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GY. SZABAD

HUNGARIAN POLITICAL TRENDS BETWEEN THE REVOLUTION AND THE COMPROMISE (1849=1867)

Gy. Szabad


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
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The author sets out to show why it was that — the lessons of 1848-49 notwithstanding — 1867 saw the making not of a compact among Hungary's peoples, but of the Compromise between Hungary's political leaders and the Habsburgs.

György Szabad presents a wealth of source material to illustrate the reactions in Hungary to the defeat of the revolution, to Habsburg oppression and absolutism, and gives a fine picture of what it was that the leaders of the major political trends hoped to achieve. He finds the forces working for an independent, democratic Hungary — one founded on the cooperation of all the country's peoples — to have been much more significant than is generally supposed, and concludes that those working for the Compromise met with much stronger opposition than historians so far have allowed. Their success, he argues, was by no means independent of the advantages that a modified Habsburg absolutism guaranteed them in an anti-democratically restricted political forum.

AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ BUDAPEST





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HUNGARIAN POLITICAL TRENDS BETWEEN THE REVOLUTION AND THE COMPROMISE (1849–1867)

by GYÖRGY SZABAD



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INTRODUCTION

In 1848–49, it was Hungary's political leaders' determination to do away with the socio-economically obsolete feudal system and the semi-absolutism which rested upon it, and to alter the established order of national privileges within the Habsburg Empire which helped bring to a head the most acute crisis that the dynastic state had ever had to face. In 1867, on the other hand, it was precisely the compromise Hungary's dominant political groups made with the Habsburgs which came to determine the final form of the Empire's existence.

The volte-face described above might well incline one to adopt an overly simplistic attitude to Hungarian history between 1849 and 1867: one which fails to distinguish between the result, and the process of its achievement. Thus, knowing the final outcome, one might well regard as insignificant, or even as inconsistent with some historical necessity solutions which contemporaries saw as genuine alternatives.

In fact, Hungary had returned to the Habsburg fold in 1849 at the point of Czarist bayonets, and during the next two decades, there was vigorous advocacy also of courses of action diametrically opposed to compromise with the Viennese oppressor. Co-operation with the other nationalities within the Empire was one alternative which came to mind, for even in Hungary, the Magyars had but a relative majority – and not even that in Transylvania¹ – and the sad lessons of the tragic conflicts of 1848–49 had greatly increased their sense of vulnerability. The thought of co-operation was given plausibility by the fact that the Habsburgs' campaign of terror – of a ruthlessness hardly paralleled in the history of 19th century Europe – was aimed not only at Magyar "separatism", but also at the nationalities attempting to win self-government throughout the Empire, but most particularly in Hungary.

The concession that had been made to the nationalities, the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary, was more formal than real. Nevertheless, Croatia-Slavonia had been separated from Hungary (the Hungarian Revolutionary

¹ According to the data of the census conducted in 1850 by the imperial authorities, one distorting the figures in a way prejudicial to the Hungarians, the Magyars made up 44.2% of the population of Hungary proper, and 26.9% of Transylvania; the Hungarian figures for 1870 are 49.84%, and 31.71% respectively. Cf. K. Keleti pp. 73–78.

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Government had been prepared to recognize the total self-government, and even the secession of the area²); the military frontier areas continued to be disjoined from both Croatia and Hungary; Transylvania and the Partium (four counties lying on the border of Transylvania) had again been severed from the body of Hungary; Hungary's south-eastern part had been made into a new "crown-land" under the name of "Serbian Voivodina and the Banat of Temes"; while what remained of Hungary had been split into five parts in such a way that only one of them would be likely to preserve its Magyar character. All this, however, in no way implied that the non-Magyar peoples had been brought closer to self-government. It hardly could, for the Austrian government had not dismembered the country in its effort to eradicate Magyar "separatism" only to permit similar aspirations among the other nationalities to gain ground. For Hungary's partition was closely linked with the Habsburgs' plans in Germany: the government, the military bureaucracy - as well as the Austrian-German haute bourgeoisie - saw dismemberment primarily as but a step facilitating the real goal of integrating the country into a centralized, homogeneous, ever more unambiguously "German" Empire.

The worst repressive and integrative measures of the Schwarzenberg-Bach system³ indiscriminately afflicted all the nationalities living in the newly organized "dominions". All suffered the total annihilation of their political liberties; and all suffered also from absolutism's faithless stewardship of the revolution's legacy: legal relations remained feudal in some respects, and the revolutionary abolition of serfdom was modified – for the most part, to the detriment of the newly free peasantry.

The forced economic unification of the Empire created a situation in which it was the financial leaders of the western dominions who were the senior partners – and the beneficiaries – in developing capitalism in the newly integrated territories. It meant, further, that they had a monopoly over this development, for both Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia were deprived of the right to negotiate the terms of the foreign investments so necessary for the initiation of capitalistic transformation. The much needed process of modernization to which the revolutionary termination of feudalism had opened the way was, thus, started under foreign domination, and was regulated to suit an oppressive power's interests; as a consequence, many measures appropriate in themselves were unpopular for being proffered on the tip of a bayonet, and Magyars and non-Magyars alike balked when a foreign voice and a mailed fist urged their adoption.

All this would have provided ample reason for the Magyars and the nationalities – the former, smarting under the Habsburgs' whip-hand; the latter,


² A. Károlyi, 1932. II. pp. 626-629. - 1848/49. Ogy. pp. 681-684. - KOM. XII. pp. 805-806.

³ This study will not go into all this in detail. For a summary of the autor's views, see Gy. Szabad, 1972. pp. 9–23, 41–54.

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disappointed in the Emperor's promises⁴ – to join forces. And yet, they did not, for those representing Hungary's conflicting political trends were busy fighting not only against the common oppressor, but also against one another. It is these battles, and the societal framework which defined them, that is the subject of this study. The behind-the-scenes battles among Hungary's political forces – battles fought on a restricted political stage with the Habsburgs always hovering in the wings, ready and able to turn the tide – have a significance beyond that of their being a part of the pre-history of the Compromise. They are significant also because their burden – the dilemmas of the Hungarian society of these years – reflect the essence of this society more profoundly than do the decisions that were embodied in the Compromise. The most grave of these dilemmas were left unsolved in 1867; and they continued to fester deep beneath the surface.

⁴ Neither is this topic discussed in detail. For the author's views, see *ibid*. pp. 25-29.



CHAPTER 1

THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION

THE GREAT LANDOWNING ARISTOCRACY

Even before 1848, Hungary's feudal social structure was well on the road to disintegration. The elimination of the old regime, however, did not bring its immediate annihilation; it was only gradually that the old feudal structure was transformed in close interaction with the country's economic development and its condition of political dependence.

The great landowning aristocrats continued to form the leadership stratum, as much in virtue of their "aristocracy" as of their being "great landowners." This latter factor, however, came to have a fresh - and lasting - significance. The majority of the great landowning aristocrats recovered relatively rapidly from the emancipation of their serfs.¹ Yet among them, too, there were those unable to pay the debts accumulated over the long years of obsolete estate management and prodigal living, those who went bankrupt. The Prince Esterházy family - whose extensive estates placed them among the greatest landowners of Europe - was one of those who faced bankrupcy. However, through the sequestration ordered by Emperor Franz Joseph, and through taking on huge new West-European loans, Prince Esterházy was able to keep his 18 Transdanubian and two Cisleithan estates. Thus, by sacrificing his Great Plain estates, those farthest from the core of his holdings, he remained the country's greatest landowner.² Then there were aristocrats who not only kept their allodial lands, and even rounded them out in the course of the land reform - as, for example, the Tata branch of the Count Esterházy family,³ but also bought new lands during the 1850's and 60's to augment the old holdings. In 1853, Count György Károlyi bought Baron Perényi's Fejér County Csurgó estate, which he already held as security, for 580,000 forints. In 1859, he bought Count Keglevich's Sőreg estate in Pest County for 525,000 forints; and in 1862, he acquired the Csernovics family's Mácsa estate in Arad County for 1.5 million forints.4

About a quarter of the country's arable land – we have no land-survey figures – remained the property of 6–700 aristocratic families. At the end of the 1860's,

¹ Cf. K. Galgóczi pp. 93-99, 366-400. - Gy. Szabad 1972. pp. 54-57, 65-66.

² Cf. Wessely, 1865. - Mészáros, 1866. etc. - D. 185. 1864-443, 1866-697, 1429, etc.

³ Cf. Gy. Szabad 1957. pp. 311-372, 421-452.

⁴ Cf. K. Galgóczi pp. 95, 97. - E. Fényes 1851. I. p. 230, III. p. 53, IV. p. 42.

all but a few of the 231 latifundia above 10,000 cadastral acres (1 cadastral acre = 0.575 hectares or 1.42 English acres) and most of the 495 large estates above 5,000 cadastral acres in size were owned by aristocrats.⁵ For the Habsburgs, for all their periodic conflicts or political issues with a sector of Hungary's aristocracy (never with the group as a whole) always strove to strengthen their socio-economic position, not least of all because they continued to see the great landowning aristocrats as the most secure domestic supporters of their rule and not least importantly in Hungary. It is for this reason that already in 1851 the government hastened to reassure the aristocrats in the "fundamental principles of government" that "all manner of means are permitted to facilitate the rehabilitation of ancient estates and entailed property". After a series of measures all indirectly aiding the aristocracy, in 1862 Franz Joseph issued an edict which concretely assisted the aristocratic families in transforming their holdings into inalienable and indivisible entailed property.

With their social and economic predominance thus placed on an even more solid footing, the aristocracy could hardly fail to note the advantages to be derived from the renewal of co-operation with the court.⁶

Two main factors enabled the aristocracy to regain their position – shaken during the 1840's – as leaders of Hungary's public life: the immense income they continued 'to derive from their estates; and their close ties with the Imperial aristocracy through whom, by the early 1860's, they were again drawn to the court.

It was not only the political, cultural, and social scene that the great landowning aristocrats dominated. They were in demand as sponsors and as members of the boards of directors of agricultural associations, of credit banks, of railway companies, of insurance companies, and of industrial enterprises, for practice proved aristocratic leadership to be a precondition of success.⁷ The hot-tempered plebian Transylvanian scientist, Samuel Brassai, incensed, in part, at Count Emil Dessewffy's having been chosen to replace Count József Teleki as President of the Academy of Sciences in the 1850's, noted scornfully in a pamphlet written in 1862: "... Here in Hungary, every President has to be an aristocrat. Far from disparaging this custom, I give thanks to God that our nation is so far superior to the English, French, Italian and all others, which have not got aristocrats competent in every discipline, and what is more, so far more competent than their fellow citizens."⁸

For all that, the great landowning aristocracy lived practically as a closed caste at the apex of society. It was still exceptional for an aristocrat to marry even

⁷ Gy. Vargha pp. 295–300. – A. Berzeviczy II. pp. 364, 370–371, 373, 405, 411–413. – E. Lederer pp. 80–112. – Cf. GL. 1852. Nov. 28, 1860. Jan. 12, Aug. 9, 1862. Sept. 28. etc. – Búsbach II. p. 34.

⁸ Sámuel Brassai: Az Akadémia igazsága (On the Academy's Being Right) Kolozsvár, 1862, Quoted by I. Mikó. pp. 234–235.

⁵ Cf. K. Keleti. pp. 148-150.

⁶ For 1851, see F. Walter I. p. 546, II. p. 192. - For 1862, see PN. 1862. Nos. 246-249.

a member of the landed nobility. The few exceptions that there were, were mostly from among the Transylvanian, or from among the handful of Protestant aristocrats, those less wealthy and less closely linked to the Imperial aristocracy. The leading aristocratic families continued to find their mates abroad, especially among the Cisleithan aristocracy. The familial ties thus created promoted not only the assimilation of the Hungarian to the Imperial aristocracy, but also integrated them into an ever wider community of property ownership and, consequently, of interest. To mention but some outstanding examples: Of the six members of the Prince Esterházy family living during the period of absolutism, all married sooner or later, one of them twice, but not one of them chose his partner from among Hungarian aristocrats. Nine members of the Tata branch of the Count Esterházy family living during the period married, but only one of them was able to find a satisfactory partner among the domestic aristocracy – and this, another Esterházy. In the Count Serényi family, there were 14 marriages, but only 2 of them were contracted with native aristocrats.⁹

The aristocracy's mode of life and pleasures were just as exclusive. Only "bluebloods" could attend their soirées, their balls, the hunts and chases that were their favorite recreation; even great landowners who had risen from among the nobility, or military and court dignitaries were invited but by way of exception. In a pamphlet written in 1855, Lajos Mocsáry would have gladly seen the aristocracy - faute de mieux - rise to lead the nation; but he was compelled to conclude sadly: "Arrogance and vacuous pleasure-seeking characterizes this caste. They pursue pleasure the world over, rather than taking pride in becoming the leader, the guardian, the teacher of the people. What do they care for the fate of the base-born; they've nothing to do with it; their grandchildren's grandchildren will be lords as high above the rest, as they themselves."¹⁰ The wave of fraternizing started by the conservatives at the end of the 1850's in an effort to secure what they thought the far from certain future of the aristocracy, could, at best, give the appearance that social barriers had been transcended, for the majority of the aristocrats were impervious to everything that as much as resembled an egalitarian notion.

A contemporary bourgeois memoir-writer left this account of aristocratic condescension: "When young aristocratic ladies dance at the public balls, they do not give their gloved hand to the – likewise gloved – bourgeois young ladies and gentlemen, but extend to them rather their handkerchiefs stinking of perfume."¹¹

The continued existence of social barriers, however, by no means meant that the aristocracy was politically isolated as well. On the contrary: its open-minded and well-informed leaders read well the signs of the times, and strove ever more energetically to win over the former nobility, the broad masses of the people, and

⁹ Fejérpataky pp. 7-8, 95-97, 209-211.

 ¹⁰ Mocsáry, 1855.25. - Cf. Tegzes (Ferenc Kubinyi Jr.) Kik a valódi fertálymágnások? (Who are the Real "Quarter Magnates") Pest, 1862. pp. 17-41. - Podmaniczky III. pp. 43-74. PN. 1859. June 9.
 ¹¹ Búsbach II. p. 33. - Cf. E. Lakatos p. 25. - Podmaniczky III. p. 74.

THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION

primarily, the intellectuals. By the 1860's, the goal was not only to have an aristocrat named to every leading position filled through court-appointment – a goal which, happily, coincided with Franz Joseph's own desires;¹² but also to place, beside those in the Upper House, as many aristocrats as possible also in the Lower House – through the very electoral process the majority of them so thoroughly despised. While at the first representative parliamentary elections in 1848 only 6% of the representatives were aristocrats, by 1861, it was 13.3%, and by 1865, it was 16.5% of the members of the Lower House who belonged to this class which comprised less than one half of one-thousandth of the country's population.¹³

THE DISINTEGRATING NOBILITY

Hungary's aristocracy was the smallest in Europe in proportion to the country's population and yet among the wealthiest on the continent; its gentry, on the other hand, comprising over 5% of the total population, was – except for that of dismembered Poland – proportionately the largest and certainly, on the average, the poorest in all of Europe.¹⁴

A significant number of their ancestors had become noblemen without receiving an estate; they might have been ennobled peasants who had but their own former plots to leave to their heirs. Studies to date of holdings in communities inhabited by gentry unambiguously indicate that the average holding of a country squire was no – or but very little – larger than that of a serf in the same or in a neighbouring community. Among the gentry, however, there was a greater proportion both of dwarf-holdings and of larger estates, principally because there were no legal restrictions on such differentiation. In the case of urbarial serfs, on the other hand, both the accumulation and the subdivision of plots were prohibited. Until 1848, there were among the tens of thousands of noble families whose way of life was indistinguishable from that of the peasants two sub-groups consisting of many thousand families each: nobles living on land held in villein tenure; and nobles who had contracted to farm a piece of land. Both these groups were subject to their landlords.

After the revolution, the former group came to be in a situation analogous to that of the liberated urbarial serfs; while the latter shared, for the most part, the fate of the cotters who were dispossessed after 1849 of what they had acquired during the revolution.¹⁵

 12 This will be discussed in detail later. Here, we shall but mention that contemporary records for the first half of the 1860's show 166 of the 175 leading lay civil servants of the Habsburg Empire were noblemen. Cf. *Hausner I*. pp. 68–69.

¹³ E. Lakatos pp. 28-29. - A. Csizmadia p. 155.

¹⁴ E. Fényes I. p. 50. - Hausner I. pp. 60-66.

¹⁵ I. Szabó pp. 340–341. – Gy. Mérei pp. 116–124. – Gy. Szabad 1957. pp. 123–134, 364–371. – I. Orosz II. pp. 100–105. – E. Simonffy 1968. pp. 168–177. – I. Imreh pp. 9–31. – I. Imreh 1973. pp. 13–32. – F. Maksay 1973. After 1849, the slow process of economic differentiation quietly going on for centuries within the ranks of the landed nobility all at once became an obtrusively evident fait accompli. Since the middle of the 18th century – when the feudal means of acquiring land were practically exhausted – traffic in noble estates came increasingly unequivocally to be regulated by money, and indirectly, by agricultural commodity production. Feudal possessory right prohibited non-nobles from acquiring noble land, and guaranteed the kinship's right of preemption. Thus, it provided those who – through more progressive husbandry, through marrying or inheriting money, or through a lucrative office – had managed to acquire considerable capital, with exceptionally favourable conditions for purchasing the property of bankrupt relatives. It was thus that the greater part of a family's undivided property came to be concentrated into the hands one of its branches.

After the emancipation of the serfs, and the termination of the system of communal holdings, most members of noble families received land so little that it could support but a peasant life-style. Loath to live as peasants, many nobles sold their plots to their more fortunate compeers, or to a peasant or burgher who offered a better price. Yet many other nobles were undone when they were obliged to pay at the end of the 1850's the debts on which a moratorium had been placed at the time of the emancipation of the serfs. Even some of those who had been quite well-off while they received feudal dues and services fell upon hard days after 1848: with but a fraction of their lands demesne, all that became their private property under civil law were the grounds of the manor; and perhaps the clearing or the fundi remanentiales won back through lawsuits started on the strength of the 1853 Imperial Patent regulating the terms of the 1848 emancipation.

It was primarily of this group that many nobles leased part of their land to peasants in return for the peasants' working their land as well. Unaccustomed to paying taxes, the nobility found the growing tax rates hard to bear; they sold the indemnity bonds they had received for renouncing their feudal benefits at great loss just to get some money as quickly as possible. Most of this money, too, was lived up, or used to pay debts; very little of it was ever invested in the estate.¹⁶

Yet not all those who lost their feudal prerogatives went bankrupt, or lived in reduced circumstances on the very periphery of a genteel way of life. There was a small segment of the gentry which entered the age of capitalism as substantial big landowners, and another, larger group which faced the new era as increasingly stable middle landowners.

¹⁰ L. Ungár 1938. – Gy. Mérei pp. 96–110. – J. Varga 1958. – Cf. PN. 1857. Dec. 7–8. – A. Gyürky II. pp. 192–193. – MS. 1862: Nos. 157–160. – A Hon (The Native Land) 1864: Nos. 199–217. – Cf. The documents of the Abony (or Tápiószele), the Sajókaza, and the Mály compossessorati. OL. P. 2. (1, 12, 28, 29, 38), P. 568. (3), P. 580 (11). – Jablonkay, 1968. – Edit Kovács, 1971. These were the owners of estates which had been more or less well organized even during the crisis period of feudalism; they had not only survived, but had made their way in the world. In many of their cases, especially in some areas of Transdanubia, feudal services had played but a limited, rather supplementary role; its replacement was thus but a transitional hurdle, and not an insuperable catastrophe. Many of them were able not only to keep intact their estate – consisting of the allodial plough-lands, of the lord's forests and pastures, and of the lands taken from the former cotters – but also to augment it. Initially using the old equipment and the servants to work off their debts, they followed the example of the majority of the great landowners in exploiting the grain boom to make a successful transition to the capitalistic mode of production.¹⁷

We have no precise data on the size of the properties belonging to noble landowners during the period under consideration. What we do have is data from 1867 on the sizes of the estates – figures not identical to the amount of land owned by one man, since a landowner could have estates in a number of communities. Nevertheless, this survey gives us some idea of the discrepancies in wealth and status among the landowning class. Estates of over 5,000 cadastral acres, we found, belonged to the great landowning aristocracy. For the rest, we have the following categories:

> Between 1,000–5,000 cadastral acres: 4,700 estates Between 200–1,000 cadastral acres: 13,748 estates Between 100– 200 cadastral acres: 11,365 estates.

Most of the estates in the first category belonged to great landowners of gentry origin; a smaller percent of them formed part of an aristocrat's estates. The greater part of the estates of between 200–1,000 cadastral acres belonged to the former serf-holding gentry class. A significant number of the 100–200 cadastral acre estates also belonged to those of gentle birth, but not a few of these holdings were owned by better-off former serfs, and even more by the free peasantry of the market towns. When feudalism was abolished in Hungary, there were between 130 and 140 thousand noble families living in the country. On the basis of the above data, we can conclude that at the time of the transition to capitalism, it was at best every fifth or sixth gentry family who had land enough to live as "gentlemen farmers".¹⁸

As throughout Europe, so in Hungary, too, the termination of feudalism sapped the financial energies of the nobility. The leadership stratum did, in fact,

¹⁷ K. Galgóczi pp. 96–99, 374–375. – GL. 1856. Jan. 3, 24, 31. Feb. 21, July 12, 19, 26. Aug. 2, 9. 1857. July 2, Sept. 3. 1862. April 13, May 21, 1863. May 31. June 7–14. Aug. 2, 1864. June 22, July 6, Aug. 3. – Cf. among others the household accounts of the Bezerédy, Kállay, Lónyay, Majthényi, Máriássy, Melczer and Szilassy archives. OL. P. 57, 343, 451, 458, 464, 470, 485, 487, 491, 499, 1016, 1034, 1036, 1043, 1188, 1193, 1603.

18 K. Keleti pp. 147-150.

profit from the extraordinary restraint with which dominical lands were treated at the time of the emancipation of the serfs. But most of them were gravely handicapped by their poverty, and suffered as the centuries-old process of differentiation accelerated with the crisis, and then abolition of feudalism.

They also suffered from oppression as a nation. They had lost their old prerogatives without gaining the rights in the hope of which many of them had been willing to sacrifice their world of privilege. They had failed to gain national self-government; had failed to see come about the bourgeois nation-state they desired not only for sentimental reasons, but also for the greater opportunities which it would have offered.

It was not only the – somewhat illusory – hopes for an independent national market which were shattered. The absolutism exercised by Vienna provoked a passive resistance which made it morally and practically impossible for most of the Hungarian nobility to enter the civil service, in spite of the fact that centuries of tradition inclined the gentry – for all their lack of professional training – to regard public offices as theirs by right.¹⁹

In the mid-1850's, Lajos Mocsáry judged the gentry - "the county-judge class", as he called them, "the most significant sector of our nation" - to be a very heterogeneous group: "One thinks one's comments and condemnation to apply to the entire class, only to find that one's judgement applies but to a small segment of it, and not at all to the rest". Mocsáry takes a panoramic view of the socially ambitious gentry, and finds "those preoccupied only with acting 'comme il faut', with imitating the magnates in Pest", and "the county-judge, who, now that there are neither county meetings nor sedria,²⁰ has nothing left to do, and can find nothing new to keep him busy". Much the same were those who, "still think themselves little kings, behind their big, locked front doors, and meditating on the lives of their glorious moustached ancestors, or on the good old days of the socage and the corvée, foresee with painful certainty the decline of their family's illustrious name". And much the same were those "who run their lives and their estates according to the maxims of their grandfathers, and consider all innovation ephemeral, a fool's itching to experiment. Trade and industrial enterprise they hold to be a disgrace, a dirty business fit only for Jews; they fear to get mixed up in any such thing, for if they did, their ancestors would turn in their graves". But Mocsáry notes also their very antitheses: those "who, like the American pioneers, dream of enterprise, of speculation"; and "the fiery democrats, who deny their noble birth, and want only to be citizens - to be men of honour and Magvars - and strive to shake off the last vestiges of aristocratic pretentiousness". The conflicts

²⁰ The pre-1848 county courts whose members were chosen from among the county nobility.

2 Szabad György

¹⁹ Cf. A Hon (Native Land) 1864: 255-257, 259, 262-264, 283. - Pulszky, 1888. pp. 17-28. -

E. Lakatos pp. 43-51. - P. Hanák 1962. - Gy. Szabad 1964. pp. 143-149.

⁻ Korbuly, 1972. - For the political history, see the following chapters.

of the 1850's among the various gentry groups of which Mocsáry speaks were to become closely intermeshed with politics after the turn of the decade.²¹

Less well off as a rule than the various groups of landed nobility were the landless, gentle-born intellectuals. Many of them, unless they could make a living in one of the professions – usually as lawyers or estate-managers – had no choice but to go hungry, or accept a degrading and despised government post. On the other hand, the rather large group of landless gentry living as urban artisans was indistinguishable quite soon after the loss of its privileges from the craftsmen, tradesmen, and inn-keepers of peasant origin whose way of life theirs so closely resembled. Together, they came to form the petit-bourgeois class, with a social consciousness much akin to that of the small landowners.

During the period of early capitalism, then, the great landowners, comprising a fraction of the nobility – and those with medium-sized estates – about an eighth of the nobility, made up the top stratum of society.

The rest of the nobility can be divided into roughly three social groups: the small landowners, with their peasant-like way of life; the intellectuals, some of whom moved with the leaders of society, and some of whom barely managed to keep a toe hold on the genteel mode of life; and the artisans, whose life-style merged with that of the bourgeoisie.

THE CHANGING BOURGEOISIE

There were significant changes in the position and composition of the bourgeoisie, who came to have ever greater economic and somewhat greater social influence during the period in question. The old patrician group, and those privileged under the old civic laws still enjoyed certain advantages in public life: they still had an easier time acquiring positions of leadership in the guilds, and in the Chambers of Trade and Commerce. During the 1850's, Viennese policy was inclined to get them elected to the city councils, and during the 1860's the tradition-bound electors were inclined to do the same. Nevertheless, respect for their patrician rights was quite soon overshadowed by respect for the men of substance - who were increasingly likely not to be from among their numbers. National and religious barriers also proved to be stronger than those of estate. With the development of capitalism, the Roumanian and Serbian bourgeoisie took ever more energetic steps to acquire more influence in the towns of the predominantly Roumanian and Serbian areas, and to oust, if possible, the German and Magyar bourgeoisie from their position of leadership. There were times during the 1850's when the Magyar and the nationalities' bourgeoisie joined forces against German predominance, especially as this struggle was somewhat intertwined with the struggle against absolutism. For although the

²¹ Mocsáry, 1855. pp. 110-111, 116. - Cf. Á. Várkonyi 1973. II. pp. 327-329.

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THE CHANGING BOURGEOISIE

majority of Hungary's German-speaking bourgeoisie was far from being in favour of the absolutist system – and even farther from giving it unqualified support – nevertheless they did derive certain advantages from it: the policy of Germanization facilitated their rapid advancement in the civil services, as well as in the army. The administrators who flooded the country during the 1850's were largely German, and it was primarily with the German-speaking bourgeoisie that they made social contact. It was with the German urban bourgeoisie that they merged, with it to travel the road to gradual assimilation and to swell the ranks of the bourgeois intelligentsia – which was primarily an administrator group. But it was during the period of absolutism that there finally ceased to be a German majority in most of Hungary's towns; the massive migration to the cities consequent upon the great socio-economic changes had had a decisive effect.²²

There were relatively few among the privileged bourgeoisie of the more developed towns who became great bourgeois entrepreneurs. Most of them were able to keep up their old shops and workshops - but became trapped in them. There were only a few artisans who managed to transform their workshops into factories, and to enter the ranks of the haute bourgeoisie. The majority of them clung to the familiar, traditionally decent means of making a living, and remained middle or petit bourgeois. However, a great number of the former privileged bourgeoisie had property - either inherited, or purchased somewhat earlier - and became some of the chief beneficiaries of early capitalistic urbanization. While the majority of them drew profit only from the rise in the price of real estate, there were quite a few of them who built storied - in Pest, many-storied - apartment houses where their former low-income loading-docks, single-storey apartment houses, workshops and warehouses had stood, and derived high rents from them. Many more exploited the opportunities offered by the boom in the building of houses, in the construction of railways and roads, and in the regulation of the rivers.23

The peculiarities of Hungarian capitalistic development brought periods of destruction and ones of revival to the industrial petite bourgeoisie. Unable to compete with an entire range of products from the Cisleithan factories, and with the food products of the domestic plants, one artisan after another was compelled to give up his shop and his independence. But the competition which these factories fostered among the trades also contributed to the failure of not a few small firms. It was particularly the guild masters, used to a position of privilege,

²² Here, and in what follows we have relied extensively on the data of urban historians, on research in the archives of Pest, Buda and Óbuda (not completely unified until 1873), of Győr, Kecskemét, Sopron, Szeged, and Székesfehérvár, and on the investigation of the pertinent material to be found in the archives of the central government agencies. We have made use also of the reports published by the various Chambers of Trade and Commerce, and the data of the contemporary censuses and other lists and registers.

²³ Cf. M. Gelléri 1887. – M. Gelléri 1912. – E. Lederer 1952. – G. Zakariás 1953. – V. Sándor 1954. – J. Berlász 1957. – M. Szakács 1961. – M. Pogány 1966. – K. Vörös 1966. – K. Vörös 1971.

and unable – for lack of flexibility and lack of capital – to adapt to the new conditions who lost ground remarkably rapidly. How far this was true we can conclude from data for Pest-Buda, which in this respect, too, was probably ahead of the other towns: by the end of the 1850's only one-third of the masters operating before 1848 had, or had left to his heirs an independent establishment, while by the beginning of the 1870's, it was only one-fifth. With the development of capitalism, with the introduction of new agricultural implements, with the revolution of transportation, with urban growth, and with the need to care for the new, imported machinery, there was born also the group of small-tradesmen who satisfied the need for a more thorough division of labour. Another consequence of urbanization and the changing style of life was the fact that more and more barbers, hairdressers, cab-drivers and others organized as enterprises the services that they had at first personally rendered.

As a result, the number of the self-employed grew rapidly from the mid-1850's on in spite of the massive proletarization of the artisans, the numbers swelled particularly by the small tradesmen. The increase reflected a rate that was twice that of the population growth between 1857 and 1869: in numbers, from 227,000 to 291,000.²⁴

With the termination of feudalism, the Jewish population – which, comprising 4% of the population, was rapidly increasing partly through immigration, but mostly through a rate of population growth far exceeding the national average – had reached a significant stage in the long process of its embourgeoisement. In 1849, the Hungarian Parliament had pronounced equal before the law the Jews who, until then, had been practically outlawed from society. Habsburg absolutism, however, refused to recognize their emancipation, and punished their support of the war of liberation by imposing a special tribute. Their rights of residence and of trade were again temporarily restricted; they were forbidden to purchase land; and they were denied the right – legislated in 1849 to promote their assimilation – to contract civil marriages. Nevertheless, even so their business activities were less restricted than they had been during the era of feudalism; and after 1860, when the trade restrictions were lifted and they were declared free to buy land, these activities were practically unlimited.

Hungary's Jewish population had never been quite homogeneous. History had wrought fundamental differences in income, consciousness, and life-style between the Jews – living mostly in Transdanubia and in the Great Plain – who had long started on the road to embourgeoisement; and the more backward Jewish population living mostly in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Differences in wealth which grew ever greater with accelerated economic development made for further divisions, so that by the age of capitalism, Jewish

²⁴ Census: 1857, 1869. – K. Keleti pp. 201–204, 237–2471 – S Matlekovits 1909. – L. Rúzsás 1957. – Gy. Tolnai 1964. – G. Eperjessy 1965. – I. Balogh 1973. – K. Francsics 1973. – A. Pásztor 1973. – K. Dóka 1975. society, as such, was well on the road to disintegration. The majority of the Jews were held together but by the ever weaker religious ties, and by the external pressure of discrimination and its consequences.

At the top of Hungary's haute bourgeoisie were the wholesale merchants; more precisely, the wholesale merchants of agricultural produce. For the most part, these men rose from that group of Hungary's Jews who, because they had been forbidden to own land, and had been discouraged from engaging in urban trade and commerce, had sought after commercial outlets. They became extra-guild artisans; leased from landlords the rights to retail wine and spirits, and to run a slaughter-house; dealt in money; and, what was to become of most significance, traded in wool, raw hides, feathers and grain. In short, they engaged in laborious, modest and theretofore little envied trading activities, which the enduring need for raw materials that accompanied the advent of capitalism now made an extraordinarily rich source of capital accumulation. A few merchant families had gradually built up a system of buying, collecting, and marketing agricultural produce which, by the 1850's and 1860's, placed into the hands of a few dozen wholesale merchants the bulk of the now enormous domestic and foreign produce trade. This wholesale merchant group was concentrated in Pest. It was here that they directed the bulk of the trade in agricultural goods; it was here that they started the large-scale milling industry that was to play such a significant role in Hungary's capitalist development, and lay the basis for the distilling - and many other, less important - industries.

The majority of Jews belonged to the middle class and to the petite bourgeoisie. Besides those engaged in the sale of agricultural produce, more and more middle class Jews came to be owners of urban speciality goods shops, of larger and smaller country mills, of distilleries, of saw-mills, and other industries. As artisans, they worked in the crafts they had grown accustomed to when they were debarred from the guilds, and ones they had come to rely on in the days when they had been unable to engage in a craft requiring substantial equipment – living as they did in constant fear of having to flee their homes. The greatest proportion of Jews was to be found among the tailors, and generally those working in the clothing industry, but there were also a great many upholsterers, goldsmiths, watch-makers, and other craftsmen among them. In the provinces, most landlords continued to lease their exclusive right to retail wine and spirits to Jews, taking their share of the tenants' profits from the related business of money-lending through demanding the payment of exorbitant rents.

During the 1860's, the growing popularity of the modern system of credit and the concurrent lifting of the Jews' disability to purchase land both helped bring about a situation in which the inkeepers' surplus capital – part of which had been lent out and earning interest – was now directly invested into agricultural production. It was thus that the inkeeper could become a tenant farmer, or a small or even medium landowner. Also, especially after 1860, when trade, with a few exceptions, became unrestricted, many Jewish itinerant traders – responding to the fact that the occasional market no longer adequately satisfied the peasant population's more regular need for industrial products – set up general stores in thousands of communities where there had never been a shop before, becoming the typically rural petit-bourgeois personality.²⁵

Contemporary statistics also reflect a conspicuously rapid increase in the total number of the various kinds of merchants. While in 1847 their number (excluding those in Transylvania) was estimated at around only 21,512, according to the 1857 census, there were altogether 42,443 independent merchants in the "Hungarian lands", while the 1869 census put their number at 51,507.²⁶

Except in the Szepesség (Zips, a privileged territory in the Carpathian Highlands settled by German colonists) which still boasted a large bourgeois element although its economic significance was gradually declining, and except in Transylvanian Saxony, the indigenous bourgeoise of the various ethnic groups played but a minor, provincial role in Hungary's restricted capitalist development. In Croatia, the urban petite bourgeoise and the local merchant class evolved roughly along with the development of a more thorough division of labour – a rather slow pace, for all the impetus given it by the emancipation of the serfs. The fact that Triest was made the port of export for Hungary's agricultural produce deprived this group of the most promising branch of long-distance trade. Although the mines and the large forests were mostly controlled by foreign capital, the Croat merchants, too, took part in the processing and the export of lumber and wood products. The lion's share of the profits from the more energetic seaside trade and the growing industries of Fiume (Opatija), however, went to the city's Italian citizens.

The Serbian, Roumanian and Slovak bourgeoisie was just as little able to step outside the but slowly expanding circle of local trade and crafts. The natural resources of the areas inhabited by the nationalities were exploited, for the most part, by Hungarian magnates, by the Viennese treasury, or by foreign capital; the nationalities' bourgeoisie derived little profit from them.

Long-distance trade in agricultural products was in the hands of the haute bourgeoisie of the Magyar towns; it was only in livestock trade that the Southern Slav merchants could compete with the merchants of the other nationalities with some success, and perhaps in the marketing of forestry products.

The industrial activities of the nationalities' merchant capitalists were just as restricted. The Slovak merchants dealing in the products woven and spun in home industries were soon unable to compete with the Cisleithan textile industries. In Transylvania, too, the few factories set up by the bourgeoisie struggled, but hardly got ahead. The only undertaking of national significance – if only temporarily

 J. Pólya 1896. – S. Büchler 1901. – Zs. Grosszmann 1917. – B. Kempelen 1937–39. – M. Pásztor 1940. – E. Lederer 1952. – V. Sándor 1959. – M. Pogány 1966. – K. Vörös 1971. – McCagg, 1972.
 E. Fényes 1847. – Census: 1857, 1869.

SOME DATA ON THE INTELLIGENTSIA

- was the Zernyest paper mill established in the 1850's by a corporation of Roumanian merchants in Brassó (Braşov). The owners of saw mills, distilleries, and mills geared to satisfying local demand were more likely to come from among the national minorities; but few of them could ever rise higher than the bottom rung of a middle-class existence. Among the Carpathian Ukrainians, the bourgeoisie could not even develop as an independent social class. The urban ethnic bourgeoisie of the relatively more developed areas inhabited by the national minorities did try to set up saving banks, but most of them were not in the position to significantly influence even the local credit conditions.²⁷

SOME DATA ON THE INTELLIGENTSIA

The intelligentsia, whose political and cultural role was, naturally, much greater than their numbers warranted, during the period in question comprised no more than 0.7% of the population. (This, in spite of the modest increase that we can infer on the basis of the data of the 1857 and 1869 censuses. The total number of those listed in the very broad "intellectual" category in all the Hungarian lands rose from 95,587 to 113,804 between the two censuses, numbers which reflect a rate of increase less than 6% greater than that of the population as a whole.) Contemporary data make it very difficult to estimate the proportions and the composition of the intellectual stratum. For the most part, censuses listed the technical and agricultural employees. In 1847, Elek Fényes estimated the number of agricultural engineers (those in Transylvania not included) to be 6,540; while in 1855 Károly Galgóczi judged it to be only 4,958. As for the engineers and technical intelligentsia in private employment – probably a much smaller group – there are not even reasonable estimates.²⁸

In 1857, the number of civil servants and of schoolteachers was put at 52,798; that of the writers, artists, and private teachers at 12,571; or a total of 65,369. The total number listed for these categories the end of 1869 was 74,779. The increase is approximately proportionate to the population increase as a whole. This last census also gives us more precise details: 35,540 civil servants; 27,221 teachers; 715 professional writers and editors, 11,303 "artists". The last number inclines one to the conclusion that besides the performing and plastic artists, stone-carvers through magicians to public house musicians were included in this category without qualitative differentiation. According to data from 1864, the top stratum of educators consisted of 70 professors at the Pest Arts University; 28 at the University of Technology in Buda; 49 at the upper schools of economics; 80 at the

²⁷ L. Katus 1963. - Cf. Matković, 1873. - Plavšić, 1905. - A. Fellner 1921. - Karaman, 1969. F. Sváby 1901. - Gy. Tolnai 1964. - J. Perényi 1957. - Bodea-Surdu, 1964. - Z.I. Tóth 1966. ²⁸ Census: 1857, 1869. - E. Fényes 1847. I. p. 45. - Galgóczi pp. 75, 178.

law-schools; and approximately 1,627 educators in the high-schools and Colleges of Education. In 1857, the census takers found 19,606 priests, ministers and monks. Statistics show an increase of 1.5% in their numbers by 1869, a slower rate than for any other intellectual category, yet even so – except for the civil servants and teachers – they were proportionately by far the largest group. (The churches' role in consciousness-forming was reinforced by the fact that more than 95% of all teachers were employed in denominational schools, standing little chance of re-employment once they had displeased their ecclesiastical superiors.)²⁹

Although the number of lawyers was traditionally very high among Hungarian intellectuals, and in 1847 Elek Fényes "knew" of 4,123 of them – not counting the Transylvanians, in 1857 the total number of lawyers, notaries public, "public and vested agents" (managers and middle-men), and private business agents was estimated to be only 3,345. With capitalist development, and not least of all, the avalanche of law-suits over the redistribution of landed property the number of those publicly engaged in law quickly multiplied; by 1869, it had grown to 4,884. Those professionally engaged in the health services were the only group which showed a faster rate of growth. In 1857, there were 7,267 of them; in 1869, 14,283, or almost twice as many. The latter census, however, also reveals that close to two-thirds of this group worked as nurses or as midwives. In a country of more than 15 million people, there were only 2,807 doctors, 1,051 surgeons, and 1,437 apothecaries.³⁰

The intelligentsia was largely self-perpetuating. Most of the intellectuals of this period were the sons of the plebeian professionals so brutally decimated in and after 1848-49. But there were more and more young landless nobles who chose not the traditional professions in the civil service, in law, or as bailiffs, but became rather teachers and engineers. (It was not only the peculiar conditions of exile, but also his sizing up of the Hungarian scene which impelled Kossuth to educate both his sons to be engineers.) There were also more and more bourgeoisie in all the professions: the second-born sons, for whom there was no room in the store or the workshop; and the poorer petite bourgeoisie, for whom education was the passport to a better world. The sons of the Jewish bourgeoisie soon surpassed in numbers the old privileged bourgeois group in all the professions. In 1855, the -Pesti Napló (Pest Diary) approvingly noted their enthusiasm for learning, observing that in Pest the number of Jewish students "was proportionately the largest in all educational institutions". The university, too, they attended in ever growing numbers, especially the medical faculty, where from the end of the 1850's on, they regularly made up more than a third of the student body.

²⁹ Census: 1857, 1869. – J. Hunfalvy 1867. pp. 195–202. – K. Keleti, pp. 55, 440. – Cf. O. Szabolcs 1967.

³⁰ Census: 1857, 1869. – E. Fényes 1847. I. p. 45. – H. Mangold 1864. – G. Buzinkay 1973. pp. 183–184.

Throughout the period, however, they were excluded from the pharmaceutical faculty – in blatant defiance of the principle of equal rights. For the young Jewish intellectual, a diploma was an important precondition not only of professional, but also of social success.³¹

For the masses of the people, however, the road to a professional career was exceedingly narrow and extraordinarily difficult. It was the churches – eager to perpetuate themselves by any means – which were the most likely to grant a scholarship or place into a seminary a promising peasant lad. Otherwise, it was but the rare coincidence of extraordinary talent, willpower, and the good fortune of having a patron which permitted the actual emergence of a talent from "the depths of society" – as contemporaries put it. Such a coincidence was needed even in order that a talent as outstanding as Mihály Munkácsy – the orphan of bourgeois intellectual parents who spent 6 years as child and youth as a carpenter's apprentice, and 2 as a journeyman – should not be trapped forever with primitive tasks and brutal masters.³²

THE EVOLVING WORKING CLASS

The unfolding of the working class well reflected the peculiar development of Hungarian industrial capitalism during the period of absolutism. For all the progress that was being made, it was the artisans of the handicraft shops who comprised the majority of the working class throughout the entire period. Recruitment to it was through the laborious process inherited from the guilds (an apprenticeship of servile labour; long years as a journeyman, including those of the wanderyears) and mostly from the old urban artisan families. The dream of every journeyman was to become a master; his one hope in life was to save enough money to be able to set up his own workshop. For most of them, however, this proved to be a vain hope, especially in those branches of industry – primarily the textile industry - where even the existing shops were being relentlessly driven out of business by the competition of the Cisleithan and the domestic factories. It was indicative of the contradictions within Hungary's industrial development that several artisan trades grew energetically after the abolition of feudalism. Journeymen thus felt even more committed to the old ways, and, especially after industrial liberty was achieved in 1860, there was an ever greater number of those who actually tried setting up their own shops. The journeymen's strong desire to become their own masters, together with the fact that their professional training was, in fact, in the handicrafts combined to bring about a situation where the

³¹ K. Galgóczy 1859. – K. Keleti pp. 206, 426–429. – Barit, 1974. pp. 69–72, 82–84. For the importance of educating the youth of noble birth in technology, see PN. 1856. March 17. Deák Ferencz levelei 234. Cf. Á. Várkonyi 1973. II. pp. 328–329. – For the Jewish students, see: G. Buzinkay 1973. p. 108. – Sashegyi, 1975. p. 61, Nos. 91–92.

32 M. Munkácsy pp. 17-63. – I. Czeglédi pp. 7-50.

factories were not yet able to satisfy - but in a very small measure - their manpower needs from among the pool of guild journeymen. Naturally, it was journeymen, working for masters who transformed their artisan's shop into a capitalist factory, who were most likely to become industrial workers. For them, the transition was, so to speak, a natural one. But there were also journeymen willing to undergo the difficulties that such change involved for the sake of the greater freedom, more favourable working conditions and better pay which working in a large factory promised. Few guilds were as explicit in their abolition of the concessions granted their journeymen during the Revolution as was the tanners' of Nyiregyháza, who recorded with the minutes of a guild meeting in early 1850 that "the Magyar Ministry had granted many concessions to our young men, but all that is now past, and can't be insisted on". Nevertheless, both the greater number of years of journeymanhood prescribed by the 1851 "industrial order", and the stricter official control of their attempts to organize made many a journeyman wonder whether the new world of factories were not more attractive than the suffocating and closed world of the guilds. The average wage of factory workers was also considerably higher than what the small masters paid their journeymen. As a result, there was some redirection of the work force from the handicrafts to the manufacturing industry. But, because of the inhibiting factors mentioned above, this work force was not nearly of the size - nor of the calibre – to satisfy the needs of even the imperfectly developed Hungarian factories.33

The majority of the large mechanized factories recruited a significant number of their skilled workers from abroad. The practice was to have foreign workers instal the foreign machinery. Generally, these men stayed only long enough to teach the local workers to handle the machine. There were those among them, however, who staved longer; some, forever. There were men who came from distant lands; but the majority of them came from the western half of the Empire. But more significant was the number of the administrators and skilled workers who, trained in a Cisleithan factory of some Austrian capitalist, were sent to head the branch-factory established in Hungary. And many factories incorporated in Hungary tapped similar sources for their top men. Some sources calculate the number of foreign masters and workers to have risen from 18% to 22.6% between 1857 and 1869 in the Pest-Buda metal industry, and from 24.8% to 40.6% in the machine industry. Although many of these men were employed in small industries, we have every reason to suppose that they were proportionately the most numerous in the large factories. The technical managers and top workers of Hungarian black-coal mines coming to be owned by foreign investors were almost without exception Cisleithan, as was a significant percentage of the miners. At the same time, it was a domestic force of mostly Germans and

³³ Gewerbeordnung, 1851. – K. Dóka 1972. pp. 20–25. – A. Pásztor 1973. pp. 41–42, 47–49. – K. Dóka 1975. – Cf. GL. 1852. Jan. 11. – Sashegyi, pp. 202–209. Slovaks, and in smaller numbers, Hungarians and Roumanians which worked the pits in the old mining areas, using relatively advanced technology in the traditionally better developed metal-ore mining areas, and one characteristic of the work of peasant-miners in others.³⁴

Behind the relatively small group of skilled workers stood the host of un-skilled workers, workers just getting acquainted with the demands of large-scale wage labour.

Most of them were rural paupers, come to try their fortune in the city; it was only rarely that they ended up in the factories. Initially, most of them worked on urban building sites, on the construction projects of Pest. Gradually, they got used to factory labour, a kind so different from that done in the fields; they got used to this more intensive work, to the discipline of wage labour, a discipline that changed both their life style and their outlook on life. Cheap and nimble female hands also came to play an even greater role in large-scale factory production; and that characteristic feature of early capitalism, child labour, was likewise not unknown.³⁵

We have only approximate data for the changes in the numbers of the industrial working class. On the threshold of the Revolution the number of Hungary's (excluding Transylvania) workers (not counting the miners) was estimated to be 101,000. The 1857 census puts their numbers at 168,000; 182,000 including Transylvania. In the mid-1860's, there were about 41–44,000 miners. The total number of industrial workers at around the middle of the period of absolutism was, therefore, between 220,000 and 230,000. By the time of the 1869 census, this number had risen to 390,000. Even if we suppose a maximal increase during the 1867–69 boom period, we are left with the fact that the number of Hungary's industrial workers at least doubled during the period of absolutism.

Wage labourers accounted for but a fraction of this increase; the number of those employed in commerce and transportation, on the other hand, grew at double the growth rate of the industrial workers, indicating the radical changes that had taken place in both the scope and the methods of commercial activity.³⁶

THE DIFFERENTIATING PEASANTRY

Of the 13.7 million people inhabiting the "Hungarian lands" in 1857, approximately three-quarters belonged to the peasantry. The integration of the

³⁶ Census: 1857, 1869. – J. Hunfalvy 1869. – K. Keleti pp. 183–184, 237–238. – E. Lederer pp. 121–125, 130–136. – M. Lackó pp. 598, 603.

²⁴ K. Keleti, pp. 184–186, 189. – M. Lackó, pp. 611–614. Cf. E. Lederer pp. 122, 126. – J. Nagy, p. 9. – Szabó-Horváth pp. 54–55. – Besides a number of engineers, there were also 7 British labourers working in Hungary in 1861. D. 189. 1861–VIII. A – 14–15416.

³⁵ GL. 1854. Oct. 19. – K. Keleti p. 184. – E. Lederer pp. 129, 138. – M. Lackó pp. 604–611, 615. – J. Katona, 1965. II. pp. 399–406. – Sashegyi, 1959. p. 56. Szabó-Horváth pp. 55–56.

ex-serfs (who comprised the greatest number of those who worked the land with their own two hands), of the fractional number of free peasants, and of the relatively small group of squirelings who shared the peasant way of life was going on apace. One exception was the South Slav peasantry of the border military zone, about a million souls isolated geographically, in their mode of life, and somewhat in respect of their social status. We have, as yet, no precise numerical data on the stratification of the entire peasantry at the time of the abolition of feudalism. The data which follow – and which are to be treated with reservation – give us an idea of the subdivision of the urbarial serfs,³⁷ the preponderant majority in Hungary proper, into the two main groups – the smallholders, and the cotters (living mostly a peasant way of life, with a few in bourgeois occupations): smallholder serfs (colonus) 39.50%; cotter (inquilinus) 53.33%; tenant-cotters (subinquilinus) 7.17%.³⁸

Among the propertied peasantry, too, there was great differentiation by the time of the emancipation. According to data which at best approximate reality, 9-10% of the farmers had an entire plot or even more; about 43-44% had at least half a plot; about 42-43% had at least a quarter plot; and 5-6% had a least an eighth of a plot. However, in view of the fact that the 1767 Urbarium fixed the area of a whole plot at between 23 and 61 acres,³⁹ the size varying from county to county and even within a county according to local classification, the percentages above but indicate the great differences that existed, without in any way illustrating quantitatively the actual subdivisions of urbarial holdings in the whole of Hungary. (As for Transylvania, we must be content with observing that there, serfs' plots were, as a rule, even smaller, and the average size of the property held by landed farmers was much smaller than in the rest of the country.)

Non-urbarial land was not distributed to Hungary's erstwhile landed serfs in accordance with the size of their urbarial holdings; the vineyards were still less so. Even communities where, at the time of the emancipation, pastures and forests were distributed to the former serfs in proportion to the area of land they already owned, the total amount of land available for distribution varied greatly. Thus, and in the absence of national survey-based statistics, Hungarian historians have yet to solve the problem of drawing an accurate picture of the distribution of the land owned by former serfs at the beginning of the capitalist period. For any clear picture of the property hierarchy among them, one would need data on at least the

³⁷ By urbarial serfs we mean those peasants whose feudal obligations were regulated in 1767. Cf. J. Varga 1965. pp. 9–37.

³⁸ Ibid. pp. 131–132. In view of the fact that the holdings were frequently jointly owned, the number of the urbarial tenants was probably a little greater than that of the cotters. J. Varga 1971. 340. Cf. Gy. Szabad 1957. pp. 138–141, 383–386.

