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**BRIDGE BUILDING AND POLITICAL CULTURES:
HUNGARY AND FINLAND 1956-1989**

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Editors' Introduction

Anssi HALMESVIRTA — Heino NYSSÖNEN

This collection of studies is a by-product of the research project *Kádár's Hungary – Kekkonen's Finland, c. 1956 – 1989* financed by the Academy of Finland (2000 – 2003). It is mostly based either on original archival research and hitherto not consulted material and tries to approach the subject-matter from fresh point of view. Although historians have completed comparative studies¹ and scholars from various disciplines have published essays on almost every aspect of contacts,² an opportunity to dig deeper and encompass wider issues had arrived with a rise of a more critical attitude and freer access to the relevant archives in both countries. A more general rationale behind the research has been that the relations of small capitalist and socialist countries such as Hungary and Finland during the Cold War era are still a largely neglected field of historical study.³ They seemed to remain in the shadows of Great Power politics and ideological arms-wrestling over world supremacy. Hungary and Finland have been deemed as suitable examples of 'politics of survival' since both of them had not only a special *modus vivendi* relation to their big neighbour, the Soviet Union, but had cherished traditions of co-operation in many scholarly fields, broken only during and after World War II. Until 1956 contacts had already been revived and their extension was motivated by a pragmatic policy: the Hungarian leadership strived for more room to manoeuvre while showing off loyalty to Moscow whereas Finnish leaders struggled in between 'finlandization' and *Realpolitik*. Kádár's and Kekkonen's tasks were not easy ones, and they

understood each other's difficulties well. In spite of being geographically situated in very different European spaces and political cultures, Hungary close to the middle and Finland in the far north, they soon found common political, scientific and cultural interests. The endless mission to build paternalist socialism in Hungary and the steady 'progressivism' of the Finnish democracy did not, after all, seem altogether antagonistic. In both systems the rule of reason over the people (population) and environment signified expansion of rational control and social policy. Modern methods of persuasion and indoctrination were applied in education and socialization. It was as if Hungarians and Finns could learn something from each other. The latter part of the old saying 'next to knowing yourself is to know your enemy' was gradually transformed to '[...] to know your friend'. In this spirit, the concepts of 'peaceful co-existence', 'bridge-building' and 'progressivism' could be given new content and more accurate and many-faceted meanings. They seem to characterize the period from the year 1956 to the 1980s which was deemed a natural but critical time span for the purpose.

In the Cold War era there was at times high tension in Europe and in the wider world, and it could be lamented that the urge of different zones, peoples, blocs and generations to understand each other was doomed to failure because there was no common language. Keywords such as 'democracy', 'freedom', 'human rights' meant different things for different ideologies. It was only gradually that the idea of dialogue between the East and the West became marketable. The Helsinki Summit of 1975 did not – albeit Kádár and Kekkonen felt it was the climax of their careers – abolish the 'Jalta-Europe'. In the end it was Hungary that had been seeking for more room of manoeuvre and credit from the West whilst Finland remained more independent and could start steering towards European economic integration. These concomitant efforts and the common aim at securing 'peace in Europe' – the Helsinki Summit of 1975 was regarded as a success by its promoters Kádár and Kekkonen – gave a special direction to the co-operation of the two countries which, after all, was of minor political impor-

tance than usually proclaimed in official meetings of the statesmen. However, was quite exceptional that constructive bridge-building could be pursued between Hungarians and Finns. It was all very practical at first, Hungarian communists realizing the usefulness of the old idea of 'kinship' (finno-ugric origin) in their propaganda work, and magyarophile Finns, Kekkonen as their patron, enjoying cultural and scientific exchange opportunities. The parties involved benefited from co-operation in multifarious activities from the diplomatic level to individual contacts. It was only the bilateral trade that did not prosper and remained so insignificant that its analysis has here been spared for future economic historians.

In stead of a very carefully thought-out research plan, we entertained a few general ideas around which to build the research framework. In the first chapter Heino Nyyssönen studies political cultures in Kekkonen's Finland and Kádár's Hungary but not in their 'traditional' contexts. In stead of taking political culture as stable or of being in a constant change, it offers different perspectives on both societies. A new 'historical' definition of political culture is delineated, when Nyyssönen argues that the ways in which a nation or groups of people deal with their past also belong to a political culture. Priority of foreign relations in both countries made an impact on domestic politics as well. It leads us to study also history and commemoration and to focus on a few 'peculiar features' in both countries like the 'personality cult' of Kekkonen and the images in Finland on Hungary and vice versa.

In the next three chapters the political relations and images of the countries are analyzed from three different and complementary angles; the external Western, the high politics (state visits) and the internal (diplomacy) ones. First Juha Pohjonen explores the background of the 1940s and first of all how Finnish diplomats saw the current political situation and Finnish-Hungarian relations from Budapest until the late 1960s. Next Vesa Vares compares images of Kekkonen and Kádár, basically defined by the strategies in the Cold War. As years went by, both improved from the image of 'an old foe' to an astonishingly similar mixture of some sort of appreciation, satisfaction and

respect. As Mari Vares reminds us, in 1963 Kekkonen was the first Western leader, who visited Hungary after the uprising of 1956. Nevertheless, Kádár's trip ten years later was not less 'historical' as it was his first visit to a capitalist country.

The second part of the book concentrates on cultural and scientific relations, which deserve their own extensive treatment because they brought in tangible, but at times contradictory achievements and opened unexpected vistas of co-operation and dialogue. They also show some of the tensions between the two systems, conspicuously in the use of 'propaganda' and 'know-how'. But as usual in Hungarian-Finnish relations, the co-operation also of cultural and scientific elites was not seriously disturbed by the contradictions between the values of the capitalist and the socialist system. This is typically 'liberal' attitude which largely ignored or found its way around marxist criticism thus avoiding open confrontation.⁴ The marxists, for their part, did not want to force the issue and make the kind of politics of science that would upset or estrange their partners. As Anssi Halmesvirta and Raija Oikari show in their articles, co-operation went on surprisingly smoothly. Psychology and its applications to control human behaviour in society's sore points were equally useful in both countries. In cultural contacts, for the Hungarian intellectuals who felt stymied at home, Finland occasionally gave some breathing space. A few Finnish suspicious critics and journalists learned from them about the less respectable aspects of the Hungarian cultural politics. However, the power structure embedded in the discourse of cultural relations usually limited the ways how 'things could be said and done'.

Finally, in the third part of the book two case-studies, comparative and specialized, have been included which, if taken together, demonstrate differences and certain out-of-context similarities between the two societies. As Péter Porkoláb's comparative article about Hungarian and Finnish village farming shows, people still found ways to go around the restrictions or live with them. In both countries the state let the peasant live, but in Finland the smallest farmers left their homesteads for good, and in Hungary all of them, huge or small, were called to collective work. In Finland, as Jari Ojala's special article on agri-

cultural 'evolution' testifies, the development has led towards specialization and to building of ever bigger production units.

What was common to the two systems, socialist and capitalist in the 1960s – 1970s was the belief in the secular religion called 'progress', be it evolutionary or marxist. In that they rivalled: human reason was promiscuously applied in regulating human affairs and cultural and natural environment. The control of populations was rationalized and conscious planning of social policy was to be based on sociological and psychological knowledge. These remained ideologically different in socialist Hungary and capitalist Finland – at times the Hungarians complained of the expansion of American values and culture in Finland, too. Propaganda-makers exploited modern mass-media. Psychologists who would not study social structures and milieu as deeply as individual behaviour became useless. In Finland canvassing and 'policy of satisfying' directed at the consumer appealed to irrational traits of the man, in Hungary irrationalism was to be rooted and a 'new, really social man' was to be created. Both systems were wary of stagnation and in the 'progressive' atmosphere social engineering was not only a matter of adjusting of this or that minor problem in social adaptation, it had to cater for overall social development. In its name, in Hungary during the whole period under scrutiny and in the late 1960s and 1970s also in Finland,⁵ 'reactionary' ideologies were deemed futile.

In its due course, as the coercive nature of total social planning and control became transparent, rude 'progressivism' was exhausted. The uncontrollability of huge social processes – forced industrialization and urban development in Hungary, the plight of the countryside and migration waves to south and Sweden in Finland – was gradually understood. Corrective control took their place, for instance, when such phenomena as unemployment, crime and booming traffic with its terrific accident numbers started to worry the decision-maker in both countries. In scientific and technical co-operation between Hungary and Finland quite a few common problems were found and up-to-date correctives were applied to the advantage of both sides. In

certain fields of culture, technology, science and scholarship – the traditionally dominating finno-ugric studies were challenged by ‘new, hard’ and social sciences – quite successful common projects were launched.

Now that both Finland and Hungary are members of the European Union, they may realize that political and scientific-technological co-operation of small countries is paramount in preserving and promoting their common interests. In science, the political leadership tries to prepare the ground for joint European projects and promote tighter co-operation of higher education and administration which is a precondition for freer movement of ideas and people. In this ‘movement’ the Hungarians and Finns have cherished a well-established tradition of their own: the flow of delegations between the countries was already in the 1960s so steady that the Hungarian Foreign Ministry at times wanted to restrict it.

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NOTES

- ¹ *Hungarian and Finnish History*. A multimedia CD-rom. Zentrum für Hungarologie im Institut für Finnougristik der Universität Hamburg, 2002; *Hungary and Finland in the 20th Century*. (Eds.) Olli Vehviläinen and Attila Pók. *Studia Historica* 68. Helsinki: Hakapaino 2002.
- ² János Nagy et al. (eds.), *Friends and Relatives: Finnish-Hungarian Cultural Relations*. Budapest: Corvina 1984; Yrjö Varpio – Lajos Szopori-Nagy, *Suomen ja Unkarin kirjalliset suhteet vuosina 1920–1986*. Pieksämäki: SKS 1990.
- ³ For a far more ambitious enterprise, see *Deutsch-ungarische Beziehungen in Naturwissenschaft und Technik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Herausgegeben von Holger Fischer. *Südeuropäische Arbeiten* 103. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1999.
- ⁴ Cf. Michael J. White, *Political Philosophy. An Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Oneworld books 2004, 7.
- ⁵ Jukka Relander, 'Jäähvyäiset Snellmanille'. *Suomen kulttuurihistoria* 4. Eds. Kirsi Saarikangas, Pasi Mäenpää & Minna Saarentola-Weiss. Helsinki: Tammi 2004, 138-167.

**Political Cultures in Urho Kekkonen's Finland and
János Kádár's Hungary**

Heino NYSSÖNEN

1 Introduction

Comparing Finland and Hungary is a fruitful task despite the apparent historical differences: after the Second World War the former remained a democracy whilst the latter became a dictatorship. Also their relation to their greatest and most powerful neighbour, Soviet Union, seems to be different. Hungary belonged to the same military pact as the Soviet Union, but Finland's foreign policy was based on the idea of neutrality. However, the difference between the most eastern country of the West and the most western country of the East is not that evident.

According to an old standpoint Finns and Hungarians are relatives and with special relationship. We can, however, doubt that the structural similarities in language and common roots 6,000 years ago hardly make sense, when we study recent political culture. Rather than 'kinship' the concept of national interest gained a more important role in mutual co-operation after 1945. Nevertheless, maintaining the old idea of a relationship, defined as 'scientific truth', made communication easier between these two nations. Already in the end of the 1960s Hungary had most connections with Finland among capitalist countries. In Europe Finland became a forerunner also in the 1970s, when visa between the two countries was abolished.

The purpose of this article is to compare political cultures in Finland and Hungary during the Urho Kekkonen and János Kádár era. The critical question is, what kind of results we can get,

when we compare these two countries to each other and not to their 'traditional' frames i.e. Nordic countries and the Eastern Bloc. After a few theoretical and historical remarks we will focus on the post-1956 era until the late 1980s. In Hungary János Kádár was superseded in May 1988 and he died in July 1989. President Urho Kekkonen resigned in October 1981 and passed away in the end of August 1986. Less than a year later a new type of a political coalition emerged, which argued to be representing a new political culture in Finland. In Hungary, on the contrary, the first government change in twelve years took place in 1987.¹

My thesis is that in spite of structural differences we can find things in common on the level of politics. Pragmatic *Realpolitik* united the two small nations of Europe despite their different political systems. The years 1986–1987 will be mentioned in this article so often that they can be regarded as a certain closure of an epoch.² Signs of new thinking emerged in both countries but became internationally acknowledged and observed a few years later.

The main focus is on comparative aspect and on two countries during a historical period. Beside historical similarities and theoretical approaches I will study foreign relations, history and commemoration but also more peculiar features such as traveling, sport and personality cult. These phenomena can be found in the source material and they labeled under the concept of political culture, a highly contested concept itself. The comparison, however, is not one to one. Because of the nature of the source material I concentrate sometimes more either on Finland or Hungary.

In addition to documents and historiography I will use periodicals as my main source material. In the course of years the periodical *Suomen Kuvalehti* has institutionalised its position in Finnish politics and in the history of journalism. In Hungary *Magyarország* was founded in 1964 as a political and social weekly. Although both more or less represented the 'official political culture', nothing prevents us to 'read between the lines' as well. Because of a comparative approach we would pay a particular attention to the way in which these weeklies described the other country and mutual relations to their readers.

2 Remarks Concerning the Concept of Political Culture

According to John Street, there is a tendency to treat political culture like a familiar piece of furniture. Everybody is vaguely aware of its existence but hardly anyone makes the question, how it came to be there. Already Plato and Aristotle discussed the problem implicitly, but the discussion began in particular after Almond and Verba's book *Civic Culture*, published in 1963. For Almond and Verba political culture was linked to a strong civic culture, which made democracy possible.³

However, Almond and Verba have been widely criticized since then, and even the supporters of the concept of political culture find it problematic. Already the idea of 'political' could be highly contested, and 'culture' is not less complicated. We are facing a serious problem, if we only accept political culture as a conceptual umbrella, which in its broadness is finally leading us to a deadlock.⁴

In political culture there are two general views to approach the topic. On one hand there is the subjective orientation to a political structure and on the other hand political behaviour. We do not need to be marxists by arguing that structures influence on political thought. Instead we should ask how they influence and how people signify structures and symbols in different cultures. Thus, political culture might include ideas varying from attitudes to different authorities or education, family, government etc. Furthermore, various signs reveal the world of political images, symbols, myths and traditions, which frame and define everyday life. Hence, we could focus on culture as values and beliefs, which are taken as granted and which signify politics.⁵

One of the most famous definitions of political culture derives from Archie Brown (1979): 'The subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectation of nations and groups'.⁶ This rather complicated definition in the strictest sense means how people define their own surroundings and attitudes to politics and analyse their own notion of politics. Frequently political thought comes into being with less rational

simplifications and stereotypes. In effect the concept of stereotype was invented to substitute concepts like 'national character' or 'modal personality' – to simplify complicated social phenomena by organ metaphors.⁷

We will use Brown's category as a point of departure. His criticism of Almond and Verba was based on the idea that instead of stable political cultures we meet political cultures in constant change. Moreover, Brown separated a dominant political culture from an official one. Communist states in particular promoted official political culture in mass media, education and other bodies of socialisation, which, however, did not necessarily dominate in 'the minds of the majority'. In studying the cases of Finland and Hungary we will also discuss characteristics and problems of monolithic and unified political cultures during the Kekkonen-Kádár era.

Brown distinguished a dominant political culture which has various political subcultures. Unquestionably, an official political culture existed also in Finland and in Hungary but it is more difficult to define the dominant one. Also ethnic and cultural minorities existed to represent political subcultures. Finally, Brown discussed about a fragmented political culture. This occurs when there is no state-wide political culture that emerged to dominate political cultures or subcultures, which were based upon tribe, locality or social or national group.⁸

Nevertheless, we do not locate Hungary or Finland in any of Brown's categories described above as such. It leads us to doubt that the whole idea of a single political culture, which Almond and Verba's book implicated, is a stereotype. Instead I will use all those categories to analyse both countries from several perspectives. In the following chapters I shall analyse current political customs and practices as political peculiarities in the twentieth century. I do not understand politics only as a universal phenomenon but also as a phenomenon bound to different cultures. In what follows I will ask what was considered 'political' or 'normal' in these cultures and relate it to our present context.

Finally I would like to broaden Brown's category further and examine historical political culture as well. Since the late 1980s Hungary and Finland have faced such fundamental changes in their po-

litical system that both Kádár and Kekkonen seemed to represent already another, past era. However, the recent past is still present and makes itself felt in current political debate. There are those who would like to charge, reckon and deprecate the era, while the others defend and understand the era relating it to current policy making and political culture. We could argue that the ways in which a nation or a group of people deal with their past also belong to a political culture.

3 Historical Similarities and Differences Before 1956

In the twentieth century Finland and Hungary have belonged to small countries of Europe. Both appeared as independent nations on the map in the end of the First World War in the belt of new states between Germany and Russia. Contrary to the Finns Hungarians, however, do not celebrate Independence Day but the foundation of the 'state' in the year 1000. In this sense Finland's nationhood and the state are essentially younger.

Historical Hungary could be considered a medieval great power of Europe. After the battle of Mohács in 1526 the Old Kingdom was divided into three parts. The country was occupied by Turks and later by Habsburgs, who ruled Hungary since then – in co-operation with the Hungarian aristocracy. In Finland the experience of being between two powers meant being located between Sweden and Russia, which both conquered Finland. Until the Napoleonic wars Finland belonged to Sweden – although some Finnish nationalist historians later tried to name this territory as Sweden-Finland for further stability. Particularly Finland's eastern border was constantly on the move – some parts were inhabited only in the sixteenth century by the order of the King of Sweden. Since 1808 Russians occupied Finland, their Napoleonic 'reward', and added it to the Empire as a Grand Duchy until 1917.

In 1918–1919 both countries faced a failed revolution. Finland had gained one of the most radical franchises in the world based on universal suffrage in 1906. However, the Russian Tsar suppressed the activity of the Parliament until 1917. Partly as a consequence of the defeat in the elections in autumn 1917 and the revolution in Russia, radicalized socialists started the revolution. In Hungary the revolu-

tion began as a bourgeois liberal one in October 1918. It encountered the hostility of the neighbouring countries with their allies. In March 1919 it led to the establishment of a Soviet Republic – lasting relatively as long as the Finnish ‘Red’ experiment a year earlier.

The commanders of the winning armies emerged from the old elites: Miklós Horthy had served in the Austria-Hungarian army, whilst Carl Gustav Mannerheim belonged to chevalier officers of the Tsar. In Finland, however, the liberal minded K.J. Ståhlberg drafted the new constitution and the Parliament appointed him for the first President of Finland. Ståhlberg represented a softer line towards the revolutionaries, and even social democrats supported him. In the 1920s Finnish governments were based mainly on the parties in the centre, agrarians and liberals, although even social democrats had an opportunity to form a short-lived minority government in 1927.

In Hungary Horthy remained in power and ruled until 1944. In the early 1920s his conservative Prime Minister István Bethlen consolidated power, raised the age limit to vote and restricted political activity of social democrats. A reader of *Magyarország* noticed in 1986 that this development could have been parallel for Finland had Mannerheim held power until the Second World War.⁹ Neither in Finland did emerge such a unity party, which would have gained a majority in parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, both faced a threat of a more authoritarian rule in the 1930s. The Hungarian attempt, failed *de facto* because of the unexpected premature death of Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös in 1936.

In Finland the principle of legality became prevalent in the ruling circles after the 1932 right-wing Mäntsälä mutiny, and the governments became stabilized. In 1937 a new type of government was formed, when social democrats and agrarians formed a coalition. This red-green, ‘red ochre’, ‘workers-peasants coalition’ built the axis in the ‘second republic’, i.e. after 1945, as well. No doubt this co-operation with other signs of political compromise influenced the integration of the country. This became apparent in the Winter War (1939–1940), when neither the former rebels nor their heirs put the Soviet attack in question. At that time Finland gained international admiration

– volunteers arrived even from Hungary. In March 1940 Finland had to cede areas, particularly the Karelia isthmus to the Soviet Union. These losses helped leading Finnish politicians to agree with Hitler's Germany and participate in another war and this time with Nazi-Germany in 1941.

In Hungary the question of borders played an important role already since the end of the First World War. In Trianon 1920 Hungary lost two thirds of her former territory to the new neighbours. This political tragedy led to a policy of an open revisionism, at first with the support of Italy and then Germany. With the help of her new allies Hungary managed to gain some territories back but had to participate in the attack against Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1941. In the end of the war Hungary tried to follow the Finnish path to get out of it. Finnish attempt had led to a cease fire in September 1944 but Hungary faced a coup d'état and fascist rule until the Soviet army liberated the country in April 1945.

The year 1945 meant a turning point in whole Europe – also in Finland and Hungary. Although Helsinki was not occupied, like Budapest, Allied Control Commissions defined and restricted political space of former enemies. In spite of this, bourgeois parties were able to gain a majority in the elections of 1945. In Finland the centre and the right-wing parties won an extremely slight majority of two seats. In Hungary bourgeois forces gathered in the tiny Smallholders' Party, which gained a landslide victory of 57 per cent. In both countries communists with their allies became as strong as social democrats: Hungarian communists received 17 per cent of the votes, whilst social democrats had to be satisfied with 14 per cent. In Finland the new Finnish People's Democratic League (FPDL) gained 49 seats and social democrats 50 out of total 200.

A coalition of the centre and left governed in both countries during the years 1945–1948. In this sense we could find similarities, because communists, social democrats and agrarians were the leading forces in the new political circumstances. However, the Hungarian smallholders remained considerably more heterogeneous than Finnish agrarians and gained much support in urban areas, too.

After the election defeat in 1948 FPD was ousted from the government. A social democratic minority government guided Finland out of the 'years of danger'. In 1950 Finland returned to the age of 'red ochre', this time under the direction of the agrarian Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen. Until then Hungary had followed the path of the rest of 'Eastern Europe', in which social democrats were merged into communist parties, and other parties were either suppressed or subjugated to communist power.

4 Capitalist Finland, Socialist Hungary – Unified Political Cultures?

In European comparison countries like Finland, Sweden, Britain or Switzerland belong to a minority, which have not experienced a radical change of political system since the 1920s. Despite her domestic cleavages Finland remained a political democracy also in the 'second republic'. New politicians emerged but the presidential system and the old civil servant stratum did not essentially change after 1945.

According to the Finnish constitution of 1919, the President had the right to dissolve the Parliament, led foreign policy and was the commander in chief of the army. On the European level the rights of the Finnish President resembled those of the President of the French Fifth Republic. Thus, the question of the personality of the President has been one of the most essential in Finnish politics. Before 1994 people voted in presidential elections particular electors nominated by parties or movements, who finally were not committed to support their original candidate. The system caused a lot of speculation and made it possible to choose a so-called 'black horse', i.e. an unknown candidate as a potential compromise.

In Hungary the 1945 turn was more revolutionary and wiped away the old rulers and the state. The red army occupied the country, and a wide land reform changed the structure of the society. In contrast, Finnish land reforms in 1922 and 1945 integrated potentially revolutionary rural proletariat into the traditional peasant society rather than changed the society. The idea of reconstruction worked until the 1960s, when migration to cities and Sweden started. Although transformation took place all over Europe, in the

OECD-countries only Greece faced a more radical structural change than Finland between 1950 and 1980. We cannot, however, play down the Hungarian situation either: villages on the Hungarian pusta lost 800,000 people, ca. 10 per cent of the country's population in 1949–1990. Although this does not reach the Finnish level either in per cents or in absolute numbers, it is likely that the change influenced on political cultures in both countries.¹⁰

Beside traditional peasant societies the post-war era became famous of significant industrialization, which created new political cultures as well. In Finland, industrialization became a victory in defeat: the country had to develop industry to pay her war reparations. At the same time new industry laid the basis for further bilateral trade with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister of the time, Urho Kekkonen even wrote a pamphlet, in which he asked whether Finland could keep her temper to gain prosperity.

A unified political culture, according to Brown, has been a goal almost for all political cultures but has usually not been realised. This task could be found in Finland and Hungary. A unified political culture in Kekkonen's Finland meant support first of all to Kekkonen's foreign policy. In many ways Kekkonen achieved this but remained as contested a person as János Kádár, who also could somehow unify Hungary's political culture. First and foremost the politics of Finland was based on *détente* and peaceful co-existence of two different political systems. In April 1948 Finland and the Soviet Union had signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), which essentially defined Finland's political culture. The draft version was based on treaties with Hungary and Rumania.

In Hungary the whole idea of Soviet security zone and the contemporary form of Socialism were questioned in the uprising of 1956. According to Kádár and his colleagues a counter-revolution had taken place. Although the revolution was crushed, the idea of a political unity did not vanish from the minds of the people. Since then Hungarian political leaders tried to praise the unity. Under the concept of socialist patriotism, patriotic and progressive values were put together in 1959. The idea was further developed in the 1960s – Socialism for some, patriotism to others. In 1974 the party accepted also 'pro-

gressive bourgeois' and 'democratic peasant' legacies to a part of 'national tradition'¹¹.

According to *Realpolitik*, Hungary remained a socialist state ruled by a communist party dictatorship. Kádár, like Kekkonen in Finland, became personal guarantor of stable relations with the Soviet Union. In Hungary the policy meant supporting Socialism and the policy of small steps. A period of recovery in the 1960s, economic reform between 1968 and 1973 or finally the growing stagnation since the late 1970s, are features of the unifying Hungarian 'goulash Communism'.

Finland finally remained the only capitalist and non-aligned neighbour of the Soviet Union in Europe. Finland represented the 'show window' of Soviet policy in public and maintained her independence. However, it happened with the cost of 'finlandization', a contested term of the *de facto* Soviet right of veto in Finnish politics. Some have argued that even Kekkonen believed in the triumph of world Communism (cf. pp. 44-45). If this were the case he was not alone in the 1960s. However, he dared to argue to Khrushchev that Finland would remain a traditional Nordic democracy even if the whole Europe would become communist. Khrushchev's replied that Finland would remain a museum of Capitalism.¹²

Evidently the idea of progress and social justice were common goals for unified political cultures in both countries. Kekkonen and Kádár – like Khrushchev – believed in progress in the course of history but understood it in a different way, one in Marxism-Leninism and in the vanguard of the party, the other in a society with a mixed economy. In fact, 'progress' was an idea, which could be found in many different, even antagonist political systems, in the twentieth century.

5 Dominant Political Culture with Various Political Subcultures

Kekkonen and Kádár represented not only progress and social justice but also official political cultures in their countries. However, one of the starting points in *Politics and Political Culture in Communist States* is the idea that official political culture is not necessarily also the dominant one. Therefore we have also to ask the question concerning the relationship of official and dominant political culture.

Traditionally religion has been an essential feature of culture. Hungary has been a Catholic country with significant Protestant and Jewish minorities. Finland on the contrary belongs to Protestant countries, in which over 90 per cent of the population belonged to the church at least formally. In Finland we could discuss about a national ethos, which was based on peasant culture, Christian and Protestant virtues combined with quietness and high work ethics. This longing for the nature and silence are still present and proved by ever-increasing amount of summer cottages in the middle of wilderness.

National but progressive peasant ethos had consequences for political culture. After the Second World War agrarians – from 1965 the Centre Party – participated in every political government, except two minority governments by social democrats, of the country. Social democrats were their most favored partner, and nearly every second coalition has included also social democratic ministers. In 1966 this dominant axis emerged again and lasted with some variations until 1987, when a new type of coalition came to being.

In addition to the social democratic-agrarian coalitions, efforts of integration have dominated. Still in the mid-1970s Kekkonen considered it important that the dividing line was not found between socialists and non-socialists.¹³ In practice the idea was more difficult to carry out. At the European level only in Italy there were more governments than Finland during the post-1945 period¹⁴. Attempts to dismiss a government have belonged to constant power struggles. Kekkonen himself used his right to dissolve the Parliament three times, and nominated six non-political governments. A new era, a more parliamentary political culture came into being in the 1980s during the Presidency Mauno Koivisto.

Stability of parties has been another dominant feature in Finnish political culture. Most of political parties emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century in a reaction to questions of mother tongue, social or the Russian question. The composition of the Parliament has remained stable: if a party won more than 10-15 new seats – more than 5 per cent of the seats – in the Parliament, it was a landslide victory in the Finnish context. Two such victories have taken place by parties already in the

Parliament, and they are still unbeaten: in 1966 social democrats won 17 new seats as did the populist Veikko Vennamo's rural party four years later.

Furthermore, non-socialist parties and their political cultures have dominated in the Parliament: only in 1916, 1958 and 1966 the left has gained a majority. Particularly, the dominance of a powerful agrarian party has been a Finnish phenomenon. In spite of structural changes in the society the support of the party has not declined. On the other hand, a particular Christian party remained relatively small as in Scandinavian countries. The Centre Party absorbed also Christian conservative values and more or less is still compatible to Christian democrats. Christian, national and right wing features dominated in the National Coalition Party (NCP), too. In the 1970s party's support outdid the Centre Party, which was the ideological home of Kekkonen.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to argue that patriotic and Christian values did not exist – or even dominated – in the ranks of the left-wing parties. When explicating dominant political culture, we argue that social democrats were integrated into the Finnish society already in the 1930s and 1940s. Religion and patriotism played essential role in the party although they emphasised political slogans like 'Home, Religion and Country' less, which were popular in the right. Symbols and their memories, anyhow, live longer: for the first time in 1978 social democrats participated in the elections without red flags and used only the national flag, traditionally monopolised by the political right.

The other left-wing party, FPD, was forced into opposition in 1948, in which it grew to be the biggest party in 1958. Contrary to Scandinavian countries social democrats were, thus, not the absolutely leading political force of the left. Partly this was due to legalisation of the communist party in 1944, which since then functioned in the frame of the FPD, and gathered some former social democrats in its ranks. Although there are similarities with other big communist parties of France and Italy, there communists did not form such a rigid alliance with left wing socialists which they did in Finland.

In 1966 Finland became an interesting laboratory of the old People's Front tactics. There has been some speculation of the possible future of Finland, but already in November 1966 even the Radio Free Europe commented that the FPDL 'has contributed to the growth of political stability in that country'.¹⁵ With a few variants this experiment lasted until the end of the Kekkonen era. At that time the majority of communists and their sympathizers had either fully integrated in the society or politically split and marginalised.

Thus, Protestant virtues combined with national progress and integration gave special flavour to the dominant political culture in Finland. In this process of political integration Kekkonen was an essential initiator. Young Kekkonen had made a long run first from the ranks of the 'Whites' and nationalist circles to support ideologies of national unity between social classes. In the agrarian left wing Kekkonen found a suitable political platform to cross political gaps hindering the unity.

Frankly speaking, the dominating political culture had quite conservative, moralist social features until mid-1960s. This is evident in moralist 'book wars', i.e. cultural struggles of the 1960s; blasphemy, intercessions prohibiting dancing, beer available only in state shops, etc. Times, however, changed quickly: for example, in 1970 *Viikkosanomat* reported how the small county of Kitee had become famous nation-wide, because of official use of Christian names in the municipal assembly¹⁶. Kekkonen's role was essential in the dominant political culture and its liberalisation, which finally modernised and 'social democratised' Finland.

When we compare Hungary with Finland, we realize that the state and the political structure were different. Stability of parties dominated in Finland but in Hungary a continuity of parties did not exist at all. The role of the Parliament has frequently been viewed as a rubber stamp, without any real political significance – they enacted approximately only five laws a year in 1950–1986.¹⁷ The election system favoured one candidate for one seat until 1966, then running two candidates in the same constituency. However, we could not idealise the previous Horthy era either: open ballots were abolished as late as in 1938,

when unambiguous secret voting became possible. During the Kádár era they defended the existing system by presenting figures of a progress such as constantly broadened franchise. However, the progress was compared only to history not to other current models and states¹⁸.

Even if Hungary was a one party state it is interesting to notice that not all the MPs needed to belong to the ruling party: the amount of party members was the lowest in 1953, 69.1 per cent and in 1958, after the revolutionary attempt, the highest 81,6 per cent. The amount of women remained always under the international 11 per cent, contrary to Finland, in which the amount grew rapidly since 1966 from the level of 15 per cent up to 38.5 per cent at the highest in 1991.

Nevertheless, the Hungarian Parliament chosen in 1985 introduced essential changes. Only 36,8 per cent of the old MPs were re-elected – compared to 65 per cent still in 1980. According to Gabriella Ilonszki, the election brought with it the biggest change after 1949. In 1985 new legislation concerning the election was used for the first time. It made the existence of more than one candidate in every electoral district compulsory.¹⁹

A Hungarian curiosity was the Patriotic People's Front, although different 'fronts' existed also in other socialist countries. One of its founding fathers was Prime Minister Imre Nagy in 1954 for whom the front represented the role of the multiparty system in Socialism. The organisation tried to integrate social classes, published the newspaper *Magyar Nemzet*, and thus offered a means to act in the frame of official channels outside the party. The most important task of the front was to organise elections. Officially candidates represented the front, the political programme of which all candidates had to accept.²⁰

Hereafter the point, however, is not to stress further such fundamental differences but to outline some less known features of the systems and how they were linked to dominant political culture. Whilst the great amount of governments is striking in Finland, there were only seven governments during the whole Kádár era. Particularly two of them lived long: Jenő Fock held his position over eight years (1967–1975) and his successor György

Lázár (1975–1987) over twelve years. Although this reveals a growing stability, at the same time we could doubt the whole political role of the government. In the party state the Parliament and the government were linked to the bureaucratic state apparatus under the leading party.

In public the role of the state bureaucracy remained obscure and eternal. A clear symptom was Toma's and Völgyes's survey from 1977: only 17 per cent of the 300 persons inquired knew the name of the Chairman of the Presidium. This is amazing for at the time Pál Losonczy had filled the post already over ten years. Even less, 12 per cent could name the highest organ of state power, the Presidential Council.²¹ The party itself, its Central Committee and finally the Political Bureau formed the core of political power in the state.

From historical point of view the party state was quite a new phenomenon. However, a broader consensus dominated that the state as such was not identical with the communist rule – it with its glorious past had existed through centuries. The historical continuity of the Hungarian State was essential as well as the role of the Hungarian nation within that state. In addition, Hungarians retained a strong sense of their national or ethnic uniqueness, which was most obviously felt in the isolation of their language in the region.²²

The relation between the society and the state remained alien in the dominant political culture. Contrary to Nordic countries an ambiguous law was not to be changed but to be utilised (*kijátszani*) with protection and personal relations.²³ Services needed other services, clients, unofficial networks and intrigues to cope with in the society. These created the 'small liberties', and in fact, passive acceptance of the 'eternal' Kádár system. Phenomena had historical predecessors, because also both the post-1867 k.u.k. and neo-k.u.k systems also had been étatist authoritarian regimes with a constitutional facade. It is striking how only three influential men have ruled Hungary over a decade since 1848: Francis Joseph, Miklós Horthy and János Kádár. None of them was a democrat in the proper sense of the word but represented a paternalist centralist rule.

Moreover, there is the question of various political subcultures in Finland and Hungary. In 1977 Toma and Völgyes complained about the difficulties to describe Hungarian political culture in the lack of empirical material. However, they considered it 'reasonable to estimate' that two general subcultures existed in Hungary. The first was a dedicated and ideologically motivated left. Secondly, there were few but strong, anticommunist proponents of national independence. Toma and Völgyes did not discuss about great masses; both these subcultures together amounted to five per cent of Hungarians.²⁴ In addition, a few representatives of Jewish and nationalist populist peasant cultures survived during the Kádár era. According to Ignác Romsics, the impression of a distinction between Jew and non-Jew was identified but mainly only in the ranks of the Budapest intelligentsia.²⁵

When we still discuss subcultures and concentrate on the parties in the government, we surprisingly note that in Finland the Swedish People's Party has, in fact, participated more often in the government than social democrats. Heterogeneous groups have supported the party, among them cultural liberals, Kekkonen's early supporters but also true right wingers. Although the party has successfully defended minority rights in Finland, we have to bear in mind that there are two official languages, Finnish and Swedish, in the country. In spite of some separatist efforts in 1918 or the question of Åland Islands, we should not speak about 'Swedish' minorities but Swedish-speaking Finnish citizens. Evidently the old 'language strife' i.e. opposing bilingualism belonged already to the past during the long presidency of Kekkonen. At that time fluent Swedish was a great advantage particularly in the Parliament and the high societies of the capital.

Obviously the Finnish Swedish-speaking minority forms a political subculture of their own. By contrast, the Lapp people did not have ethnical rights, cultural autonomy or popular assembly before the 1990s. In Finland they were considered Finns, not really ethnic or aborigines of the country. This is in spite of the dominant ideas of progress and integration, which changed and further modernised Finland during the Kekkonen era.

6 Dichotomy and Fragmentation

Integration in the name of progress had historical reasons in Finland and Hungary. Class conflict had existed in both countries although 'class' was not the only reason for all antagonisms. However, the rhetoric dichotomy of 'people' and 'rulers' is still essential in politics. Finns even have a concept for hate of masters, *herraviha*. It usually reveals a suspicious attitude to bosses, politicians, capitalists or even academics making prognoses (*roknoosiherra*) concerning the results of parliamentary elections. Thus, the narrative of integration is only one part of political culture, when we analyse beliefs, values and political knowledge of nations and groups.

In Finland the most serious clash had taken place in 1918, when the young republic faced a civil war between the 'Reds' and the 'Whites'. No doubt the terror in Hungary also divided people and left a trauma in the Hungarian society. Compared to contemporary Hungary the revolution in Finland, however, demanded more casualties. Although the Winter War in 1939–1940 forced former enemies to a united front, the memory left a long shadow. In this sense the historical dichotomy ended only in 1982, when the first social democrat, Mauno Koivisto, was elected the leader of the country.

Thus, at first we study dichotomies concerning the nature of the political system. Since 1956 it became clear that Hungary's political structure would remain 'socialist', which was confirmed in the constitution in 1972. According to Kádár, the vast majority of Hungarians had understood and accepted his activities – if not immediately, at least quite soon.²⁶

On the basis of the famous speech of Kádár those who were not against the Hungarian People's Republic, were in fact with it. By contrast Jenő Bangó argued after the collapse of Communism that the whole concept of dissident was too narrow, because in Hungary everybody was against. Bangó suggested a concept of non-conformism instead, which in principle could be found in every sector of a society. The third definition comes from George Schöpfung, who wrote about opposition and para-opposition. The latter did not overtly question the ideological bases but accepted the semi-autonomous political role permitted by the system.²⁷ We face a difficult question: which kind of activity should be interpreted as

of being against. In the lack of trustful sources we do not know, who 'supported' or 'opposed' the system in the end. In any case, existing bureaucracy was a matter of fact and framed the political field. Finally, the amount of proper dissidents and activists remained small.

However, one of the most obvious dividers emerged in the party membership: a member and a non-member. According to Lenin's theory, the party represented the vanguard of the people and not everybody was allowed to join in the 'elite'. However, the other side of coin reveals how this dichotomy retaliated in the 1970s and 1980s. The ruling party began to offer a competitive channel to develop the country inside the existing structures. One of the striking features of the later Kádár era was how cultural intelligentsia, literature as its medium was supplanted by economists, sociologists, historians and jurists.

In principle Socialism and the New Economic Mechanism had to provide the entrepreneurial spirit of Capitalism and the egalitarian ideas of communism simultaneously. As long as the system functioned to the satisfaction of the new bourgeoisie, interests in alternative political models tended to remain inchoate. In the 1980s the crisis started to feed ideas which on one hand stressed Hungary's own identity as a model and on the other hand showed Western Capitalism as a possible way.

Elemér Hankiss (1989) found another dichotomy, when he defined two societies, the first and the second society. The first, the official, society organised vertically, in which the state and ideology played essential roles. These principles did not work in the second, in the unofficial society, in which also alternative principles, like the second public, started to grow.²⁸ However, it seems that both societies needed each other – finally even as good 'enemies' to strengthen one's own identity. People played many roles, thus, official intellectuals read *samizdats* and the 'opposition' i.e. critical intellectuals published in official newspapers etc.

In Finland the idea of Socialism and the political system caused serious debates in the mid-1970s for the last time. According to an opinion poll in 1977, one third of the population supported Socialism. It was less than the current per centage of the leftist parties in

the Parliament. Relation to 'Socialism' divided the social democratic party most. In the summer of 1975 SDP had accepted the task to nationalise commercial banks, insurance companies and drug-stores. However, socialist ideas were in the air internationally as well, and an independent weekly revealed some current expectations in 1975: in standard interviews *Viikkosanomat* systematically asked what would be the nature of the political system in ten years from now. Before the general elections of 1975 the National Coalition Party tried to revive an ideological aspect and defined itself as a firm counterbalance of Socialism.²⁹

However, we should not only concentrate on history or left-right division, when we study dichotomies during Kekkonen's reign. In 1956 Kekkonen was elected mainly by the votes of the agrarians and the FPDL, when the members of the coalition party in the electoral council were even ready to support a socialist candidate. For a traditional bourgeois supporter Kekkonen appeared to be too leftist and pro-Soviet. Some right-wingers stressed companionship in arms and the wartime unity with the social democrats, which still worked well particularly in some southern cities. Agrarian Union and the pro-communist FPDL were stronger in the eastern and northern part of Finland and the others in the south and west. Thus, one dichotomy in Finnish political culture has dealt with regional policy, the relations between the south and the north and the capital and the other regions of the country. The division between the more agrarian north and the richer south was noticed by Hungarians in *Magyarország* as well³⁰.

In 1956 Kekkonen had been elected with an extremely narrow margin in a clearly divided situation. An essential change took place in the 1960s. In 1968 also the Social Democratic Party bent to support him. Five years later the majority of the NCP backed him as well. In the course of the 1970s the 'dichotomy' concerned only pro-Kekkonen forces and the small remnants of his opponents. Finally in the 1978 elections Kekkonen did not represent parties anymore but the association *Paasikivi-Seura*, which since 1958 propagated Finnish foreign policy. Whilst real dichotomies disappeared, undemocratic features emerged in official political culture, too. Not only monarchist metaphors

like *hovi* (court), *perintöprinssi* (successor/prince) emerged but even the word dissident (*toisinajatteliija*), which usually referred to communist countries. First in 1978 *Suomen Kuvalehti* speculated on possibilities whether one of Kekkonen's early supporters, Jouko Tyyri, was a dissident in Kekkonen's Finland or not.³¹

Moreover, age became a political force and represented a dichotomy even in countries like Hungary and Finland. Margaret Mead argued in the 1970s that the gap between generations had become permanent in modern society. It was already questionable whether children could understand their parents and their stories concerning the past anymore. For example, in 1968 Kekkonen understood the importance of radicalism and argued that he was closer to radical youngsters than their 'academic fathers'. Also *Magyarország* had noticed how new forms of patriotism started to appear in Finland in the 1960s.³²

In Hungary news agency UPI used the phrase 'youngster question', when a journalist interviewed Kádár in 1971. According to Kádár, problems of finding own career, lack of experience and patience were basically the same all over the world. However, Kádár stressed differences between capitalist and socialist countries, and the fact that the vast majority of Hungarian youngsters accepted the socialist ideas and the aims of the society. Of course, according to Kádár, there were 'radicals' or 'leftist' petit bourgeois people but then he branded as a small minority – supporters of Capitalism could only be found with a torch.³³

Still, as János Bródy later argued, the agenda was somehow different in the East: it became paradoxical to oppose the war in Vietnam, because the government already did it. The party worried about the tenacity of pre-communist attitudes, thus, a dichotomy between collective and petit bourgeois values. The latter was supposed to belong to the remnants of the pre-war era but at the same time the 1968 reform had strengthened those values. Talented rock bands like *Omega* and *Illés* or film makers Jancsó and Szabó became relatively famous at the same time. On the other hand, also the origins of New Left emerged in the Budapest University during the years of the economic reform.

In Finland 1960s radicalism led soon to domination of parties. Relatively soon emerged the era of over-politicisation and party mandated territories. Political balance became a slogan in the 1970s: even the Finnish Broadcasting Company, *Yleisradio*, made a decision that beside journalistic criteria, reporters should be hired according to the 'amount' of existing political opinions of the society. Impartiality and balancing found many ways: when the right-wing reformer Harri Holkeri was asked to join the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society, he joined the *Pohjola-Norden*, the Finnish-American and the Finnish-Hungarian Societies on the same day.³⁴

Little by little the idea of political balance created also certain consensus and responsibility in the main parties. In the midst of economic depression consensus was raised as an official political aim in 1977. Consensus-oriented policy gained upper hand in economy but parliamentary elections could no longer bring clear political alternatives. Erkki Tuomioja noted this growing unanimity, which was typical for the main parties and coalitions during the late Kekkonen era.³⁵

However, in the 1980s political consensus started to break Finnish political cultures. The disintegration of the broadcasting monopoly is a good example of this development. A commercial TV-corporation could finally establish its own news service in 1981 – coincidentally in the same year when organised *samizdat* publishing, *Beszélő*, emerged in Hungary. Local commercial radios began their broadcasting four years later in 1985. Even the already repeated year 1987 is significant in this field as well: the third national TV-channel and satellite televisions started their broadcasts in Finland.³⁶

In Hungary, compared to Finland, it would be wrong to speak about general fragmentation in the 1980s. Although an open terror had not existed in decades, free speech was still limited, informers were being uncovered and people were kept under surveillance. Instead of fragmentation, politics began to (re)culminate between the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them'. Also the party's 'social contract' started to grow old: in 1987 for the first time the *samizdat* publication *Beszélő* demanded Kádár's resignation. We cannot underestimate the years 1986–1987, when critical intelligentsia could still debate. Particularly, this

concerned historical 'questions of life and death' (*sorskérdések*) such as the fate of 1956 in 1986 or in Lakitelek a year later. In 1987, 100 intellectuals also boycotted the new programme of Károly Grósz's government. Even the youth organisation of the party demanded different kind of Socialism.

7 Catching the Rainbow

When we explicate political culture we cannot ignore general technological optimism of the era or the frames of the Cold War either. 'Keeping up with the Joneses', the consumer society in the making evidently influenced on political cultures in different countries, too. At the end of the 1960s Sweden – in many sense considered the older 'brother' and a model for Finns – was still twice as rich as Finland. At that time Finland's national GNP, 1399 dollars, was less than both Germanys' but more than, for example, Hungary's which stood at 1031 dollars, per year.³⁷

On the other hand, expectations of the future were high in the socialist camp in the early 1970s. Hungarian communists and officials expected the growth to be around 30-35 per cent. Thus the current Western level was assumed to take approximately 15-20 years.³⁸ Nevertheless, Hungarian political optimism vanished by the beginning of the 1980s if not even before. In 1985 Hungarian standard of living decreased for the first time. A sign of new thinking was a new weekly *Heti Világgazdaság*, which since 1979 concentrated on fluctuations in the world economy and reflected a more open and business-oriented political culture. In 1980 the magazine reported, for example, how McDonalds' had 5,700 restaurants in the world.³⁹ In Finland the company landed four years later, in 1984, for the first time. Three years later Budapest was the first city in the former Eastern Europe to accept this vanguard of globalisation.

Increasing commercialism and consumer oriented way of living could be found both in *Suomen Kuvalehti* and *Magyarország*. In 1964 *Magyarország* advertised 'television to every house', while *Suomen Kuvalehti* argued in 1977 that colour television would in five years be as cheap as the current black and white one. Catching the rainbow meant also the dream of a private car. In the late 1970s every fourth Hungarian car was the Soviet made

Lada.⁴⁰ In Finland Lada became relatively cheap and popular particularly among the working class – in 1981 Toyota, Datsun and Lada were the three most popular cars sold in Finland. There were even years in the 1980s, when civil servants in both countries used vehicles coming from the Soviet Togliatti factory.

Soviet trade and particularly Soviet oil played an important role in the relative welfare of both – two thirds of the Finnish oil originated from the Soviet Union as the journalist of the *Heti Világgazdaság* observed in 1981. During those days the Soviet Union was with its 25 per cent of import Finland's strongest trading partner. The amount had increased close to the Hungarian level, 28-29 per cent in 1979.⁴¹ Pictures of Soviet delegations raising toasts after successful negotiations became current collective experience of Finns. However, prosperous trade was linked with political relations as later will be emphasised.

On the contrary, trade between Finland and Hungary remained small. In the 1970s Hungary and Finland signed an agreement and abolished customs in the transition period of 1975–1985. In spite of some progress Finland remained only among the dozen most important trading partner of Hungary. The export consisted of tubes and textiles while the import included mainly paper and chemical pulp. In addition to Finland, Mexico and Iraq had entered into an agreement with COMECON in the mid 1970s.⁴²

'Keeping up with the Joneses' presupposed hard work and did not always succeed. In the 1960s '*kicsi vagy kocs*' i.e. the choice between a baby and a car became a slogan in Hungary. On the other hand, the state could not offer enough of some consumer goods either. For example, in 1978 there were only 103 telephones per 1,000 inhabitants. The amount was seven times less than in the leading countries United States and Sweden. In this sense Czechoslovakia was the most advanced in the socialist camp and outstripped Hungary almost two times.⁴³ The slogan '*Csak egy telefon*' – just a call – could have solved many problems but the lack of telephone became itself a problem in everyday life.

A five-day working week was established in Hungary in 1981, balanced to 40 hours three years later, modelling on other countries in the Soviet bloc. Not only one or two Hungarians noticed that they needed several jobs to maintain their standard of living in the 1980s. The idea of the 'second economy' was officially accepted in 1980 to complete state socialist structures. Reforms were re-activated in 1983 to encourage small scale private business. Those known as the 'new rich' had either connections and networks around the party, worked abroad or participated in private business already at that time. The first income tax in the former Soviet bloc was enacted in 1987. According to a slogan, Hungarians had Ethiopian wages but Swedish taxes.

Hungarians had started to rethink their reforms in 1983 at the same time, when one of the Finnish leading bankers began to demand liberalisation of the money markets for the first time.⁴⁴ In the 1980s Finns had already more self-confidence – not least because during the first half of the decade the economy grew as fast as the Japanese. The expression 'the Northern Japan' originates in *Suomen Kuvallehti* from 1984 and was a few years later spread out even into Hungary. In general we could read the idea in between the lines of *Magyarország* that Hungarians were rather surprised that Finns had industrialised their country since 1960s and done it surprisingly silently.

Although Finland was not a command economy, planning had existed in Finland as in many other capitalist mixed economies. Particular community planning came to the fore in 1960s and broadened in the sectors of economy, too. It is important to emphasize that in the first place community planning concentrated on the futures of different communities, not on the society as a whole. Planning took place in provinces, counties, schools etc. The first 'five year plan' came into being in 1968 and it dealt with the economy of the country, drawn by the Ministry of Finance.

8 The Priority of Foreign Relations

In the 1970s Brezhnev argued that if political relations were in order, also other relations will be good.⁴⁵ In the Finnish case this meant first of all the interpretation of the 1948 FCMA, a cornerstone of Finnish post-war policy. Therefore we study in the follow-

ing chapters the influence of foreign relations on political culture in Finland and Hungary. A fundamental point in FCMA was the idea that if Germany or her allies would attack to Finland or the Soviet Union through Finland, Finland will fight with all of her forces available. They would do it inside Finland's borders, and 'in case of need assisted by the Soviet Union or together with it.'⁴⁶

When the West integrated Germany in the late 1950s, indirectly the FCMA concerned NATO operations as well. According to the second paragraph of FCMA, Finland and the Soviet Union 'will negotiate with each other, if the threat of a military attack [...] has been noted'. These words introduced the key to understand Finland's post-war policy, political culture and power struggles. The questions how the threat of a military attack should be defined, when it should be noted, and by whom, became highly essential issues in sophisticated political debate.

From the Finnish point of view the best alternative was to keep the initiative in Finnish hands. It was a hard task for the Finns to persuade the Soviets to trust that the treaty was enough and no other means were needed to secure the Soviet border. For the first time the treaty was tested before the presidential elections in 1961. Khrushchev had warned earlier that those who do not vote Kekkonen, vote also against the friendship of Finland and the Soviet Union. The conflict known as the note crisis was solved by a personal meeting and mutual talks. The incident further strengthened Kekkonen's position, and the importance of personality in the political culture.

In politics words matter and when dealing with the Soviets they were particularly important. Diplomatic culture was based on communiqués which became an essential part of political culture. They defined Finland's international position and, thus played a great role in the 'struggle of neutrality', as Juhani Suomi named his book. By recognising the idea that the country was not neutral Finland would have deteriorated her own position in negotiations. Finnish negotiators had to maintain their trust in the eyes of the Soviet leaders. At the same time, they had to persuade them to accept the Finnish view, i.e. to believe that the state of affairs was as Finns wanted it to be.⁴⁷

Instead of neutrality the Soviet Union recognised only Finland's efforts to be neutral until 1989. Crucial point in the debate was whether neutrality or the FCMA should come first. The Soviets doubted, whether by emphasizing neutrality Finns would diminish their military commitments expressed in FCMA. In 1957 negotiating parties accepted a communiqué, which highlighted neutrality. However, in 1969 the communiqué did not mention the word at all but stressed the idea of FCMA for the first time. After a long political wrist-wrestling a new definition of 'peace loving neutral policy' emerged in 1971. These formulas belonged to diplomacy with the other communist state leaders as well. Among them the GDR seemed to be a more loyal follower of the Soviet path than Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria.⁴⁸

On a metaphoric level the struggle of words in foreign policy started to resemble the trinity schism in the medieval church. Policy was known as the 'line', named after its high priests Paasikivi and Kekkonen, and had its 'liturgy', 'heretics' and 'orthodox' followers. There were even Mauno Koivisto's 'fortune-tellers', a concept which tried to cut down speculative comments concerning the potential threat of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. Features of mysticism and 'occultism' emerged in political culture in the fear that open discussion leads to speculations, which could come true and finally harm the country. Instead, it was frequently more convenient only to turn to 'liturgy' and repeat old but well-known phrases of friendship and policy of good neighbourhood.

In spite of the FCMA Finland strove to represent herself as a neutral country for domestic and international audiences. Finland's political leaders described the policy as an exception and neutrality 'of a particular kind'. At the international level Kekkonen's Finland liked to act with the metaphor of a doctor and avoid direct judgements and moral statements. In the UN, for example, this policy led to abstaining from voting if a statement interfered to matters, in which the interests of the superpowers were in contradiction. The policy caused also problems and speculation like in the case of Hungary 1956, of Afghanistan 1979 or of US policy in Vietnam.

However, Finland's international position was not as stable as the contemporary public wanted to see it. The Soviet Union opposed Finland's western integration including criticism for joining the EFTA and the OECD – or even the membership in the Nordic Council. Although nothing 'very serious' happened the last major attempt to bind Finland tighter to the Soviet sphere of influence took place in 1978. At that time the idea of joint military practices was floated, but was not presented for the greater public, for example in contemporary *Suomen Kuvalehti*.⁴⁹

The idea of Finnish neutrality was very significant for small socialist countries.⁵⁰ This is one of the reasons why Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were reluctant to accept the Soviet formula of 'peace loving neutral policy', when they were dealing with Finland. They desired to maintain and increase their own political space. However, we must acknowledge that already the whole point of departure was different. Hungary and the others belonged to a military alliance and participated in military co-operation in the frame of Warsaw Pact. Moreover, Soviet troops did not leave Hungary as they had left the base of Porkkala in Finland in 1956.

Internationally Hungary had become quite isolated during the first post-1956 years. The situation changed essentially in 1962, when the Hungarian question was lifted from the UN's agenda – reciprocally a general amnesty of 1956 revolutionaries took place in March 1963. The year 1964 particularly seemed to promise a new era. Several new embassies opened in Budapest, the weekly *Magyarország* was launched and even Finns started organised tours to Hungary that year.

In Hungary communist ideology was not the only factor to define international relations. Already in 1957 Kádár had made the distinction between capitalist and imperialist countries: If Sweden was not imperialist; Finland was even less so.⁵¹ However, the Soviet Union, the first state-socialist state and a superpower, was without doubt in a privileged position in relations to other states. The Central Committee defined several times its fundamental theoretical thesis, i.e. the tight co-operation with the Soviet Union.⁵²

Until 1967 USA was one of the last three countries in the world with whom Hungary maintained diplomatic relations only at the level of legation. After the Cardinal Mindszenty's case was finally closed in 1973, relations with the Vatican also normalised. Finally the Hungarian government gained a moral victory when the old crown, the crown of Saint Stephen was returned from the United States in 1978, where it had been stored since 1945.⁵³

In Europe Hungarians started to open relations with Finland and Austria, and even with West-Germany in the 1970s. In fact, both Finns and Hungarians had had a troublesome relation with the FRG and her strengthening role in the NATO. The Western countries had established relations to the Federal Republic and the Eastern Bloc with the Democratic Republic, but Finland did not have normal relations to either of them. Finally both Hungary and Finland confirmed diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1973. At the same time Finland set up the relations with the GDR as well.

In the 1970s Hungary's foreign policy was further activated by the visits of Gandhi, Tito, Kreisky and Mitterrand in 1982, and Bush in 1983. When Margaret Thatcher prepared for a visit to Hungary in 1984, mutual communication with the two superpowers was reduced to a minimum. Years later, in 1993, Thatcher recalled her trip that 'it was through eastern Europe that we would have to work.' Her message to Kádár (read: to Kremlin) was that 'the West and Reagan personally were genuinely seeking disarmament'. However, Thatcher noted how she had to take seriously Prime Minister Lázár's caution that the worst thing she could do 'was to cast doubt on Hungary's remaining part of the socialist bloc'. Hungary had gone the 'furthest along the path of economic reform, although they (sic!) were anxious to describe it as anything but Capitalism'.⁵⁴

Thatcher's notes disclosed not only limits of political space or how good relations to the East opened more space in the West. In addition, they revealed the Cold War political context, in which also rash and unwise statements of the West could harm small countries. Particularly during the first half of the 1980s it is strik-

ing how *Magyarország* is full of concern of the consequences of the armament.⁵⁵ Both in Hungary and Finland the Soviet relations played a decisive role although their military relations were based on different policy. Despite the FCMA there are no signs that Hungarians would have considered Finland as a 'brother country', viz. neutral, in the weekly *Magyarország*.

9 A Few Peculiar Features

In fact, relations with the Soviet Union limited political space in both countries. In Hungary Kádár stressed that the domestic status quo was the best Hungarians could achieve. Kekkonen referred to John F. Kennedy's words that foreign and internal affairs were inseparable. However, if either of them was not in order, in Kekkonen's interpretation it had always to be domestic politics.

In Finland say in foreign relations increased domestic political power. Politicians divided each other to goats and sheep on the basis of how they could cultivate friendly relations with the Soviet Union. At first FPDL tried to monopolise the idea of friendship arguing that they were the true friends of the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ Mediating political role between the states subsequently increased the power of the agrarians. Until 1968, social democrats had adjusted their foreign relations, and thus became 'fit for the court', *hovikelpoinen* as Finns used to say. The right wing NCP tried to follow the path and reformed itself towards the end of the 1970s. In spite of these efforts it could not participate in the government between 1966 and 1987.

Building trust in the eyes of the Soviets was one of the most peculiar phenomena in Finland. Politicians tried to find out the Soviet point of view in advance and estimate what the Soviets might think. A glimpse of this was noted also by the Hungarian reporter Endre Sümegi: if the trust is missing between Helsinki and Moscow, everything remains a dead letter in spite of international agreements.⁵⁷ Kekkonen was the prime example of building personal relations, whose behaviour was followed gradually by other politicians. Numerous consultations in the Soviet Embassy at *Tehtaankatu* in Helsinki are already a concept in the laity discussion of the Kekkonen era.

Politicians aiming at reaching the top level of national politics needed special relations and had to build connections. In politics everybody needs connections, but in Finland an unofficial institution came to being: *kotiryssä*, the 'home Russian'. Kotiryssä made friends only with the most significant politicians to exchange information. For the greater public the 'habit' of unofficial form of political friendship was unknown until the pamphlet *Tamminiemen pesänjakajat* was published in 1981. Instead of normal newspaper channels journalists of the national daily *Helsingin Sanomat* published this '*samizdat*' under the pseudonym *Lauantaiseura*. Journalists needed anonymity just at the time, when Kekkonen finally resigned and the struggle over his successor tempered political agenda. In Kekkonen's Finland many journalists had accompanied official political culture and avoided critical publicity contrary to Britain, for example.

The second peculiarity in Finnish official political culture concerned the KGB. Until the beginning of the 1990s politics of trust was carried out not only through normal diplomatic channels but also with the more direct 'party channel', the KGB. Intelligence and counter-espionage had belonged to the traditions of Kremlin and even Kekkonen himself had served in the Finnish secret police in the 1920s. Although rumours and pieces of information belong to everyday diplomacy, there is also the grey area dividing national interest from high treason. As Seppo Hentilä has noted, the majority of discussions stayed in the frame of normal, official diplomacy. Nevertheless, some politicians crossed the borders of propriety, and information was received in the embassies particularly of both Germanys, United States and the Soviet Union. More typical, however, was it to maintain good relations with the *kotiryssä* than to spy him or her.⁵⁸

The Soviet influence increased after Kekkonen had personally solved the night frost crisis of 1958. At that time the FPDL had won the elections but other parties refused to co-operate with it. The crisis broke out, when the Soviet leaders did not hold trust in the new broadly based government. Since then Finns have debated whether Kekkonen crossed a Rubicon and let the Soviet Union intervene on domestic political agenda. One of the most obvi-

ous examples is the 1979 elections, when the Soviet Ambassador to Finland wrote in *Pravda*, which parties were acceptable in the government and which, like the National Coalition Party, were not. Although the Ambassador had to leave Finland after the elections, the winner of the elections, the NCP did not participate in the government.

However, election victory constitutes only one factor in the formation of government. The fact was not typical only for Finland but for the whole Western Europe after 1945. Victory has only guaranteed positions in the negotiating table. Particularly in Italy those who lost the election participated also in the new government.⁵⁹ In 1979, the left was not yet ready to co-operate with the NCP, and Finnish traditions did not favor purely left-wing or bourgeois coalitions. Although some MPs welcomed the idea of a 'red-blue' coalition already in 1979, social democrats were only ready to co-operate with the NCP in 1987, which also ended the era of 'red-ochre' and is considered a closure of the 'second republic'.

These phenomena could be placed under the umbrella of 'finlandization', a highly contested concept since its appearance in the FRG in the 1960s. In 1978 Walter Laqueur threw further oil into flames and argued that Finland's internal adaptation had exceeded its geographical limits. Scholars have found several origins to 'finlandization' since then: already the end of war in 1944, the Hungarian crises of 1956 and the night frost crisis in 1958. The most clever politicians, however, have understood the political realities, and the whole situation appears more Machiavellian in both Paasikivi's and Kekkonen's diaries.⁶⁰

Still, the years 1978–1981 provide more or less serious examples for further discussion of 'finlandization', either referring to the Soviet influence and its consequences in Finland or in the use of foreign policy as a weapon in domestic power struggles. For example, the subscription of the comic *Aku Ankka* (Donald Duck) was cancelled from some public libraries in Helsinki, effectively sending a negative image of the country to the international community. A year later, in 1979 leading politicians refused to give an interview to the BBC, the President refused to

comment on the experiences of the Winter War in Swedish radio. The way in which Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen intrigued with the Soviets to gain support in the President campaign of 1982 is the striking example of this practise.⁶¹ However, on the eve of the elections Mihail Suslov anticipated that there were no essential differences between the candidates Koivisto and Holkeri, the former chairman and the reformer of the NCP. The statement was not a clear recognition for Koivisto, whose opponents reminded of the lack of his personal connections with the Soviets.

At the time, however, even the *Radio Free Europe* criticized the concept of 'finlandization' in its background materials. Its commentator Kevin Devlin argued how this 'complex of policies is sometimes viewed in oversimplified terms as being based on special relationship with Finland's superpower neighbour, the Soviet Union. In fact, it involves much more than that, which is why the use of that vaguely evocative word "finlandization" generally contributes a lot more heat than light to discussion of international affairs [...]'.

Devlin concluded his report by stating: '(I)f commentators insist on using the abrasive term "finlandization", they may perhaps be reminded that so far it has been successfully exemplified only in Finland'.⁶²

For the Hungarian public 'finlandization' (*finnesítés*) was a positive concept. In Hungary Kádár tried to strike a balance between international commitments and national interests, between principles of socialist internationalism and Hungarian national consciousness. In principle, foreign relations had to be adjusted in the frames of communism, the ultimate interpreters of which were in Moscow. In 1971 Kádár argued to news agency UPI that international laws existed in building Socialism, but at the same time the work was done in national frames. Kádár continued that Hungarians were developing socialist democracy, finding proper answers to the contemporary questions. He denied consistently the existence of a certain 'Hungarian road'. When the same question was asked again years later, Kádár referred again to the 'international laws in building Socialism', but also to historical examples, to socialist patriotism and interna-

tionalism, which hinted that socialist models could not be copied. Nevertheless, in 1982 and 1983 he still denied the existence of a particular Hungarian model.⁶³

Compared to the Finnish policy of trust, the constellation in Hungary appeared more complicated. Why should the Soviet Union trust Hungary? After all, Imre Nagy had declared Hungary's sovereignty in 1956 and withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. The burden of testimony became even harder, because Stalin had named the Hungarians 'a guilty nation' referring to the Second World War. Kádár stressed that no anti-Soviet Communism had existed, exists or will exist. The emergence of Euro-Communism particularly in France and Italy was a particular theme in official political culture. When Kádár replied an inquiry of *New York Times*, he used the term 'so called Euro-Communism'. Still in 1986 the concept was put in brackets in the political dictionary together with the concept of national Communism.⁶⁴ In Kádár's political culture 'national' emerged only in the framework of the party and in co-operation with the Patriotic People's Front.

Although Soviet comrades guided the interpretation of the principles of Communism, the bloc itself did not appear as a model for all Finnish supporters of Socialism, for example. Acknowledging it publicly, however, caused protests by the Soviet authorities. When right-wing parties opposed Socialism in general, they could defend the *status quo* even by the reversed Brezhnev doctrine: only a capitalist Finland could remain independent, a socialist would slide into the Soviet bloc. Contrary to many other countries, FCP did not split until mid-1980s but maintained an artificial unity with the help of the Soviet Communist Party.⁶⁵ *Radio Free Europe* observed carefully the steps of the dispute, but *Magyarország* did not pay much attention to it. Interestingly, the weekly referred frequently to the more 'national' and 'Euro-Communist' *Kansan Uutiset*, instead of the clearly pro-Soviet *Tiedonantaja*. Finally, the Moscow oriented Democratic Alternative participated in the parliamentary elections in 1987 for the first time – also symbolising the end of the 'second republic'.

In the 1990s, Hungarians have argued that taboo topics existed during the state socialist era. Among these were Trianon, 1956 or the Soviet troops in the country. Furthermore, there was the question of Hungarian minorities. In fact, a demonstration supporting Hungarian minority in Transylvania in the summer of 1988 was the biggest gathering since 1956. Kádár's Hungary was vigorously careful not to provoke neighbouring countries in minority questions. In fact, early statements in 1958 helped to deteriorate minority statuses in Czechoslovakia and Romania. In the end of 1960s the situation had recovered in some sense. In the Helsinki Summit of 1975 Kádár was ready to give an account of the losses in Trianon for the first time.⁶⁶

In Finland, politically delicate matters were leaked to Swedish newspapers whilst Hungarians learned to use Western press to publish certain information. Instead of pre-censorship, the decision depended on individual journalists and publications in both countries. For example, György Aczél denied censorship but finally admitted that he might have had some kind of influence on matters.⁶⁷ In Finland there are some delicate cases related to foreign relations, when either the publisher refused to publish the book or later withdrew it from the markets. Still in the mid-1980s publishing Paasikivi's diaries or general Syrjä's book *Gruppen Finlandia* recalling his experiences in the Soviet military academy caused debates in political leadership. We cannot generalise the extent of Soviet control, but at least one case is known when the Soviet Ambassador himself checked the supply of bookshops in Helsinki.⁶⁸

On the other hand censorship existed in Finnish film industry and mostly concentrated on sex and violence. Also a few political cases of censorship occurred, such as films full of anti-Russian pathos before 1945, films reflecting presumptions of the Cold War or finally the debut action film of the Finnish director Renny Harlin in 1986. Although Hungarian cultural policy was dictated by the party, it could deal with relative delicate topics as well. Beside Hungarian pop classics and literature, we should definitely mention one of the best but not the most famous political satire in the socialist bloc *A tanú* (The Witness, 1969/1979). Although the film drifted between the categories of 'forbidden and tolerated', it is

likely that the making of the film could not have been possible in Kekkonen's Finland.

In the light of the earlier chapters, it is not surprising that the high-budget film of Finnish-Soviet co-operation was titled *Luottamus* (Trust, 1975). The film tells a story of Finnish independence and Lenin's role as a guarantor of it. Particularly after 1989, this mass production has become a symbol of 'finlandization', not least because it was shown at schools as a part of a teaching curriculum. However, we ought to bear in mind that co-productions existed also in other countries as a part of *détente*, for example in Yugoslavia. Hungarians had some experiences from these already in the 1960s. Finally, even Hungarians and Finns worked together in *Vámmentes házasság* (Duty-Free Marriage, 1980), a script of a delicate nature: a Hungarian woman and a Finnish man entered into matrimony on paper in order to get the woman out of Hungary.⁶⁹

In the 1970s *Suomen Kuvalehti* noted that Finns 'enjoyed' at least twice as much eastern TV programme as the other West-European countries. Generally speaking the 'East', however, bought three times more television programme from the 'West' in the beginning of the 1970s than the 'West' from the East'. The amount took ca. 10 per cent of the broadcasting time in the 'East' contrary to two per cent in the 'West'. However, a large number of 'Eastern' films represented new cinematography art in the West, among them many Hungarian films.⁷⁰

Evidently the Soviet shadow led also to peculiar features both in Finland and Hungary. In Hungary, however, culture flourished on the outskirts of the officially supported and unofficially tolerated. Despite 'Eastern' signs, in Finland we have to admit that in the late 1970s, 'punks', 'teddies' or 'duskiness' i.e. the strong Western influence could not have been further estranged from official political culture.

10 Politics, History and Commemoration

In the late 1980s some Finnish journalists and publishers tried to argue that the Winter War had been 'forgotten'. At the time a new spectacle film *Talvisota* (The Winter War) was under way. Although

filmmakers and the media concentrated more on the new version of the film *Tuntematon Sotilas* (The Unknown Soldier, 1985), historical information about the Winter War was also available. Moreover, a long TV-serial *Sodan ja Rauhan miehet* (The Men of War and Peace) was seen on television in the end of 1970s. Peculiar to Finland was also that novels on the World War II were published annually, a phenomenon absolutely absent in Kádár's Hungary.⁷¹

These examples lead us to focus on public representations of history and history writing. They certainly are tied to politics and political cultures. The education system in general takes a stand on how the past should be remembered and understood. In addition to these, there are deeper culture based differences. These existed even inside the socialist bloc: communist regimes re-built badly damaged Royal Castles in Budapest and Warsaw contrary to Berlin, in which they blew them up. A difference was found between Finland and Hungary when reception of literature was studied in the late 1980s. An experience of the presence of history was part and parcel of being a Hungarian, whereas committing oneself to history was surprisingly insignificant for Finnish readership.⁷²

Hungarian Miklós Szabó considered the legacy of Romanticism a part of political culture of the region: in East Central Europe people express their political views through historical examples and myths. The stalinist system between 1948 and 1953 created its own historical myths and progressive traditions of the poor and oppressed people. According to Szabó, however, Kádár's system denied and annihilated the whole history.⁷³ This is not true, but, as later will become clear, relation to history and politics was problematic in Hungary.

In Finland the recent history, the era since the independence in 1917, has been studied particularly well – in this comparison Hungarian perspective is essentially longer beginning already from the 10th century. Especially two contested eras have come to being in Finland: the years 1917–1918 and the period of the Wars. What was studied in the first period was the Finnish independence and Lenin's role in it, the controversial civil war in 1918, both of which were revisited in Kekkonen era.

Lenin's role in being the first to recognise Finnish independence, was – whether only of tactical nature and temporary or not – important in creating an excellent model of stabile co-existence between two political systems. President Kekkonen used this argument a couple of times since he unveiled a plaque in Leningrad in 1959 which commemorates Lenin's recognition of Finnish independence. The fact that Finnish independence was recognised by the founder of the Soviet state could be used to propagate the country's position to the contemporary Soviet leadership. This in mind, Kekkonen criticized Finnish historians, who had doubted the genuineness of Lenin's motives. More or less Lenin's role was praised in diplomatic speeches until late 1980s. In 1987 historian Eino Ketola argued in *Suomen Kuvalehti* that Lenin's views should be forgotten – a standpoint which still caused to ban his lecture.⁷⁴

The second and more controversial topic, the war in 1918 and particularly bloody reprisals afterwards, gained new perspectives in the Kekkonen era. Until the 1960s, the history of losers was neglected until Väinö Linna published a trilogy *Täällä Pohjantähden alla* (Under the North Star). The book was filmed on the fiftieth anniversary of the war and shown in television in 1970. At the time one million Finns saw the film, which, according to *Viikkosanomat*, was roughly the same number as saw the popular contemporary American soap opera, *Peyton Place*. Not only did the film influence people's views of the conflict but also the new studies, which similarly reflected the views of the losers. It seems evident that even Kekkonen himself had participated at least in one of those executions, which moulded his later political thought and ideas of integration.⁷⁵

The second period that preoccupied historians and politicians was the one of the Wars (Winter and Continuation). Since the 1960s Finns committed self-criticism and speculated, whether the war in 1939 could have been avoided. In a speech for the 25th anniversary celebration of the FCMA Kekkonen dealt with the topic, and on the 30th anniversary of the armistice in 1974 Kekkonen criticised the theory that Finland had just drifted like a log in a river to the German side in the Second World War. These speeches raised a political storm in conserva-

tive circles.⁷⁶ According to Kekkonen, Finland's policy of neutrality was possible, but at the expense of disengaging and breaking with the past, the 'political 1930s'. In this sense Kekkonen represented historical thinking, in which future was definitely more important than the past. Recent history was seen as a story of success whilst more critical light was cast onto earlier decades. In his role as a President he used history several times in the service of foreign policy. In this he was not alone, as Dieter Langewiesche has noted, all Presidents of the German Federal Republic used to interpret history in their speeches.⁷⁷

Moreover, the lessons of the World War played a role in contemporary policy as well. The threat that 'history repeats itself' flavoured with subjective conclusions of the war influenced on political thought. Kekkonen emphasised Prime Minister Kosygin's words about the shock how German troops could push until the river Volga in the Second World War. In *Magyarország* Kekkonen stressed that the Soviets will never forget it and will not let it happen for the second time. Kekkonen feared particularly that the uprising of 1953 would repeat in the GDR and nationalists in the Federal Republic would join them.⁷⁸ In Hungary open mourning of the Second World War did not happen. On the contrary, erecting memorials to the liberating Soviets had been one of the first activities of the new Hungarian state after the war. Plaques commemorated resistance and martyrs but not in general those who had fell in the fronts or vanished in the catastrophe of Don, when the whole army perished. It is amazing to notice that the idea of a memorial was brought up so late as in February 1989 in the Central Committee.⁷⁹

The Day of Liberation, 4 April, was defined the most important official festival, although it did not appear to attract substantial popular identification.⁸⁰ The provisional government declared it a public holiday immediately in April 1945. The anniversary of the 1848 Revolution, March the 15th and the International Labour Day, May the 1st, were also declared holidays at the same time. However, 15 March became complicated for the new rulers and partly for its 'bourgeois' nature. In the 1950s they abolished the holiday status of the day but Imre Nagy re-

stored it during the 1956 uprising, and in 1957 Kádár and his companions restored the former practice. Instead, Kádár wanted to found the new Communist Youth Organisation, KISZ, precisely on 15 March. The appeal was finally published on 21 March, which was the anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Republic in 1919.⁸¹ Politicians struggled about the legacy of Hungarian history and about who could complete these historical demands in the present.

No doubt communist regimes carefully prepared themselves for different celebrations and anniversaries. We cannot underestimate May the 1st or the anniversary of the Russian Revolution 7th November either, a holiday as well as a public square in Budapest. Contrary to Hungary, the day did not have the same status in Finland. Political elite participated in the celebrations in the Soviet Embassy, which was also the custom on the anniversaries of the FCMA.

The most important feast in Finland, however, takes place on the Independence Day, 6 December. The President of the Republic organises a reception in the President's palace. Beside foreign Ambassadors, prominent citizens have the honour to receive an invitation to this pseudo-Monarchist event. Moreover, days for national Great Men have been striking in Finland. The army marched in parades on the birthday of Mannerheim, and Johan Ludwig Runeberg, J.W. Snellman and Aleksis Kivi had all their special days. In politics Snellman's birthday, 12 May has also had a nationalist flavour as the 'Finnish Day', whilst the death of Swedish King, Gustavus the Second was commemorated as the 'Swedish Day'.

In addition to public commemoration, we must ask also the opposite: what was not commemorated in official political cultures. In Hungary the new meaning of the Saint Stephen's Day, 20 August, is a good example. In 1949 the new constitution of The People's Republic was timed and celebrated on that day. In official political culture the day was dedicated for new bread as well, which tried to diminish the religious meaning of the day. In Finland Mannerheim's birthday was more suitable for the whole nation after 1945 and it substituted the 1918 victory parade of the white army. In the 1970s there was a proposal to

celebrate the day of the 1944 armistice as a second Independence Day. The idea was quickly shot down and nowadays represents a clear symptom of 'finlandization'. Another failed attempt came from the Soviet side in 1986: the seventieth anniversaries of the October revolution and Finnish independence could be celebrated together.⁸²

In the Hungarian code of law there are particular memorial statutes, which since the nineteenth century have 'codified' extraordinary events or persons. During the Kádár era the Soviet liberation was enacted into law both on the fiftieth and twentieth anniversaries. The memory of the first Soviet Republic was codified on its fortieth anniversary in 1959. A peculiar form of commemoration emerged in the Academy of Sciences, which organised particular sessions to commemorate anniversaries of historical Great Men. The fiftieth anniversary of the October revolution was honored in the Academy as well.

When we deal with commemoration, we could notice that Hungarians had to come to terms with a loss of an empire. As Schöpflin formulated it, 'a substantial proportion of Hungarian opinion feels that the body of the nation [...] has been cut off from it'.⁸³ This historical experience has ignited wider historical debate as well. In 1960 historian Erik Molnár demystified the concepts of nation, people and homeland, which he considered as unities which had not been questioned even during the stalinist years. Aladár Mód answered that patriotism had not been false consciousness, and thus influenced on the further development of the concept of socialist patriotism. Another debate became public in 1987, now between Hungary and Romania, when Hungarians had published a history of Transylvania. In the socialist Hungary a public commemoration of the losses of Trianon, such as Transylvania, was not allowed.⁸⁴

Evidently lost territories have influenced mentality and political culture also in Finland. The first award of selling 30,000 records was given away in Finland in 1960 for the song *Muistatko Monrepos'n?* (Do you remember Monrepos?), which referred to a park in the city of Vyborg, which was lost to the Soviet Union, in 1940 and 1944. In official political culture the question of regaining Karelia to Finland did not exist

during the Kekkonen era, although it still played a small role in his election campaign in 1956. Lost territories were a delicate matter: for example, Mauno Koivisto and Björn Alholm have told in their autobiographical writings a humorous detail, how the Soviet Ambassador disapproved of *Karjala* (Karelia) beer, which was served at a reception in the late 1960s.⁸⁵

We should not dramatise these nostalgic signs, but there is no use to underestimate them either. Particularly this is true for the memory of 1956 during the Kádár era. As late as in 1988 the party prohibited 'a commemorative procession to memorialise the events of 23 October 1956'. First black mourning flags had appeared on 15 March, 1957, and some placed candles in their windows for the honour of 1956. In this sense, All Souls Day on the 1st November repeated commemoration to feed political expectations.

In Kádár's Hungary public commemoration of 1956 represented official political culture and history of winners, who considered the event as a counter-revolution. For the ruling HWSP, the attack on the party headquarters at *Köztársaság tér* on 30 October 1956 had been the most important evidence of the counter-revolutionary character of the rebellion. Laying wreaths at the square and the cemetery of Kerepesi, became a part of annual communist rituals. Although Kádár could emphasize socialist achievements and boasted to Kekkonen in 1973 that 1956 was hardly remembered anymore⁸⁶, forgetting was not that simple. Between 1957–1962 ca. 22,000 people were sentenced in courts, among them 250–350 to death including the former Prime Minister Imre Nagy. Beside these also earlier injustices caused bitterness as discrimination 'for political reasons'.

Challenging openly the history of winners would have endangered an individual's career. Beside general dissatisfaction, 1956, however, was finally the main factor in unifying various groups, including former neo-marxists in the 1980s. The years 1986–1987 repeat again here: in December 1986, non-conformist activists organised the first illegal conference in a private apartment. The organisers collected a bibliography of 1956, used a pseudonym and published it as a *samizdat*. Political nature of history became even more apparent, when the Committee for His-

torical Justice, *Történelmi Igazságtétel Bizottsága*, was founded illegally in June 1988. In the founding document they insisted on 'the full moral, political and juridical rehabilitation of victims, both alive and dead, from the revenge which followed the revolution'. They demanded reliable history writing on the post-1945 period, documents from 1956 to be published, and national memorial as well as the reburial of the executed persons.⁸⁷

In general, history writing in Hungary had more room for manoeuvre than in other socialist countries. Still recent history and particularly 1956 were the most difficult topics of all, in particular, because of the origins of the existing power structure and contemporary leadership and their responsibility in 1956. In political culture, there was an atmosphere of secrecy and concealment, because not everyone had the access to documents or Western literature. Such literature was branded in libraries with the letters Z.A. (closed material) and required a special permission.

The questions of power and its relation to history writing were not unknown in Finland either. The law concerning documents was changed a couple of times since 1952. Particularly documents concerning foreign policy have been the Achilles heel. In 1986 Juhani Suomi, a civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, received exclusive rights, in fact a monopoly, to Kekkonen's papers. Suomi, a professional historian, had made a political career in the same party as Kekkonen. Suomi's role in the history writing of Kekkonen has been a constant topic after each volume, which he has published.⁸⁸ Although Suomi has completed a good job, we cannot avoid the conclusion that his privileged situation resembled the position of party historians in Kádár's Hungary.

11 Cult and Sport as Politics

In addition to history writing and commemoration we have to study different forms of cult more closely. Particularly when we deal with the political cult of death and Great Men, there are numerous examples to commemorate. We can speculate that even the naming of national broadcasting channels reveals some differences between Finnish and Hungarian (political) cultures.

In Finland they used quite pure and simple naming *Yleisohjelma* and *Rinnakkaisohjelma* ('General Programme' and 'Parallel Programme'), whereas Hungarians stressed their bold national history and Great Men. Their national radio channels were named after revolutionary heroes of 1848, Lajos Kossuth and Sándor Petőfi. In 1987 the third programme was named after composer Béla Bartók.

In the late 1950s the construction of a special Workers' Movement Memorial got under way at the Kerepesi Cemetery in Budapest. From then on, communist politicians and other high officials were buried in the same cemetery in which other important figures in Hungarian history, such as Lajos Batthyány, Lajos Kossuth and Ferenc Deák. They represented the 1848 tradition and were visible all over Hungary alongside with the National Poet, Vörösmarty, military hero Hunyadi, nobles Rákóczi and Széchenyi. Although Lenin Boulevard and the Road of the Red Army existed in the centre of Budapest, the above mentioned national heroes were the most popular street names in the capital. In other words the number of national heroes commemorated was striking also in Kádár's Hungary.⁸⁹

However, we could not underestimate the value of Great Men in Finland either. The Russian Tsar Alexander the Second still stands in the centre of Helsinki. The vast majority of late Finnish Presidents have their statues in the capital. During the Kekkonen era, five of Kekkonen's predecessors received a memorial statue near the Finnish Parliament. From the remaining two Risto Ryti was more problematic, because he had been sentenced to imprisonment on the basis of responsibility in the Continuation War. As late as in 1989 his case was politically delicate, and Prime Minister Harri Holkeri was reluctant to make a speech at his tomb on the centenary of his birth.

According to the current *Suomen Kuvalehti*, politics in Finland was still made at graveyards. However, the case of Holkeri on Ryti's grave was quite insignificant compared to Hungary of the time where the past was literally dug up. In spring 1989, Imre Nagy and his compatriots were exhumed and reburied. The ceremony took place on the Heroes Square, which is also the site of the unknown soldier and had symbolic value as well. In Finland So-

viet leaders used to commemorate and lay a wreath on Paasikivi's tomb – Kádár followed the same path in 1983 – until Yeltsin honoured Mannerheim during his visit in 1992. Until then Mannerheim had represented reactionary traditions for the Soviets: in the 1960s the Soviet Union sent a note to the Romanian government, when Romanians had laid a wreath on Mannerheim's grave.⁹⁰

When we deal with the political cult of *living* political leaders, it seems that it was not the stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi, who brought personality cult to Hungary. Roots of the phenomenon are older: it is enough to study Hungarian legislation during the Dual Monarchy and Horthy era. Although Rákosi celebrated his own 60th birthday in 1952 in a pure stalinist pattern, the Hungarian party 'de-canonised' him in September 1956. At the same time they changed the name of the factory, named after him. Party organs also pushed through a principle that streets should not be named after living persons.⁹¹

Kádár seemed to follow this line of thinking and lived relatively modestly compared to some other communists. Contrary to his predecessor, Kádár's 60th birthday was neither compatible to Rákosi's nor were there as many pictures of contemporary leaders hung on party conventions⁹². Neither did Kádár reveal much of his personal life; Hungarians themselves did not know much about their leader. In *Magyarország* Kádár only once disclosed something about of his free time: if there was any time left he used to read books⁹³.

However, it seems evident that in this sense a wider cult of a leader existed in Finland than in Hungary. Kekkonen was 'pop' and an idol in Finland. He was presented as a superman, who skied, fished and even might have been able to dance rock and roll – as Jarkko Laine and his band crystallised it to the public in the late 1960s. Kekkonen, already called with the nicknames 'UKK' and 'Urkki', won three times the title of the 'most popular Finn' published by the periodical *Viikkosanomat* since 1953. *De facto*, he was the only politician who could compete with writers, sportsmen or the Finnish Miss Universe Armi Kuusela. For example, in 1970 *Viikkosanomat* wrote that 'UKK is still pop and the second popular Finn' – when a javelin-thrower had passed him.⁹⁴

No doubt Kekkonen was popular, and particularly among peasants and working people. Kekkonen did not behave like a 'master' but rather like a 'lumberjack', who met ordinate people and spent his leisure time out in the nature. A public image of a common man has been an advantage for a prominent leader in Finland. Biographers and journalists, for example, stressed Koivisto's working class background and noted his big 'worker's hands'. Still Kekkonen and Koivisto essentially helped their own careers through academic channels and degrees, whilst Kádár's working class background was combined with some self-education.⁹⁵

Kekkonen was a democrat in his principles but an autocrat of his character, as Max Jakobson has pointed out. Still many people considered the President as a counterpart to 'party power', who should take positions beyond party intrigues *pelin politiikka* ('politics of game'). Many understood this Bonapartism and expected their leader to use his power. This mentality could be read, for example, from numerous delegations, which arrived from provinces and asked an audience from the President. Even the activity of the leading protest singer, Irwin Goodman, seemed to culminate in an intention to write a letter to Kekkonen, who should stop unemployment in Finland.⁹⁶

When Kekkonen's period in office was prolonged by an *ad hoc* law, the leading political cartoonist Kari Suomalainen commented the event with his cartoon, set in a school: 'If we do not behave ourselves, the Principal would come'.⁹⁷ Thus, we ought not to underestimate the mentality of subjection; people believed that they need a higher authority, which to honour, to be afraid of but also to use against political rivals. Finnish political culture resembled a play of children on a sandpit boasting and giving a fright to each one of their potential and powerful pals.

Kekkonen represented the continued tradition of powerful leadership in which a Russian Tsar had substituted Swedish King. Loyalty to ruler helped the nation. In these circumstances it was no wonder that a street was named after Kekkonen in the capital, when he celebrated his 80th birthday. The same year also an institute, National Park and a medal bore his name. An icebreaker *Urho* had been christened years earlier. *Suomen Ku-*

valehti also participated in the building of this personality cult. In the autumn of 1975 the magazine published a supplement with 165 photos to the honour of the 75 years old President.⁹⁸

However, more embarrassing is the fact that Kekkonen's face was found in the new 500 Fmk banknote. Contemporary banknotes had the pictures of two other presidents, Ståhlberg and Paasikivi, as had 'Finland's National Philosopher', J.W. Snellman. They represented the canon from the mid-1950s to mid-1980s, in fact the Kekkonen era. When new notes were put in circulation in December 1986, they introduced composers and scientists, not Presidents anymore, not even Kekkonen. In Hungary artists and rebels represented the canon of the era, culminating in Béla Bartók in 1983. In the 1990s they had to give space for older kings, which further strengthened the canon of historical Great Men.

However, Kekkonen's critics should not forget how the extensive rights of the President were guaranteed by the constitution. The constitution was created only a year after the civil war as a compromise between the leftist and rightist political forces, the latter of which had favoured a king. In fact the constitution fed to the idea of leader cult in political culture and allowed for the concentration of political power to one person. Even more essential is to bear in mind that the 1973 extraordinary law was not as extraordinary as usually thought to be. Instead, it derived from political culture in which national interest was considered the highest value and surpassed the idea of democracy. Already the first President Ståhlberg was chosen by the Parliament in 1919, and the 1937 electors were used also in 1941 (Ryti) and 1944 (Mannerheim). In 1946, the Parliament chose President Paasikivi by an extraordinary law. The undemocratic idea further appeared in discussion several times: in 1949 by Paasikivi, and then by other politicians in 1955, 1966 and 1976, thus somehow before almost all elections.⁹⁹

Evidently Kekkonen was perceived as a great and a startling man in his time. According to *Magyarország* 'still at the age of 69 there is posture and lightness in his step'. In 1970 the periodical told how Kekkonen had surprised international journalists in Helsinki. Kekkonen had gone to skiing and could be reached

only after two days.¹⁰⁰ The periodical claimed that as a young man Kekkonen had become a national champion in skiing. Although this is not true – Kekkonen won the championship in high and triple jump – he, nevertheless, also led a national sport organisation in the 1930s and 1940s. Two nation-wide sport organisations, Finnish Central Sports Federation and the Workers' Sports Federation represented Finland's dichotomic political culture for many decades after 1918.

Definitely, sport played a role in both countries and represented political strength on national and international scene. Particularly in the Cold War, world-wide competitions were more than sports. Some of the Hungarian highlights concern particularly the stalinist era of Rákosi like the Olympics in Helsinki 1952 or the football match against England in 1953. The water polo game between Hungary and the Soviet Union in Melbourne 1956 represented already a tragedy. The boycott of Los Angeles 1984 only continued the tradition to use international arena for political purposes. At this time most communist ruled countries stayed home – Romania participated but Hungary supported the initiative of the Soviet Union.

Finns were on the top specially in skiing: before 1968 *de facto* Scandinavian countries and Finland had shared the medals. Skiing was also the most popular winter sport among citizens and it was encouraged by the state. No wonder if 'Finns were born with skies': particular skiing holidays were organized at schools and even the Parliament, *Eduskunta*, had skiing championships. During Kekkonen's reign collective phenomenon *kansanhiihto* (people's skiing) challenged men to ski ten kilometres, women five, and three kilometres was the norm for children. In 1970 a record number over 1.3 million Finns participated in the competition. A mass skiing event, *Finlandia-hiihto*, existed since 1974, and because of Kekkonen was a diligent skier, sport happenings were even named after him.

When Koivisto was elected President, even the cover of *Suomen Kuvalehti* introduced the brand new President and his wife with skies.¹⁰¹ Thus, definitely skiing had also to do with political cultures of Finland. Even a pejorative concept of *perässähiihtäjä* (literally, the skier who follows in the shadow) emerged in the political

vocabulary. He/she was a person, who waited his/her own chances next to the President, – might even have skied with him but did not dare to win. Frankly speaking, ageing actualised the question of successor, which then shadowed politics in the 1970s. In Hungary the same problem personified a decade later in Kádár, who was twelve years younger than Kekkonen.

Besides skiing, sauna and bathing belonged to Finnish political cultures. A Hungarian commentator even pointed out in *Magyarország* that Finns did not have only work lunches or diners but the sauna as well: in its heat they decided the questions of the country.¹⁰² Particularly Kekkonen's sauna in Tamminiemi and the sauna in the Parliament became famous. In addition, the sauna was an excellent place for silent unofficial negotiations. According to Kekkonen, gentle atmosphere created a mood of reconciliation. The core of Finnish political culture, however, did not always become clear outside the country. Minister Max Jakobson wrote that US Secretary of State Dean Rusk joined only with great difficulties the other bathers, when he visited Finland in 1966.¹⁰³

Although the sauna has become a concept in Finnish political culture, it has raised also criticism against politics and politicians. Sitting in the heat and intriguing outside the session hall was not considered work in the proper sense. Like hunting and other unofficial networks in the socialist countries, the sauna frequently ousted women from ultimate decision process. The sauna united but evidently created inner circles and other obscure cliques, who could agree the political agenda in advance.

In other words, the sauna is a peculiarity in Finnish political culture. Also sport was considered particularly important, and Kekkonen himself posed as a vital sportsman. Not only in sport but in many other ways Finland's personality cult reached startling dimensions, when we compare it to Kádár's Hungary, in which the cult of historical Great Men was striking even during the communist rule.

12 Travelling Politics

When Archie Brown explored political culture, he paid attention also to tourism and workers travelling abroad for employment. Both lead people to compare living conditions in differ-

ent countries. Moreover, travelling is a structural phenomenon to influence on the change of political culture: between 1950 and 1990 international passenger traffic grew 18 times. The semi-official trips between particular friendship cities are important, too. The idea of friendship towns resulted in the Finnish-Hungarian case in the first agreement between Lahti and Pécs in 1956, followed by many other contacts.

In Finland the high amount of visits Kekkonen made to the Soviet Union is striking. In fact Kekkonen visited Soviet Union annually after 1958, representing Finland either in state visits or combining unofficial discussions to his holidays. Partly this was due to his task to create personal contacts to Soviet leaders, partly as a consequence of the night frost crises in 1958. The number of official and unofficial visits reached already 30 in 1977. The Eastern 'orientation' strengthened even, when Kekkonen visited first GDR in 1977 and then FRG two years later.¹⁰⁴

In Britain and in the USA Finland's foreign policy was understood better after Kekkonen's first visits in 1961. Kekkonen was also the first West-European leader to travel to Hungary in the 1960s. Kekkonen arrived unofficially only a few months after the general amnesty in 1963, and before UN General Secretary U Thant's visit. When Kekkonen arrived for the second time in 1969, the status of the visit was raised to a state level at a time, when *détente* was a general slogan of the date. Mutual dialogue continued at the highest level in Finland four years later and again in Budapest in 1976. In the 1980s Koivisto visited Hungary twice, during his first year in office 1982 and later in 1988, whilst Kádár returned the call in 1983.

