediately executed. Frederick Barbarossa had already left Rome and was retreating to the north towards Germany when he met with the envoys sent by Manuel. Frederick rejected the Byzantine plan for a campaign against the Normans, whereupon Byzantium started war against William I without Barbarossa's participation. Pope Adrian IV, however, joined the campaign, since his position in Rome had become untenable after the departure of Frederick I, and, in the meantime, the Norman king had also attacked papal territories. Maybe it was at this time that Manuel communicated his idea to the Pope about bringing into effect the union of the Eastern and Western Churches. The alliance between the Pope and the basileus was further strengthened by the rebelling Norman barons, and late in the summer of 1155 a large-scale war unfolded against William I. The allies achieved remarkable successes in the second half of 1155 and at the beginning of 1156, and a significant part of William's country, from Ancona to Brindisi, was occupied by Byzantium. The siege of Brindisi, one of the most important South Italian ports of the Norman kingdom, began on April 15, 1156. William I, who, by the beginning of 1156 had quelled the rebellion of the Sicilian aristocracy, arrived at Brindisi with a great army and a fleet.³

The Italian successes of Byzantium were an unpleasant surprise for Frederick I, whose idea of extending his imperial power all over Italy would not—as is apparent in the treaty of Constance—allow for the Byzantine conquest in Southern Italy. The antagonistic nature of the contradictions between the aspirations of Manuel and Frederick I in Italy boiled over again, for in June 1156, in the city of Würzburg, Frederick I decided to attack Manuel in Italy, thus helping King William—whom he detested—but with the main objective of preventing the restoration of Byzantine suzerainty on the peninsula. Enraged, Barbarossa did not even give an audience to the

envoys of the basileus at the Diet of Würzburg. However, after being informed that the Byzantines had been disastrously defeated by William's army at Brindisi on May 28, Frederick was willing to receive Manuel's ambassadors in July 1156 and gave up the idea of a campaign to Italy against Manuel.⁴ At the Diet of Nuremberg it turned out that the Byzantine envoys had come to Frederick I's court to discuss two very important questions.

One of them was Frederick I's intended Byzantine marriage, the other concerned Manuel's proposal to attack Hungary.⁵ The position Frederick Barbarossa adopted in these cases indicated that—on account of the fundamental differences between their hegemonic ambitions—no practical cooperation was possible between the two emperors. The idea of the German monarch's Byzantine match had been raised in 1153 and for years negotiations had dragged on about the marriage of Frederick I to Mary, the daughter of *sebastocrator* Isaac. This dynastic link would have been intended to serve the reinforcement of the Byzantine–German alliance. However, after the events of 1155 had made it clear that the aims of Frederick I and Manuel in Italy were completely opposed, the German emperor refused to marry the Byzantine princess. In June 1156, Barbarossa had in fact married Princess Beatrice, heiress of Upper Burgundy, and as a result Burgundy and Provence, also claimed by France, became parts of the Holy Roman Empire. This, of course, increased the discord between France and the Empire.⁶

As to Manuel's proposition that the two emperors should launch a joint attack on Hungary in September 1156,⁷ it does not appear to be a case for which the Byzantine monarch "was ready to sacrifice his Italian interests in order to revive the Greek–German alliance against Hungary",⁸ since there had been no German–Byzantine alliance directed against Hungary. In reality this proposal of Manuel, conceived in the spring of 1156, that is, at the time the Byzantines were enjoying their greatest successes in Italy, and indicative of the fragility of the peace treaty of 1155 between Hungary and Byzantium, was meant to divert Frederick I's attention from the Byzantine achievements in Italy⁹ and also to occupy the powers of the Holy Roman Empire, while Manuel, with the Pope and the Norman rebels, would continue his invasion against William I. What in the last analysis lurked behind Manuel's offer was that he would support Frederick Barbarossa's expansion towards Hungary as long as he himself was free to do as he pleased in Italy. Frederick Barbarossa turned down Manuel's offer basically because he considered Italy more important than Hungary. This is also shown by the fact that he decided, as early as 1156, to launch his next Italian campaign in the summer of 1158.¹⁰ Barbarossa's attitude must obviously have been influenced by the consideration that he could not tolerate his Byzantine rival to gain ground either in Italy or in Hungary—not even by a joint venture—and it was evident that in case the proposed joint campaign achieved its goal the two empires would somehow have had to divide the Hungarian Kingdom between themselves, since the treaty of Thessalonica also sanctioned territorial division concerning the Norman kingdom in Southern Italy.

The mere fact that Manuel could at all propose a campaign against Hungary to Frederick Barbarossa clearly indicates how tense and hostile relations were between Hungary and Germany, which had begun to deteriorate in 1146. The same is also attested to by the imperial privilege with which Barbarossa raised the Margraviate of

Austria to the rank of duchy in September 1156. This move eliminated the hostility between the Welfs and the Hohenstaufen, which had been gravely troubling Frederick I since 1152. The German ruler realized that the continuation of his expansionist foreign policy was impossible without establishing the unity of the German lords. Hence, since his accession to the throne, Frederick I had been making efforts to settle the quarrel between the Welfs and the Hohenstaufen. After satisfying the claims of Welf VI in 1152, he recognized the demands of Henry the Lion concerning Bavaria at the Diet of Goslar in June 1154. Henry of Babenberg, Margrave of Austria, overlord of the Duchy of Bavaria, however, did not accept this decision and even declined to take part in the first Italian campaign of Frederick I. Barbarossa finally managed to disarm Henry of Babenberg by making Austria a duchy on September 17, 1156, as a compensation for the loss of Bavaria.¹¹

This privilege, however, also served as an edge against Hungary since the Duke of Austria was bound to support the emperor with armed forces in case of a war against Hungary.¹² This unequivocally indicated that the tense relationship between the Kingdom of Hungary and the German empire could have sparked off a war any time.

Behind all these there lay the expansionist policy of Frederick Barbarossa, who had been considering the feudal subjection of Hungary already in 1152.¹³ According to his conception, which he explained in 1155, the German emperor made efforts to expand his suzerainty over the neighbouring states.¹⁴ The events in Poland in 1157 pointed at the increasing momentum of this eastward expansion. After Bolesław IV had terminated his vassalage to Frederick I, the latter, in the summer of 1157, advanced into Poland and forced its ruler to swear fealty to him, pay him annual dues and recognize his imperial suzerainty over Poland.¹⁵

The kingdom of Géza II was in a difficult position since it was exposed both to an attack from the German empire, and a concerted bi-frontal German-Byzantine military operation.¹⁶ That is why Géza II, in order to ease the pressure on his kingdom, initiated changes in the relationship between Hungary and the West (i.e. Germany and Bohemia). The turning point was 1157. In the wake of the mission to Hungary of Daniel, who was the Bishop of Prague and also one of Barbarossa's chief confidants, a dynastic connection was established between Bohemia and Hungary as Frederick, the son of ruling Prince of Bohemia, Vladislav II¹⁷ (one of the most powerful allies of the Holy Roman Emperor) married Elizabeth, the daughter of Géza II.¹⁸ The other achievement of Bishop Daniel's visit was that Géza II, in the summer of 1157, offered Frederick Barbarossa a Hungarian auxiliary unit for his Italian campaign, then in preparation.¹⁹ Before long, in the autumn, Hungarian envoys visited Frederick I's court and delivered gifts to the Holy Roman Emperor from the King of Hungary.²⁰

With the settling of the Hungarian-German and Hungarian-Bohemian relationships, a spectacular phase, abundant in action, of Hungarian foreign policy drew to an end. The following few years of King Géza's reign were characterized partly by a much more modest and restrained foreign policy compared with the previous years and by the continuous reinforcement of the re-established western, particularly German, links. Géza II's rapprochement with Frederick Barbarossa was induced primarily by tactical considerations but there were other reasons as well behind the new tendencies of his foreign policy.

In the previous phase the multifarious international commitments of Hungary imposed heavy burdens on the country in financial, military and political terms. During these years it also became evident that the resources of the country were incapable of satisfying these demands in the long run without damaging consequences. It appears from the sources that the different wars and campaigns involved considerable material expenditure and the burden of these fell mostly on the royal court. The incident around 1151, i.e. during the Russian and Byzantine wars, when the king received a loan of 40 silver marks from the Abbot of Pannonhalma to cover his expenses in connection with his talks with the Margrave of Austria, can be related to this.²¹ It was probably due to the modest proportions of monetary circulation in Hungary that the king had little cash at his disposal.²² It may also be assumed that the financial costs of the wars in Russia and with Byzantium also contributed to the decrease in Géza II's funds of cash. This is also supported by a remark in one of the speeches of rhetor Michael, namely, that paying the mercenaries, buying gifts for strangers and the preparations for the attack in the autumn of 1154 had all considerably diminished the wealth of the Hungarian king.²³ These economic difficulties would obviously have warned Géza that when defining foreign policy objectives he should not forget about the financial capacity of the country either.

Of the inner causes that affected the new foreign policy course the problems of internal politics played a crucial role. The ruling party, which had seized power in 1131 and which had been united until the 1150s, was rent with inner conflict destroying the unity of the ruling class. Probably it was already due to this that—according to the available data—the Hungarian magnates were not always unanimous in understanding the necessity of certain foreign policy moves, particularly when it came to campaigns. A revealing example of this could be the behaviour of the bishops who dissuaded the king from the continuation of one of the campaigns—probably that of 1155—which he planned against Byzantium.²⁴ It was in the form of succession disputes that the controversies between the different factions of the ruling class concerning the question of supreme power came to the surface. The struggle for power was started by one of the brothers of Géza II, Prince Stephen.

Rahewin, who carried on the work of Otto of Freising, relates that the settlement around 1152—which provided Stephen with princely provision but left him without territories and actual power²⁵—did not satisfy the prince. He wanted to seize royal power itself and began a conspiracy among his friends and followers. The source also reveals that the chief supporter of Stephen was his uncle, *ban* Beloš, who had an extraordinary admiration for the prince. Stephen and his adherents planned the assassination of Géza and “as a result of their monstrosities” the country was pushed to the brink of civil war. The king and those around him, of course, did not stand and watch all this idly. First they started to persecute Stephen's followers then, as “the cruel enemy of the country”, the prince himself was driven into exile and later even sentenced to death. Stephen fled to the court of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa from “his brother's cruel harshness”.²⁶ Other sources do not mention Stephen's conspiracy to seize the royal crown. Among the Byzantine sources Cinnamus says only that Géza II hated Stephen out of all proportions,²⁷ while Nicetas relates that Prince Stephen fled from his country before the hand of a relative seeking his life.²⁸ Nevertheless, the

information from the Byzantine historians essentially corresponds with what Rahewin said about the deteriorated state of the relationship between Géza and Stephen.

The dating of these events is rather problematic in the literature on the subject due to several causes. The fundamental reason is that the only source—the work of Rahewin—which gives a detailed account of the conflict between Géza II and *dux* Stephen, does not specify the actual dates of the events. Most of the scholars trying to disentangle this chronological knot took as their starting point one of the passages of Cinnamus. The historian relates, in connection with the attack of Géza II that took place in 1154 as a result of his conspiracy with Andronicus, that the Hungarians were already withdrawing on the river at Belgrade when the army of Basilius Tzintzilukes fell upon them. A battle ensued, which Géza's army won; in the army of Tzintzilukes the first to turn and flee were the Hungarians fighting alongside the Byzantines who "were led by Stephen, son of Géza".²⁹

The interpretation of the passage, quoted from the work of Cinnamus in connection with the person of the Stephen in it, has incited much debate among scholars. The literature on the subject is unanimous in one respect, namely, that Cinnamus made a mistake in defining the degree of propinquity since Géza II, who was approximately twenty-four in 1154, could not have had a son old enough for battle, let alone to be entrusted with the command of a separate division.³⁰ Now, on the strength of this correct observation, specialists give two answers as to the identity of the Stephen fighting in the Byzantine army.

According to the view most widely held, and this is also what modern Hungarian historiography exclusively believes, the Stephen in question is identical with the younger brother of Géza II, Prince Stephen, who was thus in Byzantium by 1154 or 1155 at the latest. If this is true, the prince's plot against Géza II had failed by that time, in other words, Prince Stephen's attempt to seize power should be dated before 1154–1155. Those of this opinion generally hold that after the peace treaty that had put an end to the wars between Hungary and Byzantium, Prince Stephen left Byzantium for the court of Frederick I.³¹

The adherents of the other view are of the opinion that Cinnamus was mistaken not only on the degree of propinquity but also on the name of the Hungarian captain, who fought with the Byzantines. They hold that the person in question is Coloman's son, Boris, who in fact lost his life in this war.³² These historians are of diverse opinions as to the whereabouts of Prince Stephen. Some say he was staying with Frederick Barbarossa while Boris was fighting against the Hungarians.³³ Others insist that Stephen, together with Boris, was in Byzantium at the time of the campaign and went to Frederick I around 1158.³⁴ Finally, there is a view which maintains that Prince Stephen fled from Hungary straight to the German emperor after his attempt on Géza II's life either at the end of 1156, or at the beginning of 1157.³⁵

Neither of these assertions is, however, fully acceptable. It seems improbable that Cinnamus, a contemporary historian, should have made such a grave mistake in connection with persons—Boris and prince Stephen—so well known to him and playing such important roles in contemporary Hungarian and Byzantine history. Cinnamus was well acquainted with Boris, who frequently visited Byzantium and had a Byzantine wife, and he was also particularly well informed about the life of Prince Stephen, later Stephen IV. He knew, for example, that Stephen was the brother of Géza

II.³⁶ Stephen IV occupied a very special place in Manuel's Hungarian policies and Cinnamus, the imperial secretary, was able to watch the events concerning Stephen IV very closely.³⁷ For example, in the summer of 1165, Cinnamus was also present at the battles around Semlin,³⁸ which Manuel had initiated partly in retaliation for the death of Stephen IV. It is difficult to see how, in such circumstances, he could be mistaken about the degree of the relation between Géza II and Prince Stephen.

It appears that the passage quoted above is referring to a third person, whose identity can be established with the help of Cinnamus. He relates, in connection with the events following the peace treaty that concluded the war between Hungary and Byzantium in 1164, that Stephen IV, who had been dethroned in 1163, had a cousin also called Stephen, who was then staying in the Byzantine camp. This Stephen was a speaking likeness of the ex-king and he assumed the armour of Stephen IV as a strategem. Even those near Stephen IV believed him to be the anti-king and as such he was captured by traitors and extradited to Stephen III.³⁹ The extreme resemblance between the two Stephens makes it evident that their ages must also have been nearly the same, that is, in 1154 the cousin of Prince Stephen—like the prince himself—was approximately 20–22 years old and the number of his years made it possible for him to fight against Géza II as the commander of a separate body of the army.

It can be inferred, then, that the Stephen fighting in the Byzantine army in 1154 and the Stephen mentioned as the cousin of Stephen IV in 1164 are one and the same person. Unfortunately, no further data are available to facilitate the establishment of the exact identity of Stephen, cousin to King Stephen IV. The assumption may be risked, however, that this Stephen was the second son of Boris, born in the early 1130s, roughly simultaneously with the third son—later Stephen IV—of Béla II. Their extraordinary resemblance can be explained by the fact that they both were great-grandsons of King Géza I.⁴⁰

From the above identification of the person of Stephen who was fighting against Géza II in the Byzantine army in 1154 it follows that Prince Stephen, the future Stephen IV, was not in Byzantium in 1154. This is in harmony with Rahewin's information asserting that Prince Stephen—after his conspiracy had been discovered and he himself exiled from the country—made for the court of Frederick Barbarossa, and placed himself under the protection of the emperor.⁴¹ Rahewin knows nothing of Prince Stephen's stay in Byzantium before his arrival at the imperial court but it is he who relates that the prince left for Byzantium after January 1158.⁴² To define the actual time of Prince Stephen's flight to Germany one has to start from a passage by Rahewin relating that—on Géza II's being informed that his brother was aspiring to power and that Prince Beloš was his chief supporter—the king "openly accused not so much him [i.e. Stephen] but his friends and followers setting down all they had done or said as a crime against them".⁴³ This means that Géza II first turned on Stephen's friends and intimates starting to seek out and persecute them. Naturally, Prince Beloš was among the first to face the royal wrath. The date of this can be established with the help of Hungarian documents. It turns out that "Prince Belus" figures as *comes palatinus* in authentic charters during the reign of Géza II until March 1157.⁴⁴ This means that after—and not very long after—this time Beloš fell from the king's favour on account of his connection with Prince Stephen and it was probably then—in spring, 1157—that he had to leave Hungary.⁴⁵ On the basis of Rahewin's narration it is clear

that, next to the chief supporters of Prince Stephen, the king's wrath was directed against his brother, who had sought his life but who then chose to flee straight to Frederick I's court. In all probability Prince Stephen left Hungary sometime during the summer of 1157.⁴⁶ Consequently, his conspiracy to seize power can be dated to 1156–1157 or more closely to the turn of 1156–1157.

The prince, like the pretender Boris before him, placed himself under the protection of the Holy Roman Emperor soliciting his help against Géza II. Frederick Barbarossa, "by his dignity and authority as Roman Emperor" claimed the right of arbitration in the Hungarian crown dispute and sent his envoys to King Géza.⁴⁷ The King of Hungary also accepted Frederick as arbitrator⁴⁸ and his envoys, Bishop Gervasius and *comes* Heidrich made their appearance in Barbarossa's court to represent their king.⁴⁹ At the Diet of Regensburg in January 1158 both Prince Stephen and the emissaries of the Hungarian king presented their case but the emperor delayed his decision on the Hungarian question.⁵⁰ This meant, at least for some time, that Barbarossa took a stand favourable for Géza II. One source relates that the emperor even considered dividing the territory of the country between Géza and Prince Stephen—as had been the case in Denmark in 1152⁵¹—but in the end he gave up this idea.⁵² The Holy Roman Emperor obviously did not want to become bogged down in irrelevant foreign policy issues before his second campaign to Italy, which he planned for the summer of 1158. Naturally enough, his attitude was favourably influenced by the recent friendly change in the policies of Géza II towards the empire. Thus the Hungarian king was justified, since by his clever policies he managed not only to avert the expansionist efforts of the Germans, but also to save his crown from the designs of Prince Stephen, who would not shy away from pleading for foreign help. The fact that the shift in Géza II's attitude towards the German empire almost coincided with the eruption of his conflict with Prince Stephen suggests that internal power disputes played a significant role in his change of tactics in foreign policy. At the same time, Frederick Barbarossa's decision to "put off the verdict in the case [of Géza II vs. Stephen] until a more suitable time" secured for himself the possibility of exerting future political pressure on the King of Hungary.⁵³

The available facts are meagre so it is impossible to define exactly the social forces that were behind Stephen's venture to seize power. Rahewin, in connection with the conspiracy, mentions Stephen's friends and intimates, of whom, however, only Beloš is known by name.⁵⁴ Abundant material in Hungarian and foreign sources proves that Beloš, King Géza II's uncle on his mother's side, was, for about one and a half decades, until 1157, a prominent figure and a leading personality in Hungarian domestic and foreign politics. It is known, for example, that he was campaigning in Russia in 1144⁵⁵ that, together with the king, he defeated Henry Jasomirgott in 1146,⁵⁶ that he probably played an important role in forging the alliance between Hungary and Serbia against Byzantium in 1149,⁵⁷ that he fought against Manuel at the end of 1150⁵⁸ and that at about the same time he married his daughter to the brother of Prince Iziaslav in order to cement the alliance of Hungary, Volhinia and Kiev;⁵⁹ he is mentioned in the charters as *comes palatinus* (in 1152 and 1157)⁶⁰ and as *ban* (in 1150, around 1151, in 1152, around 1156, and in 1157)⁶¹ that is, as the holder of the most important offices in the realm. His family relationship with the Árpád dynasty—apart from actual references—is also demonstrated by his title of *dux*.⁶² In addition, Beloš was probably

the other leader of the plot against Géza II together with Stephen. His participation in this conspiracy is, in itself, indicative of the existence of a social group, representing considerable strength, behind Stephen; in other words, a part of the ruling class, by no means to be underestimated, which had turned against the rule of Géza II.

The crown dispute between Géza and his brother was a familiar phenomenon, the like of which had already occurred several times in Hungarian history. In an age when the king still clearly outweighed the aristocracy in terms of material resources and political-governmental power, the discontented elements of the aristocracy would try to make conditions more favourable for the increase of their own economic power and political influence by means of inciting dynastic discord.⁶³ Prince Stephen's overreaching personal ambitions coincided with the efforts of the magnates, displeased with the given political conditions, to effect some change. The representatives of diverse—both clerical and secular—groups in the ruling class probably rallied round the prince, as had been the case on other occasions.⁶⁴ The assumption can be made that foreign policy issues also had their part in the dispute. It is possible that Stephen and Beloš, with a group of magnates behind them holding different views from those of Géza II on the Byzantine and Serbian question, supported the continuation of the confrontation with Byzantium. Perhaps this is why the pretender prince first went to Frederick Barbarossa, whose court, however, he left on his own initiative—probably still in 1158—for Byzantium (via Venice), to place himself under the protection of the basileus.⁶⁵ This last fact also indicates that it was more the efforts to seize supreme power and less considerations of foreign policy that directed Prince Stephen in the struggle for the crown.⁶⁶

In 1158 the war in Italy ended with a defeat for Byzantium. It appeared that the empire could not gain an upper hand over the Normans by its own strength alone⁶⁷ and Manuel's allies gradually abandoned the fight against William I. It was a sore point for Manuel that after the battle of Brindisi, Pope Adrian IV made a pact with the Normans. In the treaty of Benevento, concluded in June 1156, the Norman king swore a vassal's fealty to the Pope, who, in turn, recognized William as king, and formally granted Southern Italy to him as a fief.⁶⁸ William I neutralized Genoa in 1156⁶⁹ and the rebelling Norman barons were defeated by, or submitted to, the king one after the other. After the last large-scale military initiative of the basileus had also failed in 1157, Emperor Manuel, with the Pope as mediator, concluded a 30-year peace with William I in 1158. Manuel, Adrian IV and William I were then gathered on the same side against their common enemy, Frederick Barbarossa.⁷⁰

Nicetas Choniates relates that Prince Stephen, on arriving in Constantinople, was happily welcomed by Manuel and honoured by various signs of the emperor's high esteem.⁷¹ This is certainly indicated by the fact that probably at this time the basileus married one of his nieces, Mary, the daughter of *sebastocrator* Isaac, who had earlier been meant for Frederick Barbarossa, to Stephen.⁷² Despite the grand reception Manuel did not immediately provide Stephen and his group with any assistance for their designs in Hungary. The reason for this was that in these years Manuel had no political plans whatever in connection with Hungary. His attentions were instead drawn to the East in 1158 and until 1161 Byzantine foreign politics were preoccupied with the problems posed by the Sultanate of Iconium, the Emirate of Mosul and the Armenian Principality of Cilicia, which were expanding at the expense of the empire,

and with issues concerning Antioch and Jerusalem.⁷³ Manuel, on the other hand, though he had to leave Italy in 1158, would not abandon his ideas about the restoration of Byzantine domination in Southern Italy and, therefore, even during the years of his eastern expansion he was deeply interested in all affairs concerning Italy.⁷⁴

Frederick Barbarossa launched his second Italian campaign in summer, 1158, and it lasted until the summer of 1162.⁷⁵ The war in Italy was associated with Frederick's hegemonist aspiration to dominate the medieval world. He regarded the German empire as the inheritor of the Roman Empire and thus saw himself as heir to the Emperors of Rome. The main objective, therefore, in the first phase of the campaign was to restore former imperial power and authority in Northern and Central Italy. The chief opponents of this effort were the cities in Northern Italy, defending their own economic and political interests. Their attitude is fully comprehensible as the German emperor was trying to eliminate their political privileges and also wanted to subdue these cities economically with their developed systems of self-government. Having access to the material wealth of these cities—which, in terms of their economy, were among the most developed of the age—would have ensured a financial basis for Frederick's further political manoeuvres. The cities of Lombardy, headed by Milan, resisted the emperor. Barbarossa, however, subdued them in a few weeks and early in September 1158 Milan also surrendered.⁷⁶ Géza II, in accordance with his promise of 1157, sent some 500 archers to Frederick's camp and the Hungarian auxiliary force within the army of Henry Jasomirgott, Duke of Austria, together with the Bohemians, took part in the battles around Milan.⁷⁷

After his military victory Frederick Barbarossa deemed the time ripe for a new political system to be introduced in Italy based on the unlimited power of the emperor. It was in November 1158 that the Diet of Roncaglia, with the help of lawyers from Bologna and on the basis of the ancient laws of Rome and Emperor Justinian, defined the imperial rights (*regalia*) that were designed to result in the economic and political subjection of the Italian cities. On the strength of the Roncaglia resolutions *podestàs*, officers appointed by and dependent on the emperor, were placed to rule over the cities; the new system of taxation meant a serious bloodletting for the economic life of the towns but it promised large revenues for the treasury; garrisons were quartered in the cities to secure the control of the emperor over Italy. Milan and Crema refused to accept the edicts of Roncaglia and rebelled as early as January 1159 prompting Barbarossa to march against them in the summer of 1159. Pope Adrian IV also supported these cities because he found himself unable to accept Frederick's notion that bishops should be vassals of the emperor, to whom they owed different feudal services. William I's attitude to the rebellious towns was rather similar to that of the Pope.⁷⁸ At the same time Géza II—in the words of one of the sources—"on hearing of the audacity of the Milanese, sent envoys to the court and of his own accord promised the emperor bigger help than before".⁷⁹ This unambiguously testifies to the fact that the King of Hungary, in 1159, persevered firmly in his policy of siding with Frederick I, which he had started in 1157.

It was only in January 1160, after seven months of fighting, that Barbarossa was able to quell the rebellion of the little town of Crema but he could not move against Milan because by that time he was completely occupied by the schism that had divided the Church of Rome in the autumn of 1159 and which later was to become an event of

immense political significance affecting the life of the whole of Europe. Pope Adrian IV, who since 1154 (the conclusion of the treaty of Brindisi) had opposed Frederick, died early in September 1159. Barbarossa wanted to use the opportunity of his enemy's death to have a pope who would be more obedient to the emperor placed in the Holy See. The majority of the cardinals, however, aware of the support of the Norman king, elected an adherent of the late Pope, Cardinal Roland, who assumed the name of Alexander III. The minority elected Octavian, the nominee of Frederick I, who became Pope Victor IV.⁸⁰ Cardinal Roland, at the Diet of Besançon in October 1157, had already declared the primacy of the Pope in connection with the rivalry between the Empire and the Papacy.⁸¹ His election threatened Frederick I with the probability that, as Alexander III, he would continue the policies of Adrian IV. Hence the emperor declined to recognize him as the legitimate Pope and did his best to induce the monarchs of the Christian world to accept his own nominee.

This attitude of Barbarossa in the question of the schism was closely associated with the ecclesiastic policies he had been pursuing since his accession to the throne and which were an organic part of his political efforts to restore the Roman Empire. His new political course ("*honor imperii*") also manifested itself in his policies towards the Church and the Papacy. Since his coming to power the Concordat of Worms (1122), which had brought the first struggle between the Papacy and the Empire to an end, had ceased to be valid in the lands under his rule simply because Barbarossa had entirely ignored it. He himself appointed bishops whom he then regarded as his own vassals. By 1157 the imperial chancellery had already elaborated the doctrines of "the divine properties of the emperor and the empire", of the unlimited imperial power and of the emperor being responsible only to God. It was declared that since the emperor derived his power from God, he owed responsibility only to Him and as the defender of the Church (*defensor ecclesiae*), he also claimed for himself superiority over the Church. At the same time, the Papacy, propagating the divine origin and the primacy of its own power, regarded the imperial crown as a Papal benefice and demanded obedience from the emperor considering him only the humble soldier of the Church (*miles ecclesiae*). Barbarossa's policy started the second round in the struggle between the Empire and the Papacy.⁸² Frederick's most obvious aim in connection with the schism was to subordinate the Papacy to the Empire by having Victor IV recognized as Pope. Had he achieved this, the emperor would have been able to use the economic, political and ideological power of the Papacy for extending the political influence of the Holy Roman Empire over all Europe.⁸³ That is why the schism, which seemed to be a simple question of Canon Law, assumed the proportions of a political issue, crucial as regards the changes in European power politics. One after the other all the states that opposed the efforts of Frederick I to gain world dominance recognized Alexander III as the lawful Pope and regarded Victor IV, the protégé of the German emperor, as illegitimate. Apart from the territories of the empire itself it was only the vassal states of the emperor, namely, Denmark, Poland and Bohemia, that supported Octavian's claims from the beginning.⁸⁴

At the beginning of 1160 Frederick summoned a church council to put an end to the schism.⁸⁵ The Council of Pavia, however, to which the ecclesiastical leaders of Hungary were also invited, was not only unable to settle the issue but, on the contrary, practically consolidated and perpetuated the schism for a longer period of time. The

council, which nearly without exception consisted of the ecclesiastics that supported Victor IV and the envoys of a few monarchs, namely, those of England, France, Denmark, Bohemia and Hungary, recognized Victor IV as legal Pope and excommunicated Alexander III together with all his supporters. Thereupon, in March 1160, Alexander excommunicated Victor and Frederick Barbarossa. By the end of the year the group behind Alexander was also clearly defined. He was supported, from the beginning, by the Lombard cities, the Norman kingdom in Sicily, Venice, and by the end of 1160 the Kingdom of Jerusalem also joined him. He was recognized by Castile, Norway and Ireland, too. From the viewpoint of the future of Alexander's papacy it proved particularly significant that in autumn, 1160, at the Council of Toulouse, England and France also came down officially on his side.⁸⁶ This influenced the attitude of Hungary to a great extent as can be seen from a letter by Géza II to Louis VII early in 1161.⁸⁷

Historical research does not seem to have paid sufficient attention to this significant and exciting issue and it has not been convincingly spelled out how Géza II behaved during the different phases of the schism precisely.⁸⁸ It is possible that in the beginning the Hungarian king was inclined to accept Victor IV. Thus, at the Council of Pavia in February 1160, Géza II's representatives were among those who signed the resolutions of the council declaring Victor IV the lawful Pope of the Church of Rome.⁸⁹ Before long, however, it turned out that this was not the final decision of the Hungarian king. At Easter 1160, Géza II—adopting a reserved, wait-and-see attitude—responded elusively to Daniel, Bishop of Prague, whom Emperor Frederick and Pope Victor IV had sent to Hungary as a legate.⁹⁰ Even so, in summer, 1160, the Holy Roman Emperor was still convinced that Hungary supported Victor IV.⁹¹ During 1160 the Hungarian ruler was also in touch with Alexander III, negotiating the recognition of the latter with papal legates.⁹² After the Council of Toulouse, in the autumn of 1160, Géza II and those around him—having sized up European power relationships—decided to recognize Alexander III. This decision proved to be final and Géza also informed Pope Alexander of it in the spring of 1161.⁹³ The king, however, did not disclose this change in his standpoint to Frederick I. One of the reasons for this must have been that Géza II did not want to come up against Barbarossa before, on the one hand, he had concluded the talks on the matter of settling the relationship between Hungary and the Pope and, on the other, before he had found suitable supporters to withstand the probable consequences of his break with the German emperor. The other reason for King Géza's procrastination was, it seems, in connection with the activities of Prince Stephen.

At this time Byzantium was achieving great successes with its eastern policies. In September 1158, the most important of the crusading princes, King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, joined Manuel's allies and the fact was endorsed by Baldwin's Byzantine marriage. In the autumn of 1158 the basileus led a victorious campaign against Cilicia, reduced its ruler, Thoros II, to vassaldom and put the country under his own suzerainty. At the same time he was able to extend imperial sovereignty over Antioch as well: Rainald, Prince of Antioch swore fealty to Manuel and became his vassal. In the spring of 1159 Manuel marched into Antioch in a magnificent triumph. After these events the emperor commenced a war against one of the strongest Muslim rulers, Nur-ad-Din, Amir of Mosul. At the end of 1159 and again in 1160 the Byzantine emperor

fought against Kilij Arslan II, Sultan of Iconium. Their conflict reached a conclusion only at the end of 1161 when the Sultan appeared in Constantinople. The peace treaty, made on this occasion, closely tied the Sultan to Byzantium.⁹⁴ Getting involved in the struggle for the Hungarian throne would have seriously disturbed Manuel's activities in the East and therefore he did not support Prince Stephen who thereupon left Constantinople and once more made his appearance in the court of Frederick Barbarossa.

According to information provided by the Chronicle of Cologne, Frederick, while in Parma, "was visited by Stephen, brother of the King of Hungary, who made every effort to obtain the country from the emperor and promised to pay him 3,000 marks every year",⁹⁵ It can be inferred that this incident took place at the turn of 1160–1161 and it proves the prince's continued insistence, despite previous failures, on his designs to seize the crown of Hungary. Obviously, Géza II had to take his brother's new attempt into account when shaping his policies towards the German emperor. An item of information, dated to 1161 by Otto of St Blasien, can be associated with this new move of Prince Stephen: it is to the effect that the King of Hungary increased the forces of the German emperor, who was preparing for the siege of Milan, by sending him a unit of archers. Most probably this remained only a promise which Géza II never fulfilled.⁹⁶ The king's rather double-faced policies are revealed by the letters he sent to the Council of Lodi in June 1161 in which he still recognized Victor IV as the sole Pope.⁹⁷ This, of course, could not go on forever and, in the autumn of 1161, Géza II revealed his final position in connection with the schism to the envoy of Frederick I. It was then that the break with the German emperor became complete since Géza not only informed Frederick of his recognition of Pope Alexander but also refused to send more troops to the Italian campaign. Furthermore he gave a negative answer to the imperial envoy concerning a proposed marriage that had been intended to cement Hungarian–German relations.⁹⁸

Thus in 1161 significant changes, compared to the course of earlier years, occurred in Hungarian foreign policy. The King of Hungary and those around him wanted to thoroughly prepare the recognition of Alexander III and the break with Frederick I and fortify the position of the country with foreign allies in view of the predictable conflicts. It was most probably in the spring of 1161 that Géza II entered into alliance with Louis VII, King of France and Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg, who was Alexander's chief German supporter. These alliances were explicitly directed against Barbarossa and, in return for their support, the Hungarian king promised both Louis and the Archbishop of Salzburg military help in case of a German attack.⁹⁹ At the same time the Chronicle of Cologne relates that in 1161, when Milan was being besieged for the second time, Hungary concluded a five-year peace treaty with Byzantium.¹⁰⁰

The foreign policy change of 1161 is attributable to several causes. It appears that the decisive factor in moulding Géza's attitude about the break with Frederick was his recognition of the danger that was a threat to the independence of Hungary greater than had been seen before, inherent in the policies of Barbarossa who was set upon establishing his hegemony in Europe. From 1157 the Hungarian monarch—so as to avert German eastward expansion and to foil Prince Stephen's attempts to seize the crown—was forced into a rapprochement with Frederick I out of tactical con-

siderations. This resulted in a rather close relationship between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Holy Roman Empire, which, however, was somewhat uncomfortable for the former. Yet the notion that Géza II submitted to the emperor and that Hungary became the vassal kingdom of the empire should be ruled out.¹⁰¹ Géza II, to give him his due, neither swore a vassal's fealty nor paid annual dues to the emperor and the latter was not free to dispose of Hungary as if it had been one of his fiefs either. The Hungarian monarch wanted to make the best of the schism in order to bring this close relationship to an end.¹⁰² In effecting this shift of direction in his foreign policy the king acted very carefully and with great prudence. Having waited for Alexander's camp to take shape Géza joined the powers that, for diverse reasons, were also worried by the increase of Frederick's power and the advance of German expansionism.

This is also confirmed by the Cologne Chronicle, according to which the contemplated submission of the Milanese made "the other kings of the world tremble and they, who so far had always rejoiced in hostilities among themselves, now mutually pledged peace and came to terms with each other against their lord, the Roman emperor [i.e. Frederick] and this was done not by battles but plans, not by force but tricks; thus, in the same year [i.e. 1161], the envoys of five kings gathered in one place to make this alliance. The Greek made peace with the Hungarian for five years."¹⁰³ The literature on the subject also mentions the Norman kingdom in Southern Italy, England, France and Venice besides Byzantium and Hungary.¹⁰⁴ Although such a coalition against Frederick Barbarossa was never forged either in 1161 or later, despite the efforts of Pope Alexander,¹⁰⁵ a passage in the Cologne Chronicle still indicates that the change in Géza II's foreign policy was noticed in Europe and his chief motives were also understood.¹⁰⁶ Considering the contemporary positions of the Papacy and the Empire and the actual power relations between the *imperium* and the *sacerdotium*, the decision of the Hungarian king—in this period of peaceful relations with Byzantium—was a totally justified and proper move.¹⁰⁷ At the same time this exemplifies very well how sensitively Hungarian foreign policy adjusted itself to changes in European power interrelations.¹⁰⁸

A letter from Lucas (Lukács), Archbishop of Esztergom, to Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg throws light on the fact that the influence of the former carried significant weight with Géza when he changed the direction of his foreign policy.¹⁰⁹ The archbishop, who from this time up to the succession of Béla III played an important role in directing the home and foreign policies of Hungary, was the "representative of extreme Gregorianism".¹¹⁰ During the schism—as revealed in his letter—he supported Alexander III from the start and maintained excellent relations with the Pope's chief German ally, Eberhard.¹¹¹ The interests of the ecclesiastical powers represented by Lucas then happened to coincide with the basic foreign policy interests of Hungary as a whole. Alexander was fully aware of Lucas' allegiance and activities¹¹² and showed his appreciation by sending him the archiepiscopal pallium in July 1161.¹¹³ At the same time—in the summer of 1161—the royal court and the *Curia* concluded a compromise (*concordat*), which settled very important aspects of both the respective authority and the relationship between the king and the Pope. In this settlement the Pope accepted the fact that the ecclesiastical leaders of Hungary were to appeal to him (*appellatio*) only with the consent of the king; he was also to have the king's consent to send legates

(*legatio*) to Hungary; and the Pope also conceded powers to the king concerning the awarding of archiepiscopal pallia. In return, the King of Hungary gave up his right to depose or transfer bishops without permission from the Pope.¹¹⁴ This agreement, in which both parties made significant concessions, was in some respects similar to both the canonical regulations of the treaty of Benevento between the South Italian Normans and the Pope in June 1156, and also to certain articles in the Constitutions of Clarendon in 1164. This fact, drawing attention to similarities between the contemporary Hungarian, Sicilian Norman and English ecclesiastical situations, demonstrates that Géza II—like William I of Sicily and Henry II of England—skilfully endeavoured to make use of Alexander's difficult position to wring certain ecclesiastical concessions from him.¹¹⁵ It is also to be regarded as a sign of the restoration of good relations between Hungary and the Papacy that in the years of 1160 and 1162 Alexander III took sides with Absolon, Archbishop of Spalato, who was supported by Géza in a dispute concerning the person of the archbishop.¹¹⁶

Thus the commencement of the so-called second struggle between the Empire and the Papacy seriously influenced the foreign policy of Hungary besides that of other European countries. The King of Hungary, in this clash between *imperium* and *sacerdotium*, found himself in the same camp with the Emperor of Byzantium. It seems, however, that the opposition of the two monarchs to Frederick I's policies was only one of the motives underlying the conclusion of the five-year peace in 1161. Certain considerations concerning internal politics also urged Géza to conclude this treaty, for the king had to maintain peaceful relations with Manuel if he wanted to stabilize power relations at home. Of Géza's brothers, Prince Stephen—as in 1158—returned to Byzantium after his enterprise in Germany. Something of the continuing struggles and disagreements between the various parties and groups within the ruling class is revealed by the fact that another brother of Géza II, Ladislav, also emigrated to Constantinople. The sources, however, give no information as to when this happened. Nicetas remarks only that this event took place not long after Stephen's arrival in Byzantium.¹¹⁷ It may be inferred with a fair degree of probability that Ladislav left for Byzantium around 1160.¹¹⁸

The available sources say nothing of the actual reason why Prince Ladislav had to leave the country, although Cinnamus observes that Géza profoundly hated Ladislav just as he hated Stephen.¹¹⁹ It follows from this that the hostility between Géza and Ladislav nearly reached the proportions of that between Géza and Stephen. Nicetas seems to contradict this by saying that the brotherly love between Géza and Ladislav did not cease and the latter did not fear the schemings of his elder brother and he went to Byzantium only because he had been attracted by the news of his younger brother's (i.e. Stephen's) favourable reception there.¹²⁰ There appears to be more to it than that, however. It is well known that the chief manifestation of the high esteem in which Stephen was held by Byzantium was his marriage to the chosen betrothed of Frederick Barbarossa. Manuel offered a similar opportunity to Ladislav: the prince had the chance to marry one of the imperial princesses. Ladislav, however, declined the honour because he did not want to "harm his affairs at home" by a Byzantine marriage.¹²¹ Taking all this into consideration, the inference that Prince Ladislav had serious reasons of a political nature for his journey to Byzantium is, perhaps, not far from the truth. It seems that after the flight of Prince Stephen the forces of the opposition,

dissatisfied with the rule of Géza, rallied around Prince Ladislas. After a time this provoked the wrath of the king and Ladislas eventually had to leave the country on account of his brother's "hatred". The prince returned to Hungary only in the summer of 1162 after the death of Géza II.¹²² His leaving the country seems to indicate that the division of the ruling class into factions, which, with the move of Prince Stephen, had occurred for the first time after twenty-five years of calm, was not a transient, momentary event but a more lasting political phenomenon. On the strength of Nicetas' information it seems quite clear that Ladislas meant to return to Hungary at an appropriate time to achieve his political aims "at home," but he also wanted to have as few commitments to Byzantium as possible, thus reserving greater freedom of movement. The political aspirations of Princes Stephen and Ladislas and their attempts to realise them indicate that the crisis in internal politics was becoming deeper and deeper and that the succession, the fate of the crown itself had become the central issue. These events, then, foreshadowed the disputes for the crown and the civil discord that were to come. It was to prevent Manuel—by tying his hands—from aiding the two princes in their high ambitions that was the precise aim of Géza II when he concluded peace with Byzantium in 1161.

The magnates who had grouped themselves around Stephen and Ladislas continued trying to increase their economic and political power by helping one or the other member of the royal family. A new centre of power would have served the aims of the dissatisfied aristocrats very well. On the other hand, Géza had to learn the lesson set by the example of Stephen and Ladislas, namely that the members of the royal house were no longer satisfied with the "princely provision" if it continued to deny them any actual power. The king was eventually forced to give in to the pressure on him coming from two sides. This was probably why Géza II, around 1161 and near the end of his reign, seems to have organized a duchy, complete with territorial power for his younger son, Béla¹²³. The king, forestalling certain claims by this measure, intended to defuse the endeavours of the malcontented aristocrats and a possible rebellion by Prince Béla. In other words, he wished to ward off further domestic struggles and disputes in this way¹²⁴ and, at the same time, strengthen the internal front against expected foreign invasions.

The literature on the subject offers differing answers to the question of the whereabouts of Béla's *ducatus*. Some scholars believe that Béla's duchy—which in Byzantium was considered to be his patrimony—extended over Central Dalmatia and Croatia,¹²⁵ while others are of the opinion that, in addition to these lands, it also included Sirmium.¹²⁶ Of all the sources only Cinnamus makes references to the territorial extension of the duchy. In connection with the events of 1165 he relates that Emperor Manuel dispatched John Ducas with an army to occupy Dalmatia, since "the Huns [i.e. Hungarians] regarded this also as theoretically belonging to Béla's patrimony."¹²⁷ From this remark it is clear that Prince Béla's portion of inheritance was not only Dalmatia but something else as well. Cinnamus, relating the events of 1165, also includes the information that after King Stephen III had recaptured Sirmium from Byzantium, the basileus began his letter to him with the following words: "You are acting illegally, oh most excellent man, when you violate your oath made earlier to our majestic self concerning Sirmium and others".¹²⁸ This oath was sworn by the Hungarian king in 1164 when he concluded peace with Manuel with the mediation of

Vladislav II, ruler of Bohemia. Both Byzantine and Bohemian chronicles contain information about these events and it is known from these sources that Stephen III's oath in 1164 concerned the handing over of Béla's patrimony¹²⁹ to the empire. According to the passage quoted from Manuel's letter Sirmium was part of the patrimony in 1164. The patrimony, however, according to the contract, had been *de iure* delivered to Prince Béla by Stephen III in 1163, when the former left for the court of Constantinople.¹³⁰ Thus in 1163 Béla's patrimony also contained Sirmium besides Central Dalmatia and Croatia.

The question now is whether Béla's ducal powers had extended over the same territories before 1163, that is, in the years between 1161 and 1163. Unfortunately, no direct answer to this question can be gleaned from the sources. But if one starts from the fact that, unlike the Croatian–Dalmatian territories, Sirmium had never been (prior to 1161) nor would ever be (following the 1190s, when the Croatian–Dalmatian duchy of Emeric [Imre] was organized)¹³¹ part of any Hungarian *ducatus*, the answer can only be that originally, i.e. between 1161 and 1163, Sirmium could not have belonged to the duchy, Béla's original patrimony. In other words, in 1161 King Géza marked out only Central Dalmatia and Croatia as the patrimony of Prince Béla.¹³² The change occurred in 1163, when Stephen III, in order to defend his crown and giving in to Byzantine pressure, had to sign away Sirmium in addition to the Croatian and Dalmatian territories in the contract he made with the Byzantine emperor. Manuel afterwards considered this valuable and rich land an integral part of Prince Béla's patrimony and staked a claim to it by right of this.¹³³

On May 31, 1162, young King Géza II died. After his decease Hungary found itself in a totally new situation. The next few years were to see a period of intensive Byzantine interference, a phenomenon unprecedented in Hungarian history up to that time.¹³⁴

Chapter VI

The years of Byzantine intervention

Géza II evidently supposed that by making his elder son, Stephen, his co-ruler and putting his younger son, Béla, at the head of a *ducatus*—which also involved territorial power—he had satisfactorily settled the question of the succession. It was in accordance with this arrangement that, not long after Géza's death (on May 31 1162),¹ the heir apparent, Stephen, was crowned king by Lucas, Archbishop of Esztergom.² For the time being, however, the rule of King Stephen III, lasted less than six weeks. In July 1162, the young king was forced to leave the country on account of intervention from Byzantium and a new king took his place. Thus began the period of Byzantine intervention and influence in Hungary, which lasted from 1162 to 1165.

The fact that Byzantium meddled in the Hungarian succession disputes was related to a change in her foreign policy in 1162. Between 1158 and 1161, the empire was busy with expansion in the East, and Manuel's successes against the Armenians, the Seljuqs and the crusader states significantly surpassed the achievements of his direct predecessors. In 1162 however, the basileus turned his attentions to the West and for a few years the problems of that region played a cardinal role in his foreign policies. This western policy of Byzantium had two main areas of operation, Italy and Hungary.

In the early 1160s a new period opened in the rivalry between the German and the Byzantine empires over the hegemony in Italy. The change was caused by Frederick Barbarossa, who in the early 1160s achieved greater successes in Italy than previously, which took him nearer his final goal: the realization of the *renovatio imperii Romani*. One particularly significant achievement of his was that after a year's siege Milan, the centre of Lombard resistance, surrendered unconditionally in March 1162. As a result, practically the whole of Northern Italy lay at the feet of Barbarossa and nothing stood in the Catholic Church, his own empire would be too vulnerable in the west if he accords with the Roncaglia resolutions. Pope Alexander III lost his supporters and was forced to leave Italy in March 1162. He fled to France, where he tried to whip up some support from the Kings of England and France against Frederick I. At this time the Norman Kingdom of Southern Italy was struggling with grave internal problems. The rebellions of the Norman barons had prevented William I from coming to the aid of Alexander in any effectual way and these domestic disputes provided Barbarossa with a good opportunity for a war against the Normans. In the spring of 1162, Frederick Barbarossa started preparations for a land and sea invasion against Southern Italy, which he intended to launch in September 1162. Thus the overall occupation of Italy became the question of the day. The empire of Frederick

Barbarossa was very close to really becoming a *Roman* empire instead of the German kingdom that it actually happened to be.