³⁹ In the course of land redistribution – which, after 1836, was regulated by law – the attempt to "compensate for" the unequal quality of the land led to the size of one acre varying from 1 100 through to 1 300 square fathoms (i. e. 3960, 4320, or 4680 sq. m.); in some southern counties, an acre was even larger. distribution of their livestock, data for which there is even less background material.⁴⁰

The abolition of feudalism created the legal, the redistribution of land provided for by the serfs' emancipation created the economic, and the sweeping victory of the capitalist marketing system created the financial preconditions for a theretofore unheard of traffic in rural property. Property changed hands mostly to decimate the ranks of the medium landowners who, at the time of the emancipation had still been in a majority. Lands were subdivided and sold, and the percentage of dwarf holdings grew, as did the number of the holdings of the rich peasantry. This bifrontal development was slowest in the areas least intensely involved in agricultural production - for instance, in Transylvania and in the north-eastern counties; and it was the most rapid in Western Transdanubia, and in the central areas of the Great Plain. In most of Transdanubia, the fragmentation of peasant holdings was by no means matched by a commensurate accumulation of land by the rich peasantry; here, the system of great estates prohibited the development of any considerable propertied peasant stratum. Such a group evolved primarily in those areas of the Great Plain where the size of the average holding had been the largest in the country even during the feudal period. Here, the large latifundia were less restrictive of the traffic in property, and formerly unknown opportunities for land accumulation were presented the peasants by the newly subdivided and newly drained lands, and by the pastures transformed into ploughland. In the Maros-Theiss and the Danube-Theiss triangles, it was primarily the land claimed from nature, and bought from their fellow peasants which augmented the holdings of peasant farmers; in the Upper Theiss area, on the northern edge of the Great Plain, and in Central Transdanubia, on the other hand, not only the rural capitalist elements (millers, innkeepers, merchants), but even peasants acquired lands belonging to the enervated among the landed nobility.

One of the most significant factors in the societal transformation of the period was the changed circumstances of the urbarial cotter tenants, the broadest sector of the peasantry at the time of the serfs' emancipation. At that time, a fraction of the cotters, about 4%, owned less than one eighth of an urbarial plot; a slightly larger percent owned other categories of small holdings, and vineyards of varying sizes. The rest had to be content with the 150 square-fathoms⁴¹ of grounds; with the – far from unrestricted – use of the common pasture, the precondition of their most important source of earnings: hauling and wheat treading; and – in some instances – with a restricted right to the use of the forest. With the redistribution of property, the cotters were given pastures of between 0.5 and 3.75 acres, and

⁴⁰ I. Orosz II. pp. 48–63. Cf. K. Galgóczi pp. 102–105. – Gy. Ember p. 12. – P. Sándor 1964. pp. 36–83. – K. Vörös 1973. p. 216.

⁴¹ In 1836, a law was passed stipulating that the grounds of the urbarial cotter tenant had to be at least 540 sq.m. in area.

perhaps 0.25 to 2 acres⁴² of forest land – lands equal to that received by serfs holding an eighth of a plot. There was scarcely a community where the pasture and forest area specifically set aside for cotters was left for common use even transitionally; in most places, they were immediately carved up into individual parcels and turned into ploughland, in the hope that at long last they would provide the basis for the "independent" farming the cotters so fervently desired. They were all the more anxious to do so in that the livestock they had formerly kept on the common pasture was becoming less and less able to earn its keep: railways and steamers were rendering the draft-horse obsolete; and corn-treading, too, was coming to be replaced by mechanical threshing. The army of ex-cotters thus entered into a new mode of life - farming their dwarf holdings, they came much to resemble the lower strata of the landed peasantry, and became a typical semi-proletarian class. With the exception of the market gardeners and wine producers among them, they were unable to make a living off their "poverty plots"; and yet, this plot tied them to the village. With a ruthlessness born of desperation, they slaved, and drove their families to make their little farms prosper. And yet, any small slump in the agricultural boom, or one of the natural disasters so frequent in the 1860's was enough to render them destitute. Even those who managed to hang on to their properties were obliged periodically to do wage labour, to become share-croppers. Partially self-supporting, they worked for wages which undermined the earning potential of those who had nothing to live on but what they could earn. They thus helped to bring about a situation in which the average wage on the - as yet limited - domestic industrial labour market was barely at, and frequently below, subsistence level.

The differentiation to be found among the nobility who had fallen on a peasant way of life differed little from that of the propertied peasantry - the former serfs. The differences within the ranks of the small landowners, of the squirelings, were perhaps even sharper, especially in the privileged, mostly noble communities. The generally more spacious countryside here, their earlier and more energetic change to market production, and the unrestricted subdivision of the plots in these communities all contributed to this greater differentiation which became most obvious after the 1849 property reorganization. In the assimilation process which followed, a roughly proportionate number of small landowning nobility found their peers to be peasants with dwarf holdings. Relatively few members of the lower nobility swelled the ranks of the middle peasantry, while a disproportionate number of them joined the rich peasant stratum. The differentiation of the peasantry of the former free communities of the Great Plain was practically as great as that of the areas with the most extreme differentiation. In Transylvania, on the other hand, from what we know of it, the process of differentiation was accompanied by a severe overall decline in the economic position of the former free, mostly Sekler peasantry. This was due as much to the appropriations of land

⁴² This was calculated in acres of 1200 sq. fathoms, or 4320 sq. m.

by the local nobility, as to the exploitative tax policy, and the primitive stage of the distribution of labour.⁴³

As of the "genteel landowners", the strong differentiation on a nationwide scale of the propertied peasantry by the end of the period is indicated only indirectly by the 1869 property statistics for the entire state of Hungary. In view of the fact that the total area of the lands of a particular owner within a given community was recorded, we not only have more estates than landowners in the statistical table, but might well get an inaccurate reflection of the differentiation among owners from the sizes recorded for the estates. Furthermore, there were probably numerous estates – especially in the first and last categories – owned not by peasants, but by the bourgeoisie or the intellectuals, or, in the latter case, by "genteel landowners". However, there were probably a number of estates of over 100 cadastral acres which belonged to the rich peasantry.

Size of Estate In Cadastral Acres	No. of Estates	As % of Estates Under 100 Cad. Acres
less than 5	1,444,400	58.85%
5- 15	643,091	26.17%
15- 30	260,619	10.61%
30- 50	77,280	3.14%
50-100	30,336	1.23%

Yet, for all the reservations noted above, this property table gives us a good indication of the extent of the differentiation among the propertied peasantry by the end of the 1860's. At least half of the propertied peasantry were dwarf holders, leading practically a semi-proletarian way of life; more than a third were smallholders, the middle peasantry; and practically every twentieth peasant was well-off, or belonged outright to the rich peasantry.⁴⁴

Behind the propertied peasants and those with dwarf noldings there stood the masses of the destitute. Most of this group consisted of the 100,000 families of urbarial tenant-cotters, and of the nearly 200,000 strong farm servant class that there was in Hungary proper at the time of the emancipation. Their ranks were soon swelled by the tens of thousands of cotters deprived of the allodial land they had been living on, by the propertied peasants who lost their lands, and by the cotters unable to keep up their dwarf holdings.

Both local data, and that of the censuses – which, in this respect, provide us but with the major trends – indicate that during the 1860's there was a particularly

⁴³ For the entire process, see I. Orosz II. pp. 13–107. – Cf. Barit, 1974, pp. 67–91. – I. Soós 1941. – P.S. Sándor (Ed.) pp. 13–21, 60–98, 204–292. – Gy. Szabad 1957. pp. 311–403, 503–518. – J. Kovács 1957. – L. Für 1965. – S. Gyimesi 1965. – I. Balogh 1965. – A. Vörös 1966. – J. Bali 1966. – Simonffy 1968. – J. Veliky 1970.

⁴⁴ K. Keleti pp. 147-151. - Cf. I. Orosz II. pp. 31-33, 117-123.

rapid increase in the numbers of the rural poor. This process was closely related to the ever more comprehensive redistribution of property, to the headway being made by capitalist development, and to the series of natural disasters which afflicted the country – among them the horrible drought of 1863 and the repeatedly decimating cattle-plague. When a great many of the pastures were ploughed up, shepherds from everywhere, but especially the Great Plain joined the armies of the poor; or joined those rural and market-town elements who rebelled against the new life, against the discipline of wage labour, and who, together with the deserters, were causing a veritable proliferation of outlaw bands.

The peasantry throughout most of the country – with a few isolated exceptions in the southern areas – made as yet no effort to emigrate. The primarily Slovak and Carpathian Ukrainian poor peasantry of overpopulated Upper Northern Hungary – with faith in the government's resettlement promises – hoped to satiate its land-hunger – and its hunger in the strictest sense of the word – within the country itself. Some rather futile efforts were thus made at the beginning of the 1860's to bring about a new wave of migrations. As for the disquietingly large-scale Sekler emigrations, Hungarians both at home and abroad who had their people's and their nation's true interest at heart protested in vain. The rural poor increased rapidly, their numbers fed by a variety of sources; and what an exception it was if anyone among them could claw his way up among even the dwarf holders.

The road from the rural hovel which led through the double life of being both a rural and urban day-labourer to becoming an industrial worker was a steep and narrow one indeed. Differentiation among the peasantry produced agrarian proletariate at a rate more rapid than agriculture – just undergoing the transition to capitalist production methods – could employ them; and more quickly than industrial development could, in fact, absorb them. It is this which accounts for the fact that the 1857 and 1869 censuses – using diverging methods, and thus yielding results that are not directly comparable – indicate the proletariat of typically peasant origin ("agricultural hands", "servants", "day-labourers") doubled during the intervening years, even though it was primarily from these same strata that the increase in the numbers of the industrial workers, too, was recruited.⁴⁵

The total population of the "Hungarian lands" in 1850 was 13.4 million; in 1857, 13.7 million, and by the end of 1869, 15.4 million. The censuses – taken using a variety of methods, and thus far from totally dependable – indicate that natural increase shrank to a minimum during the 1850's. The details, too, seem to

⁴⁵ E. Fényes 1847. I. pp. 46-50. - J. Varga 1967. pp. 100, 131. - Census: 1857, 1869. Cf. Note 43 and D. 191. 1861-IV. K.-13962, 1863-10985, 1864-IV. K.-4047, 1866-IV. K.-3103. -K. Galgóczi pp. 189-229. - P. S. Sándor (Ed.) pp. 204-251. - Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 366-367, 393-409, 416-433, 456-459, 464-66. - Z. Sárközi 1965. - I. Katona 1965. - I. Rácz 1965. -M. Pogány 1966. - M. Pogány 1974. pp. 406-408.

THE DIFFERENTIATING PEASANTRY

support this conclusion, for in 1854, for instance, the number of those who died was considerably larger than that of those born alive. The population increase indicated by the last figure exceeds that for the rest of Europe during the same period. Unambiguously indicative of the country's relative backwardness, however, is the fact that, with the exception of a few Russian provinces, Hungary had the lowest life expectancy in all of Europe.⁴⁶

The census data referred to above give us no precise picture of the changes in society which transpired during the period of absolutism. The censuses, however, undisputably reinforce the conclusion to be drawn from a multitude of local data: that the fundamental trend was toward a capitalist restructuring of society. For there can be no doubt that the growth rate of the wage-labourer stratum considerably exceeded that of the population as a whole, and even more greatly that of the owner stratum. At the same time, the fact that the great landowning aristocracy had salvaged, or, with the government's help, restored its most important positions of power, and, after a painful struggle, had succeeded in regaining its absolute influence over the formerly privileged "genteel" stratum and the old and new bourgeoisie which had clambered up beside it – all this was a formidable obstacle to social mobility. In a situation where the economic basis of those at the top hardly grew faster than they produced their successors, the existence of such an obstacle proved to be an almost insuperable impediment to the upward mobility of those below.

" Census: 1850, 1857, 1869. - Tafeln, 1849-1865. - Hausner I. pp. 12-27, 236-239. - J. Rédei pp. 99, 159, 163.

3 Szabad György

CHAPTER 2

HUNGARIAN POLITICAL ATTITUDES DURING THE 1850's

HUNGARY'S POLITICAL MOOD AFTER 1849

While the surrender of the main body of Hungary's army under Artur Görgey at Világos on Aug. 13, 1849, and the country's subsequent military occupation might have put an end to the war, they certainly did not bring immediate peace. The fort of Comorno held out until the beginning of October; guerilla units engaged in sporadic rear-guard action, and, in places, clashes were provoked by the reign of terror instituted by the army of occupation. Their enormous military superiority, however, soon broke down the last vestiges of armed resistance.¹

The mood of despair was less quickly overcome. For the army of occupation, the molestations of the gendarmerie, the prohibitions published on official posters, the multitude of directives and threats directly affected the daily lives, the personal liberties of masses of the population. There was widespread and profound sympathy for those executed, most especially for Count Lajos Batthyány, the former Prime Minister, for the Minister, László Csányi, and for the 13 generals. People were stunned at the news of the many severe sentences. Tens of thousands mourned their fallen relatives; hundreds of thousands feared for the lives of the forced conscripts, or for some deserter relative; millions lived in apprehension of what the future might bring. And, in those politically conscious, all this was of one piece with their concern for the fate of the nation.²

Scarce was the noble, bourgeois, or intellectual family in the circles whose political outlook moulded public opinion where they did not mourn at least one fallen soldier, one prisoner, or one forced conscript; where they did not search for at least one missing member; where they did not hide at least one man with a price on his head. Even fewer were the homes where the delivery of an official notice, or the search-party's knock in the night did not strike terror in all hearts. Out loud, they protested perhaps only at the confiscation of their hunting rifles, or at the German rewriting of their guild-signs. But in their heart of hearts, they wept for what they feared was lost: their native land.

Yet soon enough, the clandestine debating started. The optimists hoped that international developments would bring about some rapid change; while those

¹ Cf. Gy. Spira pp. 579-582. - D. Károlyi 1974. pp. 269-272.

² A. Bartha 1930. – Á. Károlyi 1932. I. pp. 539–574. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 128–135. – Gy. Szabad 1972. pp. 10–11. – L. Pintér 1973.

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who had lost all hope recalled that losing was the "Magyar's destiny". Gradually, there emerged concrete political points of view and their corresponding behaviour patterns; political groupings were formed or recalled to life. But, except for the leading personalities of each trend, the majority of their adherents swayed from one position to another at every real or imagined swing of the political pendulum.

The absence of legal political forums – and thus, of the opportunity and the obligation to make a public political commitment – had peculiar consequences for Hungary. The period of absolutism produced not only men of integrity who rejected even constructive new insights in the name of consistency, but patriots who, obsessed with doubts and misgivings, tested a number of different paths in their efforts to find a way out of the difficult situation. And just as characteristic of the period were the tacticians who changed camps with every change of the wind; and the turncoat fortune hunters, for whom personal success became the only goal.³

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It was not only the "foreigners" coming from the other side of the Empire and the non-Magyars – vainly hoping thus to promote the interests of their own people – who entered the service of absolutism in Hungary. There were Magyars among them, too, men alienated from their people, or men content to make their private deal with the powers that be at the expense of their compatriots.⁴ From the start, two high-placed officials of the old Metternich system were to be found on the nine-man Imperial Council: Count Ferenc Zichy, the former Vice-President of the *Helytartótanács* (Consilium Regium Locumtenentiale Hungaricum) and Imperial High-Commissioner to the Czarist army of intervention in 1849; and László Szőgyény, the former Vice-Chancellor, and the head of the administrative system organized under Windischgrätz in the areas occupied by the Imperial forces. It was only later that the Emperor made an Imperial Councillor of Count Móric Almásy, the former Vice-President of the Hungarian Treasury, and the head of the temporary fiscal administrative system set up in the occupied territories in 1849.⁵

There were soldiers and administrators of Magyar origin among the migrant population of the garrisons, and the bureaus of the provincial governments. This

³ Cf. Zsedényi, 1850. pp. 86–87. – M. Szegfi pp. 216–221. – S. Szilágyi pp. 7–10. – Búsbach II. pp. 145–148. – J. Földy pp. 13–71. – A. Noszlopy pp. 372–376. – Madarász pp. 271–281. – I. Major pp. 107–129. – F. Koós pp. 128–129. – S. Teleki pp. 389, 393–394, 397. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 164–166, 187–189. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 19–29.

⁴ Amtsleben, 1861. – J. Pálffy pp. 163–164. – I. Rogge p. 220. – Á. Károlyi 1921. p. 8. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 215–217, 266–268, 330–331. – Gy. Miskolczy 1933. pp. 388–401. – Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 60–61, 484, 485. – Z. I. Tóth, 1966. p. 385.

⁵ Szógyény-Marich II. pp. 5–19, 30–31, 39–40. – Andics III. pp. 45–53, 114–115, 207, 212–214, 289–290, 300–304.

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was the group which had traditionally felt itself superior to the nationalities, the group which now wanted to make disciplined subjects of the peoples it considered to have brought the Empire "to the brink of disaster" in 1848–49. To underpin its position – which the revolutionary crisis proved to be precarious enough – it hoped to see the gradual crystallization of a future "Austrian nation".⁶

Lajos Benedek, who rose to the rank of a field-marshal, faught against his Magyar compatriots as ruthlessly as against the Italian and Polish freedom fighters.7 Baron Károly Mecséry - whose Magyarness the Pesti Napló questioned as early as the autumn of 1860, noting that "contrary to popular belief", he was not Magyar, for he was born in Bohemia, and "lived throughout his career in the hereditary lands, spoke not a word of Hungarian, and was as German as every other Viennese" - as the vice-president of the Bohemian Council of Governors considered that his main duty was to keep "order" at all cost in a turbulent Hungary.8 It is just as difficult to determine unambiguously the "national" affiliation of Baron István Hauer who held - if not the highest - certainly one of the most important positions in the absolutist system aiming at Hungary's integration into the Empire. He was born in Sopron (Oedenburg); his mother was of the distinguished Sigray family. He also spoke Hungarian, and was thus suited to play the role of the competent expert in every "Magyar affair" in his capacity as head of the civil department of Archduke Albrecht's Governor-General's Board.⁹ In spite of his Magyar origins, or perhaps precisely to compensate for it, he was the most vociferous advocate of restricting the Magyar district of Pest-Buda to as small an area as possible. And it was again Hauer who was the most determined to have the country permanently dismembered. After 1849, he was put in charge of the Sopron district, and proved to be one of the most energetic promoters of Germanization. As a confidant of Bach, and with no small influence over Archduke Albrecht, he was one of the most ruthless executors of the policy of forced integration.¹⁰ General Ferenc Haller, a former aide-de-camp to the Palatine Archduke Joseph,¹¹ and Ban of Croatia during the 1840's, was now the deputy of Archduke Albrecht. Unlike Hauer, he was committed not so much to absolutistic centralization, as to the dynasty. His devotion to the dynasty,

⁶ Beamtentum, 1851. – Amtsleben, 1861. – Charmatz, 1918. I. pp. 23–27. – Friedjung I. 186. Rédlich I. 472–479. – Mally, 1972. – É. Somogyi, 1968. pp. 21–23.

⁷ Friedjung, 1904. pp. 18–258. – Lónyay, Carl, pp. 25–174, 194. – Andics III. pp. 207–208, 276–277, 281. – Regele pp. 32–158, 192–194. – Gy. Szabad p. 29.

⁸ PN. 1860. Oct. 23. Cf. Fejérpataky pp. 373–374. – F. Walter I. pp. 140, 188. – Gy. Szabad p. 79. – Stölzl p. 22.

⁹ Archduke Albrecht Friedrich Rudolf (1817–1895), the uncle of the Emperor Franz Joseph I, was the military and civil Governor of Hungary between 1851 and 1860.

¹⁰ Kempen pp. 340, 437, 469. – Szőgyény-Marich II. pp. 50–51, 57, 81. – SzIDH. II. pp. 101, 227–242, 251–258, 491. – D. Angyal pp. 176–178, 190. – Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 41, 54–55, 60, 62, 196, 259.

¹¹ Archduke Joseph (1776–1847), younger brother of the Emperor Franz I, had the office of Palatine, the King's deputy, the highest rank in feudal Hungary.

however, was so unquestioning, that he was ready to implement at a moment's notice even those imperial decrees which conflicted with his own – rather conservative – political ideas.¹²

A great number of Magyar professionals were forced into lower level administrative and judiciary jobs by the need to make a living. But Magyars were also to be found higher up, in positions of political responsibility requiring the rendering of substantial services to the cause of absolutism. Among them was Count Ferenc Nádasdy, Lord Lieutenant of Árva County during the reform decades and President of the Transylvanian Royal Treasury, who, after 1849, served first as President of the Sopron District High Court of Justice, then as Judge of the Viennese Supreme Court, in 1857 finally becoming the Imperial Minister of Justice. At the time of his nomination, many of his compatriots were heartened to think that "a Magyar" had finally become a member of the government, but soon had to agree that he was indeed "a more ardent Germanizer... than his fellow ministers".¹³

In the autumn of 1849, Haynau appointed Bálint Uray, president of the local Court of Exchange, as High Commissioner of the Debrecen division. It was Uray's activities during the reform era which had earned him the General's confidence. As sub-prefect of Szatmár County, it was he who had charged Wesselényi with high treason in 1834,¹⁴ and later directed the concentrated attack on the Mármaros County reform opposition during the 1840's. Uray did a ruthlessly thorough "clean-up job" as High Commissioner, and was rewarded with the Presidency of the District High Court, thence to mete out "justice" to one-fifth of the entire country.¹⁵

The absolutist government attributed great importance to consciousness forming. It not only censured, but also gave to be understood what it was that it wanted to appear in print, especially what it wanted to see in the newspapers. And it always found willing pens, unabashedly available for a price. There were those who compromised their principles in exchange for just a newspaper licence; but there were also those who made a regular bargain with the government's agents to place the paper at its service in return for a monthly sum (in the case of a Pest daily paper, generally 1,000–1,500 forints, the equivalent of a university professor's annual salary). Károly Vida, whose conservative nationalist glorification of Hungary's ancient past was coupled with castigation of the efforts to build a bourgeois nation state, the editor of the *Figyelmező*; the conservative disparager

¹² Fejérpataky p. 124. – Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 30, 119. – Kempen p. 387. – Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 70, 114, 196.

¹³ Szőgyény-Marich II. pp. 50, 94. – Kempen pp. 431, 434. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 226, 265, II. p. 158.

¹⁴ Baron Miklós Wesselényi (1796–1850) was the initiator of the anti-feudal program of national reform elaborated by Kossuth. During the 1830's, Metternich had him accused and tried on a number of counts; he was found guilty, and banished for years from his native land.

¹⁵ D. 79-80. – D. Angyal pp. 509-511. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 138, 226. – Andics III. p. 425. – Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 269-271. Cf. Trócsányi pp. 271-273.

of the Transylvanian reformers, Ferenc Szilágyi, editor of the Magyar Hirlap; and Ferenc Császár, former judge of the feudal Supreme Court, and the first editor of the Pesti Napló – all these men made such deals with the government. In the efforts to deserve the government's pay, the integrity of the press reached its all-time nadir. For all that – paradoxically, just because of that – those in power could have no peace of mind concerning the activities even of the publicists whom they had outright bought. They disciplined them with prohibitions and fines when, from time to time, they thought to divine from the undue liberty of their pens a quest for popular approval or hopes for changes up top. For those in power demanded that their paid publicists give total and unprincipled support to all their policies. For instance, although Károly Vida spared no abuse for Kossuth and Hungary's 1848 goals, he soon fell from favour when it became evident that he sympathized with the restoration plans of the conservative federalist aristocracy who had lost out on acquiring the leadership of the anti-revolutionary camp.

The ideal embodiment of unprincipled collaboration with the powers that be was Aurél Kecskeméthy. In the summer of 1849, he was ambitious enough to be willing to start a paper at the request of General Artur Görgey;¹⁶ the outcome of the war, however, left no scope for this. By the summer of 1850, he was already denouncing his conservative colleagues to the imperial authorities. He then published a leaflet entitled Hungary's Centralization in Austria, denouncing both the revolution's aspirations and nostalgia for feudal constitutionalism, and declaring embourgeoisement and assimilation into Austria as the best alternative for the Magyars and the neighbouring peoples. In the spring of 1851, he became the Vienna correspondent of the Pesti Napló, and also Minister of the Interior Bach's confidential adviser on Hungarian press affairs. He became press censor, received a daily allowance from the police authorities for his services, and, in 1854, became a police inspector. "Man is weak, but his stomach's strong" was Kecskeméthy's motto. At the time of his appointment, he confided to his diary that "it does not fulfill my ambition"; yet he was happy enough for it, for "I've become a member of that great body which in fact rules this great Empire, the bureaucracy; it gives some small self-satisfaction, and sense of security". By 1856, even in his diary he thought of himself as "first and foremost a citizen of the Austrian Empire... and only as such... a Magyar". "There is no such thing as a Hungarian policy... there can only be an Austrian policy... separatism has no rational grounds; it is built but on confused emotions." After 1857, when Kecskeméthy sensed that there was a possibility of change, he drew closer to the conservative faction that he had reviled and laughed at at the beginning of the 1850's.

For he understood that however many collaborators the Bach system found among his compatriots, it was unable to recruit a body of supporters that would be

¹⁶ General Artúr Görgey (1818–1916), in 1849, temporarily Minister of War of the Hungarian Government. In August of 1849, he left Kossuth no option but to resign, and then laid down his arms to the invading Czarist Army.

THE HABSBURGS' CONSERVATIVE RESERVES

loyal even in moments of crisis. In this sense, it was on weaker footing than the other main – for the moment, eclipsed – faction of the anti-revolutionary camp, whose best organized element was the Hungarian conservative aristocracy.¹⁷

THE HABSBURGS' CONSERVATIVE RESERVES

The only more or less organized Hungarian political force after Világos was the conservative group still busily trying to ingratiate itself with the Habsburgs. The leaders of the Conservative Party of the reform era, those who had formerly implemented Metternich's Hungarian policy, continued by all means to try to prove their loyalty to the Habsburgs, even during the autumn of 1849, after the downfall of Windischgrätz who had been their chief patron. Count Antal Szécsen even undertook personally to travel to London after the execution of Batthyány. He reviled the defeated Hungarian revolution, justified Czarist intervention and the Habsburg policy of reprisal in an effort to replenish the arsenals of British parliamentarians and journalists trying vainly to defend the Habsburgs in the face of an outraged British public.¹⁸

However, after the Hungarian conservatives found that, for all their enthusiasm, Schwarzenberg was determined to reorganize the Empire without benefit of their advice and participation, they made repeated attempts to frustrate the government's plans. After much behind the scenes activity, in the spring of 1850 they published a memorandum addressed to the Emperor. Its chief author was Count Emil Dessewffy, the group's theoretician. The memorandum - which was rejected by the Emperor - sharply condemned the 1848 Laws guaranteeing Hungary's self-government, and the constitutional changes which the Emperor had then approved. Nevertheless, it considered a fait accompli the emancipation of the serfs, the subjection of all citizens to taxation, and - with some reservation - the abolition of the nobility's monopoly of politics. It opposed the country's territorial dismemberment, rejected the Olmütz Constitution still in effect at the time of the submission of the memorandum, and objected to centralized government. Its authors wished to see restored the only political system and ties to the Empire that they considered legal for Hungary - those of the pre-revolution period.¹⁹ Pamphlets published around the same time by Ede Zsedényi and Pál Somssich contained views coinciding in many respects with those of the memorandum.²⁰ In a pamphlet which appeared in 1851, Count Antal

¹⁷ Kecskeméthy pp. 5–7, 15–17, 23–28, 63–69, 82–83, 102, 301. – D. Angyal pp. 5–11, 21–24, 28–34, 54–61, 88, 91, 101–103, 135–136, 149–152, 216–217, 220–221, 518. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 115, 194–195, 202–203, 209, II. p. 426. G. B. Németh pp. 174–188.

¹⁸ I. Hajnal pp. 313, 807, 816. - Andics III. pp. 410-412, 423-424, 430-436, 442-445.

¹⁹ Friedenfels II. pp. 166, 433–441. – Ludassy pp. 10–13. – Szőgyény-Marich II. pp. 26–28, 217–219. – Kempen p. 174. – Wertheimer I. pp. 96–100. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 159–160, 195–196. – D. Angyal p. 32.

²⁰ P. Somssich, 1850. - Zsedényi, 1850. - Zsedényi, 1851.

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Szécsen went even further, condemning bourgeois parliamentarianism, the general emancipation of the serfs, trial by jury and the liberty of the press, along with giving a critique of centralizing absolutism. He pointed out that the Magyars were a nation with a "historico-political" entity, and could be successfully governed only through the restoration of the feudal constitutional system.²¹ At the beginning of 1852, Count György Apponvi was asked to participate in a committee working on the implementation of the basic principles of government. This gave him an opportunity to summarize in another memorandum what Schwarzenberg mocked as the "old-conservative" position. There were some important questions of which he spoke even more unambiguously than before. His suggestion, for instance that aviticitas, abolished in 1848, be restored²² was indicative of the desire to preserve certain elements of the feudal system; and although he wished to see the municipalities restored, he wanted to do away with the election of municipal officers in order to frustrate all hopes of democratic self-government. Apponyi's memorandum completely ignored the constitutional rights won in 1848, and expressed his irreproachable loyalty to the Emperor. However, it was critical of the nascent system of centralization, and was thus rejected. Archduke Albrecht declared it a memorandum worthy of a Batthyány or a Kossuth!23

The conservatives were quick to understand the situation. For a long time, they took care to avoid any stand that Vienna could interpret as explicitly hostile, and took just as much care to avoid having public opinion consider them cronies of the system, which they hoped would be short-lived. The conservatives withdrew from the forums of political life, but – especially from the late 1850's on – came to play an ever more active part in the economic unions and in cultural affairs. Nor was their political reticence tantamount to total passivity. They were not content merely to work out new plans for the reorganization of the Empire, but also sought the means whereby they might influence the course of events. It was primarily through the good offices of the Hungarian members of the Imperial Council that they got a glimpse of what was going on behind the scenes, and got the chance to machinate, first of all against the government's haut bourgeois faction led by Bach.

Their demonstrative resentment was far from implacable; they took every opportunity to remind the Emperor of their loyalty, and of their readiness at all times to take over the reigns of government. It was for this reason that such an army of conservative politicians and great landowning aristocrats flocked to Vienna in 1853 to rejoice at the failure of the attempt made on the life of the

²¹ Szécsen, 1851.

 $^{^{22}}$ Aviticitas = a legal institution existing in Hungary since 1351, designed to safeguard the properties of noble families.

²³ Szőgyény-Marich II. pp. 57–61. – Ludassy pp. 23–24. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 316–320. – J. Miskolczy, 1959. p. 119.

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Emperor. A good number of them attended the festivities held the autumn of 1853 to celebrate the finding of the Crown hidden in 1849; and many more Franz Joseph's magnificent wedding in the spring of 1854. All this went neither unnoticed, nor totally unreciprocated. Time and again, the Emperor let them know that they were not forgotten. In 1854, for instance, Count György Apponyi received the Great Cross of the Order of Leopold, one of the highest honours, in recognition of his services. In 1856, the Emperor offered him the curatorship of the Viennese Terezianum, the chief bastion of leadership training in the spirit of the ancien régime, but Apponyi made some "weak excuses" to refuse it, thus letting his sovereign known that it would take a more important post to lure him from his "retirement".²⁴

For over half a decade, the conservatives refrained from overt political action. In the spring of 1857, however, they judged that the time had come to turn over a new leaf. While in 1852 most of them had kept away from the "enthusiastic" celebrations so painfully organized by the authorities on the occasion of the Emperor's first progress through Hungary, in 1857 they did their utmost to make Franz Joseph's second visit as successful as possible in order thus, too, to win the sovereign to their side. They had no little reason to suspect that the system of absolutism would take a milder turn: the deterioration of the Empire's status abroad; its growing fiscal difficulties; the crisis in the economy; the consequent political tension that was perceptibly increasing, especially in Hungary; and, closely related to all this, the amnesty granted to the majority of those who had been imprisoned and to all emigrants willing to take the oath of allegiance - all these augured well. Dessewffy composed a new conservative memorandum complaining of the disuse of the pre-1848 institutions, of the country's dismemberment, and of the policy of Germanization, and carefully hinting at the heaviness of the tax burden. The majority of the 131 signatories were from the ranks of the organized conservative group, and the ecclesiastical and civil aristocracy, but they also managed to get the signatures of Baron József Eötyös, a Minister, and of Kálmán Ghyczy, Under-Secretary of State in 1848; at the bottom of the list, they appended the names of a few of the Pest haute bourgeoisie. However, Franz Joseph repeatedly refused as much as to accept this "humble petition" from the hands of the Cardinal, János Scitovszky, and concluded his progress throughout the country with the self-satisfied observation that the implementation of the "fundamental principles of government" of 1851 had brought about "the country's indisputable prosperity". The conservatives' diagnosis of the situation proved to be inaccurate and their carefully prepared action proved to be too weak. Not only was it incapable of directly changing the system; it was unable as much as to bring to a head the latent conflicts among those in power. However, the conservatives did make sure that news of their deed

²⁴ Szógyény-Marich II. pp. 69–70, 73, 78–79, 231–232. – Kempen p. 385. – Cf. PN. 1856. Sept. 2–5. – HAH. 149. – Kónyi II. p. 411. – Berzeviczy II. pp. 11, 36–37, 41–42, 106.

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spread throughout the country. In a nation where the forums for both legal political organization and objective information were banned, it was easy enough for them thus to appear in the light of committed "patriotism".²⁵

"DISENCHANTING" AND "NEW ILLUSIONS"

The conservatives were the only political faction of the reform and of the revolutionary era to survive the crisis of 1849 as an organized force. Most of the former Centralist²⁶ leaders had, in fact, gone abroad to escape the armed conflict, but circumstances prevented their taking a common stand for quite some time. Ágoston Trefort returned as early as 1850, but retired to his country estate. *How to Bring the Revolutions to an End* was the telling title of a study he planned to publish, but the authorities confiscated the manuscript.²⁷ It was not until 1855 that László Szalay, who had had the important part of the Revolutionary Government's diplomatic envoy to Western Europe, returned from Switzerland; until the end of the decade, however, he was very careful to keep out of politics. Like him, Móric Lukács, too, devoted himself to his studies upon his return from exile.

It was while he was still in Switzerland that József Eötvös, the former leader of the Centralists, wrote his work on the lessons to be derived from the changes that had transpired in Europe since the French Revolution. It was a comprehensive and excellent work, testifying to the author's extensive knowledge of political philosophy, and to an ability to recognize the main trends of political development.²⁸ He called illusory the attempts at the concurrent realization of all three ideals of the slogan "Liberty-Equality-Nationality". Any consistent attempt to realize the latter two ("equality" and "nationality") would, he thought, necessarily endanger the given societal and political framework, and thus the very preconditions of the evolution of "liberty". The theoretical solution to the dilemma he saw in a bourgeois constitutional system which would keep the diverging and conflicting social and political forces in a state of equilibrium, and would guarantee the rights and liberties necessary to the functioning of a bourgeois society in a way that would yet prevent the democratic forces from gaining ascendancy. Eötvös, whose theory in many respects reflected a realistic appreciation of the contradictions within the liberal political system, was yet unable to take into account the Empire's true circumstances in giving his prescription to its Habsburg rulers. On the one hand, he was offering to a society

²⁶ They received their name in the course of the debates during the 1840's among the various trends of the reform-opposition on the issue of administrative reform.

²⁷ Á. Várkonyi 1973. II. p. 239.

²⁸ J. Eötvös 1851–1854.

²⁵ Adresse, 1857. – Szőgyény-Marich II. pp. 82–94, 99–106. – Kónyi II. p. 397 – Kempen pp. 424–425, 430–433. – Rogge I. pp. 480–490. – Wertheimer I. pp. 104–109. Berzeviczy II. pp. 112–122.

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wherein the bourgeoisie had not even come to power the panaceas with which the Western bourgeoisie was trying to *keep* its position of predominance; on the other, he was propounding constitutionalism as a unifying force to the Habsburgs, who dreaded constitutionalism in this period as the saboteur of the Empire's unity, and of their own absolute power.

In 1850, Eötvös published a German language political pamphlet in Pest.²⁹ In his concurrently written political theoretical work, he gave detailed justification for the creation of a system of government which would balance Imperial centralization with the dominions' self-government. He openly disagreed with the Schwarzenberg clique's "Verwirkungstheorie" that Hungary had "forfeited" its constitutional rights in 1848–49. But he wished to subordinate the nationalities' desire for self-government – including that of the Magyars – to the interests of the Empire as a whole. Although the pamphlet appeared anonymously, its authorship was soon divined, and it caused a great stir. Its arguments, however, proved to be insufficiently convincing in Vienna, and quite unpopular in Hungary. The position he had taken – along with his commitment to a constitutional, unified Empire – became one reason for Eötvös' political isolation. Yet he was to reiterate it in his 1859 pamphlet, wherein he argued even more energetically that self-government for the dominions was justified.³⁰

Not only Eötvös' compatriots were unconvinced; he failed to convince Vienna of the desirability of restoring constitutionalism. Yet – as he stated in his 1859 pamphlet, conjuring up the spectre that most terrified those in power – he wished thus but to help avert "the greatest danger that threatens every state in our days: a democratic revolution".³¹ However, at the time of his first pamphlet, the Habsburgs were already well on the road to absolutism; at the time the second was published, Franz Joseph still clung tenaciously to the system he had built.³²

Unlike Eötvös' pamphlet, the political publications of Antal Csengery and Baron Zsigmond Kemény, for all the offence they gave, had very significant and far-reaching effects on their readers. Csengery edited, and together with Zsigmond Kemény wrote most of the "political character-sketches" which appeared in Hungarian in 1851, and in German a year later. The series of portraits – of which a number vied with the best of contemporary Hungarian essay prose – gave a comprehensive evaluation of the political struggles of the reform era. They were far from denying the necessity of change, and unlike the conservative pamphlets, were far from nostalgic for the feudal world. Advocating a realistic, illusion-free evaluation of the not-so-distant past, they insisted on the necessity of the change from the feudal to the bourgeois world; but they did so deploring the turmoil that, of necessity, accompanied such change. They declared

²⁹ J. Eötvös 1850.

³⁰ J. Eötvös 1859.

³¹ Ibid. p. 215.

³² Sőtér pp. 245–281. – Bődy pp. 61–74. – Cf. Redlich I. pp. 553–570. – Mátrai pp. 293–303. – Kann II. pp. 101–107. – Gy. Szabad 1971. pp. 665–666. – Á. Várkonyi 1973. II. pp. 389–399.

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irresponsible those who had undertaken to remove the obstacles to the change they, too, claimed to desire; they called irresponsible those who had, in fact, done away with the feudal system. Csengery's and especially Kemény's "sobering" essays saw those who had laid the foundations for bourgeois transformation as also the generators of the tragic armed conflict of '48-49. At the same time, their selective use of facts gave rise to historical illusions regarding those who had formerly – unsuccessfully – opposed Kossuth on the direction that the reform movement and the struggle against feudalism was to take; and – wittingly or unwittingly – even fostered illusions about those who had, in fact, been opposed to change.³³

During the reform era, Zsigmond Kemény had sympathized with the centralists; in 1849, he played a leading role in the organization of the "peace party". His two, closely related pamphlets, *After the Revolution* (1850) and *One More Word After the Revolution* (1851) both cast light on how it was that their author – who had not only survived, but in his own way, had paid the penalty for the revolution – could come to be the best versed among contemporary Hungarian authors on the subject of psychology and moral dilemmas. Kemény wished to set up as axiomatic the Magyar people's instinctive repugnance to all revolutionary activity. It was not only the Habsburgs' vengeance that he hoped thus to moderate; with an uncanny knowledge of mass psychology, he hoped to absolve the nation of its "complicity in the crime", to loosen its moral ties to "that incarnation of negation", to that "demonic" Kossuth. He made of the leader of the revolutionary transformation, of the nation's leader in the defensive war, a scapegoat possessed of a personality diametrically opposed to the national character.

Kemény's writings hardly appeased the victors' thirst for vengeance. But – without a doubt contrary to his intentions – they did play into the hands of those anxious to exploit the mood of disillusionment consequent upon the revolution's defeat, of those who emphasized the advantages of giving up the struggle for progress.

The other basic tenet of Kemény's position was that the only correct policy for Hungary was one based on a realistic evaluation of the actual international situation. As the lessons of 1849 indicated, this observation was more than justified. But in the practical application of this line of thought, Kemény seems to have forgotten his own premiss, for he made precisely the error he had criticized. Without regard to the capacity of circumstances for change, he pronounced illusory the possibility of creating an independent Magyar state; the endurance of the Habsburg Empire, on the other hand, he considered an unconditional reality. What is more, he dreamt of a Hungary purified of the revolutionary "crimes" becoming a great power within the framework of the joint state. In 1851, he

³³ A. Csengeri 1851. - S. Somogyi MIT. IV. pp. 275-277. - Trócsányi p. 553. - M. Nagy 1972. pp. 65-70.

wrote: "With the German lands relying on the *West*, and a purified Hungarian state influencing the *East*, maintaining its authority abroad through the necessary trappings of its impressive unity, and insuring at home the free and harmonious development of its various elements, the Empire shall attain to an illustriousness heretofore unsuspected – to the greatness to which it has been called."³⁴ Kemény's perception of the Habsburg Empire as a practically timeless political reality was antithetical to his own advice always to take into account the changes in the international situation. His position was much too inflexible. It ruled out prima facie the possibility that, in a changed situation, Hungary might begin to doubt the unconditionality of the Empire's endurance; and it did so in spite of the fact that, under the circumstances, it depended to no small extent on Hungary how long and how far the preconditions of the Empire's future remained unaltered.

Kemény's social policy opposed all unambiguously retrograde measures, but – like Eötvös and most of the former Centralists – he thought it necessary to renew and to develop the old reform camp's attempts at creating a community of interests, and to bring about a state of equilibrium conducive to the preservation of the social power structure which took shape after the abolition of feudalism.³⁵

Once the system of absolutism was firmly established, there was a certain change in the tone of Kemény's writings. Fundamentally, his ideas were little altered, but he refrained from any open condemnation of the Hungarian revolution and of its leaders. His articles, published in the *Pesti Napló* (Pest Diary) which he edited from the mid-fifties, were ever more critical of absolutism, the criticism appearing for the most part hidden in the foreign affairs columns. At the same time, his writings came increasingly to reflect his covert support of bourgeois constitutionalism and the attempts to safeguard the nation's traditions, a stance which no doubt owed much to the close friendship which had grown up between him and Ferenc Deák.³⁶

DEÁK AND THE POLICY OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE

Deák was the only one of the giants of the reform and of the revolutionary era - an era in which it was still personal achievement, and not the ruler's nomination which gave true political authority - who continued to live among his people. Batthyány had fallen victim to the terror; Wesselényi had died, to the last breath

34 KZsÖM. XII. p. 328.

³⁵ I. Sótér MIT. IV. pp. 254–257. – M. Nagy 1972. pp. 61–65. – Cf. Beksics pp. 145–152.
– I. Halász pp. 181–182. – Berzeviczy I. pp. 204–205. – D. Angyal pp. 190, 582. – A. Károlyi 1936.
p. 101. J. Barta 1962. pp. 269–274. – P. Pándi 1962. pp. 275–285. – Kosáry pp. 149–170.
– J. Miklóssy In: VJÖM. VI. pp. 352–353.

³⁶ F. Papp. II. pp. 251–390. – D. Angyal pp. 195–196, 330, 334, 356–367, 375–379, 397–404, 407–409, 545, 560, 581–582, 585–588. – Cf. Beksics pp. 153–161. – Berzeviczy II. pp. 153–154, 163–164. – Kónyi II. 396.

insisting on the justice of his conquered nation's cause; Széchenyi was confined within the walls of the Döbling Asylum; Kossuth had been forced into exile. It is not surprising, therefore, that in a political atmosphere which made impossible alike the rise – and the recognition – of genuine values and of qualified new political leaders, Deák's attitude carried the weight of a lodestar for many who felt the ideals of the reformers and of 1848 to be their own. His great popularity was due, in part, to the fact that Deák had shared in the responsibility of leadership as Minister of Justice only during the successful phase of the revolution; in 1849, he withdrew from the political arena, but in such a way that he justly escaped the slightest suspicion of having collaborated with the opposing camp. As a consequence, the reputation he had won in the struggle up to 1848 was enhanced in the minds of many by his staunch integrity and his reputation for infallibility.

In 1854, Deák sold his estate to the Széchenyi family for an annuity, and, having thus escaped the complications of the land redistribution, moved to Pest. In part at the advice of Zsigmond Kemény who also lived there, he set himself up at the "Angol királynő" (English Queen) Hotel. At first, it was only his closest friends that he received there. By the end of the 1850's, however, his home became a veritable political club, where the inner circle were the former Centralists, but where other liberals, and even conservatives were frequently to be found. Wrapped in a dense cloud of cigar smoke, Deák told his anecdotes, expressing his views in a way that avoided even the semblance of presenting a political program. His rapt audience departed to give his words cautious - but wide – publicity.³⁷ He did not openly preach the political passivity, the "negative resistance" which he was so certain was the right course of action, but he practised it. It was political and moral considerations which made him courteously refuse, as early as 1850, an invitation by Minister of Justice Schmerling to take part in a symposium on civil law held in Vienna. News of this refusal was spread by a journal throughout the country, and the policy of passive resistance, initially adopted instinctively by most of the former leading politicians, drew courage from Deák's stand to become an ever more deliberate attitude.³⁸

The small and middle landowning nobility and even significant numbers of the genteel and bourgeois intelligentsia boycotted, where they could, the public forums absolutism had delimited for them. They refused to accept public office, and avoided as much as going near an office of public administration. To the best of their ability, they frustrated the decrees that were issued; they procrastinated as long as they could in the paying of their taxes – still a rather touchy point for most of the nobility. They refused to send the carriages ordered for public works, and boasted of having made fools of the excisemen. Those who dared, even

³⁷ Z. Ferenczi II. pp. 221–234. – Berzeviczy II. pp. 162–166. Cf. I. Halász pp. 175–179. – D. Angyal p. 704. – Horánszky pp. 19–29.

³⁸ Kónyi II. p. 382. - Wertheimer I. pp. 116-118. - D. Angyal pp. 512-519.

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refused to socialize with the officials of the system. However, the landowning nobility – the group best able, because of its relative financial independence and rural life-style, to adopt the policy of passive resistance – came to look with contempt not only on those impelled to serve the system by reactionary political views and the hopes of gaining personal advantage, but often also on those intellectuals whom the need to make a living had compelled to accept office. This form of resistance, moreover, while impeding the smooth functioning of absolutism and keeping alive the nation's outrage at its civil disability, nevertheless led also to the opposition of progressive measures just because they were initiated by the government. The policy of passive resistance served, in fact, to alienate significant masses of the rural and small-town nobility from the rapidly changing world around them; become a way of life, it contributed to their falling even farther behind not only in relation to an ever developing Europe, but even in relation to a modernizing Vienna, or Pest.³⁹

While a great many landowners and intellectuals - the majority of the former supporters of the reform opposition - became totally politically passive in the strictest sense of the word, Deák's passive resistance was by no means tantamount to withdrawal from public life. Especially toward the end of the 1850's, when Vienna began to give a bit more freedom of action to some of the cultural and economic' associations. Deák came to be increasingly active in the formally apolitical forums. Deák - who as early as 1851 had advised the conservative László Szőgyény to accept the post of Imperial Councillor offered him, and in 1854, to keep it,⁴⁰ – came to be in regular contact with the conservatives, the leadership group of the scientific bodies and the economic societies, and most especially with their mentor, Count Emil Dessewffy, the President of the Academy. It was on the basis of the friendship which grew up between them during these years that Dessewffy assumed that - although Deák had refused to sign the conservative memorandum of 1857 – he would be able to rely on him in the execution of his grandiose political plans. More importantly, the group of intellectuals which formed around the former Centralist core - and which, led by Antal Csengery, came to include Zsigmond Kemény, Pál Gyulai and Ferenc Salamon, to name just a few - came to exert some influence on Deák, now cut off from his native social and political environment, and exploited his nation-wide reputation to enhance their own importance. The group's - rather too general - program was the establishment of social and political "equilibrium" within a constitutional framework. Deák's ties with them were all the more significant in that, in an atmosphere of political passivity, they came increasingly to be the shapers of the nation's consciousness. Its influence extended from the Academy to the Kisfaludy Society; it had contacts with a wing of the Catholic St. Stephen

³⁹ Amtsleben, 1861. pp. 15–20, 33–37. – Fővárosi Lapok 1871: 152–156. Berzeviczy, 1907.
 pp. 11–13. Berzeviczy I. pp. 198–199, II. pp. 29, 396–401. – VJPI pp. 110–111. – Jánossy I. p. 465.
 ⁴⁰ Szőgyény-Marich II. pp. 30, 70, 227–228, 235.

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Society, and with Protestant ecclesiastical circles; the Lloyd Society of Pest haute bourgeoisie was as responsive to it as the Hungarian Economic Union dominated by the great landowners. It ran both the country's most important paper, the *Pesti Napló*, and its most influential journal, the *Budapesti Szemle*. It was a matter not only of the group's remarkable aptitude for this task; their influence was due also to their adaptability, and to their exceptional political situation of having, for the most part, weathered the trying war years in the neutrality of emigration.

Their success was guaranteed by the fact that – with the exception of a few solitary experimenters – they were the only ones among the group of writers permitted to publish who were not despised as collaborators with absolutism. That they were not, was due to a very great extent to their commonly known ties to that revered leader in passive resistance, Ferenc Deák.⁴¹

THE ATTEMPTS AT ACTIVE RESISTANCE AND THE EXILES

There were considerable numbers of passive resisters not content to follow Deák's example of waiting it out. There were some who were satisfied merely to run the risk of being discovered hiding or wearing sewn into their clothing mementoes of the revolutionary war - a piece of a flag, a badge, a Kossuth bank-note, a Kossuth picture; or the women, to wear bracelets and necklaces made of coins minted during the years of the revolution.⁴² In others, there was passion enough but for an occasional, self-justifying gesture. A hot-blooded actor would have a tricolour bouquet; some bold youths hissed during the "Gotterhalte" at the gala-performance held in honour of Franz Joseph's birthday; and the poet and publicist József Lévay smuggled the news of this "public disturbance" and of the caning of the arrested youths into the Pesti Napló.43 Until the new text-book was introduced, the Trattner-Károlyi publishing house dared to publish the 1850 edition of the Hármas Kis Tükör (Tripartite Little Mirror) used in thousands of elementary schools with the battles of 1849 illustrating the points of grammars, and the "Mr. Commissioner" introduced by the Kossuth government appearing in the list of the forms of address.⁴⁴ In 1852, the young Agost Greguss used the first letter of each line of a verse-cycle published in one of the provincial calendars to spread the message: "The revolution shall triumph and bring joy", a piece of boldness which cost him his liberty.45 Members of a group of Eger landowners and genteel and bourgeois intellectuals were jailed in

⁴⁵ D. Angyal p. 132. - Cf. P. Szemző 1970. p. 110.

⁴¹ Z. Ferenczi II. pp. 235–243. – D. Angyal 1903. pp. 13–32. – D. Angyal pp. 416–419. – Gyulai levelezése pp. 227–229, 359, 389. – Berzeviczy II. pp. 106–110, 163–165.

⁴² Zsedényi, 1850. pp. 86–87. – K. P. Szathmáry HMK. 1870. p. 190. – I. Major p. 123. – Farkas Deák pp. 51–52. – CKk. pp. 95, 99, 106. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 132–135.

⁴³ Cf. D. Angyal pp. 36-37. - Jánossy I. p. 464. - L. Lukács p. 35.

⁴⁴ Hármas Kis Tükör (Tripartite Little Mirror)... (Pub. Trattner-Károlyi) Pest, 1850. II. p. 219.

ACTIVE RESISTANCE AND THE EXILES

1851 for celebrating the third anniversary of the March 15 revolution. But in spite of the severity of their punishment, a proclamation soon appeared calling on the "burghers" of Eger "to bring tyranny to its knees".⁴⁶

The poet Imre Madách well expressed that mood of existential uncertainty which at times exploded in active resistance, one which compelled not only hot-blooded youths but als mature men to amazing acts of boldness: "Other peoples have no idea... of conditions such as ours. We must wage constant battle for our very existence; we are locked inside the wild beast's cage, and he threatens at every moment to swallow us. Other peoples need only fight for a better life." It was on Madách's property that some of the arms of the Nógrád national guard were hidden after their defeat; it was in his Csesztve home that the guerillas fighting against the Imperial troops found a temporary hiding place. He was later jailed for having hidden János Rákóczy, one of Kossuth's relatives and closest co-workers. Absolutism made of him a "rebellious" apostle of legality: "He who builds his right but on might," he concluded, "gives the other the right to use force against him."⁴⁷

At the beginning of the 1850's, the members of the secret organizations – mostly former officers of the national guard, and noble and bourgeois intellectuals whose very existence was threatened – were motivated primarily by despair. The majority of them had not the property or other source of income which would have provided the economic basis for passive resistance; yet, they refused to serve the oppressors. The precariousness of their own existence reflected the uncertain fate of the nation. For them, occasional demonstrations seemed inadequate. They strove, therefore, to establish contact with one another, and with the exiles, primarily Kossuth, who, they hoped, would initiate the battle of liberation.

