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Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae

LAJOS LUKÁCS

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PREFACE

Movements of the Hungarian political emigration were taking place on a very extensive and manifold international scene with changing intensity, variegated by successive frustrations. The basic objective of emigration was to restore the national independence of Hungary. To achieve this end, it sought to find allies sometimes from among the ranks of democratic movements, sometimes counting upon the anti-Austrian powers. The primary aim of the present study is to cast light upon the activities of the leading personalities of emigration, with special regard to the formative period of emigration in the early 1850s and to the wars in 1859 and 1866, as well as to problems involved in the transitional period between the two wars. The history of Hungarian emigration in a wider context – its movements closely related to democratic popular movements of the age, the individual legions, Hungarian volunteers in the American Civil War, as well as the emerging conflicts with the official leaders of emigration – is dealt with in detail in the Hungarian edition of this work.[1] In selecting the material for this volume, it was also aimed to produce a proper representation of the directions, methods and results of research in the history of emigration. It is hoped that this aim has been achieved and the resulting work will encourage further research efforts in the history of emigration.

Lajos Lukács

[1] Lukács Lajos: *Magyar politikai emigráció. 1849–1867* (Hungarian political emigration. 1849–1867). Budapest, 1984.

PREFACE TO THE HUNGARIAN EDITION

It is a highly problematic venture to treat the history of the Hungarian political emigration of 1848/49 in terms of a clearcut and consistent historical process. Not that the period between 1849 and 1867 had not been a distinct period of peculiar character both within Hungarian history and in a wider context of world history; still the movements of the Hungarian political emigration – which fitted well into and were organically linked to the entire historical process – were too much fragmented and mosaicked to constitute a sort of an integral whole. The history of emigration extended to affect a number of other countries as well: Turkey, Italy, France, Great Britain, and North America alike. Simultaneously, its movements were linked up with remarkable historical events ranging from the Crimean War to the North-Italian War of 1859 or from the North-American Civil War to the Italian–Prussian–Austrian War of 1866 – to say nothing of other international conflicts of the age. All of those conflicts had strong effects on the directions the emigration's movements were to take, as well as on its often massive groups and on its relationship to the 1848 emigrations of other nations. Thus, to offer a coherent view of the history of Hungarian emigration, so scattered in time and space, or more precisely, to disclose all the phenomena which finally led to an intercommunication among the individual emigrant groups, are research topics which clearly show the difficulties of approaching the subject by a uniform and coherent method. Obviously, all this has rather much to do with the fact that hardly any work offering a comprehensive coverage of the subject can be found in the related historical literature. Nevertheless, works related to the subject have been published in uncommon abundance, although they are widely different in respect of their nature, intrinsic and source values; to these, references will be made later in this volume in their proper place and context. Though much has been written on this subject, from short articles, through more exacting memoirs, up to major historical monographs, there is one thing common to all of them. Namely, they all tend to focus on one or another aspect, detail, or on a particular period of the history of Hungarian emigration, or to deal with problems related mainly to emigration movements which were taking place in one or another country. Despite the sizeable historical literature which has done remarkable work in laying the foundations, there has still remained a good number of details to be elaborated and blank spots to be explored, to the decrease of which the present study is meant to contribute by evaluating more

recent research results derived from additional sources. The reader will be given adequate information on all this in the form of references to archival and other sources in the relevant places throughout the text.

In respect of methodology, we call the reader's attention to the fact that a full understanding of the complex problems involved in the history of emigration and the exposure of the underlying motives of conflicts may only be possible if the following factors are recognized: not only did emigration come to convey the consequences of and lessons drawn from the socio-political struggles which had been going on in Hungary, but its members also became – inevitably – involved in the socio-political events of those countries where they planned to stay for longer or shorter time. Thus, members of the emigration – even if their goals had been directed towards Hungary – were to display their activities under the real conditions of a new socio-political setting. On this account, any judgement of the emigration's activities or actions with all their implications and consequences may only be possible in context of the home and foreign policy endeavours of the individual countries concerned. Without such a consideration, the movements of emigration would be almost inexplicable, would become void and perhaps the words and acts would lose their meaning. The actual leaders and also the masses of emigration inevitably had to take an unambiguous stand in the socio-political issues and struggles of their respective host country that influenced their activities. This, however, was not to mean that emigration had worked out a uniform standpoint in respect of the particular issues. In the history of emigration, the perennial problem of searching for allies necessarily tended to deepen the internal conflicts and led to the evolvement of conflicting political lines and to the formation of opposing political groups. All this was particularly conspicuous in the case of Italy where the ideas of Garibaldism, which strongly opposed the political line of Napoleon III, became predominant among the Hungarian emigrants as against the official leaders of emigration who had heavily relied on support by the French and Italian governments. Moreover, even within the leading circles of emigration, increasingly serious conflicts were emerging both in the fifties and sixties of the last century. Mention should also be made of the fact that – although the emigration of 1848/49 is dealt with here in the first place – from the early sixties, considerable changes were also taking place in the internal composition of emigration. The internal movement was essentially two-directional: the process of returning home partly commenced, but a process in the opposite direction became even more clearly marked. It was mainly under the effect of the Italian efforts to achieve unity that – for a lesser part – ex-officers of the Hungarian revolutionary army, who had been imprisoned in the Austrian dungeons, and – for a greater part – those of the younger generation whose majority sought to join the Hungarian legion in Italy, left their fatherland. The body of leaders of emigration was also in a process of transformation after the Diet of 1861 and particularly after the introduction of Schmerling's Provisorium, a new absolutism, which prompted some of the participants of the Hungarian resistance movement to emigrate.

The Hungarian emigration was displaying its activity under the burden of grave and unsolvable contradictions. Its efforts to regain national independence and its desire for a renewed struggle for freedom failed to meet with such a far-fetching social program which could give an answer to socio-economic questions arising from the domestic demand for development and transformation, or to tackle the emerging problems of agricultural reform and capitalist development in general. In the international field, the official leaders of emigration, who sought for an anti-Austrian alliance, became increasingly exposed to the unfavourable international power relations. Even if not quite free from some demands which necessitated liberal changes in political law and state organization, the universal interests of sustaining the Habsburg Empire had prevailed in 1859 and in 1866 alike, against which all the efforts of emigration successively came to a halt. And even if – from the aspect of social progress – the retrograde features of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 are more clearly marked, at the given historical moment there was no other chance for arrangement in the multinational terrain of East-Central Europe. As a result, the Hungarian emigration had necessarily embarked on the road to a complete disintegration so that its members, with a few exceptions, returned to their fatherland. More knowledge about the history of emigration along with its processes and connections, which all convey grave historical lessons, will certainly make it easier to better understand the complexity of changes in the embourgeoisement process of 19th-century Hungary. Though the whole activity of Hungarian political emigration was displayed on a broad international scene, it still raised such problems and sought for such ways and means as were closely linked with and fitted into the turns of Hungarian history, forming an integral part of it. The ideas, thoughts and lessons of the emigration became – and even more have to become – part of the material shaping Hungarian social consciousness.

Lajos Lukács

I.

ATTEMPTS AT THE CO-OPERATION OF THE WESTERN AND THE EASTERN EMIGRATION IN THE EARLY 1850s

THE ANTECEDENTS OF EMIGRATION

To become acquainted with even the broad outlines of the highly ramified, complex and multifarious history of the Hungarian emigration of 1848/49, it is essential to have a certain knowledge of its antecedents. More specifically, to take into consideration that particular foundation upon which Hungarian emigration after the Világos surrender was based.

The emergence of Hungarian emigration is organically connected with the foreign policy implications of the events taken place in 1848–1849, namely with those wide-ranging international efforts which constituted the diplomatic activity of the Revolution and the War of Independence. When the tragic end or, rather, its various phases ensued, emissaries, foreign representatives of the revolutionary group were all abroad. However small was the circle of those who, under the circumstances, were compelled to remain abroad to become the first emigrants, the significance and the role of these personalities – particularly in the first phase of emigration – grew greatly. While until then they had tended to abide by the requests and general directives of the Hungarian revolutionary government, and worked on solving problems arising from the international contacts, later, the emerging new situation required a high degree of independence, initiative and still more perseverance of them. All this is not to mean that prior to the Világos surrender the leading Hungarian diplomats were lacking initiative or the ability of problem solving necessary to carrying out their tasks independently. However, the main lines of their functioning were basically determined by the conceptions, intentions and foreign policy plans of the Hungarian revolutionary government – although they and the government policy in this respect were interdependent and conditional upon one another.[1]

[1] As to the history of the diplomatic missions of the revolutionary government of the War of Independence, see: Horváth Mihály: *Magyarország függetlenségi harcainak története 1848 és 1849-ben* (The history of Hungarian freedom fights in 1848 and 1849), Vols. I–III, Genf, 1865; Alter, Wilhelm: Die auswärtige Politik der ungarischen Revolution 1848–1849. (*Deutsche Rundschau*, 1911–1912/3) and reprint, Altenburg, 1912; Károlyi Árpád: *Németújvári gróf Batthyány Lajos főbenjáró pöre* (The trial of capital offence of the Count Lajos Batthyány of Németújvár, the first Prime-Minister of Hungary), Vols. I–II, Budapest, 1932; Kenyeres Júlia: A szabadságharc és a nemzetközi politika. In: *Forradalom és szabadságharc 1848–1849* (War of Independence and international politics. In: Revolution and War of Independence in 1848–1849), Budapest, 1948, pp. 469–515; Hajnal István: *A Batthyány-kormány külpolitikája* (Foreign policy of the Batthyány-

Perhaps it can be omitted here to give a full list of all the persons, staying either in Hungary or abroad, soldiers and civilians, who were commissioned by members of the Batthyány-government, or later by Lajos Kossuth, President of the National Defence Committee, or by his confidentials – either in legal or semi-legal, explicit or quite secret form – to carry through various tasks. Among them there were quite concrete, well defined tasks such as commissions to purchase arms, or tasks connected with arms control, or other actions of economic and financial nature, but there were also such simpler tasks as delivering messages from and to the government. How much these commissions affected the foreign policy sphere, depended on a number of factors, first of all, on the time of starting a certain action or on the closing date of its execution.[2] The major commissions of an undoubtedly diplomatic character depended on the development and changes of the Hungarian revolution, and – mainly – on the sharpening of conflicts. Several affairs become more understandable if we consider that in foreign policy issues the first responsible Hungarian government was largely dependent on the functioning of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on the old diplomatic corps. It was only possible through the mediation of the Minister *a latere*, the Prince Pál Esterházy at the time, that the government could assert its intentions to some extent. All this explains, first of all, the fact: as the conflicts between the Vienna Camarilla and Hungary grew keener, to the same extent did certain steps belonging to the individual spheres of diplomacy become part of the increasingly independent Hungarian foreign policy.

By way of illustration, it is worthwhile referring to László Szalay's mission to Frankfurt. The role he played as member of the "Centrist camp" in the Reform Era is widely known, and so are his literary, journalistic activities, as well as his participation in scientific life and in drafting bills to be submitted to the Reform Diets.[3] The first remarkable diplomatic mission of the revolutionary times was linked with his name. His task – to represent the cause of Hungary at the German Federal Assembly in Frankfurt and before the German Central Govern-

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government; henceforward: *Batthyány-kormány*), Budapest, 1957; Waldapfel Eszter: *A független magyar külpolitika 1848–1849* (The independent foreign policy of Hungary in 1848–1849), Budapest, 1962.

[2] As a Hungarian extraordinary foreign policy commissioner, Sámuel Sztanko was in charge of purchasing arms in England. Ágost Wimmer also arrived in England to obtain a loan to cover the arms purchases. Cf. Jánossy Dénes: *A Kossuth-emigráció Angliában és Amerikában 1851–1852* (The Kossuth-emigration in England and in America 1851–1852). (O.L., I–II/1–II/2, Budapest, 1940–1948, I, pp. 37–38.)

[3] Cf. Szalay Gábor: *Szalay László levelei* (László Szalay's letters). Budapest, 1913; *Idem*: Szalay Lászlóról (On László Szalay). (*Budapesti Szemle*, 1913, p. 153); Angyal Dávid: *Szalay László emlékezete* (To the memory of László Szalay). Budapest, 1914.

The term Reform Era refers to the first half, especially the twenties, thirties and forties of the 19th century, a historical period characterized by efforts to change the feudal Hungary into a modern, democratic society up to the requirements of that age. The so-called Reform Diets were primarily devoted to achieve this end and to promote social progress [The Editor].

ment residing there – cannot at all be regarded as a secret mission. In May 1848, when it came to make preparations for and realize László Szalay's mission, the Batthyány-government and its most active members came to an understanding in this respect and won not only the support of the Archduke István [Stephen of Habsburg], but also the consent of the Austrian government, then under the leadership of Pillersdorf.[4] The necessity of joining the Hungarian and German elements to counteract the impending danger of a Slav preponderance was at the time widely accepted in Pest and Vienna alike. Initially accompanied by Dénes Pázmándy, László Szalay met with a friendly reception in Frankfurt. Thus the Hungarian delegates could work effectively until Austria had overcome Piedmont in Italy and Windischgrätz had suppressed the uprising in Prague, after which Vienna felt strong enough to start a counter-attack on Hungary. But as soon as the Vienna winds began to change and many other European factors started to play into the hands of the reactionary forces, Szalay's situation also took a turn for the worse. In the meantime he was also left alone, since Pázmándy had returned to Hungary to become the president of the House of Representatives. The Archduke John, head of the German central government, and Foreign Minister Heckscher, along with Schmerling – in accordance with intimations and intents coming from Vienna – all questioned the necessity and legality of the further presence of the Hungarian delegate.[5] Thus, Lajos Batthyány's notes of 19 July and 18 August urging Szalay to bring the German–Hungarian alliance to a successful issue, became unrealizable.[6]

It was still in summer 1848 – and in connection with the worsening of the position of the Hungarian delegate in Frankfurt and with other foreign policy interests – that there emerged a plan concerning the establishment of a Hungarian diplomatic representation in Paris. Suggestions to this effect had already been received from persons keeping touch with the French governmental circles, and it also emerged as a possibility that France would set up a diplomatic representation in Hungary.[7] The French writer August De Gerando, husband of the Countess Emma Teleki, played a mediating role in this matter. In parallel with all this, the sharpening of internal conflicts coupled with an uncertainty about the prospects only enhanced the demand to build up relations with France. To such an extent that it finally led to a decision-making during the Batthyány administration. Ferenc Pulszky, who initially had held the office of Under-Secretary of State in Kossuth's Finance Ministry, later became Under-Secretary of State with the Prince Pál Esterházy in Vienna. In this capacity, within the

[4] Károlyi Á.: *op. cit.* Vol. I, pp. 281 ff.

[5] Cf. Szalay László: *Diplomatische Actenstücke zur Beleuchtung der Ungarischen Gesandtschaft in Deutschland.* Zürich, 1849; *Idem*: Magyarország s a német központi hatalom, 1848 (Hungary and the German central power, 1848). (*Pesti Napló*, October 1861.)

[6] Cf. Horváth M.: *op. cit.* I, pp. 341–343, 345–347.

[7] As to the French foreign policy, see: Quentin-Bauchart, P.: *Lamartine et la politique étrangère de la révolution de février.* Paris, 1913; Jennings, Lawrence: *France and Europe in 1848.* Oxford, 1973.

Ministry *a latere*, he was in charge of monitoring and safeguarding the Hungarian interests in foreign policy. In view of Esterházy's increasingly passive attitude, Pulszky's importance was growing from day to day, especially after the events had taken a more radical turn. Recognizing that Szalay's mission had come to a deadlock, Pulszky vigorously urged the establishment of Hungarian diplomatic representations in France and England, and continued to put Szalay's person into prominence. Later on he proposed Ödön Beöthy, an active politician of the opposition at the Reform Diets, to fill this post. However, Batthyány designated the radical count László Teleki – with whom he was on friendly terms, although politically Teleki stood to the left of him – to lead the Paris mission. Kossuth also agreed to this nomination.

The organization and implementation of Teleki's mission, however, were made by far not so public as that of Szalay in May 1848. Although Teleki's mission in general was not concealed, the government sought to keep its details secret. This is quite understandable considering that by 31 August 1848, when Teleki left Pest, the alliance between Jellačić and the Vienna court had been an accomplished fact. On 29 August when Batthyány signed Teleki's letter of credence addressed to the French Foreign Minister Jules Bastide, he could still hope to obtain the Vienna court's consent. Batthyány, who subsequently went to Vienna with Deák to ease the emerging conflicts of a general nature, made a simultaneous attempt to legalize Teleki's mission to some extent. They sent out some feelers and made certain attempts in this respect in which they involved the Prince Pál Esterházy too, who was just about to retire.[8] Teleki was also informed of all this as he stopped at that time in Vienna for a few days on his way from Pest to Paris. But it was precisely on the day of Teleki's departure, on 4 September, that Emperor Ferdinand's rescript to Jellačić, which required the Act III of 1848 to be modified and the independent Hungarian defence and finances to be ceased, inflicted a fatal blow on plans for the possible legalization of Teleki's mission because it also insisted on the Austrian government's hegemony in foreign affairs as well. It can be explained by this utterly aggravated situation that Batthyány, who otherwise was very cautious and would always adhere to legitimate measures, determined in Vienna to enter into direct contact with the Chargé d'affaires De la Cour, commissioner of France in Vienna, and – introducing Teleki to him – to make him fully acquainted with the steps deemed necessary to be taken to safeguard the independence of Hungary and to ask for his good offices to obtain the French government's good will and protection over the just endeavours of the Hungarian nation. Although De la Cour did not encourage the Hungarian politicians very positively, it still appears from his report to Paris that he tried to give an objective outline of the background of Teleki's mission. To be sure, the execution of the Paris mission already showed signs of independent Hungarian foreign policy endeavours and formed an organic part of the international efforts of the country that entered into a cam

[8] Cf. Károlyi: *op. cit.* I, pp. 325 ff and Hajnal: *Batthyány-kormány, op. cit.* pp. 100 ff.

paign for its national independence. Knowing this, Teleki, continuing his way from Vienna, had stopped again in Frankfurt to meet László Szalay and arrived in Paris on 8 September. Teleki, who had undertaken his mission quite consciously, though he had deemed it as being of a temporary character, could hardly have thought at that time that the way of his legal return to Hungary had been closed for good.[9]

Teleki set to carry through his task without sparing his energy – and we may add: amidst not insignificant difficulties. Even if his contacts, which he had built up with a good sense of diplomacy, extended from the leading government officials to public personalities of various social standing and party-affiliation, Teleki always had to reckon with the counteractions of the Baron Thom, Chargé d'affaires of Austria in Paris, which were strongly underpined by the Austrian Prime and Foreign Minister Wessenberg. If it is taken into consideration that Teleki's activity was taking place after the suppression of the Paris workers' uprising of June 1848 – that is, in a period when General Cavaignac was acting as *pro tempore* head of the French state and the revolutionary movement started in February had already turned into its opposite –, the real amount of difficulties the Hungarian commissioner had to face, becomes clear for all. Although Foreign Minister Bastide did not refrain from receiving Teleki, in fact he did not even fail to make some friendly gestures, the French government still tried to content and convince Austria of its peaceful intentions as well as of its determination not to recognize Teleki in his official capacity. Thus Teleki's status remained uncertain and contradictory throughout the period of 1848–1849.

All this, however, could not put any limit on Teleki's activities. The luxurious apartment he rented under 66 Avenue des Champs Elysées saw the visits of several well-known personalities of the French public life. To be found among his visitors were such personalities as the poet and politician Lamartine who had played a leading role in the first phase of the 1848 revolution, Ledru-Rollin, a representative of the French bourgeois radical Left, and several parliamentary representatives: Raspail, Blanqui, Lasteyrie and others. Teleki himself also frequented the public life salons where he was received with friendship and general appreciation. Through his good personal contacts, he also extended his influence to the most authentic organs of the French press. Apart from the government-party *Le National*, such newspapers as *Le Siècle*, *L'Opinion* and Victor Hugo's *Evénement* were also ready to publish pro-Hungarian articles. The press propaganda mechanism – which was ultimately operated by Teleki with the assistance of Frigyes Szarvady, one-time editor of the *Pressburger Zeitung*, and of Dr Lajos Mandl who had been living in France for a longer time –, even if it could not undertake to change the French government's increasingly counter-revolutionary political conduct, could still do much for the populariza-

[9] Óváry-Avary Károly: Teleki László gróf párizsi küldetése 1848-ban (Count László Teleki's mission to Paris in 1848). In: *Háborús felelősség* (War responsibility; henceforward: *H. F.*), 1931, pp. 434 ff; Cf. Kosáry Domokos: Magyar és francia külpolitika 1848–49-ben (The Hungarian and French foreign policies in 1848–1849). (*Századok*, 1939.)

tion of the cause of the Hungarian Freedom Fight. It could also promote the diffusion of more knowledge about the East-European situation, the past and the culture of the Hungarians, and about their historically developed place among the various nationalities of the region.[10]

In pursuance of instructions coming from his fatherland, Teleki extended his attention to tasks connected with arms purchases as well as to recruiting officers for the Hungarian national army. To perform the latter task, he even established contacts with certain leading figures of the French monarchist parties, among others, with the Count Albert Circourt. It was also connected with Teleki's activities that Henrik Dembinszki, the legendary general of the Polish revolution of 1831, was won over to the Hungarian side, who – finally on Kossuth's invitation – departed from Paris to Hungary in early January 1849.[11] This action was also approved by the prestigious and influential Prince Adam Czartoryski, leader of the conservative wing of the Polish emigration in Paris. The ties between the Prince Czartoryski and Teleki became increasingly closer, because both of them started out from the basic consideration that the conflicts having arisen between the Hungarians and the other nationalities living in Hungary should be settled in a peaceful manner and then their co-operation with the Hungarians could be secured. As a result of their efforts, they managed to win the Romanian emigration leader Golescu who initially had been hostile to the Hungarians. Golescu and Teleki were later on friendly terms with each other, they both sympathized with and fostered the idea of a Romanian–Hungarian co-operation and also supported the confederate version of a Romanian–Hungarian alliance. From Teleki's viewpoint, it also seemed advantageous that the Polish conservative emigration had a very extensive international network, the opinion of which was always taken into account by the French government circles in issues concerning Central and Eastern Europe.[12]

Although his hopes attached to Ledru-Rollin's possible election as president of the Republic had come to nothing and this post was obtained by Louis Napoleon, candidate of the right wing, in December 1848, it did not become impossible for Teleki to continue his activities after the advent of 1849. This was supposedly due not only to Teleki's diplomatic skills and tactfulness, but also to the good relations he maintained with Czartoryski. Though all this had a price to be paid by Teleki: he always had to take good care of keeping his activities within

[10] László Teleki's letters to Kossuth from Paris on 10 October 1848. (*A szabadságharc magyar diplomáciai levelei 1848–1849* – Hungarian diplomatic correspondence of the Freedom Fight 1848–1849; henceforward: *Dipl. lev. H. F.* 1928–29, pp. 279–280.); 7 March 1849 (*Ibid.* pp. 429–431); Cf. Lengyel Tamás: *Gróf Teleki László* (Count László Teleki). Budapest, no date, pp. 52 ff.

[11] Danzer, Alfonz: *Dembinski in Ungarn.* Vols. I–II, Wien, 1873. Publication in Hungarian: Budapest in 1874.

[12] Cf. Horváth Zoltán: *Teleki László 1810–1861* (László Teleki 1810–1861). Vols. I–II. Budapest, 1964, pp. 256 ff; Chastain, James: Iratok Franciaország magyarországi politikájának történetéhez (Documents on the history of the French policy towards Hungary in 1848). (*Levéltári Közlemények*, 1976, No. 2.)

legal bounds in order to secure the good will of both the French government circles and the circumspect police forces which always kept a watchful eye on the foreigners. Otherwise he too would have shared the fortune of those who, over-emphasizing their explicit oppositionary sentiments, had been banished from France. It can be explained by this very precarious situation that Teleki was not able to arrive at an active co-operation with the democratic wing of the Polish emigration, though he received Julian Falkowski who earlier had been to Hungary and then with Kossuth's approval tried to recruit officers in Paris for the Hungarian army. However, Teleki refused to give his consent to the departure of a widely known democrat, General Mieroslawski, from Paris to Hungary, as he did not want to risk his good relations with Czartoryski. Ultimately, it was for similar considerations that Teleki decided not to join the public protests against the expedition which France was to send to overthrow the Republic of Rome. Under the pressure of the actual circumstances, Teleki was forced to a political "ropedancing" which may be disputed from a strictly theoretical aspect, but which can be explained by his essential interests in maintaining the continuity of his activities.[13]

Teleki was burdened with increasingly serious problems as time passed. With the intensification of the Hungarian Freedom Fight, Teleki's mission became ever more important and his responsibility also increased. In accordance with the instructions coming from Hungary, Teleki promoted the further ramification of the main lines of the independent Hungarian foreign policy endeavours. Thus, it was through Teleki's mission in Paris that these foreign policy lines ran further to London, Brussels, Torino and also to Constantinople. Significant efforts were made to reach joint political and military co-operation between Hungary and Piedmont which was about to take revenge for his defeat in 1848 on Austria. Soon after Giuseppe Carosini, as Kossuth's commissioner, had done much to prepare the way for this endeavour in Turin, the official diplomatic relations were also established.[14] Having acted in close co-operation with Teleki, the Baron Lajos Splényi was subsequently recognized as a Hungarian envoy by the Gioberti-government. As Splényi's Italian counterpart, Colonel Monti set out for Hungary to represent the government of Piedmont. Monti's name and activity were linked up with the organization of an Italian legion. In parallel with the Italian legion organized in Hungary, a corresponding Hungarian legion was recruited in Piedmont under the command of István Türr, still lieutenant at the time, from Hungarians who had deserted the Austrian army. Both preceding and parallel with this, appeals were issued – through Teleki and Splényi – to Hungarians then serving in Austrian corps in Italy in order to win them over to the cause of the Hungarian Freedom Fight. However, the rapid military victory General Radetzky had scored at Novara on 23 March 1849 thwarted not only the

[13] Frigyes Szarvady's letter to Kossuth, Paris, 15 March 1849. (*Dipl. lev. H. F.* 1928–29, pp. 436–438); László Teleki's letter to Kossuth, Paris, 14 May 1849. (*Ibid.* pp. 506–509.)

[14] Bormioli, Mario: Giuseppe Carosini. In: *Annuario 1939 della Accademia d'Ungheria di Roma*. Roma, 1938.

more ambitious conceptions of Piedmont, but also the closely related Hungarian plans. It was mainly the active and pro-Hungarian Lorenzo Velerio who continued to foster the idea of an Italian–Hungarian co-operation in Turin in an effort to lay the foundations of a possible future co-operation at a more favourable time. Having lost his function, Splényi was given a new commission by Teleki: he went to Constantinople to represent and safeguard the Hungarian interests there, a function which he actually performed, though provisionally.[15]

From the viewpoint of an international propaganda campaign aimed to justify the cause of Hungary and possibly to achieve more inclination to take a positive stand for Hungary, it seemed desirable to win over Great Britain to the Hungarian cause, with especial view to preventing the impending danger of the Tsar's intervention. The first attempts were still connected with László Szalay's activities who moved from Frankfurt to London in November 1848. Authorized by Kossuth, Szalay had it as his main task to call the British government's attention to the benefits which might be derived for the British national economy from a possible alliance to be concluded with Hungary. Another task was to keep the British government informed of Hungary's rightful self-defence and to try to achieve that Britain would send an envoy to Hungary.[16] However, Szalay's attempts to enter into contact with the British government circles met with rigid refusal. Presumably, this refusal might also have been due to the very inopportune timing of establishing such relations, in consideration of the domestic and international situation. The British Foreign Secretary, the liberal Lord Palmerston sent a message to Szalay by Lord Eddisbury, Secretary of the Foreign Office, advising him that "the British government only knows of Hungary as a constituent part of the Austrian Empire, therefore, if a commissioner had anything to say to the British government about a commercial agreement between Great Britain and Hungary, he can only do so through the mediation of the Baron Koller, the representative of the Austrian Emperor". With this the British government not only gave utterance to its traditionally pro-Austrian official policy, but its standpoint also signalled the start of a general counter-attack on the part of the Vienna court. It also reflected the fact that the Hungarian revolutionary forces were retreating and – in an international perspective – the revolution had been defeated after Paris in Vienna too.[17]

When we consider the failure of Szalay's attempts in Britain in comparison to the much more successful mission of Ferenc Pulszky, who arrived in London in late February 1849, it should be borne in mind that the two missions were taking

[15] Cf. Hanák Péter: A magyar szabadságharc és a Habsburg monarchia elnyomott népei (The Hungarian Freedom Fight and the oppressed peoples of the Habsburg monarchy). In: *Forradalom és szabadságharc, op. cit.* pp. 417 ff; Koltay-Kastner Jenő: *A Kossuth-emigráció Olaszországban* (The Kossuth-emigration in Italy; henceforward: *Kossuth-emigráció*). Budapest, 1960, pp. 12 ff.

[16] Horváth M.: *op. cit.* II, pp. 51–52.

[17] *Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Hungary in 1847–1849. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command by her Majesty. August 15, 1850.* London, 1850, pp. 105 ff.

place at different times, and thus, in different Hungarian and international situations. Louis Napoleon's rise to the presidential seat of the French Republic was received with mixed feelings in Britain, which did not lack a certain degree of distrust either. The real danger of the Tsar's intervention turned the general attention towards East-Europe, and the reports that spread abroad on the spring counter-offensive launched by the Hungarian national army also did not fail to make their effect felt. Undoubtedly, Pulszky was more energetic and – considering the revolutionary times – might have been more suitable than Szalay to perform the tasks in Britain. To be sure, the changing Hungarian and international circumstances considerably increased the effectiveness of his activity.[18] In contrast with his predecessor, Pulszky placed more emphasis on the heart of the matter, namely to win the sympathy of the influential British political party leaders and the public, than to obtain the recognition of the official status of his mission. Essentially, the whole background of his mission to Britain has remained obscure, and it cannot be elucidated with certainty either: what proportion of his actions of several months was taken under official Hungarian authorization and what proportion out of his personal passions, that is, on a voluntary basis. That Pulszky left Hungary in early January 1849 in the greatest secrecy was largely due to the fact that his person had been strongly compromised at the time of the Vienna revolution of October 1848 and he had good reasons to fear the most serious reprisal. It was with regard to this fact, and still more to the demand for strengthening the foreign relations that – on recommendations and requests by István Bezerédj and Ödön Beöthy[19] – the ex-foreign secretary Kossuth consented to Pulszky's mission abroad. Although Kossuth sent a letter to Lord Palmerston on this matter, Pulszky kept his mission secret. To such an extent that he gave an evasive answer even to an interpellation put to him on this subject at the National Assembly in Debrecen. Pulszky believed – and not without any foundation – that he could carry through his mission more effectively if his activity were not tied to his official recognition by the British government. Although Foreign Minister Count Kázmér Batthyány later recognized him as an official commissioner in Britain, Pulszky found it wiser not to present his letter of credence, either its first or its new version, to the British

[18] Cf. A magyar forradalmi ügyekre vonatkozó levelezés, mely az angol királyi kormány és diplomatiai ügynöke közt 1848 és 49-ik években folyt, és mely a királynő parancsára 1850. évi augusztus 15-én és 1851-ik febr. 28-án a parlament mindkét háza elé terjesztetett (Correspondence relative to the Hungarian revolutionary affairs between the Royal British Government and its diplomatic agent in 1848 and 1849 which was presented to both houses of the Parliament by command of her Majesty on 15 August 1850 and 28 February 1851). (*Magyar Hírlap*, 1851, pp. 444–445); Sproxton, Charles: Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution. Cambridge, 1919; Greer, M. Donald: *L'Angleterre, la France et la révolution de 1848.* Paris, 1925; Haraszti Éva: *Az angol külpolitika a magyar szabadságharc ellen* (The British foreign policy against the Hungarian Freedom Fight). Budapest, 1951.

[19] Cf. Pulszky Ferenc: *Életem és korom* (My life and my age; henceforward: *Életem*). Vols. I–II, Budapest, 1884. New edition: Budapest, 1958, pp. 464 ff.

government circles –, from which he could derive advantages rather than disadvantages.[20]

Pulszky's mission to Britain seems not to have been defined unambiguously: this is shown by the fact that László Teleki – whose diplomatic competence was extended to cover the British affairs as well – was looking forward with reservation and doubts to a new mission to Britain, and considering Szalay's previous experience, he held it a rather hopeless venture. At the same time he was quite ready to support Pulszky's actions in all respects, seeing that Pulszky invariably insisted on them. The good personal relations between the two politicians are proven not only by their regular correspondence and the financial support supplied by Teleki to Pulszky, but also by their personal meetings and contacts. If need so arose, either Pulszky went over to Paris or Teleki crossed the Channel to help Pulszky in Britain. The Hungarian diplomatic centre in Paris transmitted the instructions and information to Pulszky, and reversely, it forwarded Pulszky's reports from London to their place of destination. Although Teleki kept his hands on the actions in Britain too and knew of all of the emerging problems and issues in detail, giving advice or guidance whenever necessary, all this did not mean at all that the resourceful Pulszky could not act or take initiatives quite independently. Teleki was a solid background, a political and intellectual companion for Pulszky in a difficult situation when the greatest problems of those engaged in diplomatic missions abroad arose from a high degree of contingency and difficulties of relations with the homeland as well as from the lack of information and guidance. Under the circumstances, the Paris centre and Teleki's person in particular, served as a basis, a real background not only for Pulszky but also for all those engaged in diplomatic missions abroad to rely on both politically and – even if only to some extent – financially.[21]

Pulszky started manifold organizational and contact-creating work in Britain. Through the good offices of his old professional friend Vipan, the doors of the most distinguished English houses and clubs were open to Pulszky, and several influential newspapers showed willingness to serve the cause of Hungary. With his excellent demeanour, the knowledgeable and always well-informed Pulszky won over many eminent members of the British political and social life to actively help him in his efforts.[22] They set up the Hungarian Propaganda Committee in London which later became a really effective and active organization. They regularly held meetings, distributed the work among themselves, wrote articles and published them in various newspapers, organized pro-Hungarian meetings and

[20] Count Kázmér Batthyány's letter to Pulszky, Debrecen, 14 May 1849. (*Dipl. lev. H. F.* 1928–29, p. 509.)

[21] László Teleki's letters to Ferenc Pulszky 1849–1851. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835); Part of Teleki's letters dated between April and September of 1849 were published in the volume: Pulszky F.: *Életem, op. cit.* I, pp. 513 ff; A more complete edition of the letters in: Vértessy Jenő: Gr. Teleki László levelei Pulszky Ferenchez (Count László Teleki's letters to Ferenc Pulszky). (*Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, 1917.)

[22] Cf. Pulszky F.: *Életem, op. cit.* II, pp. 488 ff.

displayed a wide-ranging social activity in general to promote the cause of the Hungarian Freedom Fight.[23] To exemplify their highly ramified personal relations, mention can be made of such personalities as the renowned geologist Sir Charles Lyell, Lord Dudley Stuart, who was a well-known friend of the Poles and who later became an enthusiastic supporter of the Hungarian Freedom Fight, the lawyer Toulmin Smith with whom Pulszky formed a long friendship, or the writer Edward John Taylor who became an expert in the Hungarian circumstances. The most influential supporter of the cause of Hungary was undoubtedly Richard Cobden, the eminent advocate of free trade. Pulszky also succeeded to gain admittance to the aged minister Lord Landsdowne who then acted as a benevolent mediator between him and the highest circles of the British aristocracy.[24] Taking this into account, it is easier to understand why Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, was also willing to receive Pulszky, and later Teleki as well, though in an unofficial capacity. In their report on this remarkable meeting to Kossuth and Foreign Minister Kázmér Batthyány, Pulszky and Teleki did not exaggerate when they described Palmerston as having shown understanding and benevolence to their activity and towards Hungary. Simultaneously, however, they did not fail to make it clear that the British Foreign Secretary steadily insisted on the maintenance of an integrated Austria and he was convinced that this was a necessity from a European perspective. On the other hand, Palmerston held it very desirable that the Austrian Empire renew its internal socio-economic and political system and promote the modern bourgeois transformation of society under the conditions of the peaceful coexistence of the Empire's constituent nations. The latter principles were professed not only by Lord Palmerston, but also by several other British public personalities who were sympathetic to the cause of Hungary and even supported it in some respects.[25]

Only if all this is considered, is it possible to understand Pulszky's activity, behaviour, tactful and circumspect acts which could not be disturbed even by the unexpected arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Lajos Bikkessy in London, by whom Kossuth wanted to make Palmerston officially acquainted with the Hungarian declaration of independence. In agreement with Teleki, – who was also astonished at seeing this special action – Pulszky adhered to his time-honoured cautious methods.[26] Being well aware of the views the leading British politicians held in this matter, he did his best to adjust himself to the given situation. Even if this conduct could not lead Britain to take an official stand against the Tsarist intervention which had ensued in the meanwhile, nor could it achieve Britain's full approval of the fundamental principles as laid down in the declaration of inde-

[23] Cf. Horváth Jenő: A londoni magyar propaganda-bizottság 1849-ben (The Hungarian Propaganda Committee in London in 1849). (*Budapesti Szemle*, 1936, p. 242.)

[24] Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 40 ff.

[25] Pulszky's letter to Kázmér Batthyány, Paris, 16 June 1849. (*Dipl. lev. H. F.* 1928–29, pp. 512–513); Pulszky's letter to Kossuth, Paris, 16 June 1849. (*Ibid.* pp. 513–514); London, 27 July 1849. (*Ibid.* pp. 518–519); Teleki to Kossuth, London, 3 August 1849. (*Ibid.* pp. 520–522.)

[26] Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, p. 43.

pendence of 15 April 1849, it still resulted in an increasingly wide circle of Englishmen who became friendly to Hungary, and he succeeded to make the general public of Britain aware of the absolute necessity of settling the Hungarian problem.

FORMATION OF THE WESTERN AND EASTERN WINGS OF EMIGRATION

Taking a glance at the activities of Hungarian foreign representations in the last months of the Freedom Fight, it very clearly appears that they basically and primarily aimed to invalidate the two main causes of the final failure of the nation's fight for freedom and independence. The first cause originated in the most critical and most tragic internal contradiction of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, namely in the developments of the unsolved nationality problem, the sharpened conflicts and in the resulting grievous nationality war. The second was connected with the overpower of the international reactionary forces, that is, with the starting Tsarist military intervention.

Although Teleki undoubtedly came under the strong influence of the ideas of the Prince Czartoryski who kept urging on joining the nationality forces, his personal opinion about the nationality issue was also based on his domestic experience and directly followed from his democratic political views. He became strongly convinced that problems related to the creation of an inevitable agreement with the nationalities could not be effectively solved by taking half-measures, and that the maintenance of the Hungarian supremacy and hegemony might only lead to serious harms and further conflicts. "There is one thing which I am particularly concerned about because I think Hungary's future depends on it. Namely, that we shall be most generous in granting rights to our various nationalities. Not only Austria, but St. Stephen's Hungary also died... *Liberté, égalité, fraternité* by themselves are no longer sufficient. Peoples also want to live their nationality life" – maintained Teleki in his report to Kossuth on 14 May 1849.[27] And four days later, on 18 May, the representatives of various East-European peoples already convened to hold a conference at Hôtel Lambert, Czartoryski's palace in Paris, where László Teleki, Ferenc Pulszky, Frigyes Szarvady represented the Hungarians and the Czech Rieger the Slav peoples. Undoubtedly, the bargaining and the resolutions could only be of a theoretical nature and thus could not have a direct effect either on the nationalities in Hungary or on the leading government officials. The conflicts and fratricidal fights were already too aggravated and far too intricate to make it possible to enforce the nationality peace-oriented resolutions of the Paris conference.[28]

[27] László Teleki to Kossuth, Paris, 14 May 1849. (*Dipl. lev. H. F.* 1928–29, pp. 306–309.)

[28] Minutes of the nationality conference of 18 May 1849 – Ghica, J.: *Amintiri Pribegia după 1848.* Bucureşti, 1889, pp. 396 ff; Cf. Törekvések Magyarország federalizálására (Endeavours to federalize Hungary). (*H. F.* 1928–29, pp. 241 ff.)

Moreover, on behalf of the Hungarian government, Foreign Minister Count Kázmér Batthyány flatly refused not only Teleki's conceptions and views, but also the concessions proposed by Czartoryski's circle. In his reply expounded on behalf of the Hungarian government as to the adoption of the principle of territorial autonomy and the establishment of confederate relations among Serbs, Romanians and Hungarians, i.e. the federalization of the historical Hungary – with which Teleki fully agreed –, Kázmér Batthyány took a rigidly negative stand.[29] As a matter of fact, the belated Szeged Act on Nationalities was conceived essentially in the same spirit: while it declared far-reaching rights for nationalities, it refrained from accepting the principle of territorial autonomy.[30] Although the dialogue on the arrangement of the nationality problem, which was about to start between Teleki and the government in the final phase of the Freedom Fight, had been unable to reach a stage of practical actions, it proved very important in the continuous exchange of ideas about the nationality issue which was later taking shape among the emigration leaders.

We must regard the Czartoryski–Teleki conception of the agreement with the nationalities as being closely connected with the desperate efforts to avert the Tsarist intervention, that is, as a recognition of the necessity to set the friendly alliance, co-operation, and ultimately, the confederation of the Eastern European peoples against the united reactionary forces embodied in the Austro–Russian coalition. At the same time, a really wide-ranging and highly effective propaganda mechanism was also put into operation under the control of Pulszky and Teleki – with the participation of prestigious and influential foreign statesmen, politicians and public personalities – in an effort to demonstrate the serious violation of international law by the Tsarist intervention, to mobilize the general public to take the necessary counteractions and to urge the concerned powers and their governments to take energetic measures to oppose the Russian intervention. Independently from Kázmér Batthyány's urging and entreating writings, Teleki set to unmask the reactionary nature of the Tsarist intervention and to organize and launch the counteractions on his own initiative.

The French Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys was ready to listen to Teleki's arguments, not concealing even his sympathy – without, however, holding out any promise of a factual government-level action. Drouyn de Lhuys's successor as foreign minister, the Democrat Alexis de Tocqueville, with whom Teleki had very good personal connection, was also unable to do much for Hungary under the circumstances of the French involvement in suppressing the Republic of Rome.

[29] Foreign Minister Count Kázmér Batthyány also recorded his standpoint in the nationality issue in a circular (Budapest, 10 June 1849). According to this statement, the Hungarian government insists on the adoption of the following principles: "*a)* universality of the state; *b)* the centuries-old territorial integrity of the state; *c)* maintaining the supremacy of the Hungarian element which it attained and has preserved since a thousand of years...". Pulszky F.: *Életem*, *op. cit.* I, pp. 543 ff.

[30] Cf. Kemény G. Gábor: *A magyar nemzetiségi kérdés története* (History of the nationality question in Hungary). Budapest, 1947, pp. 36–37.

What the French government did in Rome practically did not differ from the acts of the Tsarist army in Hungary. While the former stifled the uprising in Rome, the second suppressed the Hungarian revolution. On what right or upon what moral ground might the French government have taken any stand against the Tsar, when it also made every effort to stifle the European revolutionary movement into blood as quickly as possible? In this respect, there were no significant differences between President Louis Napoleon and Tsar Nicholas I. Nor did the British government show much inclination to support the Hungarian revolution, to defend Hungary and to try to hinder the Tsarist intervention.

Considering all this, one might easily be inclined to think that under the given international situation – very unfavourable for revolutions – the immense efforts Teleki and Pulszky were making to unveil the Tsarist intervention and to urge the opponents of Russia to help Hungary must hardly have been more than wasted breath. It is beyond doubt that neither Palmerston nor Louis Napoleon could undertake to press the Tsar, either by taking government-level actions or by force of arms, to withdraw his interventionist forces. At the same time, they did not raise any objections either to the British and French press to give full rein to their aversion to the Russian intervention, or to the large-scale political and press propaganda actions of the leaders of the Hungarian missions in London and Paris. With these actions they advocated the righteous struggle of Hungary and revealed the grievous aftermaths of the invasion of General Paskievich's army. Teleki's act to take up his pen to write his impressive Manifesto against the Tsarist intervention, which also appeared in English, French and German languages, might seem a futile effort, somewhat reminding of Don Quixote.[31] However, this is only the case if we think merely in the actual situation at that particular time. Putting it in a broader, international perspective and taking into account the further historical developments and tendencies, the large-scale press campaign which was going on against the Russian intervention in the West-European countries during the summer and autumn of 1849 did not miss the mark. Namely, its effect extended as far as the Crimean War when Great Britain and France at length undertook to curb Tsarist Russia. The conflicts among the great powers, which finally led to armed clashes in 1853, had already existed in 1849 and it was not without foundation that the Hungarian politicians always reckoned with and appealed to them. It is quite another question that by the time the events so much hoped for in 1849 came true, the domestic situation had undergone a dramatic change and above all the former chief enemy, Austria, had changed its attitude towards Russia, its main supporter, in fact, its saviour in 1849.

Now, with full knowledge of the further developments, Palmerston's arguments, views and especially his expectations concerning Central and Eastern Europe can hardly be left out of consideration. While he left the Hungarians

[31] *De l'Intervention Russe en Hongrie.* Paris, 1849; *The case of Hungary. Manifesto, Published in the name of the Hungarian Government.* London, 1849; *Die Russische Intervention in Ungarn.* Hamburg, 1849.

exposed to the overpower of the Tsarist intervention, he also predicted the temporary character of the Austro-Russian co-operation. He did not cease to believe it either that Austria would sooner or later emancipate itself from its onerous and transitory "ally" to fulfil once more its time-honoured, traditional European function as a great power: to put an obstacle in the way of the East-European expansion of Tsarist Russia. Although Palmerston listened to the rightful complaints and arguments of the Hungarians, he tended to believe and to place more confidence in an Austria–Hungary that was to be renewed through a transitional period of absolutism than in the effectiveness of a confederation-type alliance of various minor nations. During the 19th century, the foreign policy interests of Great Britain as a great power often collided at several points with Russia. They held very divergent views, for example, in respect of the future of the Turkish Empire. However, in 1849 all these conflicts lost much in importance compared to the problems involved in the suppression of revolutions in Europe and in the creation of a peaceful and essentially counter-revolutionary consolidation to serve as a basis for economic prosperity. The economic crisis of 1847, which was ultimately an important propelling force of revolutions which broke out in 1848, was already abating in 1849, to make room for some emerging new factors of economic prosperity, which were strengthened by the Californian gold-rush and its actual economic effect. Though it had given a decisive help to the Austrian counter-revolutionary forces, the Tsarist intervention failed to promote the revival of the utterly undermined and obsolete feudal social relations and their undisturbed survival in the Austrian Empire. Contributing to the capitalist transition of society, the achievements of the 1848 revolution, which entailed the socio-economic transformation of the entire Austrian Empire, continued to have a strong effect and to leave their mark on the history of many years to come.

It became very difficult to perceive the implications of this highly complex process in Hungary, and still more so in the emigration, under the circumstances of the Austrian absolutism. All this inevitably gave rise to a contradiction between the socio-political processes and the forces which determined the everyday tasks. It was the most immediate interests that guided the tasks to be performed by the emigration, and the more comprehensive or long-term goals were also formulated directly either on the basis of the program of the just defeated Freedom Fight or by drawing fictitious or real conclusions from the events which had taken place. As regards the Hungarian diplomatic representatives in Paris and London, their despair and depression understandably increased on receiving bad news from their homeland. However, they still continued to perform their further tasks in the hope that the leaders of the Freedom Fight – Kossuth and his fellow-ministers, the military leaders – had presumably managed to escape the expected relentless retaliation and to reach the western capital cities in a comparatively short time where they – uniting the forces of emigration – would be able to act more successfully for the cause of Hungary. Moreover, they also hoped that the British and French governments would then be more inclined to take energetic measures to check, or at least to mitigate, the terror and retorts in

Hungary and to guarantee the safety of refugees. There were several signs of this possibility – even if not without contradictions. What can be taken for certain is that the extremist requests of the absolutist powers did not meet with favourable reception on the part of the British government. The much hated Austrian military leader Fieldmarshal Haynau's visit to London in autumn 1850, where he was chased and beaten up by workers of the Barclay and Perkins Brewery, proved to be an action well representing the disposition of the international public. The Schwarzenberg–Bach Cabinet, which had provoked the preliminary dismissal of Fieldmarshal Haynau, now felt it its obligation to make up for the loss of prestige Austria had suffered from Haynau's case and to reproach the British government in a diplomatic note addressed to Palmerston, demanding a redress. Palmerston, while taking good care of the international position of Austria, qualified Haynau's case as a ridiculous comedy from which he fully excluded any role to have been played by emigrants staying in Britain. He also declared that he saw no reason whatsoever to take any action against either the workers or those who had been involved in this incident under the effect of the public feeling. This sober and moderate behaviour also seemed to be a hopeful sign.[32]

From another aspect, it should also be taken into account that the maintaining of contacts between the leaders of the western diplomatic missions, themselves becoming emigrants under the circumstances, and the leading political and military personalities, who had fled from the country after the surrender at Világos became increasingly difficult and uncertain. Thus was it that emigrants in the West did not have any authentic, reliable information on the situation of their eastern counterparts. Pulszky and Teleki, who had forwarded their reports a few days before the Világos surrender, could hardly have reckoned with the events which caused a serious delay in Captain Henningsen's mission. This Englishman not only undertook to deliver letters but also to organize a courier service planned to be built up between Corfu and Belgrade. Under these circumstances Captain Henningsen could finally find Kossuth and his fellow-refugees in Viddin where he handed over the letters which he had hidden in his bootleg.[33] Kossuth and the bulk of the refugees crossed the country border near Orsova on 17 August to arrive at Turnu Severin on the same day. From there they continued their way ten days later going via Kalafat to Viddin, where they arrived on 30

[32] Cf. Correspondence respecting an assault committed in London upon an Austrian General (Marshal Haynau). – September, October 1850 (*State Papers*, Vol. XLII, London, 1864, pp. 388 ff); *The Illustrated London News*, 7–14 September 1850; *Magyar Hírlap*, 15–26 September 1850; Kropf Lajos: Haynau kalandja Londonban (Haynau's adventure in London). (*Budapesti Szemle*, 1903, 116.)

[33] Charles Frederic Henningsen was a press correspondent working for Cobden's newspaper *Daily News* in London, whom Pulszky had sent with words of strong support to Hungary. Cf. Pulszky's letter to Kossuth, Paris, 30 July 1849. (*Dipl. lev. H. F.* 1928–29, p. 520.); Simultaneously, Pulszky to Bertalan Szemere, London, 30 July 1849. (*Ibid.* p. 519); László Teleki to Kossuth, London, 3 August 1849. (*Ibid.* pp. 520–522.) Henningsen won Kossuth's confidence and later accompanied Kossuth on his travels in Britain and the United States. Of his personality and role in Viddin, see: Hajnal István: *A Kossuth-emigráció Törökországban* (The Kossuth-emigration in Turkey; henceforward: *Kossuth-emigráció*). Budapest, 1927, pp. 53 ff.

August under strict military escort. Although the Turkish Empire was willing to receive the refugees, both the Hungarians and the Polish and Italian-born soldiers, it did not fail to take good care of their supervision with regard to the sensitivity of Austria and Russia. The polite Turkish gestures, however, did not make the refugees forget about the fact that they had actually lost their personal freedom, their possibility to move freely and had practically become prisoners whose future was quite vague and uncertain.

The initial dread of a possible Russian onslaught on the refugees' camp gradually waned after the Turks had taken proper military counteractions in this respect, fortifying the environs of Viddin, a Bulgarian town situated on the left bank of the Danube, where the refugees were staying until 3 November 1849.[34] At the same time they still had good reasons to fear the possibility that the Turkish Sultan would yield to the Austrian and Russian demands and would extradite the important personalities from among the Hungarian and Polish refugees in order to avert a military conflict. In this respect the Russian and Austrian diplomacy exerted heavy pressure on Constantinople. In his note of 16 August 1849, the Russian Ambassador Titoff already demanded the extradition of the Polish refugees on the basis of mutualism with reference to point 2 of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardzha of 1774, while the Austrian Ambassador Stürmer made claim to the extradition of Hungarian refugees, referring to point 18 of the Belgrade Treaty. Further energetic steps concerning the extradition of refugees were also taken by the northern powers on 14 September which landed Pasha Resid's Turkish government in a delicate situation. To be sure, Britain's Ambassador Canning and the French Ambassador General Aupick – pursuant to the relevant instructions of their governments – encouraged Turkey to show determination in this matter. However, the Sultan tended to be very circumspect in his actions in issues concerning the refugees, in order to avoid any serious risk and also to prevent the northern powers from becoming too irritated. It was with this in mind that the Turkish government sent Effendi Faud, Secretary-General of the Divan, with the Sultan's letters to Tsar Nicholas in an effort to induce him to moderate his demands. In parallel with all this, the British and French diplomacy was also put into operation both in Vienna and in St. Petersburg.

In the meanwhile, London and Paris had made a decision on sending the Anglo-French fleet to the Dardanelles. These developments might have had a marked effect on the further conduct of Vienna, just as well as on the Tsar's standpoint, which then became softened, although both Vienna and the Tsar took good care that their concessions or retreat could not be conceived as a sign of their weakness. However, it is also true that by the time the units of the Anglo-French fleet arrived in the Dardanelles, the capitals of the northern powers had renounced their demands for the extradition of refugees, and this must undoubtedly have been connected with the energetic measures of the western powers.[35]

[34] Cf. László Károly: *Naplótöredék* (Diary fragment). Budapest, 1887, pp. 3 ff.
[35] Cf. Hajnal: *Kossuth-emigráció, op. cit.* pp. 182 ff.

Simultaneously, nor did the Turks fail to take initiatives in respect of the refugees; they declared: they would guarantee the security of those who would convert to the Mohammedan faith. Kossuth also received messages to this effect from Constantinople, from the Count Gyula Andrássy who had been staying there since June 1849 on diplomatic missions assigned to him back in May of that year.[36] While under the highly uncertain conditions there were many – among others General Józef Bem – who accepted this offer, Kossuth and his fellow-ministers did not wish to avail themselves of this opportunity.[37] Apart from the danger of extradition, the bitterness of the days spent in Viddin was considerably increased by the serious defects in their supply which followed not so much from the ill will or avarice of the Turks, as from the unusual circumstances and from the high degree of disorganization, or anarchic organization. The fact is that their poor supply, miserable accommodation, the spreading cholera, high mortality, along with the spate of disquieting rumours, all seriously undermined the life of the camp of some four thousand refugees. Written complaints referring to the grievances of refugees were received in increasing numbers in Constantinople which brought the Turkish government into an awkward situation, regarding the several international troubles caused by the refugees. The leading circles in Constantinople could only think bitterly of the refugees, often hinting at their ungratefulness. Thus they were ready to agree with the Austrian recommendation, namely, to persuade the refugees to return to their homeland. The Austrian General Hauslab – whose related propaganda campaign among the refugees in Viddin was utterly supported by the Turks – finally managed to have 3156 persons transported to Hungary by ship. Several hundreds of Italians were directed from Viddin first to Saloniki and from there towards their homeland. Thus the number of refugees to be taken care of by the Turkish government dropped to a few hundred. By the second half of October when the Tsar seemed to be inclined to give some concessions, the number of Kossuth's companions had decreased significantly.[38]

Understandably, the leaders of Hungarian refugees made every effort to recover their freedom of movement and to leave the very troublesome Turkish camp as soon as possible. But what the enterprising ex-premier Bertalan Szemere and several of his companions managed to achieve was already not attainable for the others. Szemere had arrived in Viddin on 26 August, from

[36] Count Gyula Andrássy to Kossuth, Constantinople, 11 September 1849. (*Ibid.* pp. 468–470.); cf. Wertheimer Ede: *Gróf Andrássy Gyula és kora* (The Count Gyula Andrássy and his age). Vols. I–III. Budapest, 1910–1913, I, pp. 40 ff.