Kekkonen's visits were highly valued in Hungary. In 1976, according to *Magyarország*, his name had become a concept. On the contrary, a report of Koivisto's first visit was surprisingly lacking in the magazine. The question was not of any disagreement. According to Kádár a year later, Koivisto and Kádár did not need many words to understand each other. After Kekkonen, Koivisto seemed to remain somehow more distant and 'abstruse' also for Hungarians, for example, in an interview of *Magyarország* in 1986.¹⁰⁵

When Kádár met the Finnish Ambassador Jyrkänkallio in 1973 he told he regretted that he was not one of the most diligent travellers.¹⁰⁶ If this was the proper reason, Kádár made an effort in the subsequent years: Austria 1976, Italy, West Germany and Yugoslavia in 1977 and France a year later. To Britain he travelled for the first time in autumn 1985 as a return visit Thatcher's visit. The new Prime Minister of 1987, Károly Grósz was in 1988 the first Prime Minister to negotiate with the British PM. The new party leader Grósz visited United States also in the summer of 1988. In the Soviet Union and particularly at the receptions of the anniversaries of the Great Socialist October Revolution Kádár was present alongside other communist leaders.

In addition to their Presidents, Finnish politicians loved to travel, particularly to Hungary. *Suomen Kuvalehti* noticed the popularity of Budapest already in the beginning of 1975. After Moscow Budapest had become the second most visited city by Finnish ministers in the mid-1980s. Between 1983 and 1986 official visits were directed to Hungary more often than to Washington. Budapest was four times more popular than Bonn and surpassed three times East Berlin.¹⁰⁷

In addition to this 'Eastern deviation' there has been some popular disapproval of this whole 'privilege' of travels the politicians had. Beside Risto Ryti the President who had no statue in the capital and therefore was not particularly famous but instead remembered of his travels as 'Reissu-Lassi', the Traveller, President Lauri Relander. However, travelling belongs to the duties of politicians but evidently both countries also 'rewarded' their representatives in terms of trips. Therefore we cannot underestimate the question of who was able to travel and was invited. The argument whether a politician had an official invitation to Moscow was repeated in the 1981 presidential campaign. The official delegation of the NCP did not receive invitation to the Soviet Union until 1988.¹⁰⁸

In Hungary, it became possible to travel to the 'East' without visa in the 1960s. Travellers needed a so-called red passport, whilst a blue passport entitled a journey to the 'West'. One tourist trip was possible in three years, for seeing relatives the limit was two years.

Organised tourism, i.e. by the tourist agencies was not included to these limits. Since 1982, Hungarians could do travel abroad once a year, but hard currency was guaranteed only every three years. New passport without any restrictions was introduced in 1987.¹⁰⁹

Despite these restrictions, tourism was an important topic in Hungary. For example, *Magyarország* published annually advertisements of the state owned tourist company, which reached their peak in the end of the 1970s. On the first three-quarters of 1964, 1,077,909 Hungarians had travelled abroad, although a small minority, 56,143, to non-socialist countries. Organised tourism had, however, quite different rates: 120,000 already in 1963. In 1975 five days in Krakow cost 1950 forints and two weeks in Kiev-Riga-Tallinn-Moscow 6,900ft – compared to monthly salary of 3,100 forints of a salaried staff.¹¹⁰

On the other hand we should not forget those, who travel *into* the country. For example in January-August 1973, around 5.1 million tourists visited Hungary. Two years later Finns dominated mutual rates more than nine times: 2,500 Hungarians visited Finland whilst 23,000 Finns travelled to Hungary. When visa between both countries was abolished in 1970, for Hungarians Finland was 'the only one from the so-called Western countries without a visa' at the time. In 1978 compulsory currency exchange was cancelled, and Austria became a visa-free country the following year.¹¹¹

No doubt, holidays abroad and possibilities to increase political knowledge by travelling were luxury in both countries. In an international comparison from 1967, Finland did not belong to the top 12 countries (10 European, USA and Canada) from where the 103.9 million out of the total 139.1 million tourists originated. In the 1970s economic growth brought with it upstarts as well, for example, Kalevi Keihänen, a bohemian businessman, who started his own charters to 'the South'. According to current Finnish Tourist Office, travelling abroad was considered either a status symbol or a fashion at the time. Towards the 1980s the status slowly vanished and mass tourism topped in around two million.¹¹²

Soviet Union was the most popular country to travel from Hungary in the beginning of the 1980s. Finns, with 15 per cent, formed the biggest group arriving from capitalist countries –

every fourth trip from Finland was directed there during those years. Some of the visitors became politically even more critical towards the Soviet Union, whilst the others explained shortcomings as labour pains, and the rest did not care. After 1945, Finnish official political culture did not use the pejorative word '*ryssä*' (ruskie) but travelling warmed these memories up. Also a special concept, *vodkaturismi*, vodka tourism, emerged in Finnish political vocabulary. For example, in 1969 44,000 Finns visited Soviet Union, among them 700, one and a half per cent, who caused some disorder during their travel.¹¹³

Finally, traveling was part of 'the youngster question' i.e. related to the post-1945 generation. In Hungary the number of these travellers doubled to 180,000 between 1967 and 1972. When inter-rail train ticket was established in 1972, also GDR, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia participated in the agreement. In 1973 international discount ticket was sold also in Hungary: Rail Europe Junior gave discount in 11 eleven European countries.¹¹⁴

So, Kádár-Kekkonen era has been significant in travelling and mass tourism. Unfortunately, no information was found how travelling was connected to travellers' or their parent's political and economical status. Still we can suppose that tourism, cheaper travelling possibilities and student exchange programmes helped to open political views or even the systems and political cultures as well. In the Finnish case we must bear in mind that new methods in education started to stress more international views in the 1980s. Internationalism in education (*kansainvälisyyskasvatus*) was still a quite controversial idea in the 1970s. In Hungary there is some evidence that travelling encouraged *samizdat* literature. Finally some 'voted with their feet' and did not come back from abroad. For example, in 1986 3,295 Hungarians did not return – which was under 0.5 per cent out of 708,000 who travelled.¹¹⁵

13 Finns and Finland in Hungarian Eyes and Vice Versa

When Kekkonen described Finnish foreign policy in Kremlin in 1958, he used an expression of 'national character'. According to Kekkonen foreign policy was in congruence with some essential features of Finnish national character: it reflected seriousness,

peaceful, moderate and realistic approach to political matters. Many, many years later a Hollywood script writer of Hungarian origin, Joe Esterhas described his ex-countrymen's character of being aggressive and passionate bordering self-destructive. Moreover, they judge their opinions too hastily, are narrow-minded and even anti-semitist and racist.¹¹⁶

We may consider both statements extreme, and, in the latter case coloured by the bitterness of an emigrant. Nevertheless, in Finnish literature there are metaphors of a quiet, little slow but pig-headed figures like Runeberg's Sven Dufva or Topelius's servant Matti, who was not a beautiful man contrary to Topelius's image of brave and high-minded Hungarians. On the other hand, as Elek Fényes has pointed out, temperament, haughtiness combined to friendliness and hospitality characterised Hungarians of the same era in the 19th Century. Even if these are rough generalisations and stereotypes, they express something about preconditions and circumstances, in which people live. In political culture they reveal also attitudes and prejudices of the rhetorician itself and how people relate themselves and their history to other cultures.¹¹⁷

For example, a Hungarian journalist wrote in 1971 that according to a Hungarian popular belief Finns belong to world's calmest (*leghiggadtabb*) peoples and travelling to Finland confirms it. The writer wondered particularly the nature of 'the silently functioning parliament', in which they dealt with social and domestic problems without particular emotions.¹¹⁸ Therefore, finally, we study how Finns and Hungarians saw each other, and their political cultures, in *Magyarország* and *Suomen Kuvalehti* respectively. It seems possible that Mauno Koivisto's idea of keeping 'low profile' reveals something essential from Finland and her recent political culture. The low profile in a discussion made it possible to leave sharper stands in reserve for potential use. By contrast, the Hungarian way to debate seems to take a more 'provocative' profile.

In politics *Magyarország* considered Finland's constructive policy to be a stabilising element in Northern Europe representing peaceful coexistence between different political systems. The weekly also confirmed the essential idea of this article, i.e. how important the word

ulkopolitiikka, foreign policy, was in Finland. Rapid development of the country was considered as a good example of achievements of rational, peaceful and realistic politics. In 1978 they defined Paasikivi-Kekkonen line already as 'political realism based on historical lessons and the acknowledgement of the geographic situation.'¹¹⁹

Although the reports sometimes praised Finland, the whole picture is still much more realistic than idealistic. Crisis in the government was not considered extraordinary and the question of Presidency essential in Finnish political system. A Hungarian observer emphasized in 1973 that not even the French president had such a political power as his Finnish colleague. In 1977 Kekkonen had already become 'the symbol of the country's international position'. The picture of the Finlandia House, the venue of the 1975 European Summit in Helsinki, repeated in the stories, thus, symbolized the country itself. 'Finlandization' was explained positively, i.e. from the point of view of Finnish leadership and as a phenomenon, which was insulting Finns.¹²⁰

A critical point was found in tourism: for the Hungarian observer Finland's paradoxical attraction was based on the fact that it did not have any attraction at all. Moreover, prices in hotels and restaurants were high, 'beyond Hungarian pockets'. The writer concluded that Hungarians should carefully consider to which country to travel once in following three years. At the time, 1976, a week in Finland cost more than ten days in Vienna or London. Finns themselves were described positively: a tourist cannot feel any discrimination in spite of economic limits, as it is 'alien for Finnish mentality' (*lélektől idegen*). Finns were 'silent, modest people, who do not boast and brag.'¹²¹

However, we must bear in mind that *Magyarország* and *Suomen Kuvalehti* wrote to their domestic audiences in the first place – usually only a few times a year appeared an article concerning the other country. In some reports there were, naturally, simplifications – like the Finnish economy ruled by 20 families, Swedish People's Party representing big capital, etc. Maybe more serious was the article on Kekkonen's 70th birthday, when they tried to make him 'one of the most determined opponents of the war' referring to the Second World War. In spite of these defects the weekly concen-

trated on world politics dedicating usually one page for a country. More ideologically tainted language was used in the editorials, and particularly in the mid-1970s.¹²²

Advertisements in Hungary were considered such an extraordinary thing that they were worth a story in *Suomen Kuvalehti*. At the time, 1972–1973, the fate of the market mechanism was speculated in the weekly. When related to increasing mutual cultural connections, Hungary was, however, more or less absent in the magazine. The few articles between 1975 and 1979 dealt with the end of free abortion and the literature scandal (see Raija Oikari's article), Hungarian children, letters from Balaton and Budapest and its spas in 1979.¹²³ On the other hand, the first years of the 1980s seemed to be somehow more active. *Suomen Kuvalehti* noticed how Kádár had admitted that the country could not reach the aims of five-year plan, and the norms for the years 1981–1985 would be more moderate. Although Hungary would be loyal to her foreign political commitments, the country liked to decide its standard of living and culture itself. According to journalist Marketta Kopinski, intellectuals in neighbouring countries envy relatively broad freedom of speech.¹²⁴

Thus, economy was one of the most focused points in Hungary in the 1980s. Already in 1981 Finnish Broadcasting Company's reporters paid attention to Hungary '*Toisenlainen talous*' (Another kind of Economy). Two years later Hungary was already 'a surprise in the socialist camp', foodstuffs 'overflowed' in the market-hall. The 'old beauty' was 'almost like a Western city today'. The good image of Hungary further developed, and political commentator Knud Möller already could estimate in 1983 that Kádár would probably be chosen in free elections as well. A year later *Suomen Kuvalehti* noted first forint millionaires in a country without a feeling of 'the big brother' – even the general greyness of socialist environment had vanished.¹²⁵

On the other hand, particularly critical or 'hostile' articles were not published in *Suomen Kuvalehti* in the 1970s and 1980s. Journalists viewed Hungary in the frame of socialist countries – not in the context of Nordic countries or West Germany. In 1976, the anniversary of 1956 was present as well, when they interviewed István Nemeskürty, the later grey eminence of the Hun-

garian conservatism. At the time Nemeskürty had the view that Kádár was the most glorious statesman in Hungary in three hundred years. Nemeskürty stated that he did not belong to the party but was 'on the same side with Kádár [...] Kádár's chosen road was maybe not the best but it was the only one'. Ten years later non-conformist László Rajk had his turn in *Suomen Kuvalehti*. According to Rajk, Hungarians did not speak about their actions in 1956. None of Rajk's friends had mentioned whether their father had been a freedom fighter. For the non-conformist activist the reason was that they were still afraid.¹²⁶

In 1986 Hungary was the country which already 'tosses on the borders of Socialism'. A 'turbo era' had arrived in Socialism in the form of the first formula competition. Other new phenomena paid attention to were 'Hungarian Rambos', body building and punk rock. Later, in March 1988 the weekly foretold political crisis and how the trust in Kádár was eroding. A peaceful revolution was observed already in March 1989, by journalist Harri Saukkomaa, thus before the negotiations in the round table and the reburial of Imre Nagy. Finally, according to Saukkomaa, the MDF won the elections in 1990 by stressing national consciousness and history, compared to free democrats, who had favored more rational and European values.¹²⁷

14 Conclusion

In this piece of research I have studied political cultures in Finland and Hungary. Instead of a seeing political culture as a single unit, I have taken the concept as a methodological tool and a starting point to compare both societies. At the same time comparative aspect has been a great challenge simply because political culture could not be separated from culture in a wider sense.

Evidently the idea of progress and social justice were common tasks for unified political cultures in both countries. The idea of a dominant political culture in Kekkonen's Finland emphasized integration and avoided sharpening conflicts and dividing people. In Hungary, the old statehood, 'small liberties' combined with passive acceptance of the Kádárism characterised the system since the 1960s.

At structural level there are more differences than similarities between presidential democracy of Finland and Hungary's 'soft dictatorship'. Although Hungary showed signs of market mechanism, Kádár could still argue in the 1980s that 98 per cent of the means of production were in social ownership, which is a huge difference compared to a mixed economies. However, similar phenomena and problems existed at the level of politics, although the answers to current problems differed. Both lived in the shadow of the Soviet Union, had a common border with it and faced the political interference of the super power.

Communication between Finland and Hungary increased considerably since the late 1960s. However, it is striking that in *Magyarország* the special relationship was not given special attention. The Hungarian weekly concentrated on world politics and referred to the most important events, usually dedicating one page for one country. Sometimes Finland was considered 'friendly', however, not a brother country, a concept, which was reserved for communist ruled countries. Although some liturgy and rhetoric of friendship repeated in speeches of occasion, compared to Soviet friendship they were at much more equal level. Concepts like 'realism', 'national interest' and 'spirit of Helsinki' appeared beside 'kinship' to describe mutual relations.

Finland's personality cult reached startling dimensions, when compared to Kádár's Hungary. Although politics and political cultures became personified in both countries, Hungary at the time was lacking these outer signs of strong personal leadership. At a personal level Finnish and Hungarian leaders seemed to understand each other very well. Kekkonen commented in his diary already during his first visit that Kádár had made an impression of a really pleasant and reasonable man with a sense of humour and quiet irony.¹²⁸ When Kekkonen passed away, it was Kádár, who commemorated him at a request of a Finnish publisher in an article, which was published both in Finland and Hungary.¹²⁹

The relation to national history in political cultures is revealing in both countries. Finnish independence and 'statehood' were considered young, whilst Hungarians stress their long-

standing medieval traditions. Moreover, it seems evident that traditional historical thinking, in spite of communist indoctrination, remained stronger in Hungary than in Finland. We can find a difference in political cultures, which was confirmed in the comparative study of literature in the late 1980s. An experience of the presence of history was a part of being Hungarian, whilst committing oneself to history was surprisingly insignificant in Finland. However, national identity did not 'vanish' in Finland either but compared to earlier decades it was revisited during the Kekkonen era. Hungarians have been – and may still be – ready for more radical changes than Finns on the basis of their political cultures, subjective views of politics and history.

Finally, as Seppo Kääriäinen has noticed, 1987 ended the 'red-ochre' agrarian-industrial project, which he considered as the answer on the challenges of the Finnish 'second republic'.¹³⁰ The same year was essential also in Hungary, although the proper Rubicon was not yet crossed. In this sense Kekkonen's death in 1986 – he had resigned in 1981 – finally closed an epoch in Finland, whilst Kádár's burial less than three years later belonged already to a new era. Finally, Finland was the last 'most eastern country of the West' to become a member of the Council of Europe in 1989. Hungary, 'the most western country of the East', was the next to join a year later.

NOTES

- ¹ H. Lehtilä, *Mainettaan parempi: Valtioneuvos Harri Holkeri*. Helsinki: Otava 2001, 144; I. Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században*. Budapest: Osiris 2000, 528-532.
- ² S. Kääriäinen, *Sitä näyttää, mitä kylvää: Keskustan strategiset valinnat 1964-2001*. Helsinki: Gummerus 2002, 409-411.
- ³ J. Street, 'Review Article: Political Culture – from Civic Culture to Mass Culture'. *British Journal of Political Science* 24 (1993), 95; G. Almond, S. Verba, Sidney, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. New York: Princeton University Press 1963.
- ⁴ R. Lane, 'Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?' *Comparative Political Studies* Vol 25 No.3 (1992), 362; J. Simon, 'Definiálható-e a politikai kultúra?', in J. Simon (ed.), *Ezredvégi értelmezések: Demokráciáról, politikai kultúráról, bal és jobboldalról. Első kötet*. Budapest: Villányi úti könyvek 2001, 122-141.
- ⁵ Street, 'Review Article', 96, 101-102.
- ⁶ A. Brown, 'Introduction', in A. Brown, J. Gray (eds), *Political Culture & Political Change in Communist States*. London & Basingstoke: Macmillan 1979, 16-18.
- ⁷ H. Nyyssönen, 'Metsoja, peikkoja ja vampyyrejä: Poliittinen kulttuuri ja stereotypiat' in K. Palonen, S. Hänninen (eds), *Lue poliittisesti*. Jyväskylä: SoPhi 2004.
- ⁸ Brown, 'Introduction', 8.
- ⁹ *Magyarország* (Ma) 24, 1986.
- ¹⁰ *Népszabadság* (NSZ) 26 April 2003; Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században*, 470; Brown, 'Introduction', 4.
- ¹¹ Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században*, 514.
- ¹² M. Jakobson, *Veteen piirretty viiva: Havaintoja ja merkintöjä vuosilta 1953-1965*. Helsinki: Otava 1981, 186.
- ¹³ J. Suomi, *Umpeutuva latu: Urho Kekkonen 1976-1981*. Helsinki: Otava 2000, 92.
- ¹⁴ M. Mattila, T. Raunio, 'Vaalimenestys ja hallituksen muodostaminen Länsi-Euroopassa 1945-1999'. *Politiikka* 4 (2002), 304.
- ¹⁵ R. Salloch 22 November 1966. A Szabad Európa Rádió Archívumának Magyar Gyűjteménye. Background Report WCM Europe Finland 1963-88.
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In Kekkonen and Kádár We Trust

Juha POHJONEN

1 The Years of Evil

In Hungary there are two political lines: the first one is trying to get out of the war and eager to get into the Anglo-American sphere and the other one is willing to fight with Germans because Hungary's destiny will anyway be bad when Germany loses the war.¹

This is one of the last messages Finnish authorities got from Budapest in April, 1944, before the Allied forces started bombing it. In these bombings the residence of the Legation of Finland was also destroyed and the last official information channel from Hungary to Finland silenced although the last Finnish diplomats left the country as late as in October. Diplomatic relationships had already been cut off in September due to the regulations of the peace treaty Finland had concluded with the Soviet Union on September 17th 1944.² By this time Hungary fell under the Red Flag. Finland was still waiting for her destiny.

Politically and militarily Finland and Hungary were in a somewhat similar situation in spring 1944. Both countries had German troops on their soil and both were under the threat of becoming occupied by the Red Army. During the year 1944 the Finns succeeded in preventing the Russian troops from entering Finland, but according to the peace treaty, Russians leased the naval base of Porkkala near Helsinki and occupied it. The Hungarians were forced to accept Red Army occupation. If we seek any similarities between post-war Hungary and Finland, one of them was the Allied Control Commission. In Hungary it was led by

Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and in Finland the authority was exercised by General Andrei Zhdanov, both high in the Soviet Union's *nomenklatura*. However, politically the differences were striking. During the era 1945–1948 Finland succeeded in securing her political position both internally and also partly in foreign politics but Hungary glided rapidly towards communist dictatorship.

The Finns did not know what was going on in Hungary right after the War. The reasons were obvious. First, there was the armistice agreement with the Russians which dictated that Finland break off official relations with Hungary. Finland lost its only reliable source of information from Hungary. Second, Finland had enough domestic problems of her own and there was not much time or capacity to follow what was going on in Hungary. The Allied Control Commission – run determinedly by Russians – was the actual authority in Finland. Domestic policy was in turmoil. Communists gained power and there were serious doubts whether Finland would remain an independent country or not. In these circumstances the problems in the eastern part of Central Europe were not so very interesting in Finland. Nevertheless, the free press mentioned pieces of news which told the depressing fact. At the same time when Finland was struggling for her independence, Hungary was losing it.³

The years 1945–1949 are crucial when we start to evaluate two different processes of the two small countries. In Finland a unique political development was started but Hungary became one of the Eastern European communist states, one of the Soviet Union's European satellites.

Finland and Hungary did not have any official relations during the years 1945–1949.⁴ The Finnish press was concerned about what was going on in Eastern Europe in general but it did not worry so much about the destiny of Hungary, because the looming fear in Finland was all the time the same. If the Russians were bold enough to act in the way they did in the Central Europe, what would happen to Finland? This was the point and the mood, which can be sensed in President Paasikivi's diary in which he quotes Anthony Eden's speech in the British Parliament printed in *The Times* 20 June 1947:⁵

Where was the next move to be? Would it be in Finland, hitherto comparatively free from external pressure? There have already been rumors of threats [of Russians] against the right-wing Agrarians and to a lesser degree against the Social Democrats.

Paasikivi himself was more confident about Finland's future when he met a representative of *Agence France-Press*, Maurice Chourot in November 1947. The President pointed out that Finland is in a totally different situation compared to Hungary and other central Eastern European Countries. The range of difference was wide, it was philosophical and intellectual. Paasikivi emphasized that in his opinion Finland would never become occupied by the Red Army.⁶ He based his political thinking on the long experience of dealings with the Russians and thought that the geopolitical position of Finland was not a reason why Russians would occupy Finland. Later studies have proved his view correct. Russians hoped that Finland would eventually become a communist country, but only if the Finnish communists themselves could accomplish it. However, they failed.⁷ In the heart of Europe the situation was quite different. Hungary among other small countries of the Eastern part of Europe was in trouble.

Hungary made an unofficial request to Paasikivi in November 1946, asking to re-establish diplomatic relations because Finland's political position was better than theirs. The President was not interested in the idea. Hungary and Finland were waiting for the Peace Conference to be held in Paris and before that it was practically impossible even to think about restoring official relations. The request can be seen as a desperate gesture to gain more appreciation from the West. It was only after the Peace Treaty that relations could be re-established on the 20th of May 1947.⁸ By that time Hungary was already under the harsh leadership of Mátyás Rákosi.⁹

It is worthwhile studying the attitude of the Rákosi regime towards Finland especially in the late 1940s and particularly how Hungary reacted to Paasikivi's re-election in February, 1950, and to the Finnish survival story. It was obvious that the Hungarian post-war political society would be different compared to the one in Finland. How to explain this to the Hungarians? One may assume that Paasikivi was a respected

figure in Hungary, not because of his non-socialist political background but because he was known to be a peace-maker and a man who was evidently respected by the Russians. Surprisingly the attitude was completely the opposite. The Finnish *chargé d' affaires*, Uno Koistinen, who arrived in Hungary in February 1950, seems to have been extremely surprised by the writings he read in the Hungarian newspapers. Actually he was so astonished that he wrote his first report from Hungary as a secret one and not in the series of the normal confidential reports from Budapest.¹⁰

Koistinen was very annoyed by the way the Hungarian Press wrote about Paasikivi. Basically, Paasikivi should have been a good choice but that was not the opinion of the Hungarian press. For example, *Szabad Nép* wrote: 'The Finns have chosen a President for the next six years. He is J. K. Paasikivi who represents the reactionary powers and the capitalists'. The paper also mentions the names of two other candidates, supposedly more suitable ones; they were Finnish People's Democratic League's (FPDL) Mauno Pekkala and Urho Kekkonen (Agrarian Party). Another newspaper, *Világosság*, was even cruder. It told to its readers that Paasikivi was a butcher of the Finnish working class; it was he who was responsible for killing 40,000 workers and for torturing 84,000 more in internment camps.¹¹ *Világosság* referred with these false accusations to the losses of Reds during the Finnish Civil War of 1918 in which Paasikivi played an insignificant role.

Why did the official Hungary see Paasikivi as an advocate of evil capitalism and 'reactionary' forces. Did Rákosi's regime collect political points from the Soviet Union? This cannot be the reason. Even though Paasikivi was a capitalist he was after all a realist. To Paasikivi the foundation of foreign policy was the fact that the Soviet Union was Finland's neighbour, had won the war, and the only way Finland could survive as an independent state was to achieve good and mutually reliable relations with the new superpower. The Russians appreciated this and a man such as Paasikivi.¹² A more likely explanation is that the official, ultra-communist ideology hated everything that came from the West.

This could be coupled with the bitterness Paasikivi had caused in resisting the Russians and the Finnish communists in particular. The most obvious reason, however, was the Soviet attitude towards Paasikivi; the Russians did not want Paasikivi to be re-elected.¹³ To summarize the situation: Finland did not follow the Hungarian road to Communism and it was easy to put the blame on the President. The communists had started to persecute various enemies from 'old' social democrats to freemasons and the church. Hungary had turned inwards; the world outside was either an enemy or a friend. Paasikivi was a capitalist enemy.

In view of this background the meeting of the first post-war Finnish diplomat in Budapest with the representatives of the Hungarian government in February 1950 must have been filled with expectation. At first Koistinen met Foreign Minister Gyula Kállai in an uninformative meeting, filled with protocol, and a few days later he met the President of the Council of Ministers, István Dobi. Discussions with him were longer and the atmosphere was good but it was clear that Dobi had very little political power. Later on Koistinen met quite a few minor civil servants and the discussions were polite but lacked substance. Politicians did not talk politics, and nobody seemed to be really interested in Finland with only one exception. The Minister of Finance, István Kossá, had visited Finland in the previous year as a guest at the congress of the Finnish Communist Party and he was very excited. Koistinen never met Ernő Gerő, Zoltán Vas or Mátyás Rákosi.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the arrival of the new *chargé d' affaires* made a new start in the relations, and the Finnish government started to get updated information from Hungary for the first time in six years.

Although the political development in the countries was different, both Hungary and Finland aimed at stabilizing the political atmosphere although the methods were totally different. Finland had secured her political credibility in the eyes of the western world in the general election of 1945. The election was free and also the communists participated in it. After the wars Finland had three majority governments, the first two lead by Paasikivi and the third one led the by a left-wing socialist, Mauno

Pekkala. There were rumours and fears concerning the aims of Finnish communists but the truth was that they lacked both power and the Soviet support in order to attain a coup. Finland remained a democratic country. In Finland it was the people who chose their representatives, not the Russians while in Hungary Rákosi and his comrades stabilized the communist *regimé* with the Soviet support and Hungary became a loyal member of the Eastern bloc. Consequently, in the beginning of the 1950s both countries, different though they were, were politically stable, Finland as a Soviet-oriented democratic country and Hungary as a communist country controlled by the Russians.¹⁵

For the Finns the attitude the Hungarian press had towards Paasikivi as a person did not cause any depression. Hungary was so negligible a country that it was insignificant what the Hungarian press wrote. If the Finns had read the same kind of evaluations in *Pravda*, as they did for a moment, the situation would have been different but not serious.

The next step in Hungarian plans to re-establish relations with Finland was to launch the Finnish-Hungarian Society (FHS) in October 1950. The initiative came from Ferenc Münnich, the Ambassador of Hungary in Finland. His idea was to create a society whose members would feel kinship towards Hungary. A correct attitude of the members of the society was the main point. The society should be led by well-known leftist politicians and the members could be from working-class as well as from academic circles.¹⁶ Now the scene had been set; Finland had a *charge d' affaires* in Budapest and Hungary had her representative in Helsinki. The society enabled the communication between countries, both at the official and partly at the unofficial level. The state of the Finnish-Hungarian relationship was as good as it could be in those circumstances.

2 Koistinen as an Observer

Uno Koistinen was possibly the best man to reopen relations with Hungary. He did not speak Hungarian but he spoke Russian fluently. The only thinkable disadvantage was his age, Koistinen

was already 62 years old. He was a career diplomat who had served in Tallinn, Moscow, St. Petersburg and at home.¹⁷

When Koistinen arrived in Budapest in February 1950 Rákosi had recently secured his position and Hungary was transforming rapidly and violently into a totalitarian society. For example, the clergy was under heavy pressure, legal proceedings based on political accusations were part of everyday life and nobody knew who would be the next one to face a random arrest by the feared security police, *ÁVH*. Did the Finns get to know about these measures?

In October 1950 Koistinen wrote a splendidly informative report. In his opinion, Hungary had achieved a remarkable status as a leading communist country among the satellites of the Soviet Union. Rákosi was definitely the leading politician with Moscow's absolute and unchanged support. The former President, Árpád Szakasits, disappeared, Prime Minister István Dobi had lost his post and hard-line stalinists were in power. The most important men behind Rákosi were the Minister of Defence, Mihály Farkas and Minister of Economics Ernő Gerő. Koistinen noticed also the basic problem Hungary had to face. Koistinen considered that the country's economy was in shambles. Agriculture was neglected because of huge investments which were concentrated on heavy industry. The countryside was lacking a labour force, the harvest was poorly organized and Hungary had serious problems with the food-supply. Koistinen also marked the huge impact the Russians had. They were everywhere: in ministries, universities, hospitals and even in ordinary farming jobs. And there was also the question of language: Russian was compulsory in every school.¹⁸

Koistinen's report of October 1950 was the most informative one written before his sudden death in January 1951. It contained all the basic elements of Hungary's situation after the communists had taken power. Its conclusion was: Hungary had become a satellite of the Soviet Union.

Koistinen did not mention the kinship between the Finns and the Hungarians that was so very strongly emphasized before the Second World War. Neither the Hungarians nor the Finns used it

as an instrument to deepen relations. No one in Hungary pointed it out, but it was only natural that they denied the old rhetoric. Communists wanted to secure their political position both internally and externally and operate in general in the way the Russians told them to. The Finnish diplomats did not cherish the kinship either but the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki, working very hard to get more members into the FHS, emphasized the importance of the kinship in a very strange way. Anybody could not become a member, and the Embassy tried to use the theme of kinship as a bluff to keep the Finns interested in matters of Hungary. The problem was the huge difference between the Hungary of the 1930s and the Hungary of the 1950s. Many Finns turned down the request to join the Society because Hungary had become a communist country. The Society had a suitable chairman, a genuine socialist, Ele Alenius, but that was not enough. Alenius lacked the charisma and authority to make the Society 'presentable at the court'.¹⁹ The FHS did not grow in the same way as the Finland Soviet Union Society did, for example. The main idea of policy-making of the FHS had to be changed.

Hungarians returned to the basics. The good old kinship-romance was reinstated. The FHS started to distribute Hungarian films, books and other materials, it arranged a range of discussions and even special meetings for kids. Folk art was a natural choice and one of the exhibitions was opened by a well-known cultural personality, Prime Minister Kekkonen's wife, Sylvi Kekkonen. By the year 1953 the society had stabilized its main function to organize cultural activities. It was planned that Finns should be told about the new Hungarian mentality, movies, folk art, ethnography, literature and music. In addition, Finns got information about the new five-year plans, and about the new politics of Hungary in general. One could say that the FHS changed drastically in a few years and became a very effective channel of distinctive propaganda. In this sense it was a success. By the beginning of the year 1952 the number of the members of the FHS had increased to 839. Hungarians categorized them according to their ideological scales: 433 were workers, 195 intellectuals, 136 petty-bourgeois and 75 students.²⁰

These figures seem impressive but the truth was that the FHS remained marginal without real political importance.

Evidently the year 1952 meant a breakthrough in Finnish-Hungarian relations. Finland and Finnish politicians were becoming familiar to the Hungarians. Or, at least one politician, Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen. Why was that? The political system in Hungary – as in every communist county – concentrated on emphasizing one personality at a time. In Finland that could not be Paasikivi but Kekkonen who was neither a communist nor a socialist, he was an Agrarian and a prominent new figure in Finnish political life. The main reason for his success was Kekkonen's new political line which suited the Hungarians. Kekkonen's way of thinking was a mixture of modern political realism and patriotism. Furthermore, he was appreciated by the Russians. The statement Kekkonen made in the newspaper *Maakansa* in January, 1952 about peaceful co-existence was widely quoted in the Hungarian Press and it was regarded as a very important opening in constructing a peaceful *status quo* in Europe. In April 1952 Kekkonen was featured again; this time it was because of the speech he gave on the 4th anniversary of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with Russians in Helsinki. Kekkonen emphasized the advantages the agreement had given to Finland and pointed out that it was clear evidence of how two countries with different political systems and sizes could live in peace and could both gain politically and economically from it.²¹

It is obvious that Hungary's leaders saw that the man of the future in Finland was Kekkonen. Everybody understood that Paasikivi who was in his eighties was too old to continue as President after 1956. The most prominent candidate was Kekkonen. Others would not do; a member of the National Coalition Party (NCP) would be a capitalist and social democrats (SDP) were regarded as anti-Soviet. The SDP was considered ideologically reactionary since the Soviets regarded Väinö Tanner, who had led Finnish workers to the war against the Soviet Union, a war criminal. Only the communists were

left but their support among the voters was too weak. The only choice was Kekkonen.

It is noteworthy that during the period 1950–1952 Finnish-Hungarian relations were very formal and lacked discussion about the kinship of the two nations. Hungarians were so concentrated on their domestic policy that it looks like they had no room for manoeuvring in the field of foreign policy. Hungary did not have its own foreign policy in the Rákosi era. Rákosi himself represented the Kremlin, not Hungary, and the relations with the other socialist countries and especially with the Soviet Union were paramount. The West was imperialist and among capitalist countries there was only one country that could be considered slightly different. It was Finland. Not only were Kekkonen and his speeches noticed, but also the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952 made Finland known in Hungary. At the time, the FHS used kinship as a tool to create a positive image of Hungary in Finland, but in Hungary this rhetoric was not popular at all.²² The situation was rather irrational during the 1950s before Rákosi fell: in Hungary nobody talked about kinship but in Finland the Hungarians dedicated their efforts to promoting it.

3 The New Beginning

The successor of Koistinen, Lauri Hjelt, in Budapest since May 1951, reported to Helsinki at the end of December 1953 about rather radical changes in Finnish-Hungarian relations. The Finnish Embassy in Hungary had been engaged in prolonged negotiations with the Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry concerning the visit of Hungarian journalists to Finland and reciprocally about their Finnish colleagues' trip to Hungary. Nothing seemed to happen, but suddenly in April 1953 everything was clear. The Hungarians visited in Finland and at the end of the same year the Finns paid a return visit to Hungary. It was a modest but important beginning; the countries opened mutual communicative relations. Even more surprising was the interest Hungarians suddenly showed in the idea of kinship between the Finns and the Hungarians at the highest political level. Hjelt was flabbergasted by this development. And what was

more: Finland and Hungary started to expand their very modest commercial relations with each other. Finland had proposed a tripartite trade agreement with Hungary and the Soviet Union and there were no problems in the negotiations.²³

Why did Hungary start to open? The simple reason was that the first five-year plan (1950–1954) had led Hungary into an economic crisis. The stalinist model of industrialization saddled Hungary with an autarchic industry, which functioned at high cost and at the same time weakened the existing industrial structure. The result was that the standard of living decreased significantly, below the level reached before the five-year plan.²⁴ People were still randomly arrested, the secret police was an instrument of terror, intellectuals and clergy were under surveillance and party control. In the countryside the situation was even worse. The soil of Hungary was very fertile and in normal circumstances it had been able to provide plenty of foodstuffs. After brutal collectivisation, the level of production collapsed, the peasantry fell into apathy and suffered famine.²⁵

From the Finnish point of view the changes in Hungary were drastic. After Stalin's death a short relaxed period ensued but already in June, 1953, Hjelt reported new arrests; people who had been waiting for general amnesty, were disappointed. Actually, the system of justice was tightened by replacing about 250 judges by new ones who all had a working-class or peasant background.²⁶

Hjelt's conclusions from the period following Stalin's death were far too optimistic. Although the political situation in Hungary had not changed much, the attitude towards Finns and the atmosphere in general was quite different. Hjelt observed the rise of political activity and heard of open criticism of the government's policy – at least in Budapest. Also propaganda and the line of the communist party had become slightly more moderate, visible in minor events. One of these was Christmas, which the Hungarians were allowed to celebrate for the first time since Rákosi came to the power. A most surprising phenomenon for Hjelt was the rebirth of the old kinship theme. He noticed that even high rank politicians started to stress the importance of the

common ancient history of Finland and Hungary. This was the very first time Hjelt heard about it.²⁷

Obviously the Hungarians re-evaluated their attitude towards Finland. Because Hungary was both politically and economically isolated something had to be done, although the basic political line could not be changed. Hungary was to remain a communist country but it could establish closer relations with Finland under the banner of 'kinship'. Common roots and linguistic kinship served the purpose well. Kekkonen's foreign political opening of the years 1952 and 1953, Hungary's economic crisis and Stalin's death, which shook the world, all helped to accomplish this.

4 The Turbulent Years

Great changes followed the death of Stalin. Stalin's best pupil, Rákosi had to confess his mistakes and to step down. Imre Nagy, who had advocated a reform programme, became the Prime Minister.²⁸ His almost two year period in power yielded many corrections of economic, social and cultural policy. More investments were allocated to agriculture and housing at the expense of heavy industry. A slackening of oppression brought relief to the general mood of the population. Rákosi and his supporters did their best to bar Nagy's reformist policy.

During the change, diplomatic circles of Budapest were filled with rumours. Everybody was waiting with great interest what would happen. It was widely known that Rákosi and Farkas had been in Moscow. Some informants mentioned that Voroshilov had visited Budapest. Hjelt could tell Helsinki in July 1953 that most of the former ministers had lost their posts. But this was not the real news; more significant was the analysis Hjelt made right after the official announcement of Stalin's death. He was sure that the change of government would make a deeper impact on Hungarian society than was generally expected. The end of Hjelt's report was far-sighted.²⁹

A significant change has occurred in Hungarian politics. It can be detected from the inauguration speech of the new Prime Minister.

What was Nagy's message to the Hungarians? It can be said that his visions were critical. First, there was the five-year plan, which was deemed to be a mistake, one of the many Rákosi had made. It was time to slow down industrialization, give up the idea of being self-sufficient and to focus on the existing resources of the Hungarian economy and on lighter industry. Nagy stressed the importance of peasants and intellectuals and he was ready to bring back law and order: no more illegal arrests, no more proceedings based on false accusations and no more internment camps. It seemed as if Hungary was waking up from a bad dream. There remained the question, what was the difference between a promise and real life? Nobody knew it, Hjeltn himself was hopeful but suspicious. He took Nagy's speech as an indication of the new political spirit of the Kremlin, not an idea that emerged from the hearts of the Hungarian people.³⁰

The dry comments Hjeltn made continued at the beginning of the year 1954. The economic situation of Hungary was a mystery to him. During the session of Parliament Hjeltn heard quite a different economic analysis than he had heard from various unofficial sources. The director of the Board of Planning, Béla Szalai's figures were contradictory with the ones Nagy had made public. Hjeltn was abashed as to whether the situation was getting better or worse or from bad to even more depressing. His conclusion was that Hungary's national economy was in a deadlock and the easing of terror had made the situation worse.³¹ During the spring 1954 his reports became even more alarming. When the government decided to reduce the investments to heavy industry and at the same time the army and security police were cut the result was that a new problem appeared in Hungary, unemployment. The government did try to move unemployed people to the countryside but also this caused trouble. During the Rákosi era the peasants were forced to work at new industrial sites. Now they had to go back to the countryside which in many cases they did not want to do. This caused upheaval because people were no longer afraid of the security police. Nagy did not want to force the

people into the agricultural sector. He tried to repair the mistakes made in the late 1940s and early 1950s but he simultaneously created more problems. These were Hjelt's quite accurate conclusions, and he was almost gleeful in pointing out that indeed there could be unemployment in a communist country.³²

The year 1955 was not the easiest one for a foreign diplomat to estimate what was going on in Hungary. The essential point was the question of leadership. Who was the most powerful man in Hungary? Hjelt did not know. Sometimes it looked like Nagy had secured his position, sometimes it was Rákosi who made very powerful statements and for a while the most prominent politician seemed to be Gerő. The one and only specific conclusion Hjelt made was about the difference with the period of Nagy to the one of Rákosi: 'If the old regime could have had possibilities to continue, the situation would have been much worse both to the government and to the communist party.'³³

At the beginning of the year 1955 Hjelt was quite confused. The basic combination of political power in Hungary appeared to be impenetrable. This impression was issued from the speeches given in Debrecen during a celebratory meeting of the Parliament. On the spot there were all the top politicians: the Chairman of Parliament, Sándor Rónai, Chairman of the Speakers' Council, István Dobi, and Nagy and Rákosi. Nagy spoke enigmatically emphasizing the importance of the role of workers and peasants but he neither referred to the middle-class or intellectuals nor mentioned the economic mistakes. Rónai was on the same line and Dobi said nothing new by praising the kolkhoz-system. Rákosi instead was back on his feet with a powerful harangue in which he stressed three issues: the importance of the heavy industry, the significance of the Party as the leading political power and the importance of the security of the nation – or as Hjelt understood it, strengthening of the secret police. Rákosi spoke as if nothing had happened after the year 1952. To Hjelt this was very hard to understand:

was Hungary looking backward or forward?³⁴ The internal policy of Hungary remained a mystery to an external observer.

What could have been the reason for the different opinions of the leaders of Hungary? The most obvious must have been the definition of policy Moscow had made. By the year 1955 it was clear that the strong man in the Soviet Union was Nikita Khrushchev who had not only initiated the *détente* in Europe but also machinated the Warsaw Pact in April 1955.³⁵ There were two contradictory elements in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. By stressing the importance of better relations with the West, Khrushchev also forced the Hungarians to re-evaluate their policies towards moderation but because of the Warsaw Pact and re-armament of West-Germany, military and political tension had increased in Central Europe. This meant that Hungary did not have too much moving space in the political sense. The result was an unfathomable mishmash of political rhetoric. The West was still the main enemy but what kind of enemy? It looks like Rákosi's line of tight internal and external policy might have been winning, even though there was still a possibility of more fruitful *détente*. Hungary's decision was to sit on two chairs. Rákosi kept a hard line and Nagy was the more conciliatory man.

The economic decisions and re-evaluations made after the year 1952 had not improved Hungary's economic situation. If *détente* would continue there could be possibilities to increase trade with the West, but if the Cold War was to continue it would inevitably mean that Hungary's economy was tied solely with the economy of the Soviet Union.

The year 1955 was to show the direction. In January both Nagy and Rákosi attended the meeting of the Soviet Presidium in Moscow. There the definition of policy had changed. The man who was criticized was not Rákosi but Nagy who was considered to be guilty of 'rightist deviation'.³⁶ This accusation must have been very hard for Nagy to accept. What he had been trying to do was to reorganize the Hungarian economy after the devastating years of the Rákosi regime 1949–1952. There was not a hint of rightist deviation or slipping away from the road towards

Socialism. Nagy was seeking some alternatives to Hungary's economic structure and had tried to expand trade with foreign countries. This automatically predicated a slightly more open attitude towards the Western countries.

Presumably accusations levelled against Nagy in Moscow were the cause of Nagy's mild heart attack in February 1955. The field was now free for Rákosi's comeback. The Central Committee of the HWP (The Hungarian Workers' Party) decided on the 18th of April to dismiss Nagy from all his offices.³⁷ By the end of the spring 1955 Nagy was politically a *persona non grata*. For Hjelt Nagy's illness was naturally big news. The diplomatic circles were uncertain whether Nagy really was ill or suffered from a 'political disease' called *morbus Malenkovenssis*, but soon they found out that the news about Nagy was correct. In his first report on the Politburo's meeting in April Hjelt made a correct estimate: It was only a question of time when Nagy was to retire. Understandably Hjelt could not have any specific information about what was going on behind the scenes but when the retirement was announced on the 18th of April he was not surprised but wrote: 'The dismissal of Nagy was an awaited fact' More to the point were the estimates Hjelt made about the reasons for the overthrow. In his view, the most important reason was his behaviour which showed humility, self-criticism and apology – Nagy did not act by the established rules of the communist movement. Self-flagellation was a virtue in those circumstances. The other reason why Nagy had to go was linked to his personality. Hjelt supposed that Nagy was too democratic a person and because of that trait he also had some support among the members of the HWP, i.e. a respectable rival.³⁸ Actually Hjelt did not see any drama in the events that occurred during the spring 1955. It was just another episode of the communists' political game.

The annual publication of the budget was an occasion Hjelt was always interested in. Even the astronomical figures could not hide the fact that Hungary's economy was in tatters. Hungary did not have enough capacity to maintain the prevailing standard of living. There was no economic boom in sight and the government

did not have means to solve the problem. The Parliament had only one option to save face: the year 1955 was declared as an experiment year and the big economic rise should start next year, when the new five-year plan should come into effect. The only saviour was the Soviet Union.³⁹

There was one incident during the year 1955 that significantly increased both Finland's and Kekkonen's visibility in Hungary. The incident was the Soviet Union's decision to return the Porkkala Naval Base to the Finns. The lease was due to end in the year 1994 but the Soviets decided to give up the base after ten years. Historians have debated the motives of the Soviet leaders. Did they want to ensure Kekkonen's election as the President? The election was to be carried out in March 1956. Was Porkkala a gift to the retiring President Paasikivi or was the gesture just a part of a larger political manoeuvre? Evaluations have been made, but according to Khrushchev's memoirs the reason was both economic and practical: the naval base was expensive to maintain and because of the rapid development of armament technology it was useless in safeguarding Leningrad. Long-range missiles could destroy Leningrad irrespective of whether the Russians had a naval base in Porkkala or not. There was also the international political situation. By giving up the base the Soviets could imply that they were aiming at peace and could ask why the West was not doing the same. And if there was a possibility to boost Kekkonen's campaign, all the better. Kekkonen was the only choice in the Kremlin's eyes and surely the Soviets wanted the new President to be someone they knew and could trust. The decision to give Porkkala back to the Finns was a very skilful political and tactical move by the Soviets.⁴⁰

In Hungary the Porkkala affair was big news. It was not a surprise that the role of the Finns was played down and the peaceful attitude and forgiveness of the Soviet Union was highly admired. The return of the base was interpreted as yet another proof of the Soviet Union's consistent policy of peace and as an example of peaceful co-existence of the two countries with different political and economic systems. In other words, all the

credit was given to the Russians. All the major newspapers (*Esti Budapest, Szabad Nép, Magyar Nemzet, Népszava*) wrote with a similar overtone: the Russians are good, the West is bad. But what about Finland and the Finns? President Paasikivi was described earlier in 1950 as an evil man and an ultimate enemy of the Finnish working class. This time he was featured as the head of the Finnish deputation in the negotiations but now the papers made no evaluations at all concerning Paasikivi's person or past. The other man mentioned was Kekkonen. Nobody gave any special credit to him but, for example, the Ambassador of East Germany was very pleased about the fact that Kekkonen was among the negotiators in Moscow. But what about the ordinary Hungarians? Hjelt got some information from the grass and root levels. The message was: 'Why is there not happening anything such as this in Hungary?'⁴¹ A very good question with a simple answer: Hungary was not an independent country but a solid part of the Eastern block and geographically in a precarious location.

Both Finland and Hungary gained membership at the United Nations in December 1955, an achievement which should have stirred political commentators. Surprisingly, Hjelt gave to Finland very diverse information about the feelings in Hungary. The official Hungary was naturally pleased, but the general public was depressed. The interpretation of the decision was that the West had recognized the fact that Hungary was and would also in the future be a communist society.⁴² In the context of Finnish-Hungarian relations there were new elements of political developments in sight, although the basic situation remained static: the countries were geographically far away from each other, their political systems were different and they built their foreign policy on the idea of cherishing good relations with the Soviet Union. The novelty was that the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc as a whole started to pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy Finland and Kekkonen in particular supported. The result was that Finland became one of the most popular non-communist countries in Hungary, which was made visible during the celebration of Finland's Independence Day in December 1955. The Hungarian

delegation was exceptionally eminent: the new PM András Hegedűs, two deputy PMs, members of the government and of the politburo, highly-ranked civil servants and other minor officials, altogether about 300 guests took part in the reception at the Embassy of Finland. The delegation was a thermometer of the friendship with Finland showing relations were cordial. But as Hjelt reported, they had no real importance. It was better that in Hungary Finland was not regarded as an enemy. But if things had been different, would it have caused any stress in Finland? No. This attitude can be sensed in Paasikivi's diaries. The only serious remark on Hungary is dated from the 10th October 1955 and the only matter was Hjelt's complaint that it was very hard to get any accurate information from Hungary.⁴³

The year 1956 began in a depressing mood in Hungary because Rákosi seemed to have regained his position and the Hungarians appeared to be tired with politics. Hjelt's assumption was that the hope of a possible liberation had faded away. The Hungarians had acquiesced to their destiny. But there was still something in the air:⁴⁴

There is the same expectant mood in Hungary just as all around the world in the beginning of the new year.

Then came the twentieth congress of the CPSU in February 1956. At first nobody knew exactly what was said in Moscow but the basic note was clear: the crimes of the Stalin era were disclosed and the stalinist ideology was deemed an incorrect one. The thesis of an intensifying class struggle and the doctrine of the inevitability of war were abandoned. There could no longer be only one wise leader as Stalin had been. The times of total despotism were over⁴⁵ which meant for Hungary that the Rákosi era was reaching its end.

Before the dramatic events of the autumn 1956 Finland got more publicity in Hungary than ever before after the Second World War. The reason was the presidential elections in February 1956 and Kekkonen's victory by an extremely narrow margin. The result caused a flow of enthusiastic comments from the Hungarian press. They show concretely how an historical

event can be interpreted so very differently in a different political environment. In Finland Kekkonen's victory was far from being a stunning event. Actually, it had divided the country and created bitterness. In spring 1956 there were in Finland almost as many winners as there were losers. Seen from the Hungarian point of view the situation was totally different: the election of Kekkonen was definitely the best thing that could happen to Finland and Kekkonen was without any doubt the best and probably the only man who could be the President of Finland.

From the early 1950s Kekkonen had been an eager advocate of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The Eastern block adopted it after Stalin's death. Thus Kekkonen was the man who accidentally, 'invented' the political doctrine Khrushchev asserted into international political discourse in the mid 1950s. Another fact that secured Kekkonen's fame was his active participation in the most important negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Whenever there was something peaceful going on in Finnish-Soviet relations, Kekkonen was there. His election contributed to the reincarnation of the old idea of kinship. As Hjelt reported discussions about this subject had previously caused only uneasiness among the leading Hungarian politicians and high-ranked civil servants.⁴⁶

After the election of Kekkonen the retiring President Paasikivi also gained some respect from Hungary. Apart from Kekkonen, he was the only other official person Hungary recognized in spring 1956. Formerly he had been compared with Miklós Horthy but now he became one of the key-figures in creating Finland's peaceful foreign policy. Hungarian papers explained that it was Paasikivi who was the founder of this policy, Kekkonen had only participated in the process.⁴⁷ After the spring 1956, Finland had gained the status of an example for peaceful coexistence between a big and a small country and between a capitalist and a communist system. Correspondingly, Hjelt sensed a Hungarian tendency: it was unofficially or indirectly hoped that their country could also achieve a position similar to that of Finland, both in the eyes of the Western block

and the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the Hungarians remembered quite well that Finland and Hungary had been in a similar political situation after the Second World War but now the countries were politically and socio-economically far from each other, and the comparison did not favour Hungarians. The status Finland had and the position of Kekkonen was something to strive for.

During the spring 1956, when the internal political situation in Hungary was getting more charged, Finnish politicians gained an exceptional opportunity to make observations. The PM Hegedűs had invited in February a delegation of the Finnish Parliament to Hungary. The visit took place in June 1956, which was only a few weeks after Rákosi's public speech of self-criticism. He had admitted to an adequate amount of mistakes: the personality cult, illegal activities of the secret police etc. The message was clear: there had been some mistakes but it was all past. Now it was time to go ahead and keep the wheels of Socialism rolling. According to Hjelt, the Hungarians were disappointed; Rákosi had confessed his mistakes but was not going to resign. Hjelt thought that the Hungarians had lost their interest in politics and surmised that Rákosi might be able to hold on to his position, but for how long was unforeseeable.⁴⁸

The visit of the Finnish delegation took place just after the Hungarians had recovered from Stalin's death and Rákosi's mild self-criticism. Its delegation had been chosen on the basis of parliamentary importance. Three of the members were communists, two from the Agrarian Union, and one from the Swedish People's Party, NCP and People's Party respectively.⁴⁹ Could the delegation have had any opportunities to make sense of the situation in Hungary? Highly unlikely as the programme of the visit was planned by the host and everybody had to travel from one place to another in the group. The Finns saw what the Hungarians wanted them to see. What did they see? Museums, factories, and they made short trips to Debrecen, Hortobágy, Lake Balaton and the Mátra mountains. The hosts were as generous as the Hungarians could be and everything the Finns

wanted – or asked to be shown was shown to them – except the massive industrial site Sztálinváros. The Finns and the Hungarians became friends and now everybody talked about the kinship between Finns and Hungarians, but the facades of Potemkin were too obvious. The hosts tried, for example, to demonstrate that Hungary was a liberal state when it came to religion but unsuccessfully. There were also disputes about the methods of education but, on the whole, the visit was a success for the Hungarians. Because the Finns found the best Hungary had to offer there was not too much room for criticism and the table speeches were all the time cordial. It was a propaganda tour, the Finns got new experiences and representation but the Hungarians scored the propaganda points.⁵⁰

It was remarkable how the Hungarian press wrote about the visit. Before the year 1956 Finland had been mentioned quite seldom, and especially about Finnish politics the papers wrote only the basic incidents: who was elected President and what were the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. There had been news but no actual contact with the men and women behind it. Now the Hungarians had a group of living politicians from the North in their country, and what was the most important thing, not only communists but also some capitalists, even one member of the NCP, a true reactionary. For example, *Szabad Nép* wrote immediately after the Finnish delegation had arrived in Budapest the following:⁵¹

Yesterday morning our beloved guests arrived in our country. We are cordially happy to welcome the representatives of our relative country, Finland, and we wish that throughout their visit the relations of our countries will become even closer.

The paper stressed three main themes as cornerstones in Finnish-Hungarian relations. Those were the suddenly so popular idea of kinship, the ultimate friendship and as the most important matter, the burning desire for peace. The last one was the urge that brought Finland and Hungary even closer to each other. Because of this task, it was irrelevant whether a country was communist or capitalist.⁵² In a wider political perspective,

the timing of the visit was interesting because Mihail Suslov, a far more important visitor than any of the Finns, had simultaneously talks with HWP leaders, including János Kádár.⁵³ One can assume that there was some tension in the air, but the Finns knew nothing about it.

Before 1955 Finland had been a country which could not be considered a 'friend'. The only friends Hungary had were the other members of the communist block and neighbouring Austria. Hungary needed a window to the West. Finland was just what Hungary needed. It was on good terms with the Soviet Union, with the West, and it was gaining reputation as an international mediator. In 1955 the leaders of Hungary started to put forward the idea of kinship. In contrast, in Finland Hungary aroused little interest. It was still a minor communist country and it seems that the Finnish authorities were fully satisfied with the information they got from Hjelt who regularly wrote quite competent reports – the evaluations he made were seldom totally wrong. During the summer 1956 the events in Hungary ran rapidly for Hjelt, actually too rapidly for almost everybody.

Finnish authorities were always concerned about the risk of an open conflict, and if it would develop in Europe that was even worse. In 1956 the Suez crisis broke out, in which the USA, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Egypt were involved. It did not cause any real problems for Finnish foreign policy. There had been symptoms of disharmony in the Eastern bloc, at first in East Germany and then in Poland, but they were solved more or less peacefully or at least in a way which did not shake the balance of the Cold War.

In July 1956 Hjelt wrote to Helsinki about the internal situation in Hungary. He knew of Suslov's visit and rumours circulated. Was Rákosi falling? The information Hjelt was able to gather, gave him a wrong impression; he wrote that the most likely option would be that Rákosi would stay in power even though there was heavy pressure on him. Hjelt found several reasons to back up his supposition. The most important source of information seems to have been the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, who told Hjelt that

Rákosi could stay in power. Hjelt could not see anyone replacing him and assumed that the most important matter to the Kremlin was to maintain peaceful conditions in Hungary and that Rákosi was the right man to secure that.⁵⁴ Continuity was the key issue for the Soviets.

Just a week after Hjelt's prediction Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the CPSU CC Presidium, visited Budapest for the meeting of the HWP. Mikoyan was in Hungary to get a clear picture of what was going on. The Party was losing its authority and support, and practically all the problems focused on Rákosi. He had lost credibility in the eyes of the Hungarians. After lengthy discussions Mikoyan wrote to the CPSU CC on the 14th July 1956. The letter was devastating. The HWP was losing its leading impetus. Rákosi was politically a dead man and the first thing the Hungarians should do was to get rid of him. All the HWP CC members who were not on the same line with the Soviet Union would be dismissed and new, young and loyal members would be recruited from the cadres.⁵⁵ The Soviet Union planned a controlled transfer of power.

Hungarian politicians did as their masters had told them to do. The HWP CC announced Rákosi's resignation on the 18th July 1956. They not announce any official reason, but only hinted at Rákosi's bad health and high age. The new first secretary of the HWP CC Politburo was the former vice-PM Gerő. Hjelt tried to disentangle what was behind this political manoeuvre. What were the reasons that forced Rákosi to resign? After all he had been the leading figure of Hungarian politics for almost a decade. Now it was time for Hjelt to explain and show whether he understood anything about the country where he was posted.

Hjelt's analysis was a sharp one. He saw four main reasons why Rákosi had had to go. First, there was the general development in the Eastern European communist countries after Stalin's death. Second, Rákosi's reluctance to adjust his politics to suit to the policy lines created after Stalin's era. Third, the great economic problems which Hungary had, and fourth, the dissatisfaction with Rákosi's policy in general.

Surprisingly, Hjelt assumed that Moscow would have desired Rákosi to continue, although in the letter to CPSU CC Mikoyan had said that both the Soviet Union and quite many of the members of the HWSP Politburo agreed with the idea that it was time for Rákosi to resign. Also Rákosi himself was willing to give up his position. In the meeting with Mikoyan and the leaders of the HWSP on the 13th July 1956, Rákosi had said that the only reason he had stayed in power was that he wanted to correct the mistakes he had done and then resign. But now the time for an effort such as this had passed. Hjelt made one very clever observation by pointing to the role of the new member of the HWSP CC whose name was János Kádár. On the base of Hjelt's report, the Finnish authorities were quite well-informed about the transfer of power in Hungarian internal policy. The things Hjelt did not know were of the kind that only very few, if any, knew.⁵⁶

5 The Uprising and Aftermath

The pressure against the HWP was growing during the summer 1956. Students and intellectuals gathered in the Petőfi Club. In almost every town there were discussion groups, and Hjelt noticed that the rise of popular movements did not aim at getting out of the Soviet orbit but it created a totally new forum for debate and criticism. In his estimation in September 1956, Hjelt was pessimistic. Although a freer atmosphere was a good thing in itself and the Hungarian government was at least accepting some criticism, there were also dangerous factors. The more people were given freedom, the harder it would be to control their movements, but if the government chose a harder line, the reaction would be incalculable. For the Soviets the situation was clear: the people in the Petőfi Club represented counter-revolutionary forces.⁵⁷ The leaders of Hungary were not able to deal with the dilemma on their hands. What is the tolerable amount of freedom in a communist country? This is a question to which no communist dictatorship has ever found a satisfying answer.

Disturbances also hit Poland in 1956. The workers' uprising in Poznan in July 1956 forced the Polish United Workers' Party to make changes in its leadership. A formerly imprisoned highly-ranked party member, of Wladyslaw Gomulka, returned to power. The Poles and the Soviets eventually reached a peaceful solution in October, 1956.⁵⁸

The uprising in Hungary started 23 October 1956 and practically ended during the first weeks of November. The history of the revolution has been studied thoroughly; here we concentrate on Hjelt's reports on it. In one of them, dated 10th of November, he expounded on the reason for the uprising: the Hungarians wanted to root out stalinism, they wanted democratisation of Hungarian society, and there were also demands to investigate what had happened during the Rákosi era. According to Hjelt people also wanted to know what was Hungary's economic situation, what was wrong with Communism, where were the promised better times? The demonstrations and fighting started the 23rd of October and Nagy was elected the PM. The next day the hated Gerő resigned and a general strike was started. By the end of the month the violence was over and the Soviet troops left Budapest. Days of chaos started and there was confusion about who was in charge in Hungary. Nagy was the PM but he could not control the masses. A few days later, 4th of November the Russian troops started the invasion and fighting broke out again, now mainly in Budapest. The uprising was practically over on the 9th of November, and the new PM was János Kádár.⁵⁹

A few days later, 14th of November Hjelt was able to write a careful analysis: the impulse for the uprising had come from Poland. Polish communists could remodel the leadership of their party even though ideological changes were very moderate. This was an example for Hungarians. When they took to the barricades they gained a minor victory – the Soviet troops withdrew – but not from Hungary, only from Budapest. The most significant matter for Hjelt was the composition of the revolutionary forces: they were basically students, soldiers and workers, the key groups which should have been the most loyal supporters of communist power.

He made also one very important observation: the uprising as a whole was not against Socialism or Communism; it was against the Soviet model of Communism. What was at stake was not a change of the political system but to reform it. There was only one thing which Hjelt did not notice, when he compared Poland and Hungary. Poland was in the middle of the communist camp, the Soviet Union lies in the East, and the GDR in the West and Hungary in the South. Hungary was geopolitically in a precarious position, situated on the front line of the communist bloc. Capitalist Austria had a common border with Hungary, Tito's Yugoslavia was nearby and so was the feared FRG. According to Hjelt it was impossible for the Soviet Union to allow the liberation of Hungary.⁶⁰ In this way Hjelt gave the Finns a reasonably correct and detailed analysis about the uprising of 1956.

How was it possible for Hjelt to write such a competent analysis about the events in Budapest and elsewhere in Hungary? Hjelt actually referred to radio broadcasts many times but they could not tell everything and it is quite obvious that he went to the streets and saw it all, broken windows, collapsed walls, destroyed barricades and so on. He must have heard local informants, too because he could report about fighting in the countryside, for example, in Pécs, on the island of Csepel, in Dunapentele and in Miskolc. He knew who was fighting and who was not. He followed the high-level political manoeuvres without any illusions, and he saw that Nagy was a weak leader of the masses he could not control. For Hjelt, he was no better than Kádár whose position was based on the Soviet army, or as Hjelt wrote: 'Kádár's government hangs in the air at least as much as Nagy's did, or, in other words, it sits on the Russian tanks.'⁶¹

For Kekkonen the violence in Hungary was a shock. He made a very exceptional gesture by contacting the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki and offering himself as a mediator between the Hungarians and the Soviets. He even offered to travel to Budapest so that the bloodshed could be ended. It is hard to find any rational reason for Kekkonen's action. Did he really think he could have had enough political capital to make any

impact on the dramatic situation in Hungary? Undoubtedly not. However, his initiative can also be seen from another perspective. For Kekkonen and especially for his closest friends such as Kustaa Vilkuna, the kinship with Hungarians was emotionally a sensitive matter. When far-away located relatives were in trouble, Kekkonen felt he had to do something, whether it was useful or not. After the uprising Kekkonen commanded the Finnish Ambassador of the UN very strictly in every vote the General Assembly had. His line was clear: in the resolutions which condemned the Soviets Finland abstained but in the ones which emphasized the right of freedom and independence of the Hungarian nation Finland voted for them. At the moment nobody knew that this definition of policy would be the Finnish line at the UN for the next forty years.⁶²

In Finland the brutalities carried out by the Red Army caused intensive debate and the person in the eye of this whirlwind was Kekkonen. The majority of the Finnish newspapers expected Finland to react on the Soviet occupation more strongly both domestically and internationally. The way the Finns reacted was very emotional and unwise. Should there have been any reason to do damage to the 'friendly' relations with the Soviet Union because of the dramatic events in Hungary? Finland could not have been able to do anything. Hungary was one of the Soviet Union's satellites, a frontline country especially in view of the fact that the FRG had just started to rebuild its army. Considered in a wider political perspective or only from the point of Finnish-Russian relations, the Finns and Kekkonen did everything they had in their power to do. In the UN Finland did not accept the military intervention but, on the other hand, there was no real-political reason to judge everything the Soviet Union had done. The decisions concerning the policy towards the uprising were made by Kekkonen but he was not alone. The Hungarian uprising was the one and only foreign political issue about which Kekkonen asked advice from a higher Finnish authority. This authority was former President Paasikivi who told

Kekkonen: 'There is no reason for us to slander the Soviets now; that does not benefit us at all, rather it might harm us'.⁶³

The Hungarians tried unilaterally to change their political position in the divided Europe with catastrophic consequences. It was self-evident that the Soviet Union would not give any chance to change the power political balance in Europe. It was ready to take brutal actions in order to maintain this situation and this was a fact the Finns should have also taken into consideration. There was only one superpower in Europe and it was right next to Finland. Thus the uprising in Hungary was a reminder also to the Finns.

6 The Kádár-Kekkonen Era Begins

President Kekkonen had made his stand clear: Finland would not accept violence but at the same time he accepted the fact that the Soviet Union could not allow any kind of dissident actions from her satellites. The constellation that was created in Europe after the Second World War was immutable. After the year 1956 this idea was widely accepted both in NATO and especially among the so called non-aligned countries.⁶⁴

The Finnish *chargé d'affaires* was there at the focal point of the events in Hungary and he was able to report on the situation after the uprising. Especially the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in January 1957 was worth looking at. Restless Poland, the uncertain GDR and China-oriented Albania were absent and only the most loyal communist countries, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and Hungary were represented. According to Hjelt, the other communist countries agreed to give Hungary all material aid they could and the Soviet Union gave at least one solid promise: the Red Army would stay in Hungary.⁶⁵ The last promise must have been a pleasant one for the new leader, Kádár, whose position was on very shaky ground.

Kádár's first definition of policy that was given in his name was harsh: all counter-revolutionary activities would be rooted out. In Hungary there was room only for one party, the HWP, which had changed its name to Hungarian Socialist Workers'

Party (HSWP). All political liberalization was to be recalled. A declaration like this was no surprise for Hjelt and he did not comment on it in any way. The most significant estimation Hjelt made was about Kádár's personality: he was not a strong man in political rhetoric and it was not at all clear whether Kádár would stay in power. At the moment he seemed to be just another puppet-leader and his power was based on the sad fact that the Soviet Union had occupied the country.⁶⁶

Hjelt turned out to be wrong since Kádár soon demonstrated his ruthlessness. The period of reprisals started in April 1957 and ended in summer 1961. The new leader showed that there was no room for active opposition in 'his' country and all subversive elements were destroyed both physically and mentally. Hjelt already reported the executions and internments. In reality they amounted to 341 hanged in 1956–1961, while 22,000 Hungarians were sentenced to prison, about 13,000 persons were interned, and many others lived with panic and fear in their minds.⁶⁷ It was as if the times of Rákosi's terror were back.

Hjelt saw the beginning of the dark chapter of Hungary's post-war history. The mood as a whole was depressing. Kádár commenced his policy of eradicating the memory of October 1956. Hjelt pointed to the hasty court proceedings – almost anybody could be prosecuted and sentenced to prison for a minor offence. There was also new legislation which made it more difficult to leave the collectives. The new government and its servants were everywhere. The Hungarian Literary Union was abolished as was the Union of Journalists. Universities were closed and the news about executions caused depression. The first victims of Kádár's reprisals were former members of the Smallholders' Party, József Dudás and József Szabó, the hero of Széna Square. Hjelt heard that the prisons were filled with members of intelligentsia; writers, journalists, students and members of the Workers' Councils. As Hjelt had it, there was a kind of witch-hunt going on in Hungary.⁶⁸ The country was again on its way to year zero, to the times of revenge.

The spring 1957 was the last for Hjelt in Budapest. He concentrated on observing the policy of the new regime. The propaganda against Nagy was bitter and aggravating; now he

was nothing but a traitor, a puppet of the Western counter-revolutionary movement. The biggest issue for Kádár was the reorganization of the HSWP, which had serious problems in increasing membership. Hjelt's estimate was that the old party (HWP) had had at least one million members but the new one only about 170,000. Another serious problem was that the ideas and the memory of October 1956 still lived vividly among students. Kádár's policy did not make the atmosphere any better. One example of the pronouncements Kádár made was the claim that there were no foreign troops in Hungary because the soldiers of the Red Army were not foreigners but only guests or sons of a friendly nation who came to help in times of trouble. Hjelt played the Hungarians down quite strongly even though he had seen the passionate fighting only a few months ago, because he estimated that there could be some resistance still coming, but it would have been in Hjelt's words 'typical Hungarian stargazing'.⁶⁹

Consolidation of the Kádár regime was agreed in Moscow in March 1957 when Kádár met the leaders of the Soviet Union. As a result of the negotiations it was decided that Rákosi would not come back to Hungary and that the ex-party-leader would resign from all his public offices. The most important issue was the CPSU's support for Kádár. The Soviets agreed that he would restore the status of Hungary. Kádár himself raised the question in the Kremlin and his outlook can be crystallized in one sentence: 'To pull out a bad tooth, we cannot wait from eight to ten months, or years.'⁷⁰

Hjelt's opinion of the consequences of Kádár's visit to Moscow was well-founded. The need of liquidation of the 'counter-revolutionary elements' from the Hungarian society was imminent and there would be no essential changes in Hungarian policy; it would not, for example, follow the Yugoslavian model, Polish model or any other alternative. Hjelt reported on the financial support the Soviet Union had promised and how Kádár's regime suppressed dissidents. Internment camps were in use again, capital punishments were carried out and the propaganda in general was rude – consequently, Hjelt did not appreciate Kádár very highly. To him he was still a marionette, a leader who was lacking the support of his countrymen. One matter had not changed: Finland was still counted in Hungary

among the friendly countries. Kádár told the session of the executive committee of the HSWP in April 1957 that there had been only a few representatives of the friendly nations at the reception in the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow during Kádár's visit: from Western Europe there were only the Ambassadors of Finland and Sweden, not the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, for example.⁷¹

In his last report in May 1957 Hjelt made some observations which in the long-term proved to be far-sighted. According to it, Kádár had made a totally different public appearance, his image was changing. The forum for this change was the Parliament, which was one of the few places where foreign diplomats could hear the Hungarian leaders talking live even though it had only symbolic political power. Hjelt, who was present during the session, realized that politically Kádár's speech did not have any new content. The line chosen by Kádár had not changed: no general election, no multi-party system and no changes in the policy of 'restoration of order'. However, Kádár's tone was not the same, he spoke very warmly about the new Polish leader, Gomulka, and in general he was friendly, joyful and the audience seemed to like the man. Hjelt reported that Kádár had possibly increased his popularity among ordinary people. But as Hjelt sarcastically added: there was still lot to do in that area.⁷²

What did Hjelt actually see? He might have seen the first glimpse of the future Kádárist Hungary. Law and order would be severe, but Kádár himself was relaxed, filled with internal peace and amusement, a real contrast to Rákosi and Nagy. One reason for Kádár's relaxation might have been that he had secured his position as a definite leader of the HSWP. During the meeting of the HSWP CC in December 1957 the Party made all the essential decisions regarding the punishment of the counter-revolutionaries and of the amnesty. First, there would be the period of more severe sentences followed by years of forgiveness. Afterwards Kádár could create an image of a firm leader who could reunite the quarrelsome nation and become a congenial and respected father-figure to the nation.⁷³

In Finland there was a leader who had similar ideas regarding his own future. The victory by a one vote margin in 1956 had

plausibly brought Kekkonen more enemies than friends. To compare Kádár with Kekkonen may sound tasteless, but there are some basic similarities. Both had bitter enemies; Kádár was brought to power by the Soviets and there were also in Finland some discussions regarding whether the Soviets had exercised some influence on public opinion in favour of Kekkonen before the elections. Some political observers suspected that the Soviet Union had restored the Porkkala just to boost Kekkonen's election. Both Kekkonen and Kádár had a lot to do if they wanted to become respected leaders of their nations. However, one very significant difference remains: Kádár's hands were bloody and his way to power was covered with corpses whereas Kekkonen left only political corpses behind.

6 From the Night Frost to Mutual Understanding

The new Finnish *chargé d'affaires* was a very experienced and respected career diplomat T. H. (Toivo Heikki) Heikkilä. He had been posted in Berlin as an attaché as early as 1934 and after that in Budapest during the Second World War in 1941–1943. In Finland Heikkilä was Paasikivi's secretary during the critical years 1944–1948. Before arriving at Budapest he had been in the GDR a few years and was well aware of the circumstances in the smaller Eastern European communist countries. The years as Paasikivi's secretary taught him how the communists operated when they were aiming to gain power in a democratic society. One can state that Heikkilä was a man who also knew all the essential facts of Finnish domestic politics.⁷⁴

Heikkilä's start in Budapest was promising. The first highly-ranked Hungarian official Heikkilä met was the Foreign Minister Imre Horváth. It did not take long before they realized they were old friends from years in East-Berlin from the late 1940s. There were no problems with language because both spoke German fluently. The message Horváth gave to Heikkilä about the policy of Hungary was unambiguous: The best friend Hungary has is the Soviet Union and the other countries which were members of the 'peace-group' were not the best friends but very good ones anyway. Among these peaceful nations was

no other Western capitalist country but Finland. Heikkilä put this down as a compliment or as an insult. The Hungarians had created this classification according to a respective country's policy towards Hungarian emigrants. For example, in all the other Nordic countries – especially in Sweden – there were very active Hungarian emigrant groups but not in Finland. The reason was that Finland did not accept Hungarian political refugees on her soil. Actually, Finland did not grant asylum to refugees no matter where they came from. Later Heikkilä had a long discussion with an old friend of Finland, the vice-Prime Minister Ferenc Münnich who also clarified to Heikkilä the situation in Hungary after the uprising. Münnich spoke relatively openly about the political problems Hungary was facing and admitted that there was still some active resistance against the government but the worst was over. Probably the most disinterested statement was Münnich's estimate concerning the Hungarians themselves whom he said to be a nation with a very peculiar character. Heikkilä construed this to mean that Hungarians were not easily converted to Communism. Münnich, who had also been posted in Finland talked about Kekkonen and emphasized his great admiration for the Finnish president stating that Hungarian leaders had been following his career with great interest.⁷⁵

Even though Heikkilä's arrival in Budapest had been made warm and pleasant by the Hungarians, Heikkilä was not bluffed. He was well aware that there was another life behind the curtains of the political elite. The repression of the participants of the uprising was reaching its peak and it was impossible for the foreign diplomats not to hear about it. As early as in July 1957, in his second report to Helsinki, Heikkilä told about the depressing events occurring especially in Budapest, of which he knew best because the countryside was practically isolated from the capital. Heikkilä wrote that random arrests, long interrogations which included also torture and deportations were familiar for almost everybody who could have been linked somehow with the events of the autumn 1956. The ambience in general was depressing.⁷⁶

During the summer 1957 Heikkilä tried to find out what kind of men the new leaders of Hungary were. The picture he conveyed to Finland was not a very positive one. In late August 1957 he travelled to Kisújszállás where the Hungarian leaders had decided to celebrate the day of the constitution. Both Dobi and Kádár appeared in public, a rare occasion at the time. Kádár was the only speaker who made a neutral impression to Heikkilä: he was a blond, tall, youngish (Kádár was 44 years of age) Hungarian whose eyes and voice were devoid of fanaticism. In his speech Kádár admitted that there were people under house arrest but justified the 'method' by saying that these people were protected from a possible death in freedom. Regarding foreign policy, Kádár insisted that the UN had no right to interfere in Hungary's domestic affairs, and pointed out that the Soviets had not intervened in Hungary; they had only fulfilled their obligation to 'help' another socialist country against counter-revolutionary rebellion. It is hard to say whether Heikkilä was disappointed or not at Kádár's performance; he was a pragmatic diplomat and understood that there had been so much bloodshed on the streets of Budapest that even the idea of loosening control was impossible. In any case, Heikkilä was convinced that there would not be any disturbance in Hungary, and if anyone else could not guarantee peace, the Red Army could.⁷⁷ The personality of Kádár haunted Heikkilä: in the last analysis he was still a 'petty district ex-secretary' whose position as the leader was uncertain and his government seemed temporary, although Kádár himself might become a figurehead for future leadership. His wisest decision was to postpone court proceedings against former Deputy Minister of Defence, Pál Maléter – Heikkilä's informants could not know that he was doomed. In all, Heikkilä's forecast was not quite amiss:⁷⁸

This discussion enhanced the impression that the consequences of the uprising will have a very deep and far-reaching impact on the future. It will be especially difficult for the HSWP to recover from the setback it has suffered. It is quite possible that the Party will never fully get over the autumn 1956.

It was as early as in October 1957 when Heikkilä was able to report of the first visible signs of Kádár's new 'stick and carrot' policy; private business was allowed, for example, for doctors, restaurant- and coffee shopkeepers, and there was also some relaxation of the regulations concerning travelling abroad for students and scientists. Also 'ordinary people' were allowed to have contacts with foreigners.⁷⁹

The relations between Finland and Hungary in the late 1950s remained 'miraculously good despite the political 'earthquakes' or they became better after 'the shattering intermezzo' of 1956, as Heikkilä viewed it. One reason was that Finland condemned the Soviet occupation and violence, but the Soviet Union itself was not criticized. In the resurrected atmosphere of kinship, Heikki Hosia, the Minister of Education, renewed the agreement of cultural co-operation in 1959 and the PM V.J. Sukselainen and the Second Spokesman of the Finnish Parliament, Johannes Virolainen, visited Hungary. Henceforth dealings between Finland and Hungary became more intensive and the journalists had more opportunities to observe life over the Iron Curtain.⁸⁰

The proof of who dictated Hungary's foreign policy was given to Finns during the so-called night frost period in the end of 1958 and at the beginning of the year 1959 when a new government was formed in Finland. It was a 'normal' one, based on the co-operation of the Agrarian Union and social democrats, but it had one serious drawback: the Kremlin did not accept it and Finnish-Soviet relations practically broke up and with Hungary Finland could not progress in negotiations for wider trade because the official Hungary assumed a very calm attitude; the Independence Day of Finland was celebrated in 'an intentional coolness of atmosphere' in the Embassy of Finland,⁸¹ but finally, at the beginning of January 1959, the new agreement of trade payments was signed, and Heikkilä decided to organize a festive occasion. The date for this was well set: Fagerholm's government resigned on the 13th of January and the new one, Sukselainen's government, started its work on the very same day, and Heikkilä had decided to have the celebration on the 14th. Information about the occasion was given to Hungarians, but until the 13th only the representatives of the

non-aligned countries had answered. Heikkilä called the Protocol Department of Hungary's Foreign Ministry. At first, the answer was a cryptic one: 'Maybe somebody is coming' but, in the end, a couple of vice-Ministers, would attend. On the successful occasion, the Hungarian guests were hilarious, and the atmosphere was much better than during the celebration of Independence Day. Heikkilä estimated quite correctly that the resignation of Fagerholm's government and the inauguration of the new government had made a positive impact on the Hungarian attitude.⁸²

The warm breath of mutual understanding reached the highest level in 1963. Finns frequented Hungary; FM Ahti Karjalainen, Johannes Virolainen, Minister of Foreign Trade, Olavi J. Mattila, and Kekkonen's friend, Vilkuna with his clients.⁸³ The climax was to come; Kekkonen was planning an official visit to Yugoslavia in May 1963, and thereafter an unofficial visit to Hungary. It was time for Kekkonen and Kádár to meet for the first time.

One must keep in mind that in Kekkonen's program meeting with Tito was the most important item. He set himself to publicising more widely his idea of the Nordic non-nuclear zone and explored if the rather self-opinionated Tito would support him. According to Kekkonen's diary, Tito thought the idea was sensible. Before leaving Yugoslavia Kekkonen requested Tito characterize Kádár. Tito's answer was: 'Kádár is a very good and wise man'.⁸⁴

There is no direct evidence as to whether Kekkonen had much information about Kádár in advance. Official representatives had written their characterizations and possibly Vilkuna had told Kekkonen something. Even though the visit was a private one, Kekkonen was an old friend of Hungary and he must have been curious to see what the situation was in the country. Kádár just might engulf the fresh idea of the Nordic nuclear-free-zone.⁸⁵

In Hungary Kekkonen's visit was a big event and the new Ambassador – Finland and Hungary had elevated their diplomatic relations to the highest level in 1960 – Reino Palas had a demanding task. He had arrived in Hungary at the

beginning of May 1963, only two weeks before Kekkonen's visit. The reception organized in his honour was imposing. The accreditation took place in the Parliament; Palas left his letter of appointment to Dobi on the 6th of May. Soon Palas met three persons: the Spokesman of the Parliament, the Mayor of Budapest and Kádár. The first two meetings did not excite the experienced diplomat but the last one did. As Palas put it: 'Kádár is a very well-known and world famous man, whose policy of destalinization is well-reputed and closely watched around the world.' Possibly Palas knew that this might be the only occasion when he could meet him privately. Unfortunately, the meeting was not a discussion but a monologue. Kádár talked a lot and Palas listened. The first topic was the kinship between Finland and Hungary, already taken up by Dobi. Kádár then pointed out that Hungary wanted to maintain good relations with every country, both in the East and the West. This message was rather familiar from the policy of Kekkonen who had introduced it in Finland. For Kádár, Yugoslavia and Austria were 'friends' even though Yugoslavia was a revisionist country and Austria a capitalist one. This was not a matter of ideology but of realistic policy. The way Finland conducted her foreign policy was highly appreciated by Kádár. Especially, the manner Finland had managed the relations with the Soviet Union was also internationally remarkable, and Kádár was looking forward to seeing Kekkonen in Hungary.⁸⁶

Thus there were only good omens for Kekkonen's visit. Both Kádár's and Kekkonen's arguments concerning international politics and the position of small countries in the duopolic world of the Cold War were very similar. Small countries should try to maintain good relations with at least their close neighbours. Once again Kádár emphasized the kinship of Finns and Hungarians, which enabled good cultural and trading relations.⁸⁷

How accurate were Palas's estimates? For him Kádár was an example of a new style leader in a communist county, a man who was testing the limits of the Kremlin's attitude towards the liberalization of society while remaining a loyal friend of the Soviet Union. This was parallel with Kekkonen's policy. The

main difference between Hungary and Finland was the fact that Hungary was a true satellite of the Soviet Union and a communist country, whereas Finland was a solid friend of the Soviet Union and a capitalist country. Yet both were hoping and searching for peace, good relations with neighbouring countries and no change in political systems.

Palas's report was truly professional showing wide general knowledge. He had previously been posted in Stockholm, in Copenhagen and in Washington, and he had been in service since 1941. He was also very well educated; he had a Ph.D. in psychology and good language proficiency: he knew English, French and German.⁸⁸ Basically, he was a diplomat to the bone and capable of preparing the ground for Kekkonen.

Kekkonen arrived in Hungary on the 12th of May 1963 and met Kádár in Debrecen. The meeting must have been a pleasant surprise at least to Kekkonen. According to the information received by Finnish diplomats from Budapest, Kádár was expected to be dull and uninspiring. It should be remembered that Kekkonen could not have seen Palas's rather positive report which was dated 20th of May which had dealt with the meeting in Debrecen during which Kádár spoke very openly about the painful period after the year 1956 and also about the background of the uprising. He had found Rákosi the main culprit. Dobi, who was also present in Debrecen, made similar remarks. 'Better times are coming', was what both Kádár and Dobi emphasized. How did Kekkonen react? He was positively impressed. Afterwards he wrote in his diary:

Kádár seems to be a really likeable and sensible man. He spoke openly about the year 1956. Rákosi had made big mistakes but the promises of the West made a crucial impact on the developments that caused the uprising.⁸⁹

What was the meaning of the visit? The difference between the official visit to Yugoslavia and the unofficial visit to Hungary is apparent. In Yugoslavia Kekkonen was conducting international politics and in Hungary he was the leader of a kinship country. All the notes made by Kekkonen and all the documents and press

releases demonstrate the visit's apolitical nature. And again: Kádár talked a lot and the visitor listened.⁹⁰ For Kekkonen the visit had no special political goals. He was genuinely interested in Hungary and appreciated the way his trustee, Vilkuna, had created cultural relations with the country for years.

The Hungarian press was fascinated: the readership could not but be aware of Kekkonen's career and of his liking of Hungary. Even though the visit lacked political dimensions, the visit was interpreted as an approval of the Kádár regime.⁹¹ But Sándor Kurtán, Hungary's Ambassador in Finland, was critical. There had been some disappointments, especially the trip to Hortobágy and Debrecen were unsuccessful; the interpreter had been poor and Kekkonen had not met enough important persons. The Hungarians had wanted personal contacts with Kekkonen, and they saw Kekkonen's closest advisor, Permanent Secretary Reino Hallama, as the best source of introduction on the lines of Finnish foreign policy. The Minister of the Foreign Affairs, Veli Merikoski, was not in the eyes of the Hungarians a man who had any political power. Kurtán knew quite well that it was Kekkonen himself and his close friends whose words were worth listening to.⁹² And his estimate was completely correct. All came to this: possibly in the future there might be even closer relations between Hungary and Finland, but not yet. At first, Hungary had to re-establish its international position.

When Kekkonen started to lift his profile in the field of international politics, Kádár's reputation among the leaders of the West was getting better. His new domestic policy was bearing its first fruits. Palas wrote to Helsinki in June 1963 about the 'new line', as he put it. The atmosphere in Hungary in general was rather free, ordinary citizens were able to travel even to the West, tourism was taking its first cautious steps, almost everybody had an opportunity to study at the universities, and political prisoners were gradually released. Even the churches were allowed to operate quite freely. Palas had the courage to make a rather radical estimate that Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia might be planning to form a more liberal group within the communist camp.⁹³

One sign of the new attitude of the West was the growing number of high-level visits to Budapest. The General Secretary of the UN, U Thant, paid a visit to Budapest in July 1963 and after him came Richard Nixon. Especially the visit of U Thant was important. The General Secretary and Kádár had a three hour private discussion, and Palas estimated that Kádár's personality had made a great impact on the visitor. It was quite obvious that Hungary was slowly getting out of the cornered position in the field of international politics. As U Thant had it: 'The discussion with the PM Kádár contributed to a better understanding of Hungary in the UN and to an improvement of the relations between Hungary and other member states of the world organization'. No wonder the Foreign Ministry of Hungary was very pleased about the positive development which made its impact also at the diplomatic level because after 1963 the status of most of the Western delegations in Budapest was elevated to embassy level.⁹⁴

In the early 1960s Kádár and Kekkonen had one especially good mutual friend, the General Secretary of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev. He had repeatedly declared his good relations with Kekkonen and through Kekkonen with Finland. To Khrushchev they were a fine example of the peaceful co-existence of two different nations and two different political systems. In April 1964 Khrushchev visited Hungary, an occasion which was the peak of Kádár's political career. The relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union were perfect. Palas's evaluation at the meeting is worth quoting:⁹⁵

It seems as if it were important to Khrushchev to show to the world that there is at least one ally which is 100 percent behind him [Kádár]. On the other hand, it was important for Kádár to gain Khrushchev's approval of his "socialist democracy", so called Kádárism which was politically a sort of middle-way between "right-wing" and "left-wing" Communism.

The similarity of Kádár's and Kekkonen's reactions to Khrushchev's dismissal was salient. Kekkonen wrote in his diary about a great shock. He continued: 'He [Khrushchev] was a friend of Finland and I was able to discuss openly with him'.

Kádár, for his part, praised Khrushchev's achievements and recalled that the Hungarians had admired the fallen leader. Kádár took it personally, too, because it had been Khrushchev who had made Kádár the leader of Hungary. The Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Budapest, Denisov, told Palas that also he understood the sadness of the Finns, because Khrushchev had been a great friend of Finland, and consoled him by saying that there were now two leaders in the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin who followed the politics of friendship and trust. Kekkonen himself was more than worried and cynical. He knew the new Soviet leaders and Kosygin was a kind of friend of Kekkonen's, but about Brezhnev he had not much to say. And there was the possibility of a bigger danger if the main ideologist, Suslov, could get an important position. For Kekkonen, Suslov was the worst choice because he was 'a fanatic', without any sense of humour. According to Kekkonen he did not even drink alcohol. For Kádár the adaptation to the new situation was not a problem at all. He bluntly stated that every leader of the Soviet Union was a friend of Hungary and that no great political changes were in sight.⁹⁶

For Kekkonen Khrushchev had been the first (and presumably the last) reliable link to the Soviet regime and it was hard to see how personal contacts with new leaders would develop. This was an important question because Kekkonen had realized that the best way to manage with the Soviets was to depend on personal, mutual trust. Also for Kádár the loss was big but he was a leader of a communist country and had less to lose. The Soviet Union would anyhow maintain good relations with her small satellite and it was very unlikely that Kádár's position as a leader of Hungary was in danger.

7 On the Way to CSCE

Although Kekkonen had secured his second term as a President in 1962, problems in internal politics remained there. For the SDP Kekkonen was still the main enemy and *vice versa*. The leader of the SDP, Väinö Tanner, was a fervent opponent of

Kekkonen, and there was distrust of Kekkonen even in his own Agrarian Union.⁹⁷

Kekkonen tried to win support for his foreign policy in Finland but the result was poor. Many politicians thought that it was too favourable to the Soviet Union and did not sufficiently take into account the power of the Western bloc. Since 1963 Kekkonen began to market his idea of a nuclear-free zone, at first for the Nordic countries and then in general. It was a question of regional peace to avoid mass destruction. This was an idea that also suited Kádár. Since gaining power Kádár had been talking about peace and had noticed that Kekkonen had similar ideas. On the ideological level, when it came to peace and peaceful co-existence, Kekkonen's and Kádár's political aims were congruous.

The importance of Kekkonen's visit to Hungary was proved in the Hungarian Parliament in November 1964 when Foreign Minister János Péter spoke long and warmly about Finland and Kekkonen. According to him, Finnish-Hungarian relations were at the moment much more than the old romantic kinship – the relations were good in every way, especially at an economic level. The most important factor in this development was, as Péter put it, the recent high-level 'delightful' meeting, Kekkonen's visit.⁹⁸

It was not only the official Hungary that favoured Kekkonen. For example, *Népszabadság* published a long article in December 1963 about Finland and him, in which it was evident that Finland's foreign policy was the same as Kekkonen's. Finland's position on the playground of international politics was something special: 'positive neutrality' What did this mean? Simply that Finland could maintain good relations with every country, communist, capitalist and the neutral ones. The most important thing was that Finland was not a member of any military alliance. Among the Nordic countries Finland was the one that represented 'most firmly the idea of international peace and security', and it had been Kekkonen who had introduced the idea of nuclear-free zones. The most interesting point concerning the idea of the nuclear-free zone was that the Western bloc supposed that Kekkonen was acting on the orders

of the Kremlin, a claim that at the moment had no proof. The reason why other Nordic countries were not interested in it was simple: Norway and Denmark were members of NATO and Sweden was planning to build her own nuclear weapons.⁹⁹ Palas cited *Magyar Nemzet*: 'Finland decides her foreign policy independently. It is not forced by the East or the West'.¹⁰⁰

In the mid-1960s both Kekkonen and Kádár had consolidated their positions both internally and internationally, but on a different scale. In Finland Kekkonen had won the last contested elections in 1962 (there were normal elections in Finland after that but the year 1962 was the last one when Kekkonen had real opponents) and in Hungary Kádár's position was solid. Kekkonen established quite soon reasonably good relations with the new leaders of the Soviet Union. In 1963 he was unchallenged in Finland: his last powerful opponent retired and social democrats chose a new leader, Rafael Paasio, and the man the Soviet Union hated most, Väinö Tanner, was history. The SDP was united and it became one of the leading powers of Finnish internal politics and was finally accepted by the Soviets by the end of the 1960s.¹⁰¹ Now Kekkonen was free to conduct the policy he wanted, although he had at the same time to remember or guess the Soviet attitude. Kekkonen became an international politician. At the same time Kádár's Hungary was gradually accepted by the West and Kádár had slightly more room to carry through his own policy.

The politically relaxed years in Europe ended on the 20th August 1968 when the troops of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia. The attitudes of Kádár and Kekkonen towards the events in Czechoslovakia were partly similar and partly quite different. The main concern for both was the destiny of their own nations but the vision of the future was different. For Kekkonen the Czechoslovakian crisis was a catastrophe. He wrote in his diary:¹⁰²

It feels like a string has been cut. I have done all I could that our indispensable policy towards the East would become a clear policy of friendship and it would be a common persuasion for every Finn. The events in Czechoslovakia have destroyed these achievements and the ground for this development.

Kekkonen felt betrayed. The Soviet Union was using force again and highly-ranked Soviet diplomats had lied to him. Was there anyone to trust? What would be Finland's fate? What would happen to 'peaceful co-existence'? The foundation of Kekkonen's foreign policy seemed to have disappeared. No wonder Kekkonen was deeply depressed.

Kádár took it differently. Naturally he was concerned about the brutal intervention in which also Hungarian troops took part. But what was paramount was that it re-established the *status quo* in the Eastern bloc. The Czechs had gone too far and there was always a danger that their ideas would reach Hungary. In Kádár's view the year 1956 could not be allowed to repeat itself. This was the main concern he emphasized in discussions with Dubcek before the intervention. There was a serious danger of disturbances and the Hungarians would be obliged to participate in the action. Later he told the Soviets that the intervention was 'not worth the first prize'.¹⁰³ One can ask whether Hungary had any other alternative than to accept the Soviet decision and to participate in the intervention. The Finnish Ambassador, E. O. Raustila, had heard a statement of a highly-ranked Hungarian politician: 'Joining the intervention was for Hungary a most unpleasant duty, but one can ask whether we still existed as a nation if we had refused to do it.'¹⁰⁴

Actually Kádár's foreign policy can be described as a communist version of Kekkonen's foreign policy. Both Kádár and Kekkonen had two dimensions in their activities with other countries, the main difference being the emphasis of the context. For Kekkonen it was at least as important to stress to the West that Finland was a neutral state as to point out to the Soviets that Finland was a loyal friend of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ That was a strange doctrine but it worked. In Finnish-Soviet bilateral relations Finland's policy of neutrality was included in the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance from 1948 but internationally the idea of Finland being a neutral country did not cause any trouble with the Soviets. This was the state of affairs before the CSCE meeting in Helsinki.¹⁰⁶

In April 1969 the Soviet Union send to all the European nations a letter in which it proposed actions to convene a European security meeting. This was not the first time the Soviet Union made a suggestion like this; the previous had been made in 1954 but it had failed. Finland refused to organize the meeting on the ground that all European nations would not participate in it. In 1969 the situation was different. Kekkonen had been very active during the 1960s and he saw the CSCE as an opportunity to secure Finland's international position as a neutral country.¹⁰⁷

The CSCE meeting was designed to bring stability and peace to Europe. It did not bring peace but it finished indirectly the career of one Finnish diplomat. The man who fell was the Finnish Ambassador in Budapest. He had committed a majestic crime by accusing the Soviet Union of pressing Finland for four weeks to make a proposal for the CSCE meeting. Kekkonen was furious, and he immediately ordered Raustila to Finland.¹⁰⁸ What was his mistake? It was the biggest one a Finnish diplomat or politician could make in the field of foreign policy. If Raustila's statement had been true it would have meant that Finns were taking orders from the Soviets.