Realization of this, however, would not only have dealt a fatal blow to Manuel's ideas of a universal empire and his claims to Italy, but would also have resulted in such a great shift in European power politics that the vital interests of several countries on the continent would have been jeopardized.³ One of the passages of Cinnamus reveals that Manuel was rather concerned that "the power of Frederick, King of the Alamans [i.e. Germans], had greatly increased and was constantly growing".⁴ That is why Constantinople was afraid that Frederick Barbarossa was preparing to attack the Byzantine Empire in 1161–1162.⁵ The Chronicle of Cologne is of the same opinion: according to it, other European monarchs—such as Manuel—also deemed the expansionist superpower politics of Barbarossa dangerous. In connection with the situation the chronicle says: "This Greek king [i.e. Manuel] wrote to the Kings of Turkia, Babylonia, Persia and Cumania to inform them that the Roman emperor [i.e. Frederick Barbarossa] intended to conquer his and their lands when he had finished with Milan. The Kings of Spain, Barcelona, France and England were also afraid of that."⁶ John of Salisbury, a contemporary in England, also expressed his views rejecting Barbarossa's aspirations to world dominance: "Who made the Germans judge over the peoples of Christ? Who gave these stupid and violent men the power to place rulers over the head of mankind at their own pleasure?"⁷

Under these circumstances the Emperor of Byzantium made it one of his foreign policy goals to curb the further increase of Frederick Barbarossa's power and drive him out of Italy. To achieve this aim the basileus tried to ally himself to all the powers and forces opposing Barbarossa and this is why he supported Pope Alexander's ideas of a coalition. Alexander III, throughout his sojourn in France (1162–1165) indefatigably laboured at forging a great coalition against the German emperor. However, such an alliance eventually failed to materialize primarily because of the controversies between Byzantium and the Normans. William I objected not only to Frederick's, but also to Manuel's expansionist efforts in Italy.⁸ In spite of the failure of the coalition plans the political effect of these preparations should not be underestimated. In the summer of 1162 the German emperor had to delay the invasion against the Normans mainly because, when reconsidering his position, he saw that on account of his current conflicts with the English and the French, concerning the schism in the Catholic Church, his own empire would be too vulnerable in the west if he launched a campaign in Southern Italy.⁹ In order to improve his positions in the west, Barbarossa even tried to convert Louis VII to his side against Pope Alexander in August 1162. His design came to nothing and the King of France, though after some deliberation, remained the supporter of Alexander.¹⁰ What is more, before long diplomatic talks began between Louis and Manuel on the subject of an alliance directed against Frederick Barbarossa.¹¹ At the same time, Byzantium also embraced the cause of the Italian towns, which again started organizing and making preparations against Frederick.¹²

The other important area of the westward aspirations of Byzantium was Hungary. In the first period following the death of Géza II, Byzantine expansion was particularly blatant against Hungary. Cinnamus relates that the main objective of the emperor's foreign policy in 1162 was to establish Byzantine rule over Hungary. The historian

records that—after Géza had died—Emperor Manuel went to Sofia because “he considered securing domination over the land of the Huns [i.e. Hungarians] his most important task”.¹³ However, from the work of another Byzantine historian, Nicetas Choniates, it can be established that the basileus considered another way of conquering Hungary, which did not involve the use of arms. Nicetas mentions that Manuel “saw in his mind that if, by way of his niece, the government of the Huns descended on his brother-in-law [i.e. Prince Stephen]—who originally would have been the rightful ruler—this would give him [i.e. Manuel] much credit and the empire of the *Rhomaioi* would perhaps receive a part of the taxes from there and he could take possession of Phrangochorium [i.e. Sirmium] and Zeugminium [i.e. Semlin] in absolute security”.¹⁴ These sources provide evidence that Manuel wanted to reduce Hungary to vassalage by installing a due paying vassal king on its throne, linked to Byzantium by personal ties.¹⁵ Later events prove unequivocally that during 1162–1165, the most important political goal of the Byzantine emperor was to gain political suzerainty over Hungary. In Hungarian history, these few years were the period when the kingdom was most seriously threatened with feudal subjection by Byzantium.

The same passage in Nicetas also reveals that Byzantium was, in addition, making efforts to expand its territories at the expense of the medieval Hungarian state. The Greek historian refers to Sirmium and Semlin only, but the Byzantine expansion was eventually also directed at Central Dalmatia and Bosnia, then under Hungarian domination.¹⁶ The events of 1162–1165 show that important as territorial acquisition was for Manuel, it came into the foreground only as a compromise when feudal subjection seemed impossible.

Manuel, when wishing to extend Byzantine influence over Hungary, was also prompted by strategic considerations. This is what Cinnamus refers to when he remarks that the emperor “wanted to acquire the land of the Huns, which lay among western lands”.¹⁷ In the court of Constantinople they obviously saw that the geographical position of Hungary could open up further opportunities for Byzantine expansion both towards the Adriatic and Italy and also towards the Russian principalities (particularly Halich and Kiev). The Byzantine emperor probably took into account that by acquiring Hungary his empire would begin to prod the back of its great rival, the Holy Roman Empire and this strategically agreeable situation might influence Frederick Barbarossa’s Italian policies in a way more favourable to him.¹⁸

The international position of the Hungarian Kingdom in 1162 was suited to the realization of Manuel’s plan as Hungary had, in 1161, turned against its former western (German, Bohemian, Austrian) allies and could not expect any substantial help from Pope Alexander III, who was also in a difficult position. The Hungarian–French alliance established during Géza II’s reign could not be regarded as a serious threat to Manuel. In addition, the intervention was to come from a direction whence—on account of the five-year peace treaty in 1161—it was the least expected. Finally, favourable internal political conditions in Hungary for Manuel’s intervention were created by the feudal fights within the ruling class and by the personal ambitions of the pretender princes.

Nicetas relates that, on receiving the news of Géza II’s death, Manuel sent envoys to Hungary to negotiate the succession of Prince Stephen with the Hungarian magnates. The Hungarian potentates, however, rejected the proposal of the Byzantine envoys,

and would not pass the crown to the prince. Furthermore, they told the emissaries that if Stephen, who was the relative of the Byzantine emperor by marriage, was made king this would be to their disadvantage because they thought "while he [i.e. Stephen] ruled the Huns, he in turn would be ruled by the emperor of the *Rhomaioi*".¹⁹ This opinion of the Hungarian magnates seems rather significant because it unequivocally illustrates that vassal-type dependence on Byzantium was firmly refused even by those of the ruling class who otherwise opposed the rule of Stephen III.

After the failure of this diplomatic manoeuvre Manuel refused to give up his plan and, for the sake of greater emphasis, turned to more effective means. He sent an army, together with Prince Stephen, from Sofia to Hungary under the command of his relative, Alexius Contostephanus. The prince, accompanied by the Byzantines, reached Haram, where new talks began between the Hungarian magnates and the Byzantines. Though the latter lavished promises on their opponents, whom they did not refrain even from bribing, they were unable to make the Hungarians accept Stephen. In the meantime, the emperor himself arrived with the main body of his army in the region along the Danube, near Belgrade and Braničevo.²⁰ Nevertheless, the most Manuel could do was to persuade the Hungarian magnates, who, according to Cinriamus, feared a Byzantine attack,²¹ to make Prince Ladislás their king²² instead of his number one nominee, Stephen. This, by the way, shows how justified Ladislás' previous calculations were, who had a more realistic view of conditions at home, namely, that fewer Byzantine commitments meant a less troublesome way to the crown.

However, Lucas, Archbishop of Esztergom, would not crown Ladislás and the coronation was finally performed by the Archbishop of Kalocsa in the middle of July 1162.²³ The accession of Ladislás II formed only a part of the agreement between the Hungarian magnates and Manuel. For the chronicle of Henry Mügelin relates that while Ladislás ascended the throne, his brother, Stephen, by reviving the *ducatus* of Andrew (András) I's time, gained the duchy, which covered one-third of the country.²⁴ In fact this means that the Hungarian magnates and Manuel agreed on a compromise: the Hungarians managed to avoid the coming to power of Prince Stephen, while Manuel, on the other hand, was able to have him, his chief protégé, placed in command of significant political and military powers by the re-establishment of the *ducatus*. It may have been part of the compromise that Ladislás not only shared power with his brother through the duchy, but may also have appointed him his heir.²⁵

According to the sources, Ladislás II was king for six months²⁶—from the middle of July 1162 to mid-January 1163.²⁷ Very little is known about his reign, the sources being rather laconic about him. That the majority of the ruling class seems to have supported his rule is indicated by the fact that Stephen III was not able to defend his crown from Ladislás and he and his party could not organize the resistance against the anti-king, Stephen III himself, after his followers had fought with the "disloyal"—that is the magnates—near Kapuvár,²⁸ fled to Austria. At some indefinite time he left for Pozsony,²⁹ where he was able to hold out on his own. One of the reasons for this was that in Pozsony he could count on support from the castle network in some of the western counties, such as Sopron and Pozsony.³⁰ Also, when judging Stephen III's situation, one should remember what Mügelin says about it: "Ladislás was made king. . . thereupon King Stephen, son of Géza, fled to Pozsony, where the Hungarians

left him [in peace]".³¹ Probably the case was that Ladislav, content with the crown, did not wish for a final showdown with Stephen III, now out of the picture in Pozsony, since this would mean he could stabilize his own position and restore internal peace.

Ladislav II, once in power, made efforts to come to terms with the forces of the opposition, an intention that can be discerned in his attitude towards Archbishop Lucas. After Ladislav had been crowned by the Archbishop of Kalocsa, the Archbishop of Esztergom—through his envoy—excommunicated the new king for having "unlawfully" taken the country from Stephen III.³² Ladislav II's reaction to this was to imprison the archbishop.³³ These events throw light not only on the political alliance between Stephen III and Archbishop Lucas, but also on the willingness of Ladislav to take assertive measures against those who questioned the legality of his reign. Prompted by the mediation of Pope Alexander, however, Ladislav released the archbishop,³⁴ a move expressive of his inclination towards a compromise. The unyielding attitude of Lucas, on the other hand, clearly indicated that any possibility of a compromise between the parties of Stephen III and Ladislav II was out of the question. This is indicated by the continued opposition of Archbishop Lucas to the rule of Ladislav after his release, which led the king to imprison him again.³⁵ The fact that the king heeded the word of Alexander III shows, on the one hand, that Ladislav maintained connections with the Pope in France and, on the other, that Ladislav's relations with Alexander were definitely good, the former obviously recognizing the latter—in preference to Victor IV—as the legal head of the Church of Rome.

No information is available concerning relations between Hungary and Byzantium during the short reign of Ladislav II. On the basis of the antecedents it can reasonably be assumed that Ladislav, who to a great extent owed his crown to the help of Manuel, continued to enjoy the political support of the basileus. However, it should be clearly understood that he was not a vassal of the emperor, nor did Hungary become the "fief" of Byzantium during his reign.

Upon the death of Ladislav II—on January 14, 1163³⁶—Prince Stephen immediately succeeded to the throne.³⁷ He was crowned on January 27th,³⁸ probably also by the Archbishop of Kalocsa, since Lucas would have nothing to do with the ceremony.³⁹ The Archbishop of Esztergom excommunicated the new king as well and declared the rule of Stephen IV—like that of Ladislav II before—illegal.⁴⁰ The succession was made all the easier for Prince Stephen by the fact that with the duchy—one-third of the country—in his possession he had a very significant power-base at his disposal. With his ascent to the throne, however, the *ducatus* ceased to exist. Few details are known about the short—five month and five day long—reign of Stephen IV⁴¹ and the available information indicates that his reign was almost entirely taken up with constant struggles to retain his power. The sources reveal that the social basis he could rely on was much more limited than that of Ladislav. Mügel's remark, "Stephen... was crowned by some bishops and lords",⁴² is perhaps indicative of this. It is Cinnamus who points out that the rule of Stephen IV was not popular among the great majority of the Hungarian ruling class. According to him, "Stephen... became burdensome and rather odious to his subjects".⁴³

Prince Beloš, who had resigned the position of the Grand *Župan* of Rascia, which he had received from Manuel,⁴⁴ was at that time already back in Hungary and held the

office of *ban* during the reign of Stephen IV, according to a charter from 1163.⁴⁵ Borič, *ban* of Bosnia, was also among the supporters of Stephen IV, even providing the anti-king with armed help against the followers of Stephen III.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the rule of Stephen IV was based on a very narrow claim to power at home, being practically founded on the military support of Byzantium. Events testify to as much. According to a Byzantine source, it seems evident that soon after his accession a group, probably the supporters of Stephen III, started conspiring against him. Stephen IV then turned to Byzantium for help. To aid his protégé, Manuel dispatched a contingent under the command of Alexius Contostephanus in March. It seems, however, that in the meantime Stephen IV had managed to patch up some sort of agreement with the dissatisfied magnates because when the Byzantine troops duly arrived in Hungary he did not avail himself of their help.⁴⁷ Very probably the forces of the opposition retreated precisely upon hearing the news of the approaching Byzantine army. This is inferred from the fact that as soon as the army of Alexius Contostephanus had left, "the Hungarians again rebelled against Stephen".⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Stephen IV was having serious difficulties abroad as well. From information provided by Provost Gerhoh it unequivocally appears that Stephen IV broke with the ecclesiastical policies of his predecessor, Ladislav, which resulted in a profound change in the relationship between Pope Alexander III and the Hungarian royal court. According to the contemporary cleric, after the death of the King of Hungary [i.e. Géza II], who had recognized Alexander III, the Hungarians deserted Alexander.⁴⁹ Gerhoh's information, namely, that the Hungarian king did not permit Hungarian church leaders to appeal to Rome [i.e. Alexander] and that papal legates were forbidden to enter the country,⁵⁰ also testifies to the complete deterioration of relations between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Papacy of Alexander III.

On the strength of this source it can be inferred that Stephen IV's policy towards Pope Alexander was deeply influenced by the fact that Archbishop Lucas, who opposed the rule of the anti-king, was an adherent of Alexander.⁵¹ According to Provost Gerhoh, the unfriendly relationship between Hungary and the Pope, and the Byzantine connections of Stephen IV aroused the fear of people in the West that Hungary, like Byzantium, might break with the Roman (Western) Church.⁵² Although no more established facts point in this direction, it is possible that Stephen IV was in favour of tightening the relationship between the Churches of Hungary and Byzantium. The leaders of the Latin Church were, of course, uneasy about this, since the successive failures of the attempts to unite the Churches of Byzantium and Rome had proved that the differences between them were irreconcilable.⁵³ A possible expansion of the Byzantine Church in Hungary would not have been any more popular among Hungarian clerical leaders at that time.⁵⁴ Therefore, it is natural that the ecclesiastical policies of Stephen IV incited the majority of the Hungarian prelates against his rule.⁵⁵ This fact strengthened and enlarged the group rallying round Stephen III by increasing internal dissatisfaction with the rule of the anti-king.

In spite of the cool relations between the Papacy and the Hungarian court, Pope Alexander followed the events concerning Hungary with great attention. This is evident from the letter the Pope sent to Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg and his suffragan bishops on May 29, 1163. This epistle also reveals that Frederick Barbarossa was not indifferent to the changes in the Hungarian political situation either.

According to the missive, "the emperor [i.e. Frederick Barbarossa] decided to march to Hungary on account of the dispute that had arisen there".⁵⁶ In connection with this, Alexander's letter orders the Archbishop of Salzburg to do his best to prevent this move of the emperor and he also asks Eberhard to let Archbishop Lucas know of Frederick's plan, and to urge and encourage him to interfere with the march of Barbarossa into Hungary. The Pope was afraid that a possible intervention of Frederick would result in Hungary recognizing the anti-Pope, which would, in turn, further weaken the international position of Alexander III.

It appears that the plan for Barbarossa's Hungarian campaign was motivated by the same reason that had prompted him to consider the possibility of an anti-Byzantine campaign in Italy in June 1156. In the spring of 1156 Barbarossa had intended to start a war against the Greeks because of the expansion of Byzantium in Southern Italy and in order to drive them out of the peninsula.⁵⁷ In the spring of 1163, on the other hand—exploiting the opportunity provided by the Hungarian crown disputes—he considered starting a campaign because he was unable to tolerate the powerful Byzantine influence following the accession of Manuel's protégé to the throne in such close proximity to the German empire, since this threatened to upset the *status quo* in Central Europe. It is also obvious that if the campaign to eliminate Byzantine influence had proved successful, Hungary would have become the vassal kingdom of Germany.⁵⁸

However, the Holy Roman Emperor eventually failed to intervene directly in the Hungarian crown disputes because in the meantime Stephen III had secured the support of Barbarossa,⁵⁹ who was preoccupied with other important issues—such as the internal disputes in Poland and his preparations for another campaign in Italy⁶⁰—and the Hungarian king himself launched an attack against Stephen IV, who was already deserted by most of his followers⁶¹ and did not have time to plead for Byzantine help. Stephen III could rely not only on the increased number of his followers, but also on the assistance of mercenary knights recruited in Germany. Among the latter, Hahót from Thuringia played an important role in the power struggles. He founded the Buzád *genus*, and crushed the Csák *genus* who fought for Stephen IV.⁶²

On June 19, 1163 the anti-king lost a crucial battle at Székesfehérvár⁶³ and was captured by his nephew, Stephen III. The latter, however, on the advice of Archbishop Lucas, released his adversary allowing him to leave the country on condition that he would never return.⁶⁴ Stephen IV immediately went to Byzantium, met Emperor Manuel in Sofia⁶⁵ and "asked him to help him back into his realm and in return he would give him and his progeny Hungary as a fief".⁶⁶ These events, it seems, are of utmost significance when judging the career of Stephen IV as a whole. The anti-king owed his crown primarily to the support of Byzantium. Even if during his short, turbulent reign—precisely due to the lack of time—he did not formally become the vassal of Manuel, there can be no doubt as to his being a faithful defender of Byzantine interests during his spell as King of Hungary.⁶⁷ The fact that in the hope of regaining his crown he formally and without hesitation offered the country as a vassal kingdom to Manuel clearly indicates that he held no qualms about becoming the vassal of Byzantium. Mindless ambition must have blinded him, since he failed to learn from the lesson of his downfall, namely, that royal power based on feudal dependence on Byzantium had no significant social basis in Hungary. His short reign and his

acceptance of Byzantine vassalage saw the climax of Byzantine influence in Hungarian history. The fight that Stephen III and his followers carried on against the turned-Byzantine-vassal Stephen IV now also became formally identified with the struggle against feudal submission to Byzantium.

During the summer of 1163 while in Sofia, Manuel made the decision to help Stephen IV gain the Hungarian throne once more.⁶⁸ Placing money and a Byzantine contingent at the disposal of the ex-king the emperor himself marched with the main body of the Byzantine army. They were met in Niš by the envoys of Stephen III, who, no doubt, wished to avert further Byzantine meddling in Hungarian affairs. However, the pleas of the envoys were refused most resolutely, and after the talks had ended inconclusively,⁶⁹ Manuel marched his army to Belgrade. There, however, weighing up the possibilities, he had to realize that he would be unable to force the Hungarian magnates to accept Stephen IV as their king.⁷⁰ He then initiated talks between the courts of Byzantium and Hungary, which eventually reached a successful conclusion. Manuel, acting to all purposes as arbitrator in the Hungarian crown dispute, negotiated a compromise with Stephen III in which, for his part, he abandoned any further support for the claims of Stephen IV, while Stephen III handed over to Manuel his younger brother, Prince Béla, who would marry Mary, the emperor's daughter in Constantinople. It was a significant part of the Hungarian-Byzantine agreement that in addition to Béla, Stephen III promised to let Byzantium have the prince's patrimony, in other words, Dalmatia and Sirmium.⁷¹

In accordance with the agreement, Prince Béla, who was between 13 and 15 years old at that time,⁷² arrived in Constantinople around the end of 1163⁷³ escorted by a Byzantine delegation headed by *sebastos* George Palaeologus. In the imperial court he became a member of the Greek Church, though without having to undergo rebaptism,⁷⁴ and assumed the name of Alexius.⁷⁵ He was betrothed to Mary, the 13- or 14-year-old daughter of the emperor and simultaneously received the title of *despotes*, created especially for him.⁷⁶ This title, formerly belonging to the emperor, secured for Béla-Alexius the second highest position in the Byzantine hierarchy, directly below that of the *basileus*.⁷⁷

There is a view among Hungarian and foreign scholars which was proposed in the last century and which has gained wide recognition since, according to which the emperor had the young prince brought to Byzantium in 1163 because it was through him, in the form of a personal union, that he intended to establish the peaceful unification of the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire. For Manuel, whose wish was to dominate the world, this would have meant the materialization of a significant part of his plans for the *renovatio* of the ancient Roman Empire, especially if, after some time, Béla-Alexius managed to inherit the two crowns: that of St Stephen of Hungary, and that of Constantine the Great of Rome. According to the adherents and disseminators of this attractive theory, Prince Béla, in Byzantium from 1163, was, in accordance with the unionist plan of Manuel, simultaneous heir to both the Byzantine and the Hungarian crowns.⁷⁸ Since no direct evidence of the plan for such a personal union can be traced in the sources, they endeavour to prove this theory with the following arguments. According to one of the Byzantine sources—Nicetas Choniates—Manuel decided that Béla should be engaged to his daughter, Mary, and he “wanted to make him also the heir to his rule (*diadochos*)”.⁷⁹ Further proof

regarding the notion of the Hungarian-Byzantine personal union is the Byzantine title of *despotes* given to Béla-Alexius. According to the "unionists", Emperor Manuel conferred this honour on Béla because the word *despotes* is the exact equivalent of the Hungarian word *úr* (lord), a variation of which—*Urum*—in Cinnamus was allegedly used to denote the Hungarian heir apparent in the 12th century. This latter piece of conjecture is based on the passage of Cinnamus, according to which, the Hungarians, on Ladislas II's ascent to the throne, "granted Stephen [i.e. the future Stephen IV]. . . the dignity of Urum. And this word with the Hungarians means the person who would inherit the power".⁸⁰ In their opinion, Prince Béla—prior to his arrival in Byzantium—was heir to the throne of Hungary during the reign of Stephen III and as such was styled *Urum*. That is, by granting him the honour of *despotes*, taken from among the titles of the Byzantine ruler, Manuel intended to express that Béla-Alexius, as both *Urum* and *despotes*, was heir to both the Hungarian and the Byzantine thrones.⁸¹

However, it would seem that this line of argument is incorrect on certain points. In the first place the most important assertion can be dropped, for according to the modern critical edition of the writings of Nicetas Choniates the passage in question, which practically served as the basis for the whole "unionist" theory, is not a part of the original text, but an insertion by the previous publisher.⁸² Consequently, this implies that Manuel did not consider Béla to be heir to his throne between 1163 and 1165.⁸³ Naturally, on the other hand, the possibility can neither be proved nor disproved that Emperor Manuel, by his daughter's engagement to the Hungarian prince in 1163 and by the granting of the title of *despotes* to the latter, wished to pave the way towards a later declaration, in 1165, of Mary and Béla as his heirs. Regarding the other inference of the "unionist" theory, this does not impress one as being very well founded either, for medieval Hungary had neither the institution of the heir apparent, nor a definite order of succession.⁸⁴ Therefore, *Urum* could not have been the title referring to the heir to the throne. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of the present study to elaborate on the origin of the word *úr* and the complicated question of its meanings, which are also reflected in Hungarian geographical names, so suffice it here that the word *Urum* is regarded here simply as a suffixed (possessive) form of the noun *Úr* (cf. Mylord—lord), which in 12th century Hungary was not the title of a stately office, but merely a form of address.⁸⁵ According to the sources this term of address was the due of prominent members of the ruling class. This is shown primarily by the fact that *dominus*, the Latin equivalent of the Hungarian *úr* in contemporary Latin usage in Hungary, was equally used in reference to kings,⁸⁶ royal princes,⁸⁷ chief dignitaries on a national level such as the *ban*,⁸⁸ lay magnates such as the *comites*⁸⁹ and chief ecclesiastic dignitaries, including archbishops, bishops and abbots.⁹⁰ Further evidence of this is provided by a 12th century Hungarian charter in Latin, which mentions the Hungarian name *Vrcuta* [= *Úr kútja* = lord's well], the Latin name of the place also being available: *Puteus Ducis*. The village was a possession of Prince David, King Salomon's younger brother, during the reign of Ladislas I.⁹¹ Prince David, it is well known, was no heir to the throne, only a *dux* from the Árpád dynasty entitled to the address *úr* by his birth.⁹² From this it can be seen that the word *úr* ~ *urum* did not, in fact, denote the Hungarian heir apparent⁹³ and, consequently, neither did its Greek counterpart refer to the title of the Hungarian heir to the throne. Thus, in 1163, Béla was neither Byzantine nor Hungarian heir apparent.⁹⁴ He became the former only in

1165 and the latter in 1172,⁹⁵ but by that time he was no longer a candidate for the Byzantine throne. The personal union hypothesis, however, would have made it absolutely indispensable for Prince Béla to be simultaneously the official heir to both the Hungarian and the Byzantine thrones, or, at least, to be regarded as such by Emperor Manuel. Yet the fact is that no traces indicative of this can be found in the sources. Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the plan for a personal union between Hungary and Byzantium lacks any foundation in the sources. Nevertheless, it remains true that the given historical situation does not categorically rule out the possibility of Manuel considering the idea of such a union, but it has to be repeatedly emphasized that the sources contain no written proof whatever.

What, then, was Manuel's real purpose in taking Prince Béla to Byzantium? Cinnamus has the following to say in connection with this: the basileus "wanted, using all means at his disposal, to acquire the land of the Huns [i.e. Hungarians]... Therefore, he conceived the plan of marrying Béla, son of Géza [II]... to his daughter, Mary".⁹⁶ Research has clearly established that at that time "political alliances were expressed by family connections,"⁹⁷ in other words, "dynastic ties are the feudal way of sealing alliances".⁹⁸ Emperor Manuel obviously believed that the engagement and consequent marriage of Mary and Béla would render relations between Byzantium and Hungary favourable for the former, since the dynastic link would serve as a guarantee that Hungary remained in the political orbit of Byzantium. This notion is echoed in a letter from the basileus to Stephen III in 1164, in which, referring to the projected marriage, he urges the Hungarian king to be one of the friends of Byzantium.⁹⁹ At the same time there was the significant motive for the Byzantine emperor that, through the person of Béla, he was provided with legal grounds for taking possession of lands of both military and economic value, such as Central Dalmatia and Sirmium, which had once belonged to the Byzantine Empire. By acquiring them Manuel surpassed the western conquests of his direct predecessors appreciably. The emperor may have had something else in mind, too: the person of the prince provided him with the possibility of intervening in Hungarian affairs, should this ever be necessary. It was to achieve these goals that the basileus wanted to tie Béla to Constantinople as tightly as possible: the betrothal of his daughter and the granting of the high dignity of *despotes* were means to this end. It was not Prince Béla, but his only daughter, Mary, whom Manuel naturally regarded as the sole successor to his throne until the designation in 1165 to be discussed below. Only as the betrothed of the legal heiress to the crown of Byzantium was Béla-Alexius entitled to the rank of *despotes*. Finally, it is also important that, as bearer of this title Béla-Alexius can be regarded as co-ruler with Manuel only from 1165 at the earliest, when he received the title of the official heir apparent, and definitely not from 1163. (See the relevant passages in the next chapter.) It should be added that Prince Béla's betrothal to the emperor's daughter and his title of *despotes* taken into consideration, any view that regards Béla simply as a hostage in the basileus' court is hardly tenable.¹⁰⁰

There can be no doubt that the treaty of 1163 between Hungary and Byzantium left Stephen IV in a difficult position since, as a result of it, he could no longer expect further help from the basileus. The ex-king's unbounded thirst for power, however, refused to allow him any rest after his fall in 1163 and induced him to turn to Frederick Barbarossa, a move which evoked the danger of German intervention. Once again it

was demonstrated that Stephen IV and his followers, regardless of the interests of the country and driven only by their own ambitions to political power, were now ready to submit to German overlordship as well. According to a letter of Frederick Barbarossa to Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg—probably written around the turn of 1163–1164—three ambassadors, one of whom was sent by Stephen IV, had come to the emperor from Hungary.¹⁰¹ The ex-king was now soliciting the help of the Holy Roman Emperor in his quest for the Hungarian crown.¹⁰² Stephen III, obviously to neutralize the move of his “expelled uncle”, also sent envoys to Frederick. What is written by the emperor concerning the third mission to him sheds light on the tension in the internal political situation of Hungary and also on the divided state of the ruling class. According to the letter, many of the barons and magnates in Hungary, who had also dispatched their envoys to the emperor, were prepared to place themselves under his rule and show great respect both to him and his empire.¹⁰³ From this it appears that there was even a third group within the Hungarian ruling class, one which accepted neither Stephen III nor Stephen IV, but, by inviting the emperor to open intervention, offered the country to Barbarossa. Since October 1163, Frederick I had been in Italy where he was leading his third campaign directed against the realm of William I.¹⁰⁴ The Holy Roman Emperor deemed the occupation of Italy more important than interference in the Hungarian succession disputes, especially now that his rival, Manuel, had also been forced out of Hungary. Therefore, at Parma, in March 1164, Frederick Barbarossa turned away the envoys of Stephen IV.¹⁰⁵ At the same time he commissioned his supporters and allies, the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Austria and the Margrave of Steyr, to follow any developments in the Hungarian situation attentively, and take, when necessary, appropriate measures in accordance with the interests of the emperor.¹⁰⁶ This decision of Barbarossa averted the danger that a German invasion on the side of Stephen IV would have meant for Stephen III. The latter’s party, over which mainly the queen mother, Euphrosyne, exercised control, achieved some successes in strengthening relations between Hungary and Bohemia at this time. Such a case occurred in the first half of 1164 when one of Stephen III’s sisters married Svatopluk, son of Vladislav II, King of Bohemia. Bohemian sources unanimously testify to the fact that the political purpose of this union for the Hungarians was to secure the Bohemian alliance for the king and his party.¹⁰⁷

The close connections that were forged between Hungary and Halich at this time also significantly contributed to the consolidation of Stephen III’s position as king on the international scene. It was probably in the first half of 1164 that Stephen III became betrothed to the daughter of Yaroslav, ruling Prince of Halich.¹⁰⁸ This dynastic link secured the support of the now strong Halich for the King of Hungary. In these years Halich was expanding towards the Lower Danube and, in addition, taking over important trade routes in the region. Though it found itself opposed to Kiev, it also turned its back on a former ally, Byzantium.¹⁰⁹ The cooling of the relationship between Halich and Byzantium obviously encouraged the establishment of an alliance between Hungary and Halich. Thus in 1164 Hungary managed to break out of the choking international isolation it had sunk into in 1162. The events of the Hungarian–Byzantine conflict in 1164 proved the efficiency of Stephen III’s foreign policy. The agreement between Hungary and Byzantium in 1163 did not prove to be lasting, the reason being that Stephen III and his party accepted Manuel’s conditions

only to win time: they were afraid of a possible attack by the Byzantine troops that had advanced as far as Belgrade to aid Stephen IV and they did not wish the events of the summer of 1162 to be repeated either. The agreement, concluded in an emergency,¹¹⁰ was not respected since Stephen III refused to hand over the territories that, according to the treaty, already belonged *de iure* to Byzantium. Therefore, probably early in 1164, a Hungarian force—according to one source—of 30,000 troops, marched into Dalmatia, under the command of *ban* Ampud, to strengthen Hungary's hold over the region.¹¹¹

Byzantium, of course, could not look on this overt breach of the treaty¹¹² with arms folded. The first response of the Byzantine emperor, who had already been occupied by affairs in the East and was on the point of crossing to Asia Minor with his army,¹¹³ was to let loose the restless Stephen IV. Manuel made it possible for the ex-king to set off from the town of Anchialus, near the Black Sea in Bulgaria, and—no doubt accompanied by his Hungarian followers—advance into Hungary.¹¹⁴ Then the basileus started to play a double game. The goal, he admitted openly, was to gain the patrimony of Prince Béla¹¹⁵ and in this matter he used Stephen IV to exert pressure on Stephen III. At the same time he hoped that Stephen IV's move might be successful, a state of affairs which would have resulted in the feudal subjugation of Hungary. The Byzantine government knew very well that the ex-king wanted to regain the crown he had lost.¹¹⁶

Stephen IV invaded the country in the summer of 1164 and was joined later by several magnates. Stephen III marched to meet him with the royal army, whereupon a significant part of his followers deserted the ex-king leaving him in a difficult situation. In the meantime Byzantine troops had also started to move against Hungary with the result that Stephen III, pleading for help from his allies, was forced to retreat into his own territory. While one of the Byzantine armies, led by Andronicus Contostephanus, relieved Stephen IV from the squeeze in which he found himself, the main body of the army, commanded by Manuel, crossed the Sava, penetrated into Sirmium and then, crossing the Danube, advanced into the county of Bács.¹¹⁷ The fact that the Byzantine emperor, not satisfied with the occupation of Sirmium which was a part of the official patrimony of Prince Béla, continued his advance into the territory between the Danube and the Tisza indicated clearly that Manuel's goal went beyond recapturing Béla's patrimony. By that time it was clearly for no other purpose than to reinstate Stephen IV as king that Manuel continued his thrust, eventually reaching the archiepiscopal seat of Bács. Along the way, both in Sirmium and across the Danube, the emperor was received with great homage and ceremony by the Greek orthodox inhabitants and priests of the region.¹¹⁸ Besides Béla-Alexius,¹¹⁹ who had accompanied Manuel, also present in the Byzantine army around Bács were Stephen IV and one of his cousins, another Stephen.¹²⁰

The crown of Stephen III was finally saved in 1164 by his German (most probably Austrian), Russian (Halichian) and Bohemian allies.¹²¹ The assistance provided by the Bohemians was of especially great importance, for the army was commanded by King Vladislav II himself and his elder son, Frederick, Duke of Moravia was also present.¹²² Indeed, the Bohemian ruler was to play a crucial part in the events to come. In the face of the superior power of the combined Hungarian, Bohemian, Russian and German armies, Manuel took fright and withdrew into Sirmium across the Danube without

fighting. At the same time, however, he began secret talks with the Bohemian king. On the other hand, the obstinacy and purblindness of Stephen IV is indicated by his refusal to withdraw even at Manuel's request. To support the ex-king the basileus left behind a significant Byzantine contingent under the leadership of Nicephorus Chalupes, but Stephen IV's Hungarian-Greek army was unable to withstand the Bohemian assault and the ex-king, his hopes once more frustrated, was forced to flee after Manuel. Meanwhile, Stephen III joined the secret talks between the Bohemians and the Byzantines and finally, with the effective mediation of Vladislav II, the Emperor of Byzantium and the King of Hungary concluded a peace treaty.¹²³

In the new agreement Manuel promised to prevent Stephen IV from attacking Hungary in the future, while Stephen III again pledged to hand over the patrimony of Prince Béla.¹²⁴ Following the peace treaty the emperor directed a Byzantine army led by *sebastos* Michael Gabras to Sirmium to secure the possession of his new territory.¹²⁵ However, Stephen III continued to delay the handing over of Dalmatia. Moreover, the town of Zara, breaking away from the overlordship of Venice, recognized the suzerainty of the Hungarian king again. The Republic, naturally, did not acquiesce in this, but the Doge's attempt to recapture Zara was thwarted in 1164.¹²⁶

The events of 1165 were introduced by Stephen III's spring assault on Sirmium, which had been lost the previous year. Thus the initiative, as in 1164, was again with the Hungarians. The campaign proceeded well for the king since his army succeeded in occupying the territory of Sirmium with the exception of Semlin. This, the citadel of Sirmium, was defended by Stephen IV himself along with his followers.¹²⁷ On receiving news of the invasion, Manuel dispatched a relief force and a fleet to Semlin¹²⁸ and began preparations for a large-scale counterstrike immediately. According to Cinnamus, the overtly declared aim of the basileus was to assist Stephen IV in regaining the crown of Hungary.¹²⁹ Thus in 1165 the Byzantine emperor again made efforts directed towards the feudal subjugation of the Hungarian Kingdom. His experiences had obviously taught him that Byzantium could safely control Dalmatia and Sirmium only by having a vassal king on the Hungarian throne.

The basileus started activating his plan by means of wide-ranging diplomatic activities. In the process he negotiated with Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, Henry, Duke of Austria, Vitale Michiel, the Doge of Venice, Yaroslav, ruling Prince of Halich and Rostislav, ruler of Kiev.¹³⁰ Manuel, remembering the events of 1164, when foreign (Bohemian) help had saved Stephen III's crown, tried to isolate Hungary completely in the diplomatic scene.¹³¹ His efforts were not in vain. One of his achievements was that Yaroslav of Halich, whose daughter was betrothed to the King of Hungary, did not lend a helping hand to his future son-in-law and even restored relations between Halich and Byzantium. A clear sign of the reconciliation between Yaroslav and Manuel was that Andronicus Comnenus, who had escaped to Halich from his prison in Constantinople, returned to Byzantium in the first half of 1165. The Grand Duke of Kiev, putting an end to the ecclesiastical controversies in connection with the Metropolit of Kiev, also tidied up his affairs with the empire.¹³² Finally, Manuel's diplomacy secured the neutrality of Frederick Barbarossa and, consequently, that of Henry, Duke of Austria, in the approaching confrontation.¹³³ The Doge of Venice even went as far as cooperating with Byzantium against Hungary in a military alliance.¹³⁴

In the meantime the siege of Semlin continued unabatingly, but the town was taken by Stephen III only after Stephen IV, poisoned by one of his bribed supporters, died on April 11, 1165.¹³⁵ At the end of June 1165, the Byzantine army, reinforced by troops from the allied Seljuqs of Iconium and the subjugated Serbs, set out from Sofia and started a counterattack. This meant that the kingdom of Stephen was being attacked from two directions. Under the command of the emperor the main body of the Greek army, which included Béla-Alexius and Andronicus, who had just returned from Halich, laid siege to Semlin, which was soon recaptured.¹³⁶ The advance of the other Byzantine contingent, led by John Ducas, was equally successful. By the time Manuel took possession of Semlin the army of Ducas, having marched through Rascia, had occupied not only Dalmatia,¹³⁷ but Bosnia as well.¹³⁸ At the same time the Dalmatian successes of Byzantium were considerably furthered by the Venetian fleet, which managed to retake Zara from the Hungarians.¹³⁹ After all this, Stephen III was forced to ask Manuel for peace. The new Hungarian-Byzantine peace treaty confirmed the territorial situation of the moment. Accordingly, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Sirmium remained under the control of the empire.¹⁴⁰ The occupied lands became absorbed into the Byzantine *theme* system¹⁴¹ (Sirmium as early as 1164). With defence against possible further attacks from Hungary in mind, Byzantium additionally reinforced the defensive fortresses of the Danube line after the war: Semlin, Belgrade and Braničevo, and also Niš on the Morava.¹⁴²

Manuel's achievements at the expense of Hungary in 1165 were considerable since he gained possession of significant and valuable areas that used to belong to the 12th century Hungarian state. The occupation of Bosnia meant that in terms of territorial expansion the emperor had achieved more than had been in his original plans. In this Manuel was undoubtedly helped by the fact that in 1165 Stephen III did not receive any substantial help from abroad.¹⁴³ It was only in early August 1165 that the envoys of the Hungarian king managed to win over the Holy Roman Emperor in the talks in Vienna and persuade him to take the side of Stephen III.¹⁴⁴ The successful expansion at the expense of Hungary notwithstanding, Manuel's main goal, i.e. to help Stephen IV regain his throne could not be fulfilled on account of the latter's untimely death. Thus Manuel's grand plan concerning the feudal subjection of Hungary also foundered.

The years 1162-1165 saw the most critical period in the 12th century history of the medieval Hungarian state. Byzantium, one of the most powerful countries in Europe, endeavoured to exploit both the internal difficulties of the kingdom and the factional struggles within its ruling class in order to achieve the expansionist and hegemonist goals of the empire. During these years the Byzantine emperor, either in the open (as in 1162, 1163, 1165) or covertly (1164), strove to reduce Hungary into vassaldom. The latter, however, though at the price of serious territorial losses, was able to retain its existence as an independent state against the endeavours of the Byzantine emperor. The firmness of this resistance was certainly increased by the fact that the Hungarian Kingdom was able to secure foreign allies providing effective help. It was primarily the assistance from Bohemia that proved most significant, though Stephen III could rely on his Russian and Austrian allies as well during certain periods of the struggle. Finally, the policies of Frederick Barbarossa also contributed to the success of the fight against the Greek empire. The most crucial element in the struggle against the Byzantine subjection, however, was the fact that the majority of the Hungarian ruling

class firmly refused to make any submission to Byzantium. The sequence of Stephen IV's failures also proves this point. Thus with 1165 the period of Byzantine intervention came to an end in Hungary.

Historical research has pointed out the fact that it was largely due to the internal conditions of Hungary that the Byzantine emperor, cherishing his plans of world domination, was able to influence the course of Hungarian history in such a decisive way. Earlier historiography was of the opinion that Byzantium exploited the struggles of groups adhering to different succession principles and the unsettled state of the Hungarian succession laws in order to put these plans into action.¹⁴⁵ Modern Hungarian scholarship has, however, correctly pointed out that the factional fights and party struggles that facilitated the Byzantine intervention were not motivated by succession principles, but by the conflicting political, economic and ideological interests of the different groups within the ruling class.¹⁴⁶ Recent studies on the baronial factions have discerned two large parties within the Hungarian ruling class at this time, one being a clerical party, the other secular, and have come to the conclusion that after the middle of the 12th century Hungarian internal politics were determined by the struggle for supremacy between these two groups. Thus at this time it was with the support of these two factions that kings, anti-kings and pretenders fought for the crown.¹⁴⁷ According to the most minutely elaborated version of this view, the "Graecophil" anti-kings (Ladislav II and Stephen IV) were supported—besides the clerical potentates in the archbishopric of Bács-Kalocsa—primarily by the lay magnates, while Stephen III, who fought against them, was backed in the main by the clerical party.¹⁴⁸

However, on further examination, the view that in the mid-12th century factional struggles the Hungarian ruling class was divided into clericals and seculars and that while Stephen III was supported by the clerical dignitaries, the anti-kings by the party of the lay magnates, seems quite unacceptable. Indeed, this theory can be viewed as the imposition of one of the main undercurrents in European politics of the time on Hungarian internal conditions on the one hand, namely, the struggle between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy and, on the other, the two large (clerical and secular) components of the Hungarian estate types.

The sources available are, unfortunately, insufficient for defining the exact social composition of each faction. The information they do provide, however, lends unequivocal support to the inference that both of the baronial groups that took part in the succession struggles and solicited foreign help for themselves numbered both secular and clerical potentates among their members. There is only one extant charter by Stephen III from 1162 and, according to its testimony, the chief supporters of the king, who was then in flight, included both clericals (such as Lucas, Archbishop of Esztergom, Mikó, Archbishop of Kalocsa, Bishop Macharius and Provost Beloslaus) and secular magnates (for example the *nádor* [*comes palatinus*] Heidrich, *udvarispán* [*comes curiae*] Gabriel and *comites* Ampud, Lawrence [Lőrinc], Ruben, Fulk [Fulco] and Denis [Dénis]).¹⁴⁹ Ladislav II, when he gained power, also had a considerable social basis to fall back on. As regards the conduct of the actual persons taking sides in connection with the rule of the anti-king it is known that Archbishop Lucas most firmly opposed Ladislav II, but Archbishop Mikó, once an ardent follower of Stephen III, switched to his side.¹⁵⁰ Undoubtedly, there must have been other clerical leaders as

well who recognized Ladislav II as king. All the same, the social bases of the two anti-kings were not identical since Stephen IV enjoyed the support of a much narrower section of the ruling class than Ladislav II had. Still, Stephen IV also had both clerical and secular magnates in his party. Besides the information available from the writings of Mügelin,¹⁵¹ the only charter of Stephen IV, dating from 1163, also points in this direction. On its list of witnesses the secular magnates are represented by *ban* Belus, *nádor* Thomas (Tamás), Hendrik, *ispán* (*comes*) of Bodrog, and Esau, *ispán* of Csanád,¹⁵² and the clerical leaders by Mikó, Archbishop of Bács[-Kalocsa]—who crowned the anti-king—, Nicholas (Miklós), Bishop of [Nagy-]Várad, Macharius, Bishop of Pécs and Stephen, Bishop Elect of Csanád.¹⁵³

On the strength of the charter it is not to be doubted that the ecclesiastical leaders in the southern part of Hungary, which fell in the main under the authority of the Archbishop of Kalocsa, stayed in the court of Stephen IV, thus serving the anti-king.¹⁵⁴ A similar statement can be made concerning the secular lords, since, besides the chief officials of the crown, of all the *comites* in the country, those of Bodrog and Csanád are among the witnesses on the list. It cannot be argued, however, that the followers of Stephen IV were separated from those of Stephen III on a purely territorial basis, although the proximity of Byzantium was an influencing factor in this respect. In connection with the examination of a passage in the *Chronicon Pictum* it has been established that the Csák *genus*, who had estates in Transdanubia, i.e. in Western Hungary, were staunch supporters of Stephen IV.¹⁵⁵ Thus it is only fair to assume that in a similar way not only those clericals on the charter recognized Stephen IV as their king—other prelates might also have served the anti-king. The facts indicate that the clerical potentates were, on account of their special position, even less likely than the secular lords to be permanently attached to the entourage of an anti-king or his rival. For according to evidence from Stephen III's charters between 1163–1166, of the clerical leaders amongst Stephen IV's supporters, Archbishop Mikó and Bishops Macharius and Stephen switched to the side of Stephen III after the downfall of the anti-king.¹⁵⁶ In the light of this information, the changes in the political allegiance of Archbishop Mikó present a colourful picture during these years. In the first weeks after the death of Géza II Mikó was a member of Stephen III's retinue, but in July 1162, he joined Ladislav II, while in the first half of 1163 he served Stephen IV and a charter—dating from probably around 1163/1164—mentions him once more as the follower of Stephen III.¹⁵⁷ Similar occurrences can also be observed among the secular lords. *Comes* Esau was in Stephen IV's court in 1163,¹⁵⁸ but 1165 found him among the intimates of Stephen III.¹⁵⁹ In the chronicle of Mügelin and the writings of Cinnamus several vivid details are provided concerning the increase and/or decrease in the size and strength of the different baronial factions during the party struggles.¹⁶⁰ These changes of allegiance, equally frequent among the clerical and lay elements of the opposing groups, also endorse the contention that it is impossible from the outset to divide the Hungarian ruling class of the mid-12th century artificially into two homogeneous factions, those of the clericals and the seculars, respectively. The letter of Barbarossa to the Archbishop of Salzburg, which has been referred to, is in itself excellent proof of the fact that—at least at the turn of 1163–1164—the Hungarian nobility was not divided into two, but into three factions.¹⁶¹

Changing one's allegiance frequently was rather customary for dignitaries at this time. Consequently, these baronial groups and parties did not prove to be enduring and permanent political formations.¹⁶² In the factional fights and succession struggles the attitudes of both the clerical and the secular magnates were decided by where, in which party or with the support of which pretender, king or anti-king they could hope to secure greater political, material and other advantages or gains for themselves at the given historical moment.¹⁶³ Fomenting succession disputes among the members of the ruling dynasty seemed particularly suited to their individual purposes. For "the change of the rule" also meant "the change of the retinues, the council and the lucrative offices".¹⁶⁴

The development of contemporary foreign relations indicates that, like in earlier times, the baronial groups in their struggles with each other always turned to that power abroad from which, in the given situation, they could expect the greatest support. On the basis of the sources, the assertion that one of the groups of magnates (i.e. the clerical landlords) was supported by the Papacy in Rome, while the other (i.e. the secular landlords) had the Byzantine Empire as their foreign ally, is completely untenable.¹⁶⁵ According to the testimony of the above-mentioned letter of Frederick Barbarossa, there was one moment when all the warring factions (including that of Stephen IV) were trying to obtain help from the Holy Roman Emperor—and not from the Pope in Rome or the basileus in Byzantium.¹⁶⁶ The above conception is also further invalidated by additional facts. Thus Stephen III, who, according to this view, ought to be seen as the king of the "clerical party", actually continued his struggle against Manuel, one of Alexander III's chief allies, with the support—besides the ruling Prince of Halich, who belonged to the Byzantine Church—of those western monarchs and princes (such as the Holy Roman Emperor, the King of Bohemia and the Duke of Austria),¹⁶⁷ who opposed the Gregorian Papacy of Alexander. Also, it should be remembered that Ladislav II, described as both the puppet of the secular landlords and that of Manuel,¹⁶⁸ was willing to cooperate with Pope Alexander, allegedly the chief foreign supporter of the "clerical party".