Many hundreds of participants in the revolutionary war escaped death, and many thousands more escaped imprisonment through fleeing to Turkish territory. Conscious of the support of the British government – which tried to appease public outrage at its conduct at the time of the Czarist intervention by taking a very decisive stand to safeguard the refugees – the Turkish government refused to yield to Vienna's and St. Petersburg's belligerent demands for their extradition. However, they did permit Austrian agents to enter the refugee camps, and a significant number of demoralized soldiers were thus persuaded to return to Hungary. A great many of the Polish officers and numerous Hungarian refugees joined the Turkish army in the hope of an imminent Russo-Turkish war.

Kossuth himself lived in constant danger of assassination attempts, and was much shaken by the defeat of the war of independence. He was only too aware of the fact that his flight had earned him curses both loud and deep: of the opponents

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⁴⁶ Jánossy I. p. 466. – L. Lukács p. 36–37. – S. Sebestény pp. 102–103.

⁴⁷ MÖM. II. pp. 762, 766. – *M. Palágyi* pp. 182–185, 428–429. – *L. Lukács* pp. 116, 118. – *F. Kerényi* pp. 36–37.

of the fight against feudalism, who had long sought his Achilles' heel; of those who had stood aside when the Habsburgs had forced the nation to go to war; and of those who now sought a scapegoat for its defeat. It took quite some time for him to realistically assess his mistakes and to draw the major lessons from the struggles that had transpired: solidarity among the country's nationalities and the backing of some Great Power were equally the sine qua non of the achievement of Hungary's autonomy.

Immediately after his flight, it was – besides Russian intervention – primarily Görgey whom he held responsible for the tragic outcome of the war. For Görgey had long challenged, and then openly defied the civilian government, and, backed by the army he commanded, had demanded the Kossuth government's resignation of power into his hands as "necessary to the desired goal of safeguarding our common nation's future". And yet, once he was plenipotent, he had surrendered "unconditionally". Kossuth, who had offered to resign from the government as early as September of 1848 if this were the precondition of a compromise guaranteeing the gains of the revolution and of national self-government, was even less inclined, the tragic summer of 1849, to stand in the way of any attempt to save whatever could yet be saved. The unconditional surrender and the absolute rule which followed, however, gave meaning to his exile which thus became the chance for renewed and justified activity to regain the liberty of a nation which was indeed subjugated, but was yet uncowed.

Kossuth spent a few months on Bulgarian soil which was under Turkish suzerainty, and a hard year and a half in Kutahja in Asia Minor. It was only in the autumn of 1851 that he regained his liberty and left the Turkish Empire on board an American warship sent to fetch him.⁴⁸

Even while he was interned in Asia Minor, Kossuth was repeatedly invited by Giuseppe Mazzini to join the European Democratic Central Committee which he had set up in London the summer of 1850 with a number of other exiles. Although Kossuth had some reservations about Mazzini's goals – which he found too abstract, and about his methods – which he found in some respects not to the point, there was a great deal in the views of this formidable enemy of Europe's despots in which he concurred. Kossuth thought Italian-Hungarian co-operation of utmost importance, for the Habsburgs stood in the way of the liberty of both nations, and kept them subjugated in part through troops recruited in one, and stationed in the other, country. Once Kossuth's informants had convinced him that the secret organizations were truly very strong in Italy, he was all the more inclined to heed the calls for action and to agree to start the organization of resistance in Hungary in that he, too, was burning to take action and, in no small

⁴⁸ From the extensive literature on the conflict between Kossuth and Görgey, see J. Varga 1964, pp. 596–614. – From the wealth of material on the exiles in Turkey, see I. Hajnal pp. 34–57, 133–437. – Berzeviczy I. p. 349–368. – Jánossy I. 1–12.

part under Mazzini's influence, was confident of the success of a new revolution. However, Kossuth was strongly opposed to Mazzini's plan to fix the date of the series of uprisings for 1851, 1852 at the latest. Even from his internment in many respects more realistic than Mazzini in his evaluation of the situation, he insisted that the time for any action must depend primarily on developments between Russia and Turkey, for the tension between them was such that war could not be far off. With the Western Great Powers determined to keep their access to the straits, the Czar would, without a doubt, be unable to intervene again should the oppressed peoples all revolt together at the appropriate moment of the war. Until this favourable turn of events, however, Kossuth felt the task at hand to be not insurrection, but the political and military preparations for it.⁴⁹

During this time, Artillery-Colonel József Makk sought out Kossuth in Kutahja; he carried references from resisters in Hungary, and requested and received a commission to organize an underground organization. The organization had many cells, and aimed at co-ordinating resistance activities within the country and throughout the Empire. It was, however, soon discovered. The conspiracy, started among the Hungarian troops stationed on German territory, was nipped in the bud. Then, the preparations made in Vienna by Lieutenant-Colonel Johann May, who had fought in the Hungarian army in 1849, were exposed, and a nascent Galician movement quashed. The Hungarian branches of the organization and the groups in touch with them were dealt with next. In Pest, the set of conspirators led by Károly Jubál, who taught at the polytechnical school, was arrested, Kossuth's sisters among them. Gáspár Noszlopy, the leader of the 1849 Transdanubian popular insurrection, who had already organized a free army in Tolna County, was captured, and armed groups in touch with the Pest leadership were exposed across the Theiss and in the Mátra Mountains.

The strongest was the Transylvanian organization of many hundreds of members. It was led by a number of the former members of the 1848–49 representative parliament, many officers of the Hungarian army, and an entire contingent of Transylvania's lay and ecclesiastical intelligentsia. It was in the course of the arrests in Transylvania that they discovered the Hungarians conspiring in the Roumanian Principality to get armed troops into Transylvania. Altogether 25 conspirators were executed, and many more were imprisoned for various lengths of time. The ruthlessness of the reprisals was intensified by the fact that most of the sentences were passed by the military tribunals after Mazzini's unsuccessful insurrection in Milan on February 6, 1853, and after the attempt on the life of Franz Joseph in Vienna a few days later. The tragic end to the secret organizations, and the blood-bath which followed the Milanese insurrection convinced both the discontented at home and the Kossuth-led exiles

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⁴⁹ Kastner pp. 3–22. – Koltay-Kastner pp. 23–41. – Cf. Kossuth (London, 1853. Febr. 10). Letter to Tiedemann. OSzKk. Pulszky-papers. VIII/1872. – Cf. I. Hajnal pp. 46–47, 607, 685, 794. – Jánossy I. pp. 6–11, 399–404, 430–432. – E. Kovács pp. 43–66.

abroad to give up Mazzini style "revolution-making". The attempt to mobilize resistance had failed. The most it had achieved was to stir up a wave of sympathy for the conspirator victims, and of admiration abroad for a nation which refused to become resigned to the loss of its rights. It has, however, laid the exiles open to the grave charge of having irresponsibly risked the lives of their countrymen. It was a charge most easily made by those who did not have all the facts; a charge most glibly made by the henchmen of absolutism. Yet it was a charge which lay most heavily on Kossuth and the best of his comrades, torn between the alternatives of taking no risks and thus running the risk of missed opportunities; and of taking the initiative, but then also the responsibility for the uncertain outcome of any ensuing action.

For the moment, however, the setback the exiles had suffered with the liquidation of the illegal organizations was compounded by the fact that it was just at that moment that changes in the international situation produced circumstances which might well have given these very organizations scope for action.⁵⁰

THE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE EXILES

The leaders of the Hungarian revolutionary war had made repeated attempts in 1848–1849 to end the struggling nation's international isolation. Led by Count László Teleki, the diplomatic corps sent to Western Europe by the Hungarian Government continued to carry on its mission even after the nation's defeat. Their efforts played a great part in the initiation of the protests against the reign of terror imposed on Hungary, and in the exiles' being given asylum. In the spring of 1851, when, in keeping with Schwarzenberg's plans, Vienna tried to get the conference of all the German sovereigns sitting in Dresden to recognize the integration of the "Hungarian Crown Lands" into the German Bund, Teleki and his followers protested against the plan in a most impressive memorandum, and contributed to its being abandoned.⁵¹

But it was Kossuth who had the most success in making Hungary's cause understood, and in making her plight one of the great international problems yet to be solved. While he had been interned in Turkey, and even as he sailed westward he was still but a legendary hero to those who read about him in the newspapers. In Italian and French ports, cheering crowds defied the authorities to hail him with bonfires. During his British and American tour, however, he came to win his audience more and more through the force of his arguments and through his unmatched magnetism as a public speaker. His effect was enormous

⁵⁰ I. Berzeviczy I. pp. 287–312, II. pp. 9–25. Jánossy I. pp. 406–438, 449–473 and archives. – L. Lukács pp. 53–121. – Cf. Hentaller pp. 20–130, 147–157. – F. Koós pp. 138–162. – Farkas Deák pp. 28–53. – Kempen pp. 233–241, 268, 281, 301.

⁵¹ R. 90. I. 1054, 1081–1084. – KLI. I. pp. 15–19. – TLVM. II. pp. 70–74. – Z. Horváth I. pp. 346–349, II. pp. 240–253.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND THE EXILES

primarily in liberal and bourgeois democratic circles, which exercised no small influence on the policies of both the British and the American governments. The conservatives received him with hostility ill-concealed behind a reluctant courtesy; as for the socialists, it was Kossuth himself who kept his distance from them. Above and beyond inspiring widespread sympathy and securing the financial backing necessary for the organizational work of the exiles which he led, Kossuth succeeded in having the fundamentally anti-feudal and anti-absolutistic nature of the Hungarian revolution recognized, and succeeded, too, in making clear the burden of responsibility on those professedly freedom-loving governments which had left Hungary – just as she had almost shaken off the Habsburg yoke – a prey to Czarist intervention. Throughout about five hundred public speeches from London's City Hall to the speaker's rostrum of the American Congress, Kossuth fought not for direct aid, but for the acceptance of his principle of "intervention to guarantee non-intervention".

He fought, in other words, so that the freedom-loving forces of the world would guarantee the struggle he hoped Europe's oppressed people would engage in together from the threat of repeated intervention. In no uncertain terms, he pointed out that "the logic of historical development" was such that the stabilization of the absolute systems of government was a threat also to the most vital interests of the peoples of the bourgeois democratic states. It was, therefore, not merely moral obligation which enjoined them to aid – at least to the extent of discouraging foreign intervention – the oppressed peoples in their struggle for liberty, but also their own well informed self-interest. And, seeing the conflict over the East between Czarist Russia and the Western powers coming to a head, Kossuth was confident that his successes as an orator would become political successes.⁵²

The autumn of 1853 saw the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War. In the spring of 1854, England and France, then Piemont entered the list. Kossuth's group hoped that the Habsburgs would rush to the aid of their Russian ally, and thus give the Hungarian exiles in league with the Western powers a chance to try to liberate their country. Their expectation was by no means naive; the Czar himself was confident of Austria's entering the war, and Vienna rocked with the struggle between those in favour of and those against intervention. In the end – as it is well known.– the latter group won; what is more, Austria's bellicose conduct on her eastern borders compelled the Russians to a disadvantageous modification of their strategy. A number of factors coincided to make Vienna commit this breach of faith with her ally: her fear of a possible extension of Russian influence in the Balkans; her enormous debts throughout Europe, and the consequent ability of the Western powers and the influential bankers to give weight to their

³² R. 90. I. 1595, 1601, 1670, 1712, 1720, 1724, 1739, 1798. - Kossuth in England pp. 53-119. - Newman pp. 23-107, 114-143, 197-224, 229-260, 285-302. - Pulszky II. pp. 77-87. - Cf. Jánossy I. - Takó, 1972. - Gy. Szabad 1975. injunctions that she maintain her neutrality; but not least importantly, her doubts about being able to keep a united internal front in a situation wherein Italian, Polish, and Hungarian nationalist exiles would ally with the Western powers to take the field against them. Austria's "neutrality" thus prevented the Crimean War from becoming the occasion of Hungary's liberation. The Hungarian exiles, many of whom – led by General György Kmety – had taken part in the war against Czarist Russia withdrew, for the moment, behind the scenes, without, however, giving up their hope that some new, inevitable crisis in the European power structure would provide them with the opportunity of raising once again the question of Hungary.⁵³

PLANS FOR THE CO-ORDINATED ACTION OF THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES

The lessons to be drawn from the tragic intra-state conflict of 1848-1849 – and from the policy of oppression which rested, in part, on this antagonism – were so obvious, that practically everyone who sought a way out of absolutism emphasized the need for co-operation among all the peoples of the Empire. As to how this co-operation was to achieved, however, there were widely diverging ideas.

For example, as the editor of the *Pesti Napló*, János Török, an advocate of the conservatives' and the Habsburgs' reconciliation, used the then popular expression "kindred peoples" in an 1853 leader, it was, at least, an empty phrase. For it was used in a context that barely concealed the author's thirst for power as he dreamed of the day when "the Magyars would once more regain their former authority and be the guide and leader of their kindred peoples".⁵⁴

Baron Gábor Kemény, on the other hand, defended the right of "the nationalities to discover their own heritage, to develop it, and, in keeping with the claims made for all nations, to choose the best way to their own welfare", a position which coincided with the Hungarian policy of national self-defence against the Habsburg attempts at forced integration. What is more, he used historical analysis to show that the relationship among nationalities and among nations – their independence or their "concentration" – was the result of

⁵³ Klapka, 1855. – Friedjung II. pp. 229–243. – T. Lengyel 1938. – Jánossy, 1939. – Schroeder, 1972. – Kossuth's own ideas on the subject have been much distorted in the literature. This is the way he himself summed them up towards the end of his second Glasgow speech on July 5, 1854: "Alliances with despotic governments make the war long, alliances with nations make it short. The former make the result fraught with seeds of new inevitable wars, the latter make the result rich with the blessings of a lasting peace." Kossuth Speeches in the City Hall of Glasgow... (Ed. Trübner & Co.) London, 1854, p. 32.

⁵⁴ PN. 1853. June 30. Cf. D. Angyal pp. 100. – According to Jókai, it was Török who at about that time gave journalistic currency to the phrase "our Magyar race". And, in our opinion, it was not merely to avoid having to use the word "nation" – a word so odious to the censors – that he did so. Cf. JMCB. VI. 335.

PLANS FOR THE PEOPLES' CONCERTED ACTION

a historical process whose course was determined in no small part by their own interests. Nevertheless, he did add that "neither now, nor hereafter can nationality, state and language coincide completely, for they do not coincide", a reservation which unambiguously implied his commitment to restoring the integrity of multi-national Hungary. The essence of his position, however, was that the only realistic Hungarian policy was one which, far from ignoring the national aspirations of its neighbour peoples, made a concerted effort to take them very much into account.⁵⁵

Similar in many respects to Gábor Kemény's position was that of Lajos Mocsáry, whose 1858 pamphlet went beyond mere protest against forced integration into the Habsburg Empire to formulate a general principle: "Liberty can be attained without the subjugation and continuous oppression of others; the liberty of other peoples is, in fact, the chief guarantor of the liberty of a particular people." "Many nationalities", he added, "can work conjointly to make a homeland prosper"; at the same time, though he considered the restoration of Hungary's integrity the primary task, and sharply opposed the very thought of federalism, he did not wish to see the Magyars the nation's uncontested political leaders. Mocsáry, like Gábor Kemény, contested Eötvös' view that national interest must be subjected to the interests of the Empire, and it was precisely his desire to insure the realization that the nationalities must be won over to the Hungarian cause.⁵⁶

Madách's satire, *The Civilizer*, written in 1859, absolutism's year of crisis, but unpublished throughout his lifetime reflected the bitter experiences of the post-1849 decade, but reflected, too, his hopes for united action. Although he presented the former coexistence of the Magyars and the nationalities in a much retouched picture of a patriarchal past, he left no doubt about his repugnance for the restoration of the "old order" once Habsburg oppression will have been jointly overthrown. He saw the "unbreakable bond of agreement" born in the course of the common struggle as a "precious achievement", one which had to be safeguarded by means of a new "contract". A contract so significant, that Madách wanted it to become the symbol to replace the legendary "compact sealed with blood" (held to have taken place about the end of the 9th century) so fundamental in the view of history which had come down from the feudal past.⁵⁷

Though more indirectly, the literature of the period, too, reflects the need to see a reconciliation between the Hungarians and their "kindred peoples". Reacting against forceful Germanization, János Erdélyi wanted to keep Hungary's culture from being subordinated to the more developed German

⁵⁷ M. Pałágyi pp. 237–245. – Gy. Szabad: Az ujraolvasott Civilizátor. (The "Civilizer" Read Anew) (Now in press)

⁵⁵ G. Kemény 1856. pp. 36, 111.

⁵⁶ Mocsáry, 1858. pp. 62, 87-88. - Cf. E. Tóth pp. 68-79.

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literature in part through "gradually integrating into our own culture the intellectual currents of the nation-fragments who are in a like position as we". Unlike those able to envision Hungarians in cultural intercourse only as generous givers, Erdélyi, the leading figure of literary populism during the age of reform, hoped to see Hungarian poetry enriched with the cultural treasures of the neighbouring peoples, and thus, become the catalyst in the evolution of "a new, vital harmony in the Danube Valley".⁵⁸ An instance of the concrete implementation of this program was the work of Károly Ács, formerly a commissioner of the revolutionary government, a man who no doubt recognized also the political significance of cultural rapprochement. Ács was arrested after a long and adventurous period of hiding; he was sentenced in 1852 first to death, and then to six years in the dungeons. After his liberation, Ács, who is said to have been a remarkably talented linguist, began to study Roumanian and Serbian folk poetry, publishing his first collection as early as 1858.⁵⁹

The leaders of the secret organizations of the early 1850's considered winning the nationalities' support perhaps their most important task, and the exiles heartily concurred with them in this. Sándor Gál started the memorandum on the military preparations to be made for the Transylvanian uprising with the statement: "The first thing we must do, is to try to become reconciled with the Roumanians." Numerous appeals and instructions urged rapprochement with the Roumanians, the Croats, the Serbs, and even the Transylvanian Armenians, the Saxons, and the Germans of the Banat, Colonel Makk's - rather too emotional - proclamation declared that the nationalities "have been our brothers these thousand years", and though they had let the Habsburgs mislead them "for a moment" (that is, in 1848-1849), "now they are again our brothers". He, threatened to punish anyone "daring to revile the Serbians, the Roumanians, the Germans of Hungary, the Jews and the Gypsies for their nationalism", even as he would punish anyone mocking at "the Magyars". In a flight of wishful thought, he declared: "These people loath our common aggressor more than you yourselves. They shall be your allies; they shall fight no longer against you, but on your side." In fact, however, the secret organizations were discovered and annihilated before any genuine contact could be established with the nationalities within the country's borders, and thus we never shall know how these groups would have received the concrete suggestions for reconciliation and co-operations worked out by the exiles, suggestions which the movement's domestic leadership passed on to them no little distorted.60

58 Cf. Sőtér István. MIT. III. pp. 656-657.

³⁹ Károly Ács: Virágok a román (oláh) népköltészet mezejéről (Flowers from the Meadow of Roumanian Folk Poetry) Pest, 1858. – In the preface, Ács emphasized that his aim was to familiarize his readers with the poetry of a people "to whose millions a thousand years of history ties us". – Cf. J. Földy pp. 174, 249. – Bodea-Surdu II. p. 508.

60 Jánossy I. pp. 417, 420-421, 435-437, 525, 532-533, 595, 831-832. II. pp. 1-3.

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PLANS FOR THE PEOPLES' CONCERTED ACTION

At the beginning of the 1850's, the exiles were busy making military and diplomatic preparations for a move against absolutism; but there were significant efforts on the political front as well. For they could hardly hope to bring about reconciliation and co-operation among the peoples of Hungary without first making clear just what kind of Hungarian state they wished to reconstruct. All the leading exiles hoped that Hungary's once-won independence - restored by revolution at the hoped-for opportune moment - would then be guaranteed by an alliance with other peoples also liberated from Habsburg and Turkish rule. They were confident that the neighbouring peoples, too, would want Hungary for an ally, for - as Kossuth put it - Hungary would be a typical middle power, too weak to make the alliance the first step of annexation, yet strong enough, when allied with them, to keep the Great Powers threatening all of them at bay. The exiles also hoped that this planned league of nations would serve to reassure the highly influential British Government that the dissolution of the Habsburg and Turkish Empires would not lead to the power vacuum the British wanted so much to avoid between a unified Germany and Czarist Russia. In his British lectures of the 1850's, Kossuth used both historical and political arguments to support his claim that while the weakness of the dynastic Habsburg Empire – held together only by force of arms - actually invited conquest, the free alliance of the newly independent nationalities and of Hungary would be a guarantor of peaceful development in this Southeast European zone of Great Power conflicts.⁶¹

The Hungarian exiles were also fundamentally in agreement on the necessity of a confederate state structure. The idea went back to the 1794 constitutional plans of the Hungarian Jacobins,⁶² and was also of more proximate inspiration. In 1843, Wesselényi had suggested that the Empire be turned into a confederation under Habsburg leadership; in 1849, he wished to see it become a confederation of republican states.⁶³ From the autumn of 1848, László Teleki was increasingly attentive to, and then supportive of similar suggestions by the exiled politicians of the neighbouring nationalities; and by the spring of 1849, Frigyes Szarvady had made a draft of the plans worked out in Paris by Teleki's group of diplomats for the confederation of the Habsburg Empire. In 1850, Kossuth himself gave a detailed exposition of the basic principles behind his own concrete plans for a confederation; and the proposal for a, Hungarian–South-Slav–Roumanian Confederation was published in 1855 by General György Klapka. (Considerations similar to those to be found in these works informed the confederation plan of Mihály Táncsics, *League of Seven Nations*, written in total political isolation

⁶¹ This idea, which originated in 1848 with the Batthyány government (Cf. *I. Hajnal, 1957.* pp. 30–99), was developed by the exiles amidst heated debates, and received the formulation quoted in the course of Kossuth's 1858 lecture tour. Cf. R. 90. I. 2663–2664. *Kossuth, 1859.* pp. 83–99. – KLI. II. pp. 227–247. – Gy. Szabad, 1960. pp. 5–8.

62 K. Benda I. p. 907. - A. Csizmadia 1959. pp. 351-363.

⁶³ Wesselényi, 1843–1844. – Wierer pp. 58–59. – Kann II. pp. 115–117. – Trócsányi pp. 452–473. – Gy. Mérei 1965. pp. 16–21, 61.

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during the eight years he spent underground in a Pest hide-out.⁶⁴) Yet while all the leading exiles agreed on the necessity of some kind of confederation, their stand on the Roumanian and South-Slav proposals for Hungary's "international federalization" was by no means so unanimous. Teleki and Klapka were, in fact, inclined to accept the federative principles proposed by Bălcescu the spring of 1850; but Kossuth – in part because of his own commitment to the maintenance of the country's territorial integrity, in part because of the domestic reaction he feared to the acceptance of such a proposal – decidedly opposed Hungary's division into autonomous national units. However, he not only opposed his fellow exiles' rather vague proposals, but also worked out an alternate constitutional plan for Hungary, one which took into account what he saw to be Hungary's multi-national, but also *mixed* population, and one which he hoped "would approximate the principle of federation internally, too, as far as possible".⁶⁵

KOSSUTH'S PLAN FOR THE BOURGEOIS DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION OF HUNGARY'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The century's most concrete Hungarian plan for the bourgeois democratic transformation of Hungary's governmental system was the constitutional draft worked out by Kossuth in Kutahja in 1851 (*A Proposal for Hungary's Future Political System, with Regard to the Solution of the Nationalities Problem*), one which he was to amend during the decade to follow with more and more extensive rights for the nationalities. The exiled Kossuth meant the draft to be a "proposal", to be submitted to the parliament of a liberated Hungary; and he also hoped it would serve as the basis of negotiations and agreement with the leaders of the neighbouring peoples.

The constitutional draft emphasized that by "the people", the source and possessor of all right, it meant "all citizens", "without distinction as to race, language, or religion". Its aim was to specify in detail all bourgeois civil liberties, noting in terms reminiscent of those of the French Revolution that "the sole limit to these rights is the inviolability of the rights of others". Kossuth's plan wished to see the principle of "the sovereignty of the people" consistently realized through universal manhood suffrage in the election of the legislative body, as well as of the officials of both the counties and the communities. It suggested that the members of the House of Representatives by directly elected; and those of the Senate (which was to replace the Feudal Upper House) be chosen at the general county

⁶⁴ Táncsics pp. 295-296, 304, 310, 313. - L. Lukács pp. 217-222, 407-414.

⁶⁵ I. Hajnal pp. 105–108, 171–174, 527–539, 625–626, 673–675. – R. 90. I. 795. – Kossuth demokráciája pp. 35–50. – TLVM. II. pp. 15–17, 21–29, 68–61. – T. Lengyel. 1936. pp. 15, 23–25. – E. Waldapfel pp. 170–172. – Z. Horváth I. pp. 246–254, 332–335, II. 177–179, 221–232, 236–239, 264–280. – Gy. Mérei. 1965. pp. 53–68, 74–76. – E. Kovács pp. 169–180, 274–301, 314–315, 427–428.

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meetings. A simple majority of the electors could recall their representative. Criminal justice was to be meted out by a jury; and a constitutional court was to safeguard the rule of law. In the text of the 1851 constitutional draft, Kossuth was unambiguously in favour of a "democratic republic"; in later drafts, however, he referred also to the 1849 Declaration of Independence in insisting that it depended on the international situation whether Hungary were best reorganized as a constitutional monarchy or - as he himself would have preferred - as a republic. In the latter case, the head of state was also to be chosen on the basis of universal suffrage. And while, on the one hand, Kossuth wished to insure the functioning of the state apparatus through democratic centralism; on the other - seeing Louis Bonaparte abuse his elected office even as he had feared that he would - he wanted democratic self-government to counterbalance a possible move to absolutism by the central government, and to be the guarantee of the absolute equality of the coexisting nationalities.

In every county and every community, in every local legislative body, Kossuth's plan called for the language of the majority to be the official language; however, it provided consistent and effective guarantees for the use of the minorities' languages as well. (Kossuth felt that he had, in fact, provided for as close an approximation "as possible" to a federal system. For the counties – in most of which the nationalities had a majority – were to have self-government, a self-government to be guaranteed by the highest organ of state power, the Senate chosen by the counties themselves.) Laws were to be promulgated in all the languages used in the country; federal administrative and judicial organs alike were to deal with each client in his own language. Each community was to determine the language to be used in public education; minority groups, however, were to be free to establish their own schools, and everyone free to choose which of these schools to attend.

In Kossuth's plan, the function of the standing army was to protect the forts, and to provide the framework for the compulsory military training of the national guard which was, in fact, the body to be entrusted with the nation's defence. Military training, including officer training, was to be a part of the civil educational process, lest the soldiers feel themselves "lifted out of their civic state, or set above it". "There's hardly anything more dangerous for a free nation", wrote Kossuth – thinking no doubt also of the bitter lessons of 1849,⁶⁶ "than for a soldier to cease to regard himself as a citizen." The national guard, too, was to be organized by the counties, and – as one version of the constitutional plan had it – according to nationalities up to the battalion level.

Besides the self-government that the nationalities were to enjoy within the framework of the county-system, Kossuth wished to guarantee the non-Magyar peoples the right to create nation-wide political organizations with functions

⁶⁶ He was referring primarily to General Görgey, who, in 1849, had repeatedly defied the elected civil government responsible to parliament.

beyond the sphere of the safeguarding of "cultural autonomy". Each nationality was to be free to choose its "national chief", and, "through corporate self-government, be totally free to take steps to further all those moral and societal goals whose totality comprises nationality".⁶⁷

Kossuth devoted an entire appendix to the Croatian problem, offering Croatia complete autonomy in domestic affairs within the framework of a confederation. If this were not enough for the Croats, they could cede from the union, provided the population of Fiume were given the right to determine its own future. As for Transylvania, he expressed his hopes that the reforms envisioned by the proposed constitution would make union attractive to the Roumanians, too. (In the final draft of the proposal, Kossuth was increasingly inclined to accept territorial self-government also for Transylvania and the Serbian areas of Hungary provided the state's territorial integrity was maintained.) And Kossuth concluded his draft with listing the arguments in favour of a confederation of all the Danubian states once they had won their liberty.⁶⁸

What are we to say of all this? Although Teleki and Klapka were willing to go further than Kossuth's plan indicated him to be in satisfying the concrete demands of the nationalities' political leaders, there was not one leading exile to opt for a system of government more generally democratic than the one envisioned by Kossuth. Furthermore, the draft was significant in that above and beyond the concrete concessions, it dared to place into the hands of the nationalities the political means to greater national self-determination within the envisioned democratic framework. In 1859, after a lengthy internal rift, most of the exiles fell in line behind Kossuth, Teleki and Klapka. They formed the Hungarian National Directory, a kind of government-in-exile, which declared itself willing to come to terms with the leaders of the nationalities with Kossuth's constitutional plan as the basis of the discussions: "Although we consider the 1848 Laws... the starting point, we by no means wish to maintain them unaltered. We wish rather, to give them a form through which every interest – national as well as religious – will find perfect peace under the protective wings of the Hungarian constitution. To this

⁶⁷ It would be a mistake to interpret the structure of this institution – which together with a county self-government approximating that of the Swiss cantons in scope was meant to guarantee an extraordinarily wide range for the realization of the nationalities' rights – as applying only to guarantees of religious liberty. Even the treatment given this question in R. Kann's excellent work requires some correction. *Kann, II.* pp. 121–122.

⁶⁸ As early as June 15, 1850, Kossuth had sent to Teleki the core of his constitutional proposal, together with the outline of his plan for a confederation. R. 90. I. 795. Cf. Kossuth demokráciája pp. 44–49. – For a contemporary copy of the detailed proposal he sent to Mazzini on April 25, 1851, see: OSzKk Pulszky-iratok. VII/2797. Also in Kastner pp. 120–140. – The second, revised text of the proposal was first published in 1859 (*Irányi-Chassin I. pp.* 364–398), and was then published repeatedly both in the original and in translation. – The third version of the text presumably written at the end of 1861, is to be found: R. 90. I. 1554. For a very truncated version of it, see: Kossuth demokráciája pp. 52–74. It is being prepared for a new publication by the present author.

KOSSUTH'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL

end, may the guiding light be... the constitutional plan elaborated by the President, Kossuth, in the fundamental principles of which all of us concur."⁶⁹

As most bourgeois constitutions, Kossuth's plan, too, failed to discuss property relations, and social questions in general. However, partly to protect himself from the charge of excessive radicalism, - but also consistently with his true position - he took pains to distinguish his ideas from those of socialist inspiration, and explicitly declared socialism to be totally inapplicable to industrially underdeveloped Hungary. For although Kossuth considered the emancipation of the serfs the greatest act of the 1848 revolution, he failed to recognize the true meaning and significance of the social and political struggles which continued in Hungary in the effort to consolidate it. It was not only to the problem of agrarian capitalism (which was but just taking shape even in the West) that even the best of the exiles failed to give an answer; they failed to give answers to the unresolved problems of the emancipation that they had fought for. More precisely, they had no comprehensive program to remedy the ills attendant on the redistribution of land ordered by the Habsburgs, measures which in many respects undid the gains the peasants had won in 1848-1849.70 Kossuth did, at times, indicate that he wished to see further progress along the road chosen in 1848. Thus, while insisting on the inviolability of private property, he repeatedly referred to the possibility that the state properties might be distributed. It was from these lands that he wished to carve out plots for those who would fight in a war of liberation, and for the empoverished cotters. The peasants of the frontier military zones he wanted to see become the owners of the extensive pastures, forests, and clearings owned by the treasury. In like manner, he wanted to ameliorate the lot of the Transylvanian peasants by giving them the crown forests and pastures lying around their communities. For the most part, however, he was content to emphasize the need for a free economy, particularly for an unrestricted industry. At the same time, he hoped that a liberated Hungary would use its power of economic self-determination to establish relations with all nations, even those more developed than Austria, and experience an economic development rapid enough to reinforce the effect of the democratic political system, and to abolish the elements of backwardness in Hungarian society.71

69 KLI. I. 453, II. 396-397. - Gy. Szabad. p. 22.

⁷⁰ Among other provisions, the relevant Imperial Patents of 1853 obliged the peasants to pay redemption even for those types of land for which, in 1848–49 the Hungarian Parliament, and Government, respectively, had stipulated state compensation; and made it possible for the landlords to take from the peasants categories of land which the 1848–49 Hungarian laws had guaranteed to them. Cf. Gy. Szabad 1957. pp. 327–332. – L. Für 1965. I. pp. 41–46. – Gy. Szabad 1972. pp. 42–47.

⁷¹ Cf. R. 90. I. 1758, 1834, 2663–2664, 3436. – KLI. II. pp. 166–171, III. p. 89. – Kossuth in England pp. 47–48, 54–55, 61–66, 72–73, 78, 87–89, 96–97, 102, 103, 123–124. – Newman pp. 110–111, 177–178, 193–194, 270–273, 341–346. – Jánossy II. pp. 11–13. – L. Lukács pp.85, 88.

HUNGARIAN POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN THE 1850's

Unlike Eötvös, who wished more and more to separate liberalism and democracy, wanted to curb liberalism lest it run wild and lead to democracy, Kossuth thought democracy to be an irrepressible force precisely because it was the product of economic development. (The steam engine, the steamship, the telegraph were all the invincible prophets of democracy - said Kossuth, time and time again.) He hoped, however, that the forces of democracy - far from threatening the liberty which guaranteed the universal human values embodied in the concept of nationality – would, rather, bring them to fruition within the framework of the bourgeois democratic state system whose Hungarian version he had outlined in his constitutional draft.⁷² This is how he put the need for liberalism to give way to bourgeois democracy in one of his 1857 British lectures, perhaps the most illuminating summary of his position: "Democracy and nothing but democracy is liberty. Outside of democracy, [there] may be found institutions more or less liberal, but they will always imply inequality of duties and rights, privileges and immunities of some, to the exclusion of others. Outside of democracy, [there] may be liberties, but not liberty..."73

THE POLITICAL MOOD AND MOVEMENTS OF THE MASSES

Both the exiles and those making plans at home built their hopes on the strength of "the people", on their willingness to join forces with them; the conditions of absolutism, however, gave them little scope for organized contact with the masses. Gáspár Noszlopy, a man of great experience in the organization of guerilla-troops, felt that conspiracies such as those of József Makk were detrimental precisely to what was the "main goal", namely, that the resistance movement "establish contact with the people".⁷⁴ There was, in fact, but very limited opportunity for the actual contact making; and after the resistance movements were annihilated right to the crisis of absolutism at the end of the decade, the masses of the people were left to fend for themselves politically. Numerous contemporary sources tell us of the distress of so many among the people at the news of the revolution's defeat, and of popular resistance and rearguard action in the face of the consolidation of absolutism. The sad summer of 1849, the peasants of Somogy refused to believe that their troops had laid down their arms even when they heard it from József Madarász, and kept insisting, their ears to the ground, that they could still hear the sound of the cannons. Around Tata, it was bitterly that they told the landlords' warden: "If but one huszár would come by now; we'd show you how even this old pasture could be liberated" - they would, in other words, graze their animals there once again. In Győr, too, the citizens and "the lower classes of the people" were incredulous at the news of the

⁷² Cf. Notes 52 and 71 of this chapter.

⁷³ R. 90. I. 2635, 2637.

⁷⁴ Hentaller pp. 57-60. - L. Lukács pp. 109-110.

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THE MASSES' POLITICAL MOOD AND MOVEMENTS

armistice. And when they were convinced that it was true, there were servants who fell to the floor weeping for the lost cause of freedom.⁷⁵

Ethnographers have found stories in Nógrád county, of how "when liberty was already forbidden" and "there was a proclamation that no one may mourn for Kossuth... people bought black cloth in which there very very tiny red lines, that was their Kossuth-mourning dress". In the strictest sense of the word, the women of Tard put their pain and their hopes into their cross-stich embroidery: they copied the border that framed the 1848 banknotes for their "Kossuth-banknote" pattern.⁷⁶ Sándor Teleki, who fled Hungary the beginning of 1850, reported that the people "hope and wait wait for us... they beat the gendarmes, and hide the national guards"; as for Kossuth's proclamation, "the peasants read it as a prayer, or have it read to their children". But he added with deep concern: what will happen "if the people, too, lose heart?"; and formulated the answer that was to haunt the exiles: without the people's support, "we are a hollow voice crying in the desert".⁷⁷

Most of the peasantry, which comprised the majority of the country's population, was emancipated from serfdom in 1848. This fact practically determined their political consciousness, though by no means unambiguously. Most of the Magyar peasantry, and a great many of the non-Magyar speaking peasants, too, attributed their liberation to the revolution, and – as dozens of folk-songs testify – to Kossuth, whose memory they cherished in their heart of hearts. What is more, a great many of them – with no little oversimplification – felt that the rest of their problems had remained unsolved only because the Hungarian war of independence had been defeated.⁷⁸

The majority of the non-Magyar former serfs, however, and the occasional Magyar peasant, too, was convinced by the Imperial authorities that it was the Emperor who had done away with the feudal world. This illusion, however, could by no means counterbalance the bitterness felt by the peasant masses at the ruthless implementation of the modified land regulations, and at the mercilessness of the public administration. The absolutist regime's casual use of arms to enforce its will provoked local resistance throughout the country. The rapid increase of the tax burden, the stepped-up rate of recruitment, the rescinding of the freedoms they had learned to enjoy in 1848-1849, and the quashing of all hopes of local self-government were just as little calculated to make even the most backward peasants receptive to the "good Emperor" propaganda.⁷⁹

We have as yet no unambiguous data on how far the peasantry was familiar with the concrete aims of the exiles and the resisters, how far they were conscious

⁷⁹ L. Dégh pp. 113–115, 128. – S. Sándor P. (Ed.) pp. 63–75, 151 ff. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 80–154, 219–239. – Pölöskei-Szakács I. pp. 48–55.

⁷⁵ Madarász p. 271. – Gy. Szabad 1957. pp. 293–294. – P. Balázs p. 681.

⁷⁶ CKk. pp. 93-94. - V. Dietz pp. 149-157.

⁷⁷ S. Teleki pp. 393-394.

⁷⁸ Cf. Gy. Ortutay pp. 263-307. - L. Dégh pp. 113-130. - E. Borzsák pp. 18-30.

of the limitations of their views on social questions. There can, however, be no doubt that the majority of the peasants were willing to aid everyone - fleeing nobleman or outlaw on the run - in conflict with the foreign, repressive system which frustrated also their own hopes. There was an element among the rural poor who practically idolized the growing number of poor lads and deserters who swelled the outlaws' ranks, for they were constantly at war with the hated gendarmes. It was primarily this popular support which made both deserted fens and market-day crowds a place of refuge for them.⁸⁰ Whenever the secret organizations of the early 1850's were able to make contact with the peasants, they, too, had a galvanizing effect on them. The majority of the Sekler and the Tolna county free troops were peasant recruits, and one third of those executed after the 1852-1854 conspiracy trials were peasants.⁸¹ But these organizations had worked with very small numbers, and even among the Magyar peasants, the majority were left to themselves in the 1850's to identify alone their own frustrated aspirations with the defeated national struggle in the renewal of which they yet continued to hope.

The guild workers who joined the journeymen's unions, and the industrial workers founding their benevolent societies fought primarily for economic demands, and for the right to their – for the most part humanitarian – associations. Even in the most significant action of the 1850's, the 1852 riot at Selmecbánya (Banská Štiavnica) put down by the gendarmerie and the army, it was the economic demands which were the prime movers, although the authorities were most alarmed by the riot's political overtones. It is probably the all-embracing political fear of the prosecutors, and the heterogenous political allegiances of the participants that is reflected in the fact that the riot was attributed both to "pan-Slav" and "Kossuthist" agitation, and that the charge of "anti-monarchic democratism" was also made. The authorities were particularly upset to find among the leaders of the miners' riot Sándor Möhling, a man who had organized a guerilla unit the summer of 1849 to support the Hungarian Army, and had been among the last to lay down his arms after Világos.⁸²

The anti-absolutism of the evolving working class is well illustrated by the circumstances attending János Libényi's assassination attempt on the Emperor. The young tailor, who attacked Franz Joseph with a dagger on Feb. 18, 1853, claimed that his deed gave expression to the sentiments of all his fellow workers. The official report states that in Pest "the workers, discontent with the new state of things, in workshops, pubs and hiding-places" had agreed that the ruler must die. Libényi spent two years in Vienna preparing for the attempt, keeping company there "with those of like mind, especially those from his country and his

⁸⁰ F. Gönczy 1944. – F. Szabó 1964. – Nagy Czirok 1965. – Cf. PN. 1860. March 18. – S. Sándor P. (Ed.) pp. 220–223. – Sashegyi, 1959. p. 248.

⁸¹ PN. 1853. Jan. 2. - Berzeviczy I. pp. 311-312, II. p. 24. - L. Lukács. pp. 95-97, 112-113.

⁸² Sashegyi 1959 pp. 62–68. – Cf. L. Lukács pp. 38–39. – E. Lederer pp. 144–145. – Gy. Spira. pp. 581–582.

trade", in a "workers' club" where "they outdid each other in the most hostile statements and outbursts". The former co-workers of the executed Libényi were soon traced. One master tailor, sixteen taylor's assistants, and one printers' apprentice were condemned to various periods of hard labour, imprisonment, and deportation. Along with the loyal messages of the leadership strata, the authorities received news also of numerous antithetical opinions. In Pozsony, students were flogged or imprisoned for reviling the Emperor; in other places, peasants and burghers met a similar fate. During the week following the attempt, 379 people, mostly workers, were arrested in Pest, and charged with actually condoning Libényi's deed, or with "suspicious" behaviour.⁸³ Although the terrified authorities doubtless exaggerated the political commitment of the masses, it is also true that those most familiar with the situation were right to count the as yet relatively small, but evolving working class as a potential hot-bed of anti-absolutism in Hungary.⁸⁴

Even if they had wanted to take a common stand, the 1850's gave no scope for co-ordinated action by the discontented of the various classes. The authorities, ever vigilant, were rightly wary of all danger-signals: the great crowd that assembled for the funeral of the persecuted poet, János Garay; and the even more ominous mass of mourners which in 1855 accompanied the great poet, Mihály Vörösmarty, on his last journey in what was more of a national demonstration than a funeral march. Equally upsetting for the authorities was the pilgrimage to Máriacell organized by the conservatives the summer of 1857 both to prove their influence over the masses, and to assure the masses of their fitness for leadership.⁸⁵

In 1857, Minister of Police Kempen noted in his diary the Emperor's comment that the political atmosphere in Hungary was worse than at any time since the revolution.⁸⁶ At any rate, there can be no doubt that every significant social and political force in the country was determined to resist absolutism. There was, however, no consensus among them as to what to put in place of the absolutist system, and how to go about doing it.

LITERARY REFLECTIONS OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND OF THE SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT*

Even among the poets, it was only the greatest who were able to give expression to that sudden withering of hope in full bloom which was 1849. It was

⁸³ Kempen pp. 278–281. – Friedjung II. pp. 203–204. – L. Lukács pp. 131–144. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 157–158, 163–164.

⁸⁴ Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 6–7, 157, 166–169. Cf. Táncsics p. 311. – Jánossy I. p. 465. – L. Lukács p. 182. – M. Szakács pp. 102–103, 119.

⁸⁵ Berzeviczy II. pp. 104, 161, 413, 440–441. – D. Angyal pp. 141–142. – L. Lukács pp. 162–163, 167–168. – J. László pp. 466–473.

⁸⁶ Kempen p. 424. Cf. Wertheimer I. pp. 112-113.

* With reference also to the period following the crisis of absolutism.

5 Szabad György

Mihály Vörösmarty, to the end loyal to the Revolutionary Government, who raised his voice to indict fate, to curse Görgey, and to offer "his marrow and his blood" for but a ray of hope (Atok – Curse; Emlékkönyvbe – In an Album; 1849). He alone was able to identify completely with the formidable experiences of those two years (Előszó – Preface, 1850). It was the tune played by his gaunt old gypsy (A vén cigány – The Old Gypsy, 1854) that most clearly expressed the struggle to remain human in that inhuman period. Fully conscious though he was of all the horrors of the fight that had transpired, Vörösmarty, far from repudiating or minimizing the ideals and the meaning of the revolutionary war yet believed that only a new purifying storm could bring the dawn of the new "holiday".⁸⁷

János Arany modestly concealed his tears of mourning in more disciplined works (Letészem a lantot – I'll Put my Lyre Down, 1850; Ráchel, 1851; Ráchel siralma - Rachel's Lament, 1851). In his more intimate verse (Fiamnak - For my Son, 1850; Családi kör - Family Circle, 1851) it is the quest for internal harmony - the sine qua non of going on living - that we find reflected. His ballad series reflects the contradictions and turmoil of the age, but is imbued with a determined sense of integrity. The sincerity of his commitment is best reflected in two stylized, but immensely powerful poems: Szondi két apródja (Szondi's Two Pages, 1856), an appeal to the intelligentsia to refuse to be the servants of absolutism; and his A walesi bárdok (The Bards of Wales, 1857) an allegory reflecting his refusal to do homage to the tyrant of his own times, Franz Joseph. In A nagyidai cigányok (The Gypsies of Nagyida, 1851) the nation itself is judged. Not, however, as this was done by the former Centralists, in terms of the repudiation of the struggle itself, but, rather, as an indictment of "the national faults" which were given ever more scope with the approach of defeat. It is of this that the sobs behind the grotesque laughter speak. And it is this that we hear in the confession of Bolond Istók (Crazy Istók, 1850-1873).

At the time of the crisis of absolutism, rays of hope mingled with Arany's injuctions to perseverance in *Rendületlenül; Kies Ősz* (Undaunted; Delightful Autumn, 1860); *Magányban* (In Solitude, 1861). In *Buda halála* (The Death of Buda, 1863), he draws a parallel between the fate of the Magyar and the Hunnish people. It is, in fact, the divided leadership of 1848–49 and of the 1861 Diet that he is reproaching when he points out that it was the chieftains' quarrels which gave the Saxon, Detre, the advantage he sought. The final blow, however, was the Huns' own surrender, the "German" marriage. Although the "literary Deák-party", the party of compromise, claimed Arany for its own, Arany himself, consistently true to the ideal of national self-determination, maintained his independence of spirit.⁸⁸

The true poet of mourning, of elegiac complaint, was Mihály Tompa. Frequently imprisoned, he continued to put heart into his countrymen with

88 J. Barta 1953. - István Sőtér: Arany János. In: MIT. IV. - Keresztury, 1967.

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⁸⁷ P. Gyulai 1866. - S. Lukácsy - L. Balassa 1955. - D. Tóth 1957.

LITERARY REFLECTIONS OF POLITICAL MOOD

patriotic poetry of the utmost sincerity: A gólyához (To a stork, 1850); Levél egy kibujdosott barátom után (Letter to a Friend Fled Abroad, 1851). His Régi történet (An Old Story) and Forr a világ (The World is Seething, 1861) express the nation's dilemma at the moment of absolutism's crisis: has it the strength to exploit Vienna's weakness to take up the struggle again? The Uj Simeon (New Simeon, 1862) is a poem of hope renewed in spite of lost opportunities; Ikarus (1863) is a call to struggle at all cost.⁸⁹

The poetry of Gyula Sárosi – who was condemned to death while he was in hiding, then imprisoned, only to be interned at the end of the decade – is informed by an unshakeable faith in that "someday" his prison would "become the hall of liberty"; that his judges would be judged by "the most supreme court of all", by "world-history"; and that "the people", forever free of tyrants, would "place on its own head – the crown" (*Bujdosó* – The fugitive, *Hol vagy Isten* – Where are You, God, 1850; *Éjjel* – At Night, 1852–53).⁹⁰

There were also other sincere voices recalling the past and urging men to keep faith, but in this innumerable army of "patriotic" verse-writers we find bathos in place of the great poets' grandiloquence, and empty theatricality where they had spoken with passion. Yet these second-rate imitators were popular enough.

The appalling measure of success enjoyed by Petőfi's epigoni is all the more amazing in that' their leading figure, Kálmán Lisznyay, was nothing loath the spring of 1857 to compose the hymn of homage to Franz Joseph that Arany had refused to write.⁹¹

Half deliberately, half instinctively, the new generation of lyricists faught against epigonism in an effort to find the means of expressing their own message. An outstanding example of this is the poetry of the young János Vajda, with its striving to go beyond the folk idiom to one genuinely expressive of the new existential experience. His political poems testify not only to his profound capacity for empathy (*Virrasztók* – Watchers in the Night, 1855), but also to his extraordinarily passionate nature (*Visegrádon* – At Visegrád, 1855). This same passion was to ring out as the indictment of the nation's sins in his political pamphlets, and once he had lost his illusions regarding Vienna's willingness to turn over a new leaf, in his gripping series of attacks on the Compromise (*Luzitán dal I–II* – The Song of the Luzitans I–II, 1867–1869).⁹²

The novelist Mór Jókai towered above the other romantic prose writers not only in respect of his talent and his popularity, but also in producing a novel art form through interweaving romanticism and realism. It was only after some rather superficial excursions into the historical past – in *Erdély aranykora* (The Golden Age of Transylvania, 1851) and in *Törökvilág Magyarországon* (The Age

90 Gyula Bisztray's introduction. In: Sárosi Gyula, 1954.

⁹¹ Sándor Somogyi: Az ötvenes évek epigonköltészete (The Derivative Poetry of the 'Fifties). In: MIT. IV.

92 A. Komlós 1954.

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⁸⁹ Kálmán Kovács: Tompa Mihály. In: MIT. IV.

of the Turks in Hungary, 1852-1853) - and adventurings into exotic worlds - A janicsárok végnapjai (The Last Days of the Janissaries, 1854) - that he finally found his true subject: the immediate past. It is this period, which he knew so well from his own experiences and the stories of his contemporaries, that provides the subject matter of his most popular novels: Egy magyar nábob (A Hungarian Nabob, 1853-1854); Kárpáthy Zoltán (1854-1855); Szegény gazdagok (The Poor Rich, 1860); Az új földesúr (The New Landowner, 1862); Mire megvénülünk (By the Time We Grow Old, 1865). Oversimplified heroes, full-blooded minor characters, and a vivid and realistic portrayal of the social and natural environment are characteristic of his novels. It was not only the luxuriance of his plots and his enthusiasm for the reform-minded nobility that made Jókai's works popular, but also the realistic social miniatures they contained, and the comforting certainty the reader could have that victory – at least moral victory - would belong to the "good". Jókai, who abhorred hopelessness, encouraged his readers - and himself - with the thought that defeat could be compensated for, that a true cause would triumph in the end, and that even conquerors could be won over. His best works are compelling, almost convincing through the very power of their sincerity.93

The world of Zsigmond Kemény's novels was a very different world indeed: one of spiritual crises, of tragedies created by fatal passions. In Kemény's theory of tragedy, the "crime" leading to the fall is always a natural human attribute, or even virtue carried to excess. Kemény was, however, much too great a writer to be content to have his novels be mere instances of a formula. We find them to be authentic psychological studies, and precise, critical depictions of a society whose aristocracy was reluctant to accept the norms of bourgeois morality (Férj és nő - Husband and Wife, 1852); and accurate depictions of the tragic circumstances of the 16th and 17th centuries (Özvegy és leánva – A Widow and her Daughter, 1855-57; A rajongók - The Enthusiasts, 1859; Zord idő - Hard Times, 1862). Unlike Jókai, Kemény avoided unhistoric anachronisms; he sought, rather, to portray the genuine problems of the bygone age, to study spiritual conflicts rooted in historical reality: not ones which lent themselves to the drawing of cheap parallelisms, but ones with which a reader living in a world much too heavy with conflicts could intensely empathize. Kemény's works, however, were also a form of agitation. The characters committing the tragic mistakes are passionate and irresponsible in the same way as he – much too simplistically – stated and even more frequently implied Kossuth and his followers to have been. The characters who are their foil are weighed down with a sense of anxious responsibility; they are more calculating, though even less consistent in their moral stance. All in all, however, their sense for Realpolitik makes them more useful to their cause. In this, Kemény's work was consonant with the self-evaluation of the former Centralists now allied with Deák, who considered their new stand the political

93 M. Nagy 1968.

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realism that would lead the way to a better future. But Kemény's books also showed fate and failure to be evitable, and were, thus, a call to political action, a challenge not to be underestimated in that atmosphere of political passivity. Foreign affairs is the only factor which appears with the inevitability of "destiny", (in *Zord idő*, published in 1862), a sign that the crisis of absolutism had taught Kemény that the demands of Realpolitik included taking into account Hungary's "fatal" isolation and vulnerability.⁹⁴

Jókai's novels are still essentially romantic, interspersed with realist passages; Kemény's are already fundamentally realist, but contain a great many romantic elements. It was left to Pál Gyulai to employ consistently the realist descriptive method coming into its own the world over in a short novel that was long to remain unique in the genre. His *Egy régi udvarház utolsó gazdája* (The Last Owner of an Old Manor-House, 1857) is a requiem for a nobleman unable to adjust to the new demands of the new age. His fall is the necessary consequence of his illusions, and is all the more poignant in that his place is taken by his son-in-law, a German "officer-become-landowner", under whose management the future of the "manor-house" is bound to be very uncertain indeed. In Gyulai's short novel we find a theory of tragedy akin to that of Kemény: a virtue, the hero's devotion to tradition, is carried to insane excess and comes into conflict with reality. Thus his ruin, which he himself brings about, is sad enough, but appears just within the given frame of reference.⁹⁵

Imre Madách gave a very different answer to the fundamental problems of the age. He had had a lion's share of the trials of those years: four members of his family were lost in the bloody struggle; the years of his imprisonment cost him also his marriage. Yet he never sought the road to compromise; to his death in 1864, he consistently demanded that the achievements of the revolution be honoured, and national self-government be restored. His A civilizator (The Civilizer, 1859) a satire written "after the manner of Aristophanes" was aimed primarily at the demagogic bureaucracy, and at the would-be Germanizers of the language and spirit of the nation. The chief crime of "the civilizer", however, was his destruction of all that was truly valuable, and his attempt to put false values into its place. Madách, however, was not content to revile Bach's system alone; he censured all those who tolerated his methods. The nationalities he condemned for permitting themselves to be misled; the personage who best represents the Magyars he found guilty of sloth, for he let the others take the initiative in driving out "the civilizer", though he did, in fact, lead them when it came to carrying out the deed. Both Madách's poetry, and indirectly, his satire show how little faith he had in the judgement of the masses, in their steadfastness and their ability to act on principle. This lack of confidence, already latent in the political debates of the reform period, was reinforced by the events of 1848-49 - especially by

⁹⁴ István Sőtér: Kemény Zsigmond. In: MIT. IV. – M. Nagy 1972.