The idea of the security meeting really came from the Soviet Union, and it had a certain political cue for Finland. It was the reason why Kekkonen took it seriously. There was only one problem; if Finland would say yes straight-away people would think that Finland was a Soviet Union's advocate. Kekkonen decided that Finland should draft her own proposal, different from the one the Soviets had made and with the suggestion that the venue for the final summit would be Helsinki. This was the reason why the CSCE was so strongly attached to Kekkonen as a person.¹⁰⁹ The Soviet Union made the initial proposition but Kekkonen made the idea agreeable to every European nation and also to the USA and Canada. Here we can spot the reason why Kekkonen acted so rudely when he heard about Raustila's statements. The CSCE was becoming a mission for Kekkonen. A comic detail in this chain of events was that neither Kekkonen

nor his closest political advisers believed in the possibility that Helsinki indeed would be the venue.¹¹⁰

In Hungary the idea of a large scale security conference was warmly welcomed and the attitude towards it was very optimistic. For example, *Magyar Nemzet* of the 30th October and *Népszabadság* of the 26th October were certain that the time had come to stabilize the security situation in Europe. The Hungarians were so enthusiastic that the Finnish PM Mauno Koivisto warned them during his visit to Budapest in October not to be overoptimistic about the conference.¹¹¹

Hope for a peaceful and politically stable Europe was in principle acceptable to every European nation. But there were other big issues twined to it: the question of two Germanys, the Soviet desire to maintain her political influence in Europe, NATO's wish to secure Western Europe's position so that there would be no fear from the Soviet Union.

Finland's aims can be reflected through *Népszabadság's* article published on the 23 September 1969, shortly before Kekkonen's first state visit to Hungary. It was an extensive and well-studied summary of Kekkonen's public speeches and announcements by István L. Szabó. According to him, Finland's foreign policy was now entirely different compared to what it had been in the 1920s and 1930s when the basic line was isolation. But now, in the 1960s, everything that happened in the world was also Finland's concern and modern Finnish foreign policy could be described as 'a positive' foreign policy. This meant that every conflict between the East and the West was a test also to Finland's neutrality. Szabó wrote also that the Paasikivi-Kekkonen -line meant that Finland had tied her destiny on the question of peace. The concrete suggestions of creating nuclear-free zones were the clearest evidence of this policy. It was this very policy that was named by Szabó cryptically as 'positive foreign policy' Kekkonen who was a highly appreciated politician both in the East and West was its designer.¹¹² Szabó's estimate was quite accurate in view of the basic line of Finnish foreign policy; in his description we can find also the reason why Kekkonen hoped for success from the CSCE: he wanted Finland to become recognized world-

wide as a fully independent, neutral country which was not under the Soviet Union's command. This policy was welcomed also by the Hungarians, and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately after the proposal made an analysis of the benefits the Eastern bloc could and would gain from the conference. First, the socialist countries would benefit from it because the original idea was proposed by the Soviets. Secondly, it could impinge on the unity of NATO and the Western countries in general.¹¹³

Finnish politicians were able to discuss with their colleagues during Kekkonen's visit in September 1969. Kekkonen and Kádár, who had become good friends appreciated each other very highly, had a long talk, but surprisingly not about the CSCE. Once again Kádár spoke, and Kekkonen listened to how Kádár explained Hungary's policy before and during the Czechoslovakian crisis and the developments in the socialist camp in general. With president Pál Losonczi Kekkonen had discussions about the CSCE, and Losonczi pointed out that Hungary's position differed from that of Finland only because of geography – Finland is far in the north and Hungary lies in the heart of Europe, and that was why, for example, the question of Germany was so important to Hungary. The Foreign Ministers, Ahti Karjalainen and János Péter had similar views about the security conference. The preparations had gone so well that even the NATO countries had reacted on the proposal positively.¹¹⁴

If we study the aims Finland and Hungary had concerning the CSCE summit, there are many similarities. The most important motive both to Kekkonen and Kádár was peace. In the Second World War both countries had been on the 'wrong' side and after that Hungary had to endure the Soviet occupation since 1956. The crisis in Czechoslovakia had shown that the dangers of military action had not disappeared and in that sense a large conference with participants which could end the post-war political interregnum in Europe was a goal worth aspiring to.

The Summit took place in Finlandia House in Helsinki in August 1975 and all the participants signed the final act. Everybody won something: the first 'basket' was a victory for

the Soviets because in it was the affirmation of the borders of Europe. The second 'basket' was balanced, being mainly about economical matters and in the longer term it proved to be useless. In the third basket there was the question of human rights. It was a point to the USA. The real winner, however, was Finland because this was the first time since the Congress of Vienna that every nation was granted the right to neutrality and Kekkonen utilized the situation fully by stressing that the summit was now being held on neutral ground.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless the Cold War was still lurking behind the curtains, as the US State Secretary Henry Kissinger put it:¹¹⁶

In Helsinki all the Eastern European countries increased their maneuvering room and felt encouraged by Ford's demonstrative visit to the most independent of them (These countries had, of course, invited the President precisely to make that point).

Why was the summit important to Hungary? Henry Kissinger has an interesting quotation in his memoirs about the meeting with the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, James Callaghan, who told Kissinger what Kádár thought about the conference. To Kádár the conference was a moral and political commitment to accept the *status quo* of the borders in Europe. Both Callaghan and Kissinger agreed that the CSCE could not prevent crises like in Hungary in 1956, but the Soviet Union could never again justify or explain invasion.¹¹⁷ It was evident that the CSCE was for Kádár a meeting where he was securing Hungary's position as a sovereign socialist nation which did not have to fear brutal actions from the Soviet Union. It was a security guarantee within the Eastern European communist camp that Kádár aspired to, and that was what he got. The CSCE gave every nation in theory the permission to declare to remain a non-aligned and neutral country. The statement can be found in the final act of the CSCE. The achievement for Hungary was to secure territorial integrity in principle. Even though the future was to show that the declarations made in Helsinki had little bearing on political reality in Europe, in summer 1975 it gave to all the smaller countries in

Europe hope that there would be a longer period of peace ahead, albeit no one knew what kind of peace. Henry Kissinger put it in another way: 'One conference does not change the Soviet Union a bit.'¹¹⁸

8 The Aftermath

After 1975 Kekkonen and Kádár met only once, in November 1976 during Kekkonen's state visit to Budapest. Two old, experienced and in their own countries very popular statesmen had a long discussion in the Parliament on the 17th and 18th of November. They explained the latest developments in their own countries' internal politics. Kekkonen told of the troubles Finland had had in the economy and especially in the field of domestic policy. The conflicts had been mainly between the working class and farmers. Soon Kekkonen moved on to expound international affairs. The CSCE was naturally the main topic and there was some scepticism in Kekkonen's tone. To him the détente was still the crucial question for small countries and that is the reason why everybody should, in his view, focus on the CSCE's follow-up conferences. If Kekkonen spoke openly about Finnish domestic policy, so did Kádár of Hungarian. He informed Kekkonen about the situation: the country was 'homogenous' but there were also in Hungary different social classes; peasants, workers and petty bourgeoisie, but no capitalists. The aim was, according to Kádár, the co-operation between different classes, including the religious circles. The goal was to build a socialist society. In foreign policy Hungary and Finland had common aims. Finland was a neutral country and Hungary a socialist one. The most important friend Hungary was the Soviet Union but according to the agreements signed in Helsinki, Hungary was willing to have good relations with every country. The common interest was détente and because of it Hungary was willing to fight. In a nutshell:¹¹⁹

Primarily the leaders of Hungary seek the interest of their own nation because the Hungarians have gone through so many agonies that there is no reason for causing any more grief. This is what the Hungarians appreciate and that is the reason why they support the regime.

The principles Kádár explained to Kekkonen were very similar to the basic line Kekkonen had had during his long Presidency. Without good relations with the Soviet Union it was impossible to carry through one's own foreign policy. It was not a question of whether the Soviet Union accepted everything but the relations had to be based on mutual trust. Finland and Hungary were secure because they were only not acting against the Soviet Union but also in the interest of their own nation's future. This was the reason why Kekkonen and Kádár could understand each other so well. They both had been in politics for over 30 years in the shadow of the Soviet Union and both claimed credit for remarkable achievements. Hungary in the year 1976 was a totally different nation than it had been 20 years earlier and thanks to his reformist policy Kádár had gained a good reputation in the West. Finland had gone even further as it was widely accepted as at least a relatively neutral country. If Hungary was a model student of the socialist camp, Finland was an excellent example of how a democratic country could survive under the constant pressure of the Soviet Union. However, both success stories had their darker sides. In Hungary it was inefficient economy. As a member of the Soviet bloc Hungary was unable to develop her own industry the way it would have served the Hungarian economy¹²⁰, and there was also a serious lack of democracy. In Finland the long Kekkonen-era disturbed the domestic atmosphere and caused also a deficit of democracy. In Hungary it was impossible to see the future without the Soviet Union, in Finland it was impossible to see the future without Kekkonen.

Hungary and Finland had 'friendly' relations, not only in political declarations but also on a personal level. Kekkonen and Kádár liked each other, they both were very pragmatic in their policy, especially towards the Soviet Union. Neither of them had illusions about it. Finland and Hungary just had to live with it; there was no option. The influence of the Soviet Union could be felt also during the 1976 visit. The problem was the final *communiqué*. Kekkonen wanted, actually demanded, that there would be a mention of Finland's neutrality in the text. Kádár had told Kekkonen privately that he considered Finland a neutral country, but it was

not so easy to put it on paper. After lengthy and frustrating negotiations the magic word was added in the document, but later Kekkonen found out that the promise to use that word had come from Moscow.¹²¹ That was the price Kádár had to pay for his policy and that was the prize Kekkonen had achieved with his policy.

No matter how good friends or relatives Finland and Hungary were, there was always the mighty Soviet Union somewhere there. The greatness (or to some scholars the weakness) of Kekkonen and Kádár was that they realized this perfectly and acted in the field of domestic and international policy precisely so that the Soviets could not find reason to criticize them publicly. They had no other alternative but to notice that in Kekkonen they could trust and in Kádár they had chosen to trust. Kekkonen and Kádár knew it. They both created partly different, partly similar political cultures: Kekkonen and Kádár believed that if the Soviet Union trusted them, they both had more space to carry out their own policy. There were two important sectors for both: international status and economy. For Kekkonen international recognition and neutrality were the most important but for Kádár the economic matters were more important because they thwarted the danger of internal unrest. They both managed their missions quite well.

NOTES

- ¹ Uno Koistinen to Helsinki, 21 January 1950. UM 5/27 C. The Archives of the Foreign Ministry (=UMA).
- ² Jukka Nevakivi, *Ulkoasiainhallinnon historia 1918-1956*. Helsinki: Ulkoasianministeriö 1988, 243: *Ulkoasiainhallinnon matrikkeli*, toim. Jussi Nuorteva ja Tuire Raitio. Länsi-Savo Oy, Mikkeli: Ulkoasianministeriö, 413.
- ³ A very good example can be found in the President Paasikivi's diaries. In June 1947 Paasikivi received a letter from Foreign Minister Carl Enckell in which he wrote about his anxiety of the developments in Hungary. Enckell was worried about what was going on but the essence of the letter was the concern over Finland's destiny. *J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944-1956. Ensimmäinen osa 28.6.1944-24.4.1949*, eds Yrjö Blomstedt and Matti Klinge. WSOY. Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva (5th edition) 1985. date 19 June 1947. See also Tuomo Polvinen, *Jaltasta Pariisiin raUMAan. Suomi kansainvälisessä politiikassa 3, 1945-1947*. Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva 1981, 271-280 and passim.
- ⁴ This means naturally only the state level. The first Chairman of the Finnish-Hungarian Society, Mr. Ele Alenius visited Hungary in 1947. See: *Meidän Unkari. Suomi-Unkari 1950-2000*. Ed. Helena Honka-Hallila, Jyväskylä 2000, 11. There was also an International Youth Festival in Budapest in 1949 with participants from Finland, and the Central Hungarian Trade Union and the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions created relations during the summer 1947. See: Jaakko Numminen, 'The Development of Cultural Relations between Hungary and Finland', in Jaakko Numminen, János Nagy et al. (eds.), *Friends and Relatives. Finnish-Hungarian Cultural Relations*. Budapest: Corvina 1984, 9-18.
- ⁵ *Presidentti Paasikiven päiväkirja 21.6.1947*.
- ⁶ *Presidentti Paasikiven päiväkirja 11.11.1947*.
- ⁷ Kimmo Rentola, *Niin kylmää että polttaa. Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 1947-1958*. Keuruu: WSOY 1997, 9-80 and passim.; Lasse Lehtinen, *Aatosta jaloa ja alhaista mieltä. SDP:n ja Urho Kekkosen suhteet, 1944-1981*. Keuruu: WSOY 2002, 145-151; Jukka Nevakivi, *Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan ja Suomi suomettui*, Keuruu: Otava 1996, 29-45; Lauri Haataja, *Demokratian opissa. SKP, vaaran vuodet ja Neuvostoliitto*. Helsinki: Tammi, 1988, 213-276; Juhani Suomi, *Vonkamies. Urho Kekkonen 1944-1950*. Keuruu: Otava 1986, 263-276 and 335-349; see also Hermann Beyer-Thoma, *Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten in Finnland 1944-1948*. Wiesbaden 1990, passim.

- ⁸ *Presidentti Paasikiven päiväkirja 4.11.1946; Ulkoasiainhallinnon matrikkeli, toinen osa.* Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministeriö 1996, 413.
- ⁹ For example: Paul Lendvai, *The Hungarians. 1000 Years of Victory in Defeat.* London: Hurst & Company 2003, 427-448.
- ¹⁰ Uno Koistinen sent to Finland two reports in February 1950. Both were dated the 23rd but the first one is without a running number and the other one is the report number one. Both reports can be found in the Foreign Ministry Archives, first from series UM 5/27 C and the second one from 94 B. Unkari. UMA.
- ¹¹ *Szabad Nép* 6.2.1950 and *Világosság* 17.2.1950. The extreme leftists in Finland did not like Paasikivi either; they criticized him of the amnesty of the former President Risto Ryti. SUPO's personal and confidential report to J.K. Paasikivi, May 1949, JKP V:8. National Archives of Finland (=KA).
- ¹² Tuomo Polvinen, *J.K.Paasikivi, Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 4, 1944-1948*, Porvoo, Helsinki, Juva: WSOY 1999, 33, 71, 103, 125, 535, 541, 555, 557-558 and passim. For example, the head of the Allied Control Commission, General Grigori Savonenkov told that in his opinion Paasikivi is a 'clever and far-sighted politician who understood the advantages Finland could gain from good relations with the Soviet Union'.
- ¹³ Tuomo Polvinen - Hannu Immonen, *J.K. Paasikivi. Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 5, 1948-1956*, Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY 2003, 70-71.
- ¹⁴ Uno Koistinen to Helsinki 23 February 1950. UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ¹⁵ For Finland during the late 1940s and early 1950s, see for example, Juhani Suomi, *Urho Kekkonen, kuningastie 1950-1956.* Helsinki: Otava 1990; Juhani Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962.* Helsinki: Otava; Max Jakobson, *Den finländska paradoxen: linjen i Finlands utrikespolitik 1953-1965.* Stockholm: Norstedt 1982; Max Jakobson, *Kuumalla linjalla: Suomen ulkopoliitiikan ydinkysymyksiä 1944-1968.* Helsinki: WSOY; *Isänmaan puolesta. Suojelupoliisi 50 vuotta*, Toim. Matti Simola and Tuulia Sirviö. Jyväskylä: Gummerus 1999; Kimmo Rentola, *Niin Kylmää että polttaa. Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 1947-1958.* Helsinki: Otava 1997; Hannu Rautkallio, *Kekkonen ja KGB 1944-1962.* Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva. WSOY, 1996; Timo Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö 1956-1969. Ulkoasianhallinto ja ulkopoliitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella.* Hämeenlinna: Ulkoasianministeriö 2003. For Hungary see e.g. Jörg K. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary 1867-1986.* London and New York: Longman 1988, 187-206.
- ¹⁶ Münnich to Budapest, 5 April and 1 March 1950. MOL, Finn-KüM-XIX-J-1-Finn 7d. 12/a -020217; 019651.

- ¹⁷ *Ulkoasianministeriön matrikkeli I*. Mikkeli: Länsi-Savo Oy 1993, 329-330.
- ¹⁸ Uno Koistinen to Helsinki 6 October 1950. UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ¹⁹ Forgacs Egon to Budapest, 8 October 1950. MOL, Finn-Küm-XIX-J-1-k. 7 d. 028367.
- ²⁰ Dömötör Ferenc to Budapest, 2 November 1951, XIX-J-1-k-Finn. 18d. 016606; Budapest to Dömötör 29 November 1951. XIX-J-1-k-Finn 18d. 016606/I/3/3 and Helsinki to Budapest, 6 January 1952. MOL, XIX-J-1-Finn 18d.21/a-01155. The Finnish Security Police (SUPO) kept an eye on the FHS with great interest and found out that it was in the hands of extreme leftists. The Society was on constant surveillance during the 1960s. Suojelupoliisin ilmoitus 5357/25.4.1960. SUPO Archives.
- ²¹ Lauri Hjelt to Helsinki, 17 March 1952 and 28 April 1952. UM 5/27 C. UMA. (The newspapers Hjelt quoted were *Szabad Nép* of 26 January and *Magyar Nemzet* of 7 April 1952).
- ²² Hjelt's reports especially from the year 1952 and partly from the year 1953 to Helsinki. UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ²³ Hjelt to Helsinki, 31 December 1953. UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ²⁴ Nigel Swain, *Hungary. The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism*. London, New York: Verso 1992, 54-81.
- ²⁵ G. Schöpflin, 'Hungary after the Second World War', in György Litván (ed.) *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Reform, Revolt and repression 1953-1956*. London: Longman 1996, 20-22. Very similar information Finland got from Hjelt's reports from the years 1951-1953.
- ²⁶ Hjelt to Helsinki, 10 June 1953 UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ²⁷ Hjelt's two reports, both on the 31 December 1953 to Helsinki. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ²⁸ Schöpflin, 'Hungary after the Second World War', 24-25.
- ²⁹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 5 July 1953. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³⁰ Hjelt to Helsinki, 5 July 1953. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³¹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 6 February 1954. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³² Hjelt to Helsinki, 10 March 1954. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³³ Hjelt to Helsinki, 20 July 1954. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³⁴ Hjelt to Helsinki, 20 January 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³⁵ Vojtech Mastny, 'Learning from the Enemy', in Gustav Schmidt (ed.). *A History of Nato. The First Fifty Years. Volume 2*. N.Y: Palgrave 2001, 158-159.
- ³⁶ Schöpflin, 'Hungary after the Second World War', 30-32.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.
- ³⁸ Hjelt to Helsinki, 25 February and 27 April and 22 April 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA.

- ³⁹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 23 April 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁴⁰ Nikita Khrushchev. *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*. Boston 1974, 222-225, see also Matti Kosonen, Juha Pohjonen. *Isänmaan Portinvartijat. Suomen rajojen vartiointi 1918-1994*. Keuruu: Otava 1994, 419-422.
- ⁴¹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 27 September 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA. Actually the Soviets wanted at this moment that Paasikivi would stay as the President of Finland.
- ⁴² Hjelt to Helsinki, 31st of December 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁴³ Hjelt to Helsinki, 13 January 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA; J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat (10 October, 1955) Juva: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö 1986; Anssi Halmesvirta, 'Unkarilaisia illuusioita ja reaalipolitiikkaa: Vuoden 1956 kansannousu Suomen Budapestin lähettiläiden silmin'. *Hungarologische Beiträge*, vol 11. Universitt Jyvskyl, 1998, 132, n. 19 and passim.
- ⁴⁴ Hjelt to Helsinki, 6 January 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA
- ⁴⁵ *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*. Edited by Csaba Bks, Malcolm Byrne, Jnos M. Rainer. Budapest: Central European University Press 2002, 10-11.
- ⁴⁶ Hjelt to Helsinki, 2 March 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ⁴⁸ Hjelt to Helsinki 25 May 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁴⁹ The members of the delegation were: Toivo Kujala (FPDL), Kaisa Hiitel (SDP), Eino Heikura (Agr.), Kaiho Haapanen (FPDL), Hilja Vnnen (Agr.), Juho Lindqvist (FPDL), Kalervo Saura (CP), Arne hman and Harras Kytt. Source: Finnish Embassy's letter to Helsinki, 16 June 1956. UM/106 G/Eduskunnan vierailu Unkarissa. UMA.
- ⁵⁰ Hjelt to Helsinki, 16 June 1956. UM 5/C 27; Eduskunnan vierailusta Unkarista UM/106 G. UMA.
- ⁵¹ *Szabad Np* 5.6.1956.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, Csaba Bks. Malcolm Byrne and Jnos M. Rainer (eds.), CEU Press 2002, XXXV.
- ⁵⁴ Hjelt to Helsinki 6 July 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁵⁵ Report from Anastas Mikoyan on the Situation in the Hungarian Workers' Party, 14 July 1956 to CPSU CC. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 142-147.
- ⁵⁶ Hjelt to Helsinki, 26 July 1956. UM 5/C 27 UMA: Report from Anastas Mikoyan on the situation in the Hungarian Worker's Party, 14 July 1956 to CPSU CC. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, pp. 142-147.

- ⁵⁷ Hjelt to Helsinki, 3 September 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA; Report from Ambassasdor Yurii Andropov on Deteriorating Condition in Hungary August 29, 1956 to the Presidium of the CPSU CC. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 159-167.
- ⁵⁸ G. Schöpflin, 'From Mass Protest to Armed Uprising', in *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956*, 50-52.
- ⁵⁹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 10 November 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁶⁰ Hjelt to Helsinki, 14 November 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁶¹ Hjelt to Helsinki 10th, 14th and 21st of November, 1956. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁶² Juhani Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962*, Keuruu: Otava 1992, 60-68; Max Jakobson, *Pelon ja toivon aika. 20. vuosisadan tilinpäätös II*. Keuruu: Otava, 204-213.
- ⁶³ Kekkonen's notes, 4 December 1956, UKA 21/85 (quotation). UKA (=Urho Kekkonen's Archives, Orimattila, Finland)
- ⁶⁴ About the United States' attitude: National Security Council report 5811, "Policy To the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe", May 9 1958. In *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 543-550.
- ⁶⁵ Romanian and Czechoslovakian Minutes on the Meeting of the Five East European States Leaders in Budapest 1 - 4 Jan. 1957. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 489-490; Hjelt to Helsinki, 8 January 1956. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁶⁶ Hjelt to Helsinki, 10th January 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁶⁷ *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 374-376.
- ⁶⁸ Hjelt to Helsinki 26 January 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁶⁹ Hjelt to Helsinki 14th February 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁷⁰ Kádár's report to the HSWP Provisional Executive Committee on Soviet-Hungarian Negotiations in Moscow, April 2, 1957. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 517-523.
- ⁷¹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 3 and 4 May 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA; Kádár's report to the HSWP Provisional Executive Committee on Soviet-Hungarian Negotiations in Moscow, April 2, 1957. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 522.
- ⁷² Hjelt to Helsinki, 17 May 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁷³ Minutes of the HSWP Central Committee Meeting, December 21, 1957. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 532-538.
- ⁷⁴ *Ulkoasiainhallinnon matrikkeli I*, 211.

- ⁷⁵ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 3 July 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA. For a sharper interpretation of the discussion, see Halmesvirta, 'Unkarilaisia illuusioita ja reaali politiikkaa', 138
- ⁷⁶ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 24 July and 29 August 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁷⁷ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 29 August 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁷⁸ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 24 September 1957. UM 5/ C 27.UMA. About the decisions made concerning the trial against the 'Nagy-group', see the memorandum from Yuri Andropov to the CPSU CC, August 29th 1957. It could not be arranged any earlier than in December 1957 – January 1958. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 541-542.
- ⁷⁹ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 23 October 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁸⁰ Memorandum of Finnish-Hungarian relations, dated 4 December 1962. UKA 23/9. UMA.
- ⁸¹ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 8 December 1958 and 22 January 1959. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁸² Heikkilä to Helsinki 22 January 1959. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁸³ Akcióterv: a magyar-finn kapcsolatok alakítása 1964-ben. MOL, Finn-KüM, XIV-J-1-Finn-4/bd. 3d. -524.
- ⁸⁴ Kekkonen's diary, from 5th to 9th, May 1963. *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 1963-1968*, ed. Juhani Suomi. Keuruu: Otava 2002.
- ⁸⁵ About the plan, see, *Juhani Suomi, Urho Kekkonen 1962-1968*. Keuruu: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava 1994, 121-123.
- ⁸⁶ Reino Palas to Helsinki, 20 May 1963 (The discussion took place on 6 of May 1963). UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ *Ulkoasianhallinnon matrikkeli II*. Mikkeli: Länsi-Savo Oy 1996, 84.
- ⁸⁹ *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 2 (years 1963-1968)*, Juhani Suomi (ed), 11 May 1963. Keuruu: Otava 2002. There is a mistake in Kekkonen's diary because on the 11 May he was still in Yugoslavia and he arrived in Budapest on the 12 May. The reason for this contradiction is security. Kekkonen never had his diaries with him abroad but made his remarks after the trip. In this case he just remembered the date he met Kádár incorrectly.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid.
- ⁹¹ *Hájdú-Bihari Napló* 12 May 1963; *Esti Hírlap* 15 and 16 May 1963 and *Népszabadság* 8 May 1964. UM 94 B. UMA.
- ⁹² Kurtán to KÜM 22 August 1963. MOL, Finn-KüM, XIX-J-1-j-Finn/f. 8.d.-006502 and Feljegyzés Kekkonen látogatásáról 20.5.1963. XIX-J-1-k-Finn. 4/b-S24-3 d.
- ⁹³ Palas to Helsinki, 11 June 1963. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.

- ⁹⁴ Palas to Helsinki, 12th and 26 July 1963 and a special report 'Hungary and the Western block' on the 25 February 1964. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁹⁵ Palas to Helsinki, 13 April 1964. UM5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁹⁶ *Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 2* 20.10.1964; Palas to Helsinki, 2 November 1964. UM C 27. UMA. About Khrushchev's downfall see Dmitri Volkogonov, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire. Political Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev* (ed. and translated by Harold Schukman). London: Harper & Collins 1999, 248-259.
- ⁹⁷ *Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 2*, 89-97.
- ⁹⁸ Palas to Helsinki 26 November 1964. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁹⁹ Max Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*. Keuruu: Otava 2003, 80-90.
- ¹⁰⁰ Palas to Helsinki 9 December 1963 (Press release). UM 94 B. UMA.
- ¹⁰¹ Lehtinen, *Aatosta jaloa ja alhaista mieltä*, 413-471.
- ¹⁰² Urho Kekkonen's diary, 23 August 1968. *Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 3*, Keuruu: Otava 2003.
- ¹⁰³ Andrew Felkay, *Hungary and the USSR 1956-1988. Kádár's Political Leadership*, Contributions in political science: no 227. New York: Greenwood Press 1989, 208-217; Jukka Nevakivi to Helsinki, 7 August 1968, 24 August 1968, 30 August 1968 and E.O. Raustila to Helsinki, 9 September 1968. UM 5/C 27, UMA. Kekkonen was well-informed about the crisis for the Intelligent Department of the Staff of the Armed forces could provide very accurate information as early as the 22 August 1968. See UKA/21/117. It could have come only from the West. One must emphasize that also the reports from Hungary were very informative. See also: Huszár Tibor, *Kádár. Politikai életrajza. 2 kötet*. Budapest: Szabad Tér Kiadó 1989, 210-222.
- ¹⁰⁴ Raustila to Helsinki, 9 September 1968. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ¹⁰⁵ Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, 64.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁷ Max Jakobson, 38. kerros. *Havaintoja ja muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1965-1971*. Helsinki: Otava 1983, 220-221.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 3*,. 50-51.
- ¹⁰⁹ Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, 64-65. See also Jakobson, 38. kerros, 221-223.
- ¹¹⁰ Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, p.64.
- ¹¹¹ Martti Ingman to Helsinki, 28.10.1968. UM 7 B; Budapestin lähetystön lehdistökatsaukset 4.11.1969 ja 2.12.1969. UM 94 B. UMA.
- ¹¹² Budapestin lähetystön lehdistökatsaus 6.10.1969, tiivistelmä *Népszabadság*-lehden artikkelista 23.9.1969. UM 94 B. UMA; Actually president Kekkonen spoke about 'active' foreign policy. This term was presented in November 1965 when Kekkonen made a speech in the Young Generation's Society for

Foreign Policy, see *Suomen turvallisuuksipolitiikka. Tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkosen turvallisuuksipoliittisia puheita vuosilta 1943-1979*, Helsinki 1982.

¹¹³ MOL, Finn-KüM, XIX-J-l-Finn-l-001386 (melléklet: Az európai biztonsági konferencia).

¹¹⁴ Feljegyzés Kádár elvtárs és Kekkonen között 1969 szeptember 29-én történt tárgyalásról. MOL. XIX-J-l-Finn-l. 37.d-002242; Feljegyzés Losonczy elvtárs Kekkonen elnökkel folytatott tárgyalásáról. Budapest, 1969, október 2. XIX-J-l-J-Finn-l. 37. d.-002242; Feljegyzés Péter elvtárs Karjalainen külügyminiszterrel folytatott tárgyalásáról. Budapest, 1969, október 2. MOL, XIX-J-i-j-Finn-l. 27.d-002242.

¹¹⁵ Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, p. 65; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal. The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs*, New York: Simon & Schuster 1999, 657-663; Juhani Suomi, *Liennytyksen akanvirrassa*, Keuruu: Otava 1998, 666-670.

¹¹⁶ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 660.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 644.

¹¹⁸ Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, 66.

¹¹⁹ Memorandum of the discussion with Kádár and Kekkonen in Budapest 18 November 1976, Tájékoztató a központi bizottság tagjai részére időszerű nemzetközi kérdésekről. Budapest, 1976. december. M-KS-288f - 4 cs -148öe - 1976 12.01. MOL, Finn-KüM; Juhani Suomi, *Umpeutuva latu*, Keuruu: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava 2000, 88.

¹²⁰ On Hungarian economics, see Nigel Swain, *Hungary. The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism*. London, New York: Verso 1992.

¹²¹ Suomi, *Umpeutuva latu*, 127.

**Moral and Stability: The Image of János Kádár and
Urho Kekkonen in the West from 1956 to the early
1970s**

Vesa VARES

1 Introduction: Two Statesmen as Symbols and Images

1.1 The Countries Personified

In 1975, as President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, became 75 years old – and was as powerful as ever and as his era and political line seemed to go on indefinitely – a book *Urho Kekkonen – a Statesman for Peace* was published. It consisted of 12 articles and a foreword. Some of the writers were active politicians and diplomats, some were scholars, some of them were both. Four of the writers were Scandinavians. The book was to celebrate Kekkonen's career and role in world policy.

As such, the book naturally was not to be very critical – one Danish article perhaps excluded – but not hagiographic in any Eastern European sense either. Nevertheless, it was intended to influence foreign opinion and to disgrace the rhetoric of 'finlandization' in the West – it was originally in Finnish but translated into English. The foreword, written by a Foreign Ministry official and a university Professor, began a bit pompously and later went on to also praise the future of the statesman:¹

The name of Urho Kekkonen, the President of Finland. Belongs to a category of names of European statesmen, who symbolize their country. Kekkonen is part of Finland's international image. Finland's foreign policy is synonymous with Kekkonen's foreign policy.

Although Urho Kekkonen has already made history, he has, by no means, given up his active role. His vitality appears undiminished and he continues to remain an innovative statesman. At the moment it appears as if Kekkonen will continue to place his uniquely personal stamp on Finnish politics for a long time to come.

Other articles went on to describe the difficulties, prejudices and opposition which Kekkonen had confronted, and how he had conquered them practically all, acquired historical wisdom and was now one of the true leading statesmen in Europe – in fact, one, who played an even wider role in world politics and was specifically advancing *détente* and world peace. It was in part a dialogue on the conditions for communication between states with different social systems and its goal was to ‘break the iron ring of fear and hate’.² Kekkonen was in a unique position: the West had recognized Finland’s neutrality, he had special relations with Soviet leaders and could convey Western viewpoints to the East and Eastern viewpoints to the West. Under Kekkonen, Finland had reached all the goals in foreign policy which it had set.³

In short, Kekkonen was the symbol and guarantor of Finland. Even the slightly critical Dane, who expressed worries of what would come after Kekkonen – as he had become so indispensable – actually emphasized Kekkonen’s importance and symbolic value; was it at all possible that anyone could replace him and be able to satisfy the Soviets as he had done?⁴

Another, although smaller, example of the same kind, also published in 1975, was the issue number 2 of the Finnish periodical on foreign policy, *Ulkopolitiikka*. It was dedicated to Kekkonen on his 75th birthday, and among the writers one can find the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the previous government (the government in office at the time was a civil servant government), the Swedish Prime Minister and the Editor of *Izvestija* (also a member of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union), and there were congratulations of many big firms and businesses. Also 1000 hardbacks were issued.⁵ Also this can be seen as a part of an image-building project: Kekkonen was Finland.

In the same way János Kádár was Hungary. The similarity was even more underlined by the fact that both Kekkonen and Kádár had risen to power in the same year 1956, had become father figures and seemed to go on indefinitely without a serious domestic challenge. Both were believed to be genuine father figures in their respective nations – without any real official personality cult, if one compared it to, for example, Rumania or East Germany, let alone North Korea.

Even a *Leaders of the World* series, which was published in the West and edited by Robert Maxwell, issued in 1985 a short biography of Kádár and published many of his speeches. The author also had had a chance to interview and follow Kádár for three days; so the message got more authority. Maxwell's introduction raised Kádár to an exceptional international level and thus helped very much to build the image of a real statesman, especially in Western eyes:

Last year there was a stream of visits between senior Western leaders and Mr. János Kádár, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. These were an indication of his stature as an Eastern bloc leader willing to forge closer links with the West, and to adopt the profit motive wherever possible to help make the Marxist Socialist State more efficient and productive.

Sir Geoffrey Howe's first official visit as the British Foreign Secretary was to Hungary, as was Margaret Thatcher's first visit to a Warsaw Pact country. Other Western leaders to travel to Budapest in 1984 have included Chancellor Kohl of the Federal German Republic and Signor Craxi, the Prime Minister of Italy. Mr. Kádár's own highly successful visit to France was the first from a top-level Warsaw Pact leader to President Mitterand, and followed a visit to President Giscard d'Estaing in 1978. [...]

Steeled by a life of tumult, this tall, modest man with simple tastes has introduced changes over the last 20 years which are the marvel of his people and the envy of his neighbours. [...]

Kádár has given Hungary political stability and a high standard of living. Domestic reforms under his rule mean that there are now no political prisoners in Hungary, and internment without trial has been abolished. These advances have persuaded many of the emigrés of 1956 to return home. Kádár's popularity is now at its height, and if a Western-style pluralist poll were to be held in

Hungary it would undoubtedly result in his re-election with a massive majority. [...]

He points out that Labour and the Conservatives in Britain and Democrats and Republicans in the USA share the same basic principles and views about the organisation of their State and its defence alliances, while the debate between them is restricted to the arrangements for distribution of wealth and power within the State.

Even the fact that Kádár had 'invited' the Soviet army to Hungary in 1956 was explained according to the official version: it had been the only alternative to prevent a Civil War.

Also the *Introductory Biography* section of the book (150 pages) painted a picture of a modest and principled, but extremely wise, cunning and pragmatic man. 'He is a type mostly to be found among wise, old peasants who have lived to see much. [...] Modesty of the spirit is an inner imperative as strong as that of the body.' Only his sense of duty accounted for the fact that he had been a leader since youth. It was also noted how Kádár had turned the tables also as far as the Western viewpoint was concerned; the despised man of 1956 was now treated with respect. Among the Hungarians, his popularity was presented as genuine and natural: 'People do not adulate Kádár, do not idolize him, do not celebrate him. They love him. With an intimate, joyful respect. Not only has Kádár identified with the country, the country has also identified with him. This is why I dare to write the bombastic sentence: János Kádár is Hungary.'⁶

The images were of course uncritical, and the image of modesty and of simple, self-sacrificing nature of the true statesman belongs to the oldest political commercial there is. But it can hardly be denied that they served their purposes both in Finland, Hungary, in the Soviet Union and in the West. Kekkonen and Kádár were forces which were stable and well-suited in the big picture, especially during the détente, but also during the Cold War. Identifying Kekkonen with Finland and Kádár with Hungary also made everything much simpler and prevented all unpleasant surprises.

But how did these images come about, and were these persons originally respected or at least regarded as useful?

1.2 Kekkonen and Kádár as Objects of Research

First of all, it must be noted, that this is not a study of Kádár and Kekkonen as such; no attempt will be made to clarify what kind of politicians they were and what kind of policy they actually pursued. That issue is still very controversial in their countries and the sources available for this study do not offer a possibility to answer those questions. The purpose is to clarify the *image* they had in the West – the ‘West’ meaning in this case the United States and Britain.⁷

The opposite direction – image-building was only briefly referred to in the beginning. Finland and Hungary did indeed try to use the personalities of Kekkonen and Kádár as symbols both to the East and the West: guarantors of good, reliable relations with the Soviet Union, but simultaneously letting the West know that actually the aims of Finland and Hungary also served its interests, or at least the interests of the world community. According to the famous phrase by Kekkonen, Finland ‘did not want to be a judge, but a doctor’.

This emphasis on the Western ‘feedback’ aspect also means that the results are not results on Kekkonen or Kádár as such, but on the Western superpowers. The Western opinions and views on these persons are the object. Kekkonen and Kádár are spectres and mirrors through which the Western policy is illuminated rather than the actual object of the research. The often very critical assessments on Kekkonen and Kádár are not taken as any value as such – the truth or falseness of those assessments is not as interesting as the attitudes which can be seen lurking behind them. The similarity between reality and the image is of minor importance, because it was the image, not the actual reality which stipulated the Western political line towards Finland and Hungary. In this sense the image *was* reality to the West, even if it was – as it often was – actually erroneous or at least one-sided. This image was based on the information the West had available – not on archives nor on benefit of hindsight.

Kekkonen and Kádár are in fact quite good ‘tools’ for this kind of research. Neither Finland nor Hungary was a question which would have been crucial to Western interests, and both were geographically and also in many cases mentally distant.

Prejudices and expectations often prevailed and precise knowledge was often lacking and gave way to stereotypes, so the statements reveal better the mental climate. Both Finland and Hungary were – as Neville Chamberlain notoriously commented on Czechoslovakia in 1938 – distant countries, of which the British knew nothing – peculiar as such. And at the same time they were easily seen only in the light of the big powers, the assessments on them actually concentrated very easily on stereotypes of Russia or Germany. They were the ‘Others’ – a theme very up-to-date today, seldom passed by referring to such authorities as Stuart Hall, Benedict Anderson or Hugh Honour.⁸ It can also be asked whether Kádár and Kekkonen became kinds of scapegoats in the Western psychology – especially Kádár for the tragedy and failure of the 1956 uprising but also Kekkonen in ‘wasting’ the Paasikivi heritage and letting the Soviets to also interfere in Finnish internal affairs.

However, one cannot talk about a real ‘enemy image’ or a method with which the own bloc is made more solid by ‘creating enemies’. Both Kekkonen and Kádár were, after all, too insignificant for this from the American or British viewpoint; the Soviet Union and world Communism were the credible enemies. Finland and Hungary were only small pawns in the game, although Kádár especially also could be made ‘evil’ – responsible for the atrocities after 1956. Mainly one can say that there were expectations for both Kádár and Kekkonen, and their images differed in various periods, depending on how these expectations were fulfilled. Did the two statesmen live up to the expectation that they would at least try to keep the Soviet influence as low as possible with all the means at their disposal? Or did they let the bear in?

The period in question extends from 1956 to the mid-1970s, since the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) marked an end of one period. The next phase of the Cold War in the 1980s was another matter for both Finland, Hungary and the super-powers and it was also ended with a totally new constellation, i.e. the collapse of the Soviet Union. The study becomes even more illuminating by the fact that,

during the period under research here, there were remarkable similarities in Kekkonen's and Kádár's careers. As already mentioned, both Kádár and Kekkonen rose to power in 1956, the former after the Hungarian uprising was crushed, the latter less dramatically in a Presidential election. Both had also previously been among the prominent political elite in their respective countries. In 1975, during the CSCE, both Kádár and Kekkonen were still in power, seemed very likely to remain in power for a long time and in fact did, and the international situation had reached a new stage in which there was a real possibility that these former foes could be seen in a new role, as moderate stabilisers. This was even more so because the invasion of Czechoslovakia had first marked a much more dangerous future which had then given way to a spirit of *détente*, and as the West was not thinking its strategy as aggressively and was not as confident of changes to its benefit in the near future as it had still been in the early 1960s.

This research can be defined as a history of diplomacy and international relations. As such it might represent the very thing which the so called post-modern philosophy abhors as old-fashioned and elitist. Even though there can be truth in this, at least so far that concentrating on just diplomatic history would indeed be one-sided and neglect many valuable aspects, it must also be borne in mind that even 'new histories' sometimes become 'old', and one should remember that a new trend cannot change the past as such. Finland and Hungary in Western policy actually do represent this old-school history of old-school diplomacy at a time when the aspects popular today were not yet considered as important by the contemporaries – especially during the Cold War years. A post-modern effort to stress contacts of 'civil societies' in these cases and periods would be too trendy to be real. However, from the 1970s there are undoubtedly new possibilities in this area, but these will have to be considered in possible future studies. The fact is that the case for the study now at hand is 'traditional' because it would be quite artificial to pretend that any post-modern or other state of affairs would have existed in this kind of case in 1956–75.

It must also be added that the old controversies of *Primat der Aussenpolitik* or *Primat der Innenpolitik* do not come to the forefront either. Domestic events in the United States and Britain are of course important when the overall picture of the Cold War is concerned but they did not play a big role in the analysis of the motives of these countries on issues concerning Finland and Hungary. This is due to the fact that the circles which had opinions on Finnish and Hungarian issues were very small and even these people knew that the Finns and the Hungarians did not actually decide the big issues, not on world policy and even not always in their own policy either. Domestic changes in the United States and in England influenced only bigger issues, like the Cold War, fear of Russia and Communism, Germany, the Third World and imperialism etc. In fact, it does not seem that the Western policy line was particularly dependant on the fact of which party – Democratic or Republican, Conservative or Labour – was in power in the United States or in England. Because Finland and Hungary were not vital to the West, the policy concerning them was usually decided by the desk officers in the State Department and Foreign Office; these issues seldom required a Ministerial decision or comment. And since it was also evident that not much could be done to help the Finns or Hungarians (or to change their leadership to a more pro-Western one), continuity in these relations was very striking.

As previously noted, the study ends in the mid-1970s. It must, of course be confessed that also the sources set the end to the early 1970s, and the CSCE can be seen as the one final point. The American material was first taken from the FRUS-Online series (Foreign Relations of the United States) from the web-sites and the original documents have been consulted at College Park in 1997 and 2002. Whereas the British material is concerned, the original papers on Finland and Hungary in the Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, have been consulted. Finnish and Hungarian⁹ documents have not been used since this would have required a new set of questions and themes for the research, and the limit of resources for the project did not allow this.

2 The Hard Line of the Cold War (1956-62): A Quisling and a Tenderfoot

2.1 Hungary

2.1.1 Aspect of the Cold War: Traitors to be Ostracized

The factual events of the 1956 uprising and the biographical, personal history of Kádár will not be described here, since it can be assumed these are already known and since this study has to do with image, not with the actual events. More important is to remember the starting points of the West: Hungary was a country which had had a very strict stalinist control and which was in the enemy camp. Against such a country there could not be many causes for dissent between the Western countries. Even the simultaneous disagreements of crisis such as the Suez Canal were not relevant in the case of Hungary, where the West thought it could see the Cold War re-emerge violently from the Soviet side.

After the national uprising was crushed it was crystal clear to the West who were the heroes and who were the foes. The Hungarian communists were considered Moscow's puppets and henchmen, the real aggressor being the Soviet Union. The uprising was seen, as the British Envoy Leslie Fry defined it, as a 'revolt of a nation', and it had been directed against Soviet exploitation and communist oppression.¹⁰

An American press release, issued to the Legation in Budapest, was very typical:¹¹

In a joint declaration with the Soviet Government at Moscow on March 28th the Kádár regime has again denied the competence of the United Nations in the problem of Hungary. It has again falsified the record by alleging that the Hungarian uprising of October-November was a fascist counter-revolution unleashed by the United States.

But the record is clear. The uprising was spontaneous. It was supported by the entire nation. It was crushed only by the intervention of Soviet armed forces. In these circumstances, the continued presence of Soviet forces in Hungary and the systematic repression of the Hungarian people constitute an open confession by

the Kádár regime that it does not have the confidence of the people and cannot exist without the protection of the Soviet troops.

The Kádár regime has vengefully sought to identify, seize, and punish those who took any part in the uprising of October-November. It has carried out arrests of Hungarian citizens on a mass scale. It has re-instituted by decree the cruel practice of banishment. It has ordered all residents of Hungary to report to the police for a check of identity cards. It has made clear in public statements that Soviet troops will remain in Hungary indefinitely for the purpose of protecting the regime and intimidating the Hungarian people.

These events can only be regarded as further steps toward the complete suppression of all human rights and liberties in Hungary. They mark a reversion to some of the worst practices of the Stalinist terror in that country and stand in ironic contrast to the celebration by the Communists on April 4 of the 'Liberation' of Hungary by Soviet Armed Forces in 1945.

We believe that these developments will be of concern to the Special Committee established by the United Nations General Assembly on January 10 to investigate the problem of Hungary. The Committee will report its findings to the General Assembly, which remains seized by the problem of Hungary.

In practice, the new Hungarian leaders, Kádár included, were boycotted after the crushing of the uprising. Especially the United States aimed to deny credentials from the Hungarian UN Delegation because of the atrocities in crushing the uprising. The American view can also be seen from the motivations for a UN solution which the US Legation made known to its British counterpart in Budapest:

- a) It should comprise a series of steps, and not be a 'package' proposal.
- b) The measures proposed should be such that no formal acceptance of them either by the Russians or by the Hungarians was necessary.
- c) It should appeal to the 'uncommitted' nations.
- d) It should consist of measures which could be carried out within the existing Hungarian constitution.
- e) It should, if possible, be able to show some advantage to the Soviet Government.

As such, there was also an angle of *Realpolitik*; it was perceived that not much could be done and that the Russians would need some face-saving measures. But on the whole the American line was strict. The American Legation suggested that it would also be demanded that Hungary would withdraw such legislation (it is illuminating that the word legislation was in parentheses) which made arbitrary arrests, incarcerations, summary trials etc. possible. The UN should also demand new negotiations about the stationing of the Soviet troops in Hungary, more cultural freedom, reducing the pressure of the party in schools, increasing the number of workers' councils and widening of the government. It was of course taken for granted that these conditions would not be met, but as the Soviets would reject them, it would be a propaganda victory for the West.¹²

The American National Security Council – which drafted the policy lines to be approved by the President – also claimed that the uprising was a moral victory against Communism in the long run. This, of course, was partly an ideologically 'compulsory' interpretation and revealed in fact that the West had no means to influence events behind the Iron Curtain. The NSC considered, however, that there were possibilities for evolutionary development of the satellites, and thus they could distance them more and more from old-time stalinism and the influence of Moscow. The future looked most promising in Yugoslavia and in Gomulka's Poland.

Compared to them, Hungary was totally black:¹³

The present Communist regime in Hungary, in consolidating its physical control of the nation, has followed a policy of terror and intimidation clearly intended to wipe out all resistance. Although the Hungarian people continue to despise this regime, a surface calm prevails and the normal pattern of life under Soviet Communism has resumed. [...]

Because Hungary has become an important psychological factor in the world-wide struggle of the free nations against expansionist Soviet Communism, U.S. policy must maintain a delicate balance; it must seek to encourage the same evolutionary developments as in the other nations of Eastern Europe, without compromising the symbol which Hungary has become. More restraint will be required in dealing directly with regime officials than in certain

other nations of the area, and the timing of U.S. moves will be of great importance.

In 1958–59 the NSC defined the Western goals in the Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. The general line was not totally militant without any shades. Of course, there would be a continuing refusal to accept the *status quo* of Soviet domination over the nations of Eastern Europe as permanent, and there would be a continuing affirmation of the right of the dominated peoples to national independence and to governments of their own free choosing. However, simultaneously it was assumed that the West had to deal with the present communist governments, not to expect them to be overthrown in the foreseeable future. Even so, also in this document Hungary was presented in the most negative light:¹⁴

There has been no progress toward the achievement of U.S. policy objectives in Hungary. In the absence of any favourable change in the Hungarian regime's defiant and uncooperative attitude toward the UN and its efforts to deal with the problems arising from the 1956 revolution, U.S. relations with Hungary remain strained, and the United States has continued successfully its efforts to keep the Hungarian situation before World opinion and under active consideration at the UN.

In the UN itself, the outline was naturally more emotional, principled and strict. The US UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge referred in his speech in December 1959 several times to Kádár's speeches as evidence of the dictatorship and added: 'And to the brave and suffering people of Hungary this resolution says: You are not forgotten.' Another US representative put it even more plainly about a year later, throwing a sarcastic comment to the Soviet side: 'Freedom and peace are indivisible. The day of freedom must come – not only in Asia and Africa, where it has been arriving with dramatic suddenness – but also in those areas of Europe and Asia which have been subjected to the new domination of alien matters'.¹⁵

The British may not have disagreed with the general line but having far less superpower resources, they could usually rec-

commend no action. Sheer propaganda would not help much if nothing concrete would be achieved. As the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Patrick Reilly, pointed out to the Foreign Office, the Soviet Union would not care about international pressure, and if the UN tried to deny the Hungarian credentials in the UN, it would only reveal the impotence of the UN. The only possible way to get any results would be high level talks with the Soviets, for example, between the Secretary General of the UN and the Soviet Ambassador in the UN.¹⁶

It is hardly surprising that Reilly's colleague in Budapest, Leslie Fry, emphasized more the moralistic view, connected to the pragmatic one: 'While I agree that the Russians should logically be our main target, it seems to me to be going too far to say that "to take action against the Hungarians would be hitting the wrong target".' There was nothing illogical about hitting the secondary target, 'the Hungarian puppets', if you could not hit the main one, 'their Russian masters'. Fry did not take very seriously the threat that Hungary would in return expel the Western Legations from Budapest either.¹⁷ The atrocities which he had witnessed in Budapest clearly made him the most militant representative of the British diplomatic corps.

When Fry wrote to his superiors a critical evaluation of the UN plan of the Americans, he seems to have thought that even that was too moderate. According to him, the UN representative or group should not have been a negotiator in any normal sense of the word, but 'an "educator" seeking to convince the Russians that concessions should be made to the Hungarian people'. Of course, the Russians would not accept proposals put to them; but they might initiate something else if they were convinced that world opinion demanded it and that they would not lose thereby.¹⁸

On the whole, however, the British were more moderate or at least less convinced of the usefulness of propaganda gestures. This became evident in a small scale when the Inter-Parliamentary Union was summoned in London in 1957 and Hungary planned to send a hard-liner communist Sándor Rónai as the Hungarian representative. Fry recommended that he

should be turned out, and his further advice of how the Hungarians should be approached was not particularly diplomatic. He recommended to be expressed 'that, as the Kádár government was imposed on the Hungarian people by force of Russian arms, a delegation from a "Parliament" consisting solely of Kádár's stooges can hardly expect to be recognised in this country as representing the people of Hungary' and to complain to the delegation.

This was too much for the desk officers: they admitted that the British could mention oppression and that the British people regarded with horror 'the executions, arbitrary arrests, political prisons and concentration and forced labour camps which are now such prominent features on the Hungarian scene'. But it was doubtful whether Fry's suggestion would pay off in any way. In the first place, if the West wanted to be consistent, there would be several other delegations at the conference to whom much the same thing could be said; and in the second place, it was hardly logical to tell people simultaneously that they were mere stooges and then go on to protest to them about what their government was doing.¹⁹ The weight of Realpolitik was getting more important as time went by.

At least according to the British, the Hungarians, however, saw or wanted to see the British policy as more moderate than that of the other Western countries. Especially during Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's visit to the Soviet Union the Hungarian attitude towards the British approached, according to the British, 'even cordiality and I was forced to listen to clumsy exercises in wedge-driving through contrast between British flexibility and American-German intransigence'.²⁰ Naturally, the British did not want to see their moderation in this light or take the role of a deserter.²¹ Even so, their comments on American policy on Hungary were less and less enthusiastic: the standard British line was that, repulsive as the Kádár government was, the American approach had been proven 'sterile', and it was in the interests of the West to do whatever they could to promote contacts with the Hungarian nation and to prevent the traditional links from being broken.²² When the

American line emphasised isolation of Hungary, the British thought the same goals could perhaps be reached better from within.

The Americans held to their own line. When State Secretary Christian Herter approved in November 1960 that the Legations in Bucharest and Sofia would be raised to the status of embassies, he specifically stated that this would not apply to Budapest, since 'our current relations with Hungary are anomalous and wholly negative'.²³

2.1.2 A Quisling in 1956 – or a Lesser Evil?

Seen from the starting points and policy strategies mentioned previously, it is hardly surprising that the Western view on Kádár's person was extremely suspicious and negative. In the reports he was more often than once 'Quisling', and his government was not always considered a government at all – sometimes it was called 'terroristic'.²⁴

At best, Kádár was seen as a mediocrity and a victim of circumstances who had had no choice if he wanted to save himself. At worst, he was seen as a traitor and a quisling who had joined the Russians because of personal ambition. What was worst and most ominous – according to this interpretation – was that he had not done this because he had to, but because he had wanted to gain power in Hungary. Even his personal honesty was in doubt because he had first joined the Nagy regime but then deserted it and seemed to have willingly adopted the role of a Soviet puppet. In this interpretation it was also taken for granted that Kádár had no popular support at all, he was universally considered a traitor. In fact, some of the Western spectators thought the Hungarian people were so disgusted with him that even the Soviets would have liked to replace him with another, less hated figure.²⁵

In January 1957, Envoy Fry elaborated the difference between Kádár and Nagy as he saw it:²⁶

M. Nagy, his loyalty confronted during the brief days of freedom with a choice between Moscow and Hungary, stood steadfast by his own country. But his partner in power, M. Kádár, had already

betrayed her; and the Russians, as reward, set him up as head of a puppet government in the provincial town of Szolnok.

A 'Personality'-report on Kádár was hardly more merciful:²⁷

Never of first-rate ability or great strength of character, Kádár on his emergence from prison (in 1954, VV) was unable to decide which brand of communism to support. On August 12, 1956, he publicly disassociated himself from the Rákosi-Gerő line, but when in the autumn he entered the short-lived second Nagy Government, although himself a non-Muscovite, he made common cause with the Russians. It is worth noting, however, that after Nagy's Government fell Kádár was called on to form a Cabinet while he was on a visit to the U.S.S.R. and he was thus without any freedom of choice whatsoever. [...] the workers' councils (banned except in the factories) which, though disembodied, are still influential, treat Kádár with complete contempt. Kádár, in short, is a leader without a following. His past record suggests that he would prefer Communism shorn of its worst excesses, but that, although he owes his life to the Nagy reforms, he would not go further along the path towards 'liberal' Communism.

However, the most sinister interpretation of Kádár's motives gave gradually way to a view which at least admitted that Kádár was not the most stalinist alternative: there were still even worse options among the old Rákosists.²⁸ But even this might not be a cause to change opinion because in this case Kádár would hardly have space to manoeuvre. As one of the Foreign Office officials put it colourfully: 'Thus, while it may still be true that there are moderate and extremist factions within the party, their interests at the moment largely coincide: they must hang together if they are not to hang separately.' At any rate there was no hope to be seen.²⁹

But it seems that now, paradoxically and gradually, Kádár had come to represent some sort of 'lesser evil', compared to the old Rákosi guard. And if there would be hope of any improvement or even the end of deterioration and oppression, it would probably be connected to his name. A bit later the defeat of the molotovians in the Kremlin was seen as an advance for Kádár.³⁰ However, in Western eyes his position was still very

unstable and there was certainly no respect connected with his name. And the bottom line was at the end of 1957 still that the resistance of the Hungarian people against communist oppression was strong.³¹

2.2 Finland

2.2.1 Moderate Goals: Keeping the Paasikivi Line

Finland of the late 1950s was in many senses a very different case compared with Hungary. It was a neutral country or at least striving to be neutral; there were no Russian troops in Finland; the country was a democracy and had a multi-party system, free elections and mostly free press. However, there are astonishingly many similarities: the Soviet shadow, the tightening Soviet grip, a strong leader who remained in power for long, and suspicions in the West.

In the case of Kekkonen, there are many interpretations on how successful he in fact was in maintaining Finnish independence and neutrality. According to his supporters, he was a genuine success: he managed to get the recognitions of Finnish neutrality also from the West and thus won also Western confidence. This was something which the cautious predecessor J. K. Paasikivi (1946–56) had not dared even to try. Especially the American and British recognitions of Finnish neutrality in 1961 are taken as evidence of Kekkonen's success, the CSCE Summit and Final Act in 1975 in Helsinki being the jewel in the crown, and the declaration of how he had become a true European statesman of the first order. Many Finns seemed deeply astonished and hurt when not he but a Russian dissident Andrei Sakharov received the Nobel Peace Prize.

According to Kekkonen's opponents and critics, these achievements were not necessarily the merits of Kekkonen but something which would have been achieved anyhow – possibly even before and at lower cost, had Kekkonen not been so pro-Soviet in his speeches. The critics emphasize that Paasikivi had operated in much more difficult circumstances, held his own against the Russians in domestic policy and also enjoyed much

more personal respect and confidence in the West than Kekkonen. For example, there had been no communists in the Finnish government after summer 1948, and he had also defended the social democrat minority government in 1948–50 despite the evident Soviet opposition and displeasure.

According to the critics, Kekkonen allowed the Soviets to interfere into internal Finnish issues and domestic policy – the so-called ‘finlandization’ – which Paasikivi had managed to avoid. The main point of the criticism is that the basic line had been set by Paasikivi and that Kekkonen had used the Soviet card to his own benefit to gain political hegemony in Finland. Kekkonen had also created a stifled mental climate in Finland and weakened the Finnish backbone by demanding that the friendship with the Soviet Union should be treated as a virtue, not as an uncomfortable necessity.

But what was then the Western view on Finland? How much did the internal conditions of Finland matter to it and what was expected from the Finnish leaders and thus also from Kekkonen?

Finland was a sort of a reluctant test-case not only for the Russians but also for the West. As such it was not vitally important to the West. It was useful mainly for the fact that its independence denied the Soviets many military and political advantages which the membership in the Warsaw Pact or the status of the Baltic provinces would have given them. It was useful also in that sense that the collapse of Finland would weaken other small nations threatened by Communism, as the American National Security Council (NSC) concluded in the 1950s.³² But, not being vital, Finland might also be expendable if the achievement – such as Sweden’s possible membership in NATO – were tempting enough. In any case, Finland would never be defended by NATO troops: it was recognized that the country lay in the Soviet-dominated sphere of interest. As the NSC stated in 1954 its moderate goals concerning Finland:³³

To review NSC policy with respect to Finland with a view to continuance of an independent, economically healthy, and democratic Finland, basically oriented to the West, (but with no attempt to incor-

porate Finland in a Western coalition) neither subject to undue reliance on Soviet Bloc trade nor vulnerable to Soviet economic pressure.

In 1959 the NSC also stated:³⁴

Furthermore, if Finland is able to preserve its present neutral status – that of a nation able to maintain its independence despite heavy Soviet pressure – it could serve as an example of what the United States might like to see achieved by the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe.

Finland was a warning of what might become of a neutral Scandinavia, yet it was not Eastern Europe by any real standards, and it could be seen also as a positive prospect when the Eastern European bloc was concerned; perhaps it could be a model to ‘finlandize’ Eastern Europe?

It was clear that more was expected and hoped for from Finland’s than from Hungary’s part because Finland had some space to manoeuvre which a Warsaw Pact country such as Hungary could not have, especially after 1956. So it was important that Finland would not make too many compromises and put this space to jeopardy. The Finnish statesmen were expected to defend the degree of ‘Westernness’ they had. It was expected that they would preserve the status quo, make the necessary concessions to the Soviets to keep these content but simultaneously defend their right to take care of their own domestic affairs alone without Moscow’s interference. Domestic slipping towards Communism would be a blow to the Western interests in the Cold War and would shake the whole balance in Northern Europe.

A sort of a test case was the ability to keep the communists out of the government; as already noted above, this had been achieved since 1948. The standard American and British line in the 1950s and 1960s was to support co-operation and coalition governments between the SDP and the Agrarian Union, no matter how much they or their leaders might be distrusted as individuals. This was called ‘the red ochre’ government in Finland.

The essential aspect in grading the importance of the Finnish parties was ultimately not a question of which party was 'right' in internal disputes or even the most pro-Western one. The most important thing was to guarantee Finnish domestic stability and to avoid internal chaos, in which the trade unions and the farmers' union struggled for material and social benefits. This struggle would undermine the democratic parties, strengthen communists and thus make Finland more vulnerable to Soviet pressure. This sort of stability was also the highest goal considered possible to achieve.

It was accepted that the SDP and the Agrarian Union (from 1965 the Centre Party) were the only forces imaginable which occupied a position to control the economic interest groups and make them stabilise the economy. The 'red ochre' government was also considered the only coalition strong enough to make a stand against communist and Soviet demands and threats. In theory, the National Coalition Party (NCP, the Conservatives) was clearly the most pro-Western and anti-communist party as such but it was left to oblivion due to pragmatic reasons. Co-operation with this party would provoke the Russians and antagonize leftist parties, the Agrarian Union and Kekkonen – and whereas these could do much harm to Finnish stability, if left in opposition, the NCP could not. Thus, it was expendable. The desirability of the 'red ochre' government was due to tactical considerations and was a means, not an end. This standard line did not even depend on what party was in government in the USA or in Britain, neither on the personality of the Ambassadors nor on the desk officers in Washington and London. It remained dominant throughout the period in this research.

This sort of government had been the rule in the 1950s; however, between 1959 and 1966 this coalition became impossible because of the bad relations between the SDP and the agrarians, or, between the SDP and Kekkonen. The West faced a dilemma: on the one hand, they disliked Kekkonen and his agrarian followers but on the other hand they knew they could not do without them, since there was no other useful counterforce against the communists. The social democrats were of course there, and usually it was easier for the Western diplomats to understand them and

sympathize with them than to appreciate the agrarians; but they were not enough.

At the end of the day no pro-Western heroism was required from Finland because it was taken for granted that any ostentatious move towards the West, let alone help from the Western Powers, would only provoke the Russians to demand even more than they had originally intended, and the Russians were in a superior position to compel Finland to submit if they regarded this as necessary. In short, it was expected that the Finnish President and government would maintain the status quo of the mid-1950s. All changes would probably be changes for the worse.

Paasikivi seemed to have managed all the essentials; of Prime Minister Kekkonen's abilities and intentions or even of his bottom line sympathies one was not always equally sure. As a British memorandum which could be compared with the American NSC outlines stated in 1955:³⁵

[...] the attitude of the Finnish government towards Russia has of late been unnecessarily subservient. This is principally the fault of Dr. Kekkonen, the Prime Minister, an able and an extremely ambitious man who, though no Communist or fellow traveller, is prepared to follow almost any policy which will suit his personal book and further increase his popularity with the weak and ageing President Paasikivi, whom he hopes to succeed at the next Presidential elections. [...] there is a risk that he may allow his ambition to outrun his country's interests.

The West also seemed to appreciate a cartoon of the leading Finnish cartoonist in Helsingin Sanomat, Kari Suomalainen, in 1954, when Kekkonen ousted Ralf Törngren from the Premiership and became Prime Minister again. This can be assumed from the fact that both the American and the British ministers sent the cartoon to their foreign ministries. The cartoon described a mass of Soviet-type soldiers carrying Törngren away and Kekkonen saluting the soldiers from a balcony. The text was: 'Long Live the People's Republic of Kekkosllovakia!'

Since the West could not do much to defend Finland politically, not at least in the foreign policy, the Finnish domestic forum was the only one in which the communist and Soviet influ-

ence could be fought effectively – without a risk of an American-Soviet conflict over Finland. The best weapon would be to aid the non-communist parties and to further non-communist co-operation.³⁶ And this should be done with as little noise as possible.

Despite the criticism of Kekkonen it was mostly taken for granted in the Western diplomatic circles during Paasikivi's Presidency that Kekkonen would become the next President. Kekkonen's political talent was considered to be in its own class in Finland, he was clearly the favourite of the Soviets, and his opponents could not join their forces.³⁷ But after he indeed was elected in 1956, the fears seemed to become true, and the first real evidence of subservience seemed to come during the Hungarian uprising. The Finnish attitude towards condemning the Soviet aggression was considered very evasive. As the British Ambassador asked the Finnish Ambassador if Finland would contribute to the work of the UN Special Committee on the Hungarian Uprising the Finnish colleague was reluctant. The London officials were not surprised: as one of them noted in the minutes with a short but illuminating sentence: 'This is what we expected.'³⁸ And after Nagy's execution it was yet again Kekkonen who was seen as the culprit in Finland or at least as the censor whose line prevented some of the moral outcry which the executions would have deserved from every democratic and free man.³⁹

2.2.2 Rock Bottom – Permitting Soviet Interference in 1958–62

The convictions of Kekkonen's sins were accentuated even more after the so called night frost crisis in 1958–59 and note crisis in 1961. It is not possible to describe these crises in detail here but in both cases the Americans and the British thought they could see their worst fears come true: they thought that Kekkonen was yet again making undue concessions to the Soviets – concessions which Paasikivi would not have made.

The Night Frost crisis came after the 1958 elections. The communists became the biggest party (50 out of 200 MPs) but the negotiations to form the new government brought a pleasant surprise for the West. Instead of the dreaded popular front gov-

ernment just the opposite emerged: a coalition government of all parties except the communists (and the Small Farmer's Party of no importance). Even Kekkonen's party, the Agrarians, participated; the most influential position was held by the anti-Kekkonen social democrats, and also the ostracism of the conservatives was ended. In the Western eyes, this was even better than the 'red ochre' government: a government this large would effectively isolate the communists. The Western diplomats sensed Kekkonen's reluctance against the new government but as the American Ambassador reported to Washington, 'all Emb[assy] contacts assume, and we agree, communists will not repeat not be admitted to government unless President Kekkonen in effect goes nuts'.⁴⁰ It was recognized that Kekkonen could not prevent the government from being formed, and it was expected that the government would control his undue subservience to the East.

However, when the West was satisfied, it was evident that the same reasons would make the government an anathema for the Soviets. The discontent was soon apparent: trade negotiations were cancelled, and Ambassador Lebedev left the country without the usual courtesy visit to President. The relations of the two countries froze to a zero-point.

Kekkonen's own attitude towards the government had been negative from the very beginning since he regarded it as dangerous in foreign policy and consisting of his most ardent opponents in domestic policy. The question of his actual role in the making and breaking of the government is still debated among Finnish historians but the least what can be said with certainty is that he and the Soviets had at least some co-operation against the government – and both were trying to bring about the fall of it. Kekkonen did not show the slightest sign of following Paasikivi's example and defending a government which was under pressure from Moscow, on the contrary. For example, he inquired through his political confidant Ahti Karjalainen whether the Soviets would continue resisting the government without compromise to the end because only in that case could he throw his authority to the game against it.⁴¹

Kekkonen seemed to work against the government right from the start and then to give in to the Russians almost immediately – if not even to collaborate against the government. Finally, the government resigned.

In the Western Embassies, Kekkonen was seen as the culprit. It was thought that the Soviet pressure would not have warranted such submission from his part, especially since the Americans had promised to give economic aid. Now he had set a dangerous precedent and the Soviet interference in Finnish domestic matters had increased. As the British Ambassador Douglas Busk put it:⁴²

President Kekkonen is apparently genuinely persuaded that the degree of submissiveness to Russian wishes indicated in his speech is necessary to the safety and prosperity of his country. [...] the President is still playing party politics. [...] apparently granting the Russians the right to object to any government and from that it is but a short step to a Russian right to choose a government. [...] The President may think he is adopting 'divide et impera' as his motto, but it may work out as 'divide et Russia imperabit'. At the very least the Russian appetite must surely have been whetted.

The Western image of Kekkonen was of course partly a stereotype. But Kekkonen did not improve this image – of which he could hardly be ignorant – in his meetings with the Western diplomats especially in the years 1959–60. He repeatedly stressed to them that the real danger to world peace was not the Soviet Union at all, but the unwise, revanchist policy of Western Germany. He also maintained that the Soviet Union was in ascendancy in the Cold War, whereas the West had suffered many setbacks.⁴³

It has often been said that the Western diplomats had too one-sided contacts and listened too much to Kekkonen's opponents. According to their reports, however, Kekkonen and his supporters were listened to as well, and the arguments of Kekkonen's opponents were not taken at face value. Moreover, it was not supposed that Kekkonen's opponents had much of a chance to gain power in any case. It was especially those opinions of Kekkonen mentioned above (given by himself) which

made the West most worried, not the horror stories of his opponents which were taken with a grain of salt.

The British or the Americans did not succeed in raising Kekkonen's sympathies. On the contrary, his recently published diaries reveal that he considered most Western diplomats in Helsinki mediocre and did not appreciate their advice. Mostly he saw them, not the Soviets, as the troublemakers in Finnish-Soviet relations. In his opinion, especially the Americans did not understand the Finnish policy. In his entries, he called one of them 'the U.S. Gestapo man', another one 'a fool', a third one 'more stupid than can be permitted'.⁴⁴ Furthermore, State Secretary Dulles also gave advice, which – according to Kekkonen's diary – was 'the advice of a foolish dilettante'; the US foreign policy was in 'pitifully weak hands'.⁴⁵ The West Germans were especially repulsive: in 1969 Kekkonen wrote, that President Lübke was 'a big fool', Franz-Josef Strauss 'intimidating', and even Willy Brandt, a social democrat, had spoken 'like Hitler'.⁴⁶

These opinions Kekkonen naturally did not say aloud but the ones he did led, of course, to negative emotions in the West. It was difficult to decide whether Kekkonen had capitulated mentally or let fear or some sort of pro-Soviet conversion guide him. However, the Western conclusion was not that disenchantment should lead to distancing oneself from Kekkonen. It was taken practically for granted that he would be re-elected President in 1962, so the West had to find ways to influence him, not to discredit itself by backing his adversaries which scarcely had a chance to win. The West should rather try to improve his knowledge of the situation in the world and particularly make him aware of the American might compared to that of the Russians. At the same time the West should maintain a low profile in Finnish affairs in order not to provoke Kekkonen and the Russians.⁴⁷ 'Finland must walk a tightrope; the local Blondin [Kekkonen] is the only one available, so we must try to guide him', was a sentence used by more than one diplomat.

Even the question of inviting Kekkonen to a state visit to the United States and to Britain was seen in this light. So, paradoxically, when Kekkonen made these visits in 1961, this seemed to

be recognition of neutrality, and the Finns made the most of them. But, in fact, the invitations were not proof of Western recognition of Kekkonen's policies or his success or authority but quite the reverse.

How can this paradox be explained? One must bear in mind that Kekkonen was not accused of being a traitor or an agent of the Kremlin. He was almost always, also in the most critical Western analysis, considered to be a Finnish patriot. His greatest error was not lack of patriotism but of judgement: he had made a wrong conclusion in world politics and the outcome of the Cold War, since he had over-estimated Russian might and underestimated the American one. State visits were considered the only means to try and influence him and to make him see that Finland had a chance to hold its own against the Soviets. It was also useful to talk about Finnish neutrality when it was considered to be weakest and in danger because this was the only way to make it as difficult as possible for the Soviet Union to crush it. So the invitations to state visits and recognitions of Finnish neutrality during these visits were paradoxically not the fruit of Kekkonen success in convincing the West but of his failure to do this.⁴⁸ It was an effort to 'convert' him, and this would be done with a carrot, not with a stick.⁴⁹

The success, seen from the Western point of view, was meagre. Kekkonen maintained his official line and gave no signs of 'hidden' Western sympathies. A disillusioned British memorandum stated after the visit that Kekkonen had behaved in London as if he had recognised that the Soviets had a right to concern themselves with Finnish internal politics, and betrayed a leaning towards the Soviet point of view in world politics.⁵⁰ Another one stated: 'It must be hard to be a good Finn. What disappointed me most about the whole visit was the President's pointed omission of any indication that he was basically on our side.'⁵¹

In October 1961, while Kekkonen was still on his state visit to the United States, a crisis erupted which damaged his reputation even further in the West. The Soviet Union sent a diplomatic note to Finland and suggested that consultations according to the 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance should

be commenced due to the rising militarism and revanchism in West Germany. The 'true' motives of the note are a constantly debated issue in Finland, and the main question has been whether Kekkonen somehow collaborated with the Soviets in order to ensure his re-election. The Presidential Elections of 1962 were approaching, and the anti-Kekkonen forces, the social democrats, the conservatives, the liberals and the Swedish People's Party and the Small Farmers' Party, had nominated a former Chancellor of Justice, Olavi Honka, as a joint candidate. Even though the polls indicated that Kekkonen would win, the front behind Honka was wide enough to cause worries in the Presidential Palace, the Agrarian Party – and the Kremlin.

While it is not possible to describe the aspects of the note crisis more accurately here, the result was that even though Kekkonen finally came out as a winner of the crisis, his name became more suspicious than ever in Western eyes. First the West had considered that Finland was in true danger and that the note was a threat also to Kekkonen. Now, if ever, he should defend Finland; the Americans were ready to give extensive economic and even diplomatic support – they had agreed on this with the British already in April 1961.

But when Kekkonen yet again gave in, travelled to Novosibirsk to meet Khrushchev in a manner which looked subservient in the West, admitted most of the Soviet arguments and attacked his domestic political opponents in his speech both before and after Novosibirsk, suspicions rose. They gained more nourishment from a Soviet defector's stories that Kekkonen and Khrushchev had arranged the note together in order to ensure Kekkonen's re-election and to crush his opponents. When the Soviets dropped the suggestion of consultations almost at the same time when Kekkonen's rival stepped aside from the presidential race, the Western analysis began to smell some sort of conspiracy. This time the West was disappointed not only with Kekkonen but the disappointment covered the whole nation. Where was now the spirit of the stubborn nation of the Winter War? Was Finland now slowly and undramatically sliding to the communist camp?

Kekkonen's reputation had reached rock bottom in Western eyes. Even now he still was not suspected of being a secret communist, let alone an agent, but he simply was too ambitious and too timid. It is also noteworthy that this disappointment was deepest at the same time when the image of Kádár was slowly, even though without enthusiasm and almost without noticing it, improving. Kekkonen would become part of this rehabilitation process only later.

3 A Gradual Change for the Better in the Mid-1960s

3.1 Hungary – A Necessity Becomes a Virtue

The improvement of Kádár's image was extremely gradual. It is impossible to say any definite date or year, and it hardly developed into any positive emotion, let alone admiration as such. It was more a question of two unavoidable things: the 'lesser evil' and making an inevitable state of things a virtue. In a way it was, of course, also a sign of impotence in the matter. But even though the image of the state of things in Hungary was far from ideal, some reluctant recognition of improvement had to be given. The image of Kádár became rather an image of a cunning foe, a foe cunning enough to fool his Russian masters as well – he was not only a traitor with blood on his hands and without a will. He was rather a builder of the special Hungarian line.

Since the West was experiencing problems of its own – Vietnam and the 'anti-imperialist' slogans in the decade of decolonization – it had to adapt itself to the situation. Besides, even though the Kádár regime was still considered emotionally repulsive no spectator could deny that the situation in Hungary seemed to be normalising, and the economy even prospering. Even the NSC admitted this as early as in 1958:⁵²

A certain degree of moderation has been evident in the economic policy of the Hungarian regime. Collectivization of agriculture remains the ultimate goal, but Kádár has asserted that this will be achieved by 'Leninist' persuasion rather than 'Stalinist' coercion. A degree of private enterprise among artisans and small tradesmen has been tolerated though not encouraged, and there has been an

effort to keep the market reasonably well supplied with consumer goods. With the aid of extensive grants and loans from the Soviet Union and the other Communist nations, the Hungarian economy has recovered from the effects of the revolution more rapidly than had been anticipated, though grave economic problems remain.

Although the aspect of economic development was often partially belittled with the words 'according to Eastern European standards', it was still a fact. On the one hand, this was positive development. On the other, it could also be politically worrisome: would the Kádár regime thus be able to 'buy' the popular support which the people of Hungary had thus far denied him? At the same time, the belief that the Hungarian people would continuously resist an oppressive regime diminished.

Also Kádár's personal position and standing seemed to change. Even this was a dilemma in at least two aspects. On the one hand, if one took the moralistic view of 1956, it was not mentally comfortable to see how the quisling and demon of 1956 was becoming tolerable. On the other hand, if Kádár gained more personal authority, it could be conceivable that he would some day be able to also stand up against the Soviets, at least on some issues. When Kádár visited the Soviet Union in 1958, the West considered his domestic position safe.⁵³

The execution of Nagy in 1958 produced a shocked moral outcry but even that did not have any permanent effect. The Americans did not in fact blame Kádár for the execution in their own secret negotiations. The execution was considered a factor which would rather damage his position. The Head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, expressed his conviction that the signal for the executions had almost certainly come from Moscow and that they had been intended as warnings first to Tito and thereafter to Gomulka. 'He thought it likely that in the sequel Kádár would drop out of the political picture quite soon.'⁵⁴

Despite Dulles's comment above, at least the British did not expect Kádár to fall soon, and as already stated, when Kádár visited the Soviet Union in April 1958, the West considered his position in Hungary safe: the extremists had not gain the upper

hand.⁵⁵ In late 1959 the British also concluded a new 'Personalities'-list in which they analyzed the leading circles of Hungary and even some of the potential opposition forces. It should be added that according to the information of the archive catalogue a more extensive list also exists but is still secret.

The analysis of the list available is, however, very illuminating. Kádár is, of course, the obvious target of interest, but also some other personalities are worth mentioning. It is interesting that the personality of Gerő is not commented on at all, his career is cited only in the form of an extended *curriculum vitae*. Of Kádár, the list says the following:⁵⁶

Kádár, János: Immediately after the revolution, Kádár offered many concessions to the workers and the revolutionary councils, including the principle of multi-party free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At this time he did his best to represent himself as a moderate. But his term of power has been marked by steadily increasing repression in all fields and the elimination of most of the political concessions won by the Revolution. It has been rumoured that, particularly in the summer of 1957, he favoured the introduction of a more moderate line but was overruled. His speeches have been harsh, he accepted without protest the execution of Nagy and his associates in June, 1958, and, whatever his personal views, he appears to be a reliable tool in the hands of his Soviet masters, ready to carry out any excesses which are demanded of him. It is believed that his nerve and will-power have never recovered from his sufferings in prison; but his public appearances present a facade of confidence and determination. The great majority of Hungarians detest him as devoid of every vestige of political and moral integrity.

On the surface, this was a moralist view, and the emotional repugnance was clear. Nevertheless, it is illuminating that the critical tone sounded like compulsory mental adhering to old values which, however, would no more be permitted to stand in the way of a pragmatic policy. It would have been too much to confess a wrong analysis, but the very fact that Kádár had remained in power and was likely to be the strong man also in the future made it essential to also find good sides of him. And at the very least his success had to be admitted. Even Fry, while

stressing that Kádár was ignorant of the events outside of the Soviet bloc and distorted them, and was ideologically as rigid as Rákosi and Gerő, said he displayed 'frankness and a sense of realism' in economy and agriculture.⁵⁷

Besides, the other characteristics showed that there was no better option. To take a couple of examples:⁵⁸

Kiss, Károly: Kiss is one of the key figures in the party today and is thought to be in favour of repressive policies. He is the main party organiser and disciplinarian and has been largely responsible for carrying through the reconstruction of the party since the revolution.

Marosán, György: He did not play a prominent role in the revolution of October, but has since repeatedly declared that he voted in favour of calling in Soviet troops at the outset on October 23. [...] Marosán has been one of the Kádár régime's principal spokesmen since its conception, although less has been heard of him in recent months. He has made numerous speeches at party meetings and Workers' Conferences, the majority marked by their harsh uncompromising attitude. His style is extremely coarse and the published versions of his speeches are carefully edited. He has frequently stated that there can be no question of the revival of a separate Social Democrat Party [...] He is uneducated and regarded as something of a buffoon; but he is dangerous.

Münnich, Ferenc: He is a tough and determined Communist who would have been happy to share responsibility for the excesses of Rákosi but for his personal friendship with Rákosi's victim, Rajk. He is still said to distinguish himself from those members of the leadership who are out and out Rákosists, but he is probably as reactionary and inflexible as they are. His allegiance to the Soviet Union is probably absolute.

The difference between the British and the American attitude about tactics became clearer and the British were very conscious of it. The Head of the Northern Department, R. H. Mason, wrote to the Budapest Legation: 'I entirely agree with your view that we must try to encourage a more forward policy towards Hungary by the NATO powers as a whole. The American attitude has been an obstacle to this, but we must hope that

the new Administration (=Kennedy, VV) will be prepared to take a more positive view.⁵⁹

Necessity became a virtue, and it is of minor practical consequence whether this was due to a true conversion or tactics. A year later it was essentially Kádár's authority and personal respect which was emphasised in the British analysis and this trend became all the more obvious in the following years.⁶⁰ A phrase which was frequently repeated was that it was accepted that although Kádár would never be able to win the real confidence of the Hungarian people, the Hungarians thought Kádár to be the best Prime Minister they were likely to get. He was essentially a mediocrity who had risen to the top because of events, but Hungarian history was full of men who in similar circumstances had adopted the realistic policy of doing what was possible. One Hungarian writer had even called him the Hungarian Christ, because 'someone had to save the Hungarian people'.⁶¹ And even after Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 the British did not think that this would harm Kádár's position.⁶²

Also the American image of Kádár was gradually changing, although the Americans were slower in this mental rehabilitation process and did not concentrate so much on Kádár's person. They saw the case of Hungary in a grander scheme; as a part of the communist bloc and as a case in which only the Soviet Union really mattered. When Kádár visited the United Nations, the Americans did not meet him and restricted his travels. Even so, after Kádár had visited the UN the American attitude began to show more signs of interest in him.

A report which was issued from 'a reliable source' in December 1960 described Kádár's informal comments during this visit. They were thought to be interesting also because it was assumed that Kádár had actually wished that they would reach the Americans. This is most probably a valid guess, since the comments show Kádár's desire to convince the Americans of two starting-points: he was in power to stay but he was also a pragmatic man. He would bear no grudge for the suspicions and the boycott and was a leader whom one could have dealings with – only a few circumstances had to be understood at

first. And third: it paid off to take him seriously, since he was no puppet.

Since the events of 1956, there have been a lot of childish (gyerekes) things going on between our two countries. I want to be frank with you. Both the U.S. Government and we Hungarians have been acting like a couple of kids. Periodically, we expel one another's diplomatic representatives: one American for one Hungarian. I don't think this is an intelligent (okos) thing to do. Let us explore the possibility of an understanding.

I don't like the Germans (I mean Adenauer's Germany) but to illustrate my feeling on this subject, I would use the German word 'Realpolitik' to describe the way this matter should be treated. We do not hate the Americans. After all, let us be realistic: Who are we? We are only a 'little louse' (kis tota [sic!]) in this big world. However, the prerequisite for normal relations is a willingness on the part of the U.S. Government to recognize the hard facts. The People's Republic of Hungary is an accomplished fact. It is here today. It will stay here tomorrow. All you have to do is to recognize this fact. The rest is simple. We could then resume normal diplomatic representations instead of this ridiculous (navetaeges [sic]) Charge d'Affaires business.

The U.S. Government talks about Hungary being a Soviet satellite. Now on this subject let me tell you the following. It has cost the U.S.S.R. a lot of money to help normalize our conditions after 1956. Today we are happily engaged in constructive work. Our people enjoy freedom. No more of the Rákosi terror. Believe me, we don't take people to prison in the middle of the night any more. If you don't believe me, then talk to our writers, our intellectuals who were released from prison. Talk to Tibor Dary [Déry], the writer. And all this nonsense about Khrushchev dictating everything in Hungary – it is simply not true...

Let me assure you, once the U.S. recognizes that there was such a thing as the People's Republic with Kádár as its leader, we would not have a single problem. I cannot emphasize that strongly enough.

I must tell you in earnest: We have no illusions concerning the possibility that the U.S. will become a socialist or a communist state. We Hungarian Communists are realists. We know that your country is capitalist, and it will not adopt our system. (Source: Mr. Kádár, this does not seem to be in line with Mr. Khrushchev's remark to the effect that our grandchildren in the U.S. will live under Communism.)

What makes you think that we have to go along with everything our Comrades say? We Communists like to argue with each other. That is the democratic thing to do. The principal thing is that the East and West must co-exist in peace and that we must negotiate. Take this present UN debate. It is much better to shout (kisbalai [sic!]) at each other than to shoot (loni [sic]) at each other.⁶³

The message is clear: Kádár wanted to show that he was not a man who would hang himself for any dogma. He even took the trouble to emphasize his peasantry (!) and love for nature and animals, even joke how he would not like to live in New York: 'Not enough trees and (laugh) too many policemen.' And then he appealed to the American nationalism by confessing his and his people's admiration for Ulysses Grant. The document does not, however, reveal the American reaction.

Even as the image of Kádár became better, one thing still annoyed even the British: they thought that Hungary was buying internal independence by being extra loyal and rigid in foreign policy.⁶⁴ The Americans had even more to complain about, since according to their view Hungary was almost the most eager supporter of North Vietnam and condemned 'American imperialism' so vehemently. In 1965 there occurred a demonstration of Asian and African students in Budapest against the American Legation, and even the Legation premises were violated – according to the Americans, with no effort on the Hungarian part to control this.⁶⁵

But despite such things the American policy line had also softened remarkably. For example, the issue of Hungarian credentials in the UN became more and more a liability already in the beginning of the 1960's as the years went by, since decolonization increased the number of the countries to which the Hungarian question was of no importance or which even had, if not sympathies with the Soviet view, even fewer sympathies for Western 'Imperialists' playing the role of liberators.

In addition to this, the reluctant admission of the Hungarian domestic development was unavoidable also to the Americans: the Rákosists were pushed back and the standard of living was improving – even though it was reminded that because of the

physical and political restrictions put on it, the Legation could not test the situation adequately.⁶⁶

But slowly the tendency became clearer: 'Kádár regime, although a police state disliked by the overwhelming bulk of Hungarians who would sweep it away if able to do so, has governed better than thought possible in 1956. It is probably as good as can be hoped for in the immediate future.' Kádár was sincerely interested in the welfare working class 'rather than a pure Soviet stooge'. He gave the impression that he was not necessarily the most implacable of the bloc leaders in his attitude toward the United States, particularly if he would be given evidence that the United States was not implacably opposed to him.

In September 1961, Kádár had a collective audience for the Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions. Chargé Torbert had a discussion with him and seems to have got the same message as Kádár's 1960 comments described above. He analyzed:

By nature a cold and withdrawn man, Kádár apparently finds it difficult, or else does not consider it worth the effort, to project his personality to a heterogeneous social group. The best indication of this was that after about twenty minutes of opening formalities the event died on its feet and Kádár was left talking exclusively with minor Hungarian officials. Although the initiative to open a conversation was mine, Kádár did his full share to continue it. [...] Probably the most interesting result of the conversation was Kádár's unsolicited admission that he was trying to find ways to overcome certain institutional rigidities of the communist system which inhibited economic development. He made it clear that his principal preoccupation was with economic advancement of Hungary.

A Memorandum of Conversation attached to the report gave Kádár's message even more clearly:⁶⁷

I have been thinking while I was waiting for your arrival what I should say to you. It seems to me that we did not elect each other to office but we will have to accept each other's existence and put up with each other. We may disagree on many subjects but we have important common responsibilities. The task of diplomats is

to find ways to get along in difficult circumstances. We should, therefore, enjoy normal relations so that we can solve our problems. [...] It seems much better that we take our discussions out of the hands of soldiers and put them in the hands of diplomats. He then said that the disputes in the world were between regimes and not between people. He did not like to use the word enemy but he would say his opponent was the government of the United States. In one way he would be sorry to divert that opponent from preoccupation with armaments because he knew that America was a very powerful country with a very powerful system which in fact had some advantages over the rigidity of the Hungarian system and if we devoted ourselves entirely to economic development we would get ahead very fast and it would be that much harder for Hungary to catch up.

In February 1962 Torbert admitted, that even if the party had not gained popular support, Kádár had with his 'folksy' speeches and manners.⁶⁸

The actively hostile enemy image was fading away, although there naturally was no cordiality. But it was evident that Kádár's slow tactics and messages of pragmatism were paying dividends. In fact, he was giving the same messages throughout the 1960's in various newspaper interviews, which were also noted in many Embassy records. Since the American general line towards the Satellite countries was anyhow slowly changing, it became easier and easier for Hungary to fit in a policy which would no longer stick to the memories of 1956.

This standard American line, which can clearly be seen in the document 'Changing Patterns in Eastern Europe' in 1964, was now that the communist regimes would stay in Eastern Europe. But, now they were seen as representatives of national Communism, and they would consciously and methodically attempt to free themselves as much from the Moscow dominance as possible. In this way the communist bloc would lose its monolithic nature.

It was assumed that this political evolution was not likely to proceed at a speed which would threaten the communist regimes themselves, but the logic of this development would make the difference – against Moscow anyhow. The national communist re-

gimes were now the main force which could oppose Moscow in Eastern Europe, so it was not practical any more to treat them as oppressive and undemocratic quisling governments, but to try to develop relations with them. It was also assumed that the Soviets would consider direct military intervention in Eastern Europe only in emergency circumstances, when they believed vital Soviet interests to be threatened. Even the fall of Khrushchev did not change this analysis.⁶⁹

In any case the principle was that the United States should improve its relations with Eastern European countries – even to strengthen their communist regimes.⁷⁰

All this was a far cry from the old moralist view which separated the cause of the free, democratic world and the evil communist bloc from each other completely. No immediate victory was in sight; probably there was even some thought of the convergence of the two systems in the long run. Mainly the improving image was due to the fact that a new phase in the Cold War had changed the tactics.

3.2 Finland – Slippery Slope to the East? – or Better Omens

The same trend that was slowly changing the image of Kádár, was influencing the Western image of Kekkonen as well, although a bit slower – because his dramatic crisis had also taken place later than Kádár's. This was perhaps inevitable, if the view is accepted that it was the Grand Strategy in the Cold War which was strongly influencing the policy. A case like Finland would always in such a case partly retain its continuity, partly follow the general trend.

The American and British views on Kekkonen's personality during these crucial years can also be traced from various reports in one form or the other. They are presented in a most illuminating way in two documents: a British 'Personalities' list of influential Finns, consisting of 217 names, written in 1959, and an over 60-page 'biography' on Kekkonen, "A Study of the Career and Policies of Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland", which was written in the American Embassy in 1963. The latter one even included notes.

Neither of these documents favours any such interpretation that Kekkonen would have been a sinister demon, a traitorous power-hungry satellite or an agent of the KGB. Neither was, in fact, based on only anti-Kekkonen circles' information – as has always been suggested by Kekkonen's supporters when the question of Kekkonen's strained Western relations came to the debate. Both documents were reasonably neutral and attempted to give an unbiased view.

The key sections of the American 'biography' were in the introduction and in the conclusion. Since they sum up the analysis made before in this study, they are cited here quite extensively:

Urho Kaleva Kekkonen is the unchallenged ruler of Finland and he is likely to remain so for many years to come. At 62 he has just begun his second six-year term as President of Finland. A third term seems probable and a fourth term is within the realm of possibility. [...] He likes the Presidency which he actively sought and for which he evidently considers himself well qualified. No individual even remotely threatens his political preeminence. There is no current prospect of a coalition of domestic opponents capable of reducing Kekkonen's authority and eventually turning him out of office. In the unlikely event that Kekkonen at some point proves unable to protect his own position, the Soviet Union can be expected to take steps to preserve his authority.

Kekkonen had effectively monopolised Finnish foreign policy and also made use of it like no predecessor had done before. And no one had made domestic developments serve foreign policy or used foreign policy for domestic political purposes like him before. His domination of Finland was primarily the product of the application of political skill and purposeful exploitation of fear of Russia, and he had also remained in partisan politics. Contrary to the idealised view of the Finnish President as a unifying force, he had continued to be the real leader of his Agrarian Union and had controlled the actions of the cabinet during most of his presidential term. And no one dared to challenge him – it was known that it would be useless to try to convert him, and he would retaliate by discrediting his op-

ponents in the Russians' eyes. To make the President's task even easier, he often had the support of the large communist party and factions of the other parties; his opponents were disorganised and lacking in skilful leadership.

The report described a very autocratic leader and personality:

Kekkonen is not a popular President. Confident, tough, often resentful of advice, and markedly sensitive to criticism, he seems to have few close friends or confidants. He neither seeks nor receives the adulation or affection of his people. His relationship to them is cold, distant. The public seldom sees the congeniality of which Kekkonen is capable. He is offensively pedagogical in his attitude toward the Finnish people. Kekkonen asks for their confidence while often demonstrating that he has little confidence in them. He does not appeal for understanding and cooperation; he demands it. Despite his unassailable political position Kekkonen is seldom if ever magnanimous or conciliatory, even in moments of national crisis. He tolerates corruption in high places and deals harshly with opponents. Even among some of those who would not consider denying him their support, Kekkonen has incurred an intense dislike.

But even so, Kekkonen's views had a popular following: it was taken for a fact that Finland could not rely on the support of Western nations despite their sympathies. And Kekkonen had concluded, that the greater confidence the Soviets had in Finland, the freer Finland would be to develop its western associations. Within the limits he had set for himself, Kekkonen indeed desired considerable contact with the West, which was demonstrated by his visits to the West in the past two years.

Outwardly Kekkonen appears confident that he has been successful, even remarkably successful, in protecting Finland's independence. This is an attitude he must adopt, however, and it is at least questionable that he really believes Finland's position is as secure as he pretends. Nevertheless, despite the doubt he may have, the trying moments in relations with the Soviets, and the irritation and possible serious concern caused to him by those who suggest he may have undermined Finnish independence, Kekkonen has a taste for the burden he has assumed and seeks to retain. He seems

to be stimulated by his encounters with the Russians and he has had the satisfaction of seeing his domestic political position reinforced as a consequence of these encounters. In 1961 he told an American audience that he found it fascinating to conduct Finland's foreign affairs. Even shortly after what must have been a harrowing journey to Novosibirsk later that same year Kekkonen said privately that it was thrilling and stimulating to be President of Finland.⁷¹

It can easily be seen that the tone was critical, and if there was certain respect for the abilities of Kekkonen, it was reluctant. But the tone was not hopeless either; and Kekkonen was certainly not considered to be a mere stooge or a mediocrity. The main worry was still that he would overdo his policy in his zealotry to appease the Soviets at almost any price. It is rather a picture of a ruthless nationalist, who was too convinced that he and only he could save Finland, and nothing could change his grand plan to do this.