Chapter VII

Byzantium turns away from Hungary

In the wake of the new Byzantine-Hungarian peace treaty, in autumn 1165, a significant event in domestic politics occurred in the Byzantine capital. Emperor Manuel, who had no son, officially proclaimed his daughter, Mary and her betrothed, Béla-Alexius heirs to the throne of Byzantium.¹ Nicetas Choniates relates that during the ceremony, held in the Blachernai Church in Constantinople, Manuel made the chief officials of the empire "promise under oath to accept, after his death, Mary and her betrothed, Alexius, who—as we have said—came from Hungary, as heirs of his own rule, to obey and do homage to them, as overlords of the *Rhomaioi*".²

It was common practice in the Byzantine Empire, and was also the general custom of the Comneni, for sovereigns to formally designate their heirs to the throne in advance.³ An important part of this official designation was the oath of the potentates of the empire, in which they formally declared their loyalty to the heir designate as would-be emperor.⁴ It seems justified to ask why, near the end of 1165, Manuel designated his daughter and Béla-Alexius (then in Byzantium for two years) to be heirs to the imperial throne.

By way of an answer it appears that this move was motivated exclusively by internal political factors in Byzantium. With this act of designation Manuel's aim was obviously to forestall any aspirations to the crown from other directions. In particular, there is plenty of evidence that Manuel's move was directed primarily against Andronicus Comnenus, his cousin and since the early 1150s, the emperor's greatest rival to the throne. It is well known that in 1152, as governor of Cilicia, Andronicus maintained rather suspicious contacts with foreign rulers, namely, the Sultan of Iconium, and the King of Jerusalem. During 1153–1154, he allied himself with Géza II and even contacted Frederick I in an effort to subvert Manuel's reign. In 1154 he made two attempts on Manuel's life. When these failed, Andronicus was captured and imprisoned in Constantinople. He tried to escape first in 1158, but without luck. His next attempt was successful and he managed to reach Halich in 1164. His relative, ruling Prince Yaroslav received him kindly granting him towns and even involving him in politics. Andronicus persevered in his efforts to gain the imperial crown and was given all the assistance he needed by Yaroslav, the wartime ally of Byzantium's enemy, Stephen III. Thus the pretender was able to raise an army of 10,000 Polovtsi (Cuman) cavalry, which was ready to advance into the empire. Manuel was greatly worried at the idea, that while he was fighting against Stephen III along the Danube and the Sava, Andronicus might, with help from the Hungarian-Halichian alliance, launch an attack along the Lower Danube with the aim of seizing the crown. In this extremely perilous

situation the emperor set the wheels of his diplomacy in motion. First of all he deemed it advisable to settle his relations with the Prince of Halich and Andronicus. Once the negotiations had proved conclusive Manuel and his cousin were reconciled, the latter returned to Byzantium in the spring of 1165 where he and the basileus assured each other of their mutual loyalty.⁵ Thus Manuel managed to forestall any new manoeuvre of Andronicus, but the past activities of the pretender warned him of the need to settle the issue of succession officially. Manuel definitely wanted to prevent Andronicus, just back home, from possibly exploiting the discontent of the internal opposition in order to carry out his schemes.

In these years Manuel's policies had come under gradually increasing criticism in Byzantium, the greatest dissatisfaction being primarily provoked by his foreign policies. Part of the ruling circles in Byzantium expressed highly critical opinions about the basileus' belligerent policies against Italy,⁶ Hungary⁷ and Egypt.⁸ The opposition disliked Manuel's hegemonic aspirations because they believed that the policy of the *renovatio* of the Roman Empire had become a source of permanent wars,⁹ which exacted great human and material sacrifices from the *Rhomaioi*.¹⁰ It also became apparent, in connection with the oath to Mary and Béla-Alexius, that even in an internal political issue of such a great importance as the succession, Manuel was not supported by the Byzantine magnates unanimously. It is certainly true—Nicetas being the source—that nobody, save Andronicus, opposed the imperial order to take the oath, but later on several dignitaries assured Andronicus of their sympathy.¹¹ Manuel's cousin most firmly criticized this measure of the emperor, and said it "was a disgrace for the *Rhomaioi*" that Béla-Alexius, a foreigner, should be the husband of Mary and the ruler of the empire.¹² Thus the events completely justified Manuel's fears in connection with Andronicus. A few months after their reconciliation it became clear that no enduring cooperation was possible between the emperor and Andronicus for they turned out to have totally different views as to the future nature of power. Eventually the basileus had to recognize that it had not taken Andronicus long to become leader of the opposition in the capital. Manuel, of course, did not observe this without taking any action and still in 1165, soon after the above events, removed his cousin from the imperial court, sending him to the distant Cilicia and Lesser Armenia as a governor,¹³ where his job was to strengthen Byzantine positions shaken by the attacks of Nur-ad-Din.¹⁴

Contrary to other views¹⁵ it seems very likely, precisely on account of Béla's designation as monarch-to-be, that it was from this time, i.e. the end of 1165, that the title of *despotes* came to denote the appointed heir to the imperial power. The sources relate that Béla-Alexius as *despotes*-made-heir apparent performed certain public duties in Byzantium. In the spring of 1166 he attended a synod on questions of dogma in Constantinople in the company of Emperor Manuel and Patriarch Lukas¹⁶ and in the same year he was one of the leaders of the campaign against Hungary.¹⁷ The name of Béla-Alexius, complete with the title of *despotes*, is mentioned together with that of Manuel in a charter of ecclesiastical interest, dated March 22, 1167.¹⁸ According to a hypothesis based on the nomenclature of the protocol on the charter fragment, Béla-Alexius was at the time already regarded in Byzantium as co-ruler, Manuel's co-emperor.¹⁹ Further events, however, provide convincing evidence that Béla's designation as Byzantine heir apparent had no Hungarian aspect whatever. The

Byzantine designation did not make Béla heir of Stephen III's crown and therefore it is unlikely that this step of Manuel was directed at the creation of a personal union between Hungary and Byzantium.²⁰

The years 1166–1167 constitute a new and also final period in the confrontation between Hungary and Byzantium during Stephen III's reign. Military clashes continued between the two countries, but the only goal of Byzantium by that time was to avert, or retaliate against Hungarian attacks aimed at recapturing the lands lost to Byzantium in 1165. Neither the idea of the feudal subjugation of Hungary, nor even the thought of helping Prince Béla gain the Hungarian throne figured among the plans of Manuel, who after 1165 gradually turned his attention away from Hungary.

This change in the emperor's policies towards Hungary had two basic causes. First, the basileus had to realize that in the given international situation Byzantium was unable to subdue Hungary. The second cause can be associated with a change in the direction of Byzantine foreign policies after 1165: during 1166–1167 the empire focussed its attentions on the Italian issue.

In order to further his plans for expansion in Italy, Manuel undertook grandiose initiatives to bring about an alliance between Byzantium, the Papacy and the Normans. His plans for an anti-Barbarossa coalition having come to nothing, although he had been able to strengthen his Italian positions, Pope Alexander III left France and returned to Rome via Sicily in the autumn of 1165. At this time the chief supporters of the Pope against Emperor Frederick and the anti-Pope Pascal III (1164–1168) were the Norman Kingdom in Southern Italy and Byzantium.²¹

Manuel was inspired by the idea of restoring the empire of Justinian when through his envoys he proposed the union of the two Churches to the Pope in 1166. The basileus offered to unite the Eastern (Greek) and Western (Latin) Churches under the ecclesiastical leadership of the Pope, provided Alexander recognized him, against Barbarossa, the sole emperor and agreed to crown him ruler of the Roman Empire. However, Alexander III refused to accept this proposal because had it been realized not only would he have become dependent on Manuel, but he would have also lost the support of his western allies. And this could in no way be reconciled with the Gregorian efforts of the Roman Papacy to establish a universal empire of the Church. Alexander, on the other hand, needed Manuel's support against Barbarossa, and thus could not afford to reject the proposal for church union out of hand, so the negotiations between the Pope and the basileus continued for years, but ended inconclusively.²²

The experiences of the 1150s proved that Byzantium was unable to gain a permanent foothold in Italy against the will of the Normans. Aware of this, Manuel, wishing to win the consent and support of the Normans, proposed the idea of a marital link between Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily. Therefore, in the autumn of 1166 he offered William II, who was 13 when he had become king in May of the same year, the hand of his daughter and heir designate, Mary together with his empire. This plan, had it come to pass, would of course have put an end to the betrothal of Mary and Béla-Alexius and to the latter's title of Byzantine heir apparent. However, for reasons unknown, the dynastic link between the Normans and Byzantium eventually came to nothing.²³ All this was related not only to the hegemonic efforts of Byzantium, but was, at the same time, directed against the Italian policies of Frederick Barbarossa, who in fact was conducting his fourth campaign in Italy at this time. In the autumn of 1166

Frederick and his army crossed the Alps firmly resolved to take Rome, which was in the hands of Alexander III, then to terminate the presence of Byzantium in Ancona and finally to launch a decisive assault against William II and conquer the Kingdom of Southern Italy. Alexander III was forced to leave Rome, which was captured by the emperor, who then led the anti-Pope Pascal III into the town. In the summer of 1167, however, a devastating plague decimated the army of Barbarossa, who therefore had no choice but to abandon the campaign against the Normans. In the meantime, the towns of Lombardy rebelled against him again and entered into the treaty of Verona in the summer of 1167. Manuel supported the struggle of the cities both financially and politically. December 1, 1167 saw the official creation of the Lombard League, an alliance of the North Italian towns against Frederick, the other chief supporter of which was Alexander III. William II also embraced the cause of the towns.²⁴

The renewed clashes between Hungary and Byzantium were provoked by a Hungarian army, commanded by *comes* Denis which, in the spring of 1166, invaded Sirmium intending to recapture it from the Byzantines. The Hungarian attack was an overt violation of the peace treaty of 1165²⁵ and indicated clearly that the Hungarian ruling class was determined, even at the price of war, to regain lost territories. Denis defeated the opposing army led by Michael Gabras, the Byzantine governor of the province and Michael Branas and thus, with the exception of Semlin, Sirmium passed back into Hungarian hands.²⁶ Thereupon Manuel dispatched three armies to retaliate for the Hungarian attack. The first of these, led by *protostrator* Alexius Axuch, in which Béla-Alexius was also present, marched to the Danube. Its task was to simulate an attack in order to draw and hold the attention of the Hungarians while the other two imperial armies, under Leon Batatzes and John Ducas, invaded Transylvania.²⁷ The Byzantine troops, on the emperor's instructions, caused great destruction and devastation in their pillaging of the Transylvanian lands and a significant part of the population was either murdered or carried off into captivity. All this testifies to the purely retaliatory and deterrent nature of the Byzantine operation²⁸, Manuel's actual intentions. Congruent details in the sources confirm that the Byzantine campaigns inflicted serious damage on Hungary and Stephen III, to forestall any further raids, approached Manuel for an armistice through the mediation of Henry, Duke of Austria, who eventually managed to negotiate an agreement between Hungary and Byzantium at the talks in Sofia.²⁹ However, on account of Manuel's negative attitude, the Duke of Austria was unable to resolve the German-Byzantine controversy over the issue of Italy, a setback for Barbarossa since he was just about to lead his fourth campaign to Italy.³⁰ Manuel's behaviour in connection with the problems raised at the Sofia talks also draws attention to the fact that in 1166 it was no longer the Hungarian question, but the developments in the Italian situation which Byzantium regarded as the significant issue. This is also shown by Manuel's absence from the Hungarian-Byzantine clashes of 1166 (from 1162 to 1165 he had personally taken part in these wars). In the same year Stephen III sent home his betrothed, the ruling Prince of Halich's daughter and near the end of the year married Agnes, daughter of Henry Jasomirgott.³¹ There is no doubt that this marriage resulted in a remarkable reinforcement of Hungary's western, German and Austrian, connections. However, this by no means meant German overlordship over the Hungarian Kingdom.³² As no agreement was reached over the Italian issue between Germany and

Byzantium, Frederick Barbarossa was obviously seriously interested in having the Hungarian Kingdom on his side during his Italian campaign.

The armistice worked out in Sofia did not last long, since already at the end of 1166 the Hungarians attempted to occupy Dalmatia.³³ So the initiative was again with Hungary. Stephen III probably thought he might safely take the offensive against Manuel with the weight of the German and Austrian alliance behind him. In fact, the protraction of the Hungarian-Byzantine conflict served Barbarossa's Italian policy since it tied down Byzantium. The Hungarian army led by *ban* Ampud³⁴ launched an assault into Dalmatia and near Spalato inflicted a defeat on a Byzantine contingent commanded by the Byzantine governor of the province, *sebastos* Nicephorus Chaluphes. The Byzantine commander fell into captivity³⁵ and the Hungarians successfully reconquered a part of Dalmatia which included Tengerfehérvár³⁶ and perhaps, Sebenico.³⁷

Manuel, on hearing of this attack, decided to march against the Hungarians once the winter was over.³⁸ After Easter (April 9) 1167, the emperor went to Philippopolis where he engaged in fruitless talks with the envoys of Stephen.³⁹ The Byzantine host, reinforced by Scythians (Pechenegs or Cumans), Seljuqs from Iconium, Italian mercenaries and Rascian Serbs,⁴⁰ set off from Sofia.⁴¹ Emperor Manuel himself did not take part in the campaign,⁴² which—like that of 1166—was of a retaliatory nature.⁴³ The main objective of the Byzantine campaign in 1167 was to restore the Byzantine domination in Sirmium and Dalmatia, which had become rather insecure by that time. In addition, Byzantium mobilized its fleet, while a relative of Manuel's, Andronicus Contostephanus, was placed in charge of the conduct of the war. The Greek army crossed the Sava and marched into Semlin.⁴⁴

By that time, apparently in the wake of the failure of the talks in Philippopolis, *comes* Denis had already led the Hungarian army into Sirmium advancing as far as Semlin.⁴⁵ On July 8, 1167,⁴⁶ not far from Semlin and the Sava, the Byzantine army, assisted by the fleet, defeated the Hungarians in a fierce battle. In this battle the Hungarians, numbering 15,000 according to the source,⁴⁷ had Germans as well as other allies fighting on their side.⁴⁸ The Germans (Alamans) mentioned by the Byzantine source must have been primarily Austrians since western sources relate that Henry, Duke of Austria, went to Hungary in 1167 to help the Hungarian king against the Greek emperor.⁴⁹ Thus the Hungarian-Austrian alliance concluded in 1166 was directed against Byzantium indeed. After his victory near the river Sava, Manuel held a great triumphal march in Constantinople.⁵⁰

On the strength of the information from Mügelin and Rahewin it is a widely held opinion in the literature on the subject that the main cause of the wars between Hungary and Byzantium, from 1166 on, was that after the death of Stephen IV the Byzantine emperor, who had established contacts with groups in opposition to Stephen III, set up Prince Béla as a pretender. According to this view, Stephen III, on hearing of this plot against his rule, initiated a preventive war against Manuel.⁵¹

Besides the fact that the Hungarian attack in the spring of 1166 was directed only at the reconquest of Sirmium⁵² and that this military operation was not preventive in any way, the above-mentioned view has chronological difficulties as well, namely that the reports of Mügelin and Rahewin refer to the Hungarian-Byzantine war as taking place in 1167. Mügelin says: "Many a Hungarian joined him [i.e. Béla], served him and wrote

to the Greek emperor that the Kingdom of Hungary belonged to him by right. Thereupon the emperor gathered a great army and crossed the river called Sava. King Stephen then sent a multitude of Christians and heathens against the Greek emperor. The captain of the Hungarians was Denis. . . . The Greek emperor so harshly battered the infidels and the Hungarians to death that Denis escaped only with a few."⁵³ It is well known that *comes* Denis was defeated in July, 1167. Rahewin, attributing the same events to 1168, relates that "the Hungarian king, receiving help from his father-in-law, Henry, Duke of Austria, commenced a war against the emperor of the Greeks, because the emperor protected his ambitious brother and even married his daughter to him".⁵⁴

From these sources it appears that both Stephen, who was concerned to protect his crown, and his Austrian ally regarded the 1167 attack of Manuel, whose connections with the opposition in Hungary were known, as a step taken in the interests of Prince Béla. From the Byzantine sources, on the other hand, Byzantium turns out to have considered the wars with Hungary terminated by the settlement in the autumn of 1166 and that the clash of 1167 was provoked by the Hungarian king breaking the treaty (i.e. his attacking Dalmatia in the autumn of 1166). Nicetas relates that "after the Hungarians had violated the agreement, a war broke out again, which [had previously] ended favourably and was believed to have finally come to an end".⁵⁵ The war started in 1167 to consolidate Byzantium's shaky dominance over Dalmatia and Sirmium and was not aimed at assisting the efforts of the opposition in Hungary to bring Prince Béla to the throne. This is also proved by the fact that not only Manuel but also Béla was absent from the 1167 campaign.

The chronicle of Henry Mügelin relates that the agreement following the Byzantine victory gave the duchy to Prince Béla,⁵⁶ that is, the Byzantine rule over Sirmium, Dalmatia and Bosnia was restored.⁵⁷ Thus the Byzantine campaign of 1167 was completely successful and ensured the undisturbed Byzantine possession of the Sirmian, Dalmatian and Bosnian lands for a long time, until the early 1180s.

Recent research, on the basis of the panegyric speech of Michael of Anchialus, later Patriarch of Constantinople (1170–1178),⁵⁸ delivered before Emperor Manuel, has implied among other things that the Hungarian monarch paid homage to Manuel in the peace treaty of 1167 and the kingdom became the vassal kingdom of Byzantium. This view asserts that Hungary recognized the overlordship of Byzantium until Manuel's death.⁵⁹ To argue their point, adherents of this view cite the conditions of the Hungarian–Byzantine peace treaty as described in the oration of Michael. According to the orator, the Hungarian king assented to Sirmium, Croatia and Bosnia passing under Byzantine suzerainty.⁶⁰ The Hungarians also consented to the condition that "the church in keep of the Crown of Hungary and the capital around it [i.e. Székesfehérvár] be ranged among those under his [Manuel's] sovereignty so that the royal Crown of the Hungarian princes be subjected to him [i.e. Manuel]". The Hungarian king promised to pay dues to the emperor and together with the clerical leaders, the secular magnates and even the soldiers, he pledged to swear an oath of allegiance to Manuel. Finally, the Hungarians promised to hand over eleven distinguished hostages to guarantee the observance of the peace agreement.⁶¹

In the case of an actual peace treaty these conditions appear decidedly harsh. The question is whether such a peace treaty was ever concluded between Hungary and Byzantium and if yes, when. The date of Michael's oration is completely uncertain,

the literature on the subject has so far suggested 1167,⁶² 1166⁶³ and 1165.⁶⁴ The solution of this chronological problem is rendered difficult by the fact that the rhetor does not provide the actual time of the Hungarian–Byzantine war of which he speaks in so much detail and at the end of which, according to him, the peace treaty in question was concluded. What is certain is that the Hungarian–Byzantine conflict under discussion occurred sometime between 1164 and 1167.⁶⁵

If, however, the events of the war described in the speech are compared with the events of the Hungarian–Byzantine wars between 1164 and 1167 as narrated by different—western, Bohemian and Byzantine—historians, it can be established with complete certainty that the details of the clash described by Michael do not correspond to the wars of 1166–1167, but to those of 1164–1165. This correspondence can be pointed out on several significant points.

According to Michael, Manuel took part in the war preceding the peace treaty in question.⁶⁶ This, then, cannot refer to 1166 or 1167, since it is known from other sources that the basileus himself kept out of the campaigns in these years, but this is valid for the years of 1164 and 1165.⁶⁷ The orator also relates that the Hungarian king became frightened by the advancing Byzantine army, choosing to negotiate instead of fighting, and so there were no battles in this campaign.⁶⁸ Nor can this aspect refer to 1166 or 1167 since *comes* Denis fought bloody battles with the Byzantines in both years,⁶⁹ while in 1164 and 1165—apart from the siege of Semlin in 1165—hardly any actual fighting took place between Hungary and Byzantium. According to the rhetor, one of the guarantors of the peace treaty for Hungary was the monarch of Bohemia.⁷⁰ This unequivocally refers to 1164⁷¹ and may even be accepted for 1165,⁷² but should be firmly ruled out for 1166 and 1167 for in 1166 it was Henry, Duke of Austria, who mediated at the Hungarian–Byzantine settlement.⁷³ In 1167 it was again Henry and not Vladislav II who supported the King of Hungary against Byzantium.⁷⁴ One other circumstance is also against attributing the events, described in the speech, to 1166 or 1167, namely that Michael refers to the Norman king, William I, as someone alive and “waiting in his own den . . . for the blow and destruction to descend upon his head [i.e. from Manuel]”.⁷⁵ William I, as is known, died on May 7, 1166.⁷⁶

The editor of rhetor Michael’s oration supported his own dating of the speech to 1167 with two arguments. According to the first, the Byzantines, who in the speech accused the Hungarians of breach of faith because of the attack on Sirmium, were able to bring such a charge against Stephen III only after 1165 since Sirmium was delivered into Byzantine hands as late as 1165.⁷⁷ However, Cinnamus relates that, already in 1164, Stephen III swore to deliver Sirmium and this was the pledge he broke with his attack in the spring of 1165.⁷⁸ The Byzantines—as referred to above—actually took possession of Sirmium during the campaign in 1164 and considered it as falling under the suzerainty of the basileus. Cinnamus also records that Manuel secured his grip on Sirmium with an army as early as 1164.⁷⁹ It was also in 1164 that following the peace treaty assisted by Vladislav II, Stephen IV found refuge in Semlin, the military centre of Sirmium, where he was to die in April 1165.⁸⁰ What all this amounts to is that the Hungarian assault on Sirmium in 1165 was already a breach of contract. The other argument for dating the oration to 1167 runs as follows: since in the Hungarian–Byzantine clash narrated by Michael, Serbs also participated on the side of Byzantium⁸¹ and, according to Cinnamus, they fought in the Byzantine army against

the Hungarians only in 1167,⁸² the speech could therefore only have been composed after the war of 1167. This argument, however, also fails to stand up to criticism since it is evident from one of the passages in Cinnamus that "the Serbs under Byzantine subjection" took up arms against the Hungarians on the Byzantine side in 1165 as well.⁸³

All this considered, it seems unquestionable that Michael was referring to the events during the wars of 1164–1165 in his oration. This would mean that the peace treaty he describes was the result of those wars. The peace treaties between Hungary and Byzantium in 1164 and 1165 are, however, well known from the works of Byzantine and Bohemian historians. In the treaties described by them—apart from the Byzantine territorial conquests⁸⁴—there is not a word about the conditions mentioned by the Byzantine rhetor in his speech celebrating the basileus. No doubt rhetorical exaggerations were customary in the imperial court. It would appear, then, that the peace treaty never existed in the form described in the oration and can be regarded as the product of oratorical hyperbole. Thus the assertion that Hungary became the vassal kingdom of Byzantium, as a result of the wars between Stephen III and Manuel, is completely groundless.

The basic cause of the contradiction between reality and the oratorical statements is that the Byzantine rhetor recounted as fact only the wishes which were the chief goals of Manuel, concerning Hungary in the period between 1162–1165. During these years the main foreign policy objective of the Byzantine emperor was to effect the feudal subjection of the Hungarian Kingdom by installing a due paying vassal king on the throne of Hungary. That is, the spirit of Michael's Hungarian–Byzantine "peace treaty" has its roots in the tendencies of Manuel's Hungarian policies between 1162 and 1165. Furthermore, this also indicates that the panegyric oration was not written either in 1166 or 1167, but in 1165.

Of course the struggles of Hungary against Byzantium, during these long years, drained the resources of the country. The internal factional disputes, the wars with Byzantium, the devastating invasions of Manuel's troops and the occasional acts of pillage by the allies⁸⁵ resulted in serious material and human sacrifices not only from the ruling class, but also from the population of the whole country. That is why during the last years of Stephen III's reign Hungarian foreign policy became more restrained, avoiding conflicts abroad. The restraint of Hungary in the international scene is well exemplified by the fact that, according to the sources, Hungary did not aid in any substantial way the continuing struggle of the Serbs for their independence from Byzantium.⁸⁶ Nor was Hungarian foreign policy affected by the fact that in 1170, one of the sons of Vladislav II, Prince Svatopluk, on account of some domestic disagreements, was forced to flee to Hungary where Stephen III gave him shelter.⁸⁷

The view, shared by the present author of the restrained nature of Hungarian foreign policy after 1167 seems to be refuted by a rather deep-rooted and widespread opinion in the literature asserting that from 1167 to 1171 large-scale military clashes took place in Dalmatia between Hungary and Byzantium and between the Hungarian Kingdom and Venice over the possession of Dalmatian territories and Zara, respectively. According to this opinion, the army of the Hungarian king marched into Dalmatia in 1167–1168 and succeeded in reconquering it from Byzantium. At the same time Zara also separated from Venice and joined Hungary. The Doge, after being thwarted in his

first attempt, was able to recapture Zara only in 1170. Around the same time the Byzantines also managed to wrest Central Dalmatia back from Hungary. The Hungarian-Venetian conflict was terminated in 1171 by the marriage of a female relative of Stephen—Mary, daughter of Ladislav II—to the son of the Doge Vitale Michiel.⁸⁸

A closer scrutiny of the data in the relevant sources, however, does not support the above chronology of events. When establishing the sequence of events in Dalmatia researchers erred seriously when, instead of using contemporary sources, they—curiously—based their studies on the chronology of the 15th century Andrea Dandolo. In Dandolo's chronicle the events succeeded one another in the following way.

King Stephen [III], as a gesture of friendship, marries Ladislav's daughter, Mary, to Nicholas, the son of Doge Vitale Michiel [II]. Afterwards, however, the king arrives at the coast with his army, and gains possession, among others, of Spalato, Trau and Sebenico. The citizens of Zara then rebel, placing themselves under the sovereignty of the king. Thereupon Venice makes an unsuccessful attempt to recapture Zara, reinforced, in the meantime, by the Hungarians. The Doge, in the fifteenth year of his rule, leads his fleet against Zara and manages to take it. Later Spalato, Trau, Ragusa and nearly the whole of Dalmatia become subjected to Manuel.⁸⁹

On the other hand, the 12th century *Chronicon Venetum* relates the same events in the following order. Doge Vitale Michiel [II], on account of Emperor Manuel, often quarrelled with the Hungarian king. The inhabitants of Zara betrayed Venice and the king took the city, which he entered with an army of 30,000 troops. The first attempt of the Doge to retake the town failed because the Hungarians had occupied the whole land [i.e. Dalmatia]. In the second attempt the fleet of the Doge subdued Zara. "Thereafter the Hungarian king became friendly towards the Doge" and the latter's son, Nicholas, married the daughter of Ladislav, King of Hungary.⁹⁰

The *Historia ducum Veneticorum*—from the beginning of the 13th century—relates the events in the same order. It is significant that this Venetian source also places the Hungarian-Venetian marriage, the dating of which is essential for the definition of the chronology of the events, at the end of the whole sequence of incidents.⁹¹ The exact date of the wedding is provided by a Venetian annal from the 12th century according to which on December 17, 1167, "the envoys of the King of Hungary brought his cousin, called Mary, to be the wife of Doge Vitale Michiel's son, Nicholas".⁹²

Thus, the course of the events in Dalmatia would seem to be the following. Early in 1164 a royal army of—according to the source—30,000 troops marched to Dalmatia under the leadership of *ban* Ampud to secure Hungarian dominance over the Dalmatian towns which, by right, already belonged to Byzantium. Zara also joined the Hungarian king in the same year and the first attempt of the Doge to recapture the town failed in 1164. But in the first half of 1165 the fleet of Vitale Michiel—in alliance with Byzantium, a fact that Cinnamus also mentions—reconquered Zara.⁹³ Simultaneously the army of John Ducas occupied the towns of Central Dalmatia. Near the end of 1166 the army of the Hungarian king advanced into Dalmatia again led by the *ban*, but Central Dalmatia remained in Byzantine possession after the peace treaty of 1167. The Hungarian Kingdom was completely pushed out of Dalmatia by the early 1180s. The conflict between Hungary and Venice was ended by a dynastic link⁹⁴ and the establishment of friendly relations. This was made possible by the fact that the

Republic gradually turned against Byzantium on account of Manuel's Italian policies. The opposition of the two powers led to the events of March 12, 1171 when, at the behest of the basileus, all Venetian merchants on Byzantine soil were attacked and imprisoned, while their ships and goods were confiscated for the benefit of the exhausted treasury of the empire. In response the Venetian fleet set out against Byzantium in the autumn of 1171. The campaign lasted until Easter, 1172.⁹⁵ It was this absence of the fleet that, early in 1172, enabled Zara to recognize the Hungarian king again as its overlord.⁹⁶ This situation, of course, could not last long and the fleet, returning home in the spring of 1172, once again brought the town back into the Venetian fold.⁹⁷

The relationship between Hungary and the Papacy was settled in 1169. This was necessitated by the fact that during the Hungarian-Byzantine confrontations the connections between the Holy See and the royal court were considerably loosened as compared with the move performed by Géza II in 1161. Indicative of this is that papal legates—to whom Alexander III, on account of his own peculiar position, intended to give an important role in the practical running of the Catholic Church controlled by the Pope⁹⁸—did not visit the royal court of Hungary from 1162 until the end of the 1160s. It is, of course, out of the question that Stephen III would have changed his attitude to the schism within the Catholic Church, for this would undoubtedly have left some trace in the sources. However, during the period of the confrontation between Hungary and Byzantium, Stephen III could obviously not have been very happy about the good relationship between Alexander III and Manuel, while the Pope probably received with some misgivings the tightening of the connections between the Hungarian king and Barbarossa and the latter's Bohemian and Austrian allies.

It must also have cast a shadow on relations between Hungary and the Papacy that at this time the conditions in the Hungarian church failed in many respects to correspond with Gregorian principles. The letters of Thomas à Becket and John of Salisbury in 1167 indicate that mostly "on account of the unbridled acts of tyranny by the seculars against the apostolic institutions", the ecclesiastical conditions in Hungary—and likewise in England and Sicily—were totally incompatible with Gregorian ecclesiastical policies.⁹⁹ It was probably at this time that Stephen III relocated Prodanus, Bishop of Zagreb, and as the Pope judged this as contrary to the canons, he urged the king to refrain from such measures.¹⁰⁰ Another letter of Alexander III makes it clear that celibacy was not universal even among the higher clergy in Hungary. In his letter to the archbishops of Hungary the Pope prohibits "the audacity of consecrating married bishops".¹⁰¹ It must have been particularly grievous for the Church that during these years the king, perhaps to cover the expenses of the Byzantine wars, apparently had ecclesiastical property confiscated.¹⁰²

At the end of the 1160s the royal court and the Holy See established direct contacts. At this time Cardinal Manfred, Bishop of Praeneste visited Hungary as a papal legate.¹⁰³ He negotiated with the king, with Euphrosyne, the queen mother, and the Hungarian clerical leaders, the result of the talks being recorded in a settlement in 1169.¹⁰⁴ This settlement was mainly concerned with the internal problems of the Hungarian church, but it also touched on the relationship between Hungary and the Pope. Thus Stephen III pledged to follow the example of his father, Géza II concerning the Roman Church and the Pope.¹⁰⁵ At the same time the agreement settled several

significant issues of Hungarian ecclesiastical life in the Gregorian spirit. On a number of points the king found he had to make concessions to the church contrary to his former standpoint. The ecclesiastical concordat posed a serious threat to the institution of the royal proprietary church and completed Coloman's surrendering of the investiture at Guastalla in 1106 by extending its powers to the appointment of royal provosts and abbots.¹⁰⁶ According to the settlement Stephen promised to honour his father's provisions in which Géza II had given up his right to depose or relocate bishops without the consent of the Pope. The king also promised that—save in an emergency—he would not confiscate church property in the future.¹⁰⁷

The concordat, primarily by protecting ecclesiastical against secular property, served the interests of the Hungarian clergy in general. No doubt the agreement was the success of the policy of the Papacy and Archbishop Lucas.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, Lucas did not either then, or later prove to be an obedient instrument of papal politics. In 1169 he refused to consecrate the Bishop Elect of Győr, Andrew (András), in spite of demands from both Alexander III and the papal legate.¹⁰⁹ In 1171 he probably also came into conflict with the king and this time the Pope supported Stephen.¹¹⁰ All this indicates that the contemporary church and clergy of Hungary should not be judged only by the personality or the activities of Archbishop Lucas.

Several factors contributed to the conclusion of the concordat of 1169. When the struggle with Byzantium was over the Hungarian ecclesiastical leaders protected their positions and material wealth, forced the king to bring his policies directed against the Church to an end. The appearance of legate Manfred, at the same time, indicates that Pope Alexander, whose position had improved considerably by then,¹¹¹ came to the aid of the Hungarian church.

Towards the end of the reign of Stephen III a significant change occurred in the position of Béla-Alexius in Byzantium. On September 14, 1169 Emperor Manuel had a son, called Alexius, from his second marriage (with Mary of Antioch, in December, 1161).¹¹² Before long Béla was stripped of his rank of *despotes*, which, since 1165, had signified that the emperor's would be son-in-law was the official heir apparent and in return he was given the humbler rank of *kaisar*.¹¹³ His betrothal to Mary, the daughter of the basileus, was also dissolved, but at the same time—not later than the first half of 1170—Manuel arranged a marriage between Béla and his sister-in-law, Agnes of Châtillon from Antioch, who was in fact the half-sister of his wife. She later assumed the name of Anna in Byzantium.¹¹⁴ Simultaneously Manuel's son was ceremonially proclaimed heir to the Byzantine throne in the Blachernai Church,¹¹⁵ and in March, 1171 the infant Alexius was crowned co-emperor.¹¹⁶

After these developments it was obvious that Béla-Alexius—once heir to the throne of Byzantium and now a minor court dignitary—should turn his attentions towards Hungary with growing interest. This is proved by a charter written in Latin—most probably from the first half of 1170—in the name of "Dominus A", in which Béla-Alexius and his Antióchan wife bestowed a grant of considerable worth upon the Hospitallers of St John of Jerusalem.¹¹⁷ In this document Béla styles himself Duke of Hungary, Dalmatia and Croatia,¹¹⁸ that is, having lost the dignity of the Byzantine heir apparent, he continued to use the same title which he had been entitled to in Hungary from 1161 to 1163.

Chapter VIII

Béla III and Byzantium

On March 4, 1172, King Stephen III died at the age of 25.¹ Arnold of Lübeck, who was staying in Esztergom at the time as member of the retinue of Henry the Lion, Duke of Bavaria and Saxony and Henry Jasomirgott, Duke of Austria, relates in his chronicle that rumours attributed the young king's death to poisoning, the work of "his brother, expelled from the country".² Even if other sources do not confirm the verity of such hearsay, it is a relevant aspect in assessing the Hungarian domestic situation that there were people in the closest circle round the late king who blamed his death on Prince Béla, at that time in Byzantium. This indicates that Béla had followers in Hungary who opposed the rule of Stephen III and therefore this German source could, on the strength of information from Esztergom, implicate them in the totally unexpected death of Stephen.³

During the days following March 4 the foreign princes who were staying in Hungary, deemed the situation rather tense and uncertain. Henry Jasomirgott took his widowed daughter, who was then pregnant, home immediately after the funeral,⁴ while Henry the Lion was worried about whether he should continue his trip to Byzantium across Hungary in such circumstances.⁵

Be as it may, the death of Stephen III opened Prince Béla's way to the crown of Hungary. Cinnamus relates that at that time, in the spring of 1172, Emperor Manuel, on account of both the revolt of the Serbs led by Stephen Nemanja and the events in Hungary, went to Sofia where his army was expected to gather for the Serbian campaign. It was here that the basileus received envoys from Hungary who had come to take Béla back with them to be their king as, in their opinion, he was entitled to the crown.⁶ Their wish coincided with Béla's ambition and Manuel's intention, namely, to have one of his protégés on the Hungarian throne once more.

Cinnamus relates that Manuel then had Béla declared king and sent him and his wife to Hungary, but not before the prince had sworn to make constant efforts to serve the good of the Emperor of Byzantium in the future.⁷ According to a letter of Isaac II to Pope Celestine III in 1193, Béla also promised not to interfere in the affairs of Serbia without asking for the opinion of the basileus.⁸ This promise was necessitated by the Serbs' struggle for independence which broke out early in 1172. With the experience of the previous years in mind, this is how the Byzantine ruler wanted to prevent any anti-Byzantine cooperation between Hungarians and Serbs.

It appears from contemporary Papal and Byzantine sources that Prince Béla, on his arrival home, met with no difficulties in taking possession of the country from the common will of the magnates of the realm. In the spring of 1179, Alexander III wrote

the following to Archbishop Lucas concerning these events: "You yourself and the rest of the dignitaries of the Hungarian kingdom... acted jointly in electing Béla the majestic King of the Hungarians, and inviting him home from Greece to head and govern the country..."⁹ Nicetas writes that "Paionia [i.e. Hungary] vested him with the royal crown without any obstacles and he [Béla] became the ruler of the whole people without opposition".¹⁰ With later events in mind, the purpose of this tendentious presentation is obvious: it wished to present Béla, who ascended the throne with the help of the Pope and the basileus, as one who had, from the beginning, enjoyed the support of the entire ruling class.

The actual events following the return of the prince diametrically contradict the picture presented by these sources. It was only after a year's struggle that Béla was able to occupy the throne. Contemporaries were well aware of the significance of the ecclesiastical coronation in the process of creating a king, since during the reign of Coloman, Bishop Hartvik had already elaborated the principle that expressed the essential connection between the coronation and the possession of kingship. Since Coloman this principle had been generally recognized: he who has the crown has the kingdom. According to this view, "the *regnum*, the kingship, the possession of royal power... depends on the *corona*, the fact of the coronation."¹¹ It was obviously of paramount importance for Béla, who had returned from abroad, to have himself crowned as soon as possible.¹² According to one of the sources, however, the Archbishop of Esztergom, whose responsibility it was, refused to crown Béla hinting that his reasons involved suspected simony on the part of Béla.¹³

This would appear to testify to the probable fact that the extremely Gregorianist Archbishop Lucas was opposed to the succession of the prince from the beginning.¹⁴ The attitude of the Archbishop of Esztergom was shaped equally by ecclesiastical considerations and political aspects. Lucas regarded Béla, who had been converted to the orthodox faith, as a protégé of the schismatic Emperor of Byzantium and as such, one whose person on the throne implied the threat of schism and the increasing influence of the Greek Church¹⁵ and consequently the possibility of a decline in the political weight and authority of the Catholic Church in Hungary.

By denying the crown to Béla, Lucas was clearly expressing that he rejected the *regnum* of Béla. It seems likely, though no direct evidence corroborates this, that the archbishop supported the claim of Géza, brother of Béla, against the latter.¹⁶ Lucas knew Prince Géza would continue the anti-Greek policies of Stephen III, which since 1169 had clearly been pro-Papal and also fully respected the wishes of the Hungarian clerical leaders. A part of the ruling class followed the archbishop in rallying round Béla's younger brother. Among them were, in the first place, *comes* Lawrence and numerous other barons who were later to flee to Austria with Géza.¹⁷ *Comes* Lawrence had belonged to the royal court during Stephen III's reign and was prominent among the leaders of the ruling class, since from around 1164 he had been *comes curialis*, one of the chief officials of the kingdom.¹⁸ He still held this office in Stephen's court early in 1172.¹⁹ After this his name goes unmentioned in the charters issued during Béla III's reign. Another follower of Géza's was *comes* Fulk. He had been one of the advisers of Stephen III, for which Béla III removed him from the court.²⁰ His fate was probably also shared by *comes* Ruben.²¹ In addition to Archbishop Lucas, there must have been other clericals who supported the cause of Prince Géza. Very probably one of them was

Vido, the brother of *comes* Fulk, who had been Stephen's chaplain and who was dismissed from royal service in the wake of Béla's succession.²² One of the confidential agents of Lucas, the *notarius* Becen, probably left the court together with the head of the royal chapel.²³ It is possible that Euphrosyne, the queen mother, who had played an important role in the home and foreign policies during the reign of Stephen III, also opposed Béla and sided with her younger son.²⁴ Perhaps this is why she was later imprisoned and exiled to Byzantium in 1186.²⁵ The fact that the *Chronicon Posoniense* mentions the blinding of *comes* Wata directly after Prince Géza's flight to Austria²⁶ suggests that the *comes* was also one of Géza's supporters.

Thus the change on the throne again revealed the controversies between the various parties and factions of the Hungarian magnates and there began a desperate fight for supremacy and the crown between the two opposing baronial groups and their pretender leaders. The sources are silent about the details of this struggle, but there seems to have been a period when Béla and his followers deemed their own position rather uncertain, if not outrightly dangerous. Pope Innocent III wrote in a letter: "the dignitaries and barons of the Hungarian Kingdom asked him [i.e. Alexander III] that if Lucas . . . did not want to crown Béla king of the Hungarians somebody else should be allowed to place the crown of the realm on his head, lest grave danger should befall the kingdom and the Hungarian church were the hitherto mentioned Béla not to receive his anointment and the crown quickly".²⁷ The parties of the magnates drew, or tried to draw, foreign powers into the succession struggle on their own sides. On the basis of the papal epistle quoted above and of the events to come, the assumption might be risked that—knowing Béla to be supported by Alexander III and Manuel—Géza as early as this was trying to get in touch with Frederick Barbarossa. The possible intervention of the German monarch would indeed not only have endangered Béla's position concerning royal power, but, in addition, might have had damaging consequences for Alexander III in the struggle between the empire and the Papacy. Frederick Barbarossa was, however, fully engaged in his own problems at that time, such as the preparations for his next planned campaign to Italy and the succession disputes in Poland.²⁸ Thus, Géza was eventually unable to secure the support of foreign allies. This was favourable for Béla, who enjoyed the active assistance of two foreign powers.

Pope Alexander embraced the cause of Prince Béla and after numerous pleas had fruitlessly been made to bring Lucas to crown Béla, he authorized the Archbishop of Kalocsa to, "as soon as the bishops of the kingdom have gathered . . . , anoint him [Béla] king and place the crown on his head without delay".²⁹ It was the clever policies of Béla that eventually secured the Pope's support for him. In this the attitude of Alexander III appears to have been decided by the fact that Béla turned to him for help concerning the question of his coronation troubles, thus implicitly recognizing Alexander legitimate Pope as against the anti-Pope, Callixtus III (1168–1178), who was supported by Barbarossa. The political significance of his support for Alexander III can be discerned in the fact that precisely at this time, on March 26, 1172, Frederick I had the Diet of Worms accept his plan for the new Italian campaign directed against the Lombard cities and Pope Alexander.³⁰ In these circumstances the decision of the new Hungarian king favoured Alexander III. In addition, the Pope and, naturally, the Hungarian clergy were drawn towards Béla by the fact that the latter, very probably in

1172, swore to keep the concordat of 1169.³¹ This set both the Pope and the Hungarian clergy at ease reassuring them that the concordat would form the base of Béla's ecclesiastical policies. Finally, the fact that in the early 1170s relations between Alexander and Manuel were both close and good-natured also obviously contributed to Béla's becoming king.³²

While it is true that the Pope's support was invaluable for Béla in his rise to power, there is also no doubt that the Emperor of Byzantium was Béla's most important foreign supporter at the time. It appears from Byzantine sources that in 1172 Manuel provided Béla with all the help for the prince's efforts to gain the crown. Cinnamus relates that the retinue of Prince Béla which arrived in Hungary included *protosebastos* John and several other Byzantine dignitaries.³³ This is confirmed by Nicetas, who says that it was with a magnificent military escort and great royal pomp that the Emperor of Byzantium sent the Hungarian prince home to take up the rule in his country.³⁴ One of the letters of Isaac II, which the emperor wrote to Pope Celestine III in 1193, also contains valuable information about the help Béla received from Byzantium. In this letter the basileus informed the Pope that Béla III had attacked Serbia, since he was not content with his own country, "which he acquired with difficulties and with the help of the armies and the money of *Rhomania* [i.e. Byzantium]".³⁵ The source does not go into details but it seems likely that in 1172 the events of the summer of 1162 were repeated in so far as Manuel, in promoting his protégé's claims to the throne, did not refrain from exerting military pressure by mobilizing his armies in addition to spending Byzantine gold.

Béla, however, had to realize—as had been clearly demonstrated by the successive failures of Stephen IV—that possible as it was to ascend the throne of Hungary it was nonetheless unfeasible to hold on to it without substantial internal support. It proved to be a decisive fact both in Béla's seizure of power and the later retaining of his throne that the pretender from Byzantium managed to win over the majority of the Hungarian ruling class to his cause. Béla was also supported by the dignitaries who had returned from Greece with him, namely, Becse (Becha) and Gregory (Gergely).³⁶ This group perhaps also included Rede, Luthar, Cuda, Vrazlo and Stoyza.³⁷ Also, those barons who had been ready to have him on the throne in 1167 probably still supported him.³⁸ The happy outcome of Béla's struggle for power was also greatly facilitated by the fact—as can be demonstrated—that a significant part of Stephen III's most influential followers took his side. This is what the sources suggest with regard to *comites* Ampud, Denis, Pancras (Pongrác), Kaba, and Cubanus. *Comes* Ampud had held the highest offices, those of the *ban* and the *nádor* during Stephen III's reign and the charters in Béla's time also mention him as *ban*.³⁹ Denis, *comes* of Stephen III, who had led the Hungarian army against Byzantium in 1166 and 1167, was one of the chief officials of Béla III as *nádor* and *comes* of Bács and he probably took part in the preliminary talks in 1177 to prepare the peace of Venice and was later the chief official in Dalmatia in 1181 and 1183;⁴⁰ *comites* Pancras,⁴¹ Kaba,⁴² and Cubanus (Ssubanus)⁴³ also found their way from the retinue of Stephen III to the court of Béla III.