⁹⁵ Sándor Somogyi: Gyulai Pál. In: MIT. IV.

developments in France, where the masses placed a new tyrant on the throne - and became fundamental to Madách's system of thought. His Az ember tragédiája (The Tragedy of Man, 1859–1860), unique in 19th century Hungarian literature in the wealth and profundity of its ideas, starts out from the fundamental conflict of "good" and "evil", "divine" and "diabolical". The burden of its richly complex development is primarily the conviction that Man dedicated to the "good" fulfills his predestined mission if he triumphs over the blind and hostile masses - who throughout history are again and again reduced to servitude by a variety of social and even natural forces - and retains his ideals, the instruments of human progress. While for the Adam of the Tragedy-who refuses the ties even of commitment - life's goal lies in the transcendental message: "I say unto you, man: struggle and keep heart", Madách's next work already contains the promise of a resolution. Mózes (1860-1861), written at the time of absolutism's deepest crisis, reflects his hopes that liberty and national self-determination might at last be at hand. The drama makes unambiguous references to this, as well as to his belief that the precondition of liberty was loyalty to the principles of 1848, among them the determination to "build on the community of interest" within the nation. Moses became a "great man" through making his enslaved people's cause his own. But the long years of oppression, "the poisons of servility and of false culture" had ruined his people, had made them unfit to keep the "divine commandments". It was thus that Moses' task became the safekeeping of the law until the new generation emerged, a generation no longer timid and uncertain, but one capable of fulfilling the last will and testament of the "great man" who had been so totally true to his calling, and of building the future of its liberated homeland on the inherited laws. Madách's conclusion in Mózes is totally consonant with, but also complementary to the above quoted last words of the Tragedy: it is by no means impossible for "the great man" to devote himself to the elevation of his people; he must but defy his tragic fate to the end, having recognized the truth that "one needs a people to be able to make a people happy".96

⁹⁶ M. Palágyi 1900. – K. Horváth 1958. – István Sőtér : Madách Imre. In: MIT. IV. – Gy. Szabad 1973.

CHAPTER 3

THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTISM (1859–1861)

THE 1859 ITALIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE HUNGARIAN EXILES

At the end of the 1850's and the beginning of the '60's, the charged atmosphere over most of Europe exploded in a new series of revolutions and movements of national liberation. The source of the tensions was twofold: the problems attending the transition to a capitalist economy, compounded in much of Eastern Europe by the crisis of feudalism; and the inflexibility of the conservative political systems standing in the way of the national self-determination desired by the peoples of Europe. The economic slump following the boom years of the Crimean War reached its nadir in 1857, and contributed to the air of crisis. It was not only the capitalist and semi-capitalist half of Europe that it shook; all of Europe was affected, for credit and trade relations, ideas and political influences had worked to make Europe ever more of a homogeneous whole.

The revolutionary and national movements greatly affected the Habsburg Empire. The Italian wars of liberation were directed primarily against the Habsburgs; the Balkan and East-European revolutionary activities stimulated the renewal of nationalist agitations within the Empire, and encouraged the anti-absolutist sentiment latent in most of its population. Finances conjuring up the spectre of bankrupcy, and the unresolved problem of Germany augmented the Empire's list of woes, and called in question its very survival. Internal consolidation thus became a matter of life and death.

At the same time, forcing this weakest of the conservative powers to its knees became the touchstone of success for the revolutionary movements spreading across Central and Eastern Europe. Vienna's position was particularly precarious because of its international isolation by the second half of the 1850's: not only had the Habsburgs deserted Czarist Russia – their faithful ally of 1849–1851 – at the time of the Crimean War; they had also forced it to cede the area at the mouth of the Danube, all without having made a secure substitute alliance.¹

In the spring of 1859, the Habsburg Empire was involved in war for the first time in ten years, and a very dangerous war at that. Many of the Hungarian exiles thought that the time had come for their country's liberation; for scores of Italian

¹ Cf. Renouvin pp. 315–322. – Taylor pp. 87–103. – Birke pp. 186–193. – Baumgart pp. 246–256. – Schroeder pp. 392–427.

and French secret agents had come to consult with them as preparations for the war were being made. For Napoleon III's complex scheme, the Hungarian issue was but of modest interest; Cavour, on the other hand – recalling the routs of 1848–1849 – saw the co-ordination of Italy's political and military moves with those of Hungary as a precondition of Italy's shaking off – and keeping off – the Habsburg yoke. It was for this reason that he encouraged the French idea that the Hungarian exiles be mobilized, and supported the exiles' efforts to reach an agreement with the Roumanian and Serbian principalities.²

The Hungarian exiles, politically divided during the 1850's, had some weighty decisions to make. Its leaders wanted neither to pass up the opportunities that were at hand; nor to take the risk of provoking an unsuccessful uprising. It was Klapka and László Teleki who began organizing in response to the French and Italian initiatives. Klapka harmonized his plans with those of Kossuth, who had a great many reservations; let his allies know the exiles' demands in respect of guarantees; and then travelled to the Balkans to win the alliance of the principalities - the political and military sine qua non of a successful Hungarian war of liberation. His efforts were crowned with considerable success: the Roumanian-Hungarian Treaty of March 29, 1859. Prince Cuza, who at that time rightly saw the Habsburgs as the chief obstacle to the unification of the two Roumanian principalities, made a secret treaty with Klapka, who was vouched for by the French and the Italians. In return for a third of the arms that would be shipped there, Cuza undertook to store the rest, and to let the army of liberation use his country as its base. At the same time, the Hungarian exiles promised to help liberate Bukovina, ruled by the Habsburgs. An amendment to the treaty called on the Serbs and Roumanians of Hungary to support the insurrection; in return, it guaranteed them national rights essentially consonant with those to be found in Kossuth's constitutional proposal, supplemented by a clause providing for a vote in Transvlvania after the liberation in order that the population itself might decide whether it wanted to be united with Hungary, or to be a self-governing province of the Hungarian State. The agreement concluded with plans for a Hungarian-Serbian-Roumanian confederation.³

During his Serbian visit, Klapka but worked out the preliminaries of the agreement; its actual signing, and the explicit admission of the need for co-operation in the interest of a common cause, came when the Serbian heir to the throne travelled to London to meet with Kossuth. Prince Michael, who was soon to ascend the throne, was in total agreement with Kossuth's views: Hungary's independence was necessary for the peoples of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire not to fall victim to another expansionist Great Power. For, while a sovereign Hungary would be too weak to be a threat to their independence, it

² KLI. I. pp. 85-109. - Chiala pp. 17-23. - Koltay-Kastner, 1949. pp. 7-13. - Koltay-Kastner pp. 53-80. - E. Kovács pp. 90-97.

³ E. Kovács pp. 325–342. Cf. KLI. I. pp. 369–382. – T. Lengyel pp. 28–32. – Koltay-Kastner pp. 75–87.

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would be an ally strong enough to insure that the area would be left free to develop on its own. Such a prospect appealed to Prince Michael Obrenović, and he supported the efforts made for Hungary's liberation. Satisfied with Kossuth's plans for guaranteeing the nationalities' rights, he used his influence to win the Serbs living in Hungary to the anti-Habsburg cause.⁴

Kossuth, who favoured a constitutional system based on bourgeois parliamentary democracy, was faced with same difficult choices. In articles, on his lecture tours, in his joint statement with Mazzini and Ledru Rollin, he had ruthlessly attacked not only foreign oppression, but also absolutistic, autocratic systems of government, including that of Napoleon III. At this time, however, Napoleon III exerted the greatest influence over the Serbian and Roumanian political leaders whose alliance Kossuth's group justly regarded as one precondition of the success of a war of liberation. The other, as he saw it, was close military co-operation with Piedmont - the initiator of the battle against their common enemy - but only after it had won the French Emperor for an ally. And finally, though not least importantly, it seemed that it was precisely France's relations with Russia (the exiles had no definite information regarding the secret agreements)5 which would safeguard Hungary in case of a new war of independence from the threat of Czarist intervention. In view of all this, Kossuth, who for months had reacted coolly to all initiatives coming from Paris, once the campaign had begun visited the Emperor, who promised to aid Hungary's struggle for independence in return for Hungarian political and military action divisive of the Austrian troops.

In addition to the considerations mentioned above, Kossuth had another weighty reason for taking this step: the fear that if he refused to co-operate, Louis Napoleon would use some of the less circumspect and more restive of the exiles to provoke an inadequately prepared uprising. With this in mind, he stipulated that he alone might give the signal for an insurrection after the actual co-operation of the Roumanians, Serbs, and Croats had been won, and significant French and Italian troops had crossed the Hungarian frontier with the explicit declaration of the allied sovereigns that they were fighting for Hungary's independence. Until such a time, he gave only political support to the anti-Habsburg war, embarking on a propaganda-tour aimed at forcing a declaration of British neutrality, and calling on the Hungarian soldiers of the Imperial Army to refuse to fight against the allies, and to desert to the Hungarian contingents being organized.⁶

* E. Kovács pp. 450–458. Whether it was indeed an "agreement" – as Kossuth claims – or merely an exchange of views which came about in the course of the London discussions we cannot know for certain; but the fact that Ristić, Obrenović's confidant, accepts Kossuth's account of the event is strong indication that there was, at least, a coincidence of views. Cf. KLI. I. pp. 336–337, 341–344, 386–413. – *Ristić* I. pp. 213–221. – *Koltay-Kastner* pp. 120–121. – *Gy. Szabad* p. 121.

⁵ KLI. I. pp. 141–150, 158–159, 221, 232–233. – Kempen p. 487. – Sumner pp. 65–83. – Schüle pp. 107, 142, 156–161. – Tapié pp. 122–145. – Birke pp. 191–195.

⁶ Kossuth, 1859/a pp. 13–35. – KLI. I. pp. 91–243. – Koltay-Kastner, 1949. pp. 9–83. – Birke pp. 211–218. – Koltay-Kastner pp. 65–75, 88–117. – E. Kovács pp. 79–81, 97–104.

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Louis Napoleon's anti-Habsburg stand provoked acrimonious debate within the ranks of the various groups of political exiles throughout Europe. Marx and Engels, who had hoped for unified German action against Napoleon – one which would do away with French tyranny, and lead to the birth of a democratic Germany strong enough to launch an attack on Czarist Russia – in the same breath as they attacked the German petit-bourgeois democrats, the Russian Herzen and the Italian Garibaldi, they now attacked Kossuth's group, too, for their support of the Franco-Italian alliance, accusing them of having become mere instruments of the anti-progressive power politics of the French tyrant.⁷

In the meanwhile, Kossuth was in England, exploiting his moral authority to the utmost to win the declaration of British neutrality so important to the Franco-Italian alliance. The Palmerston – Russell Government which took office upon the defeat of the Conservatives did, in fact, promise that Britain would remain neutral should the war spread to Hungary, for its parliamentary majority depended on the Manchester Liberals who supported Kossuth; nevertheless, they used all possible diplomatic means to confine hostilities to Italy, and to bring the war to a rapid conclusion. Kossuth did not completely trust Louis Napoleon, and had openly warned Cavour at the end of May, before the decisive battle, that if the planned encircling manoeuver in Hungary – after which there could be no turning back – were not executed, the French Emperor would refrain from a frontal assault on the quadrilateral of strong Austrian fortresses in Northern Italy, and, leaving Venice to the Habsburgs, would be satisfied with the liberation of Lombardy.⁸

Already on May 6, 1859, in Paris, Kossuth, Teleki and Klapka had formed the Hungarian National Directory, a kind of government-in-exile which was to function until the new parliamentary elections – and for which they hoped later to have a Croatian and a "Transylvanian" member – and set about making political and military preparations. Most of the theretofore very divided group of exiles now assured the National Directory of their support. An "Information" sent to Hungary warned the nation against any uprising for which the exiles had not given the signal; and urged the Magyars to make their peace with the other nationalities in accordance with Kossuth's constitutional draft, which was thereby accepted as the exiles' domestic policy statement.⁹

As is well known, after initial Austrian successes, the campaign soon proved the superiority of the well-equipped French and Italian troops, whose spirits rose with Garibaldi's joining in the battle. The scant enthusiasm which the Hungarian

⁸ R. 90. I. 2759, 2773–2775, 2778, 2968. – The Daily News 1859. May 21. – The Manchester Examiner and Times 1859. May 25. For the promises made by the new British government, see Gilpin (London, 1859. June 10, 14, 18) to Kossuth. R. 90. I. 2799, 2805/a, 2811 (The citation in the Kossuth publication is inaccurate). KLI. I, 244–328. Cf. Gy. Szabad 1960. pp. 11–19. – Koltay-Kastner pp. 118–124. – Jászay, 1965. pp. 558–578.

⁹ KLI. I. pp. 238-240, 449-453, III. pp. 192-193. - E. Kovács pp. 104-110.

⁷ Marx pp. 230-242, 360-361. - Cf. Maller p. 705. - Diószegi p. 176.

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soldiers of the Imperial Army had for the Habsburg cause was further diminished by news of the activity among the exiles. At the decisive Battle of Solferino, the 19th and 34th Hungarian infantry divisions deserted practically to a man the battalion Franz Joseph was incompetently commanding with the boundless self-confidence of the autocrat.¹⁰ After losing the battle, the Austrians took refuge in their "impregnable" quadrilateral. Louis Napoleon, who feared both the possibility of a German war – a war on two fronts – and the democratization of the Italian movement, yielded to British and Russian pressure, and on July 11, signed an armistice with Franz Joseph in Villafranca.

The armistice which gave most of Lombardy to Piedmont, but left Venice to Austria, and provided for the restoration of the Habsburgs in Tuscany and Modena, caused profound bitterness among Louis Napoleon's Italian and Hungarian allies. Cavour resigned, taking leave of Kossuth with the promise of renewing the fight. Villafranca was a personal humiliation not only for the leader of the Italian Risorgimento, but also for the leader of the Hungarian exiles. At the same time, it proved how right Kossuth had been in warning against a premature Hungarian uprising. And his followers inside the country could find at least some comfort in the weakness of the Habsburgs, now exposed.¹¹

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As Rechberg was later to confess, Franz Joseph had signed the armistice for fear of domestic turmoil, particularly fear of a Hungarian uprising.¹² Everyone – from Prime Minister Palmerston to the Hungarian conservatives, from the Austrian correspondents of foreign papers to informants relied on by the exiles – everyone agreed with the confidential official reports being sent to Vienna that the tension existing throughout the Empire had, in Hungary, reached the breaking point, and would inevitably erupt in a nation-wide revolution as soon as the fighting reached the country's borders.¹³ Thus, along with the "extraordinary sacrifices" of the Treaty of Villafranca, Franz Joseph tried to consolidate his position also with concessions on the domestic front.

His first move was quickly to publish a promise of "modern improvements" to his "peoples". It was soon evident, however, that with this, as with the dismissal of the epitomy of the system, Bach, and of the dreaded Minister of Police, Kempen,

¹¹ Valsecchi, 1965. – Cf. KLI. I. pp. 468–478, II. p. 3–52. – Letters of Queen Victoria III. pp. 420–435, 450–451. – Correspondence of Russell II. pp. 234–236. – Vitzthum I. pp. 333–337. – Mayr pp. 69–70. – Taylor pp. 113–116. – Koltay-Kastner pp. 158–168. – Gy. Szabad 1960. pp. 19–22. ¹² Redlich I. p. 753.

¹³ Rogge I. pp. 542–543. – Thallóczy p. 402. – Kónyi II. pp. 414, 421–422. – Wertheimer I. pp. 123–126. – Á. Károlyi I. pp. 18–20. – Koltay-Kastner, 1949. pp. 231–241. – Connell p. 261. – Gy. Szabad pp. 9–10.

¹⁰ Rothenberg p. 74. - Cf. L. Lukács pp. 177-179. - Gy. Szabad p. 492.

he was but manoeuvring to preserve a slightly "touched up" version of the old absolutist system.¹⁴

The fall of Bach shifted the balance of power between the – until now largely coequal – haut bourgeois and aristocratic groups, the two groups standing to gain from centralizing absolutism. The aristocracy came to dominate, as the appointments of Count Rechberg as Prime Minister and of Count Goluchowski as Minister of the Interior indicated. For the time being, however, the Hungarian conservatives hoped vainly to ally with the Cisleithan opponents of absolutistic centralism in the effort to persuade the Emperor to accept their plan for a federalized, in some respects, still feudal constitutional system. Dessewffy's detailed constitutional draft, whose implementation the conservatives claimed to be the sole means of preventing a revolution, was rejected. Baron Hübner, the new Police Minister, who devoted a memorandum to justifying their fears and supporting their proposed solution, was dismissed. Franz Joseph had recovered from his initial fright. The Peace of Zürich confirming the armistice filled him with a false sense of security, and he clung tenaciously to his absolute power.¹⁵

The Protestant Patent, issued the fall of 1859, frustrated the hopes of the authorities, and but contributed to the domestic tensions. Worked out by Count Thun and his associates, this "public command" of the Emperor was meant to regulate the relations between the state and the Protestant churches to everyone's satisfaction. However, the Patent met with little success. For it made the appointment not only of high ecclesiastical officials, but also of pastors, and even of village schoolmasters conditional on the approval of the government. Although the meetings of the synods were to be freed of the presence of an "Imperial Commissioner", the precondition of permission to hold a synod was submission to the authorities of every proposal to be discussed. Protestant schools were to be put under much more rigorous supervision than the Catholic ones. The imprimatur on Protestant religion books was to be given by authorities responsible directly to the Emperor, and the same body had the right to order the closing of any Protestant educational institution suspect for its "harmful moral or political character". Vienna tried vainly to present the Patent as a guarantee of ecclesiastical self-government. Violating also Hungarian laws in effect before 1848, the Patent provoked a wave of protest - the first since 1849 - protest that extended much beyond the circle of those immediately concerned. Ecclesiastical gatherings took on a political hue, and defied not one military order to disperse. The great majority of the diocese simply refused to implement the directives of the Patent, yet, Vienna was now most reluctant to use the means it had so easily

¹⁴ Kempen pp. 525–532. – Cf. Mayr pp. 71–78. – A. Károlyi I. pp. 180–181 – Berzeviczy II. pp. 208–211, 217–20. – Goldinger pp. 106 ff.

¹⁵ Kónyi II. pp. 414–452. – Cf. Ludassy pp. 36–39. – Steinbach pp. 290–294. – Szőgyény-Marich II. pp. 144–147. – Eisenmann pp. 211–215. – Kecskeméthy pp. 97–98. – Redlich I. pp. 462–465. – Engel-Jánosi, 1933. pp. 166–169.

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resorted to in the days of terror. Resistance to the patent resulted in its being rescinded in the spring of 1860; Count Thun was dismissed soon after. By that time, however, the politically discontented had gone beyond protesting the Protestants' grievances.¹⁶

It was this spirit of resistance which prevented the execution of the "communities law" which had been promised by the "fundamental principles of government" of 1851, but was completed by the Bach group only in 1859. Throughout the country, they refused to use the antidemocratic methods prescribed to set up the committees responsible for putting the ordinance into effect. The Imperial Patent that was called the "communities law" merely permitted the "electors" - those who owned immovable property - to choose three candidates for the position of "community head", i.e. of judge, to choose their jurors, and half of the representatives of the community council. The decision as to which of the three candidates was actually to become the judge the patent left to higher authorities, as it did the confirmation of the jurors, and the choice of the other half of the community council from among the highest tax-payers. The "communities law" thus implemented the "view" expressed by the 1851 "fundamental principles", namely, "that the predominating interests should also have predominant influence". By 1859-1860, however, there was nearly no one in Hungary to implement such glaringly antidemocratic measures, not even among those who, in their heart of hearts, feared all accretion of the masses' political power. As for the authorities, they thought it wiser, at that moment, to refrain from implementing the patent at the point of bayonets.¹⁷

It was at the time of the war with Italy that a secret resistance organization began to take shape. Officers of the Hungarian Army of 1848/49 just out of prison, commissioners of the revolutionary government, and former opposition politicians joined in a loose organization that established contact with the exiles. The "radicals" of the group – György Komáromy, Imre Ivánka, János Vidats among them – had as their program that of the Hungarian National Directory; the "moderates", on the other hand, would have been content to see constitutionalism restored. It was the views of the latter group that informed the widely circulated *Information* drafted by Menyhért Lónyay, which called on the people to prepare "for a time of changes", and, in the meanwhile, to practice passive resistance: to refuse to pay taxes, and to boycott the authorities.¹⁸ This, however, was still but a very general expression of anti-absolutism and of the nation's aspirations, as were the spate of commemorative ceremonies, and of social

¹⁸ KLI. I. pp. 347, 465–466, II. pp. 71–78, 286–288, 454. – TLVM. II. pp. 153, 159–161, 164–168. – *Tanárky* pp. 89–94. – For further data, see: *Gy. Szabad* pp. 18–19.

¹⁶ Gottas, 1965. – Cf. D. 189. 1860–VIII. P. 12–671, 2197, 1861–VIII. E. – 10–1157. – G. Prónay 1860. – Búsbach II. pp. 149–169. – Berzeviczy II. pp. 140–147, 247–251, III. pp. 10–16, 37–45, 71–75. – I. Révész pp. 93–124, 193. – L. Lukács pp. 191–196.

¹⁷ Z. Horváth (Sopron) 1965. II. pp. 583–584. – Sashegyi, 1965. p. 68. – Gy. Szabad pp. 106–107. Cf. Klabouch pp. 46–54.

gatherings of ostentatiously Magyar appearance which started up the autumn of 1859.¹⁹

Utopian democratism and a readiness for battle characterized the pamphlets which began to circulate the beginning of 1860 in the Upper-Theiss region, pamphlets whose author and distributors the authorities searched for in vain. Calling on the population to take up arms against the Habsburgs and raising the charge of criminal passivity against those who should have been the country's political leaders, the pamphlets called for an independent Hungary in which land redistribution and the abolition of all privilege would lay the groundwork for a bourgeois democracy.²⁰

Their program much resembled the views expounded by Mihály Táncsics brought out from hiding by the 1857 amnesty. Táncsics made contact with a group of university students, who saw in him the personification of the 1848 revolution they so fervently admired. From the autumn of 1859, this student group was regularly heard from. They took up the cause of Magyar-language university education; demonstrated against the Protestant Patent; organized the public burning of the pro-government ecclesiastical newspaper, Idők Tanuja (Witness of the Times); and, together with the journeymen, formed the "mass" in the growing number of mass demonstrations. Encouraged by the news that the people of Tuscany and Modena had prevented the return of the Habsburg archdukes, and had declared their wish to be united with Piedmont where Cavour was again the leader, the students made plans for a fitting commemoration of March 15, the anniversary of the 1848 Pest revolution. On March 15 of 1860, the police arrested a number of students, and Táncsics, too; but they were unable to prevent the demonstration. Orders were given to fire into the crowd; there were a few injuries, and a great many arrests. One of the students died of his wounds. At least a quarter of the population of Pest-Buda accompanied his coffin on April 4, 1860, in a demonstration unprecedented in its size and intensity.²¹

The passions aroused by the funeral had hardly calmed when the nation was shaken by the news of Széchenyi's²² tragic death. The immediate causes of his suicide stretched back more than a year. Bach was still Minister of the Interior when there appeared throughout the Empire the first copies of a pamphlet published in London the beginning of 1859. The anonymous pamphlet was the work of István Széchenyi, living now for more than a decade in the mental

¹⁹ Podmaniczky III. pp. 87, 93. – Búsbach II. pp. 24–27. – Berzeviczy II. pp. 416–420, III. 46–48. – L. Lukács pp. 196–203.

²⁰ D. 161. 1860–IV. 0–492. – Cf. A. Vörös 1951. pp. 162–167, 203. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 250–254. – Gy. Szabad pp. 22–24.

²¹ Táncsics pp. 310–316. – Vezerle pp. 6–10, 36–43. – D. Angyal pp. 504–505. – L. Lukács pp. 182, 206–227. – M. Szakács pp. 102–103.

²² Count István Széchenyi (1791–1860) was one of the initiators of anti-feudal reform in Hungary. In 1848, he was a member of the Batthyány government. In September of 1848, Széchenyi, who had suffered from severe depression since his youth, was committed to the Döbling Mental Institution.

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institution in Döbling. It was "a glance" at the "backward glance" that the Bach group had cast over the "barbarian" Hungary they had "civilized" during the 'fifties, a response to an 1857 publication of theirs.²³

Perceiving the signs of renewed life in his precious nation, the sick Széchenyi repressed his hallucinations long enough to give a searing – though not altogether internally consistent – critique of Vienna's policy of oppression and assimilation.

The chief source of the contradictions in Széchenvi's work was the fact that. mainly because of his isolation, he was even more vulnerable to the influence of the conservative aristocracy than before 1848. He was, thus, unable to divest himself of his old idea that genuine political activity is the business of but a few. and, at any rate, something that the masses must be prevented from meddling with. Even in Ein Blick, which was an indictment of Bach and his system of absolutism, Széchenyi stated: "Nothing is more beneficial for the progress and thriving of human society than an inspired and wise absolutism which informs every relationship." He thought that "people" deplored absolute government not so much for its essence, but because experience showed that, as a rule, "absolutism walks hand in hand with stupidity".²⁴ It was at this "stupidity" that the brunt of Széchenvi's attack was directed, primarily at Bach's political activities - completely in keeping, in this respect, with the conservatives' tactics. Nevertheless, his attack was so multifarious, and in so many aspects so much to the heart of the matter, that anyone reading it could well think it to apply to everything that Franz Joseph tried to save of absolutism after dismissing Bach.

Investigations into the authorship of *Ein Blick* pointed more and more unambiguously to the resident of the Döbling mental institution. In the course of the searches conducted of his rooms and of the homes of his confidants, they found, among other things, an 1857 section of Széchenyi's unfinished manuscript, *Self-Knowledge*, a totally frank section he had taken particular pains to hide.²⁵ In this "great Hungarian satire", – as its discoverer, the historian Árpád Károlyi, called it – Széchenyi passed uninhibited judgement on Franz Joseph. He declared him to be a tyrant worse than Nero, and personally responsible for the moral and political degeneration of the entire Empire whose interests had come to be completely disregarded. Even in *Ein Blick*, which he meant for publication, Széchenyi was not content merely to castigate Bach for crediting absolutism with whatever progress had been made toward the bourgeois transformation of society. He was especially angry at absolutism's claiming credit for the emancipation of the serfs, for he, too, felt that in this respect, the Empire had been forced to follow Hungary's "example" in 1848. Széchenyi showed that

²³ The author of the Bach-inspired work (Rückblick auf die jüngste Entwicklungs-Periode Ungarns. Wien. 1857.) was Bernhard von Meyer. Széchenyi answered it with: Ein Blick auf den anonymen "Rückblick"... von einem Ungarn. London, 1859.

²⁴ SzIDH. III. pp. 171-172.

²⁵ A. Károlyi pp. 21-34, 52-97, 241-257.

Vienna, too, was responsible for Hungary's backwardness, for since 1790, it had constantly frustrated the nation's struggles to get out of "the swamp". And although even in his hidden manuscript Széchenyi dissociated himself from Kossuth's group and from all "separatist" goals, he now revived numerous arguments of the reform opposition, arguments which before the revolution he had judged too "incendiary" to bear expression. He listed the numerous progressive proposals that had failed to pass before 1848 because of the court's opposition, and noted Vienna's subsequent hypocritical lamentations about how difficult it was to make the Hungarians "happy". "In truth, it seems as if Your Majesty's imperial relatives had deliberately planned to keep Hungary always in a state of stagnation, in order thus to be able to recount in a thousand variations to all the world, and especially to the learned Germans: … 'How striking the difference between Cisleithania and Transleithania! The Leitha marks the boundry between civilization and barbarism!'"²⁶

The search of his rooms, and Minister of Police Baron Thierry's comment that "Döbling has ceased to be his asylum" brought on a new crisis for the sick Széchenyi. He hoped for no support from "above", and sought for none below. He let his destiny take its course. The dawn of April 8, 1860, he shot himself. The suspicion of murder which arose immediately was rebutted, but public opinion rightly held Vienna indirectly responsible for Széchenyi's death. Thousands went to his hurriedly organized funeral in Nagycenk, tens of thousands to the commemorative services held for him throughout the country. The exiled Kossuth, who, in spite of their former conflicts, remembered Széchenyi as "the greatest Magyar of our age", and "the Prometheus of the nation's spiritual revival", warned against letting the conservatives exploit the national mourning for their own ends. Imre Ivánka and many others shared in the general sorrow even while emphasizing the difference between their views and those that Széchenyi had professed. There were commemorative services with barely veiled prayers for Kossuth's return. The conservatives, however, did everything to make of Széchenyi - whose frankness and dedication to progress had made him at best an occasional, and always uncomfortable ally - a national idol carved in their own image and likeness.²⁷

CONSERVATIVE ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE OPPOSITION TO ABSOLUTISM

The increasingly organized group of conservative Hungarian aristocrats led by Counts Emil Dessewffy, György Apponyi, and Antal Szécsen and by László Szőgyény was systematically strengthening its imperial connections, and, from the autumn of 1859, did everything to draw both reviving and just nascent

²⁷ D. 162. 1860–2. – PN. 1860. April 11–15, 28, 30, May 2, 3, 12. – Béla Széchenyi pp. 3–5. – KLI. II. pp. 452, 457–459. – Podmaniczky III. pp. 94–97. – L. Lukács pp. 233–234. – Hanák p. 674. – Gy. Szabad pp. 27–28. – E. Gaál pp. 30–31.

²⁶ SzIDH. II. pp. 35-37, 179-182, 189-190, 303-305, 479-480. - Á. Károlyi pp. 149-163.

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political forces into its wake. Very much aware of the exiles' growing popularity, they yet hoped that – politically oppressed and disorganized as the country was – their anti-absolutist and nationalist generalities, pronounced from their positions of influence, would suffice to rule the moderates and to restrain the masses until they had achieved their immediate political goal: a compromise with the Habsburgs made in the name of the "nation". Cleverly exploiting the outbursts of discontent, the conservatives did their best to convince Vienna that it had been mistaken in refusing to heed the memoranda they had kept submitting after the country's 1849 defeat. Absolutism was untenable, and the "anarchy" which threatened to bring about Hungary's secession and the dissolution of the Monarchy was evitable only if the court finally accepted the anti-revolutionary alternative they had been proposing in various forms since 1849 – and hoisted them into the seat of government.²⁸

In the spring of 1860, a new wave of the Italian unification movement, and the growing tensions in Hungary and the Empire compelled the Habsburgs to a partial reexamination of their policies. The bankrupcy which threatened the state was a further argument to this end, as was the fact that the last vestiges of the government's prestige had been rent by the filthy scandal of the war contract frauds that had erupted in March of 1860. Reluctant as he was, Franz Joseph made up his mind to make some concessions. He recalled the Governor-General, Archduke Albrecht, who had wanted to guarantee order through mass arrests. In his place, he put General Lajos Benedek, a Hungarian in name, who had won the Emperor's confidence in the course of his campaigns against the Polish, Hungarian and Italian freedom fighters. Concurrently, he did away with the country's quinquepartite division, and promised to find a way to give some scope for self-government at the community, district, county, and even national levels.²⁹

The changes were prepared by the Imperial Council, which still played but an advisory role, though it was enlarged through the addition of new members. Of the Hungarians named to the Council, four refused "the honour". The first to do so was József Eötvös, whose decision is said to have been influenced by the student leaders' telling him that they considered anyone sitting on the Council "a traitor". Szőgyény has described how "everyone" in Pest told Pál Somssich that "they hoped… that he would not join the Imperial Council. And when he retorted: 'And what if I were to come back after with the 1848 Laws?' there were some who said 'We're beyond all that now, Debrecen and April 14 is the slogan". Baron Miklós Vay, popular for his opposition to the Protestant Patent, and the Transylvanian Baron Miklós Bánffy also refused the invitation.³⁰

³⁰ Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 30–40, 184–188. – Vay pp. 312–315. – Ludassy pp. 43–44. Vezerle pp. 54–55. – Gy. Szabad pp. 32–33.

6 Szabad György

²⁸ Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 2–10, 21–28, 149–178, 181–184. – Kónyi II. pp. 454–461. – Búsbach II. pp. 24–25. – Rediich I. pp. 496–497. – Gy. Szabad pp. 14–15, 26–27.

²⁹ *Redlich* I. pp. 488–500, I/2 pp. 179, 184–189, 226–227, II. pp. 706–716. Cf. *Rogge* II. pp. 35–47. – *Berzeviczy* III. pp. 59–65. – *Regele* pp. 178–181.

Thus it was the Hungarian conservatives who set the tone of the "reinforced" Imperial Council. Their leaders were ex-Chancellor Count György Apponyi, and Count Antal Szécsen who had excellent connections at court. (Count Szécsen's mother was a lady-in-waiting to the Empress Elisabeth; his father was Lord Steward to the Archduchess Sophie; his wife was the daughter of the Count Lamberg who had fallen victim to the people's anger in September of 1848; while his brother had died defending the Habsburgs' interests in Italy.) The Hungarian conservatives soon won the support of most of the Cisleithan aristocrats, and of the Czech and Polish aristocracy as well. For these men, too, wanted to exercise the authority they felt was theirs as the "natural leadership stratum" of their countries. Accordingly, they wanted to see the Empire reorganized in a way that would give full scope to each dominion's "historico-political individuality", hoping thus to ward off the spectres of bourgeois constitutionalism and national self-determination. Most of the committee dealing with the question of the Empire's "reorganization" finally voted to support the conservative memorandum advocating a "semi-feudal" federal system of this kind. The minority opposing them defended the policy of centralization, and wanted to see implemented an improved version of the Bach-system. However, the early summer of 1860, the Emperor forbade as much as a mention of a "representative constitution" at the sittings of the Council of Ministers. Thus, it was very much a moot point whether the conservative success in the Imperial Council – which was, after all, but a consultative body – would have any practical effect.³¹

In Hungary, the spring "concessions" proved to be provocatively inadequate. After a decade of inertia, many Hungarians again began to have faith in their strength and in their future. On the domestic scene, the weakness of the Habsburgs was growing ever more evident; and the impotent rage with which Vienna watched the successes of the Italian Risorgimento was even more encouraging. Franz Joseph's comment to Count György Apponyi on May 10, 1860, well epitomizes both his fears and his desires: "If the road I'm on leads to my destruction, the Magyars' historic loyalty should impel them to perish with their ruler."³² Many of "the Magyars", however, drew courage from just those things which terrified the Emperor. For in May of 1860, they received word of Garibaldi's landing in Sicily, and, in the weeks that followed, of the victorious battle against the Habsburgs' Bourbon allies. Enthusiasm ran high at the news that there were Hungarians fighting under Garibaldi's colours, and the organization of the "Hungarian contingent" in Italy was revived.

As summer approached, the tension mounted. Students in the provinces joined the Pest group of student activists; the nation-wide restlessness among the

³¹ Redlich I. pp. 500–547. – Cf. PN. 1860. Aug. 26 – Oct. 3. – Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 41–50. – Ludassy pp. 43–57. – Rogge II. pp. 55–70. – Thallóczy p. 389, 393–395. – Eisenmann pp. 221–232.

⁻ Kann II. pp. 109–111. – Gy. Szabad pp. 37–40, 64, 66–70.

³² Szőgyény-Marich III. p. 35.

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peasants also acquired a political hue. How far this was so is well illustrated by the resistance the peasants of Magyargyepes in Bihar county put up at the time of the land-survey. The authorities – thinking that it was only against the landowners that the peasants' hostility was directed – reassured them that the survey was only for the purposes of taxation. For the Roumanian and Magyar peasantry, however, this but added fuel to the fire. In their clash with the gendarmerie, the villagers suffered 3 fatalities and many injuries; but, reinforced by the peasantry of five neighbouring communities, they continued to fight on until the arrival of the military reinforcements.

There was another noteworthy riot when the authorities tried to redistribute land at Leányvár in Zemplén county. A cavalry squadron, and an infantry company came to aid the gendarmerie; women were whipped and men were flogged before the rioting was quashed. And there were alarming rumours of "revolutionary slogans" circulating everywhere, and of "discontented... noblemen having incited the peasants by telling them that the days of the present government were numbered, and that hereafter they - the nobility - would have a say in how the plots would be regrouped, and then the peasants would get a much better deal". Although the hope of some peasants that the nobility would espouse their class interests was rather far-fetched, there can be no doubt that the pamphlets distributed by the various resistance groups did their best to reassure the peasants and the non-Magyar masses that - whatever the Emperor's propagandists might say - the Hungarian national movement wished not to restore the old feudal order, but, rather, to bring about social and national equality. And although the masses heard little in the way of concrete detail as to how this would be brought about, great expectations and many illusions attended the hopes of change. The secret organizations' ever more widely heard calls that taxes and conscripts be denied the government served but to feed these illusions.³³

Throughout four days in the middle of July, renascent demonstrations swept the streets of Pest: students and journeymen cheered Kossuth and Garibaldi, and attacked the police. The series of arrests, floggings and forced conscriptions were to no avail. General Benedek was more and more inclined to share in the terrifying – and truly terrified – conservative appraisal of the situation, and sent ever more anxious reports to Vienna: in case of a war, he said, "the quiet revolution" would turn to a bloody insurrection, and "Hungary, women and children included, would go over to the foreign power".³⁴

The conservatives themselves organized the Aug. 20³⁵ commemorative services in order that the people might recognize them as their leaders: and in

³³ D. 162. 1860–6, 20, 27, 33. – D. 161. 1860 – IV. A-1252, 1860–IV. 0–356, 1251, 1611. – *Sashegyi, 1959.* pp. 254–255, 279–285. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 34–35, 44–47, 54.

³⁴ Friedjung, 1904. pp. 271–275. – Carl Lónyay pp. 197–198. – L. Lukács pp. 236–238, 415–416. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 246–249, 256, 271–272. – Regele pp. 188–189. – Gy. Szabad pp. 40–42.

³⁵ The feast of the state's founder, Stephen I of Hungary (970–1038).

order that they might prove to Vienna their ability to rule and to control the crowds. The people did, in fact, listen, hat in hand, to the sermons, and to the conservative speeches about clinging to ancient rights, with a dignified and manly calm; then, cocking their hats, they took to the streets singing of Kossuth's imminent return in a song that sent shivers down all conservative spines – the "Garibaldi song". The Aug. 26 fair at Rákospalota next to Pest swelled the crowds of demonstrators cheering the exiles. The crowd pressed into the city, and, angry that the performance of *The Siege of Sziget*, a historical drama, had been cancelled, staged its own version, setting fire to the props, and marching with the charred logs through the streets of Pest, cheering Kossuth, until the army blocked its path.³⁶

At the end of August, Táncsics was sentenced to 15 years in prison. His defence counsel, Virgil Szilágyi, caused a great sensation when he started speaking of "the discontent and irascibility ruling the country", until he was cut short by the presiding judge. And yet Szilágyi had said much less than the conservative Imperial Councillor, György Mailáth, had expressed to his confidants when he admitted with a sigh that "it is only to Garibaldi" that the people look for change; or even Governor-General Benedek, who reiterated once more that unless "there are soon some substantial changes, there is sure to be a catastrophe, for the present situation is, by now, untenable".³⁷

There were mass arrests throughout the country, and especially in Southern Hungary, where they found men in contact with the exiles. It was at this time that the scientist Frigyes Pesty, the editor of $Delejt\tilde{u}$ (Compass), was also arrested, along with his publisher and a number of his circle.³⁸ But, behind the scenes, they were preparing for substantial changes. Franz Joseph had made a deal with the conservatives. The bankrupcy of centralized absolutism, the realization of the inevitability of change, the wish to regain their international standing, the fear of the consequences of Hungarian resistance and of the Empire-wide disaffection, and the hope of averting parliamentary constitutionalism – all these factors had made the Habsburgs decide to reactivate their pre-1849 alliance with the conservatives.³⁹

THE OCTOBER DIPLOMA AND ITS RECEPTION

Count Szécsen was the one who drafted the text of the agreement between the conservatives and the Emperor, following Emil Dessewffy's outline, and

³⁶ PN. 1860. Aug. 22–28. – Vezerle pp. 61–62. – L. Lukács pp. 239–244. – Sashegyi, 1959, p. 273. – Gy. Szabad pp. 50–52.

³⁷ PN. 1860. Aug. 30. – Sept. 2. – *Táncsics* pp. 319–320. – *Vezerle* pp. 62–65. – *Szőgyény-Marich* III. p. 52. – *Kecskeméthy* pp. 102. – *L. Lukács* pp. 228–231, 406.

³⁸ D. 161. 1860–IV. H–6144. – KLI III. pp. 51–53. – Vay pp. 321–323. – Tanárky p. 194. – E. Gaál p. 33.

³⁹ Redlich II. pp. 685-705. – Szógyény-Marich III. pp. 52-53. – Schadelbauer pp. 32-33. – Sturmberger pp. 113-114. – Gy. Szabad pp. 64-66.

consulting Prime Minister Rechberg on the details.⁴⁰ The "Diploma" was dated Oct. 20, 1860, and was bestowed by the Emperor "with the strength of his full powers" on the peoples of his Empire to be "a constant and irrevocable fundamental law of state". The reconciliation of constitutional and absolutistic, of federalist and centralist elements, the Diploma was regarded by its creators as the reconciliation also of the court and the nation, and the instrument of Hungary's pacification.

The executive and legislative powers were still concentrated in the hands of the Emperor; he promised, however, to find constitutional means of exercising these powers. The supreme central organ of the executive power remained the imperial cabinet, enlarged by the addition of a Minister Without Portfolio, who was to deal with the affairs of "the Hungarian crown lands" - Count Szécsen. The pre-1848 Hungarian Chancellery, and the Consilium Locumtenentiale were resurrected to be headed by Baron Miklós Vay and György Mailáth, respectively. The Hungarian, and the subsequently revived Transvlvanian and Croatian governing boards were all subordinated to the Imperial Government without, however, their relationships being explicitly defined. Hungary's financial and police matters were still directed by the Imperial Ministries of Finance and of the Interior, respectively: the gendarmerie was under the jurisdiction of the Military High command. The reorganization of the legal system was to be dealt with by later regulations. The October Diploma restored the Hungarian Parliament, the Transvlvanian Diet and the Croatian Sabor. But it was to the new Imperial Council to be chosen from among their number, too, that it gave jurisdiction over fiscal and credit matters; taxation, tariff, trade and commerce, postal and transportation matters; and gave also the legislative functions dealing with determining the nation's budget and appropriations, and with the obligation to do military service. In all other respects, defence matters remained the prerogative of the Emperor, as did foreign affairs. It was, thus, but in a curtailed form that the Hungarian Parliament was restored its legislative rights; as for the other Cisleithan dominions, they had to be content with but drafting the bills proposed for legislation.

The Primate of Hungary was to preside at the meeting that was to suggest the legal principles on the basis of which the new Hungarian Parliament could be convoked, for of the 1848 Laws the Diploma recognized only those relating to social changes. Transylvania continued to be regarded as separate from Hungary, and was also to convoke a meeting to suggest the composition of its Diet. In Croatia, a conference to be organized by the Ban was to convoke the body that was to decide on the relationship the dominion was to have to Hungary.

The contemporaneous decree on languages made Magyar the language of county and national government; at the local level, each community was free to

⁴⁰ Steinbach pp. 294–310. – Kónyi II. pp. 462–492. – Ludassy pp. 58–65. – Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 53–59. – Redlich I. pp. 597–623. – Gy. Szabad pp. 69–75.

choose the language of administration. At the meetings of community, urban, and county councils, everyone was to be free to speak in any language he chose; the authorities were obliged to deal with each client in his own language. (At the same time, the Imperial authorities dealt with Hungarian clients exclusively in German.) The language of primary education was left to the discretion of each community; that of secondary and higher education was yet to be determined.⁴¹

Soon after the Diploma was issued, it became evident that the conservatives' promise that it would pacify the nation had been very glibly made, and that Franz Joseph's hope that it would lend the Empire the appearance of stability was a vain one indeed. And yet, he was most anxious to create this appearance, for he had gone to Warsaw the day the Diploma was issued to meet with the Russian Czar and the Prussian Regent and – flaunting just this newly achieved internal consolidation – to entice them to the renewal of the former alliances. He hoped that Austria would thus be strengthened, perhaps even enough to be able to hit back in Italy. Returning from Warsaw practically empty-handed, he was shocked to find that the Cisleithan centralists – who saw in the elements of self-government given the Magyars the first steps to the disintegration of the Empire – were just as loath to accept the Diploma as were those throughout the Empire who had hoped for a more consistent constitutionalism, or for national self-determination.⁴²

In Hungary, the authorities used the customary tactics of the absolutist period to arouse enthusiasm for the Diploma, but with little success. With noisy demonstrations, the masses drowned out the conservatives' self-congratulatory celebrations; even the theretofore silent advocates of passive resistance found their voices. The crowds in Pest were scattered with bayonets; there were many injured, two fatally. Nevertheless, the demonstrations were not only repeated, but acquired nation-wide proportions. The flags of the Empire were torn down; the black and yellow colours and the German-language signs were painted over; the two-headed eagles were knocked off the public buildings. In many places, the Imperial authorities were obliged to flee. The political nature of the demonstrations is shown not only by the crowds' incessant cheering of Kossuth, but also by the fact that the demonstrations reached their zenith on Dec. 2, the anniversary of Franz Joseph's assumption of power. It was on this day, for instance, that the Nagykörös barracks of the excise officers was taken; and that the Vác demonstration was dispersed with a cavalry and bayonet charge. The demonstrating students and journeymen were, in many places, joined by the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie, and by those belonging to the nationalities. It was by no

⁴² Schnürer pp. 301–303. – Ernst pp. 252–253. – Kecskeméthy pp. 104–105. – Kolmer I. pp. 42–44. – Eder p. 146. – Hantsch II. p. 385. – Taylor pp. 121–124. – Hanák p. 676. – Macartney pp. 506–509.

⁴¹ D. 284. B. fasc. – Kónyi II. pp. 492–504. – Redlich I. pp. 624–671, I/2, 228.–229. – Cf. Eisenmann pp. 234–243. – Berzeviczy III. pp. 127–133. – Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 73–75. – Gy. Szabad pp. 77–80.

THE EXILES' ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS

means rare to find the intelligentsia and the nobility among the demonstrators, though the authorities exaggerated in thinking them to have organized the – for the most part spontaneous – demonstrations.

Besides the mass demonstrations and the folk-songs urging Kossuth's return, the letters written to Hungarian soldiers serving in the Austrian Army in Italy - letters blocked by the censors – are also a faithful reflection of the nation's mood. A whole series of such letters told of the nation's readiness for war, and urged resistance. Such a one is Gergely Patonay's letter of November 1860 from Nagykôrös to his son: "My dear son; use your arms wisely; think of the tyranny at home."⁴³ The hopes of liberty, and the determination to do all to win it were but fired by the news that a new war was in the offing, and that preparations were being made by the exiles.

THE EXILES' ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTISM

The post-Villafranca decline in the exiles' political activity was but transitional. The crisis of absolutism, the growing strength of the resistance within Hungary, and the successes of the Italian wars of unification all impelled them to redouble their organizational efforts. Kossuth - like Teleki and Klapka - insisted that the nation itself must carry through its own liberation. He believed, however, that in the absence of contemporaneous revolutionary activity in the rest of the Habsburgs' lands - Hungary's insurrection would have a chance of success only if the Empire were to get entangled in war, and an adequately prepared Hungary were given outside aid in the initial phase of the struggle.44 In September of 1860, Cavour made a secret agreement with the members of the Hungarian National Directory, an agreement later confirmed by the Council of Ministers and the King, Cayour promised Kossuth's group generous support so that they might make preparations for Hungary's going into action in case of a new Austro-Italian War. The restoration of Hungary's independence was declared one of the goals of the joint struggle; neither Piedmont nor Hungary would make peace until the war objectives of both had been achieved. Cavour agreed that for the venture to be successful, they needed a reorganized Hungarian Legion; he also agreed that the Italian contingent to be landed in Dalmatia and the troops assembled in the Danubian Principalities would have to move into Hungary at the same time.

Cavour made the agreement at the very time that the Piedmontese army was preparing to liberate Central Italy and to join forces with Garibaldi's army. He feared that Austria would attempt to retaliate, and thus wanted to make certain

⁴⁴ KLI. I. pp. 94, 134–135, II. p. 488, III. pp. 34, 53–54, 80, 162, 556–559. Cf. Z. Horváth II. p. 338.

⁴³ D. 161. 1860–IV. A. – 5711, 5726, 7062, 7171, 7211, 7219, 7338, 7339, 7362, etc. – A. Vörös 1951. pp. 198–204. – L. Lukács pp. 249–253. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 291–297, 303–304, 324–328. – For further data, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 81–83, 96–103.

of the Hungarians' co-operation.⁴⁵ However, he considered the agreement of long-term validity, and continued to co-operate with the Hungarian exiles even after the spectacular failure of Franz Joseph's foreign policy at the Warsaw meeting of the Great Powers. The Russian Czar and the Prussian Crown Prince not only refused to support his plans for retaliation, but also failed to promise protection for his Italian territories. As for the British Foreign Minister, Lord Russell, he outright hailed the successes of the Italian Risorgimento as the realization of the ideal of a people's right to self-determination.⁴⁶ Cavour regarded supporting Hungary the major task of Italy's Balkan diplomacy, and gave concrete expression to this support in smuggling arms on a scale practically unrivalled in 19th century European history. Following the September agreement, he dispatched 35,000 hand guns, more than four million rounds of ammunition, two complete batteries, and many other kinds of equipment to Roumanian ports for the use of the Hungarian insurgents. A great many more arms he gave to Kossuth's group directly, on Italian territory.⁴⁷

In the meantime, the secret Hungarian headquarters of the loosely-knit resistance organization in existence since 1859 had established regular contact with the exiles. By the summer of 1860, however, it became evident that, besides the former officers of the Hungarian Army of 1848–1849 willing to risk an armed uprising, and the consistent independence politicians, there were also those in the organization who wished to use it only to force the court to further concessions. Among these was Menyhért Lónyay, who broke with the organization already on the eve of the political changes in Vienna. His leaving, however, by no means meant the expulsion of all those working only for a compromise. For among the exiles, it was László Teleki - who was by no means free of illusions regarding the liberal group of aristocrats and great landowners - who had direct contact with the resistance organization within Hungary. Thus, personal factors played a part in that his friend, Pál Almásy - who had been condemned to death while in exile, and then had returned to the country with an amnesty - came to head the organization. Teleki's nephew, Kálmán Tisza, who had distinguished himself in the fight against the Protestant Patent, also came to play an important role. Kossuth was deeply troubled by the onesidedness of the organization, and was profoundly critical especially of Almásy's dominant part in it. However, his

⁴⁵ R. 90. I. 3370, 3371, 3373, 3375. – ACSR. RB. Busta 1, fasc. 2/b, c. – KLI. II. pp. 547–560, III. p. 112. – *Chiala* pp. 115–129. – *Durando* pp. 100–101. – *Cavour e l'Inghilterra* II/2 pp. 75–80, 146. – *Koltay-Kastner* pp. 222–223. – *E. Kovács* pp. 122–125. For the fact that despite certain inaccuracies in Kossuth's presentation in matters of detail, the sources support his claim regarding the essence of the agreement, see Gy. Szabad pp. 114–116.