[37] After his conversion, General Bem under the name Pasha Murat became the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish artillery. (See László: *op. cit.* p. 8.) Converting to Mohammedanism among the Hungarians were: 75 officers, some 250 privates and non-commissioned officers along with 8 women; of the Poles some 100 people converted; Veress Sándor: *A magyar emigráció a Keleten* (Hungarian emigration in the East). Vols. I–II. Budapest, 1878, I, p. 34.

[38] *Ibid.* pp. 11–12; cf. Imrefi (Makay): *A magyar menekültek Törökországban* (Hungarian refugees in Turkey). Pest, 1850, pp. 144 ff; *Egressy Gábor törökországi naplója 1849–1850* (Gábor Egressy's diary in Turkey 1849–1850). Pest, 1851, pp. 70 ff.

where he fled with representatives Pál Hajnik, Lipót Fülöp, Imre Ivánka, István Bittó and Lipót Imrédy on 28 August after they had rent a boat and sailed downstream the Danube for Ruschuk, finally to arrive in Varna on 4 September. There they managed to embark a Constantinople-bound Austrian steamer on 10 September. Having reached the Turkish capital safely, Szemere and his companions met the Count Gyula Andrássy who received them with rather discouraging news as to the Turkish government's attitude towards the refugees. Here this small group of refugees divided into two parts. On 28 September, Szemere and Hajnik ventured a travel to Greece simply to satisfy their cultural needs, while their companions continued their way toward France. After his detour in Greece, Szemere embarked in Athens on 18 October and arrived at the port of Marseilles as early as the 25th of the same month to leave for Paris, altering his original place of destination: Zurich. It was in Paris that Teleki informed him of the tragic turn of events in Hungary.[39] Thus, it was in vain that the Turkish government ordered the arrest of the ex-premier of Hungary, and that it set a price on his head, as the leading Hungarian statesman managed to escape. Therefore, the Sultan might rightly have expected reproach from Austria. However, Lajos Kossuth, Ex-Foreign Minister Count Kázmér Batthyány, Ex-Minister of Defence Lázár Mészáros, General Mór Perczel along with General Bem and his Polish companions were too exposed to view to take the risk of an adventurous escape from their confinement. Otherwise, Kossuth always hoped that he would be released at an early date, having a confidence in the effectiveness of the related intervention of the western governments. Relying on the increasing sympathy in Great Britain, Teleki and Pulszky with their mentioned letters of late July, only confirmed Kossuth's hopes in his early freeing, moreover, Captain Henningsen, with whom Kossuth had soon built up very confidential relations, also encouraged Kossuth in this respect. Having overcome the distress and the paralysing depression of the first days, Kossuth again felt that perhaps he could resume his activities after all. This explains why Kossuth wrote his so-called "Viddin letter" on 12 September 1849 to the leaders of the Hungarian missions in the western countries. In this highly impressive document, Kossuth made public the conclusions he had drawn from the tragic events in Hungary and referred to Görgey's treason as the main cause of the failure of the Freedom Fight. Simultaneously, he instructed the missions to translate the letter into several languages and then to distribute it.[40] During his stay in Viddin, Kossuth wrote a letter to the British

[39] *Szemere Bertalan összegyűjtött munkái* (Collected works of Bertalan Szemere). Vols. I–VI. Pest, 1869–1870, I, pp. 4 ff, III, pp. 6 ff; Cf. Kiss Ernő: *Szemere Bertalan*. Kolozsvár, 1912, pp. 172 ff.

[40] Kossuth's Viddin letter was first published, with some passages suppressed, in German language by the Publisher Otto Wigand: *Die Katastrophe in Ungarn. Originalbericht von Ludwig Kossuth aus Widdin.* Leipzig, 1849; cf. *Kossuth a forradalom végnapjairól. Viddin, september 12-iki szozata az angol és francia politicai agensekhez.* (Jegyzetekkel kísérve Szilágyi Sándortól) (Kossuth on the last days of the Hungarian Revolution. His message of 12 September 1849 from Viddin to the Hungarian political agents in Great Britain and France. Annotations by Sándor Szilágyi). Pest, 1850; A more complete Hungarian text was published by Kacziany Géza: *Magyarország*, 1915. Nos. 233–254;

Foreign Secretary Palmerston, demanding the British government's intercession for his liberation.[41] In the letter of credence he issued to Captain Henningsen in Viddin on 2 October 1849, giving the Captain full authorization to make arrangements for the defence of the fortress of Komárom, Kossuth once more in his capacity of Hungary's governor, ordered everyone to obey the Captain's commands. The Captain was assigned the task to take severe measures against those who seemed to be inclined to give up Komárom and to organize the defence of that vast fortress so that it could resist the Austrian pressure for at least six months, during which period the much hoped for military support was expected to arrive. In this case, Kossuth thought first of all of an effective support from Britain.[42] However, considering that the commissioners of Haynau and General György Klapka had already come to an agreement on the surrender of the Komárom fortress at Puszta-Herkály as early as 27 September, and its factual military submission took place between 2 and 4 October, Henningsen's mission could not have any practical significance.[43] On the other hand, the increased military custody of Kossuth and his companions in Viddin led them to continue their travelling towards Shumla on 3 November, where they arrived after a tiresome and irksome roaming on 21 November. Though the Sultan had presented a coach both to Kossuth and to Bem, these vehicles were practically unusable on the extremely worn-down and muddy roads of the Balkan, so the refugees could only proceed on foot or with the more adaptive ox- or buffalo-carts.[44]

Shumla lies roundly 100 kilometres to the west of the Black Sea port-town of Varna. The removal of the refugees by itself could not have defied the hopes Kossuth had cherished about his liberation, but as time passed it still could give rise to a justifiable pessimism. Nevertheless, there were also some apparently promising turns of events in Shumla such as the arrival of Kossuth's wife on 15 January 1850. As an antecedent to this, back in the autumn of 1849, Artillery Major Gusztáv Wagner's mother had returned to Hungary with Kossuth's letter to his wife. After the Major's mother had managed to reach Kossuth's wife, she also obtained her a passport made out in the name of Mayerhoffer which then enabled Kossuth's wife to leave the country.[45] In the company of some enterprising persons, she finally reached her destination via Pest, Zimony and Belgrade by the benevolent assistance of – among others – the Serb government, for which later Kossuth expressed his gratitude. In Belgrade, the Italian Giuseppe Carosini, Kossuth's confidential man there, also joined the group.

Az 1849-es kiadásból kihagyott szövegekről (On the texts omitted from the 1849 edition); Hajnal: *Kossuth-emigráció, op. cit.* pp. 472 ff.

[41] Kossuth to Palmerston, Viddin 20 September 1849. (Hajnal: *Kossuth-emigráció, op. cit.* pp. 482–486.)

[42] Cf. Horváth: *op. cit.* III, p. 590; Szemere: *op. cit.* I, pp. 77–78.

[43] Cf. Szinnyei József: *Komárom 1848–49-ben (Naplójegyzetek)* (Komárom in 1848–49. Diary notes). Budapest, 1887, pp. 382 ff.

[44] Cf. László: *op. cit.* pp. 15 ff.

[45] *Ibid.* pp. 24–25.

Carosini had been active in Turin for some time, then he moved to Belgrade where he sought to act in support of the Hungarians. He had free entrance to the Serb Minister of Home Affairs Garašanin and also knew well the Belgrade consuls of the Great Powers. Kossuth was gratified by Carosini's continued activities, and to underline the importance of these services, provided him with a special letter of credence on 18 January 1850 which was countersigned by the Count Kázmér Batthyány too.[46] Carosini had among his tasks to urge the Serb government on a possible Serb–Hungarian rapprochement and co-operation, to popularize the idea of a would-be confederation, and in general, to advocate the creation of an anti-Austrian coalition.[47] As Kossuth's political agent in Belgrade, Carosini simultaneously delivered Kossuth's friendly-toned letter to Garašanin. In his letter, Kossuth expressed his thanks for the assistance the Serb government had accorded his wife in her escape, pointing out that he conceived this friendly gesture as a hopeful sign of the Serb–Hungarian rapprochement.[48] While Serbia had virtually been liberated from the Turkish rule, it still recognized the Sultan's supremacy and so it simply had to tolerate the presence of Turkish garrisons in some Serb towns, yet its policy orientation was not in conflict with its friendly gestures towards the Hungarian refugees. Nevertheless, the Serbs also took good care to maintain and foster their good relations with Austria, conceiving these relations as a rightful counterbalance to any further harassment on the part of the Turkish power.

While Carosini – pursuant to Kossuth's directives – was making efforts to promote a Serb–Hungarian rapprochement, a close co-operation had been formed between Garašanin and Colonel Radoslavlievich, the Austrian consul in Belgrade. As a result, Serbia banished the subjects of the Austrian Empire from its territory and ceased to tolerate any anti-Austrian movement or action in Serbia.[49] Another problem Belgrade had to face was an essential precondition to which Kossuth had subjected his rapprochement, namely, that the Serb–Hungarian co-operation would have to go on with the approval of Constantinople. Though this might well have seemed to be a very reasonable condition to the Serb government, the Serbs were more inclined to regard it as a highly uncertain and doubtful – and not very attractive – factor. In the course of time, however, it became clear that the relationship between Kossuth and Carosini had been narrowed down mainly to gathering and supplying information which, however, was of particular importance, holding out the prospect of liberation and filling the refugees with more hope under the difficult conditions of detention in Turkey.

[46] Hajnal: *Kossuth-emigráció, op. cit.* pp. 663–664.

[47] *Ibid.* pp. 671 ff.

[48] *Ibid.* pp. 659–661.

[49] Hajnal István: Belgrádi diplomácia és magyar emigránsok a szabadságharc után (Diplomacy of Belgrade and the Hungarian emigrants after the Hungarian Freedom Fight). (*Budapesti Szemle*, 1926, 203.)

Simultaneously, the Austrian government was not passive either: it made every effort to keep track of the far-reaching actions of Kossuth and his fellow-refugees. Nor were those surrounding the emigration leaders free from Austrian spies and secret agents who had easy access to any necessary information and could shadow the ex-governor on his way throughout Turkey.[50] Austrian consuls in Belgrade, Bucharest and Viddin could find the right men to ensure that none of Kossuth's activities could remain hidden from Vienna. The suspicion that even assassins were hired by Vienna to do away with Kossuth was not devoid of all foundation.[51] All these extremist political means also mirrored the counter-revolutionary Austrian government's fears of, and in many cases the very much exaggerated anxieties about, the defeated revolutionary forces. The same applies to those high-level diplomatic negotiations which were ultimately designed to put an end to the career of Kossuth and his companions. The Schwarzenberg cabinet was strongly determined to have Kossuth interned in a remote part of Turkey and to arrange for his future liberation so that he might get as far from Hungary as possible. At the same time, the powers concerned in this issue, including Russia and Turkey, strove to co-ordinate their conceptions with the western governments which themselves were afraid of the liberation of revolutionary leaders too early. It was on this account that vainly did Pulszky knock at Palmerston's door and vainly did Teleki intercede with President Napoleon or with Foreign Minister Tocqueville for the refugees, neither of them were given a straightforward, still less a promising answer: London and Paris fully agreed with Vienna and St. Petersburg that Kossuth and his leading associates would have to be interned in the central parts of Turkey so that their activities might be restricted through a tight military control for a certain time – or at least until a remarkable progress in the consolidation and modernization of the Austrian Empire would have been made. In respect of the term of detention, certain differences arose between the Schwarzenberg cabinet and the Turkish government. The Turks, being aware of the diplomatic and naval support of the western powers, refrained from assuming any downright obligation in this issue. They only agreed to intern Kossuth and some of his companions somewhere in Asia Minor without, however, making the term depend on the consent of Austria. Thus it was a sort of compromise of the interested great powers that formed the basis on which the near future of Kossuth and his companions rested; namely, that their freedom of movement and action was limited for a momentarily unfixed term.[52]

It was during the refugees' constrained stay in Shumla – which lasted from 21 November 1849 to 15 February 1850 – that international agreements were concluded and decisions were made on the destiny of the more important Hungarian and Polish refugees. Of them, those denying conversion to the Mohammedan faith were interned in the town of Kutahia – in right Turkish spelling: Kütahya –

[50] László: *op. cit.* pp. 21, 46–47, 67; Veress: *op. cit.* pp. 94 ff.
[51] Cf. Hajnal: *Kossuth-emigráció, op. cit.* pp. 33 ff.
[52] *Ibid.* pp. 294 ff.

in Asia Minor, while those becoming convert – with General Bem at the head – were accommodated in the Syrian town of Aleppo.

According to a more or less reliable conscription of refugees during their stay in Shumla, their number totalled 492 as of 26 January 1850, of which, the number of women and children was 52, 260 persons belonged to the ranks, from privates to sergeants, and the rest consisted of officers of various ranks.[53] Detention in Shumla was essentially narrowed down to six persons such as Ex-Governor Lajos Kossuth, Ex-Foreign Minister Count Kázmér Batthyány, Adolf Gyurman, the Polish General Wysocki, General Mór Perczel and Colonel Miklós Perczel. To be counted among them was also Ex-Minister of Defence Lázár Mészáros, though upon his own request. Initially, Effendi Ahmed, who took the measures concerning the refugees, had only been inclined to permit not more than 5 or 6 officers to form Kossuth's entourage, apart from his wife and servants. Later, however, he finally let himself be persuaded to give his consent to increasing the number of the Ex-Governor's entourage up to 23. Since the mentioned other six leading personalities were also accompanied by 14 adherents, the total number amounted to 45 when they left Shumla for Asia Minor. Taking the full number of the Shumla camp into account, less than 10 per cent of the refugees chose to follow Kossuth, while their greater part remained.[54]

The contradictory and uncertain rumours about the further fate of refugees in Turkey caused much anxiety to László Teleki and Ferenc Pulszky who had made their best to safeguard the interests of emigrants in the East. Their efforts would always come up against the rigid barriers of western diplomacy. Thus they had to take notice of the fact that Kossuth and his companions were not likely to show up in the western countries very soon. Even if their extradition had not taken place owing to the intervention of the western states, their detention became an accomplished fact. Consequently, a number of prominent political and military leaders lost their freedom of movement and their active work could not be reckoned with in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, after some time, the overwhelming majority of those remaining in Shumla could move freely within the bounds of the actual circumstances and emerging possibilities. A good part of them chose to settle in Turkey, either pursuing some civil occupation or taking military service with the Turks, while others increased the number of the banished in Kutahia. Their great majority, however, took a westerly direction and emigrated to America, Great Britain or to France.[55]

This turn of events implied that the responsibilities of Teleki and Pulszky only increased over time. Undoubtedly, Great Britain did not set any special bar against the refugees of the European revolutions of 1848–1849, and thus was it possible that a wide range of emigrants could soon take shelter in Great Britain

[53] A sumlai magyar emigráció névjegyzéke (List of Hungarian emigrants in Shumla). *Ibid.* pp. 679–683.

[54] Cf. László: *op. cit.* p. 30; Veress: *op. cit.* pp. 115 ff.

[55] Cf. Pap János – Szalczer Sándor: *A magyar emigránsok Törökországban 1849–1861* (Hungarian emigrants in Turkey in 1849–1861). Pécs, 1893, pp. 37 ff; Veress: *op. cit.* pp. 134 ff.

to represent there the failed revolutions as well as several nations subdued by absolutism and counter-revolution. In Great Britain, then, in addition to a host of French, German, Italian and Polish refugees, a large number of Hungarian immigrants also arrived. The English general public took a particular liking to the latter group and this sympathy was even enhanced by Pulszky and his influential British friendly society and also by the activity of the Hungarian Relief Society working in London by the agency of the former.[56] Besides, there was a strong need indeed to this political and charitable activity all the more because Hungarian refugees were continuously arriving in Great Britain from different directions and with miscellaneous objectives. Hungarians had already been coming from Piedmont, from István Türr's Hungarian Legion in Italy, as early as the summer of 1849 when the Hungarian Freedom Fight was still going strong. After the Sard government had suffered a military defeat from Austria, Türr dismissed his legion and managed to get with the major part of his troops as far as Baden. After the uprising there had also been suppressed, Türr continued his way to London. Following their transitional stay in Switzerland, his comrades scattered to go to either the United States or Great Britain or Turkey.[57]

In autumn 1849, led by General György Klapka, refugees from Komárom were arriving in succession in London. Having given up the fortress of Komárom, Klapka along with several high-ranking military and civil personalities and a number of officers and privates left the country with "emergency" passports issued as one of the conditions of capitulation. Klapka's way led through Pozsony and Berlin to Hamburg, and from there to London. The initial hope that perhaps some of the refugees could find defence and lasting support among the Hungarian-friendly inhabitants of Hamburg, did not come true. The Austrian, but also the Prussian, government protested against the possibility that the ex-defenders of Komárom could establish themselves in Hamburg.[58] In respect of the further steps to be taken, the opinion of the refugees widely varied. While part of them adhered to General Klapka, others supported the plan of László Újházi, one-time government commissioner of Komárom, who decided to emigrate to the United States. After having taken a look around in London first, Újházi returned to join his family in Hamburg and to start from there with a group of vigorous people towards his chosen destination.[59]

[56] Pulszky F.: *Életem, op. cit.* II, pp. 13 ff; Cf. Horváth Jenő: A londoni magyar propaganda-bizottság (The Hungarian Propaganda Committee in London). (*Budapesti Szemle*, 1936, 242); Kabdebo, T. G.: Lord Dudley Stuart and the Hungarian Refugees of 1849. (*Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research in 1971*, Vol. XLIV, No. 110.)

[57] Cf. *Türr István tábornok töredékes életrajza* (Biographical fragments of General István Türr). Edited by Pál Pitroff. *Új Magyar Szemle*, 1921, Nos. 1–2; Klapka György: *Emlékeimből* (My recollections). Budapest, 1886, pp. 562 ff; Martinola, Giuseppe: L'emigrazione politica ungherese nel Ticino dopo il 1848. Bellinzona, 1964. (Separatum from *Bollettino Storico della Svizzera Italiana*, 1964, fasc. I–II.)

[58] Cf. Szinnyei: *op. cit.* pp. 386 ff; Klapka: *op. cit.* pp. 269 ff.

[59] Cf. L. Gál Éva: *Újházi László a szabadságharc utolsó kormánybiztosa* (László Újházi, the last government commissioner of the Freedom Fight). Budapest, 1971, pp. 65 ff.

General Klapka's arrival in London once more turned the attention of the British public to the case of Hungary and its fugitive representatives. The 29-year-old general, ex-commander of the Komárom fortress, György Klapka met with enthusiastic reception and great ovation at friendly meetings as well as in the press, and his popularity was perhaps surpassed by the widely-known Kossuth only. But while the letter was in custody under strict military control, deprived of his freedom of movement, Klapka could fling himself whole-heartedly into the whirling of events. His appearance on the scene brought about changes in the western emigration, even if not immediately but in a comparatively short time. His erudition, personal traits, wide linguistic knowledge and immense energy all enabled him to profit from his experience and glorious military past. Of course, the paralysing effect of the general situation following from the fallen revolutions did not spare Klapka either. However, it can be well identified even in his initial activity that he aspired for and wanted to play an adequate leading role among the better known Hungarian emigrants. Beyond doubt, Klapka also possessed a remarkable sense of diplomacy in addition to his military talent and an ability to adjust himself to the limits set by the actual circumstances. This is why Pulszky and Teleki – whose attitude towards Klapka had initially been characterized by some reservation – were not long to recognize the General's positive personal qualities and increasingly reckoned not only with his popularity, authority and influence among the emigrants, but also with his manifold activity.

While in its overall tendency, the relationship between Pulszky and Teleki continued to be friendly, helpful, characterized by efforts to retain co-operation as its basic element, there were also signs of some contradictions which would later lead to a certain alienation from each other. In parallel with their common efforts and concern about the future of refugees, there were also many other tasks to be co-ordinated and problems to be tackled. Among the latter, no little anxiety was caused to them by the formerly mentioned "Viddin letter" of Kossuth who had made claim again to using the title of Governor and had given them explicit instructions to have the letter translated into several languages. At the time Pulszky and Teleki fully agreed that the publication of the letter in an unabridged form would not make an unambiguously positive impression on the general public in the West, therefore, they found it inevitable to re-word its text. The major part of this work fell on Ferenc Pulszky who sought to share his task with József Orosz, an excellent journalist, one-time editor of the Hungarian journal *Hírnök*, against whom, however, Teleki raised objections, suspecting him of being an Austrian spy – which later turned out to be unfounded. On the other hand, Teleki was understandably exasperated on hearing that Orosz – having made some high-handed modifications, cancellations from or even additions to the text in a manner rather different from Teleki's standpoint – had sent the German version of the letter to the German Publisher Otto Wigand of Leipzig who published it in 1849. It has remained unclear up to now whether Pulszky

might have played any role, and if so what role, in this matter. Pulszky himself denied it, yet he defended Orosz's action against Teleki.[60]

Pulszky also recommended József Orosz to Klapka to be of his assistance in the rapid preparation of the military history of the Freedom Fight to be written under a contract with Chapman and Hall Publishers. Klapka indeed fulfilled his contracted obligations within an extremely short time: the manuscript had been presented to the Publishers in barely two months and was then given out to be translated into English by Otto Wenckstern, a correspondent of *The Times*. The work was published in two volumes in London as early as 1850 under the title "Memoirs of the War of Independence in Hungary". Its German edition was published by Otto Wigand in Leipzig in the same year.[61] The success of this double venture temporarily relieved Klapka from the daily troubles pressing hard on the refugees.

Pulszky – who with his wife also tried to ease their own financial problems by writing books and newspaper articles – took the lion's share in the rather thankless task of supporting the refugees.[62] It was Pulszky who disposed of the funds raised from donations by various British personalities. According to accounts of payments from these funds, 313 refugees entered their names in the list of refugees in London or were accorded major or minor financial aid.[63] As usual in cases of similar nature, emigrant Hungarians were by far not satisfied with the method of distributing the aids and were inclined to take offence or lay blame at many things on this account, either with or without good reason. One thing is certain, namely, Pulszky's person seemed to be controversial to many, giving rise to misunderstandings. Moreover, the emigrants failed to take into due consideration the so many troubles Pulszky had previously taken to make the case of Hungary widely known and popular, nor did they duly appreciate either the excellent contacts he necessarily had to establish and build up with the British high society in the course of his efforts or the full confidence of donators in his person. Many emigrants tended to regard their financial aid as a matter-of-fact thing, laying a quite natural claim to them and showered reproaches on Pulszky for the slightest difficulty. It is also beyond doubt that there might have been faults in Pulszky's attitude and actions too, not infrequently provoking the criticism and passions of the emigrants who were inclined to be over-sensitive anyway. As time passed, some really astonishing and regrettable events also

[60] Teleki to Pulszky. Paris, 15, 25 November, 3, 20 December 1849. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835.); Cf. Kossuth: *Die Katastrophe*, *op. cit.* (see footnote 40 on page 31).

[61] Cf. Klapka: *op. cit.* pp. 296 ff; Pulszky F.: *Életem*, *op. cit.* II, pp. 19 ff; German edition of Klapka's memoirs: *Memoiren von Georg Klapka. April bis October 1819.* Leipzig, 1850.

[62] Pulszky, Theresa: *Memoirs of a Hungarian Lady*. Philadelphia, 1850; German edition: *Aus dem Tagebuch einer ungarischen Dame. Mit einer historischen Einleitung von Franz Pulszky.* Vols. I–II. Leipzig, 1850.

[63] Az angolországi emigráció pénzügyeiről vezetett számadáskönyv Pulszky Ferenctől 1850–51. (Accounts of the finances of the Hungarian emigration in London rendered by Ferenc Pulszky 1850–51). (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fol. Hung. 1718.); See: Pulszky F.: *Életem*, *op. cit.* II, p. 18.

occurred. In his resentment, Ex-Major Géza Mihalóczy wanted to fight a duel with Pulszky and, after Pulszky's evasive reply, publicly insulted him. Pulszky's activities in England were described, though not without exaggeration and one-sidedness, in his memoirs by Dániel Kászonyi who could not suppress the bad memories of those hectic days even several years after the events. Having been always hard up for money, Kászonyi – who personally could have experienced the rejection of his application for financial aid – was to act as Mihalóczy's second in the duel. [64]

Kászonyi also set to take fierce anti-Pulszky actions after the tragic event – described below – closing the Baroness Beck's activity in Great Britain. During her emigration in England, the Baroness, one-time Hungarian spy of the revolutionary times of 1848–1849, then known as *Racidula*, published her romantic-literary recollections in which the romantic and adventurous elements were mixed with true and partly fictitious stories. True, the very readable memoirs – to the preparatory work of which Kászonyi had markedly contributed – met with success in the British public interested in the Hungarian question.[65] The German version of the work included attacks on Pulszky which aroused his ill-feelings and grudge against the authoress who was alleged by many to bear the title of Baroness without rights. With her unclear past and background, Baroness Beck's further activities were accompanied with suspicion and attacks which also affected Kászonyi so much more as he wanted to launch a new literary venture in joint with her. Encouraged by the interest of the British public and on the initiative and support of the English publisher, they were to publish the diary of the Baroness. They organized a subscription tour on which the authoress was accompanied by her Hungarian-born secretary, Derra de Moreda by name, and later Kászonyi also joined them. Having visited several English cities, they arrived in Birmingham where the Baroness as an adventuress and as one bearing the title of Baroness without rights was unexpectedly arrested together with her secretary. Overtaken by the excitements she had to go through during the events, the Baroness, who had been in bad health anyway, suddenly died the day before the trial. Kászonyi wanted to put the blame for this serious case with all its implications upon Pulszky, though he also strongly criticized Pál Hajnik, one-time police minister of Hungary, who co-operated with Pulszky, as well as the lawyer Toulmin Smith who had represented the four English denunciators at the

[64] According to Dániel Kászonyi, Pulszky refused to duel (Cf. Kászonyi: *Ungarn's vier Zeitalter.* Vols. I–IV. Leipzig, 1868.) In Pulszky's version, he duelled with Mihalóczy and wounded him. (Pulszky F.: *Életem, op. cit.* II, pp. 20–21.)

[65] Baroness Wilhelmine Beck: *Personal Adventures during the Late War of Independence in Hungary.* Vols. I–II. London, 1850. Translated from German into English by M. A. Garvey, the work was dedicated to Lord Dudley Stuart who had encouraged the authoress to carry out her plan. The second English edition was published in one volume in 1851; German edition: *Memoiren einer Dame während des letzten Unabhängigkeitskrieges in Ungarn.* I–II. Leipzig, 1851; Attacks on Pulszky were left out of the English edition: *Ibid.* II, pp. 355 ff; Cf. Hungarian edition under the title: Báró Beck Vilma: *Egy hölgy emlékiratai az 1848–49-iki magyar szabadságharcról* (A lady's memoirs on the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848–49). Miskolc, 1901.

trial. Pulszky undoubtedly had taken an active part in organizing the denunciation of the Baroness, keeping in touch with the interested English persons as well as with the lawyer Toulmin Smith who thus willy-nilly got involved in this dubious case.[66] The truth may be that the tragedy of the Baroness Beck was organically linked up with that ill-considered and not always fully frank attempts at influencing the British public opinion in favour of Hungary which were made by the leading circles of the British political life to manipulate the general public in a way favourable to their actual tactical purposes. Namely, the political and business circles that had aroused the public interest in the adventurous life of the once famous spy of the Hungarian War of Independence were the same as those who a few months later became partners in her persecution and in her completely unlawful arrest, violating her personal freedom.

To be sure, these events did not enhance the reputation of the Hungarian emigration in Great Britain, while they remarkably added to sharpening the internal conflicts of emigration, though they could not undermine the prestige and wide-ranging influence of Pulszky. Obviously, contributing to the consolidation of his political standing and further position in Great Britain were Pulszky's increasingly intensive contacts with the Ex-Governor Kossuth, then in exile in Kutahia, who placed a strong emphasis on the work of his firm and reliable political agent in the West to represent all of his conceptions and opinions in an unambiguous manner. Pulszky proved to be suitable to perform this function and he himself did his best to deserve Kossuth's confidence, through which he wished to counterpoise the tensions and ill-feelings towards him which had emerged among the emigrants. This obvious tendency of Pulszky's activity could not remain hidden to the highly perceptive and clear-sighted László Teleki who soon came to realize that Pulszky had started to wedge himself in the Teleki–Kossuth relations then being established. In fact, Teleki gradually came to the conclusion that Pulszky tended to keep all ties to Kossuth well in his own hand and to behave and act as the only authentic interpreter of all instructions and information received from Kutahia. The slowly accumulating grievances and experiences, of course, markedly loosened further the relationship between Pulszky and Teleki, but they also conveyed certain important consequences which finally made their effects felt on the increasingly departing emigrant circles of London and Paris.[67]

[66] The unlawful arrest of the Baroness was also condemned at a trial two years after her death. The suit had been instituted by Constantin Derra de Moreda, secretary of the late Baroness, against the denunciators whom the court condemned and ordered to pay court costs of lawsuit and a fine of 800 pounds. Toulmin Smith, who had got hold of Baroness Beck's diary, later sought to use it in the sharpening press debates in his own support. Cf. Smith, J. Toulmin: *The fact of the case as to the pretended 'Baroness von Beck' stated and illustrated with documentary evidence.* London, 1852; Cf. Kászonyi: *op. cit.* pp. 294 ff; Kropf Lajos: Beck Vilma. *Budapesti Szemle*, 1907, p. 297; Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 81 ff.

[67] "Anyway, you are treating us as if we had not belonged among the refugees ... I ought to write a lot more than that – but I do not want to go on quarreling" – wrote Teleki to Pulszky, Montmorency, 21 July 1850. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835.)

Although there was no explicit dividing line between the London and the Paris emigration, yet the turn events had taken increasingly sharpened the maturing conflicts between the two groups of emigrants, which finally led to their organizational separation. Their actual situation and working conditions gave rise to significant differences between the two groups.

Unlike the republican France – which, however, was gradually turning into absolutism, flying to the arms of Bonapartism –, the British constitutional monarchy generally showed more compliance to and treated more liberally the homeless international emigrants and tolerated all their activities, unless they violated the British laws. Thus it is not by accident that it was London where the Central Committee of European Democrats was formed to include such leading personalities as Giuseppe Mazzini, leader of the suppressed revolution of Rome, the radical Ledru-Rollin, who had taken a strong stand against Bonapartism and was ousted by Louis Napoleon, or Albert Daras who shared the views of the democratic wing of the Polish emigration. London offered shelter to the representatives of various democratic and socialist branches of the German emigration, so to Kinkel, Willich, Sigel, Schurz, and also to Tausenau, the representative of the Viennese democrats, and to many other well-known figures of the fallen German revolutions. Although the British police kept a watchful eye on the ever expanding camp of revolutionary emigrants, it tended to refrain from taking any direct action.[68]

With its variety of political views of basically radical-democratic character, the written and organizational propaganda activity of the representatives of this broad international emigration, which foreboded and aimed to hasten the collapse of the absolutist systems in Europe, did not fail to have an effect on the Hungarian emigrants either, who – longing for orientation to find a possible way out of their plight – would often participate in various manifestations, meetings of Italian, Polish or German groups of refugees and would read their program statements and announcements. While Pulszky – also with due respect to his social relations in England – sought to be absent from the meetings and other manifestations of the radical-democratic circles of emigrants, many other Hungarians, either those opposing Pulszky or those maintaining relations with him, tended to draw nearer to the more radical groups of emigrants. They did so either out of mere interest, sympathy or perhaps because of their intent to reconcile their respective principles and ideas. Such manifestations could be experienced in the case of – among others – the ethnographer János Xanthus or the historian and politician Ernő Simonyi.[69]

[68] Cf. King, Bolton: *Mazzini*. London – New York, 1902; Morelli, Emilia: *Mazzini in Inghilterra*. Firenze, 1938; Calman, Alvin R.: *Ledru-Rollin après 1848 et les proscrits en Angleterre*. Paris, 1958; Marx, K. – Engels, F.: A számkivetés nagyjai (The notabilities of exile). In: *Marx–Engels művei. 8.* (Hungarian edition of works by Marx and Engels, Vol. 8). Budapest, 1962, pp. 223 ff.

[69] Rónay Jácint: *Napló-töredék. Hetven év reményei és csalódásai* (Diary fragment. Hopes and frustrations of seventy years). Vols. I–VIII. Pozsony, 1884–1888, I, pp. 309 ff; II, pp. 158 ff; Kászonyi: *op. cit.* pp. 302 ff; Pulszky F.: *Életem, op. cit.* II, pp. 26 ff; Klapka: *op. cit.* pp. 293 ff.

As regards the number of Hungarian emigrants in Great Britain – although they significantly outnumbered their fellow-emigrants in France –, it showed a downward tendency mainly because of newer and newer emigration waves to the United States. The total number of those settled down in Great Britain might have ranged between 150 and 200 in the mid-1850s.

Many of the emigrants regarded their stay in Great Britain as a transitory state, a period of making preparations either for emigration to the United States or for a return to the European continent. To be mentioned among those prominent personalities who succeeded, or at least attempted, to take root in England, is the renowned reform politician Ödön Beöthy, one-time government commissioner, the revolutionary government's appointed chief consul in Bucharest, who finally settled down in England. The Count Gyula Andrássy had also arrived in London from Constantinople, though somewhat later he moved on to Paris. Ex-Minister of Justice Sebő Vukovics, in turn, moved from Paris to London in 1851. Pál Almássy, one-time Vice-President of the House of Representatives, had first gone to Paris and from there he left for England. Ex-Minister of Defence Lázár Mészáros – who had got to Kutahia together with Kossuth and was liberated one year earlier than the others – shared his days until 1853 among London, Paris and the British-possessed Isle of Jersey. Coming to London were also the ex-government commissioner István Gorove and, for a transitory stay, ex-representative Sándor Lukács who with his wife shortly afterwards moved on to the United States. A lasting stay in England was ventured also by the scholar Jácint Rónay, an excellent and industrious diary writer, who had been teacher in a Benedictine school and had taken a strong stand for the cause of the Freedom Fight. For existential reasons, he undertook to act as the London correspondent of the newspaper *Pesti Napló* and reconciling his principles with the task, he performed this duty excellently and honestly. It can be taken for certain that well before Kossuth's arrival in London, the Hungarian emigration, primarily in London, had a strong basis to supply remarkable aid to the Hungarian refugees vegetating in poverty throughout the world.[70]

As to the Hungarian emigrants in France, László Teleki retained his highly esteemed leading role – for which he was predestined both by the rich experience he had gained in France and by his proficiency in public life and his widespread social relations. Showing a not very sympathetic attitude towards emigrants, even the Paris police chief Carlier would shrink from Teleki's prestige. If Teleki was to guarantee for someone, one could be sure of obtaining the residence permit from the authorities. So it happened in the case of Mihály Horváth too. The bishop of Csanád and minister of culture of the one-time Szemere-government, after the Világos surrender, Mihály Horváth had first got via Vienna to Brussels disguised as the Baroness Prónay's butler; from there, he wrote a letter to László Teleki asking for the necessary permits, and having

[70] Cf. Szokoly Viktor: *Mészáros Lázár külföldi levelei és emlékirata* (Letters and memoirs written abroad by Lázár Mészáros). Budapest, 1881, pp. 9 ff; Pulszky F.: *op. cit.* II, pp. 19 ff; Rónay: *op. cit.* I, pp. 175 ff; Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 63 ff.

received them, he arrived in Paris as early as the last week of November 1849. A devoted scholar of history, Mihály Horváth had first been living under increasingly difficult conditions, but his situation was improved considerably by the Countess Batthyány, widow of the first responsible prime-minister of Hungary who was executed on 6 October 1849, who had settled and led a retired life in Montmorency lying to the north of the nearby Paris, and who committed the education of her children to Horváth which he undertook as from the autumn of 1850.[71] Spending the first years of his emigration in Paris was also Colonel Imre Szabó, who had provisionally acted as the military attaché to Teleki's mission.[72] Colonel Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss, who had arrived in Paris as a diplomatic courier in summer 1849, settled down in France where through his marriage he became bound with family ties with the later French foreign minister Thouvenel. Although the Hungarian emigration in Paris was much smaller in number than that in London, it could attain a more independent position in respect of finances. At least there were more such emigrants – as the Counts Gyula Andrássy, Gergely Bethlen, Sándor Károlyi, or István Gorove, Menyhért Lónyay and others – who received, even if irregularly and not quite reliably, proper support from their family members at home. Those living under more modest conditions tried to earn their livelihood by teaching, journalism or literary activity.[73]

Beyond doubt, it was Bertalan Szemere who came second to Teleki among the most eminent personalities of the Hungarian emigration in Paris, especially as regards his leading role in the organizational life of emigration. A very sensitive and noble-minded personality, Ex-Prime Minister Szemere, whose political ambitions could only be excelled by his passionate literary pursuits, had opposed the unambiguous and uncritical recognition of Kossuth's leadership from the very first moment of his arrival in Paris. Nor did Szemere conceal his opinion that Kossuth had also been seriously responsible for the defeat of the Freedom Fight and that after his abdication, Kossuth had no right to bear the title of governor among the emigrants. Moreover, he flatly denied having countersigned, as the responsible Prime Minister, Kossuth's document on the relegation of full powers to Görgey.[74]

Although the overwhelming majority of the western emigration had a critical attitude towards Kossuth and aimed to secure their political-ideological inde-

[71] Márki Sándor: *Horváth Mihály (1809–1878)*. Budapest, 1917, pp. 148 ff.

[72] In the Szemere-government he had held such positions as secretary of state and then deputy minister of defence. Bölöny József: *Magyarország kormányai 1848–1975* (Governments of Hungary 1848–1975). Budapest, 1978, p. 48.

[73] Óváry-Avary Károly: *Báró Mednyánszky Cézár emlékezései és vallomásai az emigrációból* (Memoirs and confessions by the Baron Cézár Mednyánszky from the time of his emigration). Budapest, 1930, pp. 92 ff; Wertheimer: *op. cit.* I, pp. 61 ff; Berzeviczy Albert: *Az absolutismus kora Magyarországon 1849–1865* (The age of absolutism in Hungary 1849–1865). Vols. I–IV. Budapest, 1922–1937, I, pp. 390 ff.

[74] Szemere: *Naplóm* I, *op. cit.* I, pp. 68 ff; Kiss Ernő: *op. cit.* pp. 177 ff.

pendence and freedom of action, most of them were still opposed to taking any explicit stand against Kossuth. László Teleki's approaches to György Klapka and his co-operation with Bertalan Szemere finally resulted in the fact that the organization and independence of the western Hungarian emigration had been placed upon solid foundations. While in his confidential letters and other writings, Teleki consistently emphasized the importance of the democratic principles of organization and leadership in the life of emigration and criticized Kossuth's method and style of managing the affairs, he still was of the opinion that the disagreements and conflicts within the emigration should only be made public at the latest possible date. Teleki did not at all conceal from Kossuth his possibly different views about a wide range of problems which they had many-sidedly discussed and analysed. Moreover, it also appeared from Teleki's correspondence that his views concerning Kossuth's method of leading the emigration, and also about many other problems, came nearer to Szemere's views. In spite of all this, he disagreed with Szemere's sharpening anti-Kossuth attitude, especially after Szemere had widely publicized his related criticism and attacks to the international public.[75] In this respect Teleki was by far not alone: many prestigious emigrants, including Ex-Minister of Defence Lázár Mészáros, made it clear that however much they felt sorry for Szemere's isolated situation, "... he who prefers to disclose the whole truth in a brusque or even stinging manner, and to put all this down in writing, should not be surprised at seeing that people tend to shun him ... though this is a pity because there is a lot of truth in what he has told".[76] Unlike Szemere, Teleki, for a long time, had not given up making efforts to uphold the unity of emigration, to clear up the divergent views in theoretical debates and to reconcile them. In the early 1850s, Teleki made several attempts to build up a political platform in common with the exiled Kossuth staying in Kutahia in order to approach the views as to the main theoretical and political lessons to be drawn from the War of Independence and the actions to be taken in the future. However, it was quite alien to his strong character always true to himself, to insist on upholding the unity at the expense of a compromise in principle, and on this account, Teleki's successive attempts all ended up in bitter frustration, disillusionment and introversion.

DIALOGUE BETWEEN TELEKI AND KOSSUTH IN 1850–1851

Even if in his more confidential letters Teleki later questioned the *official character* of his negotiations, held on 18 May 1849, with the Prince Czartoryski and the Czech delegate Rieger on the nationality problem in Hungary, he still contin-

[75] László Teleki to Klapka, Zürich, 17, 19, 24 January 1852. (O.L., Klapka Papers.)

[76] Lázár Mészáros's letter to Sebő Vukovics, Flushing, Long Island, 26 December, 1857. (Szokoly: *op. cit.* pp. 132 ff.)

ued to insist on the content elements of the talks.[77] Teleki could not agree with the theses of the Hungarian policy towards nationalities included in the circular formulated and issued by Foreign Minister Kázmér Batthyány, which was designed to record the Hungarian government's official standpoints in this matter. Moreover, he maintained his democratic views about the relationship between Hungarians and national minorities and about the political and organizational framework of their future co-operation as he had written in his letters to Kossuth in Kutahia in early 1850. Although these letters were formally addressed to Kázmér Batthyány, they were obviously meant to convey their contents to the emigrant leaders interned in Kutahia, above all to Kossuth himself. Teleki thought that the basis for the upholding of peace between Hungarians and the various nationalities, for the elimination of conflicts and mainly for the creation of an effective union against Austria was the consideration of the interests of not only the Croats, but also of the Serbs, the Romanians and the other nationalities as well. Drawing lessons from historical experience, Teleki hoped to meet the demands of nationalities, which they had formulated so many times, by granting them – primarily to the most populous ones – regional self-government, so-called territorial independence, of course, over and above the legal protection of the democratic principles and the uniform guarantee of civil rights. Within this framework, the individual nationalities could obtain not only linguistic but also administrative regional autonomy which would make it possible to remedy many serious political, economic and social grievances and to heal the wounds caused by the fratricidal civil wars of 1848–1849. It would also serve as a solid basis for a lasting collaboration and peaceful association of various peoples living in the country. Being well aware of the ideas and programs for the future of the various nationality emigrants, Teleki tried to convince the Kutahia emigration leaders, above all Kossuth, of the reality, timeliness and usefulness of those ideas. Teleki's view of the nationality problem was undoubtedly a rather uncommon and quite modern one which virtually broke with both the older and the newer governmental practice of the historical Hungarian state. But his views also went beyond the point which Kossuth himself or any government in this country had ever reached until 1849 – including the act on the nationalities passed in Szeged in June 1849. Teleki felt and knew that his conviction, his bold thoughts concerning the resolving of the nationality problem could hardly be reconciled with the principle of maintaining the Hungarian supremacy over the other nationalities, that is, with a Hungary which – set in a uniform frame – is not inclined to make any concession beyond the mere declaration of the legal and cultural equality of nationalities. In fact, he came to the conclusion that this is precisely the most serious lesson to be drawn from the events of 1848–1849 that should urge the emigration leaders to reconsider over and over again their views and unfortunate practice in this issue. These leaders should inevitably face the East-European reality along with the appearance of the rightful demands of peoples living

[77] László Teleki to Pulszky, Paris, 13 September, 1849. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835.)

together and they should not shrink back from drawing the necessary conclusions. It was Teleki's conviction that the future independence and social progress of Hungary could only be achieved if some federative co-operation would be created between Hungarians and the nationalities – in other words, Teleki took a stand for the *internal federalization* of the historical Hungary, that is, he advocated the necessity of a federative system of the state. At the same time, he did not go into details, nor did he draw up more extensive plans, reserving this task for a broader collective including the competent representatives of Hungarians and the nationalities.[78]

It is only too understandable that Kossuth, who himself held it very necessary to go into the analysis of the lessons of the Freedom Fight, responded rather sensitively and quickly to the proposals and recommendations, unclear and unnatural as they seemed to him. He held it as his primary duty to expound his conceptions and views in detail and to engage in discussion with Teleki about the most important issues. It can hardly be doubted that it was Teleki's letters to Kutahia that gave Kossuth the ultimate impetus to expound his standpoints in detail, although there were also several other factors that prompted Kossuth to set in a uniform frame all his views about the way of securing lasting peace among the nationalities and about several other important foreign policy conditions of the independence of the Hungarian state.

The plan for a South-Eastern European confederation was not at all new to Kossuth, as conceptions of this type had already been in the air in the final days of the Freedom Fight. These ideas were even more intensively discussed in the weeks immediately following the Világos surrender and especially after Captain Henningsen's arrival at Viddin. It was quite commonly known that the idea of uniting the countries and peoples of South-Eastern Europe in a confederation was strongly supported by the Prince Czartoryski, and his emissary, the Count Zamoyski – who had arrived in Hungary with Teleki's letter of recommendation in the days of the Freedom Fight, and then had fled together with the Hungarian leaders to Turkey – who tried hard to keep this issue on the agenda.[79] The downfall of the revolution in Wallachia and the subsequent scattering of Romanian refugees throughout Turkey and France still more pressed the Romanian emigration leaders – Ghica, Bălcescu, the Golescu-brothers, Heliade and others – to think about and seek for the possible ways and means of a union with Hungarians and to consider the positive aspects of the conclusions drawn from the bitter turn of events of the 1848–1849 revolutions. Golescu's activity – even if it had started in a controversial manner in Paris in 1848 – finally took a favourable direction partly under Teleki's inspiration, partly under the effect of his experiences, thus exerting a certain influence on Teleki's confederative conceptions as well. The emigrant representative of the Romanian national move-

[78] László Teleki to Kossuth, Montmorency, 15 June 1850. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I. 796.); Cf. Deák Imre: Az első magyar–román konföderációs tervek (The first plans for a Hungarian–Romanian confederation). Parts I–XIII. *Magyar Kisebbség*, 1932, Nos. 11–23.

[79] Cf. Hajnal: *Kossuth-emigráció, op. cit.* pp. 171 ff.

ment, Bălcescu – who had discussed the possibilities of a Romanian–Hungarian co-operation with Kossuth and other Hungarian revolutionary leaders in Debrecen back in 1849 – after having left for the West, tried to popularize in London the idea of creating a lasting alliance of the South-Eastern European nations. In early 1850, Bălcescu also made the London-resident György Klapka and the visiting Teleki acquainted with his conception of the confederation of peoples living along the Danube. Bălcescu had much to do with the fact that at about the same time strong words of support for the confederation of the Danube states were also included in the programs and action-plans of the western Hungarian emigration. Since Bălcescu continued to maintain his good relations with the Ghica-led Romanian emigrant groups staying in Turkey, more particularly in Bursa (Brussa), he sought to keep them informed of his experiences in England, and within this, he also reported to them on his contacts with the Hungarian emigration leaders. Thus the exchange of letters between Bălcescu and Ghica supplied a hoard of invaluable information on how the contemporary conceptions of the confederation were taking shape, throwing light upon many widely different views, which were often at variance with each other both theoretically and practically. As it appears from Bălcescu's letters, the confederative union of Hungary, Romania and Serbia was not thought possible to be carried through with the old historical country borders maintained. In Bălcescu's scheme, any Hungarian area which was densely populated by a given ethnic minority would be annexed to the corresponding member state of the confederation. The problem of Transylvania – namely, whether it would join the Romanian principalities or would be built in the confederation as an independent regional unit – would have been decided on during the final elaboration of the confederation. By the help of Romanian emigrants in Bursa, Ghica could make Bălcescu's confederative conceptions available also to Kossuth in Kutahia, not far from Bursa, in the spring of 1850, to which Ghica might have added a reference to the supportive attitude of the western Hungarian emigration leaders, Teleki and Klapka in the first place. Taking into consideration Kossuth's opinion and conviction in this matter, it is very understandable that he gave a cold and reserved reception to the initiative of Romanians in Bursa, of which Ghica was not long to inform Bălcescu. Bălcescu received the news from Kutahia with bitterness, making only a brief remark: it was a pity to apply to Kossuth in this matter because "he is a dead man". "He is the representative of a Hungary of the past, a past which has been buried for good and ever". At the same time, both Bălcescu and Ghica knew it very well: however much progress they had made in drawing up the confederation plans in agreement with the western representatives of Hungarian emigration, they could hardly take any step forward, even at the stage of planning, without the consent or approval or participation of Kossuth.[80]

[80] *Bălcescu emlékirata* (Bălcescu's memoirs). Paris, January 1851. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I. 1568; Published by Z. Horváth: *op. cit.* II, pp. 236 ff.); Cf. Ghica: *Amintiri, op. cit;* Jancsó Benedek:

The unfavourable conditions under which the refugees were forced to live only increased Kossuth's drive to explain his opinion in detail about the confederation conceptions of both Teleki and Bălcescu. He aimed to present a real alternative, a counter-plan or program to his partners, outlining also *the utmost limits* of concessions he would be still willing to make to nationalities in Hungary. On 15 June 1850, Kossuth produced two lengthy writings to Teleki: one of them took the form of a letter, while the other summed up his objections in several points. There was no difference in a matter of principle between the two writings; each expressed Kossuth's utter objection to the Teleki-favoured *internal* confederalization of Hungary by creating regional autonomy for the individual nationalities. In Kossuth's opinion, significant concessions of this type could hardly be restricted to the more populous ethnic groups and would inevitably entail the appearance of Hungary's other nationalities (Slovaks, Ruthenians and Germans) to make further claims to regional autonomy. He also feared that having obtained the regional autonomy, the nationalities would seek to join their kins in the neighbouring states – and this would necessarily involve the disunion and territorial disintegration of the historical Hungary. Kossuth promised the nationalities a wide range of democratic rights, especially with the view to the free use of the mother tongue and their right to develop and enrich their nationality culture, but he did not see all this to be conditional on the granting of regional autonomy. Instead, he placed the emphasis on the full enforcement of rights to use the vernacular language and culture within the bounds of the autonomous counties and communities. He thought the protection of the nationality interests to be secured through the establishment of cultural organizations, similar to the religious organizations, working quite independently from regional autonomy. Although Kossuth defined Hungarian as the official language of the supreme state administration, he also wanted to guarantee the equally free use of each nationality language in the fields of legislation and public administration as well, and proposed that nationality sections be set up within the courts of justice. Kossuth advocated the idea of confederation in a certain sense only, namely that the complete historical Hungary, as an integral whole, should form a confederation with the neighbouring Romanian and Serb states, or perhaps with other countries of Eastern Europe as well. He designated foreign affairs, defence, fields of a united defence system and issues arising from the common economic interests, as common affairs of the confederation. In Kossuth's confederation plan, special emphasis was laid on the importance of an explicit approval by Turkey, as well as on a possible Turkish support against Austria and Russia. He also took it into consideration that the Turkish Porte, even if formally, still maintained its protectorate over the Romanian principalities and Serbia. In consideration of all this, and to secure the good intentions of the Turkish government, Kossuth brought up the idea that the South-Eastern European confederation ought to be created under the auspices of Turkey. He thought this plan to be

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Szabadságharcunk és a dako-román törekvések (Our War of Independence and the Daco-Roman endeavours). Budapest, 1895, pp. 181 ff.

more acceptable in this form even for England – being that London was concerned about some possible changes in power relations that would follow from the further shrinking of the Turkish Empire, with especial view to a probable expansion of the Russian power sphere. Kossuth wanted to reconcile his confederation plan with the South-Eastern Europe-related interests of the western powers and to make it properly presentable to the international diplomatic circles as well. At the same time, he also sought to secure the territorial integrity of Hungary.[81]

Kossuth's plans to settle the nationality problem and to mass the Danubian nations – which had been placed upon a broader theoretical basis and had been elaborated in a more cogent form in spring 1850 – became widely known as "the Kutahia draft constitution". However, in his plan, meritorious though it was in both its form and content, Kossuth could not reach beyond his own intellectual world and his significance in the history of ideas which – in a way – also reflects his political conviction. Apart from its author's exiled status and the actual power relations preventing its implementation, Kossuth's plan both as an intellectual recommendation as such, and as a program to be followed, met with refusal by the western circles of Hungarian emigrants, as well as by the representatives of the emigrant groups of various nationalities.[82] Teleki did not even agree with Kossuth's method of presenting and expounding his arguments, and maintained that the definite and peremptory tone in which Kossuth explained his arguments was in contrast both with the special features of the life emigrants had to lead and with the demands raised by a necessary democratic co-operation. Reading Kossuth's writings, Teleki anxiously took notice of the claim Kossuth had made on the leadership over emigration, which was essentially aimed to concentrate control, both political and military, in the hands of one single person. While Kossuth formulated his claims to controlling, and methods to be adopted in the guidance of, emigration on the basis of conclusions he had drawn from the defeated Freedom Fight, Teleki and many others held Kossuth's authoritative attitude – which became apparent in the fields of communication and program drafting alike – to be irreconcilable precisely with the actual conditions of emigration. "My friend, I consider the discussion with you as very difficult on that particular terrain from which you raise the problems ... I tell you quite frankly as I have ever done that I cannot fully support you, first, because I do not regard dictatorship either as popular or desirable or as possible at all, – secondly, I think the case of nationalities to be much more complex and important than it

[81] Kossuth to László Teleki, Kutahia, 15 June 1850. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I. 795.); furthermore, Kossuth's more detailed critical comments dated on the same day. (*Ibid.* I. 797); Kossuth to László Teleki, Kutahia, 22 August 1850. (*Ibid.* I. 882); Cf. Deák I.: *op. cit.* Part III; Horváth: *op. cit.* II, pp. 221 ff.

[82] Kutahiai alkotmányterv (The Kutahia draft constitution). (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I. 1554.); Cf. *A közelmúlt titkaiból (A muszka intervenciótól a Duna konföderációig)* (From the secrets of the recent past. [From the Russian intervention up to the Danubian Confederation]). Edited by Áldor Imre. Vols. I–II, Budapest, 1878–1879, I, pp. 65 ff.

could be decided on by only one stroke of the pen" – wrote Teleki in reply to Kossuth, then pointing out that "apart from certain concessions [made to the nationalities] in the communal, county, jurisdictional, religious and educational fields, I would also grant rights to the Romanians and the Serbs to hold provincial meetings to settle their own internal problems within the bounds of law". Teleki also deemed Kossuth's proposal on placing the confederation under Turkish sovereignty as an unreal conception – partly on account of the actual situation of Turkey and the expected Turkish refusal arising from the same reason, partly on the basis of the experiences he had gained in connection with the British foreign policy.[83] In spite of Teleki's efforts to mitigate the weight and importance of conflicts between himself and Kossuth, their relationship – owing to their widely different views concerning the method of governing the emigration as well as the settling of the nationality problem – worsened and their cooperation became looser during the 1850s. At the same time, contacts between Teleki and the leading politicians of the western Hungarian emigration: Klapka, Vukovics, Szemere, Mihály Horváth and others, became increasingly intensive. The debate that had taken place strongly moderated Teleki's expectations in respect of Kossuth's so much desired liberation, and he and his fellow emigrants in the West tended to adopt a wait-and-see attitude towards both the developments to be expected from a future intensification of the western emigration activities and the future tasks to be executed.

KUTAHIA AND ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES IN HUNGARY

As a directly interested party, as a potential ally and also as a suitable mediator, Mazzini also joined the dialogue carried on between the western and eastern emigration during the 1850s. Mazzini hoped to be able to smooth the conflicts emerging among the Hungarian, Slav and Romanian emigrants and to reconcile the diverging standpoints. It was in this hope that, on behalf of the Central Committee of European Democrats, Mazzini sent a statement dated 7 August 1850 to Kutahia – which was signed, in addition to Mazzini, by Ledru-Rollin, Albert Daras and Arnold Ruge on behalf of the French, the Poles and the Germans, respectively –, inviting Kossuth to join the Central Committee of European Democrats in the name of Hungarians.[84] To give especial emphasis to the invitation, Mazzini simultaneously sent another letter to Kossuth in the name of the London-seated Italian National Committee, strongly underlining the common lot of Italy and Hungary and the importance of their joining forces. He also notified Kossuth of György Klapka's willingness to join; but in consent with the Cen-

[83] László Teleki to Kossuth, Montmorency, 15 June 1850. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I. 796; 5 July, *Ibid.* I. 814; 6 August, *Ibid.* I. 860; 16 August, *Ibid.* I. 870; 27 September, *Ibid.* I. 890.)