In addition to the secular elements of the ruling class a significant part of the Hungarian clerical leaders also backed Béla III. This is certainly true about the Archbishop of Kalocsa who, unlike Lucas, was willing to crown Béla. It can be inferred

that other prelates besides the Archbishop of Kalocsa, whose names are not known, also came over to Béla's side, since the bidding of the Pope, namely that the coronation must take place in the presence of the bishops of the kingdom,⁴⁴ undoubtedly prompted them to do so. The examination of the social composition of the two parties reveals that both sides had secular and ecclesiastical magnates among their ranks. Thus it cannot be claimed that Béla III, who was also supported by the Gregorian Pope, was the candidate of the secular lords only.⁴⁵

The sources, as in the case of several changes on the throne in the 12th century, provide no information as to the precise circumstances of Béla III's accession. It has to be accepted as a fact—and this seems to be the crucial point—that during the party struggles, which lasted nearly a year, power relations both at home and abroad took a favourable turn for Béla. Consequently, the Archbishop of Kalocsa, acting on the authorization of Alexander III, crowned Béla King of Hungary in Székesfehérvár, the sacral capital of the realm, on January 13, 1173.⁴⁶

In the first phase of his reign—approximately up to 1180—Béla III, on the one hand, defended the crown he had gained with so much difficulty and, on the other, restored and strengthened the shaken authority of royal power. Therefore, no large-scale foreign policy initiatives or expansionist ventures were attempted in this period of his reign. In his foreign policy during these years Béla III made efforts at close cooperation with the countries and powers abroad that supported his reign. At the same time, the king took a firm stand against Austria, the Duke of which was sheltering Béla's rival, Prince Géza.

After his coronation Béla III introduced certain sanctions against his opponents. While Archbishop Lucas lost his political importance through total neglect,⁴⁷ Bohemian sources imply that Prince Géza was imprisoned by the king.⁴⁸ However, the prince was able to escape around 1174–1175 and fled to Austria with several dignitaries amongst whom was *comes* Lawrence.⁴⁹ Leopold, son of Henry Jasomirgott, Duke of Austria, married Helen, elder sister of King Béla, in the spring of 1174.⁵⁰ The emigration of Géza and his followers to Austria, however, cast a dark shadow on Hungarian–Austrian relations. Due to the Austrians' providing a sanctuary for his brother and their refusal to extradite him, Béla was already on unfriendly terms with Henry Jasomirgott by 1175.⁵¹ The friction turned into armed clashes in 1176 and this year the Hungarians, together with their Bohemian allies, invaded and pillaged Austrian lands.⁵² In 1177 Prince Géza left Austria for Bohemia because “with the help of Prince Soběslav he hoped to make his way to the emperor, obtain the crown from him, and achieve the subjection of Hungary”.⁵³ Thus Géza had not abandoned his ambition to acquire the throne, for which he wanted to solicit Frederick Barbarossa's help, at that time in Italy.⁵⁴ His plans came to nothing, as Soběslav II, ruling Prince of Bohemia had him captured and later extradited to Béla III.⁵⁵ The king ordered the dangerous pretender to be imprisoned again⁵⁶ and it was perhaps at this time that his mother, Euphrosyne, was also put in confinement and *comes* Wata blinded.⁵⁷ Barbarossa, who owed the Bohemian ruler a grudge on some other account, took revenge on Soběslav by depriving him of his crown and making Frederick, the son of Vladislav II, ruling Prince of Bohemia. The latter advanced into Bohemia with Leopold V, Duke of Austria, to claim his throne.⁵⁸ Béla III came to the aid of Soběslav II by threatening to attack Leopold, whereupon the Duke withdrew from Bohemia.⁵⁹

Eventually, however, in the autumn of 1179 Sobešlav was defeated by Frederick and had to flee the country.⁶⁰

The relationship between Béla III and Manuel has been assessed in different ways by different scholars. According to one view Hungary was the vassal state of Byzantium until Manuel's death (1180), hence Byzantine influence was strong in the country.⁶¹ It is primarily the panegyric speeches of Constantine Manasses and Eustathius which appear to support this view. In his laudatory oration delivered before Manuel in 1173.⁶² Manasses—after posing the question, who of all the emperors of Byzantium had managed “to subject and force into due-paying the invincible Pannons [i.e. Hungarians]?”⁶³—claims that it was Manuel who subdued the people and the land of Pannonia.⁶⁴ Therefore “the law of the Pannons serves us and yields us gold,”⁶⁵ because the Pannons “regard our emperor as their own overlord,”⁶⁶ who “set up princes over them”.⁶⁷ The Archbishop of Thessalonica, Eustathius, speaks about Béla's ascent in a similar way in his speech in 1174. He relates that the Byzantines sent a ruler to the country of the Paiones in the North and this prince—like other princes as well—is ruled by the Byzantine emperor, “the King of Kings”.⁶⁸

These orations, however, hardly give a realistic assessment of the actual relationship between Hungary and Byzantium. The main goal of the orators was to praise both the person and the deeds of the basileus,⁶⁹ and their efforts were often full of exaggerations and untrue statements which totally failed to fit reality. Thus Manasses, for example, who in his speech compares Manuel, among others, to Alexander the Great of Macedonia and King David of the Bible,⁷⁰ claims that Manuel forced Egypt to pay dues to Byzantium.⁷¹ This is completely at odds with the truth since the Byzantine–Latin expeditionary campaigns, launched in alliance with Jerusalem and aimed at conquering the Egypt of the Fatimids, ended in ignominious failure at the end of 1169. Following this the allies retreated from Damietta in miserable circumstances in December 1169.⁷² The assumption that an Egypt governed by Saladin would have paid any kind of due to Byzantium is completely impossible to hold.

Reliable sources do not corroborate the notion that Hungary paid dues to Byzantium, or that Béla III would have recognized the Byzantine emperor as his overlord. The oath he made to Manuel in Sofia in the spring of 1172 was not an oath of fealty. Béla only promised always to consider the interest of Byzantium and never to act contrary to them. It was also interpreted by Emperor Isaac II in this way in 1193.⁷³ There is no dispute that Béla's coming to power, in which matter Manuel was most instrumental, was justly regarded in Byzantium as a significant political *tour de force*.⁷⁴ As Béla never became the vassal of Byzantium the view that regards his ascent as being “the climax of Greek influence in Hungary”⁷⁵ seems unacceptable. The reign of Béla III differs in several relevant respects from that of Stephen IV. Béla had a wide social basis in Hungary to rely on and his foreign policy remained unbiased towards Byzantium. He enjoyed the support of the Pope and never for a moment during his reign was it brought up that Hungary desired separation from Rome. During his first years as king a dynastic link was established between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Duchy of Austria and later Béla entered into an alliance with Bohemia. Furthermore, he even made contact with Frederick Barbarossa in 1175.⁷⁶

What does appear acceptable is the view that Hungary and Byzantium maintained a relationship of close alliance at this time.⁷⁷ This would tend to be confirmed by the fact

that in 1176 Béla III, in full accordance with his oath in Sofia and in defence of Byzantine interests, sent an army under the leadership of *ban* Ampud and Leustach, *voivode* of Transylvania, to assist Manuel. On September 17, 1176 this auxiliary detachment from Hungary, together with the Serbs, also fought against the army of Kilij Arslan (Sultan of Iconium) in the battle of Myriocephalum, which ended so disastrously for the empire.⁷⁸ It seems relevant for the clarification of relations between Hungary and Byzantium at the time that, while the contemporary historian, Cinnamus, calls the Serbs, forced once more into feudal dependence early in 1172, "subjects" of Byzantium, he uses the term "allies" for the Hungarians fighting on their side.⁷⁹

According to some scholars, in the first half of the 1170s there was a marriage arranged between one of Béla III's sisters and Isaac, Manuel's cousin in order to strengthen the alliance between Hungary and Byzantium.⁸⁰ It appears, however, that such a marriage never materialized and the relevant passages in the sources refer to the marriage of Margaret, Béla's daughter to Emperor Isaac Angelus instead.⁸¹

The conduct of Béla III concerning the case of the archbishopric of Salzburg definitely testifies to a good relationship between Alexander III and the king. In 1168 Adalbertus, one of the sons of Vladislav II, King of Bohemia, occupied the archiepiscopal seat of the see of Salzburg and he, like his predecessors, proved to be a supporter of Alexander III. Inevitably there arose a conflict between him and Frederick Barbarossa, who declared Adalbertus relieved of his office in 1174 and had his own nominee elected in his place. The Pope, however, continued to recognize Adalbertus as archbishop and entrusted Walter, Bishop of Albano with the task of bringing the issue to an end.⁸² When it became clear that the question could not be resolved in normal circumstances on German soil the papal legate solicited the help of Béla III. During the summer of 1176 the King of Hungary provided secure conditions for the debate on the fate of the archiepiscopal seat in Győr. The Hungarian church was represented by Andrew, Archbishop of Kalocsa at the negotiations, which indicated the extent to which the position of Archbishop Lucas had been neglected.⁸³ At the peace treaty of August 1, 1177, concluding the second phase in the struggle between the Empire and the Papacy, both the King and the Church of Hungary were represented in Venice.⁸⁴ It is possible that *comes* Denis, Béla's commissioner also played a role of some importance during the preliminary talks.⁸⁵ In March 1179 the Third Lateran Council convened to settle the position of the Papacy and the Catholic Church after the conclusion of the struggle with the Emperor.⁸⁶ The Hungarian clergy was represented at the ecumenic council by Andrew, Archbishop of Bács-Kalocsa.⁸⁷ By that time, however, relations between Béla III and the two chief prelates of the Hungarian church had changed.

This new state of affairs was closely connected with the king's efforts to consolidate royal power and strengthen his authority. Béla acted most resolutely and severely whenever his royal power was infringed upon not only by secular magnates, such as Géza and his followers, but also by the clergy. Around 1178 he had a serious disagreement with Andrew, Archbishop of Kalocsa and the Provost of [Székes] Fehérvár.⁸⁸ Due to the decline in the importance of Archbishop Lucas, Andrew, who enjoyed the support of the Pope and the king, practically became the number one ecclesiastical official in Hungary. It was also he who represented the Hungarian church

on the highest level abroad. On the strength of a letter by Alexander III in 1179 it would seem that the Archbishop of Kalocsa gravely insulted both royal dignity and authority. Thereupon Andrew fell out of favour with the king and, in addition to being deposed from the archbishopric, he was denied the archiepiscopal revenues.⁸⁹ Because of Andrew's behaviour several of his supporters also felt the weight of the king's wrath.⁹⁰ One of these was the Provost of Fehérvár, whom Béla deprived of his provostship⁹¹ and probably simultaneously took back the royal proprietary chapel (*capella propria*) of Székesfehérvár, which had passed under the jurisdiction of the Pope.⁹² As a result of these measures a dispute occurred between Béla and the Pope, who accused the king, in both cases, of a breach of the oath he had sworn in the concordat of 1169.⁹³ Alexander III gave protection to the Archbishop of Kalocsa and the Provost of Fehérvár, threatened Béla with excommunication and, moreover, put certain ecclesiastical sanctions into effect against the king.⁹⁴

Béla III sought reconciliation with his old adversary, the Archbishop of Esztergom, who had completely been shut out from public life and now used him against Andrew and the Pope.⁹⁵ Lucas dispensed the king from his ecclesiastical penalty and on account of the maltreatment of the clericals belonging to the see of Esztergom excommunicated Archbishop Andrew, an act which, naturally, provoked the resentment of the Pope.⁹⁶ The basic reason why Lucas was willing to take a stand beside Béla against Archbishop Andrew was that the latter, making the best of Lucas' controversy with both the Pope and the king, had tried to usurp important public rights of the Archbishop of Esztergom.⁹⁷ The case was essentially one of rivalry between Esztergom and Kalocsa⁹⁸ for the leadership of the Hungarian church. After Archbishop Andrew had infringed upon royal authority, Béla III chose to support the side of Lucas against that of the ambitious prelate of Kalocsa. This probably also contributed to the fact that in 1182 the eldest son of the king, Prince Emeric, was not crowned by the Archbishop of Kalocsa, but by Nicholas, Archbishop of Esztergom.⁹⁹

This was the policy that, along with many other factors, resulted in the restoration of the weight and authority of royal power, rather shaken on account of the factional strifes in the previous years, in the first phase of Béla III's reign. The consolidated royal authority, the inner peace and the community of interests, achieved among the various groups of the ruling class, made it possible for Hungary to begin a policy of territorial expansion in the second phase of Béla's reign. A pause in the struggle among the baronial groups lasted for nearly two decades after 1177, indicating that Béla III had successfully gathered the whole of the ruling class around himself.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, changes in the international scene were also favourable for the active and aggressive foreign policies of Béla III.

The controversies between the great powers had considerably abated by the time Béla consolidated his position. The defeat of Byzantium at Myriocephalum in 1176 proved to be a catastrophic disaster from which the empire would never be able to recover. Myriocephalum proved that Byzantium was unable to retrieve Asia Minor, a vitally important area for the empire, from the Seljuqs and thus the restoration of Byzantine hegemony in the East became impossible.¹⁰¹ In the West, following the Lombard League's victory at Legnano (1176), the plans for the acquisition of Italy disappeared from Barbarossa's foreign policy programme for nearly a decade. The struggle between Frederick Barbarossa and Alexander III was brought to an end by

the peace of Venice in 1177 and meant the victory of the Papacy. Rome had managed to defend its independence from the empire and Barbarossa had no option but to recognize Alexander. The emperor no longer enforced the Roncaglia resolutions, which was a success for the Lombard cities. At the same time the settlement between the German emperor and the Pope deprived Manuel of his chief ally in Italy.¹⁰²

The easing of tensions among the great powers allowed the feudal groupings of Hungary a wider room for manoeuvre in international politics than before. The majority of the neighbouring states also weakened, to the advantage of Hungarian foreign policy efforts, giving Hungary some edge in power over these countries and their peoples. The feudal anarchy and baronial strife in Bohemia, Poland and Russia created favourable conditions for foreign interference and invasions. In 1183 the Serbs, led by Stephen Nemanja and in 1185 the Bulgarians, under the leadership of Petar and Asen, began their fight for an independent statehood against the Byzantine Empire. These struggles, which were to last for years, pinned down a large part of the military resources of these peoples and thus facilitated Hungarian expansion southward. The changes in the position of Byzantium also favoured the expansionist policy of the Hungarian ruling class.¹⁰³

When defining its foreign policy objectives, Hungary carefully took the development of international relations into account and exploited the difficulties of her neighbours to advance her own expansionist ends. Hungarian moves were directed mostly against Halich, Venice, Serbia and Byzantium. Between 1180 and 1196 Béla III's policy towards the latter was characterized by a certain duality. In some cases the king emerged as the defender of Byzantine interests, while in others the Hungarians directed themselves at seizing lands under Byzantine domination. Behind these apparent hesitations however, the decisive factors were always the interests of the Hungarian lords. In the contacts between Hungary and Byzantium in this period Hungary was always the active, initiating party, a fact indicative of both the increased power of the Hungarian Kingdom and the weakening of the Byzantine empire.

The death of Manuel (September 24, 1180) left Byzantium in an extremely difficult situation caused in the main by the home and foreign policies of the late emperor. The wars, which were an inevitable part of the policy of conquest, caused immense human and material losses to the empire during these decades and their achievements did not compensate them. The privileged position of the merchants of the Italian cities (Venice, Genoa, Pisa) had completely undermined the financial bases of the empire. Economically the West had conquered Byzantium long before 1204. The economic and military resources of the empire were exhausted. The power struggles within the ruling class unleashed an internal crisis, while the empire suffered failure after failure abroad. In Asia Minor the empire was taking a battering from Kilij Arslan II, Sultan of Iconium, while in the Balkans Béla III was conquering large territories under Byzantine rule.¹⁰⁴ According to evidence supplied by the sources, the King of Hungary began to subjugate Central Dalmatia, under Byzantine suzerainty since 1165, at the end of 1180. Thomas of Spalato relates that after the death of Emperor Manuel, the citizens of Spalato again came under the dominance of Hungary.¹⁰⁵ Spalato received a charter of privileges from Béla III probably already in 1180.¹⁰⁶ The reconquest of the Dalmatian lands did not meet with any substantial resistance. Zara, which turned its back on Venice for the fourth time since 1159, must have switched its allegiance to

Hungary at the turn of 1180–1181.¹⁰⁷ This is shown by the fact that in February 1181 *comes* Mór had his verdict, in a case of some action over possession rights, put into writing in Zara, where he was “the industrious governor of the whole coastal province”.¹⁰⁸ The importance of the recapture of Dalmatia is indicated by the fact that one of the chief officials of the country, *nádor* Farkas, was in Zara as early as March 1181.¹⁰⁹ Béla III wanted to secure Hungarian control over Dalmatia not only by civil administration, but also with the help of the ecclesiastical organization. To this end he became involved, despite protests from the Pope, in the election of the archbishop of the province, championing the interests of his own candidate. As a result one of his Hungarian followers, Peter, from the *Kán* genus, received the archiepiscopal seat of Spalato.¹¹⁰

The conquest of Dalmatia, as has correctly been pointed out by recent literature abroad, can in no way be regarded as favouring the interests of the emperor and his empire, thus Béla’s oath to Manuel was obviously broken.¹¹¹ The assertion that the Hungarian conquest served Byzantine interests because it prevented the seizure of Dalmatia by Venice, is also entirely groundless.¹¹² This is because Byzantium was not threatened by Venice in Dalmatia at the time, since the Republic even lacked the power to recapture Zara from the Hungarians. The literature on the subject has voiced the opinion that in the wake of Zara’s defection to Hungary, Doge Orto Malipiero attempted to regain the town unsuccessfully. The sources, referred to as supporting this view, really concern the events of 1187.¹¹³

No evidence is available which would directly confirm the reconquest of Sirmium. If, however, one remembers that after May 1182, the regent Andronicus accused Manuel’s widow of treason merely over the capture of Belgrade and Braničevo by the Hungarians,¹¹⁴ the inference appears justified that the lands of Sirmium had been occupied by Béla III before Andronicus’ march into Constantinople (early May 1182). It seems probable that the takeover of Sirmium took place simultaneously with the conquest of Dalmatia.¹¹⁵

As to the significance of these conquests the achievements of the Hungarian king are unquestionable. Within a short time he was able to control the lands of Dalmatia and Sirmium that Manuel had fought over for years with Stephen III. The fact that the elder son of Béla, Prince Emeric, became betrothed to one of the daughters of Frederick Barbarossa was probably related to the expansionist campaigns against Byzantium. Although the marriage came to nothing because the German princess died early—in 1184¹¹⁶—its obvious purpose was to secure the King of Hungary in the West during the moves against Byzantium.¹¹⁷

The foreign policy failures in Asia Minor and the Balkans significantly contributed to the deepening internal crisis in Byzantium, which followed the change of the ruler. Although Manuel’s 11-year-old son, Alexius II, ascended the throne in the autumn of 1180, the actual power was concentrated in the hands of the empress, whom Manuel had appointed guardian of his son and the empire. The council of regents had twelve members acting besides Mary and included Alexius, son of Manuel’s brother, Andronicus. Alexius, who held the office of *protosebastos*, was the empress’ favourite and soon acquired firm control in the government. The widow and the *protosebastos* desired unlimited powers, so not only Alexius II but many of the chief leaders from Manuel’s time were ignored. Therefore, a discontented group emerged which, under

the pretext of protecting Alexius II's interests, conspired to bypass the widow and murder the *protosebastos* with the real aim of securing power and positions for themselves. In the spring of 1181 a revolt broke out in the Byzantine capital led by Manuel's bypassed daughter, Mary and her husband. However, the power of the followers of the *protosebastos*, relying on Latin (i.e. western) merchants and mercenaries, and that of the groups in the capital rallying round the conspirators were balanced. Therefore, the issue was not decided in the spring of 1181 and the leaders of the two parties made a compromise. It was then that Manuel's perennial rival, Andronicus Comnenus, who had close connections with the leaders of the revolt against the *protosebastos*, stepped forward. Andronicus himself, after having sworn an oath of allegiance to Manuel in the summer of 1180, had become the governor of a distant province. In the autumn of 1181 he marched against Constantinople with a minor army also declaring himself the defender of Alexius II and proclaiming war against the *protosebastos*. The Byzantine fleet joined him in Chalcedon in the spring of 1182 and this proved decisive. After the *protosebastos* had been handed over to him and the Latins had been massacred by the tens of thousands during a bloody pogrom in the capital, Andronicus met no resistance when he marched into Constantinople early in May 1182. In the middle of the month Alexius II was again crowned emperor and Andronicus was appointed regent and guardian of the child monarch. He acted as an autocrat pushing the widowed empress aside and had his former allies, Manuel's daughter and her husband, imprisoned and later on, in the summer of 1182, murdered.¹¹⁸

This coincided with the new period of an anti-Byzantine Hungarian expansion. Western sources relate that in 1182 "Béla, King of Hungary, occupied the forts and towns of the Greeks in Bulgaria".¹¹⁹ On the strength of Nicetas Choniates it seems clear that—probably by the autumn of 1182—the Hungarian monarch seized the two most important Byzantine fortresses on the Danube line, Belgrade and Braničevo.¹²⁰ Béla III extended his conquests in 1183 when, in alliance with the Serbs of Rascia struggling for their independence under the leadership of Stephen Nemanja, he took Niš and Sofia.¹²¹ The information from a western annal to the effect that "Béla, King of Hungary is again raiding the land of the Greeks"¹²² is confirmed by Nicetas, who relates that in the autumn of 1183 the Byzantine generals, Alexius Branas and Andronicus Lapardas were fighting against the Hungarian monarch in the vicinity of Niš.¹²³ The taking of Sofia by the Hungarians is described in the biography of St Ivan of Rila.¹²⁴ The Hungarian literature on the subject is dominated by the view that Béla III conducted these campaigns because he realized the danger threatening Manuel's family, particularly Alexius II and the widowed empress, from Andronicus Comnenus. Therefore, in accordance with his oath to Manuel, he launched an attack to eliminate Andronicus and secure power for Manuel's widow and son. According to this opinion, the Hungarian king had no intention of expansion in mind since he initiated the war with the knowledge and at the request of Manuel's widow.¹²⁵

This conception, however, is not corroborated by the sources. Béla III kept in touch with Mary, the empress, who was completely ousted from power by Andronicus after May 1182. She then sought Béla's direct help against Andronicus. This is confirmed by Nicetas, who relates that Andronicus accused the widow of "urging Béla King of Ungria [i.e. Hungary] with letters, and encouraging him with great promises to

devastate Braničevo and Belgrade".¹²⁶ Obviously the case was that Béla III, grasping the opportunity provided by the power struggles in Constantinople, tried to conquer Byzantine territories. This view is supported by the fact that Andronicus had the imprisoned empress sentenced to death in a new trial which found her guilty of being a "traitor against [Byzantine] towns and lands".¹²⁷ That is, Mary would have been willing to recognize and satisfy Hungarian expansionist claims on certain Byzantine territories in return for assistance against Andronicus. After the regent had made the young Alexius II sign the death warrant of his own mother, the widow was executed, probably at the end of 1182.¹²⁸ Thus the Hungarian invasion could not prevent the events in Constantinople and, in fact, succeeded in accelerating the destruction of Manuel's family. In the autumn of 1183¹²⁹ Béla's troops were near Niš when Andronicus, having forced through his own election as co-emperor in September, had Alexius II murdered early in October, thus becoming the sole Emperor of Byzantium.¹³⁰ After this Byzantine troops, under the command of Alexius Branas, drove the Hungarian army back to Belgrade and Braničevo.¹³¹

In 1184 no attack was launched by Béla III on Byzantine lands. According to some scholars this lack of offensive was due to an armistice he had signed with Andronicus. The Hungarian monarch was allegedly urged to carry this out on account of Venice having started a war against him in Dalmatia.¹³² However, the sources reveal no trace of such an armistice between Hungary and Byzantium. Furthermore, it is also known that it was in 1187, not in 1184, that the Venetian fleet tried to recapture Zara. Another view has it that possibly it was the death of his wife that prevented Béla from launching a war against Byzantium in 1184.¹³³ This factor should not be neglected, though the date of Agnes of Châtillon's death is unfortunately not known.¹³⁴ However, the explanation would seem to be simpler: it was probably the successes of Alexius Branas at the turn of 1183–1184 combined with the encumbrances of the wars, which had been gravely taxing the country since 1180, that caused Béla III to call a halt to military activities.

The pause in the hostilities did not last long, however, for it seems possible that in 1185 Béla III, exploiting the opportunity provided by the internal struggles in Byzantium, made conquests at the expense of the empire in the valley of the river Morava. Although this move is not mentioned in Byzantine sources the supposition still appears tenable on the strength of western evidence. In his *Gesta*, Ansbert relates that in the time of Andronicus, "while the King of Hungary and other princes demanded contiguous territories for themselves on land, the army of the King of Apulia [i.e. Sicily and Southern Italy] raided the towns of Greece along the coast".¹³⁵ According to another source several kings took up arms against Andronicus after the murder of Alexius II: "For the excellent King of Sicily, William . . . sent a great army to Greece and took Dyrrachium . . . the town of Thessalonica . . . the excellent King of Hungary, Béla . . . also invaded Greece with a great army and occupied as much of the empire . . .".¹³⁶ The 12th century chronicle of Presbyter Magnus relates that "when the King of Sicily and the King of Hungary attacked him [i.e. Andronicus], the whole people conspired against Andronicus".¹³⁷ On the basis of the information in these sources it can be concluded that towards the end of this incursion of Béla III the Byzantine empire was hit by a large-scale Norman invasion.¹³⁸ William II's fleet of over 200 ships containing an army of 80,000 troops set out against Byzantium on June

11, 1185. After taking Dyrrachium the Normans moved on to Thessalonica laying siege to it from land and sea on August 15. This, the second most important city of the empire, finally capitulated on August 24. Then the army of William II made for Constantinople. The Normans officially claimed that their intention was to recapture Andronicus' throne for Alexius II Comnenus, who was supposed to have survived (but who was, in fact, a fraud planted by the Normans). William's real objective was the occupation of the empire and the seizure of the imperial crown. It came in very handy that several Byzantine emigrés had solicited his help against Andronicus.¹³⁹

Concerning the fall of Thessalonica to the Normans, Archbishop Eustathius relates that after the murder of Alexius II Byzantine magnates turned to a number of eastern and western monarchs for help, among them to the King of Hungary.¹⁴⁰ Data from western and Byzantine sources suggest that in the spring and summer of 1185, Béla III again exploited the internal and external difficulties of the Greek empire for conquering Byzantine lands, much as he had done in the years of 1182–1183. The Hungarians then possibly availed themselves of the Morava valley, Niš and perhaps even Sofia.¹⁴¹

A considerable part of Hungarian and international literature on the subject holds that Béla III wanted to seize the imperial crown of Byzantium in 1185. To advance his plans he is said to have proposed to Theodora, Manuel's elder sister, an aged lady at that time living in confinement in a monastery on orders from Andronicus. According to this view, Béla III wished to secure a legitimate footing for his claims to the throne by marrying a member of the Comnenus dynasty, after which he intended to overthrow the usurper Andronicus with the help of his Byzantine supporters and rise to be the lawful Emperor of Byzantium. The marriage foundered due to resistance from the Council of Constantinople, since the synod during the reign of Isaac II, who had ascended the throne in the meantime, refused to release Theodora from her vows. This presumably prevented the Hungarian king from succeeding to the throne of Byzantium, ruining Manuel's earlier plans for a Hungarian–Byzantine personal union.¹⁴²

The only source this far-reaching conception is based on is the resolution of the Council of Constantinople in 1185, which would not consent to the widow of Andronicus Lapardas, Theodora Comnena, casting aside her nun's veil to return to secular life and marry the King of Hungary.¹⁴³ Recent research has revealed that the Theodora in question was not in fact Manuel's sister, but the latter's grand-daughter and namesake. The grandmother herself had died sometime before 1157.¹⁴⁴ Thus on the strength of such a source it is imprudent to ascribe efforts at a personal union to Béla III and one might go as far as to suggest that the idea of the personal union be dropped from the literature on the subject.¹⁴⁵

The attempt of the widowed Béla III at a Byzantine marriage seems to be related to the events of the second half of 1185 in a different way. At the end of August 1185 the Byzantine Empire found itself in a critical situation, since Constantinople itself was being threatened by the Norman invasion. The news of the approach of William II's army incited a revolt in the capital, which overthrew Andronicus successfully and set Isaac Angelus on the throne on September 12th. Isaac II mobilized all available forces against the Normans under the leadership of an excellent general, Alexius Branas.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, in order to secure peace in the North Balkan territories of the empire

the basileus began negotiations with Béla III and sent his envoys to propose to the ten-year-old daughter of the Hungarian king.¹⁴⁷ Béla III, apprehensive of a change in the Balkanic power relations arising from a potential Norman conquest of Byzantium, accepted the approaches of the new basileus. Autumn 1185 witnessed the conclusion of a Hungarian-Byzantine alliance based on mutual interests.¹⁴⁸ Béla III and Isaac II agreed that the emperor would marry the king's daughter, Margaret, and receive, as her dowry, the Byzantine lands occupied by the Hungarians.¹⁴⁹ In return, Isaac II, probably officially, renounced Dalmatia and Sirmium, which had been in Hungarian hands for years anyway.¹⁵⁰ At the conclusion of the agreement Béla repeated his oath in Sofia, in 1172, which was made more pronounced on account of Nemanja's anti-Byzantine policies.¹⁵¹ It was most likely then, in the autumn of 1185, that King Béla asked for the hand of Manuel's female relative, then 30 years old. However, at the end of 1185,¹⁵² the Council of Constantinople, purely out of canonic considerations—Theodora was already an ordained nun¹⁵³—“did not allow her [Theodora] to change her way of life and marry the King of Hungary”.¹⁵⁴

This, surprisingly, had no damaging effect on Hungarian-Byzantine relations whatever. Meanwhile, the agreement between Hungary and Byzantium enabled the Greeks to turn against the Normans with all their might. The army of Alexius Branas inflicted a great defeat on William II's troops on November 7, 1185 and this proved to be the turning point in the war. By the end of the year William had completely withdrawn from the Balkans.¹⁵⁵ Following this Emperor Isaac Angelus married Margaret, daughter of Béla III, at the turn of 1185–1186.¹⁵⁶

At about the same time Béla asked Henry II of England for the hand of his granddaughter, Matilda, daughter of Duke Henry the Lion. Since this proposal was not welcomed in the English court¹⁵⁷ Béla sued for the hand of Margaret Capet, elder sister of Philip II, King of France. This marriage was concluded in the summer of 1186.¹⁵⁸ It seems possible that in the person of the French king, Béla III wished to secure a potential ally in the back of the German Empire.¹⁵⁹ During these years relations between Germany and Hungary were tense on account of Béla's westward policy of expansion, the Hungarian king claiming a part of the Duchy of Steyr.¹⁶⁰ In this territorial dispute of 1187 Béla was countered not only by the Duke of Austria, the ally of Steyr, but also by Frederick Barbarossa.¹⁶¹

In 1187 Béla III also became involved in conflicts in Dalmatia. Venice, having successfully reached an understanding with Byzantium early in 1187,¹⁶² made an attempt to recapture Zara in the autumn. However, the fleet of the Doge, Orto Malipiero, had to return empty-handed from this venture as the town had been well fortified by the Hungarians.¹⁶³ The eastern interests of Venice were also jeopardized by Saladin's attack in 1188,¹⁶⁴ which therefore made the Doge conclude a two-year truce with the King of Hungary to be renewed in 1190.¹⁶⁵ The truce was possibly prolonged early in 1192.¹⁶⁶ The new Doge, Enrico Dandolo, tried to retake Zara at the turn of 1192–1193, but once again the Venetians failed and Zara remained firmly under Hungarian rule.¹⁶⁷ In 1194 Béla III installed his elder son, Emeric, who had been designated his successor and crowned in 1182, as overlord of Croatia and Dalmatia.¹⁶⁸ This action was intended to reinforce Emeric's position as against that of Prince Andrew, who had failed to retain the crown of Halich.¹⁶⁹

The intervention of the Hungarians in Halich and their attempt to conquer the

principality took place at the end of the 1180s. Thus Béla III was the first of the kings of Hungary who ventured to occupy Russian lands¹⁷⁰ (i.e. Halich, one of the most important Russian principalities). He grabbed at the opportunity provided by internal power struggles and crown disputes to achieve his aim. Ruling Prince Yaroslav died in 1187 and the throne was occupied by one of his sons, Oleg, soon succeeded by his brother Vladimir.¹⁷¹ However, the ruler of Volhinia, Roman, ousted Vladimir from his principality in 1188 and the latter fled to Hungary soliciting Béla III's help. Taking Vladimir with him, the King of Hungary marched to Halich from where Roman fled promptly. Béla took possession of the principality easily, but he placed his younger son, Andrew, on its throne instead of Vladimir. He brought back the latter to Hungary as a prisoner to be held in captivity there together with his family. Andrew and the Halichians who joined him first had to repel an attempt by Roman to reinstate himself, then in 1189 beat off an attack by Rostislav of Smolensk with the help of a contingent sent by Béla III. In the meantime the people of Halich had come to hate Andrew's rule on account of both the acts of violence committed by the Hungarians and the heavy taxes they levied. Early in 1190 Vladimir and his family escaped from their captivity in Hungary and fled to the imperial court of Germany,¹⁷² where, in the absence of Frederick Barbarossa, his elder son, Henry, was regent.¹⁷³ Henry, not wishing to get involved in a conflict with Béla, refused to lend direct aid, but called on Casimir, ruling Prince of Poland,¹⁷⁴ to help Vladimir regain his principality. Vladimir retrieved his throne with Polish help at the end of August 1190 and Prince Andrew was forced to flee from Halich.¹⁷⁵ Béla III, who was already styled King of Halich in Dalmatian charters,¹⁷⁶ became involved in a conflict with the Polish ruler on account of these events, although the disagreement was brought to an end with a peace treaty in 1193.¹⁷⁷

During the time of Béla III's occupation of Halich—unlike earlier, in the 1150s—religious controversies sprang up between the Hungarians and the Russians.¹⁷⁸ Perhaps, from the Hungarian point of view, these were related to the Pope's policy, "which aimed at drawing the schismatic Russians under the jurisdiction of the Roman catholic Church".¹⁷⁹ The Hungarian catholic clergy also firmly opposed the Greek orthodox Church during Béla III's reign. This is indicated by the failure of the king—due to resistance from Nicholas and Job, Archbishops of Esztergom—to introduce the cult of the Bulgarian hermit-saint, St Ivan of Rila,¹⁸⁰ into Hungary between 1183–1187. In the early 1190s Job, Archbishop of Esztergom carried on a debate over religious dogma with Isaac II, representing and defending the Roman catholic view against the orthodox arguments of the emperor.¹⁸¹ Relations between the Holy See and the Hungarian court were also good during the second phase of Béla III's reign. Indicative of this is the fact that King Ladislas I was canonized with the Pope's consent in 1192.¹⁸² Byzantium was obviously aware of the good relations between Hungary and the Pope and probably this is why the basileus also insisted on papal mediation at the settlement of the conflict between Hungary and Byzantium in 1193.¹⁸³

In spite of all this it is certainly an exaggeration to assert that King Béla served the interest of the Pope not only by occupying Halich but by his foreign policies in general and that his expansionist wars "also promoted papal efforts at world dominance", "one of the main features of his foreign policy... being his obedience to papal policies".¹⁸⁴ It is hard to see Béla III as one of the spearheads of papal efforts at world

dominance,¹⁸⁵ and the contention, that it was during his reign that "the direct influence of the popes... on the internal affairs of the country" increased, cannot be proved either.¹⁸⁶ The King of Hungary, who, when asserting his own power, undertook to counter not only the Hungarian clergy but the Pope himself, respected primarily the interests of the Hungarian feudal lords. His attempt to introduce the cult of the orthodox saint could not have been connected with the Pope's aims, either. Furthermore, in the dispute which later developed into hostilities between Frederick Barbarossa and Isaac II during the Crusade proclaimed by the Pope, Béla took sides with the Emperor of Byzantium. Papal politics also failed to involve Béla in the Third Crusade, although Margrave Conrad of Montferrat, who had directed the defence of the crusaders' lands against Saladin's attacks since the autumn of 1187, asked for the Hungarian king's help in 1188 and even invited Béla himself to take up arms in the cause.¹⁸⁷

During these years the Latin crusader states were in a more perilous situation than ever before. Sultan Saladin, who had united Egypt and Syria in 1174, dealt a catastrophic blow to the united armies of the crusader states in the battle of Hattin in July 1187. In the autumn of the same year the Sultan also took Jerusalem itself. In response to this Pope Gregory VIII summoned the monarchs of the West to a "Holy War" against the infidels. Frederick Barbarossa decided to take the cross in spring, 1188¹⁸⁸ and his enormous army of about 15,000 troops marched through Hungary in June 1189.¹⁸⁹ It is indicative of the cool relationship between the two countries that Béla III considered the march of Barbarossa's crusaders through Hungary dangerous for his own royal power.¹⁹⁰ However, to avoid any conflict, he received the Holy Roman Emperor very cordially and even placed a minor military unit at his disposal to facilitate his march across the Balkans. It was at this time that the king released Prince Géza from imprisonment and the latter probably joined the crusaders and made his way to Byzantium.¹⁹¹ Both monarchs had the security of their own countries in view when one of Béla III's daughters was betrothed to Barbarossa's younger son, Frederick, Duke of Swabia, in June 1189.¹⁹²

Relations between the crusaders and the Greeks became extremely tense as the armies passed through the territory of Byzantium. Isaac II was in fear for his imperial throne from Frederick Barbarossa and therefore even entered into an alliance with Sultan Saladin against the crusaders, going out of his way to hinder their march through his lands. Barbarossa, at the same time, entered into negotiations with the Bulgarians and the Serbs about a possible campaign against Byzantium. Isaac II soon found himself in a most difficult position. Frederick Barbarossa started making preparations to lay siege to Constantinople in the spring of 1190.¹⁹³ Béla III tried to mediate between the two emperors and exerting pressure on both¹⁹⁴ and was instrumental in bringing about the peace of Adrianople between Frederick Barbarossa and Isaac in February 1190. A possible German capture of Constantinople would have left Hungary in a strangling pincer-hold of the Holy Roman Empire. Naturally, Béla III wanted to avoid this, but his attitude undoubtedly served Byzantine interests as well, since the peace treaty saved Constantinople from the German onslaught and possible conquest.¹⁹⁵ In addition, this also shows that the alliance between Hungary and Byzantium concluded in 1185 was more favourable for the latter.

In the early 1190s Hungarian expansionist efforts were focussed on Serbia. The

Serbs, led by their ruling Prince, Stephen Nemanja, had been fighting against the Byzantines successfully since 1183. That year they had attacked the empire in alliance with Béla III, while in 1189 they wanted to secure the support of Frederick Barbarossa with the same end in mind. In 1190 the Serbs cooperated with the Bulgarians and while the basileus was engaged in Asia Minor the Bulgarian and Serbian armies occupied further territories formerly under Byzantine rule.¹⁹⁶ Returning from the East, Isaac II first turned against the Bulgarians, only to suffer a serious defeat at the battle of Berroea in 1190.¹⁹⁷ Then—perhaps in autumn, 1191—the Byzantine emperor attacked the Serbs and defeated Nemanja's army near the Morava.¹⁹⁸ It was directly after this battle that Béla and Isaac began their negotiations.¹⁹⁹ First it was Béla who travelled—perhaps to Philippopolis—to see Isaac,²⁰⁰ after which the basileus crossed the Sava and met his father-in-law in Sirmium.²⁰¹ Unfortunately the sources have nothing to say as to the subject of these talks, although the two monarchs were probably preoccupied with the situation in the Balkans especially perhaps with the Serbian and Bulgarian question. Béla may already have had plans about occupying Serbian lands and perhaps this is why the king and the basileus suffered a difference of opinion.²⁰² Some sort of agreement may have been reached, but this could not prevent further Hungarian efforts at expansion southward.

It must have been related to the expansionist politics of the Hungarians that in 1191 the bishopric of Bosnia, which used to belong to Ragusa, was subordinated to the Archbishop of Spalato, who had strong Hungarian interests.²⁰³ By June 1192, Isaac was already afraid that the Hungarians, like the Normans and the Serbs, intended to seize Ragusa, which recognized Byzantine overlordship.²⁰⁴ Soon after this the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine empire nearly became embroiled in a military conflict with one another over Béla III's Serbian conquest. Emperor Isaac's letter, which he wrote to Pope Celestine III in 1193, reveals that Béla's troops invaded Serbia and occupied lands.²⁰⁵ This operation of the Hungarians probably took place around the turn of 1192–1193.²⁰⁶ The emperor referred to the Hungarian move not only as a breach of Béla's oaths made to Manuel in 1172 and to himself in the autumn of 1185, but also as a violation of Byzantine interests in the Balkans. Although by that time Byzantium had been pushed out of Serbia, the basileus continued to regard the country as falling within his own political sphere of interest and did not give up the hope of a possible restoration of his rule there. Therefore, the emperor, at that time fighting against the Seljuqs in Asia Minor, lent military help to Nemanja in his fight against the Hungarians. Simultaneously he called upon Béla to withdraw, threatening him with war should he refuse. Obviously Isaac II also wanted the Pope to put some pressure on the King of Hungary.²⁰⁷ In the end, though, there was no clash between Hungary and Byzantium because Béla probably retreated from the Serbian lands he had occupied.²⁰⁸ The Hungarian expansion into Serbia, of course, hurt the interests of the reorganized Serbian state primarily, but it also caused Byzantium to fear for its own influence in the Balkans.

No differences arose between Hungary and Byzantium over the Bulgarian issue since no Hungarian efforts at expansion were made in this direction. The armies of Isaac II were seriously defeated by the Bulgarians at Arcadiopolis in 1194.²⁰⁹ The emperor asked Béla III for military help against them and the king promised to provide it.²¹⁰ The campaign planned for the spring of 1195 was, however, cancelled due to

Isaac II's overthrow.²¹¹ It is not known whether contacts were established between the new emperor, Alexius III Angelus, and the King of Hungary, but it can almost certainly be presumed that Béla III, when deciding his attitude towards Henry VI's crusade, considered not only Hungarian but also Byzantine interests. Henry VI, pursuing, like his father, Frederick Barbarossa, the idea of *dominium mundi* and demanding the territories from Byzantium, that the Normans had occupied in 1185, proclaimed a crusade in 1195.²¹² The Balkanic claims of Henry VI, who had already been in possession of the Holy Roman Empire and the South Italian Kingdom, were not, of course, happily received in Hungary, not least because they endangered Hungarian expansionist plans. It was no coincidence that Béla III forbade his subjects to join Henry's planned crusade.²¹³

On April 23, 1196, Béla III died.²¹⁴ During the reign of this king, who was brought up in Constantinople, Hungary maintained close connections with both Byzantium and western powers. The Hungarian Kingdom acquired a place of rank—in Central East European terms—in the international scene during the years of Béla III's reign. During the reign of Béla's successor, Emeric (1196–1204), Hungary again had to face a number of internal and external difficulties. The factional fights of the magnates, the domestic wars between Emeric and Andrew gravely disturbed the peace of the country from 1197 onwards. This meant an end to the internal consolidation achieved during Béla III's reign. At the same time the universalist policies of Pope Innocent III, elected in 1198, exploited the struggles between the different groups of the ruling class and exerted an ever-increasing pressure on the country. Yet even in such circumstances Emeric attempted to continue his father's expansionist policy southward. His attacks and occupations in the now independent Serbia and Bulgaria provoked no countermeasures from Byzantium, being itself in a crisis at that time. It was the Fourth Crusade that, with the capture of Constantinople, gave the *coup de grâce* to the totally exhausted Greek empire suffering from severe internal hardships by that time. The fall of the Byzantine capital in 1204 opened a completely new chapter in the history of relations between Hungary and Byzantium.

Notes

Chapter I

Relations at the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries

1. See Pauler 1899, I: 117–135; Hóman 1939, 271–276; Moravcsik 1953, 68–71; Kazhdan 1962, 163–166; Deér 1966, 72–80; Moravcsik 1970, 64–69; MOT 69–70; Bertényi 1978, 36–37; Kerbl 1979, 1–55. Having no children, whose upbringing would have kept her in Hungary any longer, the Byzantine princess Synadene, widow of King Géza I of Hungary (1074–1077) returned to Byzantium at the turn of 1079–1080. (For the date, see Kerbl 1979, 55–57). This further weakened the links that had been established between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Greek empire through the efforts of Géza I.

2. See Chalandon 1900, 51–136; Chalandon 1907, I: 189–284; Uspenski 1948, 56–135; Bizánc 185–190; Sokolov 1963, 230–235; CMH 209–220; Ist. Viz. 278–315; Ostrogorsky 1969, 367–395; Diaconu 1970, 130–133.

3. See Pauler 1899, I: 136–160; Hóman 1939, 276–310; Lederer 1959, *passim*; ET 72–87; Györffy 1971, 63–71; MOT 62–70; Kristó 1974b, 96–107; Györffy 1977, 13–18.

4. Fraknoi 1901a, 4; C I: No. 161; HS 111; SRH I: 406.—With regard to the dating of the occupation see Pauler 1899, I: 156–157. The correlative meaning and precise usage of the terms Dalmatia and Croatia tends to alternate in the sources. For this, see Györffy 1970a, 223–240, Kristó 1979, 84–86, 89. Below, for the sake of simplicity, Dalmatia will refer to the narrow coastal strip on the Adriatic, and the islands lying off, while Croatia will designate the territory between this coastal strip and the Gvozd Mts.

5. Deér 1928, 86; Györffy 1977a, 559.

6. C I: No. 161.

7. SRH I: 412–414.

8. Marczali 1898, 22; Fraknoi 1901a, 10; Hóman 1939, 338–339; Jireček 1952, 132; Ferluga 1957, 123; Sokolov 1963, 222; Klaić 1971, 361–394; Györffy 1977a, 557–558.

9. Mill. tört. 177; Marczali 1898, 31; Fraknoi 1901a, 15; Acsády 1903, 146; Hóman 1939, 342–345; Györffy 1977a, 560.

10. Mill. tört. 166; Hóman 1939, 342; Moravcsik 1953, 71; Ferluga 1957, 125; Moravcsik 1970, 69–70; Györffy 1977, 19; Kosztolnyik 1981, 102; Magyarország 1984, 935.

11. Leib II: 127–146.

12. SRH I: 414.—A similar opinion is held by Kapitány 1979, 79.

13. SRH I: 412.—Kutesk, the Cuman chief, also wanted to take possession of Transylvania in the 1080s, thanks to Salomon (SRH I: 408).

14. Mill. tört. 172; Marczali 1911, 91.—It is a well-known fact that the Byzantine border fortress of Sirmium (Sirmion) on the river Sava was captured by the Hungarians in the early 1070s (Moravcsik 1984, 225). A recently discovered Byzantine seal has given rise to the opinion that after a time the fort was again held by the Greeks only to be retaken by the Hungarians prior to 1096. (See Ferjančić 1982, 51–52.) It might be argued that Ladislav I recaptured this important fortress from Byzantium around 1091 in order to improve the security of the southern frontier in the wake of the Cuman invasion.