⁴⁶ R. 90. I. 3440, 3446, 3484. – KLI. III. pp. 200–202. – Russell pp. 319–324. – Bismarck III. pp. 136–140. – Cavour e l'Inghilterra II/2 pp. 146–147. – Mosse pp. 91–93. – Valsecchi, 1961. pp. 194–197.

⁴⁷ KLI. III. pp. 6–8, 39, 55–61, 77–78, 92–98. – Tanárky pp. 174, 191–192. – Koltay-Kastner pp. 223–225.

fellow-directors vetoed his suggestion that the exiles take the initiative in its rejuvenation. The autumn of 1860, the exiles and the home organization agreed to make preparations for any future action through secret conscription; agreed that it was necessary to make peace with the nationalities on the basis of Kossuth's constitutional draft; and worked out a plan for co-ordinating the legal and underground activities going on within the country.⁴⁸

As early as the summer of 1860, Kossuth had suggested to the leaders of the home organization that on all legal forums their demand be national self-determination – as outlined in the 1848 Laws – self-determination that was to extend also to matters of finance and defence. Should Vienna agree to this – something he thought unlikely – and should the elected Hungarian Parliament be content with but this much, he himself would not oppose the agreement. For in this case, an autonomous Hungary would remain a part of the Empire purely in virtue of recognizing the Emperor's person as sovereign. Yet though he would not oppose such an arrangement, Kossuth added, he should not return from exile. After the October Diploma, he emphasized that he had no objections to his followers' abandoning passive resistance to fight for the legal program of 1848. He insisted, however, that it had to be "men determined to do battle" who took to the political arena, those who would use the new situation not only to win concessions, but also to undermine the system, and to create the preconditions of liberty.⁴⁹

THE FIGHT FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE 1848 LAWS

While Kossuth's group in fact wanted self-determination for Hungary and a new, bourgeois-democratic constitution, and – doubting that Vienna would concede even that much – used the restoration of the 1848 Laws only as a slogan that gave their demands the semblance of legality, Deák's circle considered the Laws the summation of the nation's needs, and something that – with disciplined determination – they were bound to achieve sooner or later. Deák, the politician within the country whose words carried the greatest authority, believed that what was needed was the restoration of the legal ties that bound the nation and the Imperial House before the fateful break: in other words, the restoration of the 1848 Laws. Insisting on legal continuity, Deák and his circle rejected the conservative compromise attempt embodied in the October Diploma; but they rejected also all "revolutionary" attempts to break away from the Empire. Deák himself did not yet come out and say so, but journalists close to him, among them Zsigmond Kemény, soon started meditating on the fact that the reinstated 1848

⁴⁸ R. 90. I. 3394, 3436, 3460. – KLI. II. pp. 389–390, 449–450, 461, 474–475, 488, III. pp. 44–48, 102–103, 188–193. – TLVM. II. pp. 169, 189, 204, 207. – *Tanárky* pp. 97, 125, 181, 196–199. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 130–133, 136–139.

⁴⁹ R. 90. I. 3436. - KLI. II. pp. 485-488, III. pp. 162-180. - Tanárky pp. 187-188, 195-198. - Gy. Szabad pp. 140-144.

Laws could be constitutionally amended not only in the respect of personal liberties – primarily the guarantees of all nationalities' equality before the law – but also in the areas of constitutional law. Among those drawn to the group surrounding Deák were men like Count Gyula Andrássy, a liberal great landowning aristocrat, who had received amnesty, and had returned – a staunch believer in a constitutional Habsburg Monarchy which, through its alliance with the Magyars, could become a world power – to become a leader of the Deák party. And there were also men like Menyhért Lónyay, who was flung – less by conviction than by an insatiable power-hunger – from the resistance movement to the right-wing of the Deák group, there to become one of the major instruments of the conservatives' influence.⁵⁰

Before the Diploma was published, the conservatives had hoped that they could draw the Deák group into their own orbit. After Deák had rejected the Diploma's basic principles, they strove to win his co-operation in at least some matters. Attempts to restorate Magyar hegemony over the nationalities, and to neutralize the exiles' "disruptive" activities would, they had hoped, prove to be areas of agreement. As for Deák, though he had rejected the Diploma, he judged the situation which had developed one from which "good could come"; thus, he supported the conservative campaign to persuade the various nominees to accept the county Lord-Lieutenancies, "especially… where the Magyar nation is under attack".⁵¹ Even so, two-fifths of all those who had been named resigned – rather a blow to the new system's authority. It became obvious that a great many even of those thought to be the "safest bets" refused to compromise themselves by supporting the Diploma.⁵²

There can be no doubt that at the end of 1860, the preponderant weight of public opinion was for the restoration of the 1848 Laws. All contemporary accounts – both conservative and those of the Deák group – agree that of those united behind the common slogan, the majority still hoped that it would be the exiles who would take the lead in the resolution of the drama. At the same time, it is obvious that the men who maintained and even monopolized the avenues of contact with the exiles – the leaders of the secret organization who rallied the faithful with this slogan – failed to concretely formulate the function of these legal demands in the struggle for national self-determination.⁵³ For the majority of those speaking in public, taking a stand for the 1848 Laws was axiomatic; even the hand-picked members of the Esztergom meeting convened by the Emperor to make suggestions for the new franchise law proposed the adaption of the one

⁵⁰ PN. 1860. Oct. 25—Nov. 6, 21. – Kónyi II. pp. 508–509. – Beksics pp. 207–225. – For further data, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 83–87, 94, 111–112.

51 Kónyi II. pp. 492, 508.

⁵² D. 185. 1860–73, 103, 104, 119, 121, 122, 177, 188, 235, 236, 297, 323. – Vay pp. 328–336. – Wertheimer I. pp. 158–161. – Gy. Szabad pp.89–93.

³³ Szógyény-Marich III. pp. 65, 231. – Tanárky p. 200. – M. 1861. Jan. 3. For further data, see: Gy. Szabad pp.148–149.

passed in 1848. The conservatives' wry-faced support of this proposal but confirmed the public's belief in their weakness.⁵⁴ Not even the fact that they were able to persuade the Emperor to reannex to Hungary proper the "Voivodina and the Banat of Temes", the Mura triangle, and the Partium could win them popularity.⁵⁵

A chief political aim of the masses was that their own elected officials be at the head not only of the national, but also of the local organs of government. In a number of places, they simply set about electing the organs of democratic self-government: community councils, town councils - most of the time composed of those who had held office in 1848. At times, these elections were so far democratic that voting took place independently of who was listed as qualified on the voters' list.⁵⁶ And yet, the Chancellery's directives to the Lords Lieutenant had instructed them to convene a "preparatory meeting" of select men just so that they might decide who was to be allowed to take part in the general meeting at which the county council was to be elected. Needless to say, this kind of reorganization of the counties was hardly compatible with the principle of "popular representation".⁵⁷ (It was only now that the nation was paying the full penalty for Parliament's having failed to act on Kossuth's 1848 suggestion that county government be by popular representation. For while the principle had been accepted, all that was passed was a temporary measure providing for the occasional co-opting of non-noble members to the general meeting of all the nobility. Thus, there was no institutionalized "popular representative" system for choosing the county council, one which could have been presented as an alternative to the Chancellery's directives⁵⁸.)

Under the pressure of public opinion, however, it was generally the members of the 1848 committees who were the first to be re-elected; those who had held offices during the years of absolutism were, for the most part, repudiated. The former privileged groups generally still had a majority in the new committees, though in some counties, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie showed considerable gains over their representation in 1848. The representation won by the nationalities was far from being proportionate to their actual numbers, yet even so, there were committees on which they were in the majority. With the elections for the various offices, the non-nobles and the nationalities were pushed even

⁵⁴ The minutes of the meeting: D. 189. 1860–VIII. 0–4–2082. – For the details, see: *Gy. Szabad* pp. 151–157.

⁵⁵ D. 185. 1860–358, 519, 1861–20, 119. – D. 284. C. fasc. – Kónyi II. pp. 522–525. – Szógyény-Marich III. pp. 67–68. – Gy. Szabad pp. 204–205, 380–386.

⁵⁶ D. 185. 1860–187, 317, 329, 355, 357, 386, 412, 413, 446. – PN. 1860. Nov. 9, 30, Dec. 2. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 311–312. – Gy. Szabad pp. 105–109.

⁵⁷ D. 185. 1860–187, 378, 455, 488. – D. 161. 1860–IV. A.–6488, 6664, 6669. – D. 191. 1861–IV. A.–10952. – *Kónyi* II. pp. 504–506. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 158–166.

⁵⁸ Cf. KOM. XI. pp. 697, 716–725. – KLI. X. pp. 364–375. – J. Varga 1971. pp. 337–338. – Gy. Szabad 1975. farther into the background – for all the admonitions to the contrary that could be heard both at home and trom abroad. In most of the cities, too, it was the former privileged groups and the most wealthy who acquired the positions of leadership, although there were places, especially in some market-towns, where the petit-bourgeois and the peasant elements had made decided gains.⁵⁹

Most of the municipalities followed the lead given by Pest county in passing a declaration of principle consonant with the lawful tactics of the exiles. They demanded the immediate reactivating of the 1848 Laws; resolved to boycott the restored feudalistic governmental boards and the fiscal and judicial organs of absolute government; and ordered their own officials to refuse to co-operate in tax-collecting and recruiting. To this, some counties added the demands for immediate general amnesty, for the restoration of the country's territorial integrity, and for constitutional government for the "hereditary lands" and the "kindred nations" too. They threatened to make the conservative statesmen answer for their activities, and set about doing away with the organs of absolutism that had survived. Some municipalities reorganized their own armed corps, and not only ordered the establishment of a National Guard, but started conscripting and arming the national guardsmen. Heedless of Deák's warnings, most of the counties set about adding the legislative to their administrative activities.⁶⁰

In places, the beginning of municipal government was attended by demonstrations amounting to riots. The demonstrators' January 5, 1861 clash with the authorities in Nagykőrös was particularly significant – not only because it claimed 5 fatalities and many injured – but also because it so eloquently testified to the masses' valiant determination.⁶¹ The arrest of László Teleki while he was in Saxony, and his extradition to Austria, but further inflamed public opinion. It was Dessewffy who then organized Teleki's theatrical release, hoping it would have a "psychological" effect on the masses, and on the jumpy Teleki as well.⁶²

The reports of the agitation, of real and imagined organizations, and especially of the conscription of former soldiers and national guardsmen – which some counties had not only started, but completed – greatly disconcerted Vienna.⁶³ Conservative foreigners – from the Prussian Ambassador to Vienna, to Czar Alexander II – judged it to be a "revolutionary" situation, as indeed did the most extreme leftists, Chernyshevskii and even more, Engels, who thought that developments in Hungary, and the activities of the exiles – whom he still criti-

³⁹ D. 185. 1860–488, 496, 513, 518, 1861–5, 15, 145. – D. 191. 1861–III. – 1506, 1861–IV. A. – 1670, 2268. – *M. Szakács* pp. 110. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 169–188.

⁶⁰ D. 185. 1861–38, 39, 111, 150, 225. – PML. Bj. 1860–3, 4, 1861–43; 52, 60, 62, 213. – NML. Bj. 1861–1, 7. – For further data, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 188–207.

61 Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 304, 313-314, 325-327. - Gy. Szabad pp. 210-213.

⁶² Dessewffy (Pozsony, 1860. Dec. 27.) to Szécsen, Dcslt. Ap. 5/d. – D. 284. F. fasc. I. – TLVM. II. . 209–212, 218–222. – Z. Horváth II. pp. 341–358. – Vay pp. 313, 356–357. – For further data see: Gy. Szabad pp. 207–210.

⁶³ D. 185. 1861–90, 120, 148. – D. 191. 1861–IV. A. – 831, 2268, 1861–IV. E. – 1007, 2112, 9814, 14530. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 213–215, 279–284.

cized primarily for their French connections – would bring about the dissolution of the crisis-ridden Habsburg Empire in 1861.⁶⁴

In Hungary, the Diploma was ill received; in Cisleithania, frustrated nationalism and constitutionalism loomed as an ever growing force. Their combined effect was that the Habsburgs turned to the centralist German haute bourgeoisie in their quest for potential allies. The first decisive step in this direction was to name Schmerling Minister of State. Attempts to stir up anti-Hungarian sentiment grew more energetic. Hungary refused to pay practically all taxes, much to the detriment of Austria's credit-rating on the international money market. The Minister of Finance made the country the scapegoat of Austria's financial difficulties, while the haute bourgeoisie threatened it with economic sanctions, among them the withdrawal of credit.65 After Deák's and Eötvös' futile audience with the Emperor⁶⁶, on Jan. 16, 1861 there appeared an imperial ordinance - drafted by the ever more discredited conservatives - demanding that the municipalities cease their "abuses of power" on pain of being compelled to do so by force of arms. It was, in fact, military intervention that annulled the "illegal" measures that had been taken in Nyitra county. All but two counties protested against the ordinance, many of them - refusing to address themselves to the Emperor - protesting in a resolution. Of the counties which did send rescripts, half refused to address Franz Joseph as king. Although most of the municipalities denied that there was anything revolutionary in their activities, there were some general meetings where there were threats of a return to passive resistance. And references were made to there being historical precedents for "wars of self-defence", and even for the dethronement of rulers who had alienated their people.67

THE FEBRUARY PATENT AND THE INCREASE OF TENSION IN HUNGARY

The failure of the conservatives' attempts to bring about a compromise undermined their influence at court. The government formed the beginning of February with Archduke Rainer as Prime Minister fell – for all practical purposes

[∞] Wertheimer I. pp. 166, 169–170. – Bismarck III. pp. 161, 164. – Birke pp. 196–197. Csernisevszkij, pp. 77–80, 83, 95. – MEW. XV. pp. 234–238. – Cavour e l'Inghilterra II/2 pp. 193–194, 198–199. – Documenti I. pp. 23–24. – Jászay, 1966. pp. 412–413. – Gy. Szabad pp. 216–218, 316.

⁶⁵ D. 284. F. fasc. I, II. – Sta. KZ. 1860–4150. – D. 185. 1860–440–443, 523, 1861–38, 39, 111. – PN. 1860. Dec. 8, 13, 16, 23. – M. 1861. Jan. 9. – Rogge II. p. 95. – Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 64–67. – Redlich I. pp. 688–689, 701–706. – Gy. Szabad pp. 200–201, 219–221, 226–228.

⁶⁶ Pál Ordódy (Bagos, 1861. Jan. 5.) – to Ghyczy Kálmán, AKk. Ms. 4851/635. – P. Sennyey (Buda, 1861. Jan. 1.) – to Dessewffy. Dcslt. Ap. 5/e. – Kónyi II. pp. 527–53. – Gy. Szabad (pp. 221–224) gives a critical review also of the rumors surrounding the discussion between Eötvös and Franz Joseph. Cf. Macartney p. 510.

⁶⁷ Sta. KZ. 1861–466. – D. 185. 1861–37, 54, 66. – D. 191. 1861–IV. A.–988, 1136, 1448. – D. 284. F. fasc. I. – Vay pp. 371–375. – *Redlich* II. pp. 727–730. – For further data, see: *Gy. Szabad* pp. 228–242.

- under Schmerling's influence. The conservatives were unable to prevent the proclamation of the "February Patent" (on Feb. 26, 1861) which - in providing for stronger centralization throughout the Monarchy - was in keeping with the wishes not only of the states' official and officer corps, but also of the German bourgeoisie. Like the October Diploma, the February Patent, too, was a peculiar reconciliation of absolutism and constitutionalism, of centralism and federalism. However, it gave wider scope for the forces of constitutional centralization than the conservative-federalist inspired preceding document had done. And, for the western half of the Empire, the Patent was indeed a step toward constitutionalism, if not quite in the liberal spirit of the last elected Austrian legislative body, the Parliament of Kremsier (Kroměřiž). The Imperial Council, heretofore purely an advisory body, now became a legislative body, restricted though its jurisdiction might have been. The chief areas of state power, however, remained the rulers' absolute prerogative. The Emperor remained unrestricted in the conducting of foreign affairs and of war; he disposed over the armed forces; and he determined the order of business of the Imperial Council, appointed its president, adjourned it and dissolved it. It was only to the ruler that the government was responsible for measures enacted while Parliament was in recess; it needed but to inform the Imperial Council of the faits accomplis. The Imperial Council lacked yet another fundamental right of bourgeois parliaments: the right of approving the budget. It had to be content with merely "examining" it.

The Imperial Council, in other words, the Austrian Parliament, was composed of two houses: the "House of Lords" comprised of the heads of the "great landowning aristocratic" families chosen by the Emperor, the prelates of the Catholic Church, and other "excellencies" named by the Emperor; and the House of Representatives, to which the various national Diets could send a total of 343 representatives. Hungary was to send 85; Transylvania 26; Croatia-Slavonia 9. Declarations of the principle of "national equality" notwithstanding, the distribution of seats was most unjust to the Italian, Hungarian, and the Polish-Ukrainian lands. (For example, Hungary had a seat for every 116,000 souls; Upper Austria and Tyrol for every 70,000; Salzburg for every 48,000.⁶⁸) Considering the proportion of the population they represented, the Transylvanian Saxons had twice as many seats as the "Magyar Seklers", and three times as many as the counties where there was a Roumanian or Magyar majority.

All matters which the Diploma did not specify as within the Hungarian Parliament's competence were matters for the plenary session of the central parliament, the Imperial Council; and even with those so specified, the Council could deal indirectly in debating the budget and appropriations. The Cisleithan representatives also sat in the "Restricted Imperial Council", a body with

⁶⁸ For a table of the number of seats as a proportion of the population of each of the provinces, see *Gy. Szabad* p. 260. (Data based on D. 284. B. fasc. "Reichsrath" subfasc.)

jurisdiction comparable to that of the Hungarian Parliament, but dealing with the affairs of the western half of the Empire.

Having issued the Patent, Franz Joseph clung no less tenaciously to the remnants of his absolutist system, felt no less vulnerable, and was no less apprehensive that these concessions might lead to a full-fledged bourgeois constitutionalism. That they might not, he made his Ministers sign a solemn pledge to resist all "attempts to wrest further concessions".⁶⁹

In the German territories, the Patent raised hopes of a parliamentary constitutionalism that might be further developed; in the Italian territories, it met with total hostility; and in the Slavic areas, with a great deal of it. In Hungary, protest erupted with the violence of an elemental force at the suggestion that the Hungarian legislature should be subjected to an Imperial Parliament. Frequently enough, protest assumed the form of scarcely veiled threats. The town of Kecskemét contrasted its history of loyalty – recalling especially the Napoleonic Wars when 2,000 of its citizens gave their lives for the House of Habsburg - with the series of grievances they had had to suffer, grievances culminating in the February Patent. In the protest it sent to the Chancellery, the market town of Csongrád, having first of all noted that "we see in our exiled countrymen the apostles of constitutional liberty", went on to reply to those urging the convening of a Parliament - however limited its competence might be: "We attach bright hopes to the imminent national assembly, but we would rather it never convened than that our grandchildren and posterity should say of us with curses that we were not strong enough, nay, that we were cowards in not safeguarding the nation's sovereign rights, but rather, surrendered them." The letter went on to warn "the Majesty" that steps to win the confidence of the nation could still strengthen "his throne, undermined by soulless or narrow-minded counsellors"; but "the times, pregnant with events" made it doubtful that he would have another chance. The letter of protest was sealed with the seal the town had had carved in 1849.

The resolution drafted by Nógrád county with the active co-operation of the poet, Imre Madách, declared that all those "who might wish to alter the legislative jurisdiction of the Hungarian Parliament both in matters of taxation and recruitment, or might want in any way to take part in the creation of the Imperial Council, as voters or as delegates, might co-operate with it or appear at it, would, as violators of their nation's laws, be regarded as traitors". This formula was to be adapted by a whole series of the municipalities.⁷⁰

Numerous county and town "committees" elected foreign anti-Habsburg politicians as honorary members, and cheered Teleki, who was, by now, openly

⁷⁰ For the remonstrances cited, see: D. 189. 1861–VIII. K. 48–4161, 1861–VIII. C-3–4499. – NML. Bj. 1861–252. – For details, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 262–266.

⁶⁹ Sta. KZ. 1861–668. – D. 284. F. fasc. I. – *Szőgyény-Marich* III. pp. 75–76, 243, 296–298. – *Redlich* I. pp. 715–763, 774, 808–809., I/2 pp. 229–234. – *F. Fellner* pp. 549–564. – *Kann* II. pp. 123–132. – *Macartney* pp. 511–515. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 256–262. – *É. Somogyi* 1968. pp. 11–20.

proclaiming his solidarity with the exiles. The boycott of the imperial authorities, the refusal to pay taxes continued, and some counties even imprisoned some more aggressive tax-collectors, excisemen and gendarmes. Throughout the nation, there were renewed demonstrations, and new clashes. The peasants of Szárföld in Sopron county said prayers in church for the destruction of the House of Habsburg and for Kossuth's return. And of the "students and youths of the commercial and artisan classes" of Debrecen, Nagyvárad and Arad, there were repeated police reports of the following kind: "There can be absolutely no doubt that, ... in case of an invasion, they would rush to a man to fight under the banner of the exiled revolutionaries, or that of any other of Austria's enemies". But it was the nation-wide organization of the National Guard that caused Vienna the greatest anxiety. The Minister of Police rightly saw it as the cover of a secret army. Numerous military leaders of the resistance movement – among them Imre Ivánka and Emil Sebes – directed and organized the conscription of former officers and privates "capable of taking up arms".⁷¹

Such was the situation when Kossuth's report of the deterioration of the international situation reached the organized home resistance movement. It gave a realistic account of the delays in the start of the new Italian offensive due both to domestic changes and to the obstructionist manoeuvres of the Great Powers. It spoke, too, of the fact that the huge consignment of arms sent by Cavour had been impounded thanks to Austrian and Russian diplomatic efforts. Kossuth did not yet know that Klapka and Cuza had confirmed their previous talks by a secret agreement, nor realized that the isolationism of the Serbian Principality was but temporary. He feared, therefore, that the Principalities would not prove to be the bases of military operation that he had counted on.

But in this new situation, too, Kossuth rejected the thought of compromise as much as that of irresponsible "revolution-making". He advised his followers to fight the efforts at compromise with the legal weapon of the 1848 program and its demand for military autonomy, and thus keep alive the spirit of resistance until the time was ripe for the war of liberation. He was convinced that the deterioration of the international situation was but temporary; an Austro-Italian war over Venice was inevitable. The exiles, he said, would initiate action only if there were foreign guarantees of its success; but, should the home forces be willing to take greater risks, the exiles would support their action. He asked the leaders of the home organization to come to a firm decision as to whether or not they were truly willing to make preparations for an armed insurrection, and called upon his followers to break with the "half-hearted".⁷²

¹¹ D. 185. 1861–145, 184, 271, 327, 466, 484, 532. – *L. Lukács* pp. 253–256. – *Sashegyi*, 1959. pp. 298, 305–306, 329–331. For further details, see: *Gy. Szabad* pp. 266–284.

²² KLI. III. pp. 572–582. – R. 90. I. 3496, 3499, 3514, 3567, 3573, 3624. – Cavour e l'Inghilterra II/2. pp. 166–167, 170–175, 177, 195–196. – Documenti I. 1, 4–8. – Parliamentary Debates CLXI. 1397–1398, 1975–1981, 2045–2049, 2066–2070, CLXII. 214–220, 259–260, 1004–1008, 1059.

Responding to this call, the advocates of purely legal resistance broke – at least formally – with the home resistance movement. Almásy resigned as its leader, and his place was taken by György Komáromy, whose reply to Kossuth's letter assured him of the organization's full support for the exiles' program. They were determined, he said, to win the support of the "nation" in resisting all compromise, and in preparing for an armed insurrection.⁷³

There can be no doubt that the resistance movement had helped to deepen the crisis of absolutism, and had a hand in the failure of the conservatives' attempts to make a bargain with the Court. It compelled to a shame-faced reticence those who would have been willing to see a compromise; and created an atmosphere wherein most Hungarians came to demand autonomy as a right. However, it was due partly to the shortcomings of the resistance movement – its failure to attribute adequate importance to the issues of social and political democracy, and its disregard for the class and national aspirations of the masses of all nationalities – that the domestic preconditions of a war of liberation never truly materialized.

THE CONTRADICTIONS IN SOCIAL POLICY AND IN THE POLICY TOWARDS THE NATIONALITIES

It was at the Lord Chief Justice's Conference (Conference of the Judex Curiae Regiae) that social questions were first subjected to a comprehensive review after the collapse of unrestricted absolutism. The Sovereign had arbitrarily – yet carefully – chosen the men convened to it to decide on the legal guidelines that were to serve a restored Hungarian judicial system on the new issues raised in the course of bourgeois transformation. Deák's group, the only substantial opposition grouping at the conference, managed to ward off the majority of the conservatives' attempts to turn back the clock. Nevertheless, in agreeing to accept the Urbarial Patent unaltered – for all the violence it did to the revolution's emancipation of the serfs – and in endorsing the practice of corporal punishment and the restrictions on mining, the Deák group, too, turned its back on some fundamental progressive demands.⁷⁴

The stands taken on social issues by the county committees reflected the predominance in these bodies of the former privileged groups and of the intelligentsia. There was great discrepancy among the counties in their attitude to, and implementation of the 1848 Laws, and even more in their carrying out of the provisions of the Urbarial Patent now confirmed by the Conference of the

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⁻ Durando pp.103-104, 108-110. - Tanárky pp. 207, 210-214, 216. - E. Kovács pp. 126-131, 381-385. - For further details, see: Gy. Szabad pp.311-315.

⁷³ R. 90 I. 3638. – KLI. III. pp. 595–596. – Kossuth to Kiss II. p. 236. – Kónyi III. pp. 113–114. – Tanárky pp. 233–234, 248, 252, 254. – T. Lengyel p. 160. – Gy. Szabad pp. 311–315.

²⁴ Gy. Ráth I. pp. 40–41, 187–198. II. pp. 294–313. – Kónyi II. pp. 549–587. – Ferenczi II. pp. 260–266. – Gy. Szabad pp. 319–326.

Judex Curiae Regiae. Behind these differences lay a whole series of political considerations, and the fact that a great many of the formerly privileged had no direct interest in the land redistributions attending the serfs' emancipation. In a number of counties, the committees yielded to the demands of the former landowners (Menyhért Lónyay among them) that the settlements made on the basis of the Urbarial Patent remain unaltered, and were willing to call in the army to make sure that they were. Other counties followed the lead of Pest county in considering also the peasants' interests; the sporadic attempts at genuine land distribution were, however, frustrated everywhere.

Most significant was Bars county's suggestion of an additional way for the former serfs to become the owners of the fundi remnentiales that made up one-seventh of the urbarial lands: state compensation, they felt, should be an alternative to the peasant's redemption of the land provided for by the Patent. Csanád, Sopron, and Torontál counties supported Bars when this motion was presented in Parliament.

But the county committees took no consistent stand on the matter, a circumstance due, in some measure, to the fact that the exiles took care to confine their democratic goals to generalities, and were most reticent on the outstanding issues of property reorganization.⁷⁵

The municipalities' stand on the issues of civil rights was no more consistent. The majority of the counties let the peasantry exercise some measure of self-government; judges and local officials were popularly elected nearly everywhere.⁷⁶ When it was challenged, Pest county repeatedly confirmed the workers of the Óbuda shipyard in their franchise. It guaranteed unrestricted freedom of association, and protested against the Conference's refusal to abolish corporal punishment.⁷⁷ At the same time, the Pest Town Council – still composed, for the most part, of the old privileged groups – continued to treat the problems of the working class as a police matter, and was most ungenerous in the face of their attempts to form into unions. Heedless of the severe condemnation of liberal politicians both at home and abroad, the Town Council suspended the right of free trade won in 1860, hoping thus to deal a blow primarily to the Jewish merchants and tradesmen operating outside the privileged guilds and corporations.⁷⁸

By this time of absolutism's period of crisis, the Jewish population had become strongly differentiated, and was ever less homogeneous in its attitudes. At the same time, the discrepancy between its socio-economic role and its total civil

²⁵ BML. Bj. 1861–274–278. – PML. Bj. 1861–445, 648, 1844, 3540, 3799. – D. 191. 1861–IX–4056, 5005. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 333–335, 416. – Gy. Szabad pp. 329–342.

⁷⁶ PML. Bj. 1861-51, 329, 373, 438. For further details, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 342-345.

⁷⁷ PML. Bj. 1861–278, 297, 325, 337, 388, 483, 900, 964, 1418, 1438, 2411, 3756. – Gy. Szabad pp. 347–349, 351–355.

⁷⁸ PVL. Kj. 1861-1922, 2317, 8324, 8703. For a critique, see R. 90. I. 3686, 3699. - M. 1861.

CONTRADICTIONS IN MAGYAR POLICY

disability appeared ever more glaring. Along with the struggle to see realized the equality before the law pronounced in 1849, there was a struggle going on within the Jewish community itself: the old-fashioned conservatives confronted the advocates of embourgeoisement – for the most part the supporters of the Hungarian national movement. The victors in the struggle in the most important areas – Pest among them – were the "progressives"; intellectuals replaced the conservative, pro-aristocrat wholesale-merchant group which had theretofore monopolized the leadership of the Jewish community. The new leaders advocated total identification with Hungary's national aims, winning over the community with their emphasis on the oft-proclaimed determination of the entire opposition – especially of the Kossuth-led exiles – to do away with the discriminatory legislation still in effect against the Jews.⁷⁹

The nationalities living within Hungary listened with anxious hope to the first legal expressions of Hungarian policy to be heard in twelve years. Many of them had drawn closer to the Magyars during the years of oppression. The disintegration of the Bach system was a source of common joy; it seemed natural to join forces against its surviving elements. At the same time, the call for the restoration of the 1848 Laws gave rise to suspicions easily exploited by the Court's minions: perhaps the Hungarian movement aimed at the oppression of the nationalities, and the restoration of the Magyars' political hegemony.⁸⁰

The numerous fraternizing Hungarian statements were indeed very well received. Lajos Medgyes'⁸¹ 1860 *Békeszózat* (Peace Oration) poetically expressed the desires of many of his contemporaries: "Offer a brother's hand! A brother's hand – Magyars, Slavs and Roumanians!" But concrete suggestions for the resolution of the nationalities' differences were harder to find. Nevertheless, the most far-reaching of the Hungarian efforts to clarify the basic questions of reconciliation and co-operation – Kossuth's Constitutional Proposal – was not altogether unknown within the country. Poorly translated copies of it circulated in the form of semi-legal pamphlets containing but an oblique reference to the author.⁸²

Jan. 31, Feb. 20, 21. - PN. 1861. March 10, 12. Gy. Szabad pp. 357-359.

⁷⁹ D. 185. 1861–711, 963. – Cf. R. 90. I. 3699, 3711, 3712. 3730. – Büchler pp. 488–492. – Grosszmann, 1917. – Venetianer pp. 211–214, 240–243. – For contemporary press, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 359–368.

⁸⁰ Bogović pp. 10–12, 44–57. – Daxner p. 144. – Barių pp. 168–174. Sever Axente pp. 1–16. – PN. 1860. Dec. 6, 12, 15. – M. 1861. Jan. 31, Feb. 2. – G. G. Kemény p. 41. – Gy. Szabad pp. 377–378, 396, 410–411.

⁸¹ Lajos Medgyes (1817–1894), poet and Protestant minister; he, too, was imprisoned after 1849. Cf. MIT. III. 730–731.

⁸² On its title-page: "The Hungarian Nation's Brighter Future. This noteworthy and most modern work is offered for the special attention of every Hungarian who values the constitution, in the hope that he will take it to heart. Translated and published by *Imre Kozma*, Győr, 1860." – Cf. Gy. Szabad pp. 245–246, 372.

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Count Ede Károlyi, one of the leaders of the secret resistance organization, published *Federal Hunnia, or the Union of the Nationalities*. The pamphlet ran to two editions, its real significance lying in the fact that it contained a relatively faithful account of the 1849 Nationalities Law, whose text was practically inaccessible. The Law, however, was discussed as if it has been but a proposal of the former Hungarian government. And, in speaking of the "principle of federalism", it was elements of the *Constitutional Proposal* that Károlyi fused with his own, less concrete, ideas.⁸³

Lajos Mocsáry's new pamphlet, explicitly referring to the October Diploma, again called for guarantees of the free use of every language at every level of public life, except in Parliament, where Hungarian was to be used. He insisted that consistent "popular representation" was the means to the "actual equality" of the nationalities that he had long been calling for, and it was a means that had to be used. Mocsáry, however, energetically opposed all suggestions for a federal system.⁸⁴

The press, too, was full of reassuring promises that the nationalities' "just" demands would be met. Mór Jókai issued this reminder: "Europe... is waiting to see how we can – with wise perspicacity and noble thoughtfulness – fuse the interests of Eastern Europe with our own". As far as he could see, the way to do it was "to deny to no other nationality... what I demand for my own. – I must give no helping hand in the forceful suppression of any nation's aims, neither within this country, nor outside its borders".⁸⁵ János Vajda thought that the Hungarians, being the "stronger party", were morally obliged to make concessions.⁸⁶ Among Deák's circle, József Eötvös, Zsigmond Kemény and Móric Lukács all recognized the necessity of revising the earlier laws aimed at Magyarization. Móric Lukács went so far as to explicitly state that these concessions were necessary to counterbalance the attractions of "reaction on the one hand, and revolution on the other".⁸⁷

It was on the language question that the liberality of the municipalities was first put to a test. Of the counties where the nationalities were in the majority, Liptó, Turóc, and later Krassó counties went beyond the provisions of the Chancellery's language regulation, and regularly recorded the minutes of the county meetings in two languages; in the other counties, the principle of the free use of all languages

⁸³ Ede Károlyi pp. 9–10, 13–16. – Elaborating on the contents of his pamphlet at a jubilee celebration of the Sárospatak College, on July 20, 1860, he referred – claims one who was present – unambiguously to the desirability of an alliance with the nations of the "Lower Danube". OSzKk. Pulszky papers VIII/2804.

⁸⁴ Mocsáry, 1860. pp. 1-3, 20, 69, 71-73, 83, 96. - Cf. E. Tóth pp. 79-84.

⁸⁵ JMCB. VI. pp. 50–51.

⁸⁶ Csatár 1861. April 4.

⁸⁷ PN. 1860. Nov. 22, Dec. 4, 6, 19–22, 1861, Jan. 1. - Gy. Szabad pp. 369, 372–373. - Bődy p. 81.

at the debates was either explicitly or implicitly accepted, though not always realized in practice.⁸⁸

The language issue proved to be one of utmost importance. In the course of its discussion, it became evident that among the Roumanian, Serbian and Slovak political leadership ascendancy was being won by the factions determined to win territorial autonomy – though generally while remaining within the State of Hungary. It was partly in reaction to their demands that territorial integrity received such strong emphasis in some counties' declarations, and that general statements insisting on the Magyars' position of leadership were drafted.⁸⁹ In Zaránd county, in the Partium, where the Hungarian landowners were a minority on the committee, the issue led to serious conflict. When the Hungarians complained of the Roumanian officials' "illegal" action, the Chancellery suspended the county's autonomy, and – in adumbration, so to speak, of the general consequences of the failure to find the road to reconciliation and co-existence – again placed the county's administration and courts into the hands of the officials of absolutism.⁹⁰

The February Patent sustained the separation of Transylvania. The conservative statesmen did everything to restore Hungarian political hegemony in Transylvania, and their blatantly antidemocratic conduct did much to discredit even those Hungarians who were anxious to win the co-operation of the nationalities in the fight against absolutism. And it was due partly to the conservatives' policy that no agreement could be reached at the Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) conference convened by the Emperor in February of 1861 to reorganize Transvlvania's legal system. Although the Hungarian majority - insured through the conservatives' anti-democratic manoeuvring - demanded. union with Hungary, neither the Saxons, nor the disproportionately small number of Roumanians - whose united stand had been worked out at the Nagyszeben (Sibiu) "national congress" - endorsed the demand.⁹¹ The dire effects for the Hungarian cause of the conservatives' domination of Transylvanian - Hungarian policy are well illustrated by its impact on George Barit, that outstanding Transylvanian Roumanian intellectual and politician. As the secretary of the Brassó (Brasov) Chamber of Trade and Commerce, and editor of the Gazeta Transilvaniei, Barit had repeatedly called for a common front against absolutism. The Hungarian and the Roumanian nations, he said, were "brother nations"; he

⁸⁸ D. 185. 1860–512. – D. 189. 1861–VIII. T. 24–1963, 1861–VIII. Z–17–18250. – D. 191. 1861–IV. B.–3978. – Gy. Szabad pp. 374–376.

⁸⁹ D. 199. 1861–VIII. B–14–86. – PN. 1860. Nov. 11, 18. 1861. April 5. – Kónyi II. pp. 529–530. – Vay p. 331. – Gy. Szabad pp. 378–381.

⁵⁰ D. 185. 1861–240, 382. – D. 189. 1861–VIII. Z.–5–4221, 4910, 5131, 5921, 7406, 7627, 9454. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 387–388.

⁹¹ Sta. KZ. 1860–4033, 4256. – D. 284. D. fasc. – Petition der Romanen 5, 7–14. – Farkas Deák pp. 7–8, 10–13. – Urmössy I. pp. 249–254. – Mester pp. 71–81. – G. G. Kemény pp. 55–56. – Jordáky pp. 18–20. welcomed the year 1861 with the hope that it would bring "the revolution of the oppressed nations allied to win their independence". However, after his efforts to democratize the franchise and to win proportionate representation for the Roumanians at all levels of government were rejected by the conservatives in the name of all Hungarians, he felt obliged – in keeping with his declared principle that "personal liberty is worthless without national liberty" – to work ever more closely with the conservative Roumanian forces. These, however, were always ready to co-operate with the Habsburgs.⁹²

It was again the conservative antidemocratism so much deplored by the exiles that helped the Orthodox Church to tighten its hold over Roumanian politics. Led by Bishop Şaguna – whom the Court had deemed worthy of a baronetcy – the new Assembly meeting in May at Balázsfalva (Blaj) passed resolutions not altogether free of national prejudices.⁹³

The situation was greatly complicated by the fact that even among the exiles there was no unanimous Transylvanian policy. In the autumn of 1860, they had agreed - and the leaders of the home resistance had accepted the decision - that Hungary and Transylvania were to remain one state, but that a later plebiscite was to decide on whether there was to be reunification with Hungary, or autonomy for Transylvania.⁹⁴ At the beginning of 1861, however, the exiles heard that Kossuth's enemies in Hungary were implying that he was willing to play Transylvania into the hands of the Roumanian Principality. Among the exiles, Ferenc Pulszky – who was moving ever farther away from the Kossuth-group - was explicitly accusing the imprisoned Teleki of having taken steps in this direction. Under these circumstances, Kossuth feared that if he listened to Klapka, and explicitly repudiated those calling for the immediate reunification of Transylvania and Hungary, he would be giving a chance to the advocates of compromise with the Habsburgs to make political capital of the issue just when Parliament was about to convene. Thus, while the exiles condemned the policy pursued by the conservatives in Transylvania, they were not sufficiently motivated openly and unambiguously to dissociate themselves from it.95 It was a situation tailor-made to suit Schmerling's policy of "divide and conquer". For Schmerling was determined to prevent the reunification of Hungary and Transylvania not so much for the publicly declared reason of safeguarding the national minorities, but rather - as he himself confessed at a sitting of the Council of Ministers – for purely political and, above all, military ones.⁹⁶

²² Barit-Wass pp. 3, 9–14. – Barit pp. 168–181. – PN. 1861. Jan. 27. – Gy. Szabad pp. 389–394. – A. Miskolczy p. 46.

93 Sta. KZ. 1861-1759. - Urmössy I. p. 294-295. - Gy. Szabad pp. 394, 540-541.

⁹⁴ R. 90. I. 3380, 3436, 3450, 3466. – KLI. III. 61–66, 168–169, 180, 193. – TLVM. II. 192–202, 205, 207. – *Tanárky* p. 209. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 124, 139–140. – *E. Kovács* pp. 374–378.

⁹⁵ R 90. I. 3482, 3639, 3655, 3697, 3701. - Tanárky pp. 219-220, 250. - Gy. Szabad pp. 405-407.

⁹⁶ Redlich II. pp. 118-119. - Gy. Szabad pp. 394-395.

THE PARTIES AT THE 1861 PARLIAMENT

Yet, from the variety of antithetical attitudes characterizing Hungarian policy on the nationalities issue, there emerged two rather clear-cut trends. The first of these was most consistently advocated by Lajos Kovács, leader of the faction opposing Kossuth in Debrecen in 1849. In essence, this line saw the activism of the nationalities as a threat to both the Hungarians and the Habsburgs, and concluded that their reconciliation through constitutional compromises was thus inevitable.⁹⁷ It was the exiles who set the other main trend. They adopted the program of Kossuth's Constitutional Proposal as their official nationalities policy. and strove also at its concrete political implementation even while postponing the solution (reunification or autonomy) of the Transylvanian question. Among the initiatives taken by followers of this line, that of Dániel Irányi was of outstanding political significance. In harmony with a proposal made within the country by Ödön Kállay, he called for the convening of a pre-parliamentary conference of the leaders of all the nationalities, in the hope that it might lead to the concrete agreements that were the precondition of a common stand against absolutism at the coming Parliament. However, his open letter to Deák in this matter escaped the notice of most of the political factions within the country.98 And thus, it was largely to Parliament, called to discuss constitutional issues the spring of 1861, that it was left to determine the direction that the closely related social and nationalities problems were to take.

THE PARTIES AT THE 1861 PARLIAMENT

The spring of 1861, parliamentary representatives were to be elected for the first time since 1848. Most influential in the choosing of the candidates were the far from democratically established county and municipal committees. The elections excited a great deal of interest, and, in places, took place in the midst of bloody clashes. Four-fifths of the delegates were from among the ranks of the landed nobility and genteel intellectuals. Almost every eighth representative declared himself to belong to one of the minority nationalities. Almost two-fifths of the men chosen had been representatives in 1848–1849; nearly one-seventh of them had been imprisoned.⁹⁹

The plank fundamental to the platform of practically every candidate was the restoration of the 1848 Laws. To this there were added in many cases the autonomy in military and foreign affairs called for by the exiles, and demands aimed at securing for the country an independent economic policy. On the social and the nationalities issues, the majority of the candidates were content to confine themselves to generalities; a number of them, however, did explicitly call for

⁹⁷ D. 189. 1860-VIII. S-16-2258. - For further data, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 408-410.

⁹⁸ D. Irányi (Menton, 1861. March?) to Ferenc Deák. OSzKk. An. lit. – For Kállay's proposal, see: PN. 1861. March 2. – Gy. Szabad pp. 408–410.

⁹⁹ M. 1861. April 14. - E. Lakatos p. 49. - Gy. Szabad pp. 413-416, 420-421.

THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTISM (1859–1861)

greater consistency in doing away with the elements of feudalism that still endured, and advocated a more thoroughgoing embourgeoisement.¹⁰⁰ The platform that was to have greatest significance was expounded by Teleki in his much publicized campaign-speech in Abony. In keeping with the exiles' legal program, he not only called for the complete restoration of the 1848 Laws, but also demanded that they be safeguarded with new guarantees, among them a more democratic implementation of the clauses dealing with social and national issues. Parliament's chief task, emphasized Teleki, was to prevent compromise, and in this it had to stand adamant, though it meant risking dissolution.¹⁰¹

The Habsburgs were preparing to cope with the turn events in parliament might be expected to take. Should the October Diploma and the February Patent be rejected, and Franz Joseph's coronation refused, they were ready to dissolve parliament and to place the country in a state of siege. The military were put on the alert and moved to strategic points throughout the country, and there was publicized a proclamation by General Benedek – by now Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial troops in Italy – threatening ruthless reprisal should the Hungarian politicians defy the Emperor.¹⁰²

From the very moment of the parliament's opening, there could be no doubt that it would refuse to send delegates to the Imperial Council that had been set over it.

Franz Joseph was thus compelled to give his speech from the throne to an Imperial Parliament where the Hungarian, Transylvanian, Croatian and Italian delegates were conspicuous by their absence. The Gesamtmonarchie principle that was the burden of his speech was accepted by the mostly Austro-German centralist majority in the face of opposition by the Czech and Polish representatives, who were inclined to support Hungary's efforts at self-government.¹⁰³

On the exiles' advice, Teleki and the great majority of the representatives boycotted the opening of the Hungarian Parliament illegally¹⁰⁴ held in Buda on the sixth of April. But at its actual sittings, on all issues where voting was along party lines – for instance, in the choosing of the officials of the House of Representatives – it was the party rallied around Teleki and his Abony program (consisting of most of the representatives of the landed nobility and of the noble intelligentsia, as well as of most of the representatives of the nationalities and of

¹⁰⁰ For the platforms of the candidates, see the March and April issues of the PN and the M for 1861. Cf. K. 2. 1861–III–94, 188. – MÖM. II. pp. 683–686. – Gy. Szabad pp. 420–425. – Gy. Szabad 1973.

¹⁰¹ TLVM. II. pp. 231-237. - M. 1861. March 30. - Gy. Szabad pp. 425-428.

¹⁰² D. 185. 1861–318. – Sta. KZ. 1861–999. – Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 84–92, 265–288. – Vay pp. 397–402. Friedjung, 1904. pp. 280–284. – Redlich II. pp. 6–27, 716–718. – Gy. Szabad pp. 428–434, 441–442.

¹⁰³ Sta. KZ. 1861–1408. – T. Kolmer pp. 53–75. – Sestan pp. 81–83. – Zdrada pp. 299–304. – Gy. Szabad pp. 458–460. – Felczak pp. 95–96.

¹⁰⁴ Article I of the 1848: 4 Law explicitly specified that Parliament be convoked to meet in the then independent city of Pest.

THE PARTIES AT THE 1861 PARLIAMENT

the bourgeoisie) which had a majority in the House. The minority party - comprised of the great landowners, the intellectuals following the line of the former Centralists, the representatives elected through the influence of the Catholic Church, and a significant percentage of the middle landowners - was soon dubbed the "Address Party". For its leader, Deák - whose supporters in the House included the conservative aristocrats, too few in number to form a party of their own - had suggested that they try to create the preconditions of reconciliation with the Habsburgs through an address to the Emperor requesting the restoration of the 1848 Laws. Teleki countered this suggestion with the motion that Parliament issue a declaration demanding the full exercise of its rights, make arrangements for national resistance, and then dissolve. The rest of his party's leadership, however, mostly members of the secret organization, and men whom he himself had helped into the limelight, opposed the proposal as too radical, not least of all because the war they had expected to break out in the spring now seemed so long in coming. The majority of his party thus sided with Teleki's nephew, Kálmán Tisza, who suggested that Parliament pass a resolution clearly setting out its views, but stay sitting and prepared to decide on any further steps that might need to be taken.¹⁰⁵

The conflict between Teleki and the other leaders of the Resolution Party was further aggravated by the new reports from Kossuth on the international situation. In a secret message which reached them the end of April, Kossuth frankly told the patriots at home that Italy's internal situation and the Great Powers' – principally Britain's – powers of persuasion were such that it seemed unlikely that Italy would embark on the renewal of hostilities that year.

Unwilling as ever to initiate action irresponsibly, Kossuth and Klapka (who countersigned Kossuth's letter) wanted their followers within the country but to do everything to prevent the reaching of a compromise. They were, in fact, advocating a policy of obstructionism until the Austro-Italian war they saw as inevitable should finally break out. At the same time, they left it to the leaders of the home resistance to decide how far to exploit the Habsburg's difficulties, and whether or not perhaps to start an insurrection which, they noted, would probably draw the Italians into the conflict.¹⁰⁶ This latter supposition was by no means unfounded. As Prime Minister Cavour's letters to Italy's chief military leaders testify, he did not then wish for a Hungarian initiative, but saw Italy's joining the fray as inevitable should the Hungarians refuse to wait.¹⁰⁷ Naturally, however, Kossuth had no knowledge of this; and, lacking explicit guarantees of support for a Hungarian insurrection, refrained from initiating one himself.

 ¹⁰⁵ D. 189. 1861–VIII. 0–4–4235. – K. 2. 1861–II–6/23–25, 1861–II–7/29, 1861–II–42/61.
 – Debreceni röpirat pp. 11–13. Madarász pp. 338–341. – Szógyény-Marich III. pp. 95, 298, 301.

⁻ Kónyi III. pp. 25-29, 110. - Ferenczi II. pp. 284-289. - Gy. Szabad pp. 434-449.

¹⁰⁶ R. 90. I. 3674-3676, 3701. - KLI. III. 595-603. - Gy. Szabad pp. 454-455.

¹⁰⁷ Documenti I. pp. 57-58, 71-74, 81-82. - Koltay-Kastner p. 233.

Under the new circumstances, the heated debates within the leadership of the Resolution Party led to the majority's supporting Count Ede Károlyi's suggestion: they would support Deák's motion, but only in a suitably modified form. Clauses insisting on an independent foreign policy, and a modified domestic policy were to be added; and the document was to have the form not of a petition, but of a resolution.¹⁰⁸

However, for the May 8 debate in the House of Representatives, Teleki prepared a motion that differed even more radically from Deák's original proposal. Now that there was little likelihood of a war of liberation, he gave up the thought of starting a revolution, and declared himself ready to try to reach an agreement. Yet he still felt that his primary duty was to prevent a compromise, and to prepare the country politically to resort to force of arms. To this end - as his surviving papers testify – he insisted on making demands he knew the Habsburgs would not accept. For instance, along with the total restoration of the 1848 Laws, he demanded that the supreme command of the army pass from the sovereign to Parliament; that there be guarantees of an independent Hungarian foreign policy; and that the Habsburgs abandon their anti-progressive machinations abroad. Parliament, he said, must leave no doubt of its determination to make no compromise with an oppressive power, whatever the cost. It must make clear its refusal to interfere in other nations' exercise of their rights. Parliament must speak to the nationalities in a democratic tone; it must guarantee the extension of civil rights, and complete the work of the serfs' emancipation. However the forces of absolutism might react, after such pronouncements the nation would be the stronger power...

Teleki's nerves, however, were too frayed for him to convince the leaders of his party – most of whom he himself had helped to the fore – to adopt this – in fact the exiles' – program. Instead of appealing to the parliamentary majority whose support he had won with his Abony program, and instead of appealing to the masses who heard in his words the voice of the exiles, on May 8 of 1861 he put a gun to his head. The shot rang out as eloquent testimony to the strength of Teleki's convictions; but his self-destruction left one obstacle less in the way of those determined to steer his party off the course he had set for it.¹⁰⁹

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The address drafted by Deák showed the October Diploma and the February Patent to be inconsistent with constitutional precedent, more precisely, with what he considered the basic contract between the sovereign and his Hungarian subjects – the Pragmatic Sanction. They were, moreover, inconsistent with the

¹⁰⁹ TLVM. II. 237–253. – For a critical review of the sources and literature of the antecedents and the circumstances of Teleki's death, see *Gy. Szabad* pp. 461–471.

¹⁰⁸ R. 90. I. 3726. - Kónyi III. pp. 29-30. - Ferenczi II. pp. 292-293. - Gy. Szabad pp. 456-457.