The British Personalities-list made the same kind of remarks:

One of the ablest men in Finland. His sardonic humour and cynicism are unusual in a Finn; his colleagues do not entirely like him, perhaps partly because they do not understand him, and he is easily criticised. Although a die-hard Finnish patriot during the early part of the war, he is now prepared to follow the 'Paasikivi line' of ostensible friendliness towards the Soviet Union. The apparent change of Soviet foreign policy in a more moderate direction has probably increased the support for such a policy and most Finns feel that it is the only realistic line for their country to pursue. But this policy has, in the past, been deeply distrusted in Finland, where it has been held to be a dangerous substitute for a tougher reaction to Soviet pressure. The prolonged Government crisis of the autumn of 1958 and early 1959 showed the President in a poor light. In the first place he was clearly not playing an impartial role, but favouring his old party, the Agrarians; in the second he allowed himself to be alarmed by Russian coldness and showed subservience to the Russians which much decreased his popularity."⁷²

This is not the place to argue whether these analyses were actually valid. However, they represent the attitude which set the suspicious mood on Kekkonen's person.

During the 1960's, after the Night Frosts crisis and Note crisis, these suspicions gradually diminished, but at intervals it sometimes seemed a new cause for suspicion of Kekkonen's uncritically pro-Soviet views and dictatorial leanings. For example, in 1965 Kekkonen stated in Moscow that Finland could only be neutral during peace. In West this was seen as a deviation from official neutrality and as yet another concession to the Soviets, and the American State Department Assistant Secretary expressed American surprise to the Finnish Ambassador and inquired whether there had been a change in Finnish foreign policy.⁷³ The Finns assured that this was not the case.

In domestic policy, Kekkonen's role in defeating the agrarians' Chairman [V.J. Sukselainen], whom the Soviets had criticised, was regarded as 'another successful foray into Finnish domestic affairs' by the Soviets in an American analysis. It was not the Soviet interference that was the worst; it was the fact that Kekkonen had made extensive use of it.⁷⁴ The British called the spectacle 'unedifying'.⁷⁵

But what was there to do? Kekkonen was there to stay, but he seemed unapproachable. If you compare the Western view on him, it might even seem to be going towards a worse direction than in Kádár's case – because Kádár was gaining more freedom from the Soviets and allowing more freedom domestically himself. However, it must also be borne in mind, that even given these two trends it was still evident that Kekkonen and Finland enjoyed more freedom than Kádár and Hungary and looked likely to do so also in the future.

The only option to control Kekkonen seemed to be to strengthen Finnish civil society and to let the eulogy of Finnish-Soviet friendship go past unnoticed, as lip-service, or, as it came to be called in Finland, *liturgy*. As a British Foreign Office official put it in 1965: 'while leaving President Kekkonen free to flirt with the Russians as much as he likes' connections between Finnish and Western individuals and organisations would be built. 'What we need, I think, is strong pro-Western public opinion in Finland capable of preventing President Kekkonen from going too far with the Russians.'⁷⁶

However, as the years went by in the 1960's, the Western image of Kekkonen improved significantly, for very much the same reasons as in Kádár's case. The Cold War came to a new phase or gave way to détente, the old diplomats with the old personal stereotypes on Kekkonen moved away, and most important of all: the worst fears had not materialised. Finland had not become a satellite or lost its democracy, and no new crisis such as the night frosts or the note crisis emerged. Finland did not even make noise about Vietnam. Quite the contrary, it seemed to gain more breathing space as it carefully, step by step, joined the economic integration of the West. So Kekkonen's cautious policy now seemed to give dividends and not to lead Finland finally to the 'slippery slope'. True, the communists entered the government in 1966, which originally caused some worry in the USA and in Britain; in 1965, the British had even expressed to the Finnish Foreign Ministry that a communist participation in the government would be looked upon with 'active dislike'.⁷⁷ Since the general line was to avoid anything which the Finns and the Russians could claim to be 'Western interference', this was an exceptionally strong expression.

But very soon the reports from Helsinki to London and Washington became very soothing: the communists had not advocated any radical policy. In fact, they seemed to have been tamed.⁷⁸ And Kekkonen seemed to have been the successful lion tamer – the one who had managed to fool those who thought they had tamed him.

4 The Good Governors

4.1 Hungary

4.1.1 The End of the 1960ss – Stability and Expectations

At the end of the 1960's the image of Hungary and Kádár had become relatively stable and even positive – if one bore in mind the starting points and the obvious differences. Hungary and Kádár were becoming not only tolerable, but they also looked

better and better compared to other bloc nations – maybe even an example for them to follow.

As the British Ambassador in Budapest, Alexander Morley, stated in his Annual Report in January 1967:⁷⁹

Hungarian leadership abjured old-fashioned dogmatist Communism and became committed to the search for a new brand of Communism, aimed at giving the people of this country material benefits similar to those enjoyed by their neighbours to the West. [...] I have the impression that if it is possible to combine a workable economic liberalism with full public ownership of production and strict central political control, which to us are the essence of communism, it is as likely to be seen in Hungary as anywhere. [...] Contrary to the then usual stereotype of how Hungarians behave (which is not always wrong) the Hungarian party and governmental apparatus has been moving slowly and methodically.

Also the American Envoy emphasized, how 'Hungary's pragmatic communist regime, though closely dependent on Moscow, is being drawn by geography and economic necessity into closer relations with the West'. However, there was also a drawback: the Hungarians were still very restrictive in cultural and commercial exchange with the Americans.⁸⁰ But the mood of the American reports says that this was a nuisance, not the main issue, let alone a reason to stick to the old animosity.

The Hungarians had noticed that the change in the US policy had become final and seemed to sense that they did not need to be the beggar who wanted to get parole from the boycott – it was in the interests of the USA to dismantle old animosity and thus Hungary could wait and set its own terms. The *chargé d'affaires* in Washington, János Radványi, could afford even a slightly sarcastic tone in his negotiations with the Americans:⁸¹

As to RFE [=Radio Free Europe, VV], Radványi said that Premier Kádár had decided to cease jamming of this station to bring some humor into the life of Hungarians, since RFE broadcasts were so ridiculous they could not be taken seriously. [...] Radványi next adverted to Cardinal Mindszenty. The US, he said, should put pressure on the Vatican to find a solution to the case. It was unfortunate that there was no provision in the Catholic Church for the

pensioning of Cardinals, he continued, since this might permit a solution of the issue.

True, the Vietnam issue was still stressed by the Hungarians, but even here the Americans now seemed apt to interpret it in a new light. It was now considered to be mostly lip-service and political currency with which more internal independence was bought from the Soviets. The issue was not in reality important to Hungary, so the West could afford this propagandist price. Hungary was considered to be much more moderate than the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic, and it was also understood to take a benevolent view on the reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1967-68. It was thought that Kádár would not allow himself to be forced either to follow the Czech model or to actively attack it.⁸²

In May 1968 the British Ambassador Millard had a long talk with Kádár and naturally sent a long report to London. Kádár's words resembled the ones in 1960 (which were probably addressed to the Americans): he thought the quarrels were mostly due to misconceptions, and as he had assured the Americans that he foresaw no socialist revolution in America, he now assured that he did not want to destroy the British Empire. But there was even more confidence in his tone now: he was firmly in the saddle and would remain so. And he pointed out that even though political relations with the West Germans were bad, the Germans had made an effort to develop economic relations; the British should do the same.

Reverting to this theme of the need for our two countries to understand each other, Kádár said that we would be aware of what had happened in Hungary during and since the war. They had suffered much, and for the events of 1956 they had paid a very high price. They were not now going to sell cheaply what had been won. If I knew the Hungarians, I would know that this was how most of them felt.

Concerning the Czechs, Kádár took an almost patronising tone: the Czech reforms were not a threat to Socialism, and in many ways the Czechs were now catching up with the Hungar-

ian reforms. 'They were dealing with their problems in their own way, and he was confident of their ability to succeed.' The Ambassador's analysis to London ended in a somewhat respecting, somewhat calculating manner:⁸³

To some extent the strength of Kádár's position is the lack of credible alternatives. Hungarians are cynical about their leadership and of course they have no means of changing it, but he is the best First Secretary they have. More positively his prestige is due to his strong personality and the relatively humane quality of his rule. Although there is little communication between Government and people, the Hungarians sense that under the pressures of office he has revealed statesmanlike qualities. Many are disposed to give him credit for this, although there is much else about the regime which they would condemn. The policy of reconciliation has produced results and to a limited extent Kádár has capitalised national feeling. From this brief contact he appears confidently in control.

The desk officers in London agreed – and were especially interested in Kádár's views on the Czech reforms and their future.⁸⁴

Kádár had a roughly equivalent meeting with the American representative. This was all the more important because this marked the final normalisation of US-Hungarian relations. And also in this meeting he played the part of the good-humoured father of the nation – and of a statesman who was big enough to forgive his counterparts' blunders. In a sense, he had a valid opportunity to pose as the winner in the US-Hungarian controversy, since this was the first time an American Ambassador met him after the long boycott. 'There was no false modesty, and he spoke with the assurance of someone who is not only party boss but the real power in this country.'

According to the Ambassador, Kádár emphasised the need for peaceful coexistence as the only rational approach between countries, whose systems were based on differing theories of society. It might not have been possible to say as much 20 years before, when the force of ideologies was much more intense, but the basic problem now was to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war between the two superpowers. And once again, referring to

the previous bad relations between the USA and Hungary, Kádár made a practical analogy:⁸⁵

He had compared the situation at that time as similar to two boxers who had been slugging at each other for seven rounds (from 1956 to 1963). Neither could hope to knock the other out, neither was prepared to capitulate, and neither could ultimately hope to gain very much from the contest. Hungary was not prepared to come on its knees to the US, and he knew the US was not prepared to assume this posture before Hungary. As I knew, he went on, the UN problem had now been solved in an acceptable way. If we approached current problems in the same spirit which had finally led to a solution of the Hungarian question in the UN, based upon realistic acceptance of the facts of life, then there was a good possibility of advancing towards agreement in other areas. --- Both sides would, of course, indulge in propaganda against each other, but firm and realistic acceptance of this truth would not let the possibilities of improving our relations be submerged by such propaganda.

Kádár was in an obviously relaxed, good humoured, sometimes semi-ironic mood. He was well-briefed and had apparently carefully thought out the line of argument he wished to use. He seemed to enjoy playing the role of a confident leader big enough to forget the past, and hopeful for betterment of Hungarian-American relations though very mindful of present difficulties.

4.1.2 The Troublesome Invasion – and the Recovery

Even after the invasion of Czechoslovakia no immediate fears were expressed about Hungary's own reforms. That is the economic freedom and the extended self-government of the people – at least as long as the Hungarians were let to decide these things themselves.

Hungary was one of the occupying powers in the Czechoslovakian crisis, but this did not destroy Kádár's record and image in Western eyes – rather on the contrary. Of course, it was noted that Hungary had participated in the invasion, but simultaneously it was taken for granted that this had been something which Kádár would have wanted to avoid; he had finally had to accept it in order not to endanger Hungary's position towards the Soviets. No enthusiasm was detected on the Hungarian side, rather extremely half-hearted efforts to find excuses for the invasion, excuses which they did not in fact take

seriously themselves but had to perform some obligatory lip-service. It was evident that the Hungarians had no wish to see the Cold War positions return.

As far as Kádár himself was concerned, there were different interpretations on whether his position had weakened or not, and a British report also registered a joke: 'A current joke here is that among the telephones on Kádár's desk, it is easy to tell which is the hot line to Moscow, because it has only a receiver.' Also the American report included a joke: 'Why are the five armies still in Czechoslovakia? They are trying to find the guy who called them to help.'⁸⁶

In 1968, the standard tone seems to have been that Kádár had tried to ride on two horses at the same time and had been forced to participate in the invasion – and would have, had the Czech reform policy succeeded, 'tried to manoeuvre himself into a Dubcek-like posture and tried to ride the whirlwind'. In any case it was thought to be essential that the West would do nothing to blame Hungary or harm its position. It was in the Western interests that contacts with Hungary would increase and the Hungarian economic reform survived, because in the long run this would strengthen Hungary's freedom towards the Soviet Union.⁸⁷ The American conclusions were no different.

There were some hints in 1968 that Kádár's position might be in danger – or his health shaky. At the very least, his authority had suffered significantly. But as the American Ambassador put it immediately after the invasion: it was doubtful whether his actual position as Party First Secretary would be in any significant danger at this time from putatively ascendant hard-liners, and there was no indication that he would be losing control of the Hungarian Party apparatus. But the Czech developments were bound to seriously impede efforts which Hungarians had made to improve relations with the West generally, at least in the short run. 'This may come about not so much as a result of Hungarian unwillingness to pursue such a course as of lack of Western receptivity', Ambassador Hillenbrand remarked dryly.⁸⁸

In 1969 the mood was already much more confident: the Hungarians were able to manage the situation. 'All in all, Hungarians

have shown considerable flexibility and skill in manoeuvring both domestically and in the foreign relations field in the post-Czechoslovakia situation to create areas of policy opportunity. A particularly interesting aspect is scattered signs they judge the current phase suitable for efforts to improve relations with Western countries.⁸⁹

When Brezhnev visited Hungary in 1972, the British noted with the true kremlological sense, that his repeated personal references to Kádár suggested endorsement of the latter's position towards other elements within the Hungarian leadership. The *communiqué* and the atmosphere of the visit had been a triumph to Kádár – and public opinion in Hungary was relieved.⁹⁰ Even the future for Hungarian economic reform now seemed brighter again and the concept that 'Hungarian lip service to the Russians [...] is, I feel sure, based solely on their interest in future material supplies'.⁹¹ All in all, the effects of Czechoslovakia had faded: 'The Hungarian regime under János Kádár has had considerable popular success with its policy of national reconciliation and the promotion of a limited degree of liberalism.'⁹²

It is also interesting to see that whereas in Leslie Fry's time the Legations had been more critical towards Kádár than the desk officers in London, now the tables were turned in this aspect. Yet again the occupational hazard of diplomats – identification with the local conditions – was at work, but this time it meant a sort of identification with Kádár's policies, not with his opposition or his victims, as after 1956. Moralism was now absent.

At any case, in the late 1960s the image of Kádár had thus stabilised. It was more positive than negative, and it was expected to improve, not deteriorate. Hungary belonged, of course, to the opposing bloc, but bearing in mind this starting point and Hungary's conditions and possibilities, the results were as good as could be expected. The Hungary of Kádár did not seem to be very rigid, orthodox or sincerely convinced about its own Socialism as such, it was anything but ideologically expansive (if it was, it was ideologically expansive to liberalize Communism in the bloc) and it seemed to want to absorb as much market economy and political breathing space as it possibly could without provoking the Soviets too much. This

did not mean implementation of capitalism or democracy as such, but it was pragmatic policy which produced very little trouble to the West. Hungary represented the *status quo* in a liberal shade and this was the best that was expected of it – especially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the declaration of the Brezhnev doctrine.

And the riddle of Kádár remained in many sense unsolved. As the Superintending Under-Secretary of Northern Department in the Foreign Office P. Hayman stated: 'The enigma about Kádár remains: how has he been able to combine a record of close association with the Soviet Union (in 1956 and at other times) with an appearance of national leadership?'⁹³ The answer remained uncertain, but more important was that Kádár had indeed succeeded.

4.2 Finland

4.2.1 The late 1960s: The Old Foe as the Guarantor of Stability

As already noted, Kekkonen, even with all the traditional misgivings attached to him, was no more looked upon as a spineless dictator after the mid-60s. He was still not 'liked' in any true sense of the word, and he was still considered difficult to influence and too pro-Soviet. But the emotional repugnance against him had disappeared, and like Kádár, he seemed to guarantee stability. He now seemed to be the old statesman, who guaranteed that Finland would maintain the status quo and even move slowly nearer the Western model of society – and all that was still the best that could be expected.

There was also a new reason to have a better opinion of Kekkonen. In the 1950s and early 1960s it had seemed that Kekkonen's policy meant more compliance and even possible 'fellow-travelling' radicalism than that of other Finns (the communists were, of course, a case of their own). Especially the social democrats, the conservatives, even the grass-roots agrarians and the civil society in general had been considered much more reliable.

In the late 1960s, however, a new danger seemed to be on the way in Finnish foreign policy: young neo-left radicals, the new intellectual elite of Finland, which was the counterpart of the

radical generation in Western Europe. They were not usually communists, but they marked the West as 'imperialist' and 'reactionary', and, even if they did not advocate outright Warsaw Pact policy, they very much favoured the Soviet interpretation of the détente to the Western interpretation. Especially the Social Democratic Party – previously so reliable – was influenced by these young neo-left intellectuals. Seen especially from the American point of view, these radicals, some of whom were recruited to the Foreign Ministry of Finland, were very noisy about Vietnam, Latin America etc. – issues which were inconvenient for the Americans and on which official Finnish foreign policy had kept quiet.

Compared to this, Kekkonen might be difficult, obstinate and a bit too near to the Soviets, but he was traditional and stable. He had not made noise about Vietnam, and he advocated strict Realpolitik, which meant that no idealist surprises were to be expected from him. Since there was a warning example also in the Western world next door to Finland – Sweden and especially Prime Minister Olof Palme who took a very moralist stand on the Vietnam issue and was also very anti-American in other cases – Kekkonen seemed a much better option than before. The confidence was strengthened by the fact that also the Finnish society – if you did not count the intellectuals on the surface – , seemed to be far from breaking, rather on the move in the right direction, to Scandinavia and Western Europe.⁹⁴

And now Kekkonen was confessed to be the best interpreter of Finnish interests and of the Finnish space to manoeuvre. As the British Ambassador in Helsinki, David Scott Fox analysed already in 1967: 'President Kekkonen can, I think, probably be trusted to understand better than anybody how far Finland can safely go. He seems to be moving Finnish neutrality very cautiously into a position where it is less slanted towards the Soviet Union, although we should not be surprised if he feels obliged to throw an occasional sop to Cerberus in the process.' And he specifically stated that what mattered most to the West was the fact that the development in Finland seemed to be tending to move gradually the Western way.⁹⁵

After the Czechoslovak crisis a British official reported on the moods of Kekkonen and the Finnish people:⁹⁶

[...] virtually nobody denies that in the things that matter, he is Finland, and that when he speaks to the outside world he is both honest and accurate in his interpretation of the way that Finland thinks and feels. If he pretended to us that he was entirely free to go his own way in foreign affairs, he would misrepresent both the facts and the beliefs of his own people. [...] And behind him, and identifying with him to an astonishing degree, are a people who desperately want to be part of the West, who are afraid for the present and the future, and who badly need a boost.

Kekkonen even afterwards confided to Ambassador Scott Fox that he had felt that the whole basis of his policy of promoting close Finnish relations with the Soviet Union had been so undermined that he had seriously contemplated resigning from the Presidency. In these circumstances, the Soviet government had found it necessary to send Kosygin to Finland at the beginning of October, for the purpose of giving the President very positive assurances that there would be no change in their attitude towards Finland and her neutrality.⁹⁷ However, there had been even rumors that the surprise visit of Kosygin might bring demands to Finland.

In these estimations Kekkonen was by no means a spineless man of compliance, nor primarily any more an over-ambitious and power-hungry partisan politician. It seems that now he was thought to have a cunning plan to not only defend Finland's neutrality but also to gain even more space. And while he seemed to be able to achieve this, the official lip-service to the Soviet friendship was not of equal importance. It also seems that the West was now counting on that Kekkonen himself did not take this lip-service seriously either.

Even the fact that the communists had entered the government in 1966 – as a very junior partner compared to the social democrats and the Centre Party – was not held against Kekkonen now. This had been the test-case before, and when the communists joined the government in 1966, there were initially worries. But as already mentioned, now it seemed rather that in integrating the communists into the government

Kekkonen had actually managed to tame them. In the beginning of the 1960s the participation of communists in the government would have been regarded as the final taming of Kekkonen. There were also phenomena which were always seen as a worrisome signs for democracy in the 1950s and early 1960s, like the so-called 'self-censorship' in the press, the isolation of the conservatives, political appointments in the civil service etc., and now these were rarely seen as very dramatic.

One would not have been so optimistic in this, had not also the image of the communists and left-wing socialists changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The new generation was not considered to be the same as the old, stalinist monolith which had only echoed its Russian masters' voice. According to the West, even the communists and the left-wing socialists had now made their choice: it was more important and paid better dividends – in fact it was the only way to gain any dividends – to integrate into the Finnish society, not to be a crony of the Russians without own will. The stalinist fervour of the young intellectuals in the early 1970s caused some concern. But by and large the stabilisation of Finland's international status and domestic policy had given the West what it mainly wanted; the 1970's seemed safe, and at the very latest the CSCE – Finland acting as the host – secured Finland's position. Also the Soviet policy seemed more predictable than before.

4.2.2 Negligible 'Finlandization': Some Concerns – Mainly Satisfaction

In the early 1970s, there were some points of concern in US-Finnish relations for the Americans. These included some deviation from the strict neutrality, some surprisingly leftist remarks of Kekkonen,⁹⁸ his growing and ever more impatient conviction that he and only he could handle the Soviets,⁹⁹ some alleged anti-US bias of the Finnish media,¹⁰⁰ and finally even the Vietnam-statements,¹⁰¹ which previously had been such a positive contrast compared to Sweden. Also the Extraordinary Law, which cancelled the 1974 presidential elections and prolonged Kekkonen's term by four years by legislation, was considered a peculiar thing in a Western democracy.

Even so, these features were in some sense common to all Western European countries and to their new generation, the noisiest part of which made a point of being radical and anti-American. The foundations of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line were still considered valid, if they were followed. The line tried to connect neutrality and friendship with the Soviet Union, which was sometimes difficult, but 'Kekkonen's leadership has minimized these inherent contradictions, and he has succeeded in maintaining a balance between the various elements in the Finnish political scene.'

There were few concrete measures to influence the Finns – mainly keeping up and even increasing the American contacts and the American visibility in Finland in general. As Ambassador Peterson advised in 1970:¹⁰²

Lacking a formal alliance or program of economic assistance, the U.S. has only limited leverage in Finland.[...] What is needed is a balance between heavy pressure on the Finns – which would only create problems for Finland with Moscow – and too passive a role – which could erode Finland's Western orientation. [...] When American interests are damaged by Finnish over-eagerness to please Moscow, the U.S. can to some degree counter this by pointing out to Finnish officials that such actions diminish the image of Finnish neutrality. Our most effective weapon is a friendly but firm line which stresses the damage which could result to long-term Finnish interests from too compliant a line towards Moscow.

This theme was repeated also the following years in slightly different words; such as in the 1950s, there was nothing spectacular to offer, and the Soviets were not to be provoked. Trusting Kekkonen and the fact that basically Finnish society remained solid and the Finns nationalistically anti-Russian seemed the best – and only – way to silently keep up the *status quo*. 'The Finns have a particularly warm feeling for the United States and Americans', State Secretary Rogers assured President Nixon in a memorandum pointing out the usefulness of a future visit to the United States by Kekkonen. According to Rogers, Kekkonen wanted to establish with the American President the same personal relationship he had with the lead-

ers of the Soviet Union, to have President Nixon's assessment of the prospects for continued peace and prosperity in Europe which were so vital to Finnish independence, and to hear the President's views on other world issues.

A lengthy citation is also here in order, because it shows that the major points of the long biography of 1963 were still valid or had now an even more positive light – and the authoritative features were not dangerous:¹⁰³

Some critics, comparing Kekkonen's performance with that of Paasikivi, consider him too deferential to the views of the Soviet Union and too obsequious in his personal relations with the Soviet leaders. While Kekkonen may occasionally go beyond what would appear to be absolutely necessary to provide the Soviet with assurances that Finnish actions will not threaten vital Soviet interests, Kekkonen's basic motive has been the preservation of Finland's independence and neutrality. And this he has achieved to date.

President Kekkonen is adroit and determined in the pursuit and exercise of political power. He is vindictive and ruthless toward rivals, critics, and opponents.

In public Kekkonen has a cool, reserved manner, but is capable of charm. In private life he is a heavy but capable drinker, and unrestrained. He has been a superb athlete. As a young man Kekkonen was Finnish high-jump champion and, in the 1930's, led the Finnish Olympic teams at Los Angeles and Berlin. Today, at 69, he hunts, fishes and skis cross-country. While he has prided himself in particular on his speed and endurance as a cross-country skier, recent confidential reports indicate that he is slowing down on the advice of his physicians.

We will also wish to assure the Finns that we accept and value Finnish neutrality, that we understand the Finns' pragmatic need for particularly friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and that we would become concerned only if concessions to the Soviet Union endangered Finland's independence, neutrality, and free democratic institutions.

We do not recommend any dramatic initiatives in furthering our objectives. Rather, we would hope to further them by cultivating Kekkonen personally – paying him respect and attention his position deserves, welcoming an expression of his views, and demonstrating to him our interest in his country's freedom and independence.

Kekkonen is likely to respond positively to this approach. He undoubtedly considers, and with justification, that he has a unique

understanding of the Soviet leaders, their problems and motives. We would wish to give careful attention to whatever windows he opens onto the Soviet scene.

Kekkonen would be pleased by evidence of our appreciation of Finland's constructive role in the UN; of the sincerity of its interest in détente in Europe; for the availability of Helsinki as a co-site for the SALT talks and the excellent facilities offered; and for a neutrality that does not feel called upon to manifest its virility through attacks on the US.

Not even the fact that a government fell in March 1971 due to communist intransigence was a problem, because 'whatever the character of the government that is next formed, President Kekkonen will remain in absolute control of Finnish foreign policy'. Maybe he would have some difficulties with Moscow, 'but he should be able to master them as he has in the past'. And if there were no communists in the Finnish government, US-Finnish relations would be on even more secure ground, and 'the "European showcase" of communist participation in the exercise of government power will be shattered'.¹⁰⁴

It seems that the mood was now that with the wizard Kekkonen around, the Americans would all the time be in a win-win-situation.

Contrary to this, the Finnish debate about 'finlandization' has stressed that the 1970's were actually more dangerous than the 1960s. This was so because the previous unpleasant inevitability – the close relations with the Soviets – had now been made a virtue. Self-censorship, discrimination on foreign policy grounds and Kekkonen's dominant position had meant a mental capitulation, a limited democracy and a limited freedom of opinion. In the 1960s everyone, except the communists, had still thought in terms of necessary compliance, neither in terms of collaboration nor in terms of true friendship with the Soviets. In Finnish eyes, this transformation was the actual 'slippery slope'.

However, this was not equally important to the West. And thus the circle was completed in the early 1970s. The West, even though it might have some complaints in single issues and think that Finnish neutrality had some odd pro-Eastern flavour in it, now believed genuinely in Finnish neutrality, the recogni-

tion of which had been more a tactical matter to it in the 1960s. And it now had the belief in Finnish neutrality for the very same reason for which it had not had this belief previously: President Kekkonen.

As the British Ambassador Bernard Ledwidge put this:¹⁰⁵

[...] there is quite a formidable battery of sanctions at the disposal of the Russians if the Finns ignore hints of disapproval of any particular policy. It is true that the Finns are today probably strong enough to resist all these pressures and get away with it. They are not in danger of the fate of Czechoslovakia. But the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line of foreign policy, which gives priority to maintaining Soviet confidence, has served Finland very well since 1944. It has steered this country out of a position of total dependence upon the Russians, when a Communist take over was an hourly possibility, to one in which the Finns live in a Western-style welfare state with much less to fear from their Eastern neighbour. So why should they bait the bear when they can do so well out of soothing him? I agree with John Killick. If I were President Kekkonen, I should handle the Russians the way he does.

By way of conclusion it can be summed up that the formula in both Kádár's and Kekkonen's image is astonishingly similar: moral dislike – disapproval of erroneous policy – a recognition of other, worse alternatives – the improved image of the old foe whom you at least knew – a feeling which was not admiration but some sort of appreciation of the achievements anyhow – satisfaction with the stability and even respect.

Also this suggests that basically the phases of the Cold War and the grand strategies in it decided the image, not Kádár's and Kekkonen's domestic policy or democratic freedom. This was even more so since you could never do much else than hope for the best and do nothing concrete, and, of course, because the worst fears had not come true. But also the persistence and traditionalism of Kádár and Kekkonen was an important factor: when you could not expect revolutionary improvements, no news was the best news.

NOTES

- ¹ Keijo Korhonen, 'Introduction', in *Urho Kekkonen – A Statesman for Peace*. Keuruu: Otava 1975, 7-8.
- ² Osmo Apunen, 'Urho Kekkonen and the Finnish policy of Peace', in *Urho Kekkonen – A Statesman for Peace*, 39, 44, 47, 48.
- ³ Risto Hyvärinen, 'Urho Kekkonen's Eastern Policy', in *Urho Kekkonen – A Statesman for Peace*, 59, 62.
- ⁴ Niels Jörgen Haagerup, 'Western European views of Urho Kekkonen', in *Urho Kekkonen – A Statesman for Peace*, 134-135.
- ⁵ *Ulkopolitiikka – Utrikespolitik* 2/1975.
- ⁶ *Selected Speeches*, ed. Robert Maxwell; 'Introduction', ix-x, 'Introductory Biography', passim, especially 1-8, 148-152. – This is of course unacceptable from a researcher, but I must confess that the paper which contained the further bibliographical information was lost. My apologies; however, this is not essential as such for this description and interpretation.
- ⁷ Originally, the plan was to concentrate on the image-building side in this issue; that is, how the Finns and the Hungarians tried to present Kekkonen and Kádár as the guarantors of their countries, as true statesmen and symbols. Did the Finns try to present Kekkonen as the guarantor of neutrality also towards the West, and did the Hungarians attempt to make Kádár the guarantor that Hungary would accomplish to create a more liberal version of Socialism without provoking the Russians? The books in the beginning of the article seem to have this tendency. However, since the Finnish Academy allowance to the project was cut, this became impossible and could only be referred to, since there was no chance to concentrate on any other subjects than to the one which had already been started and which I had studied in the Western archives. This article is based on the article 'Foes Who Grew Better with Time', published in *Hungarologische Beiträge* 14 (2002). The main differences are that after the previous *Beiträge* publication I have added the above mentioned books on image-building side, rearranged the chapters and their logic and visited also the National Archives in the United States and could henceforth widen the aspect – in the original article the emphasis was on the British side a bit more than the actual resources of the British might perhaps have merited. However, I had first only a chance to get acquainted only with the FRUS-material in the internet on the US policy; in July 2002 I managed to look through the original documents in the National Archives. Even after that there are gaps, since both the Finnish and the Hungarian material of the 1970s was

‘under rescreening’ because of the events of ‘September 11th’, as the officials in the NA told me. I must thank them that they hurried the re-screening process up for my sake and indeed managed to get me the material on Finland up to 1973; however, the time to get also the material concerning Hungary was too limited.

⁸ See for example Stuart Hall, *Identiteetti*. Translated and edited in Finnish by Mikko Lehtonen and Juha Herkman. Tampere: Vastapaino 2002, 47, 122.

⁹ For Documents on Hungarian-US relations, See László Borhi, *Iratok a magyar-amerikai kapcsolatok történetéhez 1957-1967*. Dokumentumgyűjtemény, Budapest 2002.

¹⁰ Causes and likely consequences of the Hungarian revolution. Leslie Fry to Selwyn Lloyd 5.2.57. FO 371 128662, PRO.

¹¹ Dulles to American legation, Budapest, 4.4.57. Records of the Department of State, C0026, Internal Affairs of Hungary 1955-1959, Decimal File 764, Roll. No 10 (.00/2-1557 to .00/4-1557), NA.

¹² Fry 26.7.57. FO 371 128683, PRO.

¹³ NSC 5811/1 Washington, May 24, 1958. Statement of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-dominated Nations in Eastern Europe. <http://dosfan.lib.uic/ERC/frus/frus58-60xl/02easter1.html>

¹⁴ Operations Coordinating Board Report, Washington, July 15, 1959. Report on Soviet-dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811/1)/1/. Approved by the President May 24, 1958. Period Covered: From May 24, 1958 through July 15, 1959. FRUS-Online, <http://dosfan.lib.uic/ERC/frus/frus58-60xl/05easter4.html>.

¹⁵ Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Representative, in Plenary, on the Question of Hungary, Press Release No. 3338, December 8, 1959, Statement by the Honorable Wayne Morse, United States Representative, in Plenary Session, on the Hungarian Item. Press Release No. 3526/Corr.1, October 10, 1960. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, Box 1913, 764.00/11-160, NA.

¹⁶ Patrick Reilly to Brimelow 27.8.57. FO 371 128684, PRO.

¹⁷ Fry to Brimelow 11.12.57. FO 371 128689, PRO.

¹⁸ Fry 26.7.57. FO 371 128683, PRO.

¹⁹ Fry to Brimelow 30.8.57. FO 371 128685; Brimelow, Hungarian Delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference, 12.9.57, W. Hayter, Minutes, 12.9.57. FO 371 128687, PRO.

²⁰ Cheetham to Selwyn Lloyd 5.1.60. FO 371 151579, PRO.

²¹ N. J. A. Cheetham to Brimelow 14.5.59, R.R.Ward, Minutes, 11.6.59, R. G. MacAlpine, Minutes, 13.6.59. FO 371 142998, PRO.

- ²² Cheetham to Brimelow 2.11.59, Brimelow to Cheetham 16.12.59. FO 371 142998, PRO.
- ²³ Raising the Diplomatic Missions at Bucharest, Rumania and Sofia, Bulgaria From Legations to Embassies. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower. Washington, November 10, 1960. FRUS-Online, <http://dosfan.lib.uic/ERC/frus/frus58-60xl/06easter5.html>.
- ²⁴ Dulles to Amlegation Budapest 21.8.57. Records of the Department of State, C0026, Internal Affairs of Hungary 1955-1959, Decimal File 764, Roll No. 12 (.00/6-2857 to .00/9-1657), NA. – However, the Legation recommended already next month, that Kádár as a person would not be linked with the worst atrocities. The reason for this “mercy”, though, was not necessarily flattering: one should not talk about a Kádár Government, but about a “Soviet puppet regime”. Rogers to SD 3.9.57. Records of the Department of State, C0026, Internal Affairs of Hungary 1955-1959, Decimal File 764, Roll No. 12 (.00/6-2857 to .00/9-1657), NA.
- ²⁵ See, e.g. from Budapest to Foreign Office 31.1.57, J. F. Wearing, Minutes, s.a. FO 371 128669, PRO; J. F. Wearing 11.2.57, Minutes, FO 371 128670, PRO; Fry to Brimelow 7.3.57. FO 371 128674, PRO; Walter Walmsley, Memorandum of Conversation 25.1.57, Records of the Department of State, C0026, Internal Affairs of Hungary 1955-1959, Decimal File 764, Roll No. 9 (.00/1-2257 to .00/2-1457), NA; N. Spencer Barnes to SD 13.3.57. Records of the Department of State, C0026, Internal Affairs of Hungary 1955-1959, Decimal File 764, Roll No. 9 (.00/2-1557 to .00/4-1457), NA.
- ²⁶ Leslie Fry 3.1.57. FO 371 128662, PRO.
- ²⁷ U. Todd-Naylor 14.3.57. FO 371 128664, PRO.
- ²⁸ Fry to Selwyn Lloyd 4.7.57. FO 371 128682, PRO.
- ²⁹ Fry to Selwyn Lloyd 2.7.57. FO 371 128681, PRO.
- ³⁰ Fry 12.7.57. FO 371 128683, PRO.
- ³¹ J.E.D. Street to Selwyn Lloyd 18.10.57. FO 371 128688, PRO.
- ³² See for example National Security Council, U.S. Policy Toward Finland, NSC 5914/1, 14.10.59, NA.
- ³³ See for example NSC 5403. A Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board on U.S. Policy Toward Finland 12.1.54, Annex to NSC 5403, NA.
- ³⁴ National Security Council, Operations Coordinating Board, 1.7.59, U.S. Policy Toward Finland (NSC 5403), NA.
- ³⁵ Soviet Policy Towards Finland, 8.1.55. FO 371 116274, PRO.
- ³⁶ Embassy: Finland’s Draft of Section 5 (Contingencies) of Department’s Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Finland, Gufler 14.7.62. Box 1267, 611.60E/1-262, NA.

- ³⁷ Michael Creswell to the FO 18.1.56 and 23.1.56, Creswell to Selwyn Lloyd 25.1.56, Hohler, Minutes, 27.2.56, Ward, Minutes, 27.2.56. FO 371 122263, PRO.
- ³⁸ Creswell to Selwyn Lloyd 27.2.57, unclear, s.a., Minutes. FO 371 128673, PRO.
- ³⁹ D. L. Busk to Selwyn Lloyd 25.6.58. FO 371 134858, PRO.
- ⁴⁰ Douglas Busk to the FO 3.9., 15.10.58. FO 371 128752, PRO; Hickerson to the SD 10.7.58. RG 84, Box 3, Helsinki Embassy Files 1956-58, 350 Elections 1956-57-58, NA.
- ⁴¹ *Aikoja ja tapauksia Ahti Karjalaisen elämästä*, toim. Kauko Rumpunen. Juva 1997, 169, 170.
- ⁴² Brimelow, Minutes, Russian Pressure on Finland, 2.1.59, Patrick Reilly to Selwyn Lloyd 9.2.59. FO 371 142866, PRO.
- ⁴³ Hickerson to Secretary of State 30.4.59. RG 59, 1955-59 Central Decimal File, 611.60e/2-155, Box 2519, NA; Record of Conversation between the President, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary and the Ambassador, s.a., Busk to Selwyn Lloyd 2.6.59. FO 371 142867, PRO; Enclosure to Helsinki Despatch N. 87 of July 7 addressed to the Foreign Office. FO 371 142863, PRO; Busk 4.1.69, Confidential, Busk to Home 22.8.60. Record of Conversation. FO 371 151491, PRO.
- ⁴⁴ *Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 1, 1958-62* (Urho Kekkonen diaries), edited by J. Suomi. Keuruu: Otava 2001, 162, 450. The only wise exception had been according to Kekkonen Ambassador Edson Sessions. This attitude is easy to understand since Sessions made a point of expressing to Kekkonen how he appreciated and respected Kekkonen's foreign policy. (ibid. 324, 375.) However, Kekkonen had agreed to keep direct contact with the other American and British ambassadors as well.
- ⁴⁵ *Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 1, 1958-62*, 151.
- ⁴⁶ *Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 3, 1969-74* (Urho Kekkonen diaries), edited by J. Suomi. Keuruu: Otava 2003, 36. – However, later Kekkonen's opinion on Brandt improved because of the new *Ostpolitik* of the latter.
- ⁴⁷ Record of Conversation between the President, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary and the Ambassador, s.a. Busk to Selwyn Lloyd 2.6.59. FO 371 142867, PRO.
- ⁴⁸ See for example J. Lampton Berry to Foy Kohler 3.8.60. Box 1855, 760e.001/2-860, NA.
- ⁴⁹ Gufler to Burdett 29.8.61. Box 1855, 760e.11/1-961, NA; L.D. Battle, Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy the White House, 12.10.61, Enclosure: Draft, President Kekkonen's visit, Washington, October 16-17, 1961, Scope Paper. Box 1855, 760e.11/1-961, NA.
- ⁵⁰ Con O'Neill to Paul Mason 21.7.61. FO 371 159308, PRO.

- ⁵¹ Mason to O'Neill 27.9.61, On behalf of the State Secretary, s.n., 21.7.61. FO 371 159308, PRO.
- ⁵² NSC 5811/1 Washington, May 24, 1958. Statement of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-dominated Nations in Eastern Europe. <http://dosfan.lib.uic/ERC/frus/frus58-60xl/02easter1.html>.
- ⁵³ Fry to Selwyn Lloyd 2.1.59. FO 371 142986, PRO.
- ⁵⁴ Memorandum of Discussion at the 369th Meeting of the National Security Council. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security. Washington, June 19, 1958. FRUS-Online, <http://dosfan.lib.uic/ERC/frus/frus58-60xl/03easter2.html>.
- ⁵⁵ Brimelow, January, 1959 to Fry, Fry to Selwyn Lloyd 2.1.59. FO 371 142986, PRO. – See also Cheetham to Selwyn Lloyd 5.1.60. FO 371 151579, PRO.
- ⁵⁶ Cheetham to Selwyn Lloyd 10.11.59. FO 371 142987, PRO.
- ⁵⁷ Fry to Selwyn Lloyd 31.1.58. FO 371 134851, PRO.
- ⁵⁸ Cheetham to Selwyn Lloyd 10.11.59. FO 371 142987, PRO.
- ⁵⁹ R.H. Mason to Cheetham 8.2.61. FO 371 159372, PRO.
- ⁶⁰ Ivor Pink to the Earl of Home 2.1.63. FO 371 171742, PRO.
- ⁶¹ Ivor Pink to Earl of Home 8.8.63. FO 371 171747, PRO; see also the next Annual Report, Sir Ivor Pink to Mr. R. A. Butler 6.1.64. FO 371 177538, PRO; János Kádár, s.a., s.n. FO 371 171743, PRO.
- ⁶² Sir Ivor Pink to Mr. Gordon Walker, Hungary: Annual Review for 1964, 4.1.65. FO 371 182620, PRO.
- ⁶³ Instruction from the Department of State to the Legation in Hungary, A – 37. Herter, Washington, October 21, 1960. Subject: Some Informal Remarks by Kádár. FRUS-Online, <http://dosfan.lib.uic/ERC/frus/frus58-60xl/06easter5.html>
- ⁶⁴ A. Morley to Michael Stewart, Hungary: Annual Review for 1965, 8.1.66, P.A. Rhodes, Minutes, 24.1.66, Greenhill, Minutes, 24.1.66. FO 371 188684, PRO.
- ⁶⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, David Anderson, 26.2.65. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1963-66, Pol. & Def., Subject Numeric File, Box 2275, Org – Organization & Administration Lux, NA. – The 'Lux' evidently refers to Luxemburg and is thus obviously a mistake.
- ⁶⁶ Louis Toplosky to the SD, Party and Government in 1959: Internal Affairs, 18.2.60. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State 1960-63, Central Decimal File, Box 1913, 764.00/8-260, NA.
- ⁶⁷ Torbert to Secretary of State, 26.10.61. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1960-63, Central Decimal File, Box 1914, 764.00/10-261, NA; Torbert to SD, 2.10.61. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1960-63, Central Decimal File, Box 1916, 764.00/10-261, NA.

- ⁶⁸ Torbert to SD 1.2.62. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1960-63, Political and Defence, Central Decimal File 1960-63, Box 1914, NA.
- ⁶⁹ Changing Patterns in Eastern Europe. National Intelligence Estimate/1/, NIE 12-64, Washington, July 22, 1964. FRUS-Online, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xvii/a.html; Prospects for Independence in Eastern Europe. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ No. 10-65. For the Board of National Estimates: Abbot Smith, Acting Chairman. Washington, February 18, 1965. FRUS-Online, http://www.state.gov/ww/about_state/history/vol_xvii/b.html. – The Legacy was now pressing more and more for normalization of relations with Hungary: 'The United States is thus in a position to abet the westward turning tendency of Hungary and, by judicious use of its economic and political leverage, to encourage Kádár's policy of national self-reliance and domestic relaxation.' (RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1963-66, Pol. & Def., Subject Numeric File, Box 2275, Org – Organization & Administration Lux, NA.)
- ⁷⁰ Action program for US relations with East Europe. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/, Washington, undated. NSAM 304/2/. FRUS-Online, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xvii/b.html.
- ⁷¹ A Study of the Career and Policies of Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland. Gufler to the Department of State 17.3.63. Box 1853, 760d.00/2-260, NA.
- ⁷² Leading Personalities in Finland. Busk to Selwyn Lloyd 22.4.59. FO 371 142861, PRO.
- ⁷³ William Tyler to the Secretary 10.3.65. Attachment: President Kekkonen's Speech in Moscow February 24, 1965. Box 2167, Pol 17 Fin-US 1/1/64, NA.
- ⁷⁴ Harvey Nelson, Airgram 28.6.64, Ingram 18.6.64. Box 2166, Pol 12 Political parties, NA.
- ⁷⁵ Anthony Lambert to Butler 24.6.64, received 26.6.64. FO 371 174885, PRO.
- ⁷⁶ Trevelyan to Lambert 25.2.65. FO 371 174884, PRO.
- ⁷⁷ Vesa Vares, 'Is This the Top of the Slippery Slope? The British View on the Participation of Communists in the Finnish Government 1956-1968'. *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2002, 158-161.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid., 161-163.
- ⁷⁹ Hungary: Annual review for 1966, Alexander Morley to Mr. Brown 4.1.67, Mr Millard to Mr. Brown, 22.1.68, Hungary: Annual review for 1967. FCO 28/169, PRO; British Embassy, Budapest, 31.3.67, Elections in Hungary. FCO 28/170, PRO.

- ⁸⁰ Hillenbrand to Department of State, US Policy Assessment: Hungary, 24.1.68. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1967-69, Subject Numeric File, Pol. & Def., Box 2182, Pol 30 Hung 1/1/67, NA.
- ⁸¹ Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 13, 1964. Subject: Meeting of János Radványi with Director of Eastern European Affairs. FRUS-Online, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xvii/m.html.
- ⁸² Ks. esim. From Berlin to Secstate, 31.3.67. FCO 28/170, PRO; British Embassy to FO 25.4.68.; H. F. T. Smith to Mr. Hayman, Minutes, 21.11.67, G. E. Millard to H. F. T. Smith 8.2.68, British Embassy, Budapest, to George Brown 9.9.67, P. J. Goulden, Minutes, Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Treaty, 25.9.67. FCO 28/181, PRO; Airgram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ A-137. United States-Hungarian Governmental Relations. For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. Richard W. Tims, Counselor of Legation. Budapest, August 31, 1965. FRUS-Online, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xvii/n.html.
- ⁸³ Millard to Michael Stewart 30.5.68. FCO 28/179, PRO.
- ⁸⁴ P. J. Goulden, Minutes, Ambassador's conversation with Mr. Kádár, 6.6.68. FCO 28/179, PRO.
- ⁸⁵ Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, November 30, 1967, 1626Z. Subject: Conversation with Party First Secretary János Kádár. Hillenbrand. FRUS-Online, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xvii/n.html.
- ⁸⁶ Telegram from the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, August 27, 1968, 1210Z. Hillenbrand. FRUS-Online, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xvii/n.html.
- ⁸⁷ P. R. Fearn to P. J. Goulden 4.9.68. FCO 28/172, PRO, Relations with Hungary. H.F.T. Smith 4.9.68, R.H., Minutes, 4.9., D. Greenhill 4.9., Minutes, Millard to Smith 12.9.68, Anglo-Hungarian Relations post-Czechoslovakia, Millard to Stewart 17.9.68. FCO 28/179, PRO.
- ⁸⁸ Hillenbrand, Telegram, Aug. 68, Budapest Embassy to Secretary of State, 9/18/68, AmEmbassy Budapest to SD 18.10.68. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric File, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Political and Defense, Box 2180, Pol – Political Aff. & Rel. Hung. 1967, NA; Meehan, Telegram 2/20/69. RG 59, General Records of the Department of the State, Central Foreign Policy Files, Pol & Def, Box 2181, Pol. 12 Hun, NA; Hillenbrand to SD, The Public and the Press on Kádár's Absence, 1.11.68. RG 59, General Records of the Department of the State, Central Foreign Policy Files, Pol & Def, Box 2181, Pol. 15-1 Hung 1/1/68, NA.

- ⁸⁹ Thomas K. Hughes, INR, to The Secretary, Intelligence Note 66, 5.2.69, Meehan 21.5.69. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric File, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Political and Defense, Box 2180, Pol 6 Hung. 1/1/67, NA.
- ⁹⁰ Killick, telegram, 4.12.72. Dodson, Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Hungary, 27 November to 1 December, 6.12.72. FCO 28 1874, PRO.
- ⁹¹ Bullard to Dodson 22.12.72. FCO 28 1874, PRO.
- ⁹² Noss to Bullard 18.12.72. FCO 28 1874, PRO; See also Puhan to Department of State, Hungary After Four Years, 13.8.69. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-69, Subject Numeric Files, Pol & Def., Pol 2 Hung 1967-69, NA.
- ⁹³ P.T. Hayman, Minutes, 13.6.68. FCO 28/179, PRO.
- ⁹⁴ Annual Review for 1967, Scott Fox to Mr. Brown 28.12.67. FCO 9/310, PRO.
- ⁹⁵ Annual Review for 1967, Scott Fox to Mr. Brown 28.12.67. FCO 9/310, PRO.
- ⁹⁶ Andrew Stuart to A. E. Davidson 28.8.68. FCO 9/328, PRO.
- ⁹⁷ Sir David Scott Fox to Mr. Stewart, 6.1.69, Finland: Annual Review for 1968. FCO 33/716, PRO.
- ⁹⁸ See for example Krehbiel to SD 31.5.73. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73, Political & Defense, Box 2268, Pol 15-1 Fin 4-20-72, NA.
- ⁹⁹ See for example Peterson, Airgram, U.S. Policy Assessment: FINLAND, 18.7.7. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1970-73, Subject Numeric File, Box 2269, Pol 15 FIN-US 1-8-70, NA; Ledwidge to K.A. James 13.1.72. FCO 33/1864, PRO.
- ¹⁰⁰ See for example Peterson to SecState, Telegram, Farewell call on President Kekkonen, 21.3.73. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1970-73, Subject Numeric File, Box 2269, Pol 15 FIN-US 1-8-70, NA.
- ¹⁰¹ See for example S.n., 4/28/72, SD to Helsinki 29.12.72. General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73, Political & Defense, Box 2270, Pol Fin-V, NA.
- ¹⁰² Peterson, Finnish Foreign Policy in the 1970s, dated 6.8.71. RG 59, General Records of the Department of the State, 1970-73, Subject Numeric File, Box 2267, NA.
- ¹⁰³ Rogers, Memorandum to the President, Kekkonen's Visit: Perspectives, 17.7.70. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1970-73, Subject Numeric File, Box 2276, Pol 7 Fin 4/1/70, NA.
- ¹⁰⁴ William P. Rogers, Memorandum for the President, Finnish Government Resigns over Communist Intransigence, 19.3.71. RG 59, GRDS, CFPF 1970-73, SNF, Box 2268, Pol 15 FIN 1/1/71, NA.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ledwidge to Bullard 1.6.1872. (sic!) FC 33/1870, PRO.

Policy of Friendship: The Image of Hungarian-Finnish Relations during the Kekkonen Era

Mari VARES

1 Introduction

A high-ranking Finnish foreign policy official, Keijo Korhonen wrote in his memoirs about the role of Hungary in Finnish foreign policy during the Kekkonen era. To quote Korhonen:¹

The Russians were first in importance, after them there was no-one in importance, even after no-one there was no-one, then there were the Hungarians and at the tail of the queue there were East Germans, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Rumanians.

In this article the aim is to discuss the image of the Hungarian-Finnish relations during the Kekkonen era from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, the period when the relations between Finland and Hungary improved at both the intergovernmental and non-governmental (civil society) level. The main problematic deals with Finnish foreign policy – conducted by President Kekkonen – towards Kádár's Hungary, but to make the picture more complete Hungarian points of view are illuminated as well. What sort of image did Finland and Hungary have of each other at the state, diplomatic and political levels, and, on the other hand, how did they rate the mutual relations? It is not enough to ask, which were the practical questions discussed, but one also has to clarify how the representation of the relations was managed: how were they defined and by what means were they practised? How

were these relations established and what kinds of relations were pursued?

It can be anticipated that there are two contradictory elements as starting points for this study: first, the heritage of the old cultural relations, which were based on the feeling of kinship, and second, the political reality of Cold War Europe and détente in the 1960s and 1970s. The Hungarian-Finnish relations can be approached from two angles: as the meeting point and convergence of two states representing two different social and political systems and as the encounter of two states which both saw themselves and each other as 'small states' in the world of Cold War politics.

Expressions of the Finnish policy towards Hungary can be found in the context of the meetings of the countries' leadership. Therefore, focus is on the meetings of President Kekkonen with the representatives of the Hungarian party (HWSP) and state leadership. The questions are: What sort of confidential or open interpretations were made, what was discussed and what kind of public statements were made? The visits as such and their contents are the mirror of the relations: they contain data of the relations, and their forms give indirect information of the weight that was attached to them.

First, two visits Kekkonen paid to Hungary in the 1960s will be analyzed: the private visit in May 1963 and the state visit in autumn 1969. First, these visits were symbolically significant as openings of the relations or as first steps in the history of visits. The first visit was made at a time when Hungarian relations with the West were problematic after the 1956 uprising. Kekkonen's visit in 1963, although it was officially only a detour after the visit to Yugoslavia, was the first visit of a Western leader since 1956. The state visit of 1969 was an official state visit and a part of a visit to Rumania and Czechoslovakia as well. It was made while the CSCE conference was being discussed and while the shadow of the occupation of Czechoslovakia was creating intense international pressure. This period can be named as the opening and developing of the Hungarian-Finnish political relations.

Second, I will discuss the next period lasting a decade, during which relations between Finland and Hungary were further developed in terms of actual political goals. Hungarian President Pál Losonczi visited Finland in 1971 and Kádár followed him in 1973 – both visits were first visits, since no Hungarian head of state had previously visited Finland, and, in addition to this, Kádár had never visited a non-socialist country officially before. In 1976 Kekkonen on his turn paid a state visit to Hungary. The series of meetings between Kekkonen and Hungarian leadership continued next year when the Hungarian Prime Minister visited Finland.

During the era of Kekkonen the President was unusually strong in formulating Finnish foreign policy. Kekkonen's Hungarian relations are of special interest to him because as a student politician he was an *aitosuomalainen*, an ardent Finn who respected Finnish-Estonian-Hungarian kinship, and knew Hungary and Hungarians personally. Presumably, this mental heritage might have influenced his opinions and policy towards Hungary.² Power politics was to him, however, a reality in which the relations with the Soviet Union were a primary consideration but, at the same time, reputation of Finland as a Western and neutral state was cherished. It is worth discussing how or if these two frameworks – the idea of kinship and the prevailing political conditions – were linked to each other in Kekkonen's policy. As a working hypothesis it is presumed that these two dimensions were united in his policy to make the mutual relations between Finland and Hungary a unique case in the field of Cold War Europe. In the context of satellite policy, the mutual interpretations and expressions on Hungarian Kádárism and Finnish policy of neutrality were obviously key issues. Furthermore, it is important to compare the attitudes of the diplomatic corps with the policy of the state leadership as well as the expressions of the press and publicity with the official rhetoric³.

In this article it is presumed that the two contexts – the tradition of kinship relations and the politics of Cold War – affected the visits too. In the case of Hungarian-Finnish

relations, the visits which Kekkonen paid in the 1960s seemed to be symbolically valuable as acts of recognition between two states. In the 1970s relations were further developed in the context of the state visits and discussions between the head of states. Hungarian policy emphasised their importance. Therefore, programs, symbols and forms of state visits are of special value and worth studying in order to illuminate the conduct of the Hungarian-Finnish relations.

2 Attitudes towards Kádár's Policy and Finnish Neutrality

In the aftermath of 1956, the issue of Hungary was a controversial one in Finland. Official Finnish policy towards Hungary can be defined as a formal satellite policy and the attitude of public opinion was that of a warming cultural co-operation. As the Finnish Legation in Budapest defined it, there were two different dimensions in Hungarian-Finnish relations: the correct state level relations, resulting from the moderate Finnish policy towards Kádárism. At the same time there were the correct relations between Finns and Hungarians, which were based on the Finnish sympathetic attitude towards Hungarians and on the voluntary help to the Hungarians who had suffered in the revolution. There was thus a difference between the public opinion and the Finnish official policy. Kekkonen was well aware of this difference.⁴

In the context of the idea of kinship, Hungarian-Finnish relations were normalized soon after the revolution. As the Finnish Legation in Budapest stated, thanks to the Finnish sympathy for Hungarians, the relations between Hungary and Finland were restored to cherishing the idea of kinship as early as 1957. For example, the leaders of the *Suomi-Unkari Seura* (Finnish-Hungarian Society, FHS) visited Hungary. The *chargé d'affaires*, T.H. Heikkilä, warned, however, that there was no reason for too much optimism yet. According to Heikkilä, it was still important to consider the conditions in Hungary carefully, even if they seemed to be normalised.⁵ It can be argued that the statement reflected, surprisingly, both the

attitude of Finnish public opinion and the official moderate policy towards Kádárism.

In spite of the quick return to kinship relations, state-level relations between Hungary and Finland remained cool. The relations were correct but reserved. Therefore, the fact that the Finnish government opposed all open protests against the Soviet occupation in 1956 and the Kádár regime did not imply that the official relations between Hungary and Finland were good. Heikkilä assumed that the relations were kept cool in order to preserve Finland's position as an independent country.⁶

Obviously, at the time of the first visit, the cool attitude towards satellite countries did not seem to be essential any longer. The relations between Finland and the satellite countries were gradually warming as a result of developments in international politics. In the case of Hungary, there were some new aspects to consider from the Finnish point of view. Kekkonen's visit to Hungary in 1963 was part of a process in which Hungary's diplomatic relations were normalised after the events of 1956. The Finnish political and diplomatic circles saw signs of liberalisation and de-stalinisation in Hungary as well as signs of a new orientation in the relations between Hungary and the United Nations.⁷

The question of Finland's reputation as a neutral state was also an important indicator in Finnish foreign policy. When there were perceptible signs of Western acceptance of Finnish neutrality, the Finnish political leadership was ready to improve the relations with the Eastern bloc. After the visits to Great Britain in 1960 and France in 1962, the West gave official signs of recognition that Finland was a neutral state.⁸ In addition to this, cultural and scientific contacts between Finland and Hungary had increased in the late 1950s and early 1960s.⁹ Kekkonen's visit was discreetly discussed in Helsinki already in 1961 on Hungary's initiative, but the Finnish political leadership was not ready to accept Hungary's proposal.¹⁰

The visit of 1963 can be regarded as a turning point in the relations between Finland and Hungary. The policy in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution seemed to change. Finnish

contradictory attitudes towards Hungary were still apparent. 'Finnish sympathetic attitudes towards Hungarians were transformed to 'the policy of kinship' and the 'moderate attitude of the Finnish political leadership towards Kádár' was transformed into the 'Finnish satellite policy towards Hungary'.

Kekkonen himself considered that his visit had an important effect on Hungarian-Finnish relations. He stated a year after that it was the kinship movement that should form the basis for Finnish relations towards both kinship nations, Estonia and Hungary. He pointed out in his private speech to the representatives of the so-called national sciences – such as ethonology and linguistics – in Finland that these relations should be based on unofficial civil society circles rather than conducted at the state level. As he said:¹¹

To the generation to which I belong and whose marvelous and good representatives are gathered here, the issue concerning Estonia and Hungary is an emotional subject. [...] Already for a couple of years I have had an idea that better relations with Hungary and Estonia should be established, not necessarily on a formal, official basis, because I understood that there would be difficulties with that, but merely at informal, cultural and social levels, but very carefully.

Accordingly, Kekkonen invited scholars to create informal networks. This was a way to establish and reinforce contacts between Finland and Hungary. One can ask whether this was a way to strengthen kinship relations as such or whether it was a way to get Finns involved with Hungarians in spite of political differences. Were these informal contacts aimed to further official political relations?

3 Opening New Relations

Finnish political leadership emphasized the unofficial nature of the 1963 visit. This tentative attitude of the Finnish political élite towards Hungary can be sensed in Finnish official reports to the press. The Finnish News Agency, STT, pointed out that Kekkonen would only 'call at' or 'stop in Hungary' during his way home from Yugoslavia.¹² And, Kekkonen then 'stopped in' Hungary on 12 – 15 May 1963, immediately after his visit to

Yugoslavia. President Dobi and Mrs Dobi acted as hosts. The program consisted of cultural events, sightseeing in Budapest and a visit to the countryside and Debrecen. Kekkonen also met Finns who lived in Hungary. There was no mention of a meeting between Kekkonen and Kádár in the official program – a fact that can also be interpreted as a symbol of informality.¹³ In the Hungarian draft of the program, however, it was mentioned that on 14 May there would be a meeting between the two leaders, should Kekkonen request it.¹⁴ Also the fact that the Hungarian leadership implied the political importance of the visit in the official lunch and the festive dinner by inviting also the Party leadership, Kádár in particular, to these occasions, reveals the symbolic value the Hungarian leadership attached to the visit.¹⁵

Kekkonen's visit attracted some attention in Finnish media: in the press there was a slightly critical tone. Already before the visit, Kekkonen had been annoyed about the tone of the right-wing newspaper *Uusi Suomi*. He interpreted their tone as questioning the judgement of the Finnish political leadership – i.e. Kekkonen's judgement. In *Uusi Suomi* the question was asked whether it was reasonable to visit a country in which the prevailing conditions were suspect. Kekkonen brought this matter up with the Chief Editor, Eero Petäjäniemi, who denied that he had indirectly criticised Kekkonen in this way.¹⁶

After the visit, it was claimed in a Finnish magazine *Kuva-Posti* that the state visit to Yugoslavia was successful but insinuated that the informal visit to Hungary may have been unnecessary at this time.¹⁷ The reason for these comments can be found in the post-1956 context: the press might well have been afraid that Finland was being identified with the Eastern bloc.

Hungarian media also commented on the informal nature of Kekkonen's visit. For example, the Hungarian women's magazine *Nők Lapja* concentrated on Mrs Sylvi Kekkonen, wrote about *Kalevala* and presented the city of Helsinki in a richly illustrated article. In the pictures published in newspapers and magazines, Kekkonen was photographed in informal situations: in Hortobágy and visiting suburban housing developments,¹⁸ both in traditional and modern

Hungarian contexts. One can only ask whether these pictures reflected symbolically new Hungarian-Finnish relations in which the traditional context and the modern one were present concomitantly.

In the political rhetoric certain value was afterwards given to the visit. It was to be interpreted as an opening of relations between Kekkonen's Finland and Kádár's Hungary. One year later, the Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter stated in the Hungarian Parliament that the relations between Hungary and Finland did not reflect only 'a romantic ethnographic kinship' but that the relations were at a level of modern progress. Péter argued that there were 'many useful economic and cultural achievements' between Hungary and Finland. The work of the joint Culture Committee and the trade treaty gave fresh content to these traditional relations. Later, in the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Péter's statement was cited as an example of the prevailing image of Hungarian-Finnish relations. Péter had referred to the 'high level visits' as a proof of good relations. Ambassador Palas presumed that Hungary would in the future also continue to develop relations especially by these visits.¹⁹

Kádár himself stated to Palas after Kekkonen's visit that 'Hungary carefully observed Finnish foreign policy'. He emphasized the 'good relations' between Finland and the Soviet Union and used the concept of kinship in a modern sense. 'Kinship' was defined as not only a cliché, but a scientific truth. At the same time there was in Kádár's rhetoric another concept, 'peaceful co-existence'. The fusion of 'old' with 'modern' rhetoric produced a modern conclusion: the two kinship nations wanted peaceful co-existence.²⁰

The communist state leadership of Hungary was also consulting with the Finnish Communist Party (FCP) on Finnish policy but also others, the social democrats and the Agrarian Union, exchanged thoughts with the Hungarian Ambassador. Also the plan of a visit by a parliamentary delegation pointed out the Hungarian interest during this time. Hungary was interested also in how the communist and other radical cultural circles were functioning in Finland.²¹ An interesting detail in the relations between the two different political systems was a

discussion between Kádár and the FCP Chairman, Aimo Aaltonen, a year after Kekkonen's visit. The discussion was reported to Kekkonen by the Finnish State Police. Aaltonen complained about the various difficulties created by Kekkonen's policy. He explained to Kádár that one of the reasons why there could not be a communist revolution in Finland was that Kekkonen was taking the wind out of its sails. Kádár commented with a smile: 'So God help you!'²²

At the informal level – as Kekkonen wished – there began to appear concrete signs of good relations. For example, the Hungarian leadership decided in autumn 1963 to grant Kustaa Vilkuna a decoration when he was attending an international ethnologists' conference in Budapest. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) mentioned that in addition to scientific merits, Vilkuna had had a significant role in developing Hungarian-Finnish relations. He had been active in the Hungarian-Finnish Society and in the Hungarian Ethnological Society since 1939 and in concluding the Cultural Treaty between the countries. It was also known that Vilkuna was among Kekkonen's entourage and an adviser in foreign policy issues.²³ On a more popular level, a sign of 'understanding' between the two countries was that in 1964 package tours to Hungary were for the first time organised in Finland. This told of – as the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated – the 'popularisation of Hungarian-Finnish relations'.²⁴ Tourism and travel as well as increasing student exchange were undoubtedly ways to re-establish the contacts between Hungary and Finland.²⁵ In the beginning of the year 1970, as a result of Kekkonen's state visit to Hungary in 1969, compulsory visas between the two countries were abolished. The agreement was important, because for the first time Hungarian citizens were allowed to travel to a non-socialist country without visas.²⁶

4 Two ideas of Brotherhood: Tradition and Progress

If the visit in 1963 was remarkable because it was understood to be the opening of a new era of relations between Finland and Hungary, the visit of 1969 also had a similar importance. In the

late 1960s, respect for Soviet interests was still paramount in the relations across the Iron Curtain. One new element in the foreign policy of Hungary was the increasing openness to the West. A key motivation behind it was the opportunity which the West offered to gain access to the latest technology and to participate in economic development. The first contacts in this respect were Finland and Austria. The visit paid by the Austrian Chancellor, Josef Klaus, in 1967, as well as Kekkonen's visit, were given wide publicity.²⁷ For Kekkonen, the tour in Eastern Europe offered an opportunity to formulate the Finnish position on post-Prague international politics. In 1969 there were signs of normalisation in international relations after the events in Prague. This might have encouraged Kekkonen to visit Eastern Europe.²⁸ Therefore, the situation in 1969 resembled the situation in 1963: stabilisation after tension.

The Hungarian activity and emphasis on visits was evident also in the fact that Hungary so often took the initiative in the contacts with the Finns. János Péter suggested on the 16 August 1968 to the Politburo of the HSWP, that President Losonczi should invite the Finnish President to an official state visit to Hungary. He reminded them that already in 1961²⁹ an invitation to this effect had been forwarded, but Kekkonen had not been able to accept it 'because of domestic policy reasons'. Péter said that Kekkonen was planning a visit to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Italy, and he had been informed that Kekkonen might also like to visit Hungary.³⁰ Before the visit, the Finnish Embassy in Budapest assumed that the policy of peaceful co-existence had given Finland a certain position in Hungary's policy. In the report concerning the political events in Hungary it was again estimated that relations with the Soviet Union formed the basis of Hungarian policy. This was not, however, contradictory to the idea of peaceful co-existence. It was stated that 'this pleasant side of the socialist bloc is more evident in the case of Hungary than in other socialist countries'.³¹

In addition to political conditions, attention was also drawn to cultural relations. Culture and science were seen as central aspects of mutual relations. A report which was drawn up by

the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated that the reason for the good co-operation was that Finland accepted Hungarian cultural policy: the policy which was conducted at the higher political level.³² It pointed out the importance of the idea of kinship to the relations between the countries; the tradition had been formed by the philologists had initiated Hungarian-Finnish relations. They were the starting-point for state level relations, which had gained more momentum due to the Kekkonen visit in 1963.³³

The speeches provide an interesting insight into the image and into the system of the relations between the two countries. Kekkonen's speeches in Budapest in 1969 reflected both the concept of kinship and the concept of progress: old concepts were again linked to new ones. As Kekkonen expressed it, the relations between Hungary and Finland were founded not only on historical grounds but also on modern co-operation. For example, Kekkonen praised the progress Hungary had made during the 1960s: the development in Hungary between the years 1963–1969 had shown 'the high level of Hungarian civilisation and culture'. He emphasized both political and cultural understanding between the two countries. In this connection 'kinship' was reevaluated as a scientific truth, not as a romantic speculation or a myth. In this rhetoric, the kinship was not, however, the only aspect of brotherhood but it was paired with the willingness to make cultural and commercial agreements. The concept of a small nation implied this twin brotherhood uniting the two countries politically, and its rhetoric was carried out with concepts of 'kinship, brotherhood, progress and small nation'.³⁴

The kinship aspect in the traditional sense was visible also in the informal part of the state visit. Such details were the *Kalevala*-show held in Budapest and a new Hungarian-Finnish dictionary. According to Kustaa Vilkuna, the dictionary was a 'neat or, in other words, smart and solid expression of the special status of Hungarian-Finnish relations'. Vilkuna had recommended that the dictionary should be presented to some of the Hungarian high-ups.³⁵

The HSWP had also decided that the reception of Kekkonen was to reflect his positive role in international policy and to

emphasize the importance of the visit. (The way the points of the protocol were organized reflected this, too). Hungary decided to take a positive view on freedom of visas and to conclude a treaty of technology and economy with Finland.³⁶ The discussions between Kekkonen and Kádár can be linked to the idea of mutual understanding between small nations in the field of international politics. Discussions of world politics and mutual interests dealt with the typical, actual political issues. Notes of the discussions show that an exchange of views concerning the NORDEK, European security and commercial and economic co-operation were on the agenda.³⁷ The official memorandum which the President and the Finnish Foreign Ministry gave on the state visit emphasised the correct nature of the relations between Finland and Hungary. It is worth noticing that there was an expression of 'the similarity of opinions on world politics and of the direction of the mutual relations between the two states'.³⁸

The Finnish press, however, did not adopt such a positive tone: their treatment of the visit was not necessarily in accordance with the official line. An incident of this latter visit was the case of 'muckraking journalism' of which Kekkonen accused one reporter of the Finnish newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, Lauri Karén. The codes of the official 'liturgy' were disturbed by Karén's critical articles on Kekkonen's visit to Hungary.

Karén had written that Hungary had shown only little interest in Kekkonen during the visit. Karén gave an explanation: the Soviet Union disliked the potentially increasing contacts between Hungary and neutral countries. Karén noticed that the typical symbols of a state visit had been lacking in Budapest: there was no red carpet at the airport and Kádár was not there to personally welcome Kekkonen. In addition to this 'lack of symbols at the airport', there were only a few Finnish or Hungarian flags in the streets of Budapest. He believed that the atmosphere in Czechoslovakia and Rumania had been much warmer towards Kekkonen. Karén had discussed with some British and French diplomats, who had also considered that the

reception was rather cool. Maybe Karén's tone was coloured by French or British opinions.

The President made his attitude to Karén's articles clear. He would not accept this kind of reporting and accused Lauri Karén 'of taking a waste bin instead of a pen' with him to Hungary. Kekkonen further complained that 'it was clear that a journalist who had equipped himself with these kinds of tools could not write a truthful description'.³⁹

Karén stated later in his memoirs that the Hungarians had not paid much attention to his writing.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the Hungarian appraisals of Kekkonen's visit in 1969 have pointed out the huge publicity which was given to it in Hungary.⁴¹ Accordingly, János Péter had proposed to the HSWP Political Committee that before the visit the Hungarian media would deal with Finland and the relations between the two countries. In practise, this meant that on the day of Kekkonen's arrival the daily newspapers were due to wish him welcome in two languages and that the editorials were to show respect to the importance of the visit. The speeches were to be made public and bulletins in colour were to report the results of the visit. Should Kekkonen so wish, a TV interview could also be arranged.⁴²

5 Towards Friendship

During the 1970s the dualist idea of 'brotherhood' was further developed: contemporary questions brought 'modern friendship' to the limelight. The concept of friendship was gaining more weight at the expense of the idea of kinship. The new image was that Hungary and Finland could become members of the international community. It is possible to presume that rather contemporary political circumstances and goals made an impact on the statements concerning mutual relations than the tradition.

Up to 1969, the 1960s had been the period of establishing and consolidation in Hungarian-Finnish relations. In the 1970s, however, an increase in sheer volume of interchange at political, state and diplomatic, cultural, economic and civil society levels took place. Political relations and the visits were more open than

in the 1960s, when the images of Hungary and Kádár were still undeveloped. In time the relations between Finland and Hungary improved on both intergovernmental and civil society level as the repercussions of the 1956 faded away. When President Pal Losonczi visited Finland from 23rd to 26th of August, 1971, the themes of negotiations were essentially the same as during Kekkonen's state visit in 1969, but it is evident that the political relations were now discussed more openly and publicly.

During the visit, the Hungarians were especially keen on discussing Finnish views on the CSCE, and the commercial relations between the countries, including co-operation in the fields of technology, science and economy. The Hungarian expert in these questions was Deputy Prime Minister Miklós Ajtai. That he was not a member of the politburo was interpreted by the Finnish Ambassador Martti Ingman to mean that the Hungarians intended to loosen the grip of the party on matters of technology.⁴³ Ajtai had expressed to Ingman his interest in getting acquainted with how the scientific research was organized in Finland, what the status of Hungarian-Finnish co-operation was and what the plans for the future were. He also wanted to discuss the prospects of co-operation on the economy, sounding whether the Finns thought that joint projects in industry and agriculture were possible.⁴⁴ The interest in technology, economy and agriculture can be seen in the visit plan of Losonczi; the President was to visit, for example, the Agricultural Institute in Mustiala and the Rosenlew factories in Pori. Education, culture and health care were prominent in the program of the Presidential spouse. The program included for example a lunch on an ice-breaker and visiting Tapiola in Espoo, which shows wish of the Finns to show clean nature, construction technology and technical skills – tradition and the modern side of Finland.⁴⁵

Since the most traditional part of the relations, culture, was by now in the eyes of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, consolidated and unproblematic, the focus was on modern themes during the visit. Therefore, according to Ingman, there was hardly anything else to discuss in culture during the visit than to 'note the positive development'.⁴⁶ Of course, Finno-

Ugrian philology and ethnology were still the key issues in the treaty of cultural exchange but the field of co-operation had become wider. As was stated in a preliminary memorandum, there was a mutual wish to deepen and widen the contacts in different fields of science and arts. The objects of interest were not, however, necessarily the same. The Finnish Embassy estimated that the Hungarians were more interested in Finnish science than art, and especially in gaining benefit from 'hard sciences', whereas the Finns were interested in Hungarian art. Moreover, the Finns thought that the treaty on culture was not supposed to cover all cultural exchange, but rather to show the way and incite initiative, after which it would be possible to create direct contacts.⁴⁷ The more diversified and 'natural' cultural exchange would be the better: after the official agreements one could proceed to striking direct contacts.

However, the discourse of the visit also offered a role to 'tradition'. The trend of the conversations between the two Presidents was that good relations arose from tradition, on which the countries now could build 'more modern' relations. They would answer to the needs of the present day. This 'need' was now about economy, technology, industry and society, as the Finns had prophesied already before the visit. Losonczi expressed the Hungarian interest in co-operation in health care and to conclude an agreement on co-operation in science and technology. He suggested that co-operation should be widened and that other sciences would develop the same kind of co-operation as already existed in ethnology and linguistics. He also mentioned the need to further develop the relations on the economy. Kekkonen reacted in principle positively to these proposals. Losonczi also mentioned that the cultural relations rested on the sound base of old tradition. According to Kekkonen, these cultural relations had also created the circumstances for the development of economic co-operation. Thus the cultural relations were seen as the foundation and the example for other aspects of the relations, and they were also the proof of the long tradition of the relations between the two nations. The idea of tradition was linked to the cultural

relations and they were also seen as the bridge to modernity. It can be maintained that the concept of tradition could be used as a reference point to the entirety of the relations, but the 'new' relations, established from the 1960s onwards, were linked to this tradition. Losonczi's reference to how the high-level visits had advanced the positive development of the relations reflected the emphasis the Hungarians laid to the visits as a means of foreign policy.⁴⁸

The view of the roles of Finland and Hungary had in international context was expressed by the concept of mutual understanding. In the talks with Losonczi, Kekkonen defined the Finnish line in international politics as 'an active policy of neutrality' which had been, in co-operation with the Soviet Union, consolidated as a part of European political reality. The relations with the Soviet Union were extremely important to Finland. The prolongation of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance by 20 years had set 'our consolidated good relations with the Soviet Union outside speculations as a process of change was starting in Europe'. Kekkonen placed the Finnish foreign policy as a part of a 'more stable and peaceful *status quo*'. This was connected to the aspirations to realize the plans for a European Security Meeting. In the conversation references to Hungarian-Finnish understanding in international issues were made. Losonczi, for his part, stated that the mainstay of Hungarian foreign policy was the relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; close co-operation with them was one of the factors which had 'helped us to the calm situation which now prevails in Europe'. Losonczi aligned the Finnish active policy of neutrality with the policy of 'the progress-loving forces' which had stabilized Europe, i.e. brought about the situation in which there had been no war in Europe for 26 years and the international tension had eased.⁴⁹

The key concepts of the joint *communiqué* on the visit had it that the relations were unproblematic: multilateral co-operation, mutual understanding and friendship. The visit was considered to be 'a new manifestation on friendship and mutual respect between our nations'. The relations were described as stable,

traditional and up-to-date. Economy and technology were emphasized and relations in them were to be developed. Both sides stated with satisfaction that the relations between Hungary and Finland were developing favourably in all fields of social, economic and cultural life. This was thanks to the high-level visits and discussions which 'have promoted the co-operation and traditional friendship between these two kindred people'. In recent years 'many important results have been reached in bringing the two kindred peoples closer to each other'. Getting to know the other's traditions and present status, and the new scientific contacts represented the progress of the relations.

The image of the visit of President Losonczi was that it was largely a visit of friendship and it offered a forum to declare how the relations were unproblematic and advanced positively. The Finnish and Hungarian interests were considered to be common from the viewpoint of history and the present-day international position and role. It was also expressed how the policy of the other part was appreciated: Finland 'appreciated the endeavours of the Hungarian government to maintain good relations with their neighbours and to develop their co-operation with all nations contributing to international peace and security'. Hungary expressed that the Finnish policy of neutrality served as a basis for efforts aiming at strengthening of international peace and security and at promoting mutual understanding between nations.⁵⁰

The 'kindred' aspect was not as evident as it had been before. It was mainly emphasized in dinner speeches, not in official conversations or in the *communiqué*, and even in the speeches the contemporary aspect and the challenges of the modern age were stressed. Losonczi highlighted the role of the state in developing the relations on the economy, but also the civic society level was appreciated: the friendship relations between Hungarian and Finnish and the Friendship Week⁵¹ were, according to him, new useful ways to co-operate through 'popular diplomacy'. Losonczi saw these relations as the foundation for developing political, economical, technical and cultural relations. As he referred to the different social systems, he also found a uniting factor: the policy in

international questions and the fact that also Finland was advancing the mission of peace. Thus the speech declared 'mutual understanding' both at a popular level and in international politics.⁵²

The concept of friendship was central also in the draft of Kekkonen's speech, written by Ambassador Ingman: the good Hungarian-Finnish relations were presented through the idea of 'romantic friendship'. This kind of friendship was usually very difficult to realize in state relations. Friendship was the undercurrent of the relations, and both the state-level relations and civil society contacts were to be built on it. The Hungarian-Finnish relations had originally been created by personal friendships and the studies on the origins of kindred nations and their languages in the nineteenth century. The hobby of closed circles had now become an object of interest for masses. This was due not only to the situation in Hungary, but also to the feeling of friendship. The Finnish interpretation of 'popular diplomacy' and the role of the state were put in a way that the initiatives of the civic society and the official arrangements together apparently guaranteed best results.

Kekkonen also referred to the economic problems with the idea of understanding: 'It has sometimes been jokingly said about the trade between Finland and Hungary that both parties are equally dissatisfied with its development'. Thus also trade was linked to the idea of friendship: getting actively acquainted with the other would help in removing obstacles. Simultaneously the development of the economy was linked to the idea of being members of the international community and having an important mission in it. Both countries had been pawns in Great Power policy game – even this had helped to understand each other. Thus Finland and Hungary had been on the same side in the past and so they were in the present.⁵³

The Finnish newspapers did not cause any reason for uneasiness to Kekkonen this time. They described the relations between the two countries mainly with the same discourse as the speeches mentioned above and thus also romanticized Hungarian-Finnish relations more than the reports of the 'inner circles' in diplomacy.⁵⁴ This consensus was transmitted in Kekkonen's words, cited also by the leading conservative

paper, *Uusi Suomi*, according to which 'despite their different social systems, Finland and Hungary have created consolidated forms for mutual communication'. Thus both countries had advanced 'the developing tendency of European policy which aims at creating more mutual contacts between countries with different social systems'. The paper estimated that Hungary aimed at becoming an interpreter for East European countries in East-West questions, like the Berlin Treaty.⁵⁵ The Hungarian role in the preparation of the European Security Meeting was thus made public in Finland already during Losonczi's visit.⁵⁶

Soon afterwards the official discussions between the Finns and the Hungarians were started, and yet again the high policy of visits and agreements was evident. The need for co-operation in issues of technology, science and economy was once more put forward, and it was agreed that the number of meetings of the officials of the Finnish and Hungarian Foreign Ministries was to be increased on a regular basis. Hungary suggested more ministerial level visits and proposed that the Finns would get acquainted with the Hungarian-Austrian co-operation, about which the Hungarians had given a memorandum to the Finns in spring 1971 and which could be used as a basis for advancing the Hungarian-Finnish co-operation.⁵⁷ The Finnish connection was, seen from the Hungarian point of view, most useful in the same context as the Austrian: an avenue to Western technology and economy through a neutral and thus 'easy' country.

The image of the Hungarian-Finnish relations was more rhetorically defined in a speech given by János Péter on 13 December 1972 in the Hungarian Parliament. According to him, the tradition and kinship laid the foundation for present-day relations. He thanked 'the well-deliberated stand and suggestions of the Finnish political leaders which had advanced the mutual understanding'. The relations with Finland had got 'impulses from traditional kinship relations, and they can be pursued in the prevailing international conditions in a manner which is useful to both countries'.⁵⁸

6 Evaluating Hungary in 1973 – Kádár in Finland

The formal head of state of Hungary was followed to Finland by the strong man two years later. When János Kádár visited Finland in 25 – 28 September 1973, the leading Finnish newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* noted that this was the first time Kádár visited a capitalist country and that he was received like a head of state even though he was not the President of his country. This was not really a critical remark since – to make a comparison – the paper mentioned that also other East European party leaders had been received similarly in France and the United States.⁵⁹

Once again the initiative for the visit had come from the Hungarian side. Frigyes Puja, when visiting Helsinki in the matters of the European Security Meeting, had invited Kekkonen to Hungary. However, Kekkonen interpreted the conversation with Puja to the effect that it was in fact more important that he invited Kádár to Finland. This he had done even before, but Kádár had wanted a confirmation of the suitable time.⁶⁰ Puja explained to Kekkonen that Hungary wanted to develop the mutual relations also in future and answered that Kádár would gladly accept the invitation.⁶¹ In Hungary it was decided that the visit would be an official one and take place according to the personal invitation by Kekkonen. It was also considered important that Kádár would also meet the leadership of the Finnish Communist Party. That the political culture of Hungary was dominated by the HSWP was evident also from the fact that during the visits one made such contacts with the brother parties as well as with the government.⁶²

Before the visit, Ambassador Paul Jyrkänkallio delineated the Hungarian political line: in foreign policy it followed the Soviet line and lacked 'any distinctive features worth mentioning'. Unlike Rumania, Hungary followed the Soviet line without reservations in order to be able to loosen the strains in domestic policy and pursue such economic policy which could 'increase the welfare and comfort of the private citizen'. According to Jyrkänkallio, it was only the more Western way to express things which might give cause to think that Hungary would have any independent views of foreign policy. The

official line on European détente was identical with other socialist countries.⁶³

In domestic policy a more individual policy was followed: Jyrkänkallio stated that Hungary strove to create – without keeping noise about it and without articulating the final goal because of past experiences – a socialist society with a human face. Hungary tried to take into account also of the wishes of the new generation and to create a viable environment in which the people could feel at home and would not risk rising against socialist society. There was some flexibility, but if someone was about to overstep permissible borders he/she would get a swift, although ‘not lethal’ reminder. The Hungarian leadership had ‘the reins tightly in its hands’. Kádár’s personal attitude was still decisive, although there had been changes which had increased freedom in the society. The Hungarians still saw Kádár as fighting against both revisionism and dogmatism: ‘the one who is not against us is with us’. However, the main principle was that the leading positions in the society belonged to party members. Also the cultural policy followed this line. Seen from the Finnish viewpoint and in the light of the information received by the embassy, it seemed that nowhere else in the socialist bloc the intellectual life was so free. It seemed that Kádár was popular and that positive development was connected to his person.⁶⁴

Jyrkänkallio found the relations between the neutral Austria and Hungary interesting; in trade these relations had developed better than the Hungarian-Finnish ones, and they were warm despite the memories of the Dual Monarchy. Austria was a rival for Finland as a close trading partner with Hungary. In this Jyrkänkallio saw similarities with Finnish-Swedish sense of belonging together and compared the football matches between Hungary and Austria to the athletic competitions between Finland and Sweden. He also emphasized how important good Western relations were for Hungary because the country was very dependent on foreign trade. The share of the Western industrialized countries of Hungarian trade was increasing.⁶⁵ In comparison, the Hungarian-Finnish trade was really modest and the 1969 agreement on economy, technology

and science had not created much concrete co-operation although the delegations and direct contacts in culture and economy were a sign of the 'consolidation and the vitality of the relations'.⁶⁶

7 Policy of Understanding

The theme of friendship was outwardly as central as ever during Kádár's visit but also the political lines were now dealt with more precision than during Losonczi's visit. The main point was that differences of opinion did not affect friendship and understanding of the two countries. Both Kekkonen and Kádár emphasized in their conversations their mutual interests and the similar roles in the international arena.

For example, considering the Finnish policy, there were differences but also a mutual understanding as both sides had an opportunity to make their own interpretations of it. Both defined the Finnish policy in principle in the same way, but Kádár's 'acceptance' of Finnish neutrality meant essentially a soviet interpretation of neutrality. Kádár explained that the Finnish policy was also in the Hungarian interest, even though the countries disagreed especially on the question of the relations with the EEC. Kádár defined the Finnish policy as a 'policy of positive neutrality' and thanked Finland for taking the initiative for the CSCE and on the German question. He remarked that the Finnish policy had sometimes gone against the West but that it had been the right policy. He was also thankful for Finland's correct attitude towards Hungary in 1956. And later Kádár emphasized: 'Differences of opinion may not endanger mutual co-operation and friendship'. It is hardly surprising that he drew a parallel between Finland and Hungary in the international field: both were small countries which had their roles to play in international policy but the mutual relations of which were also of importance. The countries operated in the same field and had similar interests although 'the friends also had different opinions'. Also Kekkonen pointed out that 'connecting ties are much more important and numerous than the differences of opinion'.⁶⁷ In his speech during the festive lunch Kádár yet again defined the

Finnish policy as a 'policy of positive neutrality'. Thus Finland and Hungary did not use peaceful co-existence only to their own benefit but were able to advance it also internationally. They had similar interests because of the CSCE and a similar role in international policy. These opinions were also conveyed to the Finnish public.⁶⁸

It is remarkable to realize that Hungary accepted the Finnish policy of neutrality in these years without conditions although the Soviet Union did not.⁶⁹ According to the *communiqué* of the visit, the Hungarian party confirmed again that the Hungarian government appreciated the Finnish policy of neutrality which aimed at strengthening international peace and security especially in Europe. Finland, for its part, expressed its appreciation of the determined effort of the Hungarian government to maintain good relations with all European countries and the Hungarian contribution to increasing international peace and security. The *communiqué* described the mutual relations as versatile relations of friendship of which Kádár's visit was proof.⁷⁰ So it can be said that Finland and Hungary in a way guaranteed each other and accepted the other party's definitions of itself. The image of the mutual relations was thus a kind of mirror of mutual understanding.

The ideal of this understanding can be questioned and one can speculate on it further. The Finnish policy of neutrality may well have been accepted in another sense than Finland itself did. The Hungarian leadership had a tendency to bring the countries verbally nearer by putting Finland into the same 'camp of peace' in which Hungary itself was. Accordingly, Hungary expressed its liberal attitude towards the co-operation with Western countries. Naturally, the Hungarian foreign policy was dependent on membership in the Eastern bloc but simultaneously Hungary defined itself also as an active party. It was possible to achieve understanding with the other party in a context which one oneself defined: the actual meaning of the understanding was somewhat different from the articulated one. Additionally, it can be speculated that the more Hungary 'westernized' its political image and the more Finland paid

attention to Eastern policy, the easier it was for the countries to adapt to each other and align with each other's political line.

The interpretation of the CSCE by Hungary and its criticism of the process itself⁷¹ were not prominent in Hungarian-Finnish talks, economic relations and trade prevailed. It is easy to see that Kádár wanted to concentrate especially on these issues. He wanted information especially on Finnish-Comecon relations. The cultural relations were 'excellent and flourishing', the economic ones were lagging behind. Thus economy was the sector of friendship which needed improving. To begin with, Kádár described the Hungarian motives by defending Socialism which was, in his view, becoming more democratic – basically in the same way Ambassador Jyrkänkallio had described it. It stressed Hungary's 'Western' features: freedom of culture, contacts with the outside world through tourism etc. Thus Kádár was emphasizing how Hungary was becoming a more open society. Also the economic relations with the West were improving – especially with Austria but Kádár pointed out also the co-operation with France and Germany and added: 'We do not have any prejudices in these matters'. He suggested that despite the 'free economy' in Finland the Finnish government might encourage the Finnish economy in a direction beneficial to Hungary. The message was that Hungary was very liberal and tolerant in its Western relations.⁷² Presumably Kádár was not seeking political acceptance of 'Kádárism' as such but ways to strengthen it with economic ties with Finland. And as during Losonczi's visit, the Hungarians wanted to advance direct contacts with state support whereas the Finns saw direct contacts as such as a positive development.

Finnish publicity was left with the understanding that Kekkonen appreciated the Hungarian role in the CSCE and that both countries had the same viewpoint on this issue.⁷³ The public image rested again on official speeches and the image and history of the relations were represented in and for the media as a narrative; from the kindred interests of the scholars to present-day state relations. Also Kádár had paid respect to the past while talking about the present-day challenges, i.e. the

relatives and friends were developing tradition-bound relations in a modern context.⁷⁴ Kekkonen, on the other hand, had emphasized the process of building the friendship during 15 years: this had demanded work and was now bearing fruit. The speech also contained the same arguments of traditional relations as stepping stones to present-day needs and was published as a shortened version in the *Helsingin Sanomat*. However, Kekkonen talked about kinship and tradition more than Kádár had done and expected that even more could be built on the traditional foundation. The tradition thus surpassed, for example, the ideological differences – the Finns wanted to be bridge-builders to countries which represented another social system.⁷⁵

Bridge-builders role was reserved for Finland also in the Hungarian foreign political discourse in the report which FM Frigyes Puja presented to the Hungarian Parliament in April 25, 1974. Equally illustrative is his article in *The New Hungarian Quarterly*. On these two occasions he defined the Hungarian motives towards the non-socialist countries; they were 'on a correct foundation brought about by mutual interests'. Puja stated that 'taking advantage of the possibilities offered by the easing of international tension, we aim to utilize negotiations and strengthen co-operation which is beneficial to both parties, and to strengthen the ties between our states'. According to Puja, it was a success that Hungary had signed treaties with 'almost every highly developed country'. In this connection, Puja mentioned especially Finland; the Hungarian-Finnish relations were 'in many respects a good example'. They showed how countries which had different social systems could maintain intensive, high-level contacts. Puja followed the state visit rhetoric: tradition and present needs. Besides, Finland had the same view on issues like European peace and security. According to Puja, Kádár's visit had played a major role in the development of the relations. It can be said that the 'visits' were an argument with which it was possible to point out the success and development of the relations.

Puja also compared the relations with Finland to the ones with Austria. His conception of traditional friendship and contemporary scientific and economic goals suited both cases. In the Finnish case, the idea of tradition meant kinship, in the Austrian case the friendship was based on sports and culture and on being neighbours.

Also the Finns paid attention to Puja's interpretation of the Finnish neutrality. Ambassador Jyrkänkallio maintained that it was essential that Puja had talked about the concept of neutrality in his article and had mentioned two neutral countries, Finland and Austria, with which Hungary had 'especially cordial relations' – which was shown as an example of peaceful co-existence. Even so, the word neutrality did not necessarily mean the same in both cases since Austria was referred to both in the speech and the article as 'neutral Austria', and there was no corresponding definition of Finland's policy in the parliamentary speech at all.⁷⁶

In November 1973 Puja had repeated the image of Finnish neutrality and Hungary's wish to peaceful existence in his talks with the Finnish State Secretary Richard Tötterman. He had stressed that this meant that Hungary had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. It wanted to respect sovereignty and self-determination. The Hungarian-Soviet relations were principal and regulated the Hungarian policy. The message seems to have been that Hungary was following the Soviet line and did not want to be active itself in world policy. Tötterman, in his turn, described the Finnish policy as a policy of peaceful co-existence which served Finnish national interests and also benefited the international community. When he discussed with Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy, the topic of visits surfaced again. Now Hungary wanted to increase the amount of the ministerial contacts. Both Puja and Nagy argued against the EEC and the Finnish contacts with it and maintained that they were detrimental to Hungarian-Finnish economical relations which were not as developed as the political and cultural ones. Puja couched the 'disadvantage' of the EEC also in more political terms: the EEC was anti-Soviet

and forestalled the progress towards the CSCE. Political integration would have a negative effect on Hungary. Tötterman stressed, however, that Finland carried trade with both socialist and non-socialist countries, and repeated the old Finnish dogma of direct contacts advancing cultural relations.⁷⁷ Yet politically the EEC had become an issue which did not fit in with the normal friendship rhetoric in which both parties had allowed the other to interpret the content of the definitions. Even so, the Hungarian publicity defined Finland as a friendly country towards Hungary in the beginning of 1976. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP, Gynes, explained in *Népszabadság* that according to the principles of peaceful co-existence, Hungary strived for mutually beneficial relations with the neighbouring Austria and the friendly Finland, and also with the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy. Relations to economically developed capitalist countries – also to the United States – belonged to this policy.⁷⁸

In view of this, the Finnish Embassy had interpreted in 1975 that as far as the visits were concerned, Finland and Austria had distinguished themselves as a group of their own. Puja had even commented to the Austrians on Hungary's Western relations that Hungary cultivated especially warm relations not only with Austria and Italy, but also with Finland 'which was not due to the common origins of the Finns and Hungarians'.⁷⁹ The existence of the good relations was explained rather by contemporary conditions, by the 'new tradition' of the relations than by the 'old tradition'. It consisted of such factors political like-mindedness, history of the relations and common visions concerning the future.