15. Hóman 1939, 342–343; Ferluga 1957, 125–126. Concerning the charter, see C I, No. 165.
16. See Palacky 1864, 342; Mill. tört. 176; Pauler 1899, I: 160, 173–174; Deér 1928, 83; Hóman 1939, 345; Pashuto 1968, 52–54.
17. G 2271.—Although this has turned out to be a 12th century forgery (Kapitánffy 1979, 81), this letter undoubtedly reflects contemporary political conditions very well.
18. Mill. tört. 190; Pauler 1899, I: 199; Marczali 1911, 98; Deér 1928, 93; Hóman 1939, 344.
19. For Henry IV's position, see Knonau 1903, IV: 453–456, 474–476, Deér 1928, 92–93; Hampe 1968, 76–80.
20. C I: No. 161; SRH I: 419; SRH II: 79.
21. SRH I: 419–420.
22. Györffy 1967, 50.
23. SRH I: 126, 421.—See Kristó 1974b, 109.
24. G 225, 872.—See also Pauler 1899, I: 177.
25. CD II: 13; G 42, 414, 870, etc.
26. G 2271.—For Henry IV's position, see note 19 above.
27. G 2271.—The Bohemian–Polish conflict in 1906 is outlined in Palacky 1864, 342–343; Bachmann 1899, 279; Bretholz 1912, 189–190.
28. G 2271.
29. CD II: 13–15.
30. G 943, 976–977, 2060, 2157–2158.
31. G 74, 267, 445, 524–525, 1156, 1265, 1575, 1963, 2037, 2259.—With regard to the declaration at Guastalla, which contains the renouncement of the investiture of bishops and the recognition of the canonic election of prelates, see Pauler 1899, I: 190; Marczali 1911, 110; Hóman 1939, 309; Mezey 1979, 123–124; Kosztolnyik 1984a, 136.
32. G 226, 872.—For the activities of legates Kuno and Dietrich, see Mika 1884, 43–46; Balics 1888, 75, 96; Mill. tört. 237; Fraknói 1901b, 31; Knonau 1907, VI: 316, 329–330; Kosztolnyik 1984a, 135, 136.
33. See Pauler 1899, I: 191–199; Runciman 1957, I: 120–143.
34. Chalandon 1900, 131–132, 155–158; Grousset 1934, I: 1–2; Runciman 1957, I: 144; Zaborov 1958, 47; Ist. Viz. 315; Ostrogorsky 1969, 382, Lilie 1981, 2.
35. Leib III: 160.
36. G 224.
37. G 40–41.
38. G 36–38.—See also Klaić 1968, 185–186; Kapitánffy 1979, 85.
39. Leib III: 160; G 2035.
40. Pauler 1888, 210–213; Mill. tört. 200; Pauler 1899, I: 200; Deér 1928, 93–94; Hóman 1939, 347–349; Novak 1944, 111; Šišić 1944, 20; Klaić 1971, 511–512.
41. G 976–977, 2158.
42. Ferluga 1957, 126–127; Cessi 1968, 133.
43. C I: No. 167, 168.
44. Ferluga 1957, 126–127.
45. The name of Coloman's first wife is not known. See Mályusz 1964, 253–254. According to recent views, the Norman princess was called Felicia (Vajay 1974, 350, 351. Note 48).
46. Chalandon 1907, I: 301, 347.
47. Mill. tört. 201–202; Chalandon 1907, I: 350–352; Marczali 1911, 99; Hóman 1939, 348; Caspar 1968, 19.
48. Deér 1928, 93; Hóman 1939, 349; Klaić 1971, 511. The idea of the anti-Byzantine slant to the marriage is rejected by Székely 1967, 308; MOT 71, and Kapitánffy 1979, 85. See also Kosztolnyik 1984a, 133.
49. C II: No. 1.—The time of the conclusion of the treaty is uncertain; both 1097 and 1098 are

possible. Coloman probably planned to conquer Dalmatia after settling the Croatian affairs and concluding his Norman marriage. According to the source the exchange of messages between the Doge and the king also took a long time, therefore, the settlement was probably arranged in the first half of 1098.

50. According to a recent, convincing opinion the Doge of Venice styled himself Duke of Dalmatia and Croatia without permission from the Byzantine emperor (Cessi 1968, 133). A different view is held e. g. by Marczali 1898, 30; Chalandon 1900, 92; Fraknoi 1901a, 10; Kretschmayr 1905, 165; Deér 1928, 94; Hóman 1939, 344; Ferluga 1957, 124–127; Sokolov 1963, 222, 284.

51. Hóman 1939, 349.

52. Pauler 1899, I: 203; Magyarország 1984, 949.

53. Závodszy 1904, 184–185.

54. SRH I: 422.

55. G 976, 2158.

56. SRH I: 422–423.

57. SRH I: 423.

58. Molnár 1949, 316.

59. Hodinka 1916, 55–57.

60. Hodinka 1916, 57–65, 75–76.

61. Pashuto 1968, 53–54; Makk 1984, 204.

62. ET 98, 95; Szidorova 1963, 440.

63. Palacky 1864, 345; Pauler 1899, I: 206; Huber, 1899, 275.

64. C II: No. 6.—From the relevant literature on the subject, see e. g. Marczali 1898, 76; Hóman 1939, 355; Šišić 1944, 21; Novak 1944, 111; Györffy 1967, 49; Klaić 1971, 513. A different view is held by Pauler 1888, 329.

65. Hodinka 1916, 67.

66. Hist. Pol. 220; Pashuto 1968, 46.

67. Palacky 1864, 352; Bachmann 1899, 282; Pauler 1899, I: 206; Bretholz 1912, 192.

68. Skutariotes 181–182; SRH I: 439.—For more details on the life and activities of Empress Piroška—Irene in Byzantium, see Moravcsik 1923, 7–40. Data from Hungarian (SRH I: 439), and Byzantine (K 9) sources disprove the opinion that she was not Ladislas I's daughter but King Coloman's (cf. Heilig 1973, 238). See also Kerbl 1979, 137.—The marriage is dated to 1104, e. g. by Moravcsik 1953, 72; Horváth 1935, 170; Dümmerth 1977, 302; Kerbl 1979, 80.—The date of the marriage has been established as 1108 by Walter 1966, 23. The exact date of the marriage is not known. But if Byzantium was really prompted to establish this dynastic link by the intention to forestall the manoeuvres of Bohemond, Norman ruling Prince of Antioch, in the West and as there seems to be no reason to doubt this—precisely on account of later developments—the marriage could not have taken place before the end of 1104, since Bohemond left Antioch for Italy at the end of that year. On the other hand, in the spring of 1106, twins were born from the marriage of Piroška and John (see Moravcsik 1923, 7), thus the first half of 1105 seems to be the most acceptable date for the marriage. Similarly Kapitánffy 1979, 85–87.

69. See Chalandon 1900, 184–236; Uspenski 1948, 165–166; Runciman 1957, I: 147–203; Runciman 1958, II: 44–46; Ostrogorsky 1969, 384–386; Lilie 1981, 65–66.

70. Dölger 1964, 170; Székely 1967, 308; Moravcsik 1967, 315; MOT 71.

71. Pauler 1899, I: 207; Deér 1928, 96; Hóman 1939, 357; Moravcsik 1953, 72; Ferluga 1957, 127; Moravcsik 1970, 70.

72. Ferluga 1957, 127.—Slightly differently viewed by Kapitánffy 1979, 86.

73. Marczali 1898, 51; Pauler 1899, I: 207; Deér 1928, 96; Hóman 1939, 357; Marković 1953, 103; Ferluga 1957, 127; Györffy 1967, 49; Skrivanić 1968, 61.

74. Hóman 1939, 358; Györffy 1970b, 154; Magyarország 1984, 953–954.

75. C II: 15, 391, 392.
76. C II: 392—See also Kristó 1979, 33.
77. Pauler 1899, I: 210; Hóman 1939, 362.
78. MGH SS XX: 251–253.—For the dispute between Henry IV and his son, Prince Henry in 1104–1106, see Hampe 1968, 83–86.
79. SRH I: 426.
80. G 490.
81. SRH I: 426–427; G 490.
82. G 1596.—Pauler 1899, I: 211.
83. SRH I: 427.
84. The date of Álmos' pilgrimage to the Holy Land is not known. However, since the Hungarian Chronicle relates the trip of the prince to Jerusalem after his journey to Germany and Poland and his invasion at Abaujvár in 1106, but before his emigration to Germany early in 1108 (SRH I: 427; G 481), it can be inferred that Álmos travelled to the Holy Land in 1107. Recently Györffy has come to the same conclusion (1977a, 534); Magyarország 1984, 956.
85. G 490, 1596.—For the dating of the events, see Hist. Pol. 221.
86. SRH I: 427.—The fact that Álmos had permission to hunt by royal grant after his 1107 Jerusalem pilgrimage (SRH I: 427), and that after the subsequent events at Dömös the prince went hunting not to Igfon, the favourite forest of the duchy in the county of Bihar, but to the Bakony Hills in Transdanubia (SRH I: 428), indicate that at that time Álmos was no longer overlord of the duchy (see Kristó 1974b, 120). Indeed, Álmos informed Henry V of the loss of his *ducatus* around Easter, 1108 (G 28, 225, 481, 872, 1764). All this seems to justify the supposition that King Coloman deprived his brother of the duchy in 1107 while the latter was in the Holy Land. Different datings are provided by Pauler 1899, I: 210; Marczali 1911, 113; Györffy 1958, 49; MOT 74; Kristó 1979, 39; Magyarország 1984, 956.
87. See Kristó 1974b 114, 121; Kristó 1979, 45.—It is well-known that the royal Hungarian Crown, the so called Holy Crown (*Szent Korona*), originally consisted of two separate parts; it is not known, however, when the lower half, of Byzantine origin (*corona Graeca*), and the upper part (*corona Latina*) were joined. There is a theory that the Greek crown was the insignia of the duchy and Coloman united the king's Latin crown with the Byzantine one after the elimination of the *ducatus* (Györffy 1958, 53).
88. SRH I: 428.
89. SRH I: 429; G 28, 224–225, 377, 481, 872, 1764.
90. SRH I: 429; G 28, 120, 124, 136, 141, 156, 169, 195, 225, 478, 481, 490–491, 523, 761, 805–806, 872, 1764, 1992.—For Henry V's efforts to reduce the Hungarian Kingdom to vassalage, see Deér 1928, 105–106; MOT 71. It should be mentioned here that the official reason provided by the German sovereign for his attack against Coloman in 1108 was the fact that the Hungarian king had trespassed on German territory by occupying Dalmatian towns (G 225, 377, 872). This assertion clearly signifies that the German monarch also had claims on Central Dalmatia bordering German territories in the south.
91. See Chalandon 1900, 242–243; Uspenski 1948, 167; Ist. Viz. 318; Ostrogorsky 1969, 386.
92. SRH I: 183, 433; G 60.
93. See Chalandon 1900, 244–249; Uspenski 1948, 167; CMH 215–216; Ist. Viz. 318; Sokolov 1963, 286; Ostrogorsky 1969, 386.
94. Leib III: 139.
95. Sokolov 1963, 240–241.
96. Hóman 1939, 358–359; Györffy 1967, 49.
97. Sokolov 1963, 186–199, 244–247.
98. G 60–61.—The view that the Doge approached the Emperor of Byzantium with his proposal as early as 1106 seems interesting but cannot be documented by sources (see Sokolov

1963, 302). Cessi 1965, 202, n. also challenges that the events related by Dandolo were related to 1112. Against these opinions it is proposed here that, for the time being, there is no evidence for supporting doubts about the credibility of the Venetian chronicler. Likewise Ferluga 1957, 128; Klaić 1971, 532; Kapitánffy 1979, 88.

99. For the talks about the union of the Churches in 1111–1113, see Chalandon 1900, 260–263; Norden 1903, 90; Hampe 1968, 91.

100. See Chalandon 1900, 250–253, 264–270; Uspenski 1948, 170–171; CMH 216.

101. See Chalandon 1900, 258; Uspenski 1948, 187; Heyd 1959, 118–119, 193; Sokolov 1963, 13, 293; Cessi 1965, 201; Ostrogorsky 1969, 379–380, 388; Beck 1972, 231–232.

102. C II: No. 21.

103. G 156, 200, 406, 520, 1484.—Pauler (1899, I: 473) rejects the information in these sources, and identifies the Hungarian raid of 1112 with that of 1118, thus shifting the blame for this plundering raid—customary at the time—from Coloman to Stephen II (see Pauler 1899, I: 230). This view is untenable, since it concerns 12th century, contemporary, Austrian sources, and some of these refer to the Hungarian raids both in 1112 and 1118 (G 156).

104. With regard to Margrave Leopold in 1108, see Pauler 1899, I: 214, 230.

105. Hodinka 1916, 95.

106. SRH I: 429.

107. Ist. SSSR. 565.

108. SRH I: 429.

109. SRH I: 126, 421, 430, 431; SRH II: 40, 80; G 28, 442, 443, 807, 1765, 2563.—For the date of the blinding, see Pauler 1899, I: 224; Györfly 1958, 52. More recently these events are dated to 1113 by Györfly (Magyarország 1984, 959).

110. SRH I: 430.

111. This possibility is referred to in Mill. tört. 249.—See also Kristó 1974b, 115.

112. Studies of Hungarian, Dalmatian, and Venetian history usually discuss the events of the hostilities between Hungary and Venice in detail from 1115 to 1118. See e. g. Pauler 1899, I: 225–230; Marczali 1898, 54; Kretschmayr 1905, 222–223; Deér 1928, 106–108; Šišić 1944, 30, 32, 34–37; Novák 1957, 81–82; Ferluga 1957, 129; Sokolov 1963, 320–322; Cessi 1965, 203–206; Cessi 1968, 141–142. However, due to the relatively meagre amount of source material, and also to the contradictory information provided therein, opinions differ not only concerning the assessment of the events but also in connection with their chronology. The chronology put forward here should not be regarded as final, since for this further research would be essential. At the same time, however, the view that Venice attacked Hungarian rule in Dalmatia as early as 1115 with the support of Byzantium seems utterly unacceptable (see e. g. Pauler 1899, I: 225; Novák 1957, 81; Ferluga 1957, 128; Sokolov 1963, 321; Živojinović 1964, 484; Kapitánffy 1979, 88). The sources unanimously mention the help from the German and Byzantine emperors only in connection with the second attack of Venice, in 1116 (G 61, 1550).

113. At that time it was probably only over the isle of Arbe and the town of Zara that the Doge extended his rule (C II: No. 25; G 61). Similarly Ferluga 1957, 129.

Chapter II

The first clashes

1. SHR I: 434.—For the dating, see Pauler 1899, I: 225.
2. For Henry V's journey to Venice and his talks there, see Pauler 1899, I: 229; Kretschmayr 1905, 223; Knonau 1909, VII: 1–2; Deér 1928, 107; Sokolov 1963, 321.
3. G 61, 1550.
4. See e.g. Chalandon 1900, 270; Kretschmayr 1905, 223; Sokolov 1963, 321. A different opinion is held by e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 229; Deér 1928, 107.
5. See e.g. Hampe 1968, 94.
6. See Chalandon 1900, 269–270; Ist. Viz. 318; Pashuto 1968, 88, 186–187.
7. Thus Hóman 1939, 359.
8. See Voinovitch 1934, 369.
9. Moravcsik 1967, 316. However, the view, that in 1116 “the cooperation of the Eastern and Western empires . . . against Hungary . . . manifested itself for the first time” (see Deér 1928, 107), remains unsubstantiated. On the one hand, no written source testifies to an anti-Hungarian alliance of the two emperors and, on the other, such an alliance would not logically result from the relationship between the two empires, since the talks of Henry V in Venice in 1116 were primarily aimed to win the Doge over to his side against the Pope and Byzantium. For details, see Kretschmayr 1905, 223.
10. It must have been prior to the attack of the Doge that *ban* Kledin, the official of the Hungarian king in Zara, attempted to attract the citizens of the town—drawn into the orbit of Venice in 1115—to the side of the King of Hungary (C II: 393).
11. G 61, 69, 209, 687, 1172, 1550, 1560, 2159.—It was after the Doge's attack on Dalmatia in 1116 that Manasses, Archbishop of Spalato, would have liked to hand over the control of the entire fortification system of the town to the Hungarians, but his attempt failed (G 1708; HS 113–114). After the conquest, the Doge of Venice swore to guarantee the privileges of the citizens of Tengerfehérvár (C II: No. 25).
12. Ferluga 1957, 129.
13. G 61, 209, 687, etc.
14. G 61, 1560.
15. C II: 393.
16. G 61, 69, 687, 1172, 1550.—For an identical chronology of these events, see e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 230; Deér 1928, 108; Ferluga 1957, 129; Sokolov 1963, 322; Cessi 1968, 142.
17. C II: No. 27.—1118, as the year when Doge Ordelaaffo Faliero swore an oath to the citizens of Arbe, is accepted e.g. by Klaić 1971, 528.
18. For this dating, see Kretschmayr 1905, 223, 458. More recent chronologies also place the end of Ordelaaffo Faliero's term as Doge to 1118. See Grumel 1958, 428; CMH 779. The peace treaty of 1119 is also accepted by Deér 1928, 108, which he regards as a prolongation of the earlier peace treaty.
19. G 224–225, 805–806. etc.
20. SRH I: 434–437; G 136, 226, 531–532, 806–807.
21. G 226, 532, 807, 1131.
22. G 90, 156, 259, 315, 504, 559, 1764.
23. See Pauler 1899, I: 230; Huber 1899, 221.
24. Thus Hóman 1939, 365.
25. For Vladimir Monomach's efforts to restore the earlier power of the Kievan state, see Ist. SSSR 565–573; Font 1981, 17.
26. Hodinka 1916, 95.
27. SRH I: 437–438.

28. Hodinka 1916, 95; SRH I: 437–439.
29. For the dating of the marriage and the character of the Norman prince, see Pauler 1899, I: 231, 473, Note 425.
30. For relations between the Popes and the Norman Princes of Capua, see Chalandon 1907, I: 320–321; Caspar 1968, 62–63.
31. Chalandon 1907, I: 319.
32. See Kretschmayr 1905, 224–229; Chalandon 1912, 156–158; Uspenski 1948, 187–188; Heyd 1959, 195–196; Thiriet 1959, 41; Sokolov 1963, 284–287; Cessi 1965, 206–214; Cessi 1968, 142–144; Ostrogorsky 1969, 398–399; Ahrweiler 1975, 84–85.—The assertion that in 1118 Emperor John II refused to renew the golden bull of 1082 at the request of Stephen II is, of course, entirely unsubstantiated (cf. Deér 1928, 109).
33. RA, No. 51.—See also SRH I: 434.
34. SRH I: 434; G 209, 688, 1172.—For the dimensions of the conquest, see Pauler 1899, I: 232–233; Kretschmayr 1905, 229; Deér 1928, 110; Ferluga 1957, 129; Sokolov 1963, 322; Cessi 1965, 214; Cessi 1968, 143.
35. G 209, 688, 1172.
36. Kretschmayr 1905, 224.
37. Deér 1928, 109.
38. See Palacky 1864, 393–397; Grot 1889, 16; Huber 1899, 281–283; Bretholz 1912, 203–209.
39. G 442, 532.
40. See Mill. tört. 260; Pauler 1899, I: 234; Huber 1899, 221; Hóman 1939, 365.
41. Hist. 17.
42. For all this see Deér 1928, 110; Glaser 1933, 362–363; Pleidell 1934, 309–310; Moravcsik 1953, 75–76; Moravcsik 1970, 77–78; MOT 74.—It is possible that the aim of the Byzantines was indeed to render the activities of Hungarian merchants in Byzantine territories more difficult (see Acsády 1903, 204). Incidentally, this route also had strategic importance for Byzantium, since the towns along the road formed the backbone of the military defence of the region. For this, see Kalić 1971a, 32.
43. Thus, e.g., the emigration of Prince Álmos to Byzantium is dated to 1113 by ET 440; Kerbl 1979, 70; to 1116 by Pauler 1899, I: 225; Acsády 1903, 201; Moravcsik 1953, 77; to 1125 by Csóka 1967, 200; Gunst 1968, 28; to 1126 by Grot 1889, 17; and to 1127 by Wertner 1892, 244.
44. G 443, 1668.
45. SRH I: 442.
46. K 9; Hist. 17.
47. G 807. See also G 532.
48. Hist. 17; K 10.
49. Géza II, for example, did so in 1147 on hearing that Boris was in Louis VII's camp, immediately asking for the pretender to be extradited. SRH I: 458–459; G 1721.
50. Makk 1981–1982, 50.
51. According to the Hungarian Chronicle, Álmos built a town in Macedonia (SRH I: 442–443). Other, 12th century sources, however, assert that foreign refugees—such as the Moravian Boguta after the Second Crusade, or Russian emigrants in 1162—were given castles, towns, and estates by the Byzantine emperor to settle in. For this, see Grot 1889, 311; Mavrodin 1943, 9; Ist. Viz. 241; Pashuto 1968, 193. Obviously, something similar must have happened in the case of Álmos (see Chalandon 1912, 57).
52. SRH I: 459. See also Pauler 1899, I: 475. Note 430; Moravcsik 1953, 77.
53. The same view is shared by Chalandon 1912, 57.
54. SRH I: 459.
55. SRH I: 430.
56. SRH I: 437–439.—During the Russian campaign of 1123, the Hungarian lords threatened

Stephen II that they would elect a new king for themselves unless he stopped the war. The credibility of this assertion in the Hungarian Chronicle has often been called into doubt, recently by Kristó 1977, 118. Others—e.g. Domanovszky 1902, 820—on the other hand, are of the opinion that this is probably what happened. The events related in the chronicle—in spite of the fact that certain elements in the idiomatic composition suggest a later composition—can be accepted as authentic because, on the one hand, similar scenes, i.e. the king being forced to return home due to pressure from the lords, took place twice during the Russian campaign of Géza II (Hodinka 1916, 127, 179–181, 253–257), and, on the other, the election of Ivan and comes Bors in 1128 indicates that a section of the aristocracy indeed managed to set up anti-kings during the reign of Stephen II. The events in 1123 testify to the mounting intensity of the factional struggles within the ruling class, and also to a shift in the power constellation (see ET 95; Székely 1970, 108); and, in addition, draws attention to the grave contradictions within the formerly unified ruling party.

57. See Györffy 1953, 79; Pashuto 1968, 167.

58. Euphemia died in Kiev in 1139 (Hodinka 1916, 99).

59. Although a Hungarian source relates that around 1126 the troops of the king advanced across the Polish frontier and ravaged the countryside (SRH I: 434, 439), this event probably did not effect the Hungarian–Polish relations of the time. The same view is held by Pauler 1899, I: 232. Perhaps it was nothing more than a case of customary cross-border clashes and plundering raids. It is also possible that, due to the shift of the Hungarian marchlands further to the north, necessitated by the recent settlement of these territories, the Hungarians encountered Polish settlers expanding southward. For the settlement of the region towards Poland, see e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 251; Fekete Nagy 1934, 24–29; Györffy 1963, 45–47.

60. For Bohemian–German relations see Palacky 1864, 393–397; Huber 1899, 222–223; 281–283; Bretholz 1912, 203–209; Váczy 1936, 496; Hampe 1968, 109–110, 115; Jordan 1973, 89–90.

61. Álmos' trip to Constantinople referred to in the legend of St Emeric can be related to the prince's pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1107 (SRH II: 456).

62. SRH I: 439–440.

63. SRH I: 444. See also Blaskovics 1982, 250.

64. Sophia is also regarded as Coloman's daughter by Vajay (1974, 345, n. 30). See also Makk 1972, 35–36; Vajay 1979, 17, 20.

65. For the dating of this attack see Pauler 1899, I: 234. The chronology of the Hungarian–Byzantine war during the reign of Stephen II—save for a few minor details—can be regarded as settled on the basis of research hitherto carried out (see e.g. Deér 1928, 110–111; Moravcsik 1953, 76). Still, it has recently been put forward that this war occurred not between 1127–1129, but earlier, in the years 1125–1126 (see Radojčić 1961, 177–186). However, this dating is unacceptable on two accounts. For one, it ignores the data in 12th century Central European chronicles and annals which unequivocally testify that the war between Hungary and Byzantium was still going on in 1129 (G 90, 315, 442, 761). In this respect the obviously well informed Bohemian chronicler's information around 1129—no doubt due to the participation of Bohemian–Moravian troops—is particularly relevant (G 442). On the other hand, it can be established from the sources that the whole conflict did not last longer than three years, therefore, this war between Hungary and Byzantium took place between 1127 and 1129. See also Pauler 1899, I: 475, n. 433.

66. SRH I: 126, 434, 439, 440; K 10; Hist. 17.—During this attack the Hungarians pulled down the fortifications of Belgrade and used the materials thereof for fortifying the stronghold of Semlin (K 10).

67. G 443, 1668.—See Pauler 1899, I: 235.

68. See e.g. Moravcsik 1953, 90; Moravcsik 1970, 92; Kovács 1972, 12, n. 22.

69. The data from G 707, which some scholars associate with Stephen II or Béla II, most probably relate to the time of Béla III, more precisely to the events during the years between 1183–1187. For this, see Ivanov 1936, 107; Bödey 1940, 217–221; Moravcsik 1984, 248. In this case, then, there is no written evidence that Stephen II had brought the relics of the hermit-saint from Sofia.

70. SRH I: 441; K 10; Hist. 17.

71. Hist. 17.

72. SRH I: 441; K 11.

73. SRH I: 441–442; K 11; Hist. 17.

74. K 11; Hist. 18.

75. K 11.—Different views are held by e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 236; Deér 1928, 111; Moravcsik 1953, 76.—Two lines from one of the poems of the 12th century Byzantine poet, Theodore Prodromus—which, in Thallóczy's translation refer to Emperor John extending the borders of the empire to the north—are regarded as proof of the "ephemeral conquest in 1128" of Sirmium by Thallóczy 1900, 64. However, according to the latest critical edition of the poem in question, these two lines refer only to the emperor's renewing the struggle north of the Danube; this obviously relates to the events of 1128, and suggests no conquest of any kind. See Hörandner 1974, 338, lines 88–89.

76. SRH I: 444.

77. Makk 1972, 36–38.—These events are placed around the years 1120–1125 by Vajay 1979, 19.

78. See e.g. Lovcsányi 1886, 425; Grot 1889, 24; Vasilevski 1930, 82; Urbansky 1968, 47; Kerbl 1979, 65–66, Magyarország 1984, 1184–1185.

79. SRH I: 429, 448–452, 458–459.

80. Domanovszky 1902, 818; Hóman 1925, 69–72. Horváth 1954, 285–286; Juhász 1966, 48; Pauler 1883, 108, n. 1.

81. SRH I: 448–452, 458–459.

82. SRH I: 429.

83. At his time the rank of *comes* signified not only *megyésispán* (i.e. a royal officer at the head of a county), but also persons of distinction, great landlords (Mályusz 1934, 160; ET 87).—Genealogical considerations make Vajay (1979, 20) also reject the identity of Bors and Boris.

84. See Leveles 1927–1928, 166–174.

85. As is well known, *comes* Lampert came from the Hont-Pázmány *genus* of Stephen I's time; his first wife was the elder sister of King Ladislas I; the *comes* belonged to the retinue of Coloman and Stephen II and during the reign of the latter he founded the Benedictine monastery of Bozók (Karácsonyi 1901, II: 184–185); *comes* Lampert, like his son, Nicholas, also a *comes*, fell in 1132 at the hands of Béla the Blind's supporters in the massacre on the eve of the battle with Boris (SRH I: 449).

86. SRH I: 392.

87. G 442, 532.

88. K 12.

89. See e.g. Deér 1928, 111; Kalić-Mijušković 1967, 47.

90. K 12.

91. SRH I: 441.

92. ERH I: 441–442; K 11; Hist. 17.

93. K 12.

94. SRH I: 443.—In connection with the marriage of King Béla the Blind, an interesting idea has recently been put forward by Kerbl, who—on the basis of a passage by the humanist Ransanus, namely that Béla II's wife was the niece of the Byzantine emperor—infers that the wedlock of the Hungarian prince and the Serbian princess was concluded at the instigation of

Byzantium, and took place in Constantinople around 1126 (Kerbl 1979, 70–72). However, it appears entirely unjustified to assert the above view merely on the strength of a passage by the humanist author—still to be confirmed—about the relationship between Princess Elena and Emperor John II. According to a recent supposition, Anna, Princess Elena's mother, was the daughter of one of the nieces of Emperor Alexius I (Vajay 1979, 22).

95. According to the Hungarian Chronicle, Béla and Queen Elena attended the meeting of Arad, which probably took place in the spring/summer of 1131, "*cum filiis suis*" (SRH I: 447). This means that at the time of the meeting the royal couple had at least two children, a fact that dates the king's marriage to 1129. For this see Erdélyi 1912, 777.

96. Hist. 16.—Historical research has not yet decided unequivocally whether the Serbian movement that Cinnamus places to the time of the Hungarian–Byzantine wars (K 12), and the Serbian revolt that Nicetas describes after the battle of Berroea in 1122—or, perhaps in 1123 or 1124—suppressed by Emperor John (Hist. 16), are recollections of one and the same or of two different Serbian revolts. The view prevailing today is that both Byzantine historians are referring to the Serbian moves during the Hungarian–Byzantine clashes. For the relevant literature see Izvori 14–17.

97. K 12.

98. K 13.

99. Thus e.g. Moravcsik 1923, 10; Deér 1928, 111.

100. SRH I: 442; Hist. 18.

101. Václav was probably only able to return after the peace treaty that immediately followed the attack of 1129, since according to Bohemian sources, he came home victorious (G 442, 532). For this see Makk 1970, 47.

102. Grousset 1946, 389; Ostrogorsky 1969, 400.

103. Acsády 1903, 205.

104. Deér 1928, 111.

105. Moravcsik 1953, 75, 77; Moravcsik 1970, 77, 79.

106. This is the opinion e.g. of Pashuto 1968, 167–168.

107. SRH I: 443, 444.

108. The foundation of the Premonstratensian monastery at Váradhegyfok is attributed to Stephen II e.g. by Balics 1888, 102; Oszvald 1957, 234; Györffy 1963, 689; Mályusz 1971b, 216; Hermann 1973, 77. A different view, placing it to the time of Béla III, is held by Pauler 1899, I: 366, 518, Note 574. It seems very probable that Stephen II, both in this respect and in his siding with the Gregorianist Popes, followed his father, since there is no evidence whatever of Coloman founding one single monastery. For this see Balics 1888, 79.

109. PRT I: 597.

110. Makk 1974, 257–258.

111. SRH I: 440.

112. SRH I: 441.—For the person of Setephel see Pauler 1899, I: 235.

113. Makk 1974, 259.

114. SRH I: 443, 444.

115. Some scholars are of the opinion that Béla did not go to Byzantium, but remained in Hungary all the time. See e.g. Mill. tört. 266, n. 4; Pauler 1899, I: 238; Acsády 1903, 201; Chalandon 1912, 56; Šišić 1944, 47; Csóka 1967, 201, n. 93; Urbansky 1968, 40. Another group of researchers, however, holds that Béla left for Byzantium with his father, returning from there only towards the end of Stephen II's reign. Thus e.g. Uspenski 1948, 198; Jireček 1952, 140; Moravcsik 1953, 77; Grabler 1958, VII. 29; Moravcsik 1970, 78; Kerbl 1979, 69.

116. In an earlier work the present author also accepted the idea of Béla's emigration to Byzantium, primarily on the basis of a passage in the Munich Chronicle which relates that Béla "was secretly guarded in Greece" (SRH II: 81). Now, however, it seems clear that this passage

contains a contradiction in itself, since why should Béla have been secretly hidden in Byzantium? This, evidently, could be justified only if he was staying in Hungary. The Hungarian Chronicle explicitly says that Prince Béla was hidden from the wrath of the king in Hungary (SRH I: 443).—Cf. Makk 1972, 3, n. 35.

117. The diploma of Pécsvárad dated 1158—which, although a forgery, was made on the basis of an original charter—relates that Prince Béla, in his difficult position, was taken care of by the Benedictine abbot of Pécsvárad and his monks (VMO 579). For a criticism of the charter, see Szentpétery 1918, 35–36; Kubinyi 1975, 78, n. 167.

118. SRH I: 443, 444.

119. For this, see Makk 1972, 40; Kristó 1977, 124–128.

120. SRH I: 407.

121. The sources do not contain the exact date of Stephen II's death. The acceptance of March 1, 1131, which can be found in the literature on the subject, has chronological difficulties. See Makk 1972, 38–39.

122. Makk 1972, 41–44.

123. According to the evidence from a later source, Saul, of whose fate following the designation nothing is known, survived Stephen II, and Béla became King of Hungary only after Saul's death (Budenz 1861, 272; Blaskovics 1982, 251).

124. SRH I: 446.—For the date of the coronation, see Pauler 1899, I: 239.

125. This view is held e.g. by Maier 1973, 261; Kerbl 1979, 72, 74.

Chapter III

The loosening of connections

1. The meeting of Arad is placed by some scholars to the year 1131 (e.g. Hóman 1939, 366; Kristó 1977, 127), and to 1132 by others (e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 241, 476–478, n. 438; Erdélyi 1912, 777). Having examined the question of the connection between Chapters 160 and 161 in the chronicle, the former describing the meeting at Arad, the latter the royal council near the river Sajó before the battle fought against Boris, and also separating chronologically the two sequences of events, the present author believes that the meeting held at Arad on the bank of the river Maros probably took place in the spring or summer of 1131, not very long after Béla's ascent to the throne. See Makk 1970, 62; Kristó–Makk 1972, 202.

2. SRH I: 446–447.

3. K 117; G 28, 1720, 1765.—On the basis of the sources, the view that places the Byzantine marriage of Boris to the year 1136 cannot be accepted. E.g. Moshin 1947, 84; Levchenko 1956, 478. According to a recent view, Boris, after the death of his first, Polish wife, married in Byzantium between 1141 and 1143 (Kerbl 1979, 76, 78). However, Otto of Freising, a contemporary, mentions Boris' Byzantine match before the latter's trip to Poland around the turn of 1131–1132, thus this marriage cannot be proved with the aid of authentic sources. There is, however, an interesting and clever argument claiming that Boris' Byzantine wife was probably Princess Anna Ducaena, who, after her husband's death took the veil and assumed the name Arete (Laurent 1972, 39; Kerbl 1979, 76–78).

4. Thus according to e.g. Rozanov (1930, 652) and Moravcsik (1970, 78) Boris was in Byzantium already between 1128–1130; Pashuto (1968, 167) is of the opinion that the pretender probably went to Byzantium around 1129. See also Laurent 1972, 35.

5. This is dated to 1131 by Hodinka 1889, 425.

6. Hist. 93; Cf. Moravcsik 1953, 77.

7. G 28, 1765.

8. See Chalandon 1912, 81–109; Grousset 1946, 389; Uspenski 1948, 203–206; Runciman 1958, II: 201. CMH 223; Walter 1966, 23–24; Ist. Viz. 203–206; Ostrogorsky 1969, 400.—Incidentally, it was during the campaign against the Dānishmend amir that Empress Piroška-Irene died in 1134. See Moravcsik 1923, 10.

9. See Kretschmayr 1905, 230; Chalandon 1907, II: 1–26; Chalandon 1912, 165–166; Uspenski 1948, 189; Caspar 1968, 70–97; Urbansky 1968, 55.

10. Chalandon 1912, 17–18, 83–85.

11. Thus e.g. Moravcsik 1953, 77; Moravcsik 1970, 78.

12. This view is held by Ferdinandy 1967, 57. Nor can, of course, the alternative opinion be proved, namely, that Boris' reception in Constantinople was conceived in the spirit of Byzantine "efforts at conquest". For this see Acsády 1903, 205. According to another opinion, the admission of Boris into Constantinople would have been a security measure the basileus took for the safety of Béla II (Kerbl 1979, 74). This remains, however, only an unsubstantiated hypothesis.

13. G 28, 1765, 2289, etc.—Not mentioned in the sources, it is possible that Boris was sent by Emperor John II to Russia, and went on to the court of Bolesław III only after he had failed to whip up support for his plans there. See e.g. Rozanov 1930, 653–654; Moravcsik 1953, 77.

14. See Hist. Pol. 225–226. Patze 1968, 346–347.

15. SRH I: 447–448; G 28, 1765, 2289.

16. SRH I: 448; G 28, 136, 442, 1765, 2289.

17. SRH I: 448–449, G 28, 1765.

18. See Makk 1972, 43–44.

19. G 2289.

20. G 28, 1765, 2632.—Hedvig, Béla II's sister married Adalbert, son of Leopold III, Margrave of Austria.

21. SRH I: 451; G 28, 136, 442, 1765, 2289.—For the dating of the battle see Pauler 1899, I: 243.

22. G 136, 442, 532, 1994, etc.; Hodinka 1916, 179, 253.—See also Pauler 1899, I: 243–244; Bretholz 1912, 211; Rozanov 1930, 656–657; Hist. Pol. 226–227; Pashuto 1968, 168.

23. G 442.

24. G 112, 126, 174, 226, 481, 1764, etc.—See also Pauler 1899, I: 244; Bretholz 1912, 211–212; Deér 1928, 117; Hist. Pol. 227; Pashuto 1968, 168; Jasienica 1974, 133.

25. For its dating see Pauler 1899, I: 244–245.

26. C II: 48.

27. This view is held e.g. by Šišić 1944, 52–53; Novak 1957, 79, 82; Ferluga 1957, 129.

28. G 1986, 4023; HS 114.

29. See e.g. Deér 1928, 118; Hóman 1939, 368; Šišić 1944, 52; Novak 1957, 82; Ferluga 1957, 129.—The takeover of Trau and Sebenico by the Hungarians can be presumed, although no contemporary source mentions it.

30. Ferluga 1957, 129.

31. For the voluntary submission of Bosnia see e.g. Klaić 1890, 55; Pauler 1899, I: 479, n. 441; Šišić 1944, 59.—According to the modern writer of a history of Bosnia, it is not clear how the Hungarian king took possession of Bosnia (Čirković 1964, 42, 351, n. 8).

32. The relationship between the political denotations of Bosnia and Rama is still an obscure point in the literature on the subject (see e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 245–246; Jireček 1952, 133; Čirković 1964, 42). The fact that the title *rex Ramae* became one of those of the King of Hungary seems to indicate the conquest of Rama, rather than its voluntary submission.

33. See Pauler 1899, I: 245–246, 479, n. 441.

34. Although it is also possible that after the 1136 conquest of Dalmatia the Hungarian expansion reached the region of Rama from the direction of Spalato (Šišić 1944, 59–60).

222–227; Chalandon 1907, II: 122–124; Váczy 1936, 501–502; Hampe 1968, 125–127; Heilig 1973, 154–156; Jordan 1973, 100–103.

59. Deér 1928, 120–121.

60. SRH I: 453.—For the chronology see Pauler 1899, I: 249–250.

61. C II: 48.

62. Hodinka 1916, 99–101, 205–207.

63. G 1765.—See Gerics 1975, 362.

64. G 1766.

65. G 1765.

66. See Grot 1889, 83–84; Pauler 1899, I: 260; Rozanov 1930, 661; Hóman 1939, 369.

67. SRH I: 453; G 559, 751, 762, 763, 1484, 1766, 1956.

68. SRH I: 454; G 1766.

69. See Palacky 1864, 416–422; Grot 1889, 60–73; Bretholz 1895, 275–295; Huber 1899, 286–291; Rozanov 1930, 659.

70. It should be noted here that there is no evidence of Hungary intervening directly in the Bohemian succession disputes.

71. G 1765.

72. See Jaksch 1888, 374–377; Grot 1889, 93; Pauler 1899, I: 258–259; Deér 1928, 122; Hóman 1939, 369; Ohnsorge 1958, 339; Heilig 1973, 160.

73. At the Diet of Frankfurt (May, 1142) Gertrude, widow of Henry the Proud, was persuaded to marry Conrad III's relative, Henry of Babenberg, Margrave of Austria. At the same time, Henry the Lion, son of Henry the Proud and Gertrude, was officially recognized as Duke of Saxony, and in return, he had to give up the Duchy of Bavaria, which was then given to Henry, Margrave of Austria as a fief. See Huber 1899, 227; Chalandon 1907, II: 122–123; Váczy 1936, 502; Hampe 1968, 129; Heilig 1973, 156–157; Jordan 1973, 102–103.

74. Deér 1928, 122.

75. Chalandon 1907, II: 88–90, 124, 126; Hampe 1968, 130; Caspar 1968, 228–231.

76. Hampe 1968, 131.

77. Hist. Pol. 306; Jordan 1973, 103.

78. Áldásy 1924, 42; Grousset 1935, II: 226; Lamma 1955, I: 58; Runciman 1958, II: 246.

79. Ohnsorge 1958, 376–378.

80. MGH SS XX: 363–364.

81. Acsády was already of the opinion that the Germans regarded Boris as a useful means for their "expansionist designs" (1903, 209).

82. See e.g. Huber 1899, 227.

83. This is held e.g. by Ohnsorge 1958, 122–123; Urbansky 1968, 69–70; Heilig 1973, 163; Kerbl 1979, 89–90.

84. See e.g. Chalandon 1907, II: 130–131; Váczy 1936, 504; Caspar 1968, 364; Ostrogorsky 1969, 402–403.

85. For the different views see e.g. Grot 1889, 79; Acsády 1903, 209; Rozanov 1930, 658; Heilig 1973, 160.—Curiously enough, there is no evidence even for whether Boris left Poland after the settlement of Merseburg (1135), and if he did so, where he went.

86. See Chalandon 1912, 169–190; Uspenski 1948, 208–211; CMH 224–225; Urbansky 1968, 49; Ostrogorsky 1969, 401.

87. For Manuel's western policies before the Second Crusade see Kap-Herr 1881, 13–15; Scherer 1911, 10–19; Chalandon 1912, 259–262; Lamma 1955, I: 50–55; CMH 227; Urbansky 1968, 55–56; Ostrogorsky 1969, 402–403; Heilig 1973, 158.

88. For Manuel's eastern policies during the first years of his reign see Chalandon 1912, 239–254; Uspenski 1948, 213–216; Lamma 1955, I: 46–48; CMH 226; Urbansky 1968, 56–57; Ostrogorsky 1969, 402–403.

89. Since Welf VI, brother of Henry the Proud, was not satisfied with the settlement in Frankfurt in 1142, he continued his struggle for the acquisition of Bavaria against Conrad III and Henry of Babenberg, Margrave of Austria, then in possession of the duchy. Welf VI was financially supported by Roger II. See Huber 1899, 227–228; Chalandon 1907, II: 123–124; Váczy 1936, 502; Hampe 1968, 129; Heilig 1973, 157; Jordan 1973, 103.

90. G 378, 1191, 2643.—The establishment of connections between Géza II and Welf VI is dated differently e.g. by Pauler 1899, I: 264; Deér 1928, 123; Heilig 1973, 157.

91. SRH I: 453–457; G 505, 559, 762, 763, 1484, 1766–1768, 1956, 2644, etc.—For the date of the battle see Pauler 1899, I: 262; Kerbl 1979, 94–95.

92. SRH I: 453, 457.—The fact that Rapolt, the German knight who had taken Pozsony for Boris, was fighting in the army of Margrave Henry in September, 1146, also indicates that Henry of Babenberg had known about the plan to attack Pozsony, as his own men had executed it. This clash is also referred to in the writings of Abu Hamid, who relates that the king of the Hungarians made raids into the country of the Franks [i.e. Germans] (Hrbek 1955, 210.).

93. For these see Chalandon 1912, 262–266; Áldásy 1924, 39–46; Grousset 1935, II: 225–230; Uspenski 1948, 214–220; Lamma 1955, I: 46–60; Zaborov 1958, 132–142; Runciman 1958, II: 227–252; CMH 225–227; Urbansky 1968, 56–57, 60–63.

94. SRH I: 459.

95. G 1720.

96. SRH I: 457–458.—Odo of Deuil, who took part in the crusade, made a revealing remark on relations between the Hungarian Kingdom and the German empire by saying that the Hungarians were the enemies of Conrad III (G 1720).

97. G 1720.—On the strength of Hungarian and foreign sources, the assertion that Boris simply wanted to cross Hungary with the French crusaders without any further designs is unacceptable (Rozanov 1930, 663). Contrary to this, Odo of Deuil, the French chronicler relates that Boris turned to Louis VII claiming his hereditary right to the Hungarian Kingdom (G 1720); at the same time according to the Hungarian Chronicle, some Hungarians had invited Boris because they wanted to recognize him as their king (SRH I: 459). These data are evidence for the real aims of Boris and the actual intentions of his followers in Hungary. See also Kerbl 1979, 97.

98. SRH I: 458; G 1721.

99. SRH I: 459; G 1721.

100. The same can be inferred from the passage of Odo of Deuil which relates that the two French dignitaries who smuggled Boris into the camp of the crusaders were aware that the pretender was the husband of the Byzantine emperor's cousin (G 1720).

101. The realization of the Second Crusade was a great blow to Manuel's foreign policy. From the beginning he received the whole idea of the crusade with suspicion, since he knew its materialization would thwart his own political efforts both in the East and in the West. For this see Chalandon 1912, 264; Ist. Viz. 320; Ahrweiler 1975, 78–79.

102. G 1721.—Likewise Kerbl 1979, 98.

103. Nothing is known about those Hungarians who, for example, in 1147 invited Boris to Hungary, willing to recognize him as king instead of Géza II (SRH I: 459). Judging by the events, however, they could not have represented significant social forces.

104. Thus e.g. Hóman 1939, 369.

105. The first child of Géza II and Euphrosyne, whose godfather was Louis VII, was born in July/August, 1147 (SRH 458). Thus it seems reasonable to presume that the marriage between the Hungarian king and the sister of the ruling Prince of Volhynia and Kiev was concluded at the latest in the second half of 1146. See also Grot 1889, 95; Mill. tört. 283; Pauler 1899, I: 269; Thallóczy 1900, 59; Hóman 1939, 371; Pashuto 1968, 168; Font 1980, 36.

Chapter IV

Hungary against Byzantium

1. Scherer 1911, 23; Chalandon 1912, 265.
2. Chalandon 1912, 242; Runciman 1958, II: 229.
3. Norden 1903, 77; Lamma 1955, 104–105; Chalandon 1907, II: 149; Chalandon 1912, 336.
4. Chalandon 1907, II: 133–134; Scherer 1911, 23; Chalandon 1912, 265–266; Áldásy 1924, 44; Grousset 1935, II: 226; Uspenski 1948, 219–220; Lamma 1955, I: 64–66; Zaborov 1958, 140; Urbansky 1968, 61.
5. Ahrweiler 1975, 78–83.
6. K 67.
7. Chalandon 1907, II: 133; Scherer 1911, 22; Chalandon 1912, 256, 264–268; Lamma 1955, I: 68; Ist. Viz. 320.
8. See Chalandon 1912, 269–270.
9. Chalandon 1907, II: 131; Chalandon 1912, 267; Caspar 1968, 372; Ostrogorsky 1969, 402–403; Lilie 1980, 141–142.
10. Chalandon 1907, II: 135; Chalandon 1912, 280; Rassow 1954, 213–214; Caspar 1968, 376–377; Mayer 1973, 103.
11. Chalandon 1912, 281–282; Grousset 1935, II: 233; Runciman 1958, II: 257.
12. Chalandon 1912, 283–284; Áldásy 1924, 47; Zaborov 1958, 140.
13. Chalandon 1907, II: 135; Chalandon 1912, 296, 299; Grumel 1945, 163; Lamma 1955, I: 73; Runciman 1958, II: 258–259; Zaborov 1958, 41; Caspar 1968, 378–379.
14. Chalandon 1907, II: 137; Chalandon 1912, 304; Áldásy 1924, 46; Grumel 1945, 166.
15. Chalandon 1907, II: 138; Chalandon 1912, 321; Zaborov 1958, 141.
16. Kretschmayr 1905, 233; Chalandon 1907, II: 137; Chalandon 1912, 321–322; Lamma 1955, I: 69; Sokolov 1963, 289.
17. Chalandon 1912, 321; Sokolov 1963, 186–187, 292; Ostrogorsky 1969, 403.
18. Chalandon 1907, II: 135–137; Scherer 1911, 48–49; Chalandon 1912, 318–321; Ahrweiler 1966, 241–242; Caspar 1968, 380; Ostrogorsky 1969, 404.
19. Šesan 1960, 49–52; Ahrweiler 1966, 234; 243–244; Bréhier 1970, 336.
20. Chalandon 1907, II: 138–139; Chalandon 1912, 323.
21. Ohnsorge 1958, 460; CMH 581; Hecht 1967, 8; Ist. Viz. 1967, 329; Ostrogorsky 1969, 401–402; Obolensky 1971, 160; Lamma 1971, 41–42; Th. Mayer 1973, 375; Ahrweiler 1975, 85; Schramm 1975, 291.
22. Chalandon 1912, 323–325; Lamma 1955, I: 75; Rassow 1961, 27; CHM 228; Ist. Viz. 323.—Pashuto regards it as possible that these Cumans (Polovtsi) attacked Byzantium as allies of ruling Prince Iziaslav (1968, 188). According to another view, the Cumans advanced into Byzantine territory as allies of the Normans (Diaconu 1978, 79).
23. Áldásy 1924, 47–49; Grousset 1935, II: 234–268; Zaborov 1958, 144–146; Runciman 1958, II: 257–276; Mayer 1973, 104–107.
24. Kap-Herr 1881, 36; Chalandon 1912, 326–327; Vasilevski 1930, 32–33; Lamma 1955, I: 94; Runciman 1958, II: 275; Ohnsorge 1958, 461; Rassow 1961, 27–30; Ist. Viz. 327; Ostrogorsky 1969, 404; Heilig 1973, 164–165; Jordan 1973, 107.
25. Rassow 1961, 27; Ist. Viz. 327; Ostrogorsky 1969, 404; Jordan 1973, 107.
26. K 101–102; Hist. 118–119.
27. Hampe 1968, 140; Chalandon 1907, II: 146; Chalandon 1912, 334; Lamma 1955, I: 96–97; Rassow 1961, 40–41; Caspar 1968, 397–398; Urbansky 1968, 65; Kap-Herr 1881, 39; Ostrogorsky 1969, 404; Heilig 1973, 167; Jordan 1973, 107–111.
28. Norden 1903, 84; Chalandon 1907, II: 148–149; Chalandon 1912, 336; Vasilevski 1930,

51; Lavissee 1931, 27; Grousset 1935, II. 269; Lamma 1955, I. 104; Runciman 1958, II: 276; Ostrogorsky 1969, 404; Jordan 1973, 108.