[84] Kastner, Eugenio: *Mazzini e Kossuth*. Firenze, 1929, pp. 3–4.

tral Committee of European Democrats, he wished to reserve this post for Kossuth.[85] Both letters were delivered from London by Adriano Lemmi, a reliable follower of Mazzini, who had taken part in the Revolution of Rome of 1848–1849, after the failure of which he returned to Constantinople to run his flourishing shipping company there. Thus Lemmi could fulfil Mazzini's requests with due circumspection and reliability.[86] In the Turkish capital, the Count László Vay took over the letters to forward them to Kutahia. Vay was there to replace the Count Gyula Andrássy in his function as Hungarian envoy to Constantinople after he had left for the West, a duty which Vay did his best to perform with more or less success.[87]

Overcoming the immense distance between London and Kutahia, and eluding the vigilance of the great powers, Mazzini managed to establish good relations with Kossuth in order to clarify the political and theoretical foundations of their co-operation and to mark out the tasks to be carried out. With his strong penchant for rhetorical statements, even in his confidential correspondence, and for making theatrical gestures, Mazzini remained true to himself this time too. His letters were worded in far too general terms, narrowed down to theoretical declarations, with a strong emphasis laid on the importance of adopting the republican principle in their common struggle against the oppressive monarchies.

Mazzini's offering his services, though included some fixed points for Kossuth, was not unambiguous. It contained a number of risky contradictions, he had several premature and over-generalized ideas which failed to meet with Kossuth's agreement in many respects. These reasons by themselves seemed to be sufficient for Kossuth not to give consent, but to give serious further consideration to the proposals of the Italian emigration leader. Anyhow, Kossuth did not want to commit himself in one particular direction; he preferred to have a free hand to shape his future actions. He held Mazzini's republicanism as being far too doctrinaire and impractical under the given circumstances, which might restrict his room for manoeuvring. Though in his letters from Kutahia to London, Kossuth passed rather scathing remarks on the diplomacy of the great powers, yet he reckoned with it and refrained from provoking those powers by his explicit adherence to Mazzini and his republican movement.[88] Presumably, Kossuth also reckoned with the possibility that the republican movement would narrow the circle of potential allies in an upward direction, thus decreasing the number of those forces which could be deployed against the absolutist powers. Although it was debatable what Kossuth held, namely that the republican principle is merely the question of the form of government and it should not precede the primacy of the demand for independence, yet under the circumstances, it was the keeping of

[85] *Ibid.* pp. 5–6.

[86] Cf. Pásztor Lajos: Lajos Kossuth nel suo carteggio con Adriano Lemmi 1851–1852. (*Janus Pannonius*, 1947, Nos. 2–3.)

[87] Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 399 ff.

[88] Pulszky F.: *Életem*, *op. cit.* II, pp. 36 ff.

this order of sequence that served as a guiding principle for him.[89] There are several evidences that in the period of his internment in Kutahia, Kossuth sought to enter into relations with the Piedmontese monarchy, trusting in the Baron Tecco, envoy of Piedmont to Constantinople, and reckoning with Colonel Alessandro Monti – commander of the Italian legion in Hungary in 1848, now acting as the emissary of the Sardian Kingdom – and with the Italian poet and actor Regaldi who, with his manifestations swaying the public in favour of the Sardian Kingdom, also served as a more significant background for Kossuth.[90] It was not until Kossuth had come to recognize the conservative and counter-revolutionary nature of the Sardian Monarchy's policy as a reality, and until the Monarchy itself had clearly become averse to his attempts at rapprochement, that Kossuth finally broke his silence of several months and replied to Mazzini in spring 1851. But even then with strong reserves and utterly cautiously, in a polemic tone, and asking Mazzini to keep it in strict confidence.[91] Previously Kossuth had restricted himself to maintain his correspondence with Lemmi who, of course, kept Mazzini informed of the contents of the letters. Thus Mazzini was rather well informed of Kossuth's attempts, endeavours and attitude towards the Sardian Monarchy.[92] After all this, Mazzini increasingly and more emphatically warned Kossuth against entertaining illusions about the Piedmontese Monarchy, urged him on a radical break, and required him to commit himself fully to the Central Committee of European Democrats in London and to the alliance between the two of them.[93]

It is an undeniable fact that Kossuth gave Mazzini his hand in Kutahia, even if with reservations and in secret. To lay a stronger emphasis on their alliance, Kossuth formulated a more forcible appeal to Hungarian soldiers serving in Italy, in which he reminded them that it was their patriotic obligation to join the Italian liberation movement and summoned them to desert the Austrian army. He also called them to join forces with the Italians and turn their arms against the common enemy. Kossuth sent the text of this enthusiastic and mobilizing proclamation to Mazzini in London. Simultaneously, he requested Mazzini not to make this proclamation public before the expected eve of the outbreak of the would-be uprising, because an early publication would risk the success.[94]

As to the nationality problem and its implications, Mazzini's recommendations came nearer to the Romanian and Polish conceptions of confederation, accentu-

[89] Kossuth to Mazzini, without place name, 19 March 1851. (Menghini, Mario: *Luigi Kossuth nel suo carteggio con Giuseppe Mazzini.* Aquila, 1921, pp. 21 ff.)

[90] Kossuth to the Baron Tecco, Kutahia, 17 April 1850. (Kastner: *Mazzini e Kossuth, op. cit.* pp. 97 ff. From Regaldi. *Ibid.* pp. 112 ff.)

[91] Cf. Menghini: *op. cit.* pp. 21 ff.

[92] Kossuth to Lemmi, Kutahia, 31 March 1851. (A. C. R. 398–41/1; 14 April. *Ibid.* 398–41/2; 23 April. *Ibid.* 398–41/3.) Cf. Pásztor: *Kossuth con Lemmi, op. cit.*

[93] Mazzini to Kossuth (London), 6 February 1851. In: *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini.* Edizione Nazionale, XLV, pp. 166 ff.

[94] Kossuth attached his appeal to the Hungarian soldiers serving in Italy to his letter to Mazzini, dated from Kutahia on 19 June 1851. (Menghini: *op. cit.* pp. 31 ff.)

ating the importance of far-reaching democratic rights, in which the necessity of creating regional autonomies was also included. In his letter of 19 June 1851, Kossuth did not make secret of his divergent views and anxieties based on serious experiences. He declined to take any step forward in the field of ensuring the nationality rights beyond those he had explicated in detail in his letters to László Teleki in the previous year. As in the case of the western groups of Hungarian emigration, Kossuth sent the draft constitution he had worked out in Kutahia to Mazzini as well. In this document Kossuth gave a detailed description of the nature and limits of rights to be granted to nationalities. However, under the circumstances, the ultimate function of this plan, conceived undoubtedly in a democratic spirit, was to offer views contrary to those Teleki- and Klapka-supported plans which had been widely spread in London and included the claim to regional autonomy as well.[95] From all this, Mazzini could quite well understand the limits up to which they might go in the course of their co-operation. At the moment, however, this seemed to Mazzini to be of secondary importance; instead, he held it essential to achieve that Kossuth associate himself at last with the London association of emigrants. Mazzini also expected Kossuth and these emigrants to declare and make fully public their co-operation and then to have the rightful further struggles of the oppressed peoples hallmarked by Kossuth's widely-known name.

Even though Mazzini temporarily could not achieve more than to obtain Kossuth's assent to the declaration of their common appearance on the political scene and to the issue of joint proclamations, their alliance and concerted actions can actually be dated the spring of 1851. All this manifested itself not only in the fact that Kossuth at last showed willingness to write directly to Mazzini, but also – and even more clearly – in that, on some inspirations from London, Kossuth set to explore and keep his hand upon the more or less palpable threads of discontent in Hungary and to make preparations for a possible new European confrontation as expected and predicted by Mazzini, as well as for the inspiration or even initiation of a new, so much desired freedom fight.

Supposedly, intensifying Kossuth's activity with an enhanced optimism was the hope that – on some substantial foreign initiative and intervention – the Turkish government would be willing to cease the paralysing internment, even against an Austrian protest. Understandably, the possibility of liberation in the foreseeable future had a favourable effect on Kossuth's further steps. To be taken into account is also the fact that his anxieties about his family affairs eased after the Austrian government – for merely practical rather than humanitarian reasons and motivated by rational considerations – had raised no objection to Kossuth's children to leave the country. After so many fears and uncertainties, his children, Ferenc, Vilma and Lajos junior, arrived in Kutahia on 18 June 1850 in the company of Kossuth's sister, Mrs. Ruttkay by name, and their educator Ignác

[95] Kossuth attached the text of his Kutahia plan constitution to his letter of 19 June 1851 to Mazzini. (Menghini: *op. cit.* p. 37.)

Karády.[96] Even if the resolving of his family-related problems had a beneficial effect on Kossuth, he still had several reasons to be cautious and to behave warily. To wit, the Austrian government did not at all shrink back from sending secret agents, provocateurs or even hired assassins to his surroundings, or from hiring those emigrants who perhaps volunteered, or seemed to be suitable from other aspects, to play such a role. Showing up in succession were Austrian spies who supplied their employers with plenty of reports through the Austrian consulates in Turkey, or in a more sophisticated manner through certain western contacts, who by themselves could give rise to an atmosphere of distrust to surround the Hungarian emigrants, especially Kossuth himself.[97] Kossuth was really afraid of an attempt on his life, the success of which would only have formed an organic part of the wave of terror started by the Austrian absolutism in Hungary. Even though carrying its utter cautiousness sometimes to extremes, often visualizing the worst for the emigrants, the Turkish government seriously reckoned with Austrian provocations, or even attempts, and therefore it called Bey Suleyman, government Commissioner sent to Kutahia, to take strict security measures. These measures only increased the burdens of the military custody, which was troublesome enough anyhow, enhancing the torments of emigrants. Supposedly, it can hardly be brought into connection with Kossuth's representative pretensions that only the personal-security and other necessary services were rendered by a smaller group of officers selected from his entourage. This might have been connected with the above-mentioned reasons as well. They had to look after even Kossuth's meals to prevent the potential enemy from poisoning him. Thus was it that even the duty of cooking was performed by an ex-officer of the Hungarian revolutionary army – to everyone's satisfaction. The unity and harmonious work of the groups of officers responsible for Kossuth's safety were only disturbed by one disagreeable event, back in May 1850, when Kossuth came to know that the officers who formed his most confidential personal surroundings accepted monthly financial aids not only from him, but also from General Mór Perczel, his worst personal enemy. It was only after lengthy explanations and apologies that Kossuth's passion and anger finally abated.[98]

It can hardly be stated that there had ever been a very high degree of concord and agreement among the leading Hungarian refugees, either civilian or military, in Turkey. Apart from a few exceptions, Kossuth tended to recruit his most confidential adherents, most faithful followers and supporters from among the

[96] Kossuth's children started from Pest by ship on 26 May 1850. (*Pesti Napló*, 28 May 1850.) (Report on their arrival in: László K.: *op. cit.* pp. 42–43.)

[97] Taking a particularly active part in the activity of the organization that kept the Hungarian emigration under surveillance was Gábor Jasmagy who worked for the Austrian consulate and together with a lawyer called Pál Kovács also tried to initiate the arrest of Hungarian emigrants. Cf. Hajnal: *Kossuth-emigráció, op. cit.* pp. 330 ff; *Idem:* Osztrák merénylettervek Törökországban a száműzött Kossuth ellen (Austrian plots for attempts in Turkey on the exiled Kossuth's life). (*Napkelet*, 1927.); Gusztáv Zerffy (Hirsch) sent his information and reports on the emigrants to Paris, from where Dr. Lajos Mandl forwarded them to Vienna. Cf. Hajnal: *Belgrádi diplomácia, op. cit.*

[98] László K.: *op. cit.* pp. 28 ff.

"middle cadres" of the Hungarian War of Independence. There were among them talented, well-trained, good-intentioned and highly responsible individuals just as well as simpler, compliant souls who wished to find their security in the shadow of the great name. To be found in Kossuth's closer company were the broad-minded and gifted Lieutenant-Colonel Sándor Asbóth and Lieutenant-Colonel Dániel Ihász, his confidential aide-de-camp, who swore allegiance for life to Kossuth. Belonging to the same circle were also Majors Ede Bíró and Gusztáv Wagner, Captains Alajos Fráter and István Kinizsi, the reliable diary writer and one-time artillery captain Károly László, ex-government Commissioner László Berzenczey with the brevet rank of colonel, First-Lieutenant György Grechnek, Captain Imre Cseh as official interpreter, Calvinist Reformed Minister Gedeon Ács as army chaplain, Ignác Karády and still many more people from the camp of refugees.[99]

While Ex-Foreign Minister Count Kázmér Batthyány retained his independent status, though occasionally he still co-operated with Kossuth at that time, General Mór Perczel – who had arrived with his family in Kutahia on 22 September 1850 – became quite separated from Kossuth, upholding his critical attitude towards Kossuth throughout the emigration. On account of his controversies with Kossuth, General Józef Bem, who died at the age of 60 in Aleppo on 10 December 1850, also became separated from him. At the funeral service offered for him in Kutahia, however, the entire refugee camp was present with Kossuth at the lead.[100]

Many ex-officers of the revolutionary army – who took service with the Turkish army – scattered throughout the vast Turkish Empire. To be sure, Kutahia always formed the centre of the eastern emigration where the most distinguished refugees were staying. In full awareness of the responsibility implied in the prominent role history had allotted him, Kossuth decided that he should meet the moral requirements of this leading role even under the highly involved and conflicting circumstances of emigration. In 1850–1851, when he not only enriched his knowledge of the English language, but also began to extend his proficiency in the art of war, he thoroughly studied works by military experts and took special military courses from the Polish General György Bulcharyn. He did all this in compliance with his conviction and decision that the political and military leading role should not be let out of his hands in the future – this was the lesson he had drawn from Görgey's acts.[101]

The self-assurance with which Kossuth wanted to undertake the leadership over the emigration – while it met with the approval and support of many among his middle ranking followers – gave rise to marked opposition among the higher political and military leaders of emigration, in both the eastern and the western

[99] *Ibid.* p. 52.

[100] Pap – Szalczer: *op. cit.* p. 217.

[101] Kossuth hadtudományi jegyzetei 1850–51 (Kossuth's military science notes from 1850–51). (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I. 1043); Cf. Hentaller Lajos: *Kossuth és kora* (Kossuth and his age). Budapest, 1894, p. 280.

group, that brought up a wide range of arguments against the method Kossuth wished to adopt in governing and leading the emigration, maintaining that it was hardly compatible with the real conditions of emigrant life. Ignoring the critical remarks and warnings, Kossuth, also driven by the hope of his impending liberation, wanted to proceed along the road he had chosen. Kossuth was inspired by Mazzini, encouraged by Lemmi and relied heavily on the information his confidential man, Captain Henningsen, had gathered during his tour in Europe, and he also hoped in a favourable turn of events in France, when he made approaches to the malcontented groups coming from Hungary.

While Mazzini was building up his organization and sought to stir up rebellions throughout Italy, Kossuth – still in Kutahia, under much more difficult conditions than Mazzini – tried to get in touch with the heralds of discontent in Hungary, with individuals ready to revolt, in order to give shape to the hatred for absolutism and to urge on action. He also aimed to prove it to the western world, to his fellow emigrants as well as to his Italian, Polish and German political allies that – after his anticipated liberation – he would still be able to keep a firm hand on the Hungarian affairs and to demonstrate the existence of forces supporting him, his unchanged influence as well as the inflammatory effect of his words. Well fitting into this conception was the fact that quite a few patriots, all ready for action, presented themselves to Kossuth in Kutahia. The first such herald to come was Mátyás Rózsafi, one-time defender of the Komárom fortress, who had travelled with his fellow emigrant, József Várady, to Turkey, and arrived from Bursa in Kutahia to present themselves with the letters they had brought along to be received by Kossuth as early as the autumn of 1850. They were to report to him on the intentions of József Makk, once Commander-in-Chief of the artillery of the Komárom fortress, and also to give him authentic information on what had happened in the final weeks of the siege of Komárom, on the unjust accusation of Károly Makk, asking for confidence and expecting orders and authorization for further actions. However, it took months before the rightly distrustful Kossuth finally received the representatives of the maturing Hungarian resistance movement.[102] Having arrived in Kutahia on 29 March 1851, Rózsafi carefully cleared the way for his friend and associate Károly Makk who also arrived in Turkey in the company of the very industrious and venturesome Fülöp Figyelmessy. The latter two persons took up their abode in Constantinople. It can hardly be taken for mere chance that the sending of Kossuth's first direct letter in early spring 1851 coincided in time with the appearance and the visit of Rózsafi.

Kossuth's contacts with Mazzini now developed at a more rapid rate and – again coincidentally – he gave his consent to the intensification of the Makk-led organization. While there was an exchange of some confidential letters between Kossuth and Makk, the latter, by the help of László Vay, managed to get in touch with Adriano Lemmi who readily assisted him in his efforts. Thus Mazzini's con-

[102] Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 406 ff; Cf. Lukács Lajos: *Magyar függetlenségi és alkotmányos mozgalmak 1849–1867* (Hungarian independence and constitutional movements 1849–1867; henceforward: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak*). Budapest, 1955, pp. 53 ff.

fidential man in Constantinople, who had already been a *persona grata* to Kossuth as well, did not restrict himself only to playing the role of a good-intentioned supporter. In fact, Lemmi became a mediator or even "liaison officer", fermenting and inspiring organizations the threads of which ran from London and Kutahia to Constantinople, to which he also connected the threads of organization just beginning to take shape in Hungary. It was not only Kossuth who – by Lemmi's help – became acquainted with the rules of the Mazzinist conspiracy, the secret regulations of organizations Italy, broken down into parts by appointing years, months, weeks, days, hours, but Makk and his companions also got to know them in Constantinople, from where they transmitted them to Hungary.[103]

In this case Lemmi and his secret emissaries practically surrounded Kossuth who, partly prompted by Mazzini to act, partly following his own ideas, was finally willing to receive Makk in Kutahia to discuss the further tasks to be performed. It was not at all easy to get to Kutahia, to evade the vigilance of the Turkish authorities and the Austrian agents who were always up to anything. After Makk had also obtained the support of the Constantinople embassy of the United States through the good offices of Lemmi, he managed to go to Kutahia, disguised as the butler of the American painter Walter Gould, by the false name John. After these complicated antecedents, equipped with proper credentials signed by Mrs. Meszlényi Zsuzsanna Kossuth of Pest, Makk arrived in Kutahia to visit Kossuth and stayed there from 22 to 28 June 1851. Makk's devotion, enthusiasm, readiness, and to no less extent his past as a defender of Komárom, led Kossuth to issue him the document entitled *Felhatalmazás* (Authorization) on 25 June 1851, by which Kossuth empowered Makk to direct the organizations in Hungary. Kossuth did this with reference to his power as Governor, according to which: "Starting out of the necessity of uniting the national forces in an effort to restore order, to recover the nation's freedom and independence; moreover, considering that the preparations for a solidary European freedom fight have reached a stage when – owing to the universal conformity of these movements – the organizing of the nation and its making prepared for military action can no longer be delayed without risking the future of our Fatherland!" – "... under my authorization, I shall make every effort to comply with all requirements involved in my onerous enterprise ...", wrote Makk on the verso of the document.[104]

It clearly appeared from a later exchange of letters that the fundamental principles and conspiratorial rules tended to follow the pattern of the Mazzinist organizations, though adopting its form, rather than its intellectual and ideological contents. But they indicated the readiness and desire to win over the other peoples coexisting with Hungarians, and to meet their democratic claims, at least

[103] Coromaldi, Adriano: *Adriano Lemmi attraverso il suo carteggio con Kossuth*. Roma, 1937; Cf. Pásztor: *op. cit.*

[104] Cf. Szinnyei: *op. cit.* pp. 471–473; Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 508–509; Lukács: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak*, *op. cit.* pp. 56–57.

to a certain degree.[105] Although the further development of the Hungarian organization was going on more or less independently from Kossuth, under the guidance of Makk and his companions, not infrequently involving the Mazzinist emissaries who had arrived with them, Kossuth followed the development with anxious attention.

POLITICAL PLATFORM OF THE WESTERN EMIGRATION

In the meanwhile, the influential leaders of the west wing of the Hungarian emigration were making strenuous efforts to attain the earliest possible elimination of the internment of emigrants in Turkey. Through newspaper articles, confidential talks with responsible statesmen, they did their best to make some progress in a highly complex issue which had been settled on the basis of a preliminary agreement of the leading great powers and the change of which also depended on their consent. However, the change affecting the internees did not take place solely as a result of – although not quite independently from – the efforts of their western companions. The wide-ranging international propaganda activities pursued for many years to keep the western public properly informed, also made its effect strongly felt in the related decisions taken by the governments concerned.[106] On the other hand, as time passed, signs of an understandable exhaustion or even frustration, following from so many abortive attempts, became undoubtedly clear. The incessant struggle for subsistence, along with the exhaustion of the sources of support and the changing intensity of public interest, all had a decisive effect on the tendencies of the western emigration movements. The dialogue between Kutahia and the individual emigrant leaders – Teleki in the first place – ultimately could not serve as a basis for a progress to be made jointly, instead, it promoted the polarization of forces. While Hungarian emigrants in England chose to take a wait-and-see position, abstaining from the formulation of any explicit political program, their companions in France seemed to be more active in this respect. Their prevailing opinion was that the creation of organizational unity depended on a clarification of views and principles as well as on drawing up a program on the basis of which the future directions of activity might be determined. Hungarians in Paris did not want to wait until Kossuth would regain his freedom, they wished – in anticipation of it – to elucidate those particular fundamental principles by the strength of which they thought to accomplish the unity of emigration.[107]

[105] Cf. Pásztor Árpád: Kossuth ismeretlen leveleiből (From Kossuth's unknown letters). (*Magyar Figyelő*, 1914, Nos. 1–2.)

[106] See Teleki to Pulszky, Montmorency, 10 July 1850. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835.); 21 July, *Ibid.*

[107] See László Teleki's letters to Klapka between 20 July and 14 November 1850. (O.L., Klapka Papers); Cf. Klapka: *op. cit.* pp. 559 ff; László Teleki's letters to Pulszky between 20 September 1850 and 27 April 1851. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835. Edited by Vértessy:

Finally, after a longer period of maturing and experimentation, in December 1851, Hungarians in France set up their emigrant association with László Teleki as its president. The membership of the association's steering committee included Bertalan Szemere as Vice-President, Sebő Vukovics, György Klapka, János Czetz, and István Bittó as Secretaries.[108] In addition to such widely-known causes as a more uniform attitude, the organization of more effective and more concerted actions, mutual support and aid, other concrete implications of establishing the Paris emigrant association may also be well traced.

From the autumn of 1850, causing particular excitement among the Hungarian emigrants, was the deepening Austro-Prussian conflict which was directly linked up with the Prussian military intervention in Hessen. At the Olmütz negotiations in late November of 1850, Austria met with success inasmuch as it managed to have the Prussian troops withdrawn. This achievement encouraged the Schwarzenberg-government in Vienna to lay now an explicit claim to the Habsburg Empire's leadership over all German states at the Dresden conference, convened by 24 December 1850. It was envisaged that Austria together with Hungary, now incorporated in the centralized Empire, would join in the All-German Alliance to secure its leading role.[109] This ambitious plan – which necessarily implied an unlimited centralization and Germanization, as well as the complete abolishment of the Hungarian statehood, depriving the country even of its pre-1848 constitution – rightfully gave rise to consternation and protest among the Hungarian emigrants. It was in anticipation of such developments that the Count Gyula Andrássy did not hesitate to take up his pen to express his views in his paper "The present position and policy of Austria" in the November 1850 issue of the English journal *Eclectic Review*. In his paper, Andrássy definitely blamed the policy of centralism, expounding that Austria, burdened with Hungary which it had annexed and deprived of its constitutional freedom, could no longer counterbalance Russia, and on this very account, it essentially lost its right to existence as a European empire.[110]

It was in the sign of similar thoughts, but based on solid internal policy foundations and carefully placed in a broader international context, that the *Memorandum* relating to the Dresden conference was formulated by the leaders of the Paris emigrant association. In this work Szemere concentrated on working out the constitutional issues from a Hungarian aspect and produced a remarkable material, while Andrássy with his good political sense contributed to the elaboration of the international issues. Ultimately, Teleki co-ordinated the whole work,

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op. cit. fasc. 2; Teleki's contemporaneous letters to Mihály Horváth. OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Oct. Hung. 441.)

[108] Teleki to Pulszky, Paris, 25 January 1851. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835.)

[109] Cf. Friedjung, Heinrich: *Österreich von 1848 bis 1860.* Vols. I–II. Wien, 1908–1912, II, pp. 12 ff; Taylor, A.J.P.: *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918.* London, 1948, pp. 83 ff.

[110] Andrássy: The present position and policy of Austria. (*Eclectic Review*, Vol. XXVIII, November 1850.); Cf. Wertheimer: *op. cit.* I, pp. 70 ff.

made an original contribution to the discussion of the international aspects, and translated the whole work into French.[111] Dated 15 February 1851, the *Memorandum*, signed by László Teleki, Bertalan Szemere, Sebő Vukovics and Generals György Klapka and János Czetz, was submitted to the French government by Teleki. Teleki himself was opposed to the pan-German aspirations of the Habsburg-power, and in fact, he protested against it. Further on, the *Memorandum*, in which a strong diplomatic protest was also implied, was forwarded to the British, American and Piedmontese governments as well.[112] Besides sending a copy of the *Memorandum* to Lord Dudley Stuart, Teleki went as far as requiring Pulszky to forward the copy, which he had personally received, to Lord Palmerston at his earliest convenience. At the same time, Teleki emphasized that it would be both desirable and necessary to multiply the document and to distribute copies within the more confidential circles of British political life.[113] Simultaneously, he warned against the publication of the document in the press, because it would have been contrary to the discretion that the French government had claimed in this matter. In spite of all this, in a way unclear up to now, the text of the *Memorandum* was made public by the press, more particularly in the Hungarian press. Vukovics dispatched a copy to Kossuth in Kutahia as well, and Kossuth also strongly underlined the importance and significance of the document from an international aspect.[114]

Conditions for the lasting operation of the Hungarian emigrant association in France were strongly jeopardized by the ongoing changes in the French internal policy. The general political tendency in France showed an increasing shift to the right, so that the operational possibilities of emigrants were more and more limited by several factors. But beyond this, it gave Teleki a veritable Sisyphean task to hold the refugees together and to provide for their proper political guidance. Unfortunately, he could not receive adequate support for this effort either from Kutahia or from London. Disagreements in increasing numbers had emerged day

[111] The final editing and French translation of the *Memorandum* was carried out by Teleki. "For the most part, the mémoire was put down in writing by me, but Andrássy and Szemere also contributed to it, especially as regards the Hungarian constitutional aspects." (László Teleki to Pulszky, Paris, 16 March 1851. OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835); Cf. Szemere: *Naplóm, op. cit.* I, p. 116; the former was disclaimed in: Teleki to Kossuth, Geneva, 6 August 1859. (Kossuth Lajos: *Irataim az emigrációból* (My papers from the emigration), Vols. I–III. Budapest, 1880–1882, continued in: *Kossuth Lajos iratai* (Papers of Lajos Kossuth). Ed. by Ignác Helfy and Ferenc Kossuth. Vols. IV–XIII. Budapest, 1894–1911. II, p. 105. Henceforward referred to as Kossuth: *Papers*; Teleki to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss, Montpellier, 9 April 1860. (*Ibid.* p. 106); Ernő Kiss tends to underline Bertalan Szemere's role in the work (Kiss E.: *op. cit.* p. 181), while Zoltán Horváth regards the *Memorandum* "in its entirety" as Teleki's work (Horváth Z.: *op. cit.* I, p. 352), though this statement cannot be proven.

[112] Mémoire sur le Projet formé aux Conférences de Dresde d'encorporer la Hongrie et ses parties annexes à la Conféderation Germanique. Paris, 15 February 1851. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 1104. Published in Horváth: *op. cit.* II, pp. 240 ff.)

[113] László Teleki to Pulszky, Paris, 16 March 1851. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Fond VIII, 2835.)

[114] Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* I, pp. 15 ff.

after day which gradually sharpened the latent conflicts. Pulszky, who later would grow into Kossuth's plenipotentiary representative, did not agree with the activities of Hungarians in Paris. Of the Paris emigrants, there were some who preferred to gravitate towards London and thus came into conflict with their fellow refugees such as Dániel Irányi, Frigyes Szarvady or the so much criticized Lajos Csernátony who maintained good relations with newspapers in Hungary and regularly sent them reports on the Hungarian emigrant movements, which activity, however, soon made him suspected of being an Austrian spy.[115] However, the overwhelming majority of Hungarians in France tended to support the Teleki-led steering committee, and adopted a political platform, submitted by the committee in spring 1851, which preferred the principle of *corporate* to the one-man leadership of the emigration. When they so decided, they must have thought of Kossuth in the first place whose related conceptions had become widely known from his letters to Teleki and others.

The Paris centre of Hungarian emigrants thus summed up its conceptions as to the leadership of the emigration under the title "Fundamental conditions of our political relations with Lajos Kossuth":

"I. No dictatorship whatsoever can be tolerated either within or outside the Fatherland, of course, so long as the national will would not decide otherwise.

II. Any insistence on using the title of Governor, that may only be an imitation of a pretender's policy and is incompatible with the operational principles of a liberal party, is not advised, especially in such a case when the Governor voluntarily abdicated before the War of Independence had been ended.

III. In view of the sympathy the peoples of the world have accorded to the case of Hungary, no one, personifying either one certain man or another, may regard oneself to be so high positioned and superior to one's fellow citizens that one could claim to be the only possessor of all secrets and keys pertaining to the governing of the Hungarian affairs, while seeking to use others as willing tools only."

Starting out from the above fundamental principles, they also decided to involve – in addition to the appointed leaders – some other individuals, who enjoyed the confidence of their compatriots, in managing the affairs connected with the activities abroad. Moreover, pecuniary donations, which had been made out of sympathy with the Hungarian case, were suggested to be distributed on the basis of the degree of real patriotism and needs rather than of the personal relations. It was also proposed that funds earmarked for aids should be managed impartially and publicly by committees elected freely by the concerned bodies. As to the would-be operation in Hungary, again it was decided that as soon as Hungary would be able to resume its fight for life with its oppressors, those taking the lead in those efforts would have to be bound to convene a "statutory national diet", as the only revolutionary power, on the basis of universal suffrage at the earliest possible date, and that it would only be this diet that might engender the formation of a revolutionary government. They wanted to vest those members of

[115] László Teleki to Klapka, Geneva, 19 May 1851. (O.L., Klapka Papers); 7 June, *Ibid.* 15 June, *Ibid.* 25 June, *Ibid.*; Cf. Lengyel T.: *Klapka, op. cit.* pp. 111 ff.

the old diet who would still be alive at that time with power to organize the new diet and to call elections.

Part IV of the document was to guide the way for the popularization of the Hungarian case until the time would come to start the fight. For speeches and newspaper articles to be delivered or written, "we set it as the main objective to place as great an emphasis as possible on the holiness of our endeavour, and on the identity of the interests of Hungary with those of the whole of mankind, in respect of freedom and embourgeoisement", as well as on the heroic spirit and devotion all participants are imbued with. "On this account we must oppose any intent to confiscate the whole recent history of Hungary for one single man."

Part V expressed that they did not deem it as their task either to interfere with the work of the would-be representatives or to work out a *constitution* beforehand. What they were essentially aiming at was to lay down some fundamental principles and to underline that they sought to form alliance with every neighbouring free nation, individuals and nationalities alike, in the spirit of liberty, fraternity and equality, declaring "that just as we are opposed to the supremacy of any caste, so are we against the dominance of any nationality".

In Part VI it was declared that the Hungarian army of the future should only be led and motivated by patriotic devotion and not by mere pay and selfish aims to obtain benefits, "because the freedom of peoples is secured by civic-minded soldiers rather than by mercenaries".[116]

Including the fundamental principles of the Hungarian emigration in Paris, the document unambiguously expressed the opinion of a considerable number of Hungarian emigrants in the West, as well as their protest against a one-man leadership over the emigration. When Teleki and Klapka adopted this principle, they still did hope to be able to co-operate with Kossuth and to bring a remarkable part of the emigration under a common leadership. However, the unity of the Hungarian emigration in France was only an apparent one, to become divided into factions as early as the summer of 1851. After Teleki had left for Switzerland, there was again a marked increase in the influence of the pro-Kossuth elements. This was well shown by the general assembly of the emigrant association on 5 July 1851, when Dániel Irányi and Frigyes Szarvady regained their leading role, while Bertalan Szemere was fully neglected. To express his protest over the developments, Teleki refused to accept the presidency which had been offered to him again. He clearly saw it that the events foreshadowed Kossuth's expected arrival in the West, which needed the clarification of the related expectations of emigrants.[117] In this context, Teleki explained his principled views in his letter to Sebő Vukovics in autumn 1851, expressing his hope that "to Kossuth fell the perhaps glorious task of uniting the whole revolutionary party of the freedom fight and to concentrate it into one camp". Then Teleki gave utterance to his view that "Kossuth constitutes power because he had been

[116] Klapka: *op. cit.* pp. 317 ff.

[117] László Teleki to Sebő Vukovics, Zürich, 20 July 1851. (O.L., Sebő Vukovics Papers. Published in Horváth Z.: *op. cit.* II, pp. 281–284.)

surrounded by sympathy and enthusiasm from so many sides. As a matter of fact he is not the man of one party only, but he is the man of the people ...". However, in the issue of governing the emigration, Teleki steadily and unwaveringly abided by the Paris declaration. He did not dispute the rightfulness of a dictatorial form of the revolutionary governing under utterly sharpened circumstances – referring to Robespierre among others –, yet he came to the conclusion that "Dictatorship is used to stamp out all the enthusiasm of the people. Revolution will come to an end as soon as someone happens to succeed in making a dictator of oneself ... If there is ever any need for dictatorship, it must only arise from the people itself. But in this particular manner in which Kossuth wants it, requiring all of us to blindly follow him in every respect, it is quite impossible!"[118]

KOSSUTH IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES IN 1851–1852

Every step Kossuth had taken after his liberation from Kutahia in 1851 was followed with keen attention and impatient expectation. The fact that the Count Kázmér Batthyány and General Mór Perczel did not leave Kutahia together with Kossuth, but stopped over Bursa to depart from there by a separate ship to the West, was by itself tantamount to taking sides against Kossuth. They also rejected the idea of emigrating to America, like Kossuth himself did, but they wished to give a special emphasis to their autonomous position.[119] When the frigate Mississippi went out to sea, Kossuth had already devised very definite schemes for the future. He planned to go first to Britain and from there to the United States in order to recruit still more friends to support the cause of Hungary, so that in case the freedom fight would be renewed, a strong obstacle could be put in the way of a potential Tsarist intervention. He planned to exert an influence on the governments as well as on their official diplomacy both directly and through inspiring the sympathy of the general public for the Hungarian case. He wished to have a free hand in his activities, but he also made claim to the support of the Hungarian emigrants, without, however, expecting any preliminary consent to his actions. Kossuth did not only revert to using the title of Governor, but he also insisted on the related rights and duties, ignoring the actual circumstances and conditions of the emigrant way of life. Though Kossuth continued to refrain from making his alliance with Mazzini public, he still derived a considerable encouragement to make his independent appearance on the political scene from his knowledge of the fact that he was backed up by significant factors of the international emigration in England and – in harmony with them – he was able to keep his hand upon all the threads of the organization and guidance of the discontent in Hun-

[118] László Teleki to Sebő Vukovics, Geneva, 27 October 1851. (*Ibid.* pp. 284–285.)

[119] Report by the Constantinople British envoy Canning to Foreign Secretary Palmerston, *Therapia*, 10 September 1851, No. 201. (Correspondence respecting refugees from Hungary within the Turkish Dominions – 1851, *State Papers*, Vol. XL, London, 1863.)

gary. It is not uninteresting to consider either that after his liberation from Kutahia, Kossuth chose to employ Adriano Lemmi, Mazzini's former emissary in Constantinople, as his secretary, sharing even his most confidential political affairs with him. Thus was it that Kossuth travelled together with Lemmi's wife and children on board of the Mississippi.[120] In so chosing his secretary, Kossuth presumably also took into account Lemmi's excellent international relations, financial independence and his close connections with Mazzini. Thus it was not only the western emigrants who had to note that Kossuth would retain his freedom of action, but also the members of his closer entourage coming along with him from Kutahia whom Kossuth expected to do him services without, however, initiating them into the secrets of his activity. Even Captain De Long, commander of the frigate Mississippi, and Morgan, commander of the U.S. fleet on the Mediterranean, had to take notice of the fact that their plan to transport Kossuth straight to the United States could not be realized. As the French government refused Kossuth's request that from Marseille he could cross France on his way to England, Kossuth had to debark at Gibraltar and from there to continue his way to London with his family and his narrower entourage with Adriano Lemmi among them.[121]

Even amidst the many excitements incidental to their journey on board the Mississippi, in his proclamation dated from Marseille, Kossuth did not forget about notifying all the concerned Hungarian emigrants that he invariably insisted on his office of Governor, in spite of all proposals and advice to the contrary. As he put it: "*It is me whom the Hungarian nation elected Governor ... and therefore I will set forth commands and edicts without the shackles of constraints and convention.* I will demand discipline, obedience and will not tolerate any discontent. He who is not with us is against us; I will not endure any neutrality, indifference." His message to his opposers is quite explicit: "they must either trample upon me, if they can, or be prepared that I shall relentlessly trample upon them by the power the nation has vested on me."[122] He repeated such statements in a similar manner later on – as he increasingly experienced the flaring up of the interest and solidarity of the general public. Indeed, the grandiose celebrations and demonstration which accompanied him throughout his journey, from La Spezia through Marseille up to his arrival in Southampton, from 21 September to 23 October 1851, to be continued in London, Birmingham and Manchester, may have really strongly enhanced the self-assurance of this most prominent leader of the freedom fight, confirming him in his conviction that to achieve his objectives, he should require unqualified obedience of all members of the Hungarian emigration.

In spite of all this, the effect Kossuth's appearance had on the Hungarian emigrant circles could not be regarded as an unambiguously positive one and fell

[120] Cf. László K.: *op. cit.* p. 89.

[121] Cf. Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 641 ff.

[122] Proclamation of Kossuth, Marseille, 27 September 1851. (*Ibid.* pp. 619 ff); Hentaller: *op. cit.* pp. 296 ff.

short of a general consent. To the eyes of many, Kossuth's strict words did not appear as an evidence of the unity so much desired for, but, on the contrary, as the sign of the emigration's disunity and disintegration into parties. Teleki and Klapka found it appropriate to withdraw – not wishing to share in either the successes or the failures of Kossuth. In those hectic weeks, Teleki was staying in Switzerland and exchanged letters from Zürich with Klapka, Szemere and Vukovics, showing interest in the affairs, though not without any reservation and bitterness. He clearly informed Vukovics at the time of Kossuth's celebrations in England that "I would like to be able to go along with Kossuth. As you may know, I harboured friendly feelings towards him. However, I will never sacrifice my principles, and if he requires of me to obey him or – as you put it in your letter, which is an equivalent to it – to follow him unconditionally, then our paths will part".[123] Teleki explained his views about Kossuth even more emphatically and definitely in his letter of 30 October 1851 to Bertalan Szemere. This letter constitutes a historical document which unambiguously and clearly explains why the breaking of relations between Teleki and Kossuth had to take place, making its effect felt for many years to come. The underlying reasons were summed up by Teleki in three points. *First*, because "I am opposed to any kind of dictatorship whatever it is called", "I deem the imposed dictatorship as an especially inappropriate and absurd form, namely that someone would proclaim oneself dictator, and as a refugee oneself would require blind obedience of one's fellow refugees". *Second*, "I do not regard it possible that he who had once held the highest office in his country, which he voluntarily abdicated, would claim that office back later as a refugee and would even restore himself in it without any authorization by the country". *Third*, "I want freedom, real and unlimited, in every respect, thus in respect of the nationalities as well. And I do not want that the holy cause, which we serve as its champions and protagonists, being kept within the narrow bounds of *historical law*, be shipwrecked on account of some counter-revolutionary notions of *territorial integrity*". "No nation in the free Europe should exercise supremacy over another one – and no nation should need such a supremacy" – László Teleki summarized his views.[124] As to the further activity of the liberated Kossuth, Teleki then assumed a patient, wait-and-see position. He wished to avoid any open debate before the general public and tended to influence his fellow-emigrants, among others Szemere too, to the same effect.

Although Klapka made some approaches toward Kossuth when he witnessed Kossuth's spectacular march in London, Kossuth's cold reception of his move prompted him to retire. Like Teleki, Klapka along with his more intimate friends also assumed a reserved wait-and-see position. To quote his own words: "We have decided to behave in a fully passive way, and determined not to interfere

[123] László Teleki to Vukovics, Zürich, 24 November 1851. (O.L., Sebő Vukovics Papers. Published in Horváth Z.: *op. cit.* II, pp. 288–289.)

[124] László Teleki to Szemere, Zürich, 30 October. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Correspondence Collection); Cf. Szemere: *op. cit.* V (Correspondence), pp. 94 ff., *op. cit.* I (Naplóm), pp. 147–148.

with anything, not to throw any obstacle in the way of Kossuth's activities, but in exchange for this, we made him fully responsible for the outcome of all his actions."[125] Having left London for Paris, Klapka soon moved further to Switzerland, which he had chosen to be his country of permanent residence. Klapka then maintained a vivid correspondence – with those from among his political friends who had remained in London – especially with Colonel Sándor Mednyánszky and the Count Sándor Karacsay who industriously informed him about the events of emigrant life and the developments of Kossuth's stay in England.[126]

Even under the pressure of his busy schedule in England, Kossuth did not overlook the controversial developments within the Hungarian emigration. Anyway, there was a good number of confidential informants and adherents who hurried to inform him on the emigrants' opinions, opposing views and critical remarks on his actions. However aware Kossuth was of all this, he still continued to uphold his above discussed opinion and views about the governing of emigration. Most definite of all his oral and written statements was his proclamation, dating from London on 17 November 1851, in which he repeatedly pointed out: "... I shall govern without the shackles of constraints. I demand obedience in the name of the nation, and shall not tolerate any disobedience."[127] It was on this basis that Kossuth expected the emigrants to join him, and to those joining him he promised not to forget about their future, easing their uncertain situation and helping them within the bounds of possibilities. It is, then, easy to understand that those who could be present to witness and even to partake of Kossuth's triumphal march in England, seeing the frenetic manifestations of sympathy of both the press and the general public, could hardly shake off the effect of those spectacular events. The series of surprisingly successful English-language speeches Kossuth had delivered in succession in Southampton, Winchester, in London – in the Guild Hall on 30 October, then in Copenhagen-Fields in the presence of several thousand people on 3 November – as well as in Birmingham on 10 November and the following day in Manchester, were all to bring praise and prestige for Kossuth.[128] To such an extent that even the unfriendly *The Times* had to admit the formal excellence and classical linguistic subtilities of his speeches as well as the deep impression he had made on his audience. Thousands of invitations and massive canvassing for signatures gave evidence of the heavy pressure that public opinion could bring even on the cool and reserved official circles.[129]

[125] Klapka: *op. cit.* p. 337.

[126] *Ibid.* p. 337.

[127] Jánossy: *op. cit.* II/1, pp. 9 ff.

[128] With Kossuth and his companions on board, the ship Madrid entered the port of Southampton on 23 October 1851. (*The Illustrated London News*, 1 November 1851.); Of his reception in Winchester: *The Hampshire Advertiser*, 1 November 1851; Of the antecedents of Kossuth's tour in England: *Daily News*, November 1851; Cf. *Authentic Life of Louis Kossuth with a Full Report of his Speeches Delivered in England*, London, 1851.

[129] Reports by Correspondent Russell to *The Times* between 28 October and 20 November 1851; Cf. Henningsen, C. F.: *Kossuth and The Times,* London, 1851.

As regards the intellectual content or principles which Kossuth's above-mentioned manifestations conveyed, Kossuth himself felt it necessary to give an explanation of them to his compatriots, declaring that he had to make concessions in order to win the good intentions and support of most strata of English society, ranging from the high aristocracy down to the broad strata of the working class. However, Kossuth himself increasingly had to experience the contradictions inherent in these endeavours. Undoubtedly, several representatives of the higher classes tended to swim with the tide, adjusting themselves to the mainstream of the public. Still, it did not necessarily follow from all this that the British government would change even a jot in its pro-Austrian attitude and would be willing to give Kossuth an official reception. Although Lord Palmerston, who had been managing the foreign affairs of the British Empire with minor intermissions ever since the 1830s, invited Kossuth in a private letter sent by Lord Dudley Stuart, a noted friend of Hungarians, to visit him on his estates, but Kossuth did not accept it. In his modest but unmistakable reply to Palmerston's invitation, Kossuth declared that he wished to speak to the public first, and then he would gladly accept the invitation provided the Foreign Secretary still maintained it. This, however, did not take place. Not only the British government, but the magistrates of the individual cities also averted to enter into any direct contact with Kossuth, so that the many various invitations, meetings and other events were generally organized and arranged by individuals, out of enthusiasm for Kossuth. Not lacking certain subtle distinctions, the relatively flexible political conduct of the official British circles gave rise to resentment in Vienna after all, so much so that the plenipotentiary Prime Minister Schwarzenberg even asked the British government to give explanation for the ovation given to Kossuth in England. The British government was not late to reply and warned Vienna to be patient and tolerant, pointing out that the Austrian government had no serious reason whatsoever to be anxious about the pro-Hungarian sentiments in England as they would not influence at all the time-honoured pro-Austrian policy of the British government aimed to uphold the consolidation of the Habsburg Empire.[130]

The political concessions Kossuth had made to win over the sympathy of the higher circles of British society could not be sufficient to obtain their substantial support and to induce the British government to change its traditional foreign policy, which always cast Austria a balancing role to play in the European affairs. On the other hand, this policy gave rise to confusion and reservation among the leftist groups of the British political life just as much as among the members of emigration. Thus critical remarks on Kossuth's conduct were made not only by the right wing, on the part of the conservatives, but the Left did not conceal its

[130] Cf. M'Carthy, Justin: *History of Our Own Times. 1837–1897.* Vols. I–V. London, 1899; Algernon, Cecil: *British Foreign Secretaries 1807–1916.* London, 1927; Connel, Brian: *Regina v. Palmerston. The Correspondence between Queen Victoria and Her Foreign and Prime Minister 1837–1865.* London, 1962, pp. 131 ff; Horváth, Eugene: Kossuth and Palmerston. (*Slavonic Review*, 1930–1931.)

opinion either. This applies above all to the representatives of the left wing of the English Chartists led by Hareney and Johnes. They initially expected much from Kossuth's appearance in England, basing their hopes mainly on Kossuth's strongly democratic, in fact, social-minded statements in Marseille. They believed that the leader of the Hungarian freedom fight was not only the representative of the cause of an oppressed nation, but he also understood and supported the freedom movements of various peoples in general, and that he was a supporter of the continuous struggle for the social development of the working classes. It can be explained by these expectations of theirs that the Chartists tried to persuade Kossuth, already in Southampton, to participate in the festive banquet for two thousand guests to be arranged in his honour, which, however, Kossuth declined to accept. Further on, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding or any misinterpretation of his former statements, to rectify the subsequent arbitrary interpretation of what he had said in Marseille, and mainly to win the sympathy of the English bourgeoisie, Kossuth made it clear to his audience that he had nothing to do with the socialist and communist doctrines which he treated as ones that jeopardize the social order and private property. He repeatedly emphasized this, among others in his speeches delivered in Manchester and Woodland. After his announcements to this effect, it was quite natural that the British press spoke highly of Kossuth's sobriety, self-restraint and political moderation, while press organs standing close to the working class criticized the inconsistency of his ideological-political views.[131]

Mazzini, who also looked forward to Kossuth's arrival, although he did not fully agree with Kossuth's leftist criticism, also blamed Kossuth for his exaggerated compliance with the interests of the higher classes of the British society, as well as for the fact that Kossuth devoted but a fragment of his time to his real supporters and allies. Mazzini was convinced that Kossuth's thinking was fettered by narrow-minded national considerations, therefore, he did not want to enter into a controversy with Kossuth on their widely different views as to the nationality problems in Hungary; he actually feared that their hardly established relations might be broken. Mazzini seriously reckoned with Kossuth's popularity and international prestige, and on this account he held it an erroneous step to discourage or even to turn away his so much desired ally by an excessive degree of criticism. Thus Mazzini preferred to play the role of a benign, subtly criticizing adviser with his proficiency in the British affairs and to caution Kossuth against the political pitfalls in England, as well as against the insincerity and hypocrisy of the higher circles of society. Motivated by all this, Mazzini wrote a letter of warning and guidance to Kossuth and asked Pulszky to deliver it to him in Southampton without delay.[132]

The first personal talk between the two of them took place only after Kossuth's march into London, on 31 October 1851. Even if the exact details of this meeting are not available, many inferences can be drawn from their subse-

[131] Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 95 ff.
[132] Pulszky F.: *Életem, op. cit.* II, p. 66.

quent decisions and actions as to the main topics of their talk. Mazzini's argumentation, namely that a new revolution might break out in France in the foreseeable future, which would certainly have a serious impact on Europe, was accepted also by Kossuth. Both of them hoped that the French Left was strong enough to prevent Napoleon from carrying through his planned coup d'état and introducing his dictatorship and to successfully employ force in defence of the republic.[133] This was the way they contemplated the state of affairs scarcely one month before the rightist coup d'état in France, and just as they looked upon the situation so did they evaluate the power relations. It was on account of this that they took a series of apparently exaggerated and radical measures, which could only have seemed to be really justifiable, reasonable and necessary under an actual revolutionary situation. Though Mazzini had certain reservations and doubts about Kossuth's future activities, and in more confidential circles he qualified Kossuth as "a necessary evil", yet it became his conviction that Kossuth – if only because of his fascinating name and his figure so closely intertwined with the European revolutions – must not be missing from the vanguard of the coming new European freedom fights. Therefore Mazzini held it utterly important that Kossuth's name and signature should be found on those forceful proclamations and appeals which the Committee of European Democrats was to issue and also on those designed to have an inflammatory effect on Hungarian and Italian soldiers serving in the Austrian army.[134]

It was with this end in mind that their co-authored proclamation, dated November 1851 and signed by the two of them, was printed in London. This document was essentially based on the proclamation which Kossuth had sent from Kutahia in June 1851. Addressing the Italian and Hungarian soldiers serving in the Austrian army in Italy in both languages, the proclamation reminds them of their duty: namely, that taking Pest and Milan as their passwords, the Hungarian and Italian soldiers should join forces, taking arms against the oppressors of both nations. The document also refers to the eve of the armament, indicating that the next message is to be sent on the day of the uprising when the canon of liberty and of the republic will go off.[135] Almost simultaneously, dated 19 November 1851, that is, one day before Kossuth's start to the United States, Kossuth addressed the Hungarian soldiers in Italy in another, more detailed proclamation, referring to the possibility of an uprising in the near future. The fate, course and real function of this publication, however, can but hardly be traced. It is just as possible that this document managed to reach its destination through various emissaries as that it is nothing but a written remembrance of an intention, a determination or wish; at any rate, it truly mirrors Kossuth's frame of mind at the time: "I have assessed all the available forces and considered every circumstance

[133] Cf. Kastner: *Mazzini e Kossuth, op. cit.* pp. 29 ff; Koltay-Kastner: *Kossuth-emigráció*, pp. 34 ff.

[134] Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, p. 118.

[135] "Ai soldati Italiani e Ungaresi militanti sotto l'Austria – A magyar és olasz katonákhoz kik az osztrák hadseregben szolgálnak. London, November, 1851." – a bilingual publication. (PRO, Home Office 45/4816.); Cf. Menghini: *op. cit.* pp. 77–78.

and I call out aloud in the name of God of the nations: *Hungarian soldiers, to arms, time has come!*" "Time is ripe to take revenge for the soldiers' bloodshed by the butchers, to break down the shackles of those who are suffering in prisons for the fatherland ... Time has come to restore the slaughtered nation... Common is the fight! Common is the help! Common is the victory! ... If anyone hinders you, *Hussars, draw swords!* Hungarians, fix bayonets!" reads the proclamation, among others, which was undersigned by Kossuth as Governor and Lieutenant General Antal Vetter as Commander-in-Chief and countersigned by Colonel Dániel Ihász, on commission by the Governor.[136] Kossuth sent Vetter – as well as Colonel István Türr – from London to Italy with a broad authorization to make the necessary preparations. As it appears from the content and tone of Kossuth's many-sided measures, proclamations and contemporaneous letters, he really seriously meant to co-operate with Mazzini and – though retaining his full freedom of action – he did his best to promote their common goals to be achieved. Kossuth must have received many and strong impulses from the Italian emigration leader, but he would have never accepted any order or instruction from him. He would act, take measures at his own discretion and responsibility, refraining even from giving any information on some details to Mazzini.

Thus it was at his own discretion, or even due proposals made by some of the more confidential members of the Hungarian emigration, that Kossuth issued a similar broad authorization also to Mihály Piringer Pataky, who once was General Bem's aide-de-camp. This officer's task was to agitate for and widely circulate Kossuth's proclamation among the Hungarian soldiers serving in Austrian regiments stationed in the environs of Hamburg; then he was to move further to Vienna, Pest, and to enter into contact with all those persons on the list presented to him who had been qualified as reliable. Shortly afterwards, Piringer left London to begin to perform his daring and risky undertaking.[137] It was also in London that Kossuth was visited by Fülöp Figyelmessy who had come very adventurously all the way from Pest, bringing along a message from Kossuth's sister who had remained in Hungary. This message was mainly concerned with József Makk, who had started to form a wide-spread organization under authorization issued by Kossuth back in Kutahia. According to this information, neither the appeals nor the activity of Makk fitted well into the difficult circumstances and the strict requirements which had been set under the conditions of the dictatorship of Austrian absolutism. All this also involved several serious and needless risks.[138]

This warning from Pest already bade Kossuth be more cautious, and in an attempt to revise and make good some of his measures he had taken in Kutahia,

[136] Kossuth kiáltványa (Kossuth's proclamation). London, 10 November 1851. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, II.S.2.–1; Published in Jánossy: *op. cit.* II/1, pp. 27 ff; Kossuth kiáltványa a magyarsághoz (Kossuth's proclamation to Hungarians). London, 17 November 1851. (*Ibid.* pp. 9 ff.)

[137] Cf. Lukács: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak, op. cit.* pp. 86 ff.

[138] Figyelmessy ezredes emlékiratai (Memoirs of Colonel Figyelmessy; translated from English by Géza Kacziány). (*Magyarország*, 1914, No. 3 and the following issues.)

he issued a written authorization, dated on 19 November 1851, to Sándor Gál, Ex-Colonel of the revolutionary army, a well-known and very popular officer especially among the Székelys (or Seklers, a major Hungarian ethnic group in the Eastern part of Transylvania), to act in the future as the Commander-in-Chief of the Transylvanian Liberation Army. This measure of Kossuth was undoubtedly at variance with the content of that broad authorization he had issued to Colonel József Makk in Kutahia five months before. Although it could be foreseen that Gál and Makk would come into conflict with each other over the questions of competence, yet Kossuth wanted to counterbalance Makk's powers in this particular way which – as proved by the further course of events – was belated, and this hurt Makk's feelings and self-esteem, as well as his basically good-intentioned efforts.[139] Fülöp Figyelmessy also started back to Hungary to deliver Kossuth's letters and instructions related to the ongoing organizations to the personalities concerned. Kossuth opposed the organization of a domestic centre for the uprising, but he kept urging on the building of a network of organizations, so that he might keep his hand upon all the threads of the control and guidance. It was to the same effect that Kossuth wrote a letter to Ex-Colonel István Szekulits too, entrusting him with the work of organization in the Banat, the military border zone and in the Temesvár region.[140] Hence, Kossuth's personal meetings with Mazzini were followed by far-reaching measures, which though very different in character, were rooted in the same basic consideration and were aimed to achieve one and the same objective: to prepare the way for the uprising so much hoped for in the near future. One thing is certain: Kossuth had consistently refrained from sharing his secret actions and arrangements as well as his plans for the future even with his most prestigious fellow-emigrants. He demanded – and was actually promised – unconditional confidence and full powers to take independent actions. Undoubtedly, this method of exercising leadership might have been justifiable and explicable in an utterly sharpened revolutionary situation, in the case of an actual uprising, but under the *real* conditions of emigration it had to lead, sooner or later, to an awkward, or even absurd situation. Especially amidst the situation where just the opposite of the expected new revolution was to take place. Slowly but irrevocably, the emerging new international phenomena of economy and politics showed signs of the ebb of revolutions: the absolutist powers had been consolidated and a consolidation process was also characteristic of the explicitly counter-revolutionary powers.