8 Hungarian Policy Towards the Visit in 1976

The central role of the visits as a means of taking care of the foreign relations in the Hungarian political culture became once more evident in 1976 as a meeting of the heads of the states was arranged. When Ambassador Tivadar Matusek visited the Finnish Foreign Ministry and officially invited Kekkonen to visit Hungary, he reminded them that one such invitation had

already been forwarded in 1971.⁸⁰ Also the Hungarian PM, Jenő Fock, called Kekkonen and renewed the invitations by Losonczi and Kádár; he added that he had unofficially heard that Kekkonen might accept the invitation.⁸¹ Kekkonen responded positively by declaring his readiness to a 3–5 day visit in November – five days would be possible if the program would include, for example, hunting.⁸² The Finns hoped that the program would be sufficiently light.⁸³ According to Ambassador Jyrkänkallio the Hungarians understood that the program should not be too strenuous and that there would be possibilities to rest, even though this wish was considered difficult to fulfill.⁸⁴

Also the differences in mentality and practical work sometimes seemed difficult in the Finnish eyes. To quote Jyrkänkallio's confidential letter to a Finnish colleague: 'I have been told – and I indeed do know that myself – that the Hungarians always start to act only at the last minute and then they improvise a lot. And in most cases everything then goes smoothly. But our preparations are endangered by their slackness – that is worse.'⁸⁵ The practical details of the visit were meaningful as symbols and expressions of the relations between the two states: simultaneously the Finns felt the needs to comply with the hosts and express their own opinions. Different customs clashed when the language of the invitation cards was chosen and also in choosing suits, meals and decorations.⁸⁶ So did the different ways to act in politics and diplomacy, for example, Ambassador Matusek's wish to have a say in the choice of the Finnish participants in the talks was not well received in the Finnish Foreign Ministry since it did not fit the Finnish political culture.⁸⁷

Kekkonen's visit took place in 17th – 20th November, 1976 and was publicly characterized as a friendship visit. Kádár was acting as the host. Compared to Kekkonen's visits in the previous decade when, for example, meetings with Kádár had been slightly 'back-stage', the state level and official features were now clearly visible. As the relations were now more stabilized and the meetings of the heads of states did not create

any sensations, substance become more important than sheer symbolism of the meetings. Kekkonen's visit in 1976 seems to have followed the pattern of state visits.⁸⁸

In 1976, it seems to have been important for the Finns that the Hungarians would understand correctly the international status of both Finland and of the Hungarian-Finnish relations. For Hungary, on the other hand, the main point seems to have been the image of Kádár's Hungary and the disappearance of the memory of 1956. As the Hungarian preparatory papers pointed out, the visit would take place at a time when 20 years had elapsed since the 1956 'counter-revolution' and henceforth an international propaganda campaign was to be expected from the West. Therefore the demonstrative value of Kekkonen's visit became more important. It was suggested to the Central Committee of the HSWP that the reception Kekkonen would receive in Hungary would show the Hungarian 'respect towards one of the most remarkable statesmen of the time'. The memorandum described Kekkonen as a statesman who had advanced peace, security and friendship between nations. Kekkonen had also created good, friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The Finnish relations were a practical example of peaceful coexistence between countries which had different social systems. These characterizations were very much the same in 1971. Also the development of present Hungarian-Finnish relations – which had international importance – was seen as Kekkonen's personal merit.

It was also suggested that it would be useful to declare that Hungary approved the Finnish policy concerning the security interests of the neutral countries. Hungary approved the Finnish concept of neutrality and Hungary would express its positive attitude towards Finnish foreign policy in the Hungarian-Finnish negotiations. Hungary would also show its appreciation towards neutral countries in general – which perhaps implies an effort to make them Hungary's friends. The memorandum used traditional rhetoric: it should have been made clear during the visit that Hungary believed that the neutral countries advanced more and

more readily peace, security, arms reductions and friendship between nations. The Hungarians expected the Finns to demonstrate their policy of neutrality and their international activity with this visit, especially as the visits to the Soviet Union and the United States were approaching. It was also expected that Kekkonen would be willing to negotiate about questions of economy and trade and thus to advance the Hungarian-Finnish relations even further. The political questions were without problems, and it was expected that the CSCE would be the basis for negotiations for the Finns (the conference had finally taken place in 1975 in Helsinki). It was also expected that the Hungarian and Finnish policy in international questions would be the same, and Hungary would seek co-operation with Finland in this. The goal was to 'act' in common with Finland for the next conference which was to take place in Belgrade. So it was hoped that in addition to the normal references to the mutual friendly relations and traditions also principles of co-operation and the Final Act of the CSCE would be mentioned in the *communiqué*.

It is hardly surprising that yet again it was mentioned that the economic relations would have to be raised to the same level as the cultural ones. But even the wishes concerning the cultural and scientific relations were now more extensive and detailed: it was hoped for more and faster progress in co-operation in natural and social sciences. The present goal was to realize the working plan for cultural co-operation for the years 1976–77: a common television series, co-operation in translations and a general widening of the field of co-operation. The Finnish-Hungarian Society was expected to have an important role in this.⁸⁹ Some issues might be delicate from the Hungarian point of view: purchasing of the real estates of the Finnish Embassy by the Finns, foundation of the Hungarian-Finnish Society (the Hungarians had only one friendship society, namely with the Soviet Union) and the joint film project *Fenyő és gránit* (Fir-tree and granite).⁹⁰ The Hungarian expectations were not necessarily dramatically far-reaching but nevertheless relatively high.

9 Good Relations and Successful Policy with Exceptions

The Finnish delegation in 1976 was mainly the traditional one, and during the visit Hungarian initiatives did not cause particular surprises. However, the lack of a partner to Finnish-Hungarian Society was a slight because the Finns of the FHS were receiving, organizing and arranging exhibitions and other cultural visits far more often than the Hungarians.⁹¹ In 1974 the Finns had tried to found a Kalevala-club under the auspices of the Patriotic People's Front but in the last moment the meetings had been forbidden. The Embassy had tried to support the local people who were interested in Finland and Finnish culture by presenting them samples of Finnish literature. According to Jyrkänkallio, it was not sure whether the difficulties were caused by local authorities who 'still lived in the Rákosi times', or by higher authorities. However, the system of friendship towns compensated for the lack of a friendly society to some extent. But even here there were difficulties: PM Fock had informed without giving any reason PM Kallevi Sorsa already in 1974 that there would be no new friendship towns from Hungary. Ambassador Jyrkänkallio considered all this confusing but it was probably not something directed against Finland, rather it was a consequence of the separation of the ideological worlds; '... even though there are so many warm friends of Finland in Hungary, Finland still represents the world against which an ideological battle is fought'. There had been clear limits for Hungarian-Finnish contacts although Jyrkänkallio admitted that it was possible to do much more even within these boundaries. It was mainly a question of resources and personnel.

Cultural relations had anyhow been stabilized but there was still ground for widening and improving them. The problem was that the Hungarian 'free cultural life' could not be separated from the society and party. According to Jyrkänkallio, free cultural exchange in a socialist system simply was not possible. A centralized government kept control. However, Jyrkänkallio criticized also the Finnish policy and dared to write that contrary to official courtesies in Presidential

speeches, citizens of the two nations actually knew only little of each other. As he put it: 'The image of Finland is quite dim to the Hungarians, even to the educated ones'. This was due to the fact that the Finns still concentrated on exhibiting the traditional culture, although the urban public of Budapest might be more interested in more contemporary themes which would have changed the image of the old-fashioned Finland. Hungary always exhibited the modern Hungary and 'its achievements'. To quote Jyrkänkallio:⁹²

The achievements of the semi-unknown kindred people, for example, the modern schools and library buildings or the masterpieces of the great Finnish Jugend-period or the exhibition of the excellently organized Finnish health care, would improve the image of a poorly developed country and nation which Hungary still seems to have of the Finns. The image has hardly been improved by films of the dreary life of a smallholder wife or the lethal bullets etc., which were offered to the public of Budapest during the culture week in May 1973. A large flock of the audience made their exit midway from these occasions of Finnish exhibitionism.

In other words, the cultural differences between the urban Hungary and the 'natural' Finland as well as the concepts of civil society activity and organizing collided. Jyrkänkallio's wish to modernize the Finnish image is a sort of equivalent to the emphasis on modernity in political speeches. Since it seemed important to the Hungarians to exhibit the modern Hungary of Kádár, Finland should follow the example. It seems that Jyrkänkallio's recommendations indeed did affect the later Finnish policy in cultural relations.

Despite practical difficulties, even the Finns estimated that the Hungarian-Finnish relations were unproblematic. The survey of the Finnish Embassy considered that the crucial year had been 1959 when the cultural agreement had been renewed. In those days Hungary had been in difficulties and isolated. The Finnish action had been 'exceptional and demonstrative' since Finland had concluded very few cultural treaties, until 1959 none. After 1959, Hungary had begun to establish ties with the rest of the world, and Kekkonen's unofficial visit in 1963 helped the process considerably.

Now that the relations between it and Finland were good, it was difficult to remember the problematic days. Finland and Austria were mentioned after the socialist countries 'always first and in a cordial tone'. The socialist countries measured their political relations with high-level visits and agreements, and seen even in this light Finland was a country that had drawn the attention of Hungary in the 1960s and 1970s. Kekkonen's state visit had been – according to the Embassy which hardly could belittle the event – 'exceptionally festive and visible'. Also the Finnish Ministers put Budapest first in their visit lists, a fact the Finnish newspapers did not fail to notice. Exchange of visits had been extensive and several invitations were still valid. The net of treaties and agreements between the countries was extensive and created possibilities for wide co-operation. In addition to the Finnish Communist Party, also the Social Democratic Party, led by Sorsa, had contacts with the HSWP.

Jyrkänkallio acknowledged the difficulties in trade and explained them by the fact that as industrialized countries Finland and Hungary were unknown to each other. Both had traditional import countries of their own, especially the FRG, and the neighbouring countries were the most important trading partners. The geographical factors also had created prejudices and practical obstacles on both sides. Normal trade would not take things much further, and consequently the countries should look for possibilities in scientific and industrial co-operation. However, Jyrkänkallio was not very optimistic about that either. It had been extremely difficult to reach agreements. In this sector, Finland was not the first option for Hungary; not only Germans and Austrians, but also the Swedes and the Swiss outdid the Finns.⁹³

The deciding factors had not changed. As the embassy estimated, the definition which FM Puja had given in the 30th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary on Hungarian foreign policy, was still valid. Hungary stood by the Soviet Union in foreign policy. Its goal was to create favourable circumstances to build Socialism, unity of the socialist countries and solidarity with those people who were advancing the same goals in capitalist

countries. Furthermore, Hungary wanted to support the developing countries and the national liberation movements, and to advance peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems. In the last context, Finland, Austria and lately also Italy were the first ones to be mentioned. In relations with the non-socialist countries, commercial interests were the essential ones. Hungary's line towards the EEC and the EFTA was decided by the Soviet Union, and also the policy towards the CSCE was identical with the other socialist countries. It was even possible that Hungary had been given a mission to be active in this, because it enjoyed a better reputation in the West than some other socialist countries. There were also reasons connected with foreign trade for this activism.⁹⁴

As far as the Hungarian domestic scene was concerned, Jyrkänkallio maintained that the situation was stable, as it had been moulded after 1956. The Hungarian rhetoric had treated Kekkonen as the supporting pillar of the relations and also of Finland, and likewise the Finns saw Kádár as the man behind the developments in Hungary. The stability was seen as Kádár's, 'the great statesman's', and the people's merit. According to Jyrkänkallio, the Hungarians had 'wisely' decided to tolerate even dissidents in certain limits, even though a common belief in Socialism of the whole people was the goal. The question of ideology created some breaches in the society. Jyrkänkallio recalled that there were many signs in Hungary which indicated that there was some sort of disciplinary action going on in order to make the people immune to Western influence. Even in culture ideology was now emphasized. However, it was hard for the outsider to see beneath the surface of the lively cultural life. The most visible problems in the society concerned the differences between interest groups. An outside observer could detect increasing differences in wealth, although Jyrkänkallio considered that they meant only normal conflicts in a stable society.⁹⁵

The overall picture of the mutual relations and the Hungarian society were thus favourably evaluated by Finnish diplomacy. To a keen eye, the image of the relations was more

than understanding: it meant that two different cultures were adapting to each other.

10 Discussing the Relations and the Policy Line

To explain neutrality and to explain kádárism are parallel: it was just these topics that Kekkonen and Kádár wanted to clarify. In spite of 'windy' domestic policy and conflicts, Kekkonen defined the Finnish policy as if consensus had prevailed in Finnish foreign policy: it had risen above domestic conflicts in the beginning of the 1960s. Kekkonen suggested that Finland and Hungary should co-operate in Belgrade, because 'our interests are strikingly similar'. Kekkonen wanted to see the guidelines of the Finnish foreign policy in international context: the definition of Finnish policy was not the main question but the fact that Finland aimed at having friendly relations with the Soviet Union and every other country. To quote Kekkonen:⁹⁶

By pursuing the policy of neutrality and by defining our own policy as a policy of neutrality we can create a lot of contacts in various directions as bridge-builders, and also the CSCE is based on such activity. The content of foreign policy was not endangered and will not change, be the title of it what it may. Our position demands that we have mutual confidence with the Soviet Union which is very important to the will to act for world peace I just mentioned.

While Kekkonen was explaining Finnish foreign policy Kádár concentrated more on Hungarian domestic conditions. On foreign policy he gave very much the same picture Jyrkänkallio had given; on domestic policy he naturally had to play down the problems and present the Hungarian model as a success. According to Kádár, Hungary was a non-homogenous state in which a single party held the power but also other voices were tolerated and there existed different classes, albeit not capitalists. The main principle in domestic policy was to follow common policy between various classes, the religious circles included. The main program was to build a socialist society and to develop socialist democratic direction so that still wider masses would participate in the decision-making. Referring to the year 1956 he expressed the hope that the Finns

would trust that there was at present a socially balanced situation in Hungary.

Kádár also dealt with travel and tourism in the political context reminding that after 1956 the West had boycotted Hungary. However, Hungary had started to pursue a more open policy in travel, and tourism had indeed increased. 'In view of Hungary's relations with the West', Kádár remarked, 'this policy has proved to be the right one'. He admitted that travel had been economically beneficial. Also the Western attitude towards Hungary had changed.

It is evident that the year 1956 was reflected in the way Kádár presented the Hungarian conditions and political line; he wanted to explain the Western image on Hungary, still influenced by the uprising. He also reminded Kekkonen that the Hungarian leadership takes care of the people who had suffered and did not want them suffer still more – and the people appreciated and supported this. According to Kádár in November 1976, the Hungarian policy was based on the principle that 'you will not give cause for joy to the enemy and you will not let friends down'. Kádár commented also on the international reputation of Finland and stated that, 'as everyone knew', Finland was a neutral country but Hungary belonged to the Warsaw Pact and was a People's Republic. Hungary aimed at having beneficial relations with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the Third World countries, but also with the Western countries. The relations with Austria had improved, and there were good trade relations with West Germany. According to the consolidated rhetoric, Kádár praised the Hungarian-Finnish relations and Kekkonen's role in the CSCE and repeated the Hungarian line of how the relations were to be continued by high-level meetings. As always, he also advocated the state-controlled direct contacts between enterprises and assured that the foreign companies had good possibilities to function independently in Hungary. This – although controlled and encouraged by the state – was largely in congruence with the Finnish aspirations.⁹⁷ The emphases of Kádár and Kekkonen were not naturally quite identical, but understanding was reached by letting both parties interpret the idea in their own way.

The same formula to reach understanding can also be found in the talks on neutrality which were stressed in the *communiqué* negotiations. The *communiqué* is especially noted for its being the official public image of the 1976 meeting – at the very least to the historian it is the best documented part of the visit. These talks are also the most notable proof that politics defined the image of the relations more strongly than the idea of kinship. Kádár demanded that the *communiqué* should be formulated in a way that ‘even an outsider would [...] get the idea that there are extensive relations between our countries’.⁹⁸

The preparatory negotiations for the visit proved to be quite difficult. When a Hungarian delegation of preparing officials visited Finland in 27th – 30th October, 1976, it could be seen that the drafts contained same elements but their order and some details differed from each other. Hungary, for example, wanted to describe the cultural relations much more widely.⁹⁹ But the most difficult part was to find a suitable definition to Finnish foreign policy since the Hungarians would have liked to define the foreign policy of both countries in a later passage of the *communiqué* than Finland. Seen from the Finnish viewpoint this suggestion was ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘misleading’. Furthermore, the Hungarians suggested that the Finnish line should be connected with the CSCE. The Finnish Foreign Ministry, however, interpreted that this would give an erroneous picture of the basic Finnish attitude.

The Finns assumed that the Hungarians aimed at a ‘political action’ in order to avoid a situation in which the Finnish policy of neutrality would be emphasized in the joint *communiqué*. The Finns, on the other hand, wanted to stress peaceful coexistence and the CSCE as such. Besides, the negotiations revealed basic differences in political culture, especially in concepts of state control. The Finns felt no need to include detailed chapters on various forms of co-operation in the *communiqué*; this should, after all, be mainly a high-level communication. Difference of concepts can also be seen in the fact that Kádár had also put travel in a political context and connected it with the goals of the Hungarian state. The Finns, however, did not regard travel

as belonging to immediate state control. Thus it did not require a specific chapter in the *communiqué* either.¹⁰⁰

The first Finnish suggestion emphasized the image of neutrality and aimed at getting Hungarian recognition of it. Finland also expressed its support for 'Hungary's successful policy of peace'. The relations between Finland and Hungary were a concrete example of peaceful co-existence between two countries with different social systems. The Final Act of the CSCE formed the basis for the relations and for other international activity. The Hungarian suggestion, for its part, defined both countries as pursuing international peace and security. They would influence together the *détente*. The references to the Conference and to the peaceful co-existence were mainly the same as in the Finnish suggestion.¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, in the *communiqué* it was pointed out with satisfaction that 'the traditionally good, friendly relations and the multilateral co-operation between Finland and Hungary were developing in all fields and equally served the interests of two countries and peoples as well as the cause of international peace and security. The parties reaffirmed that they both would develop their bilateral relations and international activities in full accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of CSCE in Europe.' In this context it was deemed appropriate to refer to the ideal of peaceful co-existence. The relations between the two states were a good example for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In the context of the CSCE Kádár and Losonczi 'appreciated the peace-loving, active policy of neutrality of Finland as well as the valuable contribution of the government of Finland and President Kekkonen personally to the stabilization of international peace and *détente* and to the cause of security and co-operation in Europe'. It was pointedly added that: 'President Kekkonen has expressed his high esteem towards the effective peace policy of Hungary.'¹⁰²

Thus the political publicity was sent a message of how the parties had given their approval to each other's policies: policy of peace was the link – although more loosely in the *communiqué* than in the speeches.

11 Speeches and Public Statements of Up-To-Date

The same problems and differences as in the *communiqué* negotiations and the talks can be found also in the speeches given during the visit. Mainly: What did Finnish neutrality imply? In what context should it be expressed and whose interests did it represent?

In the speeches of Kekkonen and Kádár tradition and the present day were connected. According to Kekkonen's and Kádár's rhetoric, the tradition was not only a story, it was genuine reality and it had created the basis for modern friendship. Especially the draft of Kekkonen's speech linked Kekkonen's personality strongly to Hungarian-Finnish relations: he had been to Hungary already as a young student and visited the country already as a head of the state. His relations with Hungary thus had historical perspective which obviously increased the value of the relations. Not only tradition but also modern Hungary was central; Kekkonen had arrived to see progress in Hungary – which was actually the same rhetoric as in 1969. Thus he had not become solely one to live up his memories – the present day was more important. But simultaneously he paid homage to the tradition of the visits and to their role in cultivating the relations between the two countries. The modern tradition of the new relations proved the stability of the relations. Even this could be expressed positively as a part of modernity and the liveliness and versatility of the relations. Kekkonen expressed his appreciation towards the progress and building process in the Hungary of Kádár – his approval of Kádár's policy.

It might have been on the Embassy's advice that Kekkonen's supper speech was drafted so that one should distance oneself from the old, 'wrong' Finland-image painted by folklore-clichés. The friendship was presented as 'more correct' and more up-to-date than the old images; both parties wanted to leave the romantic and ethnological 'shepherd in the folk costume' -image behind and replace it with an image of an interesting modern partner. The Hungarian-Finnish friendship was supposed to be unique in the world, and this lay the foundation for the relations. The speech did not make an issue

of the problems in trade either; these did not harm the complete image of friendship. According to the speech, there were economical, political and educational reasons for paying special attention to the 'multilateral and balanced' development of the co-operation. Part of the message was that the Hungarian and Finnish peoples had given their support to the chosen policy and to the Hungarian-Finnish relations; thus the civil society level was connected to the interests of the state leadership – as a sort of Finnish counterpart of the role the Hungarians had wanted for the government. The micro and macro levels were thus intertwined. In this context, Finland and Hungary actively took part in international life and the co-operation between nations. This could not be done without bilateral relations; the countries could not live isolated, they could live only relation to the others. This meant that Finland and Hungary were a part of the international politics and active agents within it.¹⁰³

Kádár's speech emphasized broad political lines and especially the CSCE; these were issues on which Finland and Hungary agreed. The fact that he also stressed the importance of Kekkonen's visit and state visits as such was also in congruence with the traditional Hungarian line. According to Kádár, Hungary followed the policy of peaceful co-existence; the supporters of peace aimed at defeating the obstacles built by reactionary forces. Kádár once again placed Finland in the camp of the pro-peace nations: Finnish peace-loving foreign policy had proven its vitality. Kádár thus wanted to point out the similar interests and mutual understanding; he placed both countries in the peace-loving camp, but of course, this could be understood in many ways. However, in this sense Finland was a 'brother nation' (*veljeskansa*).¹⁰⁴

It is evident that Hungary wanted broad and open publicity. The newspaper propaganda was restrained, but one could not avoid the message that Finland and Kekkonen were very much appreciated. The Hungarian newspapers had a task: they had to highlight the importance of the visit and write about Finland, Finnish foreign policy and Kekkonen. Similarly, the Hungarian television was to run a joint Hungarian-Finnish film '*Suomi*'.¹⁰⁵

President Kekkonen was also interviewed on Hungarian television before the visit.¹⁰⁶

The Finnish publicity continued with the thematic of friendship by repeating that the relations were unproblematic. Hungary was presented as a socialist country which permitted also the Western culture to have living space: cultural life was controlled from above but in fact both countries were small countries with rare languages and thus had troubles with balancing domestic and external culture. The Finnish press cited the statements of FM Puja who had also maintained that the common policy line with other socialist countries did not limit Hungary's possibilities; on the contrary, it offered more of them.¹⁰⁷ Following Kekkonen's speech the *Helsingin Sanomat* actually transmitted the same image as the state leadership: two small countries operating in the international field, since even a small country could not live in isolation.¹⁰⁸ FM Keijo Korhonen offered basically the identical view in the Hungarian *Népszabadság* in addition to which he also gave a bright picture of the future of the economical relations, the promotion of which needed a political decision. Relations relying on old traditions were good and they were not to be forgotten in the future either.¹⁰⁹

Thus the public image in the media followed flawlessly the official political discourse. The difference in emphasis between the countries was that Hungary stressed the economic relations, Finland getting to know the modern features of the 'friend'. Thus the argumentations reflected those of each other. The Finnish Ambassador's view that the image of Finland in Hungary was too old-fashioned had also made its way to the official discourse and to the media. One could say that the mission of the visit had been to 'update' the friendship, and this was the also dominant trend later in the 1970s.

12 New Aspects in Hungarian Foreign Policy – Lázár in Finland

Significant interpretations of Finnish foreign policy and of Hungarian policy towards Finland were received as the new Finnish Ambassador in Budapest, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen, was invited to have a discussion with Kádár.

It was not Kádár's habit to receive diplomats from non-socialist countries on other occasions than during the state visits. The Ambassador interpreted this special treatment to be a recognition of the special status Finland had in Hungary's policy. As such nothing essentially new seems to have been said in the discussion: the arguments were based rather on present-day politics, not on the tradition of kinship. According to Kádár, the relations were of special nature, the development of which had largely been decided by Finland's foreign policy and its 'basic line, increasing security and co-operation in Europe'. Naturally Kádár confessed that being linguistic relatives helped but at the end of the day it was of secondary importance. It was Kekkonen's personal contribution which had been essential in building the relations.

If there was any new substance in Kádár's statements, it was the fact that he remarked how Hungary's policy did not consist only of loyalty towards the Soviet Union. According to him, Hungary took care of its own foreign political and economical interests while taking the Soviet co-operation into account. Kádár praised the Finnish foreign policy: Finland had achieved 'a far more important status than the size and specific country of Finland would have merited'. He pointed out that neutral Finland would have a chance to do services to 'strengthening peace and security' also in the future.¹¹⁰ Behind this rhetoric one can see the political motives of Hungary concerning Finland: co-operation within the CSCE was probably the foremost as a goal.

The Hungarian PM György Lázár had made similar references earlier the same year (15 - 17 June 1977). The Hungarians had wished to have talks on general international questions, the preparations for the Belgrade Conference and economic relations. They also looked towards having an opportunity to meet representatives of Finnish trade and industry.¹¹¹ Ambassador Jyrkänkallio had interpreted that replacing Fock with the 'economist' Lázár was a sign that economic questions were essential to Hungary and that the direction of policy was becoming more orthodox marxist – there were also other indications of this trend.¹¹² On the other hand, the embassy pointed out that Lázár was said to enjoy a good name in the West.¹¹³

The notion that there were also independent and specific features in Hungarian foreign policy which differed from the general policy socialist bloc was new for the Finns. Especially activity and initiatives concerning the CSCE were new; Hungary had, for example, made initiatives to the Western CSCE-countries for co-operation in order to carry out the Final Act at a bilateral level. According to the Hungarian view, a peaceful Europe would be built together with the progressive elements of Western Europe at the Belgrade meeting. Yrjö-Koskinen estimated that even though the Soviet Union had naturally approved of the Hungarian initiative, first and foremost it served the Hungarian national interests. The interpretations and emphasis of the Final Act were typical and used as political means, for example, in trade disputes. The new direction was due to the détente which had given Hungary as well as the other socialist countries a good opportunity to pursue its own and the bloc interests. Ambitious goal to develop the country and economic contacts with the West were possible to achieve only in the atmosphere of international détente. So the Hungarians wanted the Belgrade Conference to be constructive. The Finnish Embassy also thought that Hungary was better off in human rights issues than most socialist countries and had thus better chances to influence the Western countries in Belgrade.

The survey was largely based on an article by FM Puja, published in the review *Külpolitika* in April 1977. Puja had argued the Hungarian foreign policy line partly in keeping with national traditions and historical ties, as was the case in the relations with Austria, the Western social democrats and the German labour movement – but he had not mentioned Finland in this context. Nevertheless, the embassy still had it that Austria and Finland were always the first ones to be mentioned after the non-socialist countries. With these countries Hungary had ‘really good relations without problems due to reasons easy to understand’. An essential factor in the relations with non-socialist countries was the commercial interests.¹¹⁴

The Hungarian line concerning the CSCE and Finland became more concrete when Puja visited Finland in June 1976 and suggested that the decisions of the Final Act would be

carried out in bilateral Hungarian-Finnish relations.¹¹⁵ The issue was also dealt with in official negotiations in October 1976 before Kekkonen's visit to Hungary. Finland had given a written answer to Budapest in November in which it had not been against the idea in principle but was of the opinion that neither new institutions nor new channels were needed; the existing ones were sufficient. Furthermore, some of the Hungarian suggestions needed to be clarified. The Foreign Ministry emphasized that Hungary had made similar suggestions to various other Western countries and that none of them, perhaps suspecting that Hungary had tactical motives, had been more positive than Finland. Most of them had not given an answer at all. So the Finnish attitude can be characterized as relatively careful. The Political Department of the Foreign Ministry suggested that if the question of developing the relations on the basis of the CSCE came up and if the Hungarian suggestions emerged again, Finland could say that the development had been positive in many different levels since the signing of the CSCE Final Act, and these achievements were compatible with the co-operation and the resources of the countries.¹¹⁶ This answer was at its best evasive.

13 Common Policy Line?

The image which the Embassies painted of the history of the relations remained largely unchanged; traditional scientific relations and the Kekkonen visit of 1963 were the most important milestones. A new feature was that during Lázár's visit the relations of the Finnish political parties to Hungary had come to the forefront. The economic relations were troublesome as ever because of a lack of traditions, geographical distance and inability to reform. Cultural relations were without problems but the Ambassadors were still worried about the old fashioned image of Finland; the problem was how to offer the 'right' one to the urban Hungarians. The planned exhibitions of Timo Sarpaneva and *Marimekko* in Budapest were seen as a step in the right direction.¹¹⁷

Even during Lázár's visit the Hungarians tried to attach a more 'political' meaning to the concept of friendship through the arguments of co-existence, peace and détente. Lázár placed Finland in his toasting speech on the same side as Hungary in international questions – 'the side of peace'. Policy which had achieved 'the positive support of both the Hungarian and Finnish societies' served the national interest of both countries and advanced the causes of friendship between nations and détente. The embassy's draft for the Prime Minister's speech, on the other hand, made a point of the different levels of friendships and visits and the cultural agreements and relations which were presented as internationally significant. And when Hungary emphasized trade policy, the Finns pondered how export might be promoted. Even the international aspect was milder in PM Sorsa's speech: the fact that Finland and Hungary were together in the international politics was put in the context of exchange of information.¹¹⁸ So yet again the Hungarians wanted to 'politicize' the rhetoric whereas the Finns played down this tune as much as possible – without changing the essentials of the liturgy.

The Finnish Embassy noted Hungarian aspirations also in the fact that the Hungarian press regarded the Lázár visit as a 'top meeting' in the same way Kádár's visit to Rumania and meeting with Ceausescu were rated. The newspaper *Magyar Hírlap* titled its article 'Relations without shadows' and considered them both official and human: they were multilateral relations, relations between good friends, and in keeping with the Helsinki Final Act. This time also the linguistic kinship was presented as a cause. Mostly, however, the Hungarian media emphasized strongly the economic aspects of Lázár's visit. Finland was presented as depending on foreign trade, and it was maintained that co-operation with socialist countries had been beneficial to Finland.

The organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, *Népszabadság*, interpreted that the Hungarian-Finnish relations were even deeper than what was recommended in the CSCE Final Act – a definition of the relations which the Hungarians had usually used to describe the relations between socialist countries.

It seems that 'friendship' was now used to verbally incorporate Finland in the same camp as Hungary and make it an example of co-existence. According to *Népszabadság*, the Hungarian-Finnish relations were based on 'sincere interest and political realism trying to find possibilities to deepen the relations to mutual benefit, while the Hungarian government and the Finnish leadership were carrying out the peaceful active policy of neutrality'. The question of the image of Finnish neutrality came to the forefront when the Finnish Embassy mentioned that Western diplomats had noticed how there was no mention of the Finnish neutrality in the Hungarian-Finnish *communiqué*.¹¹⁹ It is worth speculating whether the interpretation of Finnish policy became more 'orthodox' at the same time when Hungary was assuring to the West how it had become more open.

As the end of the 1970s was approaching the key elements of the Finnish role in Hungarian foreign policy had thus become clearer. They can also be found in Kádár's speech in the plenum of the Central Committee of the HSWP in April 1978. Kádár stated that Hungary had intensified its relations also with its most important trading partner, FRG as well as with Austria, Finland, Italy, France and 'many other capitalist countries'. Hungary was maintaining good relations with capitalist countries, although some people were doubting and fearing that this would only bring 'inflation and the negative effects of the crisis of capitalism'. However, active policy in this direction was necessary for Hungary because of economical reasons. The goal of the policy was peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems. It was the only alternative to a world war, and to carry out this policy economical, cultural and social connections and visits were needed. Peaceful co-existence between socialist and capitalist countries could not consist only of formal meetings and statements. It meant also negotiations on questions of international policy and efforts to understanding. In addition to this, it meant extensive economical relations. According to Kádár's rhetoric, there would not be a war between states which had beneficial mutual economic ties.¹²⁰

To sum up: the Hungarians connected Finland with an interpretation which suited their own needs. Both in bilateral talks and in wider contexts Finland was regarded as a political friend. This friendship was obviously linked to the international politics in terms of co-existence, and it was supposed that economic advantages could be achieved by this policy. It can perhaps be said that in the Finnish case these economical benefits remained lacking but it was possible to express the idea of political friendship relatively freely.

One example of the special status of Finland and, above all, of making politics with the visits, was also the Hungarian idea of Kekkonen's 'holiday' in Hungary in 1978. Kádár and Losonczi invited Kekkonen to a holiday and recreation trip to mark the 50th anniversary of Kekkonen's first trip to Hungary.¹²¹ The Protocol Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry did not consider the idea very realistic. There were already enough travelling to Hungary at various levels – they had to be rather restricted, especially as Hungary seemed to be so keen on them.¹²²

14 Conclusion

In the 1960s the tradition of cultural co-operation and the tradition of cherishing the idea of kinship was linked to the Finnish satellite policy towards Hungary. The concept of kinship was undoubtedly a way to establish Hungarian-Finnish relations. There was, however, a trend to modernise the concept of kinship in order to strengthen its value. This myth offered common discourse and it was a way to assure the structure of good relations at the time when the relations were reopened. As Kekkonen put it, these relations were meant to be primarily unofficial: academic contacts, cultural co-operation and increasing tourism.

Kinship activities offered a basis not only for popular, unofficial contacts between the Finns and Hungarians but for the political rhetoric as well. The only limitation on the use of the old tradition was, according to Korhonen, that the players of the game knew the rules of it. In other words, the rhetoric of tradition was to be used in the context of the limitations of the international policy.¹²³ Accordingly, the efforts to establish

unofficial contacts founded on the idea of kinship could be articulated as arguments in political relations. The liturgy of the first visits in 1960s reflected this policy. In addition, the concepts of a small nation and progress were used in the political liturgy, too. Similarly, just as with the concept of kinship, these arguments referred to the ties between the two countries. The role of science, both in terms of the kinship aspect and technical-scientific co-operation was essential. In conclusion, in the 1960s two ideas of brotherhood were developed: the traditional and the modern one.

In the 1970s, the key concepts of the image of the Hungarian-Finnish relations were the versatility of the relations, friendship, understanding and modernity. When the relations were stabilizing, the central idea was simply to develop them. The definition János Péter had given of the basis of the Hungarian-Finnish relations in 1964 – not only a romantic, ethnographic kinship, but also accomplishments in the fields of economy and education¹²⁴ – can be seen as the constant feature in the development of the state-level relations from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s.

For Finland, relations with Hungary were – in terms of state level politics – an integral part of Finnish policy towards the satellite countries, even though a special one, because the civil society activity and tradition were exceptional. The Hungarian direction was sometimes even a bit crowded with visits. In the 1970s the visits of the heads of state received no such criticism in Finland as it had in the 1960s and they were not seen as demonstrations: the Hungary of Kádár had consolidated its place as a part of the foreign relations of Finland, and both the Foreign Ministry and the public had a positive attitude towards Hungary. The visits as such were no longer an ‘issue’ for Finland, only a way to conduct relations. For Hungary, on the other hand, they were a way to measure and develop the relations with non-socialist countries. The trend of the Hungarian political culture was to take care of the bilateral relations with visits and treaties.

The economic relations were very central in the Finnish relations with the socialist bloc in the 1970s because they were usually the most troublesome aspect of the relations. The Finns inter-

preted that the Hungarian motives in Finland concerned trade policy which served the needs of domestic policy. For Hungary, the correct state level relations with Finland were important in order to create and develop technical-scientific contacts with the West. The Hungarian focus on economy, trade and the CSCE as a theme already began in the 1960s but was lifted even to a higher plane during the visits of the 1970s. Even though the trade did not develop as was hoped, the relations were maintained well in all contexts: it was a friendship with a tradition, and the Finns argued that it was born among the 'people' because of the idea of kinship.

Finland was a part of Hungary's international Western relations concerning both the economy and the CSCE. It is clear that Finland was not the only window to the West. Seen from the Hungarian point of view, it was marginal compared to Austria. However, Finland was more ready than the other Western countries to conclude agreements and make joint *communiqués* which were important tools for Hungarian foreign policy. The Finnish foreign policy of good relations with the Soviet Union made it an easy partner, and since it was geographically far away, it was also 'safer' than Austria, for example, in the question of the freedom of the visa. On the other hand, the geographical distance was naturally also a drawback when one tried to add trade or other substance to the relations and fight the old clichés which the Hungarian people attached to Finland.

The concept of kinship was in time succeeded by the concept of friendship in the political argument. Friendship was contextualized to modern times and politics, not only to tradition, language and culture. The Finns used more often the traditional definitions which rose from kinship and friendship than the Hungarians. This tradition was the sound basis, and the early relations between the countries were seen in the work of the scientists and in their interest towards the kinship nation. However, it was important to step to also modernity in cultural relations, and even more important was that this concerned economy and trade. The aspect of kinship was the central argument for the close relations only in the beginning; after that it was duly mentioned in festive and commemorative speeches but the concept of friendship became more

important as a proof of understanding between nations and states. The mutual understanding in various fields could all be put under the umbrella of 'friendship'. Even the economy was mentioned as a part of 'understanding although, paradoxically, a bit negatively: both parties acknowledged the problems in this sector. It was also maintained that the friendship was working even despite differences of opinion and different social systems and, for example, despite the disagreement about the EEC.

The respect for the head of state also seems to have been an important part of the image of good relations and friendship. The image that was given of Kádár in Finland was undoubtedly positive, as was the image of Kekkonen in Hungary. As the Finnish press noted, Kádár was received as a head of state although he actually was the Party First Secretary. It is also clear that personal opinions about Kádár influenced the opinions on conditions in Hungary.¹²⁵ In the discourse of the visits, the central role of the party in the Hungarian society and politics faded, and even though the Hungarian leadership openly declared its allegiance towards the Soviet Union, it also managed to emphasize its own line and freedom of action Hungary enjoyed. Likewise, respect for Kekkonen as a person was a part of Hungarian policy towards Finland and evidently also a way to demonstrate the good relations. The organ of the party, *Népszabadság* published in 11 September 1975 an article by Péter Dunai, called 'The Road of the Finnish Foreign Policy' which was a kind of book review on the selected speeches and articles of Urho Kekkonen translated into Hungary. Dunai wrote also about the visits and the mutual relations and explained that they and the peaceful co-existence they represented were due to Kekkonen's policy – thus the success of the policy was connected to the person of the head of state. Naturally, also Kekkonen's relations with the Soviet Union and his peace policy were emphasized.¹²⁶ Actually it can be maintained that the personal interests of Kekkonen concerning Hungary had been more visible and important when the relations and the images had been established in the 1960s rather than during the time of consolidated satellite policy in the 1970s.

In spite of all modernity it was continuously the traditional cultural sector and non-state-level contacts such as travel and friendship activities that were seen as the most useful and most developed part of the relations. It seemed that Kekkonen's urge for the scholars of 'national sciences' he had expressed in 1964 had reached its aim. However, even here there were problems when the images were to be modernized and the old kinship images to be set aside. Modernity was connected to culture as well, such as to economy. Two cultures and societies met each other in the Hungarian-Finnish relations: for example the urban Budapest and the rules of the socialist society met the Finnish nature and civil society.

Friendship was also political friendship – especially from the Hungarian perspective. The idea that the countries had the same role in the international arena belonged to the discourse of the visits as well. The countries expressed their acceptance and appreciation for each other's foreign policy, although in practise they linked this acceptance to their own political framework. For Finland, the question of neutrality was essential; for Hungary, it was the social progress, Kádárism. These had to be explained to the other party during the visits. There were also comparisons with relations between Austria and Hungary.¹²⁷ The dilemma of neutrality can also be seen in the way the Finnish Embassy paid attention to others: how did the other neutral countries see Finnish neutrality?¹²⁸

In the 1970s, the relations between the Finland of Kekkonen and the Hungary of Kádár were politically unproblematic. It was also usual to note the understanding in international questions. In the CSCE questions Hungary was especially keen on seeking understanding with Finland; it was stated that the countries had the same position in the international field. The Hungarian-Finnish friendship, based on the idea of kinship and political understanding, was given as an example which served the whole international community well– both in the sense of peaceful co-existence and in the sense of exemplary cultural relations. The image of two countries in the international field can thus be seen as a continuing trend from the opening of the relations until their consolidation phase.

NOTES

- ¹ Keijo Korhonen, *Sattumakorpraali*. Korhonen Kekkosen komennossa. Keuruu 1999, 122.
- ² See Juhani Suomi, *Kriisien aika*. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962. Keuruu: Otava 1992, 64.
- ³ In this context: to study arguments, contents and forms. See Kari Palonen, Hilikka Summa, *Retorinen käänne? Pelkkää retoriikkaa*. Tampere: Vastapaino 1996, 10-13; Chaim Perelman, *Retoriikan valtakunta*. Tre: Vastapaino 1996.
- ⁴ Foreign Ministry Archives (UMA), 12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, T.H. Heikkilä 11 Jan.1958 Budapest Suomen ja Unkarin suhteet; See Suomi 1992, 63-68 and see also Jukka Nevakivi, 'Kekkonen, a magyar '56 és a finlandizáció kezdete', *Hitel* 13 10 (2000).
- ⁵ UMA, 12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, T.H. Heikkilä 11 Jan.1958 Budapest Suomen ja Unkarin suhteet.
- ⁶ UMA, 12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, T.H. Heikkilä 3 Oct. 1959 Budapest Suh-
tautuminen Unkariin.
- ⁷ Ignác Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*. Budapest: Osiris 1999, 332-333; For Finnish interpretations see Memorandum by Finnish Foreign Ministry. UMA, 101/3/H/Kekkonen, Presidentin epävirallinen vierailu Unkariin 12.-15.5.1963; UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, R.R. Seppälä (Washington) to Max Jacobson (Finnish Foreign Ministry) 18 Apr.1963 and Otso Wartiovaara (Wien) to the Finnish Foreign Minister Veli Merikoski 22 Apr. 1963.
- ⁸ See Suomi; *Kriisien aika*, 383; see also Juhani Suomi, *Presidentti*. Urho Kekkonen 1962-1968. Keuruu: Otava 1994, 88-97.
- ⁹ See UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Katsaus Suomen ja Unkarin välisiin kulttuurisuhteisiin. Presidentin vierailu Unkariin 26.9.-1.10.1969.
- ¹⁰ Hungarian State Archives (MOL), M-KS 288f./32/1961/14 öe. Szipka József nagykövet 11 Apr. 1961 Helsinki. Kekkonen köztársasági elnök meghívása.
- ¹¹ President Urho Kekkonen's archives (UKA), *Vuosikirjat* 1964, Kekkonen papers.
- ¹² See UMA, 101/3/H/Kekkonen, Memorandum by Veikko Hietanen 25 March 1963. The visit was paid on Hungary's initiative. President Dobi's invitation was presented when Hungarian Ambassador, Sándor Kurtán left his letter of credence in Helsinki.
- ¹³ See the program of the visit. UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen; UKA, *Vierailut* 1963-1966. Kekkonen Papers 22/8.
- ¹⁴ MOL, M-KS-288 f-/5/299 öe. Péter János Budapest 25 Apr. 1963, *Jelentés az MSZMP K.B. Politikai Bizottságához, Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök 1963 májusi magyarországi látogatásáról*.

- ¹⁵ MOL, M-KS- 288 f./5/299 öe. Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1963. április 30-án tartott üléséről. Jelentés Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök 1963. májusi magyarországi látogatására. KB külügyi o. javaslata.
- ¹⁶ For the debate with Uusi-Suomi – newspaper see PUKA, Vuosikirjat 1963. Kekkonen papers.
- ¹⁷ UKA, Kuva-Posti 21 (1963). Väinö Länsiluoto, Vierailu Unkariin, Lehtileikkeet 1963-66. Kekkonen papers 41/61.
- ¹⁸ UKA, Nök Lapja 18 May 1963 and Lehtileikkeet. Vierailut 1963-33. Kekkonen papers 22/8.
- ¹⁹ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Katsaus 1968; UMA, 7/E/Unkari 1964, Reino Palas 26 Nov. 1964 Budapest Unkarin parlamentin istunto ja János Péterin ulkopoliittinen puhe.
- ²⁰ UMA, 5/C/27 Reino Palas 20 May 1963 Budapest.
- ²¹ MOL, M-KS 288 f./32/11 öe. Sándor Kurtán Helsinki 3 Oct. 1963; 5 Oct. 1963; 5 Dec. 1963; 21 Dec. 1963.
- ²² UKA, Vuosikirjat 1964. Kekkonen papers.
- ²³ MOL, M-KS 288 f./32/1963 1 öe. Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt Központi Bizottság Külügyi Osztálya. Előterjesztés az MSZMP KB Titkárságának 3 Oct. 1963.
- ²⁴ UMA, 5/C/27, Memorandum by Finnish Embassy in Budapest 30 Sept. 1968.
- ²⁵ On increasing mass tourism as a way of life in Hungary, see Romsics 1999, 402.
- ²⁶ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Yhteinen tiedonanto Suomen tasavallan presidentin tohtori Urho Kekkonen valtiovierailusta Unkarissa.
- ²⁷ Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 408-409.
- ²⁸ Juhani Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta. Urho Kekkonen 1968-1972. Keuruu: Otava 1996, 232-233.
- ²⁹ See MOL, M-KS 288 f./32/1961/14 öe. Kekkonen köztársasági elnök meghívása.
- ³⁰ MOL, M-KS 288 f. /5/468 öe. Előterjesztés az MSZMP KB Politikai Bizottságnak, Péter János Budapest 16 Aug. 1968, Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök meghívásáról.
- ³¹ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Martti Ingman 9 Sept. 1969 Budapest.
- ³² UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Katsaus Suomen ja Unkarin välisiin kulttuurisuhteisiin. Vierailu Unkariin 29.9.-1.10.1969.
- ³³ UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestissa olevan suurlähetystön R-kirjeet 1968, E.O.Raustila 30 Sept. 1968 Budapest. Huomioita suomalais-unkarilaisista kulttuurisuhteista.
- ³⁴ See the speeches, UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin 1969.

- ³⁵ UKA, Vilkuna Papers 1/54, Kustaa Vilkuna to President Kekkonen 14 Aug. 1969; for the program see UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Kekkosen vierailu Unkariin 1969.
- ³⁶ MOL, M-KS 288 f./5/497 öe. János Péter Budapest 18 Aug. 1969, Javaslat az MSZMP KB Politikai Bizottságának, Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogatásával kapcsolatban.
- ³⁷ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Kekkosen vierailu Unkariin, Tasavallan presidentin keskustelut Unkarin pääministeri Fockin kanssa 26.9.1969 klo 16.30; Tasavallan presidentti Kekkosen ja Unkarin Presidentti Losonczin keskustelut 27.9.1969.
- ³⁸ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Kekkosen vierailu Unkariin 1969, Tasavallan Presidentin Unkarin vierailun tiedonanto. 1.10.1969; Yhteinen tiedonanto Suomen tasavallan presidentin tohtori Urho Kekkosen valtiovierailusta Unkarissa.
- ³⁹ UKA, Kekkonen Papers 41/88, 41/89, Lehtileikkeet. Valtiovierailu Romaniaan, Unkariin ja Tshekkoslovakiaan 1969. Helsingin Sanomat 27 Sept. – 1 Oct. 1969.
- ⁴⁰ Lauri Karén, Herrasmiehiä valepuvussa. Juva: WSOY 1994, 174.
- ⁴¹ See for example Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 409.
- ⁴² MOL, M-KS 288 f./5/497 öe. János Péter Budapest 18 Aug. 1969 Javaslat az MSZMP KB Politikai Bizottságnak, Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogatásával kapcsolatban.
- ⁴³ UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Martti Ingman 27 July 1971 Budapest.
- ⁴⁴ UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Marri Ingman 9 Aug. 1971 Budapest.
- ⁴⁵ UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Unkarin kansantasavallan puhemiesneuvoston puheenjohtajan ja rouva Pál Losonczin valtiovierailu Suomeen 23.-26. elokuuta 1971. Ohjelma.
- ⁴⁶ UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Martti Ingman 27 July 1971 Budapest.
- ⁴⁷ UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Ritva-Liisa Elomaa 11 Aug. 1971 P.M. Suomen ja Unkarin välinen kulttuurivaihto.
- ⁴⁸ UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Muistiinpano Suomen Tasavallan Presidentin Urho Kekkosen ja Unkarin Kansantasavallan Puhemiesneuvoston Puheenjohtajan Pál Losonczin välisistä virallisista keskusteluista Presidentin linnassa 23.8.1971 klo 15.30-17.30.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Joint Communiqué on the State visit of the President of the Presidential Council

of the Hungarian People's Republic, Mr. Pál Losonczi and Madame Losonczi to the Republic of Finland.

- ⁵¹ In Hungary the friendship weeks were connected to the state-level relations through the Presidential 'patronage' and high-level meetings. See for example MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/606 öe. Jakab Sándor 8 March 1973 Budapest Javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak; 288 f. 5/614 öe. Tibor Baranyi 2 July 1973 Feljegyzés Pullai Árpád elvtársnak.
- ⁵² UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losonczi, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Unkarin Kansantasavallan Puhemiesneuvoston Puheenjohtajan puhe juhlapäivällisillä Tasavallan Presidentin Linnassa Helsingissä 23.8.1971.
- ⁵³ UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losonczi, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Suurläh. Ingmanin laatima puheluonnos.
- ⁵⁴ Helsingin Sanomat (HS) 24 Aug. 1971; Uusi Suomi (US) 24 Aug. 1971.
- ⁵⁵ US 24 August 1971.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ UMA, 12/L/Unkari suhteet 1972-1973, Suurlähetystösihteeri Ulla-Maria Tainio 2 Nov. 1971 Budapest.
- ⁵⁸ UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestin suurlähetystön r-sarja, Suurlähetystö Budapest 18 Dec.1972 postisähkejäljennös.
- ⁵⁹ HS 26 Sept.1973. Kádár's program, covered by the press, included a wreath on Paasikivi's grave, an Embassy reception and visits to Hämeenlinna and Riihimäki and getting acquainted with the Market square and the 'businesses in the central area' in Helsinki and a sauna in Tamminiemi. The program for the spouses included the factories of Arabia, the old people's home in Riistavuori and the National museum. UMA, 7/E/Unkari, Yksityiskohtainen ohjelma.
- ⁶⁰ Juhani Suomi, (ed.) Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 3 1969-74. Helsinki: Otava 2003, 314, 9 Feb. 1973.
- ⁶¹ MOL, M-KS-288 f. 5/605 öe. János Péter 15 Feb. 1973 Budapest Előterjesztés az MSZMP Politikai Bizottságnak.
- ⁶² MOL M-KS-288 f. 5/611 öe. Frigyes Puja 14 May 1973 Budapest Javaslat az MSZMP elvtárs finnországi útjára Kádár János elvtárs finnországi útjára.
- ⁶³ UMA, 7/E/Unkari 9/98 Pol-73, Paul Jyrkänkallio 15 Sept.1973 Budapest Unkarin nykyhetken ulkopoliittikka; also see 7/E/144 Unkari, Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973.
- ⁶⁴ UMA, 7/E/Unkari 9/98 Pol-73, Paul Jyrkänkallio 16 Sept. 1973 Budapest Unkarin nykyhetken sisäpolitiikka; also see 7/E/ 144 Unkari, Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973.

- ⁶⁵ UMA, 7/E/Unkari 9/98 Pol-73, Paul Jyrkänkallio 15 Sept. 1973 Budapest Unkarin nykyhetken ulkopoliittikka; also see 7/E/144 Unkari, Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973.
- ⁶⁶ UMA, 7/E/Unkari, Paul Jyrkänkallio 16 Sept. 1973 Budapest Suomen ja Unkarin bilateraalisuhteet.
- ⁶⁷ UMA, 7/E/Unkari Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973, Unkarin sosialistisen työväenpuolueen keskuskomitean ensimmäisen sihteerin ja rouva János Kádárin vierailu Suomessa 25-28 syyskuuta 1973.
- ⁶⁸ HS 27 Sept. 1973.
- ⁶⁹ Juhani Suomi, Liennytyksen akanvirrassa. Urho Kekkonen 1972-1976. Keuruu: Otava 1998, 265-266.
- ⁷⁰ UMA, 7/E/Unkari Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973, Vierailukommunikea (luonnos).
- ⁷¹ See for example a Finnish translation of Puja's statement in Népszabadság. UMA, Paul Jyrkänkallio 5 Sept.1973 Budapest. ETYK. Unkarilainen näkemys ETYKin toisesta vaiheesta.
- ⁷² UMA, 7/E/Unkari Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973, Unkarin sosialistisen työväenpuolueen keskuskomitean ensimmäisen sihteerin ja rouva János Kádárin vierailu Suomessa 25-28 syyskuuta 1973.
- ⁷³ US 26 and 27 Sept. 1973; HS 26 and 27 Sept. 1973.
- ⁷⁴ HS 27 Sept. 1973.
- ⁷⁵ HS 27 Sept. 1973.
- ⁷⁶ UMA, 12/L/Unkari, Paul Jyrkänkallio Budapest 19 June 1974. Ulkoasiainministeri Pujan lausunnot suhteista Suomeen. Liite: Ulkoasiainministeri Frigyes Pujan 25.4.1974 parlamentille esittämän ulkopoliittisen katsauksen sekä kesällä julkais- [sic]artikkelin Suomea koskevat kohdat.
- ⁷⁷ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Tötterman, Richard vierailu Unkariin v. 1973, avustaja Tapani Lehtinen 15 Nov.1973 and 23 Nov. 1973 Budapest Muistio. The central role of economy in the relations was evident also during Prime Minister Sorsa's visit to Hungary. Kalevi Sorsa, Kansakoti ja punamulta. Poliitiikan kuvioita 1972-1976. Helsinki: Otava 2003, 169-171.
- ⁷⁸ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet, Suomi-Unkari v. 1976, Budapest 27 Jan. 1976.
- ⁷⁹ UMA, 5-C-27 Budapestin suurlähetystön r-sarja v. 1975, Suurlähetystö Budapest 3 March 1975.
- ⁸⁰ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, osastopäällikkö Jaakko Iloniemi 11 Feb.1976 Helsinki.
- ⁸¹ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Vt.avustaja Kari Mitrunen 27 March 1976. Unkarin entisen pääministerin Jenő Fockin käynti tasavallan presidentin luona 26.3.1976. Also Foreign Minister Sorsa and Matusek negotiated about the invitation and a suitable time.

According to Matusek's suggestion it was agreed that the program would be discussed when Foreign Minister Puja would make his visit in June 1976. UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, jaostosihteeri Kari Veikko Salonen 1 Apr. 1976. Unkarin suurlähettilään käynti ulkoasiainministeri Sorsan luona 1.4.1976.

⁸² UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, toimistopäällikkö Jaakko Blomberg 7 June 1976 Muistiinpano.

⁸³ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Bo Klenberg 27 Sept. 1976 Helsinki to Paul Jyrkänkallio Budapest.

⁸⁴ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 5 Oct. 1976 Budapest.

⁸⁵ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 26 Oct. 1976 Budapest to Ossi Sunell Helsinki.

⁸⁶ See the details in UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 5 Oct. 1976 Budapest.

⁸⁷ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Jaakko Iloniemi 11 Nov. 1976 Helsinki to Herra tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkonen Helsinki.

⁸⁸ The program included – in addition to the talks – a visit in the turbin factory Lang-Gépgyár, shooting pheasants and rabbits in Soponya and Telk, a visit to a co-operative farm in Székesfehérvár and a press conference. See the details of the program in UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Muistiinpanot vierailun valmisteluihin liittyvästä keskustelusta Unkarin ulkoministeriössä 4.11.1976, Pertti Torstila suurlähetystösihteeri Budapest 4.11.1976; Ohjelma; MOL, M-KS 288 f. 32/1876/160 öe. Puja Frigyes 15 Oct. 1976 Budapest (KÜM) Javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak.

⁸⁹ MOL, M-KS 288 f. 32/1976/159 öe. Puja Frigyes 11 September 1976 Budapest. Javaslat 10 Szeptember 1976 Budapest KÜM. Tárgy: Látogatási koncepció Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogatására / 1976 november 17-21/; M-KS 288 f. 32/1976/160 öe. ; MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/703 Puja Frigyes 15 October 1976 Budapest (KÜM) javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak.

⁹⁰ MOL, M-KS 288 f. 32/1976/159 öe. Puja Frigyes 11 September 1976 Budapest. Javaslat 10 September 1976 Budapest KÜM. Tárgy: Látogatási koncepció Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogatására / 1976 november 17-21/.

⁹¹ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Ritva-Liisa Elomaa 10 Nov. 1976 Suomen ja Unkarin väliset kulttuurisuhteet.

⁹² UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 5 Nov. 1976 Budapest. Suomen ja Unkarin väliset bilateraaliset suhteet.

⁹³ Ibid.

- ⁹⁴ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkalio 3 Nov. 1976 Budapest. Katsaus Unkarin ulkopoliittikkaan.
- ⁹⁵ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkalio 3 Nov. 1976 Budapest. Unkarin sisäpoliittinen tilanne.
- ⁹⁶ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Tasavallan presidentin ja Unkarin sosialistisen työväenpuolueen 1. sihteerin Janos Kadarin [sic] väliset viralliset keskustelut 18.11.1976 Budapestissa Unkarin parlamenttitalossa. Muistio J. Seppinen 8 Dec.1976. Also see MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/706 Jelentés a Politikai Bizottságnak Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök magyarországi látogatásáról.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid. The Hungarian interest to make initiatives for joint statements was again evident; Matusek emphasized that it was important for the Hungarians that a grand declaration would be signed during the visit. Foreign Minister Korhonen replied to Matusek that Finland did not usually prepare 'this kind of declaratory documents with other countries'. He let Matusek to understand that Finland was not ready to make an exception even for Hungary's sake. A statement like that had been given only with the Soviet Union in 1973, because then it was meant to stress the special nature of the relations between the two countries. UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Sunell 21 Sept. 1976 Tasavallan presidentin valtiovierailu Unkariin marraskuussa 1976; UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 26 Oct. 1976 Muistio. Tasavallan presidentin Unkarin vierailun valmistelut; suurlähettiläs Matusekin käynti ulkoasiainministeri Korhosen luona.
- ⁹⁹ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu (kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 3 Nov. 1976 Unkarilaisen virkamiesvaltuuskunnan vierailu Helsingissä 27.-30.10.1976; kommunikaneuvottelut.
- ¹⁰⁰ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 8 Nov. 1976 Tasavallan presidentin virallinen vierailu Unkariin 17.-20.11.1976; kommunikaneuvottelut; UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 16 Nov. 1976 vierailutiedonanto; UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 11 Nov. 1976 kommunikaneuvottelut 10.11.1976 (kolmas neuvotteluvaihe).
- ¹⁰¹ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Vierailutiedonanto 1. luonnos Suomen ehdotus 28.10.1976; Communiqué on the Visit of the President of Finland to Hungary; Tiedonanto Liite II Unkarin ehdotus Budapest 20.11.1976.
- ¹⁰² UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v.1976, Communiqué on the visit of president of Finland to Hungary.

- ¹⁰³ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Luonnos Tasavallan Presidentin puheeksi unkarilaisen isännän tarjoamalla juhlapäivällisillä 17.11.1976 and Luonnos Tasavallan Presidentin puheeksi hänen tarjoamilaan päivällisillä 18.11.1976.
- ¹⁰⁴ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, I.Sihteeri Janos Kadarin puhe 17 Nov.1976.
- ¹⁰⁵ MOL, M-KS 288 f. 32/1976/159 öe. Puja Frigyes 11 September 1976 Budapest. Javaslat 10 Sept. 1976 Budapest KÜM. Tárgy: Látogatási koncepció Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogására /1976 november 17-21/; 288 f. 32/1976/160 öe. ; MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/703 Puja Frigyes 15 Oct. 1976 Budapest (KÜM) javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak.
- ¹⁰⁶ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Unkarin television kysymykset presidentti Kekkoselle. Kekkonen had asked the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry to prepare drafts for answers for him in advance. The answers, however, have not been documented.
- ¹⁰⁷ HS 17 Nov. 1976.
- ¹⁰⁸ HS 18 Nov. 1976.
- ¹⁰⁹ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Népszabadság 21 Nov.1976. Eredményesen fejlesztjük gazdasági, kereskedelmi együttműködésünket. Keijo Korhonen finn külügyminiszter nyilatkozata; Népszabadság ym. Budapestin päivälehdet 21.11.1976: taloudesta ja kaupallista yhteistyötämme kehitetään menestyksellisesti. Suomen ulkoasiainministerin Keijo Korhosen lausunto.
- ¹¹⁰ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet: Suomi-Unkari v. 1977-1981, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen 9 Sept. 1977 Budapest.
- ¹¹¹ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Matti Tuovinen 6 Apr.1977 Unkarin pääministerin vierailu; Matti Tuovinen 27 Apr. 1977 P.M. Pääministeri Lázárin vierailu.
- ¹¹² UMA, 5-C-27 Budapestin suurlähetystön r-sarja v. 1975, Paul Jyrkänkallio 19 May 1975 Budapest.
- ¹¹³ UMA, 12-L-Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, suurlähetystösihteeri Pertti Torstila 6 May 1977.
- ¹¹⁴ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Kaarlo Yrjö Koskinen 26 May and 11 June 1977 Budapest; Unkari: Poliittiset asenteet ja ETYK:n päätösasiakirjan toteuttaminen, Budapest 7 March 1977.
- ¹¹⁵ MOL, M-KS 288 f. 132 1976/170 öe. Javaslat a finn félnek az európai biztonsági és együttműködési értekezlet záróokmányában foglalt rendelkezések végrehajtására magyar- finn viszonylatban.

- ¹¹⁶ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Jaostopäällikkö Erkki Kivimäki, Muistio Suomalais-unkarilaisten suhteiden kehittäminen ETYK:in pohjalta; Unkarin ehdotukset kesäkuulta 1976.
- ¹¹⁷ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen 26 May 1977 Budapest Suomen ja Unkarin bilateraaliset suhteet.
- ¹¹⁸ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen Budapest 24 May 1977 Pääministeri ja rouva Lázárin vierailu Suomessa.
- ¹¹⁹ UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Budapest/um:n tiedote 8.6.1977; Magyar Hírlap 14. and 15.6.1977; Finnish Embassy 23 June 1977 Budapest.
- ¹²⁰ UMA, 7/E/Unkari Ulkopoliittikka 1977-1981, Finnish Embassy 14 July 1978 Budapest.
- ¹²¹ Originally this was Rudolf Rónai's idea. According to the Ambassador, Rónai had raised the question with Kustaa Vilkkuna in 1976. The official invitation was given to the President by Vice President Gáspár who visited Finland in autumn 1977. After that came the invitation of Kádár and Losonczi. According to the Ambassador, only these people knew about the plan. UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet, Suomi-Unkari v. 1977-1981, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen 28 Feb. 1978 Budapest to state secretary Matti Tuovinen.
- ¹²² UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet, Suomi-Unkari v. 1977-1981, Protokollaosasto Ossi Sunell 8 March 1978 to Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen Budapest. The Hungarians repeated the idea once more: Ambassador Matusek had raised the issue of the 'fiftieth-anniversary-visit' during a supper with Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa. Matusek explained that Kekkonen and Kádár had talked about this in Moscow. UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet, Suomi-Unkari v. 1977-1981, Kalevi Sorsa 9 March 1978 Helsinki P.M. keskusteluun Unkarin suurlähettilään kanssa.
- ¹²³ Korhonen, Sattumakorpraali, 123.
- ¹²⁴ UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Katsaus 1968; UMA, 7/E/Unkari 1964, Reino Pallas 26 Nov. 1964 Budapest Unkarin parlamentin istunto ja János Péterin ulkopoliittinen puhe.
- ¹²⁵ See for example Sorsa, Kansankoti ja punamulta, 170.
- ¹²⁶ UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestin suurlähetystön raporttisarja, Népszabadság 11 Sept. 1975. Suomen ulkopoliittikan tie. Urho Kekkosen valittuja puheita ja artikelleita.
- ¹²⁷ See for example UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestin suurlähetystön r-sarja 1977, Finnish Embassy 4 Nov. 1977 Budapest.
- ¹²⁸ UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestin suurlähetystön raporttisarja v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 9 Dec. 1976 Budapest. Asia: Suomi ja puolueettomien kerhot.

**Searching for the Social Man:
Hungarian and Finnish Psychologists Collaborate***

Anssi HALMESVIRTA

1 Introduction

The scientific relations of small capitalist and socialist countries during the Cold War era are largely a neglected area of study. Either it is deemed quite insignificant in comparison to wider issues of transfer of technology and know-how between greater countries or it has simply been overlooked as a peripheral subject. This holds true also of the scientific relations between Hungary and Finland. In spite of the fact that since the end of the 1960s Kádár's regime was ready to acknowledge that although the ideological warfare against the West had to be accelerated, Finland was in the category of the capitalist countries with which extensive agreements concerning scientific co-operation could be struck. Finland, like Sweden, was not an imperialist country but a capitalist one, and 'pink'¹ at that. In the beginning of the 1970s Finland was not regarded only as a highly attractive field for scientific and cultural propaganda by the Hungarian authorities but also a country where to send junior experts in increasing numbers to learn Western techniques and innovations.² The rapprochement of Hungary and Finland was preconditioned by the way Finland promoted the 'good

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neighborhood policy' towards the Soviet Union. 'Finlandization' could become to mean something positive for the Hungarians since it was – paradoxically enough – Finland, not Hungary that gained favours (Porkkala, the lease of the Saimaa Canal) and advantageous trade agreements from the Soviets.

In the favourable foreign political situation of the early 1970s, and as the science policy of the Academy of Finland (AF) was radically reformed (1970) and became impregnated by leftist concept of science ('science for the people'), an opportunity for widening scientific co-operation opened. After lengthy negotiations a bilateral agreement between it and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) was signed in 1976. The traditionally dominant finno-ugric studies had to give room to the breakthrough of up-to-date natural and technical sciences within the framework of scientific exchange activities. In the following years, they received the lion-share of funding, a fact reflected also in the composition of the symposia of the first Days of Finnish Science held in Budapest in May, 1979. Under the pressure from social reformers the priorities of the AF were, however, soon to be reshuffled.³ The shift towards social sciences can be read in the programme for the Days of Hungarian Science held in Finland (27 August – 3 September 1981); among others, one symposium of psychology was organized at the Jyväskylä University, Central Finland.

Regarding the rise of the societal role of social sciences in general, it may not be amiss to reassess the significance of psychology among them and as a field of Hungarian-Finnish scientific co-operation and exchange. Psychologists in both countries were convinced that psychology was the basic study of human behaviour and as such of immense value for social reform. Reforms were based on planning and 'social engineering' which, for their part, craved for psychological data and generalizations to back up their projects. The subject-matter of psychology was more critical than, for instance, that of medicine or agricultural sciences in shaping the understanding of society. Since the same kind of social problems and deviant behavior were found

to be on the increase in Hungary and in Finland, it was foreseeable that both could learn and benefit from each others' methods and research results. The debates and arguments of the experts would also reveal some fundamental differences between the Finnish, more individualist approach and the Hungarian, collectivist approach to psychology, and possibly lead to a point where touchy philosophical questions of values and norms were encountered. Pivotal questions in this article are: how and why was it possible for psychologists from two juxtaposed social and science systems come to terms with each other and find common ground for scientific discussion and joint projects? One must also reconstruct what results the co-operation was able to show and how and in what forms it was carried on after the change of the system in Hungary (1989).

At the outset, one has to keep in mind how 'psychology' was understood in the West when it reached its heyday in the 1970s. It was not principally a study of 'psyche' as in psychoanalysis or deep-psychology but simply 'the study of human behaviour'. The human being was seen as a mechanism of stimulus and response governed by the laws of causation. Mental processes were measured according to neurological theories rather than by interpretative analysis. This behavioralism also became quite popular in educational psychology. For a contemporary observer, it was possible to state that in Hungarian, 'socialist' psychology, the value of psychological devices of control and education of man was exaggerated and in Finland the possibilities to change human environs in order to 'improve' behaviour were underestimated.⁴ However, the behaviouralist definition of psychology implied a fair dose of psychologism, meaning that all social problems could be reduced to the analysis of individual human behaviour. In Finland, this was softened by functionalism: as in sociology, conflicts in a society were interpreted as improving its efficiency and cohesion, also in psychology the development of an individual was seen in the context of contestation of prevailing values and norms. Hungarian psychology was not equally permissive.

In Marxist psychology leanings towards behaviourism were overridden by more holistic approaches emanating from the theories of man's social development expounded by Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934)⁵ and Anton Makarenko (1888–1939)⁶ which took root in Hungary in the early 1960s. In the 1950s Hungarian psychology had been rather vulgarly collectivistic, and it was established by administrative measures. It did not rise through patient scientific discussion and emphasized stability at the expense of creativity. At the time Hungarian psychologists had very few contacts with the West, simple Pavlovism with naturalist reductionism dominated. Vygotsky's teaching became more known in the 1960s, and studies in psychology of work, educational psychology and psychology of children's development were launched. Also studies in propaganda, public education, traffic, criminal, and sports psychology became popular⁷, and they were already infiltrated by ideas from the West. However, psychology was given a peculiarly collectivistic task: by studying the laws of behaviour finding regularities on the basis of which authorities could optimize people's adaptation to social life. Social psychology in socialism set out to manage people's everyday problems.

Marxism tended to preformulate the phenomenon under study and omit the phenomenon itself. Consequently, expectations concerning psychology were very high: it should have been able to find knowledge and means to eradicate fluctuations in work-force, traffic and shop-floor accidents or quickly to reduce the number of neuroses, suicides and antisocial behaviour in general.⁸ Authorities suspected that building socialism after all bred all sorts of crime.⁹ These fears reflected the dark side of the social reality; alcoholism, suicides, and mental depression were disquietingly widespread.¹⁰ Psychology was burdened with an enormous responsibility to heal society.

Marxist psychology took root in Finland in the early 1970s, and in the reforms of teaching of psychology in the highest educational and pedagogical institutions such as Jyväskylä University, the new reference material included a Soviet handbook of

psychology along with works of Halperin, Leontjev¹¹ and others which had been translated into Finnish. They were being advertised as 'opening a new scientific-materialist phase in Finnish psychological literature'¹². The leading psychological review regarded 'friendly' relations with the Soviet Union as very important also for the development of psychology in Finland. The editor was convinced of the 'bridge-building' role of Finnish psychologists which was to allow discussion between American and Soviet traditions of psychology to flow freely in Finland.¹³ Yet, the same paper occasionally took a critical stand against the pseudo-philosophical bias in Marxist psychology itself. It was argued that the 'mentalistic' language of Halperin and Leontjev remained aloof of empirical processes and the connection of psyche to material conditions was obscure. Behaviorism was to overrule such philosophizing: consciousness was to be translated into language which described behaviour.¹⁴ It seems that Vygotsky's collectivist theories were not taken as seriously in Finland as his more applicable studies in schizophrenia¹⁵ which shows the eclectic character of Finnish psychology.

Psychology had already experienced a revival in the early 1960s in both ideological blocs. Hungarian psychologists would not refer to their domestic predecessors but to foreign sources. They tried to follow international trends, and in the end of the 1960s the latest development was the institutionalization of educational psychology which dealt with retarded populations and human selection in the name of social hygiene and educational reform. At the time when political intervention still hindered rivalry within science in Hungary,¹⁶ in Finland the state began to demand 'socially valuable' results from all social sciences, psychology included.

Both in Hungary and Finland it was widely expected that psychology would become one of the social sciences – yet another efficient means of planning and control. What was common to Socialism and Capitalism in the 1960s–1970s was the belief in the secular religion called 'progress', be it evolutionary or Marxist. In that they rivalled: human reason was promiscu-

ously applied in regulating human affairs and cultural and natural environment. The control of populations was rationalized and conscious planning of social policy was to be based on sociological and psychological knowledge. Modern ways of persuasion and indoctrination were invented and further developed in party headquarters and research institutions especially for use in education and mass recruitment. Educational psychology developed into an effective means to create suitable tastes, opinions and values. These remained ideologically different in socialist Hungary and capitalist Finland – at times the Hungarians complained of the expansion of American values and culture in Finland. Propaganda-makers exploited modern mass-media. Psychologists who would not study social structures and milieu as deeply as individual behaviour became redundant. In Finland canvassing and ‘policy of satisfying’ directed at the consumer appealed to irrational traits of the man, in Hungary irrationalism was to be rooted and a ‘new, really social man’ was to be created. Both systems were wary of stagnation and in the progressive atmosphere social engineering was not only a matter of adjusting this or that minor problem of social adaptation, it had to cater for overall social development. In its name, in Hungary during the whole period under scrutiny and in the late 1960s and 1970s also in Finland¹⁷, ‘reactionary’ ideologies were deemed futile in this respect.

The ensuing co-operation between Hungarian and Finnish psychologists was to lead to concrete, and in the eyes of the authorities, also socially applicable results. It was optimistically assumed that psychology could reveal peoples’ dispositions and give lessons to direct their behaviour into socially acceptable channels. In Hungary this became a question of viability of socialism, in Finland it was to be the recipe for ‘peaceful social progress and economic growth’. The role of psychology was deemed critical: for instance, recently detected forms of deviancy among adolescents, students and some marginal(ized) social groups were to be studied in order to make their rehabilitation possible. This served the more final goal to encounter the ‘threatening’

erosion of the moral backbone of social order in both countries.

A sociologically oriented intellectual who described the grievances of society had formerly been potentially dangerous to the Communist Party in Hungary but in the 1970s it was possible to raise such issues. The tone was changed: apologies to ideology and covering up 'mistakes' in planning and their execution were gradually given up.¹⁸ Towards the 1980s sociologists and psychologists were no longer the masters of the ideological warfare, and every now and then an interesting article or documentary was made public.¹⁹ Marxism-Leninism became so flexible in definition that a variety of interpretations of it could live side by side. Many a well-educated communist could transform himself/herself from a 'Red' to an expert'.²⁰ Also the transfer of know-how and technologies from the West was emptied of 'class-content' in the 1970s which amounted to the rise of technical intelligentsia also in Hungarian society.²¹

One intriguing question is how the 'psychological mission' could be jointly accomplished. Notwithstanding the apparent compatibility or complementarity of theories, study tasks and methods, the contradictory value-systems behind the two 'psychologies' – individualist versus collectivist – could cause hiatus in planning joint research. In such a basic 'science of man' as psychology was, one could expect that in principle antagonistic world-views of Marxism-Leninism and Liberalism – the latter being the pronounced principle of science in Finland – would cause insurmountable obstacles. Disagreement over ethical and epistemological aspects of study would arise. It has to be specified here how and why deep-lying philosophical problems were being evaded or avoided in a pragmatic manner which satisfied both sides. This involves further questions: was it that in the name of 'neutral co-operation' examination of premises of study was glossed over? Or was it that, for the sake of 'maintenance of the social order', the results of joint activities were exchanged and utilized happily without further ado? Although theories could clash, the study methods might be the same and lead to similarly applicable results. Or did any form of co-operation end

up in a cul-de-sac which could not be bypassed?

Although Finns were usually more ignorant of the condition of psychology in Hungary than the Hungarians of the one of the West, both knew of the principles, development of methods and of some of the innovative results of psychological studies over the Iron Curtain. Radical students of psychology in Jyväskylä University naively believed in the 1970s that the 'really social, virtuous man' had already been born in socialism whereas the staff of the Department took a much more moderate view of the achievements of socialism.²² Idealism vanished as the drawbacks of 'modernization' were recognized on both sides, and reassessment was demanded along similar policy lines. Knowledge of modern society and mind was expected from psychologists in both ideological camps, and their co-operation presupposed a 'depoliticized' agreement on what were the common problematics.

The records of the MTA and the AF archives preserve reports of Hungarian and Finnish exchange researchers telling their superiors about the urgency of reforms and further research co-operation to investigate mental and social grievances and deviant behaviour. The most alarmist messages issued forth from the contributions of criminologists and experts of child and adolescent psychology. The worry of losing a whole generation due to immorality, anti-social behaviour and juvenile delinquency increased during the 1970s, and for instance, the conference report of the psychologists taking part in the Days of Hungarian Science (Jyväskylä, 1981) carried with it a certain mood of common, albeit hidden despair. Partly in response, respective authorities put forward plans of 'rescue operations', tailored to specific circumstances in Hungarian and Finnish societies. Official publications and correspondence of the MTA and the AF from the same period show a considerable and continuous increase of funding in social sciences, psychology included. The 'painful' areas of society received more attention, and research of the neglected areas of social reality was started. Suggestions for reforms in mental care and changes in criminal law were forwarded to the Ministries, and law experts

and officials referred to psychological investigation to back their proposals.

It seems that in these programmes both the Marxist-oriented and the evolutionary, developmental psychology were reaching a point in which their credibility was challenged. They were now seeking support from state authorities and, to a certain extent, from each other. In Finland this led to a situation in which behavioralism had to give space to rivalling, systemic theories in which the human being was recognized as an organized, active and goal-oriented whole.²³ Under the impact of theories of cognition and mental development of Vygotsky Hungarian psychologists also leaned towards the idea that human beings should be studied in concrete contexts, not only in laboratory conditions. In this way, 'psyche' was making a come-back in psychology, and during the 1980s it was becoming a more dynamic faculty than it had ever been.²⁴

In its due course, as the coercive nature of total social planning and control became transparent, rude progressivism was exhausted. The uncontrollability of huge social processes – forced industrialization and urban development in Hungary, the plight of the countryside and migration waves to south and Sweden in Finland – was gradually understood. Corrective measures took their place, for instance, when such phenomena as unemployment, crime and booming traffic with its terrific accident numbers started to worry the social engineer and the decision-maker in both countries. In scientific and technical co-operation between Hungary and Finland quite a few common problems were found and up-to-date techniques were applied to the advantage of both sides. Psychology tackled the psychic problems caused by dislocation and alienation of certain sections of the populations in the two countries resembled each other greatly. They could be studied by the same methods even though basic social values and goals remained different. The future of the youth and the development of its potential to socialization was a one of the most pressing common concerns.

One common consequence of the theoretical shift can be

found in the plans for educational reform in both countries. More stress was now laid on new forms of education which would not be as authoritarian as had been customary both in Hungary and Finland. It was as if it had been realized that coercion was the wrong method, and a more sympathetic approach, enlightened campaigning and teaching by competition and example the right one. One comes across with variations on this theme in the records and it remains to be studied how social political questions were tackled in bilateral relations before the collapse of Marxist psychology in Hungary.

At first, the impact of social psychology was felt in re-evaluations of the state of social and political order in Hungary and Finland. The Hungarians were more eager than the Finns to draw lessons from the collaborator's social and political life – it was their mission to transfer information on the workings of Finnish society to Hungary. The initial assumption of the Hungarians studying in Finland was that Finland was on a lower, less developed stage of social 'progress' than socialist Hungary. From the Hungarian vantage point 'underdeveloped' Finnish democracy was to be compared with the 'maturing' Hungarian people's one. To Hungarian exchange researchers the 'new Finnish social policy' based on reformist social psychology of the 1970s somehow resembled socialist social policy, and was thus welcomed as a step in the 'right' direction. However, the outcome of studies pointed also to another, unexpected direction; for instance, when Finnish institutions of local democracy were carefully studied by a few younger Hungarian political and social scientists in the 1970s-1980s, they were found almost exemplary. It must have been a shock for a young communist to realize that in the final analysis it was the Finnish 'rational freedom' that bore such fruits to society and economy that made Finns themselves mentally and physically satisfied and relatively happy, and Finland a stream-lined and modern industrial country, ahead of Hungary in many respects.²⁵ As Finland turned out to be less 'reactionary' than Hungary, a mood of disillusion resounded in the reports of Hungarian researchers.

Parallel astonishment can be detected in some articles of Hungarian historical and literary reviews of the 1970s on Finnish social and scientific affairs. The realization of the fact that Hungarians had not been able to follow the Finns on 'the way to the truth' caused tangible anger in the authorities at home.²⁶ An alarming conclusion was: something was wrong with the socialist morality if it was losing the battle over souls to basically Lutheran, bourgeois mentality.

It is hard to say how widely this message from Finland was spreading in Hungary but it certainly contradicted the image the official, diplomatic representatives of Hungary delivered from Helsinki to Budapest. The Finnish political culture of 'excessive pluralism' (too many parties, extreme Right-wing propaganda, remnants of fascism and chauvinism, electioneering in local and general elections, decentralized power structures etc.) was, in their view symptomatic to a chaotic system, and eventually overcome by some form of leftist 'Finnish Popular Front'. In contrast, what came to realities in Finland was, at the same time, sadly realized by some experts that it was not Kádár's Hungary but Kekkonen's Finland that benefited politically and economically from relations with the Soviets Union.²⁷ Under the foreign political umbrella, it was equally painstaking for a visiting Hungarian scholar or scientist to gather that the Finnish economic-political system – science policy as a part of it – which should have been 'backward' was definitely more efficient than the one of Hungary. The causes for it were not found only in the usual rich natural resources and pragmatic foreign policy but also in the enterprising psycho-social build-up of the Finnish people. The 'Finnish dilemma' motivated many a Hungarian social scientist and psychologist to apply for research grants in the 1970s and the 1980s to Finland. And, in answering the question 'what did psychology have to do with changes in political culture?', it may be tentatively argued that the results and impressions they reported at home, even if not making any direct impact on the decision-makers, nevertheless could mould the way scientists looked at Hungarian science and society more critically.

2 The Jyväskylä Symposium

It was the general agreement of the Academies from the year 1976 that regulated the official scientific relations of Hungary and Finland. Although its outspoken purpose was to open co-operation in new sciences, psychology was not among them at the beginning. It did not feature in the agreement (1977) concerning the organization of the Days of Science either. Neither did the programme of the first Days of Finnish Science in Budapest in 1979 include a psychology symposium. However, in 1979 out of the MTA's and AF's 44 joint research projects seven were in social sciences, two of them being conducted in psychology; 1) a project on 'event-related potential correlates of psychological processes' carried out as experimental studies in electro-physiology (Helsinki University), 2) examination of the bullying and the behaviour of victims in primary and secondary schools (Turku University).²⁸ The first purported quite ambitiously to establish a link between electro-physiological processes of the brain and the processes of the mind, and the second focussed on a common problem at schools in line with studies in deviancy.

In the background, the floor for more extensive co-operation had been long prepared by Professor of Psychology and the Director of the Department of Psychology in Jyväskylä University, Martti Takala. During his pioneering career there (1954–88) psychological studies orientated towards developmental studies. The Department of Psychology was the oldest in Finland (est. in 1936) and developmental and educational psychology there had already acquired international fame, for instance, in family studies and in the pioneering studies in aggression by Professor Lea Pulkkinen. As the Department was growing fast in the beginning of the 1970s, the studies branched out into several directions such as social development and control of children and youth, studies in ways of life, and more specifically, studies of student attitudes (Isto Ruoppila) and social drifting and deviancy (Pulkkinen).²⁹ Although psychology be-

came a legitimate university branch of higher education of its own only in 1980 in Finland, research in the field had been conducted in Jyväskylä since the 1950s. The number of staff grew from eleven to seventeen from 1971 to 1981, and in 1980 it had got its own building on campus, the biggest of its kind in Finland. Facilities in Jyväskylä were excellent although the studies were at the beginning quite diverse, and often theoretically and methodically rather weak.³⁰

In times when Hungarian psychology lived through international networks and informal cross-talk over the borders³¹, psychology in Jyväskylä also drew the attention of the Hungarians. Common interests were soon found and Takala made personal contacts with Hungarian colleagues in international congresses in early 1970s, and it was he who gave them access to the Department in Jyväskylä.³² These initiatives were to grow into quite intensive and manifold collaboration. One of the most conspicuous results was that the Hungarian and Finnish psychologists were able to have a psychology symposium on youth education with the timely topic 'Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects of Youth Education' (from the 31st of August to the 1st of September) included in the first Days of Hungarian Science held in Finland (27th of August – 3rd of September, 1981).³³ Jyväskylä was a provincial centre but it was honoured to be the venue of the symposium, the others being held in the more easily approachable capital. It was the first official scientific meeting-point of Hungarian and Finnish psychologists under the auspices of the Academy allowing relatively free and extensive exchange of ideas and research results. Special impetus was given to its proceedings by common understanding of psychology as a social science with distinctive value as signs of social disintegration were recorded in both countries. Finnish developmental and social psychologists were well aware of anti-social tendencies and of the defiance of 'traditional' values and norms among the younger, radical generation. These were the areas of study from which the Hungarians were very keen to learn when in Finland.

From the Finnish side the symposium was co-ordinated by Professor Isto Ruoppila³⁴ from Jyväskylä, and from the Hungarian side by Dr Ferenc Pataki, the Director of the Institute for Psychology at the MTA since 1977. Pataki's career was having an upward swing and at the end of the 1980s he belonged to the closest circle of György Aczél's advisors in science policy.³⁵ Thanks to Aczél's pragmatism, psychology was also to benefit from the reform of the Academy of the 1970s. Pataki clung to the Marxist-Leninist world-view, but he agreed with reform-minded colleagues that the socialist educational philosophy in Hungary painted an altogether too rosy, 'idyllic' picture of the socialist society without tensions and contradictions while the educational institutions themselves were 'conservative'. Schematism, unquestioned stereotypes and psychological atomism misled not only educational psychologists but also teachers in the field. It was high time that education were brought to the level with the needs of the times by up-to-date socio-psychological data.³⁶ It was psychology's function to become self-critical against prevailing hyperempiricism and 'thirst for facts' (*tényszomjúság*).³⁷ What was missing from Hungary, but well-advanced in Finland, was studies in educational psychology, which would help teachers to harmonize their work with the phases of development of children. For Pataki, Makarenko's and Vygotsky's dynamic theories of development had already helped in refuting the belief in 'natural development'.³⁸ He was also inspired by Western developmental psychology, which regarded pedagogy as a branch of social psychology. If applied in Hungary, it would have meant a decisive turn away from 'old' mental hygiene towards school and youth studies. In spite of his reformist leanings, Pataki held on to the basic Marxist tenet which emphasized man's nature as a social being (*társas lény*) – the 'primitive man' had already been disposed to live in company (*társulási készítés*), a presupposition providing the credo for collective psychology. However, Pataki launched studies of school life and youth group/community studies by Western methods.³⁹ He applied them in studies of performance and con-

flict, in studies of youth culture, ethos and values, and specialized in studying conflict situations between university students and authorities. These were delicate issues, because it had been realized both in Hungary and in Finland that certain groups of young people rejected the values and norms used in socialization in higher educational institutions.⁴⁰ In Finland the studies in problems of integration of society, in reception of norms, values and in acquisition and performance of roles, were up-to-date. The head of the AF, Erik Allardt, following in the footsteps of T. Parsons, witnessed the heroic climax of critical sociology when Kekkonen accepted communists in the government (1966)⁴¹ – the danger of upheaval from that quarter was thus eliminated.

It is remarkable that psychology found room among other Science Days' symposia representing the new generation of harder sciences, namely computer-aided cardiological research, laser physics, biology, pharmacology, neurochemistry and geophysics.⁴² However, it was not to be the least of newcomers: developmental psychology with its studies in childhood and adolescent development became one of the most exhaustively analyzed fields of social studies within the co-operation of the Academies. Since the 1981 symposium in Jyväskylä, developmental and educational psychologists met regularly and aimed at generalizing their topics, for instance, to cover the wider problematic of socialization and child-rearing practices (a symposium in Jyväskylä, 4 – 6 October 1995).⁴³ Although the highlight of the co-operation occurred in early 1980s, and has somewhat abated, the contacts have so far lasted at least until the year 2000 when the latest joint conference was held in Szeged, in Hungary.

As a member of AF's Committee for Social Sciences, Ruoppila advanced the cause of psychology, took care of international relations and organized congresses in Finland. He had wanted to find concrete and high-level themes of study from the very beginning, and he also saw to it that only internationally renowned psychologists arrived from Hungary. He was positively

surprised to find out that they were not 'censured' people followed by 'shadow-minders' whom the Russian colleagues had to endure while in Finland.⁴⁴ Of course, Ruoppila could not intervene in the way the MTA chose delegates from among its own members of institutes, not from the Universities which were kept at bay in international relations.

The opening speech of the Days of Science given by Kai-Otto Donner, the Director of the AF, reflected recent, 'progressive' changes in Finnish science policy. He honoured his predecessor and the 'grand old man', Kustaa Vilkuna (d. in 1980), and remembered the 'old AF' as the cradle of natural and national sciences. However, as he emphasized, bygones were bygones, new sciences, among them the upstart psychology which produced humane applications for the common good of society, ruled the day.⁴⁵ Undoubtedly, they were more 'progressive' than the 'old ones', since they accrued benefits for wider society, not only for the industrial and scientific élite.

The honorary guest lecturer of the Days, the President of the MTA, Lénárd Pál, responded to Donner's speech and agreed with him to a certain point. In his opinion the wider public had also been disappointed at the 'old sciences', a condition which had brought with it deprecation of the social value of science in general. Pál defended 'new sciences' more potently than Donner: although – even in socialism – they were not omnipotent, they were of 'inestimable value' in building the socialist society. However, there remained the 'pitiful' discrepancy between natural and social sciences: the knowledge of nature had become overwhelming in the last 50 years while the knowledge of society and its laws lagged strangely behind. The reliability of social knowledge was certainly more questionable than that of nature if seen from the perspective of the forces of production and the socialist economy. During the processes of forceful industrialization, especially in building heavy industry, society and environment had suffered from harmful side-effects. Alarmed, Pál demanded a reevaluation of the role of science in socialism. In serving the needs of modern technology and pro-

duction, science had 'unfortunately' pushed the needs of the people aside. Planning and production should recognize the 'human factor' – people's needs and expectations should have enticed production to create new products. Production should not have created 'unwanted' needs in population. It was sociology's task to find out what people really wanted. Reflecting on the growing concern for 'social production', Pál specifically pointed to the responsibility of psychology to heal modern mental ailments caused by uncontrolled technological progress. Advanced and quickened communication, in particular, strained the 'nervous system' (stimuli moved faster than they could be processed) of the urban population. The challenge was: scientists and researchers should find innovations that could satisfy the modern demand for smoother services and comfortable infrastructure. Some key spheres of life which needed urgent, socially acceptable safety solutions were the rapidly expanding traffic and technically complicated shop-floor conditions.⁴⁶ In this way, both in Hungary and Finland, psychology was coined the social science which should find and dispense alleviation to maladjustment. The consequences of industrialization and urbanization were considered similar enough in capitalism and socialism that lessons of psychology were complementarily applicable to both. Psychology was becoming openly, and in the eyes of science authorities and planning officers, legitimately interventionist. If sociology was to deal with the general problems of adaptation of youth into society, the education of skilled workers and students, guiding them in their choices of career and in family planning was to remain the domain of social psychology.

In the papers presented at the Jyväskylä symposium, case studies of aggression, ways of life, and the formation and inculcation of values gained prominence. By way of introduction, Professor Ruoppila updated the situation in modern societies with which the psychologists had to come to terms. Changes in the structures of societies had caused 'problems' to be grappled with: urbanization, service-orientation in economy, internal waves of emigration and

unemployment (7–8% in Finland/assumed 'non-existent' in Hungary). This state of affairs had brought with it a radical change in the role of psychologists from control and treatment of children and teen-agers with psychic problems and learning difficulties to the care of their 'sound psychic development'.⁴⁷ Recent research in Jyväskylä and Helsinki concentrated on determinants of youth's social behaviour, skills and systems of value. The latest orientation was to study problems in adolescent socialization caused by unemployment, as yet an unexplored subject for the Hungarians present. They were more interested in the work done at Tampere University by T. Nummenmaa (1979) on the development of sequential structures of children's thought. Children had been shown a series of events on a film which they had to describe. Afterwards a stage model had been laid out and tested.⁴⁸ Quite remarkably, this procedure found mutual applications when designing TV-programmes for traffic education of school-children.

At this point it should be noticed that the underlying antagonism between Marxist collectivism and Western individualism in psychology had not been brought forward, let alone resolved at the Jyväskylä symposium. There was no point in causing friction in budding collaboration by ideological skirmishes. The socialist ideas of man's educability put forward by Marxist educational philosophy had not made so profound an impact in Hungarian psychology that it could have caused friction in Jyväskylä. In fact, it had been agreed by the participants to stay silent on philosophical questions and avoid a situation of competition between capitalist and socialist science. Even comparisons of experimental methods were put aside because of insurmountable cultural differences in criteria. The success of the Jyväskylä symposium was ensured by limiting the topics into social application of psychology. The Finns were quite well aware that in Hungary science was 'collectivistic', hierarchical, and controlled by the Party, but it was also clear that Hungarians were as independent as the 'Georgians', and compared favourably with hard-line colleagues coming from the GDR. A symposium was not a venue to talk about politics⁴⁹: it could be left to a more informal place such as the sauna.⁵⁰ To stress: the reason to

call the symposium together at all was its scientific interest. The Finnish psychologists had learned through their reading that their Hungarian colleagues published in English and in German studies on the same subjects as they themselves did, namely on youth development from the educational point of view which was also one of the special fields in Jyväskylä.

It was only Dr Pataki whom the Finns suspected of being a hard-line Marxist psychologist or ideologue overseeing the other Hungarian visitors. This suspicion proved false, since Pataki was at the time of the symposium conducting studies the results of which inescapably led to the criticism of the existing educational and social system: he studied the maladjusted, their deviant behaviour, and people living in disadvantageous situations in socialism. He demanded studies in alcoholism, for instance, among university teachers. He had already also spotted many signs of social disintegration in Hungary where there was found an alarming number of families in which the father was an alcoholic who needed frequent detoxification, in which the mother was in a mental hospital, and in which the children were kept in custody.⁵¹ Nevertheless, Pataki made only minor concessions to anti-authoritarianism in youth education. His paper on the results of the MTA's and the AF's joint project on 'Juvenile Health Habits', awarded by the IEA (International Association for the Evaluation of Education), dealt with the consequences of the relaxation of discipline of adolescents at school. It had been in the common interest of school authorities in Hungary and Finland to support 'healthy' socialization, for example, eradication of smoking and drinking habits and reorienting the young to sports. It was also a common concern at the symposium that symbols of discipline and strict forms of communication between the pupils and the teacher at school were undermined. Pataki had to confess that 'soft' values appealed to youth and that they were more interested in matters of mode and taste than learning proper behaviour in class. He rejected functionalism and neo-behaviouralism by

pointing to social conflicts, irrationality and complexity of normative behaviour. He had uncovered that a youngster could be a member of many groups and share many norms and values, which indicated that also in Hungary the authorities should anticipate differences in socialization in order to preserve social dynamics. He declared that an individual's autonomy should not be sacrificed and lamented the prevailing, 'severe, autocratic and indifferent teaching atmosphere' in which young people had to learn under a heavy homework-load, pressure of competition and mental tension.⁵² Pataki's lessons were applauded by his Finnish colleagues.