29. Norden 1903, 84. Chalandon 1912, 340; Lamma 1955, I: 104–105; Ohnsorge 1958, 441; Caspar 1968, 405; Ostrogorsky 1969, 404–405.

30. Scherer 1911, 88; Chalandon 1912, 146–147; Deér 1928, 124; Hóman 1939, 373; Priselkov 1939, 107; Moravcsik 1953, 78; Ohnsorge 1958, 441; Pashuto 1968, 189, 169; Ostrogorsky 1969, 405; Kalić 1970, 25; Kazhdan 1972, 236; Jordan 1973, 108.

31. Chalandon 1907, II: 149; Grousset 1935, II: 269; Lamma 1955, I: 110–111; Runciman 1958, II: 276; Caspar 1968, 408; Jordan 1973, 108.

32. Chalandon 1907, II. 152.

33. The view that the German–Byzantine alliance established at the turn of 1148–1149 was also directed against Hungary is quite impossible to prove (see Hóman 1939, 373; Heilig 1973, 163–167). In reality, the real aim of the cooperation between Conrad and Manuel was the elimination of the Norman kingdom of Southern Italy. For this see note 24. For the important role Hungary played in organizing the anti-Byzantine European coalition, see Kalić 1971b, 29.

34. K 101; G 1191.

35. See Pauler 1899, I: 268–270; Baumgarten 1930, 97; Priselkov 1939, 107; Grekov 1949, 504; Levchenko 1956, 479–482; Francès 1959, 54–55, Shusharin 1961, 168; Hellmann 1968, 278; Pashuto 1968, 155, 168–169; 188–190; Ostrogorsky 1969, 405; Font 1980, 36–37; Font 1983, 38–39.

36. Hodinka 1916, 102–105.

37. Hodinka 1916, 107–117, 209–213.

38. Hodinka 1916, 117–127; SRH II: 199. The *Chronicon Pictum* probably refers to this campaign of Géza (SRH I: 460).

39. Hodinka 1916, 129, 131.

40. Hodinka 1916, 131–149, 219–223, 224–225.

41. Hodinka 1916, 151–167, 227–243.

42. Hodinka 1916, 167–187, 243–259; 262–265, 272–273; SRH II: 199.

43. Pauler 1899, I. 269.

44. Deér 1928, 125.

45. Hóman 1939, 371.

46. ET 98; Elekes 1964, 90–91.

47. Váczy 1936, 534.

48. Elekes 1964, 78.

49. Hóman 1939, 371.

50. Hodinka 1916, 153.

51. Pashuto 1968, 171.—On the strength of this, the Soviet scholar is fully justified to remark that the Hungarian–Volhinian alliance thus worked both ways (see Pashuto 1968, 172).

52. See Grot 1889, 303; Levchenko 1956, 485; Pashuto 1968, 179.

53. This view is shared by Levchenko (1956, 485) and Pashuto (1968, 178–179). See also Font 1980, 38.

54. Hodinka 1916, 199.—For the rivalry between Halich and Kiev for the Lower Danube region see Francès 1959, 50–62.

55. Although Mügelin (SRH II: 198) relates that Volodimerko offered his country as a “fief” to Géza II, the Russian annals, which knew Russian conditions much better and relate the events in much more detail, do not mention this. Naturally, Kiev and Hungary maintained very close relations until the death of Iziaslav (1154), also confirmed by Abu Hamid, the Moslim traveller, but even so, no vassalage was implied in this particular case (Hrbek 1955, 211). For the Russian policy of Géza II see Font 1983, 33–39; Makk 1984, 205–206.

56. The same opinion held by Pashuto 1968, 180.

57. Like, e.g. in 1153, 1155, and 1157 (see Hodinka 1916, 195, 197).
58. G 1769, 2659.
59. K 98–101; Hist. 88–89.—For the date of the surrender of Corfu, recaptured under the personal command of Manuel, and with the help of the Venetian fleet, see Chalandon 1912, 332; Rassow 1954, 215; Lamma 1955, I: 99; Ist. Viz. 327.
60. K 101.
61. K 101–102; Hist. 89–90.
62. K 101.
63. K 101–102, Hist. 90.
64. Pelagonia is the ancient name of the part of Macedonia around the towns of Ohrid and Bitola today; the Emperor of Byzantium often visited the area as it was a favourite gathering place for Byzantine armies. See Hist. 101; Chalandon 1912, 385; Izvori 49, n. 110; Rosenblum 1972, 217, n. 126.
65. K 102; Hist. 90.
66. K 101–102.
67. K 102–103; Hist. 90.
68. Hist. 90–91.—The writings of Cinnamus and Nicetas are the main sources for the history of contacts between Hungary and Byzantium during the reign of Géza II. The modern critical edition of Nicetas Choniates' works has been recently published (Dieten 1971; Dieten 1972; Hist.). Scholars, however, still have to make do without an up-to-date critical edition of Cinnamus, although a full collation of the text of the chapters with Hungarian references in Cinnamus' work has been edited by Babos 1944, 3–19. See also Moravcsik 1984, 194–247.
69. K 101.
70. See e.g. Grot 1889, 151; Pauler 1899, I: 272; Marczali 1911, 120; Scherer 1911, 88–89; Chalandon 1912, 385–387; Deér 1928, 125; Hóman 1939, 373; Moravcsik 1953, 78–79; Lamma 1955, I: 99; Kalić 1970, 25–28; Izvori 23, n. 38.
71. This view is held e.g. by Freydenberg 1959, 32; Urbansky 1968, 71.
72. Hodinka 1916, 107.
73. See e.g. Deér 1928, 124–125; Vasilevski 1930, 48; Moravcsik 1953, 78.
74. Hist. 90–91.
75. Hörandner 1974, 349–354, lines 1–195.
76. Hörandner 1974, 348.
77. Hörandner 1974, 354–355, lines 196–214.
78. Hörandner 1974, 355, lines 217–222.
79. Hörandner 1974, 355, lines 223–229.
80. Hörandner 1974, 355–358, lines 230–330.
81. Hörandner 1974, 348, 360; Mathieu 1954, 64, 70.
82. The Serbs of Rascia, who in 1149 began their struggle against Byzantium under the leadership of Uroš II, brother of King Géza's mother, and with Hungarian and Norman help, were fighting for the independent existence of their country as a state. For this, see Kalić 1970, 35.
83. Hörandner 1974, 354, line 199.
84. K 101.
85. Hörandner 1974, 354, line 201.
86. Hörandner 1974, 354, line 202.
87. Hist. 91.
88. See Kap-Herr 1881, 39; Rassow 1961, 40; Hampe 1968, 140.
89. Scherer 1911, 56–57; Vasilevski 1930, 51; Lamma 1955, I: 107.
90. Hist. 92.
91. K 103–104; Hist. 92.

92. Hist. 92.
93. K 104; Hist. 92.
94. K 107.—Abu Hamid, the Moslim traveller merchant of Moor origin born in Granada, relates in one of his writings that Moslims living in Hungary also took part in the Hungarian-Byzantine wars during the reign of Géza II, and he calls one of their groups Chwarezmians, and another Magribites (Hrbek 1955, 208). Some scholars identify these with the ethnic elements Cinnamus calls Kalizes and Pechenegs (thus e.g. Hrbek 1955, 214, 216 and Kalić 1971b, 34). According to Györffy, the Chwarezmians were Kalizes, but the Magribites were Alans (Jazygians) (Györffy 1958, 62–63, 68; Györffy 1975, 259); while Czeglédy—accepting the Chwarezmian-Kaliz identification—regards the Magribites as Moslim mercenaries from the western Levant and Africa (Czeglédy 1970, 258–259). For the Kalizes and Pechenegs in Hungary in the 12th century see also Rasovski 1933, 1–66; Gyóni 1938a, 86–96, 159–168; MOT 72. For connections between Hungarians and Moslims in the 12th century see e.g. Székely 1974, 72. For the place names related to the Kalizes and the Pechenegs in Hungary see Kristó-Makk-Szegfű 1973, 17, 18–21.
95. K 104.
96. K 104.
97. K 110.—For the identity and name of Bágyon see Gyóni 1943, 23–24.
98. See Deér 1928, 126.
99. Cinnamus minutely describes the battle near the Tara, in which Manuel fought a duel with *comes* Bágyon (K 105–112). Nicetas relates the same more curtly (Hist. 92). Poetical works—such as the poem by Theodore Prodromus (Rácz 1941, 23–24), and an epigram by a 12th century anonymous author (NE 149–150)—also contain references to this battle and the single combat Manuel fought with the Hungarian king's commander.—Recent research has pointed out that this decisive battle, contrary to earlier views, was not fought near the tributary of the Drina called Tara in western Serbia, but near a stream also referred to as Tara, in the vicinity of what is today the town of Valjevo, SW of Belgrade (Blagojević 1976, 72, 75). This implies the important inference that the Byzantine army had had to march a much shorter distance before the battle than it was presumed earlier. Thus it is also evident that the whole Serbian campaign took a much shorter time. For the battle near the Tara see also Škrivanić 1962, 25–26, and more recently Novaković 1979, 21–22.
100. K 112–113.—Rhetor Michael of Constantinople also mentions the submission of Uroš II in one of his speeches delivered before the emperor (Regel 1892, I: 112–143).
101. See Radojčić 1964, 350; Kalić 1970, 36.
102. Hóman 1939, 402; MOT 74.
103. K 113.
104. Hist. 92.
105. Hist. 92.
106. K 115.
107. SRH II: 199; Geréb 1959, 235.
108. Hodinka 1916, 117–127.
109. Hodinka 1916, 167–187, 243–259, 262–265, 272–273.
110. This view is shared e.g. by Deér 1928, 126. With minor differences a similar chronology is given by Izvori 39, n. 78.
111. See e.g. Grot 1889, 185, n. 2; Chalandon 1912, 403, n. 7; Vasilevski 1930, 61, n. 4; Rozanov 1930, 667; Hóman 1939, 373; Moravesik 1953, 80; Lamma 1955, I: 133; Grabler 1958, VII: 131, 290; Freydenberg 1959, 34; Urbansky 1968, 73; Pashuto 1968, 177; Kalić 1971a, 34; Kerbl 1979, 99.
112. According to this view, put forward already by Vasilevski in the first, St Petersburg edition of his work in 1877, the campaign to Halich that is mentioned in the Russian annals in the

year 6660 of the world era did not take place in the year 1152, the equivalent of 6660, but after September 1, 1151, still in the autumn of that year, because in the Byzantine calendar the year commences on September 1. See Vasilevski 1930, 61, n. 4, 105. This was adopted first by Grot 1889, 172, n. 2, 185, 185, n. 2; Chalandon 1912, 403, 403, n. 7; and later all those who date Manuel's Hungarian campaign to the autumn of 1151. See n. 111.

113. Thus e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 493, n. 475; Hodinka 1916, 85–89.

114. Berezikov 1963, 155.—Berezikov is convinced that the Russian annals never used the Byzantine style (September 1) New Year during the period between 1140/1141 and 1156/1157 (Berezikov 1965, 23, 63, 142, 143, 155).

115. See e.g. Kap-Herr 1881, 136; Acsády 1903, 212; Pauler 1899, I: 280–283; 493, n. 475; Scherer 1911, 91.

116. For the dating of the speech see Regel 1892, I. XIX; Kalić 1970, 30; Izvori 191, n. 25.

117. Regel 1892, I: 158.

118. Hist. 92.

119. K 115; Hist. 92; SRH II: 199.

120. K 115.

121. Hodinka 1916, 126–127.

122. Hodinka 1916, 128–129.—Campaigns lasting into wintertime were not entirely unusual at this time; proof of this are the Hungarian military expeditions to Russia which started at the turn of 1149–1150, and in January, 1151. See Hodinka 1916, 107–117, 131–149, 219–223, 224–225. The information from the *Continuatio Zwettlensis* I saying that the Greeks raided the lands of the Hungarians may seem to contradict the chronology of Manuel's war against Hungary as put forward here (G 792). However, remembering that the attack of Boris' mercenaries against Pozsony early in April, 1146, and the battle near the Leitha on September 11, 1146, are both mentioned in the annal under the year 1147, it is justified to presume a similar chronological shift in the case of Manuel's Hungarian campaign as well. Marczali was also of the opinion that Manuel's campaign against Hungary took place directly after the battle near the Tara, in the autumn of 1150 (Marczali 1911, 120).

123. According to rhetor Michael, Emperor Manuel's army also contained the troops of Prince Uroš II, who had just submitted (Regel 1892, I: 143, 144).

124. Nicetas also refers to this (Hist. 92).

125. K 113; Hist. 92; Regel 1892, I: 142, 143, 144.

126. K 115.

127. Regel 1892, I: 179.

128. When enumerating the causes of the war, the Byzantine authors themselves also refer to this, but the retaliatory character of the campaign is excellently indicated by an anonymous poet from the 12th century, who wrote that Manuel's attack of Sirmium was an "appropriate punishment for the treacherous King of Hungary" (NE 150). Rhetor Michael gives a similar assessment of the devastating raid of the Byzantines, and after describing the looting and ravaging of Sirmium, the carrying off of the huge booty and the great masses of captives, he remarks: "Thus has your punishment reached the breakers of promises, . . . as it was made your duty . . . to punish those . . . who were the meanest and the most unworthy" (See Regel 1892, I: 147).

129. See Kap-Herr 1881, 60; Acsády 1903, 211–212; Scherer 1911, 87–88; Marczali 1911, 119–121; Deér 1928, 126; Hóman 1939, 373–374; Moravcsik 1953, 77–78; Ferdinandy 1967, 58; Urbansky 1968, 75.

130. For the military significance of Semlin and Belgrade see Kalić-Mijušković 1967, 43–44, 48; Kalić 1971a, 32.

131. K 113–115; Hist. 92–93.—Other Byzantine authors also refer to Manuel's attack on Hungary, the ravaging and looting in Sirmium, and the masses of population carried off; thus

e.g. rhetor Michael in three of his orations (Regel 1892, I: 146–147, 158, 174, 176), Theodore Prodromus in some of his poems (Rácz 1941, 13, 23, 24; Miller 1873, 418–419), a poem by an anonymous 12th century poet (NE 149–150), and Euthymius Tornices in a speech he delivered at the end of 1161 (Papadopoulos-Kerameus 1913, 174–175). These events are mentioned, among the western sources, by Mügelin (SRH II: 199), and the *Continuatio Zwetlensis* I (G 792).

132. It is also indicated by the fact that Manuel at that time had the fortress of Semlin, fortified with the remains of the walls of Belgrade destroyed by the Hungarians in 1127, pulled down. See Kalić 1971a, 51.

133. K 115.

134. K 117.

135. K 117–118.—The contention that the army of Boris consisted of Hungarians who had joined the Byzantines cannot be proved (cf. Grot 1889, 184; Vasilevski 1930, 61; Rozanov 1930, 667; Freydenberg 1959, 34).

136. K 118.

137. K 118.—According to some scholars, Géza II and Manuel concluded a peace at this time (e.g. Grot 1889, 185; Deér 1928, 126). However, the Byzantine sources do not explicitly mention a peace treaty, and thus it is more probable that the envoys of the two monarchs only negotiated an armistice (Pauler 1899, I: 283; Scherer 1911, 93; Kalić-Mijušković 1967, 48).

138. K 118; Hist. 93.—Both Cinnamus and Nicetas mention the triumphal march in Constantinople. What Nicetas has to say about the triumph may be of interest concerning the chronology of the campaign in Hungary. He relates that in the grandiose march the Byzantines displayed Hungarian and Serbian prisoners of war together (Hist. 93). To have Serbian warriors, captured in 1150, displayed in the march at the end of 1151 would seem somewhat anachronistic if the Hungarian campaign is placed to the autumn of 1151. Finally, it cannot be irrelevant for the chronology of Manuel's war against Hungary that in April, 1151 the Kievans still believed that Géza II "was at war with the emperor" (see Hodinka 1916, 153). Even if the campaign did not last until April, 1151, the words of the Grand Duke of Kiev, who was fairly well informed through his several envoys, indicate that the negotiations lasted until the beginning of 1151.

139. See e.g. Rozanov 1930, 667; Hóman 1939, 374; Ohnsorge 1958, 443; Ferdinandy 1967, 57–58; Istv. Viz. 325.—An interesting view has recently been put forward by Laurent, and following him, by Kerbl about political relations between the basileus and the pretender prince. Their contention is as follows: since Boris' presumed wife (Princess Anna-Arete Ducaena), as a nun, styled herself *kralaina* (queen) in a monasterial charter in September, 1157, her late husband, Boris, therefore, must have used the title of *krales* (king). According to these scholars, this would indicate that the pretender prince was officially recognized in Constantinople as King of Hungary, and that is why Manuel tried to give him military help against Géza II (Laurent 1972, 35–39; Kerbl 1979, 76–78, 101). However, the following seems to be necessary to add to this argument: first, on the basis of the available sources, the marriage of Boris and Anna-Arete Ducaena cannot be regarded as proved, but only as a clever hypothesis. Second, even if the marriage is accepted as a historical fact, the use of the titles of *kralaina* and *krales* in a monasterial charter would indicate only that Boris styled himself King of Hungary, which does not necessarily mean that the basileus also recognized him as such.

140. PRT I: 601.

141. SRH I: 460.—According to Hóman, Princes Ladislav and Stephen were granted princely provisions as early as 1146 (Hóman 1939, 368). However, it would appear that there is a close connection between Géza II making his son co-ruler and granting the provision to his brothers. This would imply that the two steps were taken at the same time, around 1152. See also Kristó 1979, 33, 46–47.

142. Regel 1892, I. 42.

143. PRT I: 602–603.—The charter referring to Adalbertus' Sicilian trip is undated. The literature on the subject generally places it to around 1153 (e.g. Kubinyi 1975, 81). There does not seem to be any reason, however, why Adalbertus' journey to Palermo, and thus the date of the charter, should not be placed in 1152.
144. Hodinka 1916, 177–187, 253–259, 264–265.
145. Chalandon 1907, II: 152; Lamma 1955, I: 111.
146. See Grot 1889, 186; Chalandon 1907, II: 152–153; Scherer 1911, 57; Chalandon 1912, 341–342; Lamma 1955, I: 111–112; Rassow 1961, 43–44; Jordan 1973, 111–112.
147. Jordan 1973, 112–113.
148. See Pelzer 1906, 2–3; Lamma 1955, I: 131–132; Ohnsorge 1958, 441; Rassow 1961, 46; Heilig 1973, 168–169.
149. See Pelzer 1906, 4–5; Lamma 1955, I: 128; Jordan 1973, 113; Gericş 1975, 361.
150. G 1769, 2659.
151. Pelzer 1906, 5; Urbansky 1968, 77.
152. For the dating of the charter that refers to the talks between Géza II and Henry Jasomirgott (PRT I: 600) see Kubinyi 1975, 81.
153. See Grot 1889, 190–191; Huber 1899, 232; Pauler 1899, I: 285; Simonsfeld 1908, 101; Deér 1928, 127; Vasilevski 1930, 66; Hóman 1939, 374; Lamma 1955, I: 131–132; Hampe 1968, 147; Heilig 1973, 168–169; Jordan 1973, 114.
154. Vladislav II, ruler of Bohemia was probably one of the princes supporting Henry Jasomirgott in his quest for the Duchy of Bavaria; and, therefore, maintaining rather cool relations with Frederick I in the early 1150s. For this see Palacky 1984, 431–433; Grot 1889, 191; Huber 1899, 231–233, 291; Bretholz 1912, 252–254.
155. Indicative of the hostile relationship between Hungary and Germany is the fact that in 1154 Frederick I granted Count Conrad of Dachau the title of Duke of Dalmatia and Croatia. With this move the German monarch expressed his claim on territories that belonged to Hungary. See Kap-Herr 1881, 51; Pelzer 1906, 6; Simonsfeld 1908, 109; Györffy 1970a, 227, n. 23.
156. G 61.
157. Kretschmayr 1905, 237–239.
158. K 102.
159. Kretschmayr 1905, 240.
160. C II: 77; G 62.
161. G 1030.
162. G 1033.—Abu Hamid's remark that despite protests from Christian priests, the Hungarian king allowed the Muslims to keep concubines (see Hrbek 1955, 210), which was strictly forbidden by papal councils (see e.g. Jaffé 1888, 52), is indicative of the loose ecclesiastical discipline at the time.
163. C II: No. 78.
164. C II: No. 79.
165. K 119.
166. K 120.—These prisoners of war were inhabitants of Sirmium and the soldiers at Semlin, whom Manuel had carried off after his raid in the region. See Acsády 1903, 120; Scherer 1911, 94; Kalić 1971a, 35.
167. K 118–119.
168. E.g. Kap-Herr 1881, 137; Pauler 1899, I: 285, 494, n. 480; Scherer 1911, 93; Deér 1928, 128; Hóman 1939, 374; Rácz 1941, 6; Moravesik 1953, 80; Moravesik 1970, 81.
169. E.g. Grot 1889, 188; Chalandon 1912, 408; Vasilevski 1930, 66; Rozanov 1930, 668; Urbansky 1968, 77; Izvori 45–46.
170. Hrbek 1955, 205–206; Czeglédy 1970, 258; Kalić 1971a, 28.

171. Hrbek 1955, 209.
172. K 120.
173. Hrbek 1955, 211, 225; Czeglédy 1970, 259.
174. K 120. Rhetor Michael also mentions this peace treaty (Regel 1892, I: 158).—In addition, 1151, like the year 1152, is also out of the question as the one in which Géza II marched to the Danube and the Byzantine–Hungarian peace treaty was concluded, as in that year the King of Hungary was occupied elsewhere. In 1151 the king's armies twice—first at the beginning of the year, then in the summer—marched to Russia to aid Iziaslav (Hodinka 1916, 131–149, 219–223, 224–225, 151–167, 227–243); in addition, relations between Hungary and Austria were also settled in that year, probably towards its end.
175. See Chalandon 1907, II: 189; Chalandon 1912, 348; Lamma 1955, I: 149.
176. K 119–121.—For the date of the defeat of the Byzantine fleet see Chalandon 1907, II: 189, n. 3.
177. K 121.
178. This is indicated by the fact that after settling the conflict the Byzantine emperor marched against the Serbs, and forced their leader to abandon his alliance with the Hungarians (Hist. 100).
179. K 121; Hist. 100.—The talks in Sofia are mentioned only by Nicetas, but they are evidently related to the events recounted by Cinnamus. See e.g. Kalić 1970, 36; Izvori 46.
180. For the name of the Serbian ruler see Kalić 1970, 36.
181. Hist. 100.—All these events are dated to 1153 e.g. by Grot 1889, 193; Chalandon 1912 409; Vasilevski 1930, 66; Kalić 1970, 36; Izvori 46. Pauler (1899, I: 286–287) dates them to the autumn of 1154, and Rácz (1941, 6) places the events without any closer date to 1154.
182. For all this see e.g. Pelzer 1906, 2–3; Váczy 1936, 552–554; Lamma 1955, I: 132; Ohnsorge 1958, 461; Rassow 1961, 46; Seidler 1967, 333–334; Rogier–Aubert–Knowles 1968, 250; Ostrogorsky 1969, 405; Heilig 1973, 168; Th. Mayer 1973, 378–379; Jordan 1973, 127; Schramm 1975, 280, 291; Gericis 1975, 360–361.
183. See e.g. Kap–Herr 1881, 42–43; Chalandon 1907, II: 154; Chalandon 1912, 343–347; Lamma 1955, I: 133–142; Ohnsorge 1958, 427, 441, 461; Classen 1960a, 79; Rassow 1961, 44–64; Haller 1962, 103; CMH 229; Ist. Viz. 327; Urbansky 1968, 76–78; Hampe 1968, 154; Caspar 1968, 426; Ostrogorsky 1969, 405; Heilig 1973, 168–170; Jordan 1973, 114–115.
184. See Chalandon 1907, II: 194; Lamma 1955, I: 154; Hampe 1968, 154–156; Urbansky 1968, 80; Jordan 1973, 117–119.
185. See Kap–Herr 1881, 58; Chalandon 1907, II: 157; Chalandon 1912, 348–350; Ist. Viz. 327; Heilig 1973, 171.
186. See Grot 1889, 195–198; Chalandon 1912, 409; Diehl 1927, 96; Vasilevski 1930, 68–70; Priselkov 1939, 106; Bănescu 1946, 160–161; Laurent 1961, 50, n. z.; Jurewicz 1962, 39–41, 53–54; Kalić–Mijušković 1967, 48–49; Pashuto 1968, 178; Kalić 1970, 36; Izvori 46–48.
187. K 124–130. Hist. 101.
188. Jurewicz 1962, 55.
189. K 130; Hist. 101.
190. The foreign ethnic elements in Géza II's army and the fact that they were mercenaries is referred to by Cinnamus (K 131), and rhetor Michael (Regel 1892, I. 158). Maybe the Moslim archers that Géza II had taken into his service from Russia also took part in these battles (Hrbek 1955, 211). See also Pashuto 1968, 178; Kalić 1971b, 35. It seems probable that the German knights called Héder (Heidrich), Wolfer, Gottfried and Albrecht, who came to Hungary during Géza II's reign, belonged to the warriors called Saxons by Cinnamus (SRH I: 189, 191–192, 296; SO I: No. 1, No. 3). See also Mályusz 1971a, 65, 73–74.
191. K 131.
192. K 131; Hist. 101; rhetor Michael also makes references to the siege of Braničevo and the ravaging of the country (Regel 1892, I: 159).

193. Hist. 101.—Rhetor Michael also alludes to this when saying that at the time of Géza II's attack Manuel was "turning his attention seaward" (Regel 1892, I: 158). This is an obvious hint at the schemes of the basileus concerning Sicily and Italy.

194. This is what transpires from one of Cinnamus' remarks, namely, that on hearing of the Hungarian invasion, "the astonished emperor was surprised at the Huns' [Hungarians'] breach of oath, as they, without any reason, broke their oaths just sworn" (K 131).

195. This is also referred to by Cinnamus and rhetor Michael (K 131; Regel 1892, I: 159).

196. Regel 1892, I: 162.

197. K 131–132; Hist. 102.—Rhetor Michael also mentions the defeat of the Greek army led by Basilius Tzintzilukes (Regel 1892, I: 162). Theodore Prodromus, court poet of the Comneni, qualifies the Hungarian victory as "a tiny accidental success" (Rácz 1941, 37 line 443).

198. K 132.—Some scholars identify this Prince Stephen with Boris, Coloman's son, and on the basis of a passage of Otto of Freising, they infer that he lost his life during these battles. E.g. Grot 1889, 200, 203; Vasilevski 1930, 71–72, 71, n. 4.; Rozanov 1930, 669; Freydenberg 1959, 35; Pashuto 1968, 178. According to Otto of Freising, in the summer of 1156 the envoys of Byzantium in the imperial German court related that Boris had been killed not long before in a clash between Hungary and Byzantium (G 1770). According to Nicetas Choniates, however, "Kalamanos" [i.e. Boris] met his death during a Scythian [Cuman or Pecheneg] raid along the Danube directly after Manuel's campaign to Sirmium in 1150 (Hist. 93). On the strength of the Byzantine historian's story, the likelihood is that Boris died earlier and, therefore, could not have taken part in the wars of 1154–1155. A similar view is held by Pauler 1899, I: 288. This Stephen of the Árpád dynasty can be identified with the Stephen who—as described by Cinnamus—marched with Manuel and Stephen IV against Stephen III and his Bohemian allies in 1164 (K 224–225), and can be regarded as the second child of Prince Boris (for this see the relevant passages in Chapter V). Be as it may, Boris is not mentioned in the sources any further. His family remained in Byzantium. Something is known about his son, called Constantine Kalamanos Ducas, who, as *sebastos*, commissioned by Manuel, served the empire as *dux* of Cilicia between 1163 and 1175 (K 216, 286; Hist. 140), but displayed no special interest in Hungary. His name can be encountered on his seals, in a chronicle (SRH I: 429), and on a golden bowl representing the victories of Manuel in Hungary. For these see Schlumberger 1919, 494; NE 129–130, 175–176; Laurent, 1933, 84; Moravcsik 1934, 200, 210; Moravcsik 1953, 83; Moravcsik 1964, 89; Polemis 1968, 123–125; Laurent 1972, 35, 39; Kerbl 1979, 78, 100; Moravcsik 1984, 255.

199. K 133.—For the attempt of the citizens of Belgrade to switch sides, and the background to this, see Kalić-Mijušković 1967, 51.

200. K 133.

201. K 132; Regel 1892, I: 160.—Henry Mügelin also refers to this attack of Géza II against Byzantium (SRH II: 199).

202. K 133.

203. According to the account of the rhetor, Géza II's conduct at the talks, preliminary to the peace treaty, suggested his intention at making things favourable for the "Sicilian Scylla [i.e. the Norman king]." (Regel 1892, I: 162–163).

204. See Chalandon 1907, II: 193; Lamma 1955, I: 155; Deér 1964, 155; Kubinyi 1975, 96.—With the Hungarian–Byzantine wars coming to an end in 1155, there is no sense in placing the activity of Gentilis—bearing the title of chancellor—to the period after the peace treaty. Gentilis, by the way, soon returned to the Norman kingdom to become Bishop of Agrigento, and is mentioned as such already in 1156. See Chalandon 1907, II: 193; Lamma 1955, I: 155; Deér 1964, 155; Kubinyi 1975, 96.

205. These events are mentioned by Cinnamus, rhetor Michael, and Prodromus (K 113; Regel 1892, I: 163–164; Rácz 1941, 32–35, lines 271–356). For the rivalry between Beloš'

brothers, Dessa and Uroš II, for the crown of the ruling Prince of Serbia, and its background, see Kalić 1970, 31, 37.

206. See Chalandon 1907, II: 199–203; Jordan 1973, 118.

207. It is probably to these events that the Provost of Reichersberg, the Gregorianist Gerhoh refers in his narration, according to which the bishops of Géza II regarded their king's war against Byzantium as a breach of faith, and persuaded him to stop it and renew the peace treaty he had violated (G 1031).

208. Weighty evidence from Cinnamus, rhetor Michael, and Prodromus suggests that the peace talks lasted for a long time (K 133–134; Regel 1892, I: 162; Rácz 1941, 37–38, lines 427–468, 43, lines 1–15). The peace was concluded probably in the summer of 1155.

209. The sources do not specify how many years of peace the two rulers concluded on the bank of the Danube. Some scholars infer that the one in 1155 was a five-year peace treaty because the one in 1161 was also made for five years (see Pauler 1899, I: 289, 494–495, n. 483; Acsády 1903, 212). They are possibly right.

210. Cinnamus, rhetor Michael, and Prodromus mention the peace treaty, but Nicetas keeps silent about it (K 134; Regel 1892, I: 163; Rácz 1941, 39, lines 516–522, 46, lines 92–94).

211. K 134. Cf. Chalandon 1912, 414.

212. See Chalandon 1912, 417–438.

213. E.g. Vasilevski 1930, 67–73; Rozanov 1930, 668–670; Jurewicz 1962, 56–61; Kalić-Mijušković 1967, 52; Kalić 1970, 30, 36; Izvori 46–55.

214. See e.g. Kap-Herr 1881, 137–138; Pauler 1899, I: 288–289; Scherer 1911, 95–97; Chalandon 1912, 409–414; Deér 1928, 129; Hóman 1939, 374; Rácz 1941, 7; Moravcsik 1953, 80; Urbansky 1968, 80, 84; Moravcsik 1970, 81–82; Kerbl 1979, 106–107.

215. See Chalandon 1912, 640–641; Lamma 1955, I: 255–256, Beck 1959, 623; Browning 1961, 182–183; Wirth 1962, 266–268; Browning 1963, 13; Ostrogorsky 1969, 376; Kalić 1970, 30; Izvori 185, n. 2; Hunger 1978, 125.

216. Kalić 1970, 30.—Rhetor Michael's speech is dated to 1155 also by the editor of the text, Regel (see Regel, 1892, I: XIX).

217. K 133.

218. K 121.

219. Hist. 100.

220. K 133.

221. These events are dated likewise by Grot 1889, 198–201 and Freydenberg 1959, 34–35.—For the chronology of the Hungarian–Byzantine confrontation between 1149 and 1155 see also Makk 1981, 25–40.

Chapter V

Hungarian pretender princes in Byzantium

1. Chalandon 1907, I: 190–191; Chalandon 1912, 349, 350, n. 6.

2. Chalandon 1912, 351–352; Heilig 1973, 171; Jordan 1973, 119.

3. See Chalandon 1907, II: 195–226; Scherer 1911, 65–68; Chalandon 1912, 351–367; Vasilevski 1930, 113–121; Lamma 1955, I: 165–175; Lozinski 1961, 143; CMH 229; Ist. Viz. 328; Urbansky 1968, 81–83; Hampe 1968, 154–156; Ostrogorsky 1969, 406–407; Jordan 1973, 118–119.

4. MGH SS XX: 413–414.—All this is discussed in detail by Grot 1889, 211–214; Chalandon 1907, II: 226–244; Scherer 1911, 69–70; Chalandon 1912, 367–374; Vasilevski 1930, 130–131; Lamma 1955, I: 175–185; Ohnsorge 1958, 444; CMH 229; Heilig 1973, 171; Jordan 1973, 120.

5. G 1770.

6. MGH SS XX: 412–413.—For the political background to Frederick I's planned Byzantine match and also the causes of its failure see Chalandon 1912, 345–346; Lamma 1955, I: 142; CMH 229; Urbansky 1968, 78; Heilig 1973, 170; Jordan 1973, 115. For the German–French controversies see Lavissee 1931, 37–38; Büttner 1968, 92–95.
7. G 1770.
8. This view was held by Deér 1928, 130.
9. Scherer 1911, 69 already referred to this.
10. MGH SS XX: 414.
11. See Grot 1889, 214; Huber 1899, 232–235; Pelzer 1906, 9–10; Bretholz 1912, 254; Lamma 1955, I: 130–131; Ohnsorge 1958, 445; Hampe 1968, 147; Patze 1968, 391; Heilig 1973, 168, 171; Jordan 1973, 113–114, 116, 121.
12. G 21, 2632, 2645.—This view is shared by Deér 1928, 130.
13. G 1769.
14. Pelzer 1906, 2–3.
15. See Pelzer 1906, 11–13, Lamma 1955, I: 243; Ohnsorge 1958, 446; Hist. Pol. 306–307; Patze 1968, 357; Jordan 1973, 123.
16. Pelzer 1906, 8, has already referred to this.
17. In the summer of 1157 Vladislav II participated in the campaign of Frederick I against the Poles. For his services to the empire the ruling Prince of Bohemia was granted the title and crown of King by the German emperor at the Diet of Regensburg in January, 1158. See Huber 1899, 292–293; Bretholz 1912, 255; Jordan 1973, 123.
18. G 1656, 1994.
19. G 1994, 2292.—For the dating of Bishop Daniel's trip to Hungary see Pauler 1899, I: 290; Pelzer 1906, 14.
20. G 1770.
21. PRT I: 600.
22. Lederer 1932, 15–16.
23. Regel 1892, I: 158.
24. G 1031.
25. A princely provision involved the grant of certain estates and revenues, but meant no share in actual political power or, for that matter, possession of a part of the country. Since Géza II made his elder son, Stephen, his co-ruler, the king's brother could not entertain realistic hopes of legally inheriting the crown (see Pauler 1899, I: 286). Thus at the Diet of Regensburg in January, 1158, the followers of the king were grossly exaggerating when asserting that Prince Stephen actually shared power with the king, and the latter was in the superior position only nominally (G 1771).
26. G 1770–1771.
27. K 203.
28. Hist. 126.
29. K 132.
30. See e.g. Grot 1889, 201–202; Chalandon 1912, 413, n. 1; Vasilevski 1930, 71, n. 4 (Vasilevski put forward this view already in the first, St Petersburg edition of his work in 1877).
31. See Pauler 1899, I: 286–289; Scherer 1911, 96–97; Marczali 1911, 121; Chalandon 1912, 413 n. 1; Deér 1928, 129; Moravcsik 1934, 194; Hóman 1939, 374–375; Moravcsik 1953, 80; ET 100; Dölger 1964, 170; Urbansky 1968, 80. It was probably Du Cange who first voiced the opinion in his commentary to Cinnamus that the Stephen of the Greek text was identical with Prince Stephen, brother of King Géza II (K 345). See also Kerbl 1979, 106–107.
32. E.g. Grot 1889, 201–202; Vasilevski 1930, 71, n. 4, 71–72; Rozanov 1930, 669; Freydenberg 1959, 35; Pashuto 1968, 178.
33. Rozanov 1930, 669; Freydenberg 1959, 35.

34. Vasilevski 1930, 71, n. 4.
35. Grot 1889, 202, 216–217.
36. K 203.—The few words that Cinnamus devotes to the relationship between Géza II and Boris in another place in his work (K 117) clearly indicate that he did not regard Boris as Géza's son.
37. Cinnamus, due to his official position, belonged to the closest circle around Emperor Manuel. See Moravcsik 1934, 189; Moravcsik 1958, 324.
38. K 241, 245.
39. K 224–225.
40. According to Pauler (1899, I: 303, 499, n. 507), the cousin of Stephen IV was probably Prince Beloš' son.
41. G 1770.
42. G 1771.
43. G 1770.
44. Fejérpataky 1900, 343.—Prince Beloš figures as *ban* and *comes palatinus* in the charter of *comes* Walfer of 1157 (PRT I: 603–604), therefore, this document was probably made in the spring of 1157. For the authenticity of the charter see Érszegi 1978, 93–104.
45. Therefore, the view, that Beloš left Hungary in 1158, is unacceptable (Pauler 1899, I: 290; Hóman 1939, 375).
46. In the lack of sources it is impossible to provide a more precise date. It is hardly probable that Prince Stephen fled from Hungary at the end of 1157 (Pelzer 1906, 15), since the exchanges of envoys prior to the Diet of Regensburg in mid-January, 1158, between Frederick I and Géza II took a considerable length of time. Finally, it is also to be remembered that after Bishop Daniel's mission to Hungary in August, 1157, which actually effected the turn in Hungarian–German relations, Prince Stephen had few reasons to go to Frederick's court. This aspect was already noted also by Grot 1889, 216–217.
47. G 1770.
48. For the arbitration of the German emperor see Deér 1928, 131; Molnár 1949, 333; Gerics 1975, 361–362.—While it is true that this sort of obvious intervention by the Holy Roman Emperor in the internal affairs of the Hungarian Kingdom “did not affect the actual independence of the country” (Molnár 1949, 333), this event at the same time indicates that Hungary by no means enjoyed the position of a great power during the reign of Géza II, as is presumed by Stadtmüller (1951, 78).
49. G 1770.
50. G 1771.
51. See Pelzer 1906, 4–5; Lamma 1955, I: 128; Jordan 1973, 113; Gerics 1975, 361.
52. G 1771.
53. The view that Manuel stood behind the soliciting of German help by Prince Stephen, the basileus thus trying to win Frederick I for himself against Hungary a second time, is completely erroneous (Deér 1928, 130).
54. G 1770.
55. Hodinka 1916, 101.
56. SRH I: 456; SRH II: 197; G 1768, 2644.
57. K 104.
58. K 117.
59. Hodinka 1916, 129, 131.
60. RA—No. 81; Fejérpataky 1900, 343.
61. PRT I: 599, 600, 601, 603; SO I: No. 1.
62. See e.g. Fejérpataky 1892–1893, 15; PRT I: 597; G 1768, 1770.
63. MOT 61; Elekes 1964, 74, Kristó 1974b, 38–39; Kristó 1979, 64–65.

64. It seems to be a rather narrow view which states that the partisans of Prince Stephen were all "pro-emperor" and secular landlords (ET 100). It can be presumed, if not proved, that the prince was supported by magnates—both ecclesiastical and secular—from different groups of the ruling class, since the prince's attempt to seize power was not determined by the momentary foreign policy situation—that is, the stage in the ripening struggle between the Empire and the Papacy—, but by the internal conditions within Hungary.

65. G 1771.

66. It is possible that Beloš belonged to the retinue of Prince Stephen both in Germany and in Byzantium. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Beloš, a scion of the Serbian ruling dynasty, fled straight to Rascia from Hungary in 1157. His name reappears only in the early 1160s. In 1162 Manuel made him ruling Prince of Rascia, a post which he held only for a short time as in 1163 he was already one of Stephen IV's dignitaries (K 204; C II: No. 94). For the activities of Beloš as Grand *Župan* of Rascia see Kalić 1970, 33. Pauler places Beloš' appearance in Serbia and his ascent to the throne to the year 1158 (Pauler 1899, I: 290); this date, however, is unacceptable.

67. Hist 100.

68. See Chalandon 1907, II: 232–234; Chalandon 1912, 371–372; Uspenski 1948, 236; Lamma 1955, I: 186; Rassow 1961, 77; Haller 1962, 128–129; Hampe 1968, 156.

69. Chalandon 1907, II: 246–247.

70. See Chalandon 1907, II: 245–254; Chalandon 1912, 377–381; Uspenski 1948, 237–238; CMH 229–230; Ist. Viz. 327–328; Ostrogorsky 1969, 407; Maier 1973, 279; Jordan 1973, 120.

71. Hist. 126.

72. K 203; Hist. 126.—Mügel's chronicle also mentions the Byzantine marriage of Prince Stephen (SRH II: 200). See Kerbl 1979, 109–114.—Vajay (1979, 22) dates the marriage to 1156.

73. See Chalandon 1912, 417–462; Ostrogorsky 1969, 407–410.

74. See Ohnsorge 1958, 449; CMH 230; Ist. Viz. 328; Ostrogorsky 1969, 407.

75. For Barbarossa's second Italian campaign see Hampe 1968, 163; Jordan 1973, 128, 134.

76. See Kretschmayr 1905, 248; Váczy 1936, 558; Hampe 1968, 163; Jordan 1973, 128–129.

77. G 1771–1772.

78. See Kretschmayr 1905, 248–249; Chalandon 1907, II: 258–261; Mourret 1928, 399–401; Váczy 1936, 557–560; Hampe 1968, 165–169; Classen 1973, 442; Jordan 1973, 128–129.

79. G 1772–1773.

80. Chalandon 1907, II: 261, 291; Mourret 1928, 401; Burgaux 1949, 135; Lamma 1957, II: 49–51; Haller 1962, 145–147; Jordan 1973, 131.

81. Lamma 1955, I: 264–275; Haller 1962, 136; Hampe 1968, 160; Jordan 1973, 126; Gergely 1982, 113.

82. See Váczy 1936, 552–555; Molnár 1949, 337; Lamma 1955, I: 264–275; Lozinski 1961, 143–145; Haller 1962, 130–132; Seidler 1967, 333–334; Rogier–Aubert–Knowles 1968, 250–252; Hampe 1968, 152, 160; Classen 1973, 442–444; Heilig 1973, 168; Th. Mayer 1973, 378–381; Schramm 1975, 280, 291; Cuvillier 1979, 341.

83. Pelzer 1906, 18; Lavissee 1930, 37.

84. For the adherents of Pope Victor IV see Huber 1899, 244, 296–297; Pelzer 1906, 27, 28; Haller 1962, 162; Jordan 1973, 133.

85. G 1759, 1873.

86. For all this see Temesváry 1886, 30–32; Pauler 1899, I: 291; Lavissee 1931, 39; Pacaut 1953, 8–15; Pacaut 1956, 139; Haller 1962, 152–162; Hampe 1968, 172; Jordan 1973, 132.—It is debatable when Byzantium recognized Alexander III, Manuel siding *de facto* with Alexander III probably as early as the end of 1160 (Ohnsorge 1928, 69–71), but the recognition *de iure* following later (see Kap-Herr 1881, 72; Chalandon 1907, II: 299; Pacaut 1956, 233–234).

87. It turns out from the letter that Géza II let his own final decision depend on the attitude of the French king (CD II: 163).

88. This question has so far been dealt with most minutely and most fruitfully by Holtzmann (1926, 406–413). The essence of his views has been accepted in the present study.

89. CD VII/1: 158; ÁUO VI, No. 54; G 1774.—A few scholars question the authenticity of the conciliar resolutions (e.g. Temesváry 1886, 36, 45; Pauler 1899, I: 496, n. 492), while others accept them as authentic (e.g. Pelzer 1906, 17; Holtzman 1926, 406; Haller 1962, 152). Marczali (1911, 123) is firmly convinced that Géza II joined Victor IV then. It cannot be ruled out, however, that the envoys of Géza II did not attend the Council at Pavia (Kosztolnyik 1984b, 43–44).

90. G 2293.—Pauler (1899, I: 293) and Deér (1928, 134) date the Hungarian trip of Bishop Daniel to Easter, 1161. This is, however, unacceptable since according to the 12th century continuer of the work of Cosmas of Prague, this took place in 1160 (G 1656). This also follows logically from the fact that Bishop Daniel set out for Hungary at the behest of Frederick I and Victor IV directly after the Council of Pavia in February, 1160 (CD VII/1: 157; G 1774).

91. At least a letter to this effect was sent by Frederick Barbarossa to Patriarch Peregrinus of Aquileia in the summer of 1160 (G 956; ÁUO VI: No. 55).

92. See Holtzmann 1926, 406; Deér 1928, 133; Ohnsorge 1928, 112–114.

93. This particular piece of information comes from the letter Archbishop Lucas wrote to Archbishop Eberhard of Salzburg. For the time of the recognition see Pauler 1899, I: 293, 496, n. 492.

94. See Chalandon 1912, 417–467; Grousset 1935, II: 397–422; Uspenski 1948, 274–277; Richard 1953, 51; Lamma 1957, II: 20–32; Runciman 1958, II: 341–348; CMH 234–235; Ist. Viz. 322; Ostrogorsky 1969, 407–410.—For the time of the talks between Kilij Arslan and Manuel in Constantinople see Lamma 1957, II: 32, n. 1.