A few weeks after Kossuth's departure to the United States, the new turn of events in Paris – Louis Napoleon's coup d'état of 2 December 1851 – sped up the consolidation process of the counter-revolutionary forces in Europe. Soon

[139] Kossuth's commission for Colonel Sándor Gál. London, 19 November 1851. (Jánossy: *op. cit.* II/1, pp. 406 ff); Gál's action plan for Kossuth, 15 November 1851; Gál Sándor terve az erdélyi felkelésről, 1851. (Sándor Gál's plan for an uprising in Transylvania in 1851). *Hadtörténeti Közlemények*, 1925.) Although Sándor Gál had been promoted general on 29 July 1849 in Szeged, Kossuth's authorization of 1851 still referred to him as a colonel.

[140] O.L., M.C.G. (G. Pr. 1852–115/863.)

after that, the threads of political and revolutionary organizations in the Austrian Empire were successively rolled up and eliminated. Piringer's mission had got stuck right at the beginning. The movement which had been not very precautiously and circumspectly started in Hamburg, met with an untimely failure. Piringer and many other persons who had ventured to do propaganda work among Hungarians serving in the Austrian army were arrested. It was an unfortunate coincidence that the list of those persons who had previously been judged in London as suitable to be involved in the political organizations, got into the hands of the Austrian authorities. Relying on this rather occasional and uncertain list, the Austrian police force started to arrest the affected persons.[141] While Fülöp Figyelmessy could get out of the clutches of his persecutors, Kossuth's sisters could not; they were arrested on 1 December 1851 together with the former university professor Károly Jubál who as the leader of the Pest organization had been in collaboration with them. Many people were arrested in Transylvania too, more particularly in Marosvásárhely where on 23 and 24 January 1852 Professor János Török and several of his companions, as the most active members of the József Makk-led organization, were captured. It gave rise to further troubles that Ex-Colonel István Szekulits – in whom Kossuth had so much confided – delivered the letters, which he had received and which called for action, to the authorities. Within the Transylvanian movement Mihály Bíró volunteered to act as a "stool pigeon"; based on his information many people ended up in prison. In parallel with this, home searches and arrests were executed in Bucharest as well, which affected those who had been in contact with József Makk.[142] Exposing the relentless determination of the Austrian government was the fact that the case of Mihály Piringer Pataky was tried by expedite procedure; as a result, he was sentenced to death and was executed as early as 5 February 1852.[143] This was only the beginning of a process which continued with numerous death sentences, sending several noble personalities of the Hungarian political organizations – among others János Török, Mihály Gálfi, Károly Horváth and Károly Jubál – to the gallows.[144]

Both the indictments of the Austrian courts-martial and the official announcements published in the press, referred to Kossuth as the mastermind behind all the political combinations and organizations. These documents tended to strongly exaggerate the role that Kossuth had actually played, in an attempt to call the attention of the governments and the diplomacy, all scared of revolutions, once more to the threats such movements might pose to the entire consolidation process. What may be the truth of all this is that Kossuth gave a strong impetus indeed to the start of movements in Hungary, and really promised much in his

[141] H. H. St. A. (Inf. B.) 1851–9327 A; 9418 A; H. L. Kriegsgericht Pesth 1852/63–888.

[142] Cf. Lukács: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak, op. cit.* pp. 88 ff.

[143] O.L., M.C. G. (G. Pr. 1852–114/600.)

[144] On the court-martial sentences see: *Budapesti Hírlap*, 5 March 1853; 19, 29, 30 March 1854; Cf. *Székely vértanúk.* Szerkesztette és a bevezető tanulmányt írta Károlyi Dénes (Székely martyrs. Edited and introductory study by Dénes Károlyi). Bukarest, 1975.

proclamations too. However, it would certainly be a strong exaggeration to suppose Kossuth to have had any real and effective possibility to master the situation, to control or directly organize the course of events, either from Turkey or from England, or even from the United States. What really happened is reminiscent of the case of the spirit released from the bottle: he who uncorked the bottle had neither the power nor the possibility to order the spirit to return to its proper place. In fact, the Hungarian movements were governed by far too many spontaneous elements and actions as well as by personal initiatives, and all this had a very serious impact on the ensuing events.

The mere fact that Kossuth flatly refused to settle in the United States, and he interrupted his journey at Gibraltar to go to England first, put the American official circles in a rather gloomy mood. There were also reports on certain signs of resentment in Washington. What seriously set Washington thinking, was when it actually became quite clear that Kossuth's real intention was to couple his round trip in the United States with a political propaganda campaign, in the course of which he aimed to inform the American public of the events that had taken place in Hungary, and through this to raise funds to cover the costs of a new freedom fight in Hungary, in fact, to attempt to change the traditional American policy of neutrality and non-interference. Kossuth's wish that in the case of a potential newer Tsarist intervention, the United States should explicitly take sides with Hungary and interfere with the events, was quite unacceptable for the American official circles. However, in view of the pro-Hungarian public sentiments and of the frenetic manifestations of sympathy to Kossuth, it would hardly have been wise of the government to show its open opposition to Kossuth's intents and to keep away from the massive and country-wide demonstrations celebrating him. To be sure, under the circumstances of the highly involved state of internal affairs in the United States, when the conflict between the southern slave states and the increasingly industrialized northern states was sharpening so that the accumulated social problems were to lead to a critical clash, President Fillmore and Foreign Secretary Webster had to give serious consideration to any step to be taken either for or against Kossuth. Thus, while they had to reckon with the opposition of the conservative forces of the southern states in the former case, they could be exposed to the severe criticism of the democratic public in the latter, which might also involve its alienation from the government. Finally they decided to take a part in the events in an attempt to keep their course within certain bounds, taking good care of not enraging either the American conservatives or Austria and Russia. Of course, this double game could not go on without contradictions, pitfalls or taking awkward and inconsistent steps. All this can be well traced from the beginning, namely from the arrival of the mail-boat *Humboldt* with Kossuth and his entourage at the port of Staten Island on 4 December 1851 or from Kossuth's veritable triumphal march into New York, two days later, through the famous Broadway.[145]

[145] Cf. Curti, Merle Eugene: Austria and the United States 1848–1852. Northampton, Mass. (*Smith College Studies in History*, 1926, Vol. XI, No. 3, pp. 169 ff); Curtis, T. George: *Life of Daniel*

In the period from 6 to 22 December 1851, i.e. while Kossuth and his entourage were staying in New York, the American government had an opportunity to come to a decision on the methods to be adopted. Foreign Secretary Webster's political flexibility and diplomatic skills finally prevailed over the more rigid views and it can be ascribed to this fact that – after his visits to Philadelphia and Baltimore – Kossuth was given a formal reception by President Fillmore at the White House of Washington on 31 December 1851. On 5 January 1852, the Senate, while on 7 January the House of Representatives gave ceremonial receptions to Kossuth. With these official events, as a matter of fact, the American government regarded the whole affair as having been settled on its own part.[146] In parallel with this, the American government sent some conciliatory statements to the Prince Schwarzenberg as the Premier of the Austrian government, advising him that the friendly relations of the United States with Austria had not changed at all, nor is it willing to alter its traditional policy of non-interference.

Kossuth's further tour, however, was already made more difficult not only by the polite but cool conduct of the official circles and by the indifferent attitude they showed towards his objectives, but also by the strongly critical and often hostile remarks coming from the side of the southern states, which at the time constituted the majority in both houses of the Congress. The highly precarious issue of slavery with all of its political and economic implications which permeated the whole American society confronted Kossuth with an increasingly difficult situation.[147] Those who backed the abolition of slavery, the abolitionists, reckoned with Kossuth as one who would certainly condemn the institution of slavery and would take an explicitly democratic position on that issue. Kossuth, in turn, recognizing the serious home policy implications of the issue, found it more advisable to show a neutral attitude and refrained from taking any open position on that delicate issue which might have entailed serious consequences. Yet he did not succeed either in abating the ill-feelings of the defenders of slavery towards him, or in making the government see the reason. At the same time, he provoked the increasingly sharp criticism of the abolitionists, whose radical representatives blamed Kossuth for his being unsteady in his conduct.[148]

This strongly critical voice, however, was still durably suppressed by the general pro-Hungarian tone of the great majority of the American public. Series of

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Webster. Vols. I–II, New York, 1970, II; *Millard Fillmore Papers.* Vols. I–II. Ed. Frank H. Severance. Buffalo, 1907.

[146] Cf. *Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Make Arrangements for the Reception of Gov. Louis Kossuth.* New York, Common Council, 1852; *The Life of Governor Louis Kossuth, With His Public Speeches in the United States.* New York, 1852; Spencer, Donald S.: *Louis Kossuth and Young America. A study of sectionalism and foreign policy 1848–1852.* Columbia and London, 1977.

[147] Balassa József: *Kossuth Amerikában 1851–1852* (Kossuth in America in 1851–1852). Budapest, 1931; Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 206 ff; Komlós, John H.: *Kossuth in America 1851–1852.* Buffalo, 1973.

[148] Cf. Garrison, William Lloyd: *Letter to L. Kossuth. Concerning freedom and slavery in the United States on behalf of the American Anti-Slavery Society.* Boston, 1852; Cf. Jánossy: *op. cit.* I, pp. 227 ff.

ceremonial receptions, celebrations, meetings and masses of newspaper articles as well as a variety of propaganda publication advocating the Hungarian cause and Kossuth, even if with varying intensity, helped Kossuth to continue his journey with success. Issued in support of the Hungarian case, the so-called "Kossuth dollars" were massively purchased and minor or major voluntary donations in increasing numbers were also received as an indication of the real public sentiments. After Washington, Kossuth visited Harrisburg, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and from 6 February 1852, Cincinnati, where the Hungarian delegation spent almost three weeks. Then Kossuth and his entourage moved on through Indianapolis and Louisville to St. Louis where they came to a daring decision. Despite all the discouraging news and reports they received as to the outcome of their journey further to the South, on the plea that he wished to express his gratitude personally to Senator Foot, Governor of the State of Mississippi, for his submission of the proposal on Kossuth's invitation by the American government to the Congress, Kossuth travelled to Jackson, and with a still more daring decision, went on to New Orleans in Louisiana State. Experiences gained during the visits to the southern states might convince the Hungarian delegation of the double sentiment that really prevailed in the United States, ranging from the manifestations of utter hospitality, to those of open hostility. During the coming three months, in the course of which Kossuth got to Boston and from there to Buffalo and the Niagara Falls, although the Hungarian support fund continued to increase, essentially no new promising turn had taken place. Thus in June 1852, after a repeated visit of a few weeks to New York, Kossuth and his entourage bade farewell to the United States.[149]

Even if not leading to the attainment of those far-fetching objectives which Kossuth and his companions had initially set, the propaganda campaign in the United States was not without success. The unresolved state of the Hungarian problem became, more than before, a matter of common knowledge in the United States. The funds they could raise during their stay of half a year should not be underestimated either. It is quite another question that both the American and the European Hungarian emigrants were disappointed to find that they might have only a limited share in the more significant donations, depending on Kossuth's personal decision. Of course, it could be disputed whether or not it was justifiable to spend a considerable part of the funds so collected on arms purchases, to reserve them for preparations for a hoped, new war of independence. One thing is certain, namely that the Hungarian emigration in the United States, which had been looking forward to Kossuth's arrival full of hope and great expectations, was somewhat disappointed, or even embittered after his departure. The agitation and propaganda campaign failed to bring about any significant change in the refugees' situation; so they had to realize that their living would have to be earned by themselves in the future too. There is also

[149] Pulszky F.: *Életem*, *op. cit.* II, pp. 71 ff; László K.: *op. cit.* pp. 138 ff; Perczel Miklós: *Naplóm az emigrációból. II. (Amerikai napló.)* (Diary of my emigration. II. Diary from America). Ed. by Papp János and Závodszky Géza. Budapest, 1979, pp. 79 ff.

evidence that Kossuth himself was rather averse to interfering with the everyday life and problems related to the existential uncertainties of the Hungarian emigration in America. He believed his task, his mission to be far too elevated and internationally too important to bother with the trifling affairs or daily problems of the refugees. Thus in the course of his round trip in America, Kossuth gradually became isolated from the majority of emigrants, and did not haste to enter into contact even with such an eminent personality as László Újházi, though it was he whom Kossuth had previously appointed as his plenipotentiary representative in the United States. However, the delay of their meeting may also have been caused by the fact that New Buda – a settlement where Újházi was living –, was a remote place and Újházi himself complained in one of his letters of his difficulties to raise the money necessary for his travel to Kossuth. At length, the meeting of these two outstanding emigrants took place in St. Louis in the spring of 1852, when Újházi went to the South in search of a new, more favourable place to settle.[150] This meeting, however, was not followed by any significant consequence for the further life of the Hungarian emigration in the United States. As to reality, it should be added here that the Hungarian question, which had been in the centre of public interest for half a year after Kossuth's arrival in December 1851, was soon removed from the agenda.

[150] L. Gál Éva: *op. cit.* pp. 68 ff.

II.

NAPOLEON III AND THE HUNGARIAN EMIGRATION

TURIN AS MEDIATOR

Even if it is true that Hungarian emigration got into a closer connection with Napoleon III, Emperor of France, only as late as 1859, this was not without antecedents. The basically reactionary character of the internal policy conducted by the Napoleonic regime had been quite clear to the emigrants right after the coup d'état of 5 December 1851, and even more so one year later when the dictator, burdened with a republican and Carbonarist past, created the imperial form of rule in France, ignoring any formality. The deleterious effect of this turn on the European democratic movements and on the conditions of further struggles became obvious for the whole international emigration too. In parallel with this recognition, it also occurred to many as a possibility that in spite of this, under the involved international situation, France might perhaps be utilized to promote the attainment of certain national objectives. However, the French imperial government always tended to make its great power policy and expansionist endeavours appear as if its efforts would have been aimed at helping the oppressed nations to regain their freedom. Raising such illusions formed an organic part of the Bonapartist policy. In a great variety of ways, through responsible political personalities and press organs, these new illusions, starting out from the Palais-Royal, gradually spread and became very suitable to deceive and entrap the paralysed, and in many other respects disillusioned, emigrants.

The court of the Tuileries, with its making fun of the national ideas, found an efficient representative in the person of the Emperor's nephew, Prince Jérôme Bonaparte Napoléon, commonly called the Red Prince or Plon-Plon. With his frequent pseudo-radical statements and purported oppositionist conduct, he seemed to many to be an exception within the highest imperial clique, as one who still preserved some of the democratic ideas and was still able to comprehend the rightfulness of the national endeavours. This study does not intend to go into the details of the Janus-faced Bonapartist political conduct, but it is certain that Plon-Plon rendered utterly useful and good services to the imperial power which destroyed with fire and sword the representatives of the freedom ideas and employed its dictatorship to safeguard the interests of the bourgeoisie, limiting at the same time the political independence of the latter. It was this unfair game that the Bonapartist power played with the freedom ideas, which was meant to be a beauty-spot to conceal and overshadow the fundamentally reactionary and counter-revolutionary character of the régime. Mixing the appearance with the essence, Prince Jérôme Napoléon managed to gradually

bring together a veritable "court" composed of emigrants of various nations, first of all Poles who already had great traditions and good connections in Paris. The personal secretary of the Red Prince was a Polish emigrant, Koyeski by name, who was particularly proficient in the highly complex affairs of the international emigration, thus he could give relevant advice to his superior.[1]

The Palais-Royal soon reached the Hungarian emigrants, too, as it becomes clear from General György Klapka's reliable information in this respect. Although Paris had refused to have dealings with Kossuth in the early 1850s, this ban was not at all extended to others. Louis Napoleon's approach at the time still generated some uneasy feelings and his person met with distrust – wrote Klapka. On the other hand, he wrote, "we already kept in permanent touch with the Prince Napoléon as we never had any doubt about his liberal way of thinking".[2] László Teleki, who was also very familiar with the French circumstances, wrote to Klapka in early 1852: "Bonaparte will certainly do his best to win over part of the emigrants, partly to himself, partly to his plans. Some of the Italian emigrants in Paris are inclined to expect much of him. I do not expect anything of his person, but I hope to achieve much more through him. It is quite possible that he will unintentionally be of great use for us. Therefore, we have to pay great attention to each circumstance."[3] There are, then, several indications that the idea of calculating with some potential gains that might be derived from the Bonapartist policy was not a newly fangled one among the Hungarian emigrants; it was hiding in the depth of their contemplations, waiting for an opportunity to break to the surface. Although there is evidence of the existence of a connection between Klapka and the Prince Jérôme Napoléon as early as the first half of the 1850s, the political content and weight of that connection are hardly more than occasional or improvised exchanges of ideas. On neither of the sides had proper conditions been created for taking another step forward. During their talks, they were mostly concentrating on the economic and financial issues. As Fazy's confidential, Klapka occasionally held discussions with the Prince Jérôme Napoléon in his capacity of representative of the Banque Général de Suisse. Fazy's bank, to wit, was one of the main companies to fund the financial transactions and the enterprises, both home and abroad, of the Tuileries, in joint with the Crédit Mobilier of Paris. Within this international financial trust, an eminent position was held by Plon-Plon as well.[4] When Plon-Plon travelled to Constantinople during the Crimean War, with his military escort recruited from various Polish emigrants, Klapka, who happened to stay there, also received a

[1] Cf. Bac, Ferdinand: *Le Prince Napoléon.* Paris, 1932; Berthet-Leleux, François: *Le vrai Prince Napoléon.* Abeville, 1932, pp. 268 ff; d'Hauterive, Ernest: *Napoléon et le Prince Napoléon.* Paris, 1925, pp. 180 ff.

[2] Klapka György: *Emlékeimből* (My recollections). Budapest, 1886, p. 405.

[3] László Teleki to Klapka, Zürich, 11 January 1852. (O.L., Klapka Papers.)

[4] Aycard: *Histoire du Crédit Mobilier.* Paris, 1867; Ramon, G.: *Histoire de la Banque de France.* Paris, 1929; Norsa, P.: *Finanziamenti stranieri nel periodo del Risorgimento e dell'Unità d'Italia (1832–1863).* Milano, 1959; Cf. Koltay-Kastner, Jenő: *A Kossuth-emigráció Olaszországban* (The Kossuth-emigration in Italy). Budapest, 1960, p. 53; Lengyel T.: *Klapka, op. cit.* p. 25.

polite invitation to join him. However, Klapka would not rest content with a role of this kind, so his reply was a similarly polite "no". Nevertheless, their personal acquaintance, their mutually good opinion about each other and Klapka's time-honoured renown as a military leader were sufficient to revive their personal relations as soon as the necessary conditions became matured.[5]

This was in the air in the late 1850s when the Italian question came into the limelight. Though the main lines of the Italian policy on France had become increasingly visible after the Paris Congress of 1856, it was only later that the actual political actions accelerated. Napoleon's decisions may have been markedly influenced by some consequences of the economic crisis of 1857 which brought about a slow-down in the boom which had started in 1850 in the capitalist economies. Preparations for a military campaign seemed to be particularly suitable to divert the attention of the public from the economic and financial crisis, unemployment, discontentment, enhancing, at the same time, the military glory of France and reminding the people of the good old Napoleonic times. On 14 January 1858, when the Italian revolutionist Orsini, adopting the method of personal terror, threw a bomb at Napoleon III and his entourage, he did so to remind Paris of its obligations related to Italian unity. The Emperor escaped, Orsini was executed, yet Orsini's warning proved to be effective, all the more so as a desire to act became predominant within the Tuileries.[6] It was this desire that took a more palpable form in Plombières on 20 June 1858, when Napoleon III and the Count Camillo Benso di Cavour laid the foundations of military alliance between France and Piedmont. This agreement, however, resulted not so much from the mentioned unselfish readiness to act and help as from the ulterior motive to extend the French influence on Italy and to acquire some additional territories. On 1 January 1859, when Napoleon III – at the New Year's reception he gave for the diplomatic corps – took aim at Austria and comported himself as the protector of Italian interests, it was already not difficult to predict that the time of a military show-down with Austria was coming, and this was even more confirmed by the French–Piedmontese agreement signed on 18 January.[7] Belonging also to the international background of the events is that Tsarist Russia gave its consent to the impending armed clash when, forgetting about the memories of the Crimean War, it offered a hand to Napoleon III. The Prince Jérôme Napoléon himself was on a diplomatic mission to St. Petersburg in an attempt to insure the French power against any surprise. There he met with a favourable reception, in fact, he was also given certain guarantees to the effect that in the event of war, Russia would not help Austria, and beyond that, by deploying troops along the Austrian frontier, Russia would thus contain part of the Austrian forces. The Franco–Russian preliminary agreements even more clearly underlined the "cabinet" character of the imminent war. Namely, the two

[5] Klapka: *op. cit.* pp. 519 ff.

[6] Cf. Luzio, Alessandro: *Felice Orsini.* Milano, 1914.

[7] Salvatorelli, Luigi: *Sommario della Storia Italia.* Torino, 1939, pp. 591 ff; Candeloro, Giorgio: *Storia dell'Italia moderna.* I–IV, Milano, 1959–1964, IV, pp. 287 ff.

great powers assured each other that they would not allow the anti-Austrian war to grow into a revolutionary war; they would adequately curb the inflamed national passions and would not endanger the counter-revolutionary consolidation of Europe.[8]

It was under such circumstances that those conditions which were essential to give shape to the working relations between the Hungarian emigration and the Napoleonic régime, were finally created. This made it possible that the formerly uncertain and casual relations could change into well-defined and closer co-operations. Though it was beyond doubt in Paris that General Klapka would be ready to act upon their call, but at the moment his person could not fully meet the actual demands of Napoleon III. What the plan for a war against Austria required, was to win over Kossuth, so that he might be separated from Mazzini as well as from the front of the international democratic emigration for good, involving him, at the same time, in the mechanism of the anti-Austrian propaganda. But Klapka himself, along with László Teleki, rightly believed that Kossuth's involvement might only increase the effectiveness and success of their activity. Therefore they thought it to be a common interest to put an end to the long break between them and Kossuth, and to enter into alliance with him – though not without any condition and not at any cost. It was in the sign of these motives and considerations that the Hungarian emigration became activated as early as 1858, and it cannot be stated that their endeavours did not meet with Kossuth's consent. By then Kossuth himself wished to resume his activities after so many years of stagnation and expectation. In other words, in this particular case, we can speak not of a one-sided attempt, but of a wish and aspiration which was common to Kossuth, Teleki as well as Klapka.[9]

Activated by signals coming from several sides, Klapka proved to be a main inspirer of the Napoleonic policy. During his visit to London in spring 1858, Klapka also called on Kossuth, thus breaking a long silence. With due tactfulness, he advised Kossuth that the French official circles would raise no objection to his person, should he be willing to have his sons educated in Paris, in addition to his daughter Vilma who had already been staying there. Moreover, Klapka also made it clear that the time had passed when Kossuth had been forbidden to travel across France, and that the Palais-Royal did no longer show an unfriendly attitude towards him.[10]

These statements, of course, aroused an understandable excitement and interest in Kossuth, but doubt and mistrust as well, as they were not very compatible

[8] Cf. Summer, B. H.: The secret Franco–Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859. (*The English Historical Review*, XLVIII, 1883.); d'Hauterive, E.: La mission du Prince Napoléon à Varsovie. (*Revue des Deux-Mondes*, 15 Juillet 1928.); Tapié, Victor-L.: La traité secret de 1859 entre la France et la Russie. (*Études d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, Tome V, 1953.)

[9] Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* (see footnote 111 on page 60) I, pp. 85 ff.

[10] Tanárky Gy.: *A Kossuth-emigráció szolgálatában. Tanárky Gyula Naplója. (1849–1866)* (In the services of the Kossuth-emigration. Gyula Tanárky's diary. 1849–1866). Ed. by Jenő Koltay-Kastner. Budapest, 1961, pp. 38–39.

either with the former behaviour of the French, or with the critical remarks Kossuth had made in his speeches in England, or with his other personal obligations. Besides, Kossuth was not a person who welcomed the assistance of mediators, he preferred to be convinced directly of the validity of what he had heard. Nevertheless, he received similar information on France from persons with whom he was on more intimate, friendly terms. Belonging among them was also Colonel Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss who, having moved to Paris and having become a brother-in-law of Thouvenel, French envoy to Constantinople, later foreign minister, was one of the most welcome guests of the Tuileries, and whose pieces of information were really worthy of attention. It was he who intimated to Kossuth that in the Tuileries they were glad to find that, lately, Kossuth's name had not gone together with Mazzini and Ledru-Rollin, and that the Hungarian emigrants in general had not been involved in the attempts made in the recent past. He also hinted to Kossuth that Paris would appreciate if in a public statement Kossuth would demarcate himself from the Orsini-type attempts and would announce his intent to take arms against Austria, if so needed.[11] Kossuth's confidentials in Paris, Dániel Irányi and Frigyes Szarvady – who gathered the necessary information from the Palais-Royal – were sending Kossuth a great number of news about the impending war and about the Emperor's intent to appoint Klapka to organize and hold together the Hungarian emigration and to lead actions. All these reports, even if they were more or less founded, were not without exaggerations.[12]

To be sure, Paris reserved important tasks for Klapka, but the exact content or scope of them were by far not clear and unambiguous. Klapka was involved in the war preparations as well as in the plans of Napoleon III and Cavour, which took not only the situation of Austria into consideration, but also reckoned with its internal circumstances and with the potential conflicts that might be provoked along its eastern borderlands. Thus was it that Klapka's activity got into connection with the concerted actions of Paris and Turin, and he became increasingly important for both the French and the Italians. Klapka was not unknown to Cavour either, since Fazy had introduced Klapka to him in Geneva in 1856, when Cavour on his way back from the Paris Congress had taken some rest there. Even if Klapka's past was not quite encouraging for Cavour – knowing that Klapka had also met Mazzini before the Milanese uprising in 1853, on account of which Klapka had been reprimanded by the Piedmontese police –, but Fazy's guarantee and his own large-mindedness suppressed his mistrust. So Cavour assured Klapka of his readiness to help him remove any possible difficulty that the Piedmontese authorities might raise in connection with his visa applications.[13] In summer 1858 he sent a message to Klapka through Santa Rosa, Under-Secretary of State for home affairs, that he would be glad to receive Klapka in

[11] Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to Kossuth, Paris, 21 March 1858. (Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* I, pp. 85–86.)

[12] Dániel Irányi to Kossuth, Paris, 7, 15, 29 December, 1858. (*Ibid.* pp. 87 ff.)

[13] Cf. Kastner, Eugenio: *Il contributo ungherese nella guerra del 1859.* Firenze, 1934, pp. 12 ff.

Turin.[14] After Cavour repeated the invitation through Fazy's mediation, Klapka set out for Turin. It was on 6 January 1859 that Klapka met Cavour who frankly revealed the opportunities of the Hungarian emigration in regard to the coming war against Austria. The possibility of an attack on Austria from the East, the organization of a Hungarian legion in Italy and the discussion of several other topics were already on the agenda of that first meeting which understandably aroused Klapka's interest.[15]

Of course, the Turin meeting and its details became known to Paris which, in fact, fomented or "fermented" this meeting and the threads of all this ultimately led to the Tuileries. Each of the two parties had their own separate connection with the Prince Jérôme Napoléon and each submitted him a separate report on the events. While Klapka immediately hastened to Paris where he notified those who were concerned of what had happened in Turin, Cavour informed the French Emperor himself of his talks with Klapka, although their meeting was quite informal, not involving any obligation and was strictly confidential in nature. It is noteworthy after all, that during their talks Cavour also managed to present Klapka to King Victor Emmanuel II. Moreover, Cavour even entrusted confidential letters to Klapka to hand them over to the Emperor and the Prince Jérôme. The favourable reception which the energetic Klapka was accorded in Paris and Turin clearly indicated that all the interested parties trusted in him and reckoned with his activity in the near future.[16]

At this time Paris picked out Klapka for a strictly confidential action which was most closely connected with the East-policy of Napoleon III, namely to increase and intensify his influence on the Romanian principalities then being in the process of unification. Since the Paris Congress of 1856, Moldavia and Wallachia had gradually come to the centre of interest, and Paris held it very important that the union of the two principalities should go on in accordance with the French foreign policy interests: what France expected of the unification was that the principalities' dependence on Turkey and Russia would be weakened and the Austrian troops still stationing there would be withdrawn very soon. All this had really come to take place in 1857. At this time, however, the Austrian troops were withdrawn from the territories of the Romanian principalities not for the good intents or voluntary consent of Austria, but because Austria was simply obliged to do so under the resolutions of the Paris Congress. By then, namely, the Great Powers had become immediately interested in the creation of an independent Romanian State. After Napoleon III had reconciled his interests with Russia, conditions gradually became ripe for creating a buffer state between

[14] Cavour to Santa Rosa, Turin, 12 August 1858. (*Camillo Cavour's gedruckte und ungedruckte Briefe*. I–IV. Ed. by Luigi Chiala. Leipzig, 1884, II, pp. 503–504.)

[15] Kastner: *Il contributo*, *op. cit.* pp. 19 ff.

[16] Frigyes Szarvady to Kossuth, Paris, 5 January 1859. (*Iratok a Kossuth-emigráció történetéhez* 1859 (Documents to the history of the Kossuth-emigration 1859; henceforward: *Iratok 1859*. Collected by Koltay-Kastner Jenő. Szeged, 1949, pp. 7–9); Cf. Lengyel, Thomas: Le Prince Napoléon Jérôme et les Hongrois. (*Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, 1939, 1.)

Austria, Russia and Turkey, under the influence and protection of France. Even if Turkey formally continued to exercise a sort of patronage over the Romanian principalities, its practical significance diminished considerably. It was back in the summer of 1856 in Constantinople that the appointments of Alexander Ghica and Theodor Balş as provisory governors of Wallachia and Moldavia, respectively, had been approved. After the Paris Conference in 1858, however, the course of events irreversibly led to unification and independence, and this process was even more accelerated by the unexpected turn of events in 1859. At that time Colonel Alexander Cuza was elected the Prince of Moldavia and a few weeks later, the Prince of Wallachia as well. Thus the two Romanian principalities had got a common ruler, and this fact gave a thrust to making new efforts to remove the obstacles in the way of unification. The ruler of the formally unified Romanian state already had to reckon not only with serious conflicts which grew keener in the internal policy field, but also with the jealousy of the neighbouring great powers, as well as with their attempts at intervention. Under this critical situation, the remote France seemed to be the least likely to pose a threat to Cuza's intentions, in fact, Cuza badly needed the diplomatic, military and economic assistance of Napoleon III. Engaged in war preparations, the French Empire at the same time held it very important – from the viewpoint of its anti-Austrian strategic plans also – that major Austrian forces be contained along the borders of the Romanian principalities. Furthermore, the French also planned to carry out certain more bellicose actions inasmuch as Cuza would give his consent to it, and if there were a Hungarian military leader who would be able to implement all this.[17]

It was this role which Paris had cast at that critical moment to General Klapka who undertook to promote and assist, both diplomatically and militarily, the achievement of the strategic objectives worked out in the Palais-Royal. Thus there was nothing to prevent the French from entrusting the necessary funds to Klapka and to mark out those who would be of his assistance. So far as the course of the strictly secret preparatory works can be traced at all, Klapka seems to have understood the Emperor's intents in a broader sense than they were initially interpreted by many during the discussion in the Tuileries. Understandably, Klapka's thoughts went much further in time and – pursuant to his talks with Cavour – he tried to extend the French help to a broader anti-Austrian action program affecting the Hungarian emigration as a whole. It is unclear whether the promises made in this respect were serious ones, and if so, to what extent. What seems to be certain is that Klapka's mission to Romania and the related French interests were taken seriously. So much so that in addition to several promises, especially in regard of their readiness to help, the French also gave utterance to a certain encouragement: namely that after the actual Eastern mission had been

[17] Cf. Bourgeois, É.: *Manuel historique de politique étrangère*. Tome 3. 1830–1878. Paris, 1948; Corvian, N.: La politica orientale di Napoleon III e l'unione dei principati romani. (*Cercetâri Istorice* an X. XIII.) (Jassi, 1937); Marcu, Alexandru: *Conspiratori şi conspiratii in epoca renasterii politice a României, 1848–1877*. Bucureşti, 1930.

successfully completed, there would seem no special objection in the way of entering into a closer collaboration with the leaders of the Hungarian emigration, and so they would help realize the Hungarian objectives in accordance with Cavour's plans. Supplied with a passport, with imperial recommendatory letters and the necessary finances, Klapka rightly felt his high responsibility and was well aware that the exploitation of the possibilities for a war against Austria would necessitate the mobilization of emigration as well as the unification of the various emigrant groups and interests. He also recognized the necessity of securing the unity of action of the most important political leaders. When Klapka hurriedly garnered in Paris all of the more influential Hungarian emigrants, he frankly spoke to them of the possible events of the coming months, which really were in a rather unmatured state, but he kept quiet about his most immediate task, namely, his secret Romanian mission conceived in the Tuileries. Although he did not speak about it this time, he made no secret of his travel to the East, and those present all knew of the General's frequent Eastern journeys, of his engagement in the bank in Geneva or of his shorter or longer stays in Constantinople. So there was nothing extraordinary in his travel. They might have regarded it as a routine trip. The French government circles laid a special emphasis on the confidential nature of the mission to avert any untimely counteraction on the part of Austria.[18]

Kossuth was kept informed on Klapka's preparations by his informants in Paris. He could receive even more information on 17 January 1859 when Klapka himself called on him in London, though not as much as he would have liked to hear. As with his compatriots in Paris, so also on his visit to Kossuth in London, Klapka did not lay all his cards on the table. Though he did not deny that he was bound to the East, he remained silent as to the real reasons of his mission and the secret instructions he had been given in the Tuileries. Although he tried to inspire Kossuth's confidence in the Emperor's policy and made mention of Cavour's friendly declarations, he failed to calm Kossuth and to abate Kossuth's mistrust in him and in his connections with Paris. Though Tanárky slightly exaggerated when he described the situation in his diary as follows: "Kossuth now stands farther from Napoleon than ever, and nearer to Mazzini than he has stood for some time", it seems certain that Kossuth's talks with Klapka led to no significant success.[19] Even if their negotiations were resumed after a longer break, their coming to agreement was still out of the question. Klapka believed that he had fulfilled his obligations when he offered his hand to Kossuth, even if not without any reservation, and invited him to join the Bonapartist camp. Kossuth, in turn, apperceived the protocol character of Klapka's visit, which it was in many respects, and strictly adhered to clarifying the vague and indistinct moments.[20]

[18] Dániel Irányi to Kossuth, Paris, 15 January 1859. (Kossuth: *Iratok 1859, op. cit.* pp. 12–13); Cf. Kastner: *Il contributo, op. cit.* pp. 27 ff.

[19] Tanárky: *op. cit.* p. 43.

[20] Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* I, pp. 99 ff.

When Kossuth on this occasion too, invariably insisted that the military and political leadership over the emigration should be united in his person, discouraged Klapka as well as all those who took a stand for the collective guidance of emigration. And when Kossuth accentuated his inflexibility and emphatically riveted attention to the dangers that he thought to arise from the Napoleonic relation – namely, that the Hungarian emigration would only be used for the purpose of simple subversion against Austria –, he essentially blocked any emigrant action that would be started and implemented without him or with his merely formal involvement. He was convinced that his personal involvement in discussions to be held with the French Emperor and in the elaboration of plans would be an adequate guarantee, and so it would prevent Napoleon III from deluding the Hungarian emigration from abusing the aspirations and hopes of the Hungarian nation. However, this conviction of Kossuth has never been justified in a historical retrospect. His view that the appearance of the French flag, i.e. the French auxiliary troops, in Hungary was a precondition for a successful Hungarian movement and the main guarantee against a potential trick, proved to be an alternative that only increased the defenceless situation of Hungarians. Though Teleki shared Kossuth's opinion, he placed a strong emphasis also on the collective guidance of the Hungarian emigration. Klapka shared the view of making claims to French military aid, but he was more and more inclined to trust in the strong impact of movements initiated in Hungary as well as in the effectiveness of military actions to be started by the Romanian principalities. He emphasized that the future of Hungarians would be determined not by the Po River in Italy, but by the Seret River, i.e. on Romanian territories. When in London Klapka asked Kossuth for patience and confidence, and referred to the possibilities hidden in the graduality of developments, he only added oil to the flames.[21]

It was on 1 March 1859 that Klapka departed from Geneva to start on his Eastern mission of some one and a half months. He wished that silence and quiet be observed within the emigration until his return. He set it as a task to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to allay Kossuth and to try to make him see reason. He also asked László Teleki to offer a friendly hand to Kossuth and to do his best to create an effective co-operation. On 24 February 1859, Klapka even wrote a farewell letter to Kossuth in the hope that his letter would produce the required effect and no unexpected turns would take place in his absence.[22] However much information had Klapka supplied to László Teleki of the events of his Eastern journey, he could not ease Teleki from his anxiety as to the future. At the given moment neither Kossuth, nor Teleki seemed to be at ease – though not necessarily for the same reasons. What was common in their views was that Klapka's

[21] Kossuth to Klapka, London, 29 March 1859. (O.L., Klapka Papers; Draft: O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 2712); cf. Kossuth to Dániel Irányi, London, 6 January 1859. (Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* I, pp. 91 ff); Kossuth to Frigyes Szarvady, London, 8 January, 1859. (*Iratok 1859, op. cit.* pp. 9 ff.)

[22] Klapka to Kossuth, Geneva, 24 February 1859. (*Iratok 1859, op. cit.* pp. 24–25); Klapka to László Teleki, Geneva, 26 February 1859. (OSZK, Department of Manuscripts, Horváth Papers); 3 March 1859. (O.L., Puky Papers.)

Eastern mission was wrapped in a certain mystery. Teleki complained of the lack of information, referring, among others, to the role of Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss whom Klapka allegedly kept informed of everything, but in the meanwhile it turned out that Nemeskéri Kiss knew hardly more of the state of affairs than Teleki did. Nor could Teleki fully accept what Klapka had imparted him about Kossuth's readiness to co-operate. Teleki saw his opinion be confirmed by the manner in which Kossuth responded to his letter of 19 March 1859, which had been meant to offer Kossuth reconciliation and friendship, drawing a veil over the past.[23] Although Kossuth's replies were not without a friendly tone, but in these letters Kossuth imposed such conditions on his co-operation, which rather disheartened Teleki.[24]

Teleki had similar doubts about the "Declaration" of 26 March 1959 which Kossuth had formulated and forwarded to him. This memorandum was aimed to make the French Emperor acquainted with Kossuth's views and also with the conditions to which he subjected his final break with Mazzini and his entering into connection with Napoleon III. At the same time, the chief aim of the memorandum was to make it clear to those in the Palais-Royal that Kossuth definitely refused to play the second fiddle only, and to permit the use of his name without his active participation in the affairs, or to be reduced merely to take notice of what Klapka had done or stated on his own behalf or in the name of the emigration. In other words, while General Klapka was on a Bonapartist mission in the East, Kossuth notified Paris that neither the Hungarian emigration nor Hungary could be employed to serve the French plans without him or his consent.[25]

Kossuth's person, influence and prestige were always reckoned with in the Palais-Royal, and there was much importance attached to winning him over. However, no agreement could be reached as to the form and the "price" of this co-operation. The Prince Jérôme Napoléon now could realize that both Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss and General Klapka were mistaken when they thought it to be easy to appease and win Kossuth by some friendly gestures. As it turned out, the Ex-Governor would not abstain from taking even the most extremist steps, should he be disregarded or left out of the planned actions. Kossuth, to wit, promised: if he continued to be excluded from the secrets of the ongoing negotiations in the Tuileries and he failed to be given an adequate leading role, he would disclose the preparations of the military alliance to the whole world and would qualify it as an irresponsible action and as one quite opposed to the Hungarian interests.[26]

This was the situation in mid-April 1859 when Klapka returned from his journey to Romania, bringing along an agreement on the Romanian–Hungarian

[23] László Teleki to Kossuth, Paris, 19 March 1859. (Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* I, pp. 177–178.)

[24] Kossuth to László Teleki, London, 28 March 1859. (O.L., Puky Papers.)

[25] Kossuth nyilatkozata (Kossuth's Declaration). London, 26 March 1859. (O.L., Puky Papers.)

[26] Speaking of the movements initiated without him, Kossuth emphasized: "I would thwart them. I have the ability, and it would be my duty to do it. And I would certainly do it." (*Ibid.;* Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* I, pp. 168 ff.)

alliance signed by Cuza too, which permitted that arms might be stored on Romanian territory for Hungarian troops, moreover, that organized Hungarian forces might start against Austria from a Romanian base. Undoubtedly, a great importance ought to be attached to this agreement, should it not have been concocted in the Tuileries. But it was masterminded there and the seriousness of its implementation depended on the utterly uncertain and dubious action of Napoleon III. Thus, however desirable it would have been to add some richer content to the sentences which showed signs of reconciliation between the two nations, this, unfortunately, could not be attained under the given historical circumstances, when the Hungarian emigration could only act within the framework of the Bonapartist policy. Paris, of course, was excessively satisfied with the agreement between Klapka and Cuza, and they held it as a potential means to keep Austria at bay in the East. Thus the effect, force, validity and reality of this agreement were also subject to the related decisions and conceptions worked out in the Tuileries.[27]

Right after his arrival, Klapka had to note: if he and his circle wished to be on friendly terms with Kossuth, he would have to give him further concessions, to which the Palais-Royal was already willing to give its consent. Thus, as a consequence of Kossuth's resolute attitude, it was at least achieved that three days after the Austrian army crossed Ticino and the French–Austrian war was openly declared, György Klapka and László Teleki went to London on 2 May 1859 to finalize the so much desired agreement with Kossuth. Under the new circumstances, time was ripe to making mutual concessions, which manifested themselves in the recognition of Kossuth's leading role, with the simultaneous establishment of a collective leading body for the Hungarian emigration.[28]

THE PERIOD OF THE NORTH-ITALIAN WAR IN 1859

From the aspect of further developments, it may seem negligible to scrutinize to what extent the agreement of the Hungarian emigration leaders in London satisfied their original aspirations and how consistent and sincere it could be regarded from the viewpoint of every participant. One thing is certain, namely, that the hopes attached to the North-Italian war of 1859 put an end to a break of almost

[27] Concluded in March 1859, the Cuza–Klapka agreement permitted the storage of arms of French origin on Romanian territories bordering on Transylvania. One-third of the total of 30,000 rifles was designed to be used by the Romanian principalities and two-thirds by the Hungarian forces. Cuza also promised to influence the Romanians living in Transylvania to take sides with the Hungarians. The Hungarian party promised the granting of nationality rights in such fields as public administration, education and religion. Moreover, in the future, the Transylvanian population might decide on the issue of whether they wish an administrative separation from or a union with Hungary. Cf. Ghica, J.: *Amintiri Pribegia după 1848. Bucureşti, 1889;* Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* I, pp. 369 ff; Jancsó B.: *Szabadságharcunk és a dako-román törekvések* (Our war of independence and the Daco-Roman endeavours). Budapest, 1895, pp. 248 ff.; Kastner: *Il contributo, op. cit.* pp. 63 ff.

[28] Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* I, pp. 207 ff; Tanárky: *op. cit.* p. 51.

one decade, and urged the emigration to join forces. Indeed, it may well be stated that the war opened a new epoch in the history of Hungarian emigration in which attempts to build up co-operation with the international democratic emigration were increasingly pushed into the background, at least on the part of the emigrant leaders. They preferred to bring their activities into harmony with the actions of the anti-Austrian states and governments. This explains the fact that in parallel with their basic objectives directed to regaining the national independence by the help of external powers, the social program of emigration was stagnating and remained in the field of generalities, mirroring the widely-known liberal objectives. The program of emigration could only slightly keep abreast with the socio-economic changes which had been taking place in Hungary since 1849, and could only hardly keep pace with the consequences of the serious changes in the social class relations effected by the powerful changes in the social structure after 1850. The emigration tended to uphold the objectives of 1848/49 in a more or less unchanged form under a situation when the Austrian absolutism in Hungary was – even if with a counter-revolutionary content and in a limited form – to put up with the not insignificant consequences of the social transformation of 1848, and so to take the wind out of the sails of the emigration which had got stuck in its, in many respects obsolete, program. This explains why the deepening socio-political crisis – however much the events of 1859 shattered the foundations of the absolutist system – could not create conditions for a new revolution, despite the fact that the general discontent extended to practically every class and stratum of society, including the nationalities.

It was under this agitated and contradictory situation that the co-operation between Napoleon III and the Hungarian emigration leaders commenced, which was sealed at the meeting of the French Emperor with Lajos Kossuth on 5 May 1859. Not that Paris would have been willing to establish some official relations with the Hungarian emigration and to conclude a well-defined, clear-cut agreement, recognizing the elected body of emigration as the official representative of the oppressed Hungary. What happened was only that the Tuileries arranged very secret talks and maintained some highly confidential relations with the Hungarian emigration leaders. They always took good care of keeping these connections within narrow bounds, so that they might draw back from the consequences at any time. The Paris action of the Hungarian emigration left no traces behind in the French official documents. At least, up to now, no official records have been found in the archives which would really cast light on what had happened at the time on the premises of the Palais-Royal. However, the contemporary notes and comments of Lajos Kossuth have come down to us. It can be inferred from these notes that no mutually signed agreement was reached. They rather seem to have surveyed only the details of actions to be taken and to have informed each other of their respective expectations. Thus the problems related to the promised French military aid and to the independence of Hungary were discussed in general terms only. What Napoleon III expected of Kossuth was: to

give up maintaining any contact with the republican Mazzinist circles, to participate in making a propaganda campaign among the Hungarian soldiers serving in the Austrian army in Italy and in formulating and issuing a possible proclamation addressed to Hungary, and to confirm his formerly offered service, namely that he would make every effort in England to persuade the leaders of the British Empire to take a neutral stand in the issue of the North-Italian war. The French Emperor left the details – including such issues as the funding of the manifold activities of the Hungarian emigration or the Hungarian Legion to be organized in Piedmont – to his high officials. Thus Senator Pierre-Marie Pietri, former chief of the Paris police, one of the Emperor's most confidential adherents, was in charge of maintaining direct relations with the Hungarian emigration. Despite his occasional doubts about the sincerity of the French Emperor, Kossuth tried to comfort himself with his conviction that the Hungarian nation would not be involved in irresponsible actions in the course of war, and he considered it as a precondition for issuing a proclamation to the nation to incite an uprising that French auxiliary troops be present in Hungary, or to put it in the contemporary wording: "that the French flag appear in Hungary." Kossuth gave utterance to this conviction of also his during the negotiations, which did not provoke the Emperor's disapproval as it was in his own interest not to go far beyond the frames of a limited cabinet war against Austria. In fact, the interests of Great Britain and Russia also moved within these bounds. So it happened that what Kossuth regarded as a guarantee against a Napoleonic trick, was really a guarantee for Napoleon III against some potential revolutionary outgrowths of the war.[29]

Under the circumstances, barely a few days after the outbreak of the French–Italian–Austrian war, it became possible to set up the supreme governing body of the Hungarian emigration, the Hungarian National Directorate, in Paris on 6 May 1859, with the participation of Lajos Kossuth, György Klapka and László Teleki. According to the minutes of the first, statutory meeting of this body, Geneva was marked out to host the headquarters of the Directorate. Kossuth was elected president, but his signing any document had to be approved by the other members too. Involved in the work of the body – for practical reasons and with voice but no vote – were also Dániel Irányi as keeper of the minutes, Colonel Imre Szabó as military correspondent, and Miklós Puky to manage the finances. Further proposals were made for suitable persons to perform tasks related to the external activities of the emigration. The first steps to form the general staff of the Hungarian Legion to be organized were also taken. General Klapka was elected as its commander-in-chief. Colonel Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss was appointed to lead the would-be first infantry brigade and Colonel Dániel Ihász to lead the second. Count Gergely Bethlen was appointed commander of the would-be cavalry brigade. Designed to play an eminent role in leading the envisaged military operations on Hungarian territory, General Mór Perczel was, for the time being, offered to act as the superintendent of the Hungarian

[29] Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* I, pp. 211 ff.

Legion.[30] After all that, Kossuth returned to England to execute the task he had undertaken, namely to organize a canvassing campaign in an attempt to overthrow the reactionary Derby-government, an action very closely related to the opposition activity and internal policy intentions of the circle of Cobden and Bright, followers of the Manchester School. With the support of the former, Kossuth held subsequent meetings and delivered speeches of great success in London, Manchester, Bradford and Glasgow, in the course of which he, naturally, abstained from mentioning his formerly voiced criticism of the French Emperor. Instead, he concentrated on the details of the Hungarian issue, including its historical antecedents.[31] Since the English opposition movement aimed to raise the Whigs to power, it soon became possible to form the second Palmerston government and to replace the leaving Foreign Secretary Malmesbury with John Russel. Kossuth then interpreted the English developments to his commissioners in France as if they had been resulting from his actions in England, which might have been an overstatement, but it was certain that his actions contributed to some extent to the change of the British cabinet which, in turn, really consolidated the neutrality of Great Britain.[32]

By the time Kossuth arrived in North-Italy, the French–Italian troops had already scored remarkable military successes. Having defeated the Austrian forces at Montebello on 20 May and at Magenta on 4 June, they marched in Milan on 8 June, and this was followed by the decisive victory at Solferino on 24 June, which resulted in the complete ousting of the Austrians from Lombardy.[33] Under the circumstances, the Hungarian emigrant leaders cherished more hope in the future and they were confirmed in their hopes by their meetings with the Italian and French leaders, with Cavour and the Prince Jérôme Napoléon and finally with Napoleon III in Valeggio on 3 July. But there were also some omens of evil portent, which may have rightly raised anxiety and doubts. Thus, no concrete promise had so far been made, nor perceptible steps taken to send out the French auxiliary forces. The French Emperor's vague and ambiguous responses were rather unpromising.[34] There were also several problems about the Hungarian Legion then in the process of formation. Kossuth himself was quite perplexed by the Sardinian King's decree of 24 May 1859, which provided for the formation of a Hungarian Legion. In this case, the main problem was that the Legion was regarded as part of the Sardinian army and the legionnaires were bound to swear allegiance to the King of Sardinia, though they would be given a Hungarian flag and their uniform would also bear some national marks. Kossuth comforted himself with the belief that all this ensued from the special circumstances only and many of them might be changed in the course of events.[35] The organization of the

[30] *Ibid.* pp. 238–240.
[31] *Ibid.* pp. 244 ff.
[32] Cf. Woodward, Llewellyn: *The Age of Reform, 1815–1870.* Oxford, 1958, pp. 171 ff.
[33] Pieri, Piero: *Storia militare del Risorgimento.* Torino, 1962, pp. 589 ff.
[34] Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* I, pp. 414 ff.
[35] *Ibid.* pp. 348 ff.

Legion was not an easy thing. Finally it was decided that the Legion would be recruited from Hungarians who had deserted the Austrian army and from the Hungarian-born prisoners of war. The interested people were not given too much time to make up their mind or to think the things over. The Hungarian origin was thought to be sufficient to summon these soldiers to take their choice: either they join the Hungarian Legion or remain prisoners of war. Thus was it that within a short time several hundreds of Austrian war prisoners were named to be enrolled for service in the Hungarian Legion. However, at the moment, they could hardly do more than compiling the list of names and separating the selected soldiers from the other prisoners of war. The would-be legionnaires were kept together in Acqui, Asti and Alessandria, and were called to be patient until they would be supplied with the necessary arms and uniforms. Thus, nominally, the Hungarian Legion consisted of over 3500 persons in the first half of July; however, this number practically did not bear proportion to the actual state of organization of the Legion.[36] Of course, if the war had lasted longer, it would have been possible to take more serious steps too, but this was prevented by the further course of events. Namely, satisfied with the occupation of Lombardy, Napoleon III concluded an armistice with Franz Joseph in Villafranca on 11 July 1859, putting an end to any further hostility, and with this, to the hopes of the Hungarian emigration too.[37]

As it appeared from the course and relations of the events, it was none but Garibaldi and his volunteers who consistently and resolutely wanted to wage war against Austria: after the occupation of Como and Brescia they assiduously demanded their further supply with arms and the increase of the number of volunteers.[38] Playing a very remarkable role among Garibaldi's Alpine rangers were also several Hungarians, such as Colonel István Türr and Major Gusztáv Frigyesy. The Count Sándor Teleki who also got into the camp was then charged with the recruitment of soldiers for the Hungarian Legion and with the transport of war prisoners.[39] Although the French and Italian monarchies welcomed Garibaldi at the moment of the outbreak of the war and initially were lavish of promises, in reality, however, they made every effort to keep off the volunteers from the main frontlines and only deployed them in the less important seats of

[36] Cf. Vigevano, Attilio: *La Legione ungherese in Italia (1859–1867)*. Roma, 1924, pp. 45 ff; Kastner: *Il contributo, op. cit.* pp. 216 ff; *Iratok 1859, op. cit.* pp. 109 ff.

[37] Cf. Valsecchi, F.: *Il tramonto della potenza Ausburgica in Italia. Il preliminari di Villafranca e la pace di Zurigo.* Firenze, 1960. Lajos Lukács: *Military Organizations of the Hungarian Exiles, 1859–67.* (The Crucial Decade: East Central European Society and National Defense, 1859–1870. Ed. by Béla K. Király, New York, 1984, pp. 457 f.)

[38] Carrano, Francesco: *I Cacciatori delle Alpi comandati dal generale Garibaldi nella guerra del 1859 in Italia.* Torino, 1860; Cf. Garibaldi, Giuseppe: *Memorie autobiografiche.* Firenze, 1888, pp. 276 ff; Gaiani, Emilio: *Garibaldi e i Cacciatori delle Alpi (1859–1909).* Città di Castello, 1909.

[39] Cf. Kastner Jenő: Türr István 1860-ban (István Türr in 1860). *Budapesti Szemle*, 1929; Campanella, A.: Gustavo Frigyesy il gran Garibaldino magiaro sconosciuto. (*Studi Garibaldini*, 1962. No. 3); Teleki Sándor: *Garibaldi alatt 1859-ben* (Serving under Garibaldi's command in 1859). Budapest, 1883.

operation, neglecting also their proper supply. It was in anticipation of all this that Mazzini, who had condemned the French Emperor's war from the outset, formulated his London declaration, warning the Italians against an alliance with Napoleon III and against attaching any hope to such an alliance in regard to the attainment of the unity and freedom of Italy.[40]

In the fervour of great hopes and expectations, however, Mazzini's warning failed to gain a hearing. But as things worked out, it became evident that his caution was not unjustified. The unexpected armistice of Napoleon III surprised even his official Italian ally. Prime Minister Cavour himself expressed his regrets over what had happened, which astonished him and disappointed the Italians in their hopes. At the same time, Napoleon III did not forget about encashing the huge price his allies had to pay for his military intervention when he made claim to annex Nice and Savoy to France, which actually happened shortly afterwards. The general uproar in Italy and the righteous indignation of the public pressed Cavour to refuse to take the blame for the shameful events and to withdraw, even if provisionally, from his prime ministerial function. In spite of the outcome of the war, and also of the fact that the French Emperor had taken great care not to let the war grow into a revolutionary crisis, the intrinsic logic of events exceeded the limited conceptions of the French. Even if the war of 1859 had remained within "cabinet" bounds, its consequences and effects on Italy and the Austrian Empire gave rise to further socio-political crisis in both countries and put the settling of a wide range of urgent but so far unresolved problems on the agenda. Thus the accumulated social discontent with the obsolete system of Papal government grew into open revolts in Romagna and other provinces of the Pontifical State. Obviously, the Sardinian Monarchy did its best to intensify rather than curb these uprisings in the hope of annexing those mid-Italian regions as soon as possible. In summer 1859, Tuscany, Romagna, Modena and Parma entered into a military alliance and finally altered the face of things under the leadership of General Fanti and Garibaldi. In early June the Cardinal Legate himself left Bologna. This course of events directly followed from the decline of the military prestige and influence of Austria in Italy, and the foreseeable process could hardly be halted by the successive diplomatic interventions and small-minded claims of the great powers.[41]

The lost war brought about a delicate situation in Austria, as it eclipsed the nimbus of the Austrian military forces and questioned the widely-spread suppositions about the invincibility of the Austrian Empire. The fall of Alexander Bach, Minister of the Interior, on 22 August 1859, signalled that time was ripe for changes. While the Hungarian emigration was seriously embittered and disappointed in their hopes of the favourable outcome of the war, the turn of events opened up new prospects for their fatherland.