1848 Laws, which Deák claimed were but the reformulation of the Pragmatic Sanction's provision that the union between Hungary and the rest of the Empire was based only on both recognizing the person of the same sovereign as their ruler. Should, however, the 1848 Laws be reactivated, the draft admitted the possibility of subjecting them to a constitutional revision should they conflict, in any way, with the "obligations" incurred through the Pragmatic Sanction. Parliament, it stated, was not averse to taking over part of the Austrian state debt, and to "occasional contact" with the Cisleithan parliamentary bodies to discuss the military and financial problems related to its "obligation" to defend the Empire. Deák's draft contained neither policy statements nor a concrete program for what was to be done; it merely mentioned that Parliament should remain seated also in the interest of resolving the nationalities issues. It called for determination, but also for calm, lest the "nation" be the one to initiate the break which Vienna might yet provoke whatever Parliament might do.¹¹⁰

The counter-proposal of the Resolution Party was put forward by Kálmán Tisza. It seemed logical that he should succeed as leader: his followers claimed that he enjoyed the confidence of the exiles, and everyone knew of his close kinship ties to Teleki, whom the entire country mourned. Few, however, realized how far he had turned against his uncle's policies in the course of the debates ending in the latter's tragic death. Yet even so, he needed deliberately to exploit the antagonisms within the party to come into Teleki's place – if not into his political heritage. He left out of his proposal the demand for new guarantees of the nation's self-determination. Having truncated and emasculated Teleki's program in a number of other respects, he wanted but to round out Deák's proposals and to see them presented as a resolution.¹¹¹

In the debate which followed, absolutism was strongly condemned, and Franz Joseph's personal responsibility for it was – at times, ruthlessly – expounded. The country's financial and economic exploitation was described – not without some exaggeration – and deplored. There were repeated calls for wresting the political guaran ees of economic self-determination. Turning to issues of foreign policy, a number of the Address Party (Gyula Andrássy among them) emphasized the fact that union through the sovereign's person was the only means of consolidating the Habsburg Empire for its role as a Great Power, a role they saw as desirable also from Hungary's point of view. At this point, Imre Madách's derisive question had a sobering effect: "Is it necessary for our happiness that we be a Great Power?" Of the Resolution Party, a number of speakers (Ede Károlyi and Ödön Kállay, too) called attention to the fact that it was not German predominance which would safeguard European progress in the face of Czarist expansionism, but the realization of self-determination for the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe. Many speakers emphasized the interdependence of the

¹¹⁰ Kónyi III. pp. 34-60.

111 K. 2. KKn. 1861. May. 16. Cf. KLI. III. p. 659.

Hungarian, Italian and East-European peoples, and their readiness to co-operate with the other peoples of the Empire, especially the Czechs and the Poles. (Virgil Szilágyi and Lajos Mocsáry made this point especially forcefully.) The former also expounded on the possibility of the Empire's dissolution, and on the subsequent regrouping of part of the area as a Großdeutsch unit, and of the rest of it as a confederation embracing the Empire's non-German peoples and the peoples of the Danubian Principalities.

When it came to social issues and the question of the nationalities, however, it was only by way of exception that concrete suggestions were made for the realization of the general formula of "equality before the law" to which most speakers gave lip service.

There were many more who – while they were careful to keep within the framework of legal resistance, and denied the charge of revolution-mongering – spoke of the need to be prepared for a "just" war (Imre Madách and Imre Ivánka were among them); there were even those who (like Lőrinc Buday, Ferenc Domahidy, and István Patay) made barely veiled threats to topple the system.

Numerous speakers tied demands for a return to the 1848 constitutional situation to demands that Hungary be independent in its military and foreign policies. The Address Party speakers kept elaborating on Deák's theory of the consonance of the 1848 Laws and the Pragmatic Sanction, and of their constitutional consequence of union through the sovereign's person. But while most of the Resolution Party confined themselves to discussing the political consequences of this stand, Imre Révész, a clergyman from Debrecen, criticized the very attributing of so decisive a role to the Pragmatic Sanction. His argument – one which Deák did not accept, but never, in fact, disproved – was the following: the laws of 1723, those of 1790–91, and those of 1848 were of coequal constitutional development dictated that, in the case of contradiction among them, it be exclusively the provisions of the latest set of laws which be considered valid and binding.¹¹²

The majority in the House was had by the Resolution Party; most of the nationalities' representatives supported them. And yet, when the matter came to a vote on June 5, the Address Party won by 3 votes. An organized faction within the Resolution Party had decided to defy and to defeat the party line. The details of the matter we know from the memoirs of Baron Frigyes Podmaniczky, one of the leaders of the party, and the vice-chairman of the House of Representatives: Upon considering the international situation, "and the unpredictability of the nationalities, the active elements of our party were convinced by its level-headed ones that the acceptance of the resolution proposal would place upon our party

¹¹² The speeches are cited on the basis of K. 2 KKn. A fairly accurate version of the texts can be found in *Osterlamm* I–III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE

a weight of responsibility from which it could hardly disengage itself, and which it could hardly endure. Thus, the two of us, Pál Almásy and I, decided that we would direct the vote in such a way that the address motion would win by a majority of 2 or 3 votes". Besides the two of them, Counts József Bethlen and Gyula Szapáry, as well as Lajos Kálóczy and Lipót Imrédy also played parts in the manoeuvre, using bribery, threats, and even claims of acting on the exiles' "instructions" to accomplish their purpose. Though the manipulations were carried on behind the scenes, some of the schemers were discovered. Tisza, however, protected them. In the press, it was an editorial by the Resolution party supporter, Frigyes Pesty, in the Temesvár Delejtű (Compass) which broke the ice: "One is almost tempted to think that they are playing a comedy up there, for though the Pest papers are hiding it, ... the whole thing was just got up for show, and the Resolution Party let the thread slip from their hands. The nation, which until now could only break, has bent... Take care, lest the veneer of expediency be blown off by a breeze, and sallow disgrace grin out from underneath". A number of the Resolution Party, Imre Révész among them, who had even earlier found the policy of the Tisza clique difficult to accept, now resigned their seats. The manoeuvre thus expedited the break with the party of about two dozen "far-leftist" representatives.¹¹³

One of them, Gábor Várady, took advantage of the outrage over the party's self-defeat. He put before the House his famous amendment stipulating that the sovereign's acceptance of Parliament's demands by no means implied that Parliament would recognize Franz Joseph's claim to the throne. The resolution passed in the face of Deák's vehement opposition, and achieved in essence what Kossuth and Teleki had originally wanted: it produced conditions which made compromise impossible. Franz Joseph considered the amended petition treasonable, and refused as much as to receive it.¹¹⁴

The new wave of radicalism which had swept over Parliament, was, however, soon to break. Developments both at home and abroad caused the never too confident Resolution majority, still reeling from the blows of Teleki's death and its treacherous defeat, to be even less certain of the road it was to take.

For Palmerston and Russell had explicitly come out and stated that they did not think the principle of self-determination – in the name of which they claimed to be supporting the Italian struggle for unification – to apply to the Hungarian situation. As for the French government, though it kept up its relations with the exiles, it was a relationship that was ever more fraught with contradictions. On the one hand, by keeping decision on the Roman question suspended, the French were keeping a check on Italian unification; on the other, the influence they

¹¹³ Podmaniczky III. pp. 114–116. – Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 104, 325–328, 334–335. – Vay pp. 417–418. – Debreceni röpirat pp. 15–17. – Kónyi III. pp. 103–106. – For further data, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 516–523.

¹¹⁴ K. 2. KKn. 1861. June 12, 14. – Sta. KZ. 1861–1973, 2379. – Debreceni röpirat pp. 18–19. – Szógyény-Marich III. pp. 107–112. – Kecskeméthy, 1862. p. 154. – Madarász p. 342. – Ferenczi II. pp. 316–317. – Redlich II. pp. 83–97. Gy. Szabad pp. 523–525, 559–561.

exercised in the Danubian Principalities could hardly be considered unambiguously pro-Hungarian. And, although Czarist Russia was preoccupied enough with its own problems and with the execution of its land reform, its diplomatic activities and its ruthlessness in suppressing the Polish movements left doubt as to whether it would be content to stand by if the conservative Habsburg Empire were to be shaken at its roots. The sudden death of Cavour, the contemporary politician most sincerely supportive of Hungary's desire for independence, was a blow that also had most serious consequences. The new Italian Prime Minister, Ricasoli, did, in fact, promise to continue co-operation with the exiles. But, especially with his growing doubts regarding Hungary's readiness for war, he did not want to initiate hostilities over Venice. He was, at any rate, more inclined to regard the solution of the Roman question as of primary importance.¹¹⁵

The mood of the country – which was, of course, reflected in Parliament – was by no means undifferentiated. The deaths of Teleki and Cavour were commemorated throughout the country in memorial services that turned into demonstrations. At Győr, there were violent clashes, and the military prison was stormed. One radical Pest paper called upon "Parliament to take steps to arm the country against the forces of reaction". From beyond the Theiss, Chancellor Vay reported the beginning of June that "the people here have gone mad... they're again waiting for Kossuth to return". As late as July, a Debrecen newspaper published poetry about Kossuth's return, and about the fact that "a Hungarian... either dies as a National Guard, or lives victorious". After Cavour's death, 366 predominantly young intellectuals took grave risks in signing a letter addressed "To the Youth of Italy", a letter which described redressing the wrong suffered at Világos as the most ardent hope of Hungary's youth. It was to Prime Minister Ricasoli that the letter was finally sent, with its reminder that "the road to Venice leads through Pest".¹¹⁶

The army of military tax-collectors which descended on the population with unprecedented ruthlessness and in unprecedented numbers made it difficult to hope that the people would indeed stand firm. For although the mass billeting of soldiers – with orders to feed them – in homes of towns and communities refusing to pay taxes fueled the country's seething desperation, it was also cause for sheer despair, for the leaders of the resistance could hold out no proximate hope of undoing the aggressor.¹¹⁷ There was yet another source of unease. The peasant

¹¹⁵ Parliamentary Debates CLXII. 1005–1008, 1530–1538, 1868, CLXIII. 28–29, 759–760, CLXIV. 698, 1003–1004. – Documenti I. pp. 167–176, 185–186, 220, II. 424. – Ricasoli VI. pp. 18–19, 69, 224, 436–440. – KLI. III. pp. 610–611, 643–644. – Lorant pp. 37–40. – For further data, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 489–490, 517–518, 562–565.

¹¹⁶ D. 191. 1861–IV. A.–5196. – *Szőgyény-Marich* III. p. 333. – *Trombita* 1861. May. 13. – *Dongó* 1861. July 7, 15. – For the letter of "The Youth of Hungary" dated Pest, June 24, 1861, see: ACSR. R. B. Busta 1. fasc. 2/a. For further data, see: *Gy. Szabad* pp. 471–473, 526–529.

¹¹⁷ D. 185. 1861–466, 504, 521, 523, 531, 544, 553, 558. – For further data, see: Gy. Szabad pp. 530–534.

THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM AND PARLIAMENT

masses felt betrayed when the majority in the House of Representatives accepted the conclusions of the Judex Curiae Regiae as the basis of jurisdiction, in spite of the fact that numerous members had called attention to the document's disregard of the former serfs' interests. The peasants were also disappointed in their hopes that Parliament would support them in the moot points of land redistribution. Their frustration rekindled the latent tensions between them and their former landlords, a circumstance that did not fail to influence a great many political leaders. They were particularly sensitive to the fact that – especially in the non-Hungarian villages which were mostly spared the military's visitations – the myth of "the good Emperor" was again gaining ground.¹¹⁸

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM AND THEIR EFFECT ON PARLIAMENT

Of all domestic issues, it was developments in the nationalities question which mostly determined the stand adopted by most members of parliament. The decided anti-Habsburg and anti-absolutistic sentiment to be found among the national minorities impelled important parliamentary factions to seek the road to reconciliation and co-operation. When the Serbian Prime Minister V. Garašanin, and the Prince's confidant J. Ristić travelled through Pest and had - partially secret - talks with the leaders of the Hungarian opposition, they declared themselves willing to promote reconciliation on conditions that were consonant with Kossuth's Constitutional Proposal. It was these same conditions that Ristić tried to get the delegates at the Karlóca (Sremski Karlovci) Serbian Congress, opened almost contemporaneously with the Hungarian Parliament, to accept. However, though he spoke as the Prince's personal representative, Serbian ecclesiastical influence reinforced by Austrian military and political pressure, and the lack of an unambiguous Hungarian stand combined to frustrate his efforts. The Congress came out in favour of a new Serbian Vojvodina independent in domestic affairs, but recognizing Hungary's central government as superior; moreover, it offered to send representatives to the Pest Parliament. Supported by the congressional "royal commissioner", the Austrian General Filipović, Patriarch Rajačić persuaded the Congress officially to convey its wishes to the Court. However, the mayor of Ujvidék (Novi Sad), Svetozar Miletić, who wanted to see good relations with the Hungarians restored, sent a copy of the resolution also to every member of the Hungarian Parliament, in the hope that their favourable reaction to it would take the wind out of the sails of those making friendly overtures to Vienna.119

¹¹⁸ K. 2. 1861–I–96, 107, 108, 1861–II–167, 175, 316, 317, 320, 323, 1861–IV–21, 385, 400, 441, 478, 502. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 534–537.

¹¹⁹ Petitionen, 1861. - K. 2. 1861-V. 497. - K. Ir. II. 258-261. - Ristić II. pp. 36-39. - Stratimirović pp. 129-130. - Redlich II. pp. 272-274. - G. G. Kemény pp. 48, 62-65. - Gy. Szabad pp. 537-540.

The Roumanians, too, wanted to convene a national congress. But at the meeting called at Balázsfalva (Blaj) on May 15 to discuss the issue, discordant voices were also raised: demands for the paying of taxes mingled with accusations of "treason" against the Hungarian resisters of absolutism.

The Hungarian Parliament, then, in its turn, showed itself most ungenerous in its reaction to a memorandum sent by the predominantly Roumanian municipality of Kővárvidék, a memorandum calling for the convening of a national congress.¹²⁰

But it was the Slovak Congress held at Turócszentmárton (Turciansky Sväty Martin) the beginning of June which most greatly influenced the decisions of the Hungarian Parliament. For the Congress sent it a memorandum demanding that the existence and equality of a Slovak nation be recognized; and that there be demarcated a district in Upper Hungary whose domestic affairs would be independently administered by Slovaks, in the Slovak language. At the same time, the Congress declared itself totally willing to recognize the constitutional and legislative community of all the nations within Hungary.

It was only after doing fierce battle with the pro-Vienna faction that the congressional majority had managed to send the memorandum directly to the Hungarian Parliament. It was not immediately badly received; but the first positive reactions to it in the Hungarian press soon gave way to ever more heated protest. It was bad enough that there were demands for Transylvania's remaining severed from Hungary, and for the setting up of a Serbian Vojvodina. But for all the protest, the enduring separation of these territories were facts to which history had accustomed Hungarian public opinion, though it could not make it accept them. The Slovaks' demand for territorial self-government was quite another matter. The predominantly Slovak counties of Upper Hungary had always been part of the state of Hungary; during the years of the Turkish conquest, they had formed part of the very heart of the state. The vehement opposition to the Slovak demand for self-government had yet another motif: a great many of the group of noblemen who dominated Parliament came from this part of the country, or had estates there, and thus had a personal and direct interest in the kind of government the area was to have.121

The Croatian Parliament, too, met at the same time as the Hungarian, having convened to discharge the task the Emperor had set it in the October Diploma: to express Croatia's and Slavonia's "desires and views... regarding its relationship to Hungary". However, due in no small part to the Habsburg's "divide and conquer" policy, the Croatians could get no Dalmatian representative to come to the Zagreb Parliament, and those of the Military Frontier Zone, too, entered the

¹²⁰ Sta. KZ. 1861–1759. – K. 2. 1861–II–282, 514, 1861–IV–541–542. – *Urmössy* I. pp. 294–296. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 540–542.

¹²¹ K. 2. 1861–II–351/361. – Osterlamm III. pp. 455–462. – Daxner pp. 173–175. – Bokes pp. 31–37. – Holotik pp. 46–48. – PN. 1861. June 8. – M. 1861. June 12. – Gy. Szabad pp. 542–545.

discussions but later. The Italian citizens of Fiume, however, simply refused to be represented. In the course of the heated debate on the fundamental constitutional question, almost a quarter of the representatives - those supporting Mirko Bogović's suggestion that Croatia and Hungary enter into a union - walked out of parliament. The majority, however, wanted the Croatian-Slavonian-Dalmatian Principality acknowledged as an autonomous unit, and demanded the recognition of whatever territorial claims it might make to areas it had held throughout history. Only then would Croatia consider establishing constitutional ties with Hungary, on condition that Hungary would recognize Croatia's right to self-government, and admit that the two countries were united but through the person of their common sovereign. However, given that Kossuth's was the only Hungarian political group unconditionally willing to recognize Croatia's right to self-government - Deák' majority-supported resolution stopped short at the generality of declaring the Croats "a nation" - there seemed to be few hopeful signs of concerted action, save the fact that the Zagreb Parliament also refused to send delegates to the Imperial Council.122

In the course of the debate on the nationalities in the Hungarian Parliament which took place in June, it was primarily among the Resolution Party that suggestions for genuine concessions were to be found. The most they were able to achieve, however, was to have appended to Deák's resolution a rather general, though reassuring statement. Even this had been something of a feat, for even within their own party it was the opposite tendencies that were gaining ground as the likelihood of a war of liberation became ever more remote. A new kind of argument – specially designed to win over the waverers – now seemed to many to make a great deal of sense, especially as Aurél Kecskeméthy so succinctly put it: "The price of reconciliation with Austria and her ruling house is not as high as the price the nationalities have set [on their good graces], and which our clumsy revolutionaries seem ready to pay them".¹²³ And so, although the Resolution Party continued to have a majority in the House, in the Committee on Nationalities set up at József Eötvös' suggestion they had but a minority, presumably as a consequence of another of Tisza's manoeuvres to avoid responsibility. The declaration of principle made by the committee majority stated, that "From a political point of view, all of Hungary's citizens, whatever language they speak, form but one nation, the unified and indivisible Hungarian nation corresponding to the historical concept of the Hungarian State". This notion, which recognized but one "political nation" in Hungary on the grounds that "a nation" was nothing other than a political community welded by history from peoples of various languages, was totally antithetical to the principle

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¹²² Šidak-Gross-Karaman-Šepić pp. 18–25. – Cf. Bogović pp. 72 and ff. – Rogge II. pp. 154–155. – Depoli pp. 344–348. – Gy. Szabad pp. 555–556.

¹²³ K. 2. KKn. 1861. June 7–11. – Kecskeméthy, 1862. p. 183. – Gy. Szabad pp. 547–551. – Jordáky p. 22.

emphasized by the national congresses of all Hungary's minority peoples, namely, that Hungary consisted of a number of "nations" sharing "a common homeland". At the same time, however, the Committee on Nationalities declared that "all peoples living in the country... the Magyar, the Slav (i.e. Slovak), the Roumanian, the German, the Serbian, the Russian, etc. must be regarded a nationalities with coequal rights, free – within the limits of the nation's political unity – to realize their particular national needs without any further restriction on their civil rights and freedom of assembly". Obviously, the inclusion of the Magyar among the list of coequal nationalities was meant to signify that attempts to win hegemony had been abandoned; however, when it came to matters of concrete detail, the committee was unable consistently to implement its principles even on the language issue.

In the amended version submitted by the committee minority, the Roumanian representatives A. Vlad and S. Popovici interpreted the concept of "political nation" to mean the "coequal nationalities" in concert; on the concrete issues, their views approximated the principal aims of Kossuth's Constitutional Proposal.

The greatest political shortcoming of the Committee on Nationalities was that it confined itself to the formulation of general principles, and refused to discuss the nationalities' actual demands, even the Turócszentmárton Memorandum officially submitted for its consideration. Daxner, the Slovak framer of the memorandum, thought that it was at this point that the Hungarians missed their "great chance" of reconciliation, by refusing to see that there were a number of "nations" in "a common homeland". Had they not done so, but had, rather, provided guarantees of "free national development in respect alike of civil, religious, educational and cultural affairs", then, as far as he could see, "they would have succeeded in making the integrity of the nation of vital interest to all the nation's nationalities".¹²⁴

Time and time again, the exiles strove to win acceptance for their nationalities policy. However – partly because of the lack of consensus among them on questions of detail, partly because they did not want to interfere in the work of a parliament representing the sovereign people – they made the grave mistake of failing themselves to publicize their complete program, a series of concrete proposals amplifying on Kossuth's Draft which was, in itself, familiar but to few. It was a sign of what was yet to come when Podmaniczky – a leader of the Resolutionists who lived off their contact with the exiles – withheld the Kossuth group's much more radical program, and endorsed the report prepared by the Committee on Nationalities.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ K. 2. 1861–II–343, 351/361, 409/411, 451/477. – Osterlamm III. pp. 387–398. – Daxner
 p. 175. – G. G. Kemény pp. 47–53. – Gy. Szabad pp. 552–555. – Jordáky pp. 24–26.
 ¹²⁵ R. 90. I. 3764, 3768, 3802, 3910, 3934. – Gy. Szabad pp. 556–559.

THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT

The parliamentary majority which had so radically amended its "Address" to the monarch proved to be most inconstant in the face of changes for the worse both at home and abroad. Thus, after Franz Joseph had returned the petition unread, the Tisza – Podmaniczky group – through refusing to convey Kossuth's protests, and silencing those of the "far-leftist" László Böszörményi – was able to persuade most of the Resolution Party to drop Várady's radical amendment, and to rewrite the "Address" as Deák had originally formulated it. It was a step which Kossuth rightly judged to bear more weighty consequences than had the "Address'" initial acceptance: in fact, it made the Italians seriously doubt that they could count on the Hungarians to support them in any anti-Habsburg stand. Thus, in the critical weeks following Cavour's death, Parliament's change of heart weakened the arguments of those pressing for an Italian initiative against Vienna; and made mutual the fear Hungarians had had of being abandoned by their potential Italian allies.¹²⁶

At the same time, Schmerling had grown more and more self-confident. With a curt reminder of their total failure to engineer a compromise, the Hungarian conservatives had been relieved of their posts; as for Parliament, Deák's address had been rejected in no uncertain terms. This, together with the rift that had taken place within the Resolution Party, served to bring together the majority of both parties in the House. It was this majority which accepted the second "Address" drafted by Deák, one which formulated the nation's constitutional claims yet more decidedly than the first, but suggested only patient steadfastness as the means to attain them: "If endure it must, the nation shall endure all to preserve for posterity the constitutional liberties that are its ancestral heritage ... for whatever force and might take away, those things time and the favour of fortune might yet return; but a hard and doubtful task it is ever to recover that which for fear of suffering, the nation itself renounces." The leadership of the Resolution Party withdrew its own counter-proposal so that the second "Address" might go to Vienna unopposed, for the most that the break-away factions could muster by way of protest was to refrain from voting.¹²⁷ The group led by Virgil Szilágyi and László Böszörményi did succeed in overcoming the obstructionism of those monopolizing contact with the exiles, and managed to get in touch with Kossuth during the last days of the parliament; but the time had run out for fruitful interaction at this stage of the crisis.128

¹²⁶ D. 191. 1861–IV. A.–6754, 6785. – R. 90. I. 3764, 3774, 3781, 3784, 3903. – KLI. III. 613–615, 631–632, 680–681. – *Documenti* I. p. 220. – *Debreceni röpirat* pp. 21–24. – *Markus* pp. 439–444. – Gy. Szabad pp. 561–568.

¹²⁷ D. 284. F. fasc. I. – D. 185. 1861–585, 587, 599, 601–637. – *Szőgyény-Marich* III. pp. 114–117, 188–193, 336–343, 367–373. – *Kónyi* III. pp. 160–272. – *Redlich* II. pp. 108–119. – For further data, see: *Gy. Szabad* pp. 571–586.

¹²⁸ R. 90. I. 3797, 3807, 3713/b, 3903, 3937. – KLI. III. pp. 644–646, 653–660, 678–679. – *Gy. Szabad* pp. 589–593.

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Parliament's last act was to issue a "remonstrance", and to publish a resolution. The latter was a generalized, watered down version of the major points of Teleki's domestic policy (the "satisfaction" of the nationalities' wishes; further guarantees of the freedom of religion, and its extension to Jews; the abolition of the remaining elements of feudalism) together with a declaration that their implementation was to be one of the duties of the next parliament. Generalities yet again, at a time when only the most concrete action could have had a political effect of any significance! Shortly thereafter, the parliament which had rejected the conservative attempt at compromise but had failed to find an alternate way out was dissolved by military command, leaving the country to face the new wave of absolutism with no more than an injunction to stand fast.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Sta. KZ. 1861–2678, 2680, 2847. - K. 2. 1861–I–421/a, 559, 560, 1861–II–514/517.
 Madarász pp. 344–345. - Kónyi III. pp. 281–282. - Redlich II. pp. 139–146. - Gy. Szabad pp. 593–598.

CHAPTER 4

THE RETURN TO ABSOLUTISM IN HUNGARY AND THE CRISIS OF THE RESISTANCE (1861–1865)

THE "PROVISO"

The dissolution of the Hungarian Parliament shocked public opinion both within the country and throughout Europe. It also provoked widespread protest in the Bohemian-Moravian and the Polish territories, whose outrage was reflected by the statements of their parliamentary representatives. Even an electoral district of suburban Vienna pronounced the use of force against the "wonderfully" valiant Hungarians a "mortal" danger for Austria. Nevertheless, Schmerling justified his heavy-handed moves with the claim that the Hungarians had "forfeited their rights" and with the charge that they were endangering the vital interests of the Empire's other peoples; and the German constitutional centralists who dominated the Imperial Council were convinced, and gave him their support.¹

For all their mistrust of his friendship with the German liberals, and of his tolerance of the bourgeois forces within the Imperial Council, two leading figures among the Hungarian instruments of absolutism gave Schmerling's efforts to restore "order" their unqualified support: the Chancellor, Count Antal Forgách, first the Royal Commissioner of the Austrian army of intervention, later Imperial Governor of Bohemia; and Count Móric Esterházy, formerly Austria's ambassador to the Vatican, and an implacable foe of Italy's unification, who had recently been made a Minister without Portfolio. When practically every one of the municipalities unanimously voted to refuse the illegally demanded taxes and conscripts, they prohibited the meeting of the general assemblies, and dispersed those defying the order with force of arms. On Nov. 5, 1861, Hungary was placed under a new system of government. There was talk of its being just a temporary, provisional measure; but in fact the basic principles of the new system were implemented practically unaltered throughout four long years. With accusations of "overt opposition verging on rebellion", the municipal councils were dissolved. Military courts were instituted with a width of jurisdiction practically unparalleled in times of peace; twelve military courts were set up. The Emperor named Lieutenant General Count Móric Pálffy President of the Consilium Locumtenentiale, secretly vesting in him practically unlimited powers for the

¹ Aegidi-Klauhold pp. 177–186. – Kolmer I. pp. 99–101. – Eisenmann pp. 334–349. – Redlich II. pp. 156–159. – Zdrada pp. 316–319. Gy. Szabad pp. 598–601. – Felczak pp. 97–98.

maintenance of "public order". (Pálffy, a commander of the gendarmerie in Hungary, had acquired notoriety after 1849 for his ruthlessness in the service of absolutism.)

A rather peculiar contradiction distinguished the new system from the unrestricted absolutism of the 1850's. A number of the measures introduced after the October Diploma remained in force. Thus, matters not directly specified as belonging under the jurisdiction of the military tribunals were still dealt with by the system of Hungarian courts set up in 1861, where judgement was passed on the basis of the reactivated Hungarian laws, and the temporary provisions of the Conference of the Judex Curiae Regiae. In the administrative sphere, there was a peculiar amalgam of traditional Hungarian and Imperial elements. The new-style absolutism had an element of provincialism which the Bach system had lacked, and was much less thoroughly centralized, for while in Cisleithania there was a semi-constitutional type of government, in Hungary Schmerling ruled with total disregard for even the most fundamental of civil rights. Transylvania was "reorganized" in much the same way under the rule of Count Ferenc Nádasdy, the former Imperial Minister of Justice. In Transvlvania, however, the municipal authorities continued to function - after being reorganized to suit Vienna's needs; and the courts, too, were obliged to implement the legal system to be found in the rest of the Empire.

The Croatian Parliament, which had also refused to participate in the Imperial Council, had also been dissolved. The Croatian municipal authorites, however, were permitted to continue to function, in view of the fact that they had merely protested against the illegal measures, but had not overtly opposed their execution.²

The first task of those who brought absolutism back to Hungary was totally to eradicate the "revolutionary spirit" that had again taken hold of the country during 1860–61. The military leaders went so far as to complain of the "laxity" of the administrative measures that had been taken. As early as the beginning of 1862, Count Coronini, Commander-in-Chief of the forces stationed in Hungary, made a list of the "revolutionary" and "treasonous" urban bourgeoisie, landowners, village notaries, and peasant farmers whom he thought had got off too lightly. In scope and intensity, the wave of persecutions did not measure up to that which the population had had to endure during the early 1850's; but the restrictions placed on the freedom of the press were even more severe than they had then been. Even in Cisleithania, Schmerling was heavy-handed in his treatment of the press; in Hungary, however, he was determined to make the pen-wielding intelligentsia buckle under. The Governor General, Count Pálffy, set the following principles of action for Aurél Kecskeméthy, who again played a key role in the new system's press policy: "Confidence in His Majesty, and

² D. 185. 1861–738, 759, 770–773. – Wertheimer I. p. 198. – Redlich II. pp. 193–200, 747–750. – Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 92–96, 406–407. – Gy. Szabad pp. 600–605.

the old Hungarian character are to be revived; the deceitful spirit of revolution is to be destroyed".

And, as early as the autumn of 1861, the Governor General's Council issued a memorandum to all school principals and their ecclesiastical inspectors, instructing them to use "implacable severity" in dealing with any teacher who was "disseminating... anti-state and anti-social ideals", or "through the circulating of irreligious and disturbing books... was committing the most hienous crime of all: that of uprooting and poisoning the morals and happiness of an entire generation".³

During the first eight months of the provisional government, 486 sentences were passed for criminal publications. János Pompéry, editor of the pro-Resolution Party Magyarország (Hungary), and the poet Kálmán Tóth, editor of the bold and satirical Bolond Miska (Crazy Mike) were imprisoned, as were many others. Miksa Falk, a popular publicist of both the Address and the Resolution Party press, was also imprisoned, and deprived of his doctoral title. A military tribunal divested Mór Mezei, who had contacts with the resistance movement, of his editorship of the Magyar Izraelita (Hungarian Israelite) denominational paper. New Year's Eve of 1862, Mór Jókai noted with bitter irony that "the greatest accomplishment of [this past year's] newspaperman is that what he did not do; his wisest speech, the one that he did not print; and his greatest good fortune, that what had not befallen him"; but the paper that he started up in the new year was soon to land him in prison, too. Fortunately for him, the author of the article - advocating the union of Hungary and Austria solely through the person of the Emperor - which had landed him in jail had been the young Count Nándor Zichy, whose influential family got him, and his "fellow criminal", Jókai, out of prison after just one month. The following year, Jókai was faced with another charge; and he was unable to return to his editor's desk for more than two years. Virgil Szilágyi, a leading figure of the paper of the Resolution left-wing, Jövő (Future), was imprisoned for his political activities; while its self-sacrificing editor, the playwright Lajos Kövér - whom Count Pálffy had personally determined either to win over or to break - died much before his time, due perhaps also to the continuous harassment to which he was subjected. Few documents illustrate the deep tragedy of the intellectuals of the period more poignantly than the letter written by the outstandingly talented Károly Zilahy dving at the age of 26, exhausted by the persecutions he had suffered for his political radicalism and by the ruthless criticisms that he had endured from Gyulai for his literary innovations. Totally broken, he only begged that his confiscated Petőfi monograph be allowed publication; for, he insisted - feeling obliged to internalize the censors' demands to the point of distortion - he had condemned his hero's political role; and, as for "the revolutionary period", as "the police

³ D. 186. 1862-7. - D. 220. 1863-VII-24326. - Kecskeméthy pp. 108-109.

itself will concede. .. one could not possibly have discussed it ... more dryly and objectively".⁴

But it was not only the Hungarian press that was so tightly controlled; there were severe restrictions on the publications of all the nationalities, especially the Croats for their refusal to participate in the Imperial Council. The trial and sentencing of the editor of the Viennese Ost und West, Tkalac, excited great interest. Kvaternik was imprisoned for a pamphlet; Ante Starčević was imprisoned for a political statement demanding that union with both Austria and Hungary be but through the common ruler. Ivan Perkovac was put into jail for an article in the Croatian liberal paper, Pozor, proclaiming Croatia's close alliance with Hungary; in 1864, the paper itself was prohibited. The editors of the Serbian Srpski Dnevnik published in Novi Sad themselves refused to continue the paper in 1864 after criminal charges were laid against them.⁵

As the price of doing away with the measures discriminating against the peoples of the "Hungarian lands", Schmerling demanded that "the Magyars" abandon their claims to their "forfeited" rights, partake in the Imperial Council, and share in the "constitutional" processes built on the February Patent. Schmerling's prime political goal, as is well enough known, was the creation of a constitutional Großdeutsch unit; he saw the strengthening of a German dominated Habsburg Empire as a precondition to this end. It is, therefore, not altogether impossible that he hoped to force, or to woo the predominantly liberal-constitutionalist Hungarian representatives to enter the Imperial Council in order that they might become the auxiliaries of the German liberals, and a counterweight alike to the conservatives' attempts to turn back the clock, the federalists' aspirations, and even Franz Joseph's absolutism. At any rate, Schmerling's bureaucratic mind could not understand that the determination to win national autonomy was so widely and deeply rooted in Hungarian society that its politicians - who were guided by bourgeois constitutional principles - could not possibly have openly given in to his centralist policy, even if they had wanted to. And so, he persisted in his superior attitude."We can wait!" he declared with blind self-confidence, even as the spectres of economic depression, and of financial difficulties so chronic that even increasing taxes could not help, loomed alongside the new thunderclouds over Europe. His complacency seemed even less justified when the Czech and Polish representatives walked out of the already incomplete Imperial Council. Even the German representatives were proving to be less than totally malleable. Already the summer of 1862, Schmerling had had to resort to explicit threats against the German constitutional centralists: if they did not stop their obstructionism on the issue of the budget, he would resort to the "constitutional" form provided for by the February Patent

⁴ V. Szokoly 1871. – Berzeviczy III. pp. 402–404, IV. p. 31–35. – Cf. MS. 1862. Dec. 31. – PN. 1864. Jan. 28. – D. 185. 1863–258. – L. Prém pp. 13–15. – Miklóssy, 1971. pp. 342–343. ⁵ Šidak-Gross-Karaman-Šepić pp. 25–26, 33. – A Hon 1864: 184. – MS. 1864: 205.

THE CONSERVATIVES' OFFER OF COMPROMISE

and take the actions the government deemed necessary through decrees.⁶ It was under such circumstances that, barely a year and a half after the failure of its attempt at a compromise, the organized group of Hungarian conservatives made a move which affected also the Hungarian officials of Schmerling's provisional rule.

THE CONSERVATIVES' OFFER OF COMPROMISE

The Imperial Decree that dissolved the Hungarian Parliament in the summer of 1861 contained a promise that a new parliament would be convened. Schmerling was inclined to fulfil this promise. On the one hand, because he knew that the overt absolutism practiced in Hungary was a constant reproach to his oft-proclaimed constitutionalism; on the other, because he thought that a new Pest Parliament's reiterated refusal to send representatives to the Imperial Council would be proof of "Hungarian obstinacy" so convincing that he could round out his incomplete "parliament" through direct elections for it. The policy that had been devised by those sitting in Hungary's traditional seats of government, however, was not consonant with this. Chancellor Forgách wanted to delay the calling of parliament until it should seem likely that he would get a majority inclined to come to a compromise. Lieutenant General Pálffy's memorandum of February 1862 declared that, for the time being, "the government ... should adopt a course calculated to prepare the way for the final, legal discussions".⁷

Schmerling and his Hungarian collocutors, however, stood on the principles they had adopted at the time of the dissolution of parliament. Thus, the preparations for the discussions which were to bring about the "normalization" of the situation hardly got beyond the measures aimed at destroying "the spirit of revolution" and the alternate, softening-up tactics of offering financial rewards and decorations. The end of 1862, however, Chancellor Forgách was able to persuade the Emperor – who needed peace within the Empire if he was to pursue his German plans – to grant a partial amnesty, and then succeeded in getting Count György Apponyi entrusted with putting forward a plan to resolve the deadlock. The conservatives, of course, were ready to modify both the February Patent and the 1848 Laws in order to stay on the road of the October Diploma. The memorandum produced through their collective efforts declared as their "main goal" the consolidation of the Habsburg Empire, and the securing of "its domestic welfare and its position as a Great Power". It was because it was

⁶ Elisamter pp. 13–15, 30. – EÖM. XVI. p. 221. – Kecskeméthy p. 176. – Rogge II. pp. 161–162.
– Wertheimer I. pp. 211–213. – Berzeviczy III. pp. 394–400, 422–425. – Redlich II. pp. 292–294.
– Kann II. pp. 129–132. – Lorenz pp. 421–422. – Macartney pp. 530–532. – É. Somogyi 1976.
pp. 31–39.

⁷ D. 186. 1862–6. – Wertheimer I. pp. 199–201, 214–215. – Berzeviczy IV. p. 14.

consonant with these ends that it deemed "the historico-political legal entity of the lands of the Hungarian Crown" something that must be upheld. Unlike the attempts at centralism which were doomed to failure, "a coequal dualism which safeguards both sovereignty and the community of national goals would satisfy not only the basic requirements of the Pragmatic Sanction, but would also break the passive resistance which Hungary's instinct of self-preservation had so far dictated, but which had been detrimental to the Monarchy's chiefest national goals". The memorandum declared foreign affairs to be unquestionably the sovereign's prerogative. The army, it conceded, had to continue as a unit, being "under the direct command of the supreme war-lord", the Emperor; and defence, too, was to be a common task. But the framers of the memorandum thought it necessary that the Hungarian Parliament have a say in at least the extraordinary military allocations. At the same time, they recommended that the 1848 law providing for a National Guard be "wiped" from the books. In the area of taxation, they pronounced as fundamental the demand that the "Lands of the Hungarian Crown" contribute to the Empire's expenses and to the bearing of the state debt "proportionately, in percent", according to a "quota" system. The memorandum emphasized "the need for unity" in the trade and tariff regulated by international agreements, and also in the area of "Imperial transport" and communications. "Joint affairs" were to be handled by "Imperial Ministers" at the executive level; and by two "permanent delegations" chosen by the parliaments of "both halves of the monarchy" at the legislative stage. The coequality of the two delegations was to be ensured by "the parity of the number of their votes". The "Imperial Ministers" were to be responsible to the delegations.

The framers of the memorandum invoked the will of the "inestimable majority" in insisting on the "restoration of the territorial integrity of the Lands of the Hungarian Crown", and on the "appointing of a Hungarian Ministry". At the same time, they suggested that all restrictions be removed on the Emperor's right to appoint his advisors and the members of the executive branch, and on his right to dissolve the Hungarian Parliament. They expressed their conviction that "such a restoration of the rule of law" would incline all elements "not outright of a revolutionary nature" to make their peace with the Emperor; "they would be freed from the fetters of passivity laid upon them by the denial of their rights, treatment through which they were practically identified with the enemies of the crown". The ruler could hardly mistake the memorandum's meaning: the Apponyi group was, in fact, claiming that their program would conclusively divide the forces of legal opposition rallied around the slogan of "1848"; and would win the support of all those who also saw compromise as the way out of the deadlock.⁸

⁸ Kónyi III. pp. 301-315. - Cf. Ludassy pp. 179-181. - Redlich II. pp. 309-310. - Berzeviczy IV. pp. 14-18. - M. Jászay 1966. p. 420.

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Most of the elements of the conservatives' memorandum were far from being new. Immediately after 1849, pamphleteers hoping to influence the direction the Empire's reorganization was to take had expressed the opinion which even then was by no means novel, namely, that the "resolution" of the situation was possible only through a return to the Pragmatic Sanction, the constitutional "basis" of the Empire; that the Empire would have to be reorganized along dualist lines expressive of the parity of its two halves; and that jurisdiction over the common affairs of these two halves would have to be relegated to committees appointed by both their legislative bodies.⁹ Naturally, the Apponvi group relied heavily on the conservatives' preparatory work for the October Diploma, and especially on the policies worked out by Count Emil Dessewffy. They probably also made use of the pamphlets Joseph Eötvös had published during absolutism's critical days; and of the suggestions worked out by Ágoston Trefort the summer of 1862. Trefort, however, had insisted on the necessity of an independent Hungarian Army and Ministry of War; and had wished to see legislative power granted to the delegations in charge of the "joint" matters of trade and foreign affairs.¹⁰

The conservatives' memorandum was strongly influenced from yet another quarter: for their definition of what was to come under the heading of "joint affairs", and even more of how these were to be administered, for the division of labour envisaged for the Imperial and the national parliaments, and for the entire workings of the delegation system they relied on the work of two Viennese publicists, the Hungarian-born Adolf Fischhof, and the professor of jurisprudence, Joseph Unger. Their pamphlet, however, had provided for constitutional restrictions on the ruler's sovereignty, having been written in the hope that the new system of government would tend to be bourgeois constitutional in nature.¹¹ When the pamphlet first appeared the spring of 1861, Miksa Falk had rejected its suggestions in the Pesti Napló (a journal which generally mirrored Deák's position) on the grounds that "it chooses the circuitous route for the sole purpose of evading the path to union but through the sovereign's person". Barely three months later, during the last weeks of Parliament, Dessewffy wrote to Apponyi that he had spoken "privately" with Deák, and found that he not only "concedes that military power must be in the Emperor's hands", and that certain financial concessions must be made, but "is considering the advisability of Hungary's sending permanent delegates to treat with the permanent Austrian delegates on

¹¹ Zur Lösung der ungarischen Frage. Ein staatsrechtlicher Vorschlag. Wien, 1861, Cf. Kann II. 149–155.

[°] Gr. Koloman Joseph Majláth: Ungarn und die Centralisation. Leipzig, 1850. – Grossschmied, 1850. – [Anonymus]: Betrachtungen über die dermalige Lage und die Zukunft Ungarns. Stuttgart, 1851.

¹⁰ For Dessewffy's and Eötvös' drafts, see Chapters 2 and 3. For Trefort's draft, see: PL. 1888. Sept. 5. Cf. *Berzeviczy* IV. p. 17. – Cf. [*Anonymus*]: Die Pacificirung [!] Ungarns. Ein freies Wort an König und Vaterland. Pest, 1861. – [*Jankovich György*]: A megoldáshoz. Az egy magánlevél irójától. (Towards a solution. From the author of the private letter). Pest, 1862.

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each issue as it arises". In short, as early as 1861, Deák was considering the possibility of starting down a "circuitous" road much like the one described in the Fischhof-Unger pamphlet. Thus, when the conservatives submitted their memorandum to Vienna the end of 1862, they were probably hoping that it would serve as the basis of at least mediated discussions between the Emperor and Deák. Apponyi sent a copy of the memorandum to the leader of the Address Party; but the Court was not yet ready to ask Deák for his opinion about it.¹²

By the time Apponyi was officially notified of his memorandum's rejection the spring of 1863, the Council of Ministers had already started its series of discussions on the "Hungarian question", with the Emperor chairing most of the meetings. At these talks, it became evident that Chancellor Forgách's own plans for resolving the question were also failing to win the ruler's assent. And this, in spite of the fact that his proposal indicated a much greater effort at consonance with Schmerling's centralizing "constitutional" system than that of the Apponyi group. Its most noteworthy feature was that, while it gave great scope for royal prerogative, matters which were to be "joint affairs" it wanted dealt with through a kind of parliamentary process. More precisely, Forgách wanted to see "preparatory delegations" of the Imperial Council and of the Hungarian Parliament make at least proposals as to the scope of these joint affairs and the manner of their handling; and wanted both legislative bodies to have the opportunity to approve whatever proposals might be made.

As to the administration of these "joint affairs", he suggested that there be a joint delegation consisting of members of both the Upper and Lower Houses to deal with it – a proposal qualitatively little different from Schmerling's suggestion for the creation of a "wider Imperial Council". The proposal was, in fact, an attempt to reach a compromise with the system founded on the February Patent; its centralistic features were reinforced by the fact that it rejected the very idea that a Hungarian Government might be established, on the grounds that Hungary would never be satisfied to have a government with powers more limited than those had by the government of 1848.¹³

Thus, for the time being, Schmerling remained on top of the situation. Franz Joseph assured Forgách of his sympathy – but worked to consolidate the existing situation. He feared the consequences of the violent Polish uprising; he was uneasy about the ambitions of the new Prussian Chancellor, Bismarck; and he was apprehensive that a new Italian conflict might erupt. At the same time, Schmerling's self-confidence acted to reassure him.

For the Minister of State was counting on the willing support of the Transylvanian Chancellor Nádasdy to help him woo the delegates of the

¹² PN. 1861. April 18. – Dessewffy (Pest, 1861. July 9–10.) to Apponyi, Dcslt. Ap. 5/D.

⁻ Szőgyény-Marich III. pp. 318-319. - Ferenczi II. p. 401. - Gy. Szabad pp. 569-571.

¹³ Redlich II. pp. 311–329, 764–766. – Cf. Ludassy pp. 180–181. – Berzeviczy IV. pp. 22–24. – M. Jászay 1966. pp. 420–421.

Transylvanian Diet into the Imperial Council; this, he hoped, would break "the Magyars' " passive resistance. And once they had succumbed, the rest would follow suit.

Under the circumstances, then, it was not only the conservatives' compromise proposal that was totally beside the mark; Chancellor Forgách's position was also shaken. Court action was taken against the man who had inspired much of his program, Lajos Kovács, whose theories were a fine amalgam of chauvinism and anti-democracy. Kovács had written an article expatiating on the memorandum Forgách had presented to the Council of Ministers on the "resolution" of the Empire's difficulties. The article first appeared in the attractively named journal Független (Independent) which enjoyed the Chancellor's financial backing; and then, as a pamphlet dedicated by Kovács to his eminent patron.¹⁴ It is indicative of Chancellor Forgách's declining prestige that he was unable to save Kovács from the military courts, and was able only with great difficulty to have his punishment partially commuted.¹⁵ For Forgách had been doing everything to prevent the success of all centralizing efforts which might decrease the chances of a conservative "reorganization" in Hungary. His jurisdictional conflicts with the Imperial Government were thus becoming ever more frequent. Not unjustly, Schmerling considered the Chancellor an obstacle to the realization of his own plans; and the spring of 1864, he finally succeeded in having him retired. The new Chancellor, Count Hermann Zichy, was prepared to use absolutistic measures to transform Hungary's entire administrative and judicial system to suit Schmerling's needs, and, in the name of the "constitutionalism" of the February Patent, to help do away with the duality in the Empire's government which "Hungarian stubbornness" still imposed.¹⁶

ATTEMPTS TO INITIATE JOINT ACTION AMONG THE NATIONALITIES OF HUNGARY

While Vienna was concluding that "the Magyars'" blind separatism would keep them from ever finding their place within the community of the Empire; and the conservatives were declaring compromise with the Habsburgs the only hope of "resolution", and were seeking new roads to this end; with the dissolution of Parliament the forces of democracy rallied once more to seek allies. For there were those who went beyond the letter of the 1848 Laws and were not content merely to ward off the danger of assimilation by Vienna. They wanted, rather, to work out a new form of coexistence with the nationalities and with Hungary's

14 L. Kovács 1863.

¹⁶ Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 98–105. – Cf. PN. 1864. May 3. – Kecskeméthy pp. 171–173. – Berzeviczy IV. pp. 97–98.

¹⁵ D. 185. 1863-1415, 1457. - Cf. Kecskeméthy pp. 140-143, 152-155.

neighbouring peoples, a form more democratic than anything the Danube Basin had so far known.

Kossuth saw the reconciliation of all of Hungary's peoples as one of the preconditions of a successful stand against absolutism, and was, thus, harsh in his condemnation of the leaders of the Resolution Party who were satisfied with the proposals of the Eötvös-led Committee on Nationalities. The Parliament's hard-hearted nationalities policy, he wrote, "I not only condemn most decidedly, but know it to be an almost fatally mournful blow to the future of our nation". Should those in organized contact with the exiles "not wish to go beyond this, I must regretfully declare that we have parted ways; our policies do not agree". Responding, in part, to Irányi's requests for clarification, Kossuth repeatedly summarized the points that should be made to the nationalities' leading politicians, and, once they had accepted them, that should be submitted for Parliament's approval. The program was that of the Kossuth group's previous messages, and was in many way, complementary to that of Kossuth's Constitutional Proposal: self-determination for Croatia, including the right to secede, with a plebiscite to decide where the Mura triangle and Fiume were to belong; for Transylvania, a variation of the Teleki-Klapka proposal that Kossuth had supported: after the Habsburgs had been driven out, a plebiscite to determine whether there should be reunion with Hungary, or an autonomous Transylvania in confederation with Hungary. Throughout the nation, there were to be extensive guarantees of the freedom to use all languages, and to participate in political organizations; the counties were to have extraordinarily great powers of self-government, with their boundaries at least partially redrawn to coincide with ethnic boundaries.

The leaders of the Resolution Party, however – the organized opposition group which had so long monopolized contact with the exiles – now worked to frustrate Kossuth's "extravagant" plan. With Kálmán Tisza and Baron Frigyes Podmaniczky in the lead, they launched a direct attack against it, and against all those willing to sacrifice Magyar predominance in order to be able to build Hungary's future on alliance with the rest of the country's oppressed peoples.¹⁷

It was the "far-leftists", who had finally established contact with Kossuth during the last days of Parliament, who energetically revived the campaign for reconciliation with the nationalities the beginning of 1862. The *Jövő* (Future), edited by Lajos Kövér, was started in part to become the mouthpiece of that group of twenty who were most committed to this cause. Among them were Virgil Szilágyi, László Böszörményi, József Madarász, and János Vidats, some of the leaders of the left wing of the Resolution Party; Ödön Kállay, a well-known advocate of the nationalities' reconciliation, and a friend of Daxner, the author of the Turócszentmárton Declaration; and Peter Csernovics, who had a great many

¹⁷ R. 90. I. 3903, 3910, 3935, 3937, 3952. – For further data, see: *Gy. Szabad* pp. 557–559. ¹⁸ Cf. R. 90. I. 3660, 3937. Serbian connections.¹⁸ Virgil Szilágyi was, without a doubt, the most popular figure among them, an unrivalled favourite among the young intellectuals, the petite and middle bourgeoisie, "Kossuth's predestined successor" as one student leader put it.¹⁹

Szilágyi – who, as far as we know to date, was more determined than any other contemporary leader to make the Resolution Party left-wing expressive of the real political aspirations of the social forces now drawn into the wake of the traditional leadership groups – hoped that the democratization the country so much needed would bring with it a climate in which all the nationalities living in Hungary could finally work together for a common goal. Even the pamphlet which Szilágyi's nascent group had published before the dissolution of parliament had declared that "if there had not been a ten years' break in our political life after the 1848 declaration and realization of complete equality before the law, and if the regular development of the strength, ability, and influence of a people enabled to practice its political rights had not been suspended by the intervening events – today, the popular element would probably be much stronger in the House of Representatives, and its preponderance would give the House a political direction generally more reassuring for the future".²⁰

Virgil Szilágyi's own series of articles, The Nationalities Question in Hungary, suggested a constitutional arrangement quite consonant with Kossuth's Draft: a bourgeois democratic system of self-government, which was to provide the basis for the various peoples' peaceful coexistence, and be the precondition of the alliance system Hungary was to enter into with its neighbour nations. Yet more explicitly than the Resolution Party left wing had in their pamphlet of the previous year, Szilágyi demanded also that the abolition of the political hegemony of the former privileged groups necessarily attend such a transformation: "... The predominance of the pre-1848 political factors must cease in order that, with the victory of civil liberty, the major cause of our brother-nationalities' mistrust of us might cease. There is every indication that, once the people come to a realization of their own strength through some great social transformation, they will sweep away these political forces. The best of the intelligentsia shall rally round the banner of democracy, under which the people will understand and resolutely bring about a new kind of liberty: one in which all peoples need but use freedom wisely to find that it totally satisfies all their national demands".²¹

Before the polemicists – whom the Tisza group had asked Jókai to lead²² – had had time to reply to the Szilágyi group's bold initiative, and before Podmaniczky's efforts to discredit Szilágyi and alienate Kossuth from the "far-left" had got well under way, the régime intervened.²³ Szilágyi was arrested on Feb. 28, 1862,

¹⁹ Vezerle p. 16. - Cf. Gy. Szabad pp. 320, 421.

²⁰ Debreceni röpirat p. 30.

²¹ Jövő 1862. Jan. 19-23. - Cf. P. Szemző, 1969. pp. 255-257.

²² MS. 1862. Jan. 29. - Feb. 1. - March 13. - JMCB. VI. pp. 114-132. - S. Takáts LXII-LXIX.

²³ R. 90. I. 3660, 3937. - Gy. Szabad pp. 592-593.

barely a month after his series of articles had appeared, just after the courier he had sent to Kossuth was caught, and the offices of the *Jövő* and the homes of Szilágyi's associate had been searched. After this, there was no one to be found in Hungary to give the nation a faithful picture of Kossuth's policies.²⁴ And more was the pity, for the exiles were soon to publish a statement that would very much have required elucidation by those convinced of the rightness of Kossuth's cause.