95. G 481.—This event, which the Chronicle of Cologne dates to 1160, is generally placed to 1164 by historians, since Frederick I held a diet in Parma in 1164 and not in 1160. E.g. Giesebrecht 1880, 389–392; Grot 1889, 324; Pauler 1899, I: 300; Pelzer 1906, 32; Scherer 1911, 104; Deér 1928, 139. In spite of the really convincing argument, it still seems possible that Prince Stephen appeared in the Italian camp of Frederick at the turn of 1160–1161, while in the spring of 1164, at the Diet of Parma, it was the envoys of Stephen IV, the ex-king, who pleaded help from Barbarossa on behalf of their overlord. This seems to be confirmed by a letter in which Barbarossa wrote Archbishop Eberhard—most probably at the turn of 1163–1164—that a deputation had come to see him from King Stephen III's uncle, the expelled king (Sudendorf No. 21). Kap-Herr has already deemed it possible that the events of the year 1160 in the chronicle are the resumé of the events of 1160 and 1164 (Kap-Herr 1881, 79, n. 5). With the restless, ambitious spirit of the obstinate pretender in mind it is difficult to believe he spent the three years between 1158 and 1162 in total passivity in Byzantium. In Constantinople he must have seen clearly that for the time being he could expect no help at all from the basileus, who was completely preoccupied with his eastern policies. The Chronicle of Cologne calls the prince the brother (*frater*) of the reigning King of Hungary, which also dates Prince Stephen's Italian trip to the reign of Géza II (see Kap-Herr 1881, 79, n. 5).

96. G 1759.—Pauler (1889, I: 495, n. 487) believes the information from Otto of St Blasien refers to the 1159 promise of Géza II. It seems, however, more probable that it was this promise that Frederick I's envoy, Provost Siegfried wished Géza II to keep in the autumn of 1161 (see Holtzmann 1926, 408).

97. MGH SS XVIII: 632.—See Holtzmann 1926, 408; Pelzer 1906, 19.

98. For the date when Frederick I's envoy, Siegfried, Provost of Paderborn came to Hungary see Pelzer 1906, 22; Holtzmann 1926, 408; Deér 1928, 135.

99. The letters of Géza II to Louis VII and Archbishop Eberhard, and the latter's answer testify to this (CD II: 163; ÁUO VI: No. 57, No. 58).

100. G 481.

101. This view is shared e.g. by Pelzer 1906, 15; Holtzmann 1926, 405; Ohnsorge 1958, 405; Hampe 1968, 148.

102. This is also the opinion of those who presume, wrongly, that an overlord-vassal relationship existed between the German emperor and the Hungarian king (e.g. Pelzer 1906, 20; Holtzmann 1926, 407; Ohnsorge 1958, 449).

103. G 481.

104. See Kap-Herr 1881, 72; Kretschmayr 1905, 249; Chalandon 1907, II: 298; Deér 1928, 135.

105. See Chalandon 1907, II: 298; Pacaut 1956, 113; Ohnsorge 1958, 449-450; Urbansky 1968, 90-91.

106. That Géza II refused the "universal empire" concept of Frederick is indicated also by the fact that in his letter to the French king he referred to Frederick as the "Emperor of the Germans" and not as the "Emperor of the Romans" (CD II: 163). See Temesváry 1886, 62; Gerics 1975, 364.

107. On the basis of the power relationship between the *imperium* and the *sacerdotium* at the time, the assessment that "in the middle of the 12th century the advance of the Papacy constituted a more dangerous menace than the empire" for Hungary seems to be entirely unacceptable (ET 100).

108. Elekes 1964, 87.

109. In his letter to Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg, Archbishop Lucas presents the case as if he alone had been responsible for the recognition of Alexander III by Géza II. "I have managed through appeals to cause our Lord the King and our whole church to accept Alexander" (G 1477). The view, based on this, that gives the influence of Archbishop Lucas all the credit for the Hungarian king's siding with Alexander III is rather widely shared in the literature on the subject. See e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 293; ET 101; Gerics 1975, 363. As it has already been referred to, what really happened was that foreign policy considerations played the crucial role in the ecclesiastical policies of Géza II.

110. See Mezey 1959, 420; Mezey 1971, 427; Kubinyi 1975, 104.

111. For Archbishop Eberhard's activity in aid of Pope Alexander III see Temesváry 1886, 46-50; Huber 1899, 242-243; Pauler 1899, I: 293-294; Pacaut 1955, 825; Jordan 1973, 137.

112. Archbishop Lucas himself was also corresponding with Alexander III in the beginning of 1161, as revealed in his letter to the Archbishop of Salzburg (G 1477).

113. Holtzmann 1926, 412-413; Ohnsorge 1928, 115.

114. Holtzmann (1926, 413) was the first to draw attention to this ecclesiastical agreement. The majority of scholars—with few exceptions (e.g. Györy 1948, 16)—accept the conclusion of the concordat as a fact (see e.g. Deér 1928, 133; Ohnsorge 1928, 116; Hóman 1939, 406; Molnár 1949, 332, 340; Lamma 1957, II: 67, n. 1; Haller 1962, 162-163; Deér 1964, 167; Patze 1968, 391, n. 247).

115. The similarities between certain articles in the Hungarian-Papal concordat of 1161, the agreement of Benevento in 1156, and the 1164 Constitutions of Clarendon can be discerned primarily in the questions of the *appellatio* and the *legatio*. The relevant passages indicate that the Hungarian, the Norman, and the English kings equally retained the right to directly control the relationship between the Papacy and the clerical leaders of their respective realms by insisting on the condition of royal permission for contacts between the clericals and the Pope. See Chalandon 1907, II: 233-234; Holtzmann 1926, 410, 413; Lavisie 1931, 50; Lamma 1957, II: 59, 67, n. 1; Haller 1962, 128, 162-163; Deér 1964, 138, 155-168; Kulesár 1965, 302.—For the

historical causes of the similarities in the Sicilian, Hungarian, and English ecclesiastical conditions see Györffy 1970b, 154, 154, n. 4.

116. C II: No. 88, No. 91.

117. Hist. 126.

118. The emigration of Ladislav to Byzantium is dated to the year 1158 by Hóman (1939, 375), and Moravcsik (1953, 80), to 1159 by Pauler (1899, I: 291), and Deér (1928, 136). Neither of these dates can be completely ruled out as impossible, but it still seems more probable that Prince Ladislav left for Byzantium a little later—around 1160—since the supposition of a close connection between Prince Ladislav's emigration to Byzantium, and the assignment of the ducal territory to Béla, the younger son of Géza II, seems well justified. The sources from the time of Géza II fail to mention Béla's *ducatus*, thus the establishment and the organization of the duchy must have taken place towards the end of Géza's reign, possibly in 1161. Ladislav went to Byzantium probably not long before that, which then makes it sometime around 1160.

119. K 203.

120. Hist. 126.

121. Hist. 126.—Prince Ladislav's Byzantine marriage is mentioned groundlessly by Kosztolnyik 1980, 377.

122. K 203; Hist. 127.

123. It is Cinnamus who provides evidence that the *ducatus* complete with territorial power was organized during the life of Géza II. The Byzantine historian has this to say about the events of 1163, i.e. the agreement between Stephen III and Byzantium: "And the Huns [i.e. Hungarians], after the negotiations with Palaeologus, readily handed over to him Béla, and as his share, the land that his father had consigned to him in his lifetime" (K. 215). The same information is contained in the letter of Manuel to Stephen III in 1164, as reported by Cinnamus: "O, my child, we have not come to bring war upon the Huns, but to regain for Béla, your brother, the land . . . that you gave [him], and your father [had given him] much earlier" (K 217).

124. Deér (1928, 137) has already referred to this.

125. See e.g. Kap-Herr 1881, 81; Pauler 1899, I: 299; Pelzer 1906, 28; Hóman 1939, 379; Ferluga 1957, 130; Ist. Viz. 326; Györffy 1970a, 228; Moravcsik 1970, 82–83.

126. E.g. Chalandon 1912, 475; Deér 1928, 137; Novak 1957, 82; Freydenberg 1959, 36; CMH 234; Kalić-Mijušković 1967, 54; Izvori 66, n. 161; Kerbl 1979, 134.

127. K 248–249.

128. K 231.

129. K 224; G 2295.

130. K 215, 217.

131. For the territorial extension of the duchies established at various times see Kristó 1979, 44–53.

132. Earlier the present author also shared the view that Sirmium was part of Béla's duchy from the beginning, together with Central Dalmatia and Croatia (Makk 1978, 22). One of the reasons that necessitated a change of mind was a cautionary remark by a colleague, István Kapitány, that the lack of direct physical contact between Sirmium and the Croatian–Dalmatian lands involves difficulties concerning any supposition that Sirmium was part of the duchy.

133. Kristó–Makk 1981, 10.

134. See Makk 1979, 29–43.

Chapter VI

The years of Byzantine intervention

1. For the date of Géza II's decease see Pauler 1899, I: 294, 496.
2. SRH I: 127, 461; SRH II: 200; G 505, 1095.
3. See Giesebrecht 1880, 292–319, 316; Kap-Herr 1881, 74–75; Lavissee 1931, 39; Pacaut 1953, 18; Lamma 1957, II: 60, 121–123; Haller 1962, 167–169; Hampe 1968, 173; Fasoli 1968, 132–133; Urbansky 1968, 90–91; Jordan 1973, 133–134.
4. K 228.
5. K. 202, 228.
6. MGH SS XVII: 774.
7. Lamma 1957, II: 58.
8. See Kap-Herr 1881, 72–76; Chalandon 1907, II: 298–301; Pacaut 1956, 113; Ohnsorge 1958, 449.
9. Giesebrecht 1880, 320; Chalandon 1907, II: 298; Hampe 1968, 174.
10. See Chalandon 1907, II: 298; Lavissee 1931, 42–43; Pacaut 1953, 20–21; Haller 1962, 170; Hampe 1968, 173; Jordan 1973, 134.
11. Chalandon 1907, II: 300; Ohnsorge 1928, 76.
12. Giesebrecht 1880, 425; Ohnsorge 1928, 75; Hampe 1968, 176.
13. K 202–203.
14. Hist. 127.
15. This view is shared e.g. by Pauler 1899, I: 295; Freydenberg 1959, 35; Urbansky 1968, 93–94.
16. The events of 1163 and 1165 prove this. From the autumn of 1163 Manuel laid claim to Sirmium and Central Dalmatia as the patrimony of Prince Béla, and in the spring of 1165 the Byzantines in addition occupied Bosnia (see note 138 below).
17. K 214.
18. See Scherer 1911, 99; Lamma 1957, II: 109; CMH 233; Urbansky 1968, 93.
19. Hist. 127.
20. Hist. 127.
21. K 203.
22. K 203; Hist. 127.—Other sources also mention Prince Ladislas' ascent to power, e.g. SRH I: 127, 461, 183; SRH II: 200, 336; G 62, 559, 677, 751, 762, 763, 1095.
23. G 1095.
24. SRH II: 200.
25. Some scholars (see Mill. tört., 295; Pauler 1899, I: 296; Scherer 1911, 101, n. 2; Ostrogorsky 1951, 454) believe that during the reign of Ladislas II his younger brother, Stephen, was heir designate to royal power. This may have been so, but the question cannot be decided with absolute certainty, as the only proof, i.e. the word *Urum* in Cinnamus allegedly denoting the Hungarian heir apparent, seems—as it turns out below—hardly acceptable.
26. SRH I: 183, 461; G 62.
27. For the beginning and the end of Ladislas II's reign see Pauler 1899, I: 296, 297, 497, n. 498.
28. SO I: No. 2.
29. HO VI: No. 2.
30. SO I: No. 2; ÓMO 44–45.
31. SRH II: 200; Geréb 1959, 236.—The *Annales Posonienses* also mention the sojourn of Stephen in Pozsony (SRH I: 127).
32. SRH II: 200, 336–337; G 1095.—For the behaviour of the Archbishop of Esztergom, see the apt remark of Molnár (1949, 340): "Archbishop Lucas was not only able to make

excommunication, this moral weapon of the Church, an effective political weapon, but also, by developing the Archbishop of Esztergom's king-creating function of crowning into a claim of the Church to the right to supervise the legal standing of the king, he managed to acquire political force to support this claim." For that matter, the legal basis for Archbishop Lucas to excommunicate the anti-kings from Byzantium was provided by Art. 17 of King Stephen I's (1000–1038) Second Code, and Art. 2 of the second synod during Coloman's reign (Závodszky 1904, 155–156, 207).

33. G 1095.

34. G 1095.—This event took place at Christmas, 1162, contrary to the information provided by Walter Map of England. See Pauler 1899, I: 297, 497, n. 497.

35. G 1095.

36. For the date see Pauler 1899, I: 297.

37. Both Hungarian and foreign sources mention the ascent of Stephen IV to the throne. E.g. SRH I: 127, 183, 210, 461; SRH II: 201, 336; K 211; G 62, 559, 751–752, 762, 763.

38. For the date of the coronation see Pauler 1899, I: 297.—According to a recently expounded view, the two parts of the Holy Crown of Hungary were united for the coronation of Stephen IV (Bertényi 1978, 44–45).

39. According to Mügelin, Archbishop Lucas of Esztergom refused to crown Stephen IV (SRH II: 201), thus it was probably the Archbishop of Kalocsa who placed the crown on the new king's head. That prelate at that time was Mikó, who, according to the evidence of a charter, was a member of Stephen IV's court in 1163 (C II: No. 94). See Pauler 1899, I: 297.

40. SRH II: 336, 337.

41. The reign of Stephen IV, according to some sources, lasted for five months and five days (SRH I: 183, 461; SRH II: 336), others say he ruled only for five months (SRH I: 210; G 62).—For the chronology of Stephen IV's reign see Pauler 1899, I: 496, n. 492, 497, n. 497; Mályusz 1971a, 112. Recently a new, but unsubstantiated and arbitrary and, therefore, quite unacceptable chronology has been introduced by Kerbl. He believes that following the death of Géza II on May 31, 1161 (!), Stephen IV reigned twice in the country: first, from the autumn of 1161 until the spring of 1162 (being crowned only in February, 1162), and second from January, 1163 until June 19, 1163 (Kerbl 1979, 115–116, 121–123).

42. SRH II: 201; Geréb 1959, 236.

43. K 211.

44. K 204.

45. C II: No. 94.

46. SRH I: 192.—Klaić (1976, 455) holds that in 1163 the *ban* of Bosnia was the same Borič who had fought against Manuel for Géza II in the early 1150s. Her view is based on the Fejér edition of Stephen IV's charter from 1163, in which—contrary to the Smičiklas edition of the same (C II: No. 94)—the name of *ban* Borič is mentioned (CD II: 165–167). Her opinion seems acceptable, though further examination of the document would seem necessary for a final answer.

47. K 211–212.—The basileus himself also marched as far as Philippopolis.

48. K 212.

49. G 1032.

50. G 1032.

51. Provost Gerhoh also sheds light on this. According to his work, "they [the Hungarians] deserted Alexander by rejecting the archbishop [i.e. Lucas] he had confirmed by his legates" (G 1032). The epistle that the Pope wrote to Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg on May 29, 1163, is also indicative of the good relations between Alexander III and Lucas (Acta No. 417).

52. It is again Gerhoh who refers to this (G 1032). For the time of the composition of the relevant passage in the contemporary chronicler's work see Classen 1960b 423.

53. See Norden 1903, 89–95; Chalandon 1912, 565–570; Moravcsik 1953, 16–17; Dvornik 1964, 139–140.

54. In this respect it would seem significant that since the second half of the 11th century no monasteries following the Eastern rite had been founded in Hungary (Érszegi 1975, 10). The failure of Béla III's efforts to establish the cult of St Ivan of Rila in Hungary also proves this point.

55. According to the evidence of the only extant charter of Stephen IV (from 1163), however, a considerable section of the Hungarian clergy, headed by Archbishop Mikó of Kalocsa, supported the anti-king (C II: No. 94).

56. Acta No. 417.

57. See note 4 to Chapter V above.

58. Kap-Herr 1881, 79.

59. In connection with this, Rahewin relates that Stephen III, "having given 5000 marks to the emperor, drew him to his own side" (G 1774). The source indeed claims that this happened in 1164, and this date is accepted by most scholars (e.g. Kap-Herr 1881, 82; Pauler 1899, I: 300; Scherer 1911, 104; Deér 1928, 139), but remembering that all the dates of Rahewin concerning the reign of Stephen III are out by one year (G 1774), the agreement between Frederick I and Stephen III would be better placed in the year 1163. See Pelzer 1906, 32.

60. See Giesebrecht 1880, 373; Pelzer 1906, 28–29; Hist. Pol. 308; Hampe 1968, 175.

61. Mügelin's work mentions that several supporters of the anti-king switched to Stephen III's side before the decisive clash between the two (SRH II: 201).

62. SRH I: 300—See also Karácsonyi 1901, II: 116; Mályusz 1971a, 58–59, 80–81.

63. SRH I: 127, 183, 462; SRH II: 201; HO VI: No. 2.—For the date of the battle at Székesfehérvár see Pauler 1899, I: 298. Foreign sources also mention the fall of Stephen IV, and Stephen III's return to power (K 212; G 505, 559, 752, 762, 763).

64. SRH II: 202.

65. K 212.

66. SRH II: 202; Geréb 1959, 236.

67. Even so, the view, shared by Grot (1889, 291), Pelzer (1906, 30), and Scherer (1911, 102), that Stephen IV, on regaining the kingship, renounced the possession of Sirmium in Emperor Manuel's favour, cannot be justified. Some scholars, by the way, regard the reign of Stephen IV as an interesting phase in the monetary history of the age of the Árpád dynasty, since in their view it was then that copper coins after the Byzantine fashion were minted and circulated in Hungary for the first time. They hold that during the reign of Stephen IV the copper coins bearing double royal images depict the sitting figures of Béla II and his son, Stephen IV on one side of the coin with the inscription REX BELA and REX STS (Réthy 1900, 171; Hóman 1916, 240; Bartoniek 1926, 812; Moravcsik 1953, 102; Moravcsik 1970, 122; Székely 1974, 73). Others, however, believe that these coins of Byzantine character were issued in the time of Béla III, the seated royal figures on the pieces depict Béla III and his predecessor, Stephen III, the inscription, naturally, also referring to these kings (Jeszenszky 1935–1936, 35–47; Huszár 1964, 145–152; Gedai 1968, 148; MOT 1971, 65). A final answer cannot be offered here to this problem, but the reign of Stephen IV would seem more fitting as the time when the coins were minted. In his charter of 1163, the anti-king refers to his having won the kingship as his "patrimonial dignity", recalling at the same time his being King Béla II's son, and styling himself Stephen III (C II: No. 94). All this clearly expresses Stephen IV's view that he had taken possession of the country by right of his descent from Béla II, according to the principle of *senioratus*, which favoured him over the younger Stephen III, whose reign of six weeks and whose claim to be king he did not recognize. This conception is in perfect harmony with his having the images of Béla II and himself, his son, displayed on the copper coins. On the other hand, it would not have made much sense for Béla III to have the image of his predecessor, Stephen III, minted next to his own figure

on his own coins, since both on his seals and in his charters Béla refers not to his being the brother of Stephen III, but to the fact that he was the son of King Géza II (Fejérpataky 1900, 149, 151, 161). A rather surprising hypothesis has recently been put forward by Vajay (1974, 368), namely, that between 1163 and 1165 Byzantium regarded Stephen IV and Béla as co-rulers, and, accordingly, the images on the copper coins are those of Stephen IV and his co-ruler, *corex* Béla (later Béla III). This view cannot be accepted since not a single source provides evidence that Stephen IV and Prince Béla were co-rulers.

68. K 212; Hist. 128.

69. K 213, 214.—According to Cinnamus, Emperor Manuel had time in Niš even to settle the affairs of Serbia. At that time, Grand *Župan* Dessa, who had replaced Beloš, was making overtures to Frederick Barbarossa, and would not aid Manuel in his campaign against the Hungarians. Finally, Dessa, prompted by the news of the march of the Byzantine army, made his appearance in the basileus' camp in Niš, where, however, he tried to contact Stephen III through the latter's envoys there. Manuel thereupon had the Serbian prince captured and imprisoned in Constantinople (K 212–214). However, the chronology of these events is rather uncertain, and it is also possible that all this took place not in 1163, but a couple of years later. See Izvori 63, n. 155.

70. K 214.

71. K 214–215; Hist. 128.—Although in connection with the Hungarian–Byzantine treaty of 1163 the sources fail to mention the pledge of Manuel that he would no longer support the restoration designs of Stephen IV, there can be but little doubt that this important condition formed a part of the agreement. This can be inferred from later events. Thus, according to a Byzantine source, in 1164 Manuel explicitly promised never again to allow Stephen IV to march with an army to Hungary (K 224). The crucial argument, however, would seem to be that at the turn of 1163–1164 Stephen IV's envoys were soliciting Frederick Barbarossa to help their overlord regain the crown he had lost (Sudendorf 1849, No. 21). This clearly indicates that in 1163 Manuel indeed relinquished his support for the aspirations of Stephen IV.

72. According to Pauler, Béla must have been a child of 12–13 in 1163 (1899, I: 299), but Thallóczy believes Prince Béla was born around 1148 (1900, 59).

73. K 215.

74. A different view is held by Thallóczy 1900, 69; Moravcsik 1953, 88; Moravcsik 1970, 89; Obolensky 1971, 162; Kerbl 1979, 142.

75. K 215.

76. K 215.—A western source also mentions the dynastic connection established between Hungary and Byzantium at that time (G 756). For the age of Mary Comnena see Kerbl 1979, 136.

77. See Moravcsik 1933, 519; Hóman 1939, 379; Ostrogorsky 1951, 458; Ferjančić 1960, 6, 9, 27, 205; Guillard 1967a, 1–2; Ist. Viz. 326; Székely 1967, 309; Moravcsik 1970, 89; Obolensky 1971, 162.

78. This view is shared e.g. by Kap-Herr 1881, 103; Pelzer 1906, 30; Scherer 1911, 103; Chalandon 1912, 476; Deér 1928, 138; Moravcsik 1933, 519–520; Gyóni 1938b, 56; Hóman 1939, 379; Laurent 1940a, 38; Stadtmüller 1951, 70; Ostrogorsky 1951, 454; Moravcsik 1953, 88; Ferluga 1957, 130; Lamma 1957, II: 106; Ohnsorge 1958, 450; Ferjančić 1960, 27; Dölger 1964, 171; CMH 234; Ferdinandy 1967, 58; Guillard 1967a, 2; Urbansky 1968, 98–99; Obolensky 1971, 160, 162; Kerbl 1979, 134, 153; Kosztolnyik 1980, 379.

79. CB 167.

80. K 203.

81. See Ostrogorsky 1951, 454; Moravcsik 1953, 87; Ferjančić 1960, 27–28; Guillard 1967a, 2; Moravcsik 1970, 89; Wirth 1973, 443; Kerbl 1979, 140.

82. Before 1975 scholars had as the best edition of the works of Nicetas Choniates the one edited by Bekker in Bonn, in 1835. This text contains the remark that Manuel, as early as 1163,

intended to make Béla his heir (CB 167). Recent examinations of the text have, however, proved that this passage is missing from the MSS which contain the original text of Nicetas, and can be found only in a later, 15th century vulgar Greek version of the historian's work. Bekker adopted the sentence in question from this vernacular version. Since, however, the vulgar Greek version does not come from Nicetas, the modern editor of his work, Dieten, does not regard the passage in question as one by the Byzantine historian. For this see Hist. XXXIII, LXXXVI, CVI, 128. The anonymous author of the vernacular version probably projected Manuel's designatory intentions back to 1163 as an effect of the actual designation in 1165.

83. Towards the end of 1165 Manuel indeed designated his daughter, Mary, and her betrothed, Béla-Alexius as heirs to the throne of Byzantium (Hist. 112, 137). For the real background of this designation see Chapter VII.

84. Deér 1934, 96–97; Gyóni 1938b, 55; Elekes 1964, 73.

85. The same view is held by Pauler 1899, I: 296.

86. See e.g. C II: 21, 96, 97, 393; SO I: No. 3; Marsina No. 97; Jakubovich 1924, 157; SRH I: 380, 431, 435, 438, 447, 456.

87. See e.g. C I: 161; SRH I: 381, 422, 450; SRH II: 456.

88. E.g. C II: 184.

89. E.g. Fejérpataky 1892–1893, 18.—The wife of *comes* Márton was *domina*, by the way (Fejérpataky 1892–1893, 18).

90. E.g. Fejérpataky 1892, 44, 61–62; Fejérpataky 1895, 19; Marsina 77; Fejérpataky 1892–1893, 16.

91. PRT X: 15, 429, 499, 501.

92. That is why Béla-Alexius is styled *dominus dux* also in the Jerusalem charter of 1170 [CD V/1, 284; Delaville 1894, 222].

93. To be sure, in the contemporary Latin usage in Hungary the word *dux*, besides *dominus*, also meant *úr* “lord”, and the male members of the royal family (brothers and sons of the king), who could exert a claim to the crown by right of descent, were styled *dux* in Hungarian charters and chronicles. However—as with the case of *dominus*—even on the basis of the word *dux* also meaning *úr* “lord”, it would be wrong to suppose that the word *úr* signified the heir apparent in Hungary at the time. In the 12th century Prince Beloš, Bishop Kalán, *voivode* Benedict, son of Korlath, and Prince Velek were all styled *dux* [PRT I: 597; C II: No. 249; CD III/1: 317; CD III/2: 67], although their being heirs to, or expectants of, the throne of the Árpáds is out of the question, since they did not belong to the ruling dynasty by descent. See Makk 1979, 31–34; Contributions 447–450.

94. This view is not shared by Ostrogorsky 1951, 454; Moravcsik 1953, 87; Ferjančić 1960, 28; Jurewicz 1962, 79; Guiland 1967a, 2; Ist. Viz. 326; Ostrogorsky 1969, 411; Kerbl 1979, 140.

95. Hist. 112, 137; K 287.

96. K 214–215.

97. Váczy 1936, 534.

98. Elekes 1964, 78.

99. K 218.

100. CMH 234; Ist. Viz. 326.

101. Sudendorf 1849, No. 21.

102. G 481.—This particular piece of information from the Chronicle of Cologne is commented on in note 95 to Chapter V.

103. Sudendorf No. 21.

104. See Giesebrecht 1880, 381–385; Lamma 1957, II: 109; Haller 1962, 176; Hampe 1968, 175; Jordan 1973, 137.

105. G 481.

106. Sudendorf 1849, No. 22.

107. G 1994–1995, 2293.
108. See also Pauler 1899, I: 302; Moravcsik 1984, 226.
109. See Vernadskij 1927–1928, 274; Francès 1959, 54–56; Pashuto 1968, 179, 194–195.
110. Deér already referred to this (1928, 138).
111. All the Byzantine source says is that Stephen III “attacked the patrimony of Béla” (K 216). According to one view, the royal army then marched into Sirmium (Deér 1928, 140), although the military move of the Hungarians was probably primarily directed against Dalmatia. This is indicated by a charter from Spalato, 1164, in which Peter, Archbishop of Spalato “in the time of Stephen, King of Hungary, son of King Géza, and his *ban*, Ampudius” passed in a possessory action a decree in favour of the church of Tengerfehérvár (C II: No. 96). That is, at that time the rule of the Hungarian king extended over Central Dalmatia. It is probably the Hungarian manoeuvres in Dalmatia in 1164 that Venetian sources are referring to when they relate that the King of Hungary took possession of the whole of Dalmatia with his army of 30,000 troops (G 62, 688, 1173). After all, it cannot be ruled out that, simultaneously with the events in Dalmatia, Hungarian control over Sirmium was also strengthened. This would also explain why the advance of Stephen IV was so promptly thwarted. For contemporary military strengths see Hadtörténet 34.
112. According to Cinnamus, it was the Hungarian king who violated the agreement of the previous year (K 216). With the antecedents in mind, there is little reason to question the historian’s statement. A different view is held e.g. by Pauler 1899, I: 300; Scherer 1911, 104–105.
113. Nur-ad-Din, Prince of Mosul, son of Zengi, seized the Emirate of Damascus in 1154, thus putting the crusading states in a most difficult position. Nur-ad-Din’s expansion primarily threatened Antioch, whose ruler became Manuel’s vassal at the turn of 1158–1159. In 1162 the amir started a campaign against Antioch, which failed. In the spring of 1163, however, he attacked the County of Tripoli. Constantine Kalamanos Ducas, Boris’ son, who was the Byzantine governor of Cilicia at the time, gave battle and defeated the amir. In the summer of 1164 Nur-ad-Din launched another campaign against Antioch, inflicting a serious defeat near Harim on the Antiochan–Byzantine–Armenian army led by Bohemond III, Constantine Kalamanos, and Thoros II. The son of Boris was also captured by the Seljuqs. Both Antioch and Jerusalem were in a critical position after the amir’s triumph. Amalric, King of Jerusalem, had already applied to the rulers of the West for help against the Seljuqs in 1163. For all this see Giesebrecht 1880, 437; Áldásy 1924, 53; Grousset 1935, II: 449–466; Lamma 1957, II: 102–105; Runciman 1958, II: 355–360. Cinnamus relates that after the battle of Harim, Manuel prepared to march against Nur-ad-Din to stop the Seljuq expansion and to defend the Principality of Antioch, but Stephen III’s attack kept him from doing so (K 215–216). Some scholars place the amir’s victory to July 20, 1164, others to August 10th. Thus, Stephen III’s move in Dalmatia—and perhaps Sirmium—and Stephen IV’s advance into Hungary had already happened by that time.
114. K 216.—It cannot be questioned that Constantinople was aware of Stephen IV’s intentions, since the anti-king would not have been able to attack Hungary from the town of Anchialus, the Black Sea base of the Byzantine fleet, without the cooperation of the imperial authorities.
115. K 217.
116. K 216, 223.
117. K 216–217, 221–222; SRH II: 202.—John Diogenes also refers to Manuel’s 1164 campaign to Hungary in his speech delivered before the emperor (Regel 1917, II: 311).
118. K 221–222.—At that time a considerable part of the population in the southern territories of Hungary (Délvidék)—the southern part of the area between the Danube and the Tisza, Sirmium, and Temesköz (Temes district)—were adherents of the Greek Church. Ecclesiastical bodies following the Byzantine rite were active in Száva-szentdemeter (in

Sirmium), and at Bács (in Pagatzium). The latter was one of the centres of the Metropolitane of the Archbishopric of Bács-Kalocsa. The fact that a great part of the population in the region followed the Byzantine faith helped, of course, to a great extent the expansionist efforts of the basileus. See Gyóni 1947, 49; Györffy 1952, I: 338–344; Moravcsik 1953, 57, 61–62; 78; ET 101; MOT 70; Györffy 1971, 64; Györffy 1977b, 167–168.

119. G 2293, 2294, 1996.

120. K 224–225.—For the identity of Stephen IV's cousin, called Stephen, see Chapter V.

121. K 218.—There can be no doubt that the allied army of the Alamans (Germans) and the "Scythians living near the Tauros" (Tauroscythians = Russians) as mentioned by Cinnamus should be interpreted as auxiliary troops mainly from Austria and Halich. See Grot 1889, 303; Pauler 1899, I: 300; Chalandon 1912, 478; Hóman 1939, 380; Levchenko 1956, 485.

122. K 218; G 184, 441, 532, 1994–1996, 2293–2295.

123. SRH II: 202; K 222–225; G 1995–1996, 2294–2295.—Besides the brief account of Mügelin, these events are also related most minutely by Cinnamus and the Bohemian authors (Vincent of Prague and Přibico). The narrations of the Byzantine and Bohemian authors correspond in the most important respects and complement each other well on several points, but the chronologies they provide of these events, which happened in numerous places and in quick succession, differ in certain aspects. As the chronology of the Bohemian chroniclers seems more logical, this has therefore been adopted in the present work.

124. K 224; G. 2295.—After the conclusion of the peace treaty Vladislav II and Manuel decided to establish dynastic connections between the Byzantine and Bohemian ruling houses (G 1996, 2295).

125. Gabras also had orders to protect Stephen IV, who had been left in Sirmium (K 226). Then, by the way, that is in 1164, the Byzantines incorporated Sirmium into the imperial *theme* system, and *sebastos* Michael Gabras was placed at the head of the province as governor (*dux*) (K 258). According to Wasilewski, the *theme* of Sirmium was organized only in 1167 (1964, 481–482). This is contradicted not only by the fact that the name of the governor of the province is known from 1166, but also by a speech of Michael of Anchialus. The Byzantine rhetor, in his oration, which is placed to 1165, has the following to say concerning Sirmium: Stephen III "relocated the established borders... His intention was to regain Sirmium, ... and the parts beyond the plains along the Istros [Danube], which... had already been geographically registered. The most illustrious ruler of all times... not long before had annexed and listed these among the most renowned possessions of the Romans" (Browning 1961, 200).

126. G 62, 688, 1173.

127. K 231, 239.—The attack against Sirmium was not only aimed at regaining the territory, but was also presumably directed against Stephen IV, whose stay in Sirmium might easily have become dangerous for the rule of Stephen III, judging by the events of 1164.

128. K 238.

129. K 231.

130. K 232, 235–237.

131. Pauler 1899, I: 306; Deér 1928, 142.

132. For the settlement of relations between Halich, Kiev, and Byzantium see Grot 1889, 327–334, 340; Chalandon 1912, 481–482; Vernadskij 1927–1928, 274–275; Levchenko 1956, 485, 489–494; Francès 1959, 58; Jurewicz 1964, 341–352; Pashuto 1968, 179, 193–195. In addition to the Russian annals, the Byzantine historians also recount in detail the flight of Manuel's rival Andronicus, to Halich, his affairs there, and his reconciliation with the basileus (K 232–234; Hist. 129–132).

133. The basileus, however, was not able to forge a German–Byzantine alliance against Stephen III as claimed by Cinnamus (K 236). The assertion that the Byzantines were aided at Semlin by an auxiliary unit of Henry, Duke of Austria, cannot be accepted (Kalić 1971a, 43). All

that Cinnamus says is "neither did Henry want to stay away from the fight" (K 236). It is not mentioned that the duke actually took part in the war. All this can be attributed to the tendentious presentation by Cinnamus (Grot 1889, 335–336; Pauler 1899, I: 305).

134. Doge Vitale Michiel offered Manuel a fleet of 100 ships against the Hungarians (K 237). The same fleet helped the Byzantines to seize Central Dalmatia in the first half of 1165. This view is shared by Grot 1889, 345; Ferluga 1957, 133–134.

135. K 239; Hist. 128.—For the date of Stephen IV's death see Pauler 1899, I: 306. Other sources also mention Stephen IV's death in Semlin (SRH I: 183, 210, 462; SRH II: 202).

136. K 240–246; Hist. 133–135.—Nicetas also mentions that during the siege some of the citizens of Semlin collaborated with the Byzantines. They were probably followers of Stephen IV. For details of the struggle for Semlin in 1165 see Kalić 1971a, 41–47.

137. K 248–249.

138. The sources fail to mention the conquest of Bosnia by Byzantium. Nevertheless, Emperor Manuel in April, 1166, had also *boshtnikos* (Bosnian) among his imperial titles (Mango 1963, 324). From this it is justified to infer that in 1165 the army of John Ducas occupied Bosnia as well (Ferluga 1957, 133; Wasilewski 1964, 482; Izvori 206, n. 33). Novak (1957, 83), however, dates the Byzantine conquest of Bosnia to 1164, and Ćirković (1964, 43) to 1166. According to the latest view, Manuel took possession of Bosnia years before 1165 (Klaić 1976, 456). In 1166 the epithet *khrobatikos* (= Croatian) figured among the titles of the basileus (Mango 1963, 324). Thus the Byzantines also very probably occupied a part of Croatia in 1165.

139. G 62, 688, 1173.—See also Ferluga 1957, 133–134.

140. K 248.—This is related to Manuel's assumption of the epithes *dalmatikos* (= Dalmatian) and *ungrikos* (= Hungarian) among his imperial titles (Mango 1963, 324). The epithet *ungrikos* refers to the takeover of Hungarian Sirmium by Byzantium.

141. See Ferluga 1957, 133, 137; Browning 1961, 476.—The first governor of the united Dalmatian *theme* was Nicephorus Chalupes (K 248), Spalato being the centre of the province (K 263).

142. Hist. 135–136.—The occupation of Sirmium resulted in financial gains for the imperial treasury. Manuel levied taxes in Sirmium as early as the autumn of 1165 (K 249).

143. Although it is a fact that during the siege of Semlin word got round the retinue of Manuel that Stephen III was approaching with Scythian (?Pecheneg) and Tauroscythian (Russian) auxiliaries, accompanied by the Bohemian king with his entire armed force (K 242), the information turned out to be false. Even Bohemian sources know nothing about Vladislav II's march to Hungary in 1165.

144. G 1774.—For the talks in Vienna, in which Vladislav II, King of Bohemia, and Henry, Duke of Austria also took part besides Frederick I, see Palacky 1864, 452; Giesebrecht 1880, 475; Kap-Herr 1881, 82; Grot 1889, 352–353; Pashuto 1968, 185, 219.

145. Pauler 1899, I: 295; Marczali 1911, 121; Scherer 1911, 99–100; Gyóni 1938b, 55; Hóman 1939, 377.

146. Molnár 1949, 315, 320–322; Lederer 1949, 84; Moravcsik 1953, 78; ET 73, 98; Elekes 1964, 73–74, 80; Székely 1970, 108; MOT 74.

147. See Lederer 1949, 84–85; Moravcsik 1953, 78; 80; ET 98, 99, 100, 101, 102; Elekes 1964, 80, 83; Bartha 1968, 114.

148. ET 101–102.

149. SO I: No. 2.

150. SRH II: 200, 336–337; G 1095.

151. SRH II: 201.

152. According to the Fejér edition of the text, the witnesses' list on the charter also included the names of *comes curialis* Broccha (Baracska), *ban* Boricius (Borič), and *comes* Adrianus (CD

II: 166). If this list is authentic, these secular lords also belonged to the followers of the anti-king. Cf. note 46 above.

153. C II: No. 94.

154. ET 101–102.

155. SRH I: 300.—For the clash between Hahót, supporter of Stephen III, and the Csák family, who were followers of Stephen IV, see Karácsonyi 1901, II: 116; Mályusz 1971a, 58–59, 80–81. *Comes curialis* Broccha (Baracska) was also a baron from Transdanubia (Karácsonyi 1900, I: 203).

156. HO VI: 3; Jakubovich 1924, 157 (for the time of the writing of the charter see Kubinyi 1975, 66, n. 61); ZO I: 2; ÓMO 45.—No further information is available about Bishop Bernaldus of Zagreb, whose name, with that of Bishop Nicholas of Várad, is listed in Stephen IV's charter. It seems quite certain however, that after the fall of Stephen IV, Nicholas—who had been the head of the royal chapel in Géza II's time—remained Bishop of Várad throughout the reign of Stephen III, and during Béla III's reign was Archbishop of Esztergom between 1181 and 1183, maintaining good relations with the king (Kubinyi 1975, 94, 112, 113). Stephen III applied no sanctions against the Archbishop of Kalocsa, who had legalized the royal power of his arch-enemies, Mikó being obviously more precious to him as a friend than as an enemy. Pauler's view (1899. I: 309) that the prelate who went to see Emperor Manuel at the behest of Stephen III to negotiate the peace in 1165 (K 247) was none other than Mikó, Archbishop of Kalocsa, may hold water. The king also enjoyed the support of the Archbishop of Bács-Kalocsa in the case of Prodanus, Bishop of Zagreb's transfer, which, according to Pope Alexander III's letter, was done contrary to the Canons (Holtzman 1959, 410).

157. HO VI: 3.

158. C II: No. 94.

159. ZO I: 2.

160. SRH II: 201–202; K 216, 217, 224–225, 226, 239; Hist. 128.

161. Sudendorf 1849, No. 21.

162. Molnár 1949, 319, n. 28.

163. It may be worthwhile to note a few relevant points here. Obviously, the fact that the few dozen offices at the court, or positions as *comites*, which existed failed to satisfy the ambitions of the adult male members in the one or two hundred aristocratic families caused great tensions within the ruling class. One of the causes of the party struggles was that the magnates did not receive equal shares in royal grants of estates. Significantly in this respect, Stephen, son of *comes* Myske, a member of the renowned Atyusz *genus*—who possessed, as it were, a considerable amount of domains—of his 14 estates, had acquired only one in return for his services to the king (Jakubovich 1924, 156). The hunger for estates of the contemporary lords, of course, demanded much greater royal “generosity”. Very often one's rise and recognition in society also depended on royal favour. Stephen II, for example, banished the relatives of *comes* Bors from the royal court (SRH I: 444); Stephen III, on the other hand, raised Botus, son of Gab, to the royal court for his “faithful services” against the anti-kings (HO VI: No. 2). With clericals, this was the same, they being able to acquire estates by rendering faithful service. *Hospes* Fulk, in ecclesiastical service (PRT I: 588–589), obtained an estate “by favour of kings”. Research has revealed that the leading, elite section of the Hungarian clergy was not homogeneous, but consisted of several groups with considerable differences of wealth and authority among them (Mályusz 1971b, 40–43). Material improvement and advance in rank even among the clergy depended to a great extent on royal grace. It seems very probable that the rivalry between Esztergom and Kalocsa for superiority in the Hungarian Church played a significant role in the fact that during the factional fights and succession disputes the two archbishops of Hungary never failed to take opposite sides.

164. Elekes 1964, 74; Kristó 1979, 64, 66.

165. Lederer 1949, 85; Moravcsik 1953, 78; ET 99–102; Unger–Szabolcs 1979, 25.
166. Sudendorf 1849, No. 21.
167. The political, diplomatic, and military help with which Henry, Duke of Austria provided Stephen III proved particularly significant during the Hungarian–Byzantine clashes in 1166–1167 (for this see the relevant passages in Chapter VII).
168. ET 101.

Chapter VII

Byzantium turns away from Hungary

1. According to Nicetas, the designation took place after the end of the Hungarian–Byzantine struggles in 1165, and the settlement of the Serbian affairs. Andronicus Comnenus also took part in the official ceremony (Hist. 137), but before long, though still in 1165, he went to Asia Minor to be governor of Cilicia and Lesser Armenia (Jurewicz 1962, 81). Thus Béla–Alexius was designated Byzantine heir apparent in the autumn of 1165.

2. Hist. 112, 137.

3. In the first years of the reign of Alexius I Comnenus, until 1092, his daughter, Anna Comnena, and her betrothed, Constantine Ducas were heirs designate. In 1092, however, Emperor Alexius I's four-year-old son, John, became the heir apparent, and was also crowned co-emperor by his father. In 1122 Alexius, son of Emperor John became heir apparent and co-emperor, and after his unexpected death in the spring of 1143, his father made Manuel his heir (Chalandon 1900, 137–139; Chalandon 1912, 4, 12, 193).

4. For the forms and functions of the oaths of allegiance customary in Byzantium see Svoronos 1951, 106–142.

5. The activities of Andronicus outlined here are minutely discussed—drawing on the Russian annals, Cinnamus, and Nicetas—by Chalandon 1912, 409–411, 426–428, 482; Diehl 1927, 96–103; Levchenko 1956, 489–494; Jurewicz 1962, 53–81; Jurewicz 1964, 333–352; Pashuto 1968, 194–195; Obolensky 1971, 230.

6. Hist. 100.

7. K 268.

8. Hist. 160.

9. This view of Nicetas concerning the wars in Italy between 1155–1158, for example, is characteristic: “Thus ended the wars of Emperor Manuel against Sicily and Calabria, and famous [as they were] and plenty of money they cost, in the end of Romans [Byzantines] profited nothing from them, and they did not become examples to be followed by emperors to come” (Hist. 100). And this is the way he, a contemporary, comments on the plans of the war against Egypt, which were first conceived in 1167, being finally decided upon in 1168: “The reason why he [Manuel] invented all this . . . was some sort of vague ambition for glory, and rivalry with the emperors whose glory was great, and whose empires spread not only from sea to sea, but stretched from the far eastern borders to the pillars of the West” (Hist. 160).

10. *Protostrator* Alexius Axuch made the following remark about the Hungarian–Byzantine war of 1166: “the basileus wants to eradicate the Romans [i.e. Byzantines]” (K 268). In Byzantium the emperor was also reproached for wasting the taxes from his subjects on wars that brought no rewards for the Byzantines (Hist. 203).

11. Hist. 137.

12. At that time a definite xenophobia could be discerned among the Byzantine aristocracy, manifested primarily against occidentals patronized by Manuel and called Latins on account of their adherence to the Church of Rome (Chalandon 1912, 226–227; CMH 240; Ist. Viz. 297;

Ahrweiler 1975, 87; Kazhdan 1976, 17). It was this xenophobia, *anti-latinitas*, that Andronicus tried to exploit against Béla-Alexius in 1165.

13. K 250; Hist. 138.

14. His mission in Cilicia having proved a failure, Andronicus left his province in 1166 for Antioch, and later Jerusalem. Manuel and Andronicus were enemies again, the emperor issuing a warrant for the latter's arrest, and threatening to blind him, while the Patriarch of Constantinople placed him under ecclesiastical anathema. Andronicus then joined the Seljuqs and carried on devastating raids against the lands of the empire for years (Jurewicz 1962, 81–91). After Andronicus' departure, Constantine Kalamanos, Boris' son, was again placed as head of Cilicia, by Manuel, in 1167 (K 286; Hist. 140).

15. Thus eg. Ostrogorsky (1951, 454), Moravcsik (1953, 87), Ferjančić (1960, 27), Guiland (1967a 2), and Kerbl (1979, 139–140) hold that the dignity of *despotes* was meant to signify Béla-Alexius' position as heir apparent from as early as 1163. A similar view was expressed by Pál Engel, the publisher's reader for the present work, in his report.

16. Migne CXL: c. 252.

17. K 260.

18. Wilson-Darrouzès 1968, 24; Wirth 1973, 424.

19. Wirth 1973, 424–425.

20. Some scholars hold that the plan of the so-called Hungarian-Byzantine personal union emerged at the end of 1165, the time of Béla-Alexius' designation. Eg. Grot 1889, 349–351; Jurewicz 1962, 80; Maier 1973, 280. Incidentally, Vajay's opinion, that from 1165, according to the imperial Byzantine protocol, Béla was regarded in Constantinople as the legitimate King of Hungary (1974, 369), lacks any foundation. The observation brought into the argument by Vajay that Béla III never used the *annus regni* (that is, the number of his years in rule) in any of his charters because he did not wish to define his attitude between the start of his reign (from his own aspect) in 1165, and 1173 (its beginning according to the constitutional view), cannot be proof, if unspoken, of this opinion (Vajay 1973, 368, 369). On the other hand, Hungarian literature on diplomacy (Szentpétery 1923, 10–11) has pointed out that the Kings of Hungary used the *annus regni* consistently only from 1207 and, besides Béla III, King Emeric (1196–1204) never used this way of dating in any of his charters either.

21. See Chalandon 1907, II: 356; Pacaut 1953, 39; Haller 1962, 194.

22. See Giesebrecht 1880, 496; Norden 1903, 89, 93–94; Chalandon 1912, 565–570; Ohnsorge 1928, 81–86; Classen 1955, 344; Parker 1956, 86–91; Lamma 1957, II: 129; Haller 1962, 195; Dvornik 1964, 139–140; CMH 230–231.

23. See Giesebrecht 1880, 495–496; Chalandon 1907, II: 358; Parker 1956, 88–91; CMH 230; Ist. Viz. 328.

24. See Giesebrecht 1880, 501–521; Kretschmayr 1905, 252; Chalandon 1907, II: 359–370; Ohnsorge 1928, 81; Classen 1960a, 79–80; Haller 1962, 196–198; Sokolov 1963, 342; Hampe 1968, 179–181; Fasoli 1968, 134–135; Jordan 1973, 140–141.