[40] King, Bolton: *Mazzini*. London – New York, 1902, pp. 176 ff.

[41] Cf. Orsi, Pietro: *L'Italia moderna (1750–1913)*. Milano, 1913, pp. 267 ff; Candeloro: *op. cit.* IV, pp. 353 ff.

In contrast with the quite hopeless atmosphere prevailing among the Hungarian emigrants on account of their own disorganization and of the rapid disbanding of the Hungarian Legion after the lost war, Hungary was filled with the sense of a national revival, and it was precisely the lost war that raised a strong desire to act and started to mobilize and organize the masses to improve the situation. True, this new process was not started under the influence of the emigration, nor was it prompted or led by those declaring their solidarity with the emigration. In fact, it was stimulated and promoted by forces which were, in many respects, politically opposed to the former. The military and political failure of the centralized system of government of Austria gave a strong impetus to those social forces which – in one way or another – had become part of the opposition after 1849, although the creation of a fully independent and consistently liberal Hungary did not stand very near to their original objectives. Springing into action were also those basically conservative political forces which had been ousted during the Bach-administration from the social and political spheres, although they supported the bourgeois transformation only to a rather limited extent and were always confessed adherents and loyal supporters of the united Austrian Monarchy. Here we think of the most active members of the ultra-conservative part of aristocracy who, under the situation, enjoyed the support of the Roman Catholic high clergy as well as of the leaders of the discontent Protestant denominations in Hungary. The landed gentry, mainly those owning medium-sized estates, and some richer citizens also joined them. But their influence practically extended to the widest layers of the discontent population, Hungarians or other nationalities alike, who still did not venture to bring forward their possible more radical views, because they might rightly fear an untimely reprisal. All what was going on in Hungary in the autumn of 1859 in the sign of national endeavours was in many respects incomprehensible and startling for the emigration. After the war, the Hungarian society awoke from its nightmarish sleep of a decade and attempted to find a way out of its grim situation by the help of its own means, power and possibilities.[42]

The Villafranca armistice gave rise to a deep feeling of frustration and astonishment among the Hungarian emigrants. Yet they failed to draw the necessary lesson from it or to come to uniform conclusions. Though aiming to be more cautious in the future, the official leadership of emigration was still unable to change its political orientation and principles significantly compared to what had been laid down in May 1859. Even if its relations with the Paris court became somewhat looser, it was mainly due to Napoleon III, who rested content with the results he had achieved during the war, that France refrained from provoking Austria any longer. Thus, despite the promises Napoleon III had made to guarantee the safe return and impunity of the members of the Hungarian Legion,

[42] Berzeviczy, A.: *Az abszolutizmus kora Magyarországon 1849–1865* (The age of absolutism in Hungary 1849–1865). Vols. I–IV. Budapest, 1922–1937, III, pp. 9 ff; Lukács Lajos: *Magyar függetlenségi és alkotmányos mozgalmak 1849–1867* (Hungarian independence and constitutional movements 1849–1867); henceforward: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak*. Budapest, 1955, pp. 189 ff.

when phenomena contrary to his promises were experienced, he shrank back from taking further, more effective and helpful actions. So it happened, despite the fact that Kossuth, even if with some delay, had transmitted the necessary documents, factual materials and other relevant evidences to the French Emperor, who handed them over to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs where the whole material got into the archives.[43] Though, in his usual informal manner, the Prince Jérôme Napoléon tried to keep and sustain the confidence and hope of the emigrant leaders in the French intervention, the related experiences could not furnish an adequately solid basis for far-reaching combinations.[44]

Kossuth himself held the opinion that it was better to wait and see patiently so long as a new turn in the international situation would offer another opportunity to take a step forward. While Ferenc Pulszky as the official representative of the Hungarian emigration was commissioned to monitor the movements of the Turin government, Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss was given similar tasks to be carried out in Paris. He was living in Paris anyway, had well-established connections with the Napoleonic court, so he might have a good access to information on the Emperor's intentions, and he could report on his experiences to the Hungarian emigration leaders.[45]

Unlike the official leaders of the Hungarian emigration and the political line presented by them, which still calculated with an expectable French aid and with the official support of the Turin court, the wider strata of Hungarian emigration showed signs of a different approach, a changed way of political thinking. Having lost their confidence in any combination based on support by the great powers and official governments, these emigrants in increasing numbers believed that connections with Napoleon III and the political forces depending on him should be broken for good. They thought the true and faithful friends of Hungary to be found among the members of the international radical democratic movements, thinking first of all of Garibaldi and his national liberation movement that aimed to bring the freedom of peoples to its fullness. At the same time they wished to establish closer connections with the Hungarian opposition forces and to pay greater attention to the internal dynamism of the nation. It was in the spirit of these considerations that the functioning and political conduct of the official leaders of the Hungarian emigration were severely criticized especially by the officers of the disbanded Hungarian Legion.[46] Even if the fledgling opposition or opposition-minded standpoints appearing within the Hungarian emigration did not take any definite course at the time and still moved within the bounds of per-

[43] Kossuth to Napoleon III, 21 July 1859. (Enclosure: records of the complaints of the Hungarian legionnaires, dated from Massa, 8 June 1860.) (A.M.A.E., Correspondence Politique Autriche. No. 477/3477); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* I, pp. 484 ff; II, pp. 420–431.

[44] Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* II, pp. 386 ff.

[45] *Ibid.* II, p. 336.

[46] Cf. Lukács Lajos: *Garibaldi magyar önkéntesei és Kossuth 1860–1861-ben* (Garibaldi's Hungarian volunteers and Kossuth in 1860–1861); henceforward: *Garibaldi magyar önkéntesei.* Budapest, 1962, pp. 33 ff.

sonal conversations and correspondence, they showed, on the basis of experiences, that the political orientation of 1859 did no longer enjoy the support of the wider circles of the Hungarian emigration, and the emerging new demands were likely to produce many unexpected surprises.

GARIBALDI OR CAVOUR

The spring of 1860 did really bring surprises for all those who were inclined to attach too much importance to the official government and to the diplomacy of the great powers in settling the various unsolved national problems. The deep crisis of the decayed and underdeveloped Kingdom of Naples, which with its obsolete government system had become quite anachronistic, made it possible to speed up actions aimed at the earliest possible achievement of Italian unity. In this case, it was Garibaldi and his volunteers who took the risk of initiating actions, and by their acts they set an example of determination as well as of the method of attaining national independence and social freedom to be followed by every oppressed nation. The preparations in Geneva could not be kept in secret, because the Piedmontese police, and through them, the top governmental circles were adequately informed of the Sicilian emigrants' bitter complaints, aspirations and desire to act. The internal problems of the Kingdom of Naples were also wished to be resolved in Turin, provided it would facilitate the extension of the Sardinian monarchy's influence and power within Italy. However, all this appeared as a tendency or trend, rather than a concrete definition of objectives to be achieved. It was all the less possible to keep the preparations secret, as the circle of the Sicilian refugees, who had originally called on Garibaldi, was widened by volunteers, of not only Italian origin, who had come in rapid succession from various regions of North-Italy, from Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont alike. Thus was it that the Piedmontese monarchy turned a blind eye to the preparations, in fact, they even placed some antiquated arms, mustered out of the royal armoury, at Garibaldi's disposal. True, they did it in such a way as if officially they had not taken notice of the whole enterprise, shifting the full responsibility for the possible risk on Garibaldi. What happened after all this was little less than a miracle, considering that having started from Quarto near Genoa, not only did the "Thousand" land successfully at Marsala in Sicily on 11 May 1860, but they also occupied the whole Sicily within a few weeks. After Palermo had capitulated on 6 June, the Garibaldist army, advancing in several columns, won a battle at Milazzo on 20 July, then also captured the city of Messina by the end of the same month.[47]

[47] Cf. Garibaldi: *Memorie, op. cit.* pp. 331 ff; *Garibaldi válogatott írásai* (Selected writings of Garibaldi). Ed. by Géza Sallay. Budapest, 1955; Trevelyan, G. M.: *Garibaldi and the Thousand.* London, 1909, pp. 143 ff; *Idem*: *Garibaldi and the making of Italy.* London – New York, 1911, pp. 48 ff; Agrati, C.: *Mille nella storia e nella leggenda.* Milano, 1933; *Idem*: *Da Palermo al Volturno.* Milano, 1937.

This rapid succession of events, of course, was a great surprise, rousing a keen interest throughout the world, especially in Turin and Paris. The anxiety of Napoleon III was enhanced mainly by the fact that Garibaldi, who wielded a dictatorial power in Sicily, made by no means secret of his great objective: to liberate Rome – where the secular power of Pope Pius IX had been secured by a French garrison ever since 1849. Under the increasingly involved situation, Cavour's main aim was to neutralize the Mazzinists and the Garibaldists, the revolutionary-republican objectives of the leftist elements who had come together in Garibaldi's army. Moreover, he wanted to achieve this end in such a manner that all the benefits arising from the overthrow of the Kingdom of Naples by Garibaldi's army might be retained and the fallen Southern monarchy might be replaced by the Sardinian rule. This endeavour did not interfere with the essential interests of Napoleon III either, as the monarchist version of advancing Italian unity was not meant to shake his positions in Rome; for this, the representatives of the Piedmontese government had assumed an obligation in Chambéry on 28 August 1860.[48]

The Hungarian aspects of the given Italian and international situation appeared in several forms, partly at General Garibaldi's level, partly at the higher levels of the official governments. Four Hungarian volunteers are known to have been serving in the red-shirted troops called the "Thousand". Among them, István Türr played an outstanding role in launching the whole enterprise, in the landing operations in Sicily, as well as in organizing the enlarged Garibaldist troops into a regular armed force. Garibaldi charged István Türr with the command of Division XV.[49] Another notable Hungarian member of the general staff was Lajos Tüköry, who had already been present at Marsala. Tüköry led the advance party to the decisive assault on the besieged Palermo where he got so seriously injured that even the amputation of his leg could not save his life.[50]

After the first Garibaldi-led expedition had scored its first successes, the Piedmontese government raised no objection to starting additional expeditions on voluntary basis to Sicily. Participating in these expeditions to Sicily were also Hungarians in such an increasing number that it soon became possible to organize an independent Hungarian Legion, for which Garibaldi made provisions in a special order issued on 16 July 1860, charging Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Mogyoródy with its command.[51] Apart from the Hungarians organized into the new

[48] *Il Carteggio Cavour-Nigra dal 1858 al 1861.* I–IV. Bologna, 1926–1929, III, pp. 276 ff; IV, pp. 34 ff; Cf. Omodeo, A.: *L'opera politica del conte di Cavour.* I–II. Firenze, 1940–1954. II, pp. 72 ff; Narrari Micheli, I.: *Cavour e Garibaldi nel 1860.* Roma, 1911, pp. 19 ff; Mack Smith, Denis: *Cavour e Garibaldi nel 1860.* Torino, 1958, pp. 62 ff.

[49] Cf. Pecorini-Manzoni, Carlo: *Storia della 15ª Divisione Türr nella Campagna de 1860 in Sicilia e Napoli.* Firenze, 1876, pp. 346 ff; *L'Opera di Stefano Türr nel Risorgimento Italiano 1948–1870. Descritta dalla figlia.* I–II. Firenze, 1928, I, pp. 26 ff; Kastner: *Türr, op. cit.*

[50] Tüköry, Luigi: *1828–1860. Testi documenti inediti e tavole.* Palermo, 1933, pp. 46 ff.

[51] Lukács: *Garibaldi magyar önkéntesei, op. cit.* pp. 61 ff.

legion, there were also several other Hungarian volunteers in Garibaldi's army who, on the basis of their military experiences, became commanding officers of Italian units such as – among others – Lieutenant Colonels Lajos Winkler and István Dunyov, and Major Gusztáv Frigyesy.[52] Having arrived in Sicily in August 1860, the Count Sándor Teleki became member of Türr's general staff. Nándor Éber, who had arrived there as the correspondent of *The Times* of London, was soon charged with a military commission in Türr's Division XV, promoted to the rank of brigadier general. The Hungarian Legion as well as the Hungarian hussar unit, which was being organized at the time under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Fülöp Figyelmessy, organizationally belonged to the cadre of Éber's brigade. After the initial campaigns in Sicily and Calabria, the Hungarian Legion had not only been over the first fights, "its front-line baptism", by September and October 1860, but it also scored remarkable successes in the Volturno battle of 1–2 October 1860 where the Bourbon-forces suffered a crushing defeat.[53]

Thus it happened that during the course of the liberation fights in South Italy, a new Hungarian Legion was born: it was composed of Hungarian volunteers and emigrants. Moreover, there were also many other Hungarian volunteers, mainly experienced officers, who played outstanding roles in the military command of Italian units. As a matter of fact, this was a spontaneous movement initiated quite independently of the intentions and conceptions of the official leaders of the Hungarian emigration. Though the participation of these volunteers in Garibaldi's army and in the actions did not in itself mean their full identification with the objectives and social program of the Italian Left, yet the fact that Hungarians in increasing numbers volunteered to fight for the Italian cause was tantamount to their taking a political stand. It was a clear expression of their motive: by joining the Garibaldi-led movement and backing its objectives, they hoped to promote the fulfilment of the desires of the Hungarian emigration as well. Those Hungarians who took arms for the unity and freedom of Italy did so in the awareness that this fight was of an immense international importance too, and its successes would strengthen the international forces of social progress and would ultimately promote the so much desired settling of the Hungarian problem. Considering the volunteering of Hungarian emigrants for service in Garibaldi's camp from this aspect, it is not an exaggeration to state that when they so did they did not follow, in fact they ignored, the principles of the political orientation laid down in 1859, instead they started something new, embarked on a new way, the outcome of which then had a strong effect on the further history of the Hungarian emigration.

All this becomes even more conspicuous, if we take a closer look at the functioning and political activities of the official Hungarian emigration leaders in that

[52] *Idem*: *Garibaldival a szabadságért. Dunyov István élete és működése 1816–1889* (With Garibaldi – for freedom. The life and activity of István Dunyov 1816–1889). Budapest, 1968, pp. 81 ff.

[53] Lukács Lajos: *A magyar garibaldisták útja. Marsalától a Porta Piáig 1860–1870* (The way of the Hungarian Garibaldists from Marsala to Porta Pia 1860–1870). Budapest, 1971, pp. 52 ff.

period, and at the connections of those activities with what had happened during Garibaldi's struggle in South Italy.

Reports on the developments in Sicily, especially in the first phase of the fights, could not much disturb Kossuth's quietude, who at the time was staying in England. He believed that all this was nothing but an internal problem of Italy which would have no direct effect whatsoever on the further fate of Hungary. Therefore, while he refrained from initiating the starting of Hungarian volunteers to Sicily, he did not refuse anyone who ventured to go to Italy and asked him to write a recommendatory letter such as he wrote in the case of Adolf Mogyoródy and Fülöp Figyelmessy as well.[54] His fellow emigrant leaders also agreed with Kossuth that the energy of the Hungarian emigration should be reserved for later times when the Venice question would be put on the agenda. However, the course of events and the unexpected outcome of the liberation fights in South Italy brought about a situation which pressed the Hungarian emigration leaders to take a more distinct position in this matter, if they did not want to lag behind the rapid turns of events. Kossuth, who spent the summer of 1861 on the Continent, wrote a letter to István Türr from Baden in Switzerland on 29 July, emphatically calling Türr's attention to the risks involved in Garibaldi's possible crossing to the mainland Calabria and to its serious international implications. Kossuth disagreed with this step, because it might enrage Napoleon III and might provoke his intervention which Kossuth thought to be averted. In his judgment, it would be appropriate if the people of Naples could get rid of the Bourbon king by self-effort rather than by the aid of a Garibaldist invasion. Kossuth's wish and his advice to Türr fell in line with the desires in Turin, namely with Cavour's intent to carry through an internal change before Garibaldi's arrival in Naples so that the Sardinian Kingdom might master the situation. This similar assessment of the events can be regarded as the antecedents of a maturing close co-operation between Cavour and Kossuth.[55]

After the landing in Calabria had taken place, which was greatly desired by Turin, Cavour could no longer delay to make his decision, which was also intended to be in accordance with the requirements set by Paris. Regarding that an open military intervention to defend his positions in Italy seemed to be disadvantageous for Napoleon III, as it may have given rise to protests, first of all, on the part of Great Britain, it seemed to be more feasible to leave the containment and then the elimination of the Garibaldist–Mazzinist movement to internal forces, i.e. to the intervention of the Piedmontese army. Fearing a potential Austrian assault in revenge for the defeat of 1859, Cavour thought the deployment of the Hungarian emigration to be suitable to counterpoise this threat. With this in mind, through the mediation of Ferenc Pulszky who acted as the Turin representative of the Hungarian National Directorate, Cavour invited Kossuth, Klapka and Teleki to appear before him at their earliest convenience in order that he might personally hear their wishes and might discuss the actions to

[54] Tanárky: *op. cit.* p. 169.

[55] O.L., Türr Papers. 1636; O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 3354.

be taken with them. The confidential talks between Cavour and the Hungarian emigration leaders took place on 10–11 September 1860, that is, on precisely the same days when the Piedmontese interventionist army departed for South Italy. Though the concluding of a bilateral agreement between the Piedmontese government and the representatives of the Hungarian emigration was out of the question at the time, they kept each other informed and surveyed the tasks arising from their mutual interests. Not only did Cavour make optimistic statements, but he also took concrete measures for the payments of financial supports and promised that arms would be reserved in Serbia and the Romanian principalities in support of the planned Hungarian actions. The Piedmontese government planned to transport those arms to the Romanian town of Galatz and earmarked some 30 to 40 thousand francs to cover the costs of their storage. At the same time, in their appeal submitted to the government, the emigration leaders applied for 200 thousand francs for canvassing and propaganda purposes and an additional amount of 100 thousand for building up the network of agents in Hungary. Moreover, they asked for the Piedmontese government's assistance in raising a major loan in the event of a war started against Austria. They also deemed it necessary to make adequate preparations for issuing new Hungarian banknotes while they were still to stay abroad. According to preliminary information, a press suitable for printing banknotes was available in England at the price of 200 thousand francs, including the cuts, paper and other prerequisites. One quarter of the sum had to be paid in advance, in case Piedmont would refuse to print the notes – as it was anticipated. The Hungarian emigrant leaders, moreover, called the attention of their negotiating party to the possibility that the needs of a Hungarian armed force to be organized in Italy should also be taken into account. Therefore they made an additional claim to Hungarian-type uniforms for 3 to 4 thousand soldiers.[56]

In parallel with this, Cavour thought not only of Austria, but he also set his mind to the internal struggles in Italy, pondering over the possibility of utilizing the influence and prestige of the Hungarian emigration leaders to counterpoise Garibaldi. It was with this end in mind that Cavour invited the Hungarian leaders, first of all Kossuth, to write letters to Garibaldi, warning him to be cautious and to exercise self-constraint, and drawing his attention to the risk which his efforts to liberate Rome could involve. In accordance with all this, on 14 September 1860, Kossuth wrote a letter to Garibaldi to warn him that his ambitious plans might lead to a clash with Napoleon III; at the same time he strongly recommended him to prefer the liberation of Venice to that of Rome.[57] On the following day, 15 September 1860, Kossuth also sent a letter to the same effect to István Türr in the hope that Türr might perhaps use all his prestige and influence to persuade Garibaldi to meet Cavour's demands. From this it appears that

[56] Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* II, pp. 549 ff; Cf. Lukács Lajos: Garibaldi és Kossuth 1860–61-ben (Garibaldi and Kossuth in 1860–1861). (*Századok*, 1958, Nos. 1–4.)

[57] Kossuth to Garibaldi, Torino, 14 September 1860. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 3376; 3377); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* III, pp. 16 ff.

Kossuth – to say the least – overestimated Türr's influence when he supposed the leader of the red-shirted troops to follow Türr's advice concerning such really crucial problems.[58] So it is little wonder that having read Kossuth's letter, Garibaldi simply put it aside and left unanswered.[59]

Though the Hungarian emigration leaders in Turin occasionally heard some news about the Hungarians who had joined Garibaldi as well as about the Legion and the acts of those heading the Italian units, essentially they were badly informed and mainly uncertain in respect of the future political conduct and affiliation of their combating compatriots. This explanation, among others, tells us why they issued a circular on behalf of the Hungarian National Directorate for the members of emigration, requesting them to secure the unity and concord of emigration and to make a formal statement of their allegiance to the official leaders of the emigration. Simultaneously with Kossuth's letter to Türr, the circular arrived in Naples where those who were concerned could read it. Practically nobody refused to sign the requested statement of allegiance. However, it was quite another question how much this simple fact allowed to draw some meaningful inferences as to the exciting problems and uncertainties which engaged the emigration leaders' minds.[60]

As regards the Hungarian Garibaldist volunteers, they must hardly have pondered much over the text of the circular. They may have been rather uninformed of all what had happened between Cavour and the Hungarian emigration leaders in Turin, and must have formed their opinion on the basis of some suppositions only. Garibaldi's Hungarian legionnaires continued their military actions quite independently of the official leaders of the Hungarian emigration. Though exhausted and burdened with serious difficulties in its advance from Palermo to Naples, the Hungarian Legion did not come into a direct armed clash with the enemy. A few days after Garibaldi's marching in Naples on 7 September 1860, the Hungarian infantry legion and the hussars also arrived to advance shortly afterwards to the region of the Volturno River, then they actively and successfully participated in winning the decisive Volturno battle. The Legion already numbered about 350 at the time. The Hungarian Legion was operating as part of Division XV and its commanders had no – nor could they have at that time any – connections with the official leaders of the Hungarian emigration.[61] The Hungarian National Directorate's various combinations and ideas about the Hungarian Legion were formulated in a later phase of events, in close connection with the disbanding of the whole South-Italian army, and with all the other problems and anxieties which the ceasing of the army brought to the surface.

[58] Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* III, pp. 26 ff.

[59] Colonel Kupa to Kossuth, Naples, 29 September 1860. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, II. S. 2–42.) Cf. Tanárky: *op. cit.* p. 195.

[60] Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* III, pp. 13 ff.

[61] Diario della Brigata Éber della Divisione 15ª (Türr) (Lukács Lajos: *Garibaldi e l'emigrazione ungherese 1860–1862.* Modena, 1964, pp. 179 ff); Cf. Pecorini-Manzoni, C.: *Storia della 15ª Divisione Türr*, *op. cit.* pp. 73 ff.

The victories of the Piedmontese military intervention over the Papal forces, the successful action of General Cialdini's troops at Castelfidardo and the occupation of Ancona, opened up the way to Naples. Taking stock of the strengths and weak points of the Mazzinist–Republican camp, and reckoning with the Piedmontese military overpower, Garibaldi decided that he would not take the risk of a civil war. Without giving up his republican, democratic principles, he chose to avert any collision, and so to promote the attainment of Italian unity. He also undertook to participate in the ceremonial marching into Naples together with King Victor Emmanuel II, without, however, agreeing with the new turn of events or assuming responsibility for its political and social consequences. This explains why he abstained from accepting any recognition or distinction with which the monarchy wanted to honour him, and a few days after the disbanding of the Garibaldist army had been declared, he retired to the Isle of Caprera.[62]

The future of the Hungarian Legion became uncertain after the Garibaldist army had been disbanded in November 1860, and only those legionnaires could get into the royal army, who had successfully passed a political and military review or screening. Under this critical situation, the Hungarian National Directorate thought that the Hungarian Legion organized under Garibaldi ought to be saved for the future and transferred to the cadre of the royal army, to maintain and develop it there. This way it would cease to be a Garibaldist military unit and would continue its activity as a political-military organization under the formal supervision of the Italian Ministry of Defence, politically, however, controlled by the Hungarian National Directorate. The implementation of this plan based on purely theoretical considerations came up against difficulties, not only because Turin felt more like dismissing the Garibaldist units of any kind, but also because the Piedmontese held a different view concerning the person of the legion's commander-in-chief. Initially there were rumours that the various international legions – French, British and other – of the Garibaldist army would be maintained in the form of a major international military unit under a uniform leadership controlled by the monarchy. However, Napoleon III raised serious objection to a solution of this kind, and Cavour also had scruples about a military formation that would mass politically, more or less, radical-democratic-minded persons. By Kossuth's effective agency, the Hungarian Legion was finally not disbanded – in fact, he personally guaranteed that this military formation, which might seem to be dangerous to the monarchy, would be properly regulated and the order and discipline would be restored so that the Piedmontese government would have no reason to raise any objection to its existence.[63]

[62] Garibaldi: *Memorie, op. cit.* pp. 395 ff; Cf. King, Bolton: *Storia dell'Unità Italiana.* I–II, Milano, 1909–1910, II, pp. 177 ff.

[63] Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* III, pp. 98 ff.

III.

PLANS FOR A DANUBIAN CONFEDERATION IN 1862

KLAPKA'S PLAN FOR A DANUBIAN CONFEDERATION

On the more and more complicated chess-board of the Hungarian emigration, Klapka seemed to assume the role of the queen. At least such tendencies seem likely to have been prevailing – if we suppose the Italian government to have been the real owner of the chess-board, and the game to have been played according to its rules. Supposedly, these tendencies were effectively promoted by some other factors too, within both the emigration and the resistance movement in Hungary. That Klapka was put on such an uncommon pedestal was due to some illusions and expectations originating from the oppositionist circles of the emigration, and also to the supposition of certain circles in Hungary that they might ultimately have a hold on him and might employ him to achieve certain objectives that mostly served the particular interests and met the demands of the resistance movement in Hungary. However, Klapka always showed a diplomatic attitude towards these manifold expectations and never gave up his own conceptions and independence in his activity.

There were indications that Klapka continued to follow the developments in the Danubian principalities with keen interest; he was particularly concerned with their future and their expected attitude towards a new Hungarian war of independence, so much hoped for. All the more so as the Italian government took an increased interest in the affairs of the Balkans, including Greece, Serbia and the Romanian principalities alike. It appeared from the activities of Italian consulates and other agents in those countries that the Italian government aimed to strengthen its political and commercial positions in the Balkans in parallel with its endeavours to recover the Italian-inhabited territories, i.e. its confrontation with Austria became clearly marked. Under the circumstances, Klapka necessarily came to the fore again, especially after Ricasoli had resigned in early March 1862 and Urbano Rattazzi took over the government. Klapka's interest in Greece was also fostered by King Victor Emmanuel II who would have liked to help his second-born son come to the Greek throne to replace King Otto who had been ruling there from 1832. This seemed to be advantageous for Napoleon III in his effort to lessen the British influence.[1] Simultaneously, those representing the internal popular discontent of Greece turned to Garibaldi for

[1] Cf. Rattazzi, M.L.: *Rattazzi et son temps.* I–II. Paris, 1881–1887, II, pp. 39 ff; Kerofilas, Costas: *Le Grecia e l'Italia nel Risorgimento italiano.* Firenze, 1919; Mack Smith, Denis: *Vittorio Emmanuele II.* Bari, 1975, pp. 169 ff.

help to bring about a democratic turn and to liberate further Greek territories from the Turkish rule. It was under this rather complex situation that preparations were made for the journalist Marco Antonio Canini's travel to the Balkans which was warmly encouraged and supported, especially by the Italian royal court. Canini was much in favour of the liberation of the Balkanic peoples and the development of a friendly co-operation among those nations. In his Balkanic travel, Canini was led by the noble objective of encouraging those peoples to come to an agreement on taking a common stand against both the Habsburg Monarchy and Turkey. He also got in touch with Garibaldi who – through Canini – addressed the peoples of South-East Europe, especially the Greeks, in a manifesto assuring them of his support of their righteous national and democratic endeavours.[2] Being fully aware of all this, Rattazzi's government and the King did nothing against the action, as it was also in their own interest to divert the attention of the red-shirted freedom fighter from the unsettled national problems of Italy to Greece, and they might perhaps have him involved in such an action that might lead to his fatal frustration. It is quite another question that Garibaldi and his Action Party tended to handle this affair with utmost caution and the events took an opposite turn in 1862. On the other hand, Canini in his good faith felt that he should have a hold on all those threads of events in the region which might bring his mission to success. He believed that everyone, from Garibaldi up to the King, was a sincere supporter of his mission, and he paid little attention to the fact that it was ultimately the French and the circles of the Bonapartist court, all highly proficient in the art of political machination, who were at the back of the objectives of the Italian monarchy. Furthermore, to increase the effectiveness of Canini's Romanian mission, Rattazzi seemed to approve of György Klapka's involvement in the negotiations. In consideration of Klapka's widely known experiences and his remarkable past achievements in Romania, the Rattazzi-government was glad to encourage Klapka to lay down his long-nurtured idea of a friendly alliance of the South-East European nations in the form of a plan, in the possession of which Canini might already act in Bucharest as an authorized person to hold negotiations on this plan of alliance.

It was only then that the formal talks between Canini and Klapka took place, in which Ferenc Pulszky was also involved. In his memoirs, Pulszky recollected that Canini, editor of the newspaper *Tribuno*, had been very well versed in the Turkish and Balkanic affairs, had shown a special sympathy towards the Romanians and had had a special penchant to deal with the idea of a Hungarian–Romanian alliance.[3] Thus it was not surprising at all that Canini, who maintained very good relations with Klapka, brought up a proposal right before the start of his travel, namely that in Bucharest, he would be glad to put forward a plan for an alliance that would unite the Hungarians and Romanians into one camp. Klapka, who was in direct contact with the Italian Prime Minister Rattazzi

[2] Canini, Marco Antonio: *Vingt ans d'exil.* Paris, 1869, pp. 184 ff; Kerofilas: *op. cit.* pp. 174 ff.

[3] Pulszky Ferenc: *Életem és korom* (My life and my age); henceforward: *Életem,* Vols. I–II, Budapest, 1884. New edition: Budapest, 1958, II, pp. 352 ff.

and knew of his agreeable views about the conception of a Danubian Confederation, found that time was ripe to act.

Under this apparently favourable situation, all those plans and notions of a Danubian Confederation could be revived, which ever since the early 1850s had given rise to so many dialogues among Hungarians, Romanians and Serbs, as well as to the elaboration of a variety of plans and counter-plans for the restoration of peace among the nationalities. These were authored by a wide range of leading personalities from Bălcescu and the Golescu-brothers, to Klapka and Teleki, or to Kossuth. To Klapka's mind, the idea of the Danubian Confederation appeared as a very lifelike and effective force as early as the years of the Crimean War and also later in connection with the Cuza-agreement of 1859. When in the spring of 1862 Canini mentioned to Klapka that it was time to draw up his plan for the confederative alliance of the Danubian states and peoples in a more concrete form, Klapka did not hesitate to fulfil his request. After having scrutinized the problems with Pulszky, György Klapka presented his Danubian Confederation plan in April 1862.

Consisting of 30 points, the plan laid down principles for the organization and functioning of the confederation of Hungarians, Romanians and the South-Slav peoples. It expected as would-be basic members of the confederation: Hungary, and separately Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, then Romania and Serbia. At the same time the confederation was supposed to be open for other states to join. The plan gave a duly detailed description of the common, i.e. confederative affairs of the allied states. Belonging to the confederative sphere were such common affairs as defence, organization and maintenance of a confederal army, foreign representation, uniform external customs, maintenance of main communication roads, telegraphic service, common currency, uniform weights and measures. The plan laid it down that there would be no customs frontiers between the individual member-states and a customs system – customs union – based on free trade would be introduced. To act as the common legislative bodies of the federal states would be a House of Federal Representatives, elected for a term of three years, and a Senate, elected for a six-year term, in which each of the member-states would be represented by five senators. The supreme executive body of the confederation would be the Executive Council with as many members as the number of the member-states. The Executive Council would be elected jointly by the Senate and the House of Representatives for a term of two years.

The plan asserted the principle of ministerial responsibility when it laid down that the Executive Council would be accountable to the Senate and the House of Representatives for its actions. The two-chamber House of Federal Representatives would not only exercise its right to supervision over the Executive Council but would also make decisions on such issues as war and peace, elaboration of acts related to the common defence, as well as on issues concerning public welfare. It would ratify trade agreements and contracts and would appoint the supreme bodies of the Confederation and their delegates. The responsibilities of

the Executive Council, in turn, would include: to ensure that the acts passed by the Federal Parliament be implemented, to prepare and draft bills, to initiate trade agreements, to take measures and issue orders connected with foreign affairs.

According to the plan, the federal bodies and authorities would be functioning for two-year terms located alternately in Pest, Bucharest, Zagreb and Belgrade. The presidential function of the Executive Council would be held by the head of that state where the Council would be functioning during that particular term. Not insignificant was the suggestion of the plan made for the official language of the Confederation: namely that French be the official language in all official proceedings, in the cross-national relations of the federal states as well as in the administrative procedures of both chambers of the Federal Parliament. However, in both of the chambers and in the Executive Council everyone might speak in one's own mother tongue, which would be simultaneously translated by interpreters. It was stipulated as a requirement that the Federal Parliament should be based on the principles of the freedom of conscience, assembly and the press and the public law of each member-state should be based on the same principles. It was set as a task for the Federal Parliament to work out a common Commercial Code that would be binding on all member-states, but it might only come into force after it had been approved by the independent legislatures of the individual member-states. In order to lay down and maintain the common financial foundations of the Confederation, the member-states would have to pay contributions to cover the costs of the common defence, foreign representation and public welfare.

This confederation plan concentrated mainly on the details of the common affairs, nevertheless it did not forget to emphasize the broad, internal, self-governmental rights of the individual member-states. The members of the Federal House of Representatives – one representative per 200,000 inhabitants – could be elected by the various member-states under their respective electoral law, and those of the Senate would have to be elected by the legislature of each state. Another interesting feature of the plan is that the situation of the various ethnic minorities living in the individual member-states was supposed to be regulated according to the laws of the given country. So in respect of Hungary, the Hungarian National Directorate's convention of 15 September 1860 was regarded as normative, which had summarized all the concessions which the individual national minorities would have to be given, such as the free use of their mother tongue at all levels of public administration, or the right to organize their own national associations, etc. The plan established that the citizens of the individual member-states would automatically be citizens of the Confederation as well – provided they had stayed at least one year in a given member-state. In the case of any judicial procedure, however, the internal laws of the given citizen's country of origin would have to be considered as effective. It also falls within the competence of the Federal Parliament to determine the conditions under which a citizen of one member-state might exercise his political rights on the territory of

another one. Finally, it was laid down that all rights and powers which did not fall within the exclusive competence of the federal authorities, would come under the jurisdiction of the member-states.[4]

Characterized by circumspection and accuracy, Klapka's plan focuses on the elaboration of the system of the confederation, leaving the questions related to the self-government of the member-states open, waiting for the comments, further proposals and initiatives of the states concerned. The French-language version of the plan had been signed by Klapka in Turin on 15 April 1862, then countersigned on 27 April by Ferenc Pulszky who even added a clause of approval to it. After that, Klapka's plan went a very long roundabout way so much so that in the end his priority, his lion's share in the elaboration of the Danubian Confederation plan became almost completely obscured. In fact, his name in this particular context had been lost in the mist of time to such an extent that it took almost a century to clarify his real role.

Canini, for instance, called on Kossuth himself in Turin – where he was just staying on his way to Switzerland – to win him to add his signature to Klapka's name. Less familiar with the various internal affairs of the emigration, Canini might have believed that he could achieve his aim without any special difficulty. However, he had to experience that Kossuth was only inclined to talk about the content of Klapka's elaboration and to give his opinion about the idea of the Confederation in general. Having seen that his negotiating partner showed no willingness either to sign his fellow-emigrant's plan, or to sum up his own notions in a concrete form, Canini finally came to such an agreement with Kossuth that he would prepare a summary of their talks and present it to Kossuth on the following day. This did happen on 1 May 1862 when Kossuth was ready to sign the summary, though he made some strict stipulations: namely, that what was included in the summary, a memorandum as it were, was nothing but guiding principles which were not meant to be publicized. Furthermore, the memorandum might only be used as a background material or starting point for future negotiations to be held with the interested parties, and was considered to require further elaboration and improvements. Perhaps it is not uninteresting to mention that, according to one of his recollections, Kossuth had recognized Pulszky's handscript in the memorandum prepared by Canini.[5] From this it can be inferred that Pulszky also played some role in the elaboration of the final version. Consid-

[4] *Klapka György Dunakonföderációs terve* (György Klapka's plan for a Danubian Confederation). Torino, 15 April 1862, countersigned and approved by Ferenc Pulszky. A French-language copy entitled *Programme d'une Confédération la Danube*, was sent by Sir James Hudson, the Turin Ambassador of Great Britain, to the Italian Foreign Minister Giacomo Durando. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 116, fasc. 2); The same plan with Klapka's original signature: *Programme d'une Confédération Danubienne*, London, 7 May 1862, differs from the former in minor stylistic changes only. (A.C.R., Archivio Bettino Ricasoli. Fondo Bianchi. Busta 1, fasc. 2); A version of Klapka's plan, dated 15 April 1962, was published by Angelo Tamborra: Progetti e idee per una confederazione danubiano-balcanica (1846–1862). *La Comunità Internazionale*, 4 October 1950; Further edition: *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani.* Prima Serie, II, pp. 253 ff.

[5] Kossuth's autographic note: O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4044/a.

ering that Canini had promised to handle the whole matter confidentially, he may have brought along Klapka's plan with the related reflections of Kossuth to his Balkanic travel in order to accentuate the importance of his negotiations.[6]

To cast light upon the circumstances of the genesis of the Danubian Confederation plan of 1862, it is inevitable to do what has unfortunately not yet happened in either the Italian or the Hungarian historiography, namely, to compare *Klapka's plan* to Kossuth's related reflections. This is so much the more important as the latter was rather rapidly made public without any reference to the former, and so, during the last century, it became known to the public, uninformed of the former, simply as Kossuth's Plan for the Danubian Confederation. This definitely needs corrections in the light of the facts. We may speak, at best, of two versions of the confederation plan, of which Klapka's version served as a basis to be followed, even if within a short while, by a more general version. A textual comparison of the two versions makes it possible not only to determine their sequence in time with certainty, but also to clarify the details of connections and the extent to which, or the passages where, the second version does or does not cover or overlap the first one.[7]

Taking a closer look at the version signed by Kossuth, we must come to the conclusion that it is nothing but a pamphlet formulated in a loose form in response to a proposition, expressing also the author's opinion about it. Thus, in many respects, Kossuth was led by the same motives and adopted the same method as in 1850–1851 when in the course of his correspondence with László Teleki, he formulated the so-called Kutahia draft constitution in which he had signalled the limits of the concessions he would make to the non-Hungarian nationalities. In 1862 a similar motive might again have formed his driving force, but now against Klapka. To put it more precisely, he did not simply oppose Klapka, as he also agreed with him in several respects. Rather, he sought to express practically the same things in a more sweeping and powerful style, enriching the text with his characteristic emotions and phraseology. In 1851 it was the name of László Teleki – who had made the proposals, initiated discussions, raised new ideas, put forward new plans – that came second to Kossuth's who summarized all that in his draft constitution. Similarly in 1862, it was György Klapka – who had initiated, formulated and rendered into a final form the plan

[6] Canini: *op. cit.* pp. 168 ff.

[7] Publishing Klapka's plan in 1950, Angelo Tamborra did not compare it with the version that had appeared with Kossuth's signature in *L'Alleanza* on 18 May 1862, and supposed the two to be identical. (Cf. Tamborra, A.: *Cavour e i Balcani.* Torino, 1958, pp. 373–374.) It was in the same belief that Klapka's plan was also published in *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani.* Prima Serie, II, pp. 253 ff; Walter Maturi also failed to compare the two texts in his work: I avventure Balcaniche di Marco Antonio Canini nel 1862. *Estratto da Studi Storici in onore di G. Volpe.* Firenze, 1959; Dealing with the problems with attention to the related Italian literature is Koltay-Kastner: *Kossuth-emigráció, op. cit.* p. 236. Emphasizing Klapka's authorship is Lukács Lajos: Gondolatok a Dunakonföderáció eszméinek elindítóiról és magyarázóiról. (Reflections on the initiators and interpreters of the idea of the Danubian Confederation). *Kortárs*, 1968, No. 7.

of the Danubian Confederation – who was eclipsed by Kossuth, who was able to argue in a more powerful and agitating way and to transfer his thoughts more effectively to the public.

The introductory part of Kossuth's version was unambiguously a reaction to that part of Klapka's plan which was concerned with Transylvania. To wit, while Klapka unconditionally treated Transylvania as a fully emancipated and independent member of the would-be confederation, Kossuth, in response, stated – although in a more conciliatory manner than in his draft constitution of 1851 – that the decision of the enfranchised people might give rise to an independent status, but he would consent to it only in case "there is a personal union between Transylvania and Hungary under a common ruler. These two countries ought to be governed by one and the same ruler, whatever they might be called later on". Kossuth's comments were recorded in a rather loose form, reflecting the informal character of his talk with Canini, therefore they differed much from the stricter and more explicit formulation of Klapka's plan. Klapka's plan with its 30 points was reduced in the document of the Canini–Kossuth conversation to a brief summary, and even within this, certain thoughts were repeated. If we now try to compare some of the more important statements of the two documents, we may keep track of the relation of Kossuth's version with Klapka's original plan.

Klapka's plan	*The Canini–Kossuth document*
"The Danubian Confederation would consist of the following states: Hungary, Transylvania, Romania, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Serbia, etc." (Point 3.)	The Confederation "would extend from the Carpathians down to the Adriatic, consisting of Hungary, Transylvania, Romania, Croatia and of other provinces which might perhaps be annexed to Serbia, etc." (Introduction.)
"It is the task of the Confederation to organize a general defence force and to take a uniform stand against the enemy. (Point 4.) Further details of the armed forces, including the fortresses and the navy, etc." (Point 6.)	"All that concerns the land and naval forces, the fortresses and naval bases, will be governed by the federal authority" (Point 2.)
"It falls within the exclusive competence of the Confederation to decide on the main communication	"The customs system and the commercial legislation will be common. There will be uniform cur-

roads, the telegraphic service, uniform currency, weights and measures" (Point 8.) "No customs frontiers whatsoever exist between the individual member-states, a uniform customs system based on free trade will be introduced." (Point 9.)

It describes the House of Federal Representatives, the Senate and the Executive Council as federal authorities. (Point 10.)

The House of Federal Representatives is elected for a period of three years in proportion to the population of the individual states – one representative per 200,000 inhabitants. (Point 10/a.)

"In the Senate each state is to be represented by five senators." (Point 10/b.)

"The Executive Council is elected by the Senate in agreement with the House of Federal Representatives for a two-year term." (Point 13.)

It determines the French to be the official language of the Confederation. (Point 19.)

"The seat of the federal authorities will be located in two-year alternation in Pest, Bucharest, Zagreb and Belgrade." (Point 17.)

"The Executive Council will be presided by the head of the state of that country where the federal authority will actually have its seat in the mentioned order of succ-

rency, uniform weights and measures throughout the Confederation." (Point 4.)

The legislature would decide on whether the Federal Assembly, i.e. the Parliament consists of one or two chambers. (Point 5.)

The members of the House of Representatives are elected "in proportion to the population of the individual states". (In Point 5.)

"Each country, large or small, will be represented in the Senate by members in equal number ..." (In Point 5.)

"The executive power is exercised by a federal council elected in the case of a one chamber legislature by the one chamber, in the case of two: by the two chambers." (Point 6.)

"The legislature will decide on the official language of the Confederation." (Point 7.)

"The seat of the federal authority will be located alternately in Pest and Bucharest, then in Zagreb, and in Belgrade." (Point 8.)

"The head of that state where

thorities are seated during the given term." (Point 18.)

The Confederation "will recognize the self-government of the individual states". (Point 2.) "All rights and powers which will not come under the direct jurisdiction of the federal authorities, will fall within the competence of the member-states." (Point 30.)

"The Federal Parliament abides by the freedom of conscience, assembly and the press. The public law of each member-state will be based on these principles." (Point 22.)

"The situation of the various ethnic communities within the individual states will be regulated according to the laws of the given state without any interference by the federal authorities and in accordance with the convention of 15 September 1860 of the Hungarian Commission."

cession, will simultaneously be the pro-tempore president of the Federal Council and the Confederation." (Point 9.)

"Each state is to create its own constitution in a form that might best serve its particular interests..." (Point 10.)

The principles of the constitutions of the individual states "shall not be opposed to the principles sanctioned by the Confederation". (In Point 10.)

"The relationship among the individual nationalities and churches would be arranged on the basis of what was included in the memorandum of the Hungarian Commission, as published in Turin on 15 September 1860." (Detailed as point 11.)

Canini – who may not have known much of the actual circumstances of Hungarian emigrants – supposedly asked Kossuth to inform him of the Hungarian emigration leaders' convention of 15 September 1860, to which Klapka's plan had only alluded. As can be read in his later notes, Kossuth then presented a copy of the Kutahia draft constitution and showed him the passages which had served as a basis for the parts of the 1860 convention related to the nationalities. At the same time, he invited Canini to make copies of the relevant passages, which he did. According to the draft, it would be the individual communities and counties that decide on the language they would use in their public administration, as well as on the language of instruction at their schools. In parliamentary debates, each representative might speak up in any language used in the country. The nationality rights to form associations, to elect nationality leaders, to adopt resolutions concerning their nationality and religious interests, were also recognized, however, with the proviso that the related resolutions and measures would be made public. These details were also included in Canini's formulation. Finally, the

Canini–Kossuth document ended in a lengthy conclusion which would have been utterly inconsistent with the stricter form of Klapka's wording. Kossuth addressed the Danubian peoples with warm words, making them a friendly proposal to consider the idea he had brought up, and, forgetting the past offences, to offer each other a friendly hand in the sign of the confederation.[8]

Further complications of the confederation issue arose from the fact that though Kossuth had demanded Canini to keep it secret, because what he had signed was nothing but a train of thought which needed further elaboration and was only meant for private use, he sent one of the copies to Ignác Helfy, editor of *L'Alleanza*. Kossuth only wanted Helfy to popularize the idea set forth in his document, rather than to publish it word by word with his signature. Thus, either Helfy had misunderstood Kossuth's instructions, and so he unintentionally acted to the contrary, or Kossuth had failed to formulate his intention accurately, when he sent the document to Helfy. Be that as it may, the document was finally published in full in *L'Alleanza* on 18 May 1862, as Kossuth's Plan of the Danubian Confederation, dated 1 May. On the following day, on 19 May, Kossuth already protested against Helfy's action, accusing him of indiscretion, and also blaming him for the irretrievable mistake he had made.[9] Nevertheless, we may not leave it out of consideration that Kossuth was perhaps led by some deep-seated internal motive, when, taking a serious risk, he sent a word by word copy of the Canini-worded document with his own autographic signature to Helfy. No one, not even Kossuth, ever denied Helfy's good intentions, yet, this did not detract from the irresponsibility of his conduct in this case. However, it can hardly be a great mistake to suggest that Kossuth's step in this matter fitted well into the series of conflicts, or rather rivalry, which had been going on between the two leaders of the emigration for several years. Now, as in several other cases before, Klapka was the first to take a step forward. This necessarily aroused Kossuth's aversion, as well as his anxiety that his fellow-leader might embark on an independent road, and, by-passing him, he would take initiatives and actions in accordance with the intents of the Italian government. By the time the idea of the Danubian Confederation was thus let out, the Hungarian National Directorate had got into a state of serious agony, and it was only the matter of time that the relations between Kossuth and Klapka would be broken for good. Kossuth, who had

[8] First published in the 18 May 1862 issue of *L'Alleanza*, under Kossuth's name, entitled *Progretto della Confederazione Danubiana*. Torino, 1 May 1862. (Collection of *L'Alleanza*: Biblioteca Brera di Milano. Cf. O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4041.) The first Canini-draft was written in French. One copy of this, with Kossuth's original signature, begins with *Les conditions tout à fait spéciales des pays ...*, dated from Turin *le 8 Mai*, and signed *L. Kossuth, ancien Gourverneur de Hongrie*. (A.C.R., Archivio Bettino Ricasoli. Fondo Bianchi. Busta 1, fasc. 2.) Among the Hungarian editions, see *A közelmúlt titkaiból (A muszka intervencziótól a Duna konföderációig)* (From the secrets of the recent past. [From the Russian intervention up to the Danubian Confederation]). Edited by Imre Áldor. Vols. I–II, Budapest, 1878–1879, II, pp. 96–101; Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* (see footnote 111 on page 60), VI, pp. 9–12, entitled "Dunai szövetség" (The Danubian Alliance).

[9] Kossuth to Ignác Helfy. Torino, 19 May 1862. (O.L., Helfy Papers.) Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 23–24.

already broken off relations with Pulszky, took offence at Klapka's unbroken contacts and even co-operation with Pulszky – Klapka's plan also showed signs of this co-operation. Kossuth felt that his name might no longer appear together with theirs, and it was supposedly on this account that Canini had to prepare a new draft, which, while essentially based on Klapka's plan, was not quite identical with it. Furthermore, Kossuth, by no means without foundations, believed that he had no less to do with the notion of the Danubian Confederation than Klapka had. Therefore, he did not think it to be appropriate that this plan would now become known, even if in a restricted circle, as Klapka's exclusive work to both the Italian government quarters and the interested Serb and Romanian politicians. Had it not been so, had it not been these internal motives that ultimately determined his intentions, Kossuth would hardly have put it down in his letter of 15 May 1862 to Klapka that "Speaking of Canini, I remark that I unreservedly informed him of my views of the Confederation of the States of the Danube Valley (an idea which I have cherished for so long that ultimately I may make claim to the paternity of the idea of the Confederation), and he gladly comprehended the underlying reason behind the idea, while I agreed with some details of his views. And after Canini had put down the fundamental idea of all this in writing, upon his request, I did not refrain from endorsing it, as a document *for private use only*, with my signature" – Kossuth wrote.[10]

Thus, in this confidential letter to Klapka, Kossuth unambiguously brings up the question of priority, that is, his right to "the paternity of the idea of the Confederation". However, Kossuth was not the person to leave the question at that, i.e. within the bounds of a private letter. Almost simultaneously with this letter, he sent Canini's draft with not very precise instructions to Helfy. Beyond doubt, Kossuth must have suspected that what was to appear in *L'Alleanza* – with regard to the close connection which had developed between the newspaper, its editor and himself – might necessarily lead many to connect the idea of the Confederation and his person, even if his name would not be indicated in any concrete form.[11] Such a sophisticated manoeuvre would have been more suited to Kossuth's intentions, because it would have enabled him to offset Klapka's role in this matter. However, what actually happened produced a contrary effect: it caused such a big explosion which not only damaged the idea of the confederation itself, but it also disrupted the Hungarian National Directorate for good, the existence of which was already merely formal. It also definitely diverted Kossuth and Klapka from their alliance formed in 1859. Kossuth's anxiety proved to be well-founded: the document with his signature spread at an unusually rapid rate, and the international newspapers also widely publicized the content of the idea.[12]

[10] Kossuth to Klapka. Torino, 15 May 1862. (O.L., Klapka Papers.)

[11] As to the history of *L'Alleanza*, see: Fornario, Vincenza Maria: L'Alleanza giornali Italo-Ungherese di Milano. *Annuario dell'Accademia d'Ungheria di Roma*, 1937.

[12] What was published in *L'Alleanza* was taken over by the Milanese newspaper *La Perseveranza* on 19 May 1862, and also by *Il Popolo d'Italia*, of Naples, on 23 May. The Paris newspaper *Le Pays*

Defying its penchant for censorship, the Austrian regime was tolerant on this occasion, because it not only failed to throw obstacles in the way of publishing reviews of the document in *L'Alleanza*, but it even encouraged it to some extent, though in its own way.[13] This was not by mere chance, because the Austrian politicians might rightly believe that by permitting the publication of this highly controversial document, they could deal the emigration, as well as Kossuth, a blow, and thus they could diminish his influence, discrediting him in the eye of the political groups which were most influential on the public opinion. Since Kossuth with his political experience had anticipated that Helfy's action was likely to have far-reaching consequences – which, in addition, could be interpreted in many ways –, he wanted to forestall them in the most unambiguous form possible. There is no denying the fact, which was repeatedly confirmed and emphasized by Kossuth himself, that what *L'Alleanza* had published on 18 May 1862, was not his own draft, even though he agreed with its main argument. But at the same time, there is even less doubt about the fact that the information given in *L'Alleanza* on 1 June 1862 was really Kossuth's own draft, the wording of which had been painstakingly thought over, and for which Kossuth was willing to take full responsibility. Kossuth, who initially believed that Helfy could rectify his fatal error, later came to the unexpected decision that he would make an announcement in this matter himself, and he would make good for all what had happened. With this, he wanted to explain how Canini's loosely formulated draft he had signed, was to be understood, which had originally been designed to serve as a basis for further discussions. As far as it can be judged from the circumstances, Kossuth's explanation entitled "Information on the Danubian Confederation Project", written in the form of a letter, must have been prepared during the week immediately following the appearance of the delicate *L'Alleanza*-publication. It was dated 25 May, and Helfy published it in *L'Alleanza* on the following Sunday, i.e., on 1 June 1862.

KOSSUTH'S PLAN

What is perhaps the most surprising and thought-provoking is that Kossuth – while definitely declaring that the *L'Alleanza*-publication of 18 May was not his work, and it was only "a proposed basis for discussion", rather than an elaborated plan or manifesto – took an impressively strong stand for the basic

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was also among the first to publish the document. In the 2 June 1862 issue of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the Baron József Eötvös dealt with what had been published in *L'Alleanza*.

[13] On 6 June 1862, the journal *Sürgöny* (Telegraph) brought out certain details of the document with some explanatory notes. In the same issue of this newspaper, Aurél Kecskeméthy wrote a review in a sharply critical tone. In the same newspaper, Kecskeméthy reverted to the topic on 17 June 1862, declaring that Kossuth "Sacrificed the fundamental principles of our national existence, the legal status of our country, its historical rights, and the integrity of the Fatherland". The related articles published in *Sürgöny*, were taken over by the conservative newspaper *Pesti Hírnök* (The Pest Herald) which published them in June 1862.

idea set forth in the document, as well as for the feasibility, rightfulness and necessity of the Confederation. He did not omit the question of priority either. This unmistakably refers to his rivalry with Klapka, especially when he emphasizes that "*The idea of a Danubian Confederation is not a new one, perhaps I was the first to suggest this idea, as a logical postulate of the development of Europe, as early as 1851*". What is really surprising in this matter is that, while Klapka, who had worked out the plan for the Danubian Confederation in 1862, remained in the background, Kossuth not only failed to feel it appropriate at least to refer to Klapka's name, but he virtually made a pretence of being the only intellectual father and active protector of the ideas about the confederation, when he devoted a sizeable text to explain and advocate the confederation-idea.