Pataki did not, however, favour the 'liberal' education, practised in Finland, either. The maladjustment of youth in capitalism could be put down to it. Surveys implied that 'liberal' teaching methods had been deemed 'weak' by both pupils and teachers in Hungary and in Finland. One thought-provoking result he picked out was that the teachers who had slackened discipline had failed to achieve the objectives of education. Leaning on this, Pataki ventured to giving a political lesson. In his view, before the socialist educational system could become 'perfect', centralism was paramount but not in the prevalent form of mechanical uniformity and over-regulation. He harked back to Makarenko's image of the model teacher who should have been 'independent, responsible and willing to take initiative', an image resembling his 'magnetic comrades' who ignited the spirit for collective building of socialism in the masses.⁵³ Thus Pataki had not given up the basic teachings of socialist psychology, which opposed the 'bourgeois' idea that man could not be transformed from a selfish, competitive, individualist 'animal' to an altruistic social being seeking the collective good (cf. Makarenko's young communists in Dzerhinsky Labour Commune). In Hungary the ideal was the 'actively serving and sacrificing' New Man, a hero pursuing chivalrous morality.⁵⁴ The ideal of socialist communal life cropped up in Pataki's presentation; teaching should have taken place in a 'perfect school-community' where teachers and pupils formed

a co-operative partnership in equality. Pupils and students should not have been treated as subjects because such 'autocracy' created dangerous anti-values in them (indifference, hostility, passivity). However, Pataki emphasized that schools should have been prepared to fight against 'stupid fashions' and 'negative' behaviour patterns (e.g. adult-aping drinking). Approaching the core of the matter, Pataki put his finger on a very tense topic in Hungarian education: the failures of the teachers to impede antisocial phenomena. Concurring with more open modes of critical discussion spreading at the time in Hungary, he dared to state that 'socialist democracy' would increase only if critical situations in schools were not made public. The system should not protect an ill-advised teacher from critical examination.⁵⁵

In spite of his 'openness', Pataki in principle held to the basic moral propensities idealized in socialist rhetoric⁵⁶, and hoped that they could still be cherished under a less authoritarian order. He admitted that the speeded-up economic development in Hungary under Kádárism had brought problems for the population in adaptation with it. Values espoused by Socialism had not consolidated after eradication of the traditional (religious) ones, a mentally distressing condition confirmed by later historians.⁵⁷ On the basis of comparison, the main difference between Finland and Hungary was that the Hungarian economy had not met the 'consumerist' demands of the people. For instance, production could not heal the 'car-fever' of the younger generation. Expectations of universal attainability of goods had been aroused but not satisfied, whereas in Finland the situation was far better. Everything was to be had. Hungary suffered also from something that seemed to be missing from Finland in the early 1980s: tolerated parasitism of the old élite and its privileged clientele. These modern dilemmas of 'individualization' – incomplete within the higher echelons but expanding in wider society – had caused 'severe incertitudes' for human sciences, psychology in particular. For Pataki, however, it was the students that caused

the problem, not the hierarchical, bureaucratic nature of the educational system. He blamed them for sticking to one-sided life-styles (e.g. reading addiction). The worst of their kin were the 'failed ones' who 'formed control-evading territorial groups of anti-social subcultures'. Pataki's judgement was straightforward: it was self-interest, the antinomy of socialist morality that had overwhelmed them. Alarmingly, young people with decent educational opportunities tried to dodge all physical labour – greatly idealized in socialist heroism – and nourished the illusion of finding an easy but well-paid job.⁵⁸

Problems of maladjustment and conscious evasion of socially 'respectable' habits made it difficult for the authorities to plan social development and adjust it with 'reality'. Pataki's concern was that reality was apparently slipping away from psychologists' purview. According to another research report presented at the symposium, student life-styles were not as erratic and disquieting in Finland as in Hungary. Finnish students' mental development was by large more positive and they were usually successful in their studies if they were allowed to study according to a 'free' program. If not, the research results showed opposite tendencies. What seemed worrying from a psychologist's point of view was that students considered university study in Finland very 'stressful'.⁵⁹ At the time of the symposium both school and university education systems in Finland were fundamentally reformed, and the students' reaction was mostly critical. Nevertheless, the dialogue with Finnish colleagues confirmed for the Hungarian psychologists that young people fared better in capitalism than in socialism which could not but be disquieting news for them. Had they not in the 1970s already realized what 'prejudices' the youth – like during the uprising of 1956 – had against Socialism in general.⁶⁰

Before the 1970s aggression was studied in Hungary in pathology and criminology. Studies of aggression from the angle of developmental psychology were launched in the MTA in the late 1970s, when patterns of anti-social behaviour were spotted and classified. This had ushered in a change of paradigm, so much

so that children's and adolescent's aggression was studied with psychoanalytical methods developed by Erik Erikson, the German psychoanalyst of identity crises, and other well-known Western authors.⁶¹ The findings of Hungarians could now be compared with empirical results of studies in violent behavior in Finland. It especially seemed to be corroborated that violence shown on TV to children incited violence in play. More tentative was the conclusion that boys 'liked' violence in cartoons but were frightened by realistic violence.⁶²

The impact of psychoanalysis on Hungarian psychology could also be heard from another paper dealing with psychodiagnostics of marginalized young people, this time married young couples facing difficult living conditions. The Hungarian speaker complained that science could not really 'catch' a deviant phenomenon: it appeared powerless against 'unfavorable effects' (illiteracy, deviancy of parents, parents' failures and mistakes in education at home, living in some isolated ethnic group). Stimulus/response -tests and multi-factor analyses did not explain the development of deviancy in such complicated situations. Socialist psychology which presupposed patience with adaptation into realities of Socialism did not seem capable of providing sufficient incentives to it. 'Individualization' begot individuals who either remained or chose to remain outsiders, a phenomenon not recognized by the science politicians. Blatant discrepancy prevailed between what families regarded as socially relevant according to their values and what really was significant to society as a whole. For a psychologist it was a moot point to realize that families did not prepare their children for school properly although they 'must' have done it. One explanation was, however, at hand; although promised in planning and propaganda, the Hungarian system had not been able to create and maintain equal educational opportunities for everybody.⁶³

Deviating from Pataki's interpretation, the younger school of Hungarian psychologists courageously criticized the prevailing system itself rather than, for instance, teachers, parents and

students. They pointed to paternalism and conservatism which allowed too little room for 'free play' of talent. They recommended that in order to root out inequality of opportunity – seen also in regional differences – the general cultural level of the unprivileged people, formerly non-existent in statistics, should have been elevated. Only thus could parents be induced to improve home education and better prepare their children for school. Another discomfiting message issued forth: a civilizing mission of such a magnitude was possibly too much for Hungarian socialism to accomplish in times of serious economic distress and ideological inflexibility.

Another example of unequal opportunities in Hungarian society was the disadvantageous position of the gypsies, a phenomenon which was acute at the time also in Finland. They seemed to have no motivation for adaptation, and their illiteracy was a lot higher than that of the average population, 25% in Finland and 39% in Hungary. Referring to recent developmental studies in the field the symposium cautiously concluded: gypsies could be integrated into 'normal' society only very slowly (!). How this could be done was to be discovered in a joint follow-up research.⁶⁴ The results of the research remain unknown but the problem itself has become marginal in Finnish psychology. In Hungary it is a constantly recurring public issue.

The most delicate theme of the Jyväskylä symposium was the one of juxtaposed value systems prevalent in Hungary and in Finland. Their comparative evaluation concerned the issue which system, socialist or capitalist, had better succeeded in socialization. Leaving the question of the use of symbolic violence aside, it was, according to one Finnish expert, 'obvious' that young people in Finland were generally more satisfied with the prevailing political system than youngsters in Hungary. This result of a questionnaire study was interpreted to prove that young Finns satisfactorily adopted the values of their parents. Finns congratulated themselves: 'We are progressing in the right direction'. The Hungarians could not believe their ears

when they heard that Finnish children, predisposed to individualism, were more ready to socialize than the Hungarian kids who were supposed to grow community-oriented. Some researchers referred to studies of Hungarian and Finnish ABC-books as evidence. In Hungarian books the character-building of a child proceeded with examples of punishment and of virtues of diligence, unselfishness, punctuality and honesty in action. In Finnish ABC-books such moralizing was not conspicuous, and pictures of punishment were missing. Instead, they were more neutral in showing scenes of physical and hygienic practices, gave lessons in traffic safety and ordinary manual skills. One Finnish psychologist considered the poems, songs and fairytales in Hungarian books to be good nourishment for emotional development which the Finnish children very rarely enjoyed. Surprisingly enough, it was the Finnish books that seemed to provide for 'internationalism' so eagerly promoted by socialist proselytizing. They taught the 'everyday knowledge of man' so that children could learn to understand others (dissimilarity, alterity) and become peace-loving and tolerant persons.⁶⁵ Thus the psychologists working in Jyväskylä laid emphasis on the so called 'moral education' – not disciplining – which supported the ethical development of the youth.⁶⁶ Here lay the obstacle to further co-operation in studying of values: because the value-systems were so different in Hungary and Finland, it was quite impossible to find any common criteria for the 'measurement' or evaluation of the values, which could be applicable in both countries. The problem was essentially a philosophical one, falling outside psychologists' competence. It could not be discussed on a platform, the speakers of which did not pretend to be able to dictate common normative aspects of science. More pertaining to the topic would have been to reassess the evidently contradictory achievements of the symposium.

As preconceivable, the AF's report on the Days of Science contained the recommendation that the controversial study of value-systems should be dropped from the future agenda of co-operation. It was suggested that most of the traditional

disciplines, such as linguistics, ethnography, folklore and musicology should be returned to the lists of the Academies, and that a comparative study should be written on science policies in Hungary and Finland under the supervision of the Hungarian Academician, Péter Vas-Zoltán. Obviously, there was a deeper learning-process going on in Hungarian-Finnish scientific relations, for it was planned that not only the science systems should be compared but also 'the cases of frustration and occasional lack of results'.⁶⁷ For psychology it was deemed advisable to concentrate on the most up-to-date studies. First, experimental psychology, i.e. physiological psychology, with its methods of modern computerized data processing, was to be rated highly on the agenda. Secondly, and in line with developmental psychology, studies in early childhood and personality development, acquisition of language skills and the way of life of youth deserved to be continued.⁶⁸ In this way, despite intermittent ambiguity and stumbling-blocks, an agreement between the Hungarian and Finnish participants was reached, which paved the way towards revision and expansion of co-operation in psychological studies.

It must be pointed out that the Hungarian side was to gain more from the co-operation than the Finnish one. As it dawned on the Hungarians that the equipment and resources at Finns' disposal were far better than their own at home, they became eager to intensify research exchange by increasing the quota of visitors.⁶⁹ While in Finland, Hungarian psychologists had an easy access to well-equipped laboratories and to most important international journals of their science, dearly needed in Hungary. It also could be sensed that Hungarian visiting researchers envied the great choice of research themes available for the Finns in Jyväskylä, especially in experimental psychology. It was not merely out of politeness that the Hungarians wrote highly of Finnish psychology. Not that the co-operation was quite imbalanced or unequal. Valuable for the Finns was that they learned from their Hungarian experiences how high-quality research could be done with meagre resources. They

had to admit that the papers Hungarians had read in the Jyväskylä symposium had been very good. The Hungarian visiting professors distinguished themselves as valuable supervisors for Finnish post-graduates who prepared their theses. About the exchange of publications there is not much record, usually Jyväskylä-based psychologists sent quite a few of the 200 copies of their serial to Hungary but it was not known how their colleagues utilized them. The material arriving from Hungary was dealt out at the Department to the researchers interested in it.⁷⁰

The satisfaction Hungarian psychologists continuously expressed of their research conditions and experiences in Finland issued forth from one follow-up visit report written a year after the Jyväskylä symposium. Having visited all psychology departments of Finnish Universities, Dr Sándor Veres from the MTA praised them for the 'maximal help' and 'deep cordiality' with which he had been able to complete his research with 'total and faultless solutions'. Without hesitation Veres could recommend Finnish institutions as exemplary research bases to his superiors. The realization of the fact that both Hungary and Finland had after World War II gone through a period of accelerated industrialization had encouraged him to wider comparisons, for instance, of social mobility using socio-psychological methods well-developed in Finland but neglected in Hungary.⁷¹ He proudly listed the institutions from which he had collected contacts, information and impressions. In the Department of Social Psychology of the University of Helsinki he had met colleagues who worked closest to his own field, minority studies (mobility, identity, migration). Besides, he became acquainted with family studies and discussed this with some leading representatives of Finnish sociology and psychology, E. Haavio-Mannila, V. Stolte-Heiskanen, E. Allardt, M. Alestalo, R. Alapuro, J. Simpura and J.-P. Roos among others. Most enlightening to him were studies in Finnish alcoholism and the declining birth-rate, serious concerns in both countries. In Turku he gathered information on aggression studies (K. Lagerspetz) and

in Tampere he became involved in 'an extraordinarily interesting exchange of ideas' concerning incarceration and rehabilitation (lunatic asylums, workers' homes, AA-centres). In his expert opinion, modern Finnish rehabilitation measures were something very suitable for reforms in Hungary.⁷²

In Jyväskylä Veres took part in the conference of the Association of Finnish Psychologists and visited the venue of the 1981 symposium to renew contacts there. He was welcomed by Professors Takala, Pulkkinen and Ruoppila and some junior members of the staff. On the basis of negotiations a joint research theme was hit upon: family life-modes and life-styles after 1945. This could be combined with studies in social mobility and socialization more popular in Hungary but familiar also to the Finns. Summarizing the utility of Finnish psychological institutions for Hungarian visitors, Veres stated that they 'are very flexible, centralized and ready to adapt', the very qualities the MTA had been looking for. Without eulogy he enumerated the 'progressivism' of Finnish psychologists: they kept pace with international developments, co-operated with Scandinavian colleagues in particular, reacted smoothly to changes in their own society and had founded new institutions to study the impact of those changes. All this was recommendable for the Hungarians, and it was, in Veres's opinion, a shame that Hungarians had established relations with Finnish psychologists much later than, for instance, colleagues from the GDR and the Soviets Union. It was high time to make official contact with the Finnish Psychological Society.⁷³ Veres's report was very well received by his superiors, and their remarks in its margins suggest that they took heed of his 'advice' and urged to enter selectively into private discussions with the leading partners in Finland. In Veres's report one could not detect the usual self-censure and reassuring rhetoric towards superiors, and it may well be that its frankness made an impression in the decision-makers of the MTA, although it was not particularly pleasing to them. Instead, it pointed to the weaknesses of their science policy and prompted to self-

criticism. Egged on by the Jyväskylä symposium, psychology proved to be a viable science among the 'harder' sciences in Hungarian-Finnish scientific relations. As a respectable social science on the rise since the late 1960s, it was very much in demand because modern societies developed so fast that some groups of people were dropping out, suffering unforeseen psychic discontents and maladies. Together with law studies and economics it was one of the sciences the function of which was to provide useful comparative and differential results to base decision-making for social planning. In the context of Hungarian-Finnish relations Hungarian psychologists were continuously interested in the economic and social problems connected to relatively fast economic growth in Finland.⁷⁴ Studies in social structure, social relations and social policy carried out also in Jyväskylä were duly reported back to the MTA.⁷⁵

It has already been suggested that the orientation of joint psychological studies was steered away from studies in value-systems towards subjects regarded as more neutral. The 'old' approach became less esteemed also because in Finland teachers were allowed to teach different values to their pupils. The tendency to 'pure empiricism' was reinforced in the 1980s. During the Days of Finnish Science held in Budapest in 15–22 April 1985 the delegation of Jyväskylä University's Department of Psychology, led by Professor Heikki Lyytinen, took part in a symposium of psychophysiology. Lyytinen's own paper on 'Psychophysiological preparation for sensory, cognitive and motor events' was quite in line with the innovative methodology of experimental neuropsychology. Later psychologists from Jyväskylä and the MTA developed a common registration system for neuro-psychological testing which is actually still in use. It was the measurement of nerve activity with sensory electrophysiology as a branch of cognitive psychology which succeeded best in this respect and was to feature prominently from the late 1980s on. Hungarians particularly were enthusiastic of these new methods which suited their interests in experimentation. This was one of the permanent achievements of

Hungarian-Finnish collaboration. To point to disappointments, the harmonization of methodology failed because the science cultures were basically too different. To cite only one typical case, harmonization was tried in studying violence shown on TV but the coding of filmed sequences turned out to be impossible because the TV programmes in Finland were largely international. This did not match with Hungarian TV which was national.⁷⁶

Bilateral relations of psychologists were kept alive by regular meetings, seminars and conferences organized by turns in Hungary and in Finland. Developmental psychology struggled to maintain its central role and managed yet another conference in Helsinki in 1989 on child-psychology and studies in parent-infant interaction in modern families. New trends also made their way to Jyväskylä where developmental psychology was traditionally at its strongest. To illustrate, one Hungarian visitor presented there in 1989 a poster on 'Rhythm in preverbal communication' which aroused great attention and was filed for later publication. Again Jyväskylä showed its know-how value as a useful partner in 'cross-cultural analysis'⁷⁷ which included also comparative studies in the development of intellectual skills.⁷⁸ Jyväskylä was picked up as the venue where one could meet the best experts of the field.

3 Conclusion

In all, the contacts and co-operation of Hungarian and Finnish psychologists were from the very beginning quite unforced, and at least according to representatives of Jyväskylä University, it was easy to work with Hungarians. Surely, the contacts were few in comparison to the relations with the West, especially the Nordic countries, but they were quite continuous, flexible and easy-going.

In general, Jyväskylä's relations with Hungarian science were many-sided and diverse; for instance, its doctoral school in musicology (Kodály-studies), the project of multidisciplinary Hungarian Studies, contrastive studies in linguistic, and the

traditional finno-ugric studies fare well even today. Among others, this has come about in the bilateral relations with Debrecen University. Sometimes psychological studies approached general sociology, in which the research co-operation branched out in many directions ranging from family-studies to studies in alcoholism and deviancy. Not surprisingly, this thematic had strong implications for social policy, one representative example being the restructuring of social services for the elderly pensioners pioneered by Professor Marjatta Marin from Jyväskylä. That the Finns preferred to take care of them at home till the end (one 94 year-old woman lived alone in a distant homestead in Sumiainen near Jyväskylä) and did not send them to institutional care was very much a service worth implementing in far-away small farms in Hungary.⁷⁹

In the 1970–1980s, the message of both Hungarian and Finnish psychologists was that the societies of their countries were going through a critical period, the Hungarians facing impending socio-economic crisis, Finns suffering from incessant fluctuations of the capitalist world economy. By way of conclusion, it may be suggested that the research co-operation was, on one hand, motivated by analyses of social statistics showing ‘negative trends’, and on the other, by the need to find ‘progressive’ measures to provide prophylactics or heal the ‘diseases’ of society such as increasing juvenile delinquency, deviancy, alcoholism, rising suicide-rates, rapid increase of deaths in traffic, and discontents of rapid urbanization in general common in both countries.⁸⁰ While in Finland the reform policy was rather utilitarian, Hungarian Socialism hated criminals and aimed at uniformity, common rules and behaviour patterns to enforce loyalty and discipline.⁸¹ Against the expectations of Hungarian socialist leaders, the expected eradication of crime under Socialism did not come true. For their part, the Finnish psychologists were not as pessimistic of the future of society as the Hungarians, but their studies also revealed symptoms of misadaptation, especially among the young living in the peripheries.

Relations in psychology brought in tangible but at times contradictory achievements and opened unexpected vistas of co-operation and dialogue. They also show some of the tensions between the two systems, conspicuously in the use of 'propaganda' and 'know-how'. But as usual in Hungarian-Finnish relations, the co-operation also of cultural and scientific elites was not seriously disturbed by the contradictions between the values of the capitalist and the socialist system. This is typically 'liberal' attitude which largely ignored or found its way around Marxist criticism thus avoiding open confrontation.⁸² The Marxists, for their part, did not want to force the issue and make the kind of politics of science that would upset or estrange their partners. Thus co-operation went surprisingly smoothly. Psychology and its applications to control human behaviour in society's sore points were equally useful in both countries.

As for the repercussions of the co-operation in psychology for science policies and political culture it may be suggested that research results awakened the decision-makers to the understanding that society needed the services of psychology in order to define social grievances and plan their alleviation. In common venues this became quite evident. For instance, when the MTKK (the Hungarian Centre for Culture and Science, Helsinki) opened a Centre for Hungarian Studies in 1988, contrastive linguistics, history, literature, ethnology, sociology, fine arts and architecture, musicology, education, film and theatre studies, geography, and also psychology were called in to make up the programme.⁸³ It led to founding of a permanent psychology work-group in 1988–1989 which organized seminars and conferences, the themes of which were problems of maladjustment in Hungary and Finland.⁸⁴ At about the same time the Universities of Jyväskylä and Lapland (Rovaniemi) started to organize continuing education for psychoanalysts and psychotherapists in psychodynamic individual psychotherapy, the latest seminar of which, eleventh in a series, was held in Budapest in 9–16 May 2004. Guided by their Hungarian colleagues, Finnish psychologists had returned to the roots of psychoanalysis – the theme of the

seminar was Sándor Ferenczi and his heritage.⁸⁵

In Finland the Nordic type of welfare society has been maintained, although the Popular Front government had to step down in 1987. In Hungary the belief in the reformist role of social sciences collapsed in the end of the 1970s as it became evident that society cannot be made socialist by social reforms. The optimistic and activist ethos connected to Socialism was fading away. Although Hungary could list the CSCE process as a diplomatic achievement, relations with capitalism developed ominously. As György Földes has concluded: in the end of the 1970s the Kádár regime was already facing grave problems in keeping the Hungarian public satisfied with the way Hungary was co-operating with the capitalist countries.⁸⁶ The planned economy turned out to be too expensive but for the sake of social integration it had to be carried on. Later on, as the internal opposition gathered strength, the discontent with the political leadership developed into a more general criticism of the high politics of statesmen and diplomats, of the so called 'détente culture of Helsinki kitsch'⁸⁷, advocated by Finland and supported by Hungary. In these circumstances the status of Hungarian, socialist science was undermined whereas in Finland science was able to maintain its financing on a relatively satisfactory level. In these circumstances the demand for psychology has not diminished. New grave problems like children's depression preoccupy the experts. It is not only the science authorities who are alarmed, also the Finnish politics of interest groups (the relations and agreements between employees, the Trade Unions and the state) encourages studies into dislocation, social inequality, and entertain wider reforms of social policy.

NOTES

- ¹ Földes, György, 'Kádár János külpolitikai nézetei (1956–1967)'. In Pritz Pál (szerk.), *Magyarország helye a 20. századi Európában*. Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat 2002, 139.
- ² Cf. Előterjesztés a kulturális és tudományos propagandáról (KKI). MOL, M-KS-288-22.cs-1971-34, ö.e..
- ³ Anssi Halmesvirta, *Co-operation across the Iron Curtain*. Hungarian-Finnish Scientific Relations of the Academies from the 1960s to the 1990s. Studies in General History, vol. 12. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä University Printing House 2005, 61-64.
- ⁴ Jörn Donner, *Raportti Tonavalta*. Transl. Seppo Virtanen. Porvoo: WSOY, 186.
- ⁵ Vygotsky was a Soviet psychologist who applied Marxist social theory to individual cognitive development conceived in historical-cultural context. In Finnish there was his *Ajattelu ja kieli* (1982), already published in English in 1965.
- ⁶ Makarenko was a major figure in developing the Soviet education in the 1920s and 1930s. He rejected both 'liberal' education and biological determinism (e.g. hereditary genius) and based his system of pedagogical logic on dialectical materialism. He specialized in working with homeless children and adolescents in labour communes combining physical labour and classroom instruction.
- ⁷ Pataki Ferenc, 'A magyar pszichológia történeti útjának néhány időszakos tanulsága'. *Magyar Pszichológiai Szemle*, vol. 34, no. 6 (1977), 572-575.
- ⁸ Ibid., 582.
- ⁹ Erős Ferenc, 'Mérei Ferenc életműve és a magyar szociálpszichológia', in Kiss György (szerk.), *Pszichológia Magyarországon*. Budapest: Országos Pedagógiai Könyvtár és Múzeum 1995, 128.
- ¹⁰ Valuch Tibor, 'A "Gulyáskommunizmus"', in Romsics Ignác (szerk.), *Mítoszok, legendák és tévhitek a 20. századi Magyarországon*. Budapest: Osiris 2002, 389.
- ¹¹ Leontjev was highly regarded by the leftist psychologists in Finland and his works were translated into Finnish. See e.g. A.A. Leontjev, *Kieli ja ajattelu*. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri Oy 1979.
- ¹² *Yleinen psykologia*. Ed. A.V. Petrovski. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri 1974, back sleeve. Vygotski and Makarenko feature in it as leading authorities.
- ¹³ 'Uuden vuoden näkymiä' (=editor's foreword), *Psykologia* 1 (1980), 1.
- ¹⁴ Markku Ojanen, 'Marxilainen psykologia: kriittinen arvio'. *Psykologia* 1 (1980), 13-21.
- ¹⁵ Esa Sariola, 'L.S. Vygotskin anti skitsofrenian ajatushäiriöiden tutki-

- mukselle', *Psykologia* 3(1982).
- ¹⁶ Csaba Pléh, 'Hungarian Contributions to Modern Psychology'. <http://www.jate.hu.szeged.hu/pleh/english/articles>, 4.
- ¹⁷ Jukka Relander, 'Jäähyväiset Snellmanille'. *Suomen kulttuurihistoria* 4. Eds. Kirsi Saarikangas, Pasi Mäen pää & Minna Saarentola-Weiss. Helsinki: Tammi 2004, 138-167.
- ¹⁸ George Konrád, 'Foreword', in Miklós Haraszti, *The Velvet Prison*. New York: Basic Books 1987, xii.
- ¹⁹ György Konrád, *Antipolitics*. Transl. by Richard E. Allen. London, Melbourne, N.Y.: Quartet Books 1984, 111, 166-67.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 146.
- ²¹ Ibid., 140-41.
- ²² Kustaa H. Vilks & Marjo Havila, 'Edistysellinen kulttuuripolitiikka, opiskelijat ja vallankumouksellinen liike Jyväskylässä 1960-luvun lopulta 1970-luvun lopulle', in Heli Valtonen & Johanna Hämäläinen (eds), *Suomalaisen Suomen pääkaupunki*. Jyväskylä: Minerva 2003, 149; Prof. Isto Ruoppila's interview on the 11th of March, 2002.
- ²³ *Suomen psykologisen tutkimuksen kehitys, nykytila ja kehitysnäkymät 1980-luvulla*. Helsinki 1985, 51-54.
- ²⁴ Pléh, 'Hungarian Contributions to Modern Psychology', 4.
- ²⁵ X/1267-82; XII/1708-85; X/496-88. Útjelentések. MTAA.
- ²⁶ Szopori Nagy Lajos, 'A finnek megítélésének hullámszáma Magyarországon', in *Hatalom és kultúra*. Jyväskylä: Hungarian Studies 2002, 196.
- ²⁷ Cf. Török Ádám, 'A finn gazdaság strukturális illeszkedéséről', *Külgazdaság* 10 (1981).
- ²⁸ Az MTA-Finn Akadémia közötti megállapodás keretében folyó együttműködési témák jegyzéke. NKO 729 (1979). MTAA.
- ²⁹ Reports from the Department of Psychology, no. 228. University of Jyväskylä 1979; Ibid., no. 245 (1982).
- ³⁰ *Suomen psykologisen tutkimuksen kehitys, nykytila ja kehitysnäkymät 1980-luvulla*, 18.
- ³¹ Pléh Csaba, 'A magyar pszichológia kétféle hagyománya: a természeti és a közösségi ember'. (lecture given at the MTA, 1999; Pléh's homepage, see n. 11).
- ³² Ruoppila's interview (Febr. 20th of, 2002).
- ³³ Memorandum, 14th of Sept., 1980. Hbb, FAA.
- ³⁴ Isto Ruoppila (b. 1935) specialized in educational and social psychology. In 1971 he became the Professor of Developmental Psychology in Jyväskylä University. Recently retired.

- ³⁵ See Révész Sándor, *Aczél és korunk*. Budapest: Sík Kiadó 1997, 356-57.
- ³⁶ Pataki Ferenc, 'Történelmi-, társadalmi és politikai nevelés'. *Magyar Tudomány* 3 (1975), 153, 156.
- ³⁷ Kiss György, 'A hazai pszichológia történeti kutatások eredményei', in *Pszichológia Magyarországon* 12-14.
- ³⁸ Pataki Ferenc, *Nevelés és társadalom*. Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó 1982, 73-77.
- ³⁹ Pataki listed e.g. Johnson, Aronson, Getzels, Erikson and Hare.
- ⁴⁰ Pataki, *Nevelés és társadalom*, 82, 92-95, 216. Pataki had – to embarrassment to political leaders, found out that stress and mental diseases were widely spread in Hungary. See Ignác Romsics, *Múltról a mának*. Budapest: Osiris 2004, 400.
- ⁴¹ Risto Kangas, 'Introduction', in *Yhteiskunta*. Tutkijaliitto, vol. 331. Helsinki 2003.
- ⁴² István Lang – Antti Kulmala, 'Suomalais-unkarilainen yhteistyö luonnontieteiden alalla', in *Ystävät – sukulaiset. Suomen ja Unkarin kulttuurisuhteet 1840–1984*. Pieksämäki: SKS 1984, 118-120.
- ⁴³ Mirja Kalliopuska's report 5.11. 1995. Matkakertomukset 1995. FAA.
- ⁴⁴ Ruoppila's interview.
- ⁴⁵ K.O. Donner, 'Opening Address', in *Days of Hungarian Science*. August 27 – September 3, 1981, Finland. Suomen Akatemian julkaisuja 5/1982, 11-12.
- ⁴⁶ Lénárd Pál, 'What is Science Worth?', in *Days of Hungarian Science*. Aug. 27 – Sept. 3, esp. 14, 23. Cf. János Ferenc, 'Gazdaságunk mai ellentmondásaink eredete és felszámolásuk útja'. *Közgazdasági szemle* 7-8 (1969), 816-817.
- ⁴⁷ Isto Ruoppila, 'Recent Research on Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects of Youth Education in Finland'. In *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects of Youth Education*. Reports from the Dept. of Psychology, no. 254. University of Jyväskylä 1983, 5.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.
- ⁴⁹ The ideological arm-wrestling was left to politicians like Aczél himself who visited Finland in May 1981 to prepare the ground for the Science Days. He was engaged in a TV-dialogue with a leading right-wing political scientist, Professor Jan-Magnus Jansson, over the pros and cons of socialism and capitalism. Aczél's message, triumphantly quoted in a Finnish left-wing paper, was that socialism was definitely winning. For one thing, there was no unemployment, rather lack of work-force. An unemployed Finnish reader might have been upset by Aczél's comment on the dole: 'It breaks one's moral backbone'. See *Kansan Uutiset*, 15 May 1981.
- ⁵⁰ Ruoppila's interview.
- ⁵¹ 'Tudományos életünkől', *Társadalmi Szemle* 6 (1981), p. 107-108.

- ⁵² Pataki, *Nevelés és társadalom*, 224-226.
- ⁵³ Pataki Ferenc, 'Kollektivizmus és szocialista életmód', *Valóság*, vol. 19, no. 6 (1976), 13, 17.
- ⁵⁴ Pléh Csaba, *Pszichológiatörténet*. Budapest: Gondolat 1992, 276-77, 294-95.
- ⁵⁵ Ferenc Pataki, 'Some aspects of the relationship between teacher and pupil', in *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects of ...*, 18-28.
- ⁵⁶ Szabó Márton, *Diszkurzio térben*. Budapest: Scientia Humana 1998, 51-58.
- ⁵⁷ Valuch, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX század második felében*, 257-270.
- ⁵⁸ Ferenc Pataki, 'The Way of Life of Young People', in *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects...*, 132-146.
- ⁵⁹ Saari, Salli, 'The Nature of the Study System and the Development of Students' Personality during the First Three Years', in *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects...*, 167-68.
- ⁶⁰ *An Overview of Social Research in Hungary*. Ed. Tamás Szecskő. Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó 1978, 15-16, 23.
- ⁶¹ Jenő Ranschburg, 'Aggression research of the developmental psychology of the Institute of Psychology of the MTA', in *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects...*, 31-33.
- ⁶² Kaj Björkqvist, 'Children and violence on TV', in *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects...*, 53, 59.
- ⁶³ Sándor Illyés, 'Young people living in difficult circumstances in Hungary', in *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects...*, esp. 62, figures from p. 71.
- ⁶⁴ Illyés, 'Young people living in difficult circumstances in Hungary'; Huttunen, K., 'A cigányok oktatása Finnországban', in Szövény, Zs. (szerk.), *A cigány gyermekek nevelése-oktatása*. Budapest 1979.
- ⁶⁵ Annika Takala, 'Values and World View', in *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects...*, 95-96.
- ⁶⁶ Ruoppila's interview.
- ⁶⁷ Report on the Days of Hungarian Science 27th August – 3rd September, 1981; Memorandum on negotiations between the MTA and FA, 5th of Febr. 1982. Hbb, FAA.
- ⁶⁸ 'Introduction', in *Psychological and Pedagogical Aspects...*, 3.
- ⁶⁹ The exchange of psychologists in 1981–1983 was not extensive: altogether nine Hungarians stayed in Finland for a longer time, two of them being neuro-psychologists, three developmental or educational psychologists, and four social psychologists. From Finland none went to Hungary yet but, for instance, to the United States 27, to the Soviet Union 28, to the GDR nine, and to Poland seven. See, *Suomen psykologisen tutkimuksen kehitys, nykytila ja kehitysnäkymät*, data gathered from tables

on pages 58, 60, 64 and 79.

⁷⁰ Ruoppila's interview.

⁷¹ He lectured in the MTKK on public education, on continuous education, on playgrounds for children in Budapest, and took part in family policy seminar on 21st – 22nd November 1981, in which he presented a paper on 'A társadalmi mobilitás néhány pszichológiai konzekvenciája a mai Magyarországon'. Előadások. MTKKA.

⁷² Veres Sándor's report. X/207-982. 8. d. MTAA.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Lang István, 'A finn-magyar tudományos együttműködés értékelése, távlatai' (Speech at the Days of Finnish Science, 16th April, 1985). NKO 729, MTAA.

⁷⁵ Rózsa Klára's report XIII/2549-88. 74.d. MTAA.

⁷⁶ First Finnish-Hungarian symposium on psychophysiology, Budapest, 17–18 April 1985. NKO 729 (1985). MTAA; Ruoppila's interview.

⁷⁷ Sugár Péterné's report X/1237-90. 102.d. MTAA.

⁷⁸ Geffert Éva's report X/1238-90. 102.d. MTAA.

⁷⁹ Széman Zsuzsa's report X/216-90. 95.d. MTAA.

⁸⁰ Cf. Valuch, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében*, 357-365.

⁸¹ Haraszti, *Velvet Prison*, 75-76.

⁸² Cf. Michael J. White, *Political Philosophy. An Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Oneworld Books 2004, 7.

⁸³ Beszámoló jelentés a helsinki Kulturális és Tudományos Központ tevékenységéről/1987. aug. 17 - 1988. június 30/ (Nyirkos István) 275/i, MTKKA.

⁸⁴ Beszámoló jelentés a helsinki Magyar Kulturális és Tudományos Központ tevékenységéről/1988. július 1 - 1989. június 30/ (Nyirkos István). 275/i. MTKKA. The first of its kind was held in Lahti, Finland, in July 1988 with ten Hungarian psychologists.

⁸⁵ Päivi Aho-Mustonen to the author 24 May 2004 (a letter containing the program).

⁸⁶ Földes György, 'Kádár János külpolitikai nézetei (1957-1967)', in Pritz Pál (szerk.), *Magyarország helye a 20. századi Európában*. Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat 2002, 146.

⁸⁷ Haraszti, 'A Helsinki giccs'.

**On the Borders of Propaganda and What Can Be Said:
Hungarian-Finnish Cultural Relations during the
Kádár-Kekkonen Era**

Raija OIKARI

1 Introduction

In this article the focus is on what kind of political aims were set to cultural exchange and in what way it was manifested in practice in the cultural relations between Kádár's Hungary and Kekkonen's Finland. There is no doubt that cultural relations after the Second World War were a scene of the use of power. During the Cold War cultural relations became highly politicized both in the East and in the West and cultural relations became the so called fourth dimension of foreign politics together with political, military and economic relations – cultural exchange was now in the service of foreign policy.

In Hungary – as well as in every socialist country – culture and international cultural relations were openly a part of foreign politics and they were given political and ideological tasks. It is also a question of language, or rather of discourse, particularly of the ideologies and use of power which are concealed in language. This discourse deals with the constituting of ideologies of languages. Furthermore, the questions of language usage have led to wider political actions; language serves as a major means of manipulating, and even of transforming power relations. In addition, it is a major factor influencing, affecting, and transforming social relationships. Yet, once selected, the very form of language used also affects by defining and concretizing the conceptions that may not have yet been spelled out.

Further, language can be used as a means of control across the range of social relationships.¹

I examine the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary first of all as a forum of discursive power and – it can be stated – as state socialist Hungary's way of making propaganda in Finland. The focus is, thus, on discursive actions, that sometimes turned into propaganda, and the purpose of which was to influence the intellectual maps, attitudes and actions of the subjects who were the objects of those actions. When discourses of two social orders meet, the consequence is clashes, misunderstandings, resistance of the other's discourse, or efforts to adapt at least to some extent to the other's discourse. It is also a question of a power relationship, where the situation constantly changes and where the actions of both sides affect the power relationship, which is consequently constantly in motion and under change.

2 Propaganda or Information?

The word 'propaganda' is of a relatively recent origin; the first documented use of the term occurred in 1622. Originally propaganda was the Catholic Church's means of coordinating efforts to bring people to the 'voluntary' acceptance of church doctrines. The term thus took on a negative meaning in Protestant countries but a positive connotation in Catholic areas. However, the term propaganda was widespread only in the beginning of the twentieth century, when it was used to describe the persuasion tactics employed during the First World War and those later used by totalitarian regimes. Propaganda became to be defined as the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, often through the use of lies and deception. The term has since evolved to mean mass 'suggestion' or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual.²

It is, of course, difficult to write about propaganda, since the term itself is questionable and has been understood in different ways depending on the period of time and society in question. In this context it is relevant to ask in which ways the conception

of propaganda differed in Hungary and in Finland, and for what (historical, political, traditions of thinking) reasons.

From the strong faith in the communist elite having the right consciousness and the right knowledge in its possession follows that in socialist rhetoric 'propaganda' does not appear as negative as in the West. Rather than implanting an organized lie in peoples' minds it seems to have been the purpose to get reality onto the right track, so to speak. Propaganda was a necessary part of building the right kind of world, and thus it was not needed to make any value judgements of it. It was about, as it was often said by Hungarian authorities, 'informational work' (*tájékoztató munka*). Propaganda made in the West, however, demanded a different approach than the one made inside the socialist camp, since in the West the attitude towards propaganda aspirations was very suspicious. 'Informational work' was to be handled with consideration and as unnoticed as possible, which required sometimes the most complicated roundabout methods.³

Nevertheless, defining 'propaganda' has long been based on not making value judgments about its contents. 'Propaganda', however, has a very negative connotation in peoples' minds even today in the West, while in Eastern Europe – it seems to be – it has been accepted as a much more neutral notion. This causes problems also in examining the official documents – which is my main source – of socialist Hungary: when is it about propaganda as we understand it, and when is it about something which can be called 'marketing' or 'information'? And when is 'information' a euphemism for propaganda?

This is also a question of reception of the target polity of propaganda aspirations, which is influenced by history, tradition, political culture etc. The inner circle of Hungarian officials responsible for dealing with information delivered to foreign (Western) countries seem to have been aware of the differences in understanding propaganda, as they speak about 'propaganda' in their classified memorandums, letters and so forth, but categorically use euphemisms when dealing with Western officials or citizens. This leads to the idea of borders for what can be said: there clearly were bor-

ders which could not be overstepped without encountering resistance and unwillingness to take the given information seriously or as truth. This seem to have been the case both in the attitude of the Finns toward the Eastern propaganda, and in the reactions caused by self-censorship when there was a doubt of having stepped over this border.⁴

When we examine the cultural relations between a socialist regime and a West-oriented democracy, the idea of alliance between knowledge and power is obvious. The aim of the state socialist Hungary was to spread 'correct knowledge' or 'correct information', and in this case the power relation can be localized in who has the power to define the contents of the 'correct knowledge'. Thus, one of the crucial themes of the relations, especially cultural ones, between the regimes is controlling contents and meanings. The idea of the Great Narratives by Lyotard is also close to this pattern of thought: socialist rhetoric has strived to create great, whole narratives about the heroic nature of Socialism, and about the epoch-making effect of the endeavour to build up Socialism on the quality and happiness of the lives of the subjects. This is also linked with a kind of mission-thinking. It is thought to be a responsibility of the bearers of the 'correct knowledge' to make dissident individuals, polities and societies to change their way of thinking, and as a consequence of that, their sense of reality corresponding with the socialist thought.

The final aim of action in Marxist thought, namely, is emancipation through correct knowledge. Freedom, however, requires first the subjects (the citizens) being brought up into the right consciousness, in other words, into the suitable subjects for the politics in question. The entire propaganda and its legitimization in the Soviet bloc were based on this thought, and, on faith in the liberation which was to be a result of the right consciousness produced by scientific Socialism. Of course there is a strong paternalistic tone in this thinking: the starting point is that there are agents in the society who know better than ordinary citizens, what kind of society is best for them. Western thought and perhaps also certain Finnish omnipotence was by no means compatible with this kind of way of thinking.

In the case of cultural relations between Finland and Hungary I will examine the mechanism, its principles as well as the way in which propaganda aspirations were manifested in practice. We can often find attempts to spread 'correct information', which can be found in numerous reports written by the Hungarian Embassy in Finland. This way of thinking is linked both in the element of power that labelled modern society and the problem of knowledge it brought about. Faith in knowledge is one of the basic principles of modernity, and it is based on absolute faith in Reason as the carrying force of modernity. The problem of knowledge is crucial if we consider discursive use of power as a principal power producing element in the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary, which is manifested in practice as endeavours to spread 'correct information', often simply propaganda, through cultural relations.

Compared to the way of thinking in the East, it is interesting to consider how the concept of 'knowledge' and 'truth' were understood in the West: the same faith in Reason guided also the Westerns thinking, but it included also the faith in authenticity. In other words, Western thinking assumes a stable, monolithic, authentic and 'right' state of affairs, which can be manipulated and distorted by discursive actions. In the Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the 'reality' was seen in another way: the 'right' and 'correct' reality was something that was reachable in the future after active endeavours. Thus, in both cases 'the reality' was seen as a construction and the conception of the constructive nature of 'reality' and 'truth' seems to have been even stronger in the Eastern thinking.⁵

Communist ideology in theory has always been oriented toward 'the world revolution of Socialism'. After Communism came to power in major countries, however, notably in the Soviet Union and China, it predictably became increasingly oriented toward the growth of the international power and influence of these countries. Communist international propaganda has been extensively developed through the press, radio, television, tourism, and the use of economic and military aid for propaganda purposes. The Soviet foreign propaganda was di-

rected toward both communist and non-communist sectors of the population, as well as, notably in terms of economic and military aid and commerce, toward rightist groups, which had reasons of *Realpolitik* for sympathy toward or alliance with the Soviet Union. The themes of communist propaganda toward capitalist countries were primarily anti-American, and it particularly concentrated on the issue of peace, through various front organizations and through constant propaganda stress on the theme that communist countries were for peace while capitalist opponents were for war.⁶ According to the plan by HWSP (1971) the main purposes of the development of propaganda were to affect the masses, to update the propaganda and to develop the material used in propaganda. According to the basic line of the propaganda defined in the report the fundamental principle of the activity was a wider understanding of propaganda: there was room for spreading socialist ideology through cultural and scientific activity, endeavours to bring socialist social order to a relevant alternative also for other than Eastern European regimes, and promoting Hungarian culture and works of art abroad. This definition, as a matter of fact, brings out the essence of the whole cultural exchange of the socialist countries: cultural relations were without any doubt an instrumental activity, the purpose of which was to propagate the socialist ideology in the first place, and only in the second place the promotion of the own culture abroad.

Hungarians, thus, strived to convey information, the purpose of which was to change the Finns' attitude towards ('new') Hungary and also towards the socialist ideology - ultimately the whole socialist block - through the agency of various institutional cultural formations. Among these was the agreement of cultural exchange - which was the basis of the cultural exchange - Finnish-Hungarian Society as well as the lecturers of Hungarian language at the University of Helsinki, who also had a role in this respect. We can point out discursive use of power in all cultural exchange, such as literature, theatre and even music, but they will be left aside in this article. Instead the focus will be in clearly institutional formations, most of all in the

agreement of cultural exchange and in friendship activities. At the end of the article I will analyze some special cases that illuminate the borders of the 'sayable' during the Kádár era.

The principal material used in this study is the official documents produced by the officials of Hungarian political regime, such as Foreign Ministry and, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. It is relevant to take into consideration the often tactical nature of those documents: rather than an image of the 'reality' of that time, they reflect the political culture, relations between the agents of officials and those who had the power, political hierarchy, and especially the paranoid and controlling atmosphere of everyday socialism. The purpose is not to state anything about how things 'really' were, but how reality was chosen and striven to be outlined.

3 Hungarian Propaganda in Finland

The basis of cultural relations between Finland and Hungary changed dramatically after the Second World War. Before the war it was based on the kinship ideology and the project of national identity, which was not possible in the new situation. On the grounds of the documents it seems to be that now Hungary's attempt to spread 'correct information', often pure propaganda, became the crucial issue of the cultural exchange. It was not an easy situation, since the former generation of the agents of cultural exchange represented the 'wrong' ideology. The basis of the kinship ideology was seen as nationalist, as well as fascist, and at least historically also Finno-Ugristics leaned on nationalist ideas. Kinship ideology was banned in the peace treaty, so that it was not a part of the cultural exchange anymore, but Hungarians could not get rid of Finno-Ugristics despite their desire. Propaganda, which was directed to Finland, was, nevertheless, taken seriously by the Hungarians since historical background made contacts between the two countries possible despite the fact that the political and social position of these countries had radically changed. Finland for Hungary was on the one hand a bridge-head towards the West, on the other hand a textbook example of the functioning peaceful co-existence.

In a thorough memorandum from the archives of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HWSP) from 1971⁷ we can find a report on the situation and possibilities as well as a plan for cultural and scientific propaganda directed abroad. This memorandum is quite straightforward in using the term 'propaganda', which is usually not the case: also in Hungarian classified documents it is typical to use euphemisms, most often the expression 'informational work'. The constructive way to see how things are is revealed in the chapter in which the writer states that imperialism is in serious crisis in general, whereas socialist ideology is 'in itself stronger and our culture, which serves society, more democratic.' The conclusion of this complete superiority of Socialism is that there is greater and greater interest towards Hungary abroad, which is seen as a consequence expressly of the invincibility in the field of the intellectual life. According to the memorandum, propaganda had been successful not only in socialist and 'progressive' countries, but in capitalist countries as well. In addition, the period of transition followed by the war was over and new groups of people were now in the sphere of influence of Hungarian propaganda, and they had already overcome the biggest obstacles to get propaganda through. There were still important goals to reach: broadening the sphere of influence of propaganda and organising effective information services. Furthermore, an efficient filing system was required, by means of which would be possible to make thorough analyses of the experiences gained from propaganda activity. Thus, it would be possible to further increase the efficiency of the planning of propaganda.

The matter to be criticised, according to the memorandum, was that propaganda had been too limited: now it was important to widen the scope of propaganda to the masses and the youth of the capitalist countries, as the key agents – such as politicians and leading agents of cultural and scientific fields – of the societies were already reached. It was to be done by planning propaganda which would be richer in nuances and carefully targeted to the different layers of these societies. In practice, Hungarians had continuous problems in their endeav-

ours to spread propaganda in Finland, since it was not possible to assume a single social subject: different layers of society would have demanded different kinds of propaganda.

The other major problem was that Hungarians soon understood that the majority of the Finns were non-socialist or not interested in politics, especially those who were in hegemonic positions. It had to be taken into consideration also in the propaganda- and information activity in the way that it was not worthwhile e.g. to spread too political material. Instead, it was still valuable to rest on an old thought of the kinship – for the time being, until the correct knowledge would disprove the old mistaken conceptions. The Hungarians realized this already in the 1950's.⁸ In a long report by Ambassador Sándor Kurtán (1964) about the tendencies in Finnish cultural and mental life especially concerning Hungary, it is stated that there is no serious opposition towards Hungarian propaganda. As a conclusion the Ambassador states that public opinion is positive. Unfortunately it was primarily due to the long Finno-Ugric traditions. The good thing for Finland was that she was not involved in the Cold War and hardly accepted any Hungarian immigrants after the 1956 uprising. Thus the counterrevolutionary ideas did not spread in Finland through immigration.

One of the problems in the propaganda work was that Finland was non-socialist and agrarian, where people preferably let go unnoticed the fact that Hungary had turned into a socialist country. However, this does not correspond to the optimistic view of the propaganda plan made for Finland. According to Kurtán's report there was clear resistance against socialist realism in arts. In addition, since the publishing in Finland was occupied by non-socialist forces, it was not easy to get new Hungarian literature published in Finnish. On the whole, making propaganda was rather problematic in Finland, although there was no opposition against Hungary itself. Rather it was because of the mental undertone, the ethos, which was predominant in Finland. The right tactics were to avoid hard tones, to make contacts with the key figures of the society, thus to influence through individuals, and to further utilize the idea of

kinship, although it was politically negative. The idea was this way to infiltrate information for Finns about the 'real' Hungary, the kin nation that was now building up Socialism. The Hungarians counted on the power of the right knowledge to the extent that they estimated the most effective method of making propaganda being to invite individual authors or journalists to Hungary. After the visit they would write about their experiences in Hungary '... in a realistic manner and from a Finnish point of view.' The writer of the report predicts that eventually the correct information would work, in other words: '... the economical and international achievements of the socialist system slowly start to have influence on the conservative and social democratic public opinion.' It is thus a question to realize and accept the reality.

In the already mentioned memorandum of the HWSP (1971) we can read that in Hungary propaganda was steered through a carefully organized system, which was based on the doctrine of Lenin. Lenin was a voluntarist, far more so than Marx: he believed that the consciousness of the masses could be and must be manipulated. Thus, propaganda, according to Lenin, must be exhaustive, differentiated, and entirely controlled by a centralized propaganda apparatus.⁹ In Hungary, the organisation of foreign propaganda consisted of domestic institutions and foreign 'bases', the structure and mutual relations of which were complicated. The steering and practical actions among these different sectors differed considerably, and foreign propaganda was only one of them. To reach a desirable purpose it was important to centralize the forces of propaganda, and to operate unanimously. The institutional basis of the foreign propaganda was built in a hierarchical way. On the highest level the steering and executing of propaganda was the responsibility of several high level organs, whereas among the expert bodies were scientific institutions, universities, scientific research institutes, as well as cultural enterprises and official instances, such as publishing houses, and art, film, music and art agencies. The bases of propaganda abroad were, according to the memorandum, the embassies, cultural and scientific att-

chés abroad, Hungarian representatives in the central office of UNESCO in Paris, Hungarian institutes and cultural centrals (Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Vienna, Rome, Paris), as well as commercial sections and offices abroad. Funds for this activity came from different sources: the state, companies, royalties of the artists, copyrights, other sources (government funds pointed for cultural and public relations activity etc.).

This highly organized propaganda machinery states the totalitarian nature of Leninist propaganda. It was intended to dominate and control not only all means of elite and mass communication, but also all history, social science, literature, art, and music. This led to the instrumentalist view of education, too. In Soviet type socialism, all the fields of society, especially art and literature, were harnessed to propaganda. As pointed out above, the institutional basis of the propaganda and the organs which were controlling the practical level of the propaganda work formed a complicated and intertwined network, which corresponds to the organization of power in socialist Hungary on the whole. The mutual hierarchical and other relations between the instances were obscure to the extent that they seem to have functioned to conceal the use of power. It is nearly impossible to understand where the decisions were actually made and who the actual agents who made the decisions were.

For instance, the position of the Institute of Cultural Relations (KKI) in the organization of the use of power is difficult to outline. After the uprising of 1956 there were some rearrangements made in Hungary. A new Ministry of Culture was founded, and it was a unification of the former two ministries that were responsible for educational and cultural affairs (*Művelődésügyi Minisztérium, Népművelésügyi Minisztérium*). Among the departments of the new ministry there were also independent offices, yet steered by the ministry and ultimately by the Party, such as the KKI. Along with the organisational reform the Department of International Relations by the Ministry of Education was unified with the KKI.¹⁰ From that on the KKI, which was originally established in 1949, was the central institution of the coordination and development of the solid cultural

propaganda of Kádár's Hungary. After 1956 it concentrated more than before on the practical level of administration. Consequently, on the one hand the KKI was a separate body in the Ministry of Culture, but on the other hand, in practice, the KKI was directly responsible for the Party and its departments, depending on the particular case in question. Naturally, György Aczél as the highest controller of the cultural policy was the actual head of the KKI as well, but we can hardly find his name in the documents concerning the operations of the KKI. This is again an indication of the opaque, concealing power exercised in socialist Hungary.

The larger campaigns, fundamental questions such as the way propaganda should be spread, how to disturb the immigration etc., were carried out by the Political Committee of the HWSP, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda and the Department of Foreign Affairs of the HWSP. Although the KKI was the central coordinating institution of the foreign relations, there were other bodies as well that operated in the same sector. The Committee for Culture and Information was established in 1960. It fell directly within the authority of the government, and it was the main organization organizing foreign propaganda at ideological level, while the KKI was a practical organizer. There were representatives of KKI in the Committee for Culture and Information, and it is likely that the KKI got instructions mainly from there, but also from the bodies mentioned above.¹¹

In the memorandum of the HWSP (1971) the writer especially stresses the point that cultural, scientific and educational foreign propaganda is an organic part of propaganda in general, and propaganda of different fields shares the same aim, which is to promote political and economical connections and that way to open new possibilities for increasing the efficiency of foreign propaganda. According to the memorandum cultural and scientific propaganda had, however, some special features because of the special character of these fields, and it caused special requirements for the propaganda. Ideological commitment was considered to be especially important for the propa-

ganda made in the fields of culture and science, as these fields were seen as door openers in foreign relations. That is because culture and science opened doors to those groups and sections of people which were impossible to reach in any other forms of propaganda. Thereby it was possible to avoid the so called political discrimination, which means in the case of Finland that the right-wing groups did not accept direct political propaganda.

According to the memorandum referred to above, the Hungarian authorities presupposed that all the cultural activity between Finland and Hungary was harnessed to propaganda. For example, the writer of a memorandum from 1964¹² outlines the possibilities of propaganda in Finland. He emphasizes the importance of individuals and personal relationships, and as an example he refers to the chairman of the Finnish-Hungarian Society, Väinö Kaukonen, whose attitude and influence is praised. According to the memorandum, Kaukonen had realized that the task of the society was not only to cherish the relations between the two countries, but also to make 'the gallant people of the new Hungary, who bravely and successfully build the new socialist life', known to the Finnish people. The society had also managed to fulfil one of its basic duties, which was to strengthen its influence by increasing the number of members among new groups of Finnish people. The FHS was important propaganda machinery for the Hungarians in many ways. On the whole, all the bigger cultural and scientific happenings were seen as mutually supporting propaganda occasions.

In the above memorandum, it is especially recommended to promote cultural products, making scientific and personal contacts as well as 'constantly being in public and influencing'. The basic idea was to convince the masses through smaller groups. The key figures of these groups were, according to the memorandum, those influential persons who had the opportunity to influence public opinion. All the practical actions were to be harnessed to the main aim, which was to spread socialist ideology: film festivals, art biennials and competitions, literature and theatre happenings and matinées, scientific conferences and so on. From this point of view music and folk art were especially favourable art

forms, as there was no language barrier to hinder the reception of the message. Nevertheless, the Hungarians had to face the fact that they could not get socialist realism through in Finland.¹³

4 Clashes

In the cultural relations between the countries representing two different social systems the question was also about the politics of truth and a language game: which words were suitable to use, in what way were the patterns of thought forced onto the right track, who had the power to define the rules of the game and to say what was regarded as truth? In this case there were two language games, the socialist one of Hungary and the Western non-socialist one of Finland. At times there were great difficulties encountered in the two language games. The Hungarians had to think carefully about what issues were possible to bring up in Finland, or rather about those borders which were not to be overstepped without encountering resistance. It was a question of a certain vocabulary that defined the space where the accepted discourse could operate. If the borders were crossed, the group that played according to the other language game (the Finns) reacted negatively and propaganda thereby turned ineffective. On the other hand, borders were indistinct and changing. For example, the phrase 'peaceful co-existence' was very doubtful to the Finns at first, but soon it became a crucial part of the accepted discourse of foreign policy of Finland.

The *chargé d'affaires* of the Finnish Embassy in Budapest, Toivo Heikkilä, stated in his report from 1959 that there are a lot of doubts about the possibility of mutual understanding and 'real' cultural exchange with peoples' republics of Eastern Europe. There were doubts about the possibility of getting in contact with the 'real' people, instead of the party cadres. According to the *chargé d'affaires*, 'Cultural relations with the Eastern regimes are encumbered with several mortgages. We have every reason to be cautious when it comes to the plotting for peaceful co-existence by the Eastern regimes.' Furthermore, Heikkilä stated that due to the differences between the social systems cultural exchange '[...] does not seem to be completely

genuine. There is some kind of unfamiliar and strange tone. Political appropriateness shows itself all too clearly. Tactical calculations produced by the idea of peaceful co-existence disturb the atmosphere.' Heikkilä believed, however, that the purpose of the cultural exchange was not to infiltrate Communism into Finland, and the situation could thus be taken calmly. In addition, Heikkilä surmised, it would be unwise not to make contacts with the communist world, because 'Besides, it may be that in the course of time, artificiality that is hindering this co-operation will disappear and it will turn open and natural. Right now the course seems to be in that direction, but all kinds of turns are possible.'¹⁴

In the beginning of the 1960s great changes took place in the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. The uprising in 1956 and the suppression of it aroused interest in Finns toward Hungary and, furthermore, it increased the interest toward Hungarian culture and literature, too. Since the official Finland refrained from commentating on the uprising, it did not cause any troubles for the relations between the two countries – on the contrary. In any case, the Hungarians were convinced that Finland was not likely to act 'unexpectedly' in its politics. Furthermore, Finland was an important bridge builder between East and West, and through the good relations between Finland and Hungary the latter could make contacts with the really important Western countries. Furthermore, peaceful co-existence between the Soviet Union and Finland seemed to be possible and even successful, and in that sense Finland was important for the whole socialist camp.

Still, little by little it became clear that the differences between the two different social systems needed to be taken into consideration. In all the socialist countries, also in Hungary, cultural life was centrally steered and controlled, and, accordingly, the cultural relations were also organized by the official instances of the state administration without exception, whereas most of the cultural import in capitalist Finland took place within the framework of the rules of market economy.¹⁵ Nevertheless, there have always been interests of (foreign) poli-

tics in Finnish cultural politics, too, in addition to the laws of the market economy.

Although the suspicions of the Finns were reduced as the years went by, Hungarians still understood that they had to change their strategies fairly often, and that they had to make subtle and discrete propaganda. In a memorandum from 1966¹⁶ it is stated that the opportunities for propaganda in Finland were, first, as wide as possible in personal relations and, second, in 'indirect information'. For example, it was important to make contacts with the right-wing press (*Uusi Suomi*, *Helsingin Sanomat*), when it would be possible to publish material supplied by the embassy in those newspapers. Furthermore, it was crucial to make contacts with radio, television and the news agencies. It was emphasized in the report that building networks for propaganda purposes served not only the propaganda interests of Hungary, but also of the whole socialist camp.

Accordingly, cultural exchange between Finland and Hungary seems to have been permeated with propaganda endeavours. For example the Friendship Weeks in 1967 was, according to a report written about it¹⁷, an occasion where the Hungarians utilized 'every single opportunity to make propaganda'. Nevertheless, the Finns were uninterested. The writer complained, for instance, that the participants of the Finnish delegation were seemingly completely apolitical, and thereby 'political information' did not reach them at all, except for an opportunity to answer the often provoking questions posed by the Finns. At the end of the visit the hosts offered the Finns an opportunity for discussion about the people's front movement, the NEM, foreign politics of Hungary, foreign cultural relations etc. According to the report, the guests did not pay any attention at all to the offer, even though it was made several times, so that the Hungarians had to give it up. Nonetheless, the Hungarians counted on the positive experiences the Finns had in Hungary, the consequence of which was likely to bear fruit later on. Again faith was exposed to the 'right knowledge'; when the Finns had seen with their own eyes the success of the socialist Hungary, they would slowly but surely change their attitude

not only toward Hungary but toward the whole socialist camp. The Hungarians were even hoping for new propagandists to be found among the Finnish delegation, which once again emphasized the importance of personal contacts in propaganda.

Around the mid-1960s the Hungarians were concerned about the tendency in the cultural relations between the two countries, which they even called 'an age of stagnation'. In a report dated in October 1964¹⁸ Ambassador Kurtán was worried about the changing emphasis of activity in cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. He saw the relations being at stake for two reasons: it was rumoured that money was tight, and that the emphasis in general was moving away from the Finno-Ugrian relations in Finland. The impression of the Ambassador was that there were also some kinds of political intrigues involved, and that some individuals were acting in their own institution's or orientation's interest. The Ambassador thought that the stagnation was caused deliberately, and despite the difficult funding situation, it was rather a political-diplomatic problem.

Taken as a whole, the situation was not especially critical, although there actually was some kind of change in the emphasis of activity in Finnish cultural politics and general approach towards the cultural relations. One of the consequences of that was an administrative reform of the Ministry of Education carried out in 1966, the result of which was the change of the role of the Finnish sub-committee. Among the other new departments was a Department of International Relations, the task of which was to coordinate the relations in the fields of culture and science. Also the relations between Finland and Hungary fell within the authority of this new department. The reform was made on the one hand because of the revival of international relations both with the West and with the East, and on the other hand because of the strong institutionalization of Finnish cultural and scientific policy, which was completed at the end of the 1960s.

The cooling down of the so far privileged relations with Hungary seems to have been confusing for the Hungarians, and they tried hard to find out what was going on. According to the

reports, Ambassador Kurtán made inquiries about who had said what to whom and why the Finns had acted the way they had. One of the reasons for the change of attitude was, according to Kurtán, the approach of the head of the Department of International Relations, Kalervo Siikala, who was also the director of the Finnish office of UNESCO. During his visit to Budapest in summer 1964, he stated that as the work of the Finnish sub-committee was so weak, it would be worthwhile to strengthen cultural co-operation based on UNESCO, instead.¹⁹ Suspicion toward Siikala was probably one of the reasons the Hungarians were so doubtful towards the reform in the Ministry of Education a couple of years later.

According to the report by Ambassador Kurtán in 1964²⁰, he had found out that Academician Kustaa Vilkkuna had something to do with the tightening of money and slackening of the Finnish-Hungarian relations. To quote Kurtán: 'The fact that Vilkkuna lies behind everything does not mean that he has turned into our enemy, but that he secures the interests of Finland by his political and diplomatic means. Presumably, in the future he will also give support to all kinds of relations between Finland and Hungary, but, naturally, he will do this bearing in mind the interests of Finland. Of course he has been acting this way all the time, even though we were not aware of it. Still, we must give our support to him in the future, too, but in the way that enables us to utilize him.' During a conversation with Vilkkuna later that year²¹ Kurtán inquired about the effects of a funding problem for the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. According to Kurtán, Vilkkuna was evasive and 'changed the subject', which gave Kurtán a reason to adopt a sceptical attitude towards him. Kurtán seems to have thought that Vilkkuna was in line with those who wanted to widen the relations both toward West and East, which would endanger Hungary's previous privileged position. Hungarians were especially concerned about Finland's plans to sign a cultural agreement with France.

In the reports mentioned above, one of the obstacles for the steps called for by the new cultural agreement is also seen to be

the factors of world politics. According to the analysis by the Ambassador Kurtán, in the new situation in world politics it devolved upon Finland to act 'in a spirit of disruption and agitation', which did not offer favourable possibilities for reciprocal cultural exchange between Finland and Hungary. The Hungarians interpreted Finland's plans to widen its cultural relations with other people's republics than Hungary (in the first place with Poland and Estonia) as disruption and agitation as well. All this is connected to the point that only now it started to be completely clear that Finland was a part of the Western camp, and that culturally and mentally it was independent from the Soviet Union, despite good relations with it. In fact, as Kurtán stated in his report, even President Kekkonen had unambiguously stated that ideologically Finland was certainly not a neutral country.²²

The Hungarians took up a doubtful attitude towards the new department of the Ministry of Education, although in the beginning they thought that it would not reduce the influence of the joint committee.²³ Nevertheless, in connection with the Finnish reform the sub-committee became less important, as its role was seen rather as advisory. Also in Hungary the execution of the work plan was moved from the sub-committee for the Institute of Cultural Relations (KKI). From Hungary's point of view, the centralization of cultural and scientific co-operation was solely a negative turn. Even in the working plans for the years 1968 and 1969 it was written that the changed attitude towards cultural relations by the Finns is 'unambiguously negative', since the Finns had come to the conclusion that the cultural relations should be as equal as possible with all the foreign countries, and that such a privileged position as that of Hungary's should not exist. The Hungarians also estimated that Finnish non-socialist hegemony had become suspicious towards Hungary, because she had been so active in the cultural relations. For that reason, according to the analysis by the Ambassador, the Finns wanted to turn to the West in their cultural relations.²⁴ According to a memorandum by the Ambassador Rudolf Rónai (1969²⁵) the purpose of the reform was besides to

centralize the state control as well as the funding of the international cultural activity, also to weaken the special position of the Finnish-Hungarian relations among the cultural relations of Finland. He referred to Kalervo Siikala's statement, according to which Hungary's position had aroused wonder both in the West and the East. Accordingly, because of Finland's new arrangements the Hungarians started to intensify the activity *outside* the agreement. Many of the memoranda and reports from the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasize it. In practice, this trend meant intensification of the role of the FHS.²⁶

The emphasis of the idea of kindred languages and Finno-Ugristics was one of the major problems for socialist Hungary in its relations with Finland. From the point of view of the Hungarians it brought the wrong kind of contents to the cultural exchange, which they had difficulties to control. The Hungarians accepted Finno-Ugrian traditions as a starting point as useful and viable, but their purpose was to have the idea of kinship effaced in the course of time. There was a lot of discussion on the topic around the mid-1960s between the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki and the Foreign Ministry of Hungary.²⁷ They saw Finno-Ugristics and kinship thinking as nationalistic ways of thinking, which they wanted to purge from the cultural contacts. On the other hand, the Hungarians thought that even though there were a lot of politically negative features in that thinking, it could still be utilized. The starting point would in that case be the fact that Hungary is a kindred nation of the Finns, which is successfully building up Socialism. In addition, most of the Finno-Ugrian peoples lived in the area of the USSR. Finland was the only one, which had a capitalist system, but, nevertheless, a well functioning Eastern policy. From this point of view it was possible to see Finno-Ugrian contacts as internationalism and peaceful co-existence.²⁸ The Hungarians also considered writing a new history of Finno-Ugristics, 'from a critical point of view'. Here we can see one example of how truth politics was functioning and in what ways the discourses being used were striving to be influential. In practice Finno-Ugristics

based on long traditions could never be properly eliminated from the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary.

5 The Cultural Agreement of 1959

The 1958 American-Soviet cultural agreement was a landmark achievement and arguably one of the most successful initiatives in the Cold War. Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 posed a temporary setback to the cultural rapprochement between the superpowers. The agreement was so important for the USA that its reaction to the uprising was seemingly strong but at the same time the superpowers were negotiating about the agreement behind the scenes. On the 28th of February, only four months after the Soviet repression in Budapest, a survey of editorials revealed that the American and allied publics would look favourably upon a resumption of contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.²⁹ One cannot avoid thinking that it may have been significant for the cultural agreement between Finland and Hungary, that the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement of cultural exchange 27th of January, 1958. However, it is not mentioned in the files.

The practical political activity in cultural relations was based on the official cultural agreement and the executive role of the joint committee. The joint committee was divided into the sub-committees of Finland and Hungary. After the war there was a temporary state of no cultural agreement between Finland and Hungary, as the new regime of Hungary did not take the old agreement as valid. Due to the administrative organization of the socialist countries the cultural co-operation with them required official arrangements, and the Western countries usually organized the cultural relations with them based on the agreements. The accomplishing of a new – or renewed, according to the point of view – agreement was crucially important to get cultural exchange started after the war. After a fairly complicated process the agreement was signed officially June 6, 1959.

Typical of socialist regimes was an aim for official agreements at the state level with the foreign (especially with the Western) countries, the purpose of which was to prevent any material con-

tradictory to the aims of the society to enter the country. On the background there was also a desire to strengthen the national cultural identity in the eyes of the rest of the world, and to prove that the change-over to the socialist system did not make culture become shallow and uniform. There were several converging features in the cultural exchange and the execution of the agreements with the socialist countries resulting from the similarity of their administrative organization. First, it was typical to require a reciprocal approach, second the authority of the state authorities and the sovereignty of the countries in deciding the contents of the cultural exchange, and third the principle of the exchange without using currencies. That way the exchange did not encumber the balance of currency account. The requirement for reciprocal cultural exchange was carefully controlled, so that always precisely the same number of scholarship students, visitors, exhibitions and materials were exchanged between the countries involved.³⁰

Consequently, one of the preconditions for the recovery of the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary was the accomplishment of an official cultural agreement. On the other hand, Finland's good relations with the Soviet Union were the most important premise for reviving Finnish-Hungarian relations. The matter of the agreement was taken up already in the late 1940s by both the Hungarians and the Finns (The Commission for Finno-Ugristics, the leaders of which were actually agents of the previous era). In a memorandum by the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki from the year 1948 it is written about how the agreement should be up-dated. The basic problem seems to have been the reciprocity, as Hungary was mainly responsible for assuming the expenses of the cultural exchange. The purpose of the new agreement was, obviously, to solve this problem.³¹

After the Second World War the new socialist countries were very willing to make cultural agreements because of the questions of prestige and image. Nevertheless, there were many factors that affected the conclusion of the agreements. As suggested above, the agreement between the USA and the USSR, signed in 1958, was likely to have been one of the most impor-

tant preconditions for the agreements between socialist and non-socialist countries. The turning points in the relations between Finland and Hungary, however, were the FCMA Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union (1948), and the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Furthermore, an agreement with Finland was important for Hungary also because it was to be the first agreement concluded with a capitalist country. The aims imposed for the agreement were to get cultural relations under the control of the state, to broaden the impact of them to all areas of society, and to lay a political foundation for the cultural work in Finland.³² Finland, however, was for a long time reserved towards new cultural agreements, and until the beginning of the 1970s only the agreements with Hungary and Poland signed before the war were revived, and a new one was consummated with the Soviet Union (1959). The agreement was necessary first of all for the literary exchange. After the war there was a rather tense period, which started to ease off in the mid-1950s. The crucial turn was, however, the signing of the cultural agreement, and after that the number of translations in both countries started to increase.³³

The Finns were aware of the political nature of the cultural relations and the agreement, and they strived to prevent propaganda from entering the country through it. The Hungarians, however, found the agreement important, but they did not want to look too eager in the matter. In a letter from the year 1954³⁴ the Foreign Ministry of Hungary tells the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki to keep a low profile and to act only in the case that the Finns brought the matter up first, which happened the very same year. Academician Kustaa Vilkkuna had an official discussion about the agreement question with the representatives of Hungary, and on that occasion promised to bring the question up among the governmental circles, to be more precise, with the then Prime Minister Kekkonen³⁵. Vilkkuna was very active in the question of the cultural agreement, together with Counsellor Väinö Kaukonen and Professor Erkki Itkonen. That time the Hungarians found the agreement important from the political point of view. In a report by the embassy it is stated

that the reviving cultural relations with Finland will not only be an improvement of the relations with Finland, but will also help to normalize Western relations of Hungary. The final aim was, however, the peaceful co-existence between the two social systems³⁶, which disturbed the Finns, as noted above. In the mid-1950s the Hungarians were quite cautious with the matter, yet they scrutinized it, looked into the contents of the old agreement, and sounded out the views of the Finns, but so that the Hungarians did not look too eager in the matter.³⁷

In the cases of Poland and Hungary, the old agreements were used as a basis of the new agreements. It is noteworthy that Finland concluded a new bilateral cultural agreement with Hungary even before the agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union, which was signed later in the same year. Consequently, Hungary was both in 1937 and in 1959 Finland's first contracting party. It must be pointed out that in comparison with the other cultural agreements of Finland the agreements with Hungary and the Soviet Union differ quite remarkably from the other agreements. In the case of Hungary the explanation is the idea of the kindred languages and that the agreement originates in earlier times. The bilateral cultural agreement was concluded with France in 1970, which caused anxiety among the Hungarians. Usually the agreements with the Western countries were wider than those signed with the socialist countries, and, thereby, the agreements with Hungary and also with Estonia were more like the agreements concluded with the Western countries than with the socialist countries.³⁸

One of the key questions was how to name the upcoming agreement: whether it was a renewal of the old agreement, or a completely new one. A document from the year 1956³⁹ refers to the earlier agreement as a possible basis for a new cultural agreement. The matter was deliberated from various points of view, but the crucial view was that the earlier agreement was signed by 'the fascist and chauvinist states of Finland and Hungary'. According to the Hungarians, the earlier agreement was not valid, as it was concluded between the governments, and not between the countries. Nevertheless, for the Hungarians it

was also 'politically appropriate' to conclude a new, functional agreement with Finland, in consideration of the fact that the earlier agreement could not be a basis for 'co-operation between the People's Republic of Hungary, which was now building Socialism, and the Republic of Finland, which was in a process of democratization'⁴⁰. The naming of the agreement was a bone of contention until the very signing of it, and finally the Hungarians had to face the fact that if the new Finnish government would not accept the idea of a totally new agreement, the only possible starting point would be to negotiate an agreement, which was based on the earlier one. At the turn of the year 1958–59 the Hungarians agreed on this arrangement, since it was still politically appropriate.⁴¹

The polishing of the contents of the agreement required a lot of negotiation, as the nature and naming of the agreement was so complicated. Eventually, the new agreement was based on the earlier agreement. It was a little shorter, and the emphasis of the kindred ideology was lessened; for example there was no mention of the kinship day, which was celebrated in schools in the 1930s. It was accepted in the agreement that the anniversary of the liberation of Hungary on 4th of April was given attention in schools, whereas the earlier agreement mentioned the Hungarian national day of the 15th of March. In socialist Hungary both the 15th of March and the 20th of August were rather doubtful, even dangerous, anniversaries⁴². Nevertheless, it was impossible to prevent citizens from celebrating those days in one way or another, and therefore the authorities strived to take away the true contents of the anniversaries by creating new traditions: socialist parades, flag-raising, literary matinées and so on.⁴³ In the agreement there is a stipulation about the school books, and in 1937 it was still important for the contracting parties that 'in school books there must be attention to the culture, life and circumstances of the kin nation, and the books have to be written not only truthfully, but also in a friendly spirit', whereas in 1959 the demand is to 'give a clear picture about the other country'.⁴⁴ The introductory chapter of the agreement had to be changed, because the name of the state of Hungary had

officially changed, but also because now the cultural relations ought to be developed 'according to the best democratic traditions, for peace and progress.' Nevertheless, there is still one crucial sentence left in the introduction: '[...] in consideration of the kin relations that join together these nations [...]'. It can be stated that this was very exceptional in an agreement text of the countries representing the two social orders in the situation subsequent to the war.

There was agreement on the possibility of appointing joint committees in different fields in addition to the executive joint committee, which is an indication of striving to have extensive general agreements, and a change-over of the focus of the activity towards the co-operation programs and plans by the joint committee. In the light of the documents we can see a radical change in the practice of the cultural exchange after the agreement became effective, the most important change being connected to the role of the joint committee. At the beginning the meetings of the committee were arranged every year, and from the mid-1960s every two years, which was a desire of the Finns. Interestingly enough, the participants of the committee had a rather different view of the working methods of the committee, depending on the country they came from. While the Finns strived for lessening the bureaucracy and lightening the execution process, the Hungarians, on the contrary, demanded more and more precise and binding work plans, and more detailed planning of the activity on the whole. For instance, the Finns refused to form working committees, but wanted to negotiate about the matters in full scale meetings instead, but it was not official enough for the Hungarians. Ambassador Kurtán stated in his report, however, that the Hungarians can expect good results from the Finns, if they did not make too categorical demands on them. It was, for instance, unwise to use expressions like 'it has to be done', or 'it needs to be done', because the Finns did not like that kind of purpose and easily become reluctant.⁴⁵ Here we can see the differences between the two political cultures, which urged the participants to search for the compromises at the official level of the cultural relations.

The Finnish and Hungarian members of the joint committee seem to have had quite different ideas of the openness of the work of the committee, since the Hungarians found it clear that there were things that ought to be discussed off the record. One such case was for instance Kaukonen's inquiry about the possible change of the lecturer of Hungarian language (István Nyirkos). According to the report about the meeting by Ambassador Kurtán, the Hungarians were quite annoyed about the incident, first because of the inquiry itself, and second, that it had been done during the meeting and not off the record. Later on the Ambassador discussed with Kaukonen the forms and procedure of meetings. In the report Kurtán said that they had reached mutual understanding: in the future all the unpleasant or minor matters would be discussed off the record. According to the report, Kurtán and Kaukonen had agreed not to bring up such matters at the meeting, so that they would not 'divert the members' attention from the truly important matters'. Among the matters of no importance was, for example, the incapability of Endre Gombár to organize properly visits agreed in the agreement and organized by the consent of the joint committee. Gombár was responsible for the cultural exchange between Finland and Hungary in the KKI.⁴⁶

To all appearances doubts about the unwillingness of the Finns for co-operation with the Hungarians were dispelled in the mid-1970s, and the Hungarians could again count on the traditional willingness of the Finns to have cultural contacts with them. As the final aim of the Hungarians was to make propaganda in Finland, it did not matter that Hungarians had more activity in Finland than vice versa; in other words that the principle of reciprocity was not realized. Although scientific relations were slowly reaching a satisfactory level, they were still far from the volume that cultural co-operation had reached long before. In the 1970s, however, the cultural and scientific co-operation agreed on in the agreement continued to expand. Furthermore, the cultural exchange was still realized on the basis of the work plans by the joint committee. Accordingly, the endeavours of the Hungarians to expand also the scientific co-

operation had been successful, as in the working plans for the years 1974–75 the forms of scientific co-operation, such as the expert visits between the universities and the student- and trainee exchange were emphasized. Moreover, also in the field of culture the stress seems to have been on the expert exchange at the cost of artist exchange and art happenings.⁴⁷

Along with the agreement there was a new level in the activity, which seemingly made the planning and practice of the cultural exchange open and translucent. Nevertheless, in practice this was not the case, because although the decisions were made in the meetings of the joint committee and there were records and documents about everything, a second, secret level still remained. The Hungarian way to deal with some matters unofficially and off the record was one of the clearest indications of it. As a matter of fact, also the huge amount of paper increases the opacity of the activity. It even feels that this mountain of paper conceals the way decisions were made in reality, as well as what was decisive in decision-making in the end.

6 The Finnish-Hungarian Society as Propaganda Machinery

Some of the institutions were originally founded and harnessed for propaganda. For example, the Finnish-Hungarian Society was established, because the Hungarians realized that they needed an organization through which they were able to reach the masses of the Finnish society.⁴⁸ The idea of re-establishment of the FHS was already put up in the late 1940s. The first document I have found is from the year 1948, when the Hungarian Ambassador in Helsinki had as his opinion that the matter was not possible to handle before the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between Finland and Hungary. In addition, broadening the relations between the two countries became possible due to the FCMA Treaty concluded between Finland and the Soviet Union the same year. Furthermore, after the war there were even boycotts hindering the revival of the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary.⁴⁹

Usually the activity of the Finns in the agreement issue is emphasized in the sources, but the documents show clearly that the

Hungarians were at least as active, behind the scenes. For instance, in a report by the Ambassador Ferenc Münnich (1950) he mentions that information about Hungary should be organized more efficiently, for example through the planned FHS. According to the report, the matter had proceeded to the point that the Ambassador had some persons, who could establish the society, and he presumed that the society would be established by October or November of the same year. The main purpose was not, in the beginning, to create a mass organization, but to get 'information' better organized and to avoid the publicity of the embassy in ceremonies or cultural occasions.⁵⁰ A friendship society between Finland and Hungary already existed, but in a new situation, and with the new ruling powers it was ideologically problematic, in the same way as the old cultural agreement. Quoting the first chairman of the FHS, Ele Alenius: 'The old friendship society was very suspicious about new Hungary, and *visa versa*'⁵¹. According to Väinö Kaukonen, the tone of the new society was different from that of the old one: now the leading role was played by the workers' delegations.⁵²

There was also a Club for the Friends of Hungary, which started before the war (1937), but it was never in favour of the establishment, like the 'official' Finnish-Hungarian Societies before and after the war. The club kept quite a low profile in its activity, so that it did not attract the attention of the Hungarian Embassy, at least not until 1956, when the members of the club became active due to the uprising in Hungary by e.g. organizing collections and writing in newspapers about the matter. In 1957 it was written in a report by the Ambassador⁵³ that the club is illegal and that it sympathizes with Horthy's Hungary. On the other hand, the club seems to have been harmless for the FHS. In 1960, when FHS celebrated its 10th anniversary, the Club for the Friends of Hungary was at hand again. The Secretary of the FHS stated in his main speech of the celebration that the club was not interested in making contacts with new Hungary, and that it was operating on a very narrow basis. Interestingly enough, the old Finnish-Hungarian Society was not mentioned at all as a forerunner of the new FHS.⁵⁴

The problem with these old friendship societies was, naturally, that they were labelled as the organizations of the kinship work, which was prohibited in the peace contract. Nevertheless, the Club for the Friends of Hungary was not suppressed, as it was apparently not officially registered. That was obviously one of the reasons the Hungarians regarded it as illegal. In any case, all the activity that could be seen as kinship work was absolutely prohibited, especially when the Allied Control Commission was still in Finland. The old kinship activists continued their work within the framework of the club, although according to different principles than before the war. They for example kept in contact with the Hungarians who stayed in Finland and organized programme connected to Hungary and especially to its culture. Vicar Martti Voipio was a key figure in the club. Viljo Tervonen, who was active in the club, says that it functioned until its members grew old and the club died 'a natural death'.⁵⁵

The special features of the various friendship societies, among them the Club for the Friends of Hungary, were analyzed in a document from the mid-1960s⁵⁶. There is a general view of the history of cultural relations between Finland and Hungary and of the role the kinship ideology played in those relations. This ideology is labelled as nationalist and politically right-wing. According to Tervonen, the authorities of Hungary did not have a negative attitude towards the club, but the documents tell another story. In 1964 Ambassador Kurtán analyzed the candidates for the board of the FHS, e.g. professor Antti Sovijärvi, who was one of the active members of the club, which was considered as a problem and led to the long lasting negotiations about his joining the board. The club was accused of hesitation with respect to Sovijärvi. The reason for the endeavours to get Sovijärvi into the FHS was the aim to isolate the club from all the activity concerning Hungary. The plan seems to have been successful, because Sovijärvi agreed in giving a speech (both in Finnish and in Hungarian) to President Kekkonen, when a folk music group from Debrecen was performing in Helsinki. The occasion was organized by the FHS,

and thus, according to the interpretation of the embassy, it came to engage Sovijärvi into the society in the eyes of both the audience and the membership of the society.

The majority of the key members of the FHS were close to the FPDŁ or the FCP, in other words communists, but there were also politically independent members – the founders of the society from the very beginning wanted to get together a membership of the representatives of different aspects of Finnish society, with different views. It strived to be an organization for the whole nation, to quote Alenius. Nevertheless, the society had to take into consideration the foreign policy of countries representing different social orders, and the activity of the society had to be in harmony with it.⁵⁷ According to Hungarian documents, however, the task of the FHS was to propagate achievements of the socialist Hungary in the fields of politics, culture and economy, as well as the life of the Hungarian working class, farmers and intelligentsia. One of the crucial tasks was also to give a contribution to the masses who fought against the Western, decadent culture, and that the society was 'fighting for the international solidarity, and had a role to play in the fight for peace, as well as the building a society and a world that respected the equality of all human beings.'⁵⁸ Official foreign policy was indeed taken into consideration, when the number 4/1953 of the *Suomi Unkari -lehti* (the Finland Hungary Magazine) was dedicated to Stalin.

In any case FHS was dependent on the Hungarian Embassy, and every action had to be accepted by it. For example, the society had to send bulletins to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, which checked them, made comments on them and gave further instructions for the information spread by the society. The embassy sometimes also complained to FHS of not informing the embassy about the plans precisely enough in advance⁵⁹, whereas the embassy drew up monthly reports for the Foreign Ministry about the activities of the FHS. In a letter from the year 1953 the ministry reproaches the embassy for not keeping a firm hand on the society, so that the embassy should pull itself together and give the society a push. One of the most important tasks was to

recruit new members from new sectors of Finnish society, the main task of the society being 'to search for [...] a way to those public circles that have until now bore distrust of our peoples' democracy, or had even adopted a harmful attitude towards it.' The task of the leaders of the society was to make contacts with as many public circles as possible, among which efficient propaganda could produce good results. Thereby, the FHS would not only help the Hungarians, but also the international peace movement.⁶⁰ The openness of the role of the embassy behind the FHS was deliberated about as well, and it was decided to keep it 'in certain matters at a general level and concealed'.⁶¹

The activity of the FHS grew rapidly, the purpose of which was to enlarge the basis of the FHS. Among the new activities there was a magazine, *Suomi Unkari -lehti* which was established in 1952. At first the majority of the editorial material came from Hungary, and thus only a tiny minority of the articles was contributed by Finns. Also the twin town movement and Friendship Week organized every third year, were the responsibility of the society. In time the twin town movement became a remarkable factor in the relations between Finland and Hungary, also because it furthered the co-operation between the society and the Hungarian Patriotic People's Front (*Hazafias Népfront*).⁶² The twin city activity was seen as important in bringing Finland closer together to the socialist camp: it was supposed to be a manifestation of a peaceful co-existence doctrine in practise.⁶³ Later on the Hungarians noticed that the twin city relations also had other political advantages. In 1969 the Ambassador wrote in his report that it had been possible to make contacts with the social democrats through the twin city relations during the time when they were still enemies: the twin city relations were a natural way of co-operation with them, as it was not yet possible at an official level.⁶⁴

In 1956 the Embassy wanted to find a new chairman for the Society to replace Alenius. According to Alenius himself, the reason was that the new Ambassador, József Szipka, distrusted Alenius. Szipka went to the office of FCP to announce that Alenius was no longer suitable as a chairman of the society, be-

cause he suspected Alenius of having connections with the CIA. Alenius mentions this incident as an example of the stalinist manner of proceeding.⁶⁵ On the other hand, according to a later memorandum by the Ambassador Kurtán, the reason for the resignation of Alenius was unknown, although Kurtán wrote that according to his sources of information Alenius was involved in an argument, as a consequence of which he was offended and resigned. Nevertheless, Alenius was a key figure for the Hungarians, and they wanted him to stay in the society. According to Alenius himself, in 1963 Ambassador Kurtán presented an official apology to him because of the incident.⁶⁶

The chairman designate, Professor Erkki Itkonen, then, joined the board of the FHS at the beginning of 1954 together with Väinö Kaukonen and Erkki Ala-Könni among others. He paid a visit to Hungary the same year, and when applying for the visa, he was evaluated by the embassy. According to the report, Itkonen was estimated to be 'just a linguist', and, furthermore, so completely apolitical, that he had for instance never been a member of any organization. From the point of view of the Hungarians, thus, it was a victory for them to have him as member of the FHS. Hungarians calculated that through Itkonen they could reach the traditional, conservative academic circles, that had until then been beyond reach. Itkonen himself had a different impression about his task, as he said in a speech after his nomination: 'Let the kinship spirit encourage us, and let us strive to build such an organization, which all the friends of our sister nation could join'.⁶⁷ It is worth noting that Itkonen mentioned the kinship ideology, which was forbidden even as a word, and in that kind of connection.

The planned visit of Itkonen was an important starting point for Hungarians to get these cultural-scientific circles inside the sphere of their influence. To achieve this goal, it was important to handle Itkonen in the right way, considering his character. According to a memorandum, in a discussion with him, the method to be used was to keep subtle, patient and not too aggressive. According to the instructions, Itkonen should first be supplied appropriate and thorough information, and only after making

good and lasting relations with him, would it be time to 'work further on him'.⁶⁸ The next year Itkonen was one of the candidates for a new member of honour of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The purpose of taking a new member of honour was – officially – to advance cultural and scientific relations between Finland and Hungary. Academician Vilkuna became the new member of honour, in the end, and in reality the most important qualifications for him were his good relations with PM Kekkonen and his strong political influence on the whole.⁶⁹

In May 1956 professor Itkonen was invited for a supper by the Ambassador Szipka to discuss the change of the chairman of the FHS. During the evening Kurtán suggested Itkonen to become a new chairman, but Itkonen hesitated on grounds that he did not want his name to be used for political purposes. The Ambassador, nevertheless, affirmed that the society was a completely apolitical, cultural organization, and that the claim that it would be a political weapon of the embassy, was nothing but wicked slander of the right wingers. Itkonen was convinced and agreed. He did not, however, wonder about how the Ambassador could decide or even negotiate regarding the chairman of the society, which should have been independent from the embassy.⁷⁰ Itkonen's period as chairman remained short and he resigned on the 26th of October. The reason for the sudden resignation was the uprising, more precisely the demand for Itkonen to express a public condemnation of it which he could not do. The following day the society decided to join the appeal of the Finnish Red Cross for helping the distressed people of Hungary by organizing a collection of funds. After the suppression of the uprising the operations of the FHS went on, and contacts were made with the new ruling powers of Hungary under a leadership of the new chairman, Erkki Ala-Könni. In the annual report of the society the uprising is characterized as 'a disorder of the previous year'.⁷¹

After the suppression the FHS had direct contact with the KKI during the whole socialist era. Formerly the connections between the society and Hungary went through the embassy. This new arrangement gave the FHS an official role in the rela-

tions between Finland and Hungary, given the position of KKI in the hierarchy of Hungarian foreign policy. According to a memorandum by the Foreign Ministry of Hungary (1973) the political steering of the FHS was a duty of the Foreign Ministry, and at a practical level a duty of the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki. The KKI was, however, the base of the practical cultural and propaganda work of FHS. The Patriotic People's front was only involved in the organization of the so called Friendship Week every third year.⁷²

The rules of the FHS were changed in 1957: now the only purpose of the society was to 'work to develop and promote the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary, and to consolidate the friendship between the two countries'⁷³. The rather strong contention of Itkonen of the uprising did not, in the end, hinder the co-operation between him and the Hungarians. In a report from the year 1963 it is written that it was extremely important to get Itkonen back to the management of the FHS. The embassy had an interesting hypothesis about the reasons for the resignation of Itkonen: it was said to have happened because Itkonen had an argument with the previous chairman Alenius. Thus, Itkonen's resignation seemed to be a matter that concerned only the Finns – as the resignation of Alenius as well. At the same time the uncomfortable 'problem of the 1956' could be avoided. It seems to be that the Hungarians could close their eyes to a 'wrong' attitude to the uprising, when a useful representative of bourgeois Finland was in question, as it was not realistic to expect orthodox thinking, whereas the leftists were objects of a careful ideological investigation in the context of the uprising. It was a question of political appropriateness which in certain manoeuvres passed ideological matters.

It seems to be that being a member of the FHS tended to increase political credibility, although it was not as big credit as being a member of the Finnish-Soviet Society. Already in 1960 the society had five deputy chairmen and actually 20 board members. As noted above, the Hungarian Embassy was active in choosing the chairman and the board members. One could think that some of the board members were there only because of po-

litical reasons, especially those who in fact did not take part in the meetings.⁷⁴ Being a member of the FHS was also favourable for those who wanted to visit Hungary and were examined by the embassy: the leaders of the society could also guarantee them.⁷⁵ The board members of the society took part in the visits of the Hungarian delegations to Finland, and they also reported on conduct unbecoming to them to the embassy, such as during the visit of László Kovács in 1960. According to the report by the secretary Sulo Muuri to the Hungarian Embassy, Kovács mentioned that he was 'on a free soil again', and that it would be difficult to vote in the coming elections in Hungary, because 'there are only oranges similar in appearance on the plate'.⁷⁶

The role of the FHS changed after the signing of the cultural agreement in 1959. Until then it had partly been a substitute of the official bodies of cultural relations, in the post-war situation.⁷⁷ Due to the agreement, part of the duties that were earlier the responsibility of the society, were now moved to the state organs, but especially the financial preconditions of the society improved remarkably at the same time.⁷⁸ The FHS and some of its central figures were fairly influential in completing the new cultural agreement between Finland and Hungary, as concretely as negotiating the details of the agreement in Budapest in 1957.

Despite the agreement, the society's role was from then on the propaganda and information activity outside the agreement. It was an important sector, as the official cultural exchange was based on the traditional co-operation between the finno-ugrists and ethnologists, which was based on the idea of kinship. Thus, it was necessary to have an organ to take care of the tasks that were not mentioned in the agreement, such as advancing Socialism in Finland.⁷⁹ Broadening of the role of the FHS was also connected to the rearrangements made in the Finnish cultural politics in the 1960s, which changed the role of the joint committee.