25. K 257.—Cinnamus also refers to Stephen III's breach of agreement.

26. K 258–259; Hist. 132.

27. K 259–261.—A 12th century, anonymous Byzantine poet also mentions John Ducas' devastating raid on Transylvania. See Fontes 544. On account of the contradiction between the data provided by Cinnamus and the anonymous poet, the debate on the route of Ducas' military expedition cannot be settled. See Moravcsik 1953, 82; Francès 1959, 58; Moravcsik 1964, 88; Naştirel 1969, 180; Litavrin 1972, 101. On this question, more recently, see Diaconu 1978, 102–103. Cinnamus in another place also refers to Béla-Alexius' participation (K 268).

28. Cinnamus openly admits that with these military manoeuvres the emperor wanted menacingly to parade the might of the empire (K 260). In addition, according to the anonymous poet, the goal of Ducas' army was to devastate the land of the Paiones [Hungarians], and carry

off prisoners of war in masses (Fontes 544). The golden cross that Ducas set up in Transylvania, was also meant to deter attacks against Byzantium. The inscription on the cross related that an innumerable multitude of Pannonians had been killed there by Byzantines (K 261). It seems justified to presume that a significant part of the masses of captives were settled by the Byzantines in Asia Minor to populate the province along the frontier (Ferluga 1980, 163–164).

29. K 261, 262.

30. K 262.

31. K 262.—Several western sources also mention the marriage of Stephen III and Agnes in 1166 (G 505, 559, 763, 752, 792, 994, 2208). On the strength of Mügeln (SRH II: 203) and a charter from Sebenico (C II: No. 108) Domanovszky (1902, 826) concludes that it was from this marriage that Stephen III's son, called Béla, was born, only to die soon after in 1167.

32. Cf. Pelzer 1906, 33.

33. K 262.

34. According to Cinnamus, the Hungarian army was led by the *ban* (K 262; Babos 1944, 12). The *ban* around 1165 was Ampud (Marsina No. 88). According to a charter of dubious authenticity from Sebenico, which can be dated to 1167, Ampud still held this office in 1167 (C II: No. 108), and in 1171 he was still *ban* (SO I: No. 3). Thus, in all probability, he also held that office in 1166, Cf. Pauler 1899, I: 313.

35. K 263.

36. The possession of Tengerfehérvár by the Hungarians is inferred from the fact that in 1166 Stephen III issued a charter confirming the estates of the church there (C II: No. 100).

37. The occupation of Sebenico can be inferred from a charter of Stephen III in 1167, in which the king confirms the privileges of the citizens of the town (C II: No. 108); it should be noted, though, that there is a view that denies the authenticity of this document (Klaić 1976, 21). However, the opinion that regards the Sebenico charter as not forged but only "of questionable authenticity" (Györffy 1967, 55; Kubinyi 1975, 82) seems better founded. This view lists the charter among the Dalmatian charters of privileges that were made with the use of original documents (Kubinyi 1975, 89, n. 264).

38. K 263; Hist. 151.

39. K 265.

40. K 271.

41. K 265; Hist. 152.

42. K 270; Hist. 151–152.

43. K 271.

44. K 270; Hist. 152–153.

45. K 270; Hist. 153.

46. Nicetas places the battle as occurring on the martyr St Procopius' day (Hist. 153), which was July 8 (Halkin 1957, 218).

47. K 270–274; Hist. 153–157; SRH II: 203.

48. Hist. 153.

49. G 792, 1774.—The latter source wrongly dates the event to 1168.

50. Hist. 157–158.—It was possibly on this occasion that Boris' son, Constantine Kalamanos Ducas, presented Manuel with a golden bowl, on which the emperor's triumphs in Hungary were depicted (NE 129–130, 175–176). See also Chapter IV, n. 198.

51. This view is shared e.g. by Grot 1889, 361; Pauler 1899, I: 311, 500, n. 515; Scherer 1911, 111; Hóman 1939, 381.

52. K 257.

53. SRH II: 203; Geréb 1959, 237.

54. G 1774.

55. Hist. 151.—Cinnamus also refers to the breach of faith (K 257).

56. SRH II: 203.
57. This view is held e.g. by Mill. tört. 304; Domanovszky 1907, 130; Ferluga 1957, 135; Freydenberg 1959, 40; Urbansky 1968, 107; Ostrogorsky 1969, 411. A different opinion is held, however, by Pauler 1899, I: 317; Acsády 1903, 217; Scherer 1911, 115; Deér 1928, 145; Hóman 1939, 383; Hadtörténet 40, who hold that Sirmium was retained by the Hungarians even after the Byzantine victory on July 8, 1167.
58. Grumel 1947, 143.
59. Browning 1961, 181; Ist. Viz. 295, 326, 329, 456, n. 37; Obolensky 1971, 160.
60. Browning 1961, 202, 203.
61. Browning 1961, 203.
62. Wirth 1960, 80; Izvori 200, 206, n. 33.
63. Vajay 1974, 355; Kovács-Lovag 1980, 8.—Györffy (1977b, 359) dates it to around 1166.
64. The editor of the text of the speech himself regards both 1165 and 1167 as possible years when the oration was written (Browning 1961, 178), Likewise Ist. Viz. 456, n. 37.
65. Browning 1961, 175.
66. Browning 1961, 201.
67. K 259–261, 270; Hist. 151–152.
68. Browning 1961, 201.
69. K 258–259; Hist. 132; K 270–274; Hist. 153–157; SRH II: 203; and K 217–225, 240–248; Hist. 133–135.
70. Browning 1961, 202.
71. K 224; G 1996, 2295.
72. Since essentially it was the peace concluded with the help of the Bohemian king in 1164 that was confirmed in 1165, apart from the clause concerning Bosnia.
73. K 261–262.
74. G 792, 1774.
75. Browning 1961, 190.
76. Giesebrecht 1880, 493; Chalandon 1907. II: 303; Parker 1956, 87; See Browning 1961, 206, n. 128.
77. Browning 1961, 176–177.
78. K 231.
79. K 226.
80. K 239.
81. Browning 1961, 200, 201.
82. K 271.
83. K 236.—Cinnamus' evidence is assessed similarly by Grot (1889, 337), and Kalić (1971a, 43). It is a different question as to when all, that rhetor Michael relates about the Serbs of Rascia in his oration, actually happened. According to the rhetor, the Paion [Hungarian] monarch entered into an alliance with the prince of the Dacians [Serbs] against Byzantium (Browning 1961, 199). Although the Grand *Župan* of Serbia submitted before Manuel, who was marching against the Hungarians, the emperor, apparently, placed another prince on the throne of Rascia (Browning 1961, 200–201). The Byzantine historians know nothing about such events in 1165. To be sure, Cinnamus relates that in 1165, after the Hungarian–Byzantine peace treaty had been concluded, the Hungarians and the Serbs began stirring against Byzantium, but on Manuel's intervention they abandoned their plans and were pacified (K 249). No Serbian prince is reported to have been removed. Nicetas, for his part, relates—for the year 1165—that Emperor Manuel and Dessa, ruling Prince of Serbia became involved in a conflict with each other, but this was eventually settled, without Dessa having to be removed (Hist. 136). However, Cinnamus also writes that in 1163 Dessa, Grand *Župan* of Serbia, "despising the power of Byzantium" made overtures toward the German emperor, and sought connections with Stephen III as well.

Because of this, Manuel eventually had him captured in Niš, and imprisoned in Constantinople (K 212–214). The relation to each other, and the chronology of all these events is extremely vague. See e.g. Izvori 63, n. 155, 138. nn. 102–106, 204, n. 30. It should be added that the Byzantine historians do not seem to know of any Serbian–Byzantine conflict in the years 1166 and 1167. It is possible that Michael of Anchialus condensed the events of 1163 and 1165 in his speech, and also that Serbian events dated to 1163 by Cinnamus actually took place in 1165.—At the end of his oration, Michael depicts Manuel as if the emperor intended to go to the East (Browning 1961, 203). According to the editor of the text, this would be a hint at the campaign to Egypt, planned from 1167, and an additional proof of the speech being made in 1167 (Browning 1961, 177). In the passage in question, however, the river Jordan is mentioned, which refers more to Palestine (i.e. the crusading states) than to Egypt, and it is Cinnamus who mentions Manuel's intention to march to the aid of Antioch in the summer of 1164, after the Seljuq victory at Harim, and that he was prevented from doing so by the attack of Stephen III (K 216). The year 1165 did not see any improvement in the position of the Byzantines and the crusading states, and, obviously, they in Constantinople would have been pleased to see Manuel restore the glory of Byzantine arms to their former might in the East after his successes against the Hungarians in 1165. The basileus, however, dispatched Andronicus against the Seljuqs at the end of 1165, instead of going himself. See also Makk 1979, 37; Contributions 455.

84. Although the Byzantine historians do not mention that in 1164 or 1165 Stephen would have given up Bosnia to Manuel, there is little doubt as to John Ducas' army occupying Bosnia in addition to Dalmatia in the first half of 1165. It was not for nothing that in April, 1166 the basileus used the epithet *bosthnikos* among his imperial titles (Mango 1963, 324).

85. Thus, for example, the Bohemian chroniclers relate that in 1164 the troops of Vladislav II "roam all over Hungary, looting whatever they can, carrying off innumerable animals and beasts of burden, and burning down with fires villages and all the wealth therein" (G 1995, 2295).

86. Stephen Nemanja, ruling Prince of Serbia, did not receive Hungarian help either in 1168, or in his 1172 campaigns against Byzantium. In 1172 he had connections with Venice (Hist. 158–159; K 286, 287).

87. G 1033, 1996.

88. This is the view e.g. of Pauler 1899, I: 317–318; Acsády 1913, 217–218; Deér 1928, 145–146; Hóman 1939, 383. There are minor differences among them in questions of detail, but they completely agree on the main points.

89. G 62.

90. G 688.

91. G 1172–1173.

92. G 209.

93. K 237.—For this see Ferluga 1970, 69.

94. The view also seems acceptable here that Mary, wife of Doge Vitale Michael II's son, Nicholas, was not necessarily the daughter of Ladislav II, but a female relative (*neptia*) of Stephen III, the closer degree of propinquity being impossible to define. See Holtzmann 1926, 409, n. 2. For the chronology of these events see also Makk 1979, 38–41.

95. See Kretschmayr 1905, 253–256; Chalandon 1912, 584–589; Lamma 1957, II: 195, 210; Thiriet 1959, 51–52; Sokolov 1963, 295–298; CMH 232; Ist. Viz. 328; Beck 1972, 232–233; Ostrogorsky 1969, 412.

96. C II: No. 127.

97. After 1172 it is in 1174 that the name of Zara can first be encountered in sources; according to the charters the town was in Venetian hands (C II: No. 132, No. 133).

98. Pacaut 1955, 823–826.

99. G 1345, 2204–2205.—For the dating of the letters see Deér 1964, 152, 153; Györffy 1970b, 153, 154.

100. Holtzmann 1959, 410.
101. Holtzmann 1959, 411.
102. Stephen III's confiscation of ecclesiastical property can be precisely inferred from the concordat of 1169. See e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 318; Marczali 1911, 124–125.—See also G 1096.
103. Although according to Ohnsorge (1928, 166), papal legates were constantly active in Hungary after 1161 and before Manfred, their activities can be proved to have been confined to Dalmatia only, and they did not visit the court of the Hungarian king either. Thus the view that attributes the establishment of direct connections between the royal court and the *Curia* to Cardinal Manfred is correct (Holtzmann 1926, 418).
104. The most recent edition of the text of the concordat was published in 1971 (Marsina 86–88). Several questions have been raised by the literature on the subject concerning the authenticity of the charter which contains the text of the concordat, its time of writing, and the agreement itself. These are not discussed here and Holtzmann's views (1926, 418–420), which he still held in 1957 (Holtzmann 1957, 159–163), as to the debatable points, are essentially accepted.
105. Marsina 87.
106. Marsina 88.—See Acsády 1903, 190; Hóman 1939, 309; Molnár 1949, 339–340; Mezey 1968, 258–260; Mezey 1972, 28; Kubinyi 1975, 99; 99, n. 327; Mezey 1979, 125–126.
107. Marsina 87, 88.
108. See e.g. Holtzmann 1926, 420; Molnár 1949, 340; Lederer 1949, 85; Deér 1964, 168; Elekes 1964, 88.
109. Holtzmann 1959, 413.
110. Holtzmann 1959, 413.—For the dating of this event see Acsády 1903, 219; Holtzmann 1926, 421.
111. Alexander III's position was greatly consolidated by the fact that in December, 1167, the towns of Northern Italy formed the Lombard League against Frederick I. At the same time, Barbarossa was not able to renew his wars in Italy before 1174, due to the failure of his campaign in 1166–1167, on the one hand, and internal disputes in Germany, on the other. For these see Kretschmayr 1905, 252; Chalandon 1907, II: 364; Classen 1960a, 79–80; Sokolov 1963, 342; Hampe 1968, 180–183; Fasoli 1968, 134–135.
112. Hist. 169.—For the date of Alexius' birth see Wirth 1956, 65–67.
113. K 287.—For the title of *kaisar* see Guiland 1967b, 25–43.
114. K 287; Hist. 170; G 29.—For the descent of Prince Béla's Antiochan wife see Városy 1886, 867–885. Agnes used the name Anna in Hungary (G 2040). She probably got her new name in Byzantium (Városy 1886, 878; Vajay 1974, 352, n. 55). Városy's opinion has been accepted in the present study as to the date of the marriage (1886, 874–875), which seems to be confirmed by the charter in Jerusalem dated June 1170 at the latest, containing a reference to the wife of Béla-Alexius (CD V/1: 284–287; Delaville 1894, 222–223). The fact that Manuel offered his daughter's hand to Henry II of England's son, and to William II, the Norman king, in 1170 (Vasiliev 1929–1930, 234; CMH 231) indicates that the engagement of Béla and Mary had been dissolved by that time.
115. Hist. 169–170.
116. On that occasion the leaders of the Byzantine Church headed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, swore an oath of allegiance to the infant Alexius (Pavlov 1895, 391–393). For the time of Manuel making his son co-emperor see Chalandon 1912, 212; Cognasso 1912, 214; 214, n. 3; Lamma 1957, II: 302; Brand 1968, 14; Kerbl 1979, 142–143.
117. CD V/1: 284–287; Delaville 1894, 222–223.—Scholars agree that the "A" sigla of the charter is to be interpreted as standing for Béla-Alexius, but they are divided on the question of the date of the document. Thus, e.g. Városy (1886, 875 n. 1) places the charter to 1167 or 1168, Pauler (1899, I: 503, n. 521) to 1165, and Györffy (1970a, 228) to around 1168–1170. Those arguing for a date earlier than 1170 of the charter base their view on the fact that Guilbert

d'Assailly, Grand Master of the Knights of St John, whose name is mentioned in the charter, resigned from his post not later than 1169, and left Jerusalem. However, it has been proved that he resigned twice, his second, final resignation being tendered after June, 1170 (Delaville 1904, 76–79; Engel 1968, 48), thus dating the charter to the first half of 1170 cannot be ruled out. Pesty (1861, 38) was already of the opinion that Prince Béla made his grant to the Knights of St John in 1170. See also Walterskirchen 1975, 105, 110.

118. CD V/1. 284; Delaville 1894, 222.—Reiszig (1925, 28) already held that Béla was not Byzantine heir apparent when the charter was made.

Chapter VIII

Béla III and Byzantium

1. For the date of the king's death see Pauler 1899, I: 320, 501, n. 519.—Relations between Hungary and Byzantium in the age of Béla III are also discussed in Kristó–Makk 1981, 14–33; Makk 1982, 33–61.

2. G 303, 1157.

3. There is a view that attributes the decease of Stephen III to a plot hatched by Prince Béla's followers (Grot 1889, 401).

4. Grot 1889, 399, 404; Pauler 1899, I: 320.—Stephen III's widow later married Hermann I, Margrave of Steyr (G 705).

5. G 303, 1157.

6. K 286–287.

7. K 287.

8. Darrouzès 1970, 343.

9. Holtzmann 1959, 413.

10. Hist. 170.

11. Csóka 1867, 422, 423. See also Bartoniek 1936, 368; Kristó 1974a, 591, 594. Cf. Gerics 1974, 126–136.

12. Twelfth century examples indicate that in the case of a smooth succession the new king was crowned within a few days or perhaps a couple of weeks (Makk 1972, 38). In this respect, Béla III's case was similar to that of Coloman, who was crowned nearly a year after the death of Ladislas I (Györffy 1967, 50).

13. Holtzmann 1959, 483. See also CD II: 436; CD III/1: 91–92.

14. That is why it is also unacceptable that Archbishop Lucas enthusiastically supported the return of Béla from Byzantium. Cf. Deér 1928, 148–149; Györffy 1970b, 155; Kubinyi 1975, 110. For the extremist Gregorianism of Lucas see Mezey 1979, 139.

15. Györffy 1970b, 155. See also Moravcsik 1947, 149.—The view that Béla's strong ties with Byzantium played a significant role in the controversy between the prince and Lucas, is well justified (Kosztolnyik 1980, 383).

16. A similar view is held by Acsády 1903, 220; Marczali 1911, 126.

17. SRH I: 127.

18. Jakubovich 1924, 157; CD IX/7: 634; ZO I: 2; ÓMO 45; Marsina 85; C II: 106; ÓMO 46.

19. PRT I: 605.

20. Kubinyi 1975, 94, 94, n. 289.

21. Comes Ruben had belonged to the royal retinue during the reign of Stephen III (SO I: 2; HO VI: 3; Jakubovich 1924, 157; ÓMO 45; Marsina 85; HO VII: 1; SO I: 3).

22. Csóka 1967, 481; Kubinyi 1975, 94, 94, n. 289.

23. Kubinyi 1975, 105, 110, n. 381.

24. A similar view is held e.g. by Grot 1889, 404; Acsády 1903, 220; Marczali 1911, 126; Deér 1928, 148–149; Hóman 1939, 409.
25. SRH I: 127.
26. SRH I: 127.
27. CD III/1: 91; MES I: 188.
28. In July, 1172 Barbarossa was at war with the Polish ruler, Mieszko III, which resulted in the Polish acceptance of German supremacy (Pelzer 1906, 34; Jordan 1973, 145).
29. CD III/1: 92; MES I: 188.
30. Giesebrecht 1880, 707–708; Haller 1962, 231.
31. Holtzmann 1959, 413, 414–415.
32. Alexander III and Manuel unabatedly supported the towns of Northern Italy against Barbarossa. The Pope and the basileus continued their talks about the reunion of the churches in 1172. In addition, Alexander III undertook to mediate in the contacts between Byzantium and France, and Byzantium and Sicily. See Chalandon 1907, II: 375; Chalandon 1912, 567; Ohnsorge 1958, 398–403.
33. K 287.
34. Hist. 170.
35. Darrouzès 1970, 343.
36. SRH I: 183; G 62.—The Gregory mentioned by Kézai and Dandolo may be identical with *comes* Gregorios who led the defence of the fortress of Semlin against the Byzantines. After the fall of the fortress, Manuel wanted to have him executed, but pardoned him at Prince Béla's request (K 245).
37. Borovszky 1898, 338–339; Marsina 95.
38. SRH II: 203.
39. Jakubovich 1924, 157; CD IX/7: 634, ZO I: 2; ÓMO 45; Marsina 85; HO VII: 1; C II: 106, 116; ÓMO 46; SO I: 3; PRT I: 604–605; Fejérpataky 1900, 159; HO VII: 20.—For Ampud's career see Wertner 1895, 91–93.
40. K 257, 258, 270, 273, 274; Hist. 133, 153, 155, 157; SO I: 2; HO VI: 3; ÓMO 46; SO I: 3; PRT I: 605; Fejérpataky 1900, 344; C II: 177; RA No. 133; Marsina 90, HO I: 2; G 459.
41. Jakubovich 1924, 157; CD IX/7: 634, Fejérpataky 1900, 344.
42. ÓMO 45; Fejérpataky 1900, 344.
43. Jakubovich 1924, 157; Fejérpataky 1900, 344.
44. See note 29 above.—It cannot be proved that Mikó was still the Archbishop of Kalocsa at that time (Cf. Mezey 1979, 132).
45. ET 102.
46. Holtzmann 1959, 413; CD II: 436; CD III/1: 92.—For the date see Pauler 1899, I: 322.
47. For Archbishop Lucas' fall from favour and retirement under pressure into the background see Kubinyi 1975, 110–112.—A different view is held by Kosztolnyik 1980, 384.
48. Bohemian chronicles relate that Béla and his brother struggled for the crown, Béla imprisoning his brother, who escaped and fled to Bohemia (G 1034, 1996). As it is known from other sources that Géza went to Austria first, and proceeded to Bohemia from there (SRH I: 127), his imprisonment should obviously be dated before his journey to Austria at the turn of 1174–1175, perhaps around the time of Béla's coronation. See Pauler 1900, 32; Mátyás 1900, 35. Another source also mentions Géza's captivity (G 28).
49. SRH I: 127; G 763, 2208.
50. G 505, 755, 763, 792, 1151, 2208.
51. G 763.
52. G 763, 792, 1485, 2632.
53. G 1034, 1996–1997; SRH I: 127.

54. Barbarossa was staying in Italy on his second Italian campaign from September, 1174 until June, 1178 (Giesebrecht 1880, 748, 866; Jordan 1973, 147, 150).

55. SRH I: 127; G 1034, 1996–1997.

56. This can be inferred from Arnold of Lübeck's remark that Béla set Géza free in June, 1189, at the request of the emperor, having kept him in confinement for 15 years (G 305).

57. SRH I: 127.

58. G 763, 1997.

59. G 763.

60. Palacky 1864, 471–473; Huber 1899, 306–307; Bretholz 1912, 277–278; Novotny 1913, 1046–1053; Lechner 1976, 167, 168, 184.

61. Pelzer 1906, 51; Chalandon 1912, 492; Heisenberg 1928, 16; Diehl 1930, 130; Urbansky 1968, 110; Obolensky 1971, 160.

62. For the dating of the speech see Kurts 1905, 73; Moravcsik 1958, 355.

63. Kurts 1905, 92.

64. Kurts 1905, 97.

65. Kurts 1905, 93.

66. Kurts 1905, 92.

67. Kurts 1905, 97.

68. Regel 1892, I: 40.

69. See Gyóni 1938b, 45; Moravcsik 1953, 86.

70. Kurts 1905, 96.

71. Kurts 1905, 89.

72. Emperor Manuel and Amalric, King of Jerusalem decided in the autumn of 1168 to launch a joint campaign against Egypt. According to the agreement, Byzantium and Jerusalem would have divided Egypt in the case of a victory. Following the failure of the offensive in 1169 by the united fleet of Byzantium and Jerusalem, Manuel and Amalric decided on another expedition against Egypt, but this was never realized. See Chalandon 1912, 537–550; Grousset 1935, II: 508–577; Richard 1953, 53–55; Runciman 1958, II: 366–377; CMH 236; Ist. Viz. 322–323; Prawer 1969, 444.

73. Darrouzès 1970, 343.

74. Freydenberg 1959, 40.

75. Molnár 1949, 333.

76. Frederick Barbarossa expected envoys from Hungary in 1175 (Sudendorf 1849, No. 35). See Pelzer 1906, 51; Ohnsorge 1958, 453.—It is another question that the emperors of Byzantium regarded themselves theoretically as the rulers not only of their own empire, but also of the whole Christian community, the successors of the Emperors of Rome. This tendency regained momentum during Manuel's reign. It followed from this attitude—implying a claim to world hegemony—that the basileus regarded no foreign monarch as his equal, declaring himself head of all other rulers, the “King of Kings”, using the phrase from the Bible. That is why the Byzantine court made efforts to adjust facts to the imperial ideology. Thus, for example, the various gifts from foreign kings and princes—including Béla III—were considered dues signifying the recognition of Byzantine supremacy. This ideology, however, did not in any way influence the real nature of contemporary Hungarian–Byzantine relations, nor did it touch at all the actual independence of the Hungarian Kingdom. See Moravcsik 1953, 8–9; Moravcsik 1966, 127–128; Ostrogorsky 1969, 53–55; Beck 1978, 78–80.

77. E.g. Hóman 1939, 413; Laurent 1941, 115; Moravcsik 1953, 89; Ist. Viz. 326.

78. HO VII: 20; K 299.—See Pauler, 1899. I: 324–325; Deér 1928, 151; Moravcsik 1953, 89; Ostrogorsky 1969, 414.

79. K 299.

80. See e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 322, 503, n. 523; Deér 1928, 151; Moravcsik 1953, 89; Collenberg 1968, Table 1.

81. Dandolo is usually cited as evidence of the presumed marriage. He relates: "then Stephen's brother, Béla the Greek ruled . . . Emperor Manuel proposed to the Hungarian king's daughter for Isaac, his cousin (*nepos*)" (G 62). The *Annales Posonienses* have also been quoted as proof: "1186. Prince Geyza . . . went to Austria, his *soror* married in Greece" (SRH I: 127). The Venetian source explicitly says it was King Béla's daughter whom Manuel's *nepos*, Isaac, married. Emperor Isaac II was indeed the *nepos* (cousin, nephew) of Manuel, being the grandson of Theodora, one of Manuel's aunts on his father's side (CMH 795; Ostrogorsky 1970, 326–329). To be sure, the *Annales Posonienses* refer to Prince Géza's *soror*, but the word *soror* in medieval Latin usage only meant not "sister" but also "female relative". It seems that in this case it means the latter, and refers to Margaret. Thus there appears to be no reason why the evidence of the sources should not point to the marriage of Isaac II and Margaret. This appears to be confirmed by the date (1186) the annals provide.

82. For this see Palacky 1864, 454, 466–467; Huber 1899, 244–249; Deér 1928, 152; Patze 1968, 393–394.

83. G 1485–1488.

84. G 689, 1174.

85. G 459.—For the possible role of *comes* Denis see Deér 1928, 153; Tarnay 1930, 569–570.

86. CD II: 193.

87. G 709.

88. The name of the Provost of Fehérvár is not known. Cf. Kubinyi 1975, 112.

89. Holtzmann 1959, 414.—It seems this did not go unnoticed by the *Annales Posonienses*, which—mixing up the name, and dating the event over ten years later—recorded the following: "1187 . . . Stephen, Archbishop of Kalocsa is deposed." (SRH I: 127). A different view is held by Szely 1914, 28. A letter, attributed to Cosmas, Archbishop of Kalocsa, in which the prelate complains that "the Lord King Béla . . . has suppressed our ecclesiastical revenues" (G 2272), also seems to relate to this. Holtzmann already pointed out that the archbishop in question was Andrew, and Cosmas, Archbishop of Kalocsa, never existed (Holtzmann 1926, 425, 425, n. 5).

90. Holtzmann 1959, 414.

91. Holtzmann 1959, 413, 414.

92. For this and the significance of the Provostship of Fehérvár see Sebestyén 1925, 382–383; Györffy 1970b, 155; Mezey 1972, 26–30; Kovács 1972, 1; Kubinyi 1975, 112; Györffy 1977b, 319–320.

93. Holtzmann 1959, 413, 414–415.

94. Holtzmann 1959, 413, 414, 414–415.

95. Lucas was on Béla's side as early as 1179 (Holtzmann 1926, 424; Kubinyi 1975, 112). Since it can be presumed that Archbishop Andrew personally informed the Pope of affairs in Hungary at the Council of Lateran in March, 1179 (Holtzmann 1959, 413), the reconciliation of the king and the Archbishop of Esztergom may be dated, at the latest, to the turn of 1178–1179.

96. Holtzmann 1959, 412, 413, 414.

97. Thus, in 1174 Prince Emeric was presumably baptized by the Archbishop of Kalocsa, although strictly speaking this was the job of the Archbishop of Esztergom (Mezey 1959, 419–420; Kubinyi 1975, 101). The most important constitutional function of the Archbishop of Esztergom was to perform the rite of the coronation (Hermann 1973, 73); this, however, was in practice jeopardized by the fact that since July, 1162 the Archbishop of Kalocsa had carried out the crowning (for Ladislas II, Stephen IV, and Béla III). This, obviously, set the two archbishops against each other (Holtzmann 1926, 424, 426). Recent research has revealed that "Andrew intended to extend his own authority as bishop and metropolite" at Lucas' expense (Kubinyi 1975, 113).

98. Rivalry of a similar sort went on between Thomas à Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Archbishop Roger of York (Pacaut 1956, 156–157; Haller 1962, 186–188, 202; Kulcsár 1965, 302; Györffy 1970b, 155–156).

99. G 976.

100. See Molnár 1949, 320; ET 103, 104, 105; Elekes 1964, 82; Bartha 1968, 118.

101. For the significance of *Myriocephalum* see Chalandon 1912, 513; Gordlevski 1941, 27; CMH 237; Ist. Viz. 332; Ostrogorsky 1969, 414.

102. For all this see Norden 1903, 101; Siuziumov 1957, 61; Haller 1962, 239–240; Hampe 1968, 191–193; Brand 1968, 18; Ostrogorsky 1969, 414–415; Jordan 1973, 148–149.

103. For the connection between the changes in the international situation and Hungarian foreign policy during Béla III's reign see Elekes 1964, 86–87, 91–92.—However, it deserves mentioning that Béla's attacks on Byzantium—mainly in the 1180s—created beyond doubt favourable circumstances for both the Serbian and Bulgarian independence struggles. These resulted in the independence of Serbia under the Nemanjas, and essentially at the same time, after nearly two centuries of Byzantine occupation, Bulgaria, which was ruled by the Asenids and united an ethnically heterogeneous (Bulgarian, Cuman and Vlach) population, also regained its independence between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire (Radev 1971, 21; Jireček 1952, 152).

104. See Moravcsik 1953, 14, 20; Siuziumov 1957, 59; Thiriet 1959, 40, 49; Tivčev 1962, 23–24; Ist. Viz. 256, 329–331; Hecht 1967, 13–16; Brand 1968, 31; Ostrogorsky 1969, 415–417.

105. HS 123.

106. Györffy 1967, 54.

107. G 62.—Another Italian source also mentions Zara's submission to Béla III, but dates the event wrongly to 1186 (G 2183).

108. C II: No. 178.

109. C II: 172.—For the activity of Farkas see Hóman 1939, 410.

110. C II: 173; G 2227.—See Pauler 1899, I: 326.

111. Hecht 1967, 13, n. 7, 40.

112. Urbansky 1968, 121.

113. Pauler 1899, I: 326; Novak 1957, 94.—It is mostly Dandolo's evidence that has served as the basis for this view. The Venetian chronicler relates that Zara joined Béla III. The Doge wanted to regain the town, and the treasury being empty, the citizens offered to supply the money for the fleet necessary for the campaign. The fleet sailed to Zara, and was able to occupy a few islands (G 62). Charters provide evidence that the fleet built from the contributions of the Venetian citizens set out the besiege Zara in the second half of 1187 (C II: No. 200, No. 203). A 12th century Venetian annal relates that the fleet of Venice set out against Zara in July, 1187, to return in September (G 209). Thus, obviously, this campaign cannot be dated to the time directly after Zara had switched sides.

114. Hist. 267.

115. Several scholars date the recapture of Sirmium to 1181 (Litavrin 1960, 429; Jurewicz 1962, 121; Ćirković 1964, 47; CMH 245).

116. G 152, 435, 471, 792.

117. Deér 1928, 154.

118. See Moravcsik 1933, 520–521; Siuziumov 1957, 62–63; Yuzbashian 1957, 12–28; Tivčev 1962, 25–32; Jurewicz 1962, 92–101; CMH 243–244; Ist. Viz. 332–334; Hecht 1967, 10–29; Brand 1968, 28–45; Ostrogorsky 1969, 417–419.

119. G 792.

120. Hist. 267.

121. See e.g. Pauler 1899, I: 327; Jireček 1952, 152; HNJ 355; Jurewicz 1962, 121.—Kulin, *ban* of Bosnia also joined the allied army of Hungarians and Serbs. It is possible, though no evidence

is available that in the wake of the occupation of Dalmatia and Sirmium, Béla III also forced Bosnia to recognize his sovereignty in the early 1180s (Čirković 1964, 47; a different opinion is held by Klaić 1976, 458).

122. G 792.

123. Hist. 277.

124. MGYBK.—See Ivanov 1936, 107.

125. This conception appeared first in Deér's (1928, 155–156) work; it was elaborated by Moravcsik (1933, 522–523; 1953, 90; 1970, 91–92). See also Kerbl 1979, 146.

126. Hist. 267.

127. Hist. 268.

128. Hist. 268–269.—The death of Manuel's widow is usually dated to the end of 1182 (Cognasso 1912, 364; Moravcsik 1933, 521; Laurent 1941, 118; Hecht 1967, 29), but August, 1183, has also been considered as a possible date (Jurewicz 1962, 152).

129. Hist. 277.

130. See Moravcsik 1933, 521–522; Jurewicz 1962, 105–106; CMH 244; Hecht 1967, 29; Brand 1968, 49.

131. In the spring of 1184 Alexius Branas left the country around Braničevo for Asia Minor to suppress the revolt there against Andronicus (Hist. 280). Braničevo was possibly also in Byzantine hands at that time (Izvori 153, n. 160). For the dating of these events see Jurewicz 1962, 108–109; Hecht 1967, 42; Brand 1968, 52.

132. E.g. Hecht 1967, 44.

133. See e.g. Moravcsik 1933, 523, n. 2.

134. Cf. Vározy 1886, 880; Pauler 1900, 33; Deér 1928, 160; Hóman 1939, 412; Urbansky 1968, 122; Dümmerth 1977, 366.

135. G 293.

136. G 257.

137. G 1489.—A Venetian chronicle also mentions the attack of William II and Béla III on Byzantium (G 690).

138. See Jurewicz 1962, 128–129.

139. See Chalandon 1907, II: 401–412; Uspenski 1948, 315–322; Lamma 1957, II: 331; Tivčev 1962, 38; Jurewicz 1962, 127–130; Hecht 1967, 68–73, 80–86; Brand 1968, 163–165; Ostrogorsky 1969, 423.

140. Kyriakidis 1961, 56.

141. The territorial extent of the Hungarian conquest is completely uncertain, since no sources make any mention of it. However, the view that for three years from 1183 Béla III held the valley of the Morava together with the towns of Niš and Sofia is unacceptable (Deér 1928, 156; Moravcsik 1933, 523, 526–527; Hóman 1939, 412; Urbansky 1968, 122), since Braničevo was in Byzantine possession by the spring of 1184 (Hist. 280).

142. E.g. Moravcsik 1933, 523–526; Deér 1938, 168; Hóman 1939, 412; Laurent 1941, 118; Stadtmüller 1951, 70; Moravcsik 1953, 90–91; Dölger 1964, 172; Urbansky 1968, 122; Obolensky 1971, 162; Bogdán 1972, 33–34; Vajay 1974, 360.—According to some scholars, this plan of the personal union would have caused the two parts of the Holy Crown of Hungary to be united under orders from Béla III, so that, like the basileus, the King of Hungary should also have a closed crown (e.g. Moravcsik 1970, 130; Vajay 1974, 359). Even if this is still impossible to prove, it is a fact that Béla III was consciously endeavouring to ensure that his royal power, even in its appearances, was similar to that of the basileus. The adoption of the Byzantine double or apostolic cross into the royal arms of Hungary would seem to be a case in point (see e.g. Moravcsik 1970, 130), the iconography of the decorated gate of the archiepiscopal cathedral erected next to the royal palace in Esztergom being another (Bogyai 1950, 85–129). For the question of the unification of the Hungarian Holy Crown (*corona sacra*) see Kovács-Lovag 1980, 81–82.

143. Migne CXXXVII: c. 1132. B-C; Grumel 1947, 176.
144. Stiernon 1966, 94-95; Kerbl 1979, 148-150.
145. This theory of personal union elaborated by Moravcsik has been opposed also by Radojčić (1954, 10); Hecht (1967, 40); and Ostrogorsky (1969, 422. n. 2).
146. See Moravcsik 1933, 526; Jurewicz 1962, 31; CMH 245; Ist. Viz. 336; Hecht 1967, 85-86; Brand 1968, 70; Ostrogorsky 1969, 424.
147. Hist. 368.—According to Ansbert, Emperor Isaac “married the daughter of Béla, King of Hungary, to strengthen his country” (G 294). Thus this particular source explicitly says that the wedlock served to consolidate the position of Isaac II, and draws attention—at least on the Byzantine side—to the political background of the dynastic connection.
148. William II, King of Sicily, had far-reaching expansionist plans. Not only did he want to occupy the Byzantine empire, but he wished to expand the rule of the South Italian Normans in the East and in Africa as well. So as to be able to realize his expansionist plans undisturbed, he approached Frederick Barbarossa. This resulted in a German-Norman dynastic link, Henry, elder son of Frederick I, who had been crowned king as successor to the emperor in 1169, betrothing Constance, heiress designate of the Norman kingdom in the autumn of 1184. This is how William II intended to keep his back covered in the West during the war with Byzantium. It is not entirely groundless to presume that the Byzantine-Hungarian alliance established in the autumn of 1185 was also meant to counterbalance the German-Normann alliance. For this see Chalandon 1907, II: 385-389; Váczy 1936, 563; Lamma 1957, II: 300; Guiland 1964, 125; Hampe 1968, 210-212; Jordan 1973, 157.
149. Theiner 1863, I: 36. See also CD II: 437.—Related to this are the passages in the *Annales Posonienses*, according to which Euphrosyne, kept in confinement in Braničevo in 1186, was exiled to Byzantium in 1187 (SRH I: 127). The case probably was that Euphrosyne, imprisoned earlier—around 1177?—was exiled via Braničevo to Byzantium by Béla III in 1186. The exile obviously started with Braničevo being handed over to the Byzantines, in 1186. The king’s mother, still in the same year, took the veil in Jerusalem with the Knights of St John (CD II: 230). For her later fate see Györffy 1952-1953, II: 349.
150. It must be admitted that not a single source mentions this. Hence the view that Byzantium did not renounce the territories in question, least of all Dalmatia (Ferluga 1957, 147). However, a better substantiated opinion is of those who hold that Isaac II, who was in an extremely critical position, had to put up with the way the situation developed in order to secure the Hungarian alliance. See Moravcsik 1933, 527; Dölger 1964, 173; Urbansky 1968, 123.
151. Darrouzès 1970, 343.
152. Grumel 1947, 176, No. 1166.
153. The Byzantine Church most strictly forbade ecclesiastical persons to marry for a second time. Theodora, widow of Andronicus Lapardas, as an ordained nun, was regarded as an ecclesiastical person, hence the refusal of the permission. See Guiland 1959, 236.
154. Migne CXXXVII: c. 1132. B-C.
155. For this see Chalandon 1907, II: 413; Uspenski 1948, 323; Brand 1968, 170-171; Ostrogorsky 1969, 426.
156. Hist. 368.—Nicetas also commemorated the wedding of Isaac and Margaret with a ceremonial oration and a nuptial poem (Dieten 1972, 35-44; 44-46). Other sources also refer to this marriage (Heisenberg 1903, 13, 18; G 62, 294, 1054; SRH I: 127). The date of the wedding is uncertain, the end of 1185 and the beginning of 1186 both being possible. See e.g. Laurent 1941, 118; Moravcsik 1953, 91; Litavrin 1960, 441; Dölger 1964, 173; Guiland 1964, 125; CMH 245; Brand 1968, 80; Dieten 1971, 90.
157. G 1054.—Karl dates this event to 1185 (1910, 51).
158. G 581, 1034, 1054, 1101, 2032, 2059.
159. Laurent 1941, 123; Vajay 1974, 371, n. 126.

160. CD VII/4: 67.
161. See Pauler 1899, II: 2; Huber 1899, 262–263; Pirchegger 1920, 170–171.
162. Sokolov 1963, 310.
163. See note 113, above.
164. See Sokolov 1963, 330.
165. G 62, 700, 2183.
166. This view is held e.g. by Šišić 1944, 107.
167. G 63, 2183.
168. C II: 267, 269.
169. Pauler 1899, II: 8.—A different opinion is held by Kristó 1979, 55.
170. Pashuto 1968, 180. For Hungarian–Russian relations in the 12th century, see Makk 1984, 206–207.
171. Pashuto 1968, 161, 180.
172. Hodinka 1916, 288–303.
173. Jordan 1973, 160.
174. It was precisely the attack by Henry, Frederick I's son, that forced the ruling Prince of Poland to submit and recognize German overlordship in 1184 (Pelzer 1906, 50).
175. Hodinka 1916, 303.—Polish sources also mention all these events (G 1078, 1313, 1602, 2290–2291). One of the *iobagiones castri* who took part in the fights in Halich was Ceka, later raised by Béla III to the ranks of the *servientes regis* (RA–No. 1829).
176. C II: No. 217, No. 231.—See ET 103.
177. G 1313, 1603.—See also G 669, 1078, 2291.
178. Hodinka 1916, 297, 301.
179. ET 103.
180. Latin, Slavonic, and Byzantine sources all refer to this (G 707; Ivanov 1931, 381). For the Byzantine source see Ivanov 1936, 107. For the literature see Bödey 1940, 218–220; Moravcsik 1953, 92; Mezey 1968, 267; Kovács 1972, 11–12; Moravcsik 1984, 248.
181. Darrouzès 1970, 190–201.—For the dating of the letter see Darrouzès 1970, 190–191, n. 1. Slightly differently by Laurent 1940a 31; Laurent 1940b, 63.
182. See Pauler 1899, I: 362; Marczali 1911, 131.
183. Darrouzès 1970, 343–345.
184. ET 103, 105.
185. Likewise Bartha 1968, 118.
186. ET 103; Lederer 1949, 85.
187. ÁUO I: 83–84.—For the activity of Conrad of Montferrat see Grousset 1936, III: 3–8; Richard 1953, 140–147.
188. See Áldásy 1924, 53–59; Grousset 1935, II: 605–621; Richard 1953, 140–141; Zaborov 1958, 153–155, 164–165; Runciman 1958, II: 414–457; Ostrogorsky 1969, 429.
189. Pauler 1899, II: 2–3.
190. G 188, 292, 792.—Concerning German–Hungarian relations it also seems revealing that Duke Leopold deemed it wiser not to travel across Hungary in 1189 because of the hostilities between Hungary and Austria (G 152).
191. G 305.—The sources are silent about Prince Géza's fate. He probably married a Byzantine princess (Moravcsik 1953, 89). Around 1210 his sons still maintained connections with Hungarian magnates, who encouraged them to return home from Byzantium and take over the kingdom. Andrew II, however, quickly suppressed this discontent (C III: No. 82).—A recently discovered Byzantine source relates that Prince Géza assumed the name John in Greece, and in 1218 one of his sons, Alexius—driven by the desire for the crown of Hungary—picked a quarrel with King Andrew II, who at that time was staying in the town of Nicaea (Vajay 1979, 25).

192. G 105, 188, 482, 792.—However, the marriage could not be concluded because Prince Frederick died in the East in 1191 (G 435; Pelzer 1906, 52; Áldásy 1924, 62).

193. For this see Zimmert 1903, 49–65; Áldásy 1924, 59–60; Deér 1928, 158–159; Zaborov 1958, 167–170; Guiland 1964, 132–133; CMH 246; Ist. Viz. 341; Brand 1968, 92; Ostrogorsky 1969, 429–430.

194. When Béla III was informed of the conflict between the crusaders and the Byzantines, he promptly ordered home the Hungarian military detachment he had placed at the disposal of Frederick (G 295). With this the Hungarian monarch obviously intended to warn Barbarossa that he—in the back of the crusaders, which lent some weight to his argument—was worried by the crusaders' activities in the Balkans. Soon he also sent a letter to Isaac II to tell him that the Byzantine attitude towards the crusaders was "extremely damaging for his [Isaac's] empire" (G 296).

195. See Zimmert 1903, 70–76; Heisenberg 1928, 16; Deér 1928, 159; Hóman 1939, 415; Laurent 1941, 119; Moravcsik 1953, 92; Guiland 1964, 134; Brand 1968, 94, 183; Ostrogorsky 1969, 430.

196. See Laurent 1941, 121–122; Uspenski 1948, 350; HNJ 355; Guiland 1964, 132–134; Brand 1968, 184; Ostrogorsky 1969, 429–430.

197. Hist. 429–430.

198. Hist. 434.

199. The literature on the subject dates the Byzantine defeat at Berroea in Thrace to 1190. The time of the Byzantine victory near the river Morava is, however, much debated. Several scholars regard the battle as having taken place in the autumn of 1190, but there are weighty arguments for later years, such as 1191, 1192 as well. See e.g. Cognasso 1912, 274; Deér 1928, 159–160; Laurent 1941, 122; Jireček 1952, 157; Moravcsik 1953, 92; Guiland 1964, 134–136; CMH 247; Brand 1968, 93–94; Ostrogorsky 1969, 431; Izvori 154, n. 161; Dieten 1971, 83–86; Obolensky 1971, 222; Zlatarski 1972, 68, 75–76. The time of the meeting between Béla III and Isaac II also depends on the chronology of the battle at the Morava. In the present study the autumn of 1191 seems to be the most acceptable.

200. Dieten 1972, 32. See also Dieten 1971, 82.

201. Hist. 434.

202. See Laurent 1941, 122–123; Moravcsik 1953, 92; Guiland 1964, 135–136; Izvori 231, n.

62. A different opinion e.g. by Deér 1928, 160.

203. See Pauler 1899, II: 9–10; Hóman 1939, 411.

204. C II: No. 240.

205. Darrouzès 1970, 343.—For the dating of the letter see Laurent 1940a, 29; Darrouzès 1970, 336, n. 1.

206. See Laurent 1941, 125; Moravcsik 1953, 92; Guiland 1964, 136; Brand 1968, 94; Ostrogorsky 1969, 431; Darrouzès 1970, 343, n. 13.

207. Darrouzès 1970, 343, 345.

208. Another reason why Béla withdrew was possibly his difficulties at that time in Dalmatia on account of Venice's attack on Zara (G 63, 2183).

209. Hist. 446.—For the dating of the battle see Ostrogorsky 1969, 431.

210. Hist. 446.—See also Zlatarski 1972, 80; Lishev 1982, 130.

211. On April 8, 1195, Alexius, Isaac's brother, seized power and Isaac was captured and blinded (Brand 1968, 112–113; Ostrogorsky 1969, 431).

212. See Áldásy 1924, 73; Váczy 1936, 563; Zaborov 1958, 178; CMH 247; Ist. Viz. 341–342.

213. G 297.

214. Pauler 1899, II: 12.—The manuscript was closed at the end of 1884. More recent literature on the subject, therefore, could not be taken into consideration.

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(List of abbreviations)

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
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
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
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THE ÁRPÁD DYNASTY IN THE 11TH-12TH CENTURIES




m = married to
 betr = betrothed to
 K = King
 D = Duke
 pr = prince/princess
 r = ruling Prince
 Emp = Emperor

THE COMNENI AND THE ANGELI



THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD



THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD



THE ÁRPÁDS AND THE COMNENI



This study surveys Hungarian-Byzantine political relationship between 1081 and 1196, a subject that has since long been neglected by Hungarian scholars. This period saw the growth of the Hungarian Kingdom into a major political force in Central Eastern Europe, and the last golden century in Byzantium under the Comnenus Dynasty. As neighbouring countries, Hungary and Byzantium influenced decisively each other's foreign policy. The author surveys the history of the two countries and discusses the fundamental changes in their relations. The 12th century was marked by an extremely lively diplomatic life throughout Europe, which provides a colourful and vivid backdrop to the events discussed in the study. The so-called Hungarian-Byzantine personal union is set in a new perspective, based on the personal researches of the author and his extensive knowledge of the relevant Hungarian, Greek and other sources. The study offers a neatly balanced account of the main tendencies in Hungarian and Byzantine foreign policy, together with a new chronological sequence for some well-known events.

The study is complemented with a full bibliography, a map, genealogical tables and an index.

ISBN 963 05 5268 X

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