THE PLAN FOR A DANUBIAN CONFEDERATION

Most of the exiles were convinced that the consolidation of the Habsburgs' position could be but temporary, for Vienna's stubborn insistence on keeping Venice would inevitably lead to the renewal of hostilities in Italy. And so, the exiles strove to reaffirm their contacts as much with the Italian Government, as with Hungary's potential allies, the Danubian Principalities threatened by neighbouring Great Powers. It was as part of a secret Italian diplomatic move aimed at bringing about Hungarian, South Slav and Roumanian co-operation that the exiles' plan for a confederation won its final formulation, and received publicity.

In the spring of 1862, the exiles responded to a request of the Italian Government by working out the details of the Danubian Confederation which could come about after the success of the wars of liberation. The document was based on both the former and the more recent of the exiles' plans, and built on the agreements already reached with the Danubian Principalities. On May 1, 1862, Kossuth accepted a modified version of the draft written by Ferenc Pulszky on the basis of a previous summary presented by General Klapka, and empowered the Italian envoy, Canini, to make use of the draft in his Balkan diplomatic talks. This draft differed from that first drawn up by Kossuth in 1850 in numerous minor, and two major respects. Kossuth no longer insisted that the Confederation have a permanent capital on Hungarian territory; and he had yielded to Teleki and Klapka in becoming willing to accept another form of Transylvania's possible independence. The draft thus contained not only the alternatives of reunion with Hungary or autonomy within it - which his own commitments, and the opposition of the home resisters had made hard enough for Kossuth to accept - but considered also a third possibility: that Transylvanians have the chance to choose a constitutionally independent state, united to Hungary only through a common head of state.

Kossuth sent the draft to Ignác Helfy, editor of the Milanese L'Alleanza, a paper dedicated to Italian – Hungarian co-operation; the May 18, 1862 issue carried the draft. Kossuth, upset bý this indiscretion, appended a lengthy explanation to the text, mentioning that the draft was not of his wording; the basic

24 D. 191. 1862-IV. H-3114, 3439, 4195, 5140, 20485.

principles, however, he accepted as his own. It is, thus, not by chance that the plan is generally attributed primarily to Kossuth. Not only did his views form the backbone of the draft, but, of all the Hungarian politicians who significantly influenced the text, he was the most consistent in accepting political responsibility for it after its publication.

The plan concerned the future of the Danube Basin after it had managed to shake off Habsburg and Turkish rule: Hungary (and Transylvania, allied with it in the form determined by the plebiscite) was to form a confederation with Roumania, Croatia, and Serbia, and whatever other South Slav provinces might decide through plebiscite or "legislative assembly" to join with the latter. The articles of confederation would stipulate defence and foreign policy as joint affairs, and would make the entire confederated area an economic community. One House of the federal parliament was to be chosen on the basis of representation by population; the other was to have an equal number of their coequality. Supreme executive power was to be in the hands of the Federal Council which was to sit in turn in each of the capital cities of the federated states. In all other matters, each state was to be free to choose its own constitutional form of government, provided that these guaranteed to all – irrespective of creed or nationality – the civil liberties outlined in Kossuth's Constitutional Draft.

Kossuth saw the cessation of national animosities as the precondition of the Danubian Confederation: the oppressed peoples of the area had to co-operate, first in shaking off the Great Powers' yoke; and then, in building a free alliance. He realized only too well that each nation alone could, at best, become a "second-rate" state, one hardly able to safeguard its independence; allied, however, they could develop freely, enjoying at the same time the dividends paid by a larger economic community.

The Confederation would serve yet another function, one calculated to satisfy Britain's rather decisive foreign affairs preferences: it would fill the power vacuum that threatened to develop with the disintegration of the two eastern Empires, both of which had, at any rate, ceased to be effective safeguards against expansionism in the area.²⁵

In Hungary, a vitriolic campaign of invective followed upon the publication of the plan for a Danubian Confederation. Kossuth, who in the past had often been accused of national prejudice for his stand against Hungary's assimilation into the Empire, now found himself charged with total lack of patriotism by papers financed from Vienna, and propagandists who hoped by their chauvinistic anathemas finally to discredit him. They declared him to be a threat to "the

²⁵ ACSR. Fondo Ricasoli, busta 1. fasc. 2. inserto g. - R. 90. I. 4041, 4043, 4047. - KLI. III.
 pp. 735-739, V. p. 496, VI. pp. 1-25. - Documenti II. pp. 293-297. - Cf. Jászi, 1918. pp. 45-50, 91-94. - Wertheimer, 1920. pp. 219-229. - T. Lengyel 1943. pp. 136-149. - Wierer pp. 60-62. - Mérei, 1965. pp. 84-89. - E. Kovács pp. 402-417. etc.

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existence of the nation", one who had even earlier "flirted with half-baked cosmopolitan ideas" but had now finally shown his true colours: he was ready to sacrifice "historic right" and "the integrity of the nation". The semi-official *Sürgöny* (Telegram) was quick to quote the attack in the conservative ecclesiastical *Pesti Hirnök* (Pest Messenger) by Bertalan Szemere – himself once an advocate of reconciliation among Hungary's peoples – who had but a little earlier tried to discredit Kossuth in progressive circles with charges of blind nationalism. Szemere was outraged by the plan which, through manhood suffrage, "would replace the liberal aristocracy, round which the nation's peculiar constitution was built, with democracy", and reduce Hungary to "a little province".²⁶ Deák's circle held their peace; Eötvös, on the other hand, found it necessary to express his disapproval even to his French correspondent, Montalembert.²⁷

The leadership of the Resolution Party and of the secret organizations closely allied with it refrained from overt attacks, but were all the more busy behind the scenes. They did, however, publish in their paper a statement which left no doubt as to where they stood. Even more detrimental to Kossuth's cause was the fact that they failed to use their rather extensive illegal information network to compensate for the shortcomings of a censored press. They failed to convey Kossuth's "clarifications" regarding the actual function of the long-range plan for a Danubian Confederation; and failed also to make clear that Kossuth himself felt the task at hand to be to find the way to reconciliation through concrete agreements with each of the nationalities.²⁸ The effect of their negligence in this respect was but compounded by the callousness with which they suffered "the Hungarian" answer to the nationalities' initial enthusiasm for the plan to be the rebuke expressed by the government press.²⁹ They also failed to contradict - and in fact, promoted - the propaganda based on Aurél Kecskeméthy's argument that when the planned confederation was compared to a compromise with the Habsburgs, the latter proved without doubt to be the more attractive alternative.30

This oversimplified comparison was to acquire wide currency; it was, however, based on a short-sighted disregard of what was, in fact, the heart of the matter. It failed to take into account the fact that the planned Danubian Confederation – unlike any kind of compromise contemplated to that point, and unlike the one later realized – was not a pact with an oppressor, but an alliance made on the basis of the democratically expressed free choice of equal partners. The Danubian Confederation was to have been an alliance in which each of the nations who had

²⁶ Pesti Hírnök 1862. June 6, 7, 11. – Sürgöny 1862. June 6, 12, 14 – July 4. SzBÖM. V. pp. 118–128. – Cf. L. Lukács pp. 319–321. – Gonda p. 31.

²⁷ Kónyi V. p. 47. – Joseph Balogh pp. 25–26.

²⁸ MS. 1862. June 7. - Cf. Kónyi V. pp. 46-48. - JMCB. VI p. 176.

²⁹ Sürgöny 1862. June 21.

³⁰ Kecskeméthy, 1862. p. 183. - Cf. Podmaniczky III. pp. 143-144.

joined it for mutual aid in the safeguarding of their hard-won liberty would have remained totally autonomous, and thus free to withdraw at any point.³¹ There are probably few examples more illustrative of the differences between the political points of view of Kossuth and Deák than the fact that, while Kossuth continued to argue in favour of the Confederation, as late as 1865 Deák expressed himself willing to see Austro-Italian differences reconciled through Austria's receiving territory in the Danubian Principalities in return for renouncing its claim to Venice.³² The two points of view differed radically not only in respect of political attitude, but also in the extent of their recognition of the real trend of historical development.

THE SUPPRESSION OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE

The leadership of the Resolution Party utilized the publication of the plan for a Danubian Confederation not only to make a public break with Kossuth, but also to provoke a breach between him and the secret resistance organization. Although György Komáromy had been permitted to become its head – partly because of Kossuth's dissatisfaction with the job the old leaders had done – Pál Almásy, Baron Frigyes Podmaniczky, and Kálmán Tisza and his group were very close to the new leader, and determined the political direction of the organization, which continued in formal existence even after the introduction of Provisional Rule. Tisza, Podmaniczky, Almásy, Komáromy and Counts Tivadar Csáky and Sándor Károlyi were the ones to insist that the Resolution Party use the *Magyar Sajtó* (Hungarian Press) to launch an attack on the Kossuth inspired nationalities policy advocated by Virgil Szilágyi in his paper, *Jövő* (Future).³³

Although Kálmán Tisza's letter of June, 1862, to Jókai³⁴ recommended that the *Magyar Sajtó* confine itself to disavowing Kossuth's policies, it went on to condemn the Danubian Confederation, and also expounded Tisza's view that "theoretical battles" over the issue of equal political rights for the nationalities were best avoided. And, "... should anything prove less than perfect, ... let practice, let life itself show the way to putting it right". This view was, of course, totally antithetical to the one repeatedly expressed by Kossuth, who knew that the nationalities were determined finally to get concrete proposals. The time had come to stop speaking in generalities, Kossuth kept insisting; agreement on questions of detail was the precondition of co-operation.

In the course of his Paris trip a few weeks later, however, Tisza was already saying that "as for the nationalities question ... he thought all further concessions

³¹ Cf. KLI. VI. pp. 15-18, 23, IX. pp. 113-114, 404-405, 445-447.

³² Kónyi V. pp. 62–64. – For the earlier plans to compensate Austria with Balkan territories, and Kossuth's condemnation of them, see: R. 90. I. 3256. – KLI. II. 526. – *Cavour e l'Inghilterra* II/2. p. 66. – *Tanárky* p. 143. – *Engel-Jánosi* p. 75. – *Gy. Szabad 1960.* pp. 28–29. – *Baumgart* pp. 39–41.

³³ S. Takáts LXVI–LXVIII.

³⁴ Kálmán Tisza (Pest, 1862. June 12, 13) – to Jókai. OSzKk.

not only dangerous, but also unnecessary, for ... in the final analysis, they will be glad if they get what the last Parliament promised them". "What self-deception", commented Irányi on recalling Tisza's words, and added: "If indeed it be self-deception, and not the deception of others." When the Resolution Party leaders insisted that concessions to the nationalities were "opposed to the mood of the entire country", Irányi could not help noting that the Resolution Party "had done nothing to eradicate these prejudices". And though this might have been a slight exaggeration, there can be no doubt that Irányi came very close to the heart of the matter when he guessed at the reasons for the failure of the Party and of the secret organization to create a more democratic spirit throughout the country: "This" he wrote to Kossuth, "can only be due either to prejudice, or to the fact that these gentlemen are not as convinced of the necessity of independence as are we ... else they would not disdain to use the means which must inevitably be employed if it is to be brought about."³⁵

The publication of the plan for a Danubian Confederation was not, thus, the cause of the alienation of the leaders of the Resolution Party from Kossuth, but was, rather, an occasion for them to break with him in such a way as to incur the least reproach.'They made sure that there was a period of transition between their first independent stand and their total breach with him, for earlier, they had justified their every move - even those diametrically opposed to Kossuth's instructions – by invoking his name,³⁶ and they knew very well that the authority and popularity he enjoyed among their own ranks had by no means disappeared from one day to the next. Podmaniczky recorded that there was a "most unpleasant exchange of views", the spring of 1863 at a meeting of the Resolution Party members of the secret organization, during which the "more level-headed won" defeating those who continued to insist "that we must keep to our original principles". The data of later police investigations indicate that the participants' concern about the activism of the nationalities, and even of the masses had a great deal to do with the victory of the "more level-headed". Podmaniczky informed Kossuth of the decision through General Türr, whom he met in Bucharest, and informed also the Italian government - which still regarded the Hungarian resistance movement as a potential ally, and gave, it support, though with growing reservations. It is not altogether clear what subsequent contact the Resolution Party leadership maintained with the revived secret organization, but there can be no doubt that their breach with Kossuth was complete.³⁷

At the turn of 1861–62, when Kossuth was himself threatening to break with the Resolution leadership because of their frustrating of his nationalities policy, he was still hoping that Virgil Szilágyi and the extreme left might emerge to faithfully represent his policies, and perhaps win over, with his support, the

³⁵ R. 90. I. 4068, 4072.

³⁶ Ibid. I. 4090.

³⁷ Podmaniczky III. pp. 205-207, 213-218. - Cf. L. Lukács pp. 340-341, 426-427.

majority of the party. The arrest of the physician, Lipót Mezei, his contact with Szilágyi, and of Szilágyi himself the end of February, 1862, put an end to these hopes. True, the amnesty granted the end of the year freed both of them; but Mezei had broken under the strain, and left prison only to be taken to an asylum; while Szilágyi continued to remain under police surveillance, so that he could continue his political activities only years later, when he had himself become an exile.³⁸

The lull that the declaration of Provisional Rule had brought in the activism of the masses proved to be but temporary. The authorities were disturbed to find students laying wreaths at the tombs of the martyrs of 1848–49 on March 15 of 1862. They were even more perturbed by the "extraordinarily great numbers" of the crowd that came to mourn Virgil Szilágyi's child, so much so, that they refused the prisoner permission to accompany his child to his grave; he had to say his last farewells at the house. Religious feasts, theatre performances, and concerts all became occasions of national demonstration, and the spirit of resistance was fanned by the unceasing flow of handbills and pamphlets. It was, however, only in 1863 that a more significant wave of resistance broke out. The Polish insurrection became the occasion of renewed attempts by the exiles to bring about concerted action, and inspired the congregation of great numbers of armed volunteers. The famine consequent upon the drought that visited the Great Plain contributed to the atmosphere of tension within the country; new secret organizations sprang up, and the old ones were revived.³⁹

In the spring of 1863, the police uncovered the secret organization directed by József Somogyi, formerly a major in the Hungarian Army. Seventeen of the intellectuals, tradesmen and students taking part in it were arrested. Six of them were condemned to death, but this sentence was in all cases commuted to that of solitary confinement with hard labour, the sentence received by the rest of the accused. It was Lajos Asbóth, formerly a colonel of the Hungarian Army, who helped the authorities uncover both the Somogyi group, and the illegal activities of one of their contacts, János Vidacs, a former parliamentary representative. Asbóth had suffered a long period of imprisonment after 1849 and was again taken into custody in 1861, much to the nation's outrage. From 1862, however, he worked for the police as a paid informer, taking full advantage of the extraordinary confidence he enjoyed among the resisters because of his long history of persecution. The spring of 1864, Asbóth led the police to arrest practically the entire leadership of the secret organization which had been operating since 1859, in two distinct groups since 1863.⁴⁰

³⁸ D. 191. 1862-IV. H-3114, 5140, 20845, 22356, 22794.

³⁹ Ibid. 1862–IV. H–6245. – L. Lukács pp. 314–317, 329–331. – J. Böhm 1964. pp. 84–113. – E. Kovács pp. 264–268.

⁴⁰ D. 186. 1863–2. – L. Steier pp. 700–732. – L. Lukács pp. 332–335, 421–424. – Gy. Szabad pp. 284–285. – M. Szakács pp. 112–114.

As far as we know, the actual direction of the secret organization after the Resolution Party leaders' break with Kossuth was again in the hands of Pál Almásy. Among the exiles, Almásy was in contact with Klapka, who had also broken with Kossuth. There were many within the organization who were dissatisfied with Almásy's anti-democratism and practically do-nothing policy; these men started to organize on their own in 1863. It was probably this faction which was responsible for a proclamation which appeared the summer of 1863, one calling for the organization of guerilla units and of the National Guard in preparation for the reviving of the Hungarian Army, and for the setting up of county and urban bodies "on the principle of the brotherhood of all nations and all religions". It was with the support of these bodies and with the aid of the exiles that the framers of the proclamation hoped to establish a provisional government in which all the nationalities of Hungary would be represented; and, after the Habsburgs were defeated, to "convene a national assembly" "for the final reorganization ... of the Kingdom of Hungary".⁴¹ The autumn of 1863, the leftist faction found a new leader in the person of István Nedeczky, formerly a captain in the Hungarian Army, and the nephew of Ferenc Deák. Nedeczky established direct contact with Kossuth. The work of the organization became more lively: the authorities found posted throughout seventeen towns a handbill Kossuth had sent from Italy calling - for the moment - for demonstrations and preparedness for action.

Early 1864 brought a rapprochement between the two factions of the organization, for Almásy, too, is said to have realized that without "Kossuth's ... name, one has no hold over the people". On March 13, 1864, the anniversary of the Viennese revolution, the Nedeczky group staged a grand demonstration throughout down-town Pest, cheering Kossuth and 1849. The arrests so carefully prepared on the basis of Asbóth's informations soon followed. Besides Almásy and Nedeczky, five representatives of the 1861 Parliament were arrested, and a whole series of intellectuals, landed noblemen, bourgeois, and former officers of the Hungarian Army. Many were compelled to flee abroad. The lawyer, Ignác Láng, who was Chief Commissioner of Pest in 1848, committed suicide; Major Emil Sebes was shot while attempting to escape. Stores of arms of various sizes were seized at Nagykanizsa, Esztergom, and Vác. The backbone of the - at any rate divided - secret organization had been successfully smashed. The harsh sentences were passed the beginning of 1865; the prisoners were then taken to Cisleithan goals, whence most of them could return only after the acceptance of the Compromise.42

⁴¹ D. 186. 1863–7.

⁴² Ibid 5, 8–12. – D. 185. 1863–782. – KLI. VII. p. 151. – Asbóth iratok pp. 172–174. – Tanárky pp. 282–286. – Búsbach II. pp. 304–305. – Berzeviczy IV. pp. 93–96. – Steier pp. 705–730. – L. Lukács pp. 335–353, 425–429. – M. Szakács pp. 115–116.

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1864 saw the last of the significant attempts to break absolutism and win Hungary's independence through armed resistance. Political leadership was ever more exclusively taken over by men who wished to put an end to absolutism through compromise – even, if need be, at the price of curtailed national self-determination, and a truncated constitutionalism.

THE REDOUBLING OF THE EFFORTS TO COME TO A COMPROMISE

As time wore on, ever larger numbers of Hungary's political leaders were feeling the situation produced by Provisional Rule to be intolerable. Many felt Schmerling's centralism to be a threat to their political goals just as much as were the nationalities, whom they saw as a direct challenge to the hoped-for restoration and preservation of Hungary's national integrity. Their fears were but augmented by the fact that Vienna – in part as a means of putting pressure on "the Magyars" – was waging an extraordinarily deliberate campaign to influence the nationalities.

And Vienna's success in this regard was commensurate with the Hungarians' failures. The Hungarian attempts to fraternize with the nationalities had bogged down in generalities; the last Parliament had failed to come to any concrete agreements, the majority being, at best, only half-hearted in its desire for rapprochement. The policy statements that had come out had little in common with the exiles' program and that of their true supporters within the country, and had served to alienate even those within the ranks of the nationalities who had worked to bring about co-operation.

The attempts to bridge over the differences among Hungary's peoples did not cease completely, but, for the most part, they were confined to outside the country's borders. I. I. Tkalac, the exiled Slav federalist publicist, General D. Stratimirović, chief of the Hungarian Serb insurgents in 1848–1849, and J. V. Frič, the outstanding democrat of the Czech national movement all sought to work hand in hand with Kossuth and Klapka.⁴³ The fundamental points of the proposal put forward by Miloš Popović were also very reminiscent of Kossuth's Constitutional Draft.⁴⁴

The struggle of the Hungarian exiles – rent by divisions though they were, and ever more thoroughly repudiated by the home politicians – their campaign for co-operation among the area's oppressed peoples could be seen in all of this to

"Popović's work discussed only Kossuth's 1848–1849 policies, and negatively at that, primarily because he had used one-sided sources. However, in his analysis of Eötvös' *A nemzetiségi kérdés* (The nationalities question) (EÖM. XVI. pp. 3–122) which appeared in 1865 he set forth fundamental demands which were very much consonant with those outlined in Kossuth's Constitutional Draft. Cf. *Popović* pp. 137–138.

⁴³ R. 90. I. 4315, 4317, 4323, 4338, 4359, 4360, 4362, etc. – KLI. VI. pp. 50, 57–78, 83–92. – *Tanárky* p. 321. – *E. Kovács* pp. 259–262. – *Tamborra, 1966.*

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have borne some fruit. There can be no doubt, however, that the period of Provisional Rule gave predominant influence to those politicians of the national minorities who, utterly disenchanted with the Magyars and encouraged by Schmerling, and not least importantly, influenced by their court-oriented high priests, were looking to Vienna for the redress of their grievances. Memoranda complaining of Magyar oppression followed upon memoranda reminding the Emperor of his yet unfulfilled promises; delegations of the nationalities travelled to Vienna or merely sent addresses there reassuring the sovereign of their loyalty. All this contributed to the tensions within the country, and made yet more profound the sense of isolation felt by most of Hungary's leading political group - a feeling that Schmerling played on with the skill of a master.⁴⁵

As early as 1862, Jókai noted that the advocates of imperial centralization had some "baited questions" on the nationalities issue to which there were no truly satisfactory answers: "Do you wish to fulfil the demands being made by the nationalities? - If we say 'Yes', they will charge us before the Magyar nation with agreeing to the partitioning of the country. - If we say we want to safeguard Hungary's integrity, they will charge us with wanting to lord it over the nationalities. - If we answer that we want to give concessions to those who want them, they will attack us for not giving similar ones to those who make no demands. ... If we say we want to give an equal measure of justice to all nationalities, they shall turn the Serbs and Croats against us with the accusation that we want to curtail ... their privileges." And he added: "And then, when the Magyar who had willingly enough started on a constitutional debate finds himself surrounded by beaters on all sides, and sees there is no way for him to break out of the ring, he finally tires out, and grows weary of and disgusted with the fruitless struggle, and says, 'I'd rather let the hunter take me than the beaters'. And then, everything quiets down". Jókai gave an excellent picture of both Vienna's tactics and of its impact on the Hungarian political leadership. But, having refused to endorse Virgil Szilágyi's – and indirectly, Kossuth's – plan for the way out of the dilemma, for a way of dispelling the Magyars' sense of isolation - not least of all so as to avoid the inevitable backlash of defiance - Jókai had precious little to offer in the way of constructive advice. He admonished the Magyars to self-discipline, and expressed his hope that the nationalities would come to see how very much the regaining of national self-determination was "in the interest of all"; for did it not offer to all citizens the most brilliant prospects of economic, social and cultural development? All this, however, could not inspire the nation's peoples to concerted action; any more than his excellent analysis of Schmerling's tactics could serve to countervail against them.46

⁴⁵ D. 191. 1863-III-24326. - Berzeviczy III. pp. 409-411. - Rapant pp. 132-144. - Bokes pp. 43-44. - Perényi pp. 68-70. - Bodea-Surdu II. pp. 192-193. - Gy. Szabad p. 607. - Jordáky pp. 31-33.

46 JMCB. VI. pp. 114-132.

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The sense of isolation felt by Hungary's leaders was heightened in a way that fulfilled all of Schmerling's expectations by the outcome of the Transylvanian Diet convened in Nagyszeben the summer of 1863. Two electoral "innovations" combined to give the Saxons unparalleled influence at the Diet. The new franchise regulation which extended the vote, but served principally the interests of centralization; and the Emperor's revived feudal right to invite non-elected members to sit with the representatives. The Saxons had almost three times as many delegates at the Diet as they should have had under a system of proportional representation. The proportion of the Hungarian delegates was slightly higher than the percentage they representated of the population; that of the Roumanians, on the other hand, was considerably lower. The political alignments that developed permitted the Saxons and the Roumanians to form a mutually supportive majority block. As a consequence – with the exception of three of the Emperor's appointees - the Hungarian representatives, who were a minority, boycotted the meetings of the Diet, which set about legislating the total coequality of the Roumanian nation with the Magyar and the Saxon, and that of the Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox religions with the Roman Catholic and the Protestant; and then accepted as "law" both the October Diploma and the February Patent. Finally, it chose the representatives to be sent to the Imperial Council.

As for the leading Hungarian politicians, they began increasingly to wonder whether instead of trying to find ways of winning the nationalities to a common anti-absolutistic stand, they ought not to be looking for ways of beating them to making a bargain with Vienna.⁴⁷ Schmerling's Transylvanian manoeuvre had, thus, succeeded in breaking the passive resistance of "the Magyars" though its long-term consequences for his centralizing policy were to be less favourable.

The voices raised in protest against the activities of the nationalities were acquiring ever more anti-democratic overtones. Press reports of the Transylvanian elections dwelt with no little satisfaction on the rabble-rousing allegedly going on, on the agitation for the "distribution" of the noble estates.⁴⁸

The new wave of peasant unrest that was sweeping the country further sapped the resistance of the majority of the Hungarian leaders. Most of the lawsuits over land redistribution reached their final stage after 1861. Clashes were the order of the day, and the Imperial Army was called out with increasing frequency to implement the verdict brought. There were even cases of the authorities – mistakenly – attributing to "Kossuthist" agitation the peasants' resistance to land redistribution – thus, for instance, in the predominantly Slovak community of Kelcse in Zemplén county. A series of bad harvests and the unprecedented

⁴⁷ Erdélyi okmánytár pp. 295–335. – Kónyi III. pp. 326–327. – Úrmössy II. pp. 110–146. – Berzeviczy IV. pp. 64–81. – M. Mester pp. 137–260. – Bodea-Surdu pp. 193–194. – Jordáky pp. 33–47.

⁴⁸ PN. 1863. July 7, 8, 20, Sept. 8. – Jordáky p. 48.

drought that parched the Great Plain in 1863 had sparked to flames the poor peasantry's discontent, so that wage demands were being driven home by strikes, and there were virtual bread-riots in the hardest hit areas.

The industrial working class, with its recurring attempts at union organization, and the periodically erupting discontent of the growing army of urban proletariate, day labourers and itinerant labourers were also sources of grave concern. The ruling classes disliked the thought of organized labour, but feared even more the possibility that the unorganized masses would, under such nebulous political conditions, join some "extreme" trend over which the ruling élite had no control.⁴⁹

The most vocal antidemocrats were those who truly feared the masses, and for this reason, too, urged alike the recognition of the aristocracy as the nation's leaders, and a compromise with the Habsburgs. Such a one was Gábor Kazinczy, who as early as 1860 had referred to 1848 as "a tasteless, immature piece of plagiarism", and who had coupled his condemnation of absolutism with a rebuff of the demands made by the nationalities in a tone more uncompromisingly impatient than that used by anyone else in Parliament. In 1862, he was already wondering "whether reaction might not often be right in the face of revolution's delirious demands"; and in 1863 – though in the course, it seems, of an urbarial law-suit – he declared: "The nation is lost, once the *power of spiritual* leadership is taken from the hands of the aristocracy."⁵⁰

Károly Vida mustered a series of antidemocratic arguments to support the cause of compromise with the Habsburgs. In 1862, we find him regretting that in 1848 it was not "the peasant" who was made to pay the compensation of the lands and services redeemed; and he took a decided stand against all further concessions: "In vain do you throw... to the masses the now tattered rags of its urbarial rights... the people, like an ocean... swallows these tiny donations, and becomes yet more voracious." It is not from the ruler that one must safeguard "the tree of the nation"; one must, rather, beware lest "we ourselves should aim the felling axe" through granting concessions to the nationalities, instead of coming to an agreement "with the Sovereign" behind their backs.⁵¹

Lajos Kovács's pamphlet of 1862 supported his arguments in favour of a compromise primarily in terms of this motif: "Long ago, it was from the flood of Turks and Tartars that we had to protect Europe's Western half; now, it is the East that we must protect – from *modern ideas*". In 1863, he expounded on his regret that, in 1848, when "we threw away our prerogatives, mobilized property... and established equality before the law we also welcomed, with

³⁰ Gábor Kazinczy (1860. Nov. 23/30, 1862. July 22, 1863. Sept. 29.) – to Ferenc Toldy, Ferenc Balássy and Count István Erdődy, Ekk. H. 89.

⁴⁹ Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 364–451. – Cf. P.S. Sándor 1961, A. Vörös 1951. pp. 92–97, 143–145, 151–161, 198, 228–242. – Pölöskei-Szakács I. pp. 72–76.

⁵¹ K. Vida 1862. pp. 53-55.

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a frenzy of joy, that new guest which came to us from the far West and introduced itself as the spirit of the age, as the joy-giving progenitor of the new world".⁵² And, although the concrete compromise plans of Lajos Kovács and his kind were repudiated by the papers of the Resolution and the Address Parties alike, their reactionary polemics were by no means without effect.

János Vajda, in two pamphlets published in 1862, *Onbírálat* (Self-criticism) and Polgárosodás (Embourgeoisement), was inspired to advocate compromise with the Habsburgs on very different grounds: the antidemocratism and the national prejudice that he saw rife among Hungary's political leaders during these critical years. Vajda condemned in no uncertain terms these "Tartuffs of patriotism", and - in complete antithesis to Lajos Kovács - declared: "We must become democrats in the Western-European sense of the word if we are to remain Magyars". Having conjoined the call for democratic transformation with the advocacy of compromise, Vajda was ruthlessly compelled to run the gauntlet. While they only polemicized against the antidemocratic Lajos Kovács and his comrades, the monopolizers of public opinion did everything to ostracize Vajda. The unkindest cuts of all were meted out by Pál Gyulai, who accused Vajda of abusing the great statesman's memory by "playing Széchenyi", and declared it necessary - in defence of the nation and of its leaders alike - to "demonstrate his immaturity, reprove his shallowness, and repudiate his false accusations". It is interesting to note that Gyulai's attack was rebuffed by the Jövő, which could not help but share Vajda's desire for a greater measure of democracy, much as it could not agree with the compromise he suggested.53 But Vajda was ostracized; it was, as he himself put it, "the actual danger of starving to death" which forced him to take up a post at a Viennese office of the Court Chancellery. Here, he had ample opportunity for losing not a few illusions. Upon his return to Hungary, it was to support a democratic-minded Kossuth's campaign against the Compromise that he again took up his pen.54 János Vajda, a democrat at heart, had travelled from one pole of the compromise issue to the other, though on roads of a direction quite antithetical to those traversed by the majority of the politicians with decisive say in Hungary's future.

Economic reasons – both genuine and supposed – seemed also to argue for the necessity of compromise. The landed nobility was able to market its produce relatively easily and generally at excellent prices both within the Empire, and abroad by means of the railways passing through Vienna or going down to Triest. For the most part, they were inclined to see both the agricultural boom that fundamentally characterized the period, and the capitalistic development consequent upon the abolition of feudalism as, in some sense, a function of the

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⁵² L. Kovács 1862. p. 1. – L. Kovács 1863. pp. 9–10.

⁵³ For all this, see: János Miklóssy. In: VJÖM. VI. pp. 374–391, 445–473. – Cf. Komlós, 1954. pp. 108–119.

⁵⁴ VJPI pp. 22-25, 93-114. Cf. Gy. Szabad 1960/a.

nation's being tied to Austria. A growing number of them hoped that the solution to their credit problems would come from Vienna, and - as some great and middle landowners, deliberately being wood by the Court through periodic grants of credit had found - not altogether without grounds. It was to satisfy the credit needs of this group, and to achieve the desired political effect, that the Hungarian Land Credit Institute was established on August 20, 1862, by special grace of His Majesty. Representatives of a variety of political forces favouring compromise united to form its board of directors under the leadership of Count Emil Dessewffy, Menyhért Lónyay, and Antal Csengery. The effect of all this was compounded by the rather deliberate talk started in Vienna at the time of the partial and transitional slump of the mid-60's, that should political stabilization finally be achieved, the boom would resume and, in fact, surpass all previous records. In Hungary, in the meanwhile, discussions of matters of finance and economy – issues of equal concern to the landowning class and the bourgeoisie - were ever more likely to lead to one and the same conclusion: the problems of taxation, the falling value of state bonds, the slower pace of railway building, in fact, the very questions of where and how to build it, the problems posed by the tariff system's discrimination against Hungarian industry and agriculture - all these could be expected to be solved through a compromise.55

The new possibilities raised by the hope of a compromise appealed to many of the now landless nobility, even to those for whom there had been no place or no security within the absolutist bureaucracy - in fact to men who, while they had identified with the policy of passive resistance, had not even sought to find such a place. A compromise, however, they saw as holding the prospect of good positions and good salaries in the new state and county offices, and in the army as well, and not only for themselves, but also for their sons who were growing ever more dissatisfied with the lean years that absolutism had brought. The "semi-constitutional" period of 1860-1861 had brought back a more colourful private and public life, one that tempted, nay, impelled them - in a frenzy of solution-seeking - from one extreme to the other: if there was no hope that absolutism would be terminated through an imminent war of liberation, then let its intolerable voke be shaken off through compromise. More and more people were beginning to see as "Realpolitik" an attitude which eschewed making "inflexible" demands the price of compromise; for though these might bear fruit for the future, they would bring no comfort within the lifetime of this "much tried" generation.56

On the international front, the prospects for winning Hungary self-determination seemed very bleak indeed. More and more people came to think that Italy

⁵⁶ Cf. D. 186. 1864–2. – Berzeviczy, 1909. pp. 220–224. – Podmaniczky III. pp. 193–197, 216–222. – For the inconsistencies of public opinion, see: Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 354–358.

⁵⁵ Gy. Kautz pp.527-618. - Gy. Vargha pp.295-304. - März pp.98-127. - Matis pp.128-144. - Gy. Szabad 1972. pp. 52-64.

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would long remain incapacitated by her own internal problems, and by the deterioration of her relationship with France over the question of Rome. The lessons to be learned from the tragic outcome of the latest Polish insurrection – which Hungarian volunteers had flocked to support – were just as discouraging: Czarist Russia was as ruthless, and public outrage throughout Europe as impotent as ever. There were, moreover, unmistakable signs of a thaw in Austro-French relations; and the British were as adamant as ever in regarding the Habsburg Empire an indispensable element of the European balance of power.

Hungary's political leaders were keeping an increasingly watchful eye also on developments in the German lands: there could be no doubt that Bismarck's taking over the helm had intensified the rivalry between Austria and Prussia. But while those committed to Hungary's independence were encouraged by the thought that the Habsburgs would now lose their footholds in Germany, their hopes waned when they saw the conservatism of Prussia's new policy-makers, and the readiness with which Berlin had helped St. Petersburg out in Poland.

In the meanwhile, there was quite a widespread revival of József Eötvös' argumentation – one meant also for Cisleithan ears – that only through introducing constitutional government throughout the Empire, and thus settling also the Hungarian question, could Habsburg Austria hope to become the leader of the unification of Germany. Many believed that, sooner or later, Vienna was bound to realize that all these issues were indeed as related as Eötvös saw them to be, and this played no small part in the fact that people were beginning actually to believe in the possibility of a compromise.⁵⁷

Yet although the sentiment in favour of compromise was growing stronger, the major political forces within the country were still biding their time. If ever the Resolution Party leadership put caution first it was now, after the wave of arrests the spring of 1864, for they knew that on the basis of the confessions wrested from the imprisoned members of the secret organization, the authorities could sweep down on them, too, anytime they wished. True, Tisza did say the autumn of 1864 that he deplored political inactivity, but as for the action that ought to be taken, he spoke of that only in generalities. Mostly, he enjoined the group he saw as the potential political leaders of Hungary – primarily the middle landowners, the gentry – to stand on guard for "moral superiority, for property – particularly landed property" – and to promote "the rapprochement of all the various layers of society", for these were the "cornerstones" of endurance and progress. Nevertheless, though Tisza steered clear of constitutional questions, it was a sign of the times that the autumn of 1864, *A Hon* (The Native Land), regarded as the official paper of the Resolution Party central leadership, listed in the most

⁵⁷ For all this, see the foreign affairs columns of the leading papers. Cf. Gonda pp. 25–27, 50–53. – J. Böhm 1964. pp. 84–113. – E. Kovács pp. 238–240, 264–268. – E. Kovács 1968. pp. 18–35. – Diószegi 1970. pp. 229–235. natural way possible "joint affairs" as one of the major points to be debated by the next Parliament.⁵⁸

For a long time, Ferenc Deák had advised his followers simply to waif. It was a stand that failed to find undivided support even within the former Address Party. The autumn of 1864, József Eötvös made up his mind to be the one to take the initiative. He sent a memorandum to Vienna, suggesting that, using the need to organize the famine relief as an excuse, they convene a new parliament. Once it is in session, the conditions for the resolution of the political situation will be more apparent. Eötvös'efforts met with failure; but even so, he strongly disapproved of Deák's "reduction to total impotence".⁵⁹

Deák did, in fact, refrain from all overtures to Vienna, but was all the more busy winning friends among the conservatives. The conservatives, in turn, had resumed their indefatigable campaign – in which Forgács's dismissal had caused a temporary lull – to fell Schmerling and to win the confidence of the Emperor. The government, too, watched with interest the ever closer ties between Deák and the conservatives. Governor Pálffy was obviously pleased to be able, the autumn of 1864, to send Chancellor Zichy a report by the Pest Chief of Police, who noted with some satisfaction that there would be no merger between the "Apponyi party" and the "Deák party"; adding that it was "desirable also from the point of view of the government" that Deák should remain the leader of the opposition, and thus prevent a more radical politician from taking that place. In fact, however, it was a question of far more than merely using Deák to check the more radical opposition elements.

The practical rout that the conservatives had suffered at the time of the October Diploma had convinced quite a few of them that, for their scheme to succeed, they would have to stay in the background, content to do the work of preparation and mediation. That is, they would have to let the formal bargaining. and even more, the actual making of the compromise be done by Deák, who, in 1861, had come out in defence of the 1848 Laws, and who was, thus - not least of all in virtue of this stand - the only one who might be able to win the majority to support the compromise solution that they had repeatedly tried to engineer, but, because of their isolation, without any success. Deák - whose own views were approaching those of the Apponyi group, though he was far from accepting the whole of their program - would have done nothing to jeopardize his influence over the nation by being identified with the former opponents of the changes wrought in 1848. Nevertheless, he realized only too well that co-operation with the conservatives was a sine qua non of winning the Emperor's confidence. For it was more than unlikely that Franz Joseph would receive kindly any Hungarian compromise initiative that had not even the support of the conservatives, the tried

⁵⁸ A Hon 1864. Nov. 8-18. - Cf. Ibid. 1864. Sept. 14. - S. Takáts LXXXVII-LXXXVIII.

³⁹ Falk pp. 227–228. – Ferenczi II. pp. 408–409. – Eötvös, Napló pp. 36–37. – J. Antall 1963. p. 101. – Galántai pp. 51–52. – Bódy p. 91.

GREATER EFFORTS TO REACH COMPROMISE

and tested opponents of revolution and separatism, and the only group within the country that had never questioned the chief of his sovereign prerogatives. Nevertheless, having made certain of the conservatives' readiness to co-operate, Deák bided his time until there could no longer be any doubt that the Emperor was willing to abandon Schmerling's experiment at centralization.⁶⁰

Schmerling's attempt to centralize the government of the Habsburg Empire through a peculiar blend of constitutional and absolutistic measures proved a failure. It became increasingly obvious that his methods were suited at most to tormenting Hungary, but neither to winning, nor to breaking her. That this was indeed the case was being recognized by more and more of the Cisleithan German liberals. The situation concerned them directly, for the cessation of Hungary's resistance appeared a precondition of Austria's being able to devote sufficient attention to German affairs. Their anxiousness to see at least this problem settled but grew when Czech and Polish opposition to Schmerling's policies became more vigorous: and when the authorities resorted to declaring a state of siege in the effort to keep in line the Poles of Galicia. A slump in the economy compounded Schmerling's political difficulties: his half-hearted economy measures, his military, tax and credit policies succeeded in infuriating the majority of his own parliament and many of the leaders of the Empire's economy, but could not restore balance to the state accounts. Parliament's alienation from him was accelerated when those urging liberal reforms constantly came up against the narrow limits of Schmerling's constitutionalism. His foreign policy failures were the last straw: the Habsburgs' efforts to win greater influence over German affairs were all fruitless; and though they won in the war against Denmark in 1864. squabbless over the division of the spoils threatened to end in imminent war against their ally, Prussia.

Four four years, Schmerling had been walking the tightrope between per'iament and Court, under constant crossfire from the liberal bourgeoisie and the conservative aristocracy. But he could keep it up no longer. The spring of 1865, the German liberals of the Imperial Council's House of Representatives prepared to launch an attack aimed at Schmerling's defeat; but by that time, Franz Joseph too, had decided that Schmerling had to go. For the Emperor was now hoping that a new conservative initiative would win the support of the Hungarian political forces led by Deák, and succeed in bringing about a compromise.⁶¹

⁶⁰ D. 186. 1864–3. – Kónyi III. pp. 319–325, 329–330, 337–338. – Ferenczi III. pp. 3–5.

⁶¹ Rogge II. pp. 252–269. – Kónyi III. pp. 379–385. – Redlich II. pp. 354–366. – Hantsch II. pp. 369–372. É. Somogyi 1976. pp. 42–59.

CHAPTER 5

THE COMPROMISE (1865–1867)

FERENC DEÁK'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL

In early 1865, when it was beginning to be rumoured that Schmerling was being made to abandon his plans for "regulating" Hungarian public administration and jurisdiction by decree, and people were claiming that, in keeping with the Emperor's wishes, the Council of Ministers had decided to start preparations for the convening of a parliament to discuss the matters of constitutional law,¹ there appeared a study by Ferenc Deák entitled *Adalék a magyar közjoghoz* (A Contribution to Hungarian Constitutional Law). Deák, and the co-author, Antal Csengery, wrote the study in refutation of Wenzel Lustkandl's work on constitutional law. Appearing in 1863, Lustkandl's book was, in fact, the summation of all the arguments that did more than merely declare that the Hungarians had "forfeited their rights" advanced in Cisleithania to justify Vienna's rejections of the resolutions of the 1861 Hungarian Parliament.

Deák's first move was to prove the untenability of the claim that, although the 1848 Laws had received royal sanction, the circumstances of their passing divested them of legality. In a brilliant analysis, he demonstrated that the circumstances criticized - a number of the delegates voted in a way contrary to the instructions² they had received; while in the Upper House, a resolution was carried merely by acclamation – were to be found attending the passing also of the 1687 and 1723 Laws of succession so highly valued by the Habsburgs. He pointed out the contradiction in Lustkandl's claim that the 1848 Laws - which he had declared prima facie to lack legal force - were invalidated by Parliament's dethroning the Habsburgs in 1849. With subtle irony, he implied that here the Austrian jurist was raising the shades precisely of the absolutist "forfeiture of ights" theory that he had been at such pains to dissociate himself from. But the greatest part of Deák's critique was devoted to the refutation of the claim that Hungary had, at one time, been joined in some "real union" with the "hereditary lands", one that went beyond their having had the same sovereign. He emphasized that his own conceding that the direction of foreign affairs was a matter of royal prerogative did nothing to change the fact that "in matters of

² The delegates to the 1848 Diet were bound by the instructions they had been given by the County Assembly.

¹ Kónyi III. pp. 332-333. - Redlich II. pp. 337-338. - Sashegyi, 1959. p. 107.

constitutional law, too, [Hungary] was an independent country, one which the ruler addressed separately, and one which made legislative decisions together with its king separately and independently of the peoples of Austria".

Those hoping finally to engineer a compromise were concerned that Deák's decided stand would jeopardize the success of their efforts. Zsigmond Kemény, on the other hand, in a letter written in January of 1865 compared Deák's work to a kind of "inventory" of mutual rights, something that was of great "practical value" precisely "when the parties are negotiating". Deák's stature as the defender of the constitution was enormously enhanced with the appearance of this work but how far he himself had no desire to have it become an obstacle to a compromise must have been obvious to any careful reader of its foreword. For in it, Deák expressed his regret that Lustkandl "did not seek to find a solution through the reconciliation of the various views and interests".³

By the time Deák's study appeared, he had received assurances that any effort at "reconciliation" that he might initiate would be well received at court. After Christmas of 1864, Baron Antal Augusz, a confidant of the Emperor's elder cousin, the former Lieutenant Governor of Hungary, Archduke Albrecht, went to see Deák. He left with a written statement of Deák's ideas on how legal continuity could be restored to Hungary's government through both parties' accepting the Pragmatic Sanction as the "alpha and omega" of constitutional relations within the Monarchy. The discussion also yielded a definition of the scope of "joint affairs" and gave suggestions for the manner of their handling. It was the Emperor himself who empowered Augusz to continue his negotiations. At two subsequent meetings, the two men worked out the precise German translation of Deák's suggestions, and Augusz was assured that should the constitutional preconditions of reconciliation be granted, they could count on the House of Representatives to give the cause of a compromise their undivided support.⁴

Behind the scenes, preparations were being made for the change of régime at a number of levels. Count Richard Belcredi, the Governor of Bohemia and a man who was trusted in Cisleithan conservative circles, was received in a private audience by the Emperor, and informed that a new era was about to open, and that he was to play a key role in it. The decision was taken to submit the administrative and judicial reforms planned for the country for the approval of the Hungarian Parliament, and Chancellor Zichy was enjoined by the Emperor to suspend trial by military courts, and to start preparations for the convening of parliament. Zichy had had power conflicts with Móric Pálffy who had been vested with emergency powers, and was glad to take the opportunity to suggest the

⁴ E. Wertheimer: Neues zum Osterartikel Deáks vom Jahre 1865. PL. Abendblatt. 1923. April 28. – Redlich II. pp. 387–391. – Hanák, 1974. pp. 572–577 – Cf. Beksics pp. 273–275.

10 Szabad György

³ Ferenc Deák pp. 4, 6–16, 23, 87–171. – Cf. Kónyi III. pp. 344–379. – Beksics pp. 265–266. – Ferenczi II. pp. 414–432. – Hanák, 1974. pp. 569–572.

dismissal of the Governor, and to propose the restoration of the traditional sphere of authority of the Consilium Locumtenentiale. On April 5, 1865, Franz Joseph gave his assent to this plan. Pálffy's actual replacement, however, was delayed by events which were to lead to the dismissal of the entire group behind Provisional Rule.⁵

In the course of the budget debate that started on March 27, 1865 in the Imperial Council's House of Representatives, Schmerling was attacked even more vehemently than had been expected. Formerly, he had been able to intimidate the representatives - who dreaded the thought both of the return of absolutism, and of the conservative federalists' assumption of power - and to keep them in line by threats that his fall would mean the end of the "constitutionalism" of the February Patent. Now, though he threatened the representatives with his resignation preceding the debate, his policies were censured more sharply than ever before. Only a few months previously, Schmerling had justified his "Hungarian policy" by claiming that the situation was not yet ripe for change: "In a country so agitated and full of passion, it is very difficult to find men willing to swim against the tide". Now, he expressed his hope that "the many people in Hungary who are convinced of the immediate necessity of their country's becoming closely tied to Austria, and of the imperial constitution's coming at last into effect in Hungary, too ... will finally be courageous enough to openly proclaim this conviction". His critics, however, were not satisfied. Moriz Kaiserfeld, who had, from the start, been very critical of Schmerling's "Hungarian policy", demanded that the Hungarian Parliament be allowed to convene without further delay, so that there might finally come about a "reconciliation" satisfactory of Hungary's constitutional aims "provided that the idea of the Empire is duly recognized". Schmerling's reply was by no means totally negative. He declared that he, too, like Kaiserfeld, sympathized with the aims of the "Hungarian liberal party" (the name Viennese publicists had given the Deák Party). But he considered "the ultraconservatives" his foes, and regretted that Hungary's political aim was not "compromise" in what he felt was the desirable sense of the word. To his mind, a precondition of return of good relations was "a thoroughgoing revision of the 1848 Laws, so that before their validity might be recognized, the 1848 Laws might be cleansed of everything that conflicts with our constitution".6

Schmerling's statement could not be left unanswered by those of Hungary's politicians who had, in fact, already started their behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Court. Even less so, now, that Schmerling – sensing his power shaken – had abandoned his "forfeiture of rights" argument, and was offering compromise, and on the conditions that the 1848 Laws would be revised and the

⁵ D. 186. 1864-4, 1865-5. - Redlich II. p. 339. - Engel-Jánosi, 1971. IX-X.

⁶ Rogge II. pp. 258–259. – Kónyi III. pp. 380–396. – Ferenczi III. pp. 6–7. – Cf. Wertheimer I. pp. 211–215. – Cf. É. Somogyi 1976. pp. 61–68.

ultraconservatives left out of things at that. The Minister of State's initiative, however, could hardly escape the suspicion of being but a tactical move, with dividing the forces working for compromise as its main goal. As for the co-operation between Deák and the conservatives, for one, things had gone too far for them to be able to draw back now; for another, both parties believed that such co-operation was the sine qua non of winning the Emperor's confidence. But they were determined to do without Schmerling in the working out of the compromise. Not only because, for all his belated obligingness, he proved to be an insatiable negotiator; but also because it would have been most difficult for the Deák group to sell as a national victory any possible compromise agreement in which Schmerling – regarded as the embodiment of the efforts to merge Hungary into the Empire – had had any direct role to play.

Another one of Augusz's visits probably had a great deal to do with Deák's decision to speak out on the matter. We do not know which of the two parties initiated the fourth discussion that took place on April 7 between Deák and the Emperor's delegate. Franz Joseph might have been impelled to bring things to a head by the overtly threatening confrontation between the Austrian and Prussian representatives that had taken place in the Bundestag but a few days earlier. As for Deák, he had reason to fear that Franz Joseph might again fall under the influence of his Minister of State. That Deák was indeed apprehensive on this score seems supported by Augusz's report to the Emperor, wherein after praising Deák's "fidelity" and "loyalty" in the most extravagant terms, he emphasized the fact that the Hungarian statesman was willing to support a settlement built only on the Pragmatic Sanction, and by no means on the "February Constitution".⁷

Thus it was that there appeared in the *Pesti Napló* on April 16, 1865 Deák's anonymous "Easter article". The author's identity was soon known to all. It is an indication of Deák's excellence as a tactician that it was in the form of a refutation of an article in a Viennese journal that he gave expression to his willingness to see a revision of the 1848 constitutional laws. He never directly said so, but there could be no mistaking his meaning: "Our goal is both to insure the Empire's complete security, and to maintain the basic laws of the Hungarian Constitution as far as possible..."; in other words, "We shall ever be prepared through the means provided by the law to bring our own laws into harmony with the demands of the complete security of the Empire". Deák derived all rights and duties from the Pragmatic Sanction,⁸ and added the warning: "It would be neither rightful, nor prudent to abolish more [of the rights and laws guaranteeing] Hungary's

⁷ See Note 4 of this chapter. Cf. E. Kovács, 1968. pp. 55-58.

⁸ The validity of the "Pragmatica Sanctio" was recognized also by the Prologue of the 1848 Laws. The Hungarian drafters of these Laws, however, interpreted the nation's constitutional tie with the Cisleithan provinces to be solely that of a dynastic union, a circumstance reflected in the wording to be found in § 6 of the 1848: 18 Law, i.e. "the imperial tie specified by the Sanctio Pragmatica, and consisting in the community of the ruling house". constitutional status than is indispensably necessary to guarantee the Empire's secure endurance". Having thus declared his willingness to come to an agreement, Deák took a side-swipe at Schmerling: in the past, he said, it was mostly certain "Austrian statesmen" who had caused the conflicts between the Hungarian nation and the House of Habsburg; but such conflicts were bound to be resolved once their adverse influence was done away with, and the ruler's love of justice again had free sway. Schmerling's opponents in the Imperial Council could not help but note Deák's last important point: his resuscitation of the pre-48 opposition's demand that "constitutional liberty be given the Cisleithan countries and be allowed full development" as one of the preconditions of a settlement.⁹

By May 8, the day the House of Representatives of the Imperial Council defeated Schmerling's budget, Deák was already giving concrete expression to his proposals. The May 7 to May 9 issues of Count György Apponyi's Viennese paper contained a compromise proposal; two weeks later, the Pesti Napló declared that the proposal reflected Deák's own position. The major elements of this "May program" can be traced to the conservative memorandum submitted by Apponyi in 1862. Deák, too, declared the "joint affairs" to include "the upkeep of the ruler's household" and foreign affairs and defence, and the means of financing them. And he, too, declared a common trade and tariff policy to be a necessity. He suggested that the "joint administration of the joint affairs" be entrusted to coequal delegations of the Cisleithan and the Hungarian Parliaments. He emphasized that any settlement to be made on these conditions presupposed a number of necessary steps: the nomination of a Hungarian government; the convening of the Hungarian Parliament, of the Transylvanian Diet, and of the Croatian Sabor, and the enjoining of the latter two to send representatives to sit in the former; the working out of a new constitutional system using the means of communication between ruler and Parliament provided for by law and custom; the ruler's coronation as King of Hungary; and finally, the creation and sanctioning of the new laws. For the moment, Deák said nothing on two issues that had been significant features of Apponyi's former memorandum. He made no explicit reference to the modification of the 1848 Laws; nor to the sovereign powers that the ruler was to enjoy under the new constitution.10

PREPARING FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM THROUGH ABSOLUTISTIC MEANS

Though the third part of Deák's anonymous "May program" – that dealing with the "delegations" and the chronological order of the steps leading to constitutionalism – appeared in Vienna, police censors prohibited its publication

⁹ Kónyi III. pp. 396-408. - Ferenczi III. pp. 8-17. - Kecskeméthy pp. 186-187.