Thus, the influence of the FHS both in cultural relations and as propaganda machinery remained great despite the agreement. And the striving to expand the sphere of influence of the society especially to the right-wing circles of Finland was still on the

agenda in the mid-1960s. The Secretary of Legation, Mr Vincze wrote in his report in 1964 that the basis of the society should be further broadened to get new members from such public circles which could increase its influence in Finnish society. He also stated that 'we must create such an impression that FHS is autonomous in a way a truly Finnish organization should be'. The embassy was still strictly steering the operations of the society, as becomes apparent in a mention that the embassy had considered closely and from different points of views the composition of the board of the society. They had come to the conclusion that they should also take right-wingers, but not to the extent that they would have real influence on the line of the FHS. Comrade Poikolainen from the FCP, who was present at the meeting, assured that the management of the society would be kept in the hands of communists, and if some troubles appeared, they would immediately ask for instructions from the embassy.⁸⁰

The basic line of policy was that the embassy indirectly supported the policy of the FCP, and accordingly, the communist members of the FHS were to support the aims of the Hungarians inside the society. The interests of the embassy and the domestic political interests of the FCP were consistent with each other: they wanted to establish relations with the radical wing of the bourgeoisie in order to be able to disseminate socialist propaganda there. The aim behind the establishment of relations with the right-wingers was to advance the people's front policy in Finland. The establishment of the front was the main goal of the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary in the 1960s, when the Hungarians rested their hope on the rise of a leftist radicalism especially among the youth and cultural circles. This ideological battle could, such were the expectations of the Hungarians, open new prospects for Hungary to advance the victory of Socialism in Finland, which was the final aim. Consequently, cultural diplomacy was considered a central area of operations, and its sectors to be the cultural agreement, the planned culture and science centre of Hungary, and the FHS. In a report from the year 1963 cultural relations are mentioned as the most important manifestation of Finnish-Hungarian relations.⁸¹

The leaders of the society seem to have been willing to participate in the accomplishment of the mission the embassy had set to the FHS as well, at least still in the 1960s. In 1964 the chairman Väinö Kaukonen said in his speech he gave at a meeting between the representatives of the society and the embassy that the duty of the society was, besides cherishing the traditional friendship between Finland and Hungary, also to make the Finns 'like' the new Hungary, whose people were bravely and successfully building up new life. This statement even surprised the Hungarians, although there had been signs of a change of the line earlier already. The Ambassador Kurtán surmised that the change of the line happened because of the influence of Kaukonen, who is characterized in the memorandum as one of the leading figures of the radical professors. The FHS was openly political and communist until Kaarina Virolainen started as chairman in 1964. The new chairman was important for the Hungarians especially as Mrs. Johannes Virolainen (Johannes Virolainen, one of the leaders of the Agrarian Party, since 1965 Centre Party, PM in 1964–66), and as a close friend to Mrs. Sylvi Kekkonen. In addition, she was a central figure in Finnish social life and in the circles of the Centre Party.⁸²

The endeavours to increase the importance and to broaden the sphere of influence of the FHS seem to have been successful, since in 1964 President Kekkonen himself was present at a gala evening organized by the society. According to a memorandum by the embassy, the presence of Kekkonen attracted attention in political and diplomatic circles, because he had not been present on occasions of any of the friendship societies, except the Finnish-Soviet Society. Ambassador Kurtán assumed that there were several reasons for Kekkonen being there. The main speech was given by the writer Väinö Linna, who 'belonged to Kekkonen's immediate circle', and, according to Ambassador, the FHS had 'managed to achieve a role as a Finnish institution'. There were also higher political reasons: Khrushchev visited Hungary about that time, and the *communiqués* given by him and Kádár were in line with Kekkonen's foreign policy: they stressed the importance of peace-

ful co-existence. Naturally the Ambassador referred also to Kekkonen's visit to Hungary the previous year.⁸³

In the mid-1960s the Hungarians found new ways of making propaganda, especially among the university students. The New Friendship Circle (*Új baráti kör*) was established under the guidance of lecturer István Nyirkos. It was an organization for the students, and the sole purpose of it was to strengthen propaganda among them. Later it was planned to be merged with the Petőfi Circle (*Petőfi kör*) of the FHS. The embassy wanted its role to remain a secret, as well as the fact that lecturer Nyirkos acted as guided by the embassy.⁸⁴ Another Petőfi Society was established as well, but it was independent from the embassy. Consequently, the embassy attacked it and its leader, Sulo Ikonen. In a report by the embassy there is a claim that Ikonen himself is a homosexual, and that he has established the society to be a meeting place for his kind. According to the report, the aim of this new society was to cause damage to the FHS and its Petőfi Circle. Ikonen had to resign from the FHS 'obviously because of his unhealthy inclinations'. The embassy even went to the point that when the members of the Petőfi Society planned a trip to Hungary, the embassy advised the KKI not to receive them.⁸⁵ According to Outi Karanko-Pap, some of the friends of Hungary avoided the FHS because of its political nature, and they wanted to establish a new society as a non-political association of those who were interested in Hungarian culture. Karanko-Pap says that the embassy put hard pressure on the Petőfi Society, and even expelled it from the premises of the FHS, where they had their meetings at the beginning.⁸⁶

The FHS went on actively when the political life became stable both in Hungary and in Finland. The FHS was the second largest friendship society in Finland after the Finnish-Soviet Society, even though the difference between the number of members was considerable: the FHS had 1200 members, while the Finnish-Soviet Society had 220,000. Although there was the cultural agreement and the executive joint committee, the position of the society remained fairly official. In the programme of every official, political guest and delegation from Hungary

there was included also negotiation or meeting with the management of the society. The FHS was a kind of model example of a well functioning friendship society as well. As the position and importance of the society was remarkable, there were sometimes also political tensions connected with Finnish domestic politics, power relations and the inner power struggle of the FCP, where the dogmatic and moderate wings were struggling for the hegemony of the party. In the party, as well as in the society, the moderate wing was in the majority. The embassy paid attention to this power struggle between the Finns in the mid-1970s, when the boards of most of the local sections of the society and the central office in Helsinki were occupied by the representatives of the three major parties of Finland (Centre Party, SDP and FPD). The embassy had also noticed that the parties had a power struggle for the positions inside the FHS. An example of how hot a question the power relations could be is that, to be quite sure, there was exactly the same number of representatives from different parties on the board of Espoo's FHS as on Espoo's municipal government. Obviously as a consequence of mandate thinking, there were as many as 40 members in the management of the society at the beginning of the 1970s.⁸⁷

In the 1970s, the basis of the society remained the same: its duty was to operate under the guidance of the Hungarians in disseminating Hungarian propaganda in Finland, which the Hungarians saw as having succeeded during the 1960s. In a memorandum from the year 1971 it is written that during the three or four previous years informing the Finns about the Hungarian culture and 'present-day life of Hungary' had produced remarkable results. A special emphasis was laid upon the importance of the society as a basis of Hungarian propaganda work in Finland. The continuous controlling and steering of the activities of the society were among the duties concerning Finland that were considered as the most important by the HWSP.⁸⁸ The efficiency of the society as propaganda machinery was considered so important that according to a memorandum by the embassy (1974), the whole cultural work of Hungarians in Finland was based on the work of the society.⁸⁹

In the mid-1970s the Finnish Ministry of Education wanted to move as many duties as possible hitherto belonging to the joint committees and ministries, to the friendship societies. In fact, the diminishing of the role of the joint committee suited the Hungarians well, because the joint committee was occupied by the 'old school' agents, who were ideologically problematic: they had connections with the 'old Hungary' and were politically too conservative. In the mid-1970s there were already many friendship societies (46 altogether) in Finland, among which the FHS was middle-sized, but, according to a memorandum by the embassy, among the most active.⁹⁰

In the course of the 1980s it started to seem that Kádár's power was beginning to totter. The political nature of the cultural exchange was lessening, as Hungary was liberating, and as the interests of Hungary towards Finland were changing. Now it was indeed more a question about the real cultural and scientific contacts and economic co-operation. According to Heikki Koski, who was the chairman of the Finnish-Hungarian Society in the 1980s, the society started to have the reputation of a non-political organization of citizens, also from the outside. There was a further broadening of the political basis of the society, as also the National Coalition Party (NCP) was brought closer to the society, which also happened on the party's own initiative. In the 1980s the society was fairly active and influential, since it was the fourth largest of the friendship societies in Finland, after the Finnish-Soviet Society, Finnish-American Society and *Pohjola-Norden* (Nordic) Society. The Hungarian Embassy was still active in controlling the operations of the society, but it is not at all relevant to compare the relation between the society and the embassy with the relations between other Eastern European countries and their friendship societies, especially not from the point of view of politics or propaganda.

The founding of the Centre for Hungarian Culture and Science in 1980 caused another change in the role of the society, because now there was another strong institution that introduced Hungarian culture and science for the Finns. They did not, however, compete with each other, because in the 1980s the Finns

were more and more interested in Hungary, its culture, society and science. According to Koski, founding the centre as a matter of fact supported the society, and they also had close co-operation with each other.⁹¹ Nevertheless, there was a conflict of political nature, which affected the political balance in the society. That was in the mid-1980s, when the board of the society chose a new executive director, and the people's democrats, the FPDL saw the post as belonging to their mandate. The board, however, gave its support to a candidate other than FPDL's, and it seems to have been a lot of discussion on the matter, both in the society and in the circles of the FPDL.⁹²

7 The Limits of What Can be Said – Two Case Studies

The limits of what can be said were not the same for the Finns and for the Hungarians, and it caused also clashes. Next I deal with two cases, that illuminate these different limits, first with the reactions that Academician Vilkuna's actions caused in Hungarians, and second the limits that some of the Finnish public circles had set for themselves. At first there is Kustaa Vilkuna, who played various roles in the post-war political life: he belonged to President Kekkonen's immediate circles, and, furthermore, he was a kind of messenger to him as well. Vilkuna also delivered information about Kekkonen's opinions to the Embassy of the Soviet Union, which drew the attention of the Hungarians, too.⁹³ Vilkuna's relations with Kekkonen were important for the Hungarians, and in addition to that he acted as a Minister of Education for a shorter time. Although Vilkuna had an important role in reviving and developing the cultural relations after the war, the co-operation between him and the Hungarians became difficult before long. It seems to be that Vilkuna no longer accepted the role the Hungarians had chosen for him, and, moreover, he did not keep to the limits of the allowed discourse, which is often reported with resentment.⁹⁴

One example is a report by the Foreign Ministry of Hungary about Mr. and Mrs. Vilkuna's visit to Budapest in 1964. According to the report, they had posed provoking questions several times and behaved in a provocative manner, in other words, they

had not obeyed the unwritten rules about the allowed topics of conversation. Vilkuna had for example asked if lecturer Nyirkos was in the service of the Foreign Ministry of Hungary or if some individuals were Jews or not. 'To crown everything', Vilkuna was reported to have told jokes about the secret police of Hungary, the ÁVH. Mrs. Vilkuna, on the other hand, had distinguished herself by asking about the situation of cardinal Mindszenty. The writer of the report, Rezső Mikola, proposed that in the future the Hungarians should be careful not to 'fraternize' with Vilkuna anymore. Mikola assumed that Vilkuna was withdrawing from scientific life, and entered into a less influential position in the foreign politics of Finland than before. Furthermore, he referred to the coming presidential elections (1968), after which Kekkonen might not be a President anymore. Such being the case, Vilkuna would remarkably lose his influence.⁹⁵

The reactions of the Hungarians reveal, above all, the unwritten rules of what was possible to say and was not, within the framework of the cultural relations. Vilkuna constantly broke these rules, thus refusing to play a language game according to the Hungarian rules. As Vilkuna broke the rules, the confusion and reactions of the Hungarians were interesting: usually it seems that the hosts did not at all enter into conversation about the denied topics, but changed the subject or kept completely silent. For example, there is a description in the report mentioned above about an episode, during which Vilkuna without any warning asked, how the Soviet Union paid for the uranium it got from Hungary. He added that the matter had been discussed in a 'propaganda occasion' earlier that day. Since there officially was no propaganda in Hungary, but only 'informational work', the hosts obviously got so confused that the only answer Vilkuna got was, according to the report: 'We will travel to Tihany tomorrow'. In another occasion the answer to an inappropriate question posed by Vilkuna was silence. The Hungarian official recalled: 'I did not react'.

There were fairly strictly defined borders of the allowed and denied discourses in Finland, too, especially in the 1970s. The political atmosphere was inflammatory, which becomes appar-

ent in a denunciation case that happened in the mid-1970s and almost developed into a scandal. In 1975 a Hungarian writer, Dénes Kiss, visited Helsinki as a reporter of the newspaper *Népszava* to report about the Hungarian Weeks in Helsinki together with the reporter of the newspaper *Magyar Hírlap*, Pál Belley. The Finnish Writers' Union organized a meeting for them to have an opportunity to speak with Finnish writers. An unofficial conversation was organized in 11 March, and the participants were supposed to discuss on the position and situation of the Finnish working-class writers. The Finnish participants were the interpreter and a writer Anna-Maija Raittila, writers Matti Rossi, Veijo Meri, among others.

The topic of the conversation did not inspire the participants, not until the discussion turned into writer Väinö Linna, and the Finnish wars. Kiss was interested to know if there was a remarkable novel about the Winter War, too, in Finland. As the Finns stated that there was not, the company started to search for the reasons for that. According to a current article of *Suomen Kuvalehti*⁹⁶ Veijo Meri, who was analyzed to be a right-winger, saw as his responsibility to explain to the guests the reasons for the breaking up of the Winter War, after which he entered into an altercation with Matti Rossi (who represented the radical wing of Finnish communists, and it is worth pointing out that Rossi also had connections to Finnish Maoism in the 1970s). The argument became so excited that it started to be unbearable for the others. When Rossi declared as his standpoint that 'Finnish Winter War has to be understood as an attack by international Fascism against Socialism', Kiss tried 'in a typical Eastern European manner', as it is written in the article, to liven up the atmosphere by asking: 'Which Fascism?' (*Melyik fasizmus?*). Much later (1997) Kiss returned to the matter in an article he wrote for the *Suomen Kuvalehti*⁹⁷, in which he states that he really was uncertain of which Fascism the excited writers were talking about. Moreover, he writes that he only wanted to point out that there was not only German Fascism, but also a Soviet one. This short and seemingly innocent utterance was to be the core point of the prolonged dispute. Raittila, who acted as an

interpreter, asked Kiss if he was sure he wanted the question to be translated, and after receiving a positive answer, translated, trying to clarify: 'Which Fascism, Eastern or Western?'. Kiss also tried to ease the situation by saying: 'We should not argue. We are both small nations. We are poets. We are not diplomats. Let us discuss on these matters as poets.'

Later Raittila realized that she had made a crucial mistake. In the article in *Suomen Kuvalehti* later that year⁹⁸ she says: 'I could as well have not translated that sentence. Or I could have stayed in the literal translation: "Which Fascism?"' The writer of the article stated that Raittila had misjudged the situation, as she had not realized that the argument between Rossi and Meri had provoked Rossi, 'a man of absoluteness', the way it had. Rossi indeed was so infuriated after the conversation that he threatened Meri that he would write about it. Meri thought that Rossi meant a newspaper article about the Winter War, but in reality Rossi wrote a letter to the Writers' Union of Hungary the very same day. In the letter, written in English, Rossi accused Kiss of anti-Soviet propaganda. Rossi wrote, for example: 'After I had given my view of the so-called "Winter War", linking it with what followed and pointing out that the two wars should be regarded as one and that the deep reasons of the tragedy lie in the rise of Fascism in Europe, Mr. Kiss asked me whether by Fascism I meant also "Eastern Fascism". As the term was unknown to me, I asked Mr. Kiss to be more precise. Mr. Kiss explained to us that "Eastern Fascism" means the fascist and imperialist Soviet Union. I was obliged to point out that to me, as to the majority of my fellow-countrymen Fascism has an entirely different meaning.'⁹⁹

Rossi added as his opinion that a statement such as that is not merely an opinion, but 'everywhere a lie', and, furthermore, can be seen as provocation in Finland. He stated that fortunately there were no 'reactionary powers' present, when the provocation would have succeeded, as it would have entered into the front page of every reactionary newspaper. Rossi judges Kiss's behaviour as 'irresponsible and stupid'. In the end of his letter Rossi threatens that 'Mr. Kiss may rest assured, that should he

feel again inspired to travel this way, I shall not be present at those press conferences or meetings in which he expounds the particularities of Eastern Fascism.' It was probably this sentence that led to the misconception that Kiss would have expressed his opinion in a press conference, and not in a closed, unofficial conversation. For instance *Suomen Kuvalehti*¹⁰⁰ writes about the incident: '[...] a letter, in which [Rossi] claims [...] that Kiss made anti-Soviet propaganda in press conferences in Finland.'

The Hungarians' actions caused by those two words reveal above all, that Finnish political atmosphere was indeed inflammatory in the 1970s. Some public circles were very sensitive about the use of correct discourse, and accusations about anti-Soviet propaganda were in some circles a striking weapon. On the other hand, this procedure illuminates how the Hungarian political machinery worked in a situation in which someone was suspected to have crossed the line of what can be said in public. Rossi's letter was addressed to the Writers' Union of Hungary, and he delivered a copy of it also to the Ambassador Rudolf Rónai, which, according to the interpretation of the Finnish Writers' Union, made it a letter of denunciation. Rossi did not inform the members of the Writers' Union about the letter, so that they could hear only hazy rumours of it during the spring. Accordingly, they did not know what was in the letter, to whom it was addressed, and what was likely to be its consequences for Kiss.

Those two crucial words 'Which Fascism?' seem to have been so important that Hungarian authorities tried to find out precisely, first, what Kiss really said, and second, how the words could be interpreted. The case was examined and handled in fairly many instances in the Hungarian political system, it was commented in Finnish media, opinions, defensive letters and statements were made both for Kiss and for Rossi. In the following I present some citations from the documents, because in that way it is possible to illuminate the importance of the right discourse and the definitions of the accepted borders of what could be said.

Kiss was questioned by Editor in Chief of his newspaper, together with the eye witness and a colleague of Kiss's, Pál Belley.

Belley assured in his report¹⁰¹ that during the discussion about the Winter War, by 'Eastern Fascism' Kiss referred to stalinism, and that he did not notice that Kiss had said anything that could have been interpreted as anti-Soviet propaganda. Rather it was, according to Belley, a mistake made by the interpreter: '[...] in my opinion, in his badly formulated question, by 'left-wing Fascism' Dénes Kiss meant stalinism [...] I think in Kiss's question there was not any hidden criticism against Soviet Union, rather it was an unfortunate formulation and an addition made by the interpreter which may have distorted the meaning.¹⁰²' Also *Népszava*'s Gerő wrote a report¹⁰³ in which he stated that the political view of Kiss is unambiguous: 'He is a man, who loves his socialist country, and works for it.' He assumed that the interpreter had made a mistake in the conversation in Helsinki, which had caused a misunderstanding.

Kiss, on the other hand, had to write over and over again what had happened, 'as in prison'¹⁰⁴. Two of Kiss's reports available in the MOL¹⁰⁵ are long and thorough, and it is possible to get a clear picture about the conversation from the point of view of Kiss. The discussion seems to have wavered from the original topic (position of the working-class writers in Finland) to TV's influence on Hungarian films, from the relation between form and content to the Winter War. According to his own words, Kiss was considering the possibility that maybe the Winter War, which had not yet been analyzed in Finland, was a consequence of stalinism, in other words, Soviet Fascism: 'Is it possible to think that a section of the Finnish public opinion could see the Winter War really as a consequence of – searching for a word – a Soviet Fascism?'¹⁰⁶

In the second report Kiss clarifies the core point of the conversation as follows: 'I asked, if the Winter War was interpreted at least by some Finns, as stalinist – we tried to find the correct word together with the interpreter – imperialism. It is possible that also the word 'Fascism' came up. We were also discussing about the danger of Fascism in Europe, and its destructive influence, mainly concerning the past.'¹⁰⁷ Kiss emphasized that this was only one of the many topics handled in the conversa-

tion, and that he could not get an exhaustive answer to it, because the Finns entered into a controversy over the matter. Kiss reported that he had asked about the 'Eastern Fascism', because he had been wondering about the many pictures of Brezhnev and Mao in the streets of Helsinki. He had posed the question thinking about Maoism. '[...] later on, when the present-day danger of Fascism came up, I asked again, that was it not possible that also Eastern Fascism existed, or something similar, which means an extreme left phenomenon.'¹⁰⁸

Veijo Meri reacted as well, and wrote his own letter, which is dated 16 May 1975 and addressed to *Népszava* (editor in chief Siklós). This letter developed into some sort of a scandal as well, as it was thought to be even more dangerous than Rossi's. *Suomen Kuvalehti* wrote on 11 July 1975 that Meri's '[...] excited counter letter, which aimed to declare false all the imagined accusations against Kiss, was addressed to the wrong place.' There were only rumours about the contents of Meri's letter, and still in 1997 Kiss claimed that he had never seen the letter in question. The letter was, however, published in *Suomen Kuvalehti* as a Finnish translation already on 1 August 1975. In his letter, written in English, Meri assures that 'In discussion Mr. Kiss did not say anything, which could offend the Soviet Union.' He refers to Rossi's 'original interpretation about the Winter War, which is not in line either with the Finnish one, or with the Soviet one.' To calm down the turmoil caused by his letter, Meri wrote also a letter to *Suomen Kuvalehti*¹⁰⁹, in which he explained the background of his letter, and the reason why he sent it to *Népszava*. Meri wrote that he viewed it sensible to address the letter to the superior of Kiss in order to get the problem solved at the original source, so to speak. He added that in Finland there was no knowledge about in which instances the case was handled in Hungary. Meri also included the translation of his letter, which was published, too. Kiss himself had the conception that it was Meri's letter that put him in a real danger, as appears in the article written by Kiss in 1997. Kiss said that he only got obscure threats, and that neither of the fateful letters was ever shown to him. At the end of his article Kiss labels both

Meri and Rossi as denouncers. In the light of the documents the situation was, however, completely different, as several Hungarian officials suggested the case to be closed already.

In Finland, however, there were still many rumours going around about what would happen to Kiss. The rumours were about his dismissal from the Writers' Union, losing his job, withdrawing his books from circulation, cancelling the Attila József Prize, sending him to physical labour, and so on. There were so many rumours that, according to *Suomen Kuvalehti*, 'There were times when it was the only topic people were talking about in the corridors of Finnish radio'. The last drop was the writers' conference of Mukkula, where the Kiss-case was a hot topic, and where the management of the Writers' Union constantly heard demands for concrete actions to help Kiss. The union felt that it was partly responsible for what had happened, because the conversation took place on the premises of the union, although Rossi sent his letter as a private person.

In a letter dated 8 July 1975¹¹⁰ János Nagy from the Foreign Ministry informed the HWSP about the actions by the Finnish Writers' Union. A delegation of the Union had approached Ambassador Rónai in 27 June 1975 that means, immediately after the Mukkula conference. The delegation gave the Ambassador a copy of a letter they had sent to the Writers' Union of Hungary, which, together with Meri's letter, had a great influence on the attitude of the Hungarian authorities towards Kiss. In the letter in question they rectified the misunderstanding that Kiss had been present at a press conference, defined Rossi's actions as provocation, claimed that Kiss never used the expression 'fascist and imperialistic Soviet Union', and confirmed that Kiss referred to stalinism. In the end they referred to the good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and appealed to Hungarian authorities to close the case.¹¹¹

In Nagy's report referred above, it appeared that Rossi himself had also been examined. The result was that he was found politically 'wavering'. He was also found to represent the minority of the FCP (the stalinists), and to have expressed negative opinions about what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and

so on. Thereby, during the thrashing out of the case, Rossi himself entered onto the dock, in a way: he himself as a writer and as a communist was carefully examined. Furthermore, his actions in the Kiss-case did not evoke a positive response even in Hungarian official circles in any stage. In addition, Rossi's friends interviewed by *Suomen Kuvalehti*¹¹² stated that 'There is enough punishment for Matti that the case has been published', and: 'It is not easy to be labelled as a denouncer.' There were also some demands for expelling Rossi from the Writers' Union in the public.

It seems to be that in July 1975 the Hungarians were willing to bury the case whereas in Finland, because of the electoral campaign and an excited political atmosphere, the case was still discussed in turmoil. The Kiss-case is even mentioned among the most known cases of the year 1975¹¹³. Meanwhile, despite the uncertainty and even fear that Kiss was experiencing¹¹⁴ the Hungarian authorities started to reach a decision. Kiss was given an admonition, and his exit permit had been denied until the end of the same year.¹¹⁵ Accordingly, when it comes to the Hungarians, the case was closed. After July 1975 the Hungarian documents only deal with the articles published in the Finnish press about the case. The Hungarians were surprised about the turmoil in an interview by *Suomen Kuvalehti*, in which they state that nothing at all had happened to Kiss. According to Kiss himself the Finns had been constantly asking him about the case, also in Hungary¹¹⁶.

8 Changing Boundaries

As a conclusion we can state that the Finns were sometimes even more sensitive than the Hungarians, when it came to allowed discourse, because of both domestic and foreign political reasons. Second, it is clear that the crucial boundary line in this case was not the remark about the 'Eastern Fascism', but if Kiss meant stalinism or 'the fascist Soviet Union' in general, by that. From the point of view of the Hungarians, it was correct and orthodox to criticize Stalin, but in the opinion of Finnish radical communists, including Rossi, that was among the denied themes as well. It is also clear that as the limits of what can be

said were obscure and changing people could not know what was allowed and what was denied at a certain moment¹¹⁷. In this case, both Dénes Kiss and the Finns presumed that the room to move was far smaller than it was in reality.

The aims of Hungarian foreign politics and propaganda followed the policy of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the propaganda made by Hungary in Finland was aimed first at the people's front policy, and second, at the victory of Socialism in Finland. This aim clashed in the course of time – in the 1960s – with the fact that it was possible to realize the policy of peaceful co-existence, but otherwise the reality was that as her ethos, orientation and aims Finland was undoubtedly right wing and orientated to the West, even though she was seemingly a neutral country. As the liberalization went on in Hungary, and as the Kádár regime was coming to an end, also the aims and contents of cultural exchange were changing. At the same time, the space of discourse was widening, and eventually the change of system in Hungary changed the framework and practice of cultural exchange in a drastic way.

Nevertheless, as Foucault says, power is everywhere and ever-present. However, we should bear in mind his insistence on the positive, productive characteristics of modern apparatuses of power. Thus, power constantly constructs in constituting discourse and knowledge. 'Power does not weigh on us as "a force that says no" instead it "induces pleasure". [...] It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. [...]. If power is strong this is because [...] it produces effects at the level of desire – and also at the level of knowledge.'¹¹⁸ There are power relations in all societies and in all human interaction, at all times, also in the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. However, today the limits of discourse are set from different positions than in the era of Kádár and Kekkonen.

NOTES

- ¹ S. Mills, *Discourse*. London: Routledge, 44; W. M. O'Barr, 'Asking the Right Questions about Language and Power', in: C. Kramarae et al. (ed.), *Language and Power*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 260, 265.
- ² A. Pratkanis & E. Aronson, *The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company 1992, 9.
- ³ E.g. National Archives of Hungary (Magyar Országos Levéltár, MOL) XIX-J-1-k-Finn-07174/18 d.53. Budapest 19 June 1953. Memorandum by Márta Kolosz, head of department, HWSP.
- ⁴ See the Dénes Kiss –case, chapter 6.
- ⁵ See e.g. W. E. Griffith, 'Communist Propaganda', in H. D. Lasswell et al. (eds.), *Propaganda and Communication in World History. Vol. II. Emergence of Public Opinion in the West*. Honolulu: The University of Hawaii 1980, 234-241.
- ⁶ Griffith, 'Communist Propaganda', 245.
- ⁷ Archives of HWSP / MOL M-KS-288-22cs.-1971-43.öe, pages 117-133. Budapest 1 September 1971. Institute of Cultural Relations (Kulturális Kapcsolatok Intézete, KKI) to the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the HWSP.
- ⁸ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-0207/7/1954, 16.d. Helsinki 24 August 1954. Rezső Mikola, Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to Mária Balogh, KÜM.
- ⁹ Griffith, 'Communist Propaganda', 241.
- ¹⁰ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-002010/1957.12.d., Budapest 15 April 1957. Memorandum by Egon Forgács (Department Chief of the Political Department of HWSP).
- ¹¹ G. B. Cseh – M. Kalmár – E. Pór (ed.), *Zárt, bizalmas, számozott. Tájékoztatáspolitikai és cenzúra 1956-1963 (dokumentumok)* [Information Politics and Censorship 1956-1963. Documents]. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó 1999, 366-370.
- ¹² MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-001079/1964, 46.d. Helsinki 13 January 1964.
- ¹³ See e.g. MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-004196/1964, 12.d. No date. A copy of a report by Ambassador Sándor Kurtán to KÜM.
- ¹⁴ A report of the chargé d'affaires Toivo Heikkilä. Report no. 15. Budapest 28 December 1959. Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Finland (UMA).
- ¹⁵ Jalonen, *Kansa kulttuurien virroissa*, 274.
- ¹⁶ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Finn-142-003400/1966, 44.d. Helsinki 27 May 1966. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.

- ¹⁷ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-002305/4-1967.37.d. Budapest 3 August 1967. A report about the Friendship Week 1967 by the Patriotic People's Front.
- ¹⁸ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001035/8/1964, 12.d. Helsinki 5 September 1964. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ¹⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001035/8/1964.12.d. Helsinki 5 September 1964. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001035/9/1964, 12.d. Helsinki 2 November 1964. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²¹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-0013035/1964, 12.d. Helsinki 17 November 1964. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²² MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-004196/1964, no date. Ambassador Kurtán's report to KÜM about the possibilities to develop propaganda in Finland.
- ²³ MOL-XIX-A-33a-Finn-8353-1/1965. Helsinki 1 December 1965. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001629/16/1967. Helsinki 28 November 1967. A report by Ambassador Kurtán. Even in 1973 it is written in a report: 'Számunkra kedvezőtlen módon centralizálja Finnország a kulturális és tudományos együttműködés irányítását.' MOL-XIX-A-33a-Finn-8649-1973.153.d.
- ²⁵ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-7-00558/6-1969.37.d. Helsinki 29 July 1969. Ambassador Rudolf Rónai to KÜM.
- ²⁶ See e.g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-002242-1969.37.d. Budapest 5.10.1968. Memorandum by KÜM about the history of Finnish-Hungarian relations.
- ²⁷ See e.g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-004196/1964, no date. Ambassador Sándor Kurtán's report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the possibilities to develop propaganda in Finland; MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-003592/1965, 46.d. Helsinki 26 May 1965. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²⁸ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-003592/1965. Helsinki 26 May 1965. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²⁹ Ibid., xii-xiv.
- ³⁰ K. Siikala, *Suomen kansainväliset kulttuurisuhteet* [The international cultural relations of Finland]. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1976, 13, 189, 191-192.
- ³¹ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18i-63753/6/1948, 17.d. Helsinki, no date. A memorandum from the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to KÜM about the contents of the Cultural Agreement.
- ³² MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18 i-00780/1956, 17.d. No date. A report from the Embassy of Hungary to KÜM, Dezső Keszthely, Political department.

- ³³ Y. Varpio – L. Szopori-Nagy, *Suomen ja Unkarin kirjalliset suhteet vuosina 1920-1986* [The Literary Relations between Finland and Hungary 1920-1986]. Pieksämäki: SKS 1990, 167.
- ³⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-010713/1954, 16.d. Budapest 20 November 1954. Boris Fáí (KÜM) to the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki.
- ³⁵ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/1-00780/1956, 17.d. No date. Keszthely (KÜM). A memorandum about the Cultural Agreement.
- ³⁶ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-020/7/1954. Helsinki 24 August 1954. Rezső Mikola (Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki) to Mária Balogh (KÜM).
- ³⁷ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-01713/1954, Budapest 20 November 1954. Boris Fáí (KÜM) to the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki.
- ³⁸ Jalonen, *Kansa kulttuurien virroissa*, 37, 41-42; MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-001035/8/1964, 12.d., Helsinki 5 September 1964. A memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ³⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-18/g-005051/1956, Budapest 28 April 1956. A suggestion by KÜM for the text of Cultural Agreement.
- ⁴⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-00780/1956, no date. Keszthely (KÜM). A memorandum about the Cultural Agreement.
- ⁴¹ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-002557/5/1958. Budapest 8 January 1959. István Sebes (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Valéria Benke (Minister of Education).
- ⁴² The 20th of August is the anniversary of the Saint Stephen and the 15th of March the anniversary of the fight for freedom in 1848. During the change of system the Saint Stephen's Day also had a political significance, because it connected Hungary to conservative traditions which were used prior to 1945. The latter is one of the symbols of the uprising of 1956, as the Prime Minister Imre Nagy re-established it as a holiday after Rákosi had abandoned it earlier. See H. Nyyssönen, *The Presence of the Past in Politics. '1956' after 1956 in Hungary*. Jyväskylä: SoPhi 1999, 191-194.
- ⁴³ M. Kalmár, *Ennivaló és hozomány. A kora kádárizmus ideológiája* [The Ideology of the Kádár Era]. Budapest: Magvető 1998, 263; about the meaning of the 15th of March, see also Nyyssönen, *The Presence of the Past*, 191, 195.
- ⁴⁴ See the cultural agreements between Finland and Hungary, 1937 and 1959. National Archives of Finland, Helsinki.
- ⁴⁵ See e.g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001035/1964, 12.d. Helsinki 16 January 1964. Kurtán to KÜM; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-IV-71.-494-13/1965, 18.d. No date. A memorandum by the Embassy to KÜM about the situation of Finnish-Hungarian relations; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-001629/16/1967, 37.d. Helsinki 28 November 1967. Kurtán to KÜM.

- ⁴⁶ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001588/1965, 46.d. Helsinki 5 November 1965. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM; 003595/3/1965, 46.d. Helsinki 1 December 1965. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁴⁷ MOL-XIX-A-33a-Finn-8649-1973.153.d. A copy of the work plan for the years 1974-1975 by the Hungarian sub-committee, no date.
- ⁴⁸ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/b-06717/1950, 11.d. Helsinki 26 September 1950. Ambassador Ferenc Münnich to KÜM.
- ⁴⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-63655/6/1948, no date; In any case, the matter had surfaced before the year 1949, which, according to Kaukonen and Huotari, is the year of the beginning of discussions about a cultural agreement. See Kaukonen, Väinö - Huotari, Tauno, 'Suomi-Unkari Seura' [the Finnish-Hungarian Society], in: János Nagy et al. (eds.): *Friends and Relatives: Finnish-Hungarian Cultural Relations*. Budapest: Corvina 1984, 221.
- ⁵⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-05651/1950. Helsinki 26 September 1950. Ambassador Münnich to KÜM.
- ⁵¹ E. Alenius, 'Ensimmäisenä puheenjohtajana tietä avaamassa' [Blazing a trail as the first Chairman], in: H. Honka-Hallila (ed.), *Meidän Unkari. Suomi-Unkari Seura 1950-2000*. [Our Hungary. Finnish-Hungarian Society 1950-2000.] Jyväskylä: Gummerus 2000, 9.
- ⁵² Honka-Hallila, *Meidän Unkari*, 29.
- ⁵³ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-12/a-003198-1957.7.d. Budapest 1 July 1957. A memorandum by Zoltán Majdik (Political department of HWSP).
- ⁵⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/a/0082810/1960, 11.d. A copy of Muuri's speech.
- ⁵⁵ An interview of Viljo Tervonen 13 December 2002, Helsinki.
- ⁵⁶ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-004196/1964. 12.d., no date. A memorandum about the possibilities of making propaganda in Finland.
- ⁵⁷ Alenius, 'Ensimmäisenä puheenjohtajana', 14, 16; Kaukonen-Huotari, 'Suomi-Unkari Seura', 221.
- ⁵⁸ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-013320-21/a/1952, 18.d. Budapest 23 November 1951. Ambassador Ferenc Dömötör to KÜM; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/b-012234/1/1952, Helsinki 21 December 1952. A memorandum by Dömötör to KÜM about cultural life in Finland in November-December 1952; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/b-01920/6/1953. Melléklet a 212/1953-hoz. Helsinki 15 February 1953. A report on the speech given by Mária Balog in the AGM of FHS, 1953.
- ⁵⁹ See e.g. MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/b-07174/1953, 11.d. Budapest 17 November 1953. Márta Kolozs (KÜM) to the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki.
- ⁶⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-01920/11/I.53, dated in 15 December 1953. A letter from KÜM to the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki.

- ⁶¹ There is a reference here to another document, which was not to be found in the MOL, and so the nature of these 'certain matters' remains conjectural. MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-0207/7/1954, 16.d. Helsinki 24 August 1954. A memorandum from the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki, Rezső Mikola to KÜM.
- ⁶² Alenius, 'Ensimmäisenä puheenjohtajana', 19.
- ⁶³ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-142-003400/1966.44.d. Helsinki 27 May 1966. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁶⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-1-001386/19/1969.36.d., no date. A report about the situation in Finland by the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to KÜM.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid., 25-26.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 27.
- ⁶⁷ Honka-Hallila, *Meidän Unkari*, 36.
- ⁶⁸ '[...] tovább tudnánk Itkonennal foglalkozni.' MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-0207/7/1954, 16.d. Helsinki 24 August 1954. A memorandum from the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to KÜM.
- ⁶⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/9-009295/1/1955.16.d. Budapest 3 November 1955; see also MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-002557/1/1958.11.d. Helsinki 12 May 1958. Ambassador József Szipka to the Foreign Minister of Hungary, about KKI's work plan for Finland for the year 1958.
- ⁷⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-005390/1956. Helsinki 18 May 1956. Ambassador Szipka to KÜM.
- ⁷¹ Honka-Hallila, *Meidän Unkari*, 37-38.
- ⁷² MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-I-19-003047/1973.45.d. Budapest 18 October 1973. A report by László Surányi, KÜM.
- ⁷³ Honka-Hallila, *Meidän Unkari*, 37-38; see also K. Vilkkuna, 'Miksi juuri suomalais-unkarilaiset kulttuurisuhteet ovat jatkuvasti vilkkaat?', *Valvoja* 2/1967, pp. 78-82.
- ⁷⁴ Linna, a writer; Ervast, a writer; Taanila, a leftist journalist; Toivo Lyy, a writer and a translator; Donner, a writer and a film maker; Kokkonen, a composer; Blomberg, a film director; Lounela, a writer and a journalist.
- ⁷⁵ See e.g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-02746/1/1954. Helsinki 16 July 1954; 02746/1954.I, dated 17 April 1954. Reports by the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki about the persons willing to visit Hungary.
- ⁷⁶ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001753/1960. Helsinki 15 January 1960. A report by the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to KÜM, based on the report given by the secretary of FHS, Sulo Muuri.
- ⁷⁷ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-002557/1/1958,11.d. Helsinki 12 May 1958. Ambassador József Szipka to the Foreign Minister of Hungary, about KKI's work plan for Finland for the year 1958.

- ⁷⁸ Kaukonen - Huotari, 'Suomi-Unkari Seura', 224.
- ⁷⁹ E. g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-5/a-005569/1963.5.d. Helsinki 24 June 1963. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001079/1/1964, 49.d. Helsinki 29 April 1964. The Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki (István Vincze) to KÜM.
- ⁸¹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-5/a-005569/1963.5.d. Helsinki 24 June 1963. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM; MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-001079/1964.46.d. Helsinki 13 January 1964. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸² MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001079/1/1964, 46.d. Helsinki 29 April 1964. Kurtán to KÜM; 265-001079/1964.46.d., Helsinki 13 January 1964. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸³ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-21/a.003699/1964.10.d. Helsinki 27 April 1964. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-001079/1964. 46.d. Helsinki 29 April 1964. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸⁵ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-002047/1966, 45.d. Helsinki 1 March 1966. Kurtán to KÜM; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/1-2082-1/1966. Helsinki 19 March 1966. The Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki (Gábor Sebestyén) to KKI (Department Chief Ferenc Buzás).
- ⁸⁶ An interview of Outi Karanko-Pap. 10 October 2002, Budapest.
- ⁸⁷ MOL-XIX-A-33-a-8003/1971. 147.d. No date. A memorandum about Finnish-Hungarian relations.
- ⁸⁸ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-I-19-003047/1973.45.d. Budapest 18 October 1973. A report by László Surányi (KÜM).
- ⁸⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-002882/1974.42.d. Helsinki 9 April 1974. Ambassador Rudolf Rónai to KÜM.
- ⁹⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-002882/1974.42.d. Budapest 7 May 1974. Károly Zimboras (KÜM) to Géza Rybka (KKI). A copy of a report by Rónai (see note 111), with a covering note.
- ⁹¹ The interview of Heikki Koski 28 February 2003, Jyväskylä.
- ⁹² Ibid.
- ⁹³ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-006309/1/1962. Helsinki 14 May 1962. The report by the Embassy of Hungary in Finland says that Vilks was a member of Kekkonen's 'sauna company', and an *éminence grise* of the government.
- ⁹⁴ See e. g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-003595/1965. Budapest 4 June 1965. A report by KÜM. Vilks had posed provoking questions and remarks in the meeting of the joint committee, which, according to the reporter, he should have posed off the record.
- ⁹⁵ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-571-003807/1965. 46.d. Budapest 8.5.1964. A report by Rezső Mikola (KÜM).

⁹⁶ 11 July 1975.

⁹⁷ 12 December 1997.

⁹⁸ 11 July 1975.

⁹⁹ MOL-M-KS-143-145. A copy of Matti Rossi's letter to the Writers' Union of Hungary, dated in Helsinki 11 April 1975.

¹⁰⁰ 11 July 1975.

¹⁰¹ MOL-M-KS-173. Budapest 2 May 1975. Belley's (*Magyar Hírlap*) report.

¹⁰² '[...] a 'baloldali fasizmus' kitétel Kiss Dénes rosszul megfogalmazott kérdésben, amely alatt – véleményem szerint a sztalinizmust értette. [...] Megítélésem szerint, Kiss Dénes kérdése nem volt akár rejtett formában is támadás a Szovjetunió ellen, legfeljebb szerencsétlen fogalmazás és a közbeiktatott tolmács-szöveg torzíthatta el értelmét.'

¹⁰³ MOL-M-KS-179. Budapest 17 May 1975. Gerő (head of the Cultural Department of *Népszava*) to Siklós.

¹⁰⁴ *Suomen Kuvalehti*, 11 July 1975.

¹⁰⁵ Dated 3 and 6 May 1975.

¹⁰⁶ 'S elképzelhető, hogy a finn közvélemény egy részében ez a háború talán, mint a Sztalinizmus – keresvén a szót – esetleg 'szovjet fasizmus' következmény él?' MOL-M-KS-170-174. Budapest 6.5.1975. Dénes Kiss's report.

¹⁰⁷ ' - kérdeztem! , - hogy talán a finn közvélemény egy részében ez a háború, mint a Sztalinizmus – a tolmácssal kerestük a szót – imperializmus s lehetséges, hogy a fasizmus szó is elhangzott, / előtte a fasiszta veszélyről és európai rombolásáról is szó volt, főként a múlta vetítve. MOL-M-KS-180-182, Budapest 3 May 1975.

¹⁰⁸ [...] amikor később a mai fasiszta veszély is szóba került, újra tettem egy megjegyzést, amennyi lehetséges 'keleti fasizmus' is, vagy ahhoz hasonló, ami szélsőséges baloldali megnyilatkozásokat jellemzi. Idem.

¹⁰⁹ 1 August 1975.

¹¹⁰ MOL-M-KS-170-173. Budapest 8.7.1975. Nagy (Foreign Ministry) to Kornidesz (Department of Science, Culture and Education of HWSP).

¹¹¹ MOL-M-LS-154-157. Nagy to Kornidesz.

¹¹² 11 July 1975.

¹¹³ SK, 19 December 1975.

¹¹⁴ SK, 11 July and 12 December 1975.

¹¹⁵ MOL-M-SK-169. Fodor (Central Committee of HWSP) to Kornidesz.

¹¹⁶ SK, 12 December 1975.

¹¹⁷ C.f. the system of the Three T's, see Oikari, 'Discursive Use of Power'.

¹¹⁸ M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*. Transl. by C. Gordon et al. New York: Pantheon Books 1980, 119.

Hungarian and Finnish Family Farming in Village Community from the 1950s to the 1980s

Péter PORKOLÁB

1 Introduction

This article purports to present the village family life both in Hungary and in Finland from the 1940s to the middle of the 1980s. The method of study was the one of participating observation and the concrete data is preserved on magnetic tapes in the possession of the author. Such a method, aiming to introduce the life of one farmer family from both countries within the above mentioned period, has not been applied before. Another explanation is relevant at the outset: because everyday language usage often confuses the concepts of 'country', 'rural' and 'village', in this article the term 'village' has been adopted as it refers to a distinct community whereas the other ones are more indefinite.

Significant political and economic changes took place in both countries after the Second World War, thus my research harks back to the 1940s. These changes should be taken into consideration; otherwise understanding later events would be impossible. Furthermore, in the middle of the 1980s remarkable changes took place in the village life both in Hungary and Finland, as well as in the life of the studied families. These changes introduced a new era in the life of village people.

The main role in this article is played by active villagers who lead their lives, work and earn their living in a village. They are the 'full value' members of the village community; therefore their whole life connects them to their village. This article does not deal with those village inhabitants, who commute or lead a

double life and have a home in another settlement as well. It also means that the situation of the whole rural society is not discussed but a rather determinative stratum of it.

The two families did not become the subject of research by chance. As a result of a wider survey, they both seemed suitable for a comparison from the point of view of the present study. It was important that both families should represent a determinative stratum of families and family farms in their own countries. From Hungary the village of Tiszadob (in the north-eastern Szabolcs-Szatmár County) and family Porkoláb, while from Finland the village of Lankamaa (in Central-Finnish Laukaa parish) and family Hienonen were chosen. The following aspects were considered in choosing the particular families:

- The families had lived in the same settlement at least for a period of three generations
- The families have had a connection to agriculture and farming at least for a period of three generations
- Within the time period of the research the family members led their lives as active villagers in the given village.

Participant observation had a great significance in the research. The life of the Hungarian family on the farm has been personally observed since the 1970s, while it was possible to collect data on the Finnish family for a three-year period from 2000. The Finnish family had been visited and observed for a number of occasions to make a deeper study possible. One may remark that neither of the families had any significant interest in politics, although, for instance, it was customary for the Finnish family to support the politics that promoted agrarian interests.

This study is structured as follows: first, the results of the research carried out in Hungary, the history of countryside, the village and the family are described. While analyzing the situation in Hungarian village community, more examples about the given village are cited than in the case of the Finnish countryside. It is due to the fact, that the events that took place in Hungarian villages as a result of collectivization require deeper introduction to the whole community. In Finland private farms

could function continuously and communal activities were formulated solely through contacts between friends or neighbors. The analysis of Finnish village community and the Finnish family follows the part discussing Hungarian settings.

2 Hungarian Villages from 1945 to the middle of the 1980s

In Hungary the political turn after 1945 changed the social structure of the village to a great extent. After the system of large estates came to an end, those without landed property, as well as small-holders were provided land or landed property according to the Land Redistribution Act enacted on 17 March 1945.¹ Already in spring 1945 villagers started to carry away belongings from the estates of Counts; they were encouraged both by sheer aversion and anger, but also by the post-war political upheaval. On 15th April 1945 the first land distribution ceremony took place also in Tiszadob. The Land Redistribution Committee invited priests and all the villagers to the event.

In 1945 the plans of the communist and Smallholders' Party were executed throughout the country in the process of land redistribution. Accordingly, agricultural workers, manorial servants, as well as dwarf and small-holders owning land less than 10 cadastral holds (one hold = 0.5755 hectares) were given new land. In the villages land claiming committees were formed from claimants for land. They distributed the land following the principles and wishes of the above-mentioned two political lines. In Tiszadob the land claims committee was called together from those agricultural workers who had not found work on large estates before 1945 owing to their leftist political views and also because the quality of their work was not sufficient enough for the demands of the landowners. Consequently, they represented the poorest stratum of the rural society.

Land distribution was completed at a great speed throughout the whole country, affecting 34.6% of the territory of the country,² namely 5.6 million cadastral holds.³ 60% of this territory was given to agricultural workers, manor servants and dwarf holders. As a result Hungary became the land of smallholders.⁴

However, these newly formed small estates lacked the necessary means of production and cattle – draught power or sowing-

seeds for cultivation. Also the adequate knowledge and agricultural competence were missing in many cases. Landless people and those owning only a small plot were not earlier forced to plan and think comprehensively of all small details in organizing agricultural production. For many who faced these tasks for the first time, it was very difficult to start. Obviously those owning bigger farms or estates already before 1945 were in a more advantageous position, mainly in respect of agricultural organization and planning. Experience and knowledge accumulated and handed over through generations is more valuable in many cases than larger landed property and bigger stock, or a larger variety of equipment. The very farming itself requires a holistic approach and knowledge gained through instruction and experience, and it cannot be replaced by anything else.

The speeded-up execution of land distribution was not only due to the general land-hunger in the country, but also to Soviet political influence. Voroshilov, the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, made it clear to the Hungarian leaders that the early accomplishment of land redistribution also serves Soviet military interests, i.e. that of the Red Army. The argument behind this was: if people realize the quick accomplishment of land redistribution, they will jettison the Fascist Arrow-Cross Government and the nation may become united.⁵ Thus the Soviet leadership exercised influence on Hungarian policy as well as Hungarian people and public life as soon as they appeared in the country. The Soviet authority ended only with the change of the regime in 1989–1990.

In spite of land redistribution, many people remained without land, or gained only a small landed property, which was not enough to provide living for a family. Many of these families left the villages and started a new life in a city, where as a result of national industrialization program factories were built attracting masses of village dwellers.⁶ In Hungary the flow of migration from the countryside to the cities, from agriculture to industry was continuous from the 1940s until the collapse of heavy industry.

Those leaving Tiszadob did not choose commuting as so many did in other parts of the country, but they looked for new

livelihood in cities. They settled in the industrial area of Borsod. As the distance between Tiszadob and the main industrial cities of the area is not very long, those leaving Tiszadob moved to the following cities in the neighborhood: Leninváros, (today Tiszaújváros), Miskolc and Kazincbarcika. Mainly young people left the countryside. For them it was important to reach the village where their families stayed⁷ – it was easier to leave if the city where they settled and started a new life was close to the onetime home village.

Those staying at home and intending to earn a living from agriculture were to face difficulties. In the years of scarcity after the war, delivery obligations and progressive tax afflicted the villagers, especially the old⁸ and bigger landowners. Those harvesting from a plot smaller than 2 holds were to deliver 25 kg wheat, while those harvesting from 15 holds had to deliver 120 kg bread crops. The principle ‘the more you have, the more you can stand’ was complied with.⁹

In Tiszadob local committees, the Executive Committee and the Permanent Delivery Committee controlled different areas within the village, and taxed mostly old landowners, who had cultivated their own land already before 1945. The new landowners¹⁰ were in most cases the followers of the new regime, and since it was them who distributed the land, they were also provided bigger landed property, and it often happened that the new landholders owned far bigger landed property than the old landowners. The old landowners were regarded as men of the Count, men of the old regime. They suffered from the highest taxes and they were controlled most strictly in time of delivery. New local authorities aimed at making life difficult for the families they did not like.

The idea of establishing co-operatives was present in Hungarian politics already in 1947, and later the idea of collectivization became popular in certain circles of rural population. At Tiszadob the onetime agricultural workers – becoming new landowners – stood for the idea of collectivization and considered the co-operative form a good solution. Collectivization and the prospects of agriculture in general caused strong debates and conflicts among political leaders.

Rákosi and Gerő argued against the line represented by Imre Nagy, who was for a gradual change. Rákosi intended to fulfill Soviet demands. The Soviets demanded the foundation of co-operatives in Hungary following the model of *kolkhozes*, even by radical means.¹¹ Opposed to this Nagy supported a long-term gradual change: co-operatives would have worked parallel to family farms, supporting them and this way gradually persuading the landowners to their side.¹²

In the studies of Péter Veres the ideal image of the smallholder from the end of the 1940s appears, alongside with the ideal of the small family farms. He does not consider the foundation of co-operatives effective in the whole territory of Hungary but imagined them as supporting institutions of individual family farms.¹³

Three years after the land distribution, in 1948, new landholders of Tiszadob founded the fifth farmers' co-operative group of the country, which was at the same time the first one in the county. Landowners, who took hold of the greater part of the dismantled manorial estates, together with their buildings and equipment, joined the co-operative. Local authority in the village also supported the foundation of co-operatives following the political line of Hungarian Workers' Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, MDP). Thus the livelihood of the old landowners and especially of those, who were considered kulaks, was made very difficult.

In 1950 Rákosi announced that peasants had to be compelled to join co-operatives to build socialism.¹⁴ Parallel to the institution of collectivization, the MDP aimed at abolishing agricultural activity of wealthy landowners, demonstrating that private farms had no future in Hungary. The MDP aimed at eliminating peasant farms on the basis of the first five-year plan. It was planned that in a very short time 60% of the land would be cultivated by co-operatives, and 6% of the land by state farms.¹⁵

The stratum of wealthy landowners (kulaks) was regarded as the main obstacle of rural development in Hungary, and in 1948 their persecution campaign started. All those who owned 25 cadastral holds were regarded as kulaks, as well as those, whose land was worth more than 350 gold crowns. Kulaks were put on the so called kulak lists. The people recorded on the list were to pay 'kulak tax', officially called 'agricultural development contribution'.¹⁶

Who was to pay this tax (contribution)?

1) Those who owned forest and landed property (hereafter: estate), the area of which reached 25 cadastral holds or those whose cadastral net income reached or exceeded 350 gold crowns,

2) Those who owned an estate of 15 cadastral holds or less did not have to pay even if its cadastral net income exceeded 350 crowns. No contribution should be paid either, if the territory of the estate exceeded 25 cadastral holds, but its cadastral net income did not exceed 150 crowns.

3) Those whose estate reached or exceeded 15 cadastral holds and its cadastral net income reached or exceeded 150 crowns, and if the landholder, besides forest and agricultural income had other income liable to general income taxation (over 5,000 forint annually).

Horticultural and wine growing estates were bound to pay threefold the size of the cultivated area would have counter for.¹⁷

However, not only the wealthier farmers were constantly controlled and taxed, but also those with smaller estates had to fulfill delivery obligations. Those who neglected any of their duties were punished by different ways. Propagandists were sent out to the threshing to estimate the quantity of the crop, as well as to urge the landowner to deliver the crops directly from the threshing machine. They also controlled and executed delivery obligations.¹⁸

In spite of obligations, old landowners at first hold onto their private lands and stayed out of co-operatives but in 1952 the wealthiest landowners finally lost their lands as the process of persecution of the kulaks was successfully completed. In 1951–52 the opposition of the peasantry against collectivism declined. It was mainly due to the process of consolidation of holdings, which was executed several times a year in order to integrate dispersed land-strips. As a consequence the farmers never knew whether they cultivated the land for themselves or for somebody else. Thus the Hungarian peasantry was crushed. In the second half of 1952 agricultural co-operatives were formed one after the other. Increasing number of smallholders offered their lands to the co-operative, giving up their private landed property. Until the end

of 1950 2,185 co-operatives had been established, by the end of 1952 their number had increased to 5,110.¹⁹

The policy of collectivization seemed to be successful. In Hungary in 1948 the Soviet (*artel*) type of co-operatives of 1935 was regarded as the basic model. Three types of co-operatives were distinguished in Hungary: co-operatives of type I, II and III. In co-operative type I fertilizing, cultivation and sowing were done collectively, all other tasks were completed individually. In co-operative type II after collective fertilizing, cultivation and sowing the land was not distributed to individual farmers. Everybody had to work on the piece of land measured according to the landed property given by him to the co-operative, or the land was again divided to individual cultivation. In both cases the gathering of crops was accomplished collectively. In co-operative type III each work phase was completed collectively according to the directions of the co-operative, and the share after work was counted by work units. In the case of co-operatives type III the members had to give up all their landed property except 1.5 holds. This remnant constituted the household plot which the families cultivated individually. In Hungary farmers' co-operatives of the type III became dominant and developed into co-operatives of the Kádár era.²⁰

Following the decision made in Moscow after the death of Stalin, on 4 July 1953, Nagy was nominated Hungarian Prime Minister replacing Rákosi, who kept his position as First Party Secretary.²¹ The provisions of the government led by Nagy were the following:

- agricultural taxes and delivery obligations were decreased
- formerly accumulated arrears of taxes and delivery obligations were remitted
- kulak lists were abolished
- for co-operatives and their members, in case they had paid their taxes 100% for year 1953, the complete tax arrears for year 1952 were refunded by the state
- for private smallholders, in case they had paid 50% of their taxes for 1953, the other 50% was cancelled by the state
- in addition to tax and delivery allowances, the state compensated for damages caused by hail or fire, also in cases, when the victim did not have insurance

Also leaving the co-operatives was made possible. The measure, which prohibited members from leaving the co-operative for three years after joining it, was repealed. Also the process of consolidation of holdings was stopped for 5 years.²²

Due to these provisions people left co-operatives in great numbers, especially the ones who had given up their private, landed properties because of the strict regulation of previous years. The foundation of a great number of co-operatives, the radical increase in the number of new members, and the quick decrease in the number of members followed one another very rapidly. In Hungary at the beginning of the year 1953 5,224 co-operatives functioned. In the second half of 1953 their number fell by 688, then in 1954 by 225. By the end of 1953 out of the total 376,000 members 126,000, and in 1954 20,000 left the co-operatives. At the beginning of 1953 the area of co-operatively owned or cultivated land decreased from 1.620,000 holds by 477,000 holds, and by a further 61,000 holds in 1954.²³ However, delivery obligations remained unchanged and were continuously in effect, although compared to previous years to a lot smaller extent.

In village life we also can see other changes than the continuous changing of agriculture which determined to a great extent the life of Hungarian villages in the 1940s–1950s.

The process of electrification with the development of electric network in Hungarian villages started in the 1950s. In 1954 local administration in Tiszadob applied to the County Council for developing an electric network of 5 km and for establishing a driven well in Újtelep. They claimed that in the Legújabb Telep part of the village the electrical network was not yet established. In the area of Újtelep only one well functioned, which could not supply enough water for the population of the whole area, and the water of the well was not healthy either. People in Újtelep fell sick with goitre, which was due to the inadequate quality of water.

In 1954 the Local Council of Tiszadob obliged local inhabitants to build permanent wooden closets on their yards. This measure was also due to the typhoid epidemic that swept the

village before 1954, which was a consequence of the unsuitable handling of human excreta.

Among the aims of village development in 1955 we find the following: establishing new roads, pavements and wells and renovation of the old ones. In April 1955 all districts of the village applied for extension of the local electric networks, as well as for establishing completely new ones. Even the biggest farmstead, called Reje, belonging to the village, joined this application. The farmstead in Reje asked for a new access road, together with telephone connection and a new well. In order to complete all these duties, the Local Council obliged the inhabitants to do community service and pay Village Development Contribution.²⁴ Recreation was also coming into the village: a tractor drivers' Sports Club was founded with 200 members in September 1954. In 1955 a football-, a table tennis-, a ski-, a chess-, a volleyball- and a swimming-club functioned in the village, as minutes of the local council tell us.²⁵

By 1955 a great number of smaller farmsteads had ceased to exist in the neighborhood of the village, and a diminishing number of people stayed there. There were only very few children so that schools were closed down. Afterwards many families finally left their farmsteads. The school of Kocsordos-Katahalma closed down in 1949 due to depopulation in Katahalma farmstead. Only in Kocsordos a school operated until 1952. In 1955 also the farmstead school of Farkashát closed down, when the teacher, Tibor C. Jankovich died.

The years 1954–55 marked again a turning point in Hungarian villages. After the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO, the economic policy of the Soviet Union changed. The development of heavy and military industry became a priority, and Hungarian policy was criticized for neglecting the improvement of these industrial branches.²⁶ In spring 1955 the political line of Rákosi gained power again, and old delivery obligations and taxes of agricultural producers increased, and in autumn 1955 Rákosi started another campaign for collectivization.²⁷ People's hatred against the regime culminated and led to an uprising in October 1956. In the countryside the revolution

of 1956 went on rather calmly, compared to what upheaval was going on particularly in Budapest.

Party Executive Committees were closed in the whole country from October 1956 to March 1957, also at Tiszadob. From there it was reported: a teacher from local school encouraged his pupils into 'revolutionary' activity, i.e. did not stop them from burning their Russian course-books. A group was formed to hunt down the leaders of the village in the name of the revolution, and a list for the purpose was written. Some of the members of this group were later arrested and put into prison. According to both the report of the Executive Committee and the witnesses, all this happened rapidly and in haste.²⁸

In late 1956 the Hungarian government was led by János Kádár. He allowed people to leave the co-operatives; and he also made their dissolution possible. Two thirds of the agricultural co-operatives broke up and several hundreds of small and middle-sized peasant farms resumed their work all over the country. The Kádár government did not rescind the cancellation of the compulsory delivery system, thus Hungary was the first among socialist countries to abolish the delivery system.²⁹

During the meeting of communist parties in Moscow in November 1957 the socialist reorganization of agriculture was discussed again. As a result in 1958 the Central Committee of the HWSP decided on the development of co-operatives and the recommencement of collectivization.³⁰ In the process there was no longer a chance for private landholders to hold on. The most prominent stratum of farmers was compelled to join the co-operatives, contrary to the earlier practice. Moreover, in many cases these big landholders became the leaders of co-operatives. The co-operatives founded in course of the third wave of collectivization were established on the model of co-operative type III. Thus everything was made common in the co-operative, only a piece of land of one cadastral hold was allotted to the members of co-operatives on which they could cultivate whatever they pleased. In many places the cultivation of household plots the land was prepared and sowed by the co-operative, while cultivation as well as harvesting was done by the members themselves.

By 1962 collectivization had been completed all over Hungary. In the following years the number of landholdings, whose owners no longer worked in co-operatives, increased.³¹ Many people left the villages and agriculture. At the end of the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s another wave of emigration took place from villages to cities. In this period the number of industrial workers, together with that of commuters rapidly increased. Many of them were employed in building industry. It was not only the emigration that increased the area of unoccupied land left in co-operatives. The same happened with the property of the members who died. These lands could have been separated from the co-operatives according to the Hungarian constitution. However, this never happened, as the apparatus of the state, the interest of which was to keep the co-operatives intact, supported the leaders of the co-operatives. Kádár claimed in 1966 that although it was unconstitutional to do so, i.e. not to give the land back to the family, according to various laws which circumvented the constitution the owner could not decide about his land anyway.³² Those who were not members of the co-operatives could not inherit the land taken by the co-operative. The land was bought from these people for a rather symbolic sum of money. Thus the co-operatives gained more and more landholdings.

On 1 January 1968 a New Economic Mechanism was introduced in Hungary. As a consequence agricultural co-operatives received far more support and could get rid of several legal and organizational problems.³³ In the 1960s household plots became supplementary farms for village population. These were legal and even supported by the state. Half of the products produced on household plots served livelihood of the family, what was left was marketed. Household plots played a significant role in supplying the country with vegetables, fruit and poultry.³⁴

At Tiszadob it was cattle- and pig-breeding that dominated in household farming. On the plots mostly crop was grown. It helped the raising of pigs and cattle, but there was a lack of market which could buy other products of agriculture from the village. The farmsteads and settlements around Nyíregyháza,

e.g. Nagycserkesz, could more easily and quickly reach markets where it was possible to sell early fruit and vegetables grown in greenhouses. Similarly, in the villages around Budapest the inhabitants earned their living from producing for the markets of the capital. This phenomenon was traditional: villages situated closer to bigger towns had a better chance to make profit in production and marketing than the ones far from them and with worse infrastructure – not to mention the dead-end villages, like Tiszadob. There the local railway station is 3 km away from the village which makes it rather difficult for local people to use railway connections. Thus they do not use railway for traveling or transport as often as it is usual in villages with better railway connections. In addition, local bus traffic was in this period rather poor. There was one line going to the direction of the nearest town, to the county centre, Nyíregyháza. In this period one could leave the settlement either by train or on the only road leading to Tiszadada-Tiszalök. Over the river Tisza, and on the asphalted road between Polgár and Tiszadob one could leave the village towards Miskolc and Lénváros. However, to these directions there was no local bus connection or any other means of public transport. The only direction that most of the inhabitants of Tiszadob could go was the road leading to Nyíregyháza.

The inhabitants of Tiszadob bred cattle both for meat and milk. They took the milk into the dairy of the co-operatives, and the co-operatives paid them monthly milk-money. Co-operatives helped members also marketing meat cattle. As for pig-breeding the locals sold both porkers and piglets. The co-operatives helped also marketing porkers, while people sold their piglets directly from the house or in livestock markets. The inhabitants of Tiszadob went to sell and buy livestock in the markets of Nyíregyháza and Ónod. Owing to household farming and the stabilization of co-operatives' salaries, the living standard of village population started to rise.

Collectivization slowed down the development of Hungarian villages and the growth of peasantry for a few years. However, a general development can be observed from the middle

of the 1960s, and the trend intensified from the year 1968. The development was gradual; people following a different model than that of the 1950s. Earlier landed property meant everything. Each family aimed at increasing the amount of land claiming that it was basically land that they lived on. They needed landed property to bring up and marry off their children. The aim was to improve financial situation. That is why besides striving after new landed property village population often followed the custom of having only one child in the family.³⁵ If there was only one child in the family, the estate did not have to be divided but it provided a living for the only heir. However, the children could not get hold of the land before their parents died. This meant that young couples were to face difficulties. Often they had to live according to the wishes of their parents until they inherited the land, and the same order of things continued in their own life as well.

After collectivization this tradition completely changed. Families lost their landed properties and they were forced to find other ways of living. This was hard since the Hungarian peasant did not know how to accommodate to the new situation. Urban manners did not suit him.³⁶ He was used to relax while working. The occasions of common spinning, corn husking and feather plucking were his 'free-time' occupations. To these occasions the villagers gathered in the evenings and listened to a good storyteller or played games.³⁷ It was only sleeping that meant a real rest. All this was about to change, too. Instead of expanding their landed property, they enlarged their houses and acquired new equipment. They educated their children and they strove to provide their children everything that the modern world demanded: motorcycles, cars, and in many a cases, a flat for the married couple.

The forms of entertainment changed, too. Old customs disappeared; sometimes dancing or a feast on the pay-day were organized at the co-operative but mainly work consumed the day. After finishing their tasks at the co-operative everybody went home to work on their household plots. They tried to work as hard as possible in order to pay for the growing de-

mands. The customary collective forms of entertainment and work disappeared from the villages.

In the second half of the 1960s the appearance of television sets in villages brought about a revolutionary change in the way of entertainment and relaxation. Watching television became the main form of spending free time.³⁸ This changed human relations, consequently also certain customs. For instance, long meetings and discussions in the evenings with neighborhood families started to recede. People spent now their free time in their homes watching TV and nobody was longing for the long discussions at neighboring houses.

The change in the life of villages was visible also from the outside. The old, long rectangle-shaped houses were replaced by the cube-shaped house type. In many cases mainly young families did not build farm buildings behind the houses, which previously used to be indispensable for village homes.

Electrification was completed in Tiszadob in 1964. Washing machines, refrigerators and televisions appeared in the households. More people started to buy bicycles and motorcycles.

After the collectivization was completed in 1962, farmsteads were gradually disappearing in Hungary. As a first step smaller schools were closed down. In 1966 in the vicinity of Tiszadob the school of Kisliget, educating children from seven farmsteads, was closed down.

By the end of the 1960s villages had a new look. From the 1970s the financial support of villages decreased and an urbanization project was launched aiming at developing the towns intensively. The rate of agricultural settlements decreased from 51% to 31% from the 1960s to the 1970s.³⁹ During this period, co-operatives even villages and schools were united. As a consequence of the centralization process 40% of the schools were closed down in Hungary between 1974 and 1977. The number of General Consumer and Marketing Co-operatives (Általános Fogyasztási és Értékesítési Szövetkezet, ÁFÉSZ) also dropped by 80% between 1960 and 1980 due to integration.⁴⁰ The centralization process was promoted with the idea 'the bigger, the better and the more socialist'.⁴¹

The leaders of co-operatives were displaced on central decision. With the new leadership a new stratum of agricultural intelligentsia appeared in the villages. They completely reorganized the structure of existing co-operatives. Also the social structure of villages remarkably changed.⁴² Beside professionals, increasing number of skilled workers started to work in co-operatives. A group of young professionals, technicians and skilled workers replaced the former non-skilled workers and low unqualified leaders of co-operatives.

As a result of mechanization and professional production in agricultural co-operatives, great part of the former worker's brigades and teams was dissolved, and the village people started to get alienated from each other, due to lack of contact.

Despite urbanization and due to the reorganization of the co-operatives the living standard of village population continuously grew. Cars – Lada, Skoda, Trabant, and Wartburg – appeared in the villages in the 1970s. The growth of families was supported also by centralized development projects; pipe water supply reached the villages. In Tiszadob the building of the water system started in 1976 and the work was almost completed in the next few years. During the 1970s another wave of development and expansion reached the villages. In this period villagers started to build stables, cowsheds and storage units on the yards behind the cube-shaped houses. Villagers realized how great a financial help the household plot could provide raw materials. Moreover, it could produce extra income for the family. This was followed by another building boom all over the country. It was possible to take loans on 3% interest rate and many people started to build houses also in the countryside. Hungarian villages now took on the outlook also visible nowadays. Since then this has been changed or extended only in regions close to cities, or in villages with good infrastructure or in resort places.

Development was visible not only in the life of the inhabitants but also in a village settlement as a whole. In Tiszadob the following institutions were being built: new kindergarten in 1976, a supermarket and a restaurant in 1978, a bank and a pharmacy in

1979, a new school in 1982. At the beginning of the 1980s citizens could already feel and in the middle of the 1980s it was already obvious that the political system was shaking in Hungary. This led at great speed to the change of the regime and the leadership in the country.

3 Village Life in Finland from 1945 to the middle of the 1980s

In Finland, agriculture and forestry played decisive roles in livelihood of the people until the middle of the 1950s.⁴³ Previously agriculture had meant subsistence farming. Self-supplying farms characterized Finnish agriculture and the Finnish countryside in the 1940s and until the end of the 1950s. Owing to the process of settling inhabitants from the ceded territories of Karelia as well as to the national agricultural and economic policy, small farms with arable land not bigger than 2-10 hectares became common. The number of dwarf holdings increased between the 1930s and the end of the 1950s as a result of population settlement, and until the beginning of the 1970s dwarf holdings constituted 2/3 of the farms in the country. In this period the second most common type of farm in Finnish agriculture were family farms with an area of 10-25 hectares. The number of farms with a territory smaller than 2 hectares was around 100,000 but the agricultural income they produced can be considered as insignificant from point of view of national economy. The number of farms bigger than 50 hectares was still small even at the end of the 1970s. In the 1950s farms with an area of 8-10 hectares arable land were considered ideal. Later by the end of the 1970s the size had grown to 25-35 hectares, depending on the agricultural branch and location of the farm. During the 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s self-subsistence in foodstuffs was aimed in Finland. However, agricultural production increased so rapidly that at the end of the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s agriculture required strict control due to overproduction. By the turn of the 1950s and the 1960s a part of the farms broke up into so little pieces on account of inheritance that they became unviable.⁴⁴

The act of leasehold in 1958 aimed at blocking this process. It encouraged farmers to buy land by providing cheap loans and by making the redemption easier in case of inheritance. New area could be bought mainly from state wooded land property until the middle of the 1960s. This was supported by the state with advantageous loans with low interest rates. According to the acts of 1969, agricultural income was regulated. Compensation was paid to the farmer, who left his land uncultivated for a while, also in the case when he gave up stockbreeding. In order to restrict pork and egg production penalties had to be paid. Acts regulated the production in all branches of agriculture. From 1968 income tax was introduced instead of the previous tax paid on basis of area. In the agricultural agreement made in 1973 a pension system was established for those working in agriculture. This could be used in case somebody gave up agriculture or a generational change took place within the family. Besides the new pension system an institution granting leave was also founded. In consequence, those making their living from agriculture could go on holiday in any time of the year, similarly to those working in other fields of economy. Owing to the agricultural income law, the salary system of those working in agriculture followed the changes taking place in the wage system of employees living on regular wages or salaries. However, also very small farms producing minimal income 'died away' in large numbers during the 1970s. The rise of agricultural income was also due to the fact that the quality improved and the quantity of production increased significantly. Afterwards, due to different reasons, mainly to agricultural policy, agricultural production in Finland began to stabilize.

From the 1940s average crop production per hectare gradually increased due to compulsory fertilization, more intensive cultivation and also to the better quality of crops. By the 1970s the average production had doubled. The production of barley increased so fast that it soon surpassed the cultivation of the traditional oat. By the end of the 1970s the production of hay decreased by 50%, and its place was soon taken by ensilage. The area of cultivated land grew significantly although vast areas were left uncultivated.

The area of arable land dropped to the level of 1945 during the 1970s. Nevertheless, land was cultivated more intensively than in the 1940s. The productivity of agriculture increased also as a result of improvement works. While in the 1960 only 8% of the fields were pipe-drained, by 1980 the rate increased to 34%. The expansion of oil plants and vegetable plants was also remarkable.

In stockbreeding raising cattle, pig and poultry remained significant branches. The structural changes in agriculture affected firstly the breeding of sheep which started to lose ground in the 1950s. Only before complete extinction, in the middle of the 1970s, it was realized that it was necessary to save Finnish sheep stock. The decrease in horse stock was due to the appearance of tractors in Finland. This process started already in the 1950s and by the 1960s Finnish horse keeping had collapsed. Later the state paid for colts, and owing to the popularity of horse riding, the drastic decrease of horse stock in Finland stopped. Nonetheless, horses have never restored their onetime position in agriculture. The number of cows also fell, but due to cattle breeding and better feeding conditions the milk production continuously grew. In consequence the overproduction of milk has caused problems in Finnish agriculture and economy since the 1960s. From the beginning of the 1960s breeding pigs and poultry spread due to the introduction of mechanized feeding system.

Hunting and fishing seemed to be significant branches but in fact they constituted only 0.3% of the gross output. More important was sea fishing. Herring fishing was important but came to an end in the 1970s and was replaced by salmon breeding which became a significant branch. Reindeer breeding in Lapland has not developed since the 1960s as the area of pasture has decreased. Today reindeer breeding plays a significant role in tourism.

In Finland the area of forest decreased by 12-13% due to parceling. Nonetheless, also the amount of growing forest decreased significantly due to intensive cutting. In the 1940s-50s 65% of Finnish wooded land was in private ownership. This represented 80% of the growing wood. In the 1950s 90% of the owners of private forests were farmers. By the 1970s this rate had changed; only 70% of

the forest owners lived in villages and earned their living from intensive cultivation. It happened in the 1970s that the amount of growing stock started to increase. Forestry preferred conifers, but between the 1950s and 1970s the composition of forests regarding the species of tree changed only slightly: in Finnish growing stock scotch fir constituted 45%, spruce 37%, deciduous species of tree – mainly birch – represented 20%.

In the 1950s in order to stop the drastic decrease of growing stock, forestry initiated fertilizing, accelerated drainage and supported forestation of the arable land. The state supported the planting of saplings. The laws of forest improvement of 1967–69 strongly supported the expansion and stabilization of forestry. Between 1959 and the middle of the 1970s wooded land of private estates increased by an average of 4%, and at the end of the 1970s cutting plans demanded 60 million m³ of crustaceous trees compared to the 50 million m³ of the 1950s. During the 1950s forestry work was done with hand tools and horses dragged the wood. Tractors not only in agriculture, but also in forestry displaced horses until the 1970s. In 1975 no horses were used in forestry and logging tasks. From the 1950s on forestry work became specialized to such an extent that it required more special skills and knowledge. Due to mechanization forestry could employ less people – mainly winter seasonal laborers.

Motor saws appeared first, but their first types were rather heavy and huge, thus they were used mainly in falling tasks and cutting bigger pieces of logs. Other tasks, for instance lopping were still carried out with hand tools. Lighter motor saws appeared rather quickly, which could be used by one person which made logging significantly easier and quicker. At the beginning of the 1970s multifunctional machines appeared which accelerated the displacement of human workforce from forestry and logging. In logging the amount of cutting was yearly 300 m³ per logger during the 1950s, which grew to 1400 m³ by the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. Due to production increase as well as to the development of techniques, quality and quantity of mechanization, during the 1970s more and more forestry workers be-

came unemployed. Not finding jobs in the countryside they moved to urban centers to earn their living.

It was the rapid spreading of mechanization that had the greatest effect on Finnish agriculture and forestry, as well as on family farms and Finnish village life. It meant modernization which the people largely accepted. This led to remarkable changes in village life after the 1960s.⁴⁵ In the first place, electrification contributed to the quick spreading of machines in agriculture. Machines powered by combustion engine or steam did not spread on Finnish farms, their place was at an early stage taken by machines run by electricity, which could be also handled more easily. Parallel to electrification different types of tractors appeared, which in the 1960s completely displaced horse-carriages from agriculture and later in the 1970s also from forestry as already pointed out. First field tractors were used also in forests, but at the beginning of the 1970s four-wheel driven machines appeared and replaced field tractors in forestry. In the beginning the size and the capacity of these machines were growing, later at the end of the 1970s more specialized machines and equipment appeared. These made work easier and quicker both on cultivated lands and in forests. Combines (harvesters) became widespread in agriculture very early, while milking machines were introduced in the 1950s. Intensive milking technology appeared in the 1970s which gradually replaced the system of transporting and storing milk in cans. The quick development in mechanization was one of the reasons that soon made farmers specialized.

Mechanization made an impact on all fields of village life.⁴⁶ Old farm buildings such as barns disappeared or began to collapse, and huge, modern silos replaced them. Hay-cocks and hay-tacks were rarely seen. The size of stalls and barns became bigger so that machines could move and work in them unhindered. Mechanization and modernization led to the specialization of farms on one product only. In the 1940s self-sufficiency was regarded as the most important factor in family farming. However, by the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s specialized farms purchased all they needed in the household

from the income they earned from one main product. Around 60% of agricultural products were sold in the 1940s. This rate had grown to 90% by the beginning of the 1970s.

Considering all this we may conclude that the share of agriculture in gross output was 16% in the 1950s, which then dropped to 11% in the 1960s and to 5% by the end of the 1970s. Living from agriculture was a life-style in Finland until the 1960s, but soon it became gradually one way of living among many others. Finnish agriculture had aimed at self-sufficiency but this led to enormous overproduction⁴⁷ which characterized even the 1980s.⁴⁸

The viability of the countryside depends to a great extent on working opportunities, although the presence of a rising generation is also important. They together determine how viable a certain village is. Again, in a village the most crucial institution for children is school. A operating school also shows the viability of a village. For children the village school is not only the place of education, but it also hosts community feasts and other important gatherings. Village schools flourished in Finland until the 1960s. Due to emptying of the villages during the 1960s, in Finland a large number of village schools closed down, between 1954 and 1975 altogether 2,280. After the 1940s the number of schools in the countryside continuously increased. The 1960s was the period of maintaining schools, while during the 1970s schools were united. As a result many old school buildings were left empty in the thinly populated regions of Finland. Many of them started to decay. At the end of the 1980s most schools had only two teachers, while more than half of the elementary schools employed 1-3 teachers. The School Act of 1984 made it possible for schools to operate also as meeting places for the local community. They became so called 'village houses' (*kyläntalo*). In school buildings different clubs were organized, and not only for school children. For instance, for smaller children day care was arranged, for elderly people pensioners' clubs or handicraft clubs were initiated in a way which did not disturb normal education. This opened a new period in the life of village schools.⁴⁹

For Finnish village population getting to work, school and other institutions is a crucial question, since they live very far from each other and from centers. It concerns mainly elderly people, young mothers with small children and the young. Traditional bus transport is not a rewarding solution for them. Since the houses are scattered, it is difficult to find a suitable place for the bus stops so that it would be close to everybody. Thus the number of travelers is very few. Villagers in Finland must use alternative means of transport. For example, they use cars, taxis or order buses and other services as well as multi-functional transport. In the middle of the 1970s in Finland 66% of the households had a car, 48% of women had a driving license, while 65% of men had one. In the 1980s more than 70% of village households used a car. Thus the car became the alternative for public transport for those who owned one. It is still students, mothers and the young who face difficulties in public transport. Since the 1980s school buses and school taxis have been allowed to transport also others than schoolchildren, if there are free seats. The habit of ordering special buses or taxis has become popular. This makes traveling for village inhabitants remarkably easier.

Transport services do not aim at taking village dwellers to different services but the services are brought to the inhabitants. For instance, besides carrying and delivering the post, the post vans can run other errands based on agreements made with local inhabitants: they could take people shopping, transport other things, etc. In order to strengthen and preserve this practice, Finnish Post made the multifunctional tasks of post vans official at the end of the 1970s. They have proved to be popular and are still used in the countryside.

Building countryside road network speeded up when cooled milk-tanks were introduced for storing milk for transport to the dairy. Milk trucks required a road of better quality in order to reach each individual farm. State and local communities together maintained local roads while the owners and others users maintained private roads. Most of the small roads are pebble-paved and cannot stand very heavy traffic. In spring these

roads in most places become impassable due to water and mud issuing from melting frost.

Alongside the permanent villagers there is a seasonal stratum of village inhabitants. Namely people who own or hire a summer cottage (*kesämökki*) and literally occupy the countryside in the summer holiday season. From the 1950s the number of summer cottages doubled in every ten years until the beginning of the 1970s, and at the beginning of the 1980s their number was over 265,000. Most of the cottages were built at the end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s. In this period the inner and northern parts of the country became more popular for building cottages. People who had left their home villages and moved to towns started to use their old homestead as a summer cottage or built a new one close to it.

Most popular resorts for summer holidays are lakeshores. Consequently, cottage plots close to a lake were the most popular and became quite expensive. The cottage building boom brought with it one negative consequence: the quality of water and natural life of small lakes suffered. As a result, the building of summer cottages was later strictly seriously restricted.

The appearance of temporary summer population in certain villages where the number of permanent inhabitants had decreased remarkably caused also positive changes. The increasing consumption of foodstuffs, petrol and building material could ensure the very survival of a particular village. It has to be underlined that the owners of the *mökki* still pay their taxes to local parish. Consequently, villages with a great number of summer cottages received a significant income from holiday-makers' taxes.

Farms with their red houses and household buildings, grazing lands for cows, roads to the fields, huge school buildings and summer cottages hidden here and there in the middle of wooded and watery landscape represent the Finnish countryside for the outside observer. But inside many tensions can be sensed: generational problems, lack of jobs and income, the impact of urbanized society caused many leave their home villages during the 1960–70s. This tendency has been continuing

ever since and only few people can realize their dreams to move back.

4 The Porkoláb Family in Tiszadob

The Porkoláb family has lived in Tiszadob at least since the eighteenth century. The settlement of Tiszadob was mentioned already in 1220 in the *Regestrum* of Várad. The village belonged to the Andrassy family until 1945. It has a radial and agglomerated settlement structure. New parts of the village were built in the 1920s and after 1945. Tiszadob is a dead-end village, as it borders in the west on the river Tisza, which can be crossed only on a temporary floating bridge. The village had an asphalted road until the end of the 1980s which led to Nyíregyháza, the center of the county of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg. Its railway station is two kilometers away from the village on the railway line Nyíregyháza-Ohat-Pusztakócs. In the period under scrutiny the co-operative employed most of the inhabitants in Tiszadob. The service of local shops has been satisfactory and the local school has always fulfilled the needs of the village.

The grand-grandparents of the author, Béni Siető and Erzsébet Sóron settled in Tiszadob after getting married. At first Béni Siető worked as a farm worker, then as a forester on the estate of Sándor Andrassy. Since his parents were wealthy farmers, he was not used to obeying orders and he intended to earn his living independently as soon as possible. The couple moved from the manorial farmstead into the village. They built a house on a plot provided by the Count. It was 14 meters long based on stone and roofed with tiles. It consisted of a big house, a small house, a kitchen and a larder at the far end. On the yard there was a thatched pigsty, which later was also roofed with tiles. There was also a cowshed attached to the cart-shed. The couple cultivated a land of 13 holds on a family agreement, since the parents of Erzsébet Sóron owned it. The young couple itself owned a land of 4 holds. On the 13 holds they could sow anything, but after harvest they were to pass half of the product to Erzsébet's parents, who on this occasion served them fine meal. They rarely hired helpers, only in times of hay-making, gathering the forage, reaping, carry-

ing and harvesting. During harvest they hired a worker who was given one third of the yield. For seasonal other hard work they hired a day worker, usually the same person.

The family kept cows, pigs, poultry and pigeons. Pigeons were popular, as they were productive and required very little care. On the land wheat, corn, barley, rye, as well as forage, such as alfalfa was grown. Besides they owned hayfield and grazing land, and a patch of forest. Dairy products, eggs and hens sold to the market-women accrued remarkable profit for the family. Pork was cooked twice a week. The family ate a lot of pigeon meat, stirred food, dumplings, potatoes and rice. They ate a lot of beans, which they also marketed. There were years when they sold 300 kg beans. They bought 130 liters of wine every year, for which they paid with products. Béni Siető bought the wine usually from one of his fellow soldiers, and later he went with others to purchase wine from a village in the district of Hegyalja. They took 4-5 sacks of crops for the wine. They distilled 15-20 liters of pálinka each year, and they bought beer and rum in time of harvest.

Their three sons of the family died very young, only one daughter stayed alive, called Erzsébet Siető. Every member of the family worked; also the growing child had to start working at a very young age. In harvest time the daughter had to collect the forage left on the field. She also milked the cows, killed and cleaned the poultry. The young girl was told very clearly and directly that her work was needed. So much so that despite her outstanding school results and the teacher's request, the parents did not let their daughter to continue her studies at day school. Parents considered most important to own larger landed property in order to survive in future saying: 'If we have 8-10 holds of land, our child can make a living'. Actually at the time, even a land of 5 holds could provide living for a small family.

The family was not remarkably well-to-do but lived relatively well. They were satisfied with their life compared to the prevailing conditions in general. There were not many possibilities for improvement; and, for instance, the medical inspection of the three dead children cost three holds of land. Their

living standard slightly improved or rather stagnated until the beginning of World War II. Before the war they managed to buy two oxen, which made transport and certain agricultural tasks easier.

In 1949 Erzsébet Siető got married with Károly Porkoláb who also lived in Tiszadob. His parents were R. Porkoláb Károly and Porkoláb Borbála, who lived in the other end of the village. Their home was a house built on the ground without basement, with two rooms and tiled roof. On the yard there was a stable, a cart shed – later a store – stores for chaff, carrots and potatoes, and a pigsty. Hens spent the night on the attic of the pigsty. The family had two horses, 4-5 cows, and 6 porkers for market each year as well as poultry, ducks and chickens.

In the garden there were haymows and straw-stacks. The family had different fruit trees in the garden: 5 apple trees, sweet apples, summer apples, plum trees, a mulberry-tree, a cherry tree and a gage tree. Hazelnut or grapes were not grown. The family cultivated 8 holds of land of their own, and besides they rented arable land. They grew wheat, barley and rye. Each year they planted half a hold of potatoes, half a hold of melons, which they took to Miskolc to sell. It also happened that they sold the melons directly from the field. On half of the rented land they could sow everything, while on the other half the owner decided what he wanted to grow.

The family earned extra income from selling dairy products to market-women, especially butter. They had also income from horse carriage transport Károly R. Porkoláb occasionally took on, including transport of ashlar from Bekecs, the bringing of different crops and pork to the market of Miskolc. In winter he worked as a second forester on the estate of the Count. Although he was offered this job for the whole year, he did not accept it. He did not want to give up the independence of a smallholder who had a fixed yearly income and some other benefits.

In time of harvest they hired a worker, who picked the swathes and the wife herself bound them. They hired a day-worker for various tasks as well, who was paid for a three-day

job with a carriage. The day-worker was served food and drink at the house. The day-worker always ate at the same table with the host.

The family slaughtered a pig of 180-200 kg once a year. They tried to preserve it so that it could last until the following autumn, since the season of ducks arrived then. The housekeeper fed the ducks with corn, so that they and their liver fattened. Ducks kept in this way were called fattened ducks, whose liver was big enough for breakfast for the whole family. Duck meat was also excellent to roast. They cooked soups, such as sweet bean soup, sour bean soup, semolina soup, rice soup, thickened gooseberry soup with meat, and lebbencs⁵⁰ -soup. For breakfast they had milk, tea, barley coffee, bread and lard. They also ate a lot of millet mush, but millet was also thickened, or popped, or used for baking strudel. They often ate dumplings, jam pockets, scones and *gúnárnyak* (gander's neck).⁵¹ On Sundays the family ate chicken-soup, mush, potatoes or dumplings with stew. If father and son went to work on the field, the child took half a liter, the father 0.7 liters of milk, which they drank after having bacon and bread for breakfast. The housekeeper took the lunch out to the field, which usually included two courses.

They drank beer, wine and pálinka in the family. They distilled pálinka themselves at home; they purchased beer in bottles of half a liter from the local pub, but mainly during the summer, in time of harvest. They bought wine at the bodega of the Count for 35-40 fillérs a liter.⁵²

Clothing was much simpler and poorer than today. In a Porkoláb family which lived well, the child had a pair of walking shoes, a pair of winter shoes and a pair of boots. In summer, as a matter of course, the child ran barefoot in order to save the shoes. Clothing included three shirts, three pairs of underwear, summer clothing, a winter and feast clothing. Adolescent man got a long and a short winter coat.

Until 1938 they were three members in the family. One child died early, but in 1938 the third child was born, a girl. So they were four at that time in the family. The children started to help in work at a rather early age, especially the son. When he left

school at the age of thirteen, he went regularly to plough, and in winter he fetched trunks with a sleigh for days alone. His work became remarkably important – in that he was treated as an adult.

Károly Porkoláb took a heifer with him to his father-in-law's house, as landed property could be inherited only after the parents died. Thus Károly Porkoláb and Erzsébet Siető started their common life at the house of Béni Siető and Erzsébet Sóron. From now on we follow the life of the young family there.

During World War II, when the front reached their village, the Siető family fled together with other families to a farmstead far away from the village. Their farm was damaged rather seriously, the pigsty and their straw-cutter was bombed, and German soldiers took away their pig, among other things. Before the family fled, they hid their belongings and food. They were away only for a short time, but it was enough for the villagers left in the village to spoil the houses left behind. In consequence, the family had hardly anything to eat and start life anew after the war. Moreover, delivery obligations introduced after 1945 made their life difficult. The leaders of the village forced the family to deliver such an amount of milk, eggs, and later of crops that was impossible to fulfill. On top of all that they had to carry milk twice a day to the other end of the village.⁵³

In 1945 it was already possible to claim for landed property, but Béni Siető did not do it. He thought that the 'old time of the Count' would come back soon.⁵⁴ Others – servants, agricultural workers – immediately claimed for land, sometimes even for 20 holds, and they got it. They also claimed for cattle, equipment, and buildings from the estate of the Count, which they also received. It was only in 1948 that the Siető family claimed for landed property. They claimed for not more than 5 holds, from the land that was still left and of not good quality.⁵⁵ In 1948 the families who had received landed property, equipment, cattle and buildings already in 1945 established the first co-operative in the village. They claimed that because before the war they had not owned landed property, they lacked agricultural experience and sufficient knowledge. The first wave of collectivization did not touch the Siető family. From 1949

both on the newly received land and on the fields so far cultivated it worked together with the young couple. Common work started. In spite of political difficulties and family quarrels the family holding improved. In 1949 Károly Porkoláb junior was born; he was the only child of Erzsébet Siető and Károly Porkoláb. In 1951 they bought a vine-yard which was registered in the name of the young husband, Károly Porkoláb. Vine-yards had always been expensive, before 1945 only richer landholders and farmers and owners of local domains could own them. The family bought a vineyard of 278 *négyszögöl*s (one *négyszögöl* = c. 3.6 square-meters) for 4,000 forints. They sold a cow for 2,500 forints and adding it up they managed to buy a vine-yard in a garden-plot where they grew grapes, pears, apples and currants and planted tomatoes and pepper. Their happiness was reflected thus: 'The grapes were so beautiful that already on the way home people bought them from our basket, and also the tomatoes and pepper grew nicely.'

In 1952 the family moved from the Újtelep part of the village to the center. They sold their house for 26,000 forints in Újtelep and bought a house for 32,000 which was not newly-built. It was an old, thatched house in a rather weak condition. The farm buildings were even worse, left uncared for. Nevertheless, the farm was large enough to maintain two families and very suitable for cultivation. First, new farm buildings had to be built for the farm had to provide a living for the big family. In 1953 a new cowshed was ready. During the previous the difficulties started when in March Károly Porkoláb was enrolled in military service for three months, exactly at the time when summer work should have begun.

In autumn 1952 after gathering and trashing was completed, Béni Siető joined one of the co-operatives in Tiszadob, called Táncsis. He took with him the landed property, and the family was left without land and work. In the autumn of the same year Károly Porkoláb went to work at the local forestry office as a forestry worker. The following one and half years were spent in mixed feelings, when in autumn 1953 due to the political changes Béni Siető left the co-operative. His son-in-law, Károly Porkoláb, left the forestry office in spring 1954. Together they

resumed independent cultivation, but this time not on their 'old land' but on the exchange land they got through reallocation of fields situated dispersedly around the village. From 1954 they worked again as private farmers. They cultivated a land of 16 holds. They grew wheat, corn, potatoes, sugar beet, which they could sell quite profitably. Instead of the previous forms of co-operatives called *Hangya* (Production, Trade and Consumer Co-operatives) this time producers' co-operatives were founded in increasing numbers. Similarly to their predecessors they dealt with buying up and selling products, supplying the needs of the villagers, and marketing. However, they followed the line of new politics. The agricultural co-operative bought up potatoes, and in order to market sugar beet it contracted with the sugar-mills of Szerencs.

Porkoláb and Siető also managed to sell other products, such as cereals and corn.

Their family kept 5-6 store-pigs and a sow, which were let out to the pasture with the herd every day. They also bred 2-3 cows. During the whole summer the cattle stayed on the pasture with the herd, while the 2-3 milking cows stayed with the village herd. They had two young bullocks, which were yoked. Besides cattle they kept poultry, which was not a source of income, but provided meat for the family of 5 members. They kept chickens, ducks and pigeons, even rabbits for a long time.

Despite delivery obligations and high taxes the farm was improving and the financial situation of the family started to get better. In 1957 they bought in Károly Porkoláb's name two weaned colts, which they started to harness. At the end of the 1950s they rented a Hoffer tractor with rubber wheels from the machine station of Tiszavasvári to haul the manure to the end of the ploughland, from where they spread the manure on the field by horse carriage. In the 1950s the family started to build a new house on the place of the old rectangular-shaped house. Although the building work itself was finished only in 1961, the needed financial sources were found in the second half of the 1950s.

It is an important fact that the 1950s was the last period in Hungarian agricultural history when the village peasant, the private

farmer, could meet his own needs himself, especially regarding food-supply. Only very rarely did they have to resort to buying: 'We produced the sowing-seed ourselves, we did not buy food in the shop, we received sugar for the sugar beet we sold, and it was only salt that we bought.' Self-sufficiency ended at the end of the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s. Land was finally taken away from the Hungarian peasantry, by general collectivization completed by 1962. Consequently, also Hungarian village population tried to adjust their tastes to the goods sold in the shops.

The agitation for joining the co-operative started in autumn of 1959 also in Tiszadob. The agitators came from Tiszavasvári. There were particular agitators sent to certain houses, who sat in the house from morning to night. They did not let anybody work but disturbed the people and did not stop talking. Even the well-to-do peasants, who were regarded as kulaks and were persecuted from 1952 and who stayed in the village but did not give their lands to the state, had to praise co-operative agriculture. These peasants were not earlier come close to the co-operatives but in collectivization of the 1960s they were also forced to join them. They were approached by saying 'even wealthy peasants realize that the only prospect for agriculture in the future is the co-operative'. The agitators intended to make those family members join the co-operative, who officially owned the landed property in the family. Béni Siető owned the family land and in autumn 1959 only he joined the co-operative as a foot-worker. In spring 1960, because of the lack of other opportunities, Károly Porkoláb also joined the co-operative as a coachman because he had brought horses with him. Erzsébet Siető became member of the co-operative only later, while Erzsébet Sóron never joined it. The family joined the co-operative called Tánctsis, which had been working from 1948, and where Béni Siető already had been a member for a short period.

Almost all villagers became members of the co-operative, only a few people could retain their lands. They were farmers with 1-2 holds of land, who got their plots in one piece very far from the village on fields of poor quality. Those who stayed out of the co-operative cultivated their small plots, and also dealt

with carriages. Most of them later became weir-keepers. Those farmers, who remained private farmers, did not have a better livelihood than those, who joined the co-operative.

In co-operatives friends, acquaintances and relatives formed working teams, brigades. Thus the old system of connections and relations could survive also in the world of the co-operatives. The Siető and Porkoláb family acquiesced with it. Although they did not like it, they had to put up with it, since everybody did the same around them. There was no real choice. After joining the co-operative in 1961 they started to build their new house. It had 3 rooms, a kitchen, a huge corridor and a pantry; its structure was different from the old rectangular type. It was based on ashlar with doubled cob-walls, it had tiled roof, and large twin windows gave it light. The ashlar were brought from Bodrogkeresztúr on train, the adobes were made in Tiszadob, and the tiles were brought from Polgár on carriage from where also other needed materials which the local building master could not produce were to be had. The wooden material of the house was cut and sawn in the village, but the builders also used a great deal of the wooden structure of the old house while making the roof for the new one. The house was ready to move in already in 1961 but many things were still needed. The money to continue building work came from selling meat cattle and bulls. When they managed to sell 1-2 bulls, they had something completed in the house. Thus the completion of the building lasted for several years.

At the beginning of the 1960s the salaries were very low at the co-operative. In the first period members received 40% of their salaries as the co-operative could not afford to pay more. A member doing physical work earned 200-300 forints a month. For the families, which had cattle and animals at home less was paid, and they did not receive bonus at the final account either. The Siető and Porkoláb family continued breeding milk and meat cattle, also store-pigs. They could earn considerable income by selling milk and meat cattle. As Károly Porkoláb had it: 'The salary paid by the co-operative was equivalent to zero'.

The co-operative provided each member a household farm of one hold, where they planted corn and potatoes. They could decide how much corn and potato they could cultivate. The family had 300-300 square-fathoms for potato, the rest for corn. They would have like to have more potato grown as it was proper feed for store-pigs, which still provided good profit for the family. At first the area of household farms provided was reduced if it had a vineyard or garden-plot. Thus Károly Porkoláb got a household farm, the area of which was reduced by the area of his own vineyard. The women in the family cultivated the household farm, the vine-yard and kept the garden around the house. They looked after the animals as well. Men mowed the fodder grass and hay-making, but they could do it only on Sunday, since they had to work at the co-operative from Monday till Saturday. However, after mowing the fodder grass in many cases the two women and the growing son completed the hay-making. Men carried the hay home, but it was not a hard job, as Károly Porkoláb could do it with his two horses, since he was a coachman.

At the beginning of the 1960s the family gave up intensive religious life. So far they had celebrated all feasts, gone to church, but since men could work on the household farm only on Sunday, they gradually gave it up. This happened to every family in the village.