In this context, we could refer to the historical antecedents, which would give evidence of the historical role the Romanian Bălcescu and Ghica played in formulating and popularizing the idea of the Danubian Confederation. We might also underline the obvious significance of Teleki and Klapka in this field. Instead, we shall only limit ourselves to trace Kossuth's commitment to the cause of the Danubian Confederation over time. He, who initially had abstained from bringing up this topic in public, now passed over into the opposite, when he addressed the general public with a polemic treatise. Kossuth turned primarily to those who were presumably concerned about the Danubian Confederation because it might have offered some possibility of limiting the Hungarian national sovereignty. Therefore, he pointed out that the essential aim of this Confederation was to join forces in creating united defence against external enemies and to organize a federal army which could only be deployed in the case of war. The federal army might only be stationed at certain fortresses marked out at places of strategic importance, which then would be qualified as federal military bases. Each of the member-states would maintain its own national army, which, however, should not enter the territory of any other member-state, except in the case of war emergency. As regards the common diplomatic representation, Kossuth held that it would not be inconsistent with the independent national diplomatic representation of the individual member-states. In respect of the Federal Parliament, Kossuth refrained from offering an alternate solution, that is, whether it be one- or two-chambered. He rather definitely declared – in harmony with Klapka's plan – that the Federal Parliament should consist of a House of Representatives and a Senate. In his opinion, this set-up guarantees the independence of the individual member-states. This time he was already willing to react upon the issue of the official language: in accordance with Klapka's view, he was also for the French language as the generally accepted parlance of the European diplomacy. However, there was one point which was missing from Klapka's plan: namely, Kossuth held it inevitable under the actual situation of Europe that all states which would be members of the Confederation, including Hungary, should adopt "the principle of constitutional monarchy". Kossuth maintained that "Hungary will have to elect a King, and this King should be a Roman Catholic and be elected from among the members of one of the presently ruling royal families of

Europe". However surprising this proposal of Kossuth is, as he had once been Mazzini's ally, it was not new in itself. Kossuth had already brought it up at the Paris negotiations of 1859, when he thought of a member of the Bonaparte-dynasty who was worthy of the Hungarian crown.[14] We are hardly very far from the truth when we surmise that Kossuth with this proposal, which was surprising of him after all, wanted to calm the European conservative powers that feared democratic republics of any kind. But when Kossuth took a strong stand for monarchy, of course with the strict exclusion of the Habsburg-dynasty, what he had in mind went beyond the aspects of foreign policy. He thought of some expectable benefits which would improve the chances and guarantees of preserving the territorial integrity of the historical Hungary. In response to those who had accused him of giving up the territorial integrity and historical rights of Hungary, Kossuth declared that he would attempt to incorporate all Hungarian historical and monarchic principles, along with the theorem of the Hungarian Holy Crown – dating back to the Middle Ages – in the Confederation's sphere of thought. All this, however, necessarily gave rise to contradictions and controversies and to virtually irreconcilable views and problems which understandably aroused the aversion of both the supporters and the opposers of the Confederation. When Kossuth raised the issues of Transylvania and Croatia, he actually ventured to explain, and to interpret in a particular way, one of the most delicate details of the conception of the Confederation. He gave Croatia a certain chance to opt out of Hungary to form an independent state, and as such, to join the Confederation. Although after his own heart, and yielding to reason, also referring to the Croatians' own interest, he proposed Croatia to remain "the component of the Hungarian Crown" under a common ruler, when he suggested that "it is in the interest of the Croatians to elect the same person as their King as the Hungarians would do". The situation with Transylvania is quite different in Kossuth's view, considering that a Transylvanian nationality as such does not exist. Like many other parts of Hungary, this region is also populated by mixed nationalities. Moreover, its historical past is also different. "Transylvania is an ancient constituent part of Hungary, part of original making of Hungary, an inseparable pearl in the Hungarian Crown. Transylvania is a land which legally, historically, physically, geographically, politically as well as from the aspect of state administration is an integral part of the Hungarian Crown, without which the Hungarian Crown is not a crown, Hungary is not Hungary, but something like a torso, or I do not know what to call it." It is not intended here to go into the further details of Kossuth's arguments, with which he retorted the views of his opponents. It will suffice to refer to the only allowance Kossuth was willing to make in this matter, which can be summarized as follows. When Hungary had gained its independence – and by no means sooner than that – the Transylva-

[14] Cf. Gooch, G. P.: *The Second Empire*. London, 1960, pp. 106 ff; "... my nation will offer Saint Stephen's crown to Your Highness" – Kossuth told the Prince Jérôme Napoléon on 18 May 1859. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* I, p. 214.

nian population could decide itself whether it would remain in union with Hungary in terms of state administration, or would prefer an autonomous administration, with the proviso that "the political unity and the right of the Hungarian Crown to possess Transylvania should by all means be left intact, because the Hungarian nation would never permit even to simply question either this or the common ruler". Further on, he also expounds that Transylvania as a member-country of equal rights of the Confederation "would by no means loosen, but, by virtue of its own interests, it would rather strengthen its relationship to the Hungarian Crown". Considering Transylvania's multi-national character, Kossuth proposed the same principles to be followed in managing the nationality problems as those applied "in the case of Hungary", i.e. the nationality rights should be guaranteed within the framework of the counties. Kossuth brought up similar ideas in respect of the Serb population living in a major block in the southern parts of Hungary. More particularly, he proposed that two counties be formed out of the one-time Military Borderland, which would be populated mostly by Serbs, and to which some additional minor areas could be annexed from the neighbouring Serb-inhabited counties. At the same time, this proposal fitted well into Kossuth's scheme of 15 September 1860, concerning the assurance of the nationality rights, which aimed to settle the problem under the county system that was considered to be maintained.[15]

In any case, however much effort Kossuth had made to buttress the territorial integrity of the historical Hungary, even by making concessions in order to calm down the nationalities, those concerned could see nothing but contradictions in all this. Neither of the interested parties had the feeling that their respective rights and interests were properly protected. It was so, despite the fact that Kossuth – with his many-sided argumentation and singular rhetoric, as well as by declaring far-sighted truths – tried hard to defend his proposals. However, the more immersed he was in clarifying these highly complex and delicate problems, the less evident they were to the mind of those involved. To such an extent that everyone finally became quite embittered, frustrated, disappointed and discontented. On hearing about this, Kossuth also became despaired. In spite of his family's tragedy – Vilma, his daughter died at the time – Kossuth devoted the rest of his energy to elaborating further explanations. When, in his letter of 20 June 1862, Kossuth informed the Countess Károlyi of the unfavourable effect the Confederation plan had produced in Hungary, he practically wrote a minor article of a dramatic tone in defence of his conceptions. In this sizeable letter, Kossuth ranks the opponents of his plan among those who wish to reach a compromise with Austria, and tends to attribute the unfavourable reception of the plan to the effect which these opponent views produced on the Hungarian public

[15] For Kossuth's explanations, see: "Schiarimenti intorno al progretto della Confederazione Danubiana", dated Torino, 25 May 1862 (*L'Alleanza*, 1 June 1862; O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4044/c, 4047; in French: *Ibid.* I, 4044.) *A közelmúlt titkaiból*, *op. cit.* II, pp. 107 ff; Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 12 ff.

opinion.[16] Although, in his subsequent explanations, Kossuth many-sidedly proved that his conceptions related to Transylvania were consistent with the requirement of maintaining Hungary's territorial integrity, the interested parties contemplated this issue from a widely different aspect. Only a faint allusion to a potential future independence of Transylvania, or to the mere possibility of its becoming an independent member-state of the Confederation, was enough for the leading Hungarian politicians to find serious offences and grievances hidden in the proposal, which, therefore, had to be immediately rejected. It may well be stated that the Transylvanian issue was the most vulnerable spot, heel of Achilles, of the whole complex problem. The Countess Károlyi and still many others, even though tacitly, took notice of Kossuth's argument that his proposals might serve best to maintain the integrity of the historical Hungary, and that the Hungarians, by their numerical size and political weight, might play the leading role within the Confederation. But all those who could actually exert a real influence on the general public of Hungary, most decidedly disagreed with Kossuth.[17] The plan met with no less resistance on the part of the leading circles of the affected neighbouring countries. Cuza turned against it, while the Serbs and the Croatians received it with reservation. Even those who found that the plan contained certain possibilities for further dialogues, looked upon it as a merely theoretical fiction without any practical significance.[18]

Kossuth could hardly struggle successfully against these highly ramified and involved interests, and he had to come to realize that he had been left alone. He became upset when he came to know that István Türr even gave voice to the utterly unfavourable reception of the Danubian Confederation plan in *L'Alleanza*. This also meant that Helfy was retreating and made concession to other leaders of the Hungarian emigration. Although, in his letter of 23 June 1862 to Türr, Kossuth enlarged upon the question of how the idea of the Confederation should be defended and how necessary it was to write about it in the leading Italian newspapers, he also made a clear allusion to the responsibility of Klapka for the adverse turn of events related to the plan. Kossuth emphasized: "... as regards Klapka, I inform you that the idea of the Confederation, at least

[16] Kossuth to the Countess Gy. Károlyi [Ragaz], 20 June 1862. (*A közelmúlt titkaiból*, *op. cit.* II, pp. 117 ff.)

[17] The political newspaper *Magyar Sajtó* (Hungarian Press; edited by the writer Mór Jókai) first qualified "the Hungarian manifesto" as a forgery, then, in its issue of 7 June 1862, it reported that the Resolution Party rejected it on its conference held on 1 June. In his diary, the Baron Frigyes Podmaniczky thus wrote "People are driven by manifestos of this kind" towards the compromise. (Podmaniczky Frigyes: *Naplótöredék* 1824–1887 (Diary fragment 1824–1887), Vols. I–III. Budapest, 1888, III, p. 143.)

[18] Cf. Canini: *op. cit.* pp. 230 ff; Jorga, N.: Un précurseur de la confédération balcanique: Marc'Antonio Canini. (*Bulletin de la section historique de l'Académie Roumain*. Bucureşti, 1913); *Episodi diplomatici del Risorgimento Italiano dal 1856 al 1863*, estratti dalle carte del Generale Giacomo Durando, compilata da Cesare Durando già suo segretario particolare. Torino, 1901; Jancsó B.: *Szabadságharcunk és a dako-román törekvések* (Our war of independence and the Daco-Roman endeavours). Budapest, 1895, pp. 300 ff; Maturi, W.: I avventure, *op. cit.* pp. 582 ff.

presently, is much more his than mine. It was he who discussed Canini's mission to the East in this matter with Ragazzi ...".[19] The farther Kossuth got from the events and the more he contemplated the developments from a perspective, the more he renounced his former claim to the original authorship of the whole plan. In his autographic notes written in Hungarian and entitled *Origins of the noise about the Danubian Confederation*, Kossuth unemotionally and profoundly explained that – when thinking about the creation of the Danubian Confederation – he never wanted to push Turkey into the background and always reckoned with the necessity of restoring Poland, of these he gave proper information to Canini. This actually refers to the insurmountable international difficulties which the plan would have had to face if realized. Kossuth also unambiguously pointed out that it was Canini who had prepared the document signed by him, while Helfy "*drummed it up as my work, which it was not*".[20]

Another not insignificant component of the affair is that Türr was unable to fulfil Kossuth's wishes as to the propaganda campaign in the Italian newspapers, because the Rattazzi-government sounded the general retreat. The government's role had been rather contradictory from the outset – as Canini also remarked in his memoirs. Canini's backing by King Victor Emmanuel II was rather transitional, because the affairs about the elevation of the King's second son to the Greek throne gave rise to a series of complications. Canini had to experience that the Italian consuls and diplomatic representatives, upon the support of whom he seriously counted in the course of his mission in the Balkans, would abandon him in succession, in fact, they would even make every effort to impede his activity. As a result, Canini's further plans to promote the friendly co-operation of the Balkanic peoples, ended up in failure.

The Romanian Prince Cuza declined to assent to any action which would interfere with the interests of either Austria or Turkey, or would provoke them. Otherwise, Cuza maintained that the problem of the formation of the independent Romanian state, i.e. the unification of the two Romanian principalities, could be achieved sooner and easier through concessions to be made by the interested great powers than through the vague plans of Hungarian emigrants.[21] Under the general power relations, both Napoleon III and the Italian government soon stopped playing with the idea of the Confederation. With this, all that had been proposed first by Klapka, and then by Kossuth, was relegated to the world of illusions.

Finally, the "noise about the Danubian Confederation" – to quote Kossuth – abated in accordance with the desire of many of those important personalities of the emigration who feared further complications. As Sebő Vukovics put it, whatever we may do, however we may explain it, it would never be suitable "to calm

[19] Kossuth to Türr, Ragaz, 23 June 1862. (O.L., Türr Papers, 1836; O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4060.) Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 1 ff.

[20] O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4044/a.

[21] Cf. Canini: *op. cit.* pp. 237 ff; Jorga: *op. cit.*; Marcu, A.: *Conspiratori si conspiratii in epoca renasterii politice a României, 1848–1877.* Bucureşti, 1930, pp. 310 ff.

down the people and, at the same time, to uphold the principles of the program – so I think we had better give up the whole project, without further ado ...".[22]

Even if not in public, but in his letters, Kossuth made further efforts to set people's mind at ease. As he had already written to the Countess Károlyi that from the aspect of sending external liberating forces to Hungary it was essential to come to an agreement with the Romanians, the Serbs and the Croatians, so he also held this necessary to prevent the nationalities in Hungary from receiving the coming foreign troops with hostile feelings. The same argument was very explicitly worded in Kossuth's letter, of 7 July 1862, to Sebő Vukovics, where he made it clear to his fellow-emigrants that the goal of the Confederation plan was "to open the door and to make way", and to help in liberating Hungary. Kossuth added to these military policy considerations that he wanted them to think over his unbinding proposal more soberly, which did not impose any obligation on the nation: he thought that the interested parties, after the liberation of the fatherland, might still decide on whether they would accept it or not.[23] In his reply of 23 August 1862, Vukovics insisted on dropping the whole Confederation project. Though he remarked that resentments started to fade away and "those who are the wisest declared: that they knew it was not Kossuth's wish, but a manoeuvre dictated by the circumstances".[24] On the other hand, it was precisely the strong emphasis which Kossuth laid on the practical, current political advantages of the Confederation that baffled the others. Independently of moral considerations, Jácint Rónay also disapproved Kossuth's standpoint from a political aspect.[25] On hearing Kossuth's interpretation, Dániel Irányi explicitly reproached Kossuth for his mentioning the Confederation program as a possibility "to open the door" to return home and "to make way for marching into the country". In his letter to Kossuth, Irányi remarked that Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss had already imparted some of his comments on Kossuth's conception to him: "so you also wish to regard the announcement of that program as a tactical step" and "I do not want to think it of Kossuth that he has recourse to the tricks of everyday diplomacy".[26] All this suggests that Kossuth, who had been increasingly reduced to a defensive position, could not abate the controversies and protests about the plan, though he deployed his most practical and reasonable arguments.

Suppositions and opinions that the publication of the Danube Confederation plan in its original 1862 form might have been a sort of counter-program or a realistic alternative to the maturing compromise with Austria, can only be regarded as strong overstatements. There is no doubt that the idea of the Confederation and the related conceptions theoretically (and only theoretically)

[22] Sebő Vukovics to Kossuth, London, 1 July 1862, (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4063.)

[23] Kossuth to Sebő Vukovics, Ragaz, 7 July 1862. (Rónay, J.: *Napló-töredék. Hetven év reményei és csalódásai* [Diary-fragment. Hopes and frustrations of seventy years]. Vols. I–VIII. Pozsony, 1884–1888, III, pp. 229 ff.)

[24] Sebő Vukovics to Kossuth, London, 23 August 1862. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4077.)

[25] Rónay: *op. cit.* III, p. 234.

[26] Dániel Irányi to Kossuth, Paris, 18 December 1862. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4097.)

offered, or sought for, a development which was quite different from the one that the leading circles in Hungary had taken. The Confederation idea actually lacked any significant socio-political basis, either at home or abroad. In spite of this, the idea, which Kossuth even defended, though with major pauses, has a proper place among the progressive historical tendencies, as well as in the socio-political thought of both the Hungarian and the South-East European peoples. It gave energy and inspiration to all who wished the friendly co-operation and alliance of the Danubian peoples and sought after, and found, resource and support in this idea. However, we should not forget about the fact either that these *"ex-post"* theoretical evaluations and historical interpretations do not have much to do with the actual and concrete events and circumstances in spring 1862, when the plan for the Confederation was conceived, and then soon removed from the agenda.[27]

It was a strange characteristic of this affair that Klapka, who had been the first to draft the plan of the Confederation in 1862, completely remained in the background as if he had had nothing to do with it. However, considering that unlike Kossuth's related interpretations and modifications, Klapka's original plan has never become known in Hungary, Klapka rightly felt that he had really not much to do with it. He also knew that it would be a fruitless effort to fight for the priority with Kossuth, who was much more proficient and effective in the art of writing. It belongs to the historical truth that Klapka had maintained silence, but it was broken by Canini. Having heard of the publication of Kossuth's writings and explanations, Canini broke his obligation to keep secret, and thought that there was no objection to his publishing the original Klapka-plan in its entirety. So the original version appeared in the Bucharest newspaper *Romanulu* on 15 July 1862.[28] As it appears from the date of publication, the document signed by Kossuth was published two months earlier than Klapka's original. But the difference was even more significant in the rate of circulation and spreading of the two documents. While Klapka's plan was published almost unnoticed and was distributed within a narrow circle, Kossuth's version spread from Milan at a very rapid rate, and so it became inseparably linked to Kossuth's name.

It is not uninteresting to note that Klapka's original plan still had to undergo many complications, though in very discrete forms. Canini, whose activity in Romania had encountered many difficulties and had been followed with the suspicion of the official circles, as well as with the reserved attitude of diplomats, finally fell into the trap of the Turkish police. In the course of a house search, all

[27] Cf. Jászi Oszkár: *Magyarország jövője és a dunai egyesült államok* (The future of Hungary and the Danubian United States). Budapest, 1918; György János: *A dunai konföderáció* (The Danubian Confederation). Budapest, 1918; Balogh Edgár: Kossuth Lajos és a dunai szövetség (Lajos Kossuth and the Danubian Alliance). (*Korunk*, 1937.); Révai József: *Kossuth Lajos* (place of publication not indicated) 1944.

[28] Klapka's plan, countersigned by Pulszky: "Programa unei Confederări Dunariane", Torino, 15 April 1862. (*Romanulu*, 15 July 1862); Letter of Annibale Strambio, the Bucharest Consul of Italy, to the Italian Foreign Minister Durando, Bucharest, 29 July 1862. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 805.)

his papers, including a French language copy of Klapka's plan, were sequestrated.[29] From here, in some curious way, it arrived in London, to the desk of the British Foreign Secretary of State Lord Russell, who may hardly have been pleased with the plan which reckoned upon the collapse of the Austrian Empire, and who may have suspected a French inspiration behind it. Lord Russell did not hesitate to inform the British Ambassador Hudson in Turin of the affair, asking him to give further explanation. They soon imparted their available information in this matter to the Austrian Foreign Minister Count Rechberg as well.[30] The Italian Foreign Minister Giacomo Durando, of whom Ambassador Hudson expected a reply in this matter, was in an awkward situation. The Italian government circles knew of Canini's mission, and, initially, had agreed with it. Finally, they preferred to maintain silence. Having experienced the bitter consequences of the Confederation plan, after it had become public through Kossuth's communications, Klapka was very pleased with this silence.

[29] It is indicated on the copy of Klapka's plan, which the British Ambassador Hudson sent from Turin to the Italian Foreign Minister Durando, that the Turkish police had found it among Canini's papers. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 116, fasc. 2.)

[30] Tamborra: Progetti e idee, *op. cit.* p. 374.

IV.

EMERGING NEW GROUPS OF THE HUNGARIAN EMIGRATION AFTER 1863

THE KLAPKA–KOMÁROMY–CSÁKY ALLIANCE

To establish and maintain international contacts, to keep the emigration in touch with the political circles at home, and to act as mediators: these were the tasks which the more radical elements of the malcontent groups in Hungary assigned, first of all, to the elderly György Komáromy and the younger, but very active, Count Tivadar Csáky, who was also well versed in international affairs. At first, the secret committee, which aimed to organize the resistance within Hungary and which gave Komáromy and Csáky the mentioned tasks, had been working under the name of the Pest Revolutionary Committee, later it assumed the name of the Budapest Hungarian National Committee. It is not at all easy to establish whether or not the Pest Revolutionary Committee was really an alive and active organization. It cannot be excluded either that, occasionally, Komáromy and Csáky just followed their own singular conceptions. And those to whom they were closely related, simply took notice of their activities, thinking that they would welcome and recognize anything that might be useful and rewarding for them, and would disavow any action that could interfere with their interests. It is also unlikely that the Pest Revolutionary Committee may have been a solid and clear-cut organization which could precisely define the tasks assigned to Csáky and Komáromy, and could make them fully responsible for their activities, including the possibility of calling them to account. Although it was not the case that the foreign representatives of the Hungarian malcontents acted on their own account or their activities were essentially of a private nature or were to cover some personal motives; but nevertheless, there were many eventualities and uncertain circumstances in their Hungarian relations, and these did not make their emigrational activity transparent and unequivocal. However, both Komáromy and Csáky may also have been aware of the difficulties and contradictions which their role and situation involved, and they recognized that they could hardly take any significant step forward by themselves.

The elderly Komáromy's name was by no means unknown to the emigration leaders. The mere fact that they had regarded him as Kossuth's representative in Hungary for several years, made free way for him to approach the emigration. As the native of and one of the most prestigious landlords in Bihar County, Komáromy's name sounded well in Hungary. During the decades preceding the Freedom Fight, he had played a leading role in the reform movement, and became a hussar captain of the revolutionary army in 1848. For his activities,

he was condemned by the Austrian court-martial in the mid-fifties to serve his sentence in the prison of the fortress of Josefstadt. These troubles, along with the overall deterioration of the economic situation, seriously affected his financial position, and it cannot be excluded that he might not have been very efficient in managing his landed estates. In the early fifties, he was living mainly in Paris where he was on friendly terms with Pál Almássy and László Teleki. He became a representative of the Resolution Party in 1861, and as a person well versed in the affairs of the emigration, he was absolutely welcomed by his friends who considered him to be able and ready to establish contacts among the malcontent Hungarian politicians, the foreign governments, and the Hungarian emigration.[1]

At the age of 47 in 1863, György Komáromy was glad to have a young helper in his tasks. His helper was the Count Tivadar Csáky who had been born in Bártfa (Sáros County) in 1834, and who was one of the most daring Resolution Party speakers at the 1861 Diet to condemn the absolutist system, sharply demanding the restoration of constitutionality. Serving in the Austrian army between 1850 and 1857, Csáky had started his military career as a cadet, then rose to the rank of first lieutenant; he quitted the army, which was an act tantamount to taking an explicit political stand. After the fall of the Austrian absolutist Bach-administration, he flung himself whole-heartedly into the movements of the opposition, took part in the noted Kazinczy-festivities, then he sharply condemned the absolutist system in a political pamphlet entitled "What do we wish?" published in both Hungarian and German in spring 1860. If the so-called October Diploma – which was an imposed constitution issued in October 1860 – had been belated, he might well have been prosecuted. Having averted this, Csáky participated in the parliamentary election campaign and became an active member of the Resolution Party massing around László Teleki. Csáky was also one of the most active members of the Free Mason movement in Hungary, as he was the president of the Saint Stephen Masonic Lodge. Many of his political friends – the Count Sándor Károlyi and others – were also participating in managing the Masonic affairs, all of them being adherents of the Resolution Party. Csáky attached great importance to fostering the foreign relations of the Hungarian Masonic Movement. He took part in the establishment of the Ister Lodge in Geneva in 1863.[2] After the dissolution of the Diet of 1861, the Hungarian Free Mason movement could provide a certain organizational framework for maintaining co-operation and contacts, as well as for developing their aforementioned plans. It would be difficult to squarely determine when Komáromy

[1] György Komáromy's registration card. (H. L. Police registration from the Bach-era); Szinnyei József: *Magyar írók élete és munkái* (Life and works of Hungarian writers). Vol. VI, pp. 816–817; Kienast, A.: *Die Legion Klapka.* Wien, 1900, p. 42.

[2] Cf. Von einem Magnaten [Count Tivadar Csáky]: *Was wir wünschen?* Pest, 1860; *Magyar nemzetiségi zsebkönyv* (Hungarian gentilitial pocket-book). Budapest, 1888, p. 70; Kempelen Béla: *Magyar nemesi családok* (Hungarian noble families). Budapest, 1912, pp. 44–46; Szinnyei: *op. cit.* II, p. 151; Kienast: *op. cit.* p. 38.

and Csáky had entered into a closer political co-operation. One thing, however, is certain, namely, that Csáky always paid due respect to his relative, as Komáromy's wife was the Countess Rozália Csáky. After Komáromy had made himself independent of Kossuth, and turned primarily to international affairs, Tivadar Csáky gladly undertook to assist Komáromy, so much the more as he wished to avoid harassments on the part of the police force.[3]

The joint appearance of the more experienced Komáromy, and Csáky with his shorter, but all the more significant political past, on the scene of emigration triggered in 1863 a whole series of new processes. These in various forms, became part of the political history of emigration, and reached their climax at the time of the warfare of 1866. It should be mentioned that historiographers have not paid too much attention to the emigrational activities of Csáky and Komáromy. And even if they happened to make mention of their names, it was invariably in the negative, exclusively relying on information included in Kossuth's memoirs. At the same time, it is also a fact that the relevant historical sources, necessary to study this problem in depth, have not been made available to researchers until recently in the Hungarian and foreign archives. In attempting to give answer to many emerging questions of the highly complex history of emigration, we also take into account these source materials.

It can be conceived as an explicit political intent that Komáromy and Csáky were primarily charged with the task of entering into contact with the Italian government to achieve support from them, both financial and other, for the opposition movement of the Hungarian nobility and bourgeoisie, and also to achieve that the Italian government would look upon this movement as an active force which would help it in its expected future anti-Austrian war. Amidst their efforts to find the feasible ways and means, Komáromy and Csáky necessarily had to turn their attention towards Klapka, whose close connections with the Italian government had already been widely known. Furthermore, Klapka was prestigious and influential enough within the emigration to act not only as a mediator between the Italian government and the Hungarian malcontents, but also as an active promoter of the emigration's objectives, even independently of Kossuth.

Thus it may be stated that György Klapka, at that moment, came into the centre of interest of the malcontent political groups in Hungary. These groups now sought to win Klapka over to their cause through the good offices of Komáromy and Csáky. It is also beyond doubt that Komáromy maintained very cordial and friendly relations with Klapka. However, this did not mean that Klapka would almost automatically adopt Komáromy's plans. As has been mentioned, this orientation towards Klapka virtually dates back to 1861, so 1863 saw only the start of newer attempts to make more explicit approaches to him. Although Klapka, who had always been utterly particular about his independence of all political lines and had taken good care to have a free hand in his activities,

[3] Count Tivadar Csáky to the Countess Andrássy, Genf, 16 October 1863. (O.L., Csáky Papers.)

received the endeavours of Komáromy and Csáky with sympathy and helpfulness, yet it took several months before their relations in this matter were outlined and determined in a more serious and definite form.[4] But all is not lost that is delayed: their co-operation, which had already been active even until then, became so ripe by November 1863 that it was possible to conclude a formal agreement between Klapka and the representatives of the Pest Revolutionary Committee. The first three of the six points of the agreement defined the scope of activity of Klapka. Accordingly, General Klapka was responsible for managing all affairs of military character, either in domestic or in emigration relations, and he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army to be organized in the event of a new war of independence. At the same time, Klapka recognized the Pest Revolutionary Committee as the political leader of the domestic resistance movements, and under the agreement, he had to act in conformity with the objectives and programs of the Committee. Furthermore, Klapka recognized that György Komáromy was the diplomatic commissioner of the Pest-seated Committee, with whom he was supposed to act in close co-operation in matters related to the friendly governments; he was also to promote Komáromy's international activities. The agreement was concluded in Geneva on 22 November 1863, and its content was endorsed by the signatures of György Klapka and György Komáromy.[5]

Klapka had already made efforts to introduce Komáromy and Csáky in the Italian government quarters before this date. Beginning with the spring of 1863, the Minghetti-government preferred Klapka's recommendations concerning the support of the resistance movement in Hungary, in the hope that it might take the necessary steps if anti-Austrian conflict happens to outbreak.[6] While strongly calculating upon the Italian government's financial and military aid, Klapka and his domestic friends and supporters declined to take the risk of sparking out an untimely, unprepared and inconsiderate uprising. They rejected this idea so much the more as the Austrian military overpower could contain the Hungarian resistance movement, which might only be successful if Austria – with the major part of its forces – were engaged in war operations elsewhere. Moreover, the activity of those malcontent political leaders who belonged to the landed gentry, was strongly influenced by the question of how the country's Hungarian and non-Hungarian peasants would behave and what stand they would take in the event of a revolt. The outcome of all this was quite uncertain. In fact, there were indications that these nobles were seriously anxious about an eventual peasant

[4] Klapka to Komáromy, Genf, 7 August 1863. (O.L., Csáky Papers); 10, 21 September, 22, 23 October 1863. (*Ibid.*); Csáky to Klapka, Genf, 5 May 1863. (*Ibid.*)

[5] Protocol of agreement between Klapka and Komáromy, the commissioner of the Hungarian Committee, Geneva, 23 November 1863. (O.L., Csáky Papers.)

[6] Klapka to the Italian Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta, Torino, 25 March 1863. (A.C.R., Carte di Visconti Venosta, Busta 1, Pacco 2.); Genf, 24 July 1863, attached to which is a simultaneous report to Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Cerruti. (*Ibid.*); Klapka to Cerruti, Zürich, 31 July 1863. (*Ibid.*); Genf, 12 October 1863. (*Ibid.*)

uprising, of which the landed nobility could expect anything but good. In spring 1863, a discussion was held by the organizing oppositionist politicians in the Count Ede Károlyi's place, where they gave utterance to their concerns about the outcome of an armed revolt. The Count Pál Almássy made rather unambiguous references to the Polish example of 1846, when the peasants had taken revenge on their landlords. Those present were all interested in excluding the risks and dangers involved in a peasant uprising, and they also sought to find some protection against the expectedly uncertain conduct of the nationalities.

Simultaneously with these developments, the results of the session of the separate Transylvanian Diet, which enjoyed the support of the Viennese government, also clearly indicated that the oppositionist Hungarian nobles, with their limited and undaring social objectives and programs, could hardly undertake to trigger an independent armed revolt.[7] But it was precisely on account of all this that the importance of foreign policy combinations and the prospects of a well-timed support by external powers had been increasing, as these might have encouraged those desiring real socio-political changes in the country.

Under such circumstances, the role of Klapka and Komáromy, also in respect of the Italian government support, was narrowed down to such activities as to do preparatory works, to manage the silent, but strenuous organizational efforts, to take stock of the necessary and seemingly active internal military forces, to smuggle arms into the country, to store them in widely different places, and to make sure that everything was prepared for deployment when opportunity would so arise.

It should be emphasized that the Minghetti-government itself did not expect more than that, because preconditions for an anti-Austrian war were not given. Due to its precarious international position, Austria took good care not to provoke anybody and to maintain, at least momentarily, its peaceful relations with both Prussia and Italy. Led by these intents, the Austrian government declined to take any step that would serve the suppression of the Polish uprising in Russia, which, however, Prussia did not hesitate to do, if only because of protecting its own Polish-inhabited regions. Moreover, Austria joined Great Britain and France in lodging a protest with the Tsarist Russia, demanding concessions to be made for the Poles and an equitable settling of the Polish problem. Austria also tolerated the supply of arms to the Poles through the territory of Galicia. In addition, despite some formal counter-measures it had taken, Austria also tolerated tacitly that volunteers from the territory of the Austrian Empire went over to the camp of the Polish rebels.[8] Though the contradictions of this ambiguous political conduct became increasingly conspicuous, this policy helped Austria to avert some disadvantageous armed conflicts, and with this, Austria also managed to neutralize the Hungarian emigration's conceptions based on international

[7] Cf. Lukács Lajos: *Magyar függetlenségi és alkotmányos mozgalmak 1849–1867* (Hungarian independence and constitutional movements 1849–1867); henceforward: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak*, pp. 340–341.

[8] *Ibid.* pp. 324 ff.

combinations. These developments were, of course, not pleasant for the activists of the Hungarian emigration. In spite of this, neither Klapka, nor Komáromy and Csáky had any special reason for anxiety, because the Italian government did not deny its support even under the new circumstances, it just requested not to disclose their activity ahead of time.

KOSSUTH'S COUNTER-MOVES

When the Italian government circles, on Kossuth's proposal, entered into contact with Komáromy and Csáky, and placed confidence in them, they did so in the awareness that the two Hungarian personalities were representing the intentions and wishes of the active groups of the Hungarian opposition. They believed that these groups had deliberately resorted to the Italian Kingdom, and that they had prestige and significant influence on Hungarian society, so that the Italians could reckon on them in due time. However, the same did not apply at all to the relationship between Kossuth and the Italian government, which had become increasingly eventual ever since 1861. Even if there were occasional contacts and correspondence in connection with some concrete events or topics, these contacts became increasingly more rare and narrow, showing no sign of any continuity. Kossuth actually attached importance to fostering the relationship and co-operation with the Italian government, but he had to experience several refusals, distrust and reservation on the part of the Italians. This more and more discouraged him, though he never gave up trying, from time to time, to revive these contacts, which he had always regarded as indispensable for him.

Ever since early 1861, i.e. still in Cavour's life, the Italian government had strongly advised the Hungarian emigrants to try to achieve their national and constitutional objectives by legal and peaceful means. This attitude of the Italian government's high officials did not change even after Cavour's death; we might think of the time when Ricasoli and Rattazzi were prime ministers, or of the Farini-administration. This, however, did not prevent them from reckoning on the appearance of an internal national movement in Hungary, when they were considering an anti-Austrian action. And they did not necessarily identify the direction and program of that movement with the intentions and objectives of Kossuth and the Hungarian emigrant groups. At the time of Minghetti's government, Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta found it appropriate to send his agents to Hungary to fathom the real situation, to hold discussion with Hungarian politicians, to ask their opinion and conceptions concerning the further developments, and to gather general information of the actual state of the country, as well as of the wishes of the individual strata of Hungarian society. They were no less keen to know if the objectives of Kossuth and the emigration could obtain adequate social support, and if so, how much in Hungary. They also wanted to know if those pieces of information which the individual members of emigration had supplied to the Italian government, were realistic and well-founded enough.

Alberto Cavaletto, head of the Venetian Secret Committee, played an important role in preparing the Hungarian journey of the Italian government agents Emanuele Ruspoli and Giuseppe Giacomelli. It was Cavaletto who received the confidential reports of the agents, and then forwarded them to Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta. Between 1863 and 1865, the agents made several trips to Hungary, where they held discussions with Ferenc Deák, Menyhért Lónyay, as well as with several influential members of the Resolution Party. Though gathered at various points of time, all the information agreed on one point, namely, that the leading members of the Hungarian political prestige groups, irrespective of their party affiliation, apart from a small minority, all rejected Kossuth's person, his style and method of managing the affairs, along with the political line which he represented and expected to be followed by the emigration. These leading circles wanted to ensure the country's transformation into a constitutional state under the guidance of the political forces of the Hungarian opposition and by realizing the intentions and objectives of those forces. It was also implied in the transformation into a constitutional state that Hungary would maintain relationship with Austria; some even supposed a more favourable international situation. The Italian government's preliminary evaluations of the Hungarian situation were only confirmed by the reports of Ruspoli and Giacomelli. So the Italian government quarters were corroborated in their belief that it would be more justifiable to support Klapka, Komáromy, Csáky and the related Hungarian political circles than Kossuth.[9]

Although the Italian government did not intend to make war against Austria in the foreseeable future, it still agreed with Klapka, Komáromy and Csáky that the forces of the Hungarian opposition should be prepared for a potential international conflict, taking the incalculable outcome of the Polish events also into consideration. Funds necessary to the organizational preparation of the oppositionist forces, reached Hungary through the mediation of Klapka, Komáromy and Csáky. In Hungary, in turn, it was the Hungarian Secret Committee's duty to see to it that the military plans were properly elaborated and the eligible military leaders selected. Simultaneously, the purchase of arms also started through various British, French and Italian trading companies, by using the funds made available by the Italian government. In late 1863, the secret transport of arms to Hungary actually began. According to the instructions, the arms had to be stored in secret places and be kept there until the time was ripe for action.

However, this quiet and continuous preparatory work could not remain in the desired secrecy. Members of the Hungarian opposition were almost without exception under police surveillance, and besides this, there were also several people whom the authorities found suitable to be planted among the participants of the organization. In spite of this, the Austrian police forces, even if they had a suspicion, could not do too much for lack of evidence. Meetings held in the Pest

[9] Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* (see footnote 111 on page 60) pp. VI, XIX ff; Ferenczi Zoltán: *Deák élete* (Life of Deák). Vols. I–III. Budapest, 1904, III, pp. 33 ff; Tamborra, Angelo: *Imbro I. Tkalac e l'Italia*. Roma, 1966, pp. 85 ff.

coffee-houses *Vadászkürt* (Hunting-horn) and *Kamon* could not give an adequate ground in themselves to the police for raiding and arresting the oppositionist groups. At the same time, there was no doubt whatsoever that the Schmerling-administration would do its best at the first given chance to lock up these oppositionist personalities, whom they regarded as trouble-makers contriving some vague objectives.[10]

It was really the irony of fate that the given chance for action, so much expected by the Austrian police, arrived very soon, quite independently of the subjective intentions of the initiators of the process. It is very understandable in many respects that Kossuth was displeased with the separate way Klapka had taken, more particularly, that Klapka started to co-operate with such personalities, both in the emigration and at home, who wanted to take actions, by-passing his consent. Moreover, Kossuth was also unhappy to see that the Italian government preferred his rivals, both among the emigrants and among those staying in Hungary. He found it unjustifiable that his person was so much neglected, and he was perhaps not mistaken when he believed that it was an endeavour of very dubious outcome to start a serious revolutionary movement in Hungary and to obtain a broad social support for it without his involvement. Supposedly, the Italian government did not draw such far-reaching conclusions, and would not have left Kossuth out of consideration in the event of an actual war. There are indications that even those who tended to regard Kossuth's practical involvement in the planned actions as unnecessary, thought of the formal use of his name in view of his mobilizing effect. As in the period of the Crimean War, so on the eve of the North-Italian Warfare of 1859, and also later on several occasions, whenever Klapka took a step forward, Kossuth was not slow to take his own. It was not otherwise at the end of 1863 either. This time, however, it was followed by slightly more disagreeable consequences than originally planned. There were several indications that Kossuth's domestic and emigrant rivals, as well as the leading political circles in Italy, may have reckoned with the consequences of neglecting Kossuth. There are references to this in – among others – the documents related to the negotiations between Kossuth and Prime Minister Minghetti. As it appears from the documents, Kossuth did not make secret of his desire, namely, that he was for a joint Italian–Hungarian–Polish action against Austria, in concert with the Polish uprising. On 24 May 1863 he expounded his ambitious plans for this action to the Italian Prime Minister as well.[11]

It is another thing that Austria strictly adhered to its neutrality, and so the desired extension of the Polish uprising to Galicia could not be realized. During his talks with Minghetti on 26 July 1863, Kossuth, when strongly emphasizing the

[10] Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 20 ff; Steier Lajos: *Beniczky Lajos az 1848/49-iki szabadságharcról és a tót mozgalomról* (Lajos Beniczky on the freedom fight of 1848–1849 and on the Slovak movement). Budapest, 1924, pp. 712 ff.

[11] Minghetti to Kossuth. Torino, 21 May 1863. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4164.); 24 May 1863. (*Ibid.* I, 4165); Memo of negotiations between Kossuth and Minghetti. (*Ibid.* I, 4167); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* V, pp. 462 ff.

Hungarians' readiness for action and the reality of his influence that would manifest itself in acts, was given the answer that the Italian government had been informed differently of the Hungarian situation. Thereupon, Kossuth unambiguously made it known to the Italian Prime Minister that it was not possible to bypass him or to simply leave him out of the plans related to Hungary. Referring to the unchanged miraculous effect of his historical name, Kossuth announced that "... my nation looks upon me as the personificator of independence, and the whole world regards me as the representative of that idea ...". On those persons who presented themselves to the Italian government as representatives of the cause of Hungary, Kossuth passed scathing remarks, namely, that they were only led by mean ambitions, they were unqualified for participating in negotiations concerning Hungary, they were motivated by sheer vanity, and they all only wanted to take the lead. He put down his opinion in a straightforward form: "... either I or nobody else ...". He declared that, without him, it might perhaps be possible to spark off some public disturbance, but not a real revolution. Then he most emphatically pronounced: he would not permit that *"petty-minded ambitions could play a careless game with the blood of my fatherland. – It is in my power to prevent this"*.[12] It seems that the Italian Prime Minister Minghetti did not become despaired. He very patiently and politely listened to the passionate Kossuth's arguments and heated words, which were almost tantamount to a threat. In spite of this, there were no signs in the following months that the Italian government's high officials would have accepted Kossuth's offer, or would have abandoned those whom they preferred to Kossuth. Under the given circumstances, Kossuth determined to take the necessary counter-measures and to prove that it was in his power to prevent the plans of his political adversaries.

At the same time, Kossuth had to encounter difficulties, as his connections in Hungary, which had still been functioning to some extent in 1860–1861, became broken after Komáromy's desertion. So Kossuth had to create new contacts between Turin and Hungary in order that he could send his messages and could notify the Hungarian politicians of his views, or give utterance of his opinion about the tasks to be performed. His troubles grew, especially after the Polish events, and he increasingly held it necessary to establish, as soon as possible, a National Revolutionary Committee – a name given by him –, which should work in concert with him and according to his instructions.[13] Of his confidants staying in Hungary, Kossuth well remembered the name of the Pest lawyer Ignác Lángh, who in a few cases had forwarded his previous messages to those concerned. However, this good-willed person could hardly undertake more than that, and so, from the viewpoint of organizational and military problems, his involvement was out of the question. Among the malcontent ex-officers of the revolutionary army and among the ex-inmates of the Austrian dungeons there were persons who would certainly abide by his instructions and would be suitable

[12] Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* V, pp. 479 ff.

[13] Kossuth summarized his related conceptions in a scheme entitled *Üzenet* (Message) dated 10 May 1863. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4159.)

for becoming resourceful organizers. But he could hardly think of the implementation of all this without the assistance of his supporters in Hungary.

In this action-centred period, full of strained expectations, it was an unforeseeable and accidental event that offered Kossuth a way out of this inevitably passive situation. It happened that late in the summer of 1863, a Hungarian gentleman, István Nedeczky arrived in Turin from Paris to visit Kossuth, with a letter of recommendation from his relative, Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss.[14] Kossuth welcomed him, so much the more as his guest had left Hungary not long before, so he could inform Kossuth of the actual Hungarian situation, relying on his recent personal experiences. A landowner in Zala County, István Nedeczky was the nephew of Ferenc Deák and had served as a hussar captain in 1848–1849. After the Világos surrender, he was forcibly enlisted as a private in the Austrian Army where he served for about one and a half years. His financial situation kept deteriorating and even his marriage in 1856 could not improve it. Little is known of his political past. The most we know is that during the period of national movements following the failure of the Bach-administration, he rather showed a moderate than a radical attitude. He did not agree with the demonstrations organized by the emerging associations of the ex-soldiers of the revolutionary army. In spite of this, he had come into conflicts with the authorities, and – especially after the introduction of summary jurisdiction following the dissolution of the 1861 Diet – he found his situation to be increasingly depressing. He became ruined economically, his estates were sequestered, and there were also troubles in his family life.[15] After such antecedents, he determined to emigrate from Hungary. Expecting help from Nemeskéri Kiss, Nedeczky first went to Paris, where he informed Nemeskéri Kiss of his intention to serve in the Hungarian Legion in Italy. Nemeskéri Kiss first tried to dissuade him, then seeing that Nedeczky insisted on his plan, he helped him by giving a letter of recommendation addressed to Kossuth in Turin. Nemeskéri Kiss also asked Klapka, as well as others, to give assistance to Nedeczky to be enlisted as an officer in the Hungarian Legion. In this letter, Nedeczky was commended as a modest person who is very familiar with Zala and Somogy counties, and whose local knowledge might well be utilized in the event of a military campaign on the territory of Hungary.[16]

Our knowledge of what really happened in Turin comes from the reports which Nedeczky directly sent to Nemeskéri Kiss in Paris. All that, and the further course of events, inevitably remind us of the events of the Kutahia internment: as if József Makk's organization started in the early fifties had repeated itself. There are formal and methodological agreements between the two events, but in spite of this, the highly consequential historical lesson left no special impression on those involved.

[14] Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to Kossuth. S. Angle, 20 September 1863. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4201.)

[15] Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 22 ff; Lukács: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak, op. cit.* pp. 336 ff.

[16] Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to Klapka. S. Angle, 20 September 1863. (O.L., Klapka Papers.)

The role and conduct of Nedeczky are understandable and explicable in several respects. First of all, his acts were those of an utterly embittered and financially ruined man, whose only concern was to survive, to earn his daily living either as an officer of the Legion, or in any other way in the emigration, or even at home, if needed, provided the minimum material conditions for it were granted. Having arrived abroad without any preliminary experience, he suddenly dropped in the jumble of the conflict-stricken emigration, which was so hopelessly complex that even the well versed people could only hardly find a fixed point of reference. In this context no one could ever know who served whom, who was conspiring against whom, and who informed or supported whom. Thus, the martially and impressively looking, resolute Nedeczky looked upon the adept leading personalities of emigration in a simple and naive manner, failing to think about the possibility of the becoming only a simple piece on the chess-board of others, a mere tool, who, after having been made use of, could be put aside without further ado, if so required. Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss, who did not belong among the shrewdest politicians, may also have been astonished at reading Nedeczky's letters from Turin. These letters revealed the topics of Nedeczky's discussion with Kossuth: to set up a new Revolutionary Committee, to issue a revolutionary call and to send it to Hungary, to provide for the funds necessary to the printing facilities. Further topics of these discussions included the condemnation of the non-Kossuth-aligned groups of Hungarian malcontents, along with their emigrant contacts. Kossuth qualified all these people as traitors and rascals who ought to be hanged as a minimum punishment. The task of starting a large-scale movement in Hungary and the necessity of organizing a guerilla war were also discussed between Kossuth and Nedeczky.[17] Since Károly Földváry, Commander of the Hungarian Legion in Italy, declined to guarantee an officer's rank to Nedeczky, whereas Kossuth wanted to assign him another task, the plan of joining the Legion had to be given up. Thus, what remained for him were those seemingly large-scale tasks which have been outlined above. And Kossuth regarded him as the right man for the implementation and co-ordination of these tasks. His return to Hungary was only postponed because the funds necessary to starting the organization in Hungary had not yet been available, though Nedeczky wrote very optimistically about the raising of those funds in his letters. Fascinated by Kossuth's personality, Nedeczky became his unreserved admirer, and this made him quite resolute and ready to overcome the towering difficulties. As he expressed: there should be no pity or compassion for Kossuth's adversaries; they should all be crushed and given an exemplary punishment. He wrote about all this with singular sincerity and simplicity in his letters to Nemeskéri Kiss, asking his relative to give his opinion on this matter, and to inform Klapka as well, so that the fight against Austria could be started alongside a fully unified emigration.[18]

[17] István Nedeczky to M. Nemeskéri Kiss. Torino, 28 September 1863. (O L., Klapka Papers.)
[18] István Nedeczky to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss. 14 [October] 1863. (*Ibid.*)

We do not know exactly how Nemeskéri Kiss reacted upon his nephew's views, who kept pressing for his answer. To be sure, previously Nemeskéri Kiss had commended Nedeczky to Kossuth, stating that "you, Mister K., may well place your confidence in him, I guarantee him". In spite of this, he may well have been astonished when Nedeczky's initial Legion-plans were fully eclipsed by his wide-ranging new commissions to be fulfilled in Hungary.[19] It added to the curiosity of the situation that Nemeskéri Kiss, who was in regular correspondence with Klapka, did not make secret of the letters he received from Nedeczky. Thus those became first informed of the preparations in Turin, who were not supposed to know of the action, as it was precisely their activity that Kossuth wanted to counterpoise by employing Nedeczky.[20]

All this had to be premised here to enable the reader to form a clear notion of the Kossuth-initiated organization which was meant to offset the Klapka–Csáky–Komáromy movement. In Turin, week succeeded week, but the necessary funds were still not made available. Yet time did not elapse in vain. To wit, dated 17 October 1863, a memorandum, signed by Nedeczky, was submitted to Prime Minister Minghetti. Its content clearly expressed its function, namely: a seemingly very prestigious and influential personality, who was reported to have good knowledge of the highest as well as other strata of Hungarian society, and who happened to be the nephew of the widely known and highly esteemed Ferenc Deák, had arrived from Hungary to give a genuine report on the actual internal situation in Hungary. Qualifying as completely false, this memorandum was to offset all the previous information, according to which the spirit of reconciliation had come to the fore in Hungary, preconditions for a new armed revolt were missing, and Kossuth's authority and influence had declined in the country. That is, referring to the first-hand information supplied by an authentic person who had just come from Hungary, Nedeczky's memorandum was contrived to confirm all what Kossuth had personally told to Minghetti a few weeks before. Supposedly, the memorandum was worded by István Nedeczky himself, though there is hardly any doubt about the originator of the basic idea, nor about the purposes it was to serve. The same inference can also be drawn by the fact that in his letter of 12 October 1863 to Ignác Helfy, Kossuth pressed for the translation of the memorandum, without mentioning Nedeczky's name, into French or Italian language. Kossuth advised Helfy that the translation should concentrate on the main argument of the document, rather than on its literal presentation. He also mentioned that if Helfy happened to find it too long, he could make certain abridgements.[21] According to the document signed by Nedeczky, great masses of Hungarian society were ready to start an armed revolt, and it only depended on

[19] Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to Kossuth. S. Angle, 20 September 1863. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4201.) On the rejection of Nedeczky's officer's rank in the Legion: Károly Földváry to Kossuth. Ancona, 29 September 1863. (*Ibid.* II, S. 2.–576.)

[20] Nedeczky's letters to Nemeskéri Kiss in a so far uncleared way got into György Klapka's possession, who then placed them among his own Papers. (O.L., Klapka Papers.)

[21] Kossuth to Ignác Helfy. Torino, 12 October 1863. (O.L., Helfy Papers.)

the Italian government's activity, helpfulness and anti-Austrian attitude whether or not it would have recourse to the immense help that a revolting Hungary could offer. Then the document let Minghetti know that practically no reconciliation party existed in Hungary, there were only "a few magnates" who advocated reconciliation with Austria. Similarly, the document expounded that the nationality problem "*de facto* does not exist in Saint Stephen's country. It was only invented and artificially incited by means of money, force and the most abominable intrigues". In a further passage, however, the document writes: if this problem happens to exist, it should not be feared, because "it will cease" in the same way as the wars of religion once came to an end. As a person of great experience, the document's author definitely declares that Italy may well reckon upon Hungary, upon its armed participation, from which Italy could gain the most. To enhance the authenticity of the document, to his signature in the covering letter, Nedeczky even added "nephew of Ferenc Deák". Nedeczky undoubtedly placed himself at Kossuth's disposal in good faith and full of helpfulness. However, it could hardly be conceived that memorandums or argumentations like this could alter Minghetti's disposition. Thus it is easy to understand that he left the document unanswered and had it shelved.[22]

Under these circumstances, Kossuth was overcome by anxiety and impatience, and the same applied to Nedeczky whose return to Hungary was seriously delayed for want of the necessary funds. All the schemes had been crystallized, the text of Kossuth's planned proclamation had been worded, so nothing but the creation of financial conditions for the execution caused serious difficulties. But Kossuth was not a person who could easily be brushed off by the Italian government, or who would simply give up his project under the pressure of difficulties. Ignoring Prime Minister Minghetti's reserved attitude, which clearly reflected the attitude of the Italian leading circles as well, in his despair, Kossuth now wrote a letter to Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta on 12 November 1863. As he expounded in this letter, he asked for not more than 5000 francs to perform a veritable miracle in Hungary, and to tell the nation on posters that "the reorganization of the movement" had been accomplished and the "Central Directorate" had also resumed its activity. He promised that the required sum would not be "spent either prodigally or fruitlessly". Then he also brought up another plan, namely, that he would address the Italian public to start a collection in support of the aridity-inflicted people in Hungary. Kossuth declared: if the King joined this program and the whole Italian nation were ready to give donations for this purpose, thereby they would oblige the people of Hungary for ever. And the Hungarians would repay this help by shedding their own blood for the cause of Italy, and would undoubtedly "place the crown of Saint Stephen on the head of the Prince of Aosta". Even if there was no objection against the pay-

[22] István Nedeczky to the Italian Prime Minister Minghetti. Torino, 17 October 1863. (A.C.R., Carte di Visconti Venosta, Busta 1, Pacco 2.)

ment of the relatively modest aid Kossuth had applied for, this fact in itself did not disclose much of the Italian government's future intentions.[23]

Pressed for time, Nedeczky was impatient, and Kossuth also wanted to send his proclamation to Hungary with the least possible delay. Therefore, in an effort to thwart the intentions of those who wanted to "play a careless game with the blood of my nation", Kossuth tried to find another solution to the problem. He asked Helfy, editor of *L'Alleanza*, to help him in strict confidence in printing the text of the proclamation, and also in sending it to Hungary together with a seal.[24] Kossuth requested Helfy to take the morning train from Milan to Turin on 23 November 1863, and to engage a room, using a false name, in the suburban hotel Albergo della Rocca, where he would call on him at a quarter past one p.m., to hand Helfy over the necessary material. Thus Helfy could return to Milan by the afternoon train. The only stipulation Kossuth made was that the printed copies of the proclamation should by all means reach Hungary by 3 December 1863, when they would be taken over at a certain place marked out for this purpose.[25]

The cogwheels must have worked perfectly: the exceedingly agile Helfy managed to carry out all of his tasks in accordance with Kossuth's request. Thus the text of the proclamation had been set and printed in the press of *L'Alleanza*, then, by the help of a reliable Italian person, who subsequently was given 400 francs, 1000 copies were carried to Hungary and handed over at the given time and place. Helfy notified Kossuth of the precise execution of the task on 9 December 1863. Kossuth, in turn, sent him a letter of appreciation on 12 December, emphasizing that Helfy "rendered an important service to the fatherland ... may you be rewarded by the consciousness that your patriotic duty was faithfully" performed. Kossuth also informed Helfy that he would pay the costs of printing in the coming days. Then he made mention of his tight financial situation.[26]

After all this, on the same day as he had received a few copies of the Helfy-printed proclamation, Kossuth immediately wrote a newer letter to the Italian Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta. In this letter, dated 10 December 1863, Kossuth most definitely called the Minister to give further financial aid, as well as to give him urgent information of the expectable future standpoint of Italy concerning the outbreak of a revolt in Hungary. Kossuth tended to make the things appear as if an effective Hungarian organization had really existed, which he could unlimitedly control, and which would only act according to his instructions, pending his order to start action. But to arrange for the proper timing of the action, it was essential to know about the intents and plans of the Italian gov-

[23] Kossuth to the Italian Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta. Torino, 12 November 1863. (*Ibid.*); The draft of this appeal was dated 12 November. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4213); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 26 ff.

[24] Kossuth to Ignác Helfy. Torino, 19 November 1863. (O.L., Helfy Papers.)