¹⁰ Kónyi III. pp. 411-429.

in Hungary. The prohibition remained in effect even after the *Pesti Napló* announced two weeks later that the series of articles in Mór Ludassy's paper had "faithfully" reflected Deák's views, and that "only the obstacles peculiar to the conditions of publication" in Hungary had prevented the appearance of the last of them within the country, too.

It was not only as a protest against the muzzling of the press that the above comment of Zsigmond Kemény's paper was significant; it was important also in that it endowed Deák's compromise suggestion with the aura of the persecuted opposition, a gesture with no small impact on the rather undecided state of public opinion throughout the country.11 And just in time, too. For it was not only beneficiaries of absolutism who criticized the program, men like Kecskeméthy, who noted in his diary: "Deák's program, as it stands in the Debatte, is ultraconservative enough. It takes as its premiss the pretty story that all evil is from the ministers, and all good from the Emperor." Eötvös thought that the program's "practical side is extraordinarily weak and not at all practical, for the means proposed for the handling of joint affairs are unacceptable, and even if they were accepted, would necessarily lead to just the state of affairs that Deák wants to avoid". As for Kálmán Ghyczy, the highly respected President of the 1861 Parliament, he wrote Deák, with no small dissatisfaction, that "he had started down a steep slope". And though Ghyczy admitted that circumstances made it very hard to judge "the sentiment of the country", he warned Deák - who had drafted the resolutions in defence of legality at the last parliament that "of the entire country, Pest had the most unhealthy political atmosphere", one most debilitating of "the staunch resolution taken in 1861".¹²

Deák's articles were, however, soon followed by the conspicuous fall of the system identified with Schmerling. Public opinion, which had come completely under the sway of the advocates of compromise, credited Deák with its achievement, and voices of criticism were, for the most part, silenced.

The Imperial Council's House of Representatives refused to support Schmerling not only in the budget, but also in the constitutional debate. It thus gave unmistakable expression to its determination to have done with absolutism, and to see semi-constitutional rule replaced by a responsible, parliamentary government through the Imperial Council. A change of personnel soon followed the series of parliamentary crises. At the end of June, Count Hermann Zichy, the Hungarian Chancellor, and Count Ferenc Nádasdy, the Transylvanian Chancellor were both dismissed. Prime Minister Archduke Rainer was relieved of his post; Minister of State Schmerling resigned.

György Mailáth was named the new Chancellor of Hungary; he had won the Emperor's esteem when, of all the conservatives, he alone rose to defend the

¹² Kecskeméthy p. 187. – Eötvös, Napló pp. 102–104. – Kónyi III. pp. 429–430. – Cf. Ferenczi III. pp. 21–22. – Galántai p. 65.

¹¹ PN. 1865. May 23. - Kónyi III. pp. 413, 421. - Beksics pp. 277-278.

October Diploma during the last days of the 1861 Parliament. The new head of the Transylvanian Chancellery became General Count Ferenc Haller. On July 1, the military courts were done away with. The powers of the Consilium Locumtenentiale suspended under Provisional Rule were restored, and, at its head, Count Móric Pálffy was replaced by Baron Pál Sennyey. But Schmerling and his ministers still retained their portfolios in the caretaker government headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Mensdorff-Pouilly. They were not actually dismissed until July 27, 1865, the day the Imperial Parliament ended, and the day the new government led by Count Richard Belcredi was installed. Of the old cabinet, it was only Foreign Minister Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, a personal confidant of the Emperor's and Carl von Franck, the Minister of War, who retained their portfolios. Count Móric Esterházy, who had played the role of the opposition in Schmerling's cabinet, was again part of the government as Minister without Portfolio.

Prime Minister Belcredi took upon himself immediate responsibility also for the Ministries of State and Police, a circumstance which gave him quite extraordinary powers, the Empire's administrative structure being what it was.¹³ However, from the first moments of the new government's assumption of office, Franz Joseph made it clear that he continued to reserve the making of policy and all other decisions of consequence for himself. He did so partially because he could not help but be an autocrat; but also because he believed that it would be best if he continued to lead the negotiations in progress with the Hungarian advocates of a compromise. At the first meeting of the new government, he declared "the unity of the monarchy" to be the most important "basic principle", and specially called upon the Hungarian members of the Council of Ministers, Esterházy and Mailáth, to "defend this basic principle with all their strength, more explicitly against their own homeland, whence they shall meet with certain attacks, and where they shall encounter a certain opposition".¹⁴

This time, the change of government was really a preparation for a change of régime. The Emperor and his new government hoped that the resolution of "the Hungarian question" would prove to be the means of securing the precarious unity of the Empire.

The Gastein Compromise, which, for the moment, averted an Austro-Prussian War, was signed already by the Belcredi government. There can be little doubt that Austria backed down at Gastein to stabilize the international scene, so that – now that negotiations for a settlement with Hungary looked promising – it might be in a position to drive as hard a bargain as possible. It was an Empire revitalized through the compromise that Austria's rulers wanted to see come out

¹³ D. 215. 1865–II–15–49204, 53120, 58392, 59534. – Rogge II. pp. 264–272. – Wertheimer I. pp. 217–218. – Lorenz p. 425. – Zimprich p. 101. – Engel-Jánosi, 1971. XII–XVI.
 ¹⁴ PdÖM. VI/1 pp. 3–9. Cf. Redlich II. pp. 406–409. – Rumpler pp. 72–73.

on top at the next round to be fought in the ring of diplomacy, when hegemony over Germany would be the stakes.¹⁵

In early September of 1865, Franz Joseph convoked the Transylvanian Diet for mid-November, and adjourned the already ongoing sittings of the Croatian Sabor in a set of moves that well illustrates the profoundly contradictory nature of the preparations being made for the transition to constitutionalism. On Sept. 17, he convoked the Cisleithan Landtage for a late autumn session, and the Hungarian Parliament for Dec. 10. Three days later, an Imperial Decree announced the "suspension" of the February Patent, and a recess in the sittings of the present central representative body, the Imperial Council. There could be no doubt that Franz Joseph and his government had determined to try to settle "the Hungarian question" and to reorganize the government of the Empire without the encumbrance of the semi-constitutional February Patent.¹⁶

Hungary's political leaders regarded the convocation of Parliament as earnest of the constitutionalism to come; and welcomed the suspension of the February Patent as a sign that the policy of Germanizing centralization had been abandoned. The Cisleithan German liberals, on the other hand, saw in the Council's "suspension" the joining of the forces of absolutism and feudalism, the victory of the anti-constitutional forces threatening the unity of the Empire. Accordingly, they protested against it both before the Landtage convened, and in the course of their debates. The Landtage with Bohemian, Moravian, Polish, Ukrainian, South-Slav and Italian majorities voted to accept the "suspension" of the February Patent, not a few of them after waging – as did the Landtag in Prague – a fierce battle with the German representatives who, locally, could muster but a minority. At the same time, most of the Landtage demanded genuine powers of self-government.¹⁷

Belcredi's goal, in fact, was to bring about a situation in which a supra-national dynasty would, with the help of the aristocracy, rule the two counterpoised halves of the Empire: the federated "Western" half, and that to be united under the aegis of the Crown of St. Stephen, the "Eastern". This being so, it was highly likely that both of the groups which supported Belcredi in his annihilation of Schmerling's system – those urging a constitutional federative, and those working for a constitutional dualist "solution" – would find unsatisfactory in certain respects the system that he proposed to put in its place.¹⁸

From the moment his government assumed office, it was quite obvious that Belcredi, though he would use them tactfully, was determined to use all the

¹⁵ Renouvin V. p. 360. - Taylor pp. 157-158. - E. Kovács 1968. pp. 64-80.

¹⁶ PdÖM. VI/1. pp. 15–16, 25–36, 50–56, 62–70. – Cf. D. 215. 1865–II–15–73991. PN. 1865. Sept. 21, 22. – *Redlich* II. pp. 436–439. – *Zimprich* pp. 106–108.

¹⁷ É. Somogyi 1973. pp. 883–898. – Cf. Rogge II. pp. 300–312. – PN. 1865. Dec. 28. – Redlich II. pp. 434–444. – Zimprich pp. 109–110.

¹⁸ For a variety of views on Belcredi's ideas, see: *Redlich* II. pp. 575-581. – *Wierer* pp. 75-77. – *Kann* II. pp. 133-134. – *Zimprich* pp. 102-106. – *É. Somogyi* 1976. pp. 75-85.

instruments of absolutism at his disposal. In Cisleithania, this meant first and foremost the dissolution of the central parliament; in Hungary - where historical precedent had made the convening of Parliament the sine qua non of any settlement - absolutism's primary weapon was the strict restriction of opportunities for organization and for the expression of political opinion. The government did not credit with self-discipline even the political groups in fact working for a compromise, much less the country at large. It could, thus, hardly believe that more political liberty would not again backfire, as it had done in 1860-1861. It made sure of things by leaving the Imperial Gendarmerie in Hungary until the signing of the Compromise, and in Transylvania even thereafter; as for the armed force stationed in the country, it was under the direct command of officers responsible solely to the Emperor. György Mailáth was unable to accomplish as much as to have the Ministry of Police recognize the competence of the Chancellery to deal with union affairs in Hungary. "Press crimes" were still defined and prosecuted on the basis of an ordinance issued during the last days of Zichy's chancellorship, one providing for the implementation of the repressive ruling of 1852 which prescribed rigorous punishment for any statement against "the uniform Austrian Imperial tie, the Austrian Imperial or the various national constitutions, the Austrian Imperial or the national administrations". After the advent of the Belcredi government, sentences already passed by the military tribunals for press crimes were not executed, but the press did not become free. It was not merely a matter of self-censorship, something that Eötvös, anxious to preserve the unity of the nascent Deák party, also practised, while emphasizing to a private correspondent: "My paper is much less an opposition paper than I myself would like it to be". Vienna, too, set limits to the free exchange of ideas, in order to prevent undesirable arguments and demands from crossing the compromise plans being made. In August of 1865, for instance, the police confiscated a professional legal journal - which could hardly be said to have been widely read - because it published an article urging the restoration of the autonomy of the counties, because, in short, it gave expression to a demand that those in power wished to ignore – at least until the compromise had become a fait accompli.19

The conservatives, now that they were once more in power, were anxious to forestall the forces that had frustrated their plans in 1860–61. To this end, they did everything they could to gain control of the organs of self-government within the country. They made a thorough review of the Lords Lieutenant of all the counties and, through a great many replacements and financial concessions, made sure that all could be counted on to support their policies. Chancellor Mailáth's instruction of August 26, 1865 made the Lord Lieutenant not only the

¹⁹ D. 185. 1865–782. – D. 215. 1865–II–15–49204. – Törvényszéki Csarnok 1865: 62.
– PN. 1865. Sept. 1. – Kónyi III. p. 445. – J. Antall 1963. p. 107. – Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 112–116.
– Galántai pp. 70–72.

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omnipotent director of the county's administration, one who, in the interest of keeping "order" could bid the competent military authority to send in the armed forces; but also empowered him to regulate the salaries of the county officials, and even to suspend or to replace them as he saw fit. It was only for filling the post of First Deputy-Lieutenant that he needed to submit the name of his nominee for the government's approval.

Mailáth justified keeping in operation the administrative and judiciary systems introduced by Provisional Rule with the argument that self-government must remain suspended in order that "parliamentary discussions might be peacefully initiated as soon as possible". To the same end, the Royal Commissioners – whose jurisdiction over the urban municipalities was similar to that of the Lords Lieutenant over the counties – were given the right to alter the structure of the greater town councils and were obliged to prevent these bodies from as much as touching on political issues.²⁰

This failure to restore self-government to the counties excited a great deal of protest, and caused no little consternation even within Deák's camp. The soothing articles that appeared in the *Pesti Napló*, among them one by Menyhért Lónyay defending the government's action, were all to no avail. Antal Csengery's brother informed him that the county's electors would not choose him for their parliamentary representatives if he did not openly come out against those conspiring to camouflage this blatant disregard of the counties' right to self-government. Csengery – who was generally known to be Deák's confidant – wrote to reassure his brother that "it's certainly not a matter of the nation's having to do away with the counties, nor of their not being restored to their legal functions before the settlement is concluded. My information is that the government has undertaken to restore full legality. It is only on this condition that it has the support of Deák and his party".²¹

The Deák group resigned itself to the fact that the authorities insisted on doing without the central parliament in Cisleithania, and without the self-governing counties in Hungary in this particular phase of the negotiations. As Ferenc Salamon, one of Deák's circle, put it, "It was an open secret that in the highest circles, where the entire new twist was conceived and worked out, it had been specified as a necessary precondition that the counties not be restored" until after the convening of parliament.²²

However, the Deák group was most anxious to ensure that the legality of the parliament convoked to make the momentous decision would never be called into question. They wanted, thus, to have its members chosen in the manner specified by the 1848 electoral law which directed that the "central steering committees" in

²⁰ D. 185. 1865–945, 1000, 1080. – D. 186. 1865–18, 19, 21. – Sashegyi, 1965. pp. 118–119. – Galántai p. 69.

²¹ PN. 1865. Aug. 21, Sept. 11, 18, 25, Oct. 16, 25. – Kónyi III. pp. 451–453. – Csengery IV. pp. 264–268.

22 OgyEK. 1867. p. 71.

charge of supervising the election be chosen by the county general assemblies and town councils. Deák most decidedly opposed the alternative plan of reviving the "central committees" that had been set up in 1861; and thus, the convoking of the county assemblies could be put off no longer. They were, in fact, called to meet, but with the proviso that they were not to engage in political debate. And so the electors flocked to the purely formal assemblies, and encountered everywhere the advocates of compromise who spared no effort to convince them that the infringement of this proviso would jeopardize the very holding of parliament. Chancellor Mailath sent the Lords Lieutenant a confidential circular full of good advice on how to keep order, and gave them a free hand to do it. He counselled them to use "confidential means" to persuade the committee members to refrain from all political debates, but, should persuasion fail, he empowered them to dissolve the recalcitrant committees, and revive those of 1861, rounding out their numbers where needed. He even empowered them to forego the calling of the general assembly altogether and to choose the members of the electoral steering committee at a "confidential meeting".

It was, thus, in an atmosphere by no means free of conflict that the "central streering committees" were chosen by general assemblies forbidden the expression of political opinion and kept more or less docile by every kind of pressure that absolutism had at its disposal.²³

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No organized parties appeared during the Hungarian parliamentary elections. The core of the former Address Party, already commonly referred to as the "Deák-party", drew the benefits to be derived from the growing willingness of the groups which set the trend of Hungarian politics to come to an agreement with the Habsburgs; and the government, too, gave the Deák party its direct and indirect support. The conservatives, who represented the interests of too small a societal group to be able to count on electoral victore in their own right, fought for the victory of the Deák party with all the means at their disposal. This is what Gusztáv Beksics - a great admirer of the Compromise and one who received his informations about its engineering from contemporaries - had to say to prove the unselfishness of the campaign waged by the conservatives: "Mailath arranged the elections in such a way that almost in every case the candidates of the Deák-party would have support." This support was manifest in the most discrepant ways: from the nominations, which the Lords Lieutenant were in the position to influence; throughout the very weighted campaigning that was allowed to take place; right to the elections, where bloody clashes that the army was called in to settle were not uncommon. In practice, they made sure that the conservative candidates and those of the Deák party did not jeopardize one another's chances:

²³ D. 185. 1865–1073. – PN. 1865. Sept. 24, 27, Oct. 1–4, 7. – Kónyi III. pp. 451–453. – Sashegyi, 1965. p. 120. – Galántai pp. 79–82.

for the most part, both groups supported the latter's, though there were places where – as in Pozsony (Bratislava), where Count Emil Dessewffy was the conservative candidate – it was agreed that the Deák party's candidate should withdraw.²⁴ It was not only through the power they had to implement the restrictive rulings that the conservatives made their weight felt; they used every means of behind-the-scenes manipulation known: from outright bribery to vague, but very personally appealing promises of good things to come. It had been on the conservatives' advice that the Habsburgs had grown even more deliberate in their use of titles and honours to win support for their policies. Distinctions had been conferred to this end since the time of the October Diploma; but the period between the autumn of 1865 and the coronation brought a veritable flood of honours and titles to those deemed to have earned them.²⁵

The restrictions on the press were such that any substantial refutation of the Deák party's propaganda could receive very little publicity. The left-wing of the Resolution Party had no independent press organ; as for the leaders of the party majority - soon dubbed the Center-Left - their support of Deák's policies in the weeks preceding the election was so complete, that there were rumours of the two parties' forthcoming fusion, and some people even claimed that "the Resolution Party had ceased to exist". In fact, it was merely a matter of the Tisza group's neither wanting, nor daring to stand in the way of a compromise with the Habsburgs. For they had turned their backs on all attempts at co-operation with the nationalities through concrete agreements, and had repudiated the growing forces of democracy; thus, they, too, were looking to settle the matter through some sort of compromise. The nature of their fears was well reflected by an article in A Hon defending the given restrictions on the franchise against those who "would, with the help of the ignorant masses, destroy democracy with democracy". There was yet another weighty reason for the considerable passivity of the former Resolution Party leadership, for their confining their political statements to the widest generalities: many of them, Kálmán Tisza and his lieutenant, Frigyes Podmaniczky among them, knew only too well that the authorities regarded them as having at least tacitly supported the "conspiracy" of the secret organization so severely punished but the beginning of the year. All this serves to make quite comprehensible Podmaniczky's post-election diary entry. "Frankly, I should not have liked it if the former Resolution Party had been able to win a majority."26

²⁴ PN. 1865. Nov. 30. - Kónyi III. pp. 471-472.

²⁵ K. 19. LXVII–LXVIII. kötet. – Typical examples: D. 185. 1865–1638, 1671, 1681, 1866–377, 385, 451, 1306, 1867–8, 42, 77, 151, 163, etc.

²⁶ A. Hon 1865. Sept. 10. – Kónyi III. pp. 467–468. – Podmaniczky III. p. 234. – S. Takáts XCIV–XCV. S. Sebestény p. 141. – There is a great deal of truth in the comment made by Kossuth's paper the end of 1866, that "It is due in no small part to Kálmán Tisza's conduct that during the last six years the left has been practically little more than a decorative background to the theoretical victories of the Deák party." N. No. 2 p. 10.

Quite unlike the majority's courteous deference to the Deák party was the stand taken by the former Resolution Party left-wing, the group the papers commonly referred to – not without a pejorative overtone – as the "Extreme-Left". In spite of all the blows they had suffered under Provisional Rule, they fought a fierce campaign so that those urging the nation to "stand its ground" might at least have a voice in the House of Representatives. The scales were extraordinarily heavily weighted against the candidates of the "Extreme-Left". Albert Németh, for instance, who had not long before been released from prison, refused to stand for election, adding that it was " impossible" to give his reasons for it. Presumably, he had refused under pressure from the authorities. Virgil Szilágyi ran as a candidate for Pest; but without press support, and without any real opportunity to express his views, he had no genuine chance.

At times, it took much more to defeat a leftist candidate. It allegedly cost Count László Czebrián 25,000 forints, and required the mobilization - by the Lord Lieutenant, Count Antal Forgách - of the entire county administrative apparatus, the gendarmerie and the army for him to defeat Ferenc Kubinyi by even a few votes. Kubinyi contested the results, and resigned his post as President of the Department of Mathematics and Natural Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences after a small majority of academicians upheld - Kubinyi felt at Deák's bidding - the politically insignificant Count Czebrián's victory, clear though it was that the election had been "fixed" through bribery and intimidation. The Pesti Naplo's report on the election could hardly be accused of objectivity: it emphasized that Kubinyi had been supported by "the rabble", and it was by way of protection from its excesses that Count Czebrián's supporters needed the help of the army. In Eger, though the Consilium Locumtenentiale had forbidden the practice, the voting was by secret ballot. It was thus that the "leftist" Sándor Csiky could win, much to the displeasure of the Pesti Napló's local correspondent, who reported that the victory celebrations "reminded us of scenes of the French Revolution".27

It was mostly those of the "Extreme-Left" whom the compromise-oriented press accused of demagogy. It was probably not only in his diary that Menyhért Lónyay expressed in the heat of the campaign his opinion that even Count Móric Esterházy, a Minister since 1861 and one who "knew no Hungarian" was "a hundred times more of an Hungarian than the thoroughly cosmopolitan $J\ddot{o}v\check{o}$ -group, who do nothing but chase after the brilliant specter (sic) of demagogy". As for the slandered "Extreme-Left", they had long ago been deprived of their paper, the $J\ddot{o}v\check{o}$ (Future), and thus had no real opportunity to reply to these charges. It was, nevertheless, probably the Resolution Party left-wing which initiated the movement to reelect the representatives of the 1861 parliament dissolved because they had "stood their ground". Deák himself was at

²⁷ D. 215. 1865–II–15/1866–711/7. – R. 90. I. 5420. – PN. 1865. Nov. 25, 29. Dec. 3. – A Hon 1865. Nov. 29. Dec. 22. – S. Sebestény p. 143. pains to repudiate this initiative – rightly seeing it as a threat to the success of his plans – by emphasizing that endorsing the principles of the previous parliament did not necessarily imply attachment to the persons of its members: To make reelecting them a moral obligation would, moreover, be an "unrightful restriction" of the "free vote".²⁸

The election results were, in fact, a veritable landslide. But four years after the previous parliament had been dissolved, less than half of its representatives were reelected. Once the Transylvanian delegates arrived, the parliamentary majority were men who had had nothing to do with the resolutions of 1861. The growing determination of Hungary's political leaders to make the compromise, their monopoly of mass communications, and the conditions under which the elections took place all made for the victory of the Deák party. The distribution of the seats - although with the close voting in so many districts, it does not exactly reflect the popular vote - indicates that the majority of the enfranchised wanted to give Deák a chance to try to engineer a settlement.²⁹ Podmaniczky noted that 21 members of the House of Representatives were conservatives - these made up the "far right"; 180 of them belonged to the "right-center", the Deák party; 94 of them to Kálmán Tisza's "left-center"; the 20 led by László Böszörményi were the "extreme-left": while a few of them belonged "nowhere". The Transylvanian delegates, after they arrived, served to increase somewhat the Deák party's majority.

The new parliament's societal composition was not very different from that of the 1861 parliament; the number of aristocrats, however, had increased. In 1848, only 6% of the representatives had been aristocrats. By 1861, the ratio was 13.3%; by 1865, it had grown to 16.5%. Thus, while only every 17th member of Hungary's first representative parliament had been an aristocrat, of the parliament which started the nation on the road to compromise, every 6th representatives — a slightly smaller number than in 1861; while the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals together made up barely a fifth of the parliament.³⁰

In this parliament, too, the nationalities' representatives were disproportionately few in number. Even the arrival of the Transylvanian delegates wrought little change in this respect. For the Emperor had taken the conservatives' advice, and had ignored not only Schmerling's voting regulations, but also those provided for by the 1848 Laws. He used the Transylvanian Law 11 of 1791 – one repealed in 1848 – to convoke the Kolozsvár (Cluj) Diet, rounding out its numbers this time with mostly Hungarian imperial appointees. In response to this new twist in the Habsburg's "divide and conquer" policy, some Roumanian politicians led by

²⁸ PN. 1865. Oct. 26, 28, 31, Nov. 18, 21, 23.

²⁹ PN. 1865. Oct. 1, 17, 19. - Kónyi III. pp. 461-467.

³⁰ Podmaniczky III. pp. 235-237. - Ferenczi III. pp. 51-54. - E. Lakatos pp. 29, 49.

Bariţ – who, already in 1860–61, had tried to establish a common front with the Hungarian opposition – proposed to boycott the Diet, and launched an attack on Cardinal Şaguna who continued to preach loyalty to the Emperor. After the Hungarian majority at the Kolozsvár (Cluj) Diet had voted for reunification with Hungary, the Emperor "adjourned" it, ordering that the new elections for the Parliament in Pest be held, and this as stipulated by the 1848 Law.³¹

The majority in the Croatian Sabor stood by the resolution it had passed in 1861, namely, that "in view of the mutual advantages and the necessity thereof, ... it was willing to establish stronger constitutional ties with Hungary, as soon as Hungary ... will have legally recognized its [Croatia's] independence and self-government, as well as its ... de facto and hoped for territories". The last proviso was a reference to Croatia's claims on Dalmatia and the Croatian Military Zone, as well as on Fiume and the Mura triangle. In an effort to reach an agreement on this score, both parliaments delegated a commission to discuss their differences. However, no settlement could be reached. For the Hungarians not only rejected Croatian claims on Fiume and the Mura triangle, but insisted that the Zagreb Sabor send representatives to Pest in recognition of the Hungarian Parliament's legislative jurisdiction over everything outside Croatia's strictly domestic affairs. They also wanted – unsuccessfully – to persuade the Croats to agree to a joint executive at the highest level.³²

The nationalities' delegates to the Hungarian House of Representatives – who altogether comprised only about 10% of that body – wanted first of all to see a reorganized "Committee on the Nationalities" again take up the work that the 1861 dissolution had cut short. They also attempted to have the House recognize the principle that Hungary was inhabited by "a number of nations", and that every constitutional act must be made also in their name and with their participation. All the Hungarian speakers addressing themselves to the issue opposed the motion that the House of Representatives declare itself to speak for "all the country's nations", but there were great differences among the arguments they advanced. Declaring that "There is but one political nation in Hungary", Ferenc Deák simply suggested that serious discussion of the matter be postponed until the debate on the comprehensive settlement of the entire nationalities question. He made sure, however, that this debate would be put off until after the Compromise had already been made.

László Böszörményi, the leader of the "Extreme-Left", at least declared that his party wanted no "Magyar bargain that would even for a moment ignore the fraternal rights of Hungary's other nationalities". "We protest against all attempts to bring about measures detrimental to the other nationalities. What we

³¹ PdÖM. VI/1. pp. 25–29, 31–36, 86–92, 224–225, 233–237. – D. 185. 1865–1572. – PN. 1865. Nov. 23, Dec. 10. – Kónyi III. pp. 476–496. – Bodea-Surdu II. pp. 195–197, 202. – Jordáky pp. 51–69.

³² PdÖM. VI/1 pp. 150–156, 216–223, 238–240, 276–277, 283–286, 297–299. – Kónyi III. pp. 475–476, 640–642. – Ferenczi III. pp. 130–137. – Šidak-Gross-Karaman-Šepić pp. 27–30.

want is democratic liberty, and want absolutely no alliances wherein aristocratic ideas come to predominate." The parliamentary majority, however, was but confirmed by the political aspirations of the nationalities in its willingness to make the Compromise: for bargaining with the Habsburgs seemed a much more certain guarantee of their political predominance than the taking of any joint action with the country's other nationalities.³³

Throughout the first two rounds of the debate on the address lasting to the spring of 1866, the majority Deák party had two chief objectives: the coming into operation of the 1848 Laws; and the appointment of a Hungarian government responsible to Parliament, which then, as wielder of the executive power, could negotiate with Vienna the conditions of the Compromise. The Emperor and his conservative advisors, however, hardly wanted to hear of this. Vienna made the precondition of any change of régime the revision of the 1848 Laws, demanding particularly that the constitutional guarantees against royal absolutism and of national self-determination be curtailed.

Nevertheless, both parties were too far committed to the thought of a settlement for negotiations to break down. On March 1, 1866, on Deák's motion, the House elected a sixty-seven member committee to help define and to work out the matter of "the joint affairs". The committee, in turn, entrusted the handling of all matters of substance to a fifteen member sub-committee presided over by Count Gyula Andrássy, and comprised mostly of members of the Deák party. The majority report of the sub-committee largely reiterated Deák's "May program", but contained also a noteworthy modification suggested by Adrássy, namely, that those delegated to administer joint affairs do their work unencumbered by instructions from the representative bodies that had sent them. "Joint affairs" were, thus, to be even farther removed from the jurisdiction of the parliaments than had been originally planned.

The minority report of the four members of the Center-Left on the subcommittee suggested, among other things, that the sovereign's foreign policy decisions be submitted for countersigning to the Hungarian and Cisleithan ministers at his side – where the matter concerned only one of them, then to the one concerned. As for the sovereign's prerogatives as "supreme commander of the armed forces", the minority report wanted him to be able to exercise them exclusively "with the countersignature of the appropriate ministers of the countries" concerned. They wanted, moreover, the two parliaments to directly supervise the conducting of joint affairs; only when they could not agree was there to be an attempt at mediation. If that, too, should fail, then the decision was to be made by the sovereign. The committee minority's demand for ministerial countersignatures was, indeed, a call for constitutional guarantees; their latter

³³ See especially the debates in the House of Representatives of Feb. 21–23, and April 21, 1866. For the stands quoted, see: KN. I. pp. 262, 303–309, II. 48–49. – *Kónyi* III. pp. 571–572, 651–652. Cf. *Galántai* pp. 92–94. – *Jordáky* pp. 64–65.

suggestion, however, – even had it been accepted – would hardly have served the Tisza group's avowed aim of safeguarding the nation's sovereignty, for even the logical possibility of the sovereign's making the final decision carried within it the threat of an absolutistic administration of "the joint affairs".³⁴

The subcommittee had hardly finished its discussions and the "Committee of 67" ordered the printing of its report, when the war broke out and, on June 26, 1866, the parliament was adjourned. It was Deák who – despite the opposition of most of his party – had agreed that it should be, fearing that a turn in the fighting unfavourable for Vienna would radicalize the House of Representatives.³⁵

As is well known, the war which broke out on June 14, 1866, rekindled the thoughts of Hungary's armed liberation. Kossuth's first move was to revive the Italian alliance, and to establish contact with the Danubian Principalities, where leading politicians not only promised him military bases and armed support, but also gave him some hope of their willingness to accept his plans for a Danubian Confederation. However, Kossuth was also ready to co-operate with Bismarck – provided he gave him adequate guarantees of the desired post-war settlement.

It was György Komáromy, a representative who left the country with the outbreak of war, and Count Tivadar Csáky who actually accepted financial support from Bismarck for the alleged purposes of the long-dispersed secret organization, in many ways thus working against Kossuth. Klapka, too, circumvented Kossuth, and ignored his provisos in making a deal with Bismarck; then, having collected a legion, he pressed on to the Carpathian Mountains. However, Bismarck wanted only to frighten the Habsburgs with the Hungarian Legion. Having won his decisive victory at Königgrätz, he had no intention whatever of dissolving the Habsburg Empire which he hoped to use as an ally in the future. All he wanted was to force it out of the German Confederation. Accordingly, both in the armistice and in the Treaty of Prague which soon followed (Aug. 30, 1866) he was content to have the Habsburgs promise to renounce all attempts at expansionism to the west of their borders.³⁶

All this, however, lent a certain urgency to the making of the compromise. In Vienna, both those in power and those fighting for it gazed dizzily into the abyss to the verge of which the war had brought them. For all their political differences, practically every one of them saw as the precondition of the survival – and future success – of the Empire the concluding of the settlement with "the Magyars". The court and the army thought the agreement to be necessary not only for

³⁴ Kónyi III. pp. 434-437, 503-651. - KVO. V-VI, pp. 1-17. - Ferenczi III. pp. 55-161.

- Wertheimer I. pp. 202-208, 231-250. - Eisenmann pp. 417-421. - Lorant pp. 51-54.

³³ PdÖM. VI/2. pp. 133–134, 148–149. – Kónyi III. pp. 755–763, IV. pp. 5–6. – Ferenczi III. pp. 162–165. – Madarász p. 357.

³⁶ R. 90. I. 4489, 4491, 4535, 4592. - KLI. VI. pp. 105-563, VII. pp. 84-289. - Tanárky pp. 315-346, 412-414. - Gonda pp. 52-64. - Koltay-Kastner pp. 251-265. - Wandruszka, 1966. - Regele, 1967. - L. Lukács 1968. pp. 175-185. - E. Kovács 1968. pp. 232-235.

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consolidation, but also for retaliation. As for the leading politicians of the Austrian-German bourgeoisie and intellectuals, the defeat just suffered made them realize that their long-nurtured hope of acquiring hegemony in Germany had all been vain. With this came the bitter realization that they would never have the backing of a Großdeutsch unit to help them establish their hegemony even within the Empire. It became ever more evident to them that, now that they had been cast out of the German Confederation, they would never have exclusive political preponderance within a predominantly non-German Empire. It was for this reason that, after Königgrätz, even the German nationalist advocates of centralization were eager to come to a power-sharing agreement with the Hungarians: so that at least in the Cisleithan lands they would be certain to retain the political hegemony they could no longer hope to exercise over the Empire as a whole.³⁷

In Hungary, even those truly opposed to compromise with the Habsburgs had now to realize that, although they let it be forced out of Italy and the German Confederation, the Great Powers of Europe desired the Habsburg Empire to remain intact; they could, thus, no longer hope for the international support necessary for the setting up of an independent State of Hungary. All this, however, could not deter those sincerely committed to self-government and to co-operation among all of Hungary's peoples from continuing to fight against the compromise. They were convinced - partially under Kossuth's influence - that a compromise would merely prolong the life of the Empire at the cost of the interests of the nation; save the Empire it could not. Thus, the only acceptable course was staunchly to keep up the demand for independence until the international scene should take a more favourable turn. They were encouraged to stand their ground also by the fact that the war and its aftermath had conspicuously strengthened opposition to the pro-compromise propaganda at all levels of society, particularly among the peasants, the small landowners, and the petite and middle bourgeoisie.

The country's leading politicians, however, were again growing impatient and encouraged Deák to take the first opportunity to have the proposed compromise accepted. But the Tisza and Ghyczy group criticized the majority report of the sub-committee of fifteen, and felt that the time had come to try to engineer a compromise on terms more favourable than those the Deák party had been willing to settle for.³⁸

³⁷ É. Somogyi 1972. pp. 111-130. – É. Somogyi 1976. pp. 129-145, 164-170, 192-198. – Cf. Eisenmann pp. 426-429. – Kónyi IV. pp. 44-45. – Hantsch, 1967. pp. 51-62. – Lorant pp. 55-56.

³⁸ For the variety of the attitudes and views in Hungary, see: D. 185. 1866–1072. – PN. 1866. Aug. 5, 6, 26, Sept. 11. – Erdélyi J. levelezése II. p. 382. – Gyulai P. levelezése p. 537. – Kónyi III. p. 764, IV. pp. 1–4, 9–16, 58–62, 70–71, 74–76. – Tanárky pp. 338–340. – Sashegyi, 1959. pp. 455, 459–463. – Eisenmann p. 429. – L. Lukács pp. 363–367. – Lukács L. 1968. pp. 185–186. – Galántai pp. 97–100.

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THE FINAL POLITICAL CLASHES IN HUNGARY BEFORE THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMPROMISE

Deák made no changes after Königgrätz in the conditions he had worked out for a settlement, arguing that an agreement made under duress was bound not to be a lasting one. And, after the hastily concluded peace, the Court, too, showed little inclination for making further concessions. It stood intransigent throughout a new series of fruitless – and seemingly interminable – discussions, heedless of the growing impatience of Hungary's leading political groups.³⁹ There were ever more voices being raised against the compromise; while those in favour of it urged its conclusion ever more insistently. The strength of both kinds of sentiment was given expression in Parliament which again met on Nov. 19, 1866, and was reflected particularly in the growing hostility of the exchanges between the Deák party and the Center-Left. Tisza, pliantly adapting to the new mood, demanded that Parliament suspend its preliminary discussions of the proposed settlement until constitutionality (meaning primarily the self-government of the municipalities, and the appointing of a responsible government) had been restored. The majority in the House, however, rejected his proposal, regarding Deák's policies as the "golden mean" not only between absolutism and "revolution", but also between Vienna's intransigence and Tisza's "radicalism".⁴⁰ But his efforts were not altogether in vain. For at the December 6 mass demonstration against the compromise, the demonstrators - consisting mostly of university students, and the workers of the Obuda shipyard and the Vidacs factory - cheered Kossuth and celebrated the Center-Left as the champions of the nation's aspirations.⁴¹ Yet, in fact, the Tisza group's parliamentary polemics - an admixture of genuine critical detail and sonorous generalities - in many respects served but to conceal from the people the Extreme-Left's genuinely convincing arguments against a settlement, and Kossuth's own consistent insistence on Hungary's self-determination.

Isolated though he was, at the turn of 1866-67, Kossuth did his best – through smuggled copies of the *Negyvenkilencz*('49)which he published in Italy with Ignác Helfy's help – to speak out "against those individuals, those families and those classes" who would tie Hungary's future to the – as he saw it – mortally ill Habsburg Empire.⁴²

It was not only a "renunciation of rights" that he saw in an agreement based on the planned revision of the 1848 Laws, but also a commitment to keeping alive the Habsburg Empire, a commitment that was incompatible with national self-determination, and would prevent the country from adapting to the exigencies of a changed political scene. It was not, Kossuth continued, with the

³⁹ Kónyi IV. pp. 3-8, 45-58, 62-70. - Ferenczi III. pp. 171-192. - Wertheimer I. pp. 281-284.

⁴⁰ KN. III. pp. 5–130. – Kónyi IV. pp. 80–83, 97–117. – Madarász pp. 358–359. – Ferenczi III. pp. 193–215. – Galántai pp. 102–104.

⁴¹ R. 90. I. 4782. - KLI. VII. pp. 161-164, 170, 174. - Kónyi IV. pp. 118-120.

⁴² KLI. VII. pp. 157-160, 179-182, 277. - Várady I. pp. 225-229. - M. Szakács pp. 124, 131.

"nations" of Cisleithania that the majority Deák party was making a compromise, but with the Habsburgs, who used absolutistic measures to keep these nations from expressing their will.⁴³ The Compromise, he warned, could not prevent the disintegration of the Empire; it could, at best, prolong its existence. But it would make Hungary "an accessory to Austria's crime" of oppressing its neighbour peoples, and of everywhere, inevitably, taking a stand against liberty. "Dualism", he emphasized the end of 1866, "is the alliance of the conservative, reactionary, and only apparently liberal elements in Hungary with those of the Austrian Germans who despise liberty, [an alliance] for the oppression of the other nationalities and races." Kossuth pointed out that the inevitable conflict of the Great Powers would lead to Austria's dissolution. Once the Compromise was made, however, it would not be on the side of its natural allies, the oppressed peoples, that Hungary would fight against Austria, but rather on Austria's side against them.⁴⁴

In a later letter, written for publication during the 1867 discussions on the economic provisions of the Compromise, he uses one of the striking metaphors so characteristic of his style to argue against the illusion that the Habsburgs could safeguard Hungary from any crisis: the Compromise was "not a lightning-rod"; on the contrary, by conjoining the nation's existential problems with those of the Habsburgs, it made destruction inevitable.⁴⁵ If, instead of making allies of their brother nations, the Magyars came to a settlement with the Habsburgs, they would be "isolated from the world, alienated from the interests of those on whom we otherwise could have counted in our hour of need; [the Compromise] will hold in store for us no other glory than that of being the stake upon which the Austrian eagle will be burned – and of ourselves burning. Alliance with the House of Austria is for us not strength, but weakness".⁴⁶ These were Kossuth's prophetic, extraordinarily passionate words the beginning of 1867.

It was not only independence that Kossuth set up against compromise, but also the voluntary union of independent nations against the constrained unity of a dualist state. He was convinced that "It is in closer ties with us that Croatia, and in a protective alliance with us that Roumania, Serbia (and perhaps even Bohemia) would find the most secure guarantees of their independence, [something] of which the balance of power in Europe – rationally conceived of – stands in need".⁴⁷ It is undoubtedly with reference to the views expressed in his plan for a Danubian Confederation that he wrote: "We are called to take the lead in the work whose aim is to establish and to consolidate the powerful forms of liberty, and of the nations' peaceful coexistence... Let every Hungarian have but

43 N. Nos 4-5. p. 28. - KLI. VII. p. 364.

⁴⁴ N. No. 1. p. 7. No. 4–5. p. 32. – KLI. VII. p. 320.

45 Ibid. VIII. 39.

46 Nos. 4-5, p. 31. - KLI. VII. p. 335.

47 No. 4-5. p. 30. - KLI. VII. p. 327.

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one thought: To hasten the annihilation of Austria, and thus establish the confederation of nations, and within it, liberty".⁴⁸ He strongly believed that if Hungary did not sacrifice its interests and did not become the Empire's support through making the Compromise, the outbreak of the new and inevitable crisis looming over Austria would produce a situation conducive to such an alliance of all the Danubian peoples. It was partly so that this possibility might have a chance of becoming a reality that he wrote in the *Negyvenkilenc* during the negotiations preceding the signing of the Compromise: "We do not call on Deák to lead a revolution... we call on him to help the nation keep op an the door to the future."⁴⁹

Kossuth's arguments were echoed in the speeches of some Extreme-Leftist representatives, and in some articles that appeared in the radical Magyar Ujság (Hungarian News) that was finally allowed to publish the spring of 1867 after the first reading of the Compromise Bill. They were put particularly forcefully in János Vajda's articles. Nevertheless, they were powerless to dissuade the parliamentary majority and the forces they represented from their determination to make the Compromise.⁵⁰

The acceleration of the Compromise negotiations at the end of 1866 had as is known well enough - a great deal to do with Baron Beust's becoming part of the Belcredi Government. Beust, who as a Saxon statesman had supported the Habsburgs, and was forced after Königgrätz to leave his native land, won Franz Joseph's confidence, and used his growing influence to bring the Habsburgs into a position to retaliate in Germany as soon as possible. He saw a hasty agreement with Hungary's political leaders as a major precondition of this. After Beust's negotiations with Deák, and even more with Andrássy, Eötvös - who was just as eager to see a settlement – and Lónyay, a secret agreement was reached in early 1867 to engineer the acceptance of the modifications Vienna desired in the report of the sub-committee of fifteen. The modifications included granting the sovereign's absolute disposal over the army; giving the Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs jurisdiction over international trade agreements; and the stipulation that the "voluntary" agreement on matters of trade and commerce between the two partners of the dual state be made at the same time as the agreement fixing their respective shares of the "joint expenses". Deák, who not so long ago had himself been loath to accept them, now persuaded the majority of the Committee of 67 to do so; the minority, members of the Center-Left, however, opposed him, insisting that union between the two halves be but through the sovereign's person.⁵¹

48 No. 1. p. 7. - KLI. VII. p. 323.

49 No. 1. p. 4.

⁵⁰ Magyar Ujság 1867. April 3, 4, 11, 18, May 12, June 22, Aug. 4–10, 14. – Cf. VJPI pp. 93–100, 104–107. – VJÖM. VI. pp. 532–534. Cf. Gy. Szabad 1960/a. p. 141.

⁵¹ Beust II. pp. 67–73. – KVO pp. 24–194. – Kónyi IV. pp. 142–179, 190–297, 381–403. – Ferenczi III. pp. 216–241. – Eisenmann pp. 438–446. – Redlich II. pp. 512–544. – Galántai pp. 109–111. – Lorant pp. 58–61.

At the beginning of February, 1867, after Beust had replaced Belcredi as head of the Viennese government and engaged in further secret negotiations, the Andrássy group promised to make Parliament accept the modifications Franz Joseph wished to see in the 1848 Laws. The most important of these were the sovereign's independence of his ministers' countersignatures in his capacity as "war-lord"; and the weakening of the guarantees to Parliament against its dissolution by the sovereign. On the strength of their promise, on February 17, Count Gyula Andrássy was appointed Prime Minister – Deák, having refused the honour, also nominated him – coming into his office in a way formally coinciding with the program set out by the Hungarian statesmen, that is, before the 1848 Laws had, in fact, been revised.

The Hungarian public celebrating the new government knew little of the preconditions of its assumption of office. And one thing that it was never to know was that at the March 17, 1867 session of the Council of Ministers, Franz Joseph, keeping the Hungarians to the promises exacted before the government was formed, made them accept a secret ruling, one consistently enforced throughout the entire period of Dualism: namely, that over and above the prerogatives explicitly guaranteed the sovereign by the Compromise, he had to give his permission for the Hungarian Government to be able to act on any issue of substance.⁵²

In the spring of 1867, Parliament was finally asked to debate the proposed settlement, whose provisions reflected the principles secretly agreed upon. It was in the course of the general debate on the "proposal on joint affairs" that Deák summed up the arguments supporting the Compromise.⁵³ He declared that a restoration of "the nation's rights" through force of arms had seemed neither desirable, nor possible. To have expected "uncertain events" to bring about more advantageous circumstances "would have been improper, even destructive". Thus, "there was nothing left to do" but "to try to convince the Emperor, and the unprejudiced public of the fact that the restoration of our constitution could be made consonant with the secure endurance of the Empire". Deák took the greatest pains to prove that from the fact - established in the Pragmatic Sanction - that Hungary and the Cisleithan nations have one and the same sovereign there naturally follows that they have some "joint affairs"; and one can but regard it as an advantage that their earlier anarchic state will now give way to precise regulations. He declared that Hungary, surrounded as it was by Great Powers on all sides, could hardly be independent even if the Habsburg Empire should disintegrate; and alliance with any nation would also imply some joint affairs. Deák was, obviously, referring to Kossuth's proposed Danubian Confederation.

53 KN. IV. pp. 108-118. - Kónyi IV. pp. 441-463. - Ferenczi III. pp. 259-263.

⁵² Kónyi IV. pp. 301–321. – Eisenmann pp. 446–455. – Redlich II. pp. 544–571, 826–832. – E. Iványi pp. 21–23, 531–532. – Komjáthy pp. 17–18. – Hanák, 1971. pp. 920–921. – É. Somogyi 1976. pp. 174–175.

But his comments did nothing to dispel the doubts expressed about the manner in which the compromise had been reached, a manner that the substance of the agreement could not help but reflect, and regarding which even Joseph Eötvös, who was so eager to see a settlement, expressed his concern.⁵⁴ It was, however, the academician Áron Szilády, a Presbyterian pastor from Kiskunhalas and a member of the opposition, who gave the most unambiguous expression to these doubts in the House a little before Deák's great speech. The compromise, he declared, was not being made by a "free nation" with other "free nations". The majority report of the Committee of 67, and Parliament's acceptance of it was the price demanded for the appointment of a responsible government; as for the Cisleithanians, they had to accept the report "because otherwise they will not get back their suspended constitution". And Szilády foretold that the Compromise, born under pressure from absolutism, and not as a contract between "free nations", would inevitably become the instrument of absolutism.⁵⁵

Very wisely, Deák did not directly defend the – by contemporary European standards – extraordinarily wide-ranging prerogatives left the sovereign in the new system of government created by the Compromise. Rather, he drew attention to the constitutional elements now restored to Hungary, and guaranteed also to Cisleithania. With a masterly turn, he reminded his audience how sharply he, too, had condemned the "opportunism" with which the conservatives had disregarded the existing laws; nevertheless, he continued, "in the creation of laws, it is precisely opportunism that we cannot do without... Every constitution, every law, every institution came about through opportunism, through suiting the exigencies of the moment, and continues to be expedient only as long as it continues to suit them". However Deák, in his advocacy of Realpolitik, was careful to omit the fact that the system brought about by the Compromise lackedthe guarantee of the self-corrective feature of provisions for constitutional change.

Replying to the protestations that "public opinion" was against the Compromise, Deák rightly pointed out the difficulty of ascertaining what views were, in fact, held; and went on to argue for the unquestionable competence of Parliament independently to decide on any matter at hand: "When the people elected us to be its representatives, it did not do so that we might ask its advice, but so that we might advise it".

But Deák, who so correctly cited the fundamental principles of parliamentarism, failed to address himself to the questionable legality of the 1865 elections, and failed also to take into account the fact that the conditions of the proposed

⁵⁴ In the Deák camp, it was Eötvös who, from the summer of 1865 on, repeatedly protested against the compromise being based not on an agreement between the two parliaments, but on a bargain with the Habsburgs. Cf. EOM. X. pp. 51–63, XVII. pp. 253–254, XX. 128–131, 145–148. – J. Antall pp. 1107–1108. – Gy. Szabad 1971. p. 667. – Bódy pp. 92–93. – É. Somogyi 1973. pp. 902–904. ⁵⁵ KN. IV. pp. 101–104.

settlement were hardly known to the electors who had given his party its parliamentary majority. For not a word had been said in the course of the 1865 elections about revising the 1848 Laws to extend the sovereign's prerogatives; and even the section of Deák's May program discussing joint affairs had not yet been published in Hungary. Thus, László Böszörményi's call for the dissolution of Parliament and a new election was very much in place. He wanted the Andrássy government to hold the election so that "in the interest of the nation's future tranquillity, and the permanence of the decisions taken, another parliament might decide on the extraordinary questions at hand... a parliament whose competence to legislate will rest on the fully restored constitutionality of [political] life, and one which will not be convoked until the people will have had - after 18 years of oppression - the opportunity, through the benefits of civic life and a free press, to become somewhat informed of the extraordinary changes threatening its most cherished interests - changes which it could not even have suspected at the time of the last elections". The majority in the House, however, did not want to face the voters again except to present them with a fait accompli; on Deák's motion, they thus rejected this proposal from the Extreme-Left without as much as a debate.56

When the vote was taken on the "joint affairs" report upon the conclusion of the general debate, the House accepted the report 257 to 117, with 22 abstentions. The Deák party and the conservatives had voted for it; the Center-Left and the Extreme-Left against it. The majority of the nationalities' representatives – who had vainly sought support for their national aspirations – abstained from voting; of the remainder, some supported, some opposed the motion.⁵⁷

A whole series of the municipalities used their newly regained competence to protest against the Compromise, but to no avail; and just as fruitless – for all its enormous impact on the nation – was Kossuth's open letter to Ferenc Deák remonstrating against the agreement that had been made.⁵⁸ For what had been concluded⁵⁹ was a *Compromise* with the nation's rulers, and not a *compact* among the nations of Hungary and of the Empire.

And the Great Powers – who had permitted Hungary's revolutionary struggle against feudalism and absolutism to end in defeat, and then, from 1849 to 1867, denied all genuine support to those Hungarians who sought a democrative alternative – applauded the Compromise that had been made, only so that barely a generation later, they might take the Hungarian nation as a whole to task for having made such a "choice".

56 Ibid. III. pp. 185-193. - K. Ir. II. pp. 58-59. - Kónyi IV. pp. 349-351.

57 KN. IV. pp. 138-139. - Kónyi IV. pp. 465-468.

⁵⁸ Kónyi IV. pp. 490–492, V. pp. 10, 132–136. – KLI. VIII. pp. 3–17. – Wertheimer I. pp. 392–393. – Szabó-Horváth pp. 67–68. – S. Sebestény 1973. pp. 1175–1176.

⁵⁹ An analysis of the development of the system of dualism established by the Compromise is beyond the scope of this study.

ABBREVIATIONS AND PRESSMARKS

ACSR = Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma.

Adresse, 1857. = Eine Adresse der ersten politischen Notabilitäten Ungarns vom Jahre 1857. Leipzig, 1861.

AHJ = Austrian History Yearbok.

AKK = Manuscript Archive of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

- Amtsleben, 1861. = Acht Jahre Amtsleben in Ungarn. Von einem k. k. Stuhlrichter in Disponibilität. (Hrsg. von Gustav Oehme.) Leipzig, 1861.
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- AtSz. = Agrártörténeti Szemle. (Review of Agrarian History)

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Barit, 1974. = George Barit magyar levelezése. (George Barit's Hungarian Correspondence) (Edited by: Ioan Chindris and Ferenc Kovács) Bucharest, 1974.

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 $B_j = (Minutes of the Committee Meeting)$

BML = Archives of the County of Bihar

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- D. 161-163. = A Statthalterei für Ungarn iratai. OL. (Documents of the "Statthalterei für Ungarn" OL.)
 D. 185. = Kancellária: elnöki iratok. OL. (Chancellery: Presidential documents OL.)
 D. 186. = Kancellária: elnöki titkos iratok. OL. (Chancellery: Presidential secret documents OL.)
 D. 189. = Kancellária: általános iratok. OL. (Chancellery: General documents. OL.)
 D. 191. = Helytartótanács: elnöki iratok. OL. (Consilium Locumtenentiale: Presidential documents. OL.)
 D. 192-226. = Helytartótanács: általános iratok. OL. (Consilium Locumtenentiale: General documents. OL.)
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
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