Even those who were not members were forcefully called to work for the co-operative in order to prevent the formation of prosperous household farms. Called or not, everybody worked on co-operative lands. Men could not manage to work on two lands besides their everyday work. Consequently, the household farm was left to the women to run. The growing child in the family also worked a lot at home during the summers. He/she usually fed, cared for and gave water to the animals. Fulfilling these tasks together with the children of the same age from the neighborhood was not so difficult for them.

However, children worked not only at home. Károly Porkoláb junior already as a primary school pupil took part in summer agricultural work at the co-operative together with several of his fellows. Sometimes 30 children worked in a team.

The children knew each other well from school, and their parents also worked at the co-operative together. Thus it was a matter of course that if one child went to work, the others also wanted to go. They worked mainly during fruit and vegetable harvest, or did other jobs that children could do led by 2-3 adults. The adults earned 3 forints per hour at the co-operative; children received 1 or 1.5 forints per hour. Károly Porkoláb recalled: 'We children wanted to go to the co-operative, since at noon we had a two-hour long lunch break when we could play. I had very good, positive memories from my childhood regarding the co-operative.' Junior worked every summer. As a grammar school pupil he guarded sunflowers, his task was to frighten crows away. Later he worked at grain clearing. Combined harvesters could not clear the grain completely, and it had to be cleared again. The grains cleared in this way were stored in sacks, and pupils helped in putting the sacks where they belonged. They worked in pairs, one week at night, next week daytime. This was a real adult job which paid well.

After finishing grammar school Károly Porkoláb Jr. applied to college, but he had already missed the first year. Until the next academic year he worked in the co-operative, this time as a young man. He worked as a wage accountant at the co-operative, which meant regular work with regular and fixed salary. When he went to college⁵⁶ he made a contract with the co-operative for his college years. He received a scholarship from the Táncsis co-operative of Tiszadob and did his summer practices there – he spent the whole summer working. After graduating from college he continued working at the co-operative. The salary from the co-operative was enough for him to live independently from his parents during the college years.

It has been seen that every member of the family worked in a one way or another at the co-operative, one as an active member, one as a child, one as a young worker or as student, others on the household farm, or on the land cultivated by shares. In the family Béni Siető and Károly Porkoláb were members, Erzsébet Sóron and Erzsébet Siető worked on the household farm and on the lands cultivated by shares. Erzsébet Siető also

became an active member in the 1970s, while Károly Porkoláb Jr. worked at the co-operative as a child, as a student and as an active member. In all, local families and the entire village community were bound to co-operatives very tightly.

In 1968 the New Economic Mechanism was introduced in Hungary which supported the co-operatives. They strengthened and the situation of villagers stabilized. Those cultivating their household farms were given more possibilities. Also household farming as a source of income was supported if the farmer was a member of a co-operative. That the people considered co-operative to be common property – this was also the policy of the party and local leaders – started a new custom in the late 1960s in Hungarian villages which people regarded as moral and legal within the limits of local unwritten regulations. This was that every worker in proportion to the area he worked on in the co-operative regularly took home a part of the product he produced there. It has to be emphasized that this was not considered illegal, as everybody followed the custom, both the leaders and the workers. During the years even a silent regulation developed in the community on how much one could take home from the common products according to his position at the co-operative. The impact of this kind of extra income could be seen also in the outlook of the settlements and whole village. Nonetheless, it was considered as normal and nobody was reprehended. The intensive cultivation of household farms led to considerable improvements in Hungarian villages.

In our case the family furnished a room in the new house with new furniture. After finishing grammar school successfully, Károly Porkoláb Jr. got a Jawa motorcycle with an engine of 250 cm³. Other improvements were also made in the family. In the middle of the 1960s they bought a new bicycle for Erzsébet Siető, since before they had only one men's bicycle in the family. They bought a television set in 1965 and at the end of the 1960s a washing machine and a refrigerator. On the yard they built a new pigsty, farm buildings and a corn-crib – the latter for storing household corn. Such significant changes could be seen in the life of the family between 1959 and the end of the 1960s.

From the 1970s there were three families. Károly Porkoláb Jr. graduating from college got married in 1972. He married Katalin Kalydy, whom he got to know at college, and who also graduated as a horticulturist. They had two children. The new family introduced a lot of new into their lifestyle. Most importantly, they moved into a separate house. Both being young agriculturists, the co-operative provided them a managerial house, which was situated 1 km from the village in an old vineyard. With the help of their parents the young couple managed to buy a Trabant in 1974. In 1976 they moved into the village, to another managerial house of the co-operative. In Tiszadob water system was established in the very same year but was installed in the house which already had a bathroom and a water closet only in the following year. Till then a pump in a well in the yard lifted water for washing and bathing. Since the water was not suitable for drinking, the family carried drinking water in cans from further away. The young couple lived considerably comfortably; in 1979 they bought a Lada, traveled in Italy and Bulgaria on trips organized by the co-operative, and in Romania and Czechoslovakia by their own car.

The young family continued to cultivate the land of their parents and grandparents. Károly Porkoláb Jr. tried bee-keeping and having sheep. However, he was promoted in the co-operative and did not have enough time to continue that. Consequently, he and his wife did not take part in running the family farm between the beginning of the 1970s and 1984.

In the following both households are dealt with because that shows continuous changing within the family

At the beginning of the 1970s in Károly Porkoláb's Sr.'s family the cattle stock was decreased because of alterations in farm buildings. One part of the cowshed was turned into a tool-store; the forage shed was turned into a garage. Higher salaries at the co-operative made it possible to pay these improvements. The family worked on the household farm, but its significance decreased remarkably in the 1970s. At the end of the 1970s water system was installed in the house, and a bathroom and a

kitchen sink were built inside. In 1976 Béni Siető died. His son-in-law took over the running of the household farm.

At the beginning of the 1980s a wave of house building spread all over Hungary. If somebody could buy a plot, he started to build a house. People were provided loans with very low interest (3%), which made building a new house together with all the necessary farm buildings possible. People used building loans also for purchasing cars and furniture, since building itself was completed with help of the community. Brothers and sisters, friends and colleagues helped. They were not paid for their work, but provided with food and drink.

Károly Porkoláb Jr. and his wife also started building a new house in 1982. At that time they had been married for 10 years. They received financial support from their parents, and they also contracted a loan. A local builder led the building work, and brothers and sisters, relatives, friends and colleagues came to help. The couple kept a record of some aspects of building work. It shows how many people took part in the building of the basement and the walls, and also for how long they worked there. Recorded also was how much and what kinds of food and drinks they bought for the helpers. Basement building lasted for 7 days. Number of helpers during these days was as follows: first day 5 people, second day 14 people, third day 14 people, fourth day 3 people, fifth day 12 people, sixth day 12 people, seventh day 7 people. Wall building lasted for 6 days. Number of helpers during these days varied from 2 to 10 people. During the recorded time – 13 days – altogether 102 people took part in the building. For them the following foodstuffs and drink were purchased:

5 kg pork	5 ducks
10 kg beef	70 eggs
6 knuckles of ham	5 packets of coffee
13 kg sausage, lard and salami	26 l pálinka
4 smoked trotters	10 l wine
2.5 kg cottage cheese	475 bottles of beer
3 cartoons of sour-cream	3 l refreshments
8 chickens	

This shows that the family wanted to treat the helpers properly with food and drink, since paying cash for their work was out of the question. During the 1980s the custom of building houses in voluntary communities (*kaláka*; in Finnish: *talkoot*) was still alive. A man went to help in several building sites, and those whom he helped all came to help him when he built his house. At Tiszadob this practice disappeared at the end of the 1980s and professional building brigades built the houses.

Bricks were delivered from Mályi, tiles from Békéscsaba, wooden material was cut and sawn in the village. The house was modern, for instance, it had central heating. It was completed in 1983.

On March 1, 1984 a great change took place in the life of the family, since Károly Porkoláb Jr. resigned from the Táncsis Co-operative for personal reasons. He went to work for the forestry property of Tiszadob. His wife also resigned and went to work in the children's home of Tiszadob. From forestry work Károly Porkoláb Jr. earned half the salary he had had at the co-operative. Instead he had much more free time and his job was now more peaceful and balanced. At the same time he took over the running of the household farm from his father, Károly Porkoláb Sr.

Already before leaving the co-operative Károly Porkoláb Jr. had bought a cow, but real improvement took place in the farm only after he took the new job. The farm was very suitable for cattle-breeding, there was professional knowledge, and the senior farmer could also help with his experience. They started to enlarge the cattle stock rapidly, but not with the old Hungarian speckled type, but with the red and black speckled Fries type, more suitable for intensive milk production.

5 The Hienonen Family at Niittyharju

The Hienonen family lives in Central Finland, in Lankamaa. Three lakes along the road to Rautalampi surround Lankamaa: Kynsivesi on the east, Leivonvesi on the south and Kuusvesi on the west. The area of the village was inhabited already in the sixteenth century. It belonged to Hankasalmi parish until 1967,

when it was connected to Laukaa to which it still belongs. Electricity was installed in the village in 1949, telephone connection was built in 1959, and the road suitable also for car traffic was laid in 1960–61. The shop vans of Keskimaa, Mäki-Matti, Topelius, Lukkarinen and Kyläri supplied the population of the village until 1992. The trucks of Valio and Mäki-Matti transported the milk from Lankamaa. Post is delivered 6 days a week, and a library-bus and a passenger bus comes regularly to the village. The community has organized regular taxi transport for those, who need it.⁵⁷

The Hienonen family lived on the central area of the present farm as crofters before the national crofters' emancipation of 1917. After 1919 the family started private farming, similarly to many Finnish peasant families. The present farmer's great-grandfather, Taavetti Hienonen built the first family house at Niittyharju. Today houses (2) and farm-buildings are situated close to each other. A pine tree and some remnants of the stone basement show the place of the first house on the other side of the brook running through the estate.

The first farmer and his son were both smiths. Nobody continued their work later on in the family. Iisakki Hienonen, the son of Taavetti and Silja Hienonen, married a Helli from Savio, near Jyväskylä. Iisakki and Helli – as they were called in the village – built a new house in 1922, which is today called as the old house. One son was born in the family, Eino Hienonen. However, they also had a foster-child, adopted from the wife's family.

Iisakki Hienonen led the estate, which consisted of forests, plough-fields, pastures and hayfields. They also kept cows, pigs, sheep, horses and hens. The farm was self-supporting, although they also marketed some products, mainly by barter. The farmer, being a smith, earned his living not only from farming – he was a handyman. He completed everything he once imagined. He made everything himself that he considered important for his family and the farm but also for his own amusement. He built boats in his workshop, which he sold. This provided remarkable extra income for the family. He also

made a *kantele* and an accordion. He built the first water system from wood in the village, and it provided water both to the house and the farm buildings. He dammed the water up in the brook running through the farm, and this ran the generator he himself planned and built. This system provided the farm with electricity, until the state electrification reached the village. Using their own electricity was not easy, as they did not have a transformer. The current was either too strong, so all the lamps had to be switched on in the house, or too weak so that the planing machine could run but the mill could not always be operated. Despite the difficulties it was a great achievement considering the circumstances of the 1940s. Before the Second World War they had already used machines on the farm, which were powered by internal engine motors. The electric ones built by Iisakki Hienonen modified these machines after the war.

The farm in this period aimed at complete self-sufficiency and developed intensively. Homemade machines and equipments helped the work in the farm and the household. At this time the family owned a landed property of 12 hectares and servants worked on the farm already in this period.

The Junior Heinonen's, namely Eino Hienonen's wife, Eila Muurikainen, came first to the farm as a servant in 1947. Having been away for a year, she came back to the family as a wife. Eila Muurikainen's family lived close to Lankamaa. On the paternal side she came from a well-to-do farmer family. Her father's father owned a land of 1000 hectares. However, Eila's father had not been in good terms with his father – he did not inherit anything after the father died. The family had to send their children, among them Eila, to serve on other family farms as usual in Finland at the time.

Now, when the family became larger with the arrival of the new wife, it had 6 milk cows, 2 mares, which had colts in succession. They kept approximately 20 sheep, 10 pigs and poultry. The farm was still led by Iisakki Hienonen but the young couple did most of the work. The farmer spent his days mainly in his workshop, and took part in farming only in time of summer season. The family lived on a common budget. They ate at the

same table and the farmer arranged all financial affairs. He checked everything very carefully both in the family and on the farm.

Until 1953 Iisakki Hienonen led the farm. His son, Eino Hienonen, succeeded him. His parents had only him and so the process of inheritance went smoothly. Eino Hienonen inherited everything but they made a contract on selling and buying property and on pension to the parents. But they still lived together, ate at the same table, and this remained so until the parents died. When they stroke the contract a couple from Tahkokorva arrived as witnesses. The contract regulated everything in detail: it told how much butter, flour, potatoes and other food as well as hygiene products constituted the pension, even Iisakki Hienonen's daily cognac portion was listed which he drank on medical prescription. The contract ensured a respectable life for the elderly parents. Money was not mentioned in the contract, since the young couple had officially bought the farm from the parents. They had one year from the signing of the contract to pay the whole sum of money, and when the payment took place between father and son, nobody knew exactly to what extent it was finally completed. As the parents had their own money, the contracted pension was called 'life-pension', i.e. the young couple had to support the elderly parents for the rest of their lives. Had the parents moved away, for instance, the points of the contract should have been followed very strictly. The family, however, agreed to continue living together and they stayed on good terms with each other.

After the farm became Eino Hienonen's property in 1953, the family continued agriculture and developed it. Eino did not continue his father's job as a smith – he did not make boats, saying that if he also started making boats, farming and agriculture would come to an end. He began intensive improvements on the farm. In the beginning they milked 4-5 cows and had a tank of 10 liters to store and transport milk daily. During winter time the amount of production of milk was not enough to fill it but when production started to grow, they acquired a 20-liter tank which became almost full in summer time. Five years after Eino

had become the farmer and the family had with great efforts gathered the capital, they started to build a new cowshed.

Men worked not only on the farm, but took up other jobs as well to get some extra income for the family. Iisakki Hienonen made boats but his son, Eino took up transport and forestry work and also hunted to earn extra money. The family had two horses in this time. With one of them Eino delivered wood in the forest during the winter. Often the housewife's brother and other neighbors, or often she herself drove the horse on the farm when his husband was away from home. He was away from home not only due to delivery jobs, but he also went to cut and float wood for weeks. The most popularly hunted animal was squirrel, since its fur could be sold most profitably. The fur was salted and put out to dry on the wall of the house. Then they were sold in Jyväskylä where a lady who had a squirrel fur coat was considered very rich.

On the farm there were also sheep, usually around 20. They were kept for own consumption, but some of them were also sold. Their sheepskin was salted and prepared for making winter blankets, waistcoats and coats. Women spun the wool at home. In summertime the family fattened pigs, at times as much as eleven, and sold them in Kytönniemi or slaughtered them for family consumption. They kept hens, but only for their eggs, since they did not eat their meat. Besides mutton and pork they also ate beef. They slaughtered one bull each year.

Women cared for the cows and completed different household duties. They also earned extra income by selling dairy-products and bread. Since there were families which did not regularly bake bread, women on the Hienonen farm baked bread for them as well.

The family aimed at complete self-sufficiency; they bought very few products from shops or tradesmen, mostly sugar and salt as well as textiles for clothing, and particular tools and utensils they could hardly make at home. They bought them either in a grocery or from an itinerant vendor. The nearest grocery was in Laukaa; itinerant vendors came with their goods in a certain time of the year.

The family grew rye and barley, which they took to the mill. The nearest mills were situated in Lievestuore and later in Lankamaa. The family also had a home mill which almost supplied their complete flour needs. At times the home mill ground the rye so white that it could be used for baking yeast bread. Saturday was the baking day for women. They baked buns, yeast bread and rye bread but they did not need to bake rye bread every Saturday for it lasted longer. Baking yeast bread and buns on Saturdays was a must for women. They baked buns from 4-5 kg flour but they often ran out by the middle of the week. So they just waited for the next baking day.

The family did its duties according to a certain order, kept the meals of the day, and divided the duties of the week. The annual feasts also had their own place, their accustomed order. The family got up every morning at five o'clock, had a cup of coffee together and then everybody went to her/his duty: some to the cowshed, some outdoors, some stayed indoors depending on the nature of the task. In the 1940s and 1950s only men worked in the forest, on the arable land and hayfield, and with the carriages. In those days men did not work do housework, not even in the cowsheds. The breakfast was ready by 7 o'clock, and it was made of potatoes and some kind of sauce. Then around ten or eleven o'clock they again had coffee together. They ate lunch between midday and one o'clock, three o'clock in the afternoon they had coffee together again. They had dinner at seven; by that time everybody had finished working. Later this order changed, when Eino and Eila Hienonen became the owners. Men took coffee, sandwiches and buns with them to the forest. When they arrived from woods a substantial warm meal awaited them, usually potatoes and meat. For breakfast they often had rye porridge, but the most popular food was potato with some kind of meat or sauce or fish. If they worked at home, the family usually had a rest after lunch, and after that everybody continued working. The family went to sauna on every Wednesday and Saturday. On six days of the week everybody worked, but Sunday was a day for rest. Similarly to other days of the week they got up at five and looked

after the animals but Sunday was a sacred day and they did not do any other work. The order of the meals was the same as on weekdays.

Going to church was very important. They went to church in Laukaa, which was 15 kms away from their house across the lake. In summer they went to church by motorboat, in winter by horse sledge. Those who could not go to church listened to the service on the radio at home. On Sunday afternoons neighbors visited each other. Either somebody came to the family, or the family visited somebody in the neighborhood to talk and have a cup of coffee. Christmas was the main feast of the year. The family was always present at the service in the church at six o'clock in the morning together with the others from the surroundings. On the first Christmas day they fed the horses earlier in the morning. The cows were given so much hay the evening before, that they did not have to bother about feeding them in the morning, they only milked them. Jingling sledges from every direction were heading to the Laukaa church on the ice early in the morning. After the service they went home competing, who would arrive home first.

On Sundays on the way home from church men did not drive the horses any longer, but sat back in the sledge and the horses were left to find the way home. Men always had spirits with them in sledges, and some of them got drunk on the way home.

Self-sufficiency literally meant that everything the family needed was to be homemade. For instance, flax was grown and women wove linen at home and made underwear from it. However, they wore homemade linen clothes only until the 1940s, later that they bought textiles from the shops and made their clothes at home of it. Underwear was made at home for a longer time but a tailor from Laukaa made, for instance, men's suits or they bought them in Jyväskylä. From leather they made blankets, waistcoats, coats and gloves. Gloves made from dog leather were the warmest. Besides clothing it was food that they produced and gathered themselves. Main products have already been mentioned but the family picked up berries in the forest, mainly cowberries and blberries. They also sold cowber-

ries but usually they conserved them for themselves for the winter. Bilberries were dried, or they made jam of them. From red bilberries they made jam, or stored them mashed in their own juice in which they lasted even without sugar. They picked great amount of mushrooms, which they salted and conserved in small pots. They salted lot of fish and conserved it in big wooden tubs, just like meat. In autumn they salted more fish than in spring. They salted pike and bream in springtime. Bream was salted, then dried in the sun or in the oven, and stored in the pantry or in the attic in large baskets. They cooked fish together with potatoes; the salt coming out of the fish salted also the potatoes. For salting meat and fish they bought coarse salt in sacks of 50 kg, and they bought sugar in 5-10 kilo lumps. Of the belly and stomach and other intestines of the animals they did not eat, soap with alkali bought in the shop was made. They grew carrots, potatoes, beetroots, cabbages, onions, turnip, swede and sugar beets in the fields around the house. They drank home made beer and sour milk; home made beer and milk were always available at the table.

The family could start building a new cowshed in 1958. In it they installed a milk tank of 40 liters, and also brought in new cattle breed which they produced more and fatter milk. At the beginning of the 1960s they completely gave up sheep breeding. They increased the number of cows and young cattle instead. Already at the end of the 1950s the family joined a tractor society and used it together with other four farms. This was always driven by the same person in order to avoid quarrel about possible problems in the work. The Hienonen family bought their own tractor, a Nuffield in 1962, which was used in ploughwork and in the forest. Together with the tractor a milking machine, crucial on a dairy farm, was bought. The farmer and his friend used this machine in milking the cows, since the wife did not like it and continued to milk by hand. When the new cowshed was built, they joined the society of milk testing. They started to transport milk to the milk bay around 1954-55, when the road suitable for cars was built in the neighborhood. In the beginning they took the milk of only three cows to the dairy,

churned butter from the milk of four cows at home, and marketed it, like in old times. However, finally all the milk was taken to the dairy. At first milk went to Äänekoski dairy, later to Jyväskylä. At first farmers collected their milk in a nearby house from where in the summer a motorboat, in the winter a horse sledge took the milk to a collecting point where a truck collected and transported it to the dairy. Although the family sold the milk, they still drank their own milk and churned butter from it for domestic use.

When the family joined the society of milk checking, they handed down milk with 6% fat content. The new cows gave so high-quality milk that the Hienonens won several prizes with them. Hard work, good caring and investment bore fruit. The family farm became specialized by conversion to a dairy farm at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s firstly by reducing, later by eliminating other activities. They strengthened the main profile of the farm buying new machines, equipment and investing their capital. They bought a forest of 19 hectares which also served the improvement of the farm. The Hienonen farm was an example for the neighboring farms. Many people came to ask for advice and many people saw how the farm was run because the post of the 7-8 families was delivered to the Heinonens. People coming to pick up their post stopped for a moment to talk with the members of the family.

Unexpected deaths divided the family into two and halted the tendency of improvement on the farm. In January 1965 Iisakki Hienonen died, shortly afterwards his wife, Helli passed away and the most hitting death was that of Eino's in May. Eino and Eila Hienonen had three sons. Markku was 11, Martti 9 and Reijo 6 years old, when their father died and Eila was left alone with her sons and the farm. Her brother, Antti helped her a lot for two years while he also lived on the farm. Often women, but also men from the neighboring houses came to help. The two elder boys, Markku and Martti, helped the most. It was his father who taught Markku how to drive a tractor, and the young boy liked this work very much. He often helped her mother driving the tractor, since Eila could not handle it al-

though she tried. Martti helped on the farm in everything; he worked in the cowshed, on the hayfield, on the plough field or in the forest. Although he was still at elementary school, it maybe said that he worked like an adult.

Eila's bother, Antti left to Helsinki after two years. Eila had to run the farm by herself again. However, with the neighbors' and children's help he could manage and the farm started to improve again. Improvement of the fields already started, horses were sold and machines did all the heavy work. Markku became an architect; at present he lives in Oulu. Reijo studied a trade and lives now with his family on the lakeshore part of the farm. Martti stayed at home in the old house with his mother. He is the one, who has continued farming.

After primary school Martti studied at a farmers' college (*maamieskoulu*) which lasted for a winter. He has been living on the farm ever since. At first his mother ran the farm, later Martti himself as he bought up the farm in 1982 from his brothers, Markku and Reijo. He made a contract with his mother based on the same principles as the one his parents made with his grandparents 30 years earlier. When Martti Hienonen bought the farm, the area was 40 hectares, out of which 10 hectares were ploughed. They had 12 cows, five bulls, five growing heifers and some hens. Later Reijo bought from Martti the summer house situated on the lakeshore and the land around it.

Martti gradually enlarged his estate and improved the farm. He started to cultivate a part of the wooded land, and also bought new arable land which slowly amounted to 23 hectares. The plough lands are all situated in the area of Lankamaa, besides there is forest of 40 hectares which is mostly situated in the same area. The landed and wooded areas together with the house and the land around it now come to a little bit more than 60 hectares. He not only enlarged the farm but following in the footsteps of his parents modernized it. Later he built a new cowshed where he installed a new piped milking system with milk-cooling tanks. He bought a new machine every year either in the cowshed or for the work on cultivated lands and in the forest. In 1981 he renovated the main living-house built by his

great grandfather. Downstairs there is a sauna, a laundry-room, a bathroom, a toilet, a living-room (*tupa*), a kitchen, and an office room. Eila Hienonen lives upstairs in a separate apartment; and in the other part there are two rooms. The old fireplace remained in the house as a heater; it heated a new central boiler. In the new cowshed functions a separate heating center and the central boiler of the heating system is there. The building is at the same time a store for firewood, also a workshop and a garage for cars and tractors.

Martti also continuously improved the cattle stock. He grew oat, barley and hay on the fields, he strengthened the profile of the farm – milking cows and live stock (*lihakarja*) at the end of the 1970s. However, it was still milk production that made the bigger profit.

After taking over the farm Martti got married. Solja came to the family as a wife in 1985. Since then the structure of the family and the method of farming changed. This change was not only due to the new housewife's will but also to the national change of economy which deeply affected the life of Finnish family farmers. The term 'family farm' is fitting because in Finland for the families, who started to live on the land and insistently continued to live on agriculture throughout the years, farming was not only a source of living, but also a lifestyle. Farming determined their everyday life, with its positive and negative sides. The family and its source of living, i.e. farming, were strictly connected. The private farms specializing only in one single product, have managed to continue farming in case the whole family was involved in it. Thus 'family farm' describes them most precisely.

Looking over the 40 years, the following changes took place at the Hienonen farm. They already had their own generator providing electricity around 1945. The village gained central electricity in 1949 and the family has also used this since then. Iisakki Hienonen also built a water supply system from wood at the end of the 1940s. Eino Hienonen renovated this system while rebuilding the cowshed, which since then has been modernized following the requirements of the age. There is still no public water supply system in Lankamaa. Each house has its

independent water pipe system and pump for drinking water supply. This is a general practice in the Finnish countryside. The telephone system was installed in the village in 1959; also the Hienonen family received a telephone-line then. However, they shared it with the Friman family. The two families could use the line by turns. When it rang twice, the call was for the Hienonen family; when once, it was for the Frimans. In 1971 the manual telephone system was altered to an automatic system in the village. The family had a washing machine already in the 1950s and they bought the first refrigerator at the end of the 1960s and their first freezer in the 1980s. They heated the house by a wood stove until 1981 when heating was modernized with the already mentioned central heating system. They installed a modern bathroom also at the time.

6 Conclusion

Since 1945 Hungarian villages and their inhabitants have been tested in many ways. In 1945 the abolition of the system of large estates marked the end of an era, while the redistribution of land opened a new one. The country of servants and landless peasantry became the country of smallholders. The new situation did not last very long either. In 1948, three years after the redistribution of the land, family estates were already regarded as obstacles of the socialist regime. Family farms strived further until 1958 under political pressurizing. Between 1958 and 1962 yet another far-reaching change took place in the Hungarian agriculture: the process of general collectivization was started. Co-operative farms were established all over the country. This changed the structure of agriculture and the life of farming families radically. People tried to get accustomed to the new conditions, meaning a struggle for survival for them. Most of the people staying in villages worked in co-operatives, and in a few years time slow economic growth was reflected also in the living standard of the Hungarian village population. However, the 'survival' of this social stratum has always been crucial for those in power, since their very existence depended on the well-being of the peasantry.

Villagers adapted themselves to the new circumstances: they aimed at enlarging and improving the small private property they were allowed to have, i.e. the household farms. The cultivation of household lands was fundamental for both the system and the owner of the land. Conditions in Hungarian villages improved. New houses were being built, electricity and water supply was installed, cars and household machines and equipment appeared in the households during the 1960s and 1970s.

In Hungarian villages a strong stratum of farmers could not develop within the discussed time period. Prominent farmers were eliminated from the villages during kulak persecutions. The stratum of active farmers disappeared from the Hungarian countryside. The called co-operative peasants stayed in the villages. The expressions 'farmer' and 'landholder' had disappeared from everyday language usage. Instead, Hungarians referred to peasants, often pejoratively, regarding somebody as uneducated and uninformed. In Hungary villagers were often identified with these negative characteristics during the time period discussed.

In Finland after the Second World War agriculture became stronger – 94,000 new individual estates started cultivation. However, in consequence the average size of a property decreased from 10 hectares to 8-9 hectares. After the war the number of village inhabitants increased, also the number of children grew. Consequently, a lot of schools were founded in the Finnish countryside.

Owing to the fast developing agriculture Finland reached the level of national self-sufficiency in the 1950s. Nonetheless, this soon led to agricultural overproduction. As a result Finnish government aimed at abolishing small and uneconomic farms. The state even gave subsidies to those giving up agricultural activity. Consequently, at the end of the 1960s great changes took place; Finnish society with a majority of village population living from agriculture turned into a consumer, primarily urban society within a few years period.

One million people gave up farming. Most of them left the countryside and moved either to the big towns of southern Finland or to Sweden.

At the end of the 1970s the state encouraged specialization in agriculture in order to sustain village life in Finland. Family farm became the basic unit of agriculture. The Finnish countryside turned into a producer of raw material. During the 1980s agricultural overproduction continued and the farmers received remarkable subsidies. The following differences can be traced between the situations of villagers in the two countries within the discussed period: due to political pressure, collectivization and its consequences formed the outlook of Hungarian villages. They lost a definitive stratum of their population, that of the independent, active farmers. The value system changed, the land, as a basis of agriculture was no longer a key-concept and a reality defining values and making wealth in Hungary. In fact, its position in Hungarian society was not taken by any alternative, until land was again privately owned in the 1990s. Hungarian village population lost its land in the 1960s and looked for other ways of economic activity, often showing off and exaggerating. However, we can state that Hungarian village dwellers were in a disadvantageous position regarding social welfare if compared to urban population.

On the contrary, in Finland a stratum of strong private farmers could develop, also due to political situation. Nonetheless, the alteration of this stratum had also dramatic effects on the whole country. As working opportunities drastically decreased in the countryside, a great deal of the population moved away. Consequently, the very survival of several villages was questionable. Finnish society became urbanized very rapidly which caused difficulties both for villagers and for urban population. The improvement of the Finnish countryside took place almost as speedily as urban modernization. Owing to both modernization and traditionalism so characteristic of Finnish village population, it faced and experienced modernization in a way that it did not lose its inherited customs and methods completely.

NOTES

- ¹ Ignác Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században*. Budapest: Osiris 1999, 281-82; Tibor Valuch, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében*. Budapest: Osiris 2002, 190; Zsuzsanna Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig'. In Estók János (szerk.), *Agrárvilág Magyarországon 1848–2002*. Budapest: Argumentum Kiadó – Magyar Mezőgazdasági Múzeum 2003, 265.
- ² Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 264; Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században*, 282.
- ³ Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 266.
- ⁴ Ferenc Donáth, 'A kisparaszti mezőgazdaság 1945–1949'. In Gunst Péter–Hoffman Tamás (szerk.), *A Magyar mezőgazdaság a XIX–XX században, 1849–1949*. Budapest 1976, 401-472; Sádorné Laczka. 'A földterület és a földhasználat alakulása 1945 és 1994 között'. *Statisztikai Szemle* 2/1998, 117-129; József Nádasdi, *Tagosítások és birtokrendesek Magyarországon a XIX. század közepétől 1956-ig*. Nyíregyháza 1996, ff.
- ⁵ Varga 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 265.
- ⁶ Valuch, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében*, 213-234; Gyula Belényi, *A sztálini iparosítás emberi ára 1948–1956*. Szeged: JATE 1993; Antal Böhm, László Pál, *Társadalmunk ingázói – az ingázók társadalma*. Budapest: Kossuth 1985.
- ⁷ Leninváros is situated 20 km from Tiszadob between Polgár and Tiszadob. Miskolc is 40 km; Kazincbarcika is 60 km from Tiszadob. There used to be a pontoon bridge or ferry connection on the river Tisza.
- ⁸ I consider 'old farmers' or 'old farming families' the ones which had their own private family estates already before 1945, and neither the farmers nor their family members worked on local large estates.
- ⁹ Varga 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 289.
- ¹⁰ I consider 'new farmers' those who received landed property in the land redistribution of 1945. They did not own a family farm earlier and earned their living by working on local large estates receiving different allotments.
- ¹¹ In the Hungarian villages the people who had lived on agriculture before the World War II stuck to their rights to own land which they gave up only until under coercion in the beginning of the 1950s.
- ¹² Béla Fazekas, *A mezőgazdasági termelőségmozgalmak Magyarországon*. Budapest: Kossuth 1976; Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században*, 374-382; Valuch, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX.*

- század második felében, 191-94; Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 283-293.
- ¹³ Veres Péter, *Az alföld parasztsága*. Budapest 1936; *Szocializmus, nacionalizmus*. Budapest 1939; *Falusi krónika*. Budapest 1941; *Paraszsors – magyarorsors*. Budapest 1942; *Próbatétel*. Budapest 1951; *Pályamunkások*. Budapest 1951; *Gyepsor*. Budapest 1954; *Három nemzedék*. Budapest 1957.
- ¹⁴ Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 283.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 238.
- ¹⁶ Pál Závada, *Kulákprés*. Budapest 1986; *Jadviga párnája*. Budapest 1997; Jávor Kata – Molnár Mária - Pirooska Szabó – Sárkány Mihály, 'A falusi társadalom a szocializmus időszakában'. In Paladi-Kovács Attila (szerk.), *Magyar néprajza VIII. Társadalom*. Budapest: Akadémiai 2000, 981, 1001.
- ¹⁷ Valuch, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében*, 192; Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 288-289.
- ¹⁸ Szabolcs-Számár-Bereg Megyei Önkormányzat Levéltára (= The Archives of the Counties Szabolcs, Szatmár and Bereg (SzSzBML), XXIII.812.TÜ jko. 1950. The file XXIII.812 contains minutes concerning Tiszadob.
- ¹⁹ Valuch *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében*, 194-95; Varga 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 293.
- ²⁰ Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 290-91.
- ²¹ Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században*, 374-382; Valuch, , 240-46; Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 294.
- ²² SzSzBML, XXIII.812. TÜ jko. 1953; Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 294-96.
- ²³ Valuch, 193-94; Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 294-95.
- ²⁴ SzSzBML, XIII.812. TÜ jko. 1954-55.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, VB jko. 1956.
- ²⁶ Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 269.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 299.
- ²⁸ SzSzBML, XXIII.812. VB. jkv. 1957.
- ²⁹ Valuch, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében*, 195; Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 301.
- ³⁰ Fazekas 1976; Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 204-309.
- ³¹ Varga 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 316.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 316-317.
- ³³ Romsics , *Magyarország története a XX. században*, 423-454; Varga 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 320.
- ³⁴ Varga, 'Az agrárium 1945-től napjainkig', 326.

- ³⁵ Péter Elek, Béla Gunda, Zoltán Hilscher, *Elsüllyedt falu a Dunántúlon*. Budapest 1936; János Kodolányi, *Ormánság*. Budapest 1960; Kalász 1961.
- ³⁶ Jávör – Molnár – Szabó – Sárkány, 'A falusi társadalom a szocializmus időszakában', 989-992.
- ³⁷ Ákos Janó, 'A társasmunkák és a kendermunkák társas jellege Szatmárban'. *Ethnológia* LXXVII/1966, 517-527; 'A fonó munkaszervezeti és társas-összejöveteli formáinak történeti és recens vizsgálatához'. *Déri Múzeum évkönyve*. Debrecen 1979, 291-318.
- ³⁸ Jávör – Molnár – Szabó – Sárkány, 'A falusi társadalom a szocializmus időszakában', 989-992.
- ³⁹ Éva Valér, 'Az urbanizálódás falvakat érintő fő sajátosságai'. *A falu* 2/1987, 32.
- ⁴⁰ György Enyedi, 'A Magyar településhálózat átalakulása'. *A falu* 1/1985, 15-23.
- ⁴¹ Ibidem.
- ⁴² Pál Juhász, 'Az agrárértelelemiség szerepe és a mezőgazdasági szövetkezetek'. *Medvetánc* 1/1983, 191-224; Rudolf Andorka, 'A falusi társadalom változásai'. *Agrártörténeti Szemle* 1994/1-4, 3-26.
- ⁴³ Saarikangas, Kirsi, 'Puu, metsä ja luonto'. Toim. Lehtonen, Tuomas M.S., *Suomi. Outo pohjoinen maa? Näkökulmia Euroopan äären historian ja kulttuuriin*. Porvoo: WSOY 1999, 170-172.
- ⁴⁴ Petrisalo Katriina, 'Maaseutukulttuuri elää'. Toim. Kirkinen, Heikki, *Sukupolvien perintö 3. Talonpoikaikulttuurin sato*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1985, 193-226.
- ⁴⁵ Korhonen, Teppo, 'Maaseudun elämäntavan muutos'. Toim. Löytönen Markku & Kolbe, Laura. *Suomi. Maa, kansa, kulttuuri*. Helsinki: SKS, 1999, 136-155.
- ⁴⁶ Petrisalo, 'Maaseutukulttuuri elää', 193-226; Pihkala, Erkki, 'Maa- ja metsätalouden uusi asema'. *Suomen taloushistoria* 2. Helsinki: Tammi 1982, 387-407.
- ⁴⁷ Väänänen, Jouko, 'Osuustoimintaimperiumien kukoistusaikaa'. Toim. Itälä, Jaakko, *Suomalaisten tarina 3. Rakentajien aika, 1937–1967*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1993, 152.
- ⁴⁸ Eskola, Antti, *Maalaiset ja kaupunkilaiset*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1965, 55-177; Pihkala, 'Maa- ja metsätalouden uusi asema', 387-407.
- ⁴⁹ Vuorela, P., Kosonen M., Virtanen, P.V., *Suomalainen maaseutu*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1983, 110-114.
- ⁵⁰ Clear soup with boiled potato and pastry cut into big irregular pieces.
- ⁵¹ It is a kind of noodles.

⁵² In order to understand the prices better it may be pointed out that a pair of an adult's leather boots cost at the time 15 pengő, a pair of children boots 8 pengő and a milking cow 120 pengő. Fillér was the change for the pengő.

⁵³ They took the milk twice a day 2-3 km away.

⁵⁴ Despite difficulties, people like them somehow managed to fare better.

⁵⁵ According to the family, Béni Siető was not astute enough so that they did not receive bigger and better landed property.

⁵⁶ Agricultural College.

⁵⁷ Leinonen, Otto & Pietiläinen, Martti, *Lankamaa. Vesien helmi, saloseudun kukka*. Lankamaan kyläseura ry, 1995, 9-10.

Co-evolution of People Politics and Production: Finnish Agriculture after the Second World War

Jari OJALA

1 Introduction

Finland is one of the northernmost agricultural countries in the world. Therefore, the short growing season and disadvantageous weather conditions are the basic constraints for Finnish agriculture. The growing season in the southernmost parts in Finland is around 180 days, whilst in the north only 120 days. Despite these drawbacks the Finnish agricultural production faced a growth in productivity during the post-war period. This was due to the modernisation and commercialisation of the agriculture. Also, a number of institutional changes can be seen as the reasons behind the growth. Finnish farming was a success story in production terms, though at the same time the rural areas and the population faced structural change, including massive migration from the rural areas.

As one of the pioneers in the study of structural change in agriculture, T. W. Schultz, already stated in the early 1950s, the development of Western economies can be characterised by a decline of the aggregate input of the community to produce farm products¹. Also in Finland the growth of productivity enabled the feeding of the Finnish people with less labour input into agricultural production. Right after the Second World War Finland was still a country highly dependent on the agricultural sector. By the end of the century the situation changed dramatically: the status of agriculture in Finland declined in terms of

both its contribution to the national economy and its role as an employer. Primary production in 1950 accounted for 26% of gross domestic production (GDP) and 46% of the labour force, whilst by 1985 its share has declined to 8% of GDP and 14% of the labour force (Table 1). In 2002 the proportion of agriculture² was only 1.5% of GDP and 4% of the labour force, though in the vast rural areas agriculture and forestry together formed the most important field of activity.³

The changes in Finnish agriculture are among the basic determinants in explaining the economic, social and political developments of the country during the latter half of the 20th century. The development of agricultural production was a key factor in launching the massive emigration from the rural areas to the urban centres – thus preparing the ground for urbanisation of Finland that occurred during this time period. Furthermore, the rise in production and productivity made it possible to lower the prices of foodstuffs; together with the growth of wealth people spent less on food and drink. For example, in the late 19th century over 50% of the private consumption expenditures still went to foodstuffs (not including drink), whilst this share decreased to one third in the early 1950s, to one fourth by the early 1980s, and to c. 14% by the early 21st century.⁴

During the post-war period agriculture made a considerable impact on the industrial development within the country. The food industry emerged to become the fourth largest industrial branch in Finland, including meat processing, the dairy industry, the bakery industry, and the brewing and soft drink industry. The agriculture based cluster of industries evolved, including not only food industries but also various other industries, for example, the machinery of metal industry production and tools (such as tractors) to be used in agricultural production. The most important industrial sector during the post-war era, namely the forest industry, was also closely linked to the developments of the agricultural sector due to the fact that the greatest proportion of the forest was owned by farms up to the 1970s.

One of the main characteristics of Finnish agricultural produc-

tion throughout history has been the privately owned, relatively small-sized farms. The role played by the central government in providing possibilities for agriculture has been another key factor. This paper aims to stress the co-evolutionary progress of Finnish agricultural production on the one hand, and the changes in society/government as a whole on the other. It is not possible to explain the other without taking into consideration the changes in the other determinant. Namely, during the period Finnish society and the economy in particular faced a number of changes. Agricultural production can be seen as pivotal in this process. Also, agricultural production was highly dependent on the complex socio-economical and macro-level political constraints. Following the basic ideas of Nobel laureate Ronald Coase, agricultural production in privately owned farms was basically possible only because of property rights provided by the government; namely the rights to own farm land.⁵

The government also used its rights to govern land ownership in several phases in Finnish history, starting with general parcelling out of land in the 18th and 19th centuries, land acquisition acts in the early 20th century and right after the Second World War. In 1950 one third of all Finnish farms, namely over 100,000 farms, were established by land acquisition acts.⁶ All these changes were only possible by infringement of private ownership, and they all laid the basis for the further development not only in agricultural production but for the countryside in Finland as a whole.

Table 1. *Distribution of Employment 1860 – 1999, percent shares*

	Primary production	Secondary production	Services	Total
1860	79	14	7	100
1890	74	17	9	100
1920	60	20	20	100
1950	46	29	36	100
1980	13	34	53	100
1999	6	28	66	100

Sources: Tilastokeskus (www.stat.fi); Hjerppe, *Suomen talous 1860–1985: Kasvu ja rakennemuutos*, 286 – 291; Hjerppe, *The Finnish Economy 1860–1985. Growth and Structural Change*, 63; Tykkyläinen and Kavilo, *Maaseudun asuttaminen ja talouden rakennemuutos Suomessa*, 14; Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 15 – 16.

The structural change of the Finnish economy can be viewed from the macro level as a change from agriculture to a service economy in a short period of time. As Riitta Hjerppe has pointed out, the development of the Finnish economy differs from those of many other Western European countries, such as Sweden, Germany, or United Kingdom: the structural transition of the economy happened directly from primary production to services, without a period of industrial dominance in the economy – both in terms of labour force and share of the GDP.⁷ Yet agriculture was a major source of livelihood for a number of people until the end of the century. Even in the early 21st century ‘farmer’ was among the most common classifications of employment in Finland; for example, in 2002 there were almost 80,000 farmers in Finland⁸.

This article purports to answer the question how and why the change occurred. The structural change of Finnish agriculture during the post-war period has not yet been studied accurately enough. This paper tries to describe the basic development patterns by using the current research literature as well as statistical material as sources for the study. First, we will concentrate on the general structural changes in the Finnish economy by stressing the

institutional constraints, and second, on the change in the productivity of Finnish agriculture, with emphasis on the modernisation and commercialisation of agricultural production. For starters, some conceptual considerations are made.

2 Conceptual Setting

What were the possibilities for individual farmers in Finland to develop their agricultural production during the post-war era? On one hand, one might stress the exogenous constraints: the international competition on farm products which lowered their prices and made the domestic production highly difficult without the aid provided by the state. On the other hand, one might say that these subsidies by the state constrained production even further. These points are worth keeping in mind, though it is necessary to point out that even though these exogenous pressures existed there was still room for individual strategies not only at the governmental level for the national agricultural policies, but also for the individual farmers. Therefore, the key issue in the development of Finnish agriculture during the post-war era is to understand macro-level exogenous constraints and micro-level endogenous possibilities, and the co-evolutionary historical paths of these two levels.

The concept 'co-evolution' is being used in describing the long term development of industries in different societies. As Johann Peter Murmann has pointed out, in order to understand the 'paths' – either success or failure – of certain industries in certain countries, the role played by society, and the governmental role in particular, have to be taken into the analysis. Firms and industries are related to the society where they emerge and develop, and furthermore, the society as well is dependent on the evolution of the industries and other branches of the economy.⁹ Following this line of thought, also the development of agriculture should be seen as a product of co-evolution of society and production, people and politics. As Jon Lauck has pointed out, also in the United States during the post-war period farmers and politics interacted, launching processes of competition and concentration¹⁰.

In describing the evolution of Finnish agriculture, a number of rather complicated concepts are used, such as modernisation,

technological change, innovation, productivity, (structural) change, continuity (discontinuity), and the role played by the institutions. Even 'agriculture' itself is a highly problematic concept in the Finnish context. Namely, when analysing primary sources of livelihood for the agrarian people in this time period, the farm itself did not necessarily provide the main income for the family. The role of forestry was especially pronounced in providing extra income in many parts of Finland. Furthermore, working outside the farm was also common.¹¹

The possibilities for individual farmers to influence their sources of livelihood were seen in the contemporary texts as well as in research narrow – on the contrary the role played by the state as 'rule maker' is stressed. Regulation and protection in a semi-closed and protected economy was characteristic of all economic activities in Finland up to the early 1980s, of agricultural production in particular. Furthermore, protection and regulation were characteristic of the agricultural production and trade on agricultural products also in an international setting throughout the post-war era up to the 1990s, though attempts were made to 'open' and deregulate production and especially trade¹².

State intervention is usually understood as a necessity to correct market failures. By referring to the institutional economics the institutions should, however, be seen in a broader context. Following Douglass C. North, we stress that institutions should be understood as the 'rules of the game', whilst individual actors and organisations are 'players'. These rules include not only formal state legislation, but also various informal constraints, such as codes of conduct, values and historical dependencies.¹³ The school of 'public choice' has paid more attention to the interaction between institutions, organisations and individuals.¹⁴ The development of Finnish agriculture during the post-war period was highly dependent – at least at the political level – on the nexus-of-contracts and interplay between a number of actors. In the corporatist system the role played by the farmers' interest group, The Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (MTK) was paramount. Farmers succeeded in influencing national (agricultural) policies through it. The situation was similar in Sweden. The corporate decision making

process enabled MTK to get a more powerful position in the negotiations during the 1980s than it should have had in proportion to agriculture's share in GDP and the number of members in the interest group.¹⁵

'Modernisation' is in this paper understood as an outcome of a number of technological and institutional innovations. A number of factors contributed to the modernisation in agriculture, including the biological and natural conditions for agricultural production; the urban environment and industrialisation as a background for the demand of agricultural products but also in supplying tools and machinery for agricultural production; professional activity of farmers, including training, education and the services provided by a number of advisor organisations. Finally, modernisation is highly dependent on the possibilities of the individual farm to adapt to innovations, whether in terms of mental readiness for change or due to financial possibilities.¹⁶

Institutional innovations are here understood mainly as the results of national agricultural policies – though they were products of long processes in which the different actors had possibilities to exercise influence on the outcomes. Technological innovations include not only the mechanisation of agricultural production, but also cereal and cattle breeding, schooling of farmers, farm advising organisations and so on. Furthermore, neither the institutional nor the technological innovations are important before they are taken into common use.¹⁷ Within the technological innovations productivity and efficiency of production is usually stressed – as well in contemporary discussion as in the research. The growth of productivity was among the key issues in Finnish agricultural policy throughout the period – the concept, its causes and consequences were not called into question. However, even the measurement of productivity is tricky¹⁸. Although the growth of productivity enabled more production with less human input, it required more capital input. Therefore, agricultural production changed from labour-intensive to capital-intensive. This caused financial difficulties to individual farms due to investments to more efficient machines and better facilities, and also due to a number of environmental problems caused by massive utilization of artificial fertilizers and pesticides.¹⁹

The changes in Finnish agricultural production did not occur in a vacuum. On the contrary, the international structural changes in agriculture, food industries, politics and the trade of agricultural products describe a lot of the 'Finnish story' – especially from the late 1980s onwards when Finnish agriculture had to be adjusted not only to the standards and restrictions of the European Union, but also to GATT and WTO agreements.²⁰

3 The Change of the Finnish Economy and Agriculture

The basic patterns that influenced Finnish agriculture during the different decades are described in Table 2. In its perspective institutional patterns are overemphasized – the production and productivity patterns, as well as technological development will be described later. The general trend in the Table marks the primary problems in each time period, whilst 'key issues' refers especially to the debates in agricultural policy. The role played by the state is prominent. As a whole the principal aims of Finnish agricultural policy since the 1950s have been efficiency, self-sufficiency in farm products, an adequate income level for the farming population, ensuring the availability of foodstuffs, and the need to maintain settlement over the whole country²¹. The two last columns, namely type of production and ownership refer to the actor-level changes in individual farms.

Immediately after the war the key issue in Finnish domestic politics was the resettlement of the soldiers and the people from the lost Karelia.²² The process was enforced by a land acquisition act. Altogether 100,000 new homesteads were founded. From these homesteads one third were engaged in full-time agriculture, c. 15% practised agriculture as a secondary source of income, and the rest were not engaged in farming at all. The homesteads were established either by dividing the farmland of the older farms or by clearing land for cultivation. Over 9% of all farming land in the 1950s was created through land acquisition. Since the urban centres in Finland did not provide enough possibilities and the poor post-war country did not have anything else to offer, the resettlement to the countryside was an act of necessity in the post-war situation, but had long- term consequences. First, the average size of Finnish farms decreased

due to the fact that the new farms were small-sized, practically all below 15 hectares. Second, the resettlement partly delayed the urbanisation process in Finland, which began only during the 1960s when the people from the rural areas started to move in masses to the urban areas. Third, again partly due to the resettlement, agriculture remained as one of the most important sources of livelihood for the majority of the people. Fourth, resettlement was one of the major reasons for the problems related to the overproduction during the 1960s and 1970s.²³

Table 2.

Phases of development in Finnish agriculture, from the 1940s to the 21st century

	1940s and 1950s	1960s and 1980s	1990s and the early third millennium
General trend	Adaptation to the post-war economy	Overproduction	Adaptation to the European Union
Key issues	Resettlement, controlled economy, encouragement of agricultural production	Restrictions on production, out-migration from rural areas	Growth and structural change, viability of the rural Finland; Commercialisation
Type of production	Diversified, central role played by the additional incomes	Concentrated, additional income important	Concentration
Typical farm ownership	Small, family owned	Middle sized farms, family ownership	'Euro-sized' production units, family owned

Until the mid-1950s the Finnish economy was tightly controlled, especially food production due to the lack of some vital foodstuffs. Therefore, agricultural production as a whole

was encouraged to meet the growing demand. The resettlement of the armed forces and Karelian people were parts in this process as well. By the end of the 1950s the encouragement of greater agricultural production even proved to be too successful: agriculture was suffering from severe overproduction.

The restrictions of the agricultural production were among the most debated issues in Finnish politics throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Critical political borderlines were drawn according to the standpoints concerning the future of agriculture. The Agrarian Party (later Centre Party) had deep roots in the countryside and close connections to the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (MTK) and supported policies that would have kept Finnish agriculture profitable, whilst the Social Democrats opposed further subsidies to agricultural production. Among the debated issues from the 1950s on was, for example, how to ensure through incomes policies similar wage trends to farmers as the workers in the society had²⁴. The overproduction became a topic of public discussion in the late 1950s. Especially the overproduction of dairy products and eggs caused problems. Four special governmental committees were established to cope with the problems, the main concern being overproduction. The first committee (1958–1962) concentrated on the acute problems of exporting agricultural products to European countries and on the structural changes in rural areas. The second committee (1965–1967) concentrated more clearly on the overproduction and recommended quite unique solutions. The third (1977–1980) and fourth (1985–1987) committees concentrated on similar issues, with more emphasis on the structural changes not only in agriculture, but in the rural areas of Finland as whole.²⁵

The role played by the state in regulating agricultural production was important. Already in the beginning of Finnish independence it was regarded as a necessity to secure the domestic production of food in the case of crises. Therefore, domestic production was being subsidized, which was even highlighted in the post-war resettlement. Already during the late 1950s Finnish agriculture produced more food than could be consumed in domestic markets (Table 3). This continued in the

1970s, 1980s and 1990s, though there were annual changes in self-sufficiency in foodstuffs.

The export of agricultural products was problematic. In most of the industrialised countries, the import of agricultural products has been under control throughout the post-war era – these restrictions in import and farming subsidies are sometimes accused of being the main reasons for the high prices of agricultural products and overproduction²⁶. Finland, among other countries, has used import duties and quotas as the central tools in maintaining domestic agricultural production – the fact was that the production of agricultural products in Finland was not competitive in world markets. Therefore, export of the overproduction needed, again, governmental subsidies. Thus, it became evident that domestic production had to be cut. This was, however, politically difficult – the leading party (Agrarian Party) was dependent on rural votes. Cuts in the production could have also led to dramatic consequences in the Finnish economy as a whole.

Table 3.

Self-sufficiency in foodstuffs: production as percent of consumption

Product group	1970	1980	1990	2000
Cereals	114	70	175	103
Dairy products – liquids	..	129	122	112
Dairy products – fats	126	128	143	132
Beef	110	102	109	93
Pork	110	119	114	101
Eggs	136	151	137	114
Sugar	27	60	91	71

Source: Official Statistics of Finland (www.stat.fi); Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (<http://tike.mmm.fi>).

Due to overproduction, agriculture became to be highly subsidized in most of the Western countries. In Finland the subsidies to agriculture were highly controversial. The restriction

methods and subsidies formed a complex system, in which most of the export subsidies were paid by the farmers themselves.²⁷

More drastic measures to cut the overproduction were introduced during the 1960s and 1970s. Among the most innovative institutional restrictions was the field reservation system, suggested by the second agricultural committee in 1969. Within the field reservation system compensation was paid for fields allowed to lie fallow. Around 10% of the total area of cultivated land was withdrawn from active cultivation. The field reservation system was widely criticised, on the one hand on emotional grounds: it was seen as the embodiment of the stagnation of rural areas, where now the areas previously cleared for farming land with hard work were abandoned or reforested. On the other hand, the field reservation system also proved to be an insufficient measure to deal with the problems of overproduction. At the same time the market situation became easier due to the sales to the Soviet Union, weak crops and oil crises, which all increased world market prices for agricultural products. Furthermore, the massive out-migration from almost all the rural areas of the country diminished the number of active farms, especially small sized ones.²⁸ The migration did not include only a flow of people, but also a flow of capital from rural to urban areas – the patterns of forest ownership changed drastically, in particular. The outcome of migration was profound in the whole of Finnish society: in 1950 around one third of the population lived in urban centres, whilst by the end of the millennium the share was about 67%.²⁹

The measures by the state to restrict production somewhat stabilised the situation but at the same time restricted 'natural' development of the individual farms. For example, the production quotas on the dairy farms meant that the production had to be adjusted to a certain level for years to come.³⁰ The production quotas allotted to milk production were defined in the middle of the 1980s and were still in use in the early 21st century, though farms were enabled to 'buy' more quotas from each other from the 1990s on.

During the 1990s Finnish agriculture again faced a period of

change. The main determinant was Finnish membership in the European Union: Finnish agriculture had to adjust itself to its agricultural politics, diminishing farming subsidies, production quotas and other restrictions. Though Finland got a number of advantages to agriculture in the Treaty of Accession to the EU, joining the EU has caused the most profound structural changes in production since the resettlement after the Second World War. The number of active farms was decreasing rapidly, people were again moving from the countryside to urban centres, and the population in rural areas was growing old. The number of milk suppliers decreased to over half in 1990–2002, namely from about 43,500 to 20,000 farms. Furthermore, about 74,000 farms applied for the basic forms of agricultural support in 2002, whilst the number in 1994 was about 105,600 farms.³¹ Thus almost 30% of active farms had disappeared in less than ten years. More emphasis in political discussion was put on the viability of the rural areas, on the need to keep the countryside inhabited. The cultural values of the rural areas and landscape were stressed in public discussion.

Environmental considerations such as the pollutant impact of agriculture gained more interest in public discussion throughout the period. The massive use of fertilizers emerged. However, their use has decreased during the 1990s, due to growing interest in organic production, on the one hand, and because of the decrease of production on the other. Also, the development of fertilizers has enabled a decrease in their use. During the 1980s the use of fertilizers increased from ca. 1,000 million kilos to 1,200 million kilos, but during the 1990s it decreased to circa 750 million kilos (in 2002). When proportioning the amount of used fertilizers to the area in production, the decrease of usage was over 35% in 1990–2002.³² The organic production of dairy products started in the 1960s. State subsidized organic production, and the number of organic farms grew to 671 in 1990 and to 5,000 in 2001. Finnish organic farms comprised 6.5% of all Finnish farms in 2001 and took 5.5% of the country's arable area, i.e. 150,000 hectares was under organic cultivation.³³

4 The Changes in Agriculture on Farms

Behind the macro level changes from the 1940s to the end of the 1990s a number of changes occurred in the individual farms as well. A 'typical' Finnish farm cannot be found because of the variation in types of production (for example, from grain growing in the southernmost parts of the country to reindeer-keeping in the north) and because geographic and climatic conditions are so different in different parts of the country. Nevertheless, some general micro-level features might be listed.³⁴ Even though there were different types of farms, the structures were rather similar and farms developed to become more similar during the time period under investigation. The institutional constraints or normative pressures – especially domestic and EU laws – forced the farms to adapt to similar kind of structures and production. Furthermore, the competitive environment including technical (and even climatic) opportunities was the same to most of the farms.³⁵

The most typical Finnish farm throughout the period was owned by the family. In 2002 private persons owned 88% of farms, heirs and family companies eleven, corporations, foundations and cooperatives 0.7 and the state, municipalities and congregations 0.1%.³⁶ Family ownership of farms was not questioned in public debate and it seems to be evident that other modes of ownership were simply not regarded as possible in Finland thanks to the traditions of private ownership of farms and forests.³⁷ Furthermore, there have arisen problems related to the uneven – young people sought jobs in towns – age structure of farmers. To solve them, a number of measures were taken in order to facilitate the transfer of farms to descendants.³⁸

Throughout the period the employment of an extra labour force has been rare, except in the largest farms. Rather farmers themselves have sought auxiliary incomes, for example, in industries and services, either as a salaried employee or as a private entrepreneur. Statistics show that in 1951–1952 55.6% of the average income of Finnish farmers came from agriculture, 28.3% from forestry, and 15.3% from secondary sources. The share of additional income was larger in small-sized farms.³⁹ In 2002 over one fourth of Finnish farmers practised other entrepreneurship besides traditional farming; of them almost 70% were engaged in

different services such as contracting and tourism.⁴⁰

Forestry has always played an important role. As was with farm land, the private ownership of forest land remains dominant in Finland: in 2003 private families owned two-thirds of the country's forests and the remaining one-third belonged to the state, municipalities and companies. In the early 21st century an average farm had 58 hectares forest. During the 1960s over 50% of forest land was owned by farms; this number decreased to around 34% in 1986–1994, and in 2001 only 18% of the owners of the forest were farmers.⁴¹ This development is due to the fact that in a number of cases the partition of the forest was carried out between heirs, out of whom an increasing number lived in urban centres. In many parts of the country, one can argue, forestry is actually a more important source of income for farmers than agriculture. In general, the arable land area is larger and correspondingly, the forest area is smaller in the south than in the north.⁴²

'Typical' farming changed from diversified production to a more concentrated type of production. This meant that farms specialised in different types of production; in the early 1960s almost all Finnish farms produced dairy products (milk), whilst in the early 1980s only one third of Finnish farms still had cows⁴³. The proportional share of dairy production in Finnish agriculture has further decreased during the 1990s and early 21st century: in 1995 one third of farms produced dairy products, whilst in 2002 the share was a little over one fourth. At the same time the share of crop farms increased from 42 to 55%.⁴⁴ Certain farm animals such as sheep almost disappeared from the rural areas.⁴⁵

Especially from the 1980s onward the average size of the farms has been growing; together with modernisation of production equipment the 'typical' early 21st century Finnish farm has become quite different when compared to its late 1940s predecessor. The average area of arable land in 1950 was around eight hectares, whilst in 2000 it was already 25 hectares. At the same time the number of cows on an average dairy farm grew from four to fifteen, but the arable land and the labour force engaged in agriculture decreased. Therefore, the productivity of Finnish agriculture grew significantly.

5 Production and Productivity

The most typical farm was small, having around 5 to 10 hectares during the 1950s.⁴⁶ The rural settlement measures favouring small-sized farms implemented in the early years of independence and after the Second World War resulted in this, and actually already from the mid-19th century the average size of farms had decreased due to the settlement and partition of farms.⁴⁷ During the 1950s only a number of small farms with less than 10 hectares land increased (Table 4). The problems related to the small farm size were also recognized in governmental regulation: from the early 1960s on the centre of gravity within Finnish agricultural policies was to rationalise by increasing the size of farms.⁴⁸ The total number of farms decreased rapidly from the 1960s on; from 1972 to 1992 approximately 5500 farms were closed down every year⁴⁹. During the period under scrutiny, the number of small farms decreased rapidly, whilst in the largest farms it grew still: the number of farms with 30–50 hectares of arable land area increased 1.5-fold, and the number of the largest farms with over 50 hectares was almost eight times the number in 2002 than it was in 1950. Most of the growth of the largest farms occurred in the 1990s. The average size of the farm in the late 1960s was still under ten hectares, in the late 1980s it was around 12.5 hectares, in 1990 about 17 hectares, whilst in 2002 it was already 30 hectares⁵⁰. The most important reason for the relatively small size of the farms after the war was the land acquisition legislation at the beginning of Finnish independence and after the war. In 1950 of all active farms around 13% were created right after independence by the Leaseholders' Act and 19% by the land acquisition laws after the war. Thus the 'old' farms constituted below 70% of all farms though the area of arable land and the number of animals on the 'old' farms was higher than on the 'new' farms.⁵¹

The area of arable land decreased during the post-war era by about one fifth, the number of farms to one fourth and the agricultural labour force to one eighth (Table 5). However, at the same time the production of the crop yield (combined production

of wheat, rye, barley and oats) increased almost threefold, and total milk production decreased only by about one third. Consequently, the productivity within the agricultural sector grew (Table 6).

Table 4. *Number of Finnish farms by size of arable land area, 1950 – 2000*

Year	1–10	10–30 ⁵²	30–50 ⁵³	50–	Total
1950	231,371	62,478	9,931	1,507	305,287
1959	249,506	70,533	9,652	1,572	331,263
1969	206,731	77,575	11,034	1,912	297,252
1980	138,616	74,399	8,753	2,953	224,721
1990	47,035	64,637	12,678	4,764	129,114
2000	17,209	35,163	15,621	10,897	78,890

Sources: Niemelä, *Lääninlampureista maaseutukeskuksiin: maaseutukeskusten ja niiden edeltäjien maatalousneuvonta 1700-luvulta 1990-luvulle*, 351, 420; Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 16–18; Finnish Official Statistics (www.stat.fi); Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (<http://tike.mmm.fi>).

In order to measure the productivity of agriculture one has to take into consideration the number of farms and the labour force in farms compared to the production output. To put it simply, one can argue that productivity corresponds with the size of a farm; the average size of farms (arable land in use) increased threefold during the time period under study. Nevertheless, it has been emphasized in several studies that the small sized farms actually operate quite efficiently⁵⁴. The growth of average-size farms during the 1980s was approximately at the same level as in EC-countries at the time. However, the agricultural labour-force decreased more rapidly in Finland than in Europe. In a long-term perspective, the productivity of Finnish agriculture already increased before the Second World War significantly, but right after the war it diminished: the productivity in 1947 and 1948 was one fourth lower than it had been before the war. From the early 1950s on, however, agricultural productivity increased, but not as

much as in Finnish industries.⁵⁵ During the 1990s the productivity of agriculture increased more rapidly, for instance, in Sweden and in Denmark than in Finland.⁵⁶ In OECD-countries the productivity growth rate of agriculture was higher than the growth of productivity in manufacturing or services, or the growth of productivity per capita GDP during the post-war era.⁵⁷

Other productivity figures of Table 6 also show significant increase. Average milk production per cow doubled and the production of milk by dairy farms grew sevenfold – at the same time the number of cows diminished to one third (from 1.1 million to 355,000). The productivity growth in milk production was due to the fact that the small farms with only one or two cows ceased to exist. Furthermore, agriculture was specialized so that certain farms started to produce, for example, milk, and others concentrated on grain production. Thus, in 1950 over 90% of all farms produced milk, whilst in 2000 their share was below 30%. Average production per cow presumably grew even more than can be detected from Table 6, because the production is calculated only from the farms under the cattle control system – in the early 1950s only about one fourth of cows were monitored by the system, whilst in early 2000 the share was around three fourths. Crop yield production per farm increased over tenfold, even though the milk farms are included in the numbers. The overall productivity growth of the labour force can be seen from the fact that the arable land area per worker increased almost sevenfold during the time period.

However, the figures in Table 6 emphasize labour-related productivity at the expense of capital productivity. In order to produce more with less labour input, investments to modern technology have been necessary. Therefore, the productivity of capital, and with it, the total factor productivity has not necessarily developed as favourably as labour productivity. This also leads to the conclusion that despite the relative increase in productivity, agricultural production was not profitable during the 1990s. Similar phenomena also occurred in Finnish industry at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s.⁵⁸

Table 5.*Production indices in Finnish agriculture 1950 – 2000 (1950 = 100)*

	Arable land in use	Agricultural labour force	Number of farms	Crop yield (total)	Milk (total)
1950	100	100	100	100	100
1960	108	79	109	152	69
1970	113	47	97	202	77
1980	103	31	74	236	81
1990	86	22	42	306	72
2000	83	12	26	291	65

Sources: Niemelä, *Lääninlampureista maaseutukeskuksiin: maaseutukeskusten ja niiden edeltäjien maatalousneuvonta 1700-luvulta 1990-luvulle*; STV, Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja (Statistical yearbook of Finland); SVT, Suomen Virallinen Tilasto III, Maatalous; Maatalouslaskenta, Maatalouslaskenta 1990 (Agricultural census 1990); Maataloustilastollinen, Maataloustilastollinen vuosikirja 2002; Silntanen and Ala-Mantila, *Maatalouden kokonaislaskelmat 1980 - 1988*, 6 - 7.

Table 6. *Productivity indices in Finnish agriculture 1950 – 2000 (1950 = 100)*

	Average size (arable land)	Milk/cow	Production of milk/ milk farms	Production of crop yield/all farms	Arable land area/worker (hectarage)
1950	100	100	100	100	100
1960	100	116	70	140	137
1970	116	142	101	207	240
1980	140	170	222	320	336
1990	203	105	410	725	394
2000	316	207	710	1115	664

Sources: see previous table.

6 Mechanization and Commercialization

Productivity growth was highly dependent on the commercialisation and the technological change in agricultural production. Technological development included not only mechanisation, namely, machinery and tools, but also better production plants (for example, barns, piggeries, grain driers), and even cereal and cattle breeding. Also, centralised advising played an important role. As in all technological development the innovations as such are not important until they are taken into use. For example, tractors first came to Finnish fields already in the early 20th century, but it was only after the Second World War that the tractors replaced the older means of cultivating and harvesting in the fields. As an outcome, farming took on characteristics of factory-like production – ‘an industrial logic or ideal in agriculture’ emerged, as Deborah Fitzgerald has pointed out in the case of the United States - and the primary sector was commercialized towards ‘agribusiness’.⁵⁹ Though the commercialization or industrialization of agriculture in the Finnish case did not reach the level of the United States or some other major producers of agricultural products, the progress was all the same significant – especially when taking into consideration the climatic, geographical, population and capital constraints.

In the work on fields mechanisation was by no means the most important factor in the productivity growth; mechanization in field crops resulted in greatly increased hectarage (as seen in Table 6)⁶⁰. Furthermore, the use of fertilizers increased significantly production of crop yield. In milk production mechanisation alone cannot explain the growth in productivity, though mechanical milking machines and highly equipped dairy barns made it possible to increase the number of cows in farms. The growth of milk production per cow was related to the cattle control system which included all kinds of counselling from animal feeding to best-practise working methods.

The first phase of mechanisation in Finnish agriculture occurred during the latter part of the 19th century. At the time the most important inventions were new types of equipment used with horses in field work. The second mechanisation period occurred

from the 1950s to the 1970s, when tractors replaced horses and the combine harvesters became general⁶¹

Technological development has made it possible to overcome a number of climatic and geographical constraints that Finnish agriculture has faced throughout history. Mäkelä has pointed to three big problems in Finnish agriculture: a cold climate, small farm size and long distances from consumption centres. The cold climate and the short growing season do not only limit the possibilities for cultivation and crops, but also cause high production costs for dairy farming: warm buildings are needed for the cattle throughout the wintertime. The small size of the farms is partly related to the climate: it has been argued that it takes more time to take care of twenty cows in Finland than fifty cows in France or 150 cows in New Zealand. Thus, for example, in 1995 the average number of cows per dairy farm in Finland was only 11, in Germany it was 23, in Sweden 26, in Denmark 40, and in Great Britain 64⁶². In sparsely populated Finland marketing agricultural products is problematic and transportation costs are high.⁶³ Together they contribute to high production and transaction costs. With technological development, however, Finnish farms have at least partly been able to overcome these problems by more efficient machinery in fields and barns. Due to the short growing season and disadvantageous weather conditions Finnish agriculture is forced to use efficient machinery in the fields, and, for example, drying grain in special grain driers.⁶⁴

Usually there is only a limited time both for sowing in the spring and for harvesting in the autumn: therefore the work has to be completed as rapidly and efficiently as possible. As the average size of the farms increased but the possibilities to use a hired workforce remained limited, technology offered a solution to the problem. In field work the most important technological innovations that were taken into common use were tractors with all possible equipment and accessories, and the self-propelled combine harvester.

The general attitude in the rural areas towards modernisation has been, according to several studies, mainly supportive. Efficient farm production, modern production machines and faci-

lities, commercialisation, and progressiveness are understood among the farmers as positive values. They were also supported by agricultural politics; for example, the taxation system supported (even to excess) investments to modern production technology, such as tractors from the late 1960s on.⁶⁵ The positive attitude toward investments can be seen in the fact that from 1995–2002 around one fifth of the production costs in Finnish agriculture came from machinery and equipment. Together with building costs (10%) investments constituted almost one third of all production costs. The relative share of investments can be partly explained by the fact that the share of hired labour of production costs was below 10% for ‘outside’ labour was not typical for Finnish agriculture.⁶⁶

Table 7. *The number of tractors and horses on Finnish farms*

Year	Tractors	Horses
1920	147	391,000
1930	1,924	357,000
1941	5,916	350,000
1950	17,000	409,000
1960	87,000	225,000
1970	155,000	90,000
1980	220,000	21,000
1990	235,000	44,000
2000	333,000	58,000

Source: Aarnio, ‘Traktori’, 99; Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A Study of Farm Mechanization in Finland at Regional and Local Levels*, 53; Tilastokatsaus, Tilastokatsaus IV, 35; Maataloustilastollinen, Maataloustilastollinen vuosikirja 2002; STV, Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja (Statistical yearbook of Finland); SVT, Suomen Virallinen Tilasto III, Maatalous; Maatalouslaskenta, Maatalouslaskenta 1990 (Agricultural census 1990), 262.

The coming of tractors to farming is usually used as an indicator of the mechanisation of agriculture. As can be seen in Table 7, the number of tractors surpassed the number of horses

during the 1960s. During the 1930s there was approximately one tractor to every 200 farms, while by the late 1970s practically every farm had at least one tractor. Actually, the change was even more drastic as a consequence of the development of tractors: average horse power grew and the four wheel drive became common in the 1980s: by the end of the decade about 80% of the newly-bought tractors were four-wheel driven.⁶⁷ For an individual farm the purchase of a tractor was a huge investment. The tractors alone constituted, for example, in 2000 c. 50% of the value of sales of all farm machinery. Furthermore, different kinds of accessories and equipment for tractors (ploughs, harrows, fertilizers, and trailers) together constituted over 25% of all investments.⁶⁸

It was not the tractors themselves that made a change in the fieldwork methods, but the equipment that could be connected to them – especially after hydraulic lifting and three-point connection had become general. Tractors carried all kinds of equipment in sowing and harvesting time, but they were widely used also in forestry work, as well as in removing snow. Among the most important equipment and machinery one can mention, for example, combined drills which are said to have increased the crops of grains from 10% to 15% during the 1960s and 1970s.⁶⁹ In grain growing the single most important technological innovation that was adapted into common use was the self-propelled combine harvester.⁷⁰ In forestry chain saw made a huge impact also on agriculture, since especially for the small-sized farms forestry with traditional methods had provided important extra incomes. Thus, technological development as a whole led to structural change and to internal migration from the countryside to urban centres.⁷¹

The agricultural machines were at first mainly imported to Finland, but domestic production began quite early. Thus also the production of agriculture machinery followed the standard steps of technology transfer: from adaptation to own production and even to own development⁷². For example, the first Finnish-made tractors were produced already in 1918, but tractor production gained more importance only in the post-war period

when the tractor became common on farms. Governmentally owned tractor producer started to produce them during the 1950s – first under the name *Valmet*, lately under the name *Valtra*.⁷³ The company grew to be the leading producer in Scandinavia and among the most important producers in the world by the end of the century. After a number of corporate arrangements, the production of *Valtra* tractors was sold to US-based *Acgo* in 2003. Besides tractors, Finnish industrial companies started to produce, for example, self-propelled combine harvesters, different kinds of equipment, and especially machinery for forestry.

Besides heavy investment in machinery such as tractors and equipment, farm buildings were also improved. Plant breeding and the use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides became more common. On dairy farms the evolution of silage took place – the adaptation of the AIV-method on a large scale and flail forage harvesters played an important role.⁷⁴ Cattle breeding, better feeding, improvements in dairy barns and milking machinery, as well as farming advice and overall professionalization in agriculture is reflected particularly in the growth of productivity in dairy production. As an average one cow produced in 1950 c. 3,300 kg milk in a year, while in the late 1960s the production was already around 4,400 and in 2002 the medium yield was 7,100 kg of milk in a year.⁷⁵

But it was not only machinery, tools, plant breeding or other rather obvious technological changes that took place. Also, practical training and, in its vein, human capital accumulation has been stated as one reason for more efficient agricultural production. However, in recent studies it has been argued that the education of agricultural people actually increased productivity of work outside the farm rather than in farming itself; namely, educated youth moved away from the rural areas.⁷⁶

7 The Defeat of Cooperative Organizations

During the period under study here, agricultural production changed from labour-intensive working methods to capital-intensive production – ‘agribusiness’ also emerged in an international context⁷⁷. This commercialization of production led to specialization in production and to overall adjustment of the production to the market economy. When analysing Finnish agriculture and its functioning within the Finnish economy, the role played by the (production) cooperatives is central. Large cooperatives functioned as collective marketing mechanisms. As in other Nordic countries (e.g. Denmark), the cooperatives were linked either to workers’ movement or to rural communities. The rural cooperatives were formed to secure cheap commodities (retail trade cooperatives) to people who lived in the countryside, but also to offer financing (bank cooperatives), and to buy the products produced in the district (dairy, meat, cereal and forest product cooperatives). The cooperatives were jointly owned by the people who joined them. Cooperatives were seen, at least in the beginning, as organisations that satisfied the needs of the people better than purely business-oriented organisations. Thus, ideological stress was pronounced when cooperatives were created.

From the late 19th and early 20th century on the cooperatives played a crucial role in buying the products from farmers, in manufacturing the products and marketing them to customers. There were usually local cooperatives for dairy products, and they together formed powerful and influential national cooperatives. These national cooperatives, such as *Valio* in dairy products and *Atria* in meat, and *Metsäliitto* in forestry, were farmer-controlled marketing organizations that helped to blunt the impact of monopoly in prices by enabling producers to assert collective control over the sale of their commodities to processors.⁷⁸ Thus these cooperatives also had an important impact on industrialisation in the country, especially in the food industry. Furthermore, a specialised cooperative was founded to sell machines and equipments to farmers (*Hankkija*), and even the retail stores and banks in rural areas were dominated by cooperatives (*SOK* in retail trade, and *Osuuspankki* in banking). Common to all these

cooperatives was that though they were 'companies', they did not act according to the 'rules' of the market economy. Namely, the aim of the cooperatives was not to create value-add but to take care of the interests of the owners, namely, rural people in the wider sense. Thus, for example, the aim of *Metsäliitto* (a forest cooperative) was not only to sell forest products (pulp, paper, timber) profitably, but also to buy raw wood at a reasonable price from the forest owners⁷⁹. Rather than produce 'market value', *Valio*'s major aim was to keep producer prices of milk at a reasonable level, as was *Atria*'s to achieve the same with the price of meat. Beside these cooperatives a number of privately owned companies operated in the same businesses.

A major change occurred in cooperative structures during the 1980s and 1990s: in practice all national cooperatives were reformed to be more market oriented. This had a huge impact on the commercialization of the whole 'agribusiness' in Finland. For example, *Valio* was no longer (necessarily) the 'most reliable' buyer of milk-products, neither was *Atria* of meat, nor *Metsäliitto* of raw wood. Furthermore, some cooperatives collapsed in bankruptcies as was the case with *Hankkija*.⁸⁰ In many parts of the country, however, (small) local cooperatives held their ground – some of them even separated from the national cooperatives.

Intensive investments to the modern technology, land acquisitions, and expansion of the estates produced financial difficulties especially from the 1980s on. Before that time period bank loans had been relatively hard to obtain and high inflation rates kept interest rates low. However, during the 1980s certain measures were made to free lending– it was now, for example, possible to obtain foreign loans. This provoked (over)investments. At the same time the interest rates started to rise, inflation decreased, and during the turn of the 1980s and 1990s stagnation hit the whole country. In this situation many farms fell into debt and even into bankruptcy.

In commercialization certain changes in mental patterns of people living in rural areas can be stressed in order to understand development during the time period. For instance, the general attitude towards farming and agriculture changed from seeing it as a way of life to regarding it as a source of livelihood. Farms

became more like enterprises, and farmers transformed from peasants to entrepreneurs. Furthermore, according to Jussila among the farmers a positive attitude toward efficient production emerged, especially during the 1980s.⁸¹

8 Conclusions

Finnish agricultural production during the post-war period faced at least four major institutional changes: the resettlement after the war, overproduction from the turn of the 1950s and 1960s onwards, out-migration from the rural areas, and the adaptation to the European Union during the 1990s and first years of the 21st century. At the same time, major technological change took place: the mechanisation of production, commercialisation of farming and overall productivity growth – which also led to the problems related to overproduction.

Why did Finnish agriculture develop as it did during the post-war period?

The whole development of Finnish agriculture can easily be seen deterministically as if it were a matter of necessity – the actors, whether politicians, technology developers, or individual farmers, did not really have any other choices than the ones that were realised. Change and modernisation are usually seen as matters of necessity, though at the same time the ‘nature’ of agricultural production as history dependent is underlined, showing slow changes and agriculture itself as a conservative and homogeneous activity. Sometimes agriculture is understood more as way of living than as a source of livelihood. Agriculture has not been able, according to, for example, T.W. Shultz, to cope with the rapid structural changes and growth in the economy. Modernisation, including the growth of the average size of farms in western countries as well as the mechanisation of production, was the solution that sought to cope with the change.⁸² Thus also agriculture faced modernisation, and the actors were actively seeking possibilities of, for example, more efficient production.

The evolution of Finnish agriculture during the post-war era was a continuous readjustment to the climatic and geographical constraints, as well as to the political, economical and techno-

logical changes. Some of the institutional constraints were old (as the patterns of land ownership), some were formulated during the period. The drastic institutional changes were faced especially right after the war and after Finland joined the European Union. During both of these changes old structures were reformed, and even the mental patterns in rural areas changed. The adaptation to new and efficient production technology also occurred during the time period. A significant feature is that still after the war technology was mostly imported, whilst in the 1990s Finland was among the leading producers and designers of agricultural technology.

The role played by the state in manoeuvring, controlling, constraining, restricting, subsidising, and enabling agricultural production – and sometimes even technological changes – was without doubt a central piece in the puzzle to understand the post-war development of the Finnish agriculture. Governmental regulation itself was a mixed process, with a lot of political tensions and activity of interest groups. At the same time the state had to secure self-sufficiency of foodstuffs, deal with the problems of overproduction and negotiate the levels of agricultural production in an international setting. The most obvious solution to the problem would have been to increase the average size of farms and mechanisation of production. However, the state had to take into consideration a number of issues related to regional policy, and the fact that the number of people involved in agricultural production was still high until the late 1960s. Thus, for example, in the reports of the agricultural committees during the 1960s and 1980s, the issues related to self sufficiency as well as to the regional issues (such as employment in the rural areas), and ensuring a reasonable income level for farmers were being emphasized. Quality and price of domestically produced agricultural products were also key issues for policymakers.⁸³

Finnish agricultural production also had its own specialities that lasted over the structural changes in the time period. Despite the constraints and exogenous pressures the rural areas remained inhabited and agriculture was preserved.

NOTES

- ¹ T. W. Schultz, 'The Declining Economic Importance of Agricultural Land', *The Economic Journal* 61:244 (1951), 726.
- ² Including fishing and hunting.
- ³ Riitta Hjerppe, *Suomen talous 1860 - 1985: Kasvu ja rakennemuutos*. Helsinki: Suomen Pankki 1988, 286 - 291; Heikki Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*. Oulu: University of Oulu, Research Institute of Northern Finland 1987, 35; Riitta Hjerppe, *The Finnish Economy 1860 - 1985. Growth and Structural Change*. Helsinki: Bank of Finland 1989, 66 - 67; Sami Myyrä and Kyösti Pietola, *Tuottavuuskehitys Suomen maataloudessa vuosina 1987 - 97*. Helsinki: Agricultural Economics Research Institute Finland 1999, 7; Sisko Mäkelä, 'Northern dimension and family farming', *www.mtk.fi* (cited 28th January 2004) (2001); STV, *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja (Statistical yearbook of Finland)*. Helsinki: Tilastokeskus 1950 - 2003; SVT, *Suomen Virallinen Tilasto III, Maatalous*. Helsinki: Tilastokeskus 1950 - 2003; Maataloustilastollinen, *Maataloustilastollinen vuosikirja 2002*. Helsinki: Tilastokeskus 2002. - See also: <http://www.finfood.fi/> (cited 28th January 2004); www.stat.fi
- ⁴ Hjerppe, *Suomen talous 1860 - 1985: Kasvu ja rakennemuutos*, 271.
- ⁵ See especially Ronald Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm', *Economica* 4 (1937); Ronald Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost', *The Journal of Law & Economics* 3 (1960).
- ⁶ SVT III, *Maatalous 1950 (Census of Agriculture)*, Vol 1, 53. For further details see e.g. Eino Jutikkala, *Suomen talonpojan historia*. Turku: 1958; Arvo M. Soininen, *Vanha maataloutemme: maatalous ja maatalousväestö Suomessa perinnällisen maatalouden loppukaudella 1720-luvulta 1870-luvulle*. Helsinki: Suomen maataloustieteellinen seura 1975; Matti Peltonen, *Talolliset ja torpparit: vuosisadan vaihteen maatalouskysymys Suomessa*. Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura 1992.
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- ⁹ See e.g. Heather A. Haveman and Hayagreeva Rao, 'Structuring a Theory of Moral Sentiments: Institutional and Organizational Coevolution in the Early Thrift Industry', *American Journal of Sociology* 102:6, (1997), 1606-1651; Johann Peter Murmann and Ernst Homburg, 'Comparing evolutionary dynamics across different national settings: the case of the synthetic dye industry, 1857-1914', *Journal of Evolutionary Economics* 11:2,

- (2001); Johann Peter Murmann, *Knowledge and Competitive Advantage: The Coevolution of Firms, Technology, and National Institutions*. Cambridge (Mass.): Cambridge University Press 2003, 8 – 24.
- ¹⁰ Jon Lauck, *American Agriculture and the Problem of Monopoly: The Political Economy of Grain Belt Farming, 1953-1980*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 2000.
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- ¹² See e.g. John Martin, *The Development of Modern Agriculture: British Farming since 1931*. London: Macmillan 2000.
- ¹³ See especially Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge; N.Y.: Cambridge University Press 1990, 3 – 10.
- ¹⁴ On public choice literature see especially Juha-Antti Lamberg, et al., 'Uusinstitutionismi ja taloushistoria', in: Juha-Antti Lamberg and Jari Ojala (Eds.), *Uusi institutionaalinen taloushistoria. Johdanto tutkimukseen*. Jyväskylä: Atena 1997; Juha-Antti Lamberg, *Taloudelliset eturyhmät neuvotteluprosesseissa. Suomen kauppasopimuspolitiikka 1920-1930-luvulla*. Helsinki: Suomen Tiedeseura 1999.
- ¹⁵ Hilka Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958–1987*. Mikkeli - Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, maaseudun tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus 1990, 16. 35, 74; Åke Anderson, *Vårt jordbrukspolitiska system*. Uppsala: Sveriges lantbrukuniversitet 1987; Liisa Sauli, *MTK ja Suomen maatalouspolitiikka - maatalousyhteiskunnasta teollisuusvaltioksi 1950-1980*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1987.
- ¹⁶ Juhani Tauriainen, *Kehitysalueiden muuttuva maatalous: Tutkimus Itä-, Sisä- ja Pohjois-Suomen maatalouden uudenaikaistumisesta*. Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto 1970, 50 – 70; Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*, 32.
- ¹⁷ On innovations and adaptation see e.g. Joel Mokyr, *The Lever of Riches. Technological Creativity and Economic Progress*. New York: Oxford University Press 1990; Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*.
- ¹⁸ On discussion see e.g. Jari Ojala, *Tehokasta liiketoimintaa Pohjanmaan pikkukaupungeissa. Purjemerenkulun kannattavuus ja tuottavuus 1700-1800-luvulla*. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura 1999, 22 – 26.
- ¹⁹ See e.g. Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958–1987*, 41, 51, 54.
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– 107. – On agriculture in international setting see also e.g. Lauck, *American Agriculture and the Problem of Monopoly: The Political Economy of Grain Belt Farming, 1953-1980*; Martin, *The Development of Modern Agriculture: British Farming since 1931*; Deborah Fitzgerald, *Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture*. New Haven: Yale University Press 2003; Tuomas Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*. Sonkajärvi: Finnish Regional Research (FAR) 1996, 45 – 53; Jukka Kola, 'EU:n maatalouspolitiikan muutospaineet, teknologinen kehitys ja Suomen maatalous', in: Aarne Pehkonen and Heikki Mäkinen (Eds.), *Teknologian mahdollisuudet maatalouden kehittämässä*. Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, maa- ja kotitalousteknologian laitos 1998, 57 – 60. – A good overview on the research literature explaining the structural change in agriculture e.g. in Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 8 – 11.

²¹ See e.g. Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*, 50 – 51.

²² Finland lost to the Soviet Union around 10% of the agricultural land in the Karelia. – Jari Niemelä, *Lääninlampureista maaseutukeskuksiin: maaseutukeskusten ja niiden edeltäjien maatalousneuvonta 1700-luvulta 1990-luvulle*. Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura 1996; Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*, 46; Erkki Laitinen (Ed.), *Rintamalta raivioille: sodanjälkeinen asutustoiminta 50 vuotta*. Jyväskylä: Atena 1995.

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²⁵ Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958 – 1987*, 23, 30, 36 – 37, 46. – See also Risto Niemi & Matti Häkkilä, *Maatalouspolitiikasta ja maatalouden rakenteen alueellisista muutoksista Suomessa ja Ruotsissa 1950-luvulta 1980-luvulle*. Oulu: Research Institute of Northern Finland 1988.

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- 23; Pinder, *Euroopan Unioni. Erään yhteisön historia*.
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- ²⁹ Tykkyläinen and Kavilo, *Maaseudun asuttaminen ja talouden rakennemuutos Suomessa*, 15. - As a comparison in Britain already in 1850 c. 50% of the population lived in towns, and in 1950 about 80%. See: Lynn Hollen Lees, 'Urban Networks', in: Martin Daunton (Ed.), *The Cambridge Urban History of Britain III (1840 - 1950)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, 70. - On the Hungarian urbanisation process, see Sándor Horváth, 'Planning Urbanisation in Hungary (1945 - 1989)', *Hungarologische Beiträge* 17 (2005).
- ³⁰ Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*; Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958 - 1987*, 44.
- ³¹ <http://www.mtk.fi/> (cited 28 January 2004). - There is a growing number of researchers analysing the impact of joining European Union for Finnish agriculture. See e.g. Timo Sipiäinen, et al., *Maatalousyrittäjien talous vuosina 1993-2002: EU-jäsenyyden vaikutus tuloihin ja kannattavuuteen*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Economics and Management 1998.
- ³² <http://www.finfood.fi/> (cited 28 January 2004)
- ³³ Heli Ahonen, 'Organic Milk Production in Finland', *www.mtk.fi* (cited 28th January 2004) (2002); Lulu Siltanen and Ossi Ala-Mantila, *Maatalouden kokonaislaskelmat 1980 - 1988*. Helsinki: Agricultural Economics Research Institute, Finland 1989, 13.
- ³⁴ E.g. the rural modernisation expanded in Finland from south-west to north-east. Thus the structural change occurred in large scale in the eastern and northernmost parts of the country especially during the 1980s and 1990s. See e.g. Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*, 13, 55 - 63, 88 - 91; Tykkyläinen and Kavilo, *Maaseudun asuttaminen ja talouden rakennemuutos Suomessa*, 15; Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennnekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 23 - 26.
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Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', *American Sociological Review* 48:2, (1983), 147-160.

³⁶ See e.g. <http://www.mtk.fi/> (cited 28th January 2004); Mäkelä, 'Northern dimension and family farming'; Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 19 - 20.

³⁷ On the history of landownership in Finland see e.g. Jutikkala, *Suomen talonpojan historia*; Soininen, *Vanha maataloutemme: maatalous ja maatalousväestö Suomessa perinnäisen maatalouden loppukaudella 1720-luvulta 1870-luvulle*; Viljo Rasila, et al. (Eds.), *Suomen maatalouden historia 1. Perinteisen maatalouden aika: esihistoriasta 1870-luvulle*. Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura 2003; Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958 - 1987*, 59.

³⁸ Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 3, 21.

³⁹ STV 1953.

⁴⁰ <http://www.finfood.fi/> (cited 28 January 2004).

⁴¹ Mäkelä, 'Northern dimension and family farming'; <http://www.finfood.fi/> (cited 28th January 2004).

⁴² See e.g. Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*, 46. See also: <http://www.mtk.fi/> (cited 28th January 2004). – On the importance of forestry in long-term see e.g. Jutikkala, *Suomen talonpojan historia*; Soininen, *Vanha maataloutemme: maatalous ja maatalousväestö Suomessa perinnäisen maatalouden loppukaudella 1720-luvulta 1870-luvulle*, 253 – 301.

⁴³ Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958 - 1987*, 42.

⁴⁴ <http://www.finfood.fi/> (cited 28th January 2004).

⁴⁵ Niemelä, *Lääninlampureista maaseutukeskuksiin: maaseutukeskusten ja niiden edeltäjien maatalousneuvonta 1700-luvulta 1990-luvulle*, 354.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 351.

⁴⁷ During the 1920s over six million hectares of land changed the owner, and over 130,000 new farms were created. See e.g. Kyösti Haataja, *Maanjaot ja tulojärjestelmä*. Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys 1949; Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*, 46; Tykkyläinen and Kavilo, *Maaseudun asuttaminen ja talouden rakennemuutos Suomessa*, 94; Jutikkala, *Suomen talonpojan historia*; Soininen, *Vanha maataloutemme: maatalous ja maatalousväestö Suomessa perinnäisen maatalouden loppukaudella 1720-luvulta 1870-luvulle*, 127 – 138.

⁴⁸ Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 3.

⁴⁹ Niemelä, *Lääninlampureista maaseutukeskuksiin: maaseutukeskusten ja niiden edeltäjien maatalousneuvonta 1700-luvulta 1990-luvulle*, 419.

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- ⁵² Years 1950–1969 10 – 25 hectares.
- ⁵³ Years 1950–1969 25 – 50 hectares.
- ⁵⁴ Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 9.
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- ⁵⁷ John Cornwall and Wendy Cornwall, 'Growth Theory and Economic Structure', *Economica*, n.s. 61:242 (1994), 240.
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- ⁶⁰ Fitzgerald, *Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture*.
- ⁶¹ See e.g. Alpo Reinikainen, et al., 'Maatalouskoneiden tarkastus- ja koetus-toiminta Suomessa', in: Olli Näri (Ed.), *Koneellistuva maataloutemme - Mechanization of Finnish Agriculture*. Vaasa: Vakola 1987; Teppo Vihola, *Leipäviljasta lypsykarjaan: maatalouden tuotantosuunnan muutos Suomessa 1870-luvulta ensimmäisen maailmansodan vuosiin*. Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura 1991.
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- ⁶⁵ See especially Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*, 42, 46 - 47; Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958 - 1987*, 12 - 13, 33; Tapani Köppä, 'Maatalouspolitiikan arvot ja maaseudun muutos', in: Pertti Suhonen (Ed.), *Suomi, muutosten yhteiskunta*. Juva: WSOY 1989, 195 - 202.
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- ⁶⁷ Kaisa Aarnio, 'Traktori', in: Olli Näri (Ed.), *Koneellistuva maataloutemme - Mechanization of Finnish Agriculture*. Vaasa: Vakola 1987, 105; Jussila, *Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A study of farm mechanization in Finland at regional and local levels*, 52 - 53
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- ⁶⁹ Kara, 'Arvioita tulevaisuuden kehityksestä', 355.
- ⁷⁰ Jaakko Kiviniemi and Olli Näri, 'Viljankorjuu', in: Olli Näri (Ed.), *Koneellistuva maataloutemme - Mechanization of Finnish Agriculture*. Vaasa: Vakola 1987, 217-222.
- ⁷¹ Alasuutari, *Toinen tasavalta*, 63; Granberg, *Valtio maataloustulojen tasaajana*, 59.
- ⁷² See e.g. Timo Myllyntaus, et al., *Teknologinen muutos Suomen teollisuudessa 1885-1920: metalli-, saha- ja paperiteollisuuden vertailu energiatalouden näkökulmasta*. Helsinki: Societas scientiarum Fennica 1986.
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- ⁷⁵ Niemelä, *Lääninlampureista maaseutukeskuksiin: maaseutukeskusten ja niiden edeltäjien maatalousneuvonta 1700-luvulta 1990-luvulle*, 353; Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (<http://tike.mmm.fi>).
- ⁷⁶ Kuhmonen, *Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka*, 10.
- ⁷⁷ Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958 - 1987*, 41; Lauck, *American Agriculture and the Problem of Monopoly: The Political Economy of Grain Belt Farming, 1953-1980*.
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- ⁷⁹ See especially Juha-Antti Lamberg, 'Isäntien metsäteollisuus - Metsäliittöryhmittymä 1934 - 1998', in: Juha Näsi, et al. (Eds.), *Metsäteollisuusyritysten strategiset kehityspolut. Kilpailu, keskittyminen ja kasvu pitkällä aikavälillä*. Helsinki: Metsäalan tutkimusohjelma Wood Wisdom 2001; Seppo Zetterberg,

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⁸² T. W. Schultz, 'Economic Effects of Agricultural Programs', *The American Economic Review* 30:5, (1941), 127; Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958 - 1987:* , 17 – 18, 60.

⁸³ See e.g. Vihinen, *Suomalaisen rakennemuutoksen maatalouspolitiikka 1958 – 1987*, 55.

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