[25] Kossuth to Ignác Helfy. Torino, 22 November 1863. (*Ibid.*)

[26] Kossuth to Ignác Helfy. Torino, 12 December 1863. (*Ibid.*)

ernment.[27] To give a greater emphasis to his arguments, Kossuth also enclosed a copy of his proclamation as the product of an existing "National Independence Committee" addressed "To the Nation" "On the Order of Governor Lajos Kossuth", dated from "Buda-Pest, on the 24th of November, 1863". The proclamation summons the people to be resolute, prepared and ready to act, because the tendency of the international situation "holds out the prospect of liberation for peoples groaning under the yoke of foreign oppressors". Then it declares that a new National Independence Committee has been formed on the order of the Governor, which, aimed at realizing the objectives of the Declaration of Independence of 1849, has started its activity in pursuance of the directives of Governor Kossuth. The Committee expects that its decrees be most obediently followed and its measures supported and performed. Those conspiring against Kossuth are seriously warned to refrain from resisting "under the pain of punishment due to traitors", because it is determined that the Committee's decrees shall be enforced. "Every honest patriot shall be prepared for action – Our slogan: 1849 and Victory", concluded the proclamation, the literal French translation of which was forwarded by Kossuth with his signature to the Italian Foreign Minister. To be seen under the printed proclamation was also a seal with the inscription National Independence Committee; in the middle of the seal, the so-called minor arms of Hungary was engraved with the crown above and with three Hungarian flags on both sides, in the white strip of one of the left-side flags the word Kossuth, while in its right-side counterpart 1849 were inscribed.[28]

From all this, Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta ought to have seen that something serious was at stake: preparations for a revolt were at an advanced stage in Hungary and now it only depended on Italy whether it wished to have recourse to the Hungarian movement for help in its own efforts, or it preferred to uphold its neutrality – in the latter case, however, the responsibility for the consequences would rest with Italy. Visconti Venosta, disregarding the usual diplomatic formalities, left Kossuth's highly problematic letter unanswered. Thus Venosta's conduct could also be interpreted this way: if Kossuth acted in this manner, then he must have done it entirely on his own initiative, hence, the full responsibility for it rested with him, and the Italian government did not wish to have any share in it. This being the case, Kossuth's impatience is very surprising. Namely, he applied to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti, as early as 17 December 1863, directly calling him to account for the non-arrival of any reply to his letter. Kossuth emphasized: "Hungary has got into such a critical situation that an immediate decision must be made without any delay" by the Italian government. He said he was pressed by his friends in Hungary to inform them of the Italian government's intentions, as they would like to know exactly what to reckon on.[29]

[27] Kossuth to the Italian Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta. Torino, 10 December 1863. (A.C.R., Carte di Visconti Venosta. Busta 1, Pacco 2.)

[28] *Ibid.*; Kossuth's autographic draft. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4216.)

[29] Kossuth to Foreign Under-Secretary of State Cerruti. Torino, 17 December 1863. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto, Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

It is interesting to note that Kossuth knew well – as he had talked it over with Nedeczky in advance – that his above-discussed proclamation would be placarded in several Hungarian towns on the morning of 17 December. Hence, in his letter to Cerruti, Kossuth referred to something, for which he had previously made the preparations himself, of which he was the only originator, that is, something which had no organizational background whatsoever in reality; furthermore, his mentioned "friends in Hungary" meant nothing but Nedeczky's action. On 23 December 1863, Kossuth sent another impatient letter to Cerruti, reproaching him that two weeks had elapsed without any reply to his letter to Visconti Venosta, though "this causes serious damage to the cause". Then he noted that he would personally call on the Under-Secretary of State.[30] It seems that the interested Italian high officials wanted to put an end to this disagreeable affair, which may have seemed to them as a vexation, because Cerruti invited Kossuth to his office in early January. In his reply of 8 January 1864, Kossuth, in turn, pointed out: if Visconti Venosta wanted to have a talk with him, he would like to know the topic of the discussion in advance.[31]

THE NEDECZKY-PROCESS

While Kossuth made a series of desperate attempts to create a kind of basis or background for the activity of the National Independence Committee, at least subsequently, and to obtain, again subsequently, the recognition and support of the Italian government for it, Nedeczky, who had returned to Hungary in the meanwhile, set to work. There can be hardly any doubt that in possession of a broad authorization by Kossuth, Nedeczky acted, directed and commanded as if he had been a real government commissioner vested with full powers. He derived the driving force and moral support of his acts and political steps from the impressions he had gained during his stay of a few weeks in Turin. Nedeczky virtually burst into the utterly strained Hungarian society, which was full of expectations and tried to find a way out of its plight. Getting weary of the absolutism, Hungarian society was at least as much characterized by its desire for changes and a strong determination to act, the latter having been also encouraged by the Polish events, as by a sense of fear, uncertainty, irresolution and wariness, all based on bitter experiences obtained in the era of absolutism.

In connection with the emigrational activities of Klapka, Komáromy and Csáky, a Secret Committee was active, the president of which was Lajos Beniczky, government commissioner in 1848, at least so he was referred to in one of Csáky's confidential papers.[32] There were only few who knew more of the Secret Committee, of its hard core members, its relations, so there were mostly

[30] Kossuth to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti. Torino, 23 December 1863. (*Ibid.*)

[31] Kossuth to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti. Torino, 8 January 1864. (*Ibid.*)

[32] *A forradalmi ügyvezetés szervezete Magyarhonban (1863)* (Organization of the revolutionary management in Hungary, 1863). (O.L., Csáky Papers); Cf. Steier: *op. cit.* pp. 703 ff.

guesses and rumours about it. At the same time, the Secret Committee tried to garner followers, supporters from the most different and heterogeneous layers of society, from both the political left and right. Accordingly, it tried to win over sometimes the ex-officers of the revolutionary army, the "déclassé" elements, or the politically compromised intellectuals, sometimes the wealthier, but existentially more and more unstable members of the medium landowners, as well as the more liberal-minded aristocrats. Coffee-houses, casinos, Masonic lodges both in the capital city and in the country, occasional meetings of members of the dissolved veteran associations, all offered a framework and opportunity for agitation. Meetings of this type were generally held in a very cautious and circumspect manner. Even so the authorities kept a watchful eye on them, but they could hardly find any pretext for intervention, though they may have supposed that those meetings meant something more than usual friendly conversations or harmless wine-parties of some dissatisfied persons. Though there were always divulgers and even police agents who sought to deserve their pay, the information they supplied was not enough to prompt the authorities to resort to arrests, as there was no evidence. It was this slow preparatory process, the organizational elements of which were mainly related to the mentioned Secret Committee, which Nedeczky with his definite intentions and demands burst into.

Kossuth's proclamation which had been placarded on the walls of houses in the capital city as well as in several country towns – among others in Szeged, Győr, Kaposvár, Zalaegerszeg – on 17 December 1863. made it clear whom Nedeczky represented and what he wanted. This spectacular beginning, however, was followed by a succession of newer actions. Nedeczky made every effort to give evidence of his abilities and aptitude for taking independent actions, and the process, which had started in Turin, began to expand and ramify in Hungary so that its ramifications and methods could hardly be monitored from afar. As in the case of the one-time Makk-organization, the spirit of revolution, getting out from the bottle, broke out in a fearful manner. Having entered into contact with the Pest lawyer Ignác Lángh, to whom he had been referred by Kossuth, Nedeczky – now in possession and making use of Kossuth's seal – sent out a series of threatening letters to people of the most different social standing, holding out the prospect of retaliation in order to make them obey his orders. He also called them to unconditionally abide by the orders issued by the signatory of the proclamation. Kossuth's name, the seal along with the proclamation aroused mixed feelings in many. But Nedeczky also had supporters mainly among the ex-officers or among the students, who were ready to copy by hand and distribute Kossuth's proclamation. At the same time, the small amount of money, which Nedeczky had at his disposal and with which he wanted to mobilize the widest possible circles of society, began to run out. The rest only sufficed for arranging some minor street demonstrations or disturbing theatre performances. In the meantime the number of his followers kept decreasing, and the whole movement showed signs of exhaustion. Nevertheless, Nedeczky still endeavoured to compel obedience from the known or supposed followers of organizations neglecting

Kossuth. The Nedeczky-initiated meetings echoed with threatening statements and denunciations, and Nedeczky even went as far as threatening to use capital punishment. It is difficult to state now how seriously, if at all, those concerned took Nedeczky. One thing, however, is certain, namely that several personalities held talks with him, thus among others, Lajos Beniczky who apparently entered into the game in order to come to know the most about Nedeczky and to have him reveal his plans. In the end, Beniczky pretended to come to an agreement with Nedeczky and he undertook, upon Nedeczky's request, the elaboration of plans for an armed revolt. Others, partly seriously, partly furtively, or partly perhaps under the effect of blackmails, entered into the co-operation.

All this gave rise to such a big confusion in a few weeks that even the participants could not find a fixed point of reference, not knowing who worked for whom, who is whose man and who was after what. It is due to this highly involved situation that when the police started to investigate and roll up the organization, and when the related proceedings also commenced, neither the police, nor the judges themselves could form a true notion of the whole issue. Moreover, defendants' confessions were strongly biased, denouncing each other, and they were influenced by the erroneous suppositions or unrealistic expectations of a lighter judgement. There were also provocateurs like Lajos Asbóth, an ex-general of the revolutionary army, who – while discussing the preparation of military plans with Nedeczky and Beniczky – became a hired agent of the police. Although he had also been imprisoned at the time of the arrests, he was set free a few months later – simultaneously receiving his due reward.[33]

Neither had the emigrational and domestic movement represented by Klapka, Komáromy and Csáky been socially more founded or justifiable than the Kossuth-incited organization of István Nedeczky. Composed primarily of the representatives of the medium landowners, the political pressure groups capable of exercising leadership over Hungary in the 1860s would hardly have been able and ready to take the lead of a newer revolution, to say nothing of the absence of preconditions for such an armed revolt. Without an effective support by the popular masses, no domestic movement – even in the event of the outbreak of a war – could have undertaken a large-scale armed action. In this respect, the Schmerling-government could hardly be beguiled. They surveyed the Hungarian

[33] *Nedeczky István pere. Beniczky, Asbóth Lajos, Almássy Pál és mások vallomásainak anyagával* (István Nedeczky's process. With the material of evidences given by I. Nedeczky, L. Beniczky, P. Almássy and others). H.L.M.B.G. Pest-Ofen, 1864 (214–222) Nedeczky A. 2; A 125; A. 239; Lukács: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak, op. cit.* pp. 335 ff; a detail of Lajos Beniczky's confession of 29 April 1864, published *Ibid.* pp. 424–439. Of the literature treating this question: Adalékok a kényuralom ellenes mozgalmak történetéhez. Az Asbóth-család irataiból (Contributions to the history of anti-absolutist movements. From Asbóth-family papers). Pest, 1871, pp. 165 ff; Márki Sándor: A modern Magyarország (1848–1896) (The modern Hungary. 1848–1896). In: *A magyar nemzet története.* Szerk. Szilágyi Sándor (The history of the Hungarian nation. Ed. by Sándor Szilágyi). Vols. I–X. Budapest, 1895–1898. X, pp. 614 ff; Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 20 ff; Az Almássy–Nedeczky-féle összeesküvés (The Almássy–Nedeczky conspiracy) (*Pesti Hírlap,* 29 November 1908); Hentaller Lajos: Az Almássy–Nedeczky-féle puccs (The Almássy–Nedeczky coup). (*Egyetértés,* 5 November 1905.)

circumstances with due circumspection, and – even if they could experience some conspicuous dissatisfaction here and there – they were fully aware of the landed gentry's fear of the peasant movements and of the various ethnic minorities. They seemed to know that this fear was so great that it damped this gentry's ardour to act, and that concessions given in due time would not fail to have the desired effect on the malcontent. In the awareness of all this, the Viennese government downgraded the significance of reports on conspiracies and organizations to their proper level, and regarded them as being dangerous or noteworthy only in a war situation. At the same time, they did not ignore the potential risks involved in the contacts which the politically influential and important personalities maintained with the emigration. Nor did they disregard these politicians' other connections which might lead to foreign governments and cause unforeseeable difficulties in some tenser international situation.

It was partly on this account that the Austrians had an aversion to the activity of Pál Almássy as well, who had returned from his emigration to Hungary in 1859. Even though Almássy was granted amnesty and reinstated in his vast possessions, his past trespasses were never forgotten, namely that he had been the Vice-President of that House of Representatives which had adopted the Declaration of Independence in 1849. Otherwise, Almássy had never belonged among Kossuth's adherents. On the contrary, he never concealed his aversion to Kossuth even in the time of his emigration, and his feelings did not change after his return either. He was on friendly terms with György Klapka, and the shocks caused by the Provisorium only added to his dissatisfaction. Thus people from various layers of society began to look upon him as a potential chief antagonist of the power. A basically liberal-minded aristocrat owning large estates, Almássy, to say the least, was not in the habit of supporting any social revolution, nor was he ready to encourage the start of any hazardous armed uprising. What he may have had in mind was to keep Austria at bay in the event of a war conflict; or, in case of strong foreign support, he may also have thought of somewhat more than that. At any rate, the power regarded him as a dangerous individual whose isolation and control were much more advisable than to turn a blind eye to his untraceable steps. Suspicion about him even increased at the end of 1863, when he returned from his journey in Germany, and the authorities surmised him to have contacted Klapka. Thus, when on 16 March 1864 and the following days the authorities rushed upon those whom they had held as politically dangerous persons, Pál Almássy was also arrested.[34]

There are indications that the authorities did not have any evidence to the effect that Almássy might have been the organizer and leader of the secret anti-government movement. Almássy's name most probably came into the limelight because he was a prestigious politician, widely known and respected among the members of the opposition, and, with his joining the movement in a real crisis situation, might have given political weight, guidance, and even prestige to an anti-government movement. During the subsequent judicial proceedings,

[34] Cf. Steier: *op. cit.* pp. 709 ff.

Almássy never pleaded guilty, asserting his innocence against the charges. As to his activities, only secondary evidence could be produced, among others, confessions made by Lajos Asbóth and Lajos Beniczky. However, Beniczky, though he made mention of his contacts with Almássy, also pointed out that Almássy had always warned against their planned armed revolt and called them to show restraint. It is a characteristic of the embarrassment of the judges that in its sentence passed on 24 November 1864, the Court-Martial of Pest-Buda had been obliged to acquit Almássy for lack of evidence. In the following months, however, the Schmerling-government enforced its conception. It held it better to remove the seemingly dangerous Almássy from the utterly strained Hungarian public life for some time. Therefore, he was accused of many things which he had not even thought of, and his name was "involved" in an organization, one thread of which led to Klapka, Komáromy and the Italian government. The latter took Almássy into consideration only as a potential ally, and it was only in this sense that Beniczky had attempted to win him over to their side.[35]

It would have certainly altered the situation if Nedeczky had not aroused the attention of the police force with his heedless and clamorous actions, and had not provoked and threatened the persons who were making silent preparations. Under the given circumstances, however, the Austrian government had a very good opportunity to arrest a number of ex-officers and persons who had given utterance to their different views, and simultaneously, to finish with Almássy and to strike terror in his close political friends. Finally, the sentences, which had not made distinction among the widely different political trends, views and groups, and the communications issued in this matter, judged each of them by the same standards, making all of the defendants appear as if they had been Kossuth's adherents and part of his emigrational attempts. The public only got to know for certain of these highly complex proceedings that Almássy was sentenced by the Supreme Military Court on 6 February 1865 for a 20-year imprisonment. István Nedeczky and Lajos Beniczky had first been sentenced to death, but later it was changed to 20-year imprisonment.[36] Major or minor sentences were also passed on the accused of the second and third orders. To avoid further ordeals, the lawyer Ignác Lángh committed suicide. Subsequently all this was simply referred to as "The Nedeczky–Almássy Conspiracy", though, in accordance with the documents of the contemporary proceedings of the court-martial, the term "The Nedeczky-process" would be more befitting.

THE KOMÁROMY GROUP IN 1864–1865

It goes without saying that what has been discussed above was a characteristically political process designed to demonstrate the resolution of the government. The whole process, however, was not meant to physically destroy the actual partici-

[35] Cf. Lukács: *Függetlenségi mozgalmak, op. cit.* pp. 341 ff.
[36] *Ibid.* p. 351.

pants in the incriminated actions, nor those who were involved in the process by the government. All this became apparent soon after the general political climate had become milder and most of the convicts had been released from their prisons and were interned in certain towns in Bohemia. They were accorded a relatively mild treatment, and their freedom to move was not markedly limited either. In fact, Pál Almássy was even permitted to visit the neighbouring bathing resorts. After the Compromise of 1867, some of them were granted amnesty.[37]

The serious consequences of the events, however, had their disagreeable effects on the emigration, first of all, on Kossuth. The Italian government quarters now had to come to the final conclusion that their decision to put Kossuth aside had been a right and justifiable one. Under-Secretary of State Cerruti – in those early January days in 1864 when Kossuth wanted to meet him and to press him for a response to his preliminary proposals – already knew that the answer could only be in the negative, and he was in close contact with Klapka and Komáromy. It was they whom the Italian government most explicitly requested to declare whether they were able to co-operate with Kossuth, and to express their opinion on whether the Italian government should give financial support to implement Kossuth's plans. The answer was a definite *no*, which was in full agreement with the Italian government's views. In his letter of 4 January 1864, in reply to Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta's question in this matter, Klapka declared that Kossuth had brought up ideas and plans with which he and his companions could not agree. "To involve the country and its most useful citizens in danger, not thinking of defence at all, to subject those people to the Austrian executioner, to make a big noise throughout Europe and to spread terror in Hungary, in the misbelief that with all this the cause will win; to ignore the war preparations and armament, and to expect *everything* from foreign intervention and nothing or *very little* from our own efforts; to regard himself as a dictator and the absolute ruler of Hungary, and to call 'traitors' all those who refuse to abide by his command, and to do this from Turin: these are Kossuth's ideas, such is his program" – Klapka pointed out. "Our program" – he went on – "maintains that no dictator and no absolute ruler has any right to decide on our fate. This right rests only with the Parliament. The country needs to be properly prepared for an anti-Austrian struggle, so that the enemy's suspicion should not be aroused ahead of time." By proper preparedness Klapka meant effective conspiracy, the import of arms as well as co-operation with Italy. An armed revolt in Hungary could make Italy's potential war on Austria easier. Instead of expecting

[37] Cf. Steier: *op. cit.* pp. 724 ff. The life of Lajos Beniczky ended in a tragic and mysterious murder in 1868. L. Steier observed: whether his murder "is connected with his trial, it cannot be known, but it is possible, though it was not he, but Asbóth who was the traitor". (*Ibid.* p. 725.) This hint at a connection between Beniczky's murder and the preceding Nedeczky-process is a supposition that cannot be excluded. So it is not inconceivable that certain ex-officers, who had been convicted in the trial, and who had stood near to Nedeczky, took vengeance on him. However, any other motive cannot by excluded either. The contemporary police investigation met with no success in finding the delinquents. (*Ibid.* pp. 119 ff.)

foreign assistance, Klapka put the main emphasis on the internal forces of Hungary. As to the financial support of Kossuth's plans by the Italian government, Klapka, in accord with Komáromy, expressed his utter disagreement. He asked the responsible Italian statesmen to notify Kossuth to the effect that "the Hungarian patriots deemed his recent acts and declarations as dangerous, and if he continued to act this way, he would *rather hasten than hinder the country's reconciliation with Austria*".[38]

In his above-cited letter, Klapka also enclosed Komáromy's statement of the same date. In this document, Komáromy expressed his full agreement with Klapka's views, and he emphasized: "It is impossible to collaborate with Kossuth, who has often given evidence of his impotence in making the necessary preparations for actions; being unable to keep secrets, he would only compromise both the interested governments and the friends who are active in the country and take a strong stand for the cause of the country. Led by his own ambition, he does not permit anyone to have a say in matters of leadership, he wants to remove everyone who could throw the slightest shadow on him – as has been proved by his recent actions as well." Komáromy believed that it would be inappropriate if the Italian government supported Kossuth financially, because any amount placed at Kossuth's disposal "would be good for nothing but permitting Kossuth to continue to create a stir, to lead demonstrations to revive his lost popularity and to incite further rivalry among the parties".[39]

In the history of emigration, it was an obvious consequence of the Nedeczky-process that the gap between the individual political leaders of the emigration widened, and the Italian government explicitly took sides with the Klapka–Komáromy group. The Minghetti-government was increasingly engaged in the negotiations on the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome and their replacement by other forces, as well as on the transfer of the capital city from Turin to Florence. Under such circumstances it did not want to increase its troubles by taking an immediate anti-Austrian step. So the prospects for a war on Austria increasingly faded. In spite of this, however, the Italian government did not deny the financial support for the Klapka–Komáromy–Csáky group's conception of making silent preparations in Hungary.[40] The Italian government was of the opinion that the Secret Committee, which had become disordered and weakened after the Nedeczky-process, could be kept in operation by its representatives abroad, namely by Komáromy and Csáky. On this very account,

[38] Klapka to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti. Genf, 4 January 1864. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215); its draft: O.L., Csáky Papers.

[39] György Komáromy to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti. Genf, 4 January 1864. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215); its draft: O.L. Csáky Papers.

[40] References to the substantial financial aid supplied by the Italian government are made in Komáromy's letter to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti (Genf, 20 January 1864). (O.L. Csáky Papers), in which Komáromy applies for the payment of 100,000 francs due for the months November and December. The Minghetti-government did not stop the regular support even after the arrests in Hungary.

Tivadar Csáky travelled to Hungary with a passport issued for him under a false name by the Italian government, in an attempt to gather personal experience and information of the real situation in Hungary early in the summer of 1864.[41]

Submitted to the Italian government on 27 August 1864, soon after Csáky's return, the Komáromy–Csáky memorandum summed up the tasks necessary to be performed. As it appeared from this document, the timely issue was the preparation of an armed revolt in Hungary, to be started some time in the autumn of that year or, taking also the Italian government's war plans into account, at a somewhat later date. To promote this, the following issues were discussed as the most important: the purchase of arms, their transport to the Romanian principalities, taking over a certain quantity of arms from Serbia, and carrying on negotations by the Italian government with the Romanian Prince Cuza. To fund the action, 500,000 francs were earmarked for early September, and a total of two million francs were applied for until the actual start of the movement in Hungary, while an additional amount of 500,000 francs was also asked to cover the costs of preparing an expedition to Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. They also wanted the Italian government to guarantee that it would recognize the independence of Hungary and the provisional government in the event of an anti-Austrian war, moreover, that the Italian government would have a landing effected in Dalmatia, and would give a state loan of 50 million forints to the provisional government of Hungary.[42]

Even though the accomplishment of these ambitious plans was delayed, the Italian government supplied a regular support – through the mediation of Komáromy and Csáky – for purposes of the continuously progressing work of organization. In spite of all this, the Italians did not make secret of their disinclination to start war on Austria in the foreseeable future. However, Minghetti's government, which had always shown a benevolent attitude towards Klapka and his friends, came to a serious political crisis in the autumn of 1864. The so-called Convention of September, concluded with Napoleon III on 15 September 1864, which recognized Florence as the new capital city of the Italian Kingdom, gave rise to immense consternation, provoking a series of mass demonstrations, which finally led to the fall of the Italian government on 28 September 1864.[43]

Disinclined to undertake a war on Austria, La Marmora, the new Prime Minister, tended to follow the conservative principles in his home politics as well. He had a strong aversion to any involvement in the Hungarian question, holding it very risky to take any step which could provoke Austria. In the meantime, the international stir created by the Polish uprising had abated, the Tsarist forces

[41] Count Tivadar Csáky to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti. Genf (Geneva), 4 April 1864. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

[42] Count Tivadar Csáky to the Italian Prime Minister Minghetti. Torino, 27 August 1864. (*Ibid.*)

[43] Cf. Case, L. M.: *Franco-Italian Relations (1860–1865). The Roman Question and the Convention of September*. Philadelphia, 1932; King, Bolton: *Storia dell'Unità Italiana*. I–II, Milano, 1909–1910, II, pp. 280 ff.

overpowered the Polish movement, reducing it to the state of illegality, and the moderate-conservative elements got the upper hand in the movement's leadership. Under these circumstances, all the actions started and supported by the Minghetti-government, that is, the purchase of arms and their transportation to the proper places, had come to a standstill.[44]

[44] Count Tivadar Csáky to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti. Genf, 21 September (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215); 26 September. (*Ibid.*); 22 November. (*Ibid.*); 28 December. (*Ibid.*); 17 January 1865. (*Ibid.*); Klapka to Prime Minister Minghetti. Genf, September 2 1864. (*Ibid.*); Klapka to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti. Schaffhausen, 18 September 1864. (*Ibid.*); London, 18 October 1864. (*Ibid.*)

V.

THE HUNGARIAN EMIGRATION AND THE ITALIAN–PRUSSIAN–AUSTRIAN WAR IN 1866

THE FLORENCE PACT

Relations between the allied Prussian and Italian governments and the Hungarian emigration grew excessively complicated: though these government circles considered Kossuth's involvement in the affairs, they did it in an utterly cautious way, taking good care to keep his role within narrow bounds. That is, while they attempted to prevent him from interfering with the actual course of events, they strove to make use of his name and the great effect which his proclamation produced on Hungarian soldiers serving in the Austrian army. Komáromy and Csáky were of a similar opinion, when they thought of a kind of potential involvement of Kossuth, and gave utterance to their unambiguous opinion before some Italian and Prussian statesmen, namely that they definitely opposed Kossuth's participation.[1] Kossuth had to perceive for himself the reserved attitude of the interested governments towards him, as his many-sided approaches had been left essentially unanswered *in merito*. In the spring of 1866, he wrote a letter to Under-Secretary of State Cerruti, then to Bettino Ricasoli as well as to King Victor Emmanuel II, and finally, on June 7 1866, to Prime Minister La Marmora.[2] With his letters, Kossuth tried to convince the interested statesmen of the national character of the Hungarian movement, and of the unfoundedness of any fear of an eventual social-revolutionary turn or tendency in Hungary.[3] He also recommended to use the same argumentation to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss, his man in Paris. Nemeskéri Kiss had repeatedly visited Berlin in spring 1866, where he had talks with Bismarck. Though their talks included general issues, Nemeskéri Kiss also intended to bring up the Hungarian question. The Prussian Chancellor must be reassured – Kossuth considered – that the Hungarian movement is not similar to the Polish affairs, and the Hungarians will abstain from taking any steps which

[1] Cf. Wertheimer, E.: *Bismarck im politischen Kampf*. Berlin, 1930, pp. 239 ff; *Aus dem Leben Theodor von Bernhardi's*. VII. Der Krieg und seine unmittelbaren Folgen. Leipzig, 1897, pp. 58 ff.

[2] Kossuth to Cerruti, Torino, 11 April 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I. 4379); Kossuth to Ricasoli, Firenze, 19 May 1866. (*Ibid.* I. 4379); Ricasoli to Kossuth, Firenze, 19 May 1866. (*Ibid.*); Kossuth to King Victor Emmanuel II. Torino, 25 May 1866. (*Ibid.* I. 4379); King Victor Emmanuel II to Kossuth, Firenze, 29 May 1866. (*Ibid.*); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* (see footnote 111 on page 60), VI. pp. 104 ff.

[3] Kossuth to La Marmora. Torino, 7 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4433); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 115 ff.

could provoke a newer Tsarist intervention.[4] These many-sided attempts, however, were not followed by practical consequences, which, quite understandably, filled Kossuth with anxiety. The only promising messages and news he received were from Paris, more particularly from Prince Jérôme Napoléon, who encouraged him not to wait for an invitation by the Italian government, but to hasten to Florence and to start working.[5]

Though not without reluctance, Kossuth in the end had decided to take this step, and went to Florence where, however, he found the doors still shut. All what happened was that the polite Under-Secretary of State Cerruti arranged a meeting between Kossuth and the Prussian Envoy Usedom, and they had a trilateral talk on 12 June 1866. Well-informed in every respect, the Prussian Envoy showed a very polite and complacent attitude towards Kossuth, assuring him of his deep sympathy, yet Kossuth had to feel that in the coming period he will have to make difficult decisions.[6] As pleased Kossuth was to hear the news that Prime Minister La Marmora practically passed his position to Ricasoli from 17 June and left Florence to take over the command of the Italian army, so was he astonished at the Italian Prime Minister's resolution that the Italian co-operation with him strictly depended upon his coming to a preliminary agreement with the Count Tivadar Csáky and György Komáromy, i.e. with those representatives of the Hungarian movement who were equally recognized and supported by the Italian and Prussian governments.[7]

This explicit request confronted Kossuth with an undoubtedly very difficult situation. He had only two choices: either he immediately leaves Florence to return to his solitary emigration in Turin, or he gives his hand to the mentioned personalities, forgetting about his mistrust in them, drawing a veil over all what they have done for years without his involvement, and so he tries to accomplish his ideas in alliance with his most powerful emigrant critics, if not opposers. As in 1859, when a co-operation to be established with Napoleon III had been at stake, so in 1866 too, Kossuth was of the opinion that he should not be far from where the action was, and that his participation was a precondition for the actual achievement of the national objectives. Therefore, he undertook to face all the difficulties and problems which might arise from this undoubtedly ill-matched, ambiguous alliance. However much Kossuth's final decision could be criticized, one thing is certain: it was in concert with the intrinsic logic of his entire political career. Like in the period of the North-Italian War of 1859, when he had held it

[4] Kossuth to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss. Torino, 8, 20 May 1866; Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 178 ff); Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to Kossuth. Berlin, 14 May 1866. (*Ibid.* p. 13); Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to Bismarck. Berlin, 21 May 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4405.)

[5] Kossuth to Türr. Torino, 26 May 1866. (O.L., Türr Papers, 1636.)

[6] Kossuth to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss. Firenze, 13 June 1866. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 222 ff.

[7] Kossuth to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss. Firenze, 4 July 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 273 ff); Kienast, A.: *Die Legion Klapka*. Wien, 1900, pp. 90 ff; Óváry Lipót: Az 1866-i hadjárat és a magyar emigráció (The warfare of 1866 and the Hungarian emigration) (*Századok*, 1903.)

inconceivable to keep aloof from the actual course of events, now in 1866, when chances for attaining the independence of Hungary had improved, he again thought it to be absurd that he would be reduced to passivity and squeezed out from the way which might lead to a promising future. At least he so considered it when he acceded to the request and, on 17 June 1866, on a Sunday evening, he sat down to table with Csáky and Komáromy. Kossuth seized this favourable opportunity in the hope that in the course of events, he might manage to keep a tight rein on the things, which then would work out according to his conception.[8]

Kossuth's negotiating partners, however, knew exactly what they were doing when, following the advice of Ricasoli and Usedom, they gave their hands to Kossuth. They were fully aware of the real intents and conceptions of the Italian and the Prussian governments, as well as of the confidence of those governments in them, and they were very well informed of the role that the war-allied forces were to assign to Kossuth. Thus they risked nothing when they entered into the game of co-operation and alliance. They did not take it seriously even for a minute that they would defer to Kossuth's will and decisions; they were strongly determined to go their own way. From the very beginning, every step they had taken was directed to preserve their full freedom of action, and they tended to leave Kossuth only such a scope of activity which was quite nominal, not going beyond the formulation of proclamations and public appeals. Sober and pragmatic politicians as they were, Csáky and Komáromy were not inclined to be jealous of Kossuth whenever his name would be given great publicity, so far as he had no chance to interfere with the actual events. Quite different was the situation with Kossuth, when he took the risk of this alliance, as he had been denied to have a say in the antecedents, and he was not supplied with confidential government information, so he was dependent on suppositions and had to trust in hopes which involved inevitable frustrations. Several of Kossuth's most faithful adherents, mostly in Paris, were utterly astonished on hearing about the Florence pact of emigrants. They did not agree with it, at least not in its actual form, as it was wrapped up in hopeful and promising explanations, like for example in Kossuth's related reports sent, among others, to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss.[9] The latter had no doubt whatsoever that Kossuth had been put in a ridiculous situation, he had been entangled in a simple game, which will have its serious consequences.[10] On defending and explaining his standpoint and attitude, Kossuth, however, emphasized that Csáky and Komáromy and the Committee represented by them enjoyed the full confidence of the Italian and the Prussian governments, they were in close contacts, and these governments were only willing to give financial support for the Hungarian movement through that committee – so

[8] *Kossuth Lajos naplójegyzetei* (Lajos Kossuth's diary notes, June 20–22, July 1866) (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4483); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VII, pp. 195 ff.

[9] Kossuth to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss. Firenze, 25 June 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 226 ff.)

[10] Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to Kossuth. Paris, 30 June 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 261 ff.)

under the circumstances, "could I take it to heart before God, the world and history" to let the opportunity slip: "I simply had to seize it."[11]

After Kossuth, Csáky and Komáromy had discussed the fundamental principles of their co-operation and their requests to be submitted to the Italian government, in the evening of 17 June 1866, the following morning they worded their conception, i.e. their preliminary propositions, as they called it, which they meant to submit as a basis for negotiations to the competent Italian high officials. This actually took place in the afternoon of 18 June, when Ricasoli – the Premier of the new Italian government, who was about to be inaugurated into office – received Kossuth, Csáky and Komáromy together. Having listened to their requests, he charged Foreign Under-Secretary of State Cerruti and Representative Guerrieri Gonzaga – who was competent in the Hungarian affairs – to discuss the details with them.[12] In the evening of 18 June, Cerruti and Guerrieri Gonzaga held a meeting with the Hungarian personalities concerned to discuss their respective standpoints.

The *preliminary propositions* were concerned with the reorganization of the Hungarian Legion in Italy on a wider basis, in such a form that this process should be closely linked up with Kossuth's name, thereby placing it in a broader political context. The Italian government was expected to start an expedition from the Adriatic Sea toward Hungary, under the proposed leadership of Garibaldi, and the reorganized Hungarian Legion would also join this expedition in addition to the Italian volunteers and other necessary auxiliary troops. Furthermore, it was declared to be necessary that Prussia should also send an expeditionary force towards North-Hungary, and the insurrection in Hungary should be started in combination with all this. Both expeditions should be accompanied by royal proclamations. A further task was to concert the military actions, to advance into Hungary, also from the territory of Serbia and the Romanian principalities, alongside the volunteers and the transport of arms. In addition to the start of the insurrection in Hungary, the preliminary propositions also underlined the readiness of the Hungarian party to accompany the movement with appropriate appeals and proclamations to the Hungarian population as well as to the Hungarian soldiers serving in the Austrian army.[13] Based on the financial estimates attached to the preliminary propositions, the governments concerned were required to place an amount of five million francs at the disposal of those charged with the execution of the action. Out of this amount, two million would cover the costs of an internal insurrection in Hungary, 500–500,000 francs would be given for the organizations in Serbia and the Romanian (Moldavian–Wallachian) principalities, and another two million would cover the general

[11] Kossuth to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss. Firenze, 4 July 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 273 ff.)

[12] Cerruti to Kossuth. Firenze, 18 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4477); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VII, pp. 193–195.

[13] A summary of the preliminary propositions by Kossuth: *Bases de l'entente la Hongrie et la menière de procéder.* Firenze, 18 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4479; O.L., Csáky Papers); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 242 ff.

administrative expenses and the military-related costs of the whole organization.[14] This broader and more exacting list of requests was then thoroughly discussed by the interested parties at the Italian Foreign Ministry in the evening of 18 June. The result of this discussion was a more concise *proposition* consisting of 8 points, which, omitting certain details, essentially followed the content of the original preliminary propositions, also maintaining what had been requested in respect of the finances. In the end, the negotiating parties agreed that the whole proposition should be submitted to Prime Minister Ricasoli for approval.[15]

The following days already reached into the period of the first armed clashes: the Prussian forces started their offensive on 19 June, while the Italian forces on 20 June. For the Hungarians, the tension and the news arriving in rapid succession were accompanied by an increasingly impatient expectation and anxiety, particularly in respect of the submitted propositions. This was a difficult situation: the strained days, hours and even minutes placed heavy burden upon those who – like Kossuth in the first place – had eagerly been waiting, for over one and a half decades, for the opportunity to re-appear on the scene to raise the banner of national independence. Tense with expectations in Florence, Kossuth could hardly control himself and put a curb on his passions in a manner required by the actual circumstances, especially after he had been received by the King of Italy on 20 June. The King was not sparing of expressions of promise and encouragement: things seemed to work out favourably, there would be money enough and there would be expedition as well. Kossuth's answer to the King was not less optimistic: "Komáromy will certainly take all the necessary measures at home, and I shall go with the expedition from Prussia, from where I can sooner return home and give orders." The polite and helpful Italian King did not want to discuss the topic at length, so he advised Kossuth to talk over the details with Prime Minister Ricasoli and to issue a proclamation to the Hungarian regiments in the Austrian army, in which Kossuth should also address the Italian soldiers who were serving there in a considerable number. Then they bade farewell to each other with a warm handshake, saying "*au revoir à Vienne*".[16]

On the one hand, the ideas and the daring plans soared high and imagination was given free vent; on the other, there was pettiness and there were the difficulties of everyday life. All this contributed to the internal tensions and contradictions which became almost unendurable. The first news was received on Thursday evening on 21 June, according to which Prime Minister Ricasoli, Minister of Labour Stefano Jacini, Under-Secretary of State Cerruti and Representative

[14] *Résumé financier* – with Kossuth's signature. Firenze, 18 June 1866. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215; O.L., Csáky Papers.)

[15] Csáky's autographic drafts of the propositions; fair copy with Csáky's signature. On his own copy, Csáky noted: "Firenze, Jun. 18–1866. Egyezkedési alap pontok a mint azok conferentia útján megállapodtattak" (Firenze, 18 June 1866. Points to serve as a basis for negotiations as agreed on at the conference). (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215; O.L., Csáky Papers.)

[16] Kossuth's diary notes 20 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4483.)

Guerrieri Gonzaga discussed the propositions prepared by the Hungarian party, but failed to come to a final agreement. There were some objections too, so they commissioned Guerrieri Gonzaga to formulate the *counter-propositions*, i.e. a summary of all issues on which the Italian party agreed or disagreed. All that happened on the following day, i.e. on 22 June, was that Guerrieri Gonzaga worked out the counter-propositions and sent the document to Cerruti, who forwarded it to Prime Minister Ricasoli. The latter held it necessary to ask General Pettinengo, Minister of Defence, and Finance Minister Scialoia to give their opinion about and their consent to the proposed measures to be taken in this matter.[17] It seems that it was primarily Kossuth who held this long-protracted bureaucratic procedure to be unbearable and was unable to keep his countenance. As he could not venture to personally knock at the door of the competent high officials, he sent his sons as mediators. First he sent Lajos Tódor, who could not find Cerruti in his office. On leaving, however, he came across Cerruti and Guerrieri Gonzaga who told him that "no final decision has so far been made".[18] Having lost patience, Kossuth – making use of the occasion that István Türr pressed him for the money necessary to his travel to the East where he was bound to – wrote a letter to Ricasoli, asking him to take urgent measures. This time Kossuth abstained from alluding to the essential points included in the propositions, instead he referred to Türr's mission and on this ground pressed the Prime Minister for the immediate payment of 500,000 francs.[19] He also wrote to Cerruti to the same effect.[20] Kossuth's letter to Ricasoli was delivered on 23 June by his son Ferenc, whom he also commissioned to run a verbal message, tantamount to a kind of threat. Namely: should Türr be unable to start on his mission on the following day, "he would rather put on the red shirt again". Kossuth was very well aware that he aimed at the weakest point of the Italian government when he alluded to Türr's one-time siding with Garibaldi, that is, to the possibility of Türr's return to his former ally. All this, however, failed to exhaust Ricasoli's patience: in his reply, Ricasoli advised Kossuth to be patient and moderate, and added that he saw a certain difference in pace between the two of them. During his talk with the Italian Prime Minister, Ferenc Kossuth was certainly not exaggerating when he referred to his father's extremely strained state of mind; he stated that his father "expects the negotiations with the Italian government with a quite nervous anxiety".[21]

It is highly probable that in those days of almost nerve-racking expectation and anxiety, Kossuth, with his energies condemned to idleness, could only find some relaxation in wording proclamations and manifestos. It was at this time that Kossuth wrote his grandiose *Manifestum*, dated 23 June 1866, which, with its

[17] *Ibid.* 22 June 1866.

[18] *Ibid.* 23 June 1866.

[19] Kossuth to Ricasoli. Firenze, 23 June 1866. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

[20] Kossuth to Cerruti. Firenze, 23 June 1866. (*Ibid.*)

[21] Kossuth's diary notes 23 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4483.)

highly convincing reasoning, or even crushing arguments, addressed the Hungarian nation, as well as the whole world. In his Manifesto, Kossuth anticipated the future realization of all hopes and expectations, because he thought that the daring conclusions he had drawn were justified by the logic of the given historical circumstances. At the same time, he reassured the governments concerned: "We, Hungarians, are not revolutionaries. We are not in favour of any political or social experimentations." In the concluding part of his almost study-sized Manifesto, Kossuth urged on action and thus ended his work: "And after the most sober calculations, and with the warmth of hopes, which I am not very much inclined to cherish, I say to you what I have never said over the past 17 years: I will see you again my country! my nation!"[22] It was essentially in the same tone that Kossuth worded his proclamation of 24 June 1866, addressed to the Hungarian-born soldiers of the Austrian army, to the date of which he added "Dated from the Royal Italian camp": "... I order and command you: Do come here! that from here you could go home to save the fatherland!"[23] Expressing his arguments to Prime Minister Ricasoli, Ferenc Kossuth explicitly referred to the proclamation which his father had already formulated: "he only waits for the negotiations to publish it." Belonging also to those heated and ready-to-act days in Florence was that on 22 June Kossuth visited the Prussian envoy Usedom, whom he expected to put pressure on the Italian leaders. Relying on the encouragement of the always helpful Usedom, Kossuth put down his requests in writing on the same day, and addressed it to the Prussian envoy with the final objective that his written requests could reach Bismarck as well. The main point of Kossuth's wish was that a Prussian expedition, to be combined with an Italian one, be started towards North Hungary, with which then a more sizeable Hungarian Legion would join forces. Kossuth resolutely insisted that he himself would start with this Prussian forces to Hungary, and he also asked for a definite answer as to his possibility to travel to Berlin. Instead of the tug-of-war with the Italian government, in his letter to Usedom, Kossuth outlined a seemingly ready agreement, as if it had really been reached. He must have done so out of some political considerations or for the sake of supporting his arguments, anticipating to have a positive effect by this on the Prussians.[24]

With a few exceptions, Kossuth's contemporary correspondence is totally imbued with this unfounded and quite unjustifiable optimistic tone. In his letters to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss, Colonel Károly Földváry and Sebő Vukovics, who was staying in London, Kossuth gave the events in Florence an interpretation contrary to the actual situation. The real situation was namely burdened with difficulties, tormenting and long-protracted bargaining, and it put a strong restraint

[22] Kossuth L.: Manifestum. Firenze, 23 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4494; 4504; in Italian: *Ibid.* I, 4557; in German: O.L., Csáky Papers.) Cf. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 315 ff.

[23] Kossuth's proclamation: *Vitéz magyarok* (Brave Hungarians), 24 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4500; 4502; 4504; in French: *Ibid.* I, 4503.)

[24] Kossuth to Usedom, Prussian envoy to Florence. Firenze, 22 June 1866. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 232 ff.

on Kossuth's freedom to act.[25] However, Kossuth's reports from Florence, or rather the large number of his orders, made things appear as if everything had been in perfect order, as if Kossuth's power and his orders had enjoyed the support and agreement of the governments concerned, and nothing but the problems of detail had remained to be settled. So – in Kossuth's interpretation – it was possible to take steps forward, to take actions, as everything went in an orderly fashion. One of the most interested persons in this matter, Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss, however, showed a very cautious attitude towards Kossuth's instruction that he could go to Berlin to act there as Kossuth's personal representative. Having already gained some experience in the Prussian affairs, Nemeskéri first waited a while, then refused Kossuth's offer, pointing out that Kossuth had already come to an agreement with Csáky on this matter, so Csáky was to go to Berlin, thus there was no point in his going there. He upheld his position of not moving out of Paris.[26] Kossuth dispatched his Manifesto and all of his other writings, which he designed to be made public, to Vukovics in London, commissioning him to make preparations for their publication.[27]

Reality, however, made the situation increasingly delicate in Florence. The only consequence of Kossuth's pressure for an Italian answer was that on Saturday evening on 23 June, Cerruti and Guerrieri Gonzaga met the interested Hungarian leaders and put forward their *counter-propositions*. This considerably cooled the Hungarian party's expectations, because the Italians were not inclined to make any binding promise that would go beyond the reorganization of the Hungarian Legion, and they cut down the envisaged expenditures significantly. Forced into defensive, the Hungarian leaders were embittered to hear the petty-minded and circuitous Italian counter-propositions and, for the time being, they continued to stubbornly argue with the Italian high officials. Thereupon, Cerruti promised that on the following day they would report once more to the Prime Minister on the actual state of affairs, and they would not be slow to give a new answer.[28]

Komáromy and Csáky were not very downcast on hearing the narrow-minded Italian answer, as they did not expect much more than that. Over the past years they had to realize that nothing but sobriety, moderateness and patience could help in resolving the problems, and even the slightest help should be welcomed under their difficult situation. Their resolution and self-assurance were enhanced by the awareness that though Ricasoli involved Kossuth, he simultaneously had to take notice of what had been included in György Komáromy's letter of 20 June 1866. Komáromy wrote this letter in his capacity as president of the National Committee in Hungary, and he stated that the Count Tivadar Csáky should be

[25] Kossuth to Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss. Firenze, 25 June 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 226 ff; Kossuth to Colonel Károly Földváry, 28 June 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 324 ff.)

[26] Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss to Kossuth. Paris, 30 June 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 261 ff.)

[27] Kossuth to Sebő Vukovics. Firenze, 1 July 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers,* VI, pp. 351 ff.)

[28] Kossuth's diary notes 23 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4483.)

regarded as the plenipotentiary foreign representative of the domestic Committee. That is, he was authorized to act on behalf of that Committee in dealings with the governments, to conclude agreements concerning the actions in Hungary, and to receive sums for the Committee against a receipt. He also had a general authorization to supply all the relevant information to the Italian government, so that Ricasoli might ask Csáky for information on any question related to the Committee's activity.[29]

Moreover, Bismarck had definitely promised them that Berlin would only be willing to deal with the Hungarian affairs with the involvement and on the initiative of Csáky and Komáromy. It was also promised that the financial support, which was deemed to be necessary for the Hungarians, would only be made payable to these two authorized Hungarian personalities.[30] Under these circumstances, wranglings in Florence could only be regarded as a sort of storm in a tea-cup, since the serious decisions, which really mattered, were made in Berlin, from where, however, Kossuth was fully excluded. After all this, Kossuth's repeatedly voiced argument seemed to be comic, namely, that he did not want to travel to Hungary together with Garibaldi only because it was a long journey, taking as many as 20 or even 30 days, while if he went with the Prussians, he could reach his destination in 2 to 3 days.[31]

Finally, the deliberate and circuitous Italian leaders had worked out their final answer by 24 June, of which they gave a verbal information to the interested persons. Binding promise was only made in connection with the reorganization of the Hungarian Legion and the related recruitments. It was also agreed that there would be an exchange of letters between Kossuth and Ricasoli on this matter, which would be published in the newspapers in due course. These letters and the text of Kossuth's proclamation, however, were made subject to approval by the Italian government. In respect of the suggested expeditions, though the Italians admitted their necessity in principle, they practically declined to make any binding promise as to the execution of this project, with especial view to the fact that the sending of such expeditions had to be in concert with the general Italian military objectives, and depended on the fulfilment of several conditions. Should there be an expedition, it would also be accompanied by a royal proclamation. In case the uprising in Hungary were made to depend on the expeditions, the Italians were ready to take notice of it. As to the finances, the Italians offered 500,000 francs as a maximum amount which the Italian government could undertake as an obligation. Out of this sum, 400,000 francs were earmarked for an action in Serbia, and 100,000 francs were placed at the disposal of the Hungarian leaders. Simultaneously, the Italian party announced that the Italian government *declined to sign any covenant or written document*, and was only willing

[29] Komáromy to Ricasoli. Firenze, 20 June 1866. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

[30] Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 70 ff.

[31] Kossuth to Vukovics. Firenze, 1 July 1866. Kossuth: *Papers*, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 351 ff.

to give verbal information of its standpoint to the Hungarian party. With regard to any further problems, the Hungarians were advised to apply to Berlin.[32]

There was hardly anything to be added to the Italian government's standpoint of 24 June 1866, and this was the last chance of those involved to draw the final conclusions from what had happened. This applied first of all to Kossuth, because Csáky and Komáromy had an open way to go to Prussia, where they could have a free terrain to act. The same day was also connected with a sad event of the Italian–Austrian war: namely after the La Marmora-led Italian army had crossed the Mincio River and attempted to penetrate into the quadrilateral of Veneto, this strategically ill-balanced step led to the battle of Custozza of 24 June 1866. This, despite the heroic efforts of the Italian troops, ended in a crushing defeat of the Italians who now were driven back by the overpowering Austrians to the territory of Lombardy.[33] Kossuth's letter written on the next day, on 25 June, to Cerruti shows that – though Kossuth was informed of the bad turn of war operations – neither this fact, nor the Italian government's standpoint, of which he had been informed the previous day, could swing him out of the series of actions he had started.[34] Otherwise, the series of the Italian–Hungarian contacts was topped off with two letters of almost similar content, both dated 26 June 1866, which Guerrieri Gonzaga simultaneously wrote to Lajos Kossuth and the Count Tivadar Csáky. In these letters, the Italian statesman quite unambiguously summarized those conceptions which the Italian party had already verbally expounded them on 24 June: the Hungarian Legion would be reorganized; in principle they agreed with the expedition, though without binding promise, as well as with the support of movements in the so-called Military Borderland and with the sending of a Hungarian officer there. In respect of Moldavia and Wallachia, they referred the Hungarians to Berlin where they could settle the further problems.[35]

If there ever was, or may have been, a point of contact between Kossuth and Csáky, then it was István Türr with his enigmatic, and in many respects, unfathomable personality, of whom one could never know where he was actually standing, on whose behalf he was acting: whether he was commissioned by Napoleon III or Bismarck or Victor Emmanuel II – or he was simply acting on his own initiative. So it was mainly due to these uncertainties about Türr's person that an agreement was concluded in Florence on 26 June 1866. This agreement put Türr under the obligation to spend the 400,000 francs, which the Italian

[32] A summary of the Italian government's final position: *L'Autriche ne reculera*. Firenze, 24 June 1866. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

[33] *La campagna del 1866 in Italia.* Redatta dalla sezione storica del Corpo di Stato Maggiore. I–II. Roma, 1875–1895, I; Rüstow, W.: Der Krieg von 1866 in Deutschland und Italien, politisch-militärisch beschrieben. Zürich, 1866, pp. 391 ff; Pollio, A.: *Custoza*. Torino, 1903, pp. 24 ff; Bortolotti, S.: *La guerra del 1866*. Milano, 1941, pp. 94 ff; Pieri: *op. cit.* pp. 752 ff.

[34] Kossuth to Cerruti. Firenze, 25 June 1866. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

[35] Guerrieri Gonzaga to Kossuth. Firenze, 26 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4518); Guerrieri Gonzaga to Csáky. Firenze, 26 June 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers.)

government had placed at his disposal, on making preparations for an inroad into Hungary from Serbia. At the same time, he was also obliged not to start any advance before he received a telegraphic order to this effect. His scope of authority was narrowed down to the military affairs, and he was not supposed to interfere with political issues or with problems concerning the relationship between Serbia and Hungary. The agreement was undersigned by Kossuth, Csáky and Türr alike.[36] Türr, by his nature, was far more easy-going and flexible than to raise difficulties as to this special agreement, the content of which may well have been insulting to him, showing too much of the cloven hoof: their deep-seated mistrust in him. On the other hand, Türr had good reasons to take this too formal and artificial agreement forced upon him with humour, as he knew much better than his concluding parties what and why he would and should do, since he continued to abide by the instructions of those who had commissioned him in Paris and Berlin. In Belgrade, Türr's real, first commander was the Prussian consul, coming second was the Italian consul. Türr was to submit his reports to these persons and he received his further instructions from them.[37] Bensides, Türr was inclined to look upon his Hungarian allies with rather an acrid and cynical indifference, since he was not only an Italian general but also possessed the fieldmarshall's baton figuratively, as he had the exclusive right to dispose of 80 per cent of the amount provided by the Italian government. The rest 100,000 francs were paid to Kossuth, out of which he placed 20,000 francs at Csáky's disposal to cover his travel and other expenses, though with the obligation of after-accounting.[38]

Almost simultaneously with General Türr, who was bound for the Romanian principalities, Csáky and Komáromy also left Florence. Having been left alone with his anxieties, Kossuth attempted once more to secure that he could continue to exercise a firm control over the started movements of the Hungarian emigration, lest he become a captain without troops, whose commands and words are not worth more than the voice crying in the wilderness, and who is moving in a vacuum rather than in real actions. However, Kossuth got into an awkward situation in his dealings with the polite, self-assured and flexible Csáky. As a matter of fact, Csáky would never say a definite no to anything; in his political conduct, he tended to take pattern by the Italian government: his words would never be followed by deeds, he would never sign any plan or written document.

Kossuth, in his autographic draft-project of 28 June 1866, attempted to enforce his standpoint, claiming that leadership and control over what was going on abroad were in his hands, while in Hungary, leadership might be exercised by

[36] *Megállapodás Kossuth, Csáky és Türr között* (Agreement between Kossuth, Csáky and Türr). Firenze, 26 June 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 294–295, with Csáky's signature omitted.

[37] Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 85 ff.

[38] See: *1866 jún. 26-i megállapodás Türr-rel* (Agreement with Türr on 26 June 1866). (O.L., Csáky Papers); Kossuth to Ricasoli. Firenze, 25 July 1866. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

the Committee until his return with the expeditionary forces to Hungary, where he would be reinstated in his position as Governor, and he would be in command there until the new constitutional bodies decided otherwise.[39] Csáky, who was at the time engaged in matters related to his travel, actually took over Kossuth's draft, but he failed to make two fair copies of it, in compliance with the sender's original wish, so he abstained from assuming any obligation or responsibility for or following from its content. Still insisting on his standpoint, Kossuth wrote a very elaborate letter to Csáky on 28 June 1866, to the effect that he, as the recognized leader, commissioned Csáky to act in Berlin and to bring about the conclusion of an agreement similar to what had been reached with the Italian government: Prussian expedition, Hungarian Legion, Prussian royal proclamation to the Hungarian nation, etc. Finally, Kossuth underlined the necessity that "I must march into Hungary with this army instead of wasting time by going with the Italian troops which have a long way to go ...". Kossuth also requested Csáky to submit himself in every respect to his personal representative, Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss. In addition, Csáky also received a copy of Kossuth's letter of 22 June to the Prussian envoy Usedom. Csáky was also required to give Bismarck an account of the content of this letter, and to leave a copy of it with Bismarck, if necessary.[40] To avoid any dispute and controversy, Csáky packed all the "commands" and letters he had received from Kossuth in a suitcase – doing so in the belief that his "superior", seeing his good intentions and adaptability, would thus calm down. Csáky was highly impatient to get rid of his never wished partner or ally, and to start to Berlin via Turin and Paris.

THE BERLIN AGREEMENT

As regards the further developments, the really significant events were taking place in Berlin, where the prospects of an anti-Austrian war seemed to be the most promising and raised high hopes among the emigrants that their most ambitious plans and ideas might be realized. It was in the first days of July 1866 that the two wings of the Prussian army successfully advanced deep into Bohemia, while the Austrians were unable to deploy their forces to start an effective action against the forcefully advancing Prussians in the environs of Königgrätz.[41] It was also in these historical days, or perhaps hours, that the Hungarian emigrant leaders, to whose persons Bismarck had given his consent, appeared in rapid succession in Prussia to play their designated part. When General György

[39] *Kossuth kézírásos megállapodás tervezete* (Kossuth's autographic draft-agreement). Firenze, 28 June 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers.)

[40] Kossuth to Csáky. Firenze, 28 June 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers); Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 256 ff.

[41] Cf. Rüstow: Der Krieg von 1866, *op. cit.* pp. 206 ff.; Friedjung Henrik: *Harcz a német hegemóniáért* (1859–1866). (Struggle for the German hegemony 1859–1866), I–III. Budapest, 1902–1904, III, pp. 65 ff.

Klapka started to Berlin, he did so out of the consideration that he would take this good opportunity to accept the leading military position which had been offered to him, that is, to act as the commander-in-chief of all the would-be armed forces to be organized in Hungary. However, he did not want to have any share in the political leadership either of the emigration or of the future Hungary. When Klapka secured the position of the commander-in-chief for himself, he knew and admitted that he would have to subject himself to the political control of the Pest-seated Hungarian National Committee, to its president, György Komáromy, who was actually staying abroad, as well as to the Count Tivadar Csáky, the Committee's foreign representative. This unequivocal position of Klapka quite naturally followed from the consequences of his previous activity, from his time-honoured co-operation with Csáky and Komáromy. On the other hand, Klapka's readiness and support greatly contributed to Csáky's and Komáromy's political weight and prestige, which they needed to display their activity more effectively. Hence it followed that General Klapka did not deem it necessary to build up closer connections with Kossuth, all the less because he had already formed his well-founded opinion about and drawn his lesson from the negative consequences of such co-operations. However, under the pressure of repeated persuasions coming from many directions, Klapka finally was willing to send Kossuth a brief letter, dated 30 June 1866, offering peace to him. But Kossuth's reply of 5 July to this letter only justified Klapka's reservation and confirmed him in his conviction that he should proceed along his own way, avoiding the inextricable controversies, mutual reproaches and stilted explanations.[42]

On 3 July 1866, the day of the noted Battle of Königgrätz, Klapka met Chancellor Bismarck at the Prussian headquarters. There, the Prussian Chancellor assured Klapka of his support and admitted the necessity of setting up the Hungarian Legion, underlining the importance of the Legion's participation in military operations in Hungary as the Hungarian contribution to bringing the common cause to success. The Count Tivadar Csáky and György Komáromy were encouraged in like manner by Bismarck, who greeted them as the representatives of the Hungarian resistance movement, recognizing them as the competent leaders of the Hungarian National Committee abroad. At the same time, Bismarck also made it clear that it was only the two of them with whom he was willing to confer in matters concerning Hungary and to conclude agreements, and he also pointed out that Kossuth's appearance in Berlin or in Prussia in general was undesired.[43] This standpoint of the Prussian Chancellor increased the political weight of the Komáromy–Csáky–Klapka group. Thus they could feel safe enough to abide by this policy, to refrain from making any concession in this respect, and to take any unnecessary risks. This was easier and more tangible to

[42] Klapka to Kossuth. Paris, 30 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4547.); Kossuth to Klapka. Firenze, 5 July 1866. (O.L., Klapka Papers.)

[43] Komáromy to Usedom, Prussian Envoy to Florence. Paris, 29 June 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers); Komáromy to Barral, Italian Envoy to Berlin. Berlin, 1 July 1866. (*Ibid.*); Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 107 ff.

them, because it coincided with their innermost wishes and aspirations that they might act quite freely and independently in the course of their future work.

Having started their activities in Prussia, the emigrant leaders made every effort to arrive at an agreement in the spirit of the directives approved by Bismarck, and by this, to help resolving the really crucial practical problems. The first week of July 1866 was devoted to these efforts, and their negotiations met with success. Unlike the long-protracted and cumbersome talks in Florence, preparatory works for the agreement in Berlin were also sped up by unambiguous and uniform standpoints as well as by the elimination of certain unrealistic moments. They did not insist on a Prussian guarantee as a precondition for agreement for the sending of expeditionary forces to Hungary, because all this was taken for granted, or at least presupposed, during the talks, in the awareness that their daring ideas were strictly made to depend on the whole course of the Italian–Prussian–Austrian war. Despite the more rigid attitude which the Prussian government had shown in several respects, a written agreement was reached between the Hungarian leaders and the representative of the Prussian government in Berlin, which then was signed by both parties. The Hungarian–Prussian agreement had essentially been accomplished by 9 July 1866, but its signing by the Prussian Deputy Defence Minister Schütz and the Count Tivadar Csáky took place only as late as 15 July.[44] Csáky quite rightfully hastened to inform the interested parties – the Italian Prime Minister Ricasoli, the Italian Under-Secretary of State Cerruti, the Prussian Envoy Usedom, as well as Kossuth – of the fact that the agreement had successfully been concluded.[45] The agreement was primarily concerned with the organization, equipment, armament, staff of officers, command and all the other related necessities of the Hungarian Legion to be set up in Prussia. Simultaneously, appropriate measures were taken for the allocation of funds promised for this purpose by the Prussian government to the Hungarians. Within this financial support, the ratios were so established that one million francs out of the one million and a half should be allotted to supporting the internal resistance in Hungary, and 500,000 francs should go to external organization. The latter amount was also designed to cover the costs of military preparations made under the guidance of Nándor Éber on the territories of the Romanian principalities and partly expenses incurred in the course of the organization of the Legion.[46]

During the execution of all this, a particularly significant and many-sided work of control and organization was done by Tivadar Csáky, who virtually acted as

[44] *Megállapodás Schütz tábornok porosz helyettes hadügyminiszter és gróf Csáky Tivadar között* (Agreement between the Prussian Deputy Defence Minister General Schütz and the Count Tivadar Csáky). Berlin, 15 July 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers.)

[45] Csáky to Ricasoli. Berlin 9 July 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers.); Csáky to Usedom. Berlin, 9 July 1866. (*Ibid.*); Csáky to Cerruti. Berlin, 12 July 1866. (*Ibid.*)

[46] *Elszámolások a porosz kormány által folyósított pénzösszegekről, 1866 aug.* (Accounts for the funds allocated by the Prussian government. August 1866). (O.L., Csáky Papers.); *Gróf Csáky Tivadar végső elszámolása a poroszországi költségekről* (Count Tivadar Csáky's final account of the expenses in Prussia). Genf, 20 August 1867. (*Ibid.*)

the most important connecting link between the Prussian government and the Hungarians who had arrived in Prussia. However, the Prussian government wanted to secure for itself direct leadership and a stable, continuous control over the affairs. To achieve this, Bismarck charged the Counsellor of the Royal Prussian Legation Bucher with the task of delivering the Prussian government's directives at any given time to the Hungarian leaders and also to the Legion, then being in the process of organization.[47] At the same time, Drygalski was sent out as a royal commissioner to the Hungarian Legion to keep an eye on the affairs and to excercise the necessary control.[48]

By a direct order from Bismarck, Hungarian soldiers were separated from the Austrian soldiers, who had been taken prisoner by the Prussian troops, and were moved to the fortresses of Glogau, Neisse and Kosel in Silesia. According to plans, the organizers of the Hungarian Legion were to go among the Hungarian soldiers so gathered, in order to perform the necessary tasks of organization. It was already laid down in the related plan made earlier that the troops should be recruited from among the prisoners of war, while the staff of officers from among the emigrants.[49] When the organization of the would-be staff of officers was planned, the plan-makers, from the outset, reckoned with the active and experienced military personalities of Hungarian emigration, especially upon those who were staying in Italy, either outside or perhaps within the Hungarian Legion in Italy. All this had already been brought up as a necessity at the time of the Florence negotiations, and it had been also discussed at the time that the Hungarian officers in Italy would have to be transported to their new destination with the consent and financial support of the Italian government. In this Kossuth also participated, namely, in inviting and informing the individual officers.[50] The practical work fell on the competent Italian government officials who had to see to it that the travel to Prussia be made possible also for those who were not serving in the Legion at the moment, and in such a way that they should not forfeit their rights which they had acquired through their former military service in Italy, and could exercise those rights upon their eventual return to Italy. It was with all these requirements met, and with the considerate Italian government's consent, that the Hungarian officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Mogyoródy, started from Italy. Then they were joined by many others, both from Italy and from other countries.[51]

As regards the Hungarian Legion in Prussia, the process of its actual organization narrowed down to rather a short time, having taken not more than a fortnight from mid-July of 1866. However we look at the things, it should be kept in

[47] Legation Counsellor Bucher to Csáky. Berlin, 10 July 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers.); 13 July. (*Ibid.*)

[48] Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 140 ff.

[49] *Ibid.* pp. 131 ff.

[50] Kossuth to Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Mogyoródy and Major György Scheiter. Firenze, 25 June 1866. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 245 ff.

[51] Cerruti to Csáky. Firenze, 14 July 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers.)

mind that the process of organization, despite the difficulties which had arisen, met with success within the shortest possible time, and an armed force of some 1500 was placed in marching order. It is quite another question that the immense efforts, the organizational and preparatory works, were all belated almost from the first moment, or more precisely, the war worked out in such a way that the role of the Hungarian Legion may well have been questioned. However, this regrettable factor does not detract in the least from the efficiency and the results of the manifold and hard work carried out. Lieutenant General Antal Vetter was put at the lead of the organization of the Hungarian Legion, who at the same time also acted as the Legion's Chief Supervisor. Colonel Baron Emil Uechtritz was appointed as his deputy for organization.[52] The core of the Hungarian army was formed by those prisoners of war who had been gathered in the town of Neisse. The Legion's Organizational Command was stationed in the same town. Having raised to the rank of colonel on his joining the Legion, Adolf Mogyoródy, together with some of his companions, went to Glogau to win the Hungarian war prisoners over to the cause of Hungary's liberation. His activity soon brought good results, but the Prussian commander of the fortress raised several difficulties and declined to separate the volunteering Hungarians from the other prisoners of war. In the end, Mogyoródy was ordered to go to Neisse and to take over the direct command, in the capacity of brigadier general, of the Hungarian forces which, in the meanwhile, had grown into a 1560-strong army.[53] The bulk of this small army, which was regarded and treated as a brigade, consisted of infantrymen, who were divided – for lack of battalion commanding officers – into 8 companies, each counting 170 to 175 soldiers. These units were then organized into four classes until the battalions would be properly set up. The Legion's cavalry consisting of some 150 hussars, was also formed, and Lieutenant Colonel György Scheiter was appointed as its commander. The Count Gergely Bethlen was appointed to act as the chief supervisor of the cavalry, which was to be further developed. Since the Legion's Organizational Command had been given six Austrian cannons, the Legion's artillery was also organized with a staff of 80.[54] General György Klapka, Commander-in-Chief of the Legion, was given an aide-de-camp in the person of the Count Arthur Seherr-Thoss, an old confidant of Bismarck, who once had performed delicate missions, mediating between the Prince Jérôme Napoléon and the Prussian Chancellor.[55] The Count Csáky, as the competent person to organize the Legion and to appoint officers, was raised to the rank of Colonel, while Komáromy, as the President of the Hungarian

[52] Cf. Abafi-Aigner, Ludwig: Die ungarische Legion in Preussen, 1866. (*Pester Lloyd*, 16–17 April 1897. Offprint.)

[53] Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 139 ff.

[54] Adolf Mogyoródy to Kossuth. Bauervitz, 9 October 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VII, pp. 84 ff.)

[55] Seherr-Thoss, A.: Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben (*Deutsche Rundschau*, 1881. Hefte 9–10). In Hungarian: Emlékezés múltamra. (*Budapesti Szemle*, 1881/27–28.)

National Committee, was also promoted to the same rank. Serving beside Csáky was Major György Rényi as Head of the Diplomatic Department, who was designated to be the commander of the would-be 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Legion. Major Ágoston Grisza was appointed to command the 1st Battalion. Colonel Sándor Mednyánszky became the chief of general staff and the Count Sándor Karacsay, Colonel by rank, also served in the general staff. The Baron Antal Balassa, as a Major, was in charge of the stores of military uniforms and war supplies.[56] Appointments to the more important officers' posts, however, did not mean that the Legion had an adequate number of officers. To fill this gap, Csáky took urgent measures that Hungarian officers in Italy could come to Prussia as soon as possible. In this matter, Csáky even sent a Prussian officer to Italy, and to help him perform his task successfully, he gave him proper instructions, as well as letters of recommendation to the Italian authorities.[57]

The Prussian government, on its own part, did its best to provide the Hungarian Legion with the necessary clothing and arms. By 26 July, the Legion had received the requested uniforms for each of the three branches of service. Infantrymen wore blue shirt, red cap, blue army trousers, but those who could not come by new trousers, might wear the old Austrian ones. Boots were also Austrian-made. Hussars wore riding boots and tight-fitting Hanoverian greatcoats. Though soldiers of the Legion were not given the modern Prussian breechloaders, they were equipped with the Hanoverian Minié-rifles with 60 cartridges and bayonets without sockets. Hussars were equipped with pistols and Hanoverian swords. Officers were given revolvers. Thus the small army, some 1500 soldiers, had been clothed and armed by 26 July 1866. In addition, there were some half a thousand other Hungarians in Neisse, who had volunteered to serve in the Legion, and whose equipment formed a further task. Owing to the new conceptions and the pressing military plans, due measures were taken for the immediate starting of the equipped legionary soldiers.[58]

26 July 1866 was a noteworthy day of the Hungarian Legion in Prussia. It was the day when General Klapka officially took over the Legion's command, the soldiers swore an oath and were given the Legion's flags. All this took place in a highly ceremonial form in Neisse in the presence of General Klapka and the Count Tivadar Csáky. At 6 o'clock in the afternoon, the legionary units formed a square, in the middle of which General Vetter and Colonel Mogyoródy received General Klapka, Tivadar Csáky and their entourage. The Legion's three flags – two for the infantry and one for the hussars – were handed over by Csáky who, in his address, greeted the legionnaires with a speech. After General Klapka had taken over the flags with a brief answer, the Legion took an oath.[59]

[56] Klapka, Vetter, Bethlen tábornokok megbízólevelének kiadása (Presentation of credentials for generals Klapka, Vetter and Bethlen). 19 July 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers.)

[57] Csáky to Cerruti. Berlin 18 July 1866. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

[58] Cf. Mogyoródy to Kossuth. Bauervitz, October 1866. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VII, pp. 84 ff.

[59] Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 141 ff.

A few hours after the ceremony, Klapka issued his order to the Legion to prepare for start. On 27 July 1866 at 5 o'clock in the morning, the Legion started to entrain. The small army arrived in Oderberg by train in the evening of the same day to continue its way on foot towards the Austrian frontiers. After crossing the border, the troops pitched camp near Ostrau at about midnight. According to schedules, they were to start further on 29 July, but then – due to the Prussian–Austrian armistice – instead of the planned advance, Klapka gave an order to the Legion to return to Prussian territory. Accordingly, they crossed the Oder River near Hruschau by ferry and boats to encamp at the nearby Schillersdorf on 30 July.[60]

From that time on, the further fate of the Legion, and let us add, the future of the whole Hungarian emigration, were always determined by the actual developments of the international situation. Though the Hungarian emigration had various isolated counter-actions, endeavours and efforts, these could not alter the actual course of events. Still it is worthwhile recollecting their history, as it well shows the final desperate attempts and the sometimes gleaming but passing hopes of the Hungarian emigration. Judging all this from the more balanced and sober viewpoint of the after-ages, their acts may seem to have been Quixotic efforts. However, if they are considered against the background of the whirling and rapidly changing contemporary events, they carry a different meaning, and many moments of their actions become understandable – even if the circumstances prevented their realization. It is to be considered as a very important factor that – from the moment the military superiority of Prussia had been magnificently proved by its victory over Austria at Königgrätz – Paris found the time ripe for starting action to mediate between the belligerent powers. Napoleon III did so out of the consideration that he could present the bill for his neutrality to Berlin and could make claim to his share, too. Namely, in parallel with Prussia's territorial augmentation, he could also extend his country borders towards the Rhine River. On the other hand, the French Emperor also tended to appear as defender of the weaker. He warned Bismarck: he should either moderate his excessive "appetite", or else he should pay the bill possibly by ceding certain German territories to France, in proportion to his conquests. The involved game of diplomatic mediation, which Napoleon III began in July 1866, may well have been regarded as a threat to the Prussian court, where securing and maintaining French and Russian neutrality were looked upon as necessary conditions. Any change in this respect must have set Bismarck thinking, so much the more as these steps of Paris, however friendly was the manner in which they had been taken, might have incalculable political implications.[61]

It arose from several considerations that Vienna consented to giving up Venice without ado, so that handing it over to the French Emperor, the latter might cede the city to the Italians as a present. After having been defeated at Custozza, Italy could no longer have much say in military issues, and this position

[60] *Ibid.* pp. 186 ff.

[61] Cf. Friedjung: *Harcz a német hegemóniáért, op. cit.* III, pp. 126 ff.

was even worsened by its defeat in the sea-battle near Issa on 19 July 1866. By the fact that General Cialdini's troops crossed the Po River to advance into the province of Veneto, and in parallel with this, the Archduke Albrecht withdrew its forces, it became possible to concentrate significant armed forces at a rapid rate near the environs of the Austrian capital city. The Prussian military leadership had to reckon with these events seriously.[62] Looking at the things from this angle, it seems that the French mediation was meant to serve as a diplomatic camouflage for the re-grouping of the Austrian military forces in an attempt to create a new situation, in which they could reckon with the appearance of counter-forces from several directions to offset the Prussian pressure. It was in this atmosphere that the Prussian–Austrian armistice negotiations were started and continued by the mediation of France, which resulted in a temporary, five-day armistice on 22 July 1866. The negotiations continued and concluded the provisional Nikolsburg peace agreement on 26 July, which at that moment was only valid until 2 August. However, there were indications that the arms would be stilled for good.[63]

When the Italian government gave utterance to its dissatisfaction with the form in which Italy re-gained Venice, as well as with the Prussian–Austrian armistice negotiations, the Prussian politicians in Berlin became justifiably indignant at the Italian conduct. The Prussians claimed that they had borne the main burden of the war, and the Italians had better show a more self-critical attitude, with especial view to their military performance.[64] To be sure, apart from the remarkable military achievement of Garibaldi and his volunteers, the Italian army could only score very little success during the war – though it should be admitted that the blame for this must go to the Italian military leadership with its wavering, in fact, reluctant attitude towards the whole war. There were signs that General La Marmora and his general staff virtually snatched at the chance of an armistice, by which Italy could obtain Venice without any special effort. Some critical voices, which aimed to appease the dissatisfied and anxious public, along with certain far-fetching plans envisaging an Italian advance beyond the Isonzo River, and so to acquire further territories in Trento, were not in conformity either with the real intentions of the official Italian government quarters, nor with the actual power relations. Nor did Napoleon III want to sharpen the "appetite" of the Italians, and thus the course of events logically led to the eight-day armistice signed by the Austrians and Italians on 2 August, to be followed by a more lasting peace agreement concluded in Cormons on 11 August.[65]

It is quite understandable that in this transitional period in July, when the role of arms was increasingly taken over by diplomacy, the situation and prospects of emigration showed a high degree of instability. True, Csáky and Komáromy

[62] Attlmayer, F.: *Der Krieg Oesterreichs in der Adria im Jahre 1866.* Pola und Wien, 1896. pp. 48 ff.

[63] Friedjung: *Harcz a német hegemóniáért, op. cit.* III, pp. 211 ff.

[64] *Ibid.* pp. 343 ff.

[65] Cf. La Marmora, Alfonso: *Un po' più di luce sugli eventi politici e militari dell'anno 1866.* Firenze, 1873, pp. 341 ff; Kuhn, F.: *Der Gebirges Krieg.* Wien, 1870, pp. 33 ff; Pieri: *op. cit.* pp. 761 ff.

really worked a miracle when they managed to create a small Hungarian army practically from nothing in a few days. However, the Nikolsburg armistice was concluded precisely at the moment when General Klapka took over the Legion's command, the organization of the Hungarian Legion in Prussia was basically completed, the soldiers swore an oath and received their flags. Subsequently, however logical it may have seemed to discontinue the organization of the Legion and to return to the earlier state of affairs, in many respects just the reverse happened. To be more precise, under the new situation contradictory measures were taken, which simultaneously tended to restrain the processes which had already started, and to advance them. This seemingly rather illogical contradiction, however, directly followed from the doubts about the durability of the armistice, and also from the view that the final outcome of the events was not yet in sight: whether the coming days would bring a lasting peace or an escalation of war. Moreover, Bismarck deliberately sought to shape the peace conditions so that they might be as favourable to Prussia as possible, and he also reckoned upon the pressure which could be put on Austria, lest Vienna should feel safe in the belief that the war had ended for them, that no external pressure would endanger their existence, and the mediation of the French Emperor would guarantee protection and safety to Austria. Thus it was the extent, content and other details of the armistice bargaining which essentially determined the new standpoint of Berlin in relation to the Hungarian case too, namely, that despite the preliminary armistice, the Hungarian Legion should not be disbanded. In fact, it was determined that the Hungarian Legion should be developed and strengthened in accordance with Bismarck's order. But all this was questioned by the fate of those who had remained under the command of General Vetter in Neisse, and were disarmed and practically reduced again to the status of war prisoners.[66]

THE KLAPKA-LEGION'S INROAD INTO HUNGARY

In contrast with Vetter's corps, the Klapka-led Legion of some 1500 took a quite different course from Schillersdorf. Assembled there on 31 July 1866, military and political leaders discussed the future of the Legion, more particularly, the problem of whether they would make another attempt to inroad into Hungary, or would rather withdraw. Their arguments and counter-arguments were equally justifiable, with especial view to the possibility that the armistice might soon expire, and the Hungarian Legion should be ready to be deployed. The uncertainty and indecision characterizing the participants – including Klapka, Komáromy, Csáky and others – arose from the ambiguous conduct of the Prussians, who simultaneously encouraged and discouraged the Hungarians. At the same time, they also pondered that the Hungarian Legion, once organized, armed and started, ought to do something positive which might give evidence of its military abilities, determination, readiness to act, as well as the bravery of its

[66] Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 186 ff.

leaders.[67] Apart from these considerations, there were also other reasons that influenced the final decision-making.

In this context, reference should be made, first of all, to Kossuth's behaviour, his peremptory conduct, always pressing for acts. Since Csáky had left Florence, Kossuth increasingly realized that he was kept away from where the real actions were, he was not properly informed of the developments in Prussia. He also realized that those, with whom he had come to an agreement in Florence, neglected him, in fact, they excluded him from the actual course of events. His impatience and anxiety about all this increased from day to day.[68] Initially, he thought that he would seize the opportunity offered by the Italian terrain where he could prepare for the expected good turn of events. It was with this in mind that he publicly exchanged letters with Prime Minister Ricasoli on 28 June 1866, who, in his reply, promised to improve the conditions and possibilities of the Hungarian Legion in Italy.[69] Arrangements were made for the publication of the *Manifestum* in English, French, German, Hungarian and Italian, for the information of the international public; proclamations were worked out and dispatched to the Hungarian-born soldiers of the Austrian army.[70] In the course of preparations for the hoped expedition, steps were taken to set up a field-press, and the manufacturing of cliches necessary to the domestic printing of banknotes, designed by Kossuth's sons, was also started.[71] In this situation, Kossuth might rightly believe that his executive power over the Hungarian Legion in Italy had been restored, and so he gave instructions to Colonel Földváry accordingly. The Colonel was not very happy to receive Kossuth's instructions, because he tended to regard them as a limitation of his scope of authority, in addition, it also came hard on him that Colonel Telkessy was sent to the Italian Ministry of Defence to act as liaison officer in matters concerning the Hungarian Legion.[72] Besides, Földváry had his own ideas about the completion of the Legion's staff of officers: he insisted that officers should be appointed mostly from among those members of the Legion, whom he had qualified himself as worthy of such promotion, and no external individuals should be brought into the Legion as officers.[73]

However, the optimistic tone of letters, outlining the bright future and prospects of the Legion, was by no means in conformity with the Legion's real situation and circumstances. After having been moved from Ancona to the

[67] See: Ernő Surányi to Dániel Irányi. Schillersdorf, 1 August 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4663.); Dániel Irányi to Kossuth. Berlin, 7 August 1866. (*Ibid.* 4667.); Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 192 ff.

[68] Lajos Kossuth to Lajos Tódor Kossuth. Torino, 8 July 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 379 ff); Kossuth to Dániel Irányi. Torino, 9 July 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 381 ff.)

[69] Kossuth to Ricasoli. Firenze, 28 June 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4483.); Ricasoli to Kossuth. Firenze, 28 June 1866. (*Ibid.*)

[70] Sebő Vukovics to Kossuth. London, 6, 7, 12 July 1866. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* V, pp. 360 ff.

[71] Kossuth's diary notes, 6 July 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4483.)

[72] Kossuth to Colonel József Telkessy. Firenze, 2 July 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 368 ff); Kossuth to Colonel Károly Földváry, Firenze 2 July 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 365 ff.)

[73] Földváry to Kossuth. Chieti, 28 June 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 327 ff); 5 July 1866. (*Ibid.* pp. 367 ff.)

Abruzzo Mountains, the Legion was once more deployed against the *brigantaggio*. Increased severity, retortions and court-martial sentences could only suppress the soldiers' dissatisfaction, without, however, resolving the fundamental problems.[74] The hope that the wish of the Hungarian soldiers would finally be fulfilled and they would change from gendarmes into soldiers fighting the Austrians, was on the wane. The transport of the Legion was a very slow, long-protracted and belated process. They had arrived in Bologna by 9 July 1866, but instead of being deployed against the Austrians, they were commanded to render hospital services.[75] There were indications that General La Marmora wanted to avoid provoking the Austrians, and would definitely prevent the Hungarian troops from coming into an armed clash with them. All this justified the caution of the democratic opposition members of the Hungarian emigration, as well as the severe criticism they had addressed to the official leaders of the emigration for their policy of committing themselves to the anti-Austrian governments, thus making the Hungarian cause depend on them. In letters to his friends, István Dunyov unmasked the ambiguous conduct of the Italian military and political leaders, pointing out that they had felt fear of the democratic and national endeavours of the Italian people much more than of the enemy.[76] Instead of sending Garibaldi to the main front line, they let him and his volunteers lose in such secondary seats of war as the Trentino area. In this sector of the front line, the most active part of the Hungarian emigration was represented by Gusztáv Frigyesy, who was in command of an independent military unit and made a remarkable contribution to the rapid advance of the Italian volunteers. It had nothing to do with their actions that the ensuing armistice obliged Garibaldi to give up all what he had achieved and to withdraw his troops.[77]

Under these circumstances, the Italian terrain offered less and less opportunity to act and to carry out the planned tasks. Kossuth, who would most willingly have gone to Berlin, and – as he repeatedly emphasized – to return from there to Hungary with the expeditionary forces, was qualified an undesirable person in Berlin and was definitely forbidden to go there. So Italy, which only gave hopes of modest chances, was the only place left for him to display his activity. Kossuth, so to say, laid siege to the competent Italian authorities in order to gather adequate information and to press for the Italian expedition. In this matter, he repeatedly consulted Ricasoli, and he also had talks with Garibaldi, who, however, knew exactly to which camp Kossuth, who resorted to him, really belonged.[78] Kossuth also met the Prince Jérôme Napoléon on 21 July 1866 in

[74] Cf. Lukács Lajos: *Az olaszországi magyar légió története és anyakönyvei 1860–1867.* (The history of the Hungarian Legion in Italy and its Registers 1860–1867). Budapest, 1986, pp. 176 ff.

[75] Földváry to Kossuth. Bologna, 18 July 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 403 ff.)

[76] Lukács: Dunyov István, *op. cit.* (see footnote 52 on page 97) pp. 182 ff.

[77] *Idem*: Frigyesy és Garibaldi 1866–67-ben (Frigyesy and Garibaldi in 1866–1867). (*Századok*, 1982, No. 4); Lajos Lukács: Gusztav Frigyesy, the Hungarian volunteer, and Garibaldi in 1866–67. in: *Pages from the Garibaldian Epic* Edited by Anthony P. Campanella. Sarasota, 1984, pp. 159 ff.

[78] Kossuth's diary notes 6–16 July 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4483.)

Ferrara, who – behaving in a rather ambiguous manner – reproached him for the delay of the outbreak of revolt in Hungary, as well as for the lack of such initiatives, because, the Prince maintained, an uprising could still alter the face of things, which now show a tendency towards peace.[79] It was at about the same time, around his talks with the Prince Napoléon, that a new change took place in Kossuth's behaviour and political line. He, who had previously so resolutely held the position that Hungary should not be incited to revolt until the foreign expeditionary forces, along with the related Italian and Prussian royal proclamations, had arrived in the country, now suddenly, though not quite unexpectedly, but anyway with a surprising resoluteness, gave up his former ideas. This change is well demonstrated in his telegraphs and messages to Tivadar Csáky in Prussia. In his letter of 16 July, worded in a demanding, reproaching and even threatening tone, Kossuth requested Csáky to give him urgent and detailed information of what had happened in Prussia, because he found it insufficient that Csáky had informed him of his agreement with Bismarck in a message of only a few lines on 13 July.[80] Somewhat later, on 20 July, Kossuth most resolutely demanded that Csáky start the uprising in Hungary at once, because an unexpected turn of events had changed the whole situation, and it was no longer necessary to make any further action depend on the intervention of the foreign expeditionary forces.[81] In his replies to Kossuth's pressing letters and telegraphs, Csáky sought to appease him, though Csáky never failed to make it clear that Prussia insisted on taking its own course. Csáky also referred to the advanced state of the Hungarian Legion's organization in Prussia as well as to its imminent deployment. At the same time, Csáky also informed Ricasoli of Kossuth's threats and his constant pressing for action.[82]

In those critical days, when the Nikolsburg armistice seemed likely to lead to the discontinuance of war, which might have entailed the frustration of the Hungarian plans, Kossuth – even if not quite free from some contradictions, but most energetically – demanded the start of the revolt in Hungary without delay, and he did so even more emphatically after his discussions with the Prince Jérôme Napoléon in Ferrara. He also sent a telegraph to Csáky to the same effect, calling him to make the final attempt, to start it immediately, and to act in the fatherland without waiting for any foreign expeditionary force. This, Kossuth believed, could still alter the course of events, could prevent a more lasting armistice, and so Austria could be forced to continue its unpromising war efforts. In the same way as in 1859, the Janus-faced, insincere Napoleonic policy ap-

[79] *Ibid.* 21 July 1866.

[80] Kossuth to Csáky. Firenze, 16 July 1866. Telegraph. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215; O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4608); Kossuth to Csáky. Firenze, 16 July 1866. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 407 ff.

[81] Kossuth to Csáky. Firenze, 20 July 1866. Telegraph. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4621; O.L., Csáky Papers.)

[82] Csáky to Ricasoli. Berlin, 18 July 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers); Csáky to Kossuth. Berlin 22 July 1866. Telegraph. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4632; its draft copy: O.L., Csáky Papers.)

peared as a decisive factor in 1866 too, and it may well be stated that the official leaders of the Hungarian emigration became badly exposed in both cases to this utterly shrewd policy, which virtually never cared at all about the real Hungarian interests. While on the one hand the manoeuvres of the French Emperor helped Austria to win a little breathing space, and after the Königgrätz defeat, this policy put Austria in a situation under which the chances of the Hungarian internal resistance became even worse, on the other hand the Emperor's nephew incited the Hungarians to revolt, provoking them to create such a situation which would have been very hazardous and fruitless to them. Supposedly, Kossuth had come by himself to the conclusion which led him to demand immediate action from Csáky. But it belongs to the truth that the related writing was formulated in Ferrara and the impressions Kossuth had gained there also left their mark on it.

"*L'action immédiate sur et dans le pays indispensable. Combinaison du côté de la Prusse question de la vie, ou de mort*" – so reads the clear command which was dispatched, through Under-Secretary of State Cerruti, from Florence to Berlin at 3:50 p.m. on 27 July 1866. To justify the necessity of taking urgent actions, the same message referred to the armistice and to the imminence of peace which might ensue in eight days.[83]

The supposition that it was in the power of the addressees of the message, or that they were able to spark an uprising in Hungary at the flick of a finger, was, to say the least, a highly daring idea. The recognition concerning the necessity of action, and the actual circumstances in Hungary, were by no means in harmony. Furthermore, the socio-political conditions for an uprising could hardly be replaced by instructions, commands or proclamations coming from abroad. To be sure, Hungarian leaders in Prussia had previously built up their contacts with some circles of the malcontents in Hungary, and had also sent them some financial aid from Prussian sources. But it did not in the least follow from all this that those active in Hungary were in the position to trigger an armed revolt without any external military support. Anyway, a decision by Csáky, Komáromy and Klapka could only have been related to problems concerning the Hungarian Legion in Prussia. In this respect, however, Csáky and Komáromy disapproved of taking any unfounded or ill-timed step, and at the War Council session held in Schillersdorf on 31 July 1866, they strongly opposed Klapka's view of starting an immediate action. Klapka, however, reckoned with the uncertain outcome of the armistice, and also took such factors into account as the ambiguous attitude of the Prussian military leaders, which concurrently encouraged and discouraged the activity of the Hungarian Legion. He also considered the possibility that the inroad of the Hungarian Legion into Hungary might animate the internal resis-

[83] Kossuth to Csáky. Ferrara, 25 July 1866. Dispatched by telegraph from Florence on 27 July. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215); Contradicting his former telegraph, Kossuth, reacting on Csáky's note of 22 July, expects answer concerning the connections between the Prussian armistice and the further action plan. This telegraph was forwarded from Florence by Lajos Tódor Kossuth on 26 July 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4645); Cf. Lajos Kossuth to Lajos Tódor Kossuth. Firenze, 27 July 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 434 ff.)

tance. Thus, it was on the basis of these considerations that he took a strong stand for the immediate action. This position, however, was not supported by the majority of the War Council members. In the end, the Council decided that Csáky should immediately go back to Berlin and there he should ask for the opinion of the competent Prussian leaders about this issue. But soon after Csáky had left Schillersdorf, Klapka gave order to his Legion to start, which then was supported by Komáromy, too.[84]

Subsequent developments raised only one serious problem: having advanced rapidly through the Moravka Valley towards the Carpathian Mountains, the Legion trod on Hungarian soil as early as 2 o'clock in the afternoon of 2 August 1866. As soon as this took place, General Stolberg's messenger caught up with them, bringing a disheartening message. According to this, the armistice was extended and the region of the Jablonka Pass, which until then had been controlled by a Prussian army some 6000 strong, would be returned to the Austrians. So the Hungarian Legion, should it be kept at bay, might not reckon with a Prussian military aid. Since Klapka had dismissed the idea of withdrawing the Legion, he continued to advance into the territory of Trencsén County and reached a place named Turzovka. As there were rumours that the Austrians were concentrating significant forces to contain the Legion, and besides, neither the mostly Slovak population, nor the few Hungarian landowners whom they met showed too much enthusiasm about their coming, the Legion soon started back to leave Hungary in the direction of Karlovitz. Later on, it was mainly due to their singular luck that they could successfully get out of the ring of the Austrian corps, because on their way back, they repeatedly supposed that they had already crossed the Prussian–Austrian demarcation line. Finally, after a very fatiguing march, not free from excitement either, they reached the safe Prussian zone. So in the evening of 8 August 1866, the Legion could encamp in the environs of Bauervitz and Ratibor, while its command was accommodated in Rakau.[85] Thus the last genuine action or feat of arms of the Hungarian emigration was over within a week, without fulfilling the high hopes attached to this audacious and risky venture. What took place was by no means suitable to enhance the prestige of the Hungarian emigration and to increase its influence, and this – understandably – gave rise to irritation, disillusionment and embitterment among the emigrants. Also with regard to the general situation, which showed a tendency toward a more lasting peace, on 14 August 1866 General Klapka resigned the high military office he had held.[86] It was characteristic of the complexity of the situation that the Prussian military leaders put practically no blame on the Legion's leaders. On the contrary, they accorded them even some encouragement and solace to increase their endurance and ambition. Berlin did not hasten to disarm and disband the Legion, which remained in armed service for two

[84] Ernő Simonyi to Dániel Irányi. Schillersdorf, 1 August 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4663.)

[85] Cf. Kienast: *op. cit.* pp. 199 ff.

[86] Mogyoródy to Kossuth. Bauervitz, 9 October 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VII, pp. 84 ff.)

months after Klapka's retirement. Finally, on 2 October 1866, the Prussian Ministry of Defence issued an order on the ceasing of the Legion, providing for a six-month pecuniary compensation to each of the participants.[87]

Csáky and Komáromy, in turn, had to face and surmount difficulties of a quite different nature: their past activity was exposed to utterly severe criticism coming from another side. Kossuth found the time ripe to take a strong stand against his political rivals, who had lost much in prestige. Therefore, he conferred full power on Dániel Irányi, his confidential man in Paris, who had acted as mediator between him and the Prince Jérôme Napoléon for several years. He sent Irányi to Berlin to reveal what exactly had happened around Csáky, Komáromy and Klapka, to severely call them to account, to oblige them to submit report on their acts, and also to render an account for the use of funds received from the Prussian government.[88] In compliance with Kossuth's instructions, Irányi showed up in Prussia and managed to sit down to table to talk with the persons concerned. As it clearly appears from his related reports, these persons did not show signs of any remorse, nor did they feel it their obligation to submit a detailed report on their activities. On the contrary, they clearly brought it to Irányi's notice that the supposition underlying his course of action was unfounded and unsupported by facts or by any good reason. They also made it clear to him that no such obligation had followed from the preliminary negotiations in Florence, for which they could be called to account now. Csáky most definitely declared that no mutually signed bilateral agreement had ever existed between him and Kossuth. He protested against such an interpretation of his co-operation with Kossuth as if the foreign affairs, in Italian and Prussian relations alike, had been fully taken over by Kossuth, and the latter's leading role had been unconditionally recognized. Both Csáky and Komáromy gave utterance to their opinion that they had full freedom to act independently in any issue which they had initiated and in any activity they had carried out; with this they referred to their activity in Prussia. As to the funds received from the Prussian government, they pointed out that it was only the Prussians, to whom they were obliged to render an account for the use of the sums, and they would not tolerate anybody else to interfere with this matter without any good reason.[89] Indeed, Kossuth only had the right to ask for information about the 20,000 francs which had been handed over to Csáky in Florence. But as Csáky had returned the whole sum, and carefully retained the receipt for it, Kossuth was given a fully satisfactory answer in this respect.[90] As

[87] Documents on the disbanding of the Hungarian Legion in Prussia and the pecuniary compensations: O.L., Csáky Papers.

[88] Kossuth to Dániel Irányi. Firenze, 31 July 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4657; 4658.)

[89] Dániel Irányi to Kossuth. Paris, 3 August 1866. (*Ibid.* 4667); Berlin, 7 August 1866. (*Ibid.* 4679); 12 August. (*Ibid.* 4690); 13 August. (*Ibid.* 4691); 14 August. (*Ibid.* 4694); 26 August. (*Ibid.* 4709.)

[90] Csáky returned the 20 thousand francs to Irányi. (O.L., Csáky Papers.); Cf. *Irányi Dániel jelentése poroszországi küldetéséről* (Dániel Irányi's report on his mission to Prussia). Berlin 11 September 1866. (Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VI, pp. 544 ff.)

regards the sums coming from Berlin, Csáky carefully kept accounts, which the Prussian auditors found in perfect order. No official data or documents are available which would refer to the emergence of any difference or unsettled problem of financial nature between the Prussian authorities and the Hungarian delegates.

After both Klapka and Komáromy had left Prussia, Csáky remained there to manage the Legion's affairs, to provide for the pecuniary compensations and to properly settle all the problems left. Csáky's correspondence with Chancellor Bismarck in that period suggests that Bismarck had always confided in him, and always regarded the affairs managed by Csáky, as properly settled ones.[91]

The prestigious and influential members of the Hungarian emigration never took sides with those who started an unjust and unfounded campaign against Csáky and Komáromy. In their opinion, it was primarily due to the hard circumstances, the unfavourable international situation, and to the premature armistice, that their activities were interrupted and their plans blocked. György Klapka, Nándor Éber, István Türr, Miklós Puky, the Countess Károlyi, and many other influential members of the Hungarian emigration identified themselves with Csáky and Komáromy. They all disapproved and condemned those unfounded accusations which were brought against them without any evidence, in an attempt to discredit them both politically and morally, and so to prevent their further political activity.[92] The persons concerned were in a particularly difficult situation, if only because Hungary with its new circumstances arising from the Compromise of 1867, concluded between Austria and Hungary, could not really serve as an appropriate environment for them. Hungary's new political leaders tended to look with an understandable mistrust upon those who not very long ago had taken sides and co-operated with the sworn enemies of Austria, like Chancellor Bismarck, the main antagonist of the great-power status of Austria. So these personalities could hardly do anything wiser than to keep silence and to leave it to time to bring a turn for the better, which might also improve their situation to some extent. Time, however, failed to work for their expectations. Their emigrant past continued to be a bad recommendation for them, when they tried to find their place in the domestic political life. Moreover, as time passed, there was an increase, rather than a decrease, in the political campaign against them, which was controlled from abroad, and which was later strongly invigorated by some leaders of the 1848 and Independence Party, who so zealously used Kossuth's name. These party leaders were hurt by and took offence at the sheer fact that there existed people who dared to challenge Kossuth's absolute authority and unfailing influence, and who would even turn against him if

[91] Bismarck to Csáky. Berlin, 4 September 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers); 8, 13 September. (*Ibid.*); Csáky to Bismarck. Berlin, 9 September 1866. (*Ibid.*); Komáromy to Ricasoli. Berlin, 28 August 1866. (A.S.M.E., Archivio di Gabinetto. Cart. conf. Busta 215.)

[92] Klapka to Komáromy. London, 11 September 1866. (O.L., Csáky Papers.); Klapka to Dániel Irányi. Bruxelles, 23 August 1866. (*Ibid.*); István Türr to Dániel Irányi. Paris, 24 November 1866. (*Ibid.*); the Countess Károlyi to Kossuth. Stresa, 3 August 1866. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, I, 4666.)

necessary. All this changed into such an unforgivable sin in the view of many after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which rightly deserved the most serious punishment and retaliation. In the atmosphere of such artificially aroused passions, objectivity or impartial consideration was out of the question. A new attack on the mentioned emigrant leaders was triggered by the publication of Kossuth's papers from emigration in 1881, the second volume of which included abusive terms concerning Komáromy, who had deceased in the meanwhile.[93] Although György Komáromy Jr., son of the deceased, gave voice to his strong protest against this in his letter of 1 February 1881 to Kossuth, this could hardly offset the disgracing opinion which had already appeared in printed form.[94] The campaign flared up again and virtually reached its peak a few years after Kossuth's death, at about the turn of the century, when further volumes of Kossuth's papers, edited by Ferenc Kossuth and Ignác Helfy, were published. These volumes contain all of Kossuth's letters which he wrote in 1866 – in the heat of serious controversies – about his political rivals in an insulting and denouncing manner. The editors, however, did not rest content with that, they even added considerably to the former accusations and complemented them with other recollections, "speaking of the machinations of Csáky and Komáromy".[95] There is not the slightest appearance of objectivity in all this, nor did the editors intend to be impartial. What they really wanted was to discredit and stigmatize those who once, at the time of the emigration, wanted to take a course different from Kossuth's political line.

[93] Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* II, p. 389.

[94] György Komáromy Jr. to Kossuth. Budapest, 1 February 1881. (O.L., Kossuth Collection, II. S.6–32.)

[95] Cf. Kossuth: *Papers, op. cit.* VII, pp. 100 ff.

EPILOGUE

Finally, it seems justifiable to raise the question: what the real role of the Hungarian emigration of 1848–1849 was; that is, where is its proper place in the history of Hungary? I believe we are not far from the mark when we consider the emigration as having been the better self or conscience of the nation, a living protest against the country's situation which had come about after the Világos surrender in 1849. The emigration also became the representative and advocate of the rightful demands, desires and endeavours of the Hungarian people before the wide international public at a time when these national aspirations were fully ignored, suppressed and forced underground in the home country. It was the emigration that preserved and maintained the noble values inherited from 1848, though it was not always free from one-sided views about the objectives and principles to be followed to gain the country's independence. It also upheld the spirit of those times when a nation, which had taken a revolutionary course to attain social transformation, had to defend its mere existence, and its self-defence fell into line with the best interests of universal social progress. Almost independently of its achievements, the Hungarian emigration, with its mere existence, posed a threat to the oppressive absolutist Austrian government, which could never feel safe, strong and self-confident enough to ignore the potential dangers involved in the continuous and wide-ranging international activities of the Hungarian emigration. Nor could it disregard the emigration as a factor that incited and intensified dissatisfaction within the country. Those in power actually could not take any steps either in home politics or in the foreign policy field, which could have escaped the emigration's utterly critical remarks, analyses and scrutiny often coming up to denunciation. Even if the Hungarian emigration had never achieved more than what has been outlined above, these in themselves would have been enough to recognize its essential historical mission, role and significance. Despite these basically positive results, however, the Hungarian emigration never constituted an integral whole, either from the territorial or the political aspect. Owing to the frequent changes in the international situation and the shifts in the political wind, widely different political groups were formed and various tendencies took shape within the emigration, which in certain periods came into sharp conflicts with one another. These controversies strongly polarized the camp of emigrants, dividing them into an essentially leftist wing, which constituted the democratic opposition, and the emigration's official leadership

which, with its inclination to a wait-and-see attitude, always sought to be allied with and supported by the governments of those powers which were against Austria at any given time. These emigrant leaders had worked along a political line originating in the Napoleonic alliance of 1859, and they finally became actors of Bismarck's political endeavours. Having taken all these aspects into consideration, it may well be maintained that during its struggles of nearly 18 years, the Hungarian emigration in its entirety, however contradictory it often was, had served its purpose, and now, subsequently, it would hardly be reasonable and justifiable to expect them to have done more than that.

Consummatum est! They have finished their course!

That the emigration's political activity had come to an end could be regarded as a sheer fact, or as one, from which proper conclusions should be drawn, and the burdens of which should be borne. At the same time it also permitted the emigrants to make attempts at adjusting themselves to the new situation created by the Compromise of 1867, and in such a way that this choice would not necessarily mean an unconditional and uncritical agreement with the changes arising from the new situation, nor the undertaking of all the negative consequences that followed from the creation of the Dualism, nor a servile submission to the possessors of power. When, seizing the opportunity offered by the amnesty, hundreds of emigrants chose to return to their fatherland after so many years of exile, they did so out of the sober consideration that they had the right to return to their homeland, to struggle and work there. This did not in the least mean that they would become political supporters of the new regime of 1867. To be sure, their decision to return to Hungary was made, to a considerable extent, under the influence of the heavy trials they had endured in emigration, and also of their serial disappointments in the political conduct of emigration politicians. They rightly felt that something had come to an end as it had lost its meaning. So there was nothing left but to try to create conditions for their further existence. When the overwhelming majority of them, leaders and simple emigrants alike, chose to return, they actually did not have a choice. Their decision was predestined by the iron laws of the general international situation: the advanced stage of the unification process of both Italy and Germany had a decisive effect on the establishment of the dual monarchy-based relations between Austria and Hungary, and within this, the settling of the Hungarian national question. It was possible to protest against this situation, but under the given circumstances, it was no longer possible to change it.

Those who returned also had to ponder that the amnesty in itself would not relieve anyone of the burden of one's own past, it would not "cleanse" anyone, and that their readjustment to the new domestic circumstances would not be a smooth and painless process. Despite the formation of the Andrássy-government in February 1867 and the general atmosphere of reconciliation generated by the coronation of Franz Joseph I as King of Hungary, the returning emigrants had to reckon with the possibility of harassments by the police, as well as with the indifferent attitude of society. They had to come to realize that those at home were

not very glad to see the appearance of new job seekers, that they were regarded as competitors with wide international experience, and so as rivals in the everyday struggle for life. In addition, in order that one might feel safe at home in every respect, and might be able to place one's future on solid foundations, one had to show an unambiguously positive political attitude towards the new socio-political system – provided the competent authorities made claim to showing signs of such a political position. It proved to be a good solution to attain a rapid-rate adjustment to the domestic socio-political life, if someone publicly gave expression to his approval of the new situation, criticizing, at the same time, his own political conduct in the past. Rising as high as the prime minister's position, the career of the Count Gyula Andrássy is a good example of how tolerant the power could be to those who were able to radically break with their past and to face all consequences of their decisions. It would take a long list to enumerate the most outstanding emigrants who returned to Hungary for good, or, leading a sort of double life, showed up sometimes in Hungary, sometimes abroad, seeking, but hardly finding repose anywhere. György Klapka, Ferenc Pulszky, István Türr, Nándor Éber, György Komáromy, the Count Tivadar Csáky, Mihály Horváth, Jácint Rónay, Bertalan Szemere, Gyula Tanárky, Miklós Nemeskéri Kiss and many others could return home without any harm, though never without any major or minor difficulty, offence, and bitterness. Nevertheless, it was not easy to attune their views, to bring their conceptions into harmony with reality. The most eminent personalities of 1848, the most active members of the emigration had to realize that their past was not the best recommendation for them, especially in the case of their potential appointment to or candidacy for more delicate posts in the political, military or administrative fields. Even within the new Hungarian Army, which was called into life after the Compromise, those who applied for officer's posts were subject to serious examination, and leading positions could hardly be held by ex-emigrants. Supposedly, General Klapka would not have refused the position of the new Hungarian Army's Commander-in-Chief if it had been offered to him. However, this was out of the question, because the new national military organization, along with the so-called common, i.e. Austro-Hungarian army, were brought to life to defend the unified dual monarchy, and on this account the Vienna court, as well as Franz Joseph himself, took special care that the armed forces be under the command of individuals of unimpeachable reputation and past.

Thus, career opportunities for emigrants presented themselves mainly in the fields of culture and economy which were on the upswing at the time. No objection was raised against any occupation which required individual risk taking. The extensive railway constructions, public sewer projects, banking and industrial enterprises all offered opportunities to the emigrants to make good use of their special economic and financial knowledge, international experience and contacts. In these busy and hopeful days, abounding in promising opportunities, the returning simple emigrants also strove to try their chance and to get ahead in life, each according to his own abilities, social connections and luck.

Deserving special attention are those ex-emigrants who found their place in the political life of Hungary. While some of them joined the small group of the extreme leftists, others sided with the 1848 and Independence Party, like – among others – Ignác Helfy and Dániel Irányi, who once belonged to the circle of Kossuth's most confidential friends. Helfy and Irányi did much to ensure that Kossuth's letters and other writings, in which he sharply criticized the Compromise of 1867, could be published and widely spread in Hungary. They were always, and they continued to be, ready to serve as a mouthpiece of Kossuth's views and suggestions. They also had a remarkable role in winning the Athenaeum Publishing House of Budapest to publish Kossuth's papers from emigration, thus ensuring a considerable income for the "Hermit of Turin". At the same time, it is also beyond doubt that the 1848 and Independence Party – which regarded itself as the only repository and inheritor of Kossuth's ideas – essentially exploited its connections with Kossuth for its own purposes in its everyday political practice, especially in electoral campaigns. This party started and conveyed the Kossuth-cult, which was to come into full display in that period. However, the general spread of the cult of Kossuth did not contradict the fact that these circles became and remained the beneficiaries and sharers of the system of Dualism, in which the boundaries between the government parties of 67 and the oppositionary 48 party became increasingly blurred.

The activity of those who chose to remain in emigration for good, whether in Europe or in America, became excessively limited by the birth of the Compromise of 1867. Kossuth's intransigent conduct, even though it still had some political significance, could no longer be conceived as a continuation of his former activity in emigration. His historical name and his actual activities in everyday practice had become separated immediately after 1849, and this difference became increasingly apparent after the advent of the so-called Age of Dualism. The name "Kossuth" was reminiscent of the times of 1848–1849, of the great social change, of the heroic and gigantic freedom fight of the nation. This name gradually changed into a spiritualized program, which – almost independently of the actual person's activity abroad – started to live an independent life in Hungary, always filled with such programs, goals, desires and ideas, as were dictated by the actual needs at any given time. In this respect there was a contradiction between the Kossuth-cult of the 48 and Independence Party and the real social demands in Hungary which were symbolized by Kossuth's name. Somewhat different is the situation, however, if we come down on the simple, grey everyday reality, on the working days of Kossuth's political activities both before and after 1867. Taking a look at the relationship and contacts between the 48 domestic opposition party and Kossuth from this aspect, even if some differences in opinion could be discerned, yet, taking it as a whole, we cannot speak of irresolvable contradictions, or of serious political controversies. This party's everyday Kossuth-cult and its uncritical identification with the inheritance of the emigration, were not in the least in contradiction. In fact, they somehow followed from one another and were almost perfectly matching. In this context, however, it is an

important task of historiography to make a study of the ever richer historical source material and to continue the investigation of the political activities of the emigration of 1848–1849. Passing the biased, one-sided historical inheritance, historiography has to draw further conclusions for the whole history of the age of Absolutism, and to throw more light upon the underlying reasons of and the road leading to the Compromise of 1867. Inasmuch as the present work was able to make a contribution to performing some of these tasks, it has attained its objective and thereby it has encouraged further efforts at clarification.

ABBREVIATIONS OF ARCHIVES

MAGYAR ORSZÁGOS LEVÉLTÁR, BUDAPEST (Hungarian National Archives)	O.L.
1526 utáni gyűjtemény (The post-1526 Collection)	
Kossuth gyűjtemény (Kossuth Collection)	
I. Kossuth Lajos általános iratai (Kossuth's General Papers)	I.
II.S.2. Az olaszországi magyar légió iratai (Papers of the Hungarian Legion in Italy)	II.S.2.
Klapka levéltár (Klapka Archives)	
Klapka György iratai (György Klapka Papers)	Klapka Papers
Klapka gyűjtemény (Klapka Collection)	Klapka Collection
Csáky Tivadar – Komáromy György gyűjtemény (Tivadar Csáky – György Komáromy Collection)	Csáky Papers
Puky Miklós – Teleki László irathagyatéka (Miklós Puky – László Teleki Papers)	Puky Papers
Türr István irathagyatéka (István Türr Papers)	Türr Papers
Dunyov István irathagyatéka (István Dunyov Papers)	Dunyov Papers
Irányi Dániel iratai (Dániel Irányi Papers)	Irányi Papers
Helfy Ignác irathagyatéka (Ignác Helfy Papers)	Helfy Papers
Abszolutizmuskori Levéltár (Archives of the Age of Absolutism)	
K.K. Militär- und Civil Gouvernement für Ungarn	M.C.G.
HADTÖRTÉNETI LEVÉLTÁR, BUDAPEST (Archives of Military History)	H.L.
Az olaszországi magyar légió iratai 1860 – 1862 (Papers of the Hungarian Legion in Italy 1860 – 1862)	Legion Papers
Kriegsgericht	
Militärbezirksgericht	

ORSZÁGOS SZÉCHÉNYI KÖNYVTÁR, BUDAPEST — OSZK
(Széchényi National Library)

Kézirattár (Manuscripts)
Horváth Mihály irathagyatéka
(Mihály Horváth Papers) — Horváth Papers
Pulszky Ferenc irathagyatéka
(Ferenc Pulszky Papers) — Pulszky Papers

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON — PRO

Home Office
Registered Papers
Foreign Office
Embassy and Consular Archives

NATIONAL ARCHIVES, WASHINGTON D.C. — N.A.W.

General Records of the Department of State
Diplomatic Dispatches

ARCHIVIO CENTRALE DELLO STATO DI ROMA — A.C.R.

Archivio Bettino Ricasoli
Carte di Visconti Venosta

ARCHIVIO STORICO DEL MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI, ROMA — A.S.M.E.

Archivio di Gabinettto

ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI TORINO — A.S.T.

Sezione I.
Carte Cavour
Sezione II.
Ministero della Guerra

ARCHIVES DU MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES, PARIS — A.M.A.E.

Correspondence Politique Autriche

HAUS-, HOF- UND STAATSARCHIV, WIEN — H.H.St.A.

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

What was the real role of the Hungarian emigration of 1848–1849? Where is its proper place in the history of Hungary? What were the Hungarian emigration's political endeavours, its successes and failures?

Providing a broad international perspective, Lajos Lukács, a renowned scholar of 19th century history and a specialist of the Hungarian independence movements after 1849, is focussing in this book on the history, the struggles and the wide-ranging international activities of the Hungarian emigration. After the defeated Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849, Lajos Kossuth, the political and military leaders and a great number of compromised persons were forced to flee from the country to find shelter in various countries. Many of them started their troublesome emigrant life in Turkey and the western states, and tried to continue their struggle for the independence of Hungary from there. The author describes the political leadership of the Hungarian emigration and the activities of its participants, pointing out the differences in its leadership and paying attention to the political views and ideas behind them. He also discloses the activities of the more populous groups, the masses of the emigration, giving an account of the fate of those who joined various international movements or wars. He describes the emigration and its leaders as having been the conscience of the nation, the representatives and advocates of the rightful demands, desires and endeavours of the Hungarian people before the wide international public at a time when these national aspirations were suppressed in the home country